On Aristophanes, Plato, and Socrates

RESPONSE TO HALL
ALLANBLOOM
of Toronto
University

[Plato in the Republic]soughtand made a citymore

to be prayedfor than hoped for . .. not such that
it can possibly be but one in whichit is possible to
see the meaning[ratio] of political things.[Cicero,
Republic II 52]
I am gratefulto ProfessorHall fora numberof reasons,especially
of the
for the seriousnesswithwhichhe has takenmyinterpretation
Republic. That he disagrees with it is secondary.We do agree on
thefundamentalthing:it is ofutmostimportanceto understandPlato.
The issues raised by Hall are enormous,and an adequate response
to his argumentswould requirevolumes,but what we reallydisagree
about is how to read Plato. He asserts that I read my prejudices
into the text. I respondthat he does not pay sufficient
attentionto
the text. In lookingat a fewof his centralcriticisms,I shall attempt
to prove my contentionand show the characteristicerrors of his
approach to the Platonic dialogue.

A UTHOR'S NOTE Hall is quiterightin sayingthatmyinterpretation

oftheRepublicis
derivative
from thatof Leo Strauss. It is thenatureof derivativeworksto be on a lower
levelthanthosefromwhichtheystem.Thereis muchinStrauss'interpretation
thatI have
understood,but thereis also surelymuchthatI havenot understood.I cannotspeakfor
him.In whatfollowsI referonlyto myessay and leave Strauss'to speakfor itself,as he
would certainlyhave wished.
POLITICAL THEORY, Vol.5 No. 3, August1977
Inc.
i 1977Sage Publications,

[3161 POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1977

I
In the firstplace, Hall presupposesthat he knows the Platonic
teachingand reads his understandingof it into the text. Arguing
againstmy contentionthat the best regimeof the Republic is not a
serious proposal, he tells us, "Socrates is explicitthat his polis is
natural."I searchin vain forSocrates'statementto thateffect.Indeed,
I know of no assertion anywherein the Platonic corpus that the
cityis natural or that man is by naturea politicalanimal. Whatever
the ideas may be-and theyare the highestand most elusive theme
and slowlyfromthecommonly
to whichwe mustascend verycarefully
sensed particulars-there is not the slightestindicationthat there
is an idea of the cityor of the best city,as thereis said to be an idea
of the beautifulor an idea of thejust. What the omission means is
debatable,but one mustbeginby recognizingthatit is so. Obviously,
fromthe point of view of the ideas, the naturalnessof the citymust
have a status very differentfromthat of, for example, man. The
kallipoliscannot participatein an idea whichis not. While thereare
manymen and an idea of man, thecitydoes not existas a particular
or as a universal;it is neithersensednor intellected.
Careful observationof what the text says about this question of
naturalnesswould have helped Hall. In his discussion of the three
waves of paradox in Book V, Socrates says (a) the same education
and way of lifeforwomen as formenis possiblebecause it is natural
(456b-c); (b) the communityof women and childrenis not against
nature(466d)-however, now Socrates shiftsthe criterionof possibilityfromnaturalnessto cominginto being (manythingswhichare
not natural,and even against nature,can come into being); (c) the
coincidenceof philosophyand ruleis just that,coincidenceor chance
(473c-d). All the attentionis given to the possibilityof that highly
improbablecoincidence.Cities, let alone the best city,do not come
intobeingas do plantsand animals.Some men are by naturefitboth
to philosophizeand to rulein thecity,butitis notsaid thatit is natural
thattheydo so. Iftheyactuallydo both,thecause is art,humanmaking,
not nature.If I wereto use againstHall the methodshe uses against
me, I would say that,with respectto the naturalnessof the city,he
has read Aristotle'sPolitics, not Plato's Republic. He does not see
thatthe cityis more problematicforPlato than forAristotle.
Justas Hall reads in, he reads out. In tryingto arguethatforPlato
thereis no significantdistinctionbetweenthe theoreticaland the
practicallife,he says thatPlato "does not suggestthatphilosophising

Bloom / RESPONSE TO HALL [317]

and rulingare unrelatedfunctions."Compare thatto the text:"each

of [the philosophers]will go to rulingas a necessaryas opposed
to a good thing... if you discovera lifebetterthan rulingforthose
who are goingto rule,it is possible thatyourwell-governedcitywill
come into being. . . . Have you anotherlife that despises political
officesotherthan that of true philosophy?. . . But men who aren't
lovers of ruling[theylove somethingother:wisdom] mustgo to it"
(521a-b). The philosopherswon't be willingto act [engage in praxis]
(519c). There could be no more radical distinctionmade betweenthe
practicaland theoreticallivesthanthatdrawnin Books V-VII and IX
of the Republic (cf. especially476a-b). The separatenessof the forms
is strongly
asserted,as are thepossibilitiesof a reasonusingonlyforms
withoutadmixtureof the senses and a life lived in contemplation
of the formspurely.This latterlifeis the best life,the onlygood life.
It is preciselythe difference
betweenit and the life of rulingthat is
the artificethatis supposed to make the citywork. Deed and speech
are also radicallydistinguished,
and the latteris said to be absolutely
superior.'I reallyfindit hard to imaginehow Hall is able to say the
thingshe does in the face of the evidenceto thecontrary.I challenge
him to finda singlestatementin the Republic thatindicatesthat the
philosophiclife requiresrulingor that the activityof rulingin any
Whatis striking
waycontributesto philosophizing.2
about theRepublic
is the distance Socrates puts betweenthe theoreticaland practical
lives, a distance belied by thingshe says elsewhereand by his own
life. But that is what he does here,and, as Hall says, "we are accustomed to taking Socrates seriously."There is simplynot a scintilla
ofproofthatthemaking,painting,or"creating"activityofthefounders
of thecityis a partof the philosopherslifeas such. Hall pilesabstraction on abstraction,unrelatedto the text,in orderto constructa case
for the sameness of the two lives, but he has no evidence.The most
striking
aspect ofthelast halfofhis paperis itsalmostentirely
personal
characterand almost total absence of referenceto text. It is true,as
he says, that the potentialphilosophersmust be compelled to leave
thecave as well as returnto it. But once out, theyrecognizehow good
it is to be out. They neversee a reason to go back, and compelling
themto go back is said to be good forthecity,not the philosophers.
If theythoughtit good to go back, theywould notbe good rulers.It is
onlyby goingout thattheybecame aware thatthe kallipolisis a cave,
nay Hades, and to be in it is as to be a shade (516d; 521c; cf. 386c).
In the midstof his complex prestidigitatory
activity,Hall announces
that it is because I am a modernpolitical scientistthat I cannot see

[318] POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1977

that Platonic rulingis really philosophizing.I would like to accept

that testimonialto impress some of my colleagues who have their
doubtsabout thegenuinenessof mycredentialsas a politicalscientist,
the explanation does not work. Again, one must
but unfortunately
look at the text. Rulers, in the best city,provideforfood, clothing,
and shelter,and theylead the soldiersto war. Above all, Hall forgets
the reasons the philosophersare invoked:theyare primarilymatchmakersor eugenicistswho have to spend a great deal of time and
subtletyon devising "throngs of lies and deceptions" designed to
withone another (458dgettherightpeople to have sexual intercourse
460b). Is thata philosophicactivity?
Displayingthe same tendencyto neglectwhat is reallyin the text,
Hall spinsa subtleweb of reasoningsabout a Platonicnotionof happia notion evidently
ness which is franklybeyond my comprehension,
intendedto overcome the tensionsbetweenphilosophyand ruling.
In thiscontexthe insiststhat "Plato, clearly,does not defineeudaimonia in termsof felt satisfaction. . . and the personal happiness
of the philosophersis not his primarydesideratum."Now, the culminationof thewhole dialogue-the judgmentconcerningthehappiness
oftheunjustman versusthatof thejust man,whichwas demandedby
Glaucon at thebeginningof thedialogueand was itsexplicitmotiveconcerns,if I understandwhatHall meansbypersonal happiness,the
personal happiness of the philosopher(576b-588a). The termsof the
comparisonhave been quietlychangedduringthe course of the dialogue fromtheunjustman versusthejust man to thetyrantversusthe
philosopher.Threetestsare made,all threeofwhichare won bythephithe philosophercan get
losopher. The firsttest is self-sufficiency:
the good thingshe desires withoutneedingor dependingon other
menwhilethetyrantlives in fearand is fullofunsatisfiabledesiresbecause of his dependencyon men. The othertwo testsprove thatthe
philosopheris the expertpar excellencein pleasureand thathe experiences the purest and most intensepleasures. Socrates calculates
thatthephilosopher'slifeis 729 timesmorepleasantthanthetyrant's.
Is this not "feltsatisfaction"of a whollypersonalkind? Philosophy
is presentedas choiceworthyon the groundthat it provides permanentlyaccessible pleasures for the individual,and the philosopher
withthecity.
hereis not presentedas rulingor in anywayconcemned
In additionto makingPlato answerhis own questionsratherthan
discoveringwhat Plato's questionsare and distortingthe phenomena
by castinga grayweb of abstractionaround themratherthanletting
themcome to lightin theirfullnessand complexity,Hall moralizes,
not open to the possibilitythatjusticeis not preachedin the Republic

Bloom / RESPONSE TO HALL [3191

but ratherquestioned and investigated.For example, so sure is he

that benefitingone's fellow man is an imperativeof Plato's thought
thathe does not take note of the factthatthecityhas no concernfor
othercities and is even willingto harmand stirup factionsin them,
supportingthe inferiorelements,solely to keep themfromthreateningit. Bestwouldbe isolation,and nextbestis cripplingone's neighbor;
never would it tryto improve them (422a-423a). Since the soul is
said to be like thecity,would not it,too, be concernedonlywithitself?
The vulgar standardsof just conduct to whichthe well-orderedsoul
is said to conformare all negative-things it does not do, such as
stealing,lying,and committingadultery(442e-443a). As was indicated earlyon, Socrates' just man does no harm; he is not said to do
good, to be a benefactor(335d). And the reasonwhythe well-ordered
soul does not do harm becomes clear when it is revealed to be the
philosophicsoul. The philosopher'sabstinencesare not due to good
will, a Kantian "settled and sincere dispositionto behave justly,"
but to a lack of caringforthevulgarthingson whichthevulgarstandards are founded. His passionate love of wisdom makes him
indifferent
to, forexample,money(485d-486b).This is no morepraiseworthythan a eunuch's abstinencefromrape. There is no "moral"
motiveinvolved.3It escapes Hall that of the threeclasses in thecity,
two have no concernfor the common good at all-the artisansare
in it for gain or out of fear,and the philosophersare therebecause
theyare compelled to be-while the dedicated class, the warriors,
are dedicated only because theybelieve in a lie and are deprivedof
any possibilityof privacy.There is, on the evidenceof the Republic,
no enlightened,nonillusionarylove of thecommongood. The virtues
of the warriorsare finallysaid to belong more to the body than to
the soul, to be merehabits(518d-e). The onlyauthenticvirtueis that
of the mindcontemplating
its properobjects.It is not I who Aristotelianize.The Republicis not the Ethics;thereare no moralvirtuesin it.
I have chosento mentionthesepointsbecause theyhelpto illustrate
what is requiredto read a Platonic dialogue; and Plato intendedto
make the requirements
forreadinghimidenticalto thoseforphilosophizing;his littleworld is the preparationforthe big world. In fine,
what is needed is an openness to thingsas theyappear unaided by
the abstractionswhichso impoverishthingsthat theycan no longer
cause surpriseor wonderand a freedomfroma moralismwhichforbids
us to see what in naturedefiesconventionand refusesto console us
in our hopes and fears.

[320] POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1977

II

withHall can be summarizedby sayingthathe does

My difference
not take the formof the dialogue seriously,that he does not begin
whereit fairlycriesout forus to begin,withthe storyor the drama,
withthose picturesof lifeon the basis of whichwe mightgeneralize
about lifeand whichare so muchmoreaccessibleto us thanare "Plato's
an Aristotelianexpresmetaphysics"ortheideas.If I maybe permitted
sion, but one whichis of Platonic inspiration,we must begin from
thethingswhichare firstaccordingto us in orderto ascendto thethings
whichare firstaccordingto nature.We musttalk about shoemakers
and pilots and dogs and such things,the Socratic themesso despised
by his less wise interlocutors.I can appreciate Hall's opinion that
thereis somethingmad in the assertionthat a work of politicalphilosophy which argues that philosophersshould be kings actually
meansthatphilosophersshouldnotbe kingsBut ifwe wereto suppose
fora momentthatthisis not preciselya book of politicalphilosophy,
at least such as we know books of political philosophyto be, but is
a drama at one momentof which one of the charactersmakes an
unusual proposal thatis designedto affectthe action,as are so many
speeches in dramas,then the paradoxical characterof my interpretation disappears. The tale would go roughlyas follows. Socrates
visitsthe Piraeus in the companyof a youngman whom,according
to Xenophon, he is tryingto cure of excessive politicalambitionas
a favorto his brother,Plato (Mem. 111,vi). There theymeeta group
of men among whom is a famous intellectualwho argues thatjustice is abiding by laws set down in the interestof the rulers.It is,
in one's interestto be ruleror, put otherwise,to be a tyrant.
therefore,
asks Socrates
motivatedbymorethanidlecuriosity,
Glaucon,evidently
to show him thatjustice (understoodas concernforequalityor lawall the obvious good things(pleasabidingness)is a good outweighing
ures and honors)whichtyranny(understoodas thepeak of injustice)
can procure. Socrates neverpreciselyshows Glaucon thatjustice as
Glaucon conceivesit is good. Rather,in the course of foundinga city
and, thus, learningthe nature of justice, Socrates introduces,as a
politicalnecessity,the philosophers.Glaucon learnsthatto be a ruler
in the cityhe has foundedhe mustbe a philosopher.Then, whenhe
is shown what philosophyis, he learns that it is the best lifeand is
essentiallyindependentof political life. From the point of view of
philosophy-which Glaucon had not consideredand, thus,had not
consideredas a good thing-the city looks like a cave or a prison.

Bloom / RESPONSE TO HALL [3211

The movementfrom rulerssimplyto philosophic rulersis a stage

in Glaucon's liberationfromthe desireto rule. The dialogue has the
characterof an ascent,like the ascent fromthe cave to the regionof
theideas. At thepeak of thatascentSocratesrevealshimselfto be the
happy man. He does not persuadeGlaucon thathe should not pursue
his own good. He onlymakes himaware ofgoods to whichthetyrant
cannot attain and the pursuitof whichtakes away the temptationto
meddlein politicsand, hence,to be unjustas a tyrantis unjust.At the
end of the comparison betweenthe tyrant'sand the philosopher's
lives,close to the end of his education,Glaucon recognizesthatthe
philosopher'scityexists only in speech,and that no longerdisturbs
him. Socrates tells him it makes no difference
whetherit exists,for
it can exist in the soul and that is enough (592a-b). A man can be
happybeinga good citizenofthecityofphilosophywithoutitsexisting.
Timocratsand timocraticcitiesexist;democratsand democraticcities
exist; tyrantsand tyrannicalcities exist; but, although thereare no
philosophical cities, philosophersexist. The tyrannical man who
does not rule a cityis not fullya tyrant(578b-c); the philosopheris
a philosopherwhetheror not he is a kingin a city.And thereis, at
thisfinalstage, no suggestionthat Glaucon should work to establish
this city or that he should even long for its establishment.Glaucon
has moved fromthe desireto be a rulerto the desire to be a rulerphilosopherto the desireto be a philosopher.The conceitof philosowas thecrucialstagein hisconversion.In thelastwordofthe
pher-kings
Republic, Odysseus-the archetypeof the wise man-cured of love
of honor or ambition and, havingseen all the human possibilities,
chooses the life of a privateman who mindshis own business.The
Socrates' concern for justice, culmiRepublic, while demonstrating
natesin providinga foundationnot forjustice but for moderation.
Hall rightlyconcentrateson thestatement
that"unlessphilosophers
ruleas kingsor thosenow called kings... philosophize... thereis no
restfromills forthecities."That therewillbe no restfromills forthe
cities is the teachingof the Republic,and this is what distinguishes
ancientfrommodernphilosophicalpolitics.Socrates,moreover,does
not suggestthat thereare ills of philosophythat would be cured by
the union of wisdomand politics.The proposal is for the sake of the
city,and not the philosopher.The distinctionmade in the discussion
withThrasymachusbetweenjustice as devotion to a community(be
a meansto an end (35 lc-d;
it band of thieves),whichis onlynecessary,
352c-d),and justice as perfectionof the soul, which is good in itself
(352d-354a),persists throughout.The philosophers' service to the

[322] POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1977

communityis necessary,whiletheirlifeof contemplationon the Isles

of the Blessed is good (540b). The two senses of justice a.e never
resolvedinto a singlecoherentone.
Hall's failureto read the dialogue as a dialogue, his unawareness
of its movement,causes him to give undue weightto isolatedphrases
or passages torn fromtheircontexts. His greatesterroris to take
the discussion of logismos-calculation or deliberation-in Book
IV as providinga definitionof the "natural function"(both words
are Hall's, not Plato's) of reasonratherthanas a provisionalstatement
correspondingto the incompletestage of the argumentand of the
awareness.Followingtheparalleloftherulersinthecity,
interlocutors'
who deliberateabout theaffairsofthecity,reasonfirstcomesto lightin
the Republic as theelementof thesoul whichcalculatesabout thedesires,decidingwhichshould and whichshould not be indulged.This
descriptionis a consequenceoftheanalogybetweencityand soul which
about
is beingpursuedinthediscussion.Whathas firstbeendetermined
thecityis appliedto thesoul (althoughSocratespointsout thatthediscussion is inadequate,435c-d). What we getin Book IV is a plausible
akinto
accountof reason'sactivityin theaffairsofdailylife,an activity
thatof rulerswho deliberateabout publicaffairs,one thatsupportsthe
viewthatmanand cityare in perfectharmony.But aftertheemergence
accountoftherationalpart
ofphilosophyin Book V, a totallydifferent
of the soul is given,one whichshowsthattheparallelbetweencityand
soul breaksdown.The highestreachesofthesoul are said to longonly
to see what is (437c-487a;509c-51le; 514a-518b;532a-534d).Deliberation or calculation(logismos),whichwas the onlyattributeof therational partof thesoul givenin Book IV, is no longereven mentioned.
The oppositionbetweendesireand calculationwhichwas thedefining
characteristic
of calculationin theearlierpassage is overcomeand philosophyis describedas a formof eros(485c; 499b). The contemplative
fromthedelibdifferent
activityofthesoul is simplysomethingentirely
is
Such
contemplation
a
city
(533b).
erativeactivityof a rulingclass in
What
no
for
it.
as
a
to
the
rulers'
and
organ
they
possess
body
alien
ends,
thesoul reallyis is botha revelationand a surprisein Book V, and its
The philosophicpart
almost accidentaldiscoverychangeseverything.
ofthesoul has no use foraction,and deliberationis notpartofitsfunction(527d-528e);it does not calculate.One mustlook to thedifference
ofthisdevelbetweenlogismosand nous to appreciatethesignificance
opment.Logismosis foraction;nous is foritself.The rulersofthecity
are highestbecause theyare mostusefulto the cityand its nonphilosophicends. Reason in the soul is highestbecause it is the end of man

Bloom / RESPONSE TO HALL (3231

and should be the end of the city.Unless ones reads the Republicas
a drama, one does not see thatit has a reversaland a discovery,that
thereis a peripety.Platonic books are closer in formto dramas than
to treatises.

III
I have put offuntilthe end discussionof what is onlya subsidiary
part of Halrs criticism-whathe says about Plato's relationto Aristophanes. But this issue seems to me centralto our differences.
The
elusive texture of Platonic thought-so differentfrom our owncan, I believe, only be approached when one becomes aware of its
peculiar combinationof what we take to be poetryand philosophy.
Or, putotherwise,Platonicphilosophyis poetic,notmerelystylistically
but at its intellectualcore, not because Plato is not fullydedicated
to reason, but because poetrypoints to problems for reason that
unpoetic earlierand later philosophydo not see and because poetic
imaginationproperlyunderstoodis partofreason.The Socratesofthe
Clouds-an account of the earlySocrates substantiallyconfirmedby
the Platonic Socrates (Phaedo 96a ff.)- was unpoetic,and thishad
somethingto do with his incapacityto understandpolitical things.
The Platonic Socrates can in some sense be understoodas a response
to the AristophanicSocrates,or, more stronglystated,Socrates may
have learned somethingfrom Aristophanes.The Republic, in one
of its guises, is the proofthat philosophersare not unpolitical(and
it must not be forgottenthat,accordingto all serious testimony,in
particularthatof Aristotleand Cicero,therewas no politicalphilosophy prior to Socrates), that theyknow the political thingsbest and
are most necessaryfor politics. Socrates, who in the Clouds stands
aside, is neutral,in thedisputebetweenthejustand theunjustspeeches,
in the Republic-in a referencewhich is clearlyto Aristophanespresentshimselfas an unconditionalpartnerof thejustspeech(Clouds.
896-7; Republic, 368b-c). And in the Symposium Aristophanesis
Socrates' only seriouscompetitorin the contestforthe best praiseof
eros: only thesetwo have some inklingof whateros reallyis. Socrates
the philosopher shows that his valid interlocutoris Aristophanes
the comic poet, and that he is Aristophanes'superiorin politicsand
erotics.Until we can take Aristophanesseriouslyand Plato comically
we shall not understandeither.It is onlyour stiffpedantrythatcauses
us to ignore Plato's countlessallusionsto Aristophanes.For us aca-

[324] POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1977

demics they simplycannot be important.ProfessorPlato musttalk

onlyto his fellowprofessors.My responseis thatwe mustlook where
Plato tellsus to look and not wherewe thinkwe should look.
Now Hall says he sees nothingfunnyin Book V. My assertionthat
thereis somethingridiculousabout the two sexes exercisingnaked
togetheris tossed off lightlyby Hall by referenceto a passage in
Xenophon which does not exist. Hall reallymeans Plutarch,and a
glanceat the appropriatepassage will proveto himthatboysand girls
failsto underin Sparta did not exercisenaked together.He, further,
standme.I knowthattherewas homosexualityin Greece.WhatI meant
is that a legislatorcan consistentlyforbidhomosexual relationsand
condemn the attractionsconnected with them (as did the Athenian
and Spartan legislators),but he cannot do the same forheterosexual
relations.Socrates explicitlysays that those who exercisenaked together,because they do so, will be sexually drawn to one another
(458c-d). Senses of humor, I am aware, do differ,but imagination
suggeststhat the externalsigns of those attractionson the playing
fieldsmightprovidesome inspirationfortastelesswits.
Similarly,Hall saysthatSocratesdoes notappeal to absurdpremises
whichgivesme
in Book V. I do not thinkit is just myethnocentrism
the impressionthat it is absurd for Socrates to found his argument
on the assertionthat the differencebetweenmale and femaleis no
more to be taken into account than the one betweenbald men and
men withhair.
about theRepublic'sdebtto theEcclesiBut,to speak meaningfully
azusae, we mustsay a few words about the meaningof that play. I
shall not enterintothe discussionas to whetherSocratesreallyrefers
to Aristophanes'play. It is too evidentto need discussion,and only
lack of attentionor the desire to quibble could cause one to deny
therelation.To supportthedenial one has to inventschoolsofthought
the existenceof whichhas no basis in historicalfact,or to invertall
probabilitiesbased on dates as well as capriciouslyto neglectthe
text. Socrates calls his new projectsthefemale drama (451b-c), just
as Aristophanes'play is his female drama par excellence. Socrates
speaksrepeatedlyofcomedyand laughterwithrespectto hisproposals
(e.g., 452a-b; 473c; 518a-b). One need only compare Praxagora's
plan withSocrates'own speech
speechputtingforthherrevolutionary
to see the greatsimilaritiesin tone and content(Ecclesiazusae, 583709; Republic, 458-466a). There are several quotes fromthe Ecclesiazusae in the Republic,two of whichI shall mentionin whatfollows.
It behoovesus to followthesimpleprocedureofseeingwhatthismeans

Bloom/ RESPONSE TO HALL[3251

anon the basis of the evidencepresentedto us insteadof fabricating

cientbeliefsabout whichwe knownothingto explain whatwe havenot
yetunderstood.The Ecclesiazusae and theRepublicbothshowfemale
rulerswho establishtotal communism,i.e., communismof property
and women and children.They are the only writingswhicheverpresentedthisparticularcombination.The writerof the Ecclesiazusaeis
deemedworthyofa responsein boththeApologyand theSymposium.
Whynot in the Republic?It is improbablethat the responseis in the
reversedirectionbecause all of Aristophanes'mentionsof Socrates
are as an unpoetic,unpolitical,uneroticman,whereasPlato's Socrates
is always counteringthose charges.
So let us look at the Ecclesiazusae. Hall tellsus that"forAristophanes' satire of such social arrangementsto have had point, others
musthave recommendedthemquite seriously."On the basis of such
reasoningwe would be forcedto say thatsomeonemusthave seriously
proposedthatthe birdsbe made gods or thata dung beetlebe used to
getto heavenand bringback Peace forAristophanesto have invented
such conceits. Why should these schemesnot have been among the
imaginativepoetic noveltieson which Aristophanesprided himself?
Surely the hilarious schemes which animate every comedy of Aristophanes ridicule, or show the ridiculous aspect of, something
important.But the explicitprojectof the heroes does not revealthe
intendedobject; it must be sought in an understandingof theeffect
of the play as a whole. In the Ecclesiazusae,the point is reallyquite
clear: Aristophanes extends the principleof Athenian democracy
to the extremeand shows that it is absurd, and therebyshows the
limits,or the problem,of that regime.Athensis ridiculed,not some
anonymous political projector.The Athenianswant equality or to
abolish the distinctionbetween rich and poor, have and have-not.
Athensis in trouble,and it is popularlythoughtthat salvationcan
be achieved only by reformswhich realize the goals of its popular
regime.New rulers,women, propose communism,the utterdestruction of privacy,in order to insurededicationto the common good
and allow all to shareequally in all good things,in orderto makethe
and satisfies
cityone. This will be a citywhichcomprehendseverything
all humanlongings.Praxagora's reformis subjectedto searchingcriticismin two greatscenes:(a) Chremesingood faithgivesall hisproperty
clearthatothermenwillnot. He appears
to thecitywhenit is perfectly
as a decentfool because therootsofprivatepropertygo too deep to be

[3261 POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1977

wouldseemto be necessary
tornout. Hence, inequalityand selfishness
concomitantsofanypoliticalorder.(b) A beautifulyoungmanis forced
witha successionofuglyold hags.This is the
to have sexual intercourse
reformconnecapplicationofthemostradical,butalso mostnecessary,
tedwithcommunism.Whatseemsto be mostprivateand mostunequal
by naturemustbecome subject to the public sector,or therewill be
have-notsin themostextremeand importantsense,and theyoungand
the beautifulwill have profoundreservationsin theircommitment
uglyscene lays bare
to civilsociety.This powerfuland unsurpassedly
of
the absurdityof tryingto make politicstotal, tryingto make an
of all thatis rare,special,and splendid,of allowing
equal distribution
or
transcendthepoliticalorder.It revealsthetension
to
escape
nothing
betweenphysisand nomos, natureand civilsociety.By hypothesizing
a perfectsocial union, Aristophaneslets his audience see for itself
thatit would be a hell,thatsome thingsmustremainprivateand that
men must accept the inconsistenciesof a communitywhich leaves
much to privacy.The actualizationof the Atheniangoal is not to be
desired.
Socrates adopts the premiseof the Ecclesiazusae:forthereto be a
mustbe made public;above all theremustbe a
everything
community,
communityof womenand children.In a passagethatis all buta direct
quote fromthe Ecclesiazusae (461c-d; Ecclesiazusae,634-9), Glaucon
asks how thecitizenswould recognzietheirclose kin,to whichSocrates
responds,as did Praxagora, thattheywill not. Neitherof thesegreat
reformersis worriedabout incest,the prohibitionagainst which is
most sacred and seems to be the backbone of both familyand city.
indeed.
Theirreformis far-reaching
But this defianceof nomos in Plato's picturedoes not turnout to
conclude that Plato
be ugly or ridiculous,and we should therefore
character
thoughtAristophanesto be wrong about the intransigent
of perfectcommunismand the transpolitof nomos, theimpossibility
to philosophymade himmiss
ical natureoferos.Aristophanes'hostility
the crucial point: philosophers,those consummateliars,could make
it all work. Because he did not understandphilosophy,Aristophanes
thoughtthe politicalproblemto be insoluble.The focus of the issue
forboth Praxagora and Socrates is sexual affairs,and Socrates acts
as thoughhe can handlethemas Praxagoracould not. Uselessphilosophy proves to be most useful. Socrates as the replacementfor

Bloom / RESPONSE TO HALL [3271

Praxagora to turn failureinto success is the Platonic improvement

on Aristophanes'femaledrama.
Now it mustbe notedthatSocrates is not introducingsome grave,
ponderousscholaras ruler.Philosophersas typeswereas yetessentially
unknownand hardlyrespectable.The publicmodel ofthephilosopher
is thatsillylittlefellowin thebasketwho makes shoes forgnatsin the
Clouds. Socrates dares to say thathe is theperfectruler.The comedy
consists partlyin Socrates' bringingtogethertwo of Aristophanes'
plays,the Clouds and theEcclesiazusae,usingtheridiculouscharacter
of theone to solvetheridiculousproblemoftheother.The philosophers
will see to it thatthe beautifulsleep withthe uglyforthe publicgood
and do so withoutdisorderor dissatisfaction.
So all is well.But now Socratesadds hisscene,akin to thoseofAristophanes. We get a glimpseof the relationof the philosopherto the
multitude.Socrates followsAristophanes'procedure. He makes the
proposal and thenletshis audience see it in action,lettingthemjudge
its actualization for themselves.Socrates uses the same language
about the philosopher'srelationto the multitudethat one of the old
hags uses to thebeautifulyoungman: theirintercourseis a Diomedean
necessity(Ecclesiazusae, 1028-1029;Republic,493c-494a). The multitude can neverknow or properlyuse the beautiful,but it will make
the beautifulits slave. Aristopahnes'comic scene is repeatedon a
higherlevel. The impossibleand undesirablethingis theforcedintercourse of philosophy and the city. The city, which once looked
beautiful,has become ugly,and itcompelswhathas now come to light
as thetrulybeautiful.Hag is to boy as cityis to philosopher.The privibetweenAristophanes
leged eros is philosophiceros. The differences
and Socrates have to do with the old war betweenphilosophyand
poetry,and herewe can do no morethanmentionit and pointout that
it is what we muststudy.They agree about the limitsof thecitywith
respectto the highestthings.Socratesuses Aristophanes'mad conceits
to highlight
bothofthesepoints.The politicalresultoftheinquiryofthe
Republic is revealedin the Laws, Plato's discussionof an actualizable
regime.There thefundamental
compromiseis made: privateproperty
is accepted. It followsimmediately
thatgentlemen,not philosophers,
rule, that women are educated differently
and lead very different
lives frommen,and thatthe familyis retained.
Anotherperspectiveon thesimilaritiesof the reformsof Praxagora
and Socrates is to be foundin adoptingthepointof viewofthefound-

[3281 POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1977

ers. The question cui bono can be usefullyposed about foundlingsas

wellas about crimes.In thecase of Praxagora,itis clearthatherwhole
institution
is an elaborate device to profither.She is a youngwoman
marriedto an old man. To satisfyher naturallongingsshe has in the
old orderto commitadultery,to breakthelaw. Underthenewdispenan old man-which Praxagora
sationa youngwomanwho sleeps-with
alreadydoes-has the rightto make loveto a youngman. Praxagora's
desires have, thus, become legitimate.Similarly,Socrates, in the
Apology,says thathe deservesto be fedat publicexpensein the prytaneumlike the Olympicvictors(Apology,36c-e; Republic,465c-d).
The Republic
is an outlineoftheonlyregimewherehe would be guarandomestic
teeddinnerin theprytaneumand be deliveredofhispersistent
problems;or, to put it less poetically,thisis theonlyregimein which
philosophywould be respected.Philosophy,like adultery,is illegal
in Athens,forthe philosophersdo not believein the gods of the city
and corruptthe young.In the kallipolisphilosophywould no longer
be a crime; the farmerswould produce food for the philosophers
and theauxiliarieswould protectthem.Praxagora and Socrates both
attemptto make theirprofoundestlongingslegal. In order to do so
theyhave to makereforms
so sweepingas todenytheessentialdemands
of politicallife(e.g., the prohibitionagainstincest).Thereis no regime
whichcan servethem,and theymustcontinueto make do as criminals.
Now, what precedesis nothingbut a seriesof hints.An adequate
articulationof the issues involved in Socrates' playfulcompetition
withAristophanesis theworkof a lifetime.
The real questionswillonly
come to lightby looking at the texts in full consciousness that we
do not now know what the real questionsare, let alone the answers
to them. Plato's way is to thinkabout the seeminglytrivialor outrageous proposals of a Praxagora. We mustimitatethat way if we
are to understandnot onlyancientthoughtbut the permanenthuman
problems,problemsno longerquite visibleto us.

CONCLUSION
My differenceswith Hall come down to whetherphilosopherkingis a compoundformula,joining twodistinctactivitiesand, thus,
violatingthe rule of justice, one man-onejob, as I insist,or whether
philosopherand kingare two wordsforthesame thing,as Hall insists.

Bloom / RESPONSE TO HALL [329]

I believe Hall produces no evidence for his belief. Socrates' irony,

whichhe claims I invokeas a deus ex machina, is to be foundin the
relationof his speechesto his deeds and his treatmentof his various
companions. It is presentto everyeye,and only by lookingtheother
way can the problemsI say need explaining be ignored or denied.
As I ponderedwhatseparatesme fromHall, I came to the conclusion
that he misunderstandshow political I take Socrates to be and how
much attentionI thinkhe paid to particulars(as opposed to ideas).
In other words, he does not pay attentionto what I say about the
cave or to the cave itself.The philosopher,of course, begins,as do
all men, in the cave; and, to go Hall one better,he pays the strictest
attentionnot onlyto particularor individualthingsbut to theirshadbetweenhimand othermenis thathe learnsthat
ows. But thedifference
theyare only shadows-shadows whichgive us access to the truthwhereastheybelievethe shadows are the real thingsand are passionately committedto that belief.That is what cave-dwellingmeans.
The cave must always remaincave, so the philosopheris the enemy
of the prisoners since he cannot take the nonphilosopher'smost
cherishedbeliefs seriously.Similarly,Socrates does care for other
men,but only to the extentthatthey,too, are capable of philosophy,
whichonly a few are. This is an essentialand qualitativedifference,
one that cannot be bridgedand that causes fundamentaldifferences
of interest.Only theyare capable of true virtue(518b-519b). To the
extentthat the philosopherturnssome men to the light,he robs the
cave-dwellersof allies. It is not because he lives in the sun, out of the
cave, that I say the philosopheris at tensionwiththecity;his problem
is due preciselyto the factthe he is in it, but in a way different
from
thatof othermen. This, however,should be the themeforan ongoing
discussion. I only hope that it is clear that Hall's criticismhas not
settledthe issue.

NOTES
1. 471e-473b;475d-480a;485a-b; 510a-51Id; 514a-519c;532a-b; 540a-b. Plato surely
makesa distinctionbetweenthepracticaland theoreticallives. Hall onlyintroducesa red
herringwhen he says I took thedistinctionfromAristotle.There is a difference
between
themconcerningthe distinctionbetweenphronesisand sophia, but that is irrelevant
here.EverythingI said was based on Plato. Hall, on the otherhand,comes dangerously
close to sayingthat knowingis making,a view to be found only in modernthought.

[3301 POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1977

2. The statementat 497a, an intermediary
stagein thediscussionof philosophyand
thecity,need meannothingmorethanthatthephilosopherwouldfindmoreencouragementin such a citythanelsewhere.Cf. 528b-c.
3. At 487a justiceappearsin thelistofvirtuesbelongingto thephilosopher.By536a it
has dropped out.
Allan Bloom is Professorof Political Science at the Universityof Toronto.
Amonghis worksare Shakespeare'sPoliticsanda translationof Plato's Republic
withcommentary.