(1) AZNAR vs GARCIA

7 SCRA 95
Facts:
Edward Christensen is a citizen of the State of California and
domiciled in the Philippines. He executed in his will
acknowledging his natural daughter Maria Lucy Christensen
as sole heir but left a legacy of some money in favor of
Helen Christensen Garcia who is declared by the Supreme
Court in its decision as acknowledged natural daughter of
Edward C. Counsel of Helen asserts that her claim must be
increased in view of the successional rights of illegitimate
children under Phil. law. Counsel of Maria insists that Art. 16
(2) provides that the NATIONAL LAW OF THE PERSON
applies in intestate and testamentary successions and since
Edward C. is a citizen of CA, its law should be applied. Lower
court ruled that CA law should be applied thus this petition
for review.

The SC reversed the lower courts decision and remanded

the case back to it for decision with an instruction that
partition be made applying the Philippine law.

SYLLABUS

1. PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW; DETERMINATION

OF CITIZENSHIP; U.S. CITIZENSHIP NOT LOST BY
STAY IN PHILIPPINES BEFORE INDEPENDENCE.
The citizenship that the deceased acquired in California
when he resided there from 1904 to 1913 was never lost by
his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory of the
United States until 1946, and the deceased appears to have
considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that
when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a
citizen of that State; so that he appears never intended to
abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another.

Issue:
What law should be applicable Philippine or California Law?
Ruling:
The court refers to Art. 16 (2) providing that intestate and
testamentary successions with respect to order of succession
and amt. of successional right is regulated by the NATIONAL
LAW OF THE PERSON.
California Probate Code provides that a testator may dispose
of his property in the form and manner he desires.
Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California provides that if no law
on the contrary, the place where the personal property is
situated is deemed to follow the person of its owner and is
governed by the LAW OF HIS DOMICILE.
These provisions are cases when the Doctrine of Renvoi may
be applied where the question of validity of the testamentary
provision in question is referred back to the decedents
domicile the Philippines.
S.C. noted the California law provides 2 sets of laws for its
citizens: One for residents therein as provided by the CA
Probate Code and another for citizens domiciled in other
countries as provided by Art. 946 of the Civil Code of
California.
The conflicts of law rule in CA (Art. 946) authorize the return
of question of law to the testators domicile. The court must
apply its own rule in the Philippines as directed in the
conflicts of law rule in CA, otherwise the case/issue will not
be resolved if the issue is referred back and forth between 2
states.

2. ID.; VALIDITY OF TESTAMENTARY PROVISIONS;

MEANING OF "NATIONAL LAW" IN ARTICLE 16,
CIVIL CODE; CONFLICT OF LAW RULES IN
CALIFORNIA TO BE APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. The
"national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot
possibly apply to any general American law, because there is
no such law governing the validity of testamentary
provisions in the United States, each state of the union
having its own private law applicable to its citizen only and
in force only within the state. It can therefore refer to no
other than the private law of the state of which the decedent
was a citizen. In the case at bar, the State of California,
prescribes two sets of laws for its citizens, an internal law for
its citizens domiciled in other jurisdiction. Hence, reason
demands that the California conflict of law rules should be
applied in this jurisdiction in the case at bar.
3. ID.; ID.; DOMICILE; FACTORS CONSIDERED IN
DETERMINING
ALIENS
DOMICILE
IN
THE
PHILIPPINES. An American citizen who was born in
New York, migrated to California, resided there for nine
years, came to the Philippine in 1913, and very rarely
returned to California and only for short visits, and who
appears to have never owned or acquired a home or
properties in that state, shall be considered to have his
domicile in the Philippines.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE OF RESORTING TO THE LAW OF
THE DOMICILE IN DETERMINING MATTERS WITH
FOREIGN ELEMENT INVOLVED. The rule laid down of
resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of
matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the
general principle of American law that the domiciliary law
should govern in most matters or rights which follow the
person
of
the
owner.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; COURT OF DOMICILE BOUND TO
APPLY ITS OWN LAW AS DIRECTED IN THE

CONFLICT OF LAWS

A G U S T I N, E. P.

CONFLICT OF LAW RULE OF DECEDENTS STATE;

APPLICATION OF THE RENVOI DOCTRINE. The
conflict of law rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code,
refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in
California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the
case at bar. The court of domicile can not and should refer
the case back to California, as such action would leave the
issue incapable of determination, because the case will then
be tossed back and forth between the two states. If the
question has to be decided, the Philippine court must apply
its own law as the Philippines was the domicile of the
decedent, as directed in the conflict of law rule of the state
of the decedent, California, and especially because the
internal law of California provides no legitime for natural
children, while the Philippine law (Articles 887 (4) and 894,
Civil Code of the Philippines) makes natural children legally
acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PHILIPPINE LAW TO BE
APPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. As the domicile of the
deceased, who was a citizen of California, was the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving
his acknowledge natural child of the latters legacy, should
be governed by the Philippine law, pursuant to Article 946 of
the Civil Code of California, not by the law of California.

(2) BELLIS vs. BELLIS

SUBJECT MATTER: Validity of Foreign Wills/Renvoi
Doctrine
FACTS
Mr. Bellis was a citizen and resident of Texas at the
time of his death. He had five (5) legitimate children with his
first wife, Mary Mallen, whom he divorced. He had three (3)
legitimate daughters with his second wife, Violet, who
survived him, and another three (3) illegitimate children with
another woman. Before he died, he executed two (2) wills,
disposing of his Texas properties, the other disposing his
Philippine properties. In both wills, he recognized his
illegitimate children but they were not given anything. Under
Texas law, there are no compulsory heirs or legitime
reserved to illegitimate children.
Naturally, the illegitimate children, Maria Cristina and
Merriam Palma, opposed the wills on the ground that they
were deprived of their legitime as illegitimate children. Under
Philippine law, they are entitled to inherit even if they are
illegitimate children. They claim that Philippine law should be
applied.
ISSUE
What law should be applied, the Philippine law or
the Texas law? May the illegitimate daughters inherit?
HELD
What applies is the Texas law. Mr. Bellis is a national and
domicile of Texas at the time of his death. Hence, both the
intrinsic validity of the will (substance or successional rights)

CONFLICT OF LAWS

and the extrinsic validity (forms of the will) are governed by

Texas law. Since under Texas law, the decedent may
dispose of his property as he wishes, the Will should be
respected. The illegitimate daughters are not entitled to any
legitime.
Assuming that Texas law is in conflict of law rule providing
that the domiciliary system (law of domicile) should govern,
the same should not result in a reference back (renvoi) to
the Philippine law since Mr. Bellis was both a national and
domicile of Texas at the time of his death. Nonetheless, if
Texas law has a conflict rule, renvoi would not arise, since
the properties covered by the second will are found in the
Philippines. The renvoi doctrine applied in the case of Aznar
v. Garcia cannot be applied since said doctrine is pertinent
where the decedent is a national of one country and
domiciliary of another country. Moreover, it has been
pointed out that the decedent executed two (2) wills- one to
govern his Texas properties and the other his Philippine
estate; the latter being the basis of the argument of
illegitimate children that he intended Philippine law to
govern. Assuming that such was the intention of the
decedent in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not
alter the law. As rule in Miciano v. Brimo, a provision of
foreigners will to the effect that his properties shall be
distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with
the national law, is illegal and void, for his national law
cannot be ignored.

(3) MICIANO vs. BRIMO

FACTS: A will of an American testator provided that his
estate should be disposed of in accordance with the
Philippine law. The testator further provided that whoever
would oppose his wishes that his estate should be
distributed in accordance with Philippine laws would forfeit
their inheritance.
SYLLABUS
1. FOREIGN LAWS; PRESUMPTION. In the absence of
evidence to the contrary foreign laws on a particular subject
are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines.
(Lim and Lim v. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
2. POSTPONEMENT OF PROCEEDING; DISCRETION.
It is discretionary on the part of the court to postpone or
not to postpone a particular proceeding in a case, and when
the person applying for it has already been given ample
opportunity to present the evidence that he wishes to
introduce, the court commits no abuse of discretion in
denying it.
3.
SUCCESSIONS;
CONDITIONAL
LEGACY;
CONDITION CONTRARY TO LAW; NULLITY OF.
If the condition imposed upon the legatee is that he
respect the testators order that his property be distributed

A G U S T I N, E. P.

in accordance with the laws of the Philippines and not in

accordance with the laws of his nation, said condition is
illegal, because, according to article 10 of the Civil Code,
said laws govern his testamentary disposition, and, being
illegal, shall be considered unwritten, thus making the
institution unconditional.

(4) DE JESUS VS. SYQUAI

Plaintiff Antonia Loanco-De Jesus worked as a cashier for a
barber shop of which defendant Cesar Syquia, an unmarried
man from a prominent family, was accustomed to get his
haircut. The two became acquainted and developed an
amorous relationship which resulted to Antonia getting
pregnant and giving birth to a baby boy on June 17, 1931.
During the early months of Antonias pregnancy, defendant
was a constant visitor at her home, and in February 1931,
he handed Antonia a letter which was addressed to the
priest who was to christen the baby acknowledging that the
baby is his and that it be christened in his name.
Defendant showed paternal interest in the situation that
even when he was abroad, he continued to write to Antonia
cautioning her to take care of herself so that junior would
be strong.
After giving birth, Syquia took Antonia and the child in his
house where they lived together in regular family style with
all household expenses paid for by Syquia. When Antonia
showed signs of a second pregnancy, Syquia left her and
thereafter married another woman.
During the christening of the child, the defendant caused the
child to be given the name Ismael Loanco instead of the
originally planned Cesar Syquia, Jr.
RULING:
The first question that is presented in the case is whether
the note to the padre, quoted above, in connection with the
letters written by the defendant to the mother during
pregnancy, proves an acknowledgment of paternity, within
the meaning of subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code.
Upon this point we have no hesitancy in holding that the
acknowledgment thus show is sufficient. It is a universal rule
of jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived,
becomes a bearer of legal rights and capable of being dealt
with as a living person. The fact that it is as yet unborn is no
impediment to the acquisition of rights. The problem here
presented of the recognition of an unborn child is really not
different from that presented in the ordinary case of the
recognition of a child already born and bearing a specific
name. Only the means and resources of identification are
different. Even a bequest to a living child requires oral
evidence to connect the particular individual intended with
the name used.

CONFLICT OF LAWS

(5) CONTINENTAL STEEL V. MONTAO

G.R. No. 182836 October 13, 2009

Doctrines:

Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not

acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a
child inside the womb already has life.
In case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision
affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor.
Facts:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel
Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) filed a claim
for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and
Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
The claim was based on the death of Hortillanos unborn
child. Hortillanos wife had a premature delivery while she
was in the 38th week of pregnancy. The female fetus died
during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental
insufficiency.
Petitioner immediately granted Hortillanos claim for
paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave
and other death benefits.
It was maintained by Hortillano, through the Labor Union,
that the provisions of the CBA did not specifically state that
the dependent should have first been born alive or must
have acquired juridical personality so that his/her
subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death
benefits.
Petitioner argued that the express provision of the CBA did
not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus,
without legal personality. It claimed that there are two
elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1)
death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which
existed in Hortillanos case. Continental Steel contended that
only one with civil personality could die, relying on Articles
40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code which provides:
Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived
child shall be considered born for all purposes that are
favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions
specified in the following article.
Article 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if
it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the
mothers womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine
life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it
dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery
from the maternal womb.
Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The
effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the
deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will.
Hence according to the petitioner, the unborn child never
died because it never acquired juridical personality.

A G U S T I N, E. P.

Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel

reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of
delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent
could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical
personality.
Labor arbiter Montao argued that the fetus had the right to
be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she
was conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support;
he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself
without the power or aid of someone else, specifically,
his/her mother.

resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice policy.

(Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199
SCRA 265 (1991)])
Bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to
an employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief
of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of
a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents grief and
sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child,
who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but
died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose
child was born alive but died subsequently.

Petitioner appealed with the CA, who affirmed the Labor

Arbiters resolution. Hence this petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not only one with juridical personality can die
2. Whether or not a fetus can be considered as a dependent
3. Whether or not any ambiguity in CBA provisions shall be
settled in favor of the employee
Held:
1. No. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41
and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is
misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child
acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41
defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly
states that civil personality is extinguished by death. The
issue of civil personality is not relevant in this case.
The above provisions of the Civil Code do not provide at all a
definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly
provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death,
it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired
juridical personality could die.
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not
acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a
child inside the womb already has life.
No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the
unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally
with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life,
then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being
delivered, qualifies as death.
2. Yes. Even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents.
Hortillanos child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its
gestational life without depending upon its mother,
Hortillanos wife, for sustenance. The CBA did not provide a
qualification for the child dependent, such that the child
must have been born or must have acquired civil personality.
Without such qualification, then child shall be understood in
its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in
the mothers womb.
3. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating
that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or
provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor
of labor. In the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions
should be interpreted in favor of labor. As decided by this
Court, any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be

CONFLICT OF LAWS

(6) GELUZ VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961
Facts:
The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance
of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo, the husband of Nita
Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician.
Lazos cuase of action was the third and last abortion of his
wife to the said doctor.
The wife aborted the first baby before they were legally
married. She had herself aborted again by the defendant in
October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became
pregnant and was aborted when the husband was
campaigning in the province. He did not give his consent.
The trial court granted the petition and order the doctor to
pay Php 3,000. The CA sustained. The doctor appealed to
the Supreme Court.
Issue: WON the husband can recover damages from the
death of a fetus
Held: No. Petition granted.
Ratio:
Fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a
person, does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is
not endowed with personality.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of
personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one
injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages
could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account
of the injuries it received, no such right of action could
derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a
cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the
same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no
transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked
juridical personality.
Under Article 40 of the Civil Code, the child should be
subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the
condition specified in the following article". (Read Art 41 of
the Civil Code) In the present case, there is no dispute that
the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.
As to the reward of moral damages to Lazo: The court ruled
that evidently because the appellee's indifference to the
previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant,
clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the
frustration of his parental hopes and affections.
He appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or
pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment of

A G U S T I N, E. P.

the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third

abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest
in the administrative and criminal cases against the
appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at
obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since he
sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees,
an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of
record, was clearly exaggerated.
SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; ABORTION; CONSENT OF WOMAN

OR HUSBAND DOES NOT EXCUSE CRIMINAL ACT.
Abortion, without medical necessity to warrant it, is a
criminal act, and neither the consent of the woman nor that
of the husband would excuse it.
2.
DAMAGES;
UNBORN
FOETUS:
WITHOUT
PERSONALITY; AWARD FOR DEATH OF A PERSON
DOES NOT COVER UNBORN FOETUS. The minimum
award for the death of a person does not cover the case of
an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality and
incapable of having rights and obligations.
3. ID.; ID.; PARENTS OF UNBORN FOETUS CANNOT
SUE FOR DAMAGES ON ITS BEHALF. Since an action
for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or
death pertains primarily to the injured, no such right of
action could derivatively accrue to the parents or heirs of an
unborn child.
4. ID.; ID.; NATURE OF DAMAGES RECOVERABLE BY
PARENTS OF UNBORN CHILD. The damages which
the parents of an unborn child can recover are limited to the
moral damages for the illegal arrest of normal development
of the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish
attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their
parental expectations, as well as to exemplary damages, if
the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230, New Civil
Code).

(7) IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF

STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005

FACTS:
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor
illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He prayed
that the child's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia,
her mother's surname, and that her surname Garcia be
changed to Catindig, his surname.
Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as
his legitimate child and heir, and pursuant to Art. 189 of the
Family Code, she is now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or
reconsideration that Stephanie should be allowed to use the
surname Garcia as her middle name.
The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for
her relationship with her natural mother should be
maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and
hardship in the future, and under Article 189 she remains to
be an intestate heir of her mother.

CONFLICT OF LAWS

ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her
natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her
middle name.
RULING:
Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted
by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle name
her mothers surname, we find no reason why she should
not be allowed to do so.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 9255, (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The
Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a
child may use. Article 365 of the CC merely provides that an
adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. Article
189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of
adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.
Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an
legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is
entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child
without discrimination of any kind, including the right to
bear the surname of her father and her mother.
(8) IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR
CORRECTION OF ENTRY IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG
G.R. 159966, March 30 2005
The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and
recognized illegitimate child contains a given name, a middle
name and a surname.
Before a person can be authorized to change his name
given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he
must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling
reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the
request should be denied.
That the continued use of a middle name would cause
confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and
reasonable cause to drop it from one's registered complete
name.
Facts: Julian was born in Cebu City on February 20, 1998 to
parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then
not yet married to each other. When his parents
subsequently got married on September 22, 1998, they
executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the
childs name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian
Lin Carulasan Wang.

Since the couple planned to live in Singapore where Julian

will study together with a sister who was born in Singapore,
Anna Lisa decided to file a petition in the Regional Trial
Court seeking to drop his middle name and have his
registered name in the Civil Registry changed from Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. The reason given for
the change of name sought in the petition is that Julian may
be discriminated against when he studies in Singapore
because of his middle name since in Singapore middle
names or the maiden surname of the mother is not carried
in a person's name.

A G U S T I N, E. P.

After trial, the RTC denied the petition because the reason
given did not fall within the grounds recognized by law. The
RTC ruled that since the State has an interest in the name of
a person it cannot just be changed to suit the convenience
of the bearer of the name. The RTC said that legitimate
children have the right to bear the surnames of the father
and the mother, and there is no reason why this right should
be taken from Julio considering that he was still a minor.
When he reaches majority age he could then decide whether
to change his name by dropping his middle name, added the
RTC.
Issues:
Was the RTC correct in denying the petition?
Held:
Yes. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or
filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from
others who may have the same given name and surname as
he has. When an illegitimate child is legitimated by
subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the
father in a public instrument or private handwritten
instrument, he then bears both his mother's surname as his
middle name and his father's surname as his surname,
reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an
acknowledged natural child. The registered name of a
legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus
contains a given name, a middle name and a surname.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals
and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change
of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a
person can be authorized to change his name given him
either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show
proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which
may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be
denied.
To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must
show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore
but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and
official name. Among the grounds for change of name
which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal
consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will
avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and
been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was
unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a
Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good
faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the
surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing
that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public
interest.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner
for the dropping his middle name is convenience. However,
how such change of name would make his integration into
Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly
established. That the continued use of his middle name
would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute
proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered
complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the

CONFLICT OF LAWS

nebulous foundation on which his petition for change of

name is based, it is best that the matter of change of his
name be left to his judgment and discretion when he
reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may
not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change
of his name and granting of the same at this point may just
prejudice him in his rights under our laws.

(9) REPUBLIC vs. DR. NORMA S. LUGSANAY UY

G.R. No. 198010, August 12, 2013
Remedial Law; Cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry. It is clear from the foregoing discussion
that when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry
in the civil register involves substantial and controversial
alterations, including those on citizenship, legitimacy
of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict
compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court is mandated. If the entries in the civil register could
be
corrected
or
changed
through
mere
summary proceedings and not through appropriate action
wherein all parties who may be affected by the entries are
notified or represented, the door to fraud or other mischief
would be set open, the consequence of which might
be detrimental and far reaching.

Service of summons as a requisite of due process. The

fact that the notice of hearing was published in a newspaper

of general circulation and notice thereof was served upon
the State will not change the nature of the proceedings
taken. A reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court shows that the Rules mandate two sets of notices
to different potential oppositors: one given to the persons
named in the petition and another given to other persons
who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be
considered interested or affected parties. Summons must,
therefore, be served not for the purpose of vesting the
courts with jurisdiction but to comply with the requirements
of fair play and due process to afford the person concerned
the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses.
CASE:
In her Certificate of Live Birth, Noras full name is Ana Uy
and her citizenship is Chinese although she is known to her
family and friends as Nora Lasala and she is not Chinese. So
to correct the entries, she filed a Petition for Correction of
Entry in her Certificate of Live Birth to correct her first
name, surname, status and citizenship.
Nora alleged that she was born on February 8, 1952 as the
illegitimate daughter of Manny Uy and Solita Lasala who
were not legally married. She also claimed that even her
school records, Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)
Board of Medicine Certificate, and passport, bear the name
Nora Lasala, and that all her siblings use the surname
Lasala in their birth certificates. Impleaded in her petition
was only the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the City
where she was born.
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) issued an Order setting the case
for hearing, directing that the said Order be published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the City at least once a

A G U S T I N, E. P.

week for three (3) consecutive weeks at the expense of

Nora, and that the order and petition be furnished the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the City Prosecutors
Office for their information and guidance.
After Nora complied with said order and presented her
evidence, the RTC decided in her favour and granted her
Petition. However, the Republic, as represented by the OSG,
appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of
Appeals (CA) on the ground that the petition failed to
implead her parents and siblings as indispensable parties
considering that Nora is asking not merely correction of
typographical or clerical errors but substantial changes in her
birth certificate.
But the CA affirmed the RTCs decision and declared that the
failure to implead the indispensable parties was cured by the
publication of the petition. So it would neither prejudice the
government nor any third party. Were the RTC and the CA
correct?
No. Where substantial changes in the birth Certificate are
sought for, all parties that stand to be affected by the
change must be impleaded in the Petition. In this case, Nora
sought the correction of her first name and surname, her
status from legitimate to illegitimate and her citizenship
from Chinese to Filipino. Thus, she should have
impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but
also her parents and siblings because her relationship with
them will be substantially affected by such corrections.
The fact that the notice of hearing was published in a
newspaper of general circulation and served upon the State
will not change the nature of the proceedings taken.
Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court mandates
two sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one
given to the persons named in the petition and another
given to other persons who are not named in the petition
but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected
parties. Summons must, therefore, be served on them not
for the purpose of vesting the courts with jurisdiction but to
comply with the requirements of fair play and due process
affording the person/s concerned with the opportunity to
protect their interest if they so choose.
Failure to implead indispensable parties in Petitions seeking
substantial and controversial alterations such as legitimacy
of marriage, citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation,
would open the doors to fraud or other mischief, the
consequence of which might be detrimental and far reaching
(Republic of the Philippines vs. Dr. Norma S. Lugsanay Uy,
G.R. No. 198010, August 13, 2013).

(10) REPUBLIC vs. COSETENG - MAGPAYO

G.R. No. 189476 February 2, 2011
A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103
(CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds
including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation;
(c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a
Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a
sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of
former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing
anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment
and there is no showing that the desired change of name
was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name
would prejudice public interest.[1] Respondents reason for
changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or
analogous to, recognized grounds, however.
The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v.
Republic of the Philippines.[2] In Alfon, the Court allowed
the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use the name that
she had been known since childhood in order to avoid
confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She
merely sought to use the surname of her mother which she
had been using since childhood. Ruling in her favor, the
Court held that she was lawfully entitled to use her mothers
surname, adding that the avoidance of confusion was
justification enough to allow her to do so. In the present
case, however, respondent denies his legitimacy.
The change being sought in respondents petition goes so
far as to affect his legal status in relation to his parents. It
seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule
103 then would not suffice to grant respondents
supplication.

Labayo-Rowe

v. Republic[3] categorically holds that

changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate . . . are substantial and controversial alterations
which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary
proceedings . . .
Since respondents desired change affects his civil status
from legitimate to illegitimate, Rule 108 applies. It reads:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition.Any person interested
in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status
of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may
file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of
any entry relating thereto, with the [RTC] of the province
where the corresponding civil registry is located.
xxxx
SEC. 3. Parties.When cancellation or correction of an entry
in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be
affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the
petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place
for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice
thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition.

CONFLICT OF LAWS

A G U S T I N, E. P.

The court shall also cause the order to be published once a

week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province. (emphasis, italics and
underscoring supplied)
Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns ones
civil status should be filed in the civil registry in which the
entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected that of Makati
in the present case, and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby should be made
parties to the proceeding.
As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was
filed not in Makati where his birth certificate was registered
but in Quezon City. And as the above-mentioned title of the
petition filed by respondent before the RTC shows, neither
the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were
made parties thereto.

(11) GRANDE vs. ANTONIO

G.R. No. 206248 February 18, 2014

FACTS:

birth, and record the same in the Register of Births; ordering

Antonio to deliver the custody to their mother; Antonio shall
have visitorial rights upon Grandes consent; parties are
directed to give and share in support of the minor children.
The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal
consequence of the recognition made by respondent Antonio
that he is the father of the minors, taken in conjunction with
the universally protected "best-interest-of-the-child" clause,
compels the use by the children of the surname "ANTONIO."
Not satisfied with the CAs Decision, petitioner Grande
interposed a partial motion for reconsideration, particularly
assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the
change of the minors surname to "Antonio." When her
motion was denied, petitioner came to this Court via the
present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the father has the right to
compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate
children upon his recognition of their filiation.
HELD: The petition is partially granted
CIVIL LAW Filiation

Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio

Antonio (Antonio) for a period of time lived together as
husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time
already married to someone else. Out of this illicit
relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis and Jerard
Patrick, both minors. The children were not expressly
recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of Births
of the children in the Civil Registry. The parties relationship,
however, eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the
United States with her two children. This prompted
respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of
Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental
Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors
and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of
Paternity of the children.
The RTC held in favor of Antonio, ordering the Office of the
City Registrar to cause the entry of the name of Antonio as
the father of the aforementioned minors in their respective
Certificate of Live Birth and causing the correction/change
and/or annotation of the surnames of said minors in their
Certificate of Live Birth from Grande to Antonio; granting the
right of parental authority over the minors; granting the
primary right and immediate custody over the minors; and
ordering Grande to immediately surrender the persons and
custody of the minors to Antonio.
Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration.
However, her motion was denied by the trial court.
Petitioner Grande then
attributing grave error on
ruling contrary to the law
grant of sole custody to
children.

filed an appeal with the CA

the part of the RTC for allegedly
and jurisprudence respecting the
the mother over her illegitimate

The CA modified in part the Decision of the RTC, directing

the Offices of the Civil Registrar General and the City Civil
Registrar of Makati City to enter the surname Antonio as the
surname of the minors in their respective certificates of live

CONFLICT OF LAWS

Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as follows:

Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be
under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime
of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the
legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all
other provisions in the Civil Code governing successional
rights shall remain in force.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA
9255 which now reads:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and
shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and
shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code.
However, illegitimate children may use the surname of their
father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their
father through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register, or when an admission in a public document or
private handwritten instrument is made by the father.
Provided, the father has the right to institute an action
before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his
lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist
of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child.
The general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the
surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA
9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by
the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or when an admission in a public document or
private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In
such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname
of the father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial
approval of recognition of the filiation of the two children
with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname
of the minors from Grande to Antonio when a public
document acknowledged before a notary public under Sec.
19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court is enough to establish the

A G U S T I N, E. P.

paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial

conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an
official declaration of his childrens surname as Antonio.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they
want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the
father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner)
who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of
their illegitimate children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and
free from ambiguity, it must be taken to mean what it says
and it must be given its literal meaning free from any
interpretation.Respondents position that the court can order
the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity.
And where there is no ambiguity, one must abide by its
words. The use of the word "may" in the provision readily
shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no
compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The
word "may" is permissive and operates to confer discretion
upon the illegitimate children

(12) LAPERAL vs. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. L-18008 October 30, 1962
Case Doctrines:
Legal separation alone is not a ground for wife's change of
name. A womans married status is not affected by a decree
of legal separation, there being no severance of the
vinculum, and under Article 372 of the New Civil Code, she
must continue using the name and surname employed by
her before the separation.
It is doubtful whether Rule 103 of the Rules of Court,
which refers to change of name in general, may prevail over
the specific provisions of Article 372 of the New Civil Code
with regard to married women legally separated from their
husbands. Even, however, applying Rule 103, the fact of
legal separation alone is not sufficient ground to justify a
change of name, because to hold otherwise, would be to
provide an easy circumvention of the mandatory provisions
of said Article 372.
Facts: In 1958, petitioner Elisea L. Santamaria was decreed
legally separated from her husband Enrique R. Santamaria.
In 1960, she filed a petition to be allowed to change her
name and/or be permitted to resume using her maiden
name Elisea Laperal. The City Attorney of Baguio opposed
the petition on the ground that the same violates the
provisions of Article 370 (should be 372) of the Civil Code,
and that it is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court.
The court denied the petition. Upon petitioner's motion,
however, the court, treating the petition as one for change
of name, reconsidered its decision and granted the petition
on the ground that to allow petitioner, who is a
businesswoman decreed legally separated from her
husband, to continue using her married name would give
rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation
of the conjugal assets. Hence, this appeal by the State.

Should petitioner be allowed to change her name or be

permitted to resume using her maiden name?
Held:
No. Article 372 of the Civil Code reads:
ART. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife
shall continue using her name and surname employed
before the legal separation.
The language of the statute is mandatory that the wife, even
after the legal separation has been decreed, shall continue
using her name and surname employed before the legal
separation. This is so because her married status is
unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of
the vinculum. It seems to be the policy of the law that the
wife should continue to use the name indicative of her
unchanged status for the benefit of all concerned.
Even applying Rule 103, the fact of legal separation alone
which is the only basis for the petition is, not a sufficient
ground to justify a change of the name of petitioner, for to
hold otherwise would be to provide an easy circumvention of
the mandatory provisions of Article 372.
The finding that petitioners continued use of her husband
surname may cause undue confusion in her finances was
without basis. It must be considered that the issuance of
the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the
conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had
automatically been dissolved and liquidated. Hence, there
could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the
conjugal assets. (Laperal vs Republic, GR No. L-18008,

October 30, 1962).

(13) ANDO vs. DFA

G.R. No. 195432
Civil Law Persons and Family Relations Foreign Divorce;
how recognized
Remedial Law Evidence Foreign Divorce; Must be proven
as a matter of fact
In 2001, Edelina Tungul married a Japanese citizen
named Yuichiro Kobayashi. In 2004, Kobayashi obtained a
divorce decree against Edelina in Japan. Kobayashi later
married someone else.
In 2005, Edelina again married another Japanese citizen
named Masatomi Ando.
Thereafter, Edelina tried to renew her passport but this time
she wanted to use her married name she wanted to use
Andos name. However, the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) told her that same cannot be issued to her until she
can prove by competent court decision that her marriage
with her said husband Masatomi Ando is valid until otherwise
declared.
In 2010, Edelina filed a petition for declaratory relief as she
insists that she should be issued a passport bearing her
married name even without a judicial declaration that her

Issues:

CONFLICT OF LAWS

A G U S T I N, E. P.

marriage with Ando is valid because, according to the law,

void and voidable marriages enjoy the presumption of
validity until proven otherwise. And also on that juncture,
she prayed that the court recognize her second marriage as
valid.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for declaratory relief
should prosper.
HELD No. In the first place, the petition is misplaced.
Edelina failed to exhaust all administrative remedies. When
her request for renewal of passport under her married name
was denied, she should have appealed the denial to the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs pursuant to the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of RA 8239 (Philippine Passport Act).
Second, her prayer to have her second marriage be
honored is not proper. The proper remedy is for her to
file a petition for the judicial recognition of her foreign
divorce from her first husband.
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in
our jurisdiction, provided the decree is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner. The presentation solely of the
divorce decree is insufficient; both the divorce decree and
the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained
the divorce must be proven. Because our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on
evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the
national law of the alien must be alleged and proven like any
other fact.

(14) REMO VS SEC. OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

G.R. NO. 169202, MARCH 5, 2010

which was to expire on 27 October 2000, showed Rallonza

as her surname, Maria Virginia as her given name, and
Remo as her middle name. While her marriage was
still subsisting, she applied for the renewal of her passport
with the Department of Foreign Affairs office in Chicago,
Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to her maiden name
and surname in the replacement passport. When her request
was denied, she made a similar request to the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs denied
the request, holding that while it is not obligatory for a
married woman to use her husbands name, use of maiden
name is allowed in passport application only if the married
name
has
not
been
used
in
previous
application. The Secretary explained that under the
implementing rules of Republic Act No. 8239 or the
Philippine Passport Act of 1996, a woman applicant may
revert to her maiden name only in cases of annulment of
marriage, divorce, and death of the husband.
Remo brought the case to the Office of the President which
affirmed the Secretarys ruling. The CA also affirmed the
ruling. Remo filed a petition for review before the Supreme
Court. Remo argued that RA 8239 (Philippine Passport Act of
1996) conflicted with and was an implied repeal of Article
370 of the Civil Code which allows the wife to continue using
her maiden name upon marriage, as settled in the case of
Yasin vs. Honorable Judge Sharia District Court [311 Phil.
696, 707 (1995)]
Issues:
Whether or not Remo, who originally used her husbands
surname in her expired passport, can revert to the use of
her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the
subsistence of her marriage.
Held:

Case Doctrines:
A married woman has an option, but not an obligation, to
use her husbands surname upon marriage. She is not
prohibited from continuously using her maiden name
because when a woman marries, she does not change her
name but only her civil status.
Once a married woman opted to adopt her husbands
surname in her passport, she may not revert to the use of
her maiden name, except in cases of: (1) death of husband,
(2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of marriage.
The acquisition of a Philippine passport is a privilege. The
law recognizes the passport applicants constitutional right to
travel. However, the State is also mandated to protect and
maintain the integrity and credibility of the passport and
travel documents proceeding from it as a Philippine passport
remains at all times the property of the Government. The
holder is merely a possessor of the passport as long as it is
valid.

Facts: Maria Virginia V. Remo (Remo) is a Filipino citizen,

married to Francisco R. Rallonza. Her Philippine passport,

10

CONFLICT OF LAWS

No. Remo cannot use her maiden name in the replacement

passport while her marriage subsists.
Indeed, under Article 370 of the Civil Code and as settled in
the case of Yasin vs. Honorable Judge Sharia District Court
(supra), a married woman has an option, but not an
obligation, to use her husbands surname upon marriage.
She is not prohibited from continuously using her
maiden name because when a woman marries, she does not
change her name but only her civil status. RA 8239 does not
conflict with this principle.
RA 8239, including its implementing rules and regulations,
does not prohibit a married woman from using her maiden
name in her passport. In fact, in recognition of this right,
the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) allows a married
woman who applies for a passport for the first time to use
her maiden name. Such an applicant is not required to adopt
her husbands surname.
In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may
either adopt her husbands surname or continuously use her
maiden name. If she chooses to adopt her husbands
surname in her new passport, the DFA additionally requires
the submission of an authenticated copy of the
marriage certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue
using her maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA will

A G U S T I N, E. P.

not prohibit her from continuously using her maiden name.

However, once a married woman opted to adopt her
husbands surname in her passport, she may not revert to
the use of her maiden name, except in the following cases
enumerated in Section 5(d) of RA 8239: (1) death of
husband, (2) divorce, (3) annulment, or (4) nullity of
marriage. Since Remos marriage to her husband subsists,
she may not resume her maiden name in the
replacement passport. Otherwise stated, a married womans
reversion to the use of her maiden name must be based only
on the severance of the marriage.
Yasin case not in point
Yasin is not squarely in point with this case. Unlike in Yasin,
which involved a Muslim divorcee whose former husband is
already married to another woman, Remos marriage
remains subsisting. Also, Yasin did not involve a request to
resume ones maiden name in a replacement passport, but a
petition to resume ones maiden name in view of the
dissolution of ones marriage.

(15) REPUBLIC vs. ALBIOS

G.R. No. 198780 : OCTOBER 16, 2013
FACTS:
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and
Albios were married, as evidenced by a Certificate of
Marriage. On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a
petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with
Fringer, alleging that immediately after their marriage, they
separated and never lived as husband and wife because they
never really had any intention of entering into a married
state or complying with any of their essential marital
obligations.
Fringer did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007,
Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit
her pre-trial brief. After the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel
and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the
hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule.

Special law prevails over general law

Even assuming RA 8239 conflicts with the Civil Code, the
provisions of RA 8239 which is a special law specifically
dealing with passport issuance must prevail over the
provisions of Title XIII of the Civil Code which is the general
law on the use of surnames. A basic tenet in
statutory construction is that a special law prevails over a
general law.
Implied repeals are disfavored.
Remos theory of implied repeal must fail. Well-entrenched is
the rule that an implied repeal is disfavored. The apparently
conflicting provisions of a law or two laws should be
harmonized as much as possible, so that each shall be
effective. For a law to operate to repeal another law, the
two laws must actually be inconsistent. The former must be
so repugnant as to be irreconcilable with the latter act. This,
Remo failed to establish.

The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio. The RTC

opined that the parties married each other for convenience
only. Albios stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a
marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship and
that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum
of $2,000.00. However, she did not pay Fringer $2,000.00
because the latter never processed her petition for
citizenship
The OSG filed an appeal before the CA. The CA affirmed the
RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite of
consent was lacking.

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage contracted for the sole

purpose of acquiring American citizenship void ab initio on
the ground of lack of consent?

State is mandated to protect integrity of passport

HELD: The marriage between the parties is valid

Remo consciously chose to use her husbands surname in

her previous passport application. If her present request
would be allowed, nothing prevents her in the future from
requesting to revert to the use of her husbands surname.
Such unjustified changes in one's name and identity in
a passport, which is considered superior to all other official
documents, cannot be countenanced. Otherwise, undue
confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport
holders will arise.

CIVIL LAW: validity of marriage

The acquisition of a Philippine passport is a privilege. The

law recognizes the passport applicants constitutional right to
travel. However, the State is also mandated to protect and
maintain the integrity and credibility of the passport and
travel documents proceeding from it as a Philippine passport
remains at all times the property of the Government. The
holder is merely a possessor of the passport as long as it is
valid.

11

CONFLICT OF LAWS

In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and

Naturalization Service, established the principal test for
determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration
cases. It ruled that a arriage is a sham if the bride and
groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time
they were married.This standard was modified with the
passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of
1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead
demonstrate that the marriage was not ntered into for the
purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United
States.The focus, thus, shifted from determining the
intention to establish a life together, to determining the
intention of evading immigration laws. It must be noted,
however, that this standard is used purely for immigration
purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the
legal validity or existence of a marriage.

A G U S T I N, E. P.

In the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, which declared

as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband to
gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage
could not be avoided erely because the marriage was
entered into for a limited purpose.The 1980 immigration
case of Matter of McKee, further recognized that a
fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from
a nonsubsisting one.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it
must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a
solemnizing officer. A reely givenconsent requires that the
contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the
marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not
vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of
consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such
as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. Consent
must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must
be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and
both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios
and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was
not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent.
Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they
understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their
ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best
evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that
they willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage.
There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid
marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be created
between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was
necessary to accomplish their goal.

Civil law; Property relations of cohabitants.

Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of
marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them
through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common
in
proportion
to
their
respective
contributions.
Civil Law Family Code Marriage Bigamy Non-existent
marriage
In September 1979, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. married
Azucena Alegre. In 1982, while Alegre was outside the
Philippines, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with
Sally Go. Sallys father was against this. In order to appease
her father, Sally convinced Benjamin to sign a purported
marriage contract in March 1982.
In 1994, the relationship between Sally and Benjamin
soured. Sally filed a bigamy case against Benjamin.
Benjamin on the other hand filed an action to declare his
alleged marriage to Sally as non-existent. To prove the
existence of their marriage, Sally presented a marriage
license allegedly issued to Benjamin.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Sally and
Benjamin is bigamous.
HELD: No. The elements of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in
case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could
not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.

GRANTED.

(16) SALLY GO-BANGAYAN vs. BENJAMIN

BANGAYAN, JR.
G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013

Criminal law; Bigamy; Subsequent marriage

must be valid. For bigamy to exist, the second or
subsequent marriage must have all the essential
requisites for validity except for the existence of a
prior marriage. In this case, there was really no
subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed
a purported marriage contract without a marriage
license. The supposed marriage was not recorded
with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics
Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and
Sally did not exist. They lived together and
represented themselves as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage.

12

CONFLICT OF LAWS

In this case, the fourth element is not present. The marriage

license presented by Sally was not authentic as in fact, no
marriage license was ever issued to both parties in view of
the alleged marriage. The marriage between them was
merely in jest and never complied with the essential
requisites of marriage. Hence, there is no bigamous
marriage to speak of.

(17) GARCIA vs. RECCIO

G.R. No. 138322

October

2,

2001

FACTS:
The respondent, a Filipino was married to Editha Samson, an
Australian citizen, in Rizal in 1987. They lived together as
husband and wife in Australia. In 1989, the Australian family
court issued a decree of divorce supposedly dissolving the
marriage. In 1992, respondent acquired Australian
citizenship. In 1994, he married Grace Garcia, a Filipina,
herein petitioner, in Cabanatuan City. In their application for

A G U S T I N, E. P.

marriage license, respondent was declared as single and

Filipino. Since October 1995, they lived separately; and in
1996 while in Autralia, their conjugal assets were divided. In
1998, petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she learned
of the respondents former marriage only in November. On
the other hand, respondent claims that he told petitioner of
his prior marriage in 1993, before they were married.
Respondent also contended that his first marriage was
dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australia in 1989
and hence, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in
1994. The trial court declared that the first marriage was
dissolved on the ground of the divorce issued in Australia as
valid and recognized in the Philippines. Hence, this petition
was forwarded before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the divorce between respondent and
Editha Samson was proven.
2. Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry
Grace Garcia.
RULING:
The Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce;
hence, our courts cannot grant it. In mixed marriages
involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family
Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in
case the divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. A divorce
obtained abroad by two aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective
laws. Therefore, before our courts can recognize a foreign
divorce, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a
fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.
In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent and
Samson appears to be authentic, issued by an Australian
family court. Although, appearance is not sufficient; and
compliance with the rules on evidence regarding alleged
foreign laws must be demonstrated, the decree was
admitted on account of petitioners failure to object properly
because he objected to the fact that it was not registered in
the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City, not to its
admissibility.
Respondent claims that the Australian divorce decree, which
was validly admitted as evidence, adequately established his
legal capacity to marry under Australian law. However, there
are two types of divorce, absolute divorce terminating the
marriage and limited divorce merely suspending the
marriage. In this case, it is not known which type of divorce
the respondent procured.
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may
under some foreign statutes, still restrict remarriage. Under
the Australian divorce decree a party to a marriage who
marries again before this decree becomes absolute commits
the offense of bigamy. This shows that the divorce obtained
by the respondent might have been restricted. Respondent
also failed to produce sufficient evidence showing the
foreign law governing his status. Together with other
evidences submitted, they dont absolutely establish his legal
capacity to remarry according to the alleged foreign law.
Case remanded to the court a quo. The marriage between
the petitioner and respondent can not be declared null and

13

CONFLICT OF LAWS

void based on lack of evidence conclusively showing the

respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner. With the lack
of such evidence, the court a quo may declare nullity of the
parties marriage based on two existing marriage certificates.

(18) ENRIQUEZ vs. ENRIQUEZ

8 PHIL 565
SYLLABUS
1. APPEAL; ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS. Where upon
an appeal by both the plaintiff and the defendant it appears
that the plaintiff made no assignment of errors against the
rulings or against the decision of the lower court. so much of
the judgment as may be adverse to the plaintiff can not be
considered by this court.
2. MARRIAGE; SUFFICIENCY OF PROOF. When a
marriage ceremony is duly celebrated between two persons
upon a certain date, in order to show that the same persons
are lawfully married before that time it is necessary to prove
that a marriage ceremony had theretofore been celebrated
between them. The fact of having had children prior to the
celebration of the latter ceremony does not prove a former
marriage.
3. COMMON-LAW MARRIAGE. What are known as
common-law marriages in England and the United States
were never recognized by the Spanish law in force in these
Islands. No valid marriage could exist under the Spanish law
unless some ecclesiastical or civil functionary intervened in
its celebration.
(19) EUGENIO vs. VELEZ
185 SCRA 45
FACTS:
Vitaliana Vargas a 25 y.o single was forcibly taken from her
residence sometime in 1987 and was confined by the
petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial residence in
Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. She cohabited with the petitioner
against her will and always had the intention of escaping.
She died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in
Eugenios residence on Aug. 28, 1988.
Unaware of her death her brothers and sisters (Vargases)
filed a petition for Habeas Corpus on September 27, 1988
before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging. The court then
issued a writ of habeas corpus but petitioner refused to
surrender the Vitalianas body to the sheriff on the ground
that a corpse cannot be subjected to habeas corpus
proceedings. The court ordered that the body should be
delivered to a funeral parlor for autopsy but Eugenio assailed
the lack of jurisdiction of the court.
ISSUE:
Who has the right to claim custody of the deceased?
HELD:
The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana
was correctly awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters
pursuant to Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code
which provides:
Persons charged with duty of burial if the deceased was an
unmarried man or woman or a child and left any kin; the

A G U S T I N, E. P.

duty of the burial shall devolve upon the nearest kin of the
deceased.
Petitioners claim that he is the spouse cannot be valid as
contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, Philippine law
does not recognize common law marriages where a man
and a woman not legally married who cohabit for many
years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the
public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be
husband and wife in the community where they live may be
considered legally married in common law jurisdictions.
In addition, it requires that the man and woman living
together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract
marriage. Whereas, the petitioner has a subsisting marriage
with another woman, legal impediment that disqualified him
from even legally marrying Vitaliana.

(20) TENCHAVEZ VS. ESCAO

G.R. No. L-19671 Nov. 29, 1965

FACTS:
Vicenta Escao, 27, exchanged marriage vows with Pastor
Tenchavez, 32, on February 24, 1948, before a Catholic
chaplain. The marriage was duly registered with the local
civil registrar. However, the two were unable to live together
after the marriage and as of June 1948, they were already
estranged. Vicenta left for the United Stated in 1950. On the
same year she filed a verified complaint for divorce against
Tenchavez in the State of Nevada on the ground of Extreme
cruelty, entirely mental in character. A decree of divorce,
final and absolute was issued in open court by the said
tribunal. She married an American, lived with him in

California, had several children with him and, on 1958,

acquired American Citizenship.

On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of

First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956,
against Vicenta F. Escao, her parents, Mamerto and Mena
Escao whom he charged with having dissuaded and
discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and
alienating her affections, and against the Roman Catholic
Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed
the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legal
separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicentas
parents denied that they had in any way influenced their
daughters acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
ISSUE:
1.
Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escao is
valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.
2.
Whether or not the charges against Vicenta Escaos
parents were sufficient in form.
RULING:
1.
No. Vicenta Escao and Pastor Tenchavez marriage
remain existent and undissolved under the Philippine
Law. Escaos divorce and second marriage cannot be
deemed valid under the Philippine Law to which Escao was
bound since in the time the divorce decree was issued,
Escao, like her husband, was still a Filipino citizen. The acts
of the wife in not complying with her wifely duties, deserting
her husband without any justifiable cause, leaving for the
United States in order to secure a decree of absolute
divorce, and finally getting married again are acts which
constitute a willful infliction of injury upon the husbands

14

CONFLICT OF LAWS

feelings in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or

public policy, thus entitling Tenchavez to a decree of legal
separation under our law on the basis of adultery.
2.
No. Tenchavez charge against Vicentas parents are
not supported by credible evidence. The testimony of
Tenchavez about the Escaos animosity toward him strikes
the court to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and
were belied by Tenchavez own letters written before the
suit had begun. An action for alienation of affections against
the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of
proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged
parents with racial or social discrimination and with having
exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and
divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety,
entitling them to recover damages
(21) GOITIA VS. CAMPOS-RUEDA
35 Phil 252
FACTS:
Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y
Rueda, respondent, were married on January 7, 1915 and
had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila. They
stayed together for a month before petitioner returned to
her parents home. Goitia filed a complaint against
respondent for support outside the conjugal home. It was
alleged that respondent demanded her to perform unchaste
and lascivious acts on his genital organs. Petitioner refused
to perform such acts and demanded her husband other than
the legal and valid cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on
refusing, respondent maltreated her by word and deed,
inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and different body
parts. The trial court ruled in favor of respondent and stated
that Goitia could not compel her husband to support her
except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a
judicial decree granting her separation or divorce from
respondent. Goitia filed motion for review.
ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to
support her outside the conjugal home.
HELD:
The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife
is created merely in the act of marriage. The law provides
that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may
fulfill the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or
by maintaining her in his own home at his option. However,
this option given by law is not absolute. The law will not
permit the husband to evade or terminate his obligation to
support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal
home because of his wrongful acts. In the case at bar, the
wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the
lewd designs and physical assault of the husband, she can
therefore claim support from the husband for separate
maintenance even outside the conjugal home.

A G U S T I N, E. P.

(22) ILUSORIO VS. BILDNER

(23) The only case where SC held that there is

no need for declaration of nullity.

FACTS:

(24) VAN DORN vs. ROMILLO

G.R. No. L-68470 1985

GR No. 139789 May 12, 2000

Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed

extensive property valued at millions of pesos. For many
year, he was the Chairman of the Board and President of
Baguio Country Club. He was married with Erlinda Ilusorio,
herein petitioner, for 30 years and begotten 6 children
namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo,
Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen. They separated from bed and
board in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was
in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club
when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand, the
petitioner lived in Antipolo City.
In 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from US, he stayed with
her wife for about 5 months in Antipolo city. The children,
Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time their mother
overdose Potenciano which caused the latters health to
deteriorate. In February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC
petition for guardianship over the person and property of
Potenciano due to the latters advanced age, frail health,
poor eyesight and impaired judgment. In May 1998, after
attending a corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not
return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland Condominium in
Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for
habeas corpus to have the custody of his husband alleging
that the respondents refused her demands to see and visit
her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to
Antipolo.

Facts:
Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines who
married Richard Upton, a citizen of the United States in
Hongkong. After 10 years of marriage and two children, they
got divorced in Nevada, United States of America, where the
petitioner subsequently married Theodore Van Dorn. One
year after, Richard Upton filed a civil case with the Regional
Trial Court Branch 115 in Pasay City praying to for the
accounting of the business, the Galleon Shop, and to be
given the right to manage the business, on the ground that
the business is conjugal property. He further contends that
the divorce is not valid and binding in the Philippines, as it is
contrary to local law and public policy, therefore he has legal
standing to claim said property. On her part, the petitioner
filed for dismissal of the civil case contending that the
private respondent is estopped from laying claim on the
alleged conjugal property because in the divorce
proceedings, by which the alien spouse is bound, the private
respondent agreed that they had no community property.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that
the property is located in the Philippines so the divorce
decree has no bearing in the case. Hence this petition for
certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus

should be issued.

Issue: Whether or not the alien spouse, divorced from the

Filipina spouse, has legal standing on the alleged conjugal
assets, in the Philippines?

HELD:

Ruling:

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal

confinement or detention, or by which the rightful custody of
a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. To
justify the grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty
must an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of
action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and
effective not merely nominal or moral.

No. Generally, divorce is not recognized in the Philippines as

it is against morals, good customs and public policy.
However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which the
Philippines may recognize, provided they are valid according
to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada,
USA is valid, thus, in the spirit of comity, it is recognized as
also valid in the Philippines. Hence, the private respondent,
as he is bound by the decision of his own coutry's Court,
which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he has no legal standing in
the Philippine court as husband of the petitioner as the
divorce legally dissolved their marriage. He is further
estopped by his own representation before the foreign Court
in the divorce proceedings, from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property. To maintain the petitioner to still
be legally obligated to the divorced husband is a
discrimination against her in her own country. Hence, it is
only just that the petition be granted. The civil case against
petitioner with the RTC was dismissed.

Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective

detention or deprivation of Potencianos liberty that would
justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter was 86
years of age and under medication does not necessarily
render him mentally incapacitated. He still has the capacity
to discern his actions. With his full mental capacity having
the right of choice, he may not be the subject of visitation
rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived
of his right to privacy.
The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit
a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In
any event, that the husband refuses to see his wife for
private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat or
any penalty attached to the exercise of his right. Coverture,
is a matter beyond judicial authority and cannot be enforced
by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the
sheriffs or by any other process.

15

CONFLICT OF LAWS

Note: This case was decided before August 3, 1988 when

the Family Code took effect. It became the basis for the
codification of Article 26 (2) of the Family Code.

A G U S T I N, E. P.

(25) Llorente vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 124371,

November 23, 2000
Facts: On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula
were married before a parish priest in Nabua, Camarines
Sur.
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United
States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No.
5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District
Court, Southern District of New York.
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces
in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S.
Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines. He
discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was living
in and having an adulterous relationship with his brother,
Ceferino Llorente.
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her . He then
returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951
filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of
California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was
represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated
in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior
Court of the State of California, for the County of San Diego
found all factual allegations to be true and issued an
interlocutory judgment of divorce.
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.
Lorenzo went back to the Philippines and on January 16,
1958 married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as
husband and wife.Their twenty-five (25) year union
produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed
Llorente.
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and
Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador
M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses
Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the
will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their
three children.
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and
allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo
moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his
estate.
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly
executed, the trial court admitted the will to probate but
before the proceedings could be terminated , Lorenzo died.
Paula filed with the same court a petition for letters of
administration over Lorenzos estate in her favor contending
that she was Lorenzos surviving spouse, that such
properties were acquired during their marriage and that
Lorenzos will would encroach her legitime.
Alicia filed in the testate proceeding , a petition for the
issuance of letters testamentary.
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate
proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paulas

16

CONFLICT OF LAWS

petition.
The Regional Trial Court found that the divorce decree
granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable
in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with
Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise
void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the
issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is
not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the
will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having
gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of
the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente.
Issue: Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N.
Llorente?
Held: The trial court held that the will was intrinsically
invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in
the trial courts opinion was a mere paramour. The trial
court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children,
Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared
Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she and
Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article
144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete
disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed in
accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal,
especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances here
obtaining.
Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before
and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage
to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly
established, admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are
necessarily governed by foreign law.
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject
to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless
of the country wherein said property may be found.
But the hasty disregard of both the RTC and CA of Lorenzos
Will by calling to the fore the RENVOI doctrine, claiming that
American law follows domiciliary rule is unjustified. There is
no such thing as American law for the whole nation of the
US, for the country comprises of a group of States, each
State having its own applicable law, enforceable only within
that state.
As to the validity of the foreign divorce , jurisprudence
reiterates that once it is proven that an individual is no
longer a Filipino, thus an alien, when he obtains a divorce
abroad, its effects shall be recognized in the Philippines.

A G U S T I N, E. P.

The Supreme Court held that the divorce obtained by

Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and
recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the
estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the
determination of the trial court.
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit
from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which
must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed
in accordance with the formalities required is answered by
referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly
probated.
The decision of the CA is set aside and that of the RTC is
reversed. Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin
for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N.
Llorentes will and determination of the parties successional
rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the
trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle
the estate of the deceased within the framework of the
Rules of Court.
(26) REPUBLIC VS. ORBECIDO
2005
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1),
(4), (5) and (6), 3637 and 38. (17a)
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, - versus CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
FACTS:

ISSUE:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where
one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains
a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry,
can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine
law?
RULING:
Yes.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of
the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
divorce decree.
The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as
if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to
sanction absurdity and injustice.
A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the
literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its
spirit or intent. The twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by
the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must
prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an
American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree
can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it
must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.

(27) PILAPIL vs. HON IBAY-SOMERA

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros

M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in the
Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing
along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an
American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his
wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a
certain Innocent Stanley.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for
authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code.
DECISION OF LOWER COURT:
(1) Regional Trial Court: declared that herein respondent
Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry.

17

CONFLICT OF LAWS

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and
private respondent Erich Geiling, a German national, were
married in Germany. After about three and a half years of
marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in Geiling
initiating a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany.
The Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated
a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of
the spouses.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce
decree, Geiling filed two complaints for adultery before the
City Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that, while still married
to said Geiling, Pilapil had an affair with a certain William
Chia. The Assistant Fiscal, after the corresponding
investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on
the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However, upon
review, the respondent city fiscal Victor approved a
resolution directing the filing of 2 complaint for adultery
against the petitioner. The case entitled PP Philippines vs.

A G U S T I N, E. P.

Pilapil and Chia was assigned to the court presided by the

respondent judge Ibay-Somera.

(29) PEREZ vs. CA and CATINDIG

A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was

denied by the respondent. Pilapil filed this special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO,
seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court
denying her motion to quash.

FACTS:

As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus

presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at
the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.
ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the
filing of the complaint for adultery, considering that it was
done after obtaining a divorce decree?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying
petitioners MTQ is SET ASIDE and another one entered
DISMISSING the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The
TRO issued in this case is hereby made permanent.
NO
Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot
be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed
by the offended spouse. It has long since been established,
with unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule
is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended
spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such
initiator must have the status, capacity or legal
representation to do so at the time of the filing of the
criminal action. This is a logical consequence since the raison
detre of said provision of law would be absent where the
supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the
alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case.
Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is
necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for
adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant
and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of
the institution of the action by the former against the latter.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent
obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic
of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects
may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private
respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle
in our civil law on the matter of status of persons Under the
same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being
no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to
commence the adultery case under the imposture that he
was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

G.R. No. 162580 January 27, 2006

Private respondent Tristan A. Catindig married Lily Gomez

Catindig twice on May 16, 1968. The marriage produced four
children. Several years later, the couple encountered marital
problems that they decided to obtain a divorce from the
Dominican Republic. Thus, on April 27, 1984, Tristan and Lily
executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to the
Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican
Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce
action under its laws.
On July 14, 1984, Tristan married petitioner Elmar O. Perez
in the State of Virginia in the United States and both lived as
husband and wife until October 2001. Their union produced
one offspring.
During their cohabitation, petitioner learned that the divorce
decree issued by the court in the Dominican Republic which
"dissolved" the marriage between Tristan and Lily was not
recognized in the Philippines and that her marriage to
Tristan was deemed void under Philippine law. On August
13, 2001, Tristan filed a petition for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage to Lily with the RTC of Quezon City.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Perez has a legal interest in the matter of
litigation required of a would-be intervenor in Tristans
petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage with his
wife?
RULING:
No, Perez has no legal interest. When petitioner and Tristan
married on July 14, 1984, Tristan was still lawfully married
to Lily. The divorce decree that Tristan and Lily obtained
from the Dominican Republic never dissolved the marriage
bond between them. It is basic that laws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad. Regardless of where
a citizen of the Philippines might be, he or she will be
governed by Philippine laws with respect to his or her family
rights and duties, or to his or her status, condition and legal
capacity. Hence, if a Filipino regardless of whether he or she
was married here or abroad initiates a petition abroad to
obtain an absolute divorce from spouse and eventually
becomes successful in getting an absolute divorce decree,
the Philippines will not recognize such absolute divorce.
Petitioners claim that she is the wife of Tristan even if their
marriage was celebrated abroad lacks merit. Thus, petitioner
never acquired the legal interest as a wife upon which her
motion for intervention is based.

(28) GARCIA vs. RECCIO

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(30) TENCHAVEZ vs. ESCANO

(31) REPUBLIC vs. IYOY
Facts:

sexual infidelity of respondents wife do not per se

constitute psychological incapacity.
RULING:
1.

1.

On 25 March 1997, Respondent Crasus Iyoy filed a

complaint in the RTC for the nullity of marriage
with his wife Fely, on the ground that after the
celebration of their marriage, he found his wife
hot-tempered, nagger and extravagant.
2. Then in 1984, Fely left the PH for the US leaving
all their five children to Crasus. After a year, she
sent a letter to respondent re seeking divorce but
the latter disregarded the request.
3. In 1985, respondent learned that Fely got married
to an American.
4. In 1987, Fely went back to the PH with her new
husband; respondent did not bother to talk to her
because hes afraid that he might not bear the
pain and sadness.
5. At the time the complaint was filed, it has been
13years since Fely left and abandoned respondent
and there was no more possibility of reconciliation
between them.
6. Respondent alleged that Fely has psychological
incapacity to perform marital obligations set forth
in the FC.
7. In 1997, Fely refuted all the allegation about her,
instead, argued that her hot temperance was due
to her husbands drunkenness, womanizing, and
lack of sincere effort to find employment, hence,
the reason why she left the country was for
financial reasons.
8. She further invokes that although she left, she
continued to give support to her children. She also
explained that after the divorce, she was
naturalized as an American Citizen, hence, her
status re marriage is governed by her present
nationality.
9. After both parties filed their respective pre-trial
briefs, the RTC gave them opportunity to present
evidence.
10. On 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its
Judgment declaring the marriage of respondent
and Fely null and void ab initio due to Felys
psychological incapacity to comply with her marital
duties such as striving for unity, observing fidelity,
mutual love, respect, help and support. Crasus
also adequately established that the defendant
practically abandoned him; and that his wife
committed bigamous marriage.
11. Petitioner Republic assailed the RTCs decision
saying that it was contrary to law and evidence,
hence, filed an appeal to the CA but the appellate
court affirmed the earlier decision of the RTC
citing article 26 of the FC saying that to

condemn plaintiff to remain shackle in a marriage

that in truth and in fact does not exist and to
remain married to a spouse who is incapacitated
to discharge essential marital covenants is verily to
condemn him to a perpetual disadvantage which
this Court finds abhorrent.

12. With such, Petitioner Republic seek an appeal in

the SC on the ground that abandonment by and

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CONFLICT OF LAWS

2.

3.

What constitute a psychological incapacity?

1. Citing Santos v CA, the Court stated that
psychological incapacity refers to no
less than a mental incapacity that
causes a party to be truly cognitive of
the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and
discharged by the parties to the
marriage.
The only evidence presented by Crasus was his
testimony which is put in question for being selfserving. The evidence is not enough to convince
the Court that Fely had such grave mental illness
that prevented her from assuming the essential
obligations of marriage.
It is worthy to emphasize that Art 36 contemplates
downright incapacity or inability to take
cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the
errant spouse.

The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts

that hurt and embarrassed respondent and the rest of the
family. Her hot-temper, nagging, and extravagance; her
abandonment of respondent; her marriage to an Am citizen;
and even her flaunting of her American family may be
indeed manifestations of her alleged incapacity, nonetheless,
the root cause for such was not identified. If the root cause f
the incapacity was not identified, then, it cannot be
satisfactorily established as a psychological

(32) LAVADIA vs. CA and HEIRS OF LUN

Atty. Luna, a practicing lawyer up until his death, married
Eugenia in 1947. Their marriage begot seven children,
including Gregorio. After two decades of marriage, Atty.
Luna and his wife agreed to live separately as husband and
wife, and executed an Agreement For Separation and
Property Settlement whereby they agreed to live separately
and to dissolve their conjugal property. On January 2, 1076,
Atty. Luna obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with
Eugenia from the Dominican Republic. On the same day, he
married Soledad.
In 1977, Atty. Luna organized a new law firm with several
other lawyers. The new law office thru Atty. Luna obtained a
condominium unit which they bought on an installment
basis. After full payment, the condominium title was
registered in the names of the lawyers with pro-indivisio
shares. When the law office was dissolved, the condominium
title was still registered in the names of the owners, with
Atty. Lunas share fixed at 25/100. Atty. Luna established a
new law firm with Atty. Dela Cruz. After Atty. Lunas death in
1997, his share in the condominium unit, his law books and
furniture were taken over by Gregorio, his son in the first
marriage. His 25/100 share in the condominium was also
rented out to Atty. Dela Cruz.
Soledad, the second wife, then filed a complaint against the

A G U S T I N, E. P.

heirs of Atty. Luna. According to him, the properties were

acquired by Atty. Luna and her during their marriage, and
because they had no children, 3/4 of the property became
hers, 1/2 being her share in the net estate, and the other
half bequeathed to her in a last will and testament of Atty.
Luna.
The RTC ruled against her, and awarded the properties to
the heirs of Atty. Luna from the first marriage, except for the
foreign law books, which were ordered turned over to her.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals modified the RTC judgment by awarding all the
properties, including the law books to the heirs of Atty. Luna
from the first marriage.
In her petition before the Supreme Court, Zenaida alleged
that the CA erred in holding that the Agreement For
Separation and Property Settlement between Atty. Luna and
Eugenia (the first wife) is ineffectual, hence the conjugal
property was not dissolved.
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court answered it by way
of determining whether the divorce decree between Atty.
Luna and Eugenia was valid, which will decide who among
the contending parties were entitled to the properties left
behind by Atty. Luna.
The Supreme Court:
The divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia was void:
From the time of the celebration of the first marriage on
September 10, 1947 until the present, absolute divorce
between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the
Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce between
Filipinos has remained even under the Family Code, even if
either or both of the spouses are residing abroad.Indeed,
the only two types of defective marital unions under our
laws have been the void and the voidable marriages. As
such, the remedies against such defective marriages have
been limited to the declaration of nullity of the marriage and
the annulment of the marriage.

No judicial approval of the Agreement for Separation and

Property Settlement:
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered
into any marriage settlement prior to their marriage on
September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains governed their property
relations. This is because the Spanish Civil Code, the law
then in force at the time of their marriage, did not specify
the property regime of the spouses in the event that they
had not entered into any marriage settlement before or at
the time of the marriage. Article 119 of the Civil Code clearly
so provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage
settlements agree upon absolute or relative community of
property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon
any other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements,
or when the same are void, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in
this Code, shall govern the property relations between
husband and wife.
Atty. Lunas marriage with Soledad was bigamous, and void
from the very beginning, hence, their property relations is
governed by the rules on co-ownership:
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous,
polygamous, or incestuous are void. Article 71 of the Civil
Code clearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous
marriages as determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a
second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings.[23] A bigamous
marriage is considered void ab initio.
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the
petitioner being void ab initio by virtue of its being
bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous
marriage were governed by the rules on co-ownership,
conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as
husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired
by either or both of them through their work or industry or
their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership.(n)

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CONFLICT OF LAWS

A G U S T I N, E. P.

exists, for the purpose of a decent burial,

and for the exclusion of the intrusion by
third persons who have no legitimate
interest in it. This quasi-property right,
arising out of the duty of those obligated by
law to bury their dead, also authorizes them
to take possession of the dead body for
purposes of burial to have it remain in its
final resting place, or to even transfer it to a
proper place where the memory of the dead
may receive the respect of the living. This is
a family right. There can be no doubt that
persons having this right may recover the
corpse from third persons.

In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried

the burden of proof to confirm such fact. To establish coownership, therefore, it became imperative for the petitioner
to offer proof of her actual contributions in the acquisition of
property. Her mere allegation of co-ownership, without
sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no relief
in her favor. As the Court explained in Saguid v. Court of
Appeals:
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez,
which involved the issue of co-ownership of properties
acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an
adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is
essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners
therein who were parties to the bigamous and adulterous
union is without basis because they failed to substantiate
their allegation that they contributed money in the purchase
of the disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of
Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the controverted
property was titled in the name of the parties to an
adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of coownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property.
Considering that Zenaida failed to adduce evidence of
ownership of the properties subject of the case, the subject
properties were awarded in favour of the heirs of Atty. Luna
from the first marriage.
Petition denied.

(33) VALINO vs ADRIANO et al.

G.R. No. 182894 April 22, 2014

DOCTRINE:

The law confines the right and duty to make

funeral arrangements to the members of
the family to the exclusion of ones common
law partner.

Philippine Law does not recognize common

law marriages. A man and woman not
legally married who cohabit for many years
as husband and wife, who represent
themselves to the public as husband and
wife, and who are reputed to be husband
and wife in the community where they live
may be considered legally married in
common law jurisdictions but not in the
Philippines.

It is generally recognized that the corpse of

an individual is outside the commerce of
man. However, the law recognizes that a
certain right of possession over the corpse

21

CONFLICT OF LAWS

FACTS:
Atty. Adriano Adriano (Atty. Adriano) married
respondent Rosario Adriano in 1955. The couple had
5 children and 1 adopted child, also impleaded
herein as respondents. The marriage did turn sour
and the couple separated in fact, though Adriano
continued to support his wife and children.
Atty. Adriano then started living with Valino, whom
he courted. Atty. Adriano died and since his
immediate family, including respondent were in the
United States, Valino took it upon herself to bury
Atty. Adriano at her family's mausoleum. In the
meantime, Respondents heard about the death and
requested Valino to delay the burial so they can pay
their final respects, but Valino still buried the body.
Respondents commenced suit against Valino praying
that they be indemnified for actual, moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees and that the
remains of Atty. Adriano be exhumed and
transferred to the family plot.
Valino claimed that it was Atty. Adriano's last wish to
be buried at Valino's family's mausoleum and that
the respondent's knew that Atty. Adriano was
already in a coma yet they still proceeded to the US
on vacation. And that as far as the public was
concerned, Valino had been introducing her as his
wife for the past 20 years.
The RTC dismissed the complaint of respondents for
lack of merit as well as the counterclaim of Valino
after it found them to have not been sufficiently
proven.
CA reversed [explained that Rosario, being the legal
wife, was entitled to the custody of the remains of
her deceased husband. Citing Article 305 of the New
Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the Family
Code, it was the considered view of the appellate
court that the law gave the surviving spouse not only
the duty but also the right to make arrangements for
the funeral of her husband. For the CA, Rosario was
still entitled to such right on the ground of her
subsisting marriage with Atty. Adriano at the time of
the latters death, notwithstanding their 30-year
separation in fact.]
ISSUE:

A G U S T I N, E. P.

Whether or not the respondents (wife and children of

deceased Atty. Adriano) are entitled to the remains
of Atty. Adriano.
HELD:
YES. The weight of legal provisions puts the
responsibility of the burial with the respondents, to
wit:
The duty and the right to make arrangements for the
funeral of a relative shall be in accordance with the
order established for support, under Article 294. In
case of descendants of the same degree, or of
brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In
case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better
right. (New Civil Code Art. 305)

Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give

support, the liability shall devolve upon the following
persons in the order herein provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and
(4) The brothers and sisters. (Family Code, Art. 199)

No human remains shall be retained, interred,

disposed of or exhumed without the consent of the
persons mentioned in Articles [199 of the Family
Code] and 305. (New Civil Code, Art. 308)
As applied to this case, it is clear that the law gives
the right and duty to make funeral arrangements to
Rosario, she being the surviving legal wife of Atty.
Adriano. The fact that she was living separately from
her husband and was in the United States when he
died has no controlling significance. To say that
Rosario had, in effect, waived or renounced,
expressly or impliedly, her right and duty to make
arrangements for the funeral of her deceased
husband is baseless.
It is also recognized that a corpse is outside the
commerce of man. However, the law recognizes that
a certain right of possession over the corpse exists,
for the purpose of a decent burial, and for the
exclusion of the intrusion by third persons who have
no legitimate interest in it. This quasi-property right,
arising out of the duty of those obligated by law to
bury their dead, also authorizes them to take
possession of the dead body for purposes of burial to
have it remain in its final resting place, or to even
transfer it to a proper place where the memory of
the dead may receive the respect of the living. This
is a family right. There can be no doubt that persons
having this right may recover the corpse from third
persons.

22

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A G U S T I N, E. P.