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No. 16-3628
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
MALIBU MEDIA LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DAVID RICUPERO,
Defendant-Appellant,
___________________________________________________
On Appeal from the United State District Court
for the Southern District of Ohio
No. 2:14-cv-00821
___________________________________________________
DEFENDANT-APPELLANTS OPENING BRIEF
___________________________________________________
Jason E. Sweet
BBO #668596
BOOTH SWEET LLP
32R Essex Street
Cambridge, MA 02139
T: 617-250-8619
F: 617-250-8883
jsweet@boothsweet.com
Joseph A. Bahgat (0082116)
Bahgat & Bahgat LLC
338 South High Street
Columbus OH 43215
T/F: 877-721-9027
joe@hubcitylawgroup.com
Counsel for Defendant-Appellant
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No. 16-3628
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
____________________________
)
MALIBU MEDIA, LLC,
)
)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
)
)
v.
)
)
DAVID RICUPERO,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
____________________________)
RULE 26.1 CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
The following information is submitted pursuant to Cir. R. 26.1
and Fed. R. App. P. 26.1:
1. Is said party a subsidiary or affiliate of a publicly owned
corporation? No.
2. Is there a publicly owned corporation, not a party to the
appeal, that has a financial interest in the outcome? No.
/s/Jason E. Sweet
_____________
BBO #668596
BOOTH SWEET LLP
32R Essex Street
Cambridge, MA 02139
T: 617-250-8619
F: 617-250-8883
jsweet@boothsweet.com
Counsel for Defendant-Appellant
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT. i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...... v
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT ... 1
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT .... 2
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW .. 3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ...... 5
STANDARD OF REVIEW .. 29
ARGUMENT ....... 30
I.
II.
III.
IV.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
(continued)
Page
B. The absence of any citation to the record
impairs review .. 43
C. Resources were expended defending a suit Malibu
had no intention of pursuing to resolution 46
D. Malibus inability to comply with its own discovery
schedule weighs against dismissal .... 50
1. Malibus dismissal six days before
dispositive motions were due carries
great significance ... 51
2. Unduly vexatious conduct weighs against
dismissal .. 54
E. The explanation for dismissal was manufactured
to avoid a negative ruling ... 56
1. Dismissal is an offense to equity .... 58
F. The factor is to be considered is whether dispositive
motions were pending .. 59
V.
VI.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
(continued)
Page
VII. ANY DISMISSAL SHOULD BE CONDITIONED ON
MALIBU PROVIDING PROPER RESPONSES TO
RICUPEROS DISCOVERY DEMANDS ... 68
CONCLUSION .... 71
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ... 72
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ... 73
DESIGNATION OF THE RECORD ..... 74
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
AmSouth Bank v. Dale,
386 F.3d 763 (6th Cir. 2004) ... 31
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242 (1986) ...... 45
Beattie v. Madison County Sch. Dist.,
254 F.3d 595 (5th Cir. 2001) .... 50
Bosteve Ltd. v. Marauszwki,
110 F.R.D. 257 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) ..... 39
Bridgeport Music v. Universal-MCA Music Publ.,
481 F.3d 926 (6th Cir. 2007) ... 43, 46
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Universal-MCA Music Pub., Inc.
583 F.3d 948 (6th Cir. 2009) .. 68
Brown v. Tellermate Holdings Ltd.,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90123 (S.D. Ohio Jul. 1, 2014) 22
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317 (1986) ...... 49
Christiansburg Garment Co.,
434 U.S. 412 (1978) ... 55
Compuserve Inc. v. Saperstein,
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 498 (6th Cir. 1999) 39
CRST Van Expedited, Inc. v. EEOC,
136 S.Ct. 1642 (2016) ... 1, 68
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cox,
447 F.3d 967 (6th Cir. 2006) ... 29
v
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vii
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Leary v. Daeschner,
349 F.3d 888 (6th Cir. 2006) .. 44
Leon v. City of Columbus,
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25595
(S.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 2012) .. 58
Linthicum v. Johnson,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85893
(S.D. Ohio Nov. 28, 2006) . 59
Maddox v. Kentucky Finance Company, Inc.,
736 F.2d 380 (6th Cir. 1984) ... 36
Maldonado v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch.,
65 Fed. Appx. 955 (6th Cir. 2003) 40, 59
Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe,
82 F.Supp. 3d 650 (E.D. Pa. 2015)
(cited to as R.58-6, Dalzell Opinion) ... 42
Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55985 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 6, 2013) 38
Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14798 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 2, 2016)
(cited to as R.78-30, Brown Opinion) . 41, 52
Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42267
(S.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2016) .. 44
Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80003
(N.D. Cal. June 20, 2016) .. 35
Malibu Media, LLC v. Lee,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72218
(D.N.J. May 22, 2013) .. 34
viii
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xi
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LOCAL RULES
S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 37.1 ... 13
S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 7.2(2) ... 27
ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES
www.pacer.gov .... 42
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Plaintiff-Appellee Malibu Media, LLC (Malibu) asserted
claims under 17 U.S.C. 101 et seq. Amended Complaint, R.5.
The district courts jurisdiction over Malibus claims arose
under 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1338; and over Ricuperos
counterclaims under 28 U.S.C. 1331, 1338, 1367, 2201, and
2202. Final judgment was entered on May 13, 2016. May 13th
Order, R.91. Ricupero timely filed his notice of appeal on Jun.
12, 2016. Notice of Appeal, R.93, PageID #1245. This Court has
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291.
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were identical save that the later omits Malibus claims that
Ricupero had not produced his Dropbox or Google Drive
accounts. Id. Notably, neither report stated that it found any
evidence, on any of Ricuperos devices, of any of the works cited
in Malibus complaint; any torrent files relating to the download
or distribution of Malibu works; any spoliation; or of Vuze, the
only BitTorrent client that Malibu identified as used to infringe
its works. First MySQL Log, R.78-5; Dec. 23rd Paige Report, R.
76-2,; cf. Neville Declaration, R.79-2; Neville Report, R.79-3,
PageID #1145-1160.
On Jan. 4, 2016, when the parties conferred about
Malibus refusal to produce evidence, Malibu claimed for the
first time that it was contractually prohibited from obtaining
the evidence from its investigators. Feb. 1st Email, R.78-22.
Ricupero served a formal discovery request for the contract on
Jan. 12, 2016twelve days prior to the Jan. 28 discovery
deadline. Second Production Request, R.78-21, PageID #980.
Ricupero followed up on Feb. 1, 2016, also requesting a copy of
an affidavit Malibu recently obtained from TWC. Feb. 1st Email,
R.78-22, PageID #982. Malibu replied on Feb. 11, 2016,
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews a district courts discretion whether to
exercise jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action de
novo. Western World Ins. Co. v. Hoey, 773 F.3d 755, 762 (6th
Cir. 2014); DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cox, 447 F.3d 967, 971
(6th Cir. 2006). See also Holliday v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA,
569 Fed. Appx. 366, 367 (6th Cir. 2014) (This Court reviews de
novo a district courts decision to grant or deny a motion to
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).).
A district courts decisions with respect to a voluntary
dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2) are reviewed for abuse of
discretion. DWG Corp. v. Granada Invs., Inc., 962 F.2d 1201,
1202 (6th Cir. 1992); Grover by Grover v. Eli Lilly and Co., 33
F.3d 716, 718 (6th Cir. 1994); see also Duffy v. Ford Motor Co.,
218 F.3d 623, 629 (6th Cir. 2000). It is an abuse of discretion
for the district court to rely on erroneous findings of fact, apply
the wrong legal standard, misapply the correct legal standard,
or make a clear error in judgment. Nafziger v. McDermott Intl,
Inc., 467 F.3d 514, 522 (6th Cir. 2006).
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ARGUMENT
I.
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Corp., 746 F.2d 323, 326 (6th Cir. 1984).4 Failure to apply the
factors when dismissing a declaratory judgment claim
constitutes reversible error. U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Albex
Aluminum, 161 Fed. Appx. 562, 564 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing
AmSouth Bank v. Dale, 386 F.3d 763, 785 (6th Cir. 2004)).
In applying the Grand Trunk factors, [t]he essential
question is always whether a district court has taken a good
look at the issue and engaged in a reasoned analysisof whether
issuing a declaration would be useful and fair. Hoey, 773 F.3d
at 759. However, here, the trial court failed to provide so much
as a cursory review of the Grand Trunk factors or elucidate as
to why the factors would not apply to the matter at hand,
subverting any notion a reasoned analysis was made.5
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Parrish, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59414, *5-6 (N.D. Ind. Jun. 11,
2010).
Such an inquiry is essential, because it is difficult in most
instances to determine whether counterclaims are identical
early in litigation. The safer course is to deny dismissal of the
counterclaim unless there is no doubt that it will be rendered
moot by the adjudication of the main action. Dominion, 126 F.
2d at 174 (we are of opinion that it was error to strike out the
counterclaim at so early a stage.); Wilson, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 59414, *5-6 (The case could conceivably be decided on
grounds other than the copyright infringement claim, which
would keep the declaratory judgment sought in the
Counterclaim relevant.). Even the Principal Life decision,
which the trial court cites, cautioned such restraint. Principal
Life, 674 F.Supp. 2d at 566. Indeed, the best and most sensible
time to determine the question is at the time of trial. No
possible harm can result from the delay. Jungersen v. Miller,
125 F.Supp. 846, 847 (D. Ohio 1954).
Accordingly, Ricupero gave the trial court every reason to
delay its Feb. 4th order: (1) Ricupero alerted the trial court to
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Natl Bank & Trust Co., 936 F.2d 273, 277 (6th Cir. 1991). The
test considers (1) whether there is a logical relationship between
the two claims; (2) whether the issues of fact and law raised by
the claim and counterclaim are largely the same; (3) whether
res judicata bars a subsequent suit on the counterclaim if the
court were not to take jurisdiction; and (4) whether
substantially the same evidence support or refute both the claim
and the counterclaim. Maddox v. Kentucky Finance Company,
Inc., 736 F.2d 380, 382 (6th Cir. 1984). The purpose is to
determine (1) whether issues of law and fact are common
among the claims; and (2) whether substantially the same
evidence would be used to support or refute the claims.
Sanders, 936 F.2d at 277.
There exists no precedent whatsoever indicating that
declaratory judgment claims are immune from Rule 13(a).
There is no reason why such actions would be excluded
from the rules of civil procedure or from the compulsory
counterclaim rule, as the policy rationale for compulsory
counterclaimsto eliminate wasteful, repetitive actions
applies with equal force in declaratory judgment actions
and in actions seeking other relief.
Holbrook v. Shelter Ins. Co., 186 Fed. Appx. 618, 621-622 (6th
Cir. 2006). See also, e.g. Polymer Industrial Products Co. v.
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A. T h e g r a n t o f d i s m i s s a l w a s i m p r o p e r l y
conditioned upon typicality.
Whether it was proper to grant Malibus dismissal
involves determining if such a dismissal caused Ricupero plain
legal prejudice. Perkins v. MBNA Am., 43 Fed. Appx. 901, 902
(6th Cir. 2002); Jones v. Lemke, 178 F.3d 1294 (6th Cir. 1999);
Grover, 33 F.3d at 718.
Four factors are considered when determining legal
prejudice: (1) defendants effort and expense in trial
preparation; (2) plaintiffs excessive delay and lack of diligence
in prosecuting the action; (3) the sufficiency of plaintiffs
explanation for the dismissal; and (4) whether defendant has
filed for summary judgment. Maldonado v. Thomas M. Cooley
Law Sch., 65 Fed. Appx. 955, 956 (6th Cir. 2003).
The factors, however, are only a guide; discretion
ultimately rests with the court. Rosenthal v. Bridgestone/
Firestone, Inc., 217 Fed. Appx. 498, 502 (6th Cir. 2007). See
also Fawns v. Ratcliff, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 17206, *8-9 (6th
Cir. 1997) (combination of first and third factors alone sufficient
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Available at www.pacer.gov
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See e.g. Morscott, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 936 F.2d 271, 272
(6th Cir. 1991); Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 905 (6th Cir.
2003).
No explanation appears in the record which justifies the
unconditional dismissal in this case. To the contrary, the
opinions only comment on the merits is that any contention
Malibus dismissal was to avoid its discovery obligations or a
decision on the merits, is speculative. May 13th Order, R.91,
PageID ##1228-1229; cf. Voluntary Dismissal Opposition, R.
80, PageID ##1173-1175. See also Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe,
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42267, *11 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2016)
([Malibus] countless voluntary dismissals filed in numerous
other suits in this District and others indicat[es] that it [does
not intend] to prosecute the merits of its copyright infringement
claims).
The May 13th opinion not only reflects the totality of facts
as construed most favorably for Malibus voluntary dismissal,
but also constitutes an exclusive summary of only those facts
which favor Malibus motion. Though the trial court purports to
tak[e] into account the entire record in this case, [May 13th,
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Dist. LEXIS 40496, *10 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2012) (citations
omitted). Nor can this Court be expected to properly review the
trial courts opinion when it parses the record or otherwise
makes speculative determinations to conform to its ruling.
Bridgeport Music, 481 F.3d at 931; EMI April Music, Inc. v.
1064 Old River Rd., Inc., 214 Fed. Appx. 589, 591 (6th Cir.
2007) (abuse of discretion occurs where the district court fails
to consider relevant facts upon which the exercise of its
discretionary judgment is based.); DWG Corp., 962 F.2d at
1202.
At the end of a case, although a litigant may be
disappointed in the outcome, he should still leave the
courthouse feeling that he has been treated fairly.
C. Resources were expended defending a suit Malibu
had no intention of pursuing to resolution.
After conceding the weakness of its claims against
Ricupero, but not before he expended significant resources,
Malibu voluntarily dismissed its claims.
The trial court discounts most, if not all, of Ricuperos
effort and expense in defending himself as wholly unnecessary
and misdirected motion practice in what it characterizes as
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Co., 5 Fed. Appx. 396, 400-401 (6th Cir. 2001). Cf. May 13th
Order, R.91, PageID #1230 (the desire to avoid expensive
litigation is a justifiable reason to dismiss this action). Often,
Ricuperos oppositions were compelled to correct Malibus
misrepresentations of law and fact. See e.g. Opposition to
Second Extension, R.53, PageID ##525-526; Opposition to
Fourth Extension, R.65, PageID ##678-679.
The second faults Ricupero for not directly disput[ing]
Malibu[]s characterization of his discovery efforts [May
13th Order, R.91, PageID #1226] and his utter lack of zeal in
pursuing Malibus discovery deficiencies [id., PageID #1228].
Even if correct, the trial court fails to explain what purpose
continued pursuit of discovery would serve. Ricuperos right to
rebut Malibus allegations meant little because no admissible
evidence was ever produced. Neville Declaration, R.79-2;
Neville Report, R.79-3. There was simply no way that this case
could go forward. Instead, Ricupero, via dispositive motions,
was able to demonstrate that Malibus claims lacked merit.
Default Judgment, R. 78; Summary Judgment, R.79. The
burden of proof is upon Malibu for its copyright infringement
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claims. Feist Publns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,
361 (1991). Ricupero has no obligation to produce or seek out
evidence negating Malibus case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 322-323 (1986). Ricupero need only point to the lack
of evidence supporting Malibus claim. Id.; Hayes v. Equitable
Energy Res. Co., 266 F.3d 560, 566 (6th Cir. 2001) (The
moving party need not support its motion with evidence
disproving the non-moving partys claim, but need only show
that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving
partys case.). Despite numerous extensions to allow for
further development of its case, the expert report(s) failed to
demonstrate any genuine question of material fact about
whether Ricupero infringed its works when it sought dismissal.
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) (absent copying, there
can be no infringement).
To the extent Malibu can be said to have met its burden, it
is only because the trial court strains to lift that burden and
place it upon the shoulders of Ricupero.
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the courts ability to control its docket, disrupt the agreedupon course of the litigation, and reward the indolent and
the cavalier.
Smith v. Holston Med. Group, P.C., 595 Fed. Appx. 474, 480
(6th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted).
Nonetheless, the trial court points the finger at Ricupero
for any delay [May 13th Order, R.91, PageID #1229], ignoring
the five months that lapsed while Malibus motions languished
on its docket.
1. Malibus dismissal six days before dispositive
motions were due carries great significance.
The appropriate measure in determining diligence in
moving for voluntary dismissal is not the period after which a
party finds out that its choice to act on a meritless claim was illconceived. Rather, it is the period between the filing of the
complaint and the filing of the dismissal, and the significant
events that transpired in the interim that should have prompted
Malibu to acknowledge the fruitless nature of pursuing this
litigation far earlier. Fawns, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 17206, *7-9;
United Van Lines v. Solino, 153 Fed. Appx. 46 (2d Cir. 2005),
(denying dismissal where the claims had been pending for
months, discovery had occurred and the court had decided
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(The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that
[plaintiffs] conspicuously conditional offer to discontinue
litigation of claims it found to be frivolous, unreasonable, or
groundless was tantamount to continu[ing] to litigate those
claims.).
E. The explanation for dismissal was manufactured
to avoid a negative ruling.
Malibu insists that it did conduct a pre-filing investigation
into the legal and factual basis for its copyright claims, and that
its decision to abandon those claims has nothing to do with the
merits. Voluntary Dismissal, R.76, PageID #732. Instead, it
explains that its decision was based on its belief that it would
not be cost-effective to pursue. Id., PageID #740 (In short,
Plaintiff very recently learned it has no upside in this case.).
Such a decision had not followed the trial courts urging.
The trial court rejects any notion Ricuperos financial
situation should have been obvious from the outset, because
any statements made by Ricupero were unverified. May 13th
Order, R.91, PageID #1230. The trial court goes on to find it
reasonable that his financial situation was a topic Malibu
Media would have chosen to explore at Mr. Ricuperos
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Case: 16-3628
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Ricupero respectfully
requests the following relief:
1. The declaratory judgment counterclaim be reinstated and
remanded for independent adjudication despite Malibus
dismissal without prejudice of its claims; and
2. Malibus dismissal of its claims be conditioned on it
providing proper responses to Ricuperos discovery
demands.
Dated: December 21, 2016
Respectfully submitted,
s/Jason
E. Sweet
_____________
Jason E. Sweet
BBO #668596
BOOTH SWEET LLP
32R Essex Street
Cambridge, MA 02139
T: 617-250-8619
F: 617-250-8883
jsweet@boothsweet.com
Counsel for Defendant-Appellant
!71
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Document: 31
Filed: 12/21/2016
Page: 85
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that the foregoing Brief complies with Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 32(a)(7)(B) in that it contains
12,844 words, exclusive of the corporate disclosure statement,
table of contents, table of authorities, statement with respect to
oral argument, this certificate of compliance, and the certificate
of service.
s/Jason
E. Sweet
_____________
Jason E. Sweet
BBO #668596
BOOTH SWEET LLP
32R Essex Street
Cambridge, MA 02139
T: 617-250-8619
F: 617-250-8883
jsweet@boothsweet.com
Counsel for Defendant-Appellant
!72
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Document: 31
Filed: 12/21/2016
Page: 86
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on December 21, 2016 a corrected
copy of the foregoing brief of Defendant-Appellants was filed
electronically through the ECF system. Notice of the filing will
be sent to all parties by operation of the Courts electronic filing
system. Parties may access this filing through the Courts
electronic filing system.
s/Jason
E. Sweet
_____________
Jason E. Sweet
BBO #668596
BOOTH SWEET LLP
32R Essex Street
Cambridge, MA 02139
T: 617-250-8619
F: 617-250-8883
jsweet@boothsweet.com
Counsel for Defendant-Appellant
!73
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Page: 87
26(f) Motion
07/12/2014
16
R. 2-1
26(f) Memo
07/12/2014
19
R. 5
Amended Complaint
09/22/2014
51-53
R. 7
Answer
10/20/2014
70-73
R. 9
Motion to Dismiss
11/10/2014
e.g.
R. 10
Motion to Strike
11/10/2014
e.g.
R. 14
Consent Order
12/02/2014
133
R. 15
Discovery Schedule
12/03/2014
135
R. 22
02/04/2015
160-161
R. 23
Reconsideration
02/20/2015
e.g.
R. 25
First Extension
02/23/2015
e.g.
R. 27
Opposition to First
Extension
03/06/2015
195-196
R. 27-2
03/06/2015
210-211
R. 28-1
Discovery Responses
03/13/2015
223-237
R. 28-2
Objections to Discovery
Responses
03/13/2015
233
R. 28-3
03/13/2015
e.g.
R. 28-4
03/13/2015
237-241
R. 28-5
Stipulation
03/13/2015
e.g.
R. 28-6
03/13/2015
e.g.
R. 30-1
Proposed Sur-reply
03/19/2015
265-266
R. 36
Motion to Compel
04/01/2015
318
74
Case: 16-3628
Document: 31
Filed: 12/21/2016
Page: 88
R. 39
Neighbors Protective
Motion
04/03/2015
e.g.
R. 39-1
373-375
R. 39-2
04/03/2015
377
R. 41
Ricuperos Protective
Motion
04/04/2015
386-389
R. 41-2
04/04/2015
394
R. 41-3
04/04/2015
397
R. 42
TWC Subpoena
04/06/2015
e.g.
R. 43
Denton Deposition
04/07/2015
e.g.
R. 47
Second Extension
04/15/2015
434
R. 49
Motion to Exclude
04/16/2015
e.g.
R. 49-1
04/16/2015
475
R. 51
Opposition to Protective
Orders
04/17/2015
505-506
R. 52
Withdrawal of Protective
Orders
04/19/2015
513
R. 52-1
04/19/2015
516
R. 53
Opposition to Second
Extension
04/19/2015
525-526
R. 53-1
Reply to Discovery
Objections
04/19/2015
535
R. 53-3
Cancellation Email
04/19/2015
550
R. 57
Third Extension
04/24/2015
e.g.
R. 58
Opposition to Compel
05/04/2015
564-573
R. 58-6
Dalzell Opinion
05/04/2015
606-620
R. 59
05/04/2015
626-627
R. 64
Fourth Extension
05/16/2015
e.g.
75
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Document: 31
Filed: 12/21/2016
Page: 89
R. 65
Opposition to Fourth
Extension
05/22/2015
678-679
R. 67
07/14/2015
685-709
R. 68
Fifth Extension
10/05/2015
e.g.
R. 69
Notice of Conference
10/20/2015
714
R. 70
Opposition to Third
Extension
10/22/2015
715-717
R. 76
Voluntary Dismissal
02/23/2016
732-748
R. 76-2
02/23/2016
e.g.
R. 76-8
02/23/2016
e.g.
R. 77
02/24/2016
830
R. 78
Default Judgment
02/29/2016
831-852
R. 78-1
Sweet Affidavit
02/29/2016
855-856
R. 78-2
Interrogatories
02/29/2016
e.g.
R. 78-3
Admissions
02/29/2016
e.g.
R. 78-4
Document Request
02/29/2016
e.g.
R. 78-5
02/29/2016
876-903
R. 78-9
02/29/2016
930-937
02/29/2016
939
02/29/2016
942-943
02/29/2016
946-949
02/29/2016
951
02/29/2016
954
02/29/2016
958-959
02/29/2016
963
02/29/2016
965
R. 78-18 Emails
02/29/2016
969-970
76
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Document: 31
Filed: 12/21/2016
Page: 90
02/29/2016
974
02/29/2016
976
02/29/2016
980
02/29/2016
982
02/29/2016
985
02/29/2016
988-990
02/29/2016 1036-1061
R. 79
Summary Judgment
02/29/2016
R. 79-1
02/29/2016 1134-1137
R. 79-2
Neville Declaration
02/29/2016 1140-1143
R. 79-3
Neville Report
02/29/2016 1145-1160
R. 80
Voluntary Dismissal
Opposition
03/04/2016
1165-1177
R. 82
Sixth Extension
03/21/2016
e.g.
R. 83
03/22/2016
e.g.
R. 84
03/23/2016 1189-1191
R. 86
Seventh Extension
03/24/2016
e.g.
R. 87
03/28/2016
1208
R. 90
04/01/2016 1216-1219
R. 91
05/13/2016 1221-1233
R. 93
Notice of Appeal
06/12/2016
R. 100
11/04/2016 1290-1291
77
1124-1131
1245