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ELECTION ADJUDICATION SYSTEM APPEAL AND OTHER ELECTION ISSUES [XIII-XIV]

XIII.

Election Adjudication System


1. Jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Courts
EXCEPTION: exercises jurisdiction only over offenses relating to failure to register
or to vote
2. Jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts
Has exclusive jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal actions or proceedings for
violation of elections laws.
3. Jurisdiction of COMELEC
Has exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute cases involving violations
of election laws (Sec. 2(6) Art. IX-C, 1987 Constitution)
but COMELEC may delegate power to the Provincial Prosecutor
It is not the duty of the COMELEC, as investigator and prosecutor to gather
proof in support of a complaint filed before it.
The ombudsman or Prosecutor may only prosecute election offenses if
deputized by the COMELEC
4. Procedure in election contests: Courts, COMELEC
Art.XXI (Election Contests) OEC
Sec. 254. Procedure in election contests. - The Commission shall prescribe the
rules to govern the procedure and other matters relating to election contests
pertaining to all national, regional, provincial, and city offices not later than thirty
days before such elections. Such rules shall provide a simple and inexpensive
procedure for the expeditious disposition of election contests and shall be
published in at least two newspapers of general circulation.
However, with respect to election contests involving municipal and barangay
offices the following rules of procedure shall govern:
(a) Notice of the protest contesting the election of a candidate for a municipal or
barangay office shall be served upon the candidate by means of a summons at
the postal address stated in his certificate of candidacy except when the
protestee, without waiting for the summons, has made the court understand that
he has been notified of the protest or has filed his answer hereto;
(b) The protestee shall answer the protest within five days after receipt of the
summons, or, in case there has been no summons from the date of his
appearance and in all cases before the commencement of the hearing of the
protest or contest. The answer shall deal only with the election in the polling
places which are covered by the allegations of the contest;
(c) Should the protestee desire to impugn the votes received by the protestant in
other polling places, he shall file a counter-protest within the same period fixed for
the answer serving a copy thereof upon the protestant by registered mail or by
personal delivery or through the sheriff;
(d) The protestant shall answer the counter-protest within five days after notice;
(e) Within the period of five days counted from the filing of the protest any other
candidate for the same office may intervene in the case as other contestants and
ask for affirmative relief in his favor by a petition in intervention, which shall be
considered as another contest, except that it shall be substantiated within the

same proceedings. The protestant or protestee shall answer the protest in


intervention within five days after notice;
(f) If no answer shall be filed to the contest, counter-protest, or to the protest in
intervention, within the time limits respectively fixed, a general denial shall be
deemed to have been entered;
(g) In election contest proceedings, the permanent registry list of voters shall be
conclusive in regard to the question as to who had the right to vote in said
election.
5.

Procedure in HRET, SET, PET


HRET PROCEDURE (2011 Rules of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, or HRET Rules)
RULE 15. How Initiated. An election contest is initiated by the filing of a
verified petition of protest or a verified petition for quo warranto against a
Member of the House of Representatives. An election protest shall not include a
petition for quo warranto. Neither shall a petition for quo warranto include an
election protest.
RULE 16. Election Protest. A verified petition contesting the election or returns
of any Member of the House of Representatives shall be filed by any candidate
who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same
office, within fifteen (15) days after the proclamation of the winner. The party filing
the protest shall be designated as the protestant while the adverse party shall be
known as the protestee.
No joint election protest shall be admitted, but the Tribunal, for good and
sufficient reasons, may consolidate individual protests and hear and decide them
jointly. Thus, where there are two or more protests involving the same protestee
and common principal causes of action, the subsequent protests shall be
consolidated with the earlier case to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. In case of
objection to the consolidation, the Tribunal shall resolve the same. An order
resolving a motion for or objection to the consolidation shall be unappealable.
The protest is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read it and that the
allegations therein are true and correct of his knowledge and belief or based on
verifiable information or authentic records. A verification based on "information
and belief," or upon "knowledge, information and belief," is not a sufficient
verification.
An unverified election protest shall not suspend the running of the reglementary
period to file the protest.
An election protest shall state:
1. The date of proclamation of the winner and the number of votes obtained
by the parties per proclamation;
2. The total number of contested individual and clustered precincts per
municipality or city;
3. The individual and clustered precinct numbers and location of the
contested precincts; and

4. The specific acts or omissions complained of constituting the electoral


frauds, anomalies or irregularities in the contested precincts.
RULE 17. Quo Warranto. A verified petition for quo warranto contesting the
election of a Member of the House of Representatives on the ground of ineligibility
or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall be filed by any registered
voter of the district concerned within fifteen (15) days from the date of the
proclamation of the winner. The party filing the petition shall be designated as the
petitioner while the adverse party shall be known as the respondent.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph to the contrary notwithstanding, a
petition for quo warranto may be filed by any registered voter of the district
concerned against a member of the House of Representatives, on the ground of
citizenship, at any time during his tenure.
The rule on verification and consolidation provided in Section 16 hereof shall
apply to petitions for quo warranto.
RULE 18. Damages. Damages may be granted in election protests or quo
warranto proceedings in accordance with law.
RULE 19. Periods Non-Extendible. The period for the filing of the appropriate
petition, as prescribed in Rules 16 and 17, is jurisdictional and cannot be
extended.
RULE 20. Filing with the Tribunal. Petitions for election protests and quo
warranto shall be filed either personally with the Office of the Secretary of the
Tribunal or by registered mail addressed to the Secretary of the Tribunal, together
with fifteen (15) clearly legible copies thereof. If filed personally, the Secretary of
the Tribunal shall inscribe on the petition the date and hour of filing. If filed by
registered mail, the date of the mailing of the petition, as shown by the post office
stamp on the envelope or the registry receipt, shall be considered as the date of
its filing with the Tribunal. The envelope shall be attached to the record of the
case.
RULE 21. Summary Dismissal of Election Contest. An election protest or
petition for quo warranto may be summarily dismissed by the Tribunal without the
necessity of requiring the protestee or respondent to answer if, inter alia:
(1) The petition is insufficient in form and substance;
(2) The petition is filed beyond the periods provided in Rules 16 and 17 of
these Rules;
(3) The filing fee is not paid within the periods provided for filing the protest
or petition for quo warranto;
(4) In case of a protest where a cash deposit is required, the cash deposit, or
the first P150, 000.00 thereof, is not paid within ten (10) days after the filing
of the protest; and
(5) The petition or copies thereof and the annexes thereto filed with the
Tribunal are not clearly legible.
For this purpose, the Secretary of the Tribunal shall, upon receipt of the
petition, prepare a report and calendar the same for appropriate action by the
Tribunal or the Executive Committee.
This rule shall, pro tanto, apply to counter-protests.
SET PROCEDURE (RA 66 Revised Rules of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal)
RULE 13.How Initiated. An election contest is initiated by the filing of an
election protest or a petition for quo warranto against a Member of the Senate. An

election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto, nor shall a petition
for quo warranto include an election protest.
RULE 14.Election Protest. A verified petition contesting the election of any
Member of the Senate shall be filed by any candidate who has duly filed a
certificate of candidacy and been voted for the office of Senator within fifteen (15)
days after the proclamation of the protestee. No joint election protest shall be
admitted, but the Tribunal, for good and sufficient reasons, may consolidate
individual protests and hear and decide them jointly. chanrobles virtual law library
RULE 15.Quo Warranto. A verified petition for quo warranto contesting the
election of a Member of the Senate on the ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the
Republic of the Philippines shall be filed by any voter within ten (10) days after the
proclamation of the respondent. chanrobles virtual law library
RULE 16.Damages. Damages may be granted in election contests (protests or
quo warranto proceedings) in accordance with law.
RULE 17.Periods Non-extendible. The periods prescribed in Rules 14 and 15 are
non-extendible.
RULE 18.How Filed. Election contests (protest or quo warranto) shall be filed
either personally with the Office of the Secretary of the Tribunal or by registered
mail addressed to the same office in fifteen (15) clearly legible copies. If filed
personally, the Secretary of the Tribunal shall endorse on the petition the date and
hour of filing; if filed by registered mail, the date of the mailing of the petition, as
shown by the post office stamp on the covering envelope or the registry receipt,
shall be considered as the date of filing in the Tribunal. The envelope shall be
attached to the record of the case.
RULE 19.Summary Dismissal. An election protest or petition for quo warranto
may be summarily dismissed by the Tribunal without requiring the protestee or
respondent to answer, if inter alias:
(1)The petition is insufficient in form and substance;
(2)The petition is filed beyond the period prescribed therefor in Rule 14 or
Rule 15, as the case may be;
(3)The filing fee is not paid within the applicable period prescribed in these
Rules;
(4)In case of protests where a cash deposit is required, if such deposit, or the
first One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos thereof, is not paid within
ten (10) days after the filing of the petition;
(5)The petition or copies thereof, or their annexes, filed with the Tribunal are
not clearly legible.
PET PROCEDURE (RA 1793)
Section 3. The Presidential Electorial Tribunal shall decide the contest within
twenty months after it is filed, and within said period shall declare who among the
parties has been elected, or, in the proper case, that none has been elected, and
in case of a tie between the candidates for president or for vice-president involved
in the contest, one of them shall be chosen President or Vice-President, as the
case may be, by a majority vote of the members of the Congress in joint session
assembled.

Molaer, Airisa D. | Election Law | Atty. Pascasio

The party who, in the judgment, has been declared elected, shall have the right to
assume the office as soon as the judgment becomes final which shall be ten days
after promulgation. The promulgation shall be made on a date previously fixed, of
which notice shall be served in advance upon the parties or their attorneys,
personally or by registered mail or by telegraph. No motion shall be entertained for
the reopening of a case but only for the reconsideration of a decision under the
evidence already of record, No party may file more than one motion for
reconsideration, copy of which shall be served upon the adverse party who shall
answer it within five days after the receipt thereof. Any petition for reconsideration
shall be resolved within ten days after it is submitted for resolution. As soon as a
decision becomes final, a copy thereof shall be furnished both houses of the
Congress.
Section 5. Any registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the
Philippines who received not less than five hundred thousand votes may contest
the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by filing a
petition of contest with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty
days after the proclamation of the result of the election.
Before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal shall take cognizance of a petition of
contest or counter-contest, the contestant or counter-contestant shall file a bond
with two sureties satisfactory to the Tribunal and for such amount as it may fix, to
answer for the payment of all expenses and costs incidental to said contest, or
shall deposit with the Tribunal cash in lieu of the bond, or both, as the Tribunal
may order. Within five days from the filing of the contest or counter-contest, the
Tribunal shall fix the amount of the bond or the cash deposit or both and if the
contestant or counter-contestant fails to file the required bond or cash deposit or
both within ten days from notice, his petition of contest or counter-contest, shall
be dismissed. The Tribunal may, for good reason, order from time to time that the
amount of the bond or the cash deposit be increased or decreased, or order the
disposition of such deposit as the course of the contest may require. In case the
party who has paid the expenses and costs wins in the contest, the Tribunal shall
assess, levy and collect the same as costs from the losing party.
6.

Readings:

Article IX (c), Sec. 2, 1987 Constitution


SECTION 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns,
and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate
jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of
general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited
jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective
municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including
determination of the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials
and inspectors, and registration of voters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies and

(5)

(6)

(7)
(8)
(9)

instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the
exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or coalitions which, in
addition to other requirements, must present their platform or program of government; and
accredit citizens arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious denominations and sects
shall not be registered. Those which seek to achieve their goals through violence or
unlawful means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported
by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to political parties,
organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections constitute interference in
national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of
their registration with the Commission, in addition to other penalties that may be prescribed
by law.
File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or
exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of
election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and
malpractices.
Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including
limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be posted, and to prevent and
penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.
Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized, or the
imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to
its directive, order, or decision.
Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the conduct of each
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
Article XXI, Secs. 249-252, OEC

Sec. 249. Jurisdiction of the Commission. - The Commission shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all Members of the Batasang
Pambansa, elective regional, provincial and city officials.
Sec. 250. Election contests for Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial and city offices. - A
sworn petition contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa or any
regional, provincial or city official shall be filed with the Commission by any candidate who has
duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within ten days after
the proclamation of the results of the election.
Sec. 251. Election contests for municipal offices. - A sworn petition contesting the election of a
municipal officer shall be filed with the proper regional trial court by any candidate who has duly
filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within ten days after
proclamation of the results of the election.
Sec. 252. Election contest for barangay offices. - A sworn petition contesting the election of a
barangay officer shall be filed with the proper municipal or metropolitan trial court by any
candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office,
within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election. The trial court shall decide
the election protest within fifteen days after the filing thereof. The decision of the municipal or
metropolitan trial court may be appealed within ten days from receipt of a copy thereof by the

Molaer, Airisa D. | Election Law | Atty. Pascasio

aggrieved party to the regional trial court which shall decide the case within thirty days from its
submission, and whose decisions shall be final.
[A.M. No. 10-4-1-SC] 2010 Rules of Procedure in Election Contests Rules of
Procedure in Election Contests Before the Courts Involving Elective
Municipal and Barangay Officials;
RULE 2 (ELECTION CONTESTS)
Section 1. Jurisdiction of regional trial courts. Regional trial courts shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over all election contests involving municipal officials.
Section 2. How initiated. An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election
protest or a petition for quo warranto against an elective municipal official. An election
protest or a petition for quo warranto shall be filed directly with the court in three legible
copies plus such number of copies corresponding to the number of protestees or
respondents.
An election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto, nor shall a petition for quo
warranto include an election protest.
Section 3. Modes of service and filing. Service and filing of pleadings, including the
initiatory petition and other subsequent papers, shall be done personally. Except for papers
emanating from the court, resort to other modes of service must be accompanied by a
written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A pleading or motion
violating this Rule shall be considered not to have been filed.1avvphi1
Section 4. Election protest. A petition contesting the election or returns for an elective
municipal office shall be filed with the proper Regional Trial Court by an candidate who was
voted for the same office and who received the second or third-highest number of votes or,
in a multi-slot position, was among the next four candidates following the last-ranked winner
duly proclaimed, as reflected in the official results of the election contained in the
Statement of Votes by Precinct. The party filing the protest shall be designated as the
protestant; the adverse party shall be known as the protestee.
Each contest shall refer exclusively to one office; however, contests for offices of the
Sangguniang Bayan may be consolidated in one case.
Section 5. Quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto against an elective municipal
official shall be filed with the proper Regional Trial Court by any registered voter who voted
in the municipal election. The party filing the petition shall be designated as the petitioner;
the adverse party shall be known as the respondent.
Section 6. Petition must be verified and accompanied by a certificate of non-forum
shopping. An election protest or a petition for quo warranto shall be verified by an affidavit
stating that the affiant has read the petition and that its allegations are true and correct of
the affiants own knowledge or based on authentic records. A verification based on
"information and belief" or upon "knowledge, information and belief" is not sufficient.
The protestant or petitioner shall sign personally the certificate of non-forum shopping,
which must be annexed to the election protest or petition for quo warranto.

An unverified or insufficiently verified petition or one that lacks a certificate of non-forum


shopping shall be dismissed outright and shall not suspend the running of the required
period for the filing of an election protest or petition for quo warranto.
Section 7. Period to file protest or petition; non-extendible. The election protest or
petition for quo warranto shall be filed within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days
counted from the date of proclamation.
Section 8. Pendency of pre-proclamation controversy. The pendency of a preproclamation controversy, involving the validity of the proclamation as defined by law, shall
suspend the running of the period for the filing of an election protest or petition for quo
warranto.
Section 9. COMELEC judgment in disqualification case. The decision of the COMELEC,
either en banc or in division, in a disqualification case shall not be a bar to the filing of a
petition for quo warranto based on the same ground, except when the Supreme Court has
affirmed the COMELEC decision.
Section 10. Contests of the protest or petition. (a) An election protest or petition for quo
warranto shall commonly and specifically state the following facts:
(i) the position involved;
(ii) the date of proclamation; and
(iii) the number of votes credited to the parties per the proclamation.
(b) A quo warranto petition shall also state:
(i) if the petitioner is not a candidate for the same municipal position, the
facts giving the petitioner standing to file the petition;
(ii) the qualifications for the municipal office and the disqualifications
prescribed by law;
(iii) the petitioners cited ground for ineligibility or the specific acts of
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines.
(c) An election protest shall also state:
(i) that the protestant was a candidate who had duly filed a certificate of
candidacy and had been voted for the same office;
(ii) the total number of precincts in the municipality;
(iii) the protested precincts and votes of the parties are not specified, an
explanation why the votes are not specified; and
(iv) a detailed specification of the acts or omissions complained of
showing the electoral frauds, anomalies or irregularities in the protested
precincts.
Section 11. Raffle of cases. The Supreme Court shall designate the Regional Trial Court
within a judicial region that shall take cognizance of election protests and petitions for quo
warranto. A raffle conducted by the executive judge shall determine the assignment of
cases to these courts except in single-sala courts or courts specifically designated by the
Supreme Court. No court shall assume jurisdiction over an election contest unless the case
has been properly assigned to it as provided herein.
At least twenty-four (24) hours before the raffle, the clerk of court must serve personal
notice to the parties, stating the date and time of the raffle. Proof of service to the parties
shall be submitted to the court, and the raffle shall be open to the public. The Supreme
Court shall issue the necessary circular implementing this proviso.

Molaer, Airisa D. | Election Law | Atty. Pascasio

The Court may order a change of venue or place or trial for compelling reasons to avoid a
miscarriage of justice.
Section 12. Summary dismissal of election contests. The court shall summarily dismiss,
motu proporio, an election protest, counter-protest or petition for quo warranto on any of
the following grounds:
(a) The court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(b) The petition is insufficient in form and content as required under Section 10;
(c) The petition is filed beyond the period prescribed in these Rules;
(d) The filling fee is not paid within the period for filling the election protest or
petition for quo warranto; and
(e) In a protest case where cash deposit is required, the deposit is not paid within
five (5) days from the filling of the protest.
COMELEC Resolution No. 8804 The Comelec Rules of Procedure on
Disputes in an Automated Election System.
PART II
PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSIES
Rule 3
Coverage of Pre-Proclamation Controversies
Section 1. Pre-Proclamation Controversy. - A pre-proclamation controversy refers to the
proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidates or by any
registered political party or coalition of political parties, or by any accredited and participating
party list group, before the board or directly with the Commission. It covers only two issues:
a. Illegal composition of the Board of Canvassers (BOC);
b. Illegal proceedings of the BOC.
The basis of the canvass shall be electronically transmitted results.
Section 2. Jurisdiction of the Commission in Pre-Proclamation Controversies. - COMELEC has
exclusive jurisdiction in pre-proclamation controversies arising from national, regional pr local
elections.
A pre-proclamation controversy may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political
party, organization, or coalition of political parties before the BOC, or directly with the
Commission.
Issues affecting the composition or proceedings of the Boards may be initiated by filing a verified
petition before the Board or directly with the Commission.
If the petition is filed directly with the Board, its decision may be appealed to the Commission
within three (3) days from issuance thereof. However, if commenced directly with the
Commission, the verified petition shall be filed immediately when the board begins to act
illegally, or at the time of the appointment of the member of the board whose capacity to sit as
such is objected to.
Section 3. Rights of Political Parties and Candidates Before the Board of Canvassers in PreProclamation Cases. a) All registered political parties, organizations, or coalitions of political parties, and
accredited citizens' arms, and candidates, have the right to be present and to be

b)
c)
d)

represented by counsel during the canvass of election returns, or certificates of


canvass.
Only one counsel may argue for each registered political party, organization, or
coalition of political parties, accredited citizens' arm or candidate.
No dilatory action shall be allowed by the BOC. It may impose time limits for oral
arguments.
All registered political parties, organizations, or coalitions of political parties, and
candidates, are entitled to obtain a copy of the Statement of Votes per precinct
and a copy of the certificate of canvass duly authenticated by the BOC.

COMELEC Resolution No.9164 IN THE MATTER OF REINSTATING AND


REIMPLEMENTING COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 8804 WITH AMENDMENTS
AMENDMENTS:
Reinstated Sec. 6 (Conduct), Rule 15 (Recount of Ballots) of Reso. No. 8804
Reinstated Sec. 7 (Preparation and submission of recount report), Rule 15 (Recount of
Ballots)
Set aside Sec. 3 (Compensation of the members of the recount Committee), Rule 15
and other rules pertaining to compensation and distribution honoria of recount
committees
Rule 17 is renumbered to Rule 16 (Photocopying of Ballots/Printing of Ballot
images/Augmentation of Cash Deposit) and the successive numbers as follows.
Jalosjos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 192474, 26 June 2012
Election Law; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET); Jurisdiction; The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC ends and when that of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
beginsthe proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests COMELEC
of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the proclaimed
Representative in favor of the HRET.While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to
decide all questions affecting elections, such power is not without limitation. It does not extend
to contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives and the Senate. The Constitution vests the resolution of these contests solely
upon the appropriate Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives. The
Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of the COMELEC ends and when
that of the HRET begins. The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election
divests COMELEC of jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of the proclaimed Representative in favor of the HRET.
FACTS:

While serving as Mayor of Tampilasan Zamboanga del Norte, petitioner, Romeo Jalosjos
sought the transfer of his voter's registration record to Precint 0051F of Barangay Veterans
Village, Zamboanga Sibugay.
Dan Erasmo filed a petition with the MCTC which rendered judgment excluding Jalosjos
from the list of voters in question on the ground that he did not abandon his domicile in
Tampilasan and is still the incumbent mayor.

Molaer, Airisa D. | Election Law | Atty. Pascasio

Jalosjos appealed the decision to the RTC but the MCTC ruling was affirmed.
Through a petition for certiorari with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, Jalosjos elevated the case to the CA. His application was granted and his name
was reinstated in the voter's list pending resolution of the petition.
Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the Second
District of Zamboanga Sibugay for the May 2010 national elections. This prompted Erasmo
to file a petition with the COMELEC to deny or cancel said COC. His petition was denied by
the COMELEC for insufficiency in form and substance.
Pending Erasmo's motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc, Jalosjos won
the elections and was proclaimed representative.
Meanwhile, CA rendered in his favor judgement on the pending petition. Erasmo filed a
petition for review of the CA's decision before the Supreme Court.
Thereafter, COMELEC en banc granted Erasmo's motion anf declared Jalosjos ineligible to
seek election as representative for not satisfying the residency requirement because of his
incumbency as mayor of Tampilisan.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to pass upon the question of
Jalosjos residency qualification considering that he has been proclaimed winner in the
election and has assumed the discharge of that office.

RULING:

While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to decide all questions affecting
elections, such power is not without limitation. It does not extend to contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives and the
Senate. The Constitution vests the resolution of these contests solely upon the appropriate
Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives.
The proclamation of a congressional candidate following the election divests COMELEC of
jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
proclaimed Representative in favor of the HRET.
After Jalosjos' proclamation, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction when it still passed
upon the issue of his qualification and declared him ineligible for the office of
Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.
On election day of 2010 the COMELEC En Banc had as yet to resolve Erasmos appeal from
the Second Divisions dismissal of the disqualification case against Jalosjos. Thus, there
then existed no final judgment deleting Jalosjos name from the list of candidates for the
congressional seat he sought. The last standing official action in his case before election
day was the ruling of the COMELECs Second Division that allowed his name to stay on that
list. Meantime, the COMELEC En Banc did not issue any order suspending his proclamation
pending its final resolution of his case. With the fact of his proclamation and assumption of
office, any issue regarding his qualification for the same, like his alleged lack of the
required residence, was solely for the HRET to consider and decide.
Consequently, the Court holds in G.R. 192474 that the COMELEC En Banc exceeded its
jurisdiction in declaring Jalosjos ineligible for the position of representative for the Second
District of Zamboanga Sibugay, which he won in the elections, since it had ceased to have
jurisdiction over his case. Necessarily, Erasmos petitions (G.R. 192704 and G.R. 193566)
questioning the validity of the registration of Jalosjos as a voter and the COMELECs failure
to annul his proclamation also fail. The Court cannot usurp the power vested by the
Constitution solely on the HRET.

Lokin v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179431-321, 22 June 2010


Election Law; Election Protests; Quo Warranto; Words and Phrases; Election Protest, and Quo
Warranto, Distinguished.An election protest proposes to oust the winning candidate from
office. It is strictly a contest between the defeated and the winning candidates, based on the
grounds of electoral frauds and irregularities, to determine who between them has actually
obtained the majority of the legal votes cast and is entitled to hold the office. It can only be filed
by a candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for in the
preceding elections. A special civil action for quo warranto refers to questions of disloyalty to the
State, or of ineligibility of the winning candidate. The objective of the action is to unseat the
ineligible person from the office, but not to install the petitioner in his place. Any voter may
initiate the action, which is, strictly speaking, not a contest where the parties strive for
supremacy because the petitioner will not be seated even if the respondent may be unseated.
Same; Same; Same; Certiorari; Certiorari, not an election protest or quo warranto, is the proper
recourse to review a Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolution approving the withdrawal
the nomination of its original nominees and substituting them with others, even if the substitute
nominees have already been proclaimed and have taken their oath of office.The controversy
involving Lokin is neither an election protest nor an action for quo warranto, for it concerns a
very peculiar situation in which Lokin is seeking to be seated as the second nominee of CIBAC.
Although an election protest may properly be available to one party-list organization seeking to
unseat another party-list organization to determine which between the defeated and the winning
party-list organizations actually obtained the majority of the legal votes, Lokins case is not one
in which a nominee of a particular party-list organization thereby wants to unseat another
nominee of the same party-list organization. Neither does an action for quo warranto lie,
considering that the case does not involve the ineligibility and disloyalty of Cruz-Gonzales to the
Republic of the Philippines, or some other cause of disqualification for her. Lokin has correctly
brought this special civil action for certiorari against the COMELEC to seek the review of the
September 14, 2007 resolution of the COMELEC in accordance with Section 7 of Article IX-A of
the 1987 Constitution, notwithstanding the oath and assumption of office by Cruz-Gonzales. The
constitutional mandate is now implemented by Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
which provides for the review of the judgments, final orders or resolutions of the COMELEC and
the Commission on Audit. As Rule 64 states, the mode of review is by a petition for certiorari in
accordance with Rule 65 to be filed in the Supreme Court within a limited period of 30 days.
Undoubtedly, the Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over Lokins petitions for certiorari
and for mandamus against the COMELEC.
Same; Election Law; Party-List System; The Legislature deprived the party-list organization of the
right to change its nominees or to alter the order of nominees once the list is submitted to the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), except when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the nominee
withdraws in writing his nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes incapacitated.The provision
is daylight clear. The Legislature thereby deprived the party-list organization of the right to
change its nominees or to alter the order of nominees once the list is submitted to the
COMELEC, except when: (a) the nominee dies; (b) the nominee withdraws in writing his
nomination; or (c) the nominee becomes incapacitated. The provision must be read literally
because its language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a single, definite, and
sensible meaning. Such meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning that the
Legislature has intended to convey. Even where the courts should be convinced that the
Legislature really intended some other meaning, and even where the literal interpretation should

Molaer, Airisa D. | Election Law | Atty. Pascasio

defeat the very purposes of the enactment, the explicit declaration of the Legislature is still the
law, from which the courts must not depart. When the law speaks in clear and categorical
language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application.
Accordingly, an administrative agency tasked to implement a statute may not construe it by
expanding its meaning where its provisions are clear and unambiguous.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be
directory, for there is but one way to obey the command thou shall not, and that is to
completely refrain from doing the forbidden act, subject to certain exceptions stated in the law
itself.The usage of No in Section 8No change of names or alteration of the order of
nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in
cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, or becomes
incapacitated, in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last in the
listrenders Section 8 a negative law, and is indicative of the legislative intent to make the
statute mandatory. Prohibitive or negative words can rarely, if ever, be directory, for there is but
one way to obey the command thou shall not, and that is to completely refrain from doing the
forbidden act, subject to certain exceptions stated in the law itself, like in this case.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Allowing the party-list organization to change its nominees through
withdrawal of their nominations, or to alter the order of the nominations after the submission of
the list of nominees circumvents the voters demand for transparency.The prohibition is not
arbitrary or capricious; neither is it without reason on the part of lawmakers. The COMELEC can
rightly presume from the submission of the list that the list reflects the true will of the party-list
organization. The COMELEC will not concern itself with whether or not the list contains the real
intended nominees of the party-list organization, but will only determine whether the nominees
pass all the requirements prescribed by the law and whether or not the nominees possess all the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications. Thereafter, the names of the nominees will be
published in newspapers of general circulation. Although the people vote for the party-list
organization itself in a party-list system of election, not for the individual nominees, they still
have the right to know who the nominees of any particular party-list organization are. The
publication of the list of the party-list nominees in newspapers of general circulation serves that
right of the people, enabling the voters to make intelligent and informed choices. In contrast,
allowing the party-list organization to change its nominees through withdrawal of their
nominations, or to alter the order of the nominations after the submission of the list of nominees
circumvents the voters demand for transparency. The lawmakers exclusion of such arbitrary
withdrawal has eliminated the possibility of such circumvention.
Same; Election Law; Party-List System; The success of the party-list system could only be
ensured by avoiding any arbitrariness on the part of the party-list organizations, by seeing to the
transparency of the system, and by guaranteeing that the electorate would be afforded the
chance of making intelligent and informed choices of their party-list representatives.We further
note that the new ground would not secure the object of R.A. No. 7941 of developing and
guaranteeing a full, free and open party-list electoral system. The success of the system could
only be ensured by avoiding any arbitrariness on the part of the party-list organizations, by
seeing to the transparency of the system, and by guaranteeing that the electorate would be
afforded the chance of making intelligent and informed choices of their party-list
representatives.
XIV.

Appeal and Other Election Issues

1.

Quo Warranto

Omnibus Election Code (Sec. 253)


Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. - Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the
Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election.
Any voter contesting the election of any municipal or barangay officer on the ground of
ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo
warranto with the regional trial court or metropolitan or municipal trial court, respectively, within
ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election.
2.

Substitution

COMELEC Resolution No. 9518 (Sec. 15)


SEC. 15. Substitution of Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. If after the last day for the filing of Certificates of Candidacy, an official candidate of a duly
registered political party or coalition of political parties dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any
cause, he may be substituted by a candidate belonging to, and nominated by, the same political
party. No substitute shall be allowed for any independent candidate.
The substitute of a candidate who has withdrawn on or before December 21, 2012 may file his
Certificate of Candidacy for the office affected not later than December 21, 2012, so that the
name of the substitute will be reflected on the official ballots.
No substitution due to withdrawal shall be allowed after December 21, 2012.
The substitute for a candidate who died or is disqualified by final judgment, may file his
Certificate of Candidacy up to mid-day of election day, provided that the substitute and the
substituted have the same surnames.
If the death or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of
election day, the substitute candidate may file his Certificate of Candidacy with any Board of
Election Inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or in the case of a
candidate for Senator, with the Law Department of the Commission on Elections in Manila,
provided that the substitute and the substituted candidate have the same surnames.
3.

Withdrawal of COC

COMELEC Resolution No. 9518 (Sec. 14)


SEC. 14. Withdrawal of Certificate of Candidacy. - Any person who has filed a Certificate of
Candidacy may, at any time before election day and subject to Sec. 15 hereof, file personally a
Statement of Withdrawal under oath, in five (5) legible copies, with the office where the
Certificate of Candidacy was filed. No Statement of Withdrawal shall be accepted if filed by a
person other than the candidate himself or if filed by mail, electronic mail, telegram or facsimile.
The Regional Election Director, Provincial Election Supervisor, or the Election Officer concerned
shall, upon receipt of the withdrawal, notify the Law Department by fastest means of
communication, stating the following:

Molaer, Airisa D. | Election Law | Atty. Pascasio

a.
b.
c.
d.

full name of the candidate withdrawing;


elective office concerned;
nominating political party or coalition of political parties, if any; and
full name of the substitute, if any

On the same day, he shall immediately forward to the Commission, through the Law Department,
four (4) copies of the Statement of Withdrawal, retaining one (1) copy thereof for his file. The
Law Department shall, in turn, distribute the copies to the offices/departments concerned as
provided for under Sec. 13 hereof.
The filing of a withdrawal of a Certificate of Candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or
administrative liabilities a candidate may have incurred.
A person who has withdrawn his Certificate of Candidacy for a position shall not be eligible,
whether as a substitute candidate or not, for any other position.
4.

b)
c)
d)
e)

For furnishing certified transcript of records or copies of any record, decision or


ruling or entry of which any person is entitled to demand and receive a copy, for
every page P 2.00
For every certificate or writ or process 10.00
For each certificate not on process 2.00
In appropriate cases, for filing a second and succeeding motions for
reconsideration 50.00
For every search of any record of more than one year's standing and reading the
same 10.00

Sec. 271. Payment of Fees. - The fees mentioned in the preceding section shall be
paid to the cashier of the Commission who shall in all cases issue a receipt for the
same and shall enter the amount received upon his book specifying the date when
received, the fee, and the person from whom received. The cashier shall immediately
report such payment to the Commission.

Execution of Pending Appeal

6.

SOURCE: Carloto v. COMELEC G.R. No. 174155


In the absence of an express provision in the Omnibus Election Code, execution of
judgment pending appeal in election cases is governed by Section 2, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court which finds suppletory application in this case, thus:

Secs. 73, 76, 253, OEC

Section 2. Discretionary execution.

Readings:

Sec. 73. Certificate of candidacy. - No person shall be eligible for any elective public office unless
he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein.
A person who has filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election, withdraw the same by
submitting to the office concerned a written declaration under oath.

(a)
Execution of a judgment or a final order pending appeal. -On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party
filed in the trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in
possession of either the original record or the record on appeal, as
the case may be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court
may, in its discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order
even before the expiration of the period to appeal.
After the court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending
appeal may be filed in the appellate court.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated
in a special order after hearing.
To grant execution pending appeal in election protest cases, the following
requisites must concur: a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with
notice to the adverse party; b) there must be good reasons for the execution
pending appeal; and c) the order granting execution pending appeal must state
good reasons.
5.

a)

No person shall be eligible for more than one office to be filled in the same election, and if he
files his certificate of candidacy for more than one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them.
However, before the expiration of the period for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the person
who was filed more than one certificate of candidacy may declare under oath the office for which
he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices.
The filing or withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or
administrative liabilities which a candidate may have incurred.
Sec. 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt. - The Commission, provincial
election supervisor, election registrar or officer designated by the Commission or the board of
election inspectors under the succeeding section shall have the ministerial duty to receive and
acknowledge receipt of the certificate of candidacy.
Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. - Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the
Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the
Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election.

Appeal fee/Filing fee


ARTICLE XXIII.
LEGAL FEES

Sec. 270. Collection of legal fees. - The Commission is hereby authorized to collect
fees as follows:

Any voter contesting the election of any municipal or barangay officer on the ground of
ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo
warranto with the regional trial court or metropolitan or municipal trial court, respectively, within
ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election.

Molaer, Airisa D. | Election Law | Atty. Pascasio

COMELEC Resolution No. 9518


GUIDELINES ON THE FILING OF CERTIFICATES OF CANDIDACY AND NOMINATION AND
ACCEPTANCE OF OFFICIAL CANDIDATES OF REGISTERED POLITICAL PARTIES OR COALITION OF
POLITICAL PARTIES IN CONNECTION WITH THE MAY 13, 2013 AUTOMATED SYNCHRONIZED
NATIONAL, LOCAL AND ARMM REGIONAL ELECTIONS
Dumayas v. COMELEC v. 357 SCRA 358
Election Law; Omnibus Election Code; Commission on Elections; If at the time it is promulgated,
a judge or member of the collegiate court who had earlier signed or registered his vote has
vacated office, his vote on the decision must automatically be withdrawn or cancelled.In Jamil
vs. Commission on Elections, we held that a decision becomes binding only after its
promulgation. If at the time it is promulgated, a judge or member of the collegiate court who had
earlier signed or registered his vote has vacated office, his vote on the decision must
automatically be withdrawn or cancelled. Accordingly, the votes of Commissioners Gorospe and
Guiani should merely be considered as withdrawn for the reason that their retirement preceded
the resolutions promulgation. The effect of the withdrawal of their votes would be as if they had
not signed the resolution at all and only the votes of the remaining commissioners would be
properly considered for the purpose of deciding the controversy.
Same; Same; Same; Generally, the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto
precludes the subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy or amounts to the
abandonment of one earlier filed; Exceptions.As a general rule, the filing of an election protest
or a petition for quo warranto precludes the subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy
or amounts to the abandonment of one earlier filed, thus depriving the COMELEC of the authority
to inquire into and pass upon the title of the protestee or the validity of his proclamation. The
reason for this rule is that once the competent tribunal has acquired jurisdiction of an election
protest or a petition for quo warranto, all questions relative thereto will have to be decided in the
case itself and not in another proceeding, so as to prevent confusion and conflict of authority.
Nevertheless, the general rule is not absolute. It admits of certain exceptions, as where: (a) the
board of canvassers was improperly constituted; (b) quo warranto was not the proper remedy;(c)
what was filed was not really a petition for quo warranto or an election protest but a petition to
annul a proclamation; (d) the filing of a quo warranto petition or an election protest was
expressly made without prejudice to the pre-proclamation controversy or was made ad cautelam;
and (e) the proclamation was null and void.
Same; Same; Same; Election Protest; An election protest is a contest between the defeated and
winning candidates on the ground of frauds or irregularities in the casting and counting of the
ballots, or in the preparation of the returns; A petition for quo warranto under the Omnibus
Election Code raises in issue the disloyalty or ineligibility of the winning candidate,An
examination of the petition filed primarily by Vice-Mayor Betita with the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City reveals that it is neither a quo warranto petition under the Omnibus Election Code nor
an election protest. In Samad vs. COMELEC, we explained that a petition for quo warranto under
the Omnibus Election Code raises in issue the disloyalty or ineligibility of the winning candidate.
It is a proceeding to unseat the respondent from office but not necessarily to install the
petitioner in his place. An election protest is a contest between the defeated and winning
candidates on the ground of frauds or irregularities in the casting and counting of the ballots, or
in the preparation of the returns. It raises the question of who actually obtained the plurality of
the legal votes and therefore is entitled to hold the office.

Same; Same; Same; Findings of fact by the Commission on Elections or any other administrative
agency exercising particular expertise in its field of endeavor, are binding on the Court.Wellentrenched is the rule that findings of fact by the COMELEC or any other administrative agency
exercising particular expertise in its field of endeavor, are binding on this Court. In a preproclamation controversy, the board of canvassers and the COMELEC are not required to look
beyond or behind the election returns which are on their face regular and authentic. Where a
party seeks to raise issues the resolution of which would necessitate the COMELEC to pierce the
veil of election returns which are prima facie regular, the proper remedy is a regular election
protest, not a pre-proclamation controversy.
FACTS:

Petitioner Dumayas, Jr. and respondent Bernal, Jr. were rival candidates for the position of
mayor in Carles, Iloilo.
During the canvassing on 13 May 1998, election returns for precincts nos. 61A, 62A, and
63A/64A all of Barangay Pantalan were protested for inclusion in the canvass before the
Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC for brevity) by petitioner-appellant Dumayas Jr. The
grounds relied upon for their exclusion are all the same-that is, violation of Secs. 234, 235,
236 of the Omnibus Election Code and other election laws; acts of terrorism, intimidation,
coercion, and similar acts prohibited by law. Appellant Dumayas, Jr. submitted his
evidence to the Board of Canvassers on 14 May 1998 which consist of (a) the joint
affidavits executed by LAMMP watchers for precinct 61A: Teresita Oblido, Reyland de la
Rosa, and Armando Flores [signed by Oblido and Flores only]; (b) affidavit of petitioners
supporter Virgilisa Capao; (c) joint affidavit of precinct 63A-watcher Nona Dichosa and
precinct 62A - watcher Daniel Carmona; (d) blotter report dated 12 May 1998 of Carles
PNP, Iloilo; and (d) corroborating affidavit of LAMMP supporter Honorato Gallardo.
All the affidavits submitted by petitioner contain similar attestations such as: certain local
baranggay (sic) officials were inside the polling place during the casting and counting of
votes, or acted as watcher of respondent; SPO3 Gilbert Sorongon who was in shorts and tshirt armed with an armalite roamed around and inside the polling places; a CVO in
uniform was roaming precinct 63A; the presence of the public officials posed threat and
intimidation driving most of the watchers of other political parties away; the BEIs were so
intimidated and coerced that no election return was prepared simultaneous with the
tallying; the election returns were prepared under duress; the voters were coerced to vote
for certain favored candidates especially herein respondent; petitioners watchers were
made to sign or affix their thumbmarks on the already prepared election returns; in precinct
63A/64A, the voting ended at almost 9:00 P.M. without the BEI members writing the
names of such voters.
Respondent denied petitioners allegation and in support thereof, he averred: All the
supplemental affidavits of the different BEIs categorically declared that the elections in
their respective precincts starting from the start of the voting to its closing, to the counting
of votes and to the preparation and submission of election returns were peaceful, clean,
orderly and no acts of terrorism, intimidation, coercion and similar acts prohibited by law
was (sic) exerted on anybody including the voters and members of the BEIs. They all
attested that the incidents alleged by petitioners watchers did not happen. The alleged
terrorism, coercion, or violation of election laws like the opening of ballots and reading the
votes allegedly done by certain public officials like SPO3 Sorongon, Nody Mahilum, Anonia
Barrios, Telesforo Gallardo and others are not true, the truth being that these people were

Molaer, Airisa D. | Election Law | Atty. Pascasio

only inside the polling place to exercise their right of suffrage. They also vehemently denied
that the election returns were not simultaneously prepared with the tallying and counting of
votes.
They stressed that as public school teachers, they cannot risk their future and career and
will not allow or tolerate anybody to make a mockery of the electoral process to (sic) which
they were duly sworn to uphold.
Thereafter, petitioners motion was denied by the Municipal Board of Canvassers, but on
appeal, the COMELEC second division reversed the same. Aggrieved by the same, private
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc.
Notwithstanding the appeal, the MBC continued the canvassing and thereafter, proclaimed
petitioner as the winner in accordance with the COMELEC second divisions decision.
Meanwhile, on August 25, 1998, the duly-proclaimed Vice-Mayor Arnold Betita filed an
action for quo warranto against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch
66. Docketed as Spl. Civil Action No. 98-141, said petition included respondent Bernal as
one of the petitioners together with Vice-Mayor Betita.
On September 18, 1998, petitioner filed before the COMELEC en banc a motion to expunge
respondent Bernals motion for reconsideration and motion to declare petitioners
proclamation void ab initio, on the ground that respondent Bernal should be deemed to
have abandoned said motions by the filing of Spl. Civil Action No. 98-141 which, according
to petitioner, is a formal election protest via quo warranto brought before the regular courts.
However, it was denied by the COMELEC en banc.
The Law Department is directed to investigate the election offense allegedly committed by
PO3 Gilbert Sorongon on election day. Let the Deputy Executive Director for Operations of
the Commission implement this Resolution with dispatch giving a copy thereof to the
Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government. SO ORDERED.
On March 13, 2000, respondent Bernal, Jr. was proclaimed by the newly-constituted
Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly-elected Mayor of the Municipality of Carles,
thereby unseating petitioner Dumayas.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Motion for reconsideration is deemed abandoned upon filing of the
petition for quo warranto.

RULING:
See full case for other rulings.
No. Now, regarding the first issue raised by petitioner. Did respondent Bernal effectively
abandon his pending motions before the COMELEC en banc by the filing of Spl. Civil Action No.
98-141? Petitioners contention that Bernal did appears to us untenable.
As a general rule, the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto precludes the
subsequent filing of a pre-proclamation controversy or amounts to the abandonment of one
earlier filed, thus depriving the COMELEC of the authority to inquire into and pass upon the title
of the protestee or the validity of his proclamation.
The reason for this rule is that once the competent tribunal has acquired jurisdiction of an
election protest or a petition for quo warranto, all questions relative thereto will have to be
decided in the case itself and not in another proceeding, so as to prevent confusion and conflict
of authority. Nevertheless, the general rule is not absolute. It admits of certain exceptions, as

where: (a) the board of canvassers was improperly constituted; (b) quo warranto was not the
proper remedy; (c) what was filed was not really a petition for quo warranto or an election protest
but a petition to annul a proclamation; (d) the filing of a quo warranto petition or an election
protest was expressly made without prejudice to the pre-proclamation controversy or was made
ad cautelam; and (e) the proclamation was null and void.
An examination of the petition filed primarily by Vice-Mayor Betita with the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo City reveals that it is neither a quo warranto petition under the Omnibus Election Code nor
an election protest. In Samad vs. COMELEC, we explained that a petition for quo warranto under
the Omnibus Election Code raises in issue the disloyalty or ineligibility of the winning candidate.
It is a proceeding to unseat the respondent from office but not necessarily to install the
petitioner in his place. An election protest is a contest between the defeated and winning
candidates on the ground of frauds or irregularities in the casting and counting of the ballots, or
in the preparation of the returns. It raises the question of who actually obtained the plurality of
the legal votes and therefore is entitled to hold the office.
The allegations contained in Betitas petition before the regular court do not present any proper
issue for either an election protest or a quo warranto case under the Omnibus Election Code.
Spl. Civil Action No. 98-141 appears to be in the nature of an action for usurpation of public
office brought by Betita to assert his right to the position of Mayor pursuant to the rules on
succession of local government officials contained in the Local Government Code.[12] Although
said petition is also denominated as a quo warranto petition under Rule 66 of the Rules of
Court, it is different in nature from the quo warranto provided for in the Omnibus Election Code
where the only issue proper for determination is either disloyalty or ineligibility of respondent
therein. Neither can it be considered as an election protest since what was put forth as an issue
in said petition was petitioners alleged unlawful assumption of the office of Mayor by virtue of
his alleged illegal proclamation as the winning candidate in the election.
A closer look at the specific allegations in the petition disclose that Spl. Civil Action No. 98-141 is
actually an action for the annulment of petitioners proclamation on the ground of illegality and
prematurity. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that the nature of the action is
determined by the averments in the complaint or petition[13] and not the title or caption thereof.
The material stipulations of the petition substantially state:
13. That when the Board of Canvassers convened in the afternoon and despite the submission
of the copy of the order certifying the Motion for Reconsideration to the COMELEC En Banc and
in violation of the Comelec Rules and Procedure and due to the threat received by the Board, Mr.
Dalen, the Chairman of the Board and Mr. Serafin Provido, Jr. signed the Certificate of
Proclamation proclaiming respondent as winner of the elections for Mayor. Mr. Deony Cabaobao
did not signed (sic) the said Certificate of Proclamation as he dissented to (sic) the decision to
proclaim respondent;
14. The proclamation, therefore, of respondent is illegal and null and void from thevery
beginning for it was done in violation of law and under duress. The affidavit of Mr. Serafin
Provido, Jr. a member of the Board of Canvassers showing duress is hereto attached as Annex
C;
15. On account of the illegal proclamation of the respondent said proclamation does not vest
any right or authority for him to sit as Mayor of the town of Carles thus when he sits as such
Mayor he usurps, intrudes into, and unlawfully holds and exercise(s) a public office without
authority;
16. The authority to act as mayor for and in the absence of the duly proclaimed mayor is vested
on petitioner Betita pursuant to law;

Molaer, Airisa D. | Election Law | Atty. Pascasio

10

17. That the continued unlawful exercise by the respondent of the position of mayor of the town
of Carles will cause great and irreparable damage to the petitioners, particularly petitioner
Betita, who pursuant to law is entitled to act as Mayor of the town of Carles and the people of
Carles who pays his salaries unless he be restrained or enjoined from sitiing (sic) as such Mayor;
xxx
Thus, respondent Commission did not err, much less abuse its discretion, when it refused to
consider as abandoned Bernals motion for reconsideration and urgent motion to declare
petitioners proclamation as void ab initio. Note that under the allegations cited above, the
determination of Betitas right would ultimately hinge on the validity of petitioners proclamation
in the first place. To repeat, the quo warranto petition brought by Vice- Mayor Betita is a
petition to annul petitioners proclamation over which COMELEC exercises original exclusive
jurisdiction. Consequently, it could not be deemed as a proper remedy in favor of respondent
Bernal, Jr. even if his name was included in the title of said petition.
Luna v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 165983, 24 April 2007
Election Law; Certificates of Candidacy; A petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy shall be heard summarily after due notice.Under Rule 23 of the 1993 COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy shall be
heard summarily after due notice. The law mandates that the candidates must be notified of the
petition against them and should be given the opportunity to present evidence on their behalf.
This is the essence of due process.
Same; Same; When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the Commission on Elections
has a ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its receipt.When a candidate files his
certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge its
receipt. Section 76 of the Omnibus Election Code (Election Code) provides: Sec. 76. Ministerial
duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt.The Commission, provincial election supervisor,
election registrar or officer designated by the Commission or the board of election inspectors
under the succeeding section shall have the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt
of the certificate of candidacy. In this case, when Hans Roger filed his certificate of candidacy on
5 January 2004, the COMELEC had the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of
Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy. Thus, the COMELEC had the ministerial duty to give due
course to Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy.
Same; Same; Substitution of Candidacy; Where a candidate withdrew his certificate of
candidacy and the Commission on Elections found that the substitute complied with all the
procedural requirements for a valid substitution, the latter can validly substitute for the former.
On 15 January 2004, Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy. The Election Code allows
a person who has filed a certificate of candidacy to withdraw the same prior to the election by
submitting a written declaration under oath. There is no provision of law which prevents a
candidate from withdrawing his certificate of candidacy before the election. On the same date,
Luna filed her certificate of candidacy as substitute for Hans Roger. Section 77 of the Election
Code prescribes the rules on substitution of an official candidate of a registered political party
who dies, withdraws, or is disqualified for any cause after the last day for the filing of certificate
of candidacy. Section 77 of the Election Code provides: Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death,
disqualification or withdrawal of another.If after the last day for the filing of certificates of
candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is
disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party

may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his
certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the preceding sections not
later than mid-day of election day of the election. If the death, withdrawal or disqualification
should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election day, said certificate
may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a
candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country,
with the Commission. Since Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy and the COMELEC
found that Luna complied with all the procedural requirements for a valid substitution, Luna can
validly substitute for Hans Roger.
Same; Same; Same; The Commission on Elections may not, by itself, without the proper
proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form; The
question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate for non-age is beyond the usual and proper
cognizance of the Commission on Electionsif the candidate made a material
misrepresentation as to his date of birth or age in his certificate of candidacy, his eligibility may
only be impugned through a verified petition to deny due course to or cancel such certificate of
candidacy under Section 78 of the Election Code.The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring that Hans Roger, being under
age, could not be considered to have filed a valid certificate of candidacy and, thus, could not be
validly substituted by Luna. The COMELEC may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings,
deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. In Sanchez v. Del
Rosario, 1 SCRA 1102 (1961), the Court ruled that the question of eligibility or ineligibility of a
candidate for non-age is beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC. Section 74
of the Election Code provides that the certificate of candidacy shall state, among others, the
date of birth of the person filing the certificate. Section 78 of the Election Code provides that in
case a person filing a certificate of candidacy has committed false material representation, a
verified petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of said person may
be filed at any time not later than 25 days from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy. If
Hans Roger made a material misrepresentation as to his date of birth or age in his certificate of
candidacy, his eligibility may only be impugned through a verified petition to deny due course to
or cancel such certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Election Code.
Same; Same; Same; There can be no substitution of a person whose certificate of candidacy
has been cancelled and denied due course.It would have been different if there was a petition
to deny due course to or cancel Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy. For if the COMELEC
cancelled Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy after the proper proceedings, then he is no
candidate at all and there can be no substitution of a person whose certificate of candidacy has
been cancelled and denied due course. However, Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy was
never cancelled or denied due course by the COMELEC. Moreover, Hans Roger already withdrew
his certificate of candidacy before the COMELEC declared that he was not a valid candidate.
Therefore, unless Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy was denied due course or cancelled in
accordance with Section 78 of the Election Code, Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy was valid
and he may be validly substituted by Luna.
FACTS:

On 15 January 2004, Luna filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of vice-mayor of
Lagayan, Abra as a substitute for Hans Roger, who withdrew his certificate of candidacy on
the same date. Ruperto Blanco, Election Officer of Lagayan, Abra removed the name of

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Hans Roger from the list of candidates and placed the name of Luna.
On 20 April 2004, private respondents Tomas Layao, Solomon Lalugan III, Nelia Lazaga,
Anthony Layao, Cipriano Lapez, Jr., Victoria Layao, Moderno Lapez, RodrigoParias, and
Eugenio Caber Donato (private respondents) filed a petition for the cancellation of the
certificate of candidacy or disqualification of Luna. Private respondents alleged that Luna
made a false material representation in her certificate of candidacy because Luna is not a
registered voter of Lagayan, Abra but a registered voter of Bangued, Abra. Private
respondents also claimed that Lunas certificate of candidacy was not validly filed because
the substitution by Luna for Hans Roger was invalid.
Private respondents alleged that Hans Roger was only 20 years old on election day and,
therefore, he was disqualified to run for vice-mayor and cannot be substituted by Luna.[2]
The COMELECs Ruling
In the 4 June 2004 Resolution, the COMELEC First Division granted the petition and denied
due course to the substitution of Luna for Hans Roger. The COMELEC First Division ruled
that, while Luna complied with the procedural requirements for substitution, Hans Roger
was not a valid candidate for vice-mayor. The COMELEC First Division pointed out that Hans
Roger, being underage,[3] did not file a valid certificate of candidacy and, thus, Hans Roger
was not a valid candidate for vice-mayor who could be substituted by Luna.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there substitution was invalid.

RULING: No.
Substitution of Luna for Hans Roger was Valid
Luna contends that Hans Roger filed a valid certificate of candidacy and, subsequently, upon
Hans Rogers withdrawal of his certificate of candidacy, there was a valid substitution by Luna.
On the other hand, the COMELEC ruled that Hans Roger, being under age, could not be
considered to have filed a valid certificate of candidacy and, therefore, is not a valid candidate
who could be substituted by Luna.
When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to
receive and acknowledge its receipt. Section 76 of the Omnibus Election Code (Election Code)
provides:
Sec. 76. Ministerial duty of receiving and acknowledging receipt.- The Commission, provincial
election supervisor, election registrar or officer designated by the Commission or the board of
election inspectors under the succeeding section shall have the ministerial duty to receive and
acknowledge receipt of the certificate of candidacy.
In this case, when Hans Roger filed his certificate of candidacy on 5 January 2004,[6] the
COMELEC had the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt of Hans Rogers
certificate of candidacy. Thus, the COMELEC had the ministerial duty to give due course to Hans
Rogers certificate of candidacy.[7]
On 15 January 2004, Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy. The Election Code allows
a person who has filed a certificate of candidacy to withdraw the same prior to the election by
submitting a written declaration under oath.[8] There is no provision of law which prevents a
candidate from withdrawing his certificate of candidacy before the election.

On the same date, Luna filed her certificate of candidacy as substitute for Hans Roger.
Section 77 of the Election Code prescribes the rules on substitution of an official candidate of a
registered political party who dies, withdraws, or is disqualified for any cause after the last day
for the filing of certificate of candidacy. Section 77 of the Election Code provides:
Sec. 77. Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another. - If after the last
day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited
political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and
certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate
who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party
concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the
preceding sections not later than mid-day of election day of the election. If the death, withdrawal
or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and mid-day of election
day, said certificate may be filed with any board of election inspectors in the political subdivision
where he is a candidate, or, in the case of candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of
the country, with the Commission.
Since Hans Roger withdrew his certificate of candidacy and the COMELEC found that Luna
complied with all the procedural requirements for a valid substitution,[10] Luna can validly
substitute for Hans Roger. The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in declaring that Hans Roger, being under age, could not be considered
to have filed a valid certificate of candidacy and, thus, could not be validly substituted by Luna.
The COMELEC may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a
certificate of candidacy filed in due form.[11] In Sanchez v. Del Rosario,[12] the Court ruled
that the question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate for non-age is beyond the usual and
proper cognizance of the COMELEC. Section 74[13] of the Election Code provides that the
certificate of candidacy shall state, among others, the date of birth of the person filing the
certificate. Section 78[14] of the Election Code provides that in case a person filing a certificate
of candidacy has committed false material representation, a verified petition to deny due course
to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of said person may be filed at any time not later than 25
days from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy.
If Hans Roger made a material misrepresentation as to his date of birth or age in his certificate
of candidacy, his eligibility may only be impugned through a verified petition to deny due course
to or cancel such certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Election Code. In this case,
there was no petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of Hans Roger.
The COMELEC only declared that Hans Roger did not file a valid certificate of candidacy and,
thus, was not a valid candidate in the petition to deny due course to or cancel Lunas certificate
of candidacy. In effect, the COMELEC, without the proper proceedings, cancelled Hans Rogers
certificate of candidacy and declared the substitution by Luna invalid.
It would have been different if there was a petition to deny due course to or cancel Hans Rogers
certificate of candidacy. For if the COMELEC cancelled Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy
after the proper proceedings, then he is no candidate at all and there can be no substitution of a
person whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled and denied due course.[15] However,
Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy was never cancelled or denied due course by the
COMELEC. Moreover, Hans Roger already withdrew his certificate of candidacy before the
COMELEC declared that he was not a valid candidate. Therefore, unless Hans Rogers certificate
of candidacy was denied due course or cancelled in accordance with Section 78 of the Election

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12

Code, Hans Rogers certificate of candidacy was valid and he may be validly substituted by Luna.
Loreto-Go v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147741, 10 May 2001
Election Law; Commission on Elections; Nothing in Section 73, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881
mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be filed with the same office where the
certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed.There is nothing in this Section which
mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be filed with the same office where the certificate
of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can be filed directly with the main office of the
COMELEC, the office of the regional election director concerned, the office of the provincial
election supervisor of the province to which the municipality involved belongs, or the office of the
municipal election officer of the said municipality.
Same; Same; Same; The requirement that the withdrawal be filed before the election officer of
the place where the certificate of candidacy was filed, is merely directory, and is intended for
convenience; It is not mandatory or jurisdictional.While it may be true that Section 12 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A, adopted on 20 November 2000, requires that the withdrawal
be filed before the election officer of the place where the certificate of candidacy was filed, such
requirement is merely directory, and is intended for convenience. It is not mandatory or
jurisdictional. An administrative resolution can not contradict, much less amend or repeal a law,
or supply a deficiency in the law. Hence, the filing of petitioners affidavit of withdrawal of
candidacy for mayor of Baybay with the provincial election supervisor of Leyte sufficed to
effectively withdraw such candidacy. The COMELEC thus acted with grave abuse of discretion
when it declared petitioner ineligible for both positions for which she filed certificates of
candidacy.
Same; Same; The Commission on Elections, acting as a quasijudicial tribunal, cannot ignore the
requirements of procedural due process in resolving cases before it.Obviously, the COMELEC
en banc in approving the report and recommendation of the Law Department, deprived the
petitioner of procedural due process of law. The COMELEC, acting as a quasi-judicial tribunal,
cannot ignore the requirements of procedural due process in resolving cases before it.
BELLOSILLO, J., Concurring Opinion:
Election Law; Commission on Elections; The right of a citizen to participate in the democratic
process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted omissions and impositions of
requirements not otherwise specified in any law.In this connection, I find nothing legally
objectionable to the PES receiving petitioners Affidavit of Withdrawal and thereafter transmitting
it to what he may deem the appropriate COMELEC office. In fact, Director Jose P. Balbuena of
the COMELEC Law Department admitted during the oral argument that the PES of Leyte could
have validly received it and transmitted it to the Municipal Election Officer concerned. At any
rate, such tender of the Affidavit to the PES, to my mind, produced the same effect as the filing
thereof with the Municipal Election Officer of Baybay, Leyte. The right of a citizen to participate in
the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted omissions and
impositions of requirements not otherwise specified in any law.
FACTS:

Petitioner Go filed two (2) certificate of candidacy: (1) first COC was for mayoralty in Babay,
Leyte, and (2) second COC was for the position of Governor in Leyte.
Thereafter, she decided to withdraw her 1st COC (mayor) before the Provincial Election
Supervisor. However, it was rejected because, under the COMELEC resolution, the

withdrawal must be filed before the office where the COC to be withdrawn was filed.
Pursuant to said resolution, petitioner tried to withdraw the same in said office, but she only
did it after the deadline; consequently, she was disqualified.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the withdrawal must be filed before the office where the COC to be
withdrawn was filed.

RULING:
No. We grant the petition. We annul the COMELEC resolution declaring petitioner disqualified for
both positions of governor of Leyte and mayor of the municipality of Baybay, Leyte. The filing of
the affidavit of withdrawal with the election officer of Baybay, Leyte, at 12:28 a.m., 1 March
2001 was a substantial compliance with the requirement of the law.[14]
We hold that petitioner's withdrawal of her certificate of candidacy for mayor of Baybay, Leyte
was effective for all legal purposes, and left in full force her certificate of candidacy for
governor.[15] Section 73, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election
Code, provides that:
"SEC. 73. Certificate of candidacy.- No person shall be eligible for any elective public office
unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period fixed herein. "A person who has
filed a certificate of candidacy may, prior to the election, withdraw the same by submitting to the
office concerned a written declaration under oath. "No person shall be eligible for more than one
office to be filled in the same election, and if he files his certificate of candidacy for more than
one office, he shall not be eligible for any of them. However, before the expiration of the period
for the filing of certificates of candidacy, the person who has filed more than one certificate of
candidacy may declare under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the
certificate of candidacy for the other office or offices."
There is nothing in this Section which mandates that the affidavit of withdrawal must be filed
with the same office where the certificate of candidacy to be withdrawn was filed. Thus, it can
be filed directly with the main office of the COMELEC, the office of the regional election director
concerned, the office of the provincial election supervisor of the province to which the
municipality involved belongs, or the office of the municipal election officer of the said
municipality.
While it may be true that Section 12 of COMELEC Resolution No. 3253-A, adopted on 20
November 2000, requires that the withdrawal be filed before the election officer of the place
where the certificate of candidacy was filed,[16] such requirement is merely directory, and is
intended for convenience. It is not mandatory or jurisdictional. An administrative resolution can
not contradict, much less amend or repeal a law, or supply a deficiency in the law.[17] Hence,
the filing of petitioner's affidavit of withdrawal of candidacy for mayor of Baybay with the
provincial election supervisor of Leyte sufficed to effectively withdraw such candidacy. The
COMELEC thus acted with grave abuse of discretion when it declared petitioner ineligible for
both positions for which she filed certificates of candidacy.
Divinagracia v. COMELEC, G.R. Nos. 186007 & 186016, 27 July 2009
Election Law; Appeals; Appeal Fees; Pleadings and Practice; On May 15, 2007, the Supreme
Court, by A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, introduced the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests before

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13

the Courts involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials, which superseded Rules 35 and
36 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure governing elections protests and quo warranto cases
before the trial courts; A major change introduced by A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC is the imposition of
an appeal fee under Section 9 of Rule 14 thereof, separate and distinct from, but payable within
the same period as, the appeal fee imposed by the Comelec under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 40 of
the Comelec Rules of Procedure, as amended by Comelec Resolution No. 02-0130; The
requirement of two appeal fees by two different jurisdictions had caused confusion in the
implementation by the Comelec of its procedural rules on payment of appeal fees for the
perfection of appeals, prompting the Comelec to issue Resolution No. 8486 (July 15, 2008).On
May 15, 2007, the Court, by A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, introduced the Rules of Procedure in Election
Contests before the Courts involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials, which
superseded Rules 35 and 36 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure governing elections protests
and quo warranto cases before the trial courts. Not only was the amount of the filing fee
increased from P300 to P3,000 for each interest; the amount of filing fee was determined by the
Court, not by the Comelec, which was, to recall, the cause of confusion in Loyola, Miranda and
Soller. Another major change introduced by A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC is the imposition of an appeal
fee under Section 9 of Rule 14 thereof, separate and distinct from, but payable within the same
period as, the appeal fee imposed by the Comelec under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 40 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure, as amended by Comelec Resolution No. 02-0130. Contrary to
respondents contention, the Comelec-prescribed appeal fee was not superseded by A.M. No.
07-4-15-SC. The requirement of these two appeal fees by two different jurisdictions had caused
confusion in the implementation by the Comelec of its procedural rules on payment of appeal
fees for the perfection of appeals, prompting the Comelec to issue Resolution No. 8486 (July 15,
2008).
Same; Same; Same; Same; That Comelec Resolution No. 8486 took effect on July 24, 2008 or
after a party had filed a notice of appeal, as in the case of petitioner, does not exempt it from
paying the Comelec-prescribed appeal fees.That Comelec Resolution No. 8486 took effect on
July 24, 2008 or after a party had filed a notice of appeal, as in the case of petitioner, does not
exempt it from paying the Comelec-prescribed appeal fees. The Comelec merely clarified the
existing rules on the payment of such appeal fees, and allowed the payment thereof within 15
days from filing the notice of appeal.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Supreme Court NOW DECLARES, for the guidance of the Bench
and Bar, that for notices of appeal filed after the promulgation of this decision, errors in the
matter of non-payment or incomplete payment of the two appeal fees in election cases are no
longer excusable.In Aguilar, the Court recognized the Comelecs discretion to allow or dismiss a
perfected appeal that lacks payment of the Comelec-prescribed appeal fee. The Court stated
that it was more in keeping with fairness and prudence to allow the appeal which was, similar to
the present case, perfected months before the issuance of Comelec Resolution No. 8486.
Aguilar has not, however, diluted the force of Comelec Resolution No. 8486 on the matter of
compliance with the Comelec-required appeal fees. To reiterate, Resolution No. 8486 merely
clarified the rules on Comelec appeal fees which have been existing as early as 1993, the
amount of which was last fixed in 2002. The Comelec even went one step backward and
extended the period of payment to 15 days from the filing of the notice of appeal. Considering
that a year has elapsed after the issuance on July 15, 2008 of Comelec Resolution No. 8486,
and to further affirm the discretion granted to the Comelec which it precisely articulated through
the specific guidelines contained in said Resolution, the Court now declares, for the guidance of
the Bench and Bar, that for notices of appeal filed after the promulgation of this decision, errors
in the matter of non-payment or incomplete payment of the two appeal fees in election cases are

no longer excusable.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Estoppel; The doctrine of estoppel by laches is not new in election
cases.On the Comelecs application of the doctrine of estoppel by laches, records show that
petitioner raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction for his and private respondents non-payment of
the appeal fee only after the Comelec appreciated the contested ballots and ruled in favor of
respondent, an issue which could have been raised with reasonable diligence at the earliest
opportunity. The Court finds the Comelec resolution well-taken. That petitioners filing of the
appellees brief was an invocation of the Comelecs jurisdiction and an indication of his active
participation cannot be refuted on the mere asseveration that he was only complying with the
Comelecs directive to file the same. The submission of briefs was ordered precisely because the
Comelec could not anticipate the claims and defenses that would be raised by the parties.
Moreover, in his Verified Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner once again pleaded to the
Comelec to exercise its jurisdiction by dismissing private respondents appeal on the merits. The
doctrine of estoppel by laches is not new in election cases. It has been applied in at least two
cases involving the payment of filing fees.
Same; Same; Motions for Reconsideration; Equity; It bears noting that unlike appellate
proceedings before the Comelec, a motion for reconsideration of a trial courts decision in an
election protest is a prohibited pleading, which explains why stale claims of non-payment of
filing fees have always been raised belatedly before the appellate tribunal; He who comes to
court must come with clean hands.To allow petitioner to espouse his stale defense at such late
stage of the proceedings would run afoul of the basic tenets of fairness. It is of no moment that
petitioner raised the matter in a motion for reconsideration in the same appellate proceedings in
the Comelec, and not before a higher court. It bears noting that unlike appellate proceedings
before the Comelec, a motion for reconsideration of a trial courts decision in an election protest
is a prohibited pleading, which explains why stale claims of non-payment of filing fees have
always been raised belatedly before the appellate tribunal. In appellate proceedings before the
Comelec, the stage to belatedly raise a stale claim of non-payment of appeal fees to subvert an
adverse decision is a motion for reconsideration. The Commission thus did not gravely abuse its
discretion when it did not countenance the glaring inequity presented by such situation. More.
Petitioner, guilty as he is of the same act that he assails, stands on equal footing with private
respondent, for he himself admittedly did not pay the appeal fee, yet the Comelec similarly
adjudicated his appeal on the merits, the resolution of which he glaringly does not assail in the
present petition. He who comes to court must come with clean hands.
Same; Same; Election cases cannot be treated in a similar manner as criminal cases where,
upon appeal from a conviction by the trial court, the whole case is thrown open for review and
the appellate court can resolve issues which are not even set forth in the pleadings.Election
cases cannot be treated in a similar manner as criminal cases where, upon appeal from a
conviction by the trial court, the whole case is thrown open for review and the appellate court
can resolve issues which are not even set forth in the pleadings. Petitioner having set his eyes
only on the issue of appeal fees, the present petition must be resolved, as it is hereby resolved,
on the basis of such singular ground which, as heretofore discussed, failed to convince the
Court.
Same; Election Contests; Appreciation of the contested ballots and election documents involves
a question of fact best left to the determination of the Comelec, a specialized agency tasked
with the supervision of elections all over the country.En passant, appreciation of the contested
ballots and election documents involves a question of fact best left to the determination of the

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Comelec, a specialized agency tasked with the supervision of elections all over the country. In
the absence of grave abuse of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law, the factual
findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered by the Comelec on matters falling within its
competence shall not be interfered with by this Court.
Same; An assistor cannot assist in the preparation of the ballots for more than three times.By
the assailed Resolutions, the Comelec declared as marked those ballots containing the words
Ruby, Ruby Lizardo and its variants after finding a discernible pattern in the way these words
were written on the ballots, leading to the conclusion that they were used to identify the voter.
The Comelec found material the following evidence aliunde: the name Ruby Lizardo referred to
a community leader and political supporter of petitioner; said name and its variants were written
on several ballots in different precints; and the fact that Ruby Lizardo acted as an assistor in the
elections cannot hold water since an assistor cannot assist in the preparation of the ballots for
more than three times. The Comelec did not invalidate the other ballots for absence of evidence
aliunde to prove that the markings therein were used for the purpose of identifying the voter. It
ruled that circles, crosses and lines (e.g., X marks) placed on spaces on which the voter has
not voted are considered signs to indicate his desistance from voting and should not invalidate
the ballot.
FACTS:

Petitioner Divinagracia and private respondent Centena are opponents for the vicemayoralty race in Calinog, Ilolo.
After the voting and the canvassing of the votes, petitioner was proclaimed winner.
Thereafter, respondent filed an election protest before the RTC which dismissed the same.
Both parties filed an appeal before the COMELEC upon notice of appeal and paying the
filing fees.
COMELEC second division reversed the RTCs decision and thereby proclaimed respondent
as the true winner.
Petitioner then filed his motion of reconsideration; he alleged that the appeal must be
dismissed on the ground that the required appeal fees are not paid.
COMELEC en banc did not take heed and affirm the COMELEC second divisions decision. It
ruled that petitioner was barred under the doctrine of estoppel by laches when he failed to
raise the question of jurisdiction when he filed his Appellants and Appellees Briefs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is barred by laches.

RULING:
Yes. There are two (2) appeal fees that should be paid. The court clarified as follows: In the
recent case of Aguilar v. Comelec, the Court harmonized the rules with the following
ratiocination:
The foregoing resolution is consistent with A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC and the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, as amended. The appeal to the COMELEC of the trial courts decision in election
contests involving municipal and barangay officials is perfected upon the filing of the notice of
appeal and the payment of the P1,000.00 appeal fee to the court that rendered the decision
within the five-day reglementary period.
The non-payment or the insufficient payment of the additional appeal fee of P3,200.00 to the

COMELEC Cash Division, in accordance with Rule 40, Section 3 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, as amended, does not affect the perfection of the appeal and does not result in
outright or ipso facto dismissal of the appeal.
Following, Rule 22, Section 9(a) of the COMELEC Rules, the appeal may be dismissed. And
pursuant to Rule 40, Section 18 of the same rules, if the fees are not paid, the COMELEC may
refuse to take action thereon until they are paid and may dismiss the action or the proceeding.
In such a situation, the COMELEC is merely given the discretion to dismiss the appeal or not.
(Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In Aguilar, the Court recognized the Comelecs discretion to allow or dismiss a perfected
appeal that lacks payment of the Comelec-prescribed appeal fee. The Court stated that it was
more in keeping with fairness and prudence to allow the appeal which was, similar to the
present case, perfected months before the issuance of Comelec Resolution No. 8486.
Aguilar has not, however, diluted the force of Comelec Resolution No. 8486 on the matter of
compliance with the Comelec-required appeal fees. To reiterate, Resolution No. 8486
merely clarified the rules on Comelec appeal fees which have been existing as early as 1993,
the amount of which was last fixed in 2002. The Comelec even went one step backward and
extended the period of payment to 15 days from the filing of the notice of appeal.
DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL BY LACHES REGARDING FILING FEES
A party cannot raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction on the ground that there was lack of
payment of filing fees because on that matter it is within the discretion of the COMELEC to
dismiss or not any petition. Being the case thereof, it must be raised by the parties if the
COMELEC did not dismiss it. In other words, although the case is dismissible, the party must
invoke it or seek the court or COMELECs attention. Moreover, under the doctrine of estoppels by
laches, it bars any individual from raising the said issue after he actively participated and
recognized the court or tribunals jurisdiction even and after received an adverse decision from
said tribunal or court. Therefore, he must raise the same during the course of the trial not for the
first time on appeal.
Santos v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 155618, 26 March 2003
Election Law; Courts; Board of Canvassers; Between the determination by the trial court of who
of the candidates won the elections and the finding of the Board of Canvassers as to whom to
proclaim, it is the courts decision that should prevail.Between the determination by the trial
court of who of the candidates won the elections and the finding of the Board of Canvassers as
to whom to proclaim, it is the courts decision that should prevail. This was sufficiently explained
in the case of Ramas v. COMELEC in this wise: All that was required for a valid exercise of the
discretion to allow execution pending appeal was that the immediate execution should be based
upon good reasons to be stated in a special order. The rationale why such execution is allowed
in election cases is, as stated in Gahol v. Riodique, to give as much recognition to the worth of a
trial judges decision as that which is initially ascribed by the law to the proclamation by the
board of canvassers. Thus: Why should the proclamation by the board of canvassers suffice as
basis of the right to assume office, subject to future contingencies attendant to a protest, and
not the decision of a court of justice? Indeed, when it is considered that the board of canvassers
is composed of persons who are less technically prepared to make an accurate appreciation of
the ballots, apart from their being more apt to yield to extraneous considerations, and that the

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board must act summarily, practically racing against time, while, on the other hand, the judge
has benefit of all the evidence the parties can offer and of admittedly better technical
preparation and background, apart from his being allowed ample time for conscientious study
and mature deliberation before rendering judgment, one cannot but perceive the wisdom of
allowing the immediate execution of decisions in election cases adverse to the protestees,
notwithstanding the perfection and pendency of appeals therefrom, as long as there are, in the
sound discretion of the court, good reasons therefor. To deprive trial courts of their discretion to
grant execution pending appeal would, in the words of Tobon Uy v. COMELEC, bring back the
ghost of the grab-the-proclamation-prolong the protest techniques so often resorted to by
devious politicians in the past in their efforts to perpetuate their hold to an elective office. This
would, as a consequence, lay to waste the will of the electorate.
FACTS:

Petitioner Edgar Y. Santos and respondent Pedro Q. Panulaya were both candidates for
Mayor of the Municipality of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental in the May 14, 2001 elections. On
May 16, 2001, after the votes were counted and canvassed, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers proclaimed respondent Panulaya as the duly elected Mayor.

Petitioner filed an election protest and after trial, obtained a decision in favour of him from
the trial court. Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion for execution pending appeal.

While the motion is pending, the respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the
COMELEC. The latter dismissed said motion. Consequently, petitioner was proclaimed
winner.

Despite the proclamation, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.

Two days later, while the motion for reconsideration is pending, respondent filed another
petition which contained the same prayer on his first petition.

Consequently, the COMELEC issued another decision reversing itself. It barred the
petitioners assumption of office.
ISSUE/S:
(1)
Whether or not respondent is guilty of forum shopping.
(2)
Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the
motion for execution pending appeal.
RULING:
(1)
Yes, please see case.
(2)
No. The trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The petition for certiorari
in SPR No. 37- 2002 assailed the trial courts orders for the execution of its decision
pending appeal. The grant of execution pending appeal was well within the
discretionary powers of the trial court. In order to obtain the annulment of said orders
in a petition for certiorari, it must first be proved that the trial court gravely abused its
discretion. He should show not merely a reversible error committed by the trial court,
but a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave
abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility which must be so patent
and gross as to amount to an invasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform
the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Mere abuse of discretion is
not enough.

We find that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the trial court. In its order
granting execution pending appeal, it held: It is of judicial notice that for the public
official elected last May 14, 2001 elections only a short period is left. Relative to this
Courts jurisdiction over the instant case, the settled rule that the mere filing of the
notice of appeal does not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and to
resolve pending incidents, i.e., motion for execution pending appeal (Asmala vs.
COMELEC, 289 SCRA 745) need not be overemphasized. However, the COMELEC set
aside the aforesaid order, saying that shortness of term alone is not a good reason for
execution of a judgment pending appeal. We disagree.
While it was indeed held that shortness of the remaining term of office and posting a
bond are not good reasons, we clearly stated in Fermo v. COMELEC that: A valid
exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal requires that it should be
based upon good reasons to be stated in a special order. The following constitute
good reasons and a combination of two or more of them will suffice to grant
execution pending appeal: (1.) public interest involved or will of the electorate; (2.) the
shortness of the remaining portion of the term of the contested office; and (3.) the
length of time that the election contest has been pending (italics supplied).[23]
The decision of the trial court in Election Protest No. 1-M(2001) was rendered on April
2, 2002, or after almost one year of trial and revision of the questioned ballots. It
found petitioner as the candidate with the plurality of votes. Respondent appealed the
said decision to the COMELEC. In the meantime, the three-year term of the Office of the
Mayor continued to run. The will of the electorate, as determined by the trial court in
the election protest, had to be respected and given meaning. The Municipality
of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental, needed the services of a mayor even while the election
protest was pending, and it had to be the candidate judicially determined to have been
chosen by the people.
Between the determination by the trial court of who of the candidates won the
elections and the finding of the Board of Canvassers as to whom to proclaim, it is the
courts decision that should prevail. This was sufficiently explained in the case
of Ramas v. COMELEC in this wise: All that was required for a valid exercise of the
discretion to allow execution pending appeal was that the immediate execution should
be based upon good reasons to be stated in a special order. The rationale why such
execution is allowed in election cases is, as stated in Gahol v. Riodique, to give as
much recognition to the worth of a trial judges decision as that which is initially
ascribed by the law to the proclamation by the board of canvassers. Thus: Why should
the proclamation by the board of canvassers suffice as basis of the right to assume
office, subject to future contingencies attendant to a protest, and not the decision of a
court of justice? Indeed, when it is considered that the board of canvassers is
composed of persons who are less technically prepared to make an accurate
appreciation of the ballots, apart from their being more apt to yield to extraneous
Considerations, and that the board must act summarily, practically racing against
time, while, on the other hand, the judge has benefit of all the evidence the parties can
offer and of admittedly better technical preparation and background, apart from his
being allowed ample time for conscientious study and mature deliberation before
rendering judgment, one cannot but perceive the wisdom of allowing the immediate
execution of decisions in election cases adverse to the protestees, notwithstanding
the perfection and pendency of appeals therefrom, as long as there are, in the sound

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discretion of the court, good reasons therefor.


To deprive trial courts of their discretion to grant execution pending appeal would, in
the words of Tobon Uy v. COMELEC, bring back the ghost of the grab-theproclamation- prolong the protest techniques so often resorted to by devious
politicians in the past in their efforts to perpetuate their hold to an elective office. This
would, as a consequence, lay to waste the will of the electorate. Thus, the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course, instead of dismissing
outright, the petition in SPR No. 37-2002 despite the clear showing that respondent
was guilty of forum-shopping; and in setting aside the trial courts order granting
execution pending appeal.

its affirmation. Section 3 finds application in ordinary civil actions where the interest of the
prevailing party is capable of pecuniary estimation, and consequently, of protection, through the
filing of a supersedeas bond. Thus, the penultimate sentence of Section 3 states: [T]he bond
thus given may be proceeded against on motion with notice to the surety. Consequently, it finds
no application in election protest cases where judgments invariably include orders which are not
capable of pecuniary estimation such as the right to hold office and perform its functions.
FACTS:

Navarosa v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157957, 18 September 2003


Election Law; Commission on Elections; Court will no longer tolerate any mistake in the
payment of the full amount of filing fees for election cases filed after the promulgation of the
Loyola decision on March 25, 1977.In an earlier ruling, the Court held that an election protest
is not dismissible if the protestant, relying on the trial courts assessment, pays only a portion of
the COMELEC filing fee. However, in Miranda v. Castillo, the Court, reiterating Loyola v.
Commission on Elections, held that it would no longer tolerate any mistake in the payment of
the full amount of filing fees for election cases filed after the promulgation of the Loyola decision
on March 25, 1997.
Same; Same; Although a party cannot waive jurisdictional issues and may raise them at any
stage of the proceedings, estoppel may bar a party from raising such issues.Although a party
cannot waive jurisdictional issues and may raise them at any stage of the proceedings, estoppel
may bar a party from raising such issues. In Pantranco North Express v. Court of Appeals this
Court applied the doctrine of estoppel against a party who also belatedly raised the issue of
insufficient payment of filing fees to question the courts exercise of jurisdiction over the case.
Same; Same; Election Protest; Requisites to grant execution pending appeal in election protest
cases.To grant execution pending appeal in election protest cases, the following requisites
must concur: (1) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party;
(2) there must be good reasons for the execution pending appeal; and (3) the order granting
execution pending appeal must state the good reasons.
Same; Same; What constitutes good reasons to justify execution pending appeal.In Ramas v.
Commission on Elections, the Court, after reviewing pertinent jurisprudence, summarized the
circumstances qualifying as good reasons justifying execution pending appeal, thus: In a
nutshell, the following constitute good reasons, and a combination of two or more of them will
suffice to grant execution pending appeal: (1) the public interest involved or the will of the
electorate; (2) the shortness of the remaining portion of the term of the contested office; and (3)
the length of time that the election contest has been pending.
Same; Same; A supersedeas bond under Section 3 cannot fully protect the interests of the
prevailing party in election protest cases; Section 3 finds no application in election protest cases
where judgments invariably include orders which are not capable of pecuniary estimation such
as the right to hold office and perform its functions.Furthermore, a supersedeas bond under
Section 3 cannot fully protect the interests of the prevailing party in election protest cases. x x x
A supersedeas bond secures the performance of the judgment or order appealed from in case of

Petitioner Charito Navarosa (petitioner Navarosa) and respondent Roger M. Esto


(respondent Esto) were candidates for mayor of Libacao, Aklan in the 14 May 2001
elections. On 17 May 2001, the COMELEC Municipal Board of Canvassers of Libacao
proclaimed petitioner Navarosa as the duly elected mayor, with a winning margin of three
(3) votes over respondent Esto.[3]
Claiming that irregularities marred the canvassing of ballots in several precincts,
respondent Esto filed an election protest docketed as Election Case No. 129 (election
protest) in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Kalibo, Aklan (trial court). Petitioner
Navarosa, who also claimed that canvassing irregularities prejudiced her, filed a counterprotest in the same case.
On 4 March 2002, after revision of the contested ballots, the trial court rendered judgment
in favor of respondent Esto. The trial court found that respondent Esto obtained 4,595
votes over petitioner Navarosas 4,553 votes. Thus, the trial court declared respondent Esto
the elected mayor of Libacao by a margin of 42 votes and annulled the earlier proclamation
of petitioner Navarosa. The trial court also ordered petitioner Navarosa to pay respondent
Esto actual damages and attorneys fees.
Petitioner Navarosa appealed the trial courts ruling to the COMELEC (EAC Case No. A-92002). Respondent Esto, on the other hand, filed with the trial court a motion for execution
of the judgment pending petitioner Navarosas appeal. Petitioner Navarosa opposed
respondent Estos motion. In the alternative, petitioner Navarosa offered to file a
supersedeas bond to stay execution pending appeal, should the trial court grant respondent
Estos motion.
In its Order of 22 March 2002 (Order), the trial court granted respondent Estos motion
subject to the filing of a P300,000 bond. However, in the same order, the trial court also
granted petitioner Navarosas prayer to stay the execution pending appeal, upon filing a
P600,000 supersedeas bond.
Both petitioner Navarosa and respondent Esto sought reconsideration of the Order but the
trial court denied their motions on 5 April 2002.
Respondent Esto filed a petition for certiorari with the COMELEC against the Order.
In her memorandum to the petition, petitioner Navarosa raised for the first time the issue of
the trial courts failure to acquire jurisdiction over the election protest because of
respondent Estos failure to pay the COMELEC filing fee.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the filing of supersedeas bond to avert the motion for execution
pending appeal is valid.

RULING:
See also ruling on estoppel by laches.
No. The legal basis which allows the execution pending appeal is As to election cases involving
regional, provincial, and city officials, which fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the

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COMELEC, Section 3 of Article IX-C of the Constitution vests the COMELEC with the authority to
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including
pre-proclamation controversies.
Additionally, Section 52(c), Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code empowers the COMELEC to
promulgate rules and regulations implementing the provisions of the Code or other laws which it
is required to enforce and administer. Accordingly, the COMELEC promulgated the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure. Section 1 of Rule 41 thereof expressly provides that [i]n the absence of any
applicable provision in [said] Rules, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in the
Philippines shall be applicable by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect.
In the earlier case of Gahol v. Riodique, the Court explained the legislative intent
behind the enactment of Section 218 of the Election Code of 1971. In Gahol, the Court gave an
additional justification for allowing execution pending appeal of decisions of trial courts, thus:
xxx [T]his innovative provision is the product of the bad experience of the people under the
previous election laws. Public policy underlies it. xxx [S]omething had to be done to strike the
death blow at the pernicious grab-the-proclamation-prolong-the- protest technique often, if not
invariably, resorted to by unscrupulous politicians who would render nugatory the peoples
verdict against them and persist in continuing in an office they very well know they have no
legitimate right to hold. xxx [T]o uphold the theory of Protestee that the very nature of the matter
in dispute in election contests, the holding of a public office and the performance of its
functions, makes gravely doubtful the propriety of an execution pending appeal, what with the
possible placing of the corresponding powers of government in the hands of one who might
ultimately turn out not to be really entitled to the position, is to negate the unquestionable and
patent intent of the legislature to give as much recognition to the worth of a trial judges decision
as that which is initially ascribed by the law to the proclamation by the board of canvassers. Why
should the proclamation by the board of canvassers suffice as basis of the right to assume
office, subject to future contingencies attendant to a protest, and not the decision of a court of
justice? Indeed, when it is considered that the board of canvassers is composed of persons who
are less technically prepared to make an accurate appreciation of the ballots, apart from their
being more apt to yield extraneous considerations, that the board must act summarily,
practically [racing] against time, while, on the other hand, the judge has the benefit of all the
evidence the parties can offer and of admittedly better technical preparation and background,
apart from his being allowed ample time for conscientious study and mature deliberation before
rendering judgment, one cannot but perceive the wisdom of allowing the immediate execution of
decisions in election cases adverse to the protestees, notwithstanding the perfection and
pendency of appeals therefrom, as long as there are, in the sound discretion of the court, good
reasons therefor. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, a primordial public interestto obviate a hollow victory for the duly elected candidate as
determined by the trial courtlies behind the present rule giving suppletory application to
Section 2. Only a more compelling contrary policy consideration can prevent the suppletory
application of Section 2. In insisting that the simple expedient of posting a supersedeas bond
can stay execution pending appeal, petitioner Navarosa neither claims nor offers a more
compelling contrary policy consideration. Instead, she merely contends that Section 3 of Rule
39 (Section 3) applies also in a suppletory character because its Siamese twin provision,
Section 2, is already being so applied. Such simplistic reasoning both ignores and negates the
public interest underlying Section 2s application. We cannot countenance such argument.

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