i.

Marital disqualification
Alvarez vs Ramirez

Alvarez vs. Ramirez

GRN 143439
Sandoval Gutierrez, J.;
FACTS:
Petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of the CA for allowing the
testimony of petitioners wife in a criminal proceeding where petitioner was accused for ransom.
Private prosecutor in the said criminal case called the petitioners wife without objection from
petitioners counsel. Wife testified that it was her estranged husband who poured and set the
house of her sister on fire. A motion to disqualify the testimony of his wife was filed pursuant to
rules on martial disqualification.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the wife can testify against her husband in a criminal case.
RULING:
The reason for the rule on martial disqualification are:
1. There is identity of interests between husband and wife;
2. If one were to testify for or against the other, there is consequent danger of perjury;
3. The policy of the law is to guard the security and confidence of private life, even at the risk of an
occasional failure of justice and to prevent domestic disunion and unhappiness;
4. Where there is want of domestic tranquility there is danger of punishing one spouse through the
hostile testimony of the other.
The offense of arson attributed to the husband impairs the conjugal relation between him
and his wife. His act eradicates all the major aspects of marital life such as trust, confidence,
respect and love by which virtues the conjugal relationship survives and flourishes the
evidence and facts presented reveal that the preservation of the marriage between petitioner and
his wife is no longer an interest the State aims to protect.

People of the Philippines vs Castaneda

When an offense directly attacks, or directly and vitally impairs the Conjugal
Relation, it comes within the exception to the statute that
one shall not be a witness against the other except in a criminal prosecution
for a crime committed by one against the other. With more
reason must the exception apply to the instant case where the victim of the
crime and the person who stands to be directly prejudiced by
the falsification is not a third person but the wife herself. Taken collectively,
the actuations of the witness-wife underscore the fact that the
martial and domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have
become so strained that there is no more harmony to be
preserved said nor peace and tranquility which may be
disturbed.

People of the Philippines vs. Castaneda

88 SCRA 562 (1979)
FACTS:
Edmundo Enriquez became a victim of a robbery-killing. He was beaten and stabbed on the
different parts of his body which caused his subsequent death. His wallet containing P60.00, his
wrist watch, ring, shirt, and shoes, were all taken from him. Teresita Nobello, a deaf-mute, while
walking along Taft Ave. and E. delos Santos Ave., allegedly saw the incident. When she reported
it to the police, investigation and taking down of sworn statement took place but nobody was
arrested. Castaneda was then arrested at the iceplant where he works, admitting the crime and
pointed two others Juanito and Benedicto. He alleged that it started when they were drinking
when they saw Enriquez (deceased) at the nearby table and Benedicto approached him and
asked for money but instead Enriquez gave him a cigarette. When Enriquez passed along a dark
alley, the accused and companions beat and stabbed (causing death) Enriquez with pipe and
took the wallet containing P60, ring, watch and shirt. Teresita, as a witness, said Castaneda
acted as a lookout while the others beat and stabbed the victim. RTC held that Juanito and
Castaneda shall be punished with DEATH discrediting their respectivealibis.
ISSUE:
Whether the trial court erred in admitting extrajudicial admission and testimony of lone
evidence Teresita.
RULING:

No. Trial court is correct in its decision. Extrajudicial confessions of the accused in a criminal
case are universally recognized as admissible evidence against him and this rule is based on the
presumption that no one would declare anything against himself unless such declarations were
true. Accordingly, it has been held that a confession constitutes an evidence of a high order since
it is supported by the strong presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and
knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience. The trial court is not
bound to believe all that the witness has said, but it may give weight and credence to such
portions of her testimony as it may deem worthy of belief and disbelieve the other portions of her
testimony. Triers of facts are not bound to believe all that a witness has said; they may accept
some portions of his testimony and reject other portions, according to what seems to them, upon
other facts and circumstances, to be the truth. Even when witnesses are found to have

deliberately falsified in some particulars, the jury are not required to reject the whole of their
uncorroborated testimony, but may credit such portions as they may deem worthy of belief. In
this regard, it would suffice to state that the trial court by reason of its proximate contact with
witnesses, is in a more competent position to discriminate between the true and the false, and in
the case at bar, we find no reason to disturb its conclusion that the said witness of the prosecution
saw the incident in question.
ii.

Death or insanity (dead mans statute)

Razon vs Court of Appeals See also Suarez book p.103

The case was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late Juan
Chuidian to recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly
owned by the late Juan T. Chuidian. It is clear, therefore, that the testimony
of the petitioner is not within the prohibition of the dead man
statute. The case was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor
was it filed upon claims against the estate. Furthermore, the
records show that the private respondent never objected to the testimony of
the petitioner as regards the true nature of his transaction
with the late elder Chuidian.
G.R. No. 74306 March 16, 1992, THIRD DIVISION
ENRIQUE RAZON, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, in his capacity as
Administrator of the Estate of the Deceased JUAN T. CHUIDIAN, respondents.
G.R. No. 74315 March 16, 1992
VICENTE B. CHUIDIAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ENRIQUE RAZ0N, and E. RAZON, INC.,
respondents.
Facts:
In G.R. No. 74306 the Regional Trial Court of Manila declared that the owner
of the 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. covered by Stock Certificate No. 003 is
owned by the petitioner, but which was reversed by the Court of Appeals and ruled that
Juan T. Chuidian, the deceased father of petitioner Vicente B. Chuidian in G.R. No.
74315 is the owner of the said shares of stock.
Stock Certificates No. 003 for 1,500 shares of stock of defendant corporation
was issued and registered in the name of Juan T. Chuidian in the books of the
corporation. Later on said certificate of stock was personally delivered by Chuidian to
the Corporate Secretary, since then Enrique Razon was in possession of said stock
certificate even during the lifetime of the late Chuidian, from the time the late Chuidian
delivered the said stock certificate to defendant Razon. By agreement of the parties
such certificates were delivered for deposit with the bank under the joint custody of the

parties.
The certificates were delivered by the late Chuidian to Enrique because it was
the latter who paid for all the subscription on the shares of stock in the defendant
corporation and the understanding was that he (defendant Razon) was the owner of the
said shares of stock and was to have possession thereof.
In G.R. No. 74306, petitioner Enrique Razon assails the appellate court's
decision on its alleged misapplication of the dead man's statute rule under Section 20(a)
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. According to him, the "dead man's statute" rule is not
applicable to the instant case. Moreover, the private respondent, as plaintiff in the case
did not object to his oral testimony regarding the oral agreement between him and the
deceased Juan T. Chuidian that the ownership of the shares of stock was actually
vested in the petitioner unless the deceased opted to pay the same; and that the
petitioner was subjected to a rigid cross examination regarding such testimony.
The petitioner maintains that his aforesaid oral testimony as regards the true
nature of his agreement with the late Juan Chuidian on the 1,500 shares of stock of E.
Razon, Inc. is sufficient to prove his ownership over the said 1,500 shares of stock.
In G.R. No. 74315, petitioner Vicente B. Chuidian insists that the appellate
court's decision declaring his deceased father Juan T. Chuidian as owner of the 1,500
shares of stock of E. Razon, Inc. should have included all cash and stock dividends and
all the pre-emptive rights accruing to the said 1,500 shares of stock.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioner's testimony is admissible.
2. The main issue is whether or not the 1,500 shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. covered
by Stock Certificate No. 003 are owned by Juan T. Chuidian.
3. Whether or not all cash and stock dividends and all the pre-emptive rights accrues to
the said 1,500 shares of stock.
Rulings:
1. Yes, it is admissible. Section 20(a) Rule 130 of the Rules of Court (Section 23 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence) States:
Sec. 20. Disqualification by reason of interest or relationship The following persons
cannot testify as to matters in which they are interested directly or indirectly, as herein
enumerated.
(a) Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other representative of a deceased
person, or against a person of unsound mind, upon a claim or demand against the
estate of such deceased person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify
as to any matter of fact accruing before the death of such deceased person or before
such person became of unsound mind."
The purpose of the law is to "guard against
the temptation to give false testimony in regard to the transaction in question on the part
of the surviving party."
The rule, however, delimits the prohibition it contemplates in that it is
applicable to a case against the administrator or its representative of an estate upon a
claim against the estate of the deceased person.
The case was filed by the administrator of the estate of the late Juan Chuidian

to recover shares of stock in E. Razon, Inc. allegedly owned by the late Juan T.
Chuidian. It is clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the
prohibition of the rule. The case was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor
was it filed upon claims against the estate. Furthermore, the records show that the
private respondent never objected to the testimony of the petitioner as regards the true
nature of his transaction with the late elder Chuidian. The petitioner's testimony was
subject to cross-examination by the private respondent's counsel. Hence, granting that
the petitioner's testimony is within the prohibition of Section 20(a), Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court, the private respondent is deemed to have waived the rule.
2. Yes, it is owned by Juan T. Chuidian. The records show that during his lifetime
Chuidian was ellected member of the Board of Directors of the corporation which clearly
shows that he was a stockholder of the corporation. From the point of view of the
corporation, therefore, Chuidian was the owner of the 1,500 shares of stock. the
petitioner who claims ownership over the questioned shares of stock must show that the
same were transferred to him by proving that all the requirements for the effective
transfer of shares of stock in accordance with the corporation's by laws, if any, were
followed or in accordance with the provisions of law.
The law is clear that in order for a transfer of stock certificate to be effective,
the certificate must be properly indorsed and that title to such certificate of stock is
vested in the transferee by the delivery of the duly indorsed certificate of stock. To
reiterate, indorsement of the certificate of stock is a mandatory requirement of law for an
effective transfer of a certificate of stock.
3. The cash and stock dividends and all the pre-emptive rights are all incidents of stock
ownership, hence, it accrued and attached to the 1,500 shares in E. Razon, Inc., since
1966 are declared to belong to the estate of Juan T. Chuidian.

Sunga Chan Chua vs Chua See also Suarez book p.104

G.R. No. 143340
August 15, 2001
LILIBETH SUNGA-CHAN and CECILIA SUNGA, petitioners,
vs.
LAMBERTO T. CHUA, respondent.
FACTS
Lamberto Chua alleged that in 1977, he verbally entered into a partnership with
Jacinto in the distribution of Shellane LPG. For business convenience, Lamberto and
Jacinto allegedly agreed to register the business name of their partnership, SHELLITE
GAS APPLIANCE CENTER, under the name of Jacinto as a sole proprietorship. Both
Lamberto and Jacinto contributed P100,000.00 to the partnership, with the intention that
the profits would be equally divided between them.
The partnership allegedly had Jacinto as manager, assisted by Josephine Sy,
sister-in-law of Lamberto. Upon Jacintos death in the later part of 1989, his daughter,
Lilibeth took over the operations of Shellite without Lambertos consent. Despite

Lambertos repeated demands for accounting, she failed to comply.

On June 22m 1992, Lamberto filed a complaint against Lilibeth with the RTC.
RTC decided in favor of Lamberto.
Lilibeth questions the correctness of the finding that a partnership existed
between Lamberto and Jacinto. In the absence of any written document to show such
partnership between Lamberto and Jacinto, Lilibeth argues that these courts were
proscribed from hearing the testimonies of Lamberto and his witness, Josephine, to
prove the alleged partnership three (3) years after Jacintos death.
To support the argument, Lilibeth invokes the DEAD MANS STATUTE OR
SURVIVORSHIP RULE under Sec. 23, Rule 130. Lilibeth thus implores this Court to
rule that the testimonies of Lamberto and his alter ego, Josephine, should not have
been admitted to prove certain claims against a deceased person (Jacinto).
ISSUE
Whether or not the DEAD MANS STATUTE applies to this case so as to render
inadmissible Lambertos testimony and that if his witness, Josephine.
HELD
No. The Dead Mans Statute provides that if one party to the alleged transaction
is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the surviving
party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own contradicted and
unexplained account of the transaction.
Lilibeth filed a compulsory counterclaim against Lamberto in their answer before
the RTC, and with the filing of their counterclaim, Lilibeth herself effectively removed this
case from the ambit of the Dead Mans Statute. Well entrenched is the rule that when
it is the executor or administrator or representatives of the estate that sets up the
counterclaim, Lamberto, may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to
defeat the counterclaim. Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, Lamberto is not
disqualified from testifying as to matters of fact occurring before the death of the
deceased, said action not having been bought against but by the estate or
representatives of the deceased.
The testimony of Josephine is not covered by the Dead Mans Statute for the
simple reason that she is not a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in
whose behalf a case is prosecuted. Lamberto offered the testimony of Josephine to
establish the existence of the partnership between Lamberto and Jacinto. Lilibeths
insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of Lamberto does not make her an assignor
because of the term assignor of a party means assignor of a cause of action which
has arisen, and not the assignor of a right assigned before any cause of action has
arisen. Plainly then, Josephine is merely a witness of Lamberto, latter being the
plaintiff.
Lilibeths reliance alone on the Dead Mans Statue to defeat Lambertos claim
cannot prevail over the factual findings that a partnership was established between
Lamberto and Jacinto.
Based not only on the testimonial evidence, but the
documentary evidence as well, they considered the evidence for Lamberto as sufficient
to prove the formation of a partnership, albeit an informal one.

The Dead Mans Statute provides that if one party to the alleged
transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental
disabilities, the surviving party is not entitled to the undue advantage of
giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction.
But before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of
testimonial evidence, it is necessary that: 1. The witness is a party or
assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf a case is
prosecuted; 2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person or a person of unsound mind; 3. The
subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of
such deceased person or against person of unsound mind; and 4. His
testimony refers to any matter of fact which occurred before the death of
such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind.
Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the executor or administrator or
representatives of the estate that sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff,
herein respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of the
deceased to defeat the counterclaim. Moreover, as defendant in the
counterclaim, respondent is not disqualified from testifying as to matters of
fact occurring before the death of the deceased, said action not having
been brought against but by the estate or representatives of the
deceased. (Sunga-Chan vs. Chua, G.R. No. 143340, August 15, 2001,
Gonzaga-Reyes, J.).
But before this rule can be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of
testimonial evidence, it is necessary that: 1. The witness is a
party or assignor of a party to case or persons in whose behalf a case in
prosecuted; 2. The action is against an executor or
administrator or other representative of a deceased person or a person of
unsound mind; 3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim
or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against person of
unsound mind; 4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact
of which occurred before the death of such deceased person or before such
person became of unsound mind." Two reasons forestall
the application of the "Dead Man's Statute" to this case. First, petitioners
filed a compulsory counterclaim against respondents in their
answer before the trial court, and with the filing of their counterclaim,
petitioners themselves effectively removed this case from the ambit
of the "Dead Man's Statute". Second, the testimony of Josephine is not
covered by the "Dead Man's Statute" for the simple reason that
she is not "a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons in whose behalf
a case is prosecuted."
Bordalba vs Court of Appeals See also Suarez book p.103

The dead mans statute does not operate to close the mouth of a witness as
to any matter of fact coming to his knowledge in any other
way than through personal dealings with the deceased person, or
communication made by the deceased to the witness.

iii.

Privileged Communication most digest available on net

related sa legal ethics
Chan vs Chan

To allow, however, the disclosure during discovery procedure of the hospital

recordsthe results of tests that the physician ordered, the
diagnosis of the patients illness, and the advice or treatment he gave him
would be to allow access to evidence that is inadmissible
without the patients consent. Physician memorializes all these information in
the patients records. Disclosing them would be the
equivalent of compelling the physician to testify on privileged matters he
gained while dealing with the patient, without the latters prior
consent.
SEC. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons cannot testify
as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
xxxx
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics cannot in a civil case, without the
consent of the patient, be examined as to any advice or treatment given by him or any information which
he may have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which information was
necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and which would blacken the reputation of the patient.
The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician who gets
information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined without the
patients consent as to any facts which would blacken the latters reputation. This rule is intended to
encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and give him
access to his body, enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the
appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could be compelled in the future to come to court and narrate
all that had transpired between him and the patient might prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his
own health at great risk

Lacurom vs Jacoba
The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence,may be waived by failure

of the claimant to objecttimely to its presentation or by any

conduct thatmay be construed as implied consent
Samala vs Valencia
a lawyer may not undertake to discharge conflicting duties any more than he
may represent antagonistic interests. This stern rule is
founded on the principles of public policy and good taste, which springs from
the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust and
confidence. Lawyers should not only keep inviolate the client's confidence,
but also avoid the appearance of treachery and doubledealing.
Only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice.
The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is founded on principles of public
policy and good taste. It springs from the attorney's duty to represent his client with undivided
fidelity and to maintain inviolate the client's confidence as well as from the injunction forbidding
the examination of an attorney as to any of the privileged communications of his client.

Almonte vs Vasquez
ALMONTE et. al. VS VASQUEZ
G.R. No. 95367 May 23, 1995

Facts
The case is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to annul the subpoena
duces tecum and orders issued by respondent Ombudsman, requiring petitioners Neria
Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as chief accountant and record custodian of the Economic
Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce all documents relating to
Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers (salary)
for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988 and to enjoin him from enforcing his orders.
An anonymous and unsigned letter purportedly written by an employee of the EIIB, was
sent to the Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished to several government offices,
including the Office of the Ombudsman.
In the letter were allegations as to the misuse of funds from the savings of unfulfilled

plantilla positions, among other forms of corruption and abuse of power.

As a response to the letter-complaint, petitioner Almonte denied allegations. Petitioner
Perez also denied the issue for the savings realized from the implementation of E.O.
No. 127, since the DBM only allotted for the remaining 947 personnel, and that the
disbursement of funds for the plantilla positions for overt and covert personnel had been
cleared by COA.
Jose F. Sano, the Graft Investigation Officer of the Ombudsmans office found their
responses unsatisfactory; therefore he asked for authority to conduct an investigation.
Anticipating the grant of his request, he issued a subpoena to petitioners, compelling
them to submit their counter-affidavits and the affidavits of their witnesses, as well as
subpoena duces tecum to the chief of the EIIBs Accounting Division, ordering him to
bring all documents relating to Personal Service Funds for the year 1988 and all
evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988.
Petitioners then moved to quash the subpoena (which was granted by the Ombudsman
since no affidavit was filed against petitioners) and the subpoena duces tecum, which
was denied, since it was directed to the Chief Accountant, petitioner Nerio Rogado. In
addition the Ombudsman ordered the Chief of the Records a Section of the EIIB,
petitioner Elisa Rivera, to produce before the investigator "all documents relating to
Personnel Service Funds, for the year 1988, and all documents, salary vouchers for the
whole plantilla of the EIIB for 1988, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof."
Petitioners filed for a motion of reconsideration, which was denied.
Issue(s)
1 Whether or not an unsigned and unverified letter complained is an appropriate
case within the concept of the Constitution
2 Whether or not the documents in question are classified, and therefore beyond
the reach of public respondents subpoena duces tecum.
Discussion
The petition is DISMISSED, but it is directed that the inspection of subpoenaed
documents be made personally in camera by the Ombudsman, and with all the
safeguards outlined in the decision.

True, the court recognizes the privilege based on state secrets. However, in the case at
bar, there have been no claims that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by
the production of records pertaining to the personnel of the EIIB. Nor is there a law or
regulation which considers personnel records of the EIIB as classified information. On
the contrary, COA Circular No. 88-293 states that The only item of expenditure which
should be treated as strictly confidential because it falls under the category of classified
information is that relating to purchase of information and payment of rewards.
And even if the subpoenaed documents are treated as presumptively privileged, the
decision would only justify ordering the inspection in camera, and not their
nonproduction.
Further, documents in question are public documents and as petitioner claims, the
disbursements by the EIIB of funds for personal service has already been cleared by
COA, then there should be no reason why they should object to the examination of the
documents by the respondent Ombudsman.
As to the issue whether or not an unsigned and unverified letter is an appropriate
case, it is expressly provided for in the Constitution that the Ombudsman and his
Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form
or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or

instrumentality

thereof,

including

government-owned

or

controlled

corporations and shall in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the actions taken
and the result thereof.
Ruling
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, but it is directed that the inspection of subpoenaed
documents be made personally in camera by the Ombudsman, and with all the safeguards outlined in this
decision.

*Where the claim of confidentiality does not rest on the need to protect
military, diplomatic or other national security secrets but on a general public
interest in the confidentiality of his conversations, courts have declined to
find in the Constitution an absolute privilege of the President against a
subpoena considered essential to the enforcement of criminal laws.
a. Testimonial Privilege
b. Admissions

Constantino vs Heirs of Pedro Constantino Jr.

By the term privies is meant those between whom an action is deemed
binding although they are not literally parties to the said action.
-------- Thus, any condition attached to the property or any agreement
precipitating the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement
with Waiver which was binding upon Maria Laquindanum is applicable
to respondents who merely succeeded Maria.
Constantino v. Heirs of Pedro Constantino
Facts:
1 Pedro Constantino, Sr. (Pedro Sr.), ancestors of the petitioners and respondents, owned
several parcels of land, one of which is an unregistered parcel of land in Bulacan. Upon
his death, he was survived by his six children, one of which is Pedro Constantino, Jr.
(Pedro Jr.), the grandfather of the respondents.
2 Respondents great grandchildren of Pedro Sr. (Laquindanum and Cailipan), in
representation of Pedro, Jr. filed a complaint against petitioners, grandchildren of Pedro
Sr. ( Oscar Constantino, Maxima Constantino and Casimira Maturingan), for the
nullification of a document denominated as Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman, and
certain tax declarations.
3 Respondents alleged that in 1998, petitioners asserted their claim of ownership over the
whole parcel of land to the exclusion of respondents who are occupying a portion thereof;
that a tax declaration in the name of petitioners was unlawfully issued due to the
execution of a fictitious document denominated as Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman,
where petitioners misrepresented themselves as the sole and only heirs of Pedro Sr.
4 Petitioners claimed that the document Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman pertaining
to the 240 sq m lot was perfectly valid and legal, as it was a product of mutual and
voluntary agreement between and among the descendants of the deceased Pedro Sr; that
the respondents have no cause of action against them considering that the respondents
lawful share over the estate of Pedro Sr., had already been transferred to them as
evidenced by the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver
a In the said deed, respondents adjudicated unto themselves to the exclusion of
other heirs, the parcel of land with an area of 192 sq m by misrepresenting that
they were the only legitimate heirs of Pedro Sr.
5 RTC: They are in pari delicto, whereby the law leaves them as they are and denies
recovery by either one of them. Although, plaintiffsheirs of Pedro Constantino, Jr.,
including Asuncion Laquindanum and Josefina Cailipan are not parties or signatories to
the Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver they are successorsininterest of Pedro
Constantino, Jr. They are considered privies to said deed, and are bound by said
extrajudicial settlement. They are estopped to share in the real property subject matter of
this case. Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman and the tax declarations stand.
6 CA: Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver covering the 192 sq m lot actually belongs to
Pedro Jr. (It had a typographical error: Instead of Pedro Jr., Pedro Constantino only),
hence, not part of the estate of Pedro Sr, considering that the children of Pedro Jr. were

specifically identified.
It is asserted by the petitioners that their execution in 1992 of the contract denominated as
Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman which excluded other heirs of Pedro Sr., was with
an underlying agreement with the other heirs including Maria Constantino, daughter of
Pedro Jr. and grandmother of respondents. The agreement was for the other heirs to
recognize the 192 square meters lot subject matter of the Extrajudicial Settlement with
Waiver executed in 1968 as the share of the heirs of Pedro Sr. in the estate of Pedro Sr.

Issue/Held: Whether or not respondents (great grand children of Pedro, Sr.) are considered
parties to the unlawful Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver, although not signatories to such
--- Yes.
Ratio:
Clearly, the principle of in pari delicto cannot be applied. The inapplicability is dictated not only
by the fact that two deeds, not one contract, are involved, but because of the more important
reason that such an application would result in the validation of both deeds instead of their
nullification as necessitated by their illegality. It must be emphasized that the underlying
agreement resulting in the execution of the deeds is nothing but a void agreement (contrary to
law; morals, good customs, public order or public policy).
That said, we cannot give credence to the contention of respondents that no fault can be
attributed to them or that they are free from the effects of violation of any laws arising from the
supposed unlawful agreement entered into between Maria Laquindanum, their predecessorin
interest, and the other heirs, including petitioners herein, based on the fact that they are not
signatories to said agreement, thus, the lack of any binding effect to them. Respondents argued
and set forth as an issue during the trial that they were not signatories to any of the contract or
privies to such an arrangement.
It is not disputed, however, that respondents are successorsininterest of Maria Laquindanum,
one of the signatories in the Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver who was also allegedly in
agreement with the petitioners. On this note, We agree with the trial court that respondents
are privies to Maria Laquindanum. By the term privies is meant those between whom
an action is deemed binding although they are not literally parties to the said action.
Correa v. Pascual: Privity in estate denotes the privity between assignor and assignee, donor and
donee, grantor and grantee, joint tenant for life and remainderman or reversioner and their
respective assignees, vendor by deed of warranty and a remote vendee or assignee. A privy in
estate is one, it has been said, who derives his title to the property in question by purchase; one
who takes by conveyance.
Respondents, as successorsininterest, derive their right from and are in the same position as their
predecessor in whose shoes they now stand. As such successors, respondents situation is
analogous to that of a transferee pendente lite illustrated in Santiago Land Development
Corporation v. Court of Appeals: As such, he stands exactly in the shoes of his predecessor in
interest, the original defendant, and is bound by the proceedings had in the case before the
property was transferred to him. He is a proper, but not an indispensable, party as he would, in

any event, have been bound by the judgment against his predecessor. Thus, any condition
attached to the property or any agreement precipitating the execution of the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver which was binding upon Maria Laquindanum is
applicable to respondents who merely succeeded Maria.
This notwithstanding, it must however be shown that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with
Waiver, referred to a property owned by Pedro Sr. Records show that apart from respondent
Asuncion Laquindanumss statement that the parcel of land subject matter of the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement with Waiver is not part of the estate of Pedro Sr., their common
ancestor, no other evidence was offered to support it. CA in giving credence to the respondents
claim, merely relied on the alleged typographical error in the Deed. The mention of the names of
the children of Pedro Jr. in the Extrajudicial Settlement is not proof that the subject of the deed is
the property of Pedro Jr. meant to exclude all the other heirs of Pedro Sr.
CA actually contradicted the admissions made no less by the respondents during the pretrial
conference where they stipulated that the land covered by the tax declaration belongs to Pedro Sr.
Clearly, the stipulation is an admission against respondents interest of the fact of ownership by
Pedro, Sr. which was transferred to respondents mother, the daughter of Pedro, Jr. The general
rule regarding conclusiveness of judicial admission upon the party making it and the
dispensation of proof admits of two exceptions: 1) when it is shown that the admission was made
through palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown that no such admission was in fact made. The
latter exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying that he made such an
admission. However, respondents failed to refute the earlier admission/stipulation before and
during the trial, and merely offered a vague explanation as to how such parcel of land was
acquired by Pedro Jr.
Considering that the infirmities in the two deeds relate to exclusion of heirs, both deeds are to be
considered void. While both parties acted in violation of the law on legitimes, the pari delicto
rule which refuses remedy to either party to an illegal agreement and leaves them where they are,
does not apply in this case. In order not to put a premium to the circumvention of the laws as
contemplated by the parties in the instant case, we must declare both contracts as void. Indeed,
any circumvention of the law cannot be countenanced.
Decision of the CA reversed.
People vs Gandia
A witness can only testify on facts which are based on his personal
knowledge or perception. The offer of compromise allegedly made by
the appellants parents to Amalia may have been the subject of testimony of
Amalia. However, following the principle of res inter alios
acta alteri nocere non debet, the actions of his parents cannot prejudice the
appellant, since he was not a party to the said conversation,
nor was it shown that he was privy to the offer of compromise made by
them to the mother of the victim.

Doldol vs People of the Philippines

Such partial restitution of the petitioners of the cash shortage is an implied
admission of misappropriation of the missing funds. Said
payment is of no moment and could not have legally brought acquittal for
the appellant. On the contrary, as guided by Section 27, Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence, We hold that said payment, particularly when
taken in conjunction with appellants commitment to
gradually pay the remainder of the missing funds, is a clear offer of
compromise which must be treated as an implied admission of
appellants guilt that he embezzled or converted the missing funds to
his personal use.
Partial restitution of cash shortage is an implied admission of misappropriation of missing
funds by the municipal treasurer in case where he/ she offers no competent and credible
evidence to prove that the missing funds were actually cash advances of employees in the
municipality. (Doldol v. People of the Philippines, GR 164481, 09.20.2005)
c. Confessions
Ladiana vs People of the Philippines See also Suarez book
p.142
Evidently, a person undergoing preliminary investigation before the public
prosecutor cannot be considered as being under custodial
investigation. There is no question that even in the absence of counsel, the
admissions made by petitioner in his Counter-Affidavit are
not violative of his constitutional rights. It is clear from the undisputed facts
that it was not exacted by the police while he was under
custody or interrogation
Ladiana vs. People, 393 SCRA 419
FACTS: The accused, a public officer, being then a member of the Integrated National
Police (INP now PNP) assigned at the Lumban Police Station, Lumban, Laguna, acting in
relation to his duty which is primarily to enforce peace and order within his jurisdiction,
taking advantage of his official position confronted Francisco San Juan why the latter was
removing the steel pipes which were previously placed to serve as barricade to prevent
the entry of vehicles along P. Jacinto Street, Barangay Salac, Lumban, Laguna, purposely
to insure the safety of persons passing along the said street and when Francisco San Juan
told the accused that the latter has no business in stopping him, said accused who was
armed with a firearm, attacked and shot Francisco San Juan with the firearm hitting
Francisco San Juan at his head and neck inflicting upon him fatal wounds thereby causing
the death of Francisco San Juan.
Petitioner admitted that he shot the victim while the latter was attacking him. Kaya itong
si Kapitan San Juan ay sumugod at hinawakan ako sa may leeg ng aking suot na T-shirt
upang ako ay muling saksakin; sa dahilang hindi ako makatakbo o makaiwas sa kabila ng
aking pananalag hanggang magpaputok ako ng pasumala sa kanya; sa bilis ng pangyayari

ay hindi ko alam na siya ay tinamaan

ISSUE: whether he acted in self-defense is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender.
Through the above statement, petitioner admits shooting the victim -- which eventually
led to the latters death -- but denies having done it with any criminal intent. In fact, he
claims he did it in self-defense. Nevertheless, whether categorized as a confession or as
an admission, it is admissible in evidence against him.
In general, admissions may be rebutted by confessing their untruth or by showing they
were made by mistake. The party may also establish that the response that formed the
admission was made in a jocular, not a serious, manner; or that the admission was made
in ignorance of the true state of facts. Yet, petitioner never offered any rationalization
why such admissions had been made, thus, leaving them unrebutted. Having admitted
that he had fatally shot the victim, petitioner had the duty of showing that the killing was
justified, and that the latter incurred no criminal liability therefor. Petitioner should have
relied on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that for the
prosecution. Even if his evidence be weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused has
admitted the killing. Petitioner argues that it was the prosecution that indirectly raised the
issue of self-defense. Hence, he could not be bound by it. This argument deserves scant
consideration. Therefore, petitioner can no longer invoke his constitutional right to be
presumed innocent of the crime charged. As far as he is concerned, homicide has already
been established. The fact of death and its cause were established by his admissions
coupled with the other prosecution evidence including the Certificate of Death, the
Certificate of Post-Mortem Examination and the Medico-Legal Findings. The intent to
kill is likewise presumed from the fact of death.
The only pieces of evidence in support of the plea of voluntary surrender made by
petitioner are statements made by two (2) prosecution witnesses that they were allegedly
told by other people that he had already gone to the police station. There is no showing
that he was not actually arrested; or that when he went to the police station, he
surrendered himself to a person in authority. Neither is there any finding that he has
evinced a desire to own to any complicity in the killing.
We have ruled in the past that the accused who had gone to the police headquarters
merely to report the shooting incident did not evince any desire to admit responsibility for
the killing. Thus, he could not be deemed to have voluntarily surrendered. In the absence
of sufficient and convincing proof showing the existence of indispensable circumstances,
we cannot appreciate voluntary surrender to mitigate petitioners penalty.
Petition is DENIED
People of the Philippines vs Ulit
Although the appellant was not assisted by counsel at the time he gave his
statement to the barangay chairman and when he signed the
same, it is still admissible in evidence against him because he was not under
arrest nor under custodial investigation when he gave his
statement. The exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that the
defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and runs
through menacing police interrogation procedures where the potentiality for

compulsion, physical and psychological, is forcefully

apparent.
People of the Philippines vs Sayaboc
Jurisprudence provides that extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be
voluntary. The condition for this presumption, however, is that
the prosecution is able to show that the constitutional requirements
safeguarding an accuseds rights during custodial investigation have
been strictly complied with, especially when the extrajudicial confession has
been denounced. The rationale for this requirement is to
allay any fear that the person being investigated would succumb to coercion
while in the unfamiliar or intimidating environment that is
inherent in custodial investigations. Therefore, even if the confession may
appear to have been given voluntarily since the confessant did
not file charges against his alleged intimidators for maltreatment, the failure
to properly inform a suspect of his rights during a custodial
investigation renders the confession valueless and inadmissible.
Tanenggee vs People of the Philippines
confession and admission is pesumed voluntarily until the contrary is proved and
the confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary

G.R. No. 179448

June 26, 2013

CARLOS L. TANENGGEE, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Ponente: Del Castillo, J.

Facts:
1. Five separate Information for estafa through falsification of commercial documents were filed
against petitioner.
2. The said Information portray the same mode of commission of the crime as in Criminal Case
No. 98-163806 but differ with respect to the numbers of the checks and promissory notes
involved and the dates and amounts.
3. In the middle of January 1998, two (2) Metrobank auditors conducted an audit of the
Commercio Branch for more than a week.
4. Thereafter or on 26 January 1998, appellant was asked by Elvira Ong-Chan, senior vice
president of Metrobank, to report to the Head Office on the following day.

5. When appellant arrived at the said office, he was surprised that there were seven other people
present: two senior branch officers, two bank lawyers, two policemen (one in uniform and the
other in plain clothes), and a representative of the Internal Affairs unit of the bank, Valentino
Elevado.
a. Appellant claimed that Elevado asked him to sign a paper in connection with the audit
investigation; that he inquired what he was made to sign but was not offered any explanation;
that he was intimidated to sign and was threatened by the police that he will be brought to the
precinct if he will not sign; that he was not able to consult a lawyer since he was not apprised of
the purpose of the meeting; and that just to get it over with he signed the paper which turned
out to be a confession.
b. After the said meeting, appellant went to see Tan at his office but was unable to find the latter.
c. He also tried to phone him but to no avail.
d. He asserts that said written statement was taken in violation of his rights under Section 12,
Article III of the Constitution, particularly of his right to remain silent, right to counsel, and
right to be informed of the first two rights. Hence, the same should not have been admitted in
evidence against him.
Issue:
Whether or not the written statement executed by the appellant is admissible in evidence.
Held:

We find the Petition wanting in merit.

Petitioners written statement is admissible in evidence.

The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession

of guilt obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, as correctly
observed by the CA and the OSG, is applicable only in custodial interrogation.

Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement

authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in any significant manner. Indeed, a person under custodial investigation is
guaranteed certain rights which attach upon the commencement thereof, viz: (1) to
remain silent, (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other rights above. 19 In the present case,
while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled written statement
regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch he managed, the following are clear:
(1) the questioning was not initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by
an internal affairs manager of the bank; and, (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor

restrained of his liberty in any significant manner during the questioning. Clearly,
petitioner cannot be said to be under custodial investigation and to have been
deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the taking of his written statement.

Moreover, in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, 20 we declared that the right to

counsel "applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to
those made in an administrative investigation." Amplifying further on the matter,
the Court made clear in the recent case of Carbonel v. Civil Service Commission: 21

However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the
Bill of Rights is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the
exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to
admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an
administrative investigation.22

Here, petitioners written statement was given during an administrative inquiry

conducted by his employer in connection with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly
committed in the course of his employment. No error can therefore be attributed to
the courts below in admitting in evidence and in giving due consideration to
petitioners written statement as there is no constitutional impediment to its
admissibility.

Petitioners written statement was given voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.

Petitioner attempts to convince us that he signed, under duress and intimidation, an

already prepared typewritten statement. However, his claim lacks sustainable basis
and his supposition is just an afterthought for there is nothing in the records that
would support his claim of duress and intimidation.

Moreover, "it is settled that a confession or admission is presumed voluntary until

the contrary is proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving the
contrary."23 Petitioner failed to overcome this presumption. On the contrary, his
written statement was found to have been executed freely and consciously. The
pertinent details he narrated in his statement were of such nature and quality that
only a perpetrator of the crime could furnish. The details contained therein attest to
its voluntariness. As correctly pointed out by the CA:

As the trial court noted, the written statement (Exhibit N) of appellant is replete with
details which could only be supplied by appellant. The statement reflects
spontaneity and coherence which cannot be associated with a mind to which
intimidation has been applied. Appellants answers to questions 14 and 24 were
even initialed by him to indicate his conformity to the corrections made therein. The
response to every question was fully informative, even beyond the required
answers, which only indicates the mind to be free from extraneous restraints. 24

In People v. Muit,25 it was held that "one of the indicia of voluntariness in the
execution of petitioners extrajudicial statement is that it contains many details and
facts which the investigating officers could not have known and could not have
supplied without the knowledge and information given by him."

Also, the fact that petitioner did not raise a whimper of protest and file any charges,
criminal or administrative, against the investigator and the two policemen present
who allegedly intimidated him and forced him to sign negate his bare assertions of
compulsion and intimidation. It is a settled rule that where the defendant did not
present evidence of compulsion, where he did not institute any criminal or
administrative action against his supposed intimidators, where no physical evidence
of violence was presented, his extrajudicial statement shall be considered as having
been voluntarily executed.26

Neither will petitioners assertion that he did not read the contents of his statement
before affixing his signature thereon "just to get it over with" prop up the instant
Petition. To recall, petitioner has a masteral degree from a reputable educational
institution and had been a bank manager for quite a number of years. He is thus
expected to fully understand and comprehend the significance of signing an
instrument. It is just unfortunate that he did not exercise due diligence in the
conduct of his own affairs. He can therefore expect no consideration for it.

No suppression of evidence on the part of the prosecution.

Petitioner claims that the prosecution should have presented Tan in court to shed
light on the matter. His non-presentation created the presumption that his
testimony if given would be adverse to the case of the prosecution. Petitioner thus
contends that the prosecution suppressed its own evidence.

Such contention is likewise untenable. The prosecution has the prerogative to

choose the evidence or the witnesses it wishes to present. It has the discretion as to
how it should present its case. 29 Moreover, the presumption that suppressed
evidence is unfavorable does not apply where the evidence was at the disposal of
both the defense and the prosecution. 30 In the present case, if petitioner believes
that Tan is the principal witness who could exculpate him from liability by
establishing that it was Tan and not him who signed the subject documents, the
most prudent thing to do is to utilize him as his witness. Anyway, petitioner has the
right to have compulsory process to secure Tans attendance during the trial
pursuant to Article III, Section 14(2) 31 of the Constitution. The records show,
however, that petitioner did not invoke such right. In view of these, no suppression
of evidence can be attributed to the prosecution.

Petitioners denial is unavailing.

The Court is also not persuaded by the bare and uncorroborated allegation of
petitioner that the loans covered by the promissory notes and the cashiers checks
were personally transacted by Tan against his approved letter of credit, although he
admittedly never saw Tan affix his signature thereto. Again, this allegation, as the
RTC aptly observed, is not supported by established evidence. "It is settled that
denials which are unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence are negative
and self-serving evidence. They merit no weight in law and cannot be given greater
evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on
affirmative matters."32 The chain of events in this case, from the preparation of the
promissory notes to the encashment of the cashiers checks, as narrated by the
prosecution witnesses and based on petitioners own admission, established beyond
reasonable doubt that he committed the unlawful acts alleged in the Informations.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23653 dated December 12, 2006 and September 6, 2007,
respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the minimum term
of the indeterminate sentence to be imposed upon the petitioner should be four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional.
SO ORDERED.

d. Conduct and Character

People of the Philippines vs Santos See also Suarez book p.145

We consider that the trial court did not commit reversible error in admitting the Guerrero affidavit for the limited purpose for proving
knowledge or plan or scheme, and more specifically, that appellant knew that the particular corner of two (2) particular streets in Manila
was a good place to ambush a vehicle and its passengers.

People of the Philippines vs Nardo See also Suarez book p.147

Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did nor did not do the same or a similar
thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or
usage, and the like. While lying may constitute a habit, we believe that the falsehoods committed by Lorielyn, assuming them for the
moment to be true, are petty and inconsequential. They are not as serious as charging one's own father of the sordid crime of rape, with
all of its serious repercussions.

The case:
This case is an automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City,
Albay, Branch III, which imposed on accused-appellant the death penalty for rape in Criminal
Case No. 7170.
Facts:
The victim, Lorielyn Nardo, is the eldest daughter of accused- appellant. She was born on
September 11, 1981 and, at the time of the incident, was fourteen (14) years old. During the trial,
the defense endeavored to portray the victim as an incorrigible liar. Occasions were cited
wherein the victim supposedly lied in order to obtain money or her parents' permission to leave
the house. The defense also presented Atty. Gonzales (employer of the accused) as a witness
which describes the victim as the one capable of concocting lies.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime of rape was established.
Ruling:
While lying may constitute a habit, the court believes that the falsehoods committed by the
victim assuming them for the moment to be true, are petty and inconsequential. They are not as
serious as charging one's own father of the sordid crime of rape, with all of its serious
repercussions. Rule 130, Section 34, of the Rules of Court provides that: "Evidence that one did
or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did nor did not do the
same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a specific intent or
knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like."
On the argument of the accused-appellant that the trial court should have given credence to the
witness, Atty. Santer G. Gonzales, because he is a member of the bar, the court reasoned out that
the witness took the witness stand not as a lawyer but as an ordinary person. He testified in his
capacity as accused-appellant's employer. As such, no special privilege should be accorded him
by the trial court by reason of his being a member of the bar. He did not appear in that case as an
officer of the court but as a mere witness, and hence should be treated as one.
Sifting through the entire body of evidence presented in this case, the court find nothing which
would destroy the moral certainty of accused- appellant's guilt. While there may be some
inconsistencies in the testimony of the victim, these are considered as minor inconsistencies
which serve to strengthen her credibility as they are badges of truth rather than indicia of
falsehood. Minor inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of witnesses, as they may even tend
to strengthen rather than weaken their credibility. Inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution
witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of
their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. Such minor flaws may even

enhance the worth of a testimony, for they guard against memorized falsities. Besides, a rape
victim cannot be expected to recall vividly all the sordid details of the violation committed
against her virtue.
Republic of the Philippines vs Heirs of Alejaga Sr.
The doctrine of independently relevant statements is an exception to
hearsay rule. It refers to the fact that such statements were made
is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule
does not apply: hence, the statements are admissible as
evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but
primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in
issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. The
witness who testifies thereto is competent because he heard
the same, as this is a matter of fact derived from his own perception, and the
purpose is to prove either that the statement was made or
the tenor thereof
Republic vs. Heirs of Felipe Alejaga, Sr.,
393 SCRA 361
Facts:
On Dec. of 1978, Alejaga Sr. filed a Free Patent Application with the District Land Office is
Roxas City. On March of 1979, the free patent was ordered to be issued to him. The Defendant
(Register of Deeds) also issued the OCT for the parcel of land.
On April of that same year, Ignacio Arrobang requested the Director of Lands in manila, through
a letter, to investigate for irregularities in the issuance of the title of a foreshore land in favor of
Alejaga Sr. The investigator, Isagani Cartagena recommended to the Director to file a civil
proceeding to cancel the Free Patent issued to Alejaga Sr.
On April 18, 1990, the government through the Solicitor General instituted an action for
Annulment/Cancellation of Patent and Title and Reversion against Alejaga Sr. He died pending
the proceeding. He was substituted by his heirs.
The RTC declared Isaganis testimony as hearsay and the Patent null and void, and the CA
reversed the RTC brushing aside as hearsay Isagani Cartagenas testimony that Land Inspector
Efren L. Recio had not conducted an investigation on the free patent application of Felipe
Alejaga Sr..
Issue:
Whether Isaganis testimony can be consider as hearsay hence cannot be properly admitted in
court?
Held:
No. The report of Special Investigator Isagani P. Cartagena has not been successfully rebutted.
In that report, Recio supposedly admitted that he had not actually conducted an investigation and
ocular inspection of the parcel of land. Cartagenas statement on Recios alleged admission may
be considered as independently relevant. A witness may testify as to the state of mind of

another person -- the latters knowledge, belief, or good or bad faith -- and the formers
statements may then be regarded as independently relevant without violating the hearsay rule.
Thus, because Cartagena took the witness stand and opened himself to cross-examination, the
Investigation Report he had submitted to the director of the Bureau of Lands constitutes part of
his testimony. Those portions of the report that consisted of his personal knowledge, perceptions
and conclusions are not hearsay. On the other hand, the part referring to the statement made by
Recio may be considered as independently relevant.
The doctrine on independently relevant statements holds that conversations communicated to a
witness by a third person may be admitted as proof that, regardless of their truth or falsity, they
were actually made. Evidence as to the making of such statements is not secondary but primary,
for in itself it (a) constitutes a fact in issue [36] or (b) is circumstantially relevant to the existence
of such fact.
Since Cartagenas testimony was based on the report of the investigation he had conducted, his
testimony was not hearsay and was, hence, properly admitted by the trial court.
e. Hearsay Evidence Rule
Patula vs People of the Philippines
Witness-lady-auditor witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed
fact cannot be calledupon for that purpose because her testimony derives its
value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness presently testifying
but from the veracity and competency of
the extrajudicial source of her information.
Topic: Evidence; Hearsay
Title: Patula v. people G.R. No. 164457; April 11, 2012
BERSAMIN J.
Facts: In a Estafa case, witness auditor based her testimony on the entries found in the receipts
supposedly issued by petitioner and in the ledgers corresponding to each customer, as well
as on the unsworn statements of some of the customers.
Issue: Is the testimony hearsay?
Ruling: Yes
Analysis: Sec. 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, states that a witness can testify only to those facts
that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her own
perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. Witness-lady-auditor
witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that
purpose because her testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a
witness presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial
source of her information.

AN ACCUSED CANNOT BE CONVICTED OF AN OFFENSE THAT IS NOT

CLEARLY CHARGED IN THE COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION. TO
CONVICT HIM OF AN OFFENSE OTHER THAN THAT CHARGED IN THE
COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION WOULD BE VIOLATIVE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND

CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION.

Indeed, the accused cannot be convicted of a crime, even if duly proven, unless the
crime is alleged or necessarily included in the information filed against him. (ANNA
LERIMA PATULA VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. NO. 164457, APRIL 11,
2012, BERSAMIN, J.).
i.

Dying Declaration: People of the Philippines vs

Gatarin

ii. Declaration against interest: People of the

Philippines vs Bernal See also Suarez book p.165

iii. Declaration about pedigree: Tizon vs Court of

Appeals See also Suarez book p.170
Facts:
This is a case of an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land and an apartment. Teodora
Guerrero died and left a parcel of land and an apartment. Her husband Martin Guerrero
adjudicates the said land to him and consequently sold to Teodora Domingo. The nephews and
nieces Tison et al seek to inherit by right of representation from the property disputed property
presenting documentary evidence to prove filial relation. The respondent contended that the
documents/evidence presented is inadmissible for being hearsay since the affiants were never
presented for cross-examination.
Issue:
Whether or not the evidence presented is hearsay evidence and is inadmissible.
Held:
The evidence submitted does not conform to the rules on their admissibility; however the same
may be admitted by reason of private respondent's failure to interpose any timely objection
thereto at the time they were being offered in evidence. It is elementary that an objection shall be
made at the time when an alleged inadmissible document is offered in evidence; otherwise, the
objection shall be treated as waived, since the right to object is merely a privilege which the
party may waive.
The primary proof that was considered in ascertaining the relationship between the parties
concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the effect that Teodora Dezoller

Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically declared that the former is Teodora's
niece. Such a statement is considered a declaration about pedigree which is admissible, as an
exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, subject to the
following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that the declarant be
related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3) that such relationship be shown
by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the declaration was made ante litem motam,
that is, not only before the commencement of the suit involving the subject matter of the
declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.
In a case for property heirship, the alleged niece testified about her being a
niece to the decedent. She testified that allegedly, her deceased childless Aunt,
the owner of the property in questions, since her lifetime had always declared her
as her niece, who would be capacitated to inherit her property.
The adverse party claims that it is hearsay evidence, and hence
inadmissible.
The Judge sustained the objection. Is the Judge Correct?
Answer: The Judge is wrong. The Supreme Court ruled in Tison V. Court of Appeals ([G.R.
No. 121027. July 31, 1997] The primary proof to be considered in ascertaining the
relationship between the parties concerned is the testimony of Corazon Dezoller Tison to the
effect that Teodora Dezoller Guerrero in her lifetime, or sometime in 1946, categorically
declared that the former is Teodoras niece. Such a statement is considered a declaration about
pedigree which is admissible, as an exception to the hearsay rule, under Section 39, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, subject to the following conditions: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to
testify; (2) that the declarant be related to the person whose pedigree is the subject of inquiry; (3)
that such relationship be shown by evidence other than the declaration; and (4) that the
declaration was made ante litem motam, that is, not only before the commencement of the suit
involving the subject matter of the declaration, but before any controversy has arisen thereon.
As the statement is a declaration about pedigree,the same can be admitted as evidence, as an
exception to the hearsay rule.
Tison vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 121027
July 31, 1997
FACTS:
The case involves an action for reconveyance filed by petitioners Corazon and
Rene against private respondent Teodora Domingo. The petitioners herein are the niece
and nephew of spouses Teodora Guerrero and Martin Guerrero. Teodora Guerrero died
without any ascendant or descendant. When she died, the petitioners sought to inherit the
parcel of land from Teodora by right of representation. Martin, however, sold the land to
private respondents Teodora Domingo. Just the same, the petitioners sought
reconveyance, saying that they are entitled to inherit of the property in question by
right of representation. In this regard, private respondent Domingo maintains that the
petitioners failed to establish their legitimate filiation.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the legitimacy of petitioners may be properly challenged in the

present action for reconveyance
HELD:
No. The private respondent is not the proper party to impugn the legitimacy of
herein petitioners. The presumption consequently continues to operate in favor of
petitioners unless and until it is rebutted.
Even assuming that the issue is allowed to be resolved, the burden of proof rests not on
the petitioners who have the benefit of the presumption in their favor, but on the private
respondent who is disputing the same
iv. Family reputation: Jison vs Court of Appeals See also
Suarez book p.172,174
Note, however, that the participation of the alleged father must be shown in any document or
evidence which the child intends to present (Jison vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124853
February 24, 1998).
FRANCISCO L. JISON vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MONINA JISON (G.R. No.
124853 February 24, 1998)
FACTS:
This is a case filed by one Monina Jison for recognition as an illegitimate child of
Francisco Jison who is married to Lilia Lopez Jison. MONINA alleged that she is the
daughter of FRANCISCO who impregnated her mother Esperanza F. Amolar, who was
then employed as the nanny of FRANCISCO's daughter. She claims that she has
openly and continuously possessed the status of an illegitimate child of Francisco and
that Francisco had also openly and continuously recognized her as such.
The trial court categorized Moninas many evidences as hearsay evidence, incredulous
evidence, or self-serving evidence and ruled against Monina while the Court of Appeals
decided in favour of Monina and declared her to be the illegitimate daughter of
Francisco.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the testimonies of Moninas witnesses were sufficient to
establish MONINA's filiation.
ISSUE: Did Monina successfully establish her filiation under Article 172 par. 2 of the
Family Code (open and continuous possession of the status)?
HELD: Yes. Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as
MONINA's, may be established in the same way and on the same evidence as that of
legitimate children. The Supreme Court sustained the findings of the CA that Monina
was able to prove her illegitimate filiation.
For the success of an action to establish illegitimate filiation under Article 172 par. 2, a

"high standard of proof" is required. To prove open and continuous possession of the
status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the
permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous
and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to
pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction
of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all
relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously.
By "continuous" is meant uninterrupted and consistent, but does not require any
particular length of time.
In deciding paternity suits, the issue of whether sexual intercourse actually occurred
inevitably redounds to the victim's or mother's word, as against the accused's or
putative father's protestations. In the instant case, MONINA's mother could no longer
testify as to the fact of intercourse, as she had already passed away. But the fact of
Moninas birth and her parentage may be established by evidence other than the
testimony of her mother.
The testimonial evidence offered by MONINA, woven by her narration of circumstances
and events that occurred through the years, concerning her relationship with
FRANCISCO, coupled with the testimonies of her witnesses, overwhelmingly
established that the following:
1) FRANCISCO is MONINA's father and she was conceived at the time when her
mother was in the employ of the former;
2) FRANCISCO recognized MONINA as his child through his overt acts and
conduct like sending her to school, paying for her tuition fees, school uniforms,
books, board and lodging at the Colegio del Sagrado de Jesus, defraying for her
hospitalization expenses, providing her with monthly allowance, paying for the
funeral expenses of her mother, acknowledging her paternal greetings and
calling appellant his "Hija" or child, instructing his office personnel to give
appellant's monthly allowance, recommending her to use his house in Bacolod
and paying for her long distance telephone calls, having her spend her long
distance telephone calls, having her spend her vacation in his apartment in
Manila and also at his Forbes residence, allowing her to use his surname in her
scholastic and other records.
3) Such recognition has been consistently shown and manifested throughout the
years publicly, spontaneously, continuously and in an uninterrupted manner.
The totality of the evidence on record established Moninas filiation.
Appeal filed by Francisco Jison was dismissed.

DECISION

In her complaint[4] filed with the RTC on 13 March 1985, MONINA alleged that
FRANCISCO had been married to a certain Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940. At the end of
1945 or the start of 1946, however, FRANCISCO impregnated Esperanza F. Amolar
(who was then employed as the nanny of FRANCISCO's daughter, Lourdes). As a
result, MONINA was born on 6 August 1946, in Dingle, Iloilo, and since childhood, had
enjoyed the continuous, implied recognition as an illegitimate child of FRANCISCO by
his acts and that of his family. In view of FRANCISCO's refusal to expressly recognize
her, MONINA prayed for a judicial declaration of her illegitimate status and that
FRANCISCO support and treat her as such.
ISSUE:
Whether or not MONINA is an illegitimate child of Francisco
Ruling:
Carefully evaluating appellants evidence on her enjoyment of the status of an
illegitimate daughter of [FRANCISCO] vis-a-vis [FRANCISCOs] controversion thereof,
We find more weight in the former. The positive testimonies of [MONINA] and [her]
witnesses xxx all bearing on [FRANCISCOs] acts and/or conduct indubitably showing
that he had continuously acknowledged [MONINA] as his illegitimate daughter have not
been succeessfully [sic] refuted. In fact, [FRANCISCO] himself, in his deposition, only
casually dismissed [MONINAs] exhaustive and detailed testimony as untrue, and with
respect to those given by [MONINAs] witnesses, he merely explained that he had fired
[them] from their employment. Needless to state, [FRANCISCOs] vague denial is
grossly inadequate to overcome the probative weight of [MONINAs] testimonial
evidence.
Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as MONINA's, may
be established in the same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate
children. Article 172 thereof provides the various forms of evidence by which legitimate
filiation is established, thus:
(1)
(2)
(1)
(2)

ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
v. Common Reputation
vi. Res Gestae: People of the Philippines vs Feliciano
FACTS
On December 8, 1994, seven (7) members of the Sigma Rho fraternity were
eating lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of the University of the
Philippines, Diliman, when they were attacked by several masked men carrying
baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of them sustained injuries that required

hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina, died from his injuries.

A case was filed against several members of the Scintilla Juris fraternity, namely,
Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Julius Victor L. Medalla, Warren L. Zingapan, Robert Michael
Beltran Alvir, Christopher L. Soliva, Reynaldo G. Ablanida, Carlo Jolette Fajardo,
George Morano, Raymund E. Narag, Gilbert Merle Magpantay, Benedict Guerrero, and
Rodolfo Pealosa, Jr. with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 219.
Prosecution witnesses saw about ten (10) men charging toward them. The men
were armed with baseball bats and lead pipes, and their heads were covered with either
handkerchiefs or shirts.
A witness positively identified Danilo Feliciano, Jr. as he was beating Venturina
up with a lead pipe while Raymund E. Narag was aiming to hit Venturina.
Venturina was transferred from the U.P. Infirmary to St. Lukes Hospital on
December 8, 1994 and died two days later.
The defense employed the defense of alibi.
On February 28, 2002, the trial court rendered its decision with the finding that
Robert Michael Alvir, Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Christopher Soliva, Julius Victor Medalla, and
Warren Zingapan were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and attempted murder
and were sentenced to, among other penalties, the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The trial court, however, acquitted Reynaldo Ablanida, Carlo Jolette Fajardo,
Gilbert Magpantay, George Morano, and Raymund Narag.
The case against Benedict Guerrero was ordered archived by the court until his
apprehension.
The Lower Courts ruling was appeal, however the Court of appeals affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUES
1
Whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that
accused-appellants attacked private complainants and caused the death of
Dennis Venturina.
2

Whether accused-appellants constitutional rights were violated when the

information against them contained the aggravating circumstance of the use
of masks despite the prosecution presenting witnesses to prove that the
masks fell off; and

Whether the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals correctly ruled, on

the basis of the evidence, that accused appellants were sufficiently identified.
HELD
Lower Courts decision affirmed with modification, Guilty beyond reasonable doubt on
attempted murder.
An information is sufficient when the accused is fully apprised of the charge
against him to enable him to prepare his defense.
Findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, are entitled to
great weight and credence.
The accused were sufficiently identified by the witnesses for the prosecution.
Evidence as part of the res gestae may be admissible but have little persuasive
value in this case.
The belated identification by the victims do not detract from their positive
identification of the appellants.
Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the victim.
Accused-appellants were correctly charged with murder, and there was treachery
in the commission of the crime.
The presence of conspiracy makes all of the accused appellants liable for murder
and attempted murder.

People of the Philippines vs Villarico

Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking place
or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances
thereof, may be given in evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, statements
accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal
significance, may be received as part of the res gestae (Rule 140, Section 42 of
then Rules of Court). The term res gestae refers to "those circumstances which
are the undesigned incidents of a particular litigated act and which are
admissible when illustrative of such act. In a general way, res gestae includes
the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and
serve to illustrate its character and which are so spontaneous and
contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and

fabrication.
The rule on res gestae encompasses the exclamations and statements
made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime immediately
before, during, or immediately after the commission of the crime when the
circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous
reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was
no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false
statement.
The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is
whether the act, declaration, or exclamation is so intimately interwoven or
connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be
regarded a part of the principal fact or event itself, and also whether it clearly
negatives any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.
A declaration or an utterance is thus deemed as part of the res gestae
that is admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the
following requisites concur: (a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling
occurrence; (b) the statements were made before the declarant had time to
contrive or devise; and (c) the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances (PEOPLE VS. GILBERTO
VILLARICO ET AL., G.R. NO. 158362, APRIL 4, 2011, BERSAMIN, J).
People of the Philippines vs Palanca 336 scra
vii. Entries in the Course of business: Philippine Airlines
vs Ramos See also Suarez book p.183

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. JAIME M. RAMOS, NILDA

RAMOS
G.R.
No.
92740
March
23,
1992
PHILIPPINE
AIRLINES,
INC.,
petitioner,
vs.
JAIME M. RAMOS, NILDA RAMOS, ERLINDA ILANO, MILAGROS ILANO, DANIEL
ILANO
AND
FELIPA
JAVALERA,
respondents.
FACTS

Plaintiffs complained that they were not allowed to board their PAL( Philippines Air Lines)
flight, despite the fact that they went to the check-in counter one hour before departure. They
alleged that when they arrived there no one was at the counter. They testified that the PAL
clerk arrived 30 minutes before departure. PAL however, presented as evidence the plaintiffs
tickets with notation late 4:04 and the passenger manifest which showed that two other
passengers who arrived earlier than plaintiffs, were not accommodated.
ISSUE
Are the documents presented by PAL admissible? Which should prevail the oral testimony of
plaintiffs
or
the
documentary
evidence
presented
by
PAL?
HELD
Yes. The documentary evidence presented by PAL to corroborate the testimonies of its
witnesses are entries made in the regular course of business which plaintiffs failed to
overcome with substantial and convincing evidence other than their testimonies.
Consequently they carry more weight and credit. A writing or document made
contemporaneously with a transaction which are evidence of facts pertinent to an issue, when
admitted as proof of those facts, is ordinarily regarded as more reliable proof and of greater
probative force than the oral testimony of a witness as to such fact based upon memory and
recollection. Spoken words could be notoriously unreliable as against a written document
that speaks a uniform language.
viii. Entries in official records: Lao vs Standard Insurance
See also Suarez book p.190
Sabili vs COMELEC
Sabili vs COMELEC
Facts:
1 COMELEC denied Sabilis Certificate of Candidacy for mayor of Lipa due to failure to comply with the
one year residency requirement.
2 When petitioner filed his COC1 for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein that he had
been a resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8) months.
3 However, it is undisputed that when petitioner filed his COC during the 2007 elections, he and his family
were then staying at his ancestral home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San Juan, Batangas.
4 respondent Florencio Librea (private respondent) filed a "Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification
5 Allegedly, petitioner falsely declared under oath in his COC that he had already been a resident of Lipa
City for two years and eight months prior to the scheduled 10 May 2010 local elections.
6 In its Resolution dated 26 January 2010, 41 the COMELEC Second Division granted the Petition of private
respondent, declared petitioner as disqualified from seeking the mayoralty post in Lipa City, and canceled
his Certificate of Candidacy for his not being a resident of Lipa City and for his failure to meet the statutory
one-year residency requirement under the law.
7 Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the 26 January 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC, during the
pendency of which the 10 May 2010 local elections were held. The next day, he was proclaimed the duly
elected mayor of Lipa City after garnering the highest number of votes cast for the said position. He
accordingly filed a Manifestation42with the COMELEC en banc to reflect this fact.

8
9

In its Resolution dated 17 August 2010, 43 the COMELEC en banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration of
petitioner.
Hence, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition (Petition for Certiorari with Extremely Urgent Application
for the Issuance of a Status Quo Order and for the Conduct of a Special Raffle of this Case) under Rule 64
in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the annulment of the 26 January 2010 and 17 August
2010 Resolutions of the COMELEC.

Issue and ruling not related to Evid

ix. Commercial lists: Meralco vs Quisimbing See also
Suarez book p.193
x. Learned Treaties
xi. Testimony or disposition at a former proceeding:
People of the Philippines vs Ortiz Miyako See also
Suarez book p.196

[G.R. Nos. 115338-39. September 16, 1997] PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. LANIE
ORTIZMIYAKE accused-appellant.
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with illegal recruitment in large
scale in the Regional Trial Court of Makati on a complaint initiated by Elenita Marasigan,
Imelda Generillo and Rosamar del Rosario. In addition, she was indicted for estafa by
means of false pretenses in the same court, the offended party being Elenita Marasigan
alone.
A judgment was rendered by said court convicting appellant of both crimes as
charged. In convicting appellant of illegal recruitment in large scale, the lower court
adopted a previous decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Paraaque as a basis for
the judgment. Said previous decision was a conviction for estafa involving the same
circumstances in the instant case, wherein complainants Generillo and Del Rosario
charged appellant with two counts of estafa. In thus convicting appellant in the illegal
recruitment case, the court adopted the facts and conclusions established in the estafa
decision as its own findings of facts and as its rationale for the conviction in the case
before it.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE ADOPTION OF THE TRIAL COURT OF THE FACTS
STATED IN THE DECISION OF THE PARAAQUE TRIAL COURT FALLS UNDER
THE EXCEPTION TO THE RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION AS THE EXCEPTION

CONTEMPLATED BY LAW PURSUANT TO SEC. 47 OF RULE 130 OF THE RULES

OF COURT
RULING:
NO. Under the law, the accused in a criminal case is guaranteed the right of
confrontation. This right, however, is not absolute as it is recognized that it is sometimes
impossible to recall or produce a witness who has already testified in a previous
proceeding, in which event his previous testimony is made admissible as a distinct
piece of evidence, by way of exception to the hearsay rule previous testimony is made
admissible because it makes the administration of justice orderly and expeditious
(section 47 of Rule 130). Under these rules, the adoption by the Makati trial court of the
facts stated in the decision of the Paraaque trial court does not fall under the exception
to the right of confrontation as the exception contemplated by law covers only the
utilization of testimonies of absent witnesses made in previous proceedings, and does
not include utilization of previous decisions or judgments. In the instant case, the
prosecution did not offer the testimonies made by complainants Generillo and Del
Rosario in the previous estafa case. Instead, what was offered, admitted in evidence,
and utilized as a basis for the conviction in the case for illegal recruitment in large scale
was the previous decision in the estafa case. A previous decision or judgment, while
admissible in evidence, may only prove that an accused was previously convicted of a
crime. It may not be used to prove that the accused is guilty of a crime charged in a
subsequent case, in lieu of the requisite evidence proving the commission of the crime,
as said previous decision is hearsay. To sanction its being used as a basis for
conviction in a subsequent case would constitute a violation of the right of the accused
to confront the witnesses against him.
[30]

People v. Ortiz-Miyake
hearsay rule the right of confrontation is not absolute as it is recognized that it is sometimes
impossible to recall or produce a witness who has already testified in a previous proceeding, in
which event, his previous testimony is made admissible as a distinct piece of evidence by way of
exception to
the hearsay rule; Exception contemplated by law covers only the utilization of testimonies of
absent witness made is previous proceedings BUT DOES NOT cover previous decisions or
judgments (if used
proof only that he was previously convicted of a crime BUT not guilty in a subsequent case.

Go vs People of the Philippines

Doctrine: The procedure for taking depositions in criminal cases recognizes the prosecution's right to
preserve testimonial evidence and prove its case despite the unavailability of its witness. It cannot,
however, give license to prosecutorial indifference or unseemly involvement in a prosecution witness'
absence from trial. To rule otherwise would effectively deprive the accused of his fundamental right to be
confronted with the witnesses against him.

Facts:
1. Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were charged before the MeTC of Manila for
Other Deceits under Article 318 of the RPC.
2. The Information dated September 24, 2003, later amended on September 14, 2004, reads:
a. That sometime in August 1996, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring,
confederating together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
defraud Highdone Company Ltd. Represented by Li Luen Ping.
b. by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which they made to said Li Luen Ping
to the effect that they have chattels such as machinery, spare parts, equipment and raw materials
installed and fixed in the premises of BGB Industrial Textile Mills Factory located in the Bataan Export
Processing Zone (BEPZ) in Mariveles, Bataan, executed a Deed of Mortgage for a consideration of the
amount of $464,266.90 or its peso equivalent at P20,892,010.50 more or less in favor of ML Resources
and Highdone Company Ltd. Representing that the said deed is a FIRST MORTGAGE when in truth and
in fact the accused well knew that the same had been previously encumbered, mortgaged and foreclosed
by CHINA BANK CORPORATION as early as September 1994 thereby causing damage and prejudice to
said HIGHDONE COMPANY LTD., in the said amount of $464,266.90 or its peso equivalent at
P20,892,010.50 more or less."
3. Upon arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty to the charge.
4. The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia,
traveled from his home country back to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing held on September
9, 2004.
5. However, trial dates were subsequently postponed due to his unavailability.
6. On October 13, 2005, the private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition of Li
Luen Ping, alleging that he was being treated for lung infection at the Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos,
Cambodia and that, upon doctor's advice, he could not make the long travel to the Philippines by reason
of ill health.
7. Notwithstanding petitioners' Opposition, the MeTC granted the motion after the prosecution complied
with the directive to submit a Medical Certificate of Li Luen Ping.
8. Petitioners sought its reconsideration which the MeTC denied, 9 prompting petitioners to file a Petition
for Certiorari before the RTC.
9. On September 12, 2006, the RTC granted the petition and declared the MeTC Orders null and void.
a. The RTC held that Section 17, Rule 23 on the taking of depositions of witnesses in civil cases cannot
apply suppletorily to the case since there is a specific provision in the Rules of Court with respect to the
taking of depositions of prosecution witnesses in criminal cases, which is primarily intended to safeguard
the constitutional rights of the accused to meet the witness against him face to face.
10. Upon denial by the RTC of their motion for reconsideration through an Order dated March 5,
2006, the prosecution elevated the case to the CA.

11. On February 19, 2008, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision which held that no grave abuse of
discretion can be imputed upon the MeTC for allowing the deposition-taking of the complaining witness Li
Luen Ping because no rule of procedure expressly disallows the taking of depositions in criminal cases
and that, in any case, petitioners would still have every opportunity to cross-examine the complaining
witness and make timely objections during the taking of the oral deposition either through counsel or
through the consular officer who would be taking the deposition of the witness.
12. On November 28, 2008, the CA denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
13. Hence, this petition.

Issues: Whether the application of the rules on deposition-taking in civil cases to criminal cases is
proper.

Held:
1.
We rule in favor of petitioners.

The Procedure for Testimonial Examination of an Unavailable Prosecution Witness is Covered

Under Section 15, Rule 119.

The examination of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court. 13 This is true
especially in criminal cases where the Constitution secures to the accused his right to a public trial and to
meet the witnessess against him face to face. The requirement is the "safest and most satisfactory
method of investigating facts" as it enables the judge to test the witness' credibility through his manner
and deportment while testifying.14 It is not without exceptions, however, as the Rules of Court recognizes
the conditional examination of witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu of
direct court testimony.

Even in criminal proceedings, there is no doubt as to the availability of conditional examination of

witnesses both for the benefit of the defense, as well as the prosecution. The Court's ruling in the case
of Vda. de Manguerra v. Risos15 explicitly states that

"x x x As exceptions, Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court provide for the different modes of discovery that
may be resorted to by a party to an action. These rules are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies
of witnesses or as modes of discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12, 13 and 15, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the conditional
examination of both the defense and prosecution witnesses." (Underscoring supplied) 16

The procedure under Rule 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court allows the taking of depositions in civil
cases, either upon oral examination or written interrogatories, before any judge, notary public or person
authorized to administer oaths at any time or place within the Philippines; or before any

Philippine consular official, commissioned officer or person authorized to administer oaths in a

foreign state or country, with no additional requirement except reasonable notice in writing to the other
party.17

But for purposes of taking the deposition in criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution
witness who would forseeably be unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be made before
the court, or at least before the judge, where the case is pending as required by the clear mandate of
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The pertinent provision reads thus:

SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for
the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court, or has to leave the
Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court
where the case is pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after
reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served on him shall be conducted in the same
manner as an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after
notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or against the
accused.

Since the conditional examination of a prosecution witness must take place at no other place than
the court where the case is pending, the RTC properly nullified the MeTC's orders granting the motion to
take the deposition of Li Luen Ping before the Philippine consular official in Laos, Cambodia. We quote
with approval the RTC's ratiocination in this wise:

The condition of the private complainant being sick and of advanced age falls within the provision
of Section 15 Rule 119 of the Rules of Court. However, said rule substantially provides that he should be
conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Thus, this Court concludes that the
language of Section 15 Rule 119 must be interpreted to require the parties to present testimony at the
hearing through live witnesses, whose demeanor and credibility can be evaluated by the judge presiding
at the hearing, rather than by means of deposition. No where in the said rule permits the taking of
deposition outside the Philippines whether the deponent is sick or not. 18 (Underscoring supplied)

Certainly, to take the deposition of the prosecution witness elsewhere and not before the very
same court where the case is pending would not only deprive a detained accused of his right to attend the
proceedings but also deprive the trial judge of the opportunity to observe the prosecution witness'
deportment and properly assess his credibility, which is especially intolerable when the witness' testimony

is crucial to the prosecution's case against the accused. This is the import of the Court's ruling in Vda. de
Manguerra19 where we further declared that

While we recognize the prosecution's right to preserve the testimony of its witness in order to
prove its case, we cannot disregard the rules which are designed mainly for the protection of the
accused's constitutional rights. The giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The conditional
examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and as such, calls for a strict
construction of the rules.20 (Underscoring supplied)

It is argued that since the Rules of Civil Procedure is made explicitly applicable in all cases, both
civil and criminal as well as special proceedings, the deposition-taking before a Philippine consular official
under Rule 23 should be deemed allowable also under the circumstances.

However, the suggested suppletory application of Rule 23 in the testimonial examination

of an unavailable prosecution witness has been categorically ruled out by the Court in the same
case of Vda. de Manguerra, as follows:

It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the rules of civil procedure
apply to all actions, civil or criminal, and special proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of
civil procedure have suppletory application to criminal cases. However, it is likewise true that
criminal proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Considering that Rule 119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in the instant case, we
find no cogent reason to apply Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise." (Underscoring supplied)

The Conditional Examination of a Prosecution Witness Cannot Defeat the Rights of the Accused
to Public Trial and Confrontation of Witnesses

2.
The CA took a simplistic view on the use of depositions in criminal cases and overlooked
fundamental considerations no less than the Constitution secures to the accused, i.e., the right to a public
trial and the right to confrontation of witnesses. Section 14(2), Article III of the Constitution provides as
follows:

Section 14. (1) x x x

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and
shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in
his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (Underscoring supplied)

In dismissing petitioners' apprehensions concerning the deprivation of their constitutional rights to

a public trial and confrontation, the CA opined that petitioners would still be accorded the right to crossexamine the deponent witness and raise their objections during the deposition-taking in the same manner
as in a regular court trial.

We disagree. There is a great deal of difference between the face-to- face confrontation in a
public criminal trial in the presence of the presiding judge and the cross-examination of a witness in a
foreign place outside the courtroom in the absence of a trial judge. In the aptly cited case of People v.
Estenzo,21 the Court noted the uniqueness and significance of a witness testifying in open court, thus:

"The main and essential purpose of requiring a witness to appear and testify orally at a trial is to secure
for the adverse party the opportunity of cross-examination. "The opponent", according to an eminent
authority, "demands confrontation, not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed
upon by him, but for the purpose of cross examination which cannot be had except by the direct and
personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers." There is also the advantage of the
witness before the judge, and it is this it enables the judge as trier of facts "to obtain the elusive and
incommunicable evidence of a witness' deportment while testifying, and a certain subjective moral effect
is produced upon the witness. It is only when the witness testifies orally that the judge may have a true
idea of his countenance, manner and expression, which may confirm or detract from the weight of his
testimony. Certainly, the physical condition of the witness will reveal his capacity for accurate observation
and memory, and his deportment and physiognomy will reveal clues to his character. These can only be
observed by the judge if the witness testifies orally in court. x x x" 22 (Underscoring supplied)1wphi1

The right of confrontation, on the other hand, is held to apply specifically to criminal proceedings
and to have a twofold purpose: (1) to afford the accused an opportunity to test the testimony of witnesses
by cross-examination, and (2) to allow the judge to observe the deportment of witnesses. 23 The Court
explained in People v. Seneris 24that the constitutional requirement "insures that the witness will give his
testimony under oath, thus deterring lying by the threat of perjury charge; it forces the witness to submit to
cross-examination, a valuable instrument in exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth; and it enables
the court to observe the demeanor of the witness and assess his credibility." 25

As the right of confrontation is intended "to secure the accused in the right to be tried as far as
facts provable by witnesses as meet him face to face at the trial who give their testimony in his presence,
and give to the accused an opportunity of cross-examination," 26 it is properly viewed as a guarantee
against the use of unreliable testimony in criminal trials. In the American case of Crawford v.
Washington,27 the US Supreme Court had expounded on the procedural intent of the confrontation
requirement, thus:

Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth
Amendment's right to confront witness face to face protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence,
much less to amorphous notions of "reliability". Certainly, none of the authorities discussed above
acknowledges any general reliability exception to the common-law rule.

Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of
confrontation. To be sure, the Clause's ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a
procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that
reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. The Clause
thus reflects a judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable evidence (a point on which there could
be little dissent), but about how reliability can best be determined." (Underscoring supplied)

The Webb Ruling is Not on All Fours with the Instant Case

The CA found the frail and infirm condition of the prosecution witness as sufficient and compelling
reason to uphold the MeTC Orders granting the deposition-taking, following the ruling in the case of
People v. Webb28 that the taking of an unavailable witness' deposition is in the nature of a discovery
procedure the use of which is within the trial court's sound discretion which needs only to be exercised in
a reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of the law.29

But the ruling in the cited case is not instantly applicable herein as the factual settings are not
similar.1The accused in the Webb case had sought to take the oral deposition of five defense witnesses
before a Philippine consular agent in lieu of presenting them as live witnesses, alleging that they were all
residents of the United States who could not be compelled by subpoena to testify in court. The trial court
denied the motion of the accused but the CA differed and ordered the deposition taken. When the matter
was raised before this Court, we sustained the trial court's disallowance of the deposition-taking on the
limited ground that there was no necessity for the procedure as the matter sought to be proved by way of
deposition was considered merely corroborative of the evidence for the defense. 30

In this case, where it is the prosecution that seeks to depose the complaining witness against the
accused, the stringent procedure under Section 15, Rule 119 cannot be ignored without violating the
constitutional rights of the accused to due process.

Finally, the Court takes note that prosecution witness Li Luen Ping had managed to attend the
initial trial proceedings before the MeTC of Manila on September 9, 2004. At that time, Li Luen Ping's old
age and fragile constitution should have been unmistakably apparent and yet the prosecution failed to act
with zeal and foresight in having his deposition or testimony taken before the MeTC pursuant to Section
15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court. In fact, it should have been imperative for the prosecution to
have moved for the preservation of Li Luen Ping's testimony at that first instance given the fact that the

witness is a non-resident alien who can leave the Philippines anytime without any definite date of return.
Obviously, the prosecution allowed its main witness to leave the court's jurisdiction without availing of the
court procedure intended to preserve the testimony of such witness. The loss of its cause is attributable to
no other party.

Still, even after failing to secure Li Luen Ping's conditional examination before the MeTC prior to
said witness' becoming sick and unavailable, the prosecution would capitalize upon its own failure by
pleading for a liberal application of the rules on depositions. It must be emphasized that while the
prosecution must provide the accused every opportunity to take the deposition of witnesses that are
material to his defense in order to avoid charges of violating the right of the accused to compulsory
process, the State itself must resort to deposition-taking sparingly if it is to guard against accusations of
violating the right of the accused to meet the witnesses against him face to face. Great care must be
observed in the taking and use of depositions of prosecution witnesses to the end that no conviction of an
accused will rely on ex parte affidavits and deposition.31

Thus, the CA ignored the procedure under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure for taking the
deposition of an unavailable prosecution witness when it upheld the trial court's order allowing the
deposition of prosecution witness Li Luen Ping to take place in a venue other than the court where the
case is pending. This was certainly grave abuse of discretion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated February 19, 2008 and the
Resolution dated November 28, 2008 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court which disallowed the deposition-taking in Laos,
Cambodia is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.

xii. Child Witness Rule: People of the Philippines vs

Ibanez
f. Opinion Rule
i. Expert Witness: People of the Philippines vs Abriol
See also Suarez book p.204
Bautista vs Court of Appeals See also Suarez book
p.207
Avelino vs People of the Philippines

Expert evidence is admissible only if: (a) the matter to be testified to is one that requires
expertise, and (b) the witness has been qualified as an expert. (Avelino vs. People, G.R.
No. 181444, July 17, 2013 and Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court)

ii. Ordinary Witness: People of the Philippines vs

Duranan See also Suarez book p.212
g. Character Evidence
People of the Philippines vs Deopita See also Suarez book
p.217
Mr. Deopita not only robbed but also raped a poor young woman. When he was
arrested and was brought to trial, he alleged that he is a person of good moral
character holding as he does the position of Ministerial Servant in the congregation of
Jehovahs witnesses, and that he is a godly man, righteous person, and a good
Christian who preaches the word of God.
Unconvinced because of the overwhelming evidence pointing to Deopita, the court
declared that his sterling qualities he mentioned is no guarantee against any sexual
perversion and plunderous proclivity. In closing, the court went on to further explain that:
Indeed, religiosity is not always an emblem of good conduct, and it is not the
unreligious alone who succumbs to the impulse to rob and rape
A. Burden of Proof and Presumptions
1. Burden of Proof vs Burden of Evidence
FEBTC vs Chante
G.R. No. 170598

October 9, 2013

FAR EAST BANK TRUST COMPANY, Petitioner,

vs.
ROBERTO MAR CHANTE, a.k.a. ROBERT MAR G. CHAN, Respondents.
Ponente: Bersamin, J.
Facts:
1. Robert Chan, also known as Robert Chan was a current account depositor for petitioner.
a. He was issues a Do-it-all card to handle credit card and ATM transactions.
b. A PIN, known only to Chan, was the security feature.
2. FEBTC bought a complaint against Chan to recover P770,488.30 as unpaid balance for an
amount allegedly withdrawn using the card at the ATM facility at the Manila Pavilion Hotel in
Manila.
a. The withdrawals were done in a series of 242 transactions with the use of the same
machine at P4,000 per transaction.

b. The transactions were processed despite:

b. 1. the offline status of the branch of account (FEBTC Ongpin Branch);
b. 2. Chans account balance being only P198,511.70 at the time, as shown in the bank
statement;
b. 3. the maximum withdrawal limit of the ATM facility being P50,000.00/day; and
b. 4. his withdrawal transactions not being reflected in his account, and no debits or
deductions from his current account with the FEBTC Ongpin Branch being recorded.
b. 5. FECTC alleged a bug allowed Chan to withdraw more than his account would allow.
3. Chan denied liability alleging he was home at the time of the withdrawal.
a. He argued it was humanly impossible to stand long hours in front of the ATM to withdraw
those funds.
4. The RTC rendered judgment in favor of FEBTC.
a. Regardless of lack of precedence regarding computer errors, respondent should return
what is not rightfully his.
5. The CA reversed the decision.
a. The evidentiary dilemma was that there was no direct evidence on who made the actual
withdrawals.
Issue: Is Chan liable for the amount?
Held:

The FEBTC argues that Chan authorized the withdrawals based on the fact that only
Chan knew the correct PIN.

We disagree with FEBTC.

Although there was no question that Chan had the physical possession of Far East
Card No. 05-01120-5-0 at the time of the withdrawals, the exclusive possession of the card
alone did not suffice to preponderantly establish that he had himself made the withdrawals,
or that he had caused the withdrawals to be made. In his answer, he denied using the card
to withdraw funds from his account on the dates in question, and averred that the
withdrawals had been an "inside job." His denial effectively traversed FEBTCs claim of his
direct and personal liability for the withdrawals, that it would lose the case unless it
competently and sufficiently established that he had personally made the withdrawals
himself, or that he had caused the withdrawals. In other words, it carried the burden of
proof.

Burden of proof is a term that refers to two separate and quite different concepts,
namely: (a) the risk of non-persuasion, or the burden of persuasion, or simply persuasion
burden; and (b) the duty of producing evidence, or the burden of going forward with the
evidence, or simply the production burden or the burden of evidence. 10 In its first concept, it
is the duty to establish the truth of a given proposition or issue by such a quantum of
evidence as the law demands in the case at which the issue arises. 11 In its other concept, it
is the duty of producing evidence at the beginning or at any subsequent stage of trial in
order to make or meet a prima facie case. Generally speaking, burden of proof in its second
concept passes from party to party as the case progresses, while in its first concept it rests

throughout upon the party asserting the affirmative of the issue.12

The party who alleges an affirmative fact has the burden of proving it because mere
allegation of the fact is not evidence of it. 13 Verily, the party who asserts, not he who denies,
must prove.

In civil cases, the burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no
evidence is given on either side. 15This is because our system frees the trier of facts from the
responsibility of investigating and presenting the facts and arguments, placing that
responsibility entirely upon the respective parties. 16 The burden of proof, which may either
be on the plaintiff or the defendant, is on the plaintiff if the defendant denies the factual
allegations of the complaint in the manner required by the Rules of Court; or on the
defendant if he admits expressly or impliedly the essential allegations but raises an
affirmative defense or defenses, that, if proved, would exculpate him from liability. 17

Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court sets the quantum of evidence for civil
actions, and delineates how preponderance of evidence is determined, viz :

Section 1. In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of
evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances
of the case, the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which
they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of
interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon
the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is
not necessarily with the greater number. (Emphasis supplied)

As the rule indicates, preponderant evidence refers to evidence that is of greater

weight, or more convincing, than the evidence offered in opposition to it. 18 It is proof that
leads the trier of facts to find that the existence of the contested fact is more probable than
its nonexistence.19

Being the plaintiff, FEBTC must rely on the strength of its own evidence instead of
upon the weakness of Chans evidence. Its burden of proof thus required it to preponderantly
demonstrate that his ATM card had been used to make the withdrawals, and that he had
used the ATM card and PIN by himself or by another person to make the fraudulent
withdrawals. Otherwise, it could not recover from him any funds supposedly improperly
withdrawn from the ATM account. We remind that as a banking institution, FEBTC had the
duty and responsibility to ensure the safety of the funds it held in trust for its depositors. It
could not avoid the duty or evade the responsibility because it alone should bear the price

for the fraud resulting from the system bug on account of its exclusive control of its
computer system.

Did FEBTC discharge its burden of proof?

The CA ruled that FEBTC did not because

After a review of the records of this case, we find the totality of evidence submitted
by FEBTC insufficient to establish the crucial facts that would justify a judgment in its favor.

To our mind, the fact that Chans account number and ATM card number were the
ones used for the withdrawals, by itself, is not sufficient to support the conclusion that he
should be deemed to have made the withdrawals.

FEBTC offers in this regard the PNB ATMs journal tapes to prove the withdrawals and
their details the time of the transactions; the account number used; the ATM card number;
and the amount withdrawn and at the same time declared that these tapes are authentic
and genuine. These tapes, however, are not as reliable as FEBTC represented them to be as
they are not even internally consistent. A disturbing internal discrepancy we note relates to
the amounts reflected as "ledger balance" and "available balance". We find it strange that
for every 4,000.00 pesos allegedly withdrawn by Chan, the available balance increased
rather than diminished. Worse, the amount of available balance as reflected in the tapes was
way above the actual available balance of less than Php200,000.00 that Chans current
account had at that time. These discrepancies must inevitably reflect on the integrity of the
journal tapes; the proven inconsistencies in some aspects of these tapes leave the other
aspects suspect and uncertain.

But more than this, we are not convinced that the tapes lead us to the inevitable
conclusion that Chans card, rather than a replacement card containing Chans PIN and card
number or some other equivalent scheme, was used. To our mind, we cannot discount this
possibility given the available technology making computer fraud a possibility, the cited
instances of computer security breaches, the admitted system bug, and most notably the
fact that the withdrawals were made under circumstances that took advantage of the
system bug. System errors of this kind, when taken advantage of to the extent that had
happened in this case, are planned for. Indeed, prior preparation must take place to avoid
suspicion and attention where the withdrawal was made for seven (7) long hours in a place
frequented by hundreds of guests, over 242 transactions where the physical volume of the
money withdrawn was not insignificant. To say that this was done by the owner of the
account based solely on the records of the transactions, is a convenient but not a convincing
explanation.20

In our view, the CAs ruling was correct.

To start with, Edgar Munarriz, FEBTCs very own Systems Analyst, admitted that the
bug infecting the banks computer system had facilitated the fraudulent withdrawals. 21 This
admission impelled the CA to thoroughly dissect the situation in order to determine the
consequences of the intervention of the system bug in FEBTCs computer system. It
ultimately determined thusly:

Significantly, FEBTC made the admission that there was a program bug in its
computer system. To digress, computers are run based on specific pre-arranged instructions
or "programs" that act on data or information that computer users input. Computers can
only process these inputted data or information according to the installed programs. Thus,
computers are as efficient, as accurate and as convenient to use as the instructions in their
installed programs. They can count, sort, compute and arrive at decisions but they do so
only and strictly in accordance with the programs that make them work. To cite an easy
example, a computer can be programmed to sort a stack of cards prepared by male and
female clients, into male and female stacks, respectively. To do this, the computer will first
scan a card and look at the place ("a field") where the male/female information can be
found. This information may be in an appropriate box which the bank client checks or shades
to indicate if he/she is male or female. The computer will check if the box beside the word
"Female" is shaded. If it is, it will send the card to the "Female" bin. If the box beside the
"male" is shaded, it will send the card to the "Male" bin. If both the squares are shaded or
none is shaded or the card cannot be read, it will send the card to the "Unknown" bin. This
way, the female cards and the male cards can be sorted efficiently. However, the program
instructions can be written in such a way that the computer can only make two decisions,
that is, if the Female box is shaded, then the card goes to the "Female" bin; otherwise, the
card goes to the "Male" bin. In this program, all the Female cards will be sorted correctly but
the Male bin will contain all the other cards, that is, the Male cards, the cards with no
shading at all, and all the other cards that cannot be classified.

The imperfect results arose from the imperfect program instructions or from a
program "bug". Something very close to this example happened in the present case.

According to the testimony of the FEBTCs systems analyst, there were two computer
programs that were involved in the transactions: CAPDROTH and SCPUP 900. CAPDROTH is
the program that validates if the account exists in the FEBTC files, if the transaction is valid,
and if the branch where the account is maintained is ON-LINE (i.e. continuously sending
data). When the Chan transaction entered the system, it was validated by CAPDROTH which,
on seeing that the FEBTC-Ongpin branch was off-line, returned a decision code passing on
the decision to authorize the transaction to the SCPUP 900, another module. However,
SCPUP 900 was not expecting this type of response or decision code. As the SCPUP 900
program was originally written, it will send back an error message and abort a requested
transaction if it receives an error message from any other module; otherwise, it will send a

message authorizing the transaction. In other words, SCPUP 900 had only two decisions to
make: check if the message is an error message, if not then, authorize. Since what it
received in the disputed transactions were not error messages and were not also
authorizations, it sent back authorization messages allowing the cash withdrawals. It kept on
sending authorization messages for the 242 cash withdrawal transactions made from Chans
account between the evening of May 4 and early morning of May 5, 1992. This program bug
was the reason the 242 cash withdrawals were allowed by the PNB ATM-Megalink machine.

The program bug occurred because of the simultaneous presence of three conditions
that allowed it to happen: (1) the withdrawal transactions involved a current account; (2) the
current account was with a branch that at that time was off-line; and (3) the transaction
originated from MEGALINK (i.e., through MEGALINK through a member bank other than
FEBTC). Because of the bug, Chans account was not accessed at the time of the
transactions so that withdrawals in excess of what the account contained were allowed.
Additionally, FEBTCs rule that only a maximum withdrawable amount per day (in the
present case P50,000.00 per day) can be made from an ATM account, was by-passed. Thus,
242 withdrawals were made over an eight hour period, in the total amount ofP967,000.00.22

Secondly, the RTCs deductions on the cause of the withdrawals were faulty. In
holding against Chan, the RTC chiefly relied on inferences drawn from his acts subsequent to
the series of withdrawals, specifically his attempt to withdraw funds from his account at an
FEBTC ATM facility in Ermita, Manila barely two days after the questioned withdrawals; his
issuance of a check for P190,000.00 immediately after the capture of his ATM card by the
ATM facility; his failure to immediately report the capture of his ATM card to FEBTC; and his
going to FEBTC only after the dishonor of the check he had issued following the freezing of
his account. The inferences were not warranted, however, because the subsequent acts
would not persuasively establish his actual participation in the withdrawals due to their
being actually susceptible of other interpretations consistent with his innocence.

We join the CAs observation that Chans subsequent acts "could have been impelled
by so many reasons and motivations, and cannot simply be given the meaning that the
lower court attributed to them," and, instead, were even consistent with the purpose and
nature of his maintaining the current account deposit with FEBTC, rendering the acts "not
unusual nor illegal."23 Although he was expected to forthwith bring his cards capture to
FEBTCs attention, that he did not do so could have other plausible explanations consistent
with good faith, among them his being constantly occupied as a businessman to attend to
the multifarious activities of his business. He might have also honestly believed that he still
had the sufficient funds in his current account, as borne out by his issuance of a check
instead after the capture of the card so as not for him to undermine any financial obligation
then becoming due. Nor should his opting to withdraw funds from his account at the ATM
facility in Ermita in less than two days after the questioned withdrawals manifest
responsibility on his part, for he could also be properly presumed to be then still unaware of
the situation involving his account. We note that his letters 24 written in response to FEBTCs
written demands to him disclosed honest intentions rather than malice.

Thirdly, the RTC ignored the likelihood that somebody other than Chan familiar with

the bug infection of FEBTCs computer system at the time of the withdrawals and adept with
the workings of the computer system had committed the fraud. This likelihood was not farfetched considering that FEBTC had immediately adopted corrective measures upon its
discovery of the system bug, by which FEBTC admitted its negligence in ensuring an errorfree computer system; and that the system bug had affected only the account of
Chan.25 Truly, the trial court misapprehended the extent to which the system bug had made
the computer system of FEBTC stumble in serious error.

Fourthly, and perhaps the most damaging lapse, was that FEBTC failed to establish
that the PNB-MEGALINKs ATM facility at the Manila Pavilion Hotel had actually dispensed
cash in the very significantly large amount alleged during the series of questioned
withdrawals. For sure, FEBTC should have proved the actual dispensing of funds from the
ATM facility as the factual basis for its claim against Chan. It did require PNB to furnish a
validated showing of the exact level of cash then carried by the latters ATM facility in the
Manila Pavilion Hotel on May 4, 1992.26 Yet, when PNB employee Erwin Arellano stood as a
witness for FEBTC, he confirmed the authenticity of the journal tapes that had recorded
Chans May 4 and May 5, 1992 supposed ATM transactions but did not categorically state
how much funds PNB-MEGALINKs ATM facility at the Manila Pavilion Hotel had exactly
carried at the time of the withdrawals, particularly the amounts immediately preceding and
immediately following the series of withdrawals. The omission left a yawning gap in the
evidence against Chan.

And lastly, Chans allegation of an "inside job" accounting for the anomalous
withdrawals should not be quickly dismissed as unworthy of credence or weight. FEBTC
employee Manuel Del Castillo, another witness for FEBTC, revealed that FEBTC had
previously encountered problems of bank accounts being debited despite the absence of any
withdrawal transactions by their owners. He attributed the problems to the erroneous
tagging of the affected accounts as somebody elses account, allowing the latter to withdraw
from the affected accounts with the use of the latters own ATM card, and to the formers
account being debited.27 The revelation of Del Castillo tended to support Chans denial of
liability, as it showed the possibility of withdrawals being made by another person despite
the PIN being an exclusive access number known only to the cardholder. 28

It is true that Del Castillo also declared that FEBTC did not store the PINs of its clients
ATM cards.
However, he mentioned that FEBTC had stored the opposite numbers
corresponding to the PINs, which meant that the PINs did not remain entirely irretrievable at
all times and in all cases by any of its officers or employees with access to the banks
computer system. Accordingly, Del Castillos assertion that the PINs were rendered useless
upon being entered in the banks computer system did not entirely disclose how the
information on the PINs of the depositors was stored or discarded as to become useless for
any purpose.

In view of the foregoing, FEBTC did not present preponderant evidence proving
Chans liability for the supposedly fraudulent withdrawals. It thus failed in discharging its
burden of persuasion.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals; and DIRECTS the
petitioner to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED.

2. Presumptions
a. Conclusive presumptions
Ibaan Rural Bank vs Court of Appeals See also Suarez
book p.222
Alcaraz vs Tangga an See also Suarez book p.223
010 Sps. Reynaldo and Esmeralda Alcaraz v. Pedro M. Tangga-an et. al.,
GR No. 128568, 09 April 2003

On October 4, 1994, respondents Pedro Tangga-an and the heirs of Virginia Tangga-an filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer, with damages, against petitioner spouses Reynaldo Alcaraz and Esmeralda Alcaraz.
2 The complaint alleged that the late Virginia Tangga-an (the spouse of respondent Pedro Tangaa-an and mother of the
rest of the respondents) leased a residential building (house) located in Cebu City to the petitioner spouses.
3 The lease contract was limited to the use and occupancy of the said residential building and did not include
the lot on which it was constructed because the said lot was then owned by the National Housing Authority (NHA).
4 Under the contract, the petitioner spouses bound themselves for five years to pay Virginia a monthly rental of P4,000
beginning November 22, 1991. However, since November 1993, they failed to pay rent.
5 Thus, as of October, 1994, they were in arrears in the amount of P48,000. Despite repeated demands by respondents
to pay the rentals in arrears and to surrender the possession of the residential building, the petitioner spouses refused
to vacate the same.
6 Petitioner spouses alleged that, on July 23, 1993, the ownership of the lot on which the house stood was
transferred by the NHA to Virgilio and Angelita D. Tangga-an.
7 Virgilio Tangga-an is the son of the late Virgilia Tangga-an and respondent Pedro Tangga-an, and the brother of the
other respondents.
8 According to the petitioner spouses, the subsequent change in ownership of the lot and the house resulted in the
cancellation of the contract of lease between respondents and petitioner spouses.
9 Thereafter, they paid the rent to the new owners of the lot (Virgilio and Angelita) and not to respondents since the
latter supposedly no longer had the legal right to collect rentals.
10 MTC: ruled in favor of the respondents. Petitioner spouses clearly violated the contract of lease due to nonpayment of rent. They failed to show that the subject house belonged to Virgilio alone.
11 RTC affirmed the decision of the MTC, and held that: spouses failed to present any documentary evidence
modifying or amending the contract of lease.
12 CA: private respondents have the right to institute the action for ejectment, and that the claim of petitioner
that Virgilio Tangga-an owns the lot where the leased residential building stands and occupied by petitioners
is still the subject of a civil action for annulment of the sale of the lot before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu.
ISSUE: whether the petitioner spouses, as lessees, were excused from paying the rent because of the change in the ownership
of the land on which the rented house was built.
HELD: NO, petitioner spouses failed to substantiate their factual averment that Virgilio not only acquired the lot but also
the house.
RATIO:
1 All the petitioner spouses presented was Virgilios uncertified xerox copy of the certificate of title over the lot. No
document was ever shown evidencing cession of the subject house in Virgilios favor. Virgilios title could not be used to
prove ownership over the house built on said lot as it carried no reference at all to the house.
2 On the other hand, the respondents proved that, as compulsory heirs of Virginia, they were the rightful owners of the
subject house. They presented a tax declaration in the name of their trustees, co-respondent Hermes Tangga-an and his
wife, which tax declaration sufficiently evidences their co-ownership and acquisition of title following the death of the

decedent Virginia.
They claim that the lease contract ceased to be effective because Virgilios assumption of ownership of the land stripped
the respondents of ownership of the building. Section 2, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides as a conclusive
presumption that:

4
5
6
7

Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:

a Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to
believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such
declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it;
After recognizing the validity of the lease contract for two years, the petitioner spouses are barred from alleging the
automatic cancellation of the contract on the ground that the respondents lost ownership of the house after Virgilio
acquired title over the lot.
Further, petitioner spouses rescinded the contract of lease without judicial approval. They alleged that there was no reason
anymore to perform their obligations as lessees because the lessor had ceased to be the owner of the house.
But there is nothing in their lease contract that allows the parties to extrajudicially rescind the same in case of violation of
the terms thereof. Extrajudicial rescission of a contract is not possible without an express stipulation to that effect.
What the petitioner spouses should have done was to file a special civil action for interpleader for the claimants to litigate
their claims and to deposit the rentals in court.

b. Disputable presumptions
Rosaroso vs Soria

One Who Purchases Real Property Which Is Possession Of

Another, Should, At Least Make Some Inquiry Concerning
The Right Of Those In Possession
Spouses Luis and Honorata, parents of Hospicio, Arturo, Florita, Lucila,
Eduardo, Manuel, Cleofe, Antonio and Angela owned several real properties
in Cebu. After Honoratas death, Luis married Lourdes. In 1996, Luis filed a
complaint against his daughter, Lucila, and her daughter, Laila. An amended
complaint was filed by his heirs against Lucila, Laila, Lourdes and Meridian
Realty. According to them, on November 4, 1991, Luis executed Deed of
Absolute Sale covering Lots 8, 19, 22, 23 55665, and 7967 in their favour,
with the full knowledge and consent of Lourdes. However, without their
knowledge, Lucila obtained a Special Power of Attorney dated April 3, 1993,
from Luis, who was then sick and of unsound mind, , authorising Laila to sell
and convey Lots 8, 22 and 23. On the strength of another SPA, Laila and
Ham mortgaged Lot 19 to Vital Lending. A second sale took place on August
23, 1994 when the defendants made Luis sign a Deed of Absolute Sale
conveying the three lots to Meridian Realty. They alleged that Meridian was
in bad faith when it did not inquire as to the real owners and occupants of
the properties. They thus prayed that the two SPAs and the deed of absolute
sale in favour of Meredian be annulled, and the defendants ordered to pay
actual, moral, and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees. On the
other hand, the defendants contested the First Sale in favour of the
plaintiffs. Even assuming it was valid, plaintiffs were estopped from
questioning the validity of the Second Sale because they did not make the
necessary annotation and transfer of the properties in there name. Meridian
averred that Luis was fully aware of the execution of the Deed of Absolute
Sale, as in fact it was witnessed by its officer. Before buying the properties,
they conducted a check with the Registry of Deeds, and found out that the
First Sale was not registered on the title. Lourdes averred that her signature
was a forgery. There was no consideration on the first sale.
After trial, the RTC ruled in favour of the plaintiffs. It annulled the two SPAs,
the Deed of Absolute Sale, and upheld the first Deed of Sale. It posited that
at the time of the second sale, Luis was not anymore the owner of the lots.
The non-registration of the first sale was not prejudicial to the plaintiffs,
holding that Luis actually delivered to them.
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the RTC ruling. It held that the first
sale was invalid as the plaintiffs failed to show any consideration for its sale.
The second sale, being notarised, enjoyed the presumption of validity.
Evidence that Luis was infirm at the time of its execution was wanting. It also
ruled that the first SPS was valid at the time of the execution of the Second
Sale. Had Luis intended to discredit the second sale, he should have revoked
not only the first SPA but also the second SPA. Since the SPAs were valid, the
transactions emanating from it were also valid. Thus, plaintiffs elevated their
case to the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court:

After an assiduous assessment of the records, the Court finds for the
petitioners.
The First Deed Of Sale Was Valid
The fact that the first deed of sale was executed, conveying the subject
properties in favor of petitioners, was never contested by the respondents.
What they vehemently insist, though, is that the said sale was simulated
because the purported sale was made without a valid consideration. Under
Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the following are disputable
presumptions: (1) private transactions have been fair and regular; (2) the
ordinary course of business has been followed; and (3) there was sufficient
consideration for a contract.[1] These presumptions operate against an
adversary who has not introduced proof to rebut them. They create the
necessity of presenting evidence to rebut the prima facie case they created,
and which, if no proof to the contrary is presented and offered, will prevail.
The burden of proof remains where it is but, by the presumption, the one
who has that burden is relieved for the time being from introducing evidence
in support of the averment, because the presumption stands in the place of
evidence unless rebutted.[2]
In this case, the respondents failed to trounce the said presumption. Aside
from their bare allegation that the sale was made without a consideration,
they failed to supply clear and convincing evidence to back up this claim. It
is elementary in procedural law that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by
evidence, are not equivalent to proof under the Rules of Court.[3]
The CA decision ran counter to this established rule regarding disputable
presumption. It relied heavily on the account of Lourdes who testified that
the children of Luis approached him and convinced him to sign the deed of
sale, explaining that it was necessary for a loan application, but they did not
pay the purchase price for the subject properties. This testimony, however, is
self-serving and would not amount to a clear and convincing evidence
required by law to dispute the said presumption. As such, the presumption
that there was sufficient consideration will not be disturbed.
Granting that there was no delivery of the consideration, the seller would
have no right to sell again what he no longer owned. His remedy would be to
rescind the sale for failure on the part of the buyer to perform his part of
their obligation pursuant to Article 1191 of the New Civil Code. In the case of
Clara M. Balatbat v. Court Of Appeals and Spouses Jose Repuyan and Aurora
Repuyan,[4] it was written:
The failure of the buyer to make good the price does not, in law, cause the
ownership to revest to the seller unless the bilateral contract of sale is first
rescinded or resolved pursuant to Article 1191 of the New Civil Code. Nonpayment only creates a right to demand the fulfillment of the obligation or to
rescind the contract. [Emphases supplied]
Meridian is Not a
Buyer in Good Faith

Respondents Meridian and Lucila argue that, granting that the First Sale was
valid, the properties belong to them as they acquired these in good faith and
had them first recorded in the Registry of Property, as they were unaware of
the First Sale.[5]
Again, the Court is not persuaded.
The fact that Meridian had them first registered will not help its cause. In
case of double sale, Article 1544 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the
ownership shall be transferred to the person who may have first possession
thereof in good faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person
acquiring it who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who
in good faith was first in possession; and, in the absence thereof; to the
person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
Otherwise stated, ownership of an immovable property which is the subject
of a double sale shall be transferred: (1) to the person acquiring it who in
good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property; (2) in default thereof,
to the person who in good faith was first in possession; and (3) in default
thereof, to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good
faith. The requirement of the law then is two-fold: acquisition in good faith
and registration in good faith. Good faith must concur with the registration.
If it would be shown that a buyer was in bad faith, the alleged registration
they have made amounted to no registration at all.
The principle of primus tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger in right)
gains greater significance in case of a double sale of immovable property.
When the thing sold twice is an immovable, the one who acquires it and first
records it in the Registry of Property, both made in good faith, shall be
deemed the owner. Verily, the act of registration must be coupled with good
faith that is, the registrant must have no knowledge of the defect or lack of
title of his vendor or must not have been aware of facts which should have
put him upon such inquiry and investigation as might be necessary to
acquaint him with the defects in the title of his vendor.)[6] [Emphases and
underlining supplied]
When a piece of land is in the actual possession of persons other than the
seller, the buyer must be wary and should investigate the rights of those in
possession. Without making such inquiry, one cannot claim that he is a buyer
in good faith. When a man proposes to buy or deal with realty, his duty is to
read the public manuscript, that is, to look and see who is there upon it and
what his rights are. A want of caution and diligence, which an honest man of
ordinary prudence is accustomed to exercise in making purchases, is in
contemplation of law, a want of good faith. The buyer who has failed to know
or discover that the land sold to him is in adverse possession of another is a
buyer in bad faith.In[7] the case of Spouses Sarmiento v. Court of
Appeals[8], it was written:

Verily, every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no
way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the
property. Thus, the general rule is that a purchaser may be considered a
purchaser in good faith when he has examined the latest certificate of title.
An exception to this rule is when there exist important facts that would
create suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man to go beyond the present
title and to investigate those that preceded it. Thus, it has been said that a
person who deliberately ignores a significant fact which would create
suspicion in an otherwise reasonable man is not an innocent purchaser for
value. A purchaser cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a
reasonable man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith
under the belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor. As we
have held:
The failure of appellees to take the ordinary precautions which a prudent
man would have taken under the circumstances, specially in buying a piece
of land in the actual, visible and public possession of another person, other
than the vendor, constitutes gross negligence amounting to bad faith.
In this connection, it has been held that where, as in this case, the land sold
is in the possession of a person other than the vendor, the purchaser is
required to go beyond the certificate of title to ma[k]e inquiries concerning
the rights of the actual possessor. Failure to do so would make him a
purchaser in bad faith. (Citations omitted).
One who purchases real property which is in the actual possession of
another should, at least make some inquiry concerning the right of those in
possession. The actual possession by other than the vendor should, at least
put the purchaser upon inquiry. He can scarely, in the absence of such
inquiry, be regarded as a bona fide purchaser as against such possessors.
(Emphases supplied)
Prescinding from the foregoing, the fact that private respondent RRC did not
investigate the Sarmiento spouses claim over the subject land despite its
knowledge that Pedro Ogsiner, as their overseer, was in actual possession
thereof means that it was not an innocent purchaser for value upon said
land. Article 524 of the Civil Code directs that possession may be exercised
in ones name or in that of another. In herein case, Pedro Ogsiner had
informed RRC that he was occupying the subject land on behalf of the
Sarmiento spouses. Being a corporation engaged in the business of buying
and selling real estate, it was gross negligence on its part to merely rely on
Mr. Puzons assurance that the occupants of the property were mere
squatters considering the invaluable information it acquired from Pedro
Ogsiner and considering further that it had the means and the opportunity to
investigate for itself the accuracy of such information. [Emphases supplied]

In another case, it was held that if a vendee in a double sale registers the
sale after he has acquired knowledge of a previous sale, the registration
constitutes a registration in bad faith and does not confer upon him any
right. If the registration is done in bad faith, it is as if there is no registration
at all, and the buyer who has first taken possession of the property in good
faith shall be preferred.[9]In the case at bench, the fact that the subject
properties were already in the possession of persons other than Luis was
never disputed. Sanchez, representative and witness for Meridian, even
testified as follows:
x x x; that she together with the two agents, defendant Laila Solutan and
Corazon Lua, the president of Meridian Realty Corporation, went immediately
to site of the lots; that the agents brought with them the three titles of the
lots and Laila Solutan brought with her a special power of attorney executed
by Luis B. Rosaroso in her favor but she went instead directly to Luis
Rosaroso to be sure; that the lots were pointed to them and she saw that
there were houses on it but she did not have any interest of the houses
because her interest was on the lots; that Luis Rosaroso said that the houses
belonged to him; that he owns the property and that he will sell the same
because he is very sickly and he wanted to buy medicnes; that she
requested someone to check the records of the lots in the Register of Deeds;
that one of the titles was mortgaged and she told them to redeem the
mortgage because the corporation will buy the property; that the registered
owner of the lots was Luis Rosaroso; that in more or less three months, the
encumbrance was cancelled and she told the prospective sellers to prepare
the deed of sale; that there were no encumbrances or liens in the title; that
when the deed of absolute sale was prepared it was signed by the vendor
Luis Rosaroso in their house in Opra x x x. (Underscoring supplied)
From the above testimony, it is clear that Meridian, through its agent, knew
that the subject properties were in possession of persons other than the
seller. Instead of investigating the rights and interests of the persons
occupying the said lots, however, it chose to just believe that Luis still owned
them. Simply, Meridian Realty failed to exercise the due diligence required
by law of purchasers in acquiring a piece of land in the possession of person
or persons other than the seller. In this regard, great weight is accorded to
the findings of fact of the RTC. Basic is the rule that the trial court is in a
better position to examine real evidence as well as to observe the demeanor
of witnesses who testify in the case.[10]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The December 4, 2009 Decision and
the November 18, 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No.
00351, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The July 30, 2004 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, 7th Judicial Region, Cebu City, in Civil Case
No. CEB-16957, is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

Heirs of Trazona vs Heir of Canada

Suppression of testimony: People of the Philippines vs
Padrigone See also Suarez book p.225

Pedrigone assails the procedural irregularities committed by the prosecution

and by the trial court. He claims that the prosecution SUPPRESSED
EVIDENCE by not presenting Rowena, the rape victim, when the latter
should have had her sane moments. As a consequence, the trial court
deprived Pedrigone of the opportunity to cross-examine her when she was
allegedly declared before the Chief of Police that it was only Pedrigone who
raped her which declaration became the basis for the latter's conviction.
Besides, the non-presentation of Rowena on the witness stand cannot be
considered as SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE. Under Rule 131, Section 3(e) of
the Rules of Court, the rule that evidence willfully suppressed would be
adverse if produced does not apply if:
1. the evidence is at the disposal of both parties;
2. the suppression was not willful;
3. it is merely corroborative or cumulative; and
4. the suppression is an exercise of a privilege.
Plainly, there was no suppression of evidence in this case.
FIRST: The defense had the opportunity to subpoena Rowena even if the
prosecutor did not present her as a witness. Instead, the defense failed to
call her to the witness stand.
SECOND: Rowena was certified to be suffering from Acute Psychotic
Depressive Condition and thus, cannot stand judicial proceedings yet. The
non-presentation therefore, of Rowena was not willful.
THIRD: In any case, while Rowena was the victim, Nimfa was also present
and in fact witnessed the violation committed on her sister.
Metrobank vs Court of Appeals See also Suarez book
p.227

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY vs. CA Case Digest

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 122899. June 8, 2000
FACTS: Mr. Chia offered the subject property for sale to private respondent G.T.P.
Development Corporation (hereafter, GTP), with assumption of the mortgage
indebtedness in favor of petitioner METROBANK secured by the subject property.
Pending negotiations for the proposed sale, Atty. Bernardo Atienza, acting in behalf of
respondent GTP, went to METROBANK to inquire on Mr. Chia's remaining balance on
the real estate mortgage. METROBANK obliged with a statement of account of Mr. Chia
amounting to about P115,000.00 as of August ,1980. The deed of sale and the
memorandum of agreement between Mr. Chia and respondent GTP were eventually
executed and signed. Atty. Atienza went to METROBANK Quiapo Branch and paid one
hundred sixteen thousand four hundred sixteen pesos and seventy-one centavos
(P116,416.71) for which METROBANK issued an official receipt acknowledging
payment. This notwithstanding, petitioner METROBANK refused to release the real
estate mortgage on the subject property despite repeated requests from Atty. Atienza,
thus prompting respondent GTP to file an action for specific performance against
petitioner METROBANK and Mr. Chia. issue and ruling not related to EVID.
Official Duty: Delos Santos vs Commission on Audit
People of the Philippines vs Candidia

Cohabition: People of the Philippines Edualino See also

Suarez book p.216 and p.239
Facts:
This is a review of the conviction of a rape case filed against Jesus Edualino by the complainant
Rowena Nantiza a married and pregnant woman at the time of the incident.
The complainant version of fact states that she was invited to drink one bottle of beer by then a
drunk Edualino. When she was semi-conscious she was dragged in a place where the evil acts
were consummated.
The accused arguments rely on alternative defenses and alibi, to wit; 1) that there was foreplay
and orgasm that occurred in the alleged consummation and that according to the defense bear the
earmarks of a voluntary and mutual coition of a consensual intercourse 2) that the character of
the complainant is of ill-refute on the basis that no responsible and decent pregnant married
woman, would be out at two (2) o'clock in the morning getting drunk much less would a decent
Filipina ask a man to accompany her to drink beer 3) that the complainant merely concocted the
charge of rape to save her marriage since her husband had found out that she was using drugs

and drinking alcohol and even made a spectacle of herself when she tried to seduce accusedappellant on May 1994 while she was under the influence of drug and alcohol.
Issue:
Whether or not the crime of rape was established.
Ruling:
The crime of rape was established beyond reasonable doubt.
The court held that the victim Rowena Nantiza's testimony was sufficient to manifest that the
carnal knowledge was without her consent and with due force and intimidation. The court further
provides that a person accused of rape can be convicted solely on the testimony of the victim
provided the testimony is credible, natural, convincing and otherwise consistent with human
nature and the course of things.
On the issue of morality of the complainant, the court pointed out that the moral character of a
rape victim is immaterial in the prosecution and conviction of the accused. The allegation of
drunkenness and being a drug user will not per se preclude a finding that a woman was raped.
The Court ruled that even prostitutes can be the victims of rape.
On the Accused-appellant argument that the charge of rape was concocted by the victim to save
her marriage; the Court did not believe that a married woman would invent a story that she was
raped in an attempt to conceal addiction to drugs or alcohol, in order to save her marriage. The
court cannot understand how a false rape story can save a marriage under the circumstances.
B. Presentation of Evidence
1. Order of Presentation of Evidence: People of the Philippines vs
Fabre See also Suarez book p.252
2. Leading and Misleading Questions: People of the Philippines vs
Perez See also Suarez book p.260
3. Impeachment People of the Philippines vs Castellano
4. Reference to Memorandum
a. Present memory revived: People vs Plasencia See also Suarez
book p.268

b. Past Recollection Recorded: Canque vs Court of Appeals See

also Suarez book p.186,p.270
Facts:
Petitioner Rosella D. Canque is a contractor doing business under the name and style RDC
Construction. She entered into 2 contracts with Socor Contruction as sub-contractor for her
projects with the government. On May 28, 1986, Socor sent a bill (Exh. C), representing the
balance of Canque for materials delivered and services rendered by Socor under the two
contracts. However, Canque refused to pay, claiming that private respondent failed to submit the
delivery receipts showing the actual weight in metric tons of the items delivered and the
acceptance by the government.
Hence, Socor brought a suit in the RTC to recover from the Canque. During the trial, Socor
presented Dolores Aday, its bookkeeper to testify on the entries of their Book of Collectible
Accounts. RTC rendered a decision in favor of Socor. Canque however, argues that the entries in
Socor's Book of Collectible Accounts cannot take the place of the delivery receipts and that such
entries are mere hearsay and, thus, inadmissible.
Issue:
1. Whether the entries in the Book of Collectible Accounts constitute competent evidence?
2. May the entries be admitted under Rule 132, 10 of the Rules of Court?
Ruling:
No, for the following reasons.
Rule 130, 37 of the Rules of Court - Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near
the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, outside of the Philippines
or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as
prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the
performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
The admission in evidence of entries in corporate books requires the satisfaction of the following
conditions:
1. The person who made the entry must be dead, outside the country or unable to testify;
2. The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;
3. The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
4. The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether
legal, contractual, moral or religious; and
5. The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
First, Dolores Aday, who made the entries, was presented by private respondent to testify on
the account. There was, therefore, neither justification nor necessity for the presentation of the
entries as the person who made them was available to testify in court.
Moreover, Aday admitted that she had no personal knowledge of the facts constituting the
entry. She said she made the entries based on the bills given to her. But she has no knowledge
of the truth or falsity of the facts stated in the bills.
Second, under the provision (Rule 132, 10), the memorandum used to refresh the memory of
the witness does not constitute evidence, and may not be admitted as such, for the simple reason

that the witness has just the same to testify on the basis of refreshed memory. In other words,
where the witness has testified independently of or after his testimony has been refreshed by a
memorandum of the events in dispute, such memorandum is not admissible as corroborative
evidence. It is self-evident that a witness may not be corroborated by any written statement
prepared wholly by him.
However, the entries recorded under Exhibit K were supported by Socor's Billings under the
account of RDC Construction. These billings were presented and duly received by the
authorized representatives. The circumstances obtaining in the case at bar clearly show that for a
long period of time after receipt thereof, RDC never manifested its dissatisfaction or objection to
the aforestated billings submitted by plaintiff. Neither did defendant immediately protest to
plaintiffs alleged incomplete or irregular performance.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.
ROSELLA D. CANQUE vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and SOCOR CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION (Sam)
Facts: Petitioner Rosella D. Canque is a contractor doing business under the name and style RDC
Construction. At the time material to this case, she had contracts with the government for (a) the
restoration of Cebu-Toledo wharf road; (b) the asphalting of Lutopan access road; and (c) the asphalting
of Babag road in Lapulapu City. In connection with these projects, petitioner entered into two contracts
with private respondent Socor Construction Corporation.
On May 28, 1986, private respondent sent petitioner a bill (Exh. C), containing a revised computation,
for P299,717.75, representing the balance of petitioners total account of P2,098,400.25 under the two
contracts. However, petitioner refused to pay the amount, claiming that private respondent failed to submit
the delivery receipts showing the actual weight in metric tons of the items delivered and the acceptance
thereof by the government.
Hence, on September 22, 1986, private respondent filed a collection suit.
In her answer, petitioner admitted the existence of the contracts with private respondent as well as receipt
of the billing (Exh. C), dated May 28, 1986. However, she disputed the correctness of the bill:
. . . considering that the deliveries of [private respondent] were not signed and acknowledged by the
checkers of [petitioner], the bituminous tack coat it delivered to [petitioner] consisted of 60% water, and
[petitioner] has already paid [private respondent] about P1,400,000.00 but [private respondent] has not
issued any receipt to [petitioner] for said payments and there is no agreement that [private respondent]
will charge 3% per month interest.
Petitioner subsequently amended her answer denying she had entered into sub-contracts with private
respondent. During the trial, private respondent, as plaintiff, presented its vice-president, Sofia O.
Sanchez, and Dolores Aday, its bookkeeper.
Petitioners evidence consisted of her lone testimony
RTC ruled for private respondent. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It upheld the trial courts
reliance on private respondents Book of Collectible Accounts (Exh. K) on the basis of Rule 130, 37 of the
Rules of Court.
Issue: WoN CA decision should be reversed as it has only inadmissible evidence to support it.
Held: No.
First. Petitioner contends that the presentation of the delivery receipts duly accepted by the then Ministry
of Public Works and Highways (MPWH) is required under the contracts (Exhs. A and B) and is a condition
precedent for her payment of the amount claimed by private respondent. Petitioner argues that the entries
in private respondents Book of Collectible Accounts (Exh. K) cannot take the place of the delivery receipts
and that such entries are mere hearsay and, thus, inadmissible in evidence.
The stipulation in the two contracts requiring the submission of delivery receipts does not preclude proof
of delivery of materials by private respondent in some other way. The question is whether the entries in
the Book of Collectible Accounts (Exh. K) constitute competent evidence to show such delivery. Private
respondent cites Rule 130, 37 of the Rules of Court and argues that the entries in question constitute
entries in the course of business sufficient to prove deliveries made for the government projects. This
provision reads:

Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased,
outside of the Philippines or unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated, may be received as prima
facie evidence, if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the ordinary or
regular course of business or duty.

The admission in evidence of entries in corporate books requires the satisfaction of the following
conditions:
1. The person who made the entry must be dead, outside the country or unable to testify;
2. The entries were made at or near the time of the transactions to which they refer;
3. The entrant was in a position to know the facts stated in the entries;
4. The entries were made in his professional capacity or in the performance of a duty, whether legal,
contractual, moral or religious; and
5. The entries were made in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
As petitioner points out, the business entries in question (Exh. K) do not meet the first and third
requisites. Dolores Aday, who made the entries, was presented by private respondent to testify on the
account of RDC Construction. It was in the course of her testimony that the entries were presented and
marked in evidence. There was, therefore, neither justification nor necessity for the presentation of the
entries as the person who made them was available to testify in court.
Necessity is given as a ground for admitting entries, in that they are the best available evidence. The
person who may be called to court to testify on these entries being dead, there arises the necessity of
their admission without the one who made them being called to court be sworn and subjected to crossexamination. And this is permissible in order to prevent a failure of justice.
Moreover, Aday admitted that she had no personal knowledge of the facts constituting the entry. She said
she made the entries based on the bills given to her. But she has no knowledge of the truth or falsity of
the facts stated in the bills. The deliveries of the materials stated in the bills were supervised by an
engineer. The person, therefore, who has personal knowledge of the facts stated in the entries, i.e., that
such deliveries were made in the amounts and on the dates stated, was the companys project engineer.
Whether or not the bills given to Aday correctly reflected the deliveries made in the amounts and on the
dates indicated was a fact that could be established by the project engineer alone who, however, was not
presented during trial. The rule is stated by former Chief Justice Moran, thus:
[W]hen the witness had no personal knowledge of the facts entered by him, and the person who gave him
the information is individually known and may testify as to the facts stated in the entry which is not part of
a system of entries where scores of employees have intervened, such entry is not admissible without the
testimony of the informer.
Second. It is nonetheless argued by private respondent that although the entries cannot be considered
an exception to the hearsay rule, they may be admitted under Rule 132, 10.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that evidence which is inadmissible for the purpose for which it
was offered cannot be admitted for another purpose.
It should be noted, however, that Exh. K is not really being presented for another purpose. Private
respondents counsel offered it for the purpose of showing the amount of petitioners indebtedness. This is
also the purpose for which its admission is sought as a memorandum to refresh the memory of Dolores
Aday as a witness. In other words, it is the nature of the evidence that is changed, not the purpose for
which it is offered.
Be that as it may, considered as a memorandum, Exh. K does not itself constitute evidence. As explained
in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals:
Under the above provision (Rule 132, 10), the memorandum used to refresh the memory of the witness
does not constitute evidence, and may not be admitted as such, for the simple reason that the witness
has just the same to testify on the basis of refreshed memory. In other words, where the witness has
testified independently of or after his testimony has been refreshed by a memorandum of the events in
dispute, such memorandum is not admissible as corroborative evidence. It is self-evident that a witness
may not be corroborated by any written statement prepared wholly by him.
As the entries in question (Exh. K) were not made based on personal knowledge, they could only
corroborate Dolores Adays testimony that she made the entries as she received the bills.
Third. Does this, therefore, mean there is no competent evidence of private respondents claim as
petitioner argues? NO. Aside from Exh. K, private respondent presented other documents like contract
agreements, affidavits, work accomplishment reports, bills, certifications etc.
The entries recorded under Exhibit K were supported by Exhibits L, M, N, O which are all Socor Billings
under the account of RDC Construction. These billings were presented and duly received by the

authorized representatives of defendant. The circumstances obtaining in the case at bar clearly show that
for a long period of time after receipt thereof, RDC never manifested its dissatisfaction or objection to the
aforestated billings submitted by plaintiff.
FINALLY, Exhibit D-1 is material proof of plaintiffs complete fulfillment of its obligation.
There is no question that plaintiff supplied RDC Construction with Item 302 (Bitunimous Prime Coat), Item
303 (Bituminous Tack Coat) and Item 310 (Bitunimous Concrete Surface Course) in all the three projects
of the latter. The Lutopan Access Road project, the Toledo wharf project and the Babag-Lapulapu Road
project.
On the other hand, no proof was ever offered by defendant to show the presence of other contractors in
those projects. We can therefore conclude that it was Socor Construction Corp. ALONE who supplied
RDC with Bituminous Prime Coat, Bituminous Tack Coat and Bituminous Concrete Surface Course for all
the aforenamed three projects.

5. Classes of Documents
a. Public Document
Iwasawa vs Gangan

When Yasuo married Felisa in 2002, she introduced herself to Yasuo as

single. They then resided in Japan. In 2009, he noticed Felisa depressed, so
he confronted her. It was then that she confessed to having married
Raymond in 1994. It was the news of her first husband passing away that
made her depressed. Because of this discovery, Yasuo filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with Felisa being a bigamous marriage.
Among the documents he presented as evidence are the Certificates of
Marriage between him and Felisa, and between Felisa and Raymond; the
death certificate of Raymond; and the certification from the NSO that there
are two marriages registered in the name of Felisa. The RTC dismissed his
case for insufficiency of evidence, holding that Yasuo is a stranger to the
certificate of marriage between Raymo thus have no personal knowledge of
the prior marriage between Raymond and Felisa; he is also a stranger to the
certification issued by the NSO as he had no hand in the preparation of the
document.
Yasuo appealed the decision to the Supreme Court directly on pure question
of law.
The Supreme Court:
There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner
are all public documents. As provided in the Civil Code:
ART. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating
thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima facie
evidence of the facts therein contained.
As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further
proof of their due execution and genuineness. Thus, the RTC erred when it
disregarded said documents on the sole ground that the petitioner did not
present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them to testify on their
authenticity and due execution since proof of authenticity and due execution
was not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents
admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary weight because they
constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. And in the instant
case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted since neither the private
respondent nor the public prosecutor presented evidence to the contrary.
This Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity is
required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what
transpires is a bigamous marriage, which is void from the beginning as
provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines. And this is
what transpired in the instant case.

As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the documentary exhibits taken

together concretely establish the nullity of the marriage of petitioner to
private respondent on the ground that their marriage is bigamous. The
exhibits directly prove the following facts: (1) that private respondent
married Arambulo on June 20, 1994 in the City of Manila; (2) that private
respondent contracted a second marriage this time with petitioner on
November 28, 2002 in Pasay City; (3) that there was no judicial declaration
of nullity of the marriage of private respondent with Arambulo at the time
she married petitioner; (3) that Arambulo died on July 14, 2009 and that it
was only on said date that private respondents marriage with Arambulo was
deemed to have been dissolved; and (4) that the second marriage of private
respondent to petitioner is bigamous, hence null and void, since the first
marriage was still valid and subsisting when the second marriage was
contracted.
Civil registry; nature of civil register books; books making up the civil register and all
documents relating thereto are public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts
therein contained; as public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further
proof of their due execution and genuineness.There is no question that the documentary evidence
submitted by petitioner are all public documents. As provided in the Civil Code:
ART. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents relating thereto shall be
considered public documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.
As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due
execution and genuineness. Thus, the RTC erred when it disregarded said documents on the sole
ground that the petitioner did not present the records custodian of the NSO who issued them to
testify on their authenticity and due execution since proof of authenticity and due execution was
not anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents admissible, they deserve to be
given evidentiary weight because they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
And in the instant case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted since neither the private
respondent nor the public prosecutor presented evidence to the contrary. In Yasuo Iwasawa v.
Felisa Custodio Gangan (a.k.a. Felisa Gangan Arambulo and Felisa Gangan Iwasawa), et
al., G.R. No. 204169, September 11, 2013.

Asian Terminals vs Philam Insurance

Asian Terminals, Inc., Petitioner, vs. Philam Insurance Co., Inc., (now
Chartis Philippines Insurance, Inc.), Respondent
G.R. No. 181163, July 24, 2013
Philam Insurance Co., Inc., (now Chartis Philippines Insurance Inc.),

Petitioner, vs. Westwind Shipping Corporation and Asian Terminals,

Inc., Respondents
G.R. 181262
Westwind Shipping Corporation, Petitioner, vs. Philam Insurance Co.,
Inc. (now Chartis Philippines Insurance Inc.), Respondent
G.R. 181319
Facts: The case is a consolidation of three petitions for certiorari assailing
the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals where Nichimen
Corporation shipped to consignee Universal Motors Corporation packages of
automobiles, where upon delivery, said goods were found to have sustained
damages. However, being insured with Philam against all risks, said
insurance agency compensated Universal Motors and a subrogation receipt
was issued thereafter to the insurance company. Philam, now the subrogee
of Universal Motors went after Westwind and Asian Terminal for reparation of
compensated amount given to Universal Motors.
Issue: What document may be effective used to prove loss and/or damages
on the part of the shipper or consignee?
Ruling:
A letter of credit may be used. A letter of credit is a financial
device developed by merchants as a convenient and relatively safe mode of
dealing with sales of goods to satisfy the seemingly irreconcilable interests of
a seller, who refuses to part with his goods before he is paid, and a buyer,
who wants to have control of his goods before paying. Letters of credit are
employed by the parties desiring to enter into commercial transaction,
mainly for the benefit of the parties to the original transaction. Accordingly,
for purposes of reckoning when notice of loss or damage should be given to
the carrier or its agent, the date of delivery to Universal Motors is controlling.
6. Offer of Evidence: Aludos vs Suerte
Case 9: ALUDOS vs. SUERTE (G.R. No. 165285, June 18, 2012)
Facts:
In Jan. 1969, Lomises Aludos acquired leasehold rights from the Baguio City Govt over
two stalls in the Hangar Market as evidenced by a permit issued by the City Treasurer.
On Sept. 8, 1984, Lomises entered into an agreement with Johnny M. Suerte for the
transfer of all improvements and rights over the two market stalls for P260,000.
Lomises backed out of the agreement and returned the payments already received from
Johnny amounting to P68,000.
Johnny sued him for specific performance with damages before the RTC but the latter
nullified the agreement between them for failure to secure the consent of the Baguio City

Government.
Lomises appealed to the CA claiming that the real agreement was merely a loan not a sale
which was rejected by CA. CA ruled that the assignment of leasehold rights was void but
the sale of the improvements was valid.
On motion for reconsideration, Lomises contended that no valid sale of the improvements
could be made because the lease contract dated May 1, 1985 between him and Baguio
City Government, supposedly marked as Exh. A, provided that all improvements shall
ipso facto become properties of the City of Baguio.
CA denied the motion after finding that his lawyer misrepresented Exh. A as the lease
contract when in fact it was merely a permit issued by the City Treasurer and that the
lease contract dated May, 1 1985 was never formally offered in evidence and could thus
not be considered pursuant to the rules of evidence.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Was the CA correct in not considering the lease contract as evidence?
Held: YES, under Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the court he court shall consider
no evidence which has not been formally offered. The offer of evidence is necessary because it is
the duty of the court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the
evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the
purpose or purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper
barren of probative weight. What was formally offered was the 1969 permit, which only stated
that Lomises was permitted to occupy a stall in the Baguio City market and nothing else. In other
words, no evidence was presented and formally offered showing that any and all improvements
in the market stalls shall be owned by the Baguio City Government.
Investment Corporation vs Francia Jr.
Case 10: WESTMONT INVESTMENT CORPORATION (WINCORP) vs. AMOS P.
FRANCIA, JR. et al. (G.R. No. 194128, December 7, 2011)
Facts: The Francias invested their money in Wincorp for 11% interest for 43 days. They failed
to collect upon maturity and their investment were rolled over for another 34 days for which
Confirmation Advices were issued by Wincorp indicating Pearlbank as the actual borrower of the
funds invested. Failing again to collect, the Francias filed a collection suit against Wincorp and
respondent Pearlbank before the RTC. Wincorp did not object or comment to the evidence
offered by the Francias and filed a motion to postpone hearing 3 days before the scheduled
hearing for presentation of Wincorps defense evidence which was denied. RTC considered
Wincorp to have waive its right to present evidence. It held Wincorp solely liable to the Francias
and dismissed the case against Pearlbank. CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Was the CA correct in not admitting the documents attached to Wincorps pleadings?
Held: Yes. It appears that Wincorp was given ample opportunity to file its Comment/Objection
to the formal offer of evidence of the Francias but it chose not to file any. All the documents
attached by Wincorp to its pleadings before the CA cannot be given any weight or evidentiary
value for the sole reason that, as correctly observed by the CA, these documents were not
formally offered as evidence in the trial court. To consider them now would deny the other

parties the right to examine and rebut them. This is in accordance with Section 34, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court

C. Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence

Hierarchy of Evidence
i.
Overwhelming evidence
ii.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt

People of the Philippines vs Caliso
People of the Philippines vs Patentes

iii.

Clear and convincing

Supreme Court vs Delgado
Govt of Hong kong Special Administrative Region vs Olalia
Jr.

Juan Muoz was charged before a Hong Kong Court with several counts of offenses in
violation of Hong Kong laws. If convicted, he faces a jail term of 7 to 14 years for each
charge. After Juan Muoz was arrested in the Philippines, the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of Juan
Muoz. On December 20, 2001, Judge X of RTC-Manila allowed Juan Muoz to post bail.
However, the government of Hong Kong alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting him to bail because
there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee a
right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings. May Juan Muoz, a
potential extradite, be granted bail on the basis of clear and convincing evidence that he is
not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. In a unanimous decision the SC remanded to the Manila RTC, to determine whether Juan
Muoz is entitled to bail on the basis of clear and convincing evidence. If Muoz is not
entitled to such, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate
detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.

If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be
allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition
cases. After all, both are administrative proceeding where the innocence or guilt of the person
detained is not in issue, the Court said.
Citing the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, the
Court saw the need to reexamine its ruling in Government of United States of America v. Judge
Purganan which limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings. (visit
fellester.blogspot.com)
It said that while our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, there
is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right under the
Constitution.
It further said that even if a potential extradite is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by
its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may follow
extradition. It added that extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of potential
extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character.
(GR No. 153675, Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Judge Olalia,
Jr. and Muoz, April 19, 2007)
Note: In Government of United States of America v. Judge Purganan, September 24, 2002,
The SC ruled that Mark Jimenez is not entitled to the right to bail and provisional liberty
while the extradition proceedings are pending except upon a clear and convincing showing
(1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.
FACTS:
Respondent Muoz was charged of 3 counts of offences of accepting an advantage as agent,
and 7 counts of conspiracy to defraud, punishable by the common law of Hongkong. The
Hongkong Depoartment of Justice requested DOJ for the provisional arrest of respondent
Muoz; the DOJ forward the request to the NBI then to RTC. On the same day, NBI agents
arrested him.
Respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
application for preliminary mandatory injunction and writ of habeas corpus questioning the
validity of the order of arrest.
The CA declared the arrest void. Hence this petition by the Hongkong Department of Justice thru
DOJ.
DOJ filed a petition for certiorari in this Court and sustained the validity of the arrest.
Hongkong Administrative Region then filed in the RTC petition for extradition and arrest of

respondent. Meanwhile, respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed by the petitioner,
initially the RTC denied the petition holding that there is no Philippine Law granting bail in
extradition cases and that private responded is a flight risk.
Motion for reconsideration was filed by the respondent, which was granted. Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not right to bail can be avail in extradition cases.
HELD:
In Purganan case, the right to bail was not included in the extradition cases, since it is available
only in criminal proceedings.
1.
2.
3.
4.

However the Supreme Court, recognised the following trends in International Law.
The growing importance of the individual person in publican international law who, in the 20th
century attained global recognition.
The higher value now being given in human rights in international sphere
The corresponding duty of countries to observe these human rights in fulfilling their treaty
obligations
The of duty of this court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one
hand, and the law on extradition on the other.
The modern trend in the public international law is the primacy placed on the sanctity of
human rights.
Enshrined the Constitution The state values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights. The Philippines therefore, has the responsibility of
protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that
those detained or arrested can participate in the proceeding before the a court, to enable it to
decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified.

Examination of this Court in the doctrines provided for in the US Vs Purganan provide the
following.
1. The exercise of the States police power to deprive a person of his liberty is not limited to
criminal proceedings.
2. To limit the right to bail in the criminal proceeding would be to close our eyes to jurisprudential
history. Philippines has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only.
This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact,
bail has been involved in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the tendency of
administrative proceedings, taking into cognisance the obligation of the Philippines under
international conventions to uphold human rights.
EXTRADITION, is defined as the removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of
placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to
hold him in connection with criminal investigation directed against him or execution of a penalty

imposed on him under the penal and criminal law of the requesting state or government. Thus
characterized as the right of the a foreign power, created by treaty to demand the surrender of one
accused or convicted of a crimes within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative obligation
of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state.
The extradited may be subject to detention as may be necessary step in the process of extradition,
but the length of time in the detention should be reasonable.
In the case at bar, the record show that the respondent, Muoz has been detained for 2 years
without being convicted in Hongkong.
The Philippines has the obligation of ensuring the individual his right to liberty and due process
and should not therefor deprive the extraditee of his right to bail PROVIDED that certain
standards for the grant is satisfactorily met. In other words there should be CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
However in the case at bar, the respondent was not able to show and clear and convincing
evidence that he be entitled to bail. Thus the case is remanded in the court for the determination
and otherwise, should order the cancellation of his bond and his immediate detention.
People vs Fontanilla

iv.

Preponderance of Evidence

PCIB vs Balmaceda
PCIB vs Balmaceda
Banks; degree of diligence required. The General Banking Law of 2000 requires of
banks the highest standards of integrity and performance. The banking business is
impressed with public interest. Of paramount importance is the trust and confidence of
the public in general in the banking industry. Consequently, the diligence required of
banks is more than that of a Roman pater familias or a good father of a family. The
highest degree of diligence is expected.

Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence
on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight
of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of
evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is
evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto.

The party carrying the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence, or evidence which, to the court, is more worthy of belief than the evidence
offered in opposition.
Facts:
On September 10, 1993, PCIB filed an action for recovery of sum of money with
damages before the RTC against Antonio Balmaceda, the Branch Manager of its Sta.
Cruz, Manila branch. In its complaint, PCIB alleged that between 1991 and 1993,
Balmaceda, by taking advantage of his position as branch manager, fraudulently
obtained and encashed 31 Managers checks in the total amount of Ten Million Seven
Hundred Eighty Two Thousand One Hundred Fifty Pesos (P10,782,150.00).
On February 28, 1994, PCIB moved to be allowed to file an amended complaint to
implead Rolando Ramos as one of the recipients of a portion of the proceeds from
Balmacedas alleged fraud. PCIB also increased the number of fraudulently obtained
and encashed Managers checks to 34, in the total amount of Eleven Million Nine
Hundred Thirty Seven Thousand One Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,937,150.00). The RTC
granted this motion.
Since Balmaceda did not file an Answer, he was declared in default. On the other hand,
Ramos filed an Answer denying any knowledge of Balmacedas scheme. According to
Ramos, he is a reputable businessman engaged in the business of buying and selling
fighting cocks, and Balmaceda was one of his clients. Ramos admitted receiving money
from Balmaceda as payment for the fighting cocks that he sold to Balmaceda, but
maintained that he had no knowledge of the source of Balmacedas money.
The RTC issued a decision in favor of PCIB ,
1. Ordering defendant Antonio Balmaceda to pay the amount of P11,042,150.00 with
interest thereon at the legal rate from [the] date of his misappropriation of the said
amount until full restitution shall have been made[.]
2. Ordering defendant Rolando Ramos to pay the amount of P895,000.00 with interest
at the legal rate from the date of misappropriation of the said amount until full restitution
shall have been made[.]

3. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff moral damages in the sum of P500,000.00
and attorneys fees in the amount of ten (10%) percent of the total misappropriated
amounts sought to be recovered
4. Plus costs of suit.
On appeal, the CA dismissed the complaint against Ramos, holding that no sufficient
evidence existed to prove that Ramos colluded with Balmaceda in the latters fraudulent
manipulations. And ordered to pay appellant Ramos the following:
a) P50,000.00 as moral damages
b) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages, and
c) P20,000.00 as attorneys fees
ISSUE:
I THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO
HOLD THAT RESPONDENT RAMOS ACTED IN COMPLICITY WITH RESPONDENT
BALMACEDA
II THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE PETITIONER TO RELEASE
THE AMOUNT OFP251,910.96 TO RESPONDENT RAMOS AND TO PAY THE
LATTER MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAmages and atty fees
HELD
No, Ramos is not liable.
The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition and AFFIRMED the decision of
the Court of Appeals dated with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral and
exemplary damages in favor of Rolando N. Ramos is DELETED.
PCIB, as plaintiff, had to prove, by preponderance of evidence, its positive assertion that
Ramos conspired with Balmaceda in perpetrating the latters scheme to defraud the
Bank. All that PCIBsevidence proves is that Balmaceda used Ramos name as a payee
when he filled up the application forms for the Managers checks.

But, as the CA correctly observed, the mere fact that Balmaceda madeRamos the payee
on some of the Managers checks is not enough basis to conclude that Ramos
wascomplicit in Balmacedas fraud; a number of other people were made payees on the
other Managers checks yet PCIB never alleged them to be liable, nor did the
Bank adduce any other evidence pointing to Ramos participation that would justify his
separate treatment from the others. Also, while Ramos is Balmacedas brother -in-law,
their relationship is not sufficient, by itself, to render Ramos liable, absentconcrete proof
of his actual participation in the fraudulent scheme.
The party carrying the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence, or evidence which, to the court, is more worthy of belief than the evidence
offered in opposition.
In encinas vs national bookstore . defined "preponderance of evidence" in the following
manner:
Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence
on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight
of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of
evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis,means probability of the truth. It is
evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto.
Ramos participation in Balmacedas scheme was not proven by PCIB by
preponderance of evidence. Given that PCIB failed to establish Ramos participation in
Balmacedas scheme, it was not even necessary for Ramos to provide an explanation
for the money he received from Balmaceda. Even if the evidence adduced by the
plaintiff appears stronger than that presented by the defendant, a judgment cannot be
entered in the plaintiffs favor if his evidence still does not suffice to sustain his cause of
action; 25 to reiterate, a preponderance of evidence as defined must be established to
achieve this result.
Dela Llana vs Biong

17. DELA LLANA VS BIONG

FACTS:

On March 30, 2000, Juan dela Llana was driving a car along North Avenue,
Quezon City. His sister, Dra. dela Llana, was seated at the front passenger
seat while a certain Calimlim was at the backseat. Juan stopped the when
the signal light turned red. A few seconds after the car halted, a dump truck
owned by Rebecca Biong and driven by Joel Primero containing gravel and
sand suddenly rammed the cars rear end, violently pushing the car forward.
Due to the impact, the cars rear end collapsed and its rear windshield was
shattered. Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana. Apart from these
minor wounds, Dra. dela Llana did not appear to have suffered from any
other visible physical injuries.
In the first week of May 2000, Dra. dela Llana began to feel mild to moderate
pain on the left side of her neck and shoulder. The pain became more intense
as days passed by. Her injury became more severe. Her health deteriorated
to the extent that she could no longer move her left arm. On June 9, 2000,
she consulted with Dr. Rosalinda Milla, a rehabilitation medicine specialist, to
examine her condition. Dr. Milla told her that she suffered from a whiplash
injury, an injury caused by the compression of the nerve running to her left
arm and hand. Dr. Milla required her to undergo physical therapy to alleviate
her condition.
Dra. dela Llanas condition did not improve despite three months of
extensive physical therapy. She then consulted other doctors in search for a
cure. Dr. Flores, a neuro-surgeon, finally suggested that she undergo a
cervical spine surgery to release the compression of her nerve. On October
19, 2000, Dr. Flores operated on her spine and neck, between the C5 and the
C6 vertebrae. The operation released the impingement of the nerve, but
incapacitated Dra. dela Llana from the practice of her profession since June
2000 despite the surgery.
Dra. dela Llana, on October 16, 2000, demanded from Rebecca
compensation for her injuries, but Rebecca refused to pay. Thus, on May 8,
2001, Dra. dela Llana sued Rebecca for damages before the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City (RTC). She alleged that she lost the mobility of her arm
as a result of the vehicular accident and claimed P150,000.00 for her medical
expenses (as of the filing of the complaint) and an average monthly income
of P30,000.00 since June 2000. She further prayed for actual, moral, and
exemplary damages as well as attorneys fees.
At the trial, Dra. dela Llana presented herself as an ordinary witness and Joel
as a hostile witness. Dra. Dela Llana reiterated that she lost the mobility of
her arm because of the vehicular accident. To prove her claim, she identified
and authenticated a medical certificate dated November 20, 2000 issued by
Dr. Milla. The medical certificate stated that Dra. dela Llana suffered from a
whiplash injury. It also chronicled her clinical history and physical

examinations. Meanwhile, Joel testified that his truck hit the car because the
trucks brakes got stuck.
In defense, Rebecca testified that Dra. dela Llana was physically fit and
strong when they met several days after the vehicular accident. She also
asserted that she observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of Joel.
The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. dela Llana and held that the proximate cause
of Dra. dela Llanas whiplash injury to be Joels reckless driving.
The CA reversed the RTC ruling.
ISSUES:
1 Who has the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joels
negligence and Dra. dela Llanas whiplash injury?
2 WON the medical certificate has no probative value for being hearsay.
3 WON Dra. dela Llanas medical opinion cannot be given probative
value for the reason that she was not presented as an expert witness.
4 WON the Supreme Court cannot take judicial notice that vehicular
accidents cause whiplash injuries.
HELD:
1.
In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.
He who alleges has the burden of proving his allegation by preponderance of
evidence or greater weight of credible evidence. The reason for this rule is
that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to
proof. In short, mere allegations are not evidence.
In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate causation between
Joels negligence and Dra. dela Llanas whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela
Llana. She must establish by preponderance of evidence that Joels
negligence, in its natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produced her whiplash injury, and without which her
whiplash injury would not have occurred.
2.
The medical certificate has no probative value for being hearsay. It is
a basic rule that evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its
probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness but on
the knowledge of another person who is not on the witness stand. Hearsay
evidence, whether objected to or not, cannot be given credence except in
very unusual circumstance that is not found in the present case.
Furthermore, admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of
evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and
competence, while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already
admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item

of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on

judicial evaluation within the guidelines provided by the Rules of Court.
3.
Under the Rules of Court, there is a substantial difference between an
ordinary witness and an expert witness. The opinion of an ordinary witness
may be received in evidence regarding: (a) the identity of a person about
whom he has adequate knowledge; (b) a handwriting with which he has
sufficient familiarity; and (c) the mental sanity of a person with whom he is
sufficiently acquainted. Furthermore, the witness may also testify on his
impressions of the emotion, behavior, condition or appearance of a
person.43 On the other hand, the opinion of an expert witness may be
received in evidence on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill,
experience or training which he shown to possess.44
However, courts do not immediately accord probative value to an admitted
expert testimony, much less to an unobjected ordinary testimony respecting
special knowledge. The reason is that the probative value of an expert
testimony does not lie in a simple exposition of the experts opinion. Rather,
its weight lies in the assistance that the expert witness may afford the courts
by demonstrating the facts which serve as a basis for his opinion and the
reasons on which the logic of his conclusions is founded.45
In the present case, Dra. dela Llanas medical opinion cannot be given
probative value for the reason that she was not presented as an expert
witness. As an ordinary witness, she was not competent to testify on the
nature, and the cause and effects of whiplash injury. Furthermore, we
emphasize that Dra. dela Llana, during trial, nonetheless did not provide a
medical explanation on the nature as well as the cause and effects of
whiplash injury in her testimony.
4.
Indeed, a perusal of the pieces of evidence presented by the parties
before the trial court shows that Dra. dela Llana did not present any
testimonial or documentary evidence that directly shows the causal relation
between the vehicular accident and Dra. dela Llanas injury. Her claim that
Joels negligence caused her whiplash injury was not established because of
the deficiency of the presented evidence during trial. We point out in this
respect that courts cannot take judicial notice that vehicular accidents cause
whiplash injuries. This proposition is not public knowledge, or is capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of
their judicial functions. We have no expertise in the field of medicine. Justices
and judges are only tasked to apply and interpret the law on the basis of the
parties pieces of evidence and their corresponding legal arguments.
In sum, Dra. dela Llana miserably failed to establish her case by
preponderance of evidence. While we commiserate with her, our solemn

duty to independently and impartially assess the merits of the case binds us
to rule against Dra. dela Llanas favor. Her claim, unsupported by
preponderance of evidence, is merely a bare assertion and has no leg to
stand on.
Candao vs People
Zacaria Candao vs. People of the Philippines and Sandiganbayan
G.R. Nos. 186659-710, October 19, 2011
Facts:
On August 5, 1993, Chairman Pascasio S. Banaria of the Commission on Audit (COA)
constituted a team of auditors from the central office to conduct an Expanded Special
Audit of the Office of the Regional Governor, Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao
(ORG-ARMM). State Auditors Heidi L. Mendoza (Team Leader) and Jaime Roxas
(Member) were directed to conduct the said audit under the supervision of Jaime P.
Naranjo (State Auditor V). From August 24 to September 1, 1993, the expanded audit
was thus conducted on the financial transactions and operations of ORG-ARMM for the
period July 1992 to March 1993.
As stated in Special Audit Office (SAO) Report No. 93-25 submitted by the audit team, it
was found that illegal withdrawals were made from the depository accounts of the
agency through the issuance of checks payable to the order of petitioner Israel B. Haron
(Disbursing Officer II) without the required disbursement vouchers.
In a letter dated September 10, 1993, Chairman Banaria demanded from petitioner
Haron to produce and restitute to the ARMM-Regional Treasurer immediately the full
amount of P21,045,570.64 and submit his explanation within seventy-two (72) hours
together with the official receipt issued by the ARMM Regional Treasurer in
acknowledgment of such restitution.
On April 17, 1998, the Office of the Special Prosecutor, Office of the OmbudsmanMindanao, filed in the Sandiganbayan criminal cases for malversation of public funds
against the following ORG-ARMM officials/employees: Zacaria A. Candao (Regional
Governor), Israel B. Haron (Disbursing Officer II), Abas A. Candao (Executive
Secretary) and Pandical M. Santiago (Cashier). They were charged with violation of
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, under the following informations
with identical allegations except for the varying date, number and amount of the check
involved in each case.
Sandiganbayan ruling: By Decision dated October 29, 2008, the Sandiganbayan found
petitioner Haron guilty beyond reasonable doubt of malversation of public funds under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed in conspiracy with
petitioners Zacaria A. Candao and Abas A. Candao who were likewise sentenced to
imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine equivalent to the amount of the check in each

case.
The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioners presented no proof that the cash advances
intended for "peace and order campaign" were spent for public purposes, as in fact the
alleged disbursement vouchers did not indicate any detail as to the nature of the
expense/s such as purchase of equipment, services, meals, travel, etc. and there were
no supporting documents such as the Request for Issuance of Voucher, Purchase
Request and Inspection Report of the items supposedly purchased. More importantly,
the vouchers were not accomplished in accordance with existing COA circulars because
they are unnumbered and undated. Hence, the belatedly submitted vouchers are of
doubtful veracity or origin, nay, a fabricated evidence or, as pointed out by the
prosecution, "self-serving or an afterthought, belatedly prepared to give the illegal
disbursements amounting to the aggregate amount of more than P21M, a semblance of
regularity."21 As to the JAO and Certification dated August 18, 1998 issued by Chief
Accountant Fontanilla, the Sandiganbayan found there is nothing therein to indicate the
particular disbursement voucher that corresponds to each of the subject 52 checks
which were neither reflected in the JAO.
With respect to petitioners assertion that the audit conducted by the COA special audit
team was incomplete and tainted as it did not follow procedures because the person
audited were not notified thereof, the Sandiganbayan found these allegations
unsubstantiated as in fact at the start of the audit on August 24, 1993, the audit team
thru their team leader State Auditor Naranjo, informed the management of ORG-ARMM
thru the COA Resident Auditor of the expanded special audit to be conducted as they
even requested for the original copies of the disbursement vouchers together with their
complete supporting documents covering the 52 checks. But despite said letter, the
ORG-ARMM failed to heed the audit teams request. For the failure of petitioner Haron
to account for the funds involved in the illegal withdrawals when asked to do so, the
presumption arose that he misappropriated the same, which presumption was not
overcome by defense evidence.
On the respective liabilities of petitioners Zacaria A. Candao and Abas A. Candao, the
Sandiganbayan held that by their act of co-signing the subject checks, petitioner Haron
was able to consummate the illegal withdrawals without the required disbursement
vouchers of the amounts covered by the 43 checks (for Abas) and 9 checks (for
Zacaria). Thus, by their collective acts, said court concluded that petitioners conspired
to effect the illegal withdrawals of public funds which, when required by the COA to be
properly accounted for, petitioners failed to do so.
Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan committed a reversible error in not applying the
"Equipoise Rule" which if applied would have resulted in the acquittal of the accusedpetitioners?
Held: No.

In fine, the Sandiganbayan committed no reversible error in holding that the testimonial
and documentary evidence presented by the petitioners failed to overcome the prima
facie evidence of misappropriation arising from Harons failure to give a satisfactory
explanation for the illegal withdrawals from the ARMM funds under his custody and
control. Petitioners likewise did not accomplish the proper liquidation of the entire
amount withdrawn, during the expanded audit or any time thereafter. There is therefore
no merit in petitioners argument that the Sandiganbayan erred in not applying the
equipoise rule.
Under the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there
is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof
loses. The equipoise rule finds application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of
the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill
the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction. Such is not the
situation in this case because the prosecution was able to prove by adequate evidence
that Disbursing Officer Haron failed to account for funds under his custody and control
upon demand, specifically for the P21,045,570.64 illegally withdrawn from the said
funds. In the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof
that the accountable officer had received public funds, that he did not have them in his
possession when demand therefor was made, and that he could not satisfactorily
explain his failure to do so. Direct evidence of personal misappropriation by the accused
is hardly necessary in malversation cases.
v.

Substantial evidence

Office of the ombudsman vs Reyes

Facts:
Respondent Antonio Reyes being then the Head Office LTO was found guilty of grave abuse of
misconduct by the Office of the Ombudsman. Based on the affidavits and testimonies of several
witnesses (Penaloza, Amper and Valdehueza) it was said that Reyes would give the flunkers of
the drivers license examination the option of retaking the examination or to simply pay an
additional cost to have a passing grade without actually re-taking the same. It is alleged that he
illegally exacted money from Acero in exchange for the issuance of a driver's license to the latter,
notwithstanding that Acero did not pass the requisite written examination therefor.
On appeal, the CA reversed the said judgment and exonerated him from the administrative
charge for insufficiency of evidence.
Issue: Was Reyes afforded due process?
"x x x.

Ledesma v. Court of Appeals[35] elaborates on the well established doctrine of due

process in administrative proceedings as follows:

Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations
require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a person is notified
of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself.
In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable
opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him
constitute the minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process
is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity
to explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of.[36]

Moreover, Department of Health v. Camposano[37] restates the guidelines laid down

in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations[38] that due process in administrative
proceedings requires compliance with the following cardinal principles: (1) the
respondents right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and
submit supporting evidence, must be observed; (2) the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented; (3) the decision must have some basis to support itself; (4)
there must be substantial evidence; (5) the decision must be rendered on the
evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed
to the parties affected; (6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have acted on
its own consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have
simply accepted the views of a subordinate; and (7) the decision must be rendered
in such manner that respondents would know the reasons for it and the various
issues involved.[39]
In the present case, the fifth requirement stated above was not complied
with. Reyes was not properly apprised of the evidence offered against him, which
were eventually made the bases of petitioners decision that found him guilty of
grave misconduct.
To recall, after the affidavit of Acero was filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao, the respondents therein, i.e., Reyes and Pealoza, were
ordered to submit their counter-affidavits in order to discuss the charges lodged
against them. While Pealoza acknowledged in his counter-affidavit his
participation in the illicit transaction complained of, he pointed to Reyes as the
main culprit. Pealoza thereafter submitted the affidavits of Amper and Valdehueza
as witnesses who would substantiate his accusations. However, the records reveal
that only the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao and Acero were furnished
copies of the said affidavits.[40] Thus, Reyes was able to respond only to the
affidavit of Acero. It would appear that Reyes had no idea that Pealoza, a corespondent in the administrative case, would point an accusing finger at him and
even supply the inculpatory evidence to prove his guilt. The said affidavits were
made known to Reyes only after the rendition of the petitioners Decision dated
September 24, 2001.
The fact that Reyes was able to assail the adverse decision of the petitioner

via a Motion for Reconsideration Cum Motion to Set the Case for Preliminary
Conference did not cure the violation of his right to due process in this case. Reyes
filed the said motion precisely to raise the issue of the violation of his right to due
process. There is nothing on record to show that Reyes was furnished with, or had
otherwise received, a copy of the affidavits of Pealoza, Amper and Valdehueza,
whether before or after the Decision dated September 24, 2001 was issued. Thus, it
cannot be said that Reyes had a fair opportunity to squarely and intelligently
answer the accusations therein or to offer any rebuttal evidence thereto.
It is true that, in the past, this Court has held that the right to due process of a
respondent in an administrative case was not violated if he was able to file a
motion for reconsideration to refute the evidence against him. However, the instant
case should be differentiated from Ruivivar v. Office of the Ombudsman,[41] which
likewise involved the issue of administrative due process. In the said case,
Ruivivar was found administratively liable for discourtesy in the course of her
official functions and was meted the penalty of reprimand. In her motion for
reconsideration, Ruivivar argued that she was deprived of due process because she
was not furnished copies of the affidavits of complainants witnesses. Thereafter,
the Ombudsman ordered that Ruivivar be furnished with copies of the affidavits of
the witnesses, with the directive for her to file any pleading that she may deem
appropriate. As Ruivivar still opted not to controvert the affidavits that were
belatedly provided to her, the Ombudsman ruled that her right to due process was
not violated and her administrative liability was upheld. The Court affirmed the
ruling of the Ombudsman, declaring that the law can no longer help one who had
been who had been given ample opportunity to be heard but who did not take full
advantage of the proffered chance.[42]
In the instant case, petitioner plainly disregarded Reyes protestations
without giving him a similar opportunity, as in Ruivivar, to be belatedly furnished
copies of the affidavits of Pealoza, Amper and Valdehueza to enable him to refute
the same. As it were, petitioner rendered its Decision dated September 24, 2001 on
the basis of evidence that were not disclosed to Reyes. This the Court cannot
sanction. A judgment in an administrative case that imposes the extreme penalty of
dismissal must not only be based on substantial evidence but also rendered with
due regard to the rights of the parties to due process.
x x x."
Ramos vs BPI Family Savings Bank
FACTS:
Ramos was employed by BPI Family in 1995 and eventually became its Vice-President for
Dealer Network Marketing/Auto Loans Division. During his tenure, a client named Trezita B.
Acosta (Acosta) purportedly secured an auto loan from BPI Family in the amount of

P3,097,392.00 for the purchase of a Toyota Prado vehicle (subject loan) which had remained
unpaid. As it turned out, Acosta did not authorize nor personally apply for the subject loan,
rendering the transaction fraudulent.
After investigation, BPI Family found that Ramos released these documents without the prior
approval of BPI Family's credit committee; and he was grossly remiss in his duties since his
subordinates did not follow the banks safety protocols, particularly those regarding the
establishment of the loan applicants identity, and that the promissory note was not even signed
by the applicant in the presence of any of the marketing officers.
As a consequence, BPI Family lost P2,294,080.00, which amount was divided between Ramos
and his three (3) other subordinates, with Ramos shouldering the proportionate amount ofP
546,000.00.
The foregoing amount was subsequently deducted from Ramos benefits which accrued upon his
retirement on May 1, 2006. Claiming that the deductions made by BPI Family were illegal,
Ramos filed a complaint for underpayment of retirement benefits and non- payment of overtime
and holiday pay and premium pay against BPI Family and/or its President at that time, Alfonso
L. Salcedo, Jr., before the NLRC.
The LA dismissed Ramoss complaint, ruling that the deduction made on his retirement benefits
was "legal and even reasonable"since Ramos was negligent in running his department.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the LA decision, holding that the deduction complained of was
"illegal and unreasonable"in that (a) the alleged negligence committed by Ramos was not
substantially proven as he was not expected to personally examine all loan documents that pass
through his hands or to require the client to personally appear before him because he has
subordinates to do those details for him; (b) the issuance of the PO and ATD prior to the loans
approval is not an irregular procedure, but an ordinary occurrence in BPI Family;and (c) the
deduction does not fall under the exceptions prescribed under Article 113of the Labor Code on
allowable deductions.
Accordingly, it ordered BPI Family to return/refund to Ramos the amount of 546,000.00, with
additional payment of 10% thereof as attorneys fees.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the finding of negligence on the part of Ramos, holding that Ramos
was remiss in his duty as head of Dealer Network Marketing/Auto Loans Division in failing to
determine the true identity of "Trezita Acosta". However, it also attributed negligence on the part
of BPI Family since it sanctioned the practice of issuing the PO and ATD prior to the approval of
the credit committee. Such relaxed supervision over its divisions contributed to a large extent to
its defraudation. Thus, reducing the deductible amount from his retirement benefits to
P200,000.00.
Ramos moved for reconsideration which was, however, denied in a Resolution. Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NLRC when it found the deduction made from Ramoss retirement benefits to be illegal and
unreasonable.
HELD: The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed.
REMEDIAL LAW remedy of certiorari
To justify the grant of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the petitioner must satisfactorily
show that the court or quasi-judicial authority gravely abused the discretion conferred upon
them. Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment exercised in a capricious and whimsical
manner that is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. Global Business Holdings, Inc. v. Surecomp
Software, B.V., G.R. No. 173463, October 13, 2010.
In labor disputes, the NLRCs findings are said to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion when
its conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence.
As a general rule, in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the appellate
court does not assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and
the NLRC based their conclusion. The query in this proceeding is limited to the determination of
whether or not the NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in rendering its decision. However, as an exception, the appellate court may examine
and measure the factual findings of the NLRC if the same are not supported by substantial
evidence. Protacio v. Laya Mananghaya & Co., G.R. No. 168654, March 25, 2009
parang wala dito yung doctrine
vi.

Prima facie evidence

Lucas vs lucas

A prima facie case is built by a partys evidence and not by mere allegations in
the initiatory pleading.

JESSE U. LUCAS vs. JESUS S. LUCAS

G.R. No. 90710, June 6, 2011
x x x.
The statement in Herrera v. Alba[1] that there are four significant procedural
aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face has been widely
misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called

procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respective
evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial
stage of the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed.
The CAs observation that petitioner failed to establish a prima facie casethe first
procedural aspect in a paternity caseis therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is
built by a partys evidence and not by mere allegations in the initiatory
pleading.
Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss the lack of a prima facie
case vis--vis the motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, as yet, been
presented by petitioner. More essentially, it is premature to discuss whether, under
the circumstances, a DNA testing order is warranted considering that no such order
has yet been issued by the trial court. In fact, the latter has just set the said case for
hearing.
X x x.

During The Hearing On Motion For DNA Testing, Petitioner

Must Present Prima Facie Evidence Or Establish A
Reasonable Possibility Of Paternity
JESSE U. LUCAS v. JESUS S. LUCAS
G.R. No. 190710, June 6, 2011, SECOND DIVISION (Nachura, J.)
Jesse U. Lucas (Jesse), filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for
the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC). Jesse narrated his mothers account of her history with Jesus S. Lucas
(Jesus) and attached several copies of his personal documents.
Though Jesus was not summoned and was not served a copy of the
petition, he nevertheless learned of it and obtained for himself a copy. He then
filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting among others that the
petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on
him as respondent.
Unbeknownst to Jesus on the day before he filed his Comment, Jesse filed
a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC found to be
sufficient in form and hence set the case for hearing.
After learning of the RTCs order, Jesus filed a Motion for
Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere
allegation pointing to him as Jesses father.
Acting on Jesus Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case
and held that Jesse failed to establish compliance with the four procedural
aspects for a paternity action enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba.
This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration of his own
which the RTC granted. A new hearing was scheduled where the RTC held that
ruling on the grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing the instant petition is

premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place.
Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC.
He then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA
ruled in favor of Jesus, it noted that Jesse failed to show that the four
significant aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met and held that
DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a
prima facie case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can
issue a DNA testing order.
HELD:
Petition GRANTED.
Misapplication of Herrera v. Alba by the Regional Trial Court and the
Court of Appeals.
The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant
procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face
has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is
confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties
have presented their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that
cannot be determined at this initial stage of the proceedings, when only the
petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CAs observation that petitioner
failed to establish a prima facie casethe first procedural aspect in a paternity
caseis therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a partys evidence
and not by mere allegations in the initiatory pleading.
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA evidence.
The Rule on DNA Evidence was enacted to guide the Bench and the Bar
for the introduction and use of DNA evidence in the judicial system. It provides
the prescribed parameters on the requisite elements for reliability and validity
(i.e., the proper procedures, protocols, necessary laboratory reports, etc.), the
possible sources of error, the available objections to the admission of DNA test
results as evidence as well as the probative value of DNA evidence. It seeks
to ensure that the evidence gathered, using various methods of DNA analysis,
is utilized effectively and properly, [and] shall not be misused and/or abused
and, more importantly, shall continue to ensure that DNA analysis serves
justice and protects, rather than prejudice the public.
Not surprisingly, Section 4 of the Rule on DNA Evidence merely provides
for conditions that are aimed to safeguard the accuracy and integrity of the
DNA testing. Section 4 states: The appropriate court may, at any time,
either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in
the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due
hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following: (a) A
biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;(b) The biological sample:
(i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or
(ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons; (c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid
technique; (d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new
information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and (e) The
existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially

affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing. This Rule shall not
preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of
any party, including law enforcement agencies, before a suit or proceeding is
commenced.
This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a
matter of right if, during the hearing, the said conditions are established.
Court order for blood testing equivalent to search under the
Constitution.
In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there
must be a show cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case or a reasonable possibility of
paternity or good cause for the holding of the test. In these states, a court
order for blood testing is considered a search, which, under their
Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in
order to be valid. Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable
possibility, was imposed in civil actions as a counterpart of a finding of
probable cause.
The Supreme Court of Louisiana eloquently explained; Although a
paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of
sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case
must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in
various jurisdictions have differed regarding the kind of procedures which are
required, but those jurisdictions have almost universally found that a
preliminary showing must be made before a court can constitutionally order
compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as a
preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood
testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of
paternity. As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a
party to the action refuses to voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause
hearing must be held in which the court can determine whether there is
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a
court order for blood testing.
The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to
protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the
hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie
evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.

vii.

Probable Cause

PNB vs Tria
Del Castillo vs People

viii. Iota of Evidence (circumstantial)

People of the Philippines vs Anticamara
People of the Philippines v. Alberto Anticamara y Cabillo, et al.
G.R No. 178771
8 June 2011
PERALTA, J.:
Facts: This is an appeal of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial court's judgment finding appellants Fernando
Calaguas Fernandez (Lando) and Alberto Cabillo Anticamara (Al) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder and of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention. About the early morning of May 7, 2002, in Sitio
Rosalia, Brgy. San Bartolome, Municipality of Rosales, Province of Pangasinan, Lando and Al, being then armed with
a hand gun, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery, evident
premeditation and superior strength, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take Sulpacio Abad,
driver of the Estrellas, hog tied him, brought to a secluded place, shoot and bury in a shallow grave. In his defense,
Lando denied having committed the crimes charged and interposed alibi as a defense. He claims that at the time of the
incident on May 7, 2002, he was in Barangay Maligaya, San Miguel, Tarlac, with his family. He denied ever going to
the Estrella farm in Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan. Al claimed that he acted as a lookout
and was tasked to report to his companions if any person or vehicle would approach the house of the Estrellas. He said
that he was forced to follow what was ordered of him and did not report the matter to the police because he was
threatened to be killed, including the members of his family who were in Cebu.
Issue:

Are the appellants guilty of murder and kidnapping and serious illegal detention?

Resolution: The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00556 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.
For Murder:
The trial court found that although there was no direct eyewitness in the killing of Sulpacio in the early morning of
May 7, 2002 at Sitio Rosalia, Barangay San Bartolome, Rosales, Pangasinan, the prosecution adduced sufficient
circumstantial evidence to establish with moral certainty the identities and guilt of the perpetrators of the crime.
Moreover, there was a conspiracy between the perpetrators and the defense of denial was not given weight
since there was a positive identification of the accused by the witness, AAA. As to the defense of alibi, a side from the
testimony of appellant Lando that he was in Tarlac at the time of the incident, the defense was unable to show that it
was physically impossible for Lando to be at the scene of the crime. Basic is the rule that for alibi to prosper, the
accused must prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible
for him to have been at the scene of the crime.
For Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention:
The Court finds appellant Lando guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with rape. The crime of kidnapping was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. Appellants
Lando and Al, both private individuals, forcibly took AAA, a female, away from the house of the Estrellas and held her
captive against her will. Thereafter, appellant Lando brought AAA to his house in San Miguel Tarlac, whereby she was
deprived of her liberty for almost one month. It is settled that the crime of serious illegal detention consists not only of
placing a person in an enclosure, but also in detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty.
The
crime of rape was also established by the prosecution. Appellant Lando succeeded in having carnal knowledge of
AAA through the use of threat and intimidation. AAA testified that on May 9, 2002, appellant Lando brought her to a
hotel to hide her from Fred and Bert, who intended to kill her. Appellant Lando told her to follow his orders,
otherwise, he will give her to Fred and Bert. While in the hotel, appellant Lando raped her.

People vs De Ocampo
Evidence; circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a)
there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain that inexorably
leads to one fair conclusion: the accused committed the crime to the exclusion of all others. In

this case, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction made by the RTC based on its findings that
the accused was responsible for the murder of the Alolod couple based on circumstantial
evidence. People of the Philippines v. Maritess Alolod, Efren Deocampo, Elmer Deocampo and
Edwin Deocampo, G.R. No. 185212, February 15, 2012.