research-article2016
Article
Cultural Studies Critical Methodologies
2016, Vol. 16(2) 111124
2016 SAGE Publications
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DOI: 10.1177/1532708616636147
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Abstract
The premise of this article is that social science researchers often rush to application, to empirical method and methodology,
before studying the history, philosophy, and politics of various empiricisms. Because there are incompatibilities between
the empiricisms of different systems of thought, it is dangerous to attempt new empirical work without having studied
the old empiricisms, lest those incompatibilities produce weak, fundamentally flawed scholarship. To help prevent such
confusions, this article briefly describes two empiricisms commonly used in social science researchlogical empiricism
and the empiricism of phenomenologyas well as Deleuze and Guattaris transcendental empiricism, which is being used
in much new empirical inquiry.
Keywords
empiricism, logical empiricism, phenomenology, transcendental empiricism
As I began reading scholarship grounded in what Clough
(2009) called the new empiricism, I wondered what was
new about its empiricism, which led me to think about the
old empiricism (as if the old empiricism is one thing), and I
realized I had never actually studied empiricism per se, so
how could I differentiate the new from the old? I had studied what Ive called conventional humanist qualitative
methodology as a doctoral student and had taught that
empirical methodology and its methods for over 20 years,
but my course syllabi did not begin with the history or philosophy or politics of empiricism. Why had I skipped that
step? I wondered whether anyone at my university taught
empiricism straight on. Curiouser and curiouser, I searched
my universitys curriculum bulletin (searching course titles
and brief course descriptions) and retrieved only one course
focused on empiricism, an undergraduate philosophy course
on the British empiricists (see St. Pierre, in press-a). I speculated that philosophers must believe the study of empiricism is foundational given that they teach it at the
undergraduate level. But philosophers dont typically do
empirical researchthey dont go out to natural settings in
the field and do messy human subjects researchso why do
they teach empiricism? Why is empiricism the province of
philosophy? After all, its we social scientists who are
charged with accomplishing empirical research, with collecting data about everything, with measuring even what
cannot be measured, with making meaning (producing
knowledge) that gets to the bottom of things once and for
all, with filling all those gaps in knowledge so that our foundations are secure, steady, and true and we can claim to
Corresponding Author:
Elizabeth A. St.Pierre, Professor, Department of Educational Theory and
Practice, University of Georgia, 604E Aderhold Hall, Athens, GA 30602,
USA.
Email: stpierre@uga.edu
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that age-old belief by claiming that through the right use of
reason anyone, whether ethical or not, can produce true
knowledge. He also invented the cogito whose existence
depends on knowing (thought), and in his work to be
became equated with to know. Descartes knowing subject
is at the center of modern science. Lyotard (1979/1984),
however, would later write that knowledge is not the same
as science (p. 18), but it is this knowing subjectthis particular onto-epistemological inventionthat is the lynchpin
of modern science and that is now at stake in the new
empiricism.
At any rate, I think the old theory/practice binary is dangerous because it perpetuates the modern separation of philosophy and science, though the natural sciences were once
a philosophical matter. The idea that theory and practice are
separate has been much critiqued, especially by those who
reject binary oppositions. Althusser (1970/1971) wrote that
an ideology always exists in an apparatus, and its practice
or practices. This existence is material (p. 166) and, further, the ideas of a human subject exist in his actions (p.
168). Foucault (1994/1997), too, took this position:
Thought, understood in this way, then, is not to be sought
only in theoretical formulations such as those of philosophy or
science; it can and must be analyzed in every manner of
speaking, doing, or behaving in which the individual appears
and acts as a knowing subject, as ethical or juridical subject, as
subject conscious of himself and others. In this sense thought is
understood as the very form of action. (pp. 200-201)
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St. Pierre
before we too casually use a concept like assemblage in an
interview study with human subjects, before we attempt any
kind of new empirical inquiry. The best advice may well be
to postpone the leap to application. As I noted earlier, I recommend studying the old empiricisms before we imagine
new empiricisms and/or new methodologies.
This article is my first attempt to do that, to take on the
empirical before imagining new methodologies for new
empirical work, though I suspect methodology as we know
it is unthinkable in the new empiricisms of this ontological
turn. I begin with a general discussion of empiricism and
then sketch, in turn, the empiricisms of logical empiricism
and phenomenology, which ground most empirical social
science research. I then briefly describe Deleuze and
Guattaris transcendental empiricism (see also, St. Pierre, in
press-b), which, I argue, does not align with existing social
science research methodologies including qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods methodologies. How we think
of being, of human being, and of inquiry in the new empiricisms of the ontological turn will be our challenge and will
probably require some forgetting of what weve learned,
what we think is true and real about empirical research, and
how to do it.
Empiricisms
Within epistemology, the branch of philosophy concerned
with the nature, source, and limits of knowledge, empiricism is usually defined against rationalism in a debate about
how dependent knowledge is on sense experience. The conventional view of empiricism holds that the contents of our
minds, our consciousness, and the source of knowledge of
real existence (existence independent of thought) must be
derived from and justified by sense-based observations of
experience. Primacy of sensation, then, the given, what is, is
the source of our ideas, of knowledge. In other words, we
cannot claim to know anything not given in our experiencespeculation about what might be cannot be a criterion of truth. In this way, empiricism is not only a theory of
knowledge but also a methodology.
Though the labels empiricism and rationalism did not
exist during the 16th and early 17th centuries, they have
since been used to differentiate between the work, during
that period, of Francis Bacon who has been called the father
of empiricism and of the scientific method and the work of
Descartes, who is typically described as a rationalist and the
father of modern philosophy. Having little reverence for the
past and believing classical ideas impeded progress, Bacon
was central is separating philosophy from theology and reason from faith, but he is generally thought of as a methodologist who insisted that any experimental method that
claims to produce knowledge must be carefully described
and that the systematic and proper use of method can guarantee valid knowledge. His methodology was grounded in
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argue that our knowledge often transcends what can be justified through observation of the external world; for example, we have a priori, innate concepts and ideas that come
from intuition and deduction that are not found in experience. Descartes believed we begin from first principles
known directly by reason or intuition (I think, therefore I
am.) and build knowledge from there. Descartes advised
that we doubt knowledge obtained by our senses because
such knowledge is always temporal, uncertain, and contingent. Here we see the mind/external world, Self/Other
dualisms at work. Likewise, a Platonic Form, which is
transcendentPlatos poisoned gift of transcendence
(Rajchman, 2001, p. 110)cannot be found in real existence, is pure, unchanging, perfect, eternal, and a product
of reason. Rationalism relies on epistemic foundationalism, the claim that ideas derived from pure reason require
no other justification, no justification through sense experience. The rationalist claim that our minds come with preexisting concepts and categories persists, for example, in
the analytic philosophy of Chomskyan linguistics, which
claims that the structure of language is biologically determined and so innate in the human mind.
The rationalist/empiricist debate in epistemology
extends to metaphysics where philosophers are concerned
with questions about first causes, being as such, and things
that do not change, for example, the nature of reality
questions that cannot be resolved by science. Metaphysics,
then, is broader and more fundamental than science. An
early focus of metaphysics was, for example, the existence
of non-physical entities like God. One of the basic questions of metaphysics is whether entities (anything real) are
only material (materialism) or are mental (idealism). Hume,
the British empiricist, is famous for dismissing metaphysics
because it deals with issues that cannot be warranted by scientific, empirical evidence. He wrote as follows:
If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school
metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any
abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does
it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of
fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: for it
contains nothing but sophistry and illusion. (Hume, 1748/1955,
p. 184)
Phenomenology
Much social science research, including humanist qualitative research, focuses on the phenomenology of lived experience, though some might agree with Rorty (1979) who
noted that phenomenology gradually became transformed
into what Husserl despairingly called mere anthropology
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(p. 167). Phenomenology, taken up in the social sciences,
could be considered an example of a complex philosophical
movement being reduced to a how to, methods-driven
empirical approach to knowledge production.
But phenomenology has a long history in which it moves
between the empiricist-rationalist poles. In general, phenomenology is the study of phenomena, things in themselves, essences, as they appear to us in our consciousness.
Some phenomenologists, like Husserl, focused on epistemological issues, while others, like Heidegger, focused on
ontological concerns.
I focus here on Husserl who refused the standards, methods, and foundations of the science of his day, which
explained the nature of reality and so bracketed or disconnected any a priori from his analysis and began phenomenology, which he called the science of the essence of
consciousness, with the pure consciousness of the individual person, the I, the Ego. He wrote as follows:
Consciousness in itself has a being of its own which in its
absolute uniqueness of nature remains unaffected by the
phenomenological disconnexion (Husserl, 1931/1952, p.
113). Pure consciousness, then, can be separated not only
from whatever might distract it mentally but also from natural reality. In Husserls pure phenomenology, the natural
world in its ordered being as a spatial present that reaches
rather in a fixed order of being into the limitless beyond
exists in a dimly apprehended depth or fringe of indeterminate reality (p. 102). This dim world of natural experience
is separate from pure human consciousness, but human consciousness, which has bracketed all that is a priori and
might interfere with the phenomenological gaze can pierce
it with rays from the illuminating focus of attention with
varying success (p. 102).
Husserl used the term intentionality to describe the consciousness of the individual directed toward something in
the world, the mental look (Husserl, 1931/1952, p. 117).
The title of the problem which in its scope covers phenomenology in its entirety is Intentionality. This indeed
expresses the fundamental property of consciousness
(p. 404). We are conscious of something in perception but
also in recollections and representations that remind us of
prior perceptions. In this way, Husserl attempted to disrupt
the Cartesian mind/body dualism by joining human consciousness to the objects that exist in the material world that
help us form experience.
In addition to intentionality, epoch or the suspension of
judgment is a key concept in phenomenological analysis.
The phenomenologist must bracket or suspend assumptions about what she thinks she sees, eliminating all mediating influences like language and culture, and instead see
what shows itself to her, what is given or self-evident in
experience. Husserl (1901/1970) made the case that there
is an a priori necessity of essence (p. 443), pure essences
that are self-evidently truenon-empirical, universal,
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act of knowledge (p. 475). Deleuze and Guattari
(1991/1994) together followed with the critique that phenomenology is grounded in the primordial lived (p. 150)
that supposedly exists before language, culture, and interpretation. Derrida (1993/1994), too, critiqued the phenomenological good sense of the thing itself, of the immediately
visible commodity, in flesh and blood: as what it is at first
sight (p. 150). And, of course, Sellars (1956/1997) is
famous for his critique of what he called the Myth of the
Given in traditional empiricism that claims that the perceptually given is the foundation of empirical knowledge
(p. 77) in an attempt to break out of discourse to an arch
beyond discourse (p. 117). The feminist scholar Scott
(1991) provided a powerful critique of basing knowledge
on experience, explaining, rather, that experience (common
sense, the given) is that which must be explained.
But conventional humanist qualitative methodology is
steeped in phenomenology when researchers base their
epistemological claims on lived experience, when they
insist on preserving the phenomenon exactly as described
by participants in careful word-for-word transcriptions of
interviews, when they let the data speak for itself and
refuse to theorize in analysis, and when their research
reports only describe, as if description is not an interpretation. Of course, lived experience matters, and how people
describe their lives matters, and there is something to be
said for trying to come to the world fresh, with as few preconceptions as possible.
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Another tenet of logical empiricism is incrementalism,
the idea that knowledge steadily accumulates and corrects
itself over time producing a secure, uniform foundation of
scientific truththus does science progress. From incrementalism comes the threat of a gap in knowledge, a
breach in its foundation that science must fill. We use logical empiricism when we ask students to identity a gap in the
literature their studies will address. Ironically, in the
Structure of Scientific Revolutionsthe last of the 19 volumes of the logical empiricists imposing Encyclopedia of
Unified Science, Kuhn (1962/1970) discredited incrementalismalong with logical empiricism itself and the idea of
unified science more broadlyexplaining that the persistent tendency to make the history of science look linear or
cumulative (p. 140) is problematic and mostly an effect of
textbooks that describe science in a narrative like the following: One by one, in a process often compared to the
addition of bricks to a building, scientists have added
another fact, concept, law, or theory to the body of information supplied in the contemporary science text (p. 140). In
other words, as the history of science is written and re-written, it ignores conflict and failure and inconsistency. What
was a scientific fact in the normal science of one paradigm
is no longer thinkable in another.
In logical empiricism, language, too, must be objective,
and scientists are expected to use exact, precise, scientific
language that unambiguously represents the empirical fact
observed (see Ayer, 1936). Haack (2007) described early
logical empiricisms understanding of language as follows:
There are only two kinds of meaningful statement: the analytic,
including the statements of logic and mathematics, and the
empirically verifiable, including the statements of empirical
science. Anything else is, cognitively speaking, nonsense, an
expression of emotion at best. Much of traditional philosophy
metaphysics, ethics, aestheticswas discarded, along with
theology, as meaningless verbiage or bad poetry. If philosophy
was not to be abandoned altogether, it had to be re-invented;
and so it was, as the logic of science. (p. 32)
In addition, logical empiricism relies heavily on the objectivity of the Cartesian cogito, rational procedure, sanctioned research practices, clarification of whatever appears
confused, and, importantly, the assumption that the human
is separate from and superior to the non-human. In logical
empiricism, the world exists separate from human beings
as an objective entity that can be known in its entirety.
Science can test theories using independent empirical evidence and can identify phenomenon through observation
and measurement and then describe them using unambiguous scientific language. Sensory experience, not speculation, is the basis for knowledge. At the beginning of his
critique of positivism, Habermas (1968/1971) wrote that,
though empiricism is classified as a form of epistemology,
logical positivism/logical empiricism separated itself from
epistemology:
Positivism marks the end of the theory of knowledge
[epistemology]. In its place emerges the philosophy of science
. . . Positivism is philosophical only insofar as it is necessary
for the immunization of the sciences against philosophy . . . [it]
stands and falls with the principle of scientism, that is that the
meaning of knowledge is defined by what the sciences do and
can thus be adequately explicated through the methodological
analysis of scientific procedures. (p. 67)
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data collection, they assume that data are somehow independent of them such that they can be collected, thus
adopting the human/non-human divide of logical empiricism. When they code data, they assume that words can
contain and close off meaning (essences) that can be identified and subsumed into categories, adopting logical empiricisms view of language. When they forego narrative and
description in their social science research reports and present data as one would in a natural science report, they emulate logical positivism.
It is ironic that qualitative methodology, which was
invented as an interpretive critique of logical empiricism,
should now be shot through with positivist concepts and
practices. It is especially troublesome that within one qualitative study, a researcher will mobilize the incompatible
approaches of both phenomenology and logical empiricism,
which, I believe, speaks to our failure to teach and study
empiricism. When philosophy is separated from science,
when inquiry is reduced to methodology and method to
technique, when one has determined how to proceed before
one begins, it is not surprising that the results are too often
inconsequential, low-level, impoverished findings that
have little explanatory power.
But the ideas described in both phenomenology and logical empiricism, with which we are so familiar, the ideas we
are taught in social science research methodology courses
and read in methodology textbooks, are not thinkable in the
image of thought Deleuze and Guattari called transcendental empiricism.
Transcendental Empiricism
Unlike the logical empiricists who rejected metaphysics
and scholars like Derrida who wanted to overthrow metaphysics, Smith (2012) explained that Deleuze said in an
interview, I consider myself to be a pure metaphysician
(p. 182). Deleuze wanted to rethink metaphysics entirely,
and he certainly rethought empiricism. The name of his
empiricismtranscendental empiricism or superior empiricism or radical empiricismdescribed in Difference and
Repetition (1968/1994) and The Logic of Sense (1969/1990)
can be misleading because it refers neither to transcendental
philosophies like those of Plato and Kant nor to the abstract
thought of classical empiricism. Plato argued that if we find
justice in the imperfect, temporal, empirical world of sensation, there must be a perfect, eternal, abstract form, Justice,
which gives justice its meaning. In this model, Justice is the
essence of all material, transient, imperfect instantiations of
justice. In his transcendental philosophy, Kant argued that
rather than assuming that objects conform to our own, to
human, cognitionthat human synthesis of the empirical
produces the worldwe could analyze a priori (transcendental) structures or categories of the mind (intuition) that
condition sense experience. Bryant (2009) wrote that for
Kant, the aim is both to discover all the conditions for all
possible experience and the limits of knowledge (p. 29).
The problem for Deleuze was that both Plato and Kant
traced the transcendental from the empirical; in other words,
the transcendental is in the image of, and in resemblance
to, that which it is supposed to ground (p. 31). Deleuze did
not believe this transcendental empirical doubling
(Rajchman, 2001, p. 17)this mimetic link, this repetition,
the copy theory of truth, the logic of representation
allowed the production of something different, something
new. For Deleuze, this transcendental was a closed system
and not transcendental enough (Bryant, 2008, p. 22).
Unlike Kant, Deleuze (1968/1994) was interested in the
conditions of real experience (p. 154) in all its peculiarities and in how specific phenomena are generated without
the human, without the synthesizing rationality of the
human subjects reliance on a priori categories or concepts
to identify/sense something in the worldthat is, the model
of recognition that grounds the logic of representation. It is
also a static model, which assumes that the conditions of
the thing resemble the thing (Bryant, 2009, p. 36). Deleuze
broke the link of resemblance in the law of representation
and posited genetic conditions that do not resemble what
they produce in order to enable something new to come
into existence.
For this reason, he is credited with the restoration of the
empiricalwith attending to the concrete richness of the
sensible (Deleuze & Parnet, 1977/1987, p. 54) as it exists
for-itself, not in relation to the human or to a priori categories. Bryant (2008) wrote that, in Deleuzes empiricism,
the conditions of experience are no broader than that which
they condition, they are unique to that which they condition.
Finally, it follows from this that they are conditions of real
rather than all possible experience, since they are no broader
than that which they condition. (p. 62)
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speeds, and intensities that come together like the toss of
the dice (Deleuze, 2006, p. 351), never to exist again. They
produce empirical events, what Stagoll (2010) called the
potential immanent within a particular confluence of forces
(p. 90). As Baugh (1992) explained,
This is an example of Deleuzes project to invent an experimentalism, which, instead of asking for conditions of possible experience, would look for the conditions under which
something new, as yet unthought, arises (Rajchman, 2001,
p. 17).
The focus shifts from identifying the characteristics of the
thing (what is this?) to its genetic conditions (how is this possible?) and from a closed system that relies on internal relations that establish resemblance and identity to an open system
of external relations that enable difference through chance and
unstable connections. Deleuze was interested in genetic conditions grounded in the conjunction and and external relations, connections that are unpredictable (anything could
connect to anything) rather than in the verb to be that
requires a stable internal relation to establish identitythis is
that (so another relation is not possible, for example, this cannot be that).
But how is it possible to imagine genetic, productive conditions of external relations that enable difference and the
possibility of the new? First, Deleuze rethought difference.
He did not accept the classical description of difference in
which difference is subordinated to the Same, the Similar,
to the Opposed or to the Analogous (Deleuze, 1968/1994,
p. xvi). He imagined a different difference, not difference
from something else (a negative relation between already
existing things), nor difference in relation to identity, nor difference subordinated to resemblanceall internal relationsbut pure difference (Deleuze, 1968/1994, p. xx),
difference in itself (p. xix), ontological Difference (p.
ix), difference without negation (p. xx), absolute difference (p. 9). This difference does not refer to transcendence
nor is it based on representational logic. It is difference that
has become independent of the negative and liberated from
the identical (Deleuze, 1968/1994, p. xx). This difference is
internal to every aspect of reality, what makes an entity particular or unique, given but new and different. In Deleuzes
transcendental empiricism, every moment, every individual, every event is absolutely new and singular: Being is different, that is, it is the inexhaustible creation of difference,
the constant production of the new, the incessant genesis of
the singular (Smith, 2012, p. 185).
It is through intensity, intensity in an encounter, a conjunction (Deleuze & Guattari, 1991/1994, p. 93) that thought
comes to us. Forces in the world overtake us in an encounter, and something in the world forces us to think
(Deleuze, 1968/1994, p. 139). Thought does not originate in
human recognition nor can an established method compel
us to think. The reason of the sensible, the condition of that
which appears, is not space and time but the Unequal in
itself, disparateness as it is determined and comprised in
difference of intensity, of intensity as difference (p. 223).
Where are pure difference and intensity as difference to
be found? For Deleuze (1969/1990), presubjective, prepersonal intensities exist on an immanent transcendental
field (p. 98) that is no longer of the form, but neither is it
that of the formless: it is rather of the unformed (p. 107)
but still determinable. Deleuze and Guattari (1980/1987)
make it very clear that in no sense, of course, is unformed
matter chaos of any kind (p. 56). Deleuze and Deleuze
with Guattari together called this field, variously, the plane
of immanence, plane of consistency, pure difference, body
without organs, abstract machine, and so on. Deleuze
(1983/1986) also called it the plane of matter (p. 61). In
What Is Philosophy?, Deleuze and Guattari (1991/1994)
described philosophy as the creation of concepts, like those
listed above, and the laying out of a plane (p. 36, emphasis added) that calls forth new concepts.
As already explained, unlike Descartes, they did not lay
out a plane that begins from the point of view of a subjective certainty (I think; therefore, I am). They asked, first,
does thought have to begin at all? Second, they asked, Can
thought as such be the verb of an I? (p. 27)does all begin
with the human? Instead of assuming there is a beginning, a
point of origin, Deleuze (1970/1988) wrote, one never
commences; one never has a tabula rasa; one slips in, enters
in the middle; one takes up or lays down rhythms (p. 123).
The plane of immanence, then, does not begin with the
necessity of human consciousness, human thought, or of
any necessity. Again, it is pre-individual, pre-consciousness, pre-conceptual, formless, depthlessbut not inert. It
is an extensive continuum of movement, forces, speeds, and
intensities of the virtual that has not yet become actual. For
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Deleuze, the virtual and actual are both real. Importantly,
this transcendental plane, the plane of immanence, is not
immanent to anything. If it were, it would reinstate the transcendent and the model of representation. The plane of
immanence has no outside. It is destratified, decoded,
absolutely deterritorialized matter (Bogue, 1989, p. 132)
everywhere present, everywhere first and primary, always
immanent (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 70). The
plane of immanence is prior to subjects and objects, prephilosophical, a-conceptualpure differencean absolute
immanent milieu from which differentiation occurs, providing the conditions under which something new is produced (Deleuze & Parnet, 1977/1987, p. vii).
The plane of immanence is constituted of nomadic singularities and thus of anti-generalities, which are however
impersonal and pre-individual, [and] must serve as our
hypothesis for the determination of this domain and its
genetic power [emphasis added] (Deleuze, 1969/1990, p.
99). Here, a singularity is opposed to a generality. The distributions and reshufflings of singularities (p. 175) or free
intensities (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987, p. 40) or spatiotemporal haecceities (p. 405) on this transcendental
field provide the genetic conditions for the individuation of
individuals. An individual is any entityconsciousness,
matter, a person, a concept, a time of day, a rose, weather, a
flock of sheep, a landscape. Deleuze avoided the problem of
tracing the transcendent from the empirical because singularities or potentials are nomadic movements that are contingent and unstable. In the topology of the flat plane of
immanence, a singularity is a point on its surface, an intensity that has the potential to actualize an entity. Each singularity is the source of a series extending in a determined
direction right up to the vicinity of another singularity
(Deleuze, 1969/1990, p. 53) and a world therefore is constituted on the condition that series converge (p. 110). The
movements of singularities, chance concatenations of
forces (Baugh, 1992, p. 140), are the genetic conditions of
the entity but bear no resemblance to what is individuated
and actualized because the conditions immediately disappear in movementthey cannot be replicated. The chance
movements of intensities by which actuality is produced
are, then, its genetic history, its difference.
Again, these genetic, empirical conditions, constellations of singularities, chance encounters of unformed matter of pure speeds and intensities at the limits of
deterritorialization, produce a particular actuality, the
thing itself, and then disappear. But we do not have two
separate ontological realmsa transcendental realm and
an empirical realm. The transcendental field is composed
of external relations of the unformed that are expressed in
empirical states of affairsall exist on the same plane of
immanence.
Once an entity is actualized, it is at risk of being captured
by strata, of being normalized, stratifiedbecoming
ordinary. Deleuze does not oppose the true and the false but
the singular and the ordinary.
The plane of consistency knows nothing of differences in level,
orders of magnitude, or distances. It knows nothing of the
distinction between contents and expressions, or that between
forms and formed substances; these things exist only by means
of and in relation to the strata. (Deleuze & Guattari, 1980/1987,
pp. 69-70)
Deleuzes and Deleuze with Guattaris topological ontology, their flat plane of existence, the plane of immanence
they laid out, called forth many concepts. Some we recognizerhizome, singularity, transcendental, eventbut their
meaning is different because they are used in a different ontological arrangement and in a different empiricism. Other
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concepts may be new or unfamiliarbody without organs,
abstract machine, lines of flight. Deleuze and Guattari did not
define concepts, and they often used concepts interchangeably, as illustrated by all the different concepts listed earlier
for plane of immanence. This practice is similar to Derridas
refusal to privilege a signifier into transcendencein his
case difference itselfby using a chain of words where each
may be substituted for the other, but not exactly: . . . trace,
difference, reserve, supplement, dissemination, hymen,
greffe, pharmakon, pareregon (Spivak, 1974, p. lxx).
Furthermore, a concept that appears primary in one text, like
sense in The Logic of Sense (Deleuze, 1969/1990), mostly
disappears from later work.
But it is important to remember that Deleuzes and
Deleuze with Guattaris concepts should not be used casually because each brings with it the entire system of thought
in which it is thinkable. In other words, concepts enabled by
one plane will not work on a different plane. For example,
using rhizome, a concept from transcendental empiricism,
to code data, a conceptual practice of logical empiricism,
just doesnt work and, I believe, indicates epistemological
and empirical confusion, even incommensurability.
Likewise, trying to identify parts that make up an assemblage would indicate a misunderstanding of that concept.
Most importantly, transcendental empiricism is a radical empiricism because it is not an epistemological project.
As Hein (2015) explained, it is the experience of the plane
of immanence (p. 7). Again, classical empiricism is an
epistemology that claims that sensation, the given, is the
origin of ideas and that knowledge is built up through our
impressions of the sensory world. But, as Baugh (1992)
explained, if the empirical is pure actuality, the pure here
and now that falls outside of the concept and outside of the
Idea [outside the given], then it is without content from the
standpoint of conceptual knowledge (p. 135). In fact,
Deleuze seldom used the word epistemology in his work.
So it would not make sense for a researcher to begin (as
if one begins) a study using transcendental empiricism with
the aim of producing new knowledge that will fill a gap in
existing knowledge. That would be the aim of logical
empiricism. Nor would one design (are research designs
thinkable?) a transcendental empirical study whose aim is
to study things in themselves, the given, as they appear to us
in and are conditioned by our consciousness. That would be
the aim of phenomenology. It seems to me that our conventional social science research methodologies do not encourage the kind of experimentation Deleuze and Deleuze with
Guattari recommended. Unfortunately, it is typical for
social science researchers to reduce the complexity of a
study to fit existing categories of a pre-existing, systematic,
legitimate research process. One cannot experiment as long
as one is tried to a dogmatic image of thought (Deleuze,
1962/1983, p. 103) that supports the view that thought
needs a method, an artifice which enables the thinker to
122
in the human subject of humanism, and conventional
humanist social science research is not at all clear. It is difficult to imagine how the normalized concepts and conceptual practices of humanist research methodologies can be
thought together with Deleuzian concepts premised on preindividual, impersonal, pre-conscious, formless, virtual
forces and intensities. The idea that one can design a study
using Deleuzian concepts appears nonsensical. Typical
social science research methods and practices (e.g., experiment, interview, observation) are also dependent on the
humanist subject, not the Deleuzian subject whose goal is to
become imperceptible. Typical social science research concepts (e.g., data, research design, data analysis, measurement, researcher) are also grounded in the humanist subject.
In Deleuzian empiricism, such normalized concepts and
practices condition a study in advance and tie it to the strata.
In transcendental empiricism, concepts and practices are
invented in encounters of events in the context of the problem whose conditions they determine (Deleuze, 1969/1990,
p. 54) and so cannot be determined in advance.
It seems to me that transcendental empiricism insists we
study Deleuzes and Deleuze with Guattaris philosophy,
demands that we read and read and read until its concepts
overtake us and help us lay out a plane that enables lines of
flight to what we have not yet been able to think and live.
How we do this different kind of inquiry is not at all clear,
but I doubt it resembles conventional social science
research. I expect it looks more like philosophy.
It also seems to me that those of us who have been welltrained as social science researchers using the empiricisms
of phenomenology and of logical empiricism will have to
try to forget our training. No doubt, that will be difficult
initially. But here I am reminded of Foucaults (as cited in
Racevskis, 1987) comment that we need to free thought
from what it thinks silently and to allow it to think otherwise (p. 22). Rather than relying on thought already
thought or on method already determined, we might follow
Deleuze (1968/1994) and trust that something in the world
forces us to think (p. 139) and that such an encounter might
bring into being that which does not yet exist (there is no
other work, all the rest is arbitrary, mere decoration) (p.
147). The assumptions and milieu of this image of thought
might enable the new that is everywhere, immanent but
not yet actualized.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with
respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this
article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
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Author Biography
Elizabeth A. St. Pierre is Professor of Critical Studies in the
Educational Theory and Practice Department and Affiliated
Professor of both the Interdisciplinary Qualitative Research Program
and the Institute of Womens Studies at the University of Georgia.
Her work focuses on theories of language and the subject from critical and poststructural theories in what she has called post qualitative
inquirywhat might come after conventional humanist qualitative
research methodology. Shes especially interested in the new empiricisms and new materialisms enabled by the ontological turn.