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RULINGS/PRINCIPLES

RULE 113: ARREST


Posadas v. CA, 188 SCRA 288 (1990): Where the
accused acted suspiciously and attempted to flee upon
being approached by police officers, there was probable
cause to conduct a stop and frisk on the accused. Stop
and frisk doctrine: A police officer may in appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a
person for the purpose of investigating possible criminal
behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an
arrest. The officer may stop the suspicious individual
briefly in order to determine his identity or maintain the
status quo while obtaining more information.

People v. Salangga, 234 SCRA 407 (1994): Where the


accused was arrested without a warrant while he was at
home attending to some domestic chores, he is not in any
way committing a crime or attempting to commit one.
Absent personal knowledge on the part of the arresting
officer or a showing that he was a fugitive from the law,
his arrest was illegal, and any evidence obtain on occasion
of such arrest is inadmissible.

People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 (1986): For warrantless


arrests, it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed a
crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been
committed first. The fact of the commission of the
offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground
applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.
Furthermore the arresting officer must have personal
knowledge of these facts.
People v. Doria:
1. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante
delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the
police are not only authorized but duty-bound to
arrest him even without a warrant.
2. There is no rule of law which requires that in "buybust" operations there must be a simultaneous
exchange of the marked money and the prohibited
drug between the poseur-buyer and the pusher.
Again, the decisive fact is that the poseur-buyer
received the marijuana from the accused-appellant.
3. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in
the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be
arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
create the probable cause of guilt of the person to
be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must
be founded on probable cause, coupled with good

faith on the part of the peace officers making the


arrest.
4. It is clear that an object is in plain view if the
object itself is plainly exposed to sight.
The
difficulty arises when the object is inside a closed
container. Where the object seized was inside a
closed package, the object itself is not in plain view
and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant.
However, if the package proclaims its contents,
whether by its distinctive configuration, its
transparency, or if its contents are obvious to an
observer, then the contents are in plain view and
may be seized.
People v. Sucro: An offense is committed in the presence
or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the
rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the
officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears
the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to
the scene thereof. Thus, there is probable cause when
Macabante run and throw away the marijuana.

Go v. CA: The arrest of the accused without warrant six


days after the shooting incident was illegal.
People v. Cendana: The information given one day after
the killing is not personal knowledge. Accused-appellant was
arrested one day after the killing of the victim and only on
the basis of information obtained by the police officers

from
unnamed
sources.
These
abovementioned
circumstances clearly belie a lawful warrantless arrest.
Considering that the arrest of accused-appellant
herein was unlawful, any search conducted on his person or
place of arrest which is an incident thereof, was also
unlawful. Perforce, any evidence recovered during the
unlawful search, being made without a warrant, becomes
inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant and the
shotgun which was allegedly the fatal weapon cannot be
presented against him.
People v. Gerente: Where the police officer has seen the
dead body, and there was a witness who testified that he
saw the killing incident and they proceeded to the scene of
the crime, and the witness accompanied the police to the
residence of the accused person, such officer has probable
cause based on the knowledge of facts and circumstance
which would validate the warrantless arrest. Since there
was a valid warrantless arrest, the defendant may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be
used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a
search warrant.
People v. Acol: Where the police team was formed and
dispatched to look for the persons responsible for the
crime on account of the information related by Percival Tan
and Rene Araneta that they had just been robbed, Section
5(b) of Rule 113 is applicable. Thus, accused-appellant's
arrest was lawful, it follows that the search made
incidental thereto was valid.

Where two passengers who were apprehended after they


supposedly staged a hold-up inside a passenger jeepney on
September 29, 1990 were haled to court, not for the
felonious asportation, but for possession of the two
unlicensed firearms and bullets recovered from them which
were instrumental in the commission of the robo.
Padilla v. CA: Where petitioner's vehicle figured in a hit
and run - an offense committed in the "presence" of
Manarang, a private person, who then sought to arrest
petitioner, it must be stressed at this point that
"presence" does not only require that the arresting person
sees the offense, but also when he "hears the disturbance
created thereby AND proceeds at once to the scene. As
testified to by Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires
followed by a thud, saw the sideswiped victim (balut
vendor), reported the incident to the police and thereafter
gave chase to the erring Pajero vehicle using his
motorcycle in order to apprehend its driver. After having
sent a radio report to the PNP for assistance, Manarang
proceeded to the Abacan bridge where he found
responding policemen SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda
already positioned near the bridge who effected the actual
arrest of petitioner. The arrest was in flagranti delicto.

Mallari v. CA: The Rule allow a police officer to effect


arrest without a warrant in his possession at the time of
the arrest. The officer need not have the warrant in his
possession at the time of the arrest but after the arrest,
if the person so arrested requires, the warrant shall be
shown to him as soon as practicable. Thus, when a warrant
of arrest was issued by the court, it cannot be converted
into a warrantless arrest when the police officer was not in
possession of the warrant. Hence, if there is a search
incident thereto, the search and seizure made incident
thereto would be valid, although conducted without a
warrant.

Samulde v. Salvani: It is not obligatory, but merely


discretionary, upon the investigating judge to issue a
warrant for the arrest of the accused, even after having
personally examined the complainant and his witnesses in
the form of searching questions and answer, for the
determination of whether it is necessary to arrest the
accused in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, is
left to his sound discretion.
Sanchez v. Demetriou: The warrantless arrest was illegal,
because the police officers who arrested him were not
present when he allegedly participated in the rape and
killing. They had no personal knowledge of the alleged
criminal liability of Mayor Sanchez but merely relied on the
sworn statements of two witnesses. Since he was arrested
46 days after the commission of the crimes in question, it

could not be said that he had just committed a crime at


the time of the arrest.

Umil v. Ramos: The grounds of suspicion is reasonable


when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on
actual facts, or supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt
of the person to be arrested.

RULE 126: SEARCH WARRANT


Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff, AFP, 133 SCRA 800
(1984):
1. Prerequisite to impugning the validity of a search
warrant before the appellate courts is a motion to
quash the warrant with the issuing court.
2. Even properties not belonging to the person against
whom the warrant is issued may be seized pursuant
to the search warrant, as long as it was under his
control or possession. Ownership is immaterial.
3. Where a search warrant applied for against a
newspaper for publication of subversive materials,
the application and affidavits must specify the
alleged subversive materials publish or intended to

be published, otherwise it is a general warrant that


is void.
4. The affiant must have personal knowledge.

Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967):


1. Legality of a seizure against a corporation can be
questioned only by corporation itself.
2. The warrant must allege a specific offense. No
specific offense was alleged in the applications;
hence it was impossible to determine probable
cause.
3. Furthermore, the warrant did not describe with
particularity the things to be seized. The warrants
authorized the search for and seizure of records
pertaining to all business transactions, regardless of
whether the transactions were legal or illegal.
Articles seized under a void warrant are absolutely
inadmissible.
People v. Musa, 217 SCRA 597: While warrantless
search and seizure is justified as incident to a lawful
arrest, this warrantless search and seizure cannot extend
beyond the premises or surrounding under the immediate
control of the person arrested. Objects, however, in the
plain view of a searching officer who has the right to be
in the position to have view are subject to seizure and may
be presented as evidence. To be subject to a lawful seizure
under the plain view doctrine, it must immediately
apparent to the police that the items they observe may be

evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to


seizure.

search and seizure without a search warrant in the


enforcement of customs laws.

Asian Surety & Insurance Co. Inc., v. Herrera:


1. Under Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of
Court, no search warrant shall for more than one
specific offense. In the case at bar, the search
warrant was issued for four separate and distinct
offenses of: (1) estafa, (2) falsification, (3) tax
evasion and (4) insurance fraud.
2. The search warrant was a general warrants for it
violates the constitutional mandate requiring
particular description of the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized. In the case
at bar, the search warrant herein involved reads in
part: "property (Subject of the offense, stolen or
embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense
used or intended to be used as the means of
committing the offense) should be seized and
brought to the undersigned.
3. The search warrant violated the specific injunctions
of Section 8 of Rule 126 where the search warrant
in question left blank the "time" for making search.

People v. Aruta: There is no valid warrantless arrest. The


accused cannot be said to be committing a crime, she was
merely crossing the street and was not acting suspiciously
for the Narcom agents to conclude that she was
committing a crime. There was no legal basis to effect a
warrantless arrest of the accuseds bag, there was no
probable cause and the accused was not lawfully arrested.
Where a search is first undertaken, and an arrest
effected based on evidence produced by the search, both
such search and arrest would be unlawful, for being
contrary to law.

People v. Mago: Except in the case of the search of a


dwelling house, persons exercising police authority under
the customs law and having a probable cause may effect

The police had more than 24 hours to procure a search


warrant and they did not do so. The seized marijuana was
illegal and inadmissible evidence.

People v. Amminudin: The evidence of probable cause


should be determined by a judge and not by lawenforcement agents. There was no warrant of arrest or
search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination by him of the existence of probable cause.
Contrary to the averments of the government, the
accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante delicto nor
was a crime about to be committed or had just been

committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under


Rule 113.

constitutional mandate requiring particular description of


the things to be seized.

People v. Maqueda: Once a criminal complaint or


information is filed in court and the accused is thereafter
arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest, he must be
delivered to the nearest police station or jail and the
arresting officer must make a return of the warrant to the
issuing judge, and since the court has already acquired
jurisdiction over his person, it would be improper for any
public officer or law enforcement agency to investigate
him in connection with the commission of the offense for
which he is charged. If, nevertheless, he is subjected to
such' investigation, then Section 12(1), Article III of the
Constitution and the jurisprudence thereon must be
faithfully complied with.

Prudente v. Dayrit: The "probable cause" for a valid


search warrant, has been defined "as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and that objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched." This
probable cause must be shown to be within the personal
knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may
produce and not based on mere hearsay.
The failure of the search warrant to mention the
particular provision of PD No. 1866 that was violated is not
of such a gravity as to call for its invalidation on this score.
Besides, while illegal possession of firearms is penalized
under Section 1 of PD No. 1866 and illegal possession of
explosives is penalized under Section 3 thereof, it cannot
be overlooked that said decree is a codification of the
various laws on illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions
and explosives; such illegal possession of items destructive
of life and property are related offenses or belong to the
same species, as to be subsumed within the category of
illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No. 1866.

The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel


and to be informed thereof under Section 12(1), Article
III of the Constitution are not confined to that period
prior to the filing of a criminal complaint or information
but are available at that stage when a person is "under
investigation for the commission of an offense."
Nolasco v. Cruz-Pano: There is absent a definite guideline
to the searching team as to what items might be lawfully
seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion
regarding what articles they should seize. It is thus in the
nature of a general warrant and infringes on the

People v. Salanguit: The fact that there was no probable


cause to support the application for the seizure of drug
paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the

search warrant is void. This fact would be material only if


drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the police. The
fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant
issued. If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void only
insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug paraphernalia,
but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine
hydrochloride as to which evidence was presented showing
probable cause as to its existence.
The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law
that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are
subsumed into "prohibited" and "regulated" drugs and
defines and penalizes categories of offenses which are
closely related or which belong to the same class or
species. Accordingly, one (1) search warrant may thus be
validly issued for the said violations of the Dangerous
Drugs Act.
For the plain view doctrine to apply, there must be:
(a) prior justification; (b) inadvertent discovery of the
evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality of the
evidence before the police. The question is whether these
requisites were complied with by the authorities in seizing
the marijuana in this case.
Once the valid portion of the search warrant has
been executed, the "plain view doctrine" can no longer
provide any basis for admitting the other items
subsequently found.
Jurisprudence allows the seizure of personalty
despite absence of warrant under plain view doctrine, so
long as the area of search is within the immediate control

of the arrested person and that the object of the search


was open to the eye.

RULE 112: PRELIMINARY


INVESTIGATION
Rodis, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, 166 SCRA 618 (1988)
Lack of preliminary investigation is not a ground for a MtQ.
The remedy is to ask for a preliminary investigation. If the
lack of preliminary investigation is raised before
arraignment, the court should order the investigation be
conducted. If such absence was raised only after
arraignment, the remedy is to hold the criminal
proceedings in abeyance pending the resolution of a
petition for reinvestigation. The participation of the
accused is not indispensable in the preliminary
investigation.
Escolin: At the time this case was promulgated, the RTC
and Sandiganbayan had authority to conduct a preliminary
investigation once the case reaches their dockets.
Paderanga v. Drilon, 196 SCRA 86 (1991) Absence of a
preliminary investigation does not go to the jurisdiction of
the court but merely to the regularity of the proceedings.
It could even be waived. These are matters to be inquired
into by the trial court, not an appellate court. The accused

in a preliminary investigation has no right to cross-examine


the witnesses which the complainant may present.

not be ordered arrested in order to appear at the


preliminary investigation.

Paredes v. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 464 (1991)


Absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the
jurisdiction of the criminal court or the validity of the
information. The remedy is to ask for the conduct of a
preliminary investigation of the case. The court should
suspend the trial and order the prosecutor to conduct the
preliminary investigation.

People v. Montesa, 248 SCRA (1995) No complaint or


information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating
fiscal without the prior written authority or approval of
the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor. A
MtD filed by the investigating fiscal without such approval
is without force and effect. A judge can not dismiss a
criminal case on the basis of such MtD. The findings and
conclusion of the Provincial Prosecutor is the final
disposition on the reinvestigation, is the sole and only valid
basis for the respondent Judge's final action with respect
to the reinvestigation.

People v. Yutila, 102 SCRA 264 (1981) Lack of


preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the
proceedings. It does not affect the jurisdiction of the
court over the case. Furthermore, a plea of not guilty is a
waiver of the objection to the lack of preliminary
investigation. Objection to denial of the accuseds right to
preliminary investigation can not be raised for the first
time on appeal.
Escolin: Under the new rules, accused can ask for
preliminary investigation even after filing a bail bond.
de Leon: But a plea in the arraignment is still a waiver of
the right to preliminary investigation. After arraignment,
the remedy of the accused is to petition the DoJ for a
reinvestigation. Pending the resolution of such petition, the
trial court should hold the trial in abeyance.
Alisanco v. Tagbiligran, Jr., 224 SCRA 1 (1993) Right
to preliminary investigation may be waived. Accused may

Pilapil v. Sandiganbayan, 221 SCRA 349 (1993) An


information may be filed charging a crime different from
that denominated in the preliminary investigation.
Furthermore, absence of a preliminary investigation is not
a ground to quash a complaint or information. Objections on
the ground of absence of preliminary investigation is even
waivable.
Samulde v. Salvani, Jr., 165 SCRA 734 (1988) An
investigating judge is not required to issue an arrest
warrant after a finding of probable cause. 3 conditions
must exist before an arrest warrant may be issued by the
investigating judge: 1) the investigating judge must have
examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his
witnesses by searching questions and answers, 2) he must
be satisfied that a probable cause exists, and 3) there is a

need to place the respondent immediately in custody in


order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Even after a
finding of probable cause, the investigating judge has
discretion whether to issue the arrest warrant. The
remedy of the prosecutor is to immediately file an
information so the RTC judge may issue the arrest
warrant.
de Leon: But note that a finding of probable cause by a
RTC judge always results in the issuance of an arrest
warrant.
People v. CA, 242 SCRA 645 (1995) modified by the
rules; The 5-day period after the filing of an information in
which the accused, who was arrested without a warrant,
may ask for preliminary investigation is mandatory.
Furthermore, filing of bail bond is a waiver of the right to
preliminary investigation.
Escolin: Under the new rules, filing for bail is not a waiver
of the right to preliminary investigation.
de Leon: But the 5-day period to ask for a preliminary
investigation still applies (Rule 112, Sec. 7, last par.)

RULE 114: BAIL


Feliciano v. Pasicolan, 2 SCRA 888 (1961): Though it is
not necessary that a person applying for bail wait until an
information is filed against him, he should be in the
custody of law or otherwise deprived of liberty. Only
persons who have been either arrested, detained or
otherwise deprived of their liberty can apply for bail. Bail
can not be applied for by the wife of an accused, more so if
the accused is in hiding.
Dinapol v. Baldado, 225 SCRA 110 (1993): Only those
persons who have been either arrested, detained or
otherwise deprived of their liberty has the right to bail.
No petition for bail can be validly entertained for as long
as the applicant is NOT in the custody of the law. Since
the accused were not yet arrested, and did not voluntarily
submit to the jurisdiction of the trial court, they had no
standing in court to file a motion for bail. Nor did the
court have any business setting the same for hearing. The
prosecution can not be required to prove that its evidence
of the applicants guilt is strong if the court has not yet
acquired jurisdiction over the applicant.
Concerned Citizens v. Judge Elma, 241 SCRA 84 (1995)
Where bail is not a matter of right, a petition for bail
should be set for hearing before it is granted. At the
hearing, the court should assure that the prosecution is
afforded the opportunity to adduce evidence relevant to
the factual issue, with the applicant having the right of

cross-examination and to introduce his own evidence in


rebuttal.
Tucay v. Domagas, 242 SCRA 110 (1995) Even where
there is no objection to the grant of bail, the court should
still set a hearing for the petition for bail to take into
account the guidelines in fixing the amount of the bail.
de Leon: Does this mean the court must order a hearing for
a petition for bail even if bail is a matter of right?

People v. Carlos (19) The offended party has standing to


question the grant of the bail even if the accused was
charged with a capital offense.
Marcos v. Ruiz, 213 SCRA 177 (1992) Absence of the
accused at a stage when his presence is not required is not
a ground to forfeit the bond. The accused is required to
appear only in 3 instances
1.
arraignment (Rule 116, Sec. 1 [b])
2.
promulgation of judgment, unless promulgation
allowed in absentia (in case of light offense) (Rule 120, Sec.
6)
3.
identification by witnesses of the prosecution (Rule
115, Sec. 1 [c])

Almeda v. Villaluz, 66 SCRA 38: While the amount fixed


for bail may be reasonable if considered in terms of surety
or property bonds, it may be excessive if demanded in the
form of cash. A surety or property bond does not require
an actual financial outlay on the part of the bondsman or
the property owner, and in the case of the bondsman the
bond may be obtained by the accused upon the payment of
a relatively small premium. Only the reputation or credit
standing of the bondsman or the expectancy of the price
at which the property can be sold, is placed in the hands of
the court to guarantee the production of the body of the
accused at the various proceedings leading to his conviction
or acquittal. Upon the other hand, the posting of a cash
bond would entail a transfer of assets into the possession
of the court, and its procurement could work untold
hardship on the part of the accused as to have the effect
of altogether denying him his constitutional right to bail.
The option to deposit cash in lieu of a surety bond
primarily belongs to the accused, as may be clearly
deduced from Section 14 of Rule 114.

The additional allegations of habitual delinquency and


recidivism do not have the effect of charging another
offense different or distinct from the charge of qualified
theft (of a motor vehicle) contained in the information.

Neither do they tend to correct any defect in the


jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-matter of
the case. The said new allegations relate only to the range
of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of
conviction. They do not alter the prosecution's theory of
the case nor possibly prejudice the form of defense the
accused has or will assume.

Tijing v. Court of Appeals, 354 SCRA 17: The DNA


evidence should be admitted. It is not in violation of the
constitutional right against self-incrimination or his right
of privacy and personal integrity. The right against selfincrimination is applicable only to testimonial evidence.
Extracting a blood sample and cutting a hair strand from
the hair of the accused are purely mechanical acts that do
not involve his discretion nor require his intelligence.

Crespo v. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462: The rule therefore in


this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is
filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or
the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains
the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal
cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot
impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best
and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case

filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who


has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not
matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of
the accused or that the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of
Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.
The Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable,
refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal
from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or
information has already been filed in Court. The matter
should be left entirely for the determination of the Court.

People of the Philippines vs. Arnold Martinez y Angeles,


et al: a warrantless arrest based solely on an informers
tips is insufficient to support probable cause to effect a
warrantless arrest since the instant case did not involve a
buy-bust operation or drugs in transit. The apprehending
officers should have first conducted a surveillance
considering that the identity and address of one of the
accused were already ascertained. After conducting the
surveillance and determining the existence of probable
cause, then a search warrant should have been secured
prior to effecting arrest and seizure.

Romer Sy Tan vs. Sy Tiongs, et al: A search warrant


may be issued only if there is probable cause in connection
with only one specific offense alleged in an application on

the basis of the applicants personal knowledge and his or


her witnesses. Accordingly, petitioner cannot, therefore,
utilize the evidence seized by virtue of the search
warrants issued in connection with the case of Robbery in a
separate case of Qualified Theft, even if both cases
emanated from the same incident.

People of the Philippines vs. Ricky Alfredo y Norman:


The fact that the trial judge who rendered judgment was
not the one who had the occasion to observe the demeanor
of the witnesses during trial, but merely relied on the
records of the case, does not render the judgment
erroneous, especially where the evidence on record is
sufficient to support its conclusion.

Ernesto Marcelo, Jr. and Lauro Llames vs. Rafael R.


Villordon, Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City:
The matter of deciding who to prosecute is a prerogative
of the prosecutor. the remedy of mandamus, as an
extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an officer to
perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.
Mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of
discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon
him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any
manner in which he is required to act, because it is his

judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.


The only time the discretion of the prosecutor will stand
review by mandamus is when the prosecutor gravely abuses
his discretion. (citing Hipos v. Judge Bay)

Benjamin Jesalva vs. People of the Philippines: Custodial


investigation refers to any questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way. This presupposes that he is suspected
of having committed a crime and that the investigator is
trying to elicit information or a confession from him. The
rule begins to operate at once, as soon as the investigation
ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime, and
direction is aimed upon a particular suspect who has been
taken into custody and to whom the police would then
direct interrogatory questions which tend to elicit
incriminating statements.
People of the Philippines vs. Nelida Dequina, Joselito
Jundoc and Nora Jingabo: Settled is the rule that no
arrest, search or seizure can be made without a valid
warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. The
Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. It further decrees
that any evidence obtained in violation of said right shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Nevertheless, the constitutional proscription against
warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain legal

and judicial exceptions, as follows: (1) warrantless search


incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3)
search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless
search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7)
exigent and emergency circumstances.

George Miller v. Secretary Hernando B. Perez: To


determine the existence of probable cause, there is need
to conduct preliminary investigation. Its purpose is to
determine whether (a) a crime has been committed; and (b)
whether there is a probable cause to believe that the
accused is guilty thereof.
It is well-settled that the determination of probable cause
for the purpose of filing an information in court is an
executive function which pertains at the first instance to
the public prosecutor and then to the Secretary of
Justice. The Secretary of Justice may reverse or modify
the resolution of the prosecutor, after which he shall
direct the prosecutor concerned either to file the
corresponding information without conducting another
preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for
dismissal of the complaint or information with notice to the
parties.

Joseph C. Cerezo v. People of the Philippines: Wellentrenched is the rule that once a case is filed with the
court, any disposition of it rests on the sound discretion of
the court. In thus resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to
withdraw an Information, the trial court should not rely
solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor
or the Secretary of Justice. It is the courts bounden
duty to assess independently the merits of the motion, and
this assessment must be embodied in a written order
disposing of the motion. While the recommendation of the
prosecutor or the ruling of the Secretary of Justice is
persuasive, it is not binding on courts.

People of the Philippines vs. Bingky Campos: Well-settled


is the rule in criminal cases that the prosecution has the
burden of proof to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. However, once the accused
admits the commission of the offense charged but raises a
justifying circumstance as a defense, the burden of proof
is shifted to him. He cannot rely on the weakness of the
evidence for the prosecution for even if it is weak, it
cannot be doubted especially after he himself has
admitted the killing. This is because a judicial confession
constitutes evidence of a high order.

Crisostomo Villarin and Aniano Latayada v. People of the


Philippines: The absence of a proper preliminary
investigation must be timely raised and must not have been

waived. This is to allow the trial court to hold the case in


abeyance and require the prosecutor to hold a
reinvestigation, which, necessarily involves a reexamination and re-evaluation of the evidence already
submitted by the complainant and the accused, as well as
the initial finding of probable cause which led to the filing
of the Information after the requisite preliminary
investigation.

People of the Philippines v. Edgardo Fermin y Gregorio


and Job Madayag Jr. y Balderas: In all criminal
prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charged laid
unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. The
burden lies on the prosecution to overcome such
presumption of innocence by presenting the quantum of
evidence required. To repeat, the prosecution must rest on
its own merits and must not rely on the weakness of the
defense. And if the prosecution fails to meet the required
amount of evidence, the defense may logically not even
present evidence on its own behalf. In which case, the
presumption prevails and the accused should necessarily be
acquitted.

People of the Philippines v. Jhon-Jhon Alejandro y Dela


Cruz: The evidentiary presumption that official duties
have been regularly performed is not conclusive and cannot,
by itself, overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence. The presumption of regularity, it must be

emphasized, obtains only when there is no deviation from


the regular performance of duty. Where the official act in
question is irregular on its face, no presumption of
regularity can arise.

Erdito Quarto v. The Hon. Ombudsman Simeon Marcelo:


Mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the Ombudsman
the performance of a ministerial duty imposed by law. The
remedy of mandamus lies since he is duty-bound, as a rule,
to include in the information all persons who appear
responsible for the offense involved.

US v. Tan Teng: The prohibition of compelling a man in a


criminal court to be a witness against himself is a
prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to
extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his
body as evidence it may be material.

RULE 115: RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED


Beltran v. Samson, 53 Phil 570 (1929): The
constitutional right against selfincrimination is directed
not merely to giving of oral testimony, but embraces as well

the furnishing of evidence by other means than by word of


mouth, the divulging, in short, of any fact which the
accused has a right to hold secret. Writing is something
more than moving the body, or the hand, or the fingers;
writing is not a purely mechanical and attention. The
witness is being compelled to write and create, by means of
the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and
which may identify him as the falsifier.

People v. Presiding Judge, 125 SCRA 269 (1983): The


1973 Constitution permits trial in absentia even of capital
offenses, provided that after arraignment he may be
compelled to appear for the purpose of identification by
the witnesses of the prosecution, or provided he
unqualifiedly admits in open court after his arraignment
that he is the person named as the defendant in the case
on trial.

People v. Crisologo, 150 SCRA 653 (1987): Where the


accused was a deaf-mute and was not supplied with an
adequate interpreter, his conviction should be overturned.

Borja v. Mendoza, 77 SCRA 422 (1977): The


indispensable requisite for trial in absentia is that it should
come "after arraignment." Arraignment is the means of
bringing the accused in court. Failure to arraign is violative
of the due process of law clause and the right to be
informed of the nature of the accusation against him.

Tubb v. People, 101 Phil 114 (1957): Where the accused


was charged with estafa through misappropriating property
held by him in trust, but was convicted of estafa by
swindling by means of false pretenses, his constitutional
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him was violated. The two crimes are
entirely different and distinct. Some elements of the
crime he was convicted (false pretenses or fraudulent
acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the
commission of the fraud) was not alleged in the
information.
Cabal v. Kapunan: The accused cannot be compelled to
take the witness stand by an order of the court.

Even the most intelligent person may not have the skill in
law, especially the rules of procedure, hence, the accused
may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he
may not know how to establish his innocence.
People v. Salas, 143 SCRA 163 (1986): The 1973
Constitution now allows trial in absentia. The prisoner
cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued prosecution
and possibly eventual conviction provided only that: a) he
has been arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of the
trial; and c) his failure to appear is unjustified. Escape is a
waiver of the notice and constitutes unjustified failure to
appear at the trial. Trial will continue even in his absence
and most likely result in his conviction. The right to be

present at one's trial may now be waived except only at


that stage where the prosecution intends to present
witnesses who will identify the accused. The defendant's
escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the
inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent
hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his trial.
Gimenez v. Nazareno, 160 SCRA 1 (1988): Where one
of the co-accused escapes after arraignment, trial by
absentia should ensue. Upon the termination of a trial in
absentia, the court has the duty to rule upon the evidence
presented in court. The court need not wait for the time
for the escapee to decide to appear in court to present his
evidence and cross-examine the witnesses against him. By
his failure to appear during the trial of which he had
notice, an escapee waives his rights to cross-examine and
to present evidence on his behalf.
Trial in absentia is not violative of the accuseds
right to due process because it does not mean that the
judgment will result in conviction. The judgment will still
based on the evidence presented as the prosecution is still
bound to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. The accused was given the opportunity to be heard
but fails to do so.
Escolin: When accused waives his right to be present at
trial, he not only waives his right to adduce evidence on his
behalf, but also to confront witnesses against him.
People v. Santos, 221 SCRA 715 (1993): It is the
witness who is investigated or interrogated in the course

of a police line-up and who gives a statement to the police,


rather than the accused, who is not questioned at all at
that stage. Furthermore, there is nothing in the record of
this case which shows that in the course of the line-up, the
police investigators sought to extract any admission or
confession from appellant Santos. The investigators did not
in fact interrogate appellant Santos during the line-up and
he remained silent after he had been identified.
People v. Liquen, 212 SCRA 288 (1992): Entrapment is
not a bar to prosecution and conviction. Accused having
been caught in flagrante in the buy-bust operation, the
police was not only authorized but also obligated to arrest
him even without a warrant. The warrantless search
incident to that arrest is valid and the marked money and
drugs seized is admissible.
People v. Pizarro, 131 SCRA 624 (1984): Under the 1973
Constitution, a person under investigation shall have the
right to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of
such right. Confessions obtained in violation of these
constitutional rights are deemed null and void and
expressly declared to be inadmissible in evidence.
Considering that prior to the interrogation, accused was
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any
statement he does make may be used as evidence against
him and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney,
either retained or appointed, the admissibility of the
confession is beyond question because appellant had waived
them voluntarily and knowingly.

People v. Hernandez, 162 SCRA 422 (1988): 1987


Constitution now requires that the right to counsel during
custodial investigation should be waived in the presence of
counsel.
People v. Luvendino, 211 SCRA 36 (1992): The accused
must be informed of his rights in a custodial investigation
before he participates in a re-enactment. Otherwise,
evidence of the re-enactment is inadmissible.
Calderon-Bargas v. RTC of Pasig, 227 SCRA 56 (1993):
One of the rights of the accused is the right to have a
speedy, impartial and public trial. A denial of this right
entitles the accused to a dismissal of the case, upon filing
the appropriate motion to dismiss; and the dismissal
operates as an acquittal. There are only two occasions when
double jeopardy will attach even if the motion to dismiss
the case is made by the accused himself. The first is when
the ground is insufficiency of the evidence of the
prosecution, and the second is when the proceedings have
been unreasonably prolonged in violation of the right to a
speedy trial. Failure of the prosecution to file a comment
to a motion to quash for 2 years despite several extensions
amounts to unreasonable delay. However, the motion to
quash the information was not strictly the proper remedy,
because a denial of the right to speedy trial is not one of
the grounds upon which a motion to quash a complaint or
information may be grounded. The proper remedy is a
motion to dismiss on the ground of failure of the

prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond


reasonable doubt.
People v. Villaluz, (19): Where the prosecution witnesses
have been cross-examined by the accused in the
preliminary investigation, their testimony in the preliminary
investigation may be presented in evidence at the trial if
they are thereafter unable to testify.
Alejandro v. Pepito: Where the court ordered the accused
to present evidence ahead of the prosecution, it violated
the right of the accused to be presumed innocent and the
right to due process. In fact, it violated the order of
presentation of evidence. The accused has the right to
take the witness stand and that right carries with it the
right not to take the witness stand.
Dumlao v. Comelec: Where BP 51 disqualified candidates
running for public office on the ground that they have been
charged before the military tribunals, it violates the
presumption of innocence clause because it put the
candidates in the category of convicts without first finally
convicting the same.
People v. Madridano, GR 93435: Where the defendant
was charged with the crime of having raped a woman once,
he cannot be convicted of two (2) rapes if the woman
testified to that effect because that would be a
deprivation of his right to informed of the nature of the
accusation against him.

People v. Labado, 98 SCRA 730: The real nature of the


criminal charge is determined not from the technical name
given by the fiscal appearing in the title of the information
but by the actual of facts appearing in the complaint or
information.
Thus, where the allegation in the information clearly set
forth the essential elements of the crime charged, the
constitutional rights of the accused to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him is not
violated.
People v. Amaca, et al. GR. No. 110129: Where the
accused was charged with the crime of murder qualified by
evident premeditation but was convicted of murder
qualified by treachery although treachery was not alleged
in the information deprived him of his right to be informed
of the nature of the accusation against him. Treachery is
an element of a crime. Thus, he cannot be convicted of
murder through treachery under an information that
charged him with murder qualified by evident
premeditation.
People v. de la Cruz, GR. No. 13554-56: Where the
information alleged that the accused committed sexual
abuse on his daughter either by raping her or committing
acts of lasciviousness on her is not sufficient averment of
the acts constituting the offense, for it does not state the
acts and omissions constituting the offense. These are
mere conclusions of law, not facts. The information is null

and void for being violative of the right of the accused to


be informed of the nature of the accusation against him.
People v. Palarca, GR. No. 146020: Where the
information in a rape case did not specifically allege the
element if force or intimidation but the prosecution was
able to establish its existence during the trial, the
accused, as a general rule, cannot be convicted of an
offense not clearly charged in the complaint or
information, otherwise, it would violate his right to be
informed of the nature of the accusation against him.
The rule, however, is not absolute, as when he did not assail
the sufficiency of the information or admission of
evidence. His failure to do so is a waiver of such right.
Amion v. Hon. Chiongson. Et al.: The provision of the
Constitution concerning the right to counsel of choice
pertains more to a person under custodial investigation
rather than the one who is accused in criminal prosecution.

People v. Flores, GR. No. 106581: When counsel for an


accused charged with a capital offense manifests before
the trial court that he is waiving the right of the accused
to present evidence and is instead filing a demurrer to
evidence, the trial court is mandated to inquire into the
voluntariness and full knowledge of the consequences of
the waiver made by the accused through counsel. This is to
avoid miscarriage of justice.

Baseco v. PCGG, GR. No. 75885: The right against selfincrimination is not applicable to juridical persons. An
individual may refuse to answer questions incriminating him
unless there is an immunity statute granted to him. This
does not apply to a corporation vested with privileges or
franchises, for it may not refuse to show its hands when
charged with abuse of its privileges. In fact, an officer of
the company cannot refuse to produce its records in its
possession, upon plea of self-incrimination, either of
himself or the company.
Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 344:
The
right
against
self-incrimination
applies
to
administrative
People v. Olvis: The rule against self-incriminations does
not apply to mechanical acts because it is made to execute,
not meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain
physical attributes determinable by simple observations.
This include requiring the accused to submit to a test to
extract virus from the body, or compelling him to
expectorate morphine from his mouth, making her submit
to a pregnancy test, or requiring him to take part in police
line-up in certain cases. In each case, the accused does not
speak his guilt. It is not a pre-requisite in such instance
that he be provided with the guiding hand of counsel.
Villaflor v. Summers: Where a woman charged with
adultery, she can be compelled to undergo physical

examination to determine her pregnancy. She cannot invoke


her right against self-incrimination because such right is
only against testimonial compulsion.
People v. Jungco: Photographs taken during the reenactment may not be admissible in evidence without the
presence of counsel because they are based on invalid
extra-judicial confession.
People v. Alicia: Where the accused were asked about the
nature of their previous conviction while being tried of
murder and multiple frustrated murders, the accused
cannot invoke their right against self-incrimination because
it was not disputed that they were serving sentence at the
time of the commission of the crimes. Since these were
alleged in the information, it was proper for the court to
inquire into the nature of the offense for which they were
serving sentence.
People v. Tranca, GR. No. 110357: Where the accused
was arrested and ultra-violet ray radiation was conducted
on him, he cannot invoke the right against selfincrimination because what is prohibited is the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communication from
the witness, not an inclusion of his body as evidence, when
it may be material.
People v. Gueron: The right to confrontation is not
absolute because there is an express exception which is
the admission of dying declaration.

People v. de la Cruz: Where the accused was convicted on


the basis of the extrajudicial confession of a co-accused
who was earlier convicted and the confessed killer cannot
be presented anymore, the accused cannot be convicted
because the extrajudicial confession was hearsay. It is
violative of the right to confront the witness.

Anciro v. People, GR. No. 107819: Where the witness


has already been cross-examined but the crossexamination was not completed because the witness died,
the testimony should not be deleted from the record for
as long as it has already covered the material points
touched upon in the direct examination, the testimony
should then be allowed to remain.

People v. Orsal: The test of a violation of the right to


speedy trial has always been made to begin from the time
of the filing of the information.
Parada v. Veneracion: A trial in absentia without proper
notice to counsel who had already notified the court of his
change of address is a denial of due process.
People v. Presiding Judge: Despite the waiver to be
present during the trial, the accused can be ordered
arrested by the court for non-appearance upon summons to

appear for purposes of identification, unless the accused


unqualifiedly state in open court during arraignment that
he is the person named as defendant in the case on trial.
People v. Serzo: The right to counsel covers the period
beginning from custodial investigation, well into the
rendition of judgment and even on appeal.
Telan v. CA: To hold that the right to counsel exists only
in the trial courts and that thereafter the right ceases in
the pursuit of the appeal is an absurd interpretation if the
law.
An accused was deprived of his right to counsel
when he retained the services of a person who
misrepresented himself as a lawyer.
Yapdiangco v. Buencamino, 122 SCRA 713: Where the
last day for the filing of an information falls on a Sunday
or legal holiday, the period of prescription cannot be
extended up to the next working day as prescription
automatically sets in.
Sabina:
The information is sufficient if it contains the full name of
the accused, the designation of the offense given by the
statute, the acts or omissions constituting the offense,
the name of the offended party, the approximate date, and
the place of the offense.

RULE 11O: PROSECUTION OF


OFFENSES
Brocka, et al., v. Enrile: As a rule, criminal prosecution
may not be restrained or stayed by injunction. However,
the rule is not absolute for it admits certain exceptions.
Thus, where there is manifest bad faith that accompanies
the filing of criminal charges, as in the instant case where
Brocka, et al. were barred from enjoying provisional
release until such time that charges were filed, and where
a sham preliminary investigation was hastily conducted,
charges that are filed as a result should lawfully be
enjoined.

People v. Galano: Prescription is interrupted with the filing


of the case even if the court is without jurisdiction.

Double Jeopardy; The principle of double jeopardy cannot


be validly invoke to avoid arraignment under the second
information where the offense charged therein is
different and not included in the offense charged under
the first information. The doctrine of double jeopardy is a
revered constitutional safeguard against exposing the
accused from the risk of being prosecuted twice for the
same offense, and not a different one. There is simply no
double jeopardy when the subsequent information charges
another and different offense, although arising from the
same act or set of acts. Prosecution for the same act is
not prohibited. What is forbidden is the prosecution for
the same offense.
Double Jeopardy; Requisites; To substantiate a claim for
double jeopardy, the accused has the burden of
demonstrating the following requisites: (1) a first jeopardy
must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first
jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the
second jeopardy must be for the same offense as in the
first. As to the first requisite, the first jeopardy attaches
only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent
court; (c) after arraignment, (d) when a valid plea has been
entered; and (e) when the accused was acquitted or
convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent. The test for the
third element is whether one offense is identical with the
other or is an attempt to commit it or a frustration
thereof; or whether the second offense includes or is

necessarily included in the offense charged in the first


information.