Written Evidence submitted by Dr David Blagden1

1.
I am writing to offer evidence in line with your ongoing inquiry into the implications
of Russia for UK defence. I write in an individual professional capacity, as an academic
researcher of British defence policy and European geopolitics with elements of relevant
professional experience; I do not claim any particular knowledge of the Russian national
context. Additional details on my areas of expertise and professional background are
available here, if required: http://www.exeter.ac.uk/strategy/people/davidblagden.
2.
My submission considers the following areas in turn: the challenges associated with
assessing Russian intentions, and the associated implications; trends in Russian behaviour
and capabilities; and the UK contribution to European defence. I draw throughout on my
research into the economic drivers and strategic consequences of changes in the international
balance of power. This includes a recent article that discussed the implications of Russian
capabilities and behaviour for European security and UK defence at length,2 and a previous
piece on why the possibility of hostile major powers should still feature prominently in
British strategic planning.3
Assessing Intentions in International Politics
3.
In the aftermath of Russias 2014 annexation of Crimea and incursion into other areas
of Ukraine, Western analysts have devoted much time and effort to attempted assessments of
Russian intentions. You will no doubt receive many such submissions to this inquiry. There
are essentially two poles in this debate. One sees Russia as a status quo, security-seeking,
essentially conservative major power that with its flimsy economy, dated conventional
forces, shortage of major allies, and questionable hold on domestic order is threatened by
NATO expansion, the US proclivity for military intervention and regime change, and
overwhelming Western economic and conventional superiority. The other sees Russia as a
dangerous revisionist state intent on redressing its post-Soviet loss of power and prestige,
ruled by a thuggish and potentially belligerent security autocracy that leverages nationalism
and external enmity to maintain political control, and which will seize any opportunity to best
its Western foes by re-establishing its rightful dominion over Eastern Europe.
4.
The problem with attempting to distinguish between these two understandings of
Russian intent is that they yield very different policy implications. In his 1976 book
Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Robert Jervis identifies a distinction
between the spiral model and the deterrence model of interstate relations.4 In the former, a
state that only wants to be safe takes measures that increase another states insecurity,
causing that other state to take threatening measures in return: two status quo, securityseeking, non-revisionist powers nonetheless end-up spiralling into a relationship of mutual
hostility and threat (the so-called security dilemma). The best policy option in such a spiral
model situation is therefore to exercise reassurance and restraint, convincing the other side
of your own benign intentions. In the latter, however, a security-seeking state does not
1

Dr David Blagden, Lecturer in International Security and Strategy, University of Exeter

David Blagden, Global Multipolarity, European Security and Implications for UK Grand Strategy: Back to the
Future, Once Again, International Affairs 91:2 (March 2015), pp. 333-350.
3 David Blagden, Strategic Thinking for the Age of Austerity, RUSI Journal 154:6 (December 2009), pp. 6066.
4 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1976).
2

confront another status quo, security-seeking state; rather, it confronts a revisionist, greedy
power, intent on increasing its power, influence, and even territory. The best policy option in
such a deterrence model situation is therefore the opposite of reassurance/restraint, which
will simply be taken as appeasement that creates opportunities for expansion; rather, the
security-seeking state must take a strong, confrontational approach to deterring its aggressive
foe by convincing them that aggression will not pay.
5.
The applicability of the spiral model versus deterrence model exchange to the
UKs current Russia debate is clear. Those who subscribe to the view that, for all its
autocratic tendencies, Russia is essentially a reasonable, pragmatic, restrained power that has
been backed into a corner by NATO expansion and other Western policy choices urge
reassurance, cooperation, and reconciliation. Those who, by contrast, see Russia as a hostile,
revanchist power urge the West in general and Britain specifically to bolster capabilities
and confront Moscow.
6.
The obvious problem with trying to distinguish which model of relations NATO and
Russia are occupying is that it requires us to be able to reliably assess Russian intentions.
Unfortunately, however, uncertainty over others intentions is an embedded characteristic of
international politics and to the extent that we can (gu)estimate others present intentions,
we have even less idea of how they will change/evolve in future.5 This is not to say that there
are no certainties in international politics: during the Cold War, Western policymakers were
not uncertain as to whether the Soviet Union was an opponent. They were uncertain,
however, over what type of opponent they were facing defensive, conservative securityseeker or implacable, revisionist empire-builder and about how Moscow would behave in a
given scenario.
7.
A key implication of this uncertainty over others intentions is that we must focus not
only on what they might do, but also on what they can do: that is, we should pay even more
attention to their capabilities than to our best-guesses of their aims. Thus, in thinking about
what Russia means for UK defence, we must of course do our best to understand Moscows
foreign policy culture, elite pathologies, long-term concerns, immediate pressures, and
overall incentive structure. But we must not attach too much confidence to such assessments
the fact that any given Western specialist on Russian foreign policy cannot conceive of
Moscow wanting to pursue a course of action does not mean that Russian decision-makers
will not conceive of a reason to do so and must pay close attention to their capabilities at
the same time.
8.
To refine this point further, and in keeping with the previous discussion, it is easier to
discern overarching incentive structures for another state than it is to predict specific policy
choices in certain contingencies especially when the same set of incentives is common to
both spiral and deterrence understandings of the relationship. Thus, we are not currently
uncertain about whether Russia would like to halt NATO expansion and ultimately weaken
the Alliance: viewed as either a defensive security-seeker or a revisionist empire-builder,
Moscow has good reasons to want to roll-back perceived encirclement by the Western bloc.
Similarly, we are not uncertain about whether Russia would like to improve its position in
the European balance of power, or whether it relies heavily on nuclear forces/doctrine to
compensate for conventional military failings. The uncertainty lies, rather, in lower-level
questions. Will the Kremlin seek reconciliation with the West, because post-Ukraine
5

John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001).

sanctions are disproportionately harming the Russian economy and thereby weakening both
their position in the balance of power and their domestic-economic credibility, or seek to
permanently fracture NATO, by provoking an Article V crisis in the Baltic States? Will
Russia eschew militarised confrontation with NATO states, because of awareness of its
economic/conventional inferiority, or be emboldened, because of a sense that its nuclear
arsenal will deter a meaningful Western conventional response? In the face of such
uncertainty, of course, the most salient question for Britain and our NATO allies in each of
these scenarios must then be what can they do, rather than what do we think they might do?
Russian Behaviour and Capabilities
9.
The 2014 (and ongoing) Ukraine intervention has embarrassed those who had
previously asserted with confidence that state-based war had been permanently expunged
from Europe by the spread of liberal values, that Britain/NATO no longer faced major power
threats, and that Russia had been pacified by its integration into Western economic exchange
and multilateral institutions. Yet the Crimea annexation was only one data-point in a broader
pattern of behaviour. The 2006 assassination of Alexander Litvinenko (amongst numerous
other coercive espionage operations), 2007 cyber-attack on Estonia (as part of a broader
pattern of cyber behaviour), 2008 invasion of Georgia (which, admittedly, Tbilisi did much to
provoke), repeated simulated invasions of Northern and Eastern European NATO states,
explicit nuclear threats against Denmark and Poland, public contemplation of tactical nuclear
use in Syria, and now-routine provocative approaches to NATO airspace/territorial
waters/forces are all evidence of a militarily-coercive approach to regional politics.
10.
The Litvinenko murder, in particular, showed a belligerence and disdain towards
Britain specifically that provides troubling food-for-thought. Russia did not simply
assassinate an FSB defector that had started working for MI6 always likely to be a perilous
career move but rather did so in London using a material that posed a grave risk to public
safety, that would terrify those who might consider opposing Moscow, and that was
presumably intended to signal a willingness and ability to operate on British territory with
impunity. Indeed, the Foreign and Commonwealth Offices (FCO) apparent unwillingness to
confront Russia over the January 2016 report into Litvinenkos death, because of a desire to
sustain cooperation with Moscow in areas such as Syria policy, risks getting its priorities
backwards: this amounts to saying we cannot offend this powerful, dangerous state because
we need them to confront this weak, ineffective state! It is an odd approach to counterterrorism, meanwhile, to avoid sanctioning the one state that has sponsored a radiological
attack on British soil.6
11.
Note that as discussed previously none of this is necessarily to accuse Moscow of
evil motivations, although neither does it preclude them: as discussed above, a country of its
size, position, and shortage of major allies has good reason to want to halt and ultimately rollback perceived encirclement by a seemingly hostile, growing, and conventionally-superior
military alliance. This would hold even if Russia were not governed by the autocratic,
thuggish, and suspicious regime currently in place, although such factors likely exacerbate
underlying tensions.

Patrick Wintour and Luke Harding, Litvinenko report: Foreign Office urges No 10 to show restraint against
Russia, The Guardian, 19 January 2016: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/19/litvinenko-inquiryforeign-office-urges-no-10-to-show-restraint-against-russia.
6

12.
This return to militarised regional assertiveness on Russias part comes against a
backdrop of structural change in the international system. In particular, the US unipolarity
that characterised the 1990s-2000s has waned as large emerging markets have experienced
strong catch-up growth. This is not to say that the United States will not remain the worlds
pre-eminent military power for the foreseeable future, nor a claim that such emerging-market
growth is set to continue in a linear fashion: clearly, Chinas economy is stalling, Indias has
repeatedly failed to fulfil its potential, Brazils is in crisis, and Russias hydrocarbon
dependence has been exposed by recent weak oil prices. It is simply to recognise that an
element of multipolarity has been returned to the international system by the boom of the
BRICs, that this trend has potential to continue, and that at least in terms of antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities to curtail US freedom-of-action the horse has
already bolted (i.e. China and Russia have already made significant strides).
13.
It is in this context of strong BRIC growth (and associated hydrocarbon demand)
that Russia has availed itself of the opportunity to restore its military capabilities, including
via the $140 billion rearmament and professionalization plan announced in 2009. These
reforms appear to have borne fruit, given a comparatively proficient military performance in
Ukraine vis--vis the 2008 Georgia intervention. Linking this observation together with the
previous analysis, Russia has thus been restored to a position where it not only has good
reason to want to counter and ultimately weaken NATO; it has also experienced a modestbut-significant improvement in its capabilities to do so.
14.
Western discussions of Russian capabilities since 2014 have focused in particular on
certain non-traditional dimensions of Moscows hybrid warfare (although many of them
have historical precedent): the use of mysteriously well-equipped rebels and plain-clothes
special forces (so-called little green men), the support/enfranchisement of ethnic Russian
populations who then require protection, propaganda, cyber-attack, and so forth. It is
important, however, not to lose sight of the traditional dimensions to such operations, and
of contemporary Russian doctrine more generally. The swift and firepower-intensive use of
massed armour and artillery, extensive air and maritime denial operations, and even the early
use of tactical nuclear weapons all remain elements of Russian war-planning and indeed,
the large-scale movement of heavy forces has been a key coercive component of recent
hybrid operations. The regular Russian testing of British/NATO air and maritime defences
has also been documented extensively in recent years: the European Leadership Network logs
sixty incidents of contact between Russian and Western forces during the March 2014 to
March 2015 period alone.7 The rearmament programme has similarly focused not just on
reduced conscript-dependence, special forces, and enhanced C4ISTAR8 capabilities; it has
also sought to modernise nuclear forces, long-range strike capabilities, sea- and air-control
assets, and the armoured vehicle fleet.
15.
This militarised, coercive approach to regional politics could give rise to unintended
confrontation and/or inadvertent escalation, as many have observed.9 The possibility of an
7 Thomas Frear, List of Close Military Encounters between Russia and the West, March 2014 to March 2015
(London: European Leadership Network, 2015):
http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/medialibrary/2015/03/11/4264a5a6/ELN%20Russia%20%20West%20Full%20List%20of%20Incidents.pdf.
8 Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and
Reconnaissance.
9 Thomas Frear, ukasz Kulesa, and Ian Kearns, Dangerous Brinksmanship: Close Military Encounters between
Russia and the West in 2015 (London: European Leadership Network, 2014):
http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/medialibrary/2014/11/09/6375e3da/Dangerous%20Brinkmanship.p

intended military confrontation also cannot be ruled out, however. And as discussed
previously, in the absence of an ability to reliably assess Moscows intentions, we must pay
close attention to Russian capabilities. Recent RAND Corporation modelling of NATORussia confrontation scenarios provide particularly concerning evidence on this front.10 Their
2015 analysis suggests that a Russian assault on the Baltic States, possibly in support of a
Moscow-sponsored uprising by ethnic Russian citizens of Latvia or Estonia, could achieve
control of those countries before NATO had assembled sufficient forces to repel such a swift
and large-scale invasion. In the face of such a fait accompli that had established facts on the
ground, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) would then face three options, none of them
palatable: a bloody attempt at re-conquest in the face of rapidly-established Russian A2/AD
capabilities that could see tens-of-thousands of NATO casualties, a perilous escalation to
nuclear coercion, or conceding defeat and accepting the loss of NATO member states in a
way that would surely break the Alliance.
16.
Of course, such choices would also be fraught with risk for Russia too, and we might
question whether the benefits for Russia would exceed the high costs. Yet the point, as ever,
is that in the absence of reliable information about Russian intentions and particularly given
the potential for a belligerent faction to gain ascendancy within the Kremlin/military we
should focus on the implications of such a capability existing. Moreover, as noted above,
while we may be unsure about the type of rival that Russia constitutes defensive securityseeker or greedy revisionist we can be sure of the fact that, on either reading, breaking
NATO would be a treasured prize. Given the real risk of the NAC being unable to agree to a
costly recapturing of the Baltic States, especially in light of limited public support for doing
so in some NATO members,11 and the terminal effect that such a failure of Article V would
likely have on the Alliance, it would be hubristic to assume that it is inconceivable for
Moscow to choose such a policy. It is also always worth recalling that neither of the two
World Wars were intended to become multi-year, global conflagrations by their initiators:
each began with a particular major power perceiving an opportunity to swiftly secure prized,
enduring strategic gains at acceptable relative cost. The perceived opportunity to break
NATO and thereby permanently remove the most formidable obstacle to its long-term
interests could represent just such a temptation. Insofar as NATO and UK policy choices can
be configured to remove such a temptation, therefore, it is incumbent on us to do so.
17.
Russia is never again going to be a superpower peer to the United States: it lacks the
economic base, human capital, and technological advancement. However, Washington is set
to spend the coming decades predominantly focused on balancing the most potent peer
competitor that it has faced since its own emergence as a superpower: the Chinese economy
is already bigger vis--vis the US economy than the Soviet Unions ever was. This means that
the United States is likely to become increasingly unwilling, and perhaps eventually unable,
to shoulder all of its global allies defence burdens simultaneously. A paradoxical
consequence could be European states having to do at least as much to provide for their own
security vis--vis Russian capabilities as they did in the Cold War, despite Moscow never
again reclaiming the relative power of the Soviet Union. This has significant implications for
British defence, and these are the focus of the final section.
df.
10 David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson, Reinforcing Deterrence on NATOs Eastern Flank: Wargaming
the Defense of the Baltics (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015):
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1253/RAND_RR1253.pdf.
11 BMI Research, New survey raises doubts about NATOs security commitment, BMI Research Blog, 10 June
2015: http://www.bmiresearch.com/blog/new-survey-raises-doubts-about-natos-security-commitment.

The UK Contribution to European Defence

18.
Even notwithstanding modest recent recommitments of US forces to Europe,12 the
total American presence in the region is set to remain a fraction of what it was in the Cold
War: the growth of Chinese capabilities, the reduced salience of Russia to US security since
the USSRs collapse, and American fiscal limitations all point in this direction. At the same
time, as one of Europes two principal military powers and possibly soon Europes largest
economy13 Britain will be one of the few key non-US states, if not the key state, with the
resource base, technological sophistication, operational expertise, and resolve to shoulder a
significant share of the NATO security burden. Taken together, therefore, this combination of
geopolitical circumstances (Russian assertiveness, US rebalancing) and UK power potential
(pre-existing military proficiency and comparatively good growth prospects, at least by
European standards) will place particular demands on Britain. Specifically, we will likely
have to act as a pivotal offshore balancer in Europe still with US support, but potentially
no longer wholly reliant on the American security blanket14 and that, in turn, will entail
making a substantial contribution to European defence.
19.
A first, general challenge to be addressed will be ensuring that NATO and Britain
within that retains a credible ladder of escalatory options. The concern voiced by the
RAND analysis cited above can essentially be distilled as a worry that NATO forces have a
gap on their escalatory ladder between exquisite capabilities suited to counter-terrorism
(CT) and counter-insurgency (COIN) special forces, high-end light infantry, remotelypiloted air systems, light vehicles, etc on the one hand, and strategic nuclear weapons, on
the other. To preserve deterrence, an opponent must calculate that a credible ladder of
escalation exists from even low-level coercive activity right up to nuclear war. Otherwise,
there is a risk that they will decide that there are certain activities that they can get away
with, i.e. conventional/hybrid operations that are beyond the immediate reactive
capabilities of NATO but that stop short of strategic nuclear use, as in the fait accompli
scenario described previously.
20.
This is not to say that our high-end light capabilities are irrelevant to this deterrent
ladder: as has already been recognised, the likes of 16 Air Assault Brigade, 3 Commando
Brigade, and UK Special Forces represent an important capability to swiftly repulse a little
green men scenario before they can establish facts on the ground. Nonetheless, Britain
currently represents a particular case of a major NATO power with an escalatory gap between
small (albeit competent and well-equipped) conventional forces orientated towards CT/COIN
operations, on the one hand, and a strategic nuclear arsenal, on the other. Fifteen years of
operations under the Global War on Terror banner complete with a pre-assumption of USprovided theatre dominance have led to an ever-diminishing emphasis on armour, artillery,
combined-arms manoeuvre, sea/air control, deterrence, and mass in general. This is not to
suggest that we should simply revert to the military posture of 1980, given the advances in
Andrew Tilghman, The Pentagon starts planning to base more troops in Europe, Military Times, 6 March
2016: http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/pentagon/2016/03/06/us-troops-nato-europe-russia-vladimirputin/81323722/.
13 CEBR Global, World Economic League Table 2016 Highlights (London: Centre for Economics and Business
Research, 2016): http://www.cebr.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Cebr-World-Economic-League-Table2016-26-December-2015-final.pdf.
14 John J. Mearsheimer, Why is Europe Peaceful Today? European Political Science 9:3 (September 2010),
pp. 387-397.
12

precision munitions, electronic warfare, reconnaissance, cyber and computing, etc, that have
been made in the interim. Nonetheless, it does necessitate the reconsideration of certain
assumptions of a relatively benign, uncontested operating environment for NATO forces that
have prevailed since the 1990s. Indeed, we may only know what skills and capabilities
necessary for operating in contested domains against another major power have atrophied
during the last quarter-century of an assumed-to-be-permissive strategic environment once
we encounter them but there is nonetheless value in thinking them through as best we can.
21.
With this in mind, the 2015 SDSR makes important progress towards addressing
certain UK military weaknesses. A full 138-aircraft F-35 fleet will enable Britain to make a
substantial contribution to European combined-arms operations if required, as well as having
utility in other theatres. Pressing ahead with two full-sized aircraft carrier groups enhances
the survivability of UK combat air against the possible loss of ground airbases and
strengthens our ability to generate Northeast Atlantic sea control, as well as enabling powerprojection in the wider world. Moving to a maximum effort deployment of 50,000, from the
2010 SDSRs 30,000, similarly raises the total UK contribution that could be made to a
European NATO operation although generating such a force from an 82,000-strong Army
will be challenging in the extreme. Plugging the gap in maritime patrol aircraft (MPA)
coverage via a purchase of nine Boeing P-8s is welcome news in the anti-submarine warfare
(ASW) domain, given the recent activities of Russian submarines around UK waters. And
raising total fast jet numbers by retaining the Tranche 1 Typhoons as the Tranche 3 aircraft
are introduced is a similarly welcome addition to our ability to control UK airspace, and that
of weaker NATO allies if necessary.
22.
Beyond this good news, however, questions remain about the size, configuration, and
optimisation of UK capabilities to face a future of increased demands, potentially reduced US
support, and Russian assertiveness. A few such areas are discussed below.
Diplomatic. Along with its commitment to the two-percent-of-GDP NATO defence
spending target, the SDSR contained welcome news of a sustainment and eventual reexpansion of the FCO budget. While this submission has stressed our inability to
perfectly assess others intentions, there is still value in trying to gain situational
awareness, to detect early warnings, to understand potential opponents thought
processes (particularly foreign policy elites worldviews), to appreciate the domestic
and external political/economic/social pressures that key decision-makers face, and so
forth. The FCO has fared poorly in budgetary terms since the 2010 SDSR, and indeed,
in terms of general institutional standing since the creation of DfID in 1997. Having
accumulated depths of Russia expertise during the Cold War, it is perhaps the case
that a focus on Brussels, Washington, New York, and increasingly Beijing as the postCold War hubs of UK-relevant diplomacy, at the expense of Moscow, has resulted in
a diminution of that expertise. Strengthening our diplomatic and intelligence
operations ability to understand Russian incentives and assess local conditions should
therefore be a key priority.
ASW. As has been well documented, Russian submarine activity in or around UK
territorial waters has increased significantly in the last five years. Such vessels may be
conducting reconnaissance/intelligence gathering (by monitoring UK radio traffic or
undersea cables), attempting to track the movements of our own submarines
(including the Vanguard-class ballistic missiles submarines (SSBNs) that carry our
nuclear arsenal), testing UK ASW and broader maritime defences, or demonstrating
operational capability/resolve for coercive effect. The purchase of the P-8 MPA is
therefore important while questions have rightly been raised about its ability to

contribute to Falklands defence (say), due to its lack of compatibility with current UK
air-to-air refuelling systems, these questions do not impact on its ability to operate in
the Northeast Atlantic, where it will deliver unparalleled capability. Beyond the
recommitment to MPA operations, however, questions over Britains ASW
capabilities remain. The Government must ensure that the P-8 order proceeds
immediately, and the same for the Type 26 frigate that will replace the aging Type 23
in the surface ASW role. Having cut the planned Type 26 fleet from thirteen to eight,
the Government must also move quickly with the lighter, cheaper frigate mooted in
the SDSR that will enable the sustainment and eventual expansion of the Royal
Navys (RN) escort/patrol fleet. Looking longer term, given the costs and limited
numbers of the RNs nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarine (SSN) fleet, there may
even be a case for supplementing these immensely capable long-range vessels with a
number of cheaper diesel-powered boats (SSKs) for local ASW patrol work in the
UKs immediate maritime vicinity. We must also ask frank questions about whether
anything has been lost during the MPA gap skills and/or operational intelligence
(e.g. if Russian SSNs have got closer to HMNB Clyde than previously) that
subsequently merits a change in operational procedures (say).
Air. Given the near-routine approach of nuclear-capable Russian strategic bombers to
skirt the edges of UK airspace, and the central role that airpower would play in any
sort of Baltic contingency (say), it is imperative that UK airpower quickly receives the
strengthening that the SDSR promises. Obviously, the production timeline for the
(troubled) F-35 lies primarily in American hands but any opportunity that Britain
can take to speed its entry into UK service, and to fully optimise its potential, should
be grasped.15 Likewise, the capabilities of the Typhoon should be fully optimised as
soon as possible.16 Promises of numbers of both aircraft must be met.
Nuclear. As stressed throughout, all UK and NATO interactions take place under the
shadow of the nuclear revolution: the catastrophic potential end-point of escalation
colours all of our interactions with Moscow, producing both deterrence and dangers.17
Moreover, as similarly stressed, nuclear weapons play a central role in Russian
doctrine and identity. Britain currently possesses a secure second-strike retaliatory
nuclear capability, delivered via our Continuous At-Sea Deterrence (CASD) posture,
and nothing discussed here suggests that a move away from that would be prudent.18
Certainly, the European and global geopolitical environments are most unlikely to be
conducive to a multilateral disarmament agreement, as discussed throughout. The idea
that British unilateral disarmament could somehow trigger reciprocation from other
nuclear powers with their own security concerns in which we are only one element,
meanwhile, is optimistic at best. The Government should therefore move forward
with the introduction of the Successor-class SSBN before the Vanguards become
unsafe to their crews or ineffective through their acoustic signature. Recent concerns
that submarine-trailing drones will compromise the stealth, and thus survivability, of
SSBNs merit attention I have written about them myself.19 However, to conclude

Justin Bronk, Maximum Value from the F-35: Harnessing Transformational Fifth-Generation Capabilities for
the UK Military (London: Royal United Services Institute, 2016):
https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/20160201_whp_maximum_value_from_the_f-35_web.pdf.
16 Justin Bronk, Maximising European Combat Air Power: Unlocking the Eurofighters Full Potential (London:
Royal United Services Institute, 2015): https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/whr_115_maximising_european_combat_air_power_0.pdf.
17 Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).
18 David Blagden, Reducing Britains nuclear capability would be a grave mistake, The Guardian, 1 July 2013:
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jul/01/reducing-britains-nuclear-capability-grave-mistake.
15

that an experimental technology will suddenly render SSBNs obsolete is to

misunderstand the oscillation of the offence-defence balance. Just as the surface-to-air
missile did not suddenly do away with ground-attack aircraft and as the armourpiercing shell did not immediately spell the end of the armoured vehicle, innovations
in offensive penetrability are countered by innovations in defensive shielding. In the
case of SSBNs, for a drone to have the power, speed, and range necessary to sustain
a trail would currently necessitate it having a nuclear propulsion system, with people
to maintain it that is, a manned SSN! There is also ample scope for innovation in the
delousing processes that SSBNs go through on putting to sea. So the point is not that
such technologies should not be analysed, deployed, and countered. The point, rather,
is simply that it is unduly pessimistic to conclude that Successor will be obsolete
before it is even built, based on a technology that is still largely conceptual and that
can be countered in an array of ways.
Resilience. Britains ability to sustain a contribution to a NATO operation in Europe
has, with the consolidation of Defence real-estate, become dependent on a small
number of high-value sites. There are now only three proper naval bases, including
only one capable of the full spectrum of submarine operations, and only three fast-jetoperating RAF stations (four if the US Air Force presence at RAF Lakenheath is
counted)20 along with certain critical command-and-control nodes, such as
Northwood Headquarters. Many other closures/consolidations of infrastructure that
have taken place in the name of efficiency may have resulted in similar concentrations
of logistical support, fuel supplies, electronic/cyber infrastructure, etc. Striking certain
key targets in mainland Britain could therefore be a tempting option for an opponent
trying to substantially degrade the UK contribution to Northern European defence
during a Baltic contingency (say). The point is not to suggest that such a scenario is
likely to happen, or that an opponent would be willing to escalate to an attack on
mainland Britain even if it did. Nonetheless, this potential lack of resilience bears
consideration, and there is value in thinking the unthinkable. Could we rebuff a
plain-clothes, deniable special forces raid on a critical site, say? How about a sealaunched cruise-missile strike that holed key runways? While seemingly far-fetched
scenarios, it might be worth some further enhanced base security and perhaps the
extension surface-to-air missile defences around key military sites to avoid running
the experiment.
Land. As noted above, we must question the assumption of an ever-dwindling role for
armour and artillery. We must also ensure operational proficiency, via exercises, at
large-scale combined-arms manoeuvre warfare. Finally, we should at least conduct
contingency planning for how to re-grow the Army quickly from its current small,
light, CT/COIN/stabilisation-focussed orientation towards a larger force capable of
making a major contribution to a European theatre operation, should that contingency
emerge.

23.
More generally, the return of Russia to the forefront of UK security calculations must
prompt a reassessment of the ways in which we conduct prioritisation. It is still the case that
the most likely security threats that Britain faces will come from terrorism, probably with
Islamist links. But given the the catastrophic costs of even a limited war with Russia in
Europe let alone the perils of escalation to the nuclear level we must question whether
David Blagden, What DARPAs naval drone could mean for the balance of power, WarOnTheRocks.com, 9
July 2015: http://warontherocks.com/2015/07/what-darpas-naval-drone-could-mean-for-the-balance-of-power/.
20 Of course, several others would be fast-jet-capable if the aircraft had already been dispersed, but they could
not even take-off if runways were holed, and may have been destroyed outright in their hangars.
19

terrorism, insurgency, and nebulously-defined instability constitute the most important

focus of UK defence. This questioning is particularly apposite when an expansive approach
to countering instability abroad and pursuing the humanitarian responsibility to protect
(R2P), without much meaningful prioritisation based on the UK interests at stake or the
capabilities of those being countered, results in a military posture skewed heavily towards
such operations. In post-2001 Britain, such skewing has come at the expense of the
capabilities necessary to deter or, if necessary, scale-up to fight a potentially hostile major
power.
24.
As a final point, there has been reticence in some sections of the UK policy
community to take a firm line in the face of coercion by Moscow due to concerns about the
importance of Russian money to the British economy: specifically, London finance, realestate, and luxury goods/services. This, again, is to get our priorities the wrong way around.
The economic dynamism of London rests on its strong rule-of-law, its high quality-of-life, its
creative culture and knowledge community, and its transparent and accountable business
climate. Many of these traits are directly undermined by London becoming a sinkhole for
overseas wealth of questionable provenance, even accepting that there are certain industries
in the capital that profit from that wealth. Moreover, the total Russia-dependence of the
economy would have to be an order of magnitude over what it already is for it to be worth
conceding core British security interests for.
Conclusion
25.
This evidence submission has considered the implications of uncertainty over Russian
intentions, recent trends in Russian behaviour and capability development, and the
implications of Russias increasingly militarised approach to regional geopolitics for UK
defence. We cannot know for sure whether Russia is a status quo, security-seeking state that
simply wants to halt perceived NATO encroachment or a revisionist, greedy state that wants
to re-assert its power throughout Europe. As such, NATO also cannot know for sure whether
to take restrained, conciliatory steps with the intention of reassuring Russia (e.g. ruling out
further expansion, cancelling ballistic missile defence plans, etc) or belligerent,
confrontational steps with the intention of cowing Russia (e.g. large forward garrisons in
Eastern Europe, large-scale exercises, etc) either could make the situation worse, depending
on what Russia intends, and depending on how that might change in the future.
26.
However, we can identify certain interests that Russia will hold in either type, such
as seeking to weaken NATO and heavy reliance on nuclear weapons. We can also recognise
that because we cannot know Moscows intentions, particularly in future, we should pay
close attention to Russian capabilities and seek to hedge against them where necessary.
This finding has direct implications for UK force posture, which despite welcome areas of
expansion and modernisation announced in the 2015 SDSR remains heavily skewed by a
fifteen-year-long focus on counter-terrorism, COIN, R2P, and stabilisation operations.
09 February 2016