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UNIVERSITY
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Cornell University Library

N64 .H46 1886


The introduction

to Hegel's Philosophy

3 1924 030 652 352


olin

Cornell University
Library

The

original of this

book

is in

the Cornell University Library.

There are no known copyright

restrictions in

the United States on the use of the

text.

http://www.archive.org/details/cu31924030652352

THE INTRODUCTION TO
HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF FINE ART

71^0 f

s-%.

THE INTRODUCTION TO

HEGEL'S
PHILOSOPHY OF FINE ART

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN

WITH NOTES AND PREFATORY ESSAY

BERNARD BOSANQUET,

M.A.

LATE FELLOW AND TUTOR OF UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, OXFORD

LONDON
KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH &

CO.,
1886

PATERNOSTER SQUARE

A< IT-HS^:

(Tlfo?

rights of translation

and of reproduction

are reserved.)

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

Hegel's
is

"

JSstketik," or "Philosophy of Fine Art,"

a work which should no longer be inaccessible to

English reading

the

of which, in

its'

public,

but the reproduction

complete form of 1600 pages,

task not to be lightly undertaken.

know

is

of three

partial reproductions of the "sEsthetik" in English,

Mr.

viz.

Bryant's

translation

Kedney's short analysis of the

of

Part

II.,*

entire work,-f-

Mr.

and

Mr. Hastie's translation of Michelet's short "Philo-

sophy of Art,"

prefaced

by Hegel's

Introduction,

partly translated and partly analysed.


I

wholly disapprove of analyses (among which

may be

reckoned Michelet's summary above men-

tioned) as representations of Hegel's writing, which


*

New

York, Appleton and Co.

t Chicago,

Griggs and Co., 1885.

% Edinburgh, Oliver

and Boyd,

1886.

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
is

chiefly

attractive
detail.

its

am

by the

force

and freshness of

convinced that Hegel should

be

allowed to speak for himself, and that failing the

copious
I

the whole

of

translation

selections,

have adopted

late

the

entire

the best

course

the present volume,

This Introduc-

so

be said to have literary manner at


in a

and

is

as he can

far
all,

work which has been produced by

lecture-notes,

especially

editors from

tolerably complete in

itself.

not contained as a whole in any of the above-

It is

mentioned works.
Mr.

Hastie's

ought to say, however, that

translation

after the first thirty-four

Nor

analysis.
I

viz. to trans-

Introduction, including the chapter

Hegel's best manner

in

is

of very

that which

is

"Division of the Subject."

entitled,

tion

in

or

"JSstketik,"

is it

is

excellent in style

pages

it

also

many who, without being

sophy, are intelligent lovers of art.

done

my

but

becomes an

wholly free from serious mistakes.

have hoped that the present volume

interest to

may

be of

students of philoI

have therefore

best to interpret philosophical expressions,

instead of merely furnishing their technical equivalents.

have also added a few short notes, either

to explain literary allusions, or to complete the in-

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.
The

terpretation of technical terms.

was written with a

prefatory essay

similar intention, not as original

speculation, but as an assistance to general readers


in

apprehending the point of view from which Fine

Art

regarded by Hegel and kindred writers.

is

have broken up the " Einleitimg" or Introduc-

tion proper,

which

continuous

is

in

the original, into

four chapters,* hoping that the arrangement of the

may be

discussion

The

" Eintheilungl'

thus rendered

a separate chapter in
contents

is

My

Chapter

The

the original.

V.,

table

is

of

translated from the original, excepting

those portions of
brackets,

my

which forms

to follow.

easier

it

which are enclosed

in

square

J.

literary notes are entirely

borrowed from the

late Mrs. F. C. Conybeare's translation of Scherer's

" History of

to the

German

Literature

"

work invaluable

English student, whose gratitude must for

long be saddened by the

untimely death of the

translator.
*

Of these, Chapter

III. is subdivided into

two Parts, because

of the disproportionate length of the division in the original to

which

it

corresponds.

CONTENTS.
PAGE

Prefatory Essay by the Translator

CHAPTER

...

..

vii

I.

The Range of ^Esthetic

defined, and some Objections


against the Philosophy of Art refuted (1-25).

[a.

Beauty of Art
...
Treatment ?
Treatment appropriate to Art ?

.(Esthetic confined to

0.

Does Art merit

y.

Is Scientific

5.
*.

Answer
Answer

to

Scientific

...

j8.

to 7.]

...

...

...

[1.

Empirical Method
(a) Its

Range

(b)

It generates

(c)

The Rights

Art-scholarship

...
...

Rules and Theories


of Genius...

2.

Abstract Reflection

3.

The

Philosophical

notion of]

...

...

...

...
...

...

...

...

...

20

II.

Methods of Science Applicable to Beauty and Art


is

8
13

...
...

2
5

...

...

...

CHAPTER

...
...

...

...
...

...

...
...

...

...

...

28

...

3s

...

...

27
27

...

...
...

(26-42).

Conception of Artistic Beauty, general


...

...

...

41

CONTENTS.
CHAPTER

III.

Artistic Beauty,
beginning with current ideas of art (43-105).

The Philosophical Conception of

PAGE

Part I. The Work of Art as Made and as Sensuous


1. Work of Art as Product of Human Activity ...
[(a)
(b)

Artistic Inspiration...

(c)

Dignity of Production by

Man's Need

(b)

Feeling of Beauty

(<r)

Art-scholarship

(d)

Taste

...
...

...

60
...

...

...

Profounder Consequences of Sensuous Nature of Art


...
(0) Relations of the Sensuous to the Mind
...
...
...
(00) Desire
...
(00)

Theory

...

(0)

...

The Content

/J.art II. The End of

...

Mere Repetition

...
...

of Nature

...

...
...

Humani nihil ?

Mitigation of the Passions

...
...

Hand

74
78

...

...

...

It

(77)

Nor

explicitly

Purpose

own Purpose

...

...

80
80
82

...

83
85

...

90

79

...

...

...

87

...
...

addressed
...

79

...

...

must have a Worthy Content


(00) But ought not to be Didactic...
(aa.)

its

70
72

...

...

Sleight of

Bow Art mitigates the Passions


How Art purifies the Passions

Art has

67
68

(79-106)

...

Arts cannot be called Imitative

(<r)

(0)

is

...

Amusing merely as
What is Good to Imitate ?

(b)

(a)

65
66

the

...

...

...

(77)

Some

...

...

(00) Imperfect

(7)

in

63

Art.

(00) Superfluous

(0)

...

...

...

of Art Sensuous]

[The Interest or End of Art


(a) Imitation of Nature ?
(o)

...

Spiritual

The Sensuous Element, how Present


Artist

(7)

...

Symbol of

(77) Sensuous as

(a)

57

...
...

...

48
48
50
54

...60-78

...

...

...

...

...

...

to

3.

...

...

Man

...
...

...

produce Wqrks of Art]


Work of Art as addressed to Man's Sense
Pleasant Feeling ?
...
[() Object of Art
(d)

2.

Conscious Production by Rule

...43-78

to

...

as Revelation of

91
...

94

...

95
9c

...

Moral
...

Truth

gg
...

ick

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER

IV.

Historical Deduction of the True Idea of Art in


Modern Philosophy (107-132).
PAGE
I.

Kant

...

[()

l/~

Pleasure in Beauty not Appetitive

(b)

Pleasure in Beauty Universal

(c)

The

[d)

...

...

...

...

...
...

Beautiful in its Teleological Aspect

...

...

...

...

Winckelmann, Schilling

^.

Schiller,

3.

The Irony

...

...

...
...

...

CHAPTER

...

...

113

116

...
...

111

112

...

Delight in the Beautiful necessary though felt\

107

110

...

...

120

V.

Division of the Subject (133-175).


[1.

The Condition

of Artistic Presentation

of Matter and Plastic


2. Part
3.

Part

I.The Ideal
II.The Types

(a)
(j8)

(7)
4.

of Art

..

Symbolic Art
Classical Art
Romantic Art

Part III. The Several Arts

is

the Correspondence

133
141

144

H5
148
IS'

Architecture

157
160

(/3)

Sculpture

162

(y)

Romantic Art, comprising

164

(a)

(i.)

(ii.)

(iii.)

5.

Porm

Conclusion]

Painting

167

Music

169

Poetry

171

...

173

PREFATORY ESSAY BY THE TRANSLATOR.

ON THE TRUE CONCEPTION OF ANOTHER WORLD.


"With such barren forms of thought, that are always in a
Its object is
world beyond, Philosophy has nothing to do.
always something concrete, and in the highest sense present."
Hegel's Logic, Wallace's translation, p. 150.

It will surprise many readers to be told that the


words which I have quoted above embody the very
essence of Hegelian thought.

The

Infinite,

the supra-

sensuous, the divine, are so connected in our minds

with

futile

rackings of the imagination about remote

matters which only distract us from our duties, that


a philosophy which designates

its

problems by such

terms as these seems self-condemned as cloudy and


inane.

But,

all

appearances to the contrary notwith-

standing, Hegel
concrete.

is

always dealing with


lay,"

faithful to the

present and the

In the study of his philosophy

human

experience.

"

we

are

My stress

says Mr. Browning,* "on the incidents in the


*

Preface to " Sordello."

PREFATORY ESSAY.
development of a soul

little

else

worth study."

is

For "a soul" read "the mind," and you have the
subject-matter to which Hegel's eighteen closeprinted

volumes are devoted.

ductory remarks are meant


point of view.

The

to insist

present intro-

on

this neglected

wish to point out, in two or three

undergone by
when sedulously applied to life,
and restrained from generating an empty " beyond."
By so doing I hope to pave the way for a due

salient instances, the transformation

speculative notions

appreciation of Hegel's philosophy of fine

art.

That

the world of mind, or the world above sense, exists


as an actual

and organized whole,

is

a truth most

easily realized in the study of the beautiful.

And

grasp this principle as Hegel applies

nothing

less
life.

it

is

to

than to acquire a new contact with spiritual

The

spiritual

world, which

present, actual,

is

and concrete, contains much besides beauty.


But
to apprehend one element of such a whole constitutes
and presupposes a long step towards apprehending
the

rest.

It is for this

reason that

propose, in the

by prominent examples, the


conception of a spiritual world which is present and
actual, and then to let Hegel speak for himself on
the particular sphere of art.
So closely connected
indeed are all the embodiments of mind, that the
first

place, to explain,

Introduction

to

the

"

Philosophy of Fine Art

almost a microcosm of his entire system.

''

is

THE OTHER WORLD.

We

know, to our

cost,

the popular conception of

Whatever that world is,


not here and not now.

the supra-sensuous world.


it is,

That

commonly thought

as

to say,

is

miracle, at

of,-

here and now,

if

it

is

so

by a

sort of

which we are called upon to wonder, as

when angels are said to be near us, or the dead to


know what we do. Again, it is a counterpart of our
and

world,

present

senses, than

as such.

in

It is

its

imperceptible

rather

to

otir

nature beyond contact with sense

peopled by persons,

who

live eternally,

which means through endless ages, and to whose

communion with

actual

God, we look forward

us, as also to

in the future.

our

It

own with

even perhaps

contains a supra-sensuous original corresponding to

every thing and movement in this world of ours.


'

And
of

it

life,

does not necessarily deepen our conception

but only reduplicates

it.

Such a world, whatever we may think about


actual existence,

sophy.
are

The

is

" things

not seen

Plato,

world.

indeed,

way

"

of Plato or of Hegel

projection

not a double or a

conceptions in a

its

not the " other world " of philo-

wavered

of the existing

between

the

two

that should have warned his

interpreters of the divergence in his track of thought.

But

in Hegel, at least, there

world of

When we

spirits

with him

is

is

no ambiguity.

study the embodiments of mind or

in his pages,

and read of

The

no world of ghosts.

law, property,

spirit

and national

PREFATORY ESSAY.
unity

of fine

intellect

the religious community, and the

art,

that has

attained

scientific

self-conscious-

we may miss our other world with its obscure


"beyond," but we at any rate feel ourselves to be
ness,

and with the deepest


concerns of life. We may deny to such matters the
titles which
philosophy bestows upon them
we
may say that this is no "other world," no realm of
dealing with something

real,

spirits,

nothing

infinite or divine

but this matters

we know what we are talking about,


and are talking about the best we know. And what
we discuss when Hegel is our guide, will always
be some great achievement or essential attribute of
the human mind. He never asks, "Is it?" but always
little

so long as

"What

is

it?" and therefore has instruction,

from experience, even

for those to

whom

the

drawn

titles

of

seem fraudulent or bombastic.


These few remarks are not directed to maintaining any thesis about the reality of nature and of
his inquiries

Their object

sense.
falls

between the world

do not know.
life.

am

am

is

to enforce a distinction which

we know, and not


we know and another which we

the world which

within

-.

This distinction

is

real,

and governs

not denying any other distinction, but

insisting

on

this.

No

really great philosopher,


\

nor religious teacher, neither Plato, nor Kant, nor


St. Paul
can be understood unless we grasp this
antithesis in the right way.
All of these teachers

I
*

THE OTHER WORLD.


have pointed men to another World.
perhaps, were led at times
reality of their

All of them,

by the very

own thought

and

force

into the fatal

separa-

So strong was their


sense of the gulf between the trifles and the realities

tion that cancels

of

imagination

transmute
into

an

But

their

bility,

they gave

that

life,

meaning.

its

in

themselves

this gulf

and

inaccessibility

others

in

that

all

to

effort

apprehension.

defies

purpose was to overcome

hardest of

indolent

the

to

from a measure of moral

not to heighten

The

occasion

this

inaccessi-

it.

lessons in interpretation

is

to

We
believe that great men mean what they say.
are below their level, and what they actually say
seems impossible to us, till we have adulterated it
to suit our

own

imbecility.

speak of the highest


of reality to

what

realities,

they

Especially

we

when they

attach our notio n

pronounc e to be rea L_

And

thus we Ban^every attempt to deep en our_Jdeas_gi


the woridltT which we live." The work of intelligence
is

hard

that of the sensuous fancy

is

easy

and so

we substitute the latter for the former. '^We are told,


for instance, by Plato, that goodness, beauty, and
truth are realities, but not visible or tangible.
Instead of responding to the call so made on our
intelligence by scrutinizing the nature and conditions
of these intellectual facts though we know well how
tardily they are produced by the culture of ages we

PREFATORY ESSAY.
apply forthwith our idea of 'reality as something
separate in space and time, and so "refute" Plato
with ease, and remain as wise as

And

true

is

it

we were

Plato, handling

that

import with the mind

and

ideas

before.

of vast

language of his day,

sometimes by a similar error refutes himself.* He


makes, for instance, the disembodied soul see the
invisible ideas.

mind

as

Thus he

travesties his things of the

though they were things of sense, only not of

our sense

thereby

destroying the deeper difference

of kind that alone enables them to find a place

our world.

That

doctrine of ideas

his

was

in

really

rooted, not in mysticism, but in scientific enthusiasm,


is

truth

that

is

veiled

inconsistencies, but far

from

us

partly

by

his

more by our own erroneous

preconceptions.!

There
" this "

is,

however, a genuine distinction between

world and the

"

other

"

world, which

is

merely

parodied by the vulgar antitheses between natural

and supernatural, finite and infinite, phenomenal


and noumenal. We sometimes hear it said, " The
*

" Endless duration

whiter,"
ideas,

is

and

one of
is

just,

makes good no better, nor white any


comments on Plato's " eternal

Aristotle's

unless " eternal " conveys a difference of

kind.
t Whewell, I think, misinterprets Plato's language about
astronomy in this sense. Plato is not decrying observation, but
demanding a theoretical treatment of the laws of motion, a
remarkable anticipation of modern ideas.

THE OTHER WORLD.


world

quite changed to

is

person," or

me

to

"

such

literally true

since

knew such a

an idea."
The expression may be
and we do not commonly exaggerate,

underrate

vastly

but

me

studied such a subject," or " had suggested

instance, in a

good

import.

its

We

read,

for

"These twenty kinds

authority,

of birds (which Virgil mentions) do not correspond

much

so

to our species as to our genera

Greeks and Romans,

very rough-and-ready methods of


as

is

Any one may

the observation of
called

lifer

"

same fact as regards


Every yellow ranunculus

verify the

flower/i.

everjy large

a "butter-c

hemlock."

which men consciousl


considerable degree

no metaphor, but
environment

is

is

ulve^it least as
s

ofj

al objects.

wish b

"

ural objects, although

per*

it

world.

consciousness does not

into

oid, I cannot, indeed,

"m

by
makes our immediate

is

But there

Without going

more in the matter t

enabling us to

as a
It

the training even of

mere apprehension
I

much

or blindness.

say that man's whole

transfo

maintain that mind

the surroundings in

liter;

metaphysics, which

white umbel-

hundreds of other

wijth

Ti

differences of percepti

his

classification, just

the case with uneducated people at the present

day."*

is

for the

need hardly say, had only

ma

Year with the Birds.

!Jf

unquestionably

My individual

create the differences

%n an Oxford

Tutor.

PREFATORY ESSAY.
between the species of ranunculus, although

my

create

doi

it

But when we

knowledge of them.

corr

to speak of the world of morals or art or politic

we may

venture

much

further in our assertions. /Tr

actual facts of this world

are causally sustained

do

directly arise out of an

by conscious

intelligence

The

these facts form the world above sense.


of a Christian church or congregation
fact of life

may
is

is

is

unity?

this

it

is,

unity

it

visible

and

so,

Wh;

to be.

tangible, like

human body? /ho, the unity is


exists in the medium of thought

made up

What

Is

come

unit

a governin

that of a family or a nation

hope, will that of humanity

unity of a
that

so

is

an

tr.

"ideal;

only

of certain sentiments, purposes, and idea

even

of

an

army?

Here,

an

too,

ide;

the mainspring. of action.

Without mutu;
intelligence and reciprocal reliance you may ha\
a mob, but you cannot have an army. But all the:
conditions exist and can e:- ist in the mind only. A
is

army, qua army,


only does

does that

it

is

not a mere fact of sense

need mind to perceive

but

The world

it

also needs

mind

it

to

for nc

a heap of san
make

it.

of these governing facts of

life

is

tl

world of the things not seen, the object of reaso


the world of the truly infinite and divine.
It is,

course, a false antithesis to contrast seeing with tr

bodily eye and


.

seeing eye

is

seeing with the mind's eye. Tr


always the mind's eye. The distinctic

THE OTHER WORLD.


between sense and
within

between the

mind

is

spirit or intellect is

mind, just as

the

and the

spirit

that only sees colour

is

flesh.

The

self-conscious spirit.

opposition

<Nevertheless,__the

sense or sense-p

from th e mind that

different

a distinction

Paul's

St.

_sees_

er ceptio n

latter includes the former,

To

but the former does not include the

latter.

one the colour

to the other

is

an element

is

in

the ultimate fact

a thing of beauty.

above

The "things not

sense.

the
it

This relation

prevails throughout between the world of sense

the world

beauty, ifl__

and

seen,"

philosophically speaking, are no world of existences

and severed from

or of intelligences co-ordinate with


this

They

present world.

are a value, an

import,

a significance, superadded to the phenomenal world,

which

may

thus be said, though with some risk of

degraded

misunderstanding, to be

The

house,

the

the

cathedral,

into

judge's

a symbol.
robe,

the

general's uniform, are ultimate facts for the child or

the savage

but

for

symbols of domestic
State.
its

*"

the

life,

civilized

man

they are

of the Church, and of the

Even where the supra-sensuous world has

purest expression, in the knowledge and will of

intelligent

beings,

it

presupposes a sensuous world

as the material of ideas

and of

actions.

"

This " world

and the "other" world are continuous and inseparable,


and all men must live in some degree for both. But
the completion of the Noumenal world, and the

PREFATORY ESSAY.
apprehension of

by

task
I

fulfilling

its

and completeness,

reality

is

the

which humanity advances.

pass to the interpretation, neither technical noi

two of Hegel's most alarming

controversial, of one or

phrases.

The

"infinite"

seems to practical minds the ver>

opposite of anything
the description of
life

we knowTas

the very

a"oEthesjs_of_any

appears

to"

be

the mere negation o f the

the description of a purpose,

ceive to be attainable
it?

by denying every

fcTfned

had not selected

most precious
of

common

in

And

this

logic,

though

what

be,

is

tha

the place and meet!

fills

the problem of that conception.

how this can


when we read about

could wis!

much-abused tern

different in nature to

yet rightly

explain

predicate

most real anc


adhered to it, no doubt

He

life.

infinity,

i<

we can con

purpose that

as the distinctive predicate of

because his

it

as the description of a being

which we attach to personality.


that Hegel

As

or valuable.

real, present,

life, it is

will

attempt

and what ve are

infinity in the

t(

discussing

Hegelian philo

sophy.
It is

an obvious remark, that

infinity

was a symbo

of evil in Hellenic speculation, whereas to Christiai

and modern thought


idle talk has arisen

it is

on

identified with good.

Mud

this account, as to the limita

tion of the Hellenic mind.

For

in fact, the

Finit

ascribed to Pythagoras, and the idea of limit and pro

THE OTHER WORLD.


portion in Plato or in Aristotle, are far more nearly-

akin to true infinity than

popular philosophy.
limit.

infinity,

which

may be

with enumeration ad infinitum,

infinity of Hegel

is

modern

means the negation of

Infinite

Now, common

in general

the Infinite of

is

identified

the false

the attempt to negate or transcend

a limit which inevitably recurs.

'It arises

from attempt-

we
without making any advance^

ing a task or problem in the wrong way, so that

may go on
towards

its

for

ever

achievement.

which of course has

its

All quantitative infinity

definite uses, subject to proper

reservations

change

character by_ mere continuance, and the

its

of this nature.

is

"aggregate of a million units

is

process_ does not

no more

the aggregate of ten.

limitation than

._

"A

free

from

defect in

kind cannot be compensated by mere quantity. We


see the fallacious attempt in savage, barbaric, or
vulgar

Meaningless

art.

iteration, objectless labour,


jj

size,

extravagant costliness, indicate the

effort to satlify

marTTheed Of expiessferfby the mere

enormous

accumulation of work without adequate idea or purBut such efforts, however stupendous, never
pose.
attain their goal.

They

constitute a recurrent failure

to transcend a recurrent

to enumeration

ad

limit,

infinitum.

precisely

analogous

hundred thousand

pounds' worth of bricks and mortar comes no nearer


to the embodiment of mind than a thousand pounds'
worth.

To

attempt adequate expression by mere

PREFATORY ESSAY.
aggregation of cost or size

is

therefore to

fall

into the

infinite process or the false infinity.

Another well-known instance


happiness

in

the form

of

"

is

the pursuit of

pleasure for pleasure's

The recurrence of unchanging units leaves us


where we were. A process which does not change
sake."

remains the same, and


at

first,

will

on producing

somehow
straight
infinity

or
line

we

if it

did not bring satisfaction

not do so at last.*

We

might as well go

parallels to infinity, in the

somewhere they may meet.

may

serve as

hope that

An

infinite

a type of the kind of

are considering.

Infinity in the Hegelian sense does not partake


in

any way of this endlessness, or of the unreality which

attaches to
faction.

because

it.

Its root-idea

That which
it

is

is

self-completeness or satis-

" infinite " is

does not refer beyond

or for justification

without boundary,

itself for

and therefore.in

all

explanation,

human existence

or production infinity can only be an aspect or element.

picture, for instance,

art, justifies itself,

regarded as a work of fine

gives satisfaction directly

and without raising questions of cause or of comparison, and


is in this sense
i.e. in respect of its beauty
regarded

When, on

as "

infinite.''

this

same work of art

the other hand,

as an historical

a link in a chain of causation

e.g.

we

consider

phenomenon, as

as elucidating the

development of a school, or proving the existence


of
*

See note above,

p. xii.

THE OTHER WORLD.


a certain technical process at a certain date

go beyond
depress

it

itself for its interest

at

once into a

that which presents

finite

itself as

then we

and explanation, and

The

object

incomplete

finite is

<

the infinite

that which presents itself as complete, and which,


therefore, does not force

upon us the

This character belongs

tation.

fact of its limita-

in the highest

degree

to self-conscious mind, as realized in the world above

sense

world

and

in

some degree

to

elements of that

all

for instance, to the State

in as far as

represent man's realized self-consciousness.

nature of self-consciousness to be

infinite,

they

It is the

because

it

what was opposed to


is its
organized sphere
it, and thus to make itself into an
that has value and reality within, and not beyond
If false infinity was represented by an infinite
itself.
straight line, true infinity may be compared to a
nature to take into

itself

circle or a sphere.

between true and false infinity is


The sickly yearnimport.
moral
of the profoundest
ing that longs only to escape from the real, rooted

The

distinction

in the antithesis

between the

infinite

and the actual


"

"
or concrete, or in the idea of the monotonous infini
"
"
is
the
or
gouffre,"
which is one with the abtme"

appraised
to rest

by

this test at its true value.

on a mere

sentiment.

So

far

It is

pathetic fallacy of thought

from

the infinite

seen

and

being remote,

can be truly
abstract, unreal,' nothing but the infinite

PREFATORY ESSAY.
present, concrete,

us

of

and

The

real.

always refers

finite

away and away through an endless series of causes,


effects, or of relations.
The infinite is individual,

and bears the character of knowledge, achievement,


In short, the actual realities which we

attainment.

have

in

infinite,

mind when,

unity and general

we speak

in philosophy,

are such as a nation that


will,

of the

conscious of

is

its

or the realm of fine art as

the recognition of man's higher-na ture,

the religious

""community with its""cbnviction of arnncTwelling Deity.

Now, whether we

like the

term

whether or no we think that man's

Infinite or
life

not,

can be ex-

plained and justified within the limits of these aims


and these phenomena, there is no doubt that these
matters are real, and are the most momentous of

In acquainting ourselves with their struc-

realities.

ture, evolution,

and

relation to individual

at least not wasting time, nor

life,

we

are

treating of matters

beyond human intelligence.


There is a very similar contrast in the conception
of human Freedom. " Free will " is so old a vexed
question, that though the conflict

round

it,

upon

turn

its

abstract, " Is

But when

decision.

man

rages

free

fitfully

much can

in place of the

we

are confronted with the


what, and as what, does
carry out his will with least hindrance and
with

concrete inquiry, "

man

still

the world hardly conceives that

fullest

"

When,

satisfaction?"

in

then

we have

before us

the

THE OTHER WORLD.


actual

phenomena of

civilization, instead of

an

idle

and abstract Yes or No.


Man's Freedom, in the sense thus contemplated,
lies in the spiritual or supra-sensuous world by which
his humanity is realized, and in which his will finds

The

fulfilment.

law are the

family, for example, property,

and

In them

steps of man's freedom.

first

the individual's will obtains and bestows recognition


as an agent in a society

i.e.

whose bond of union is ideal


and this recog-

existing only in consciousness

nition develops into duties

man

that

finds

which and

As

and

something to

rights.

live

for,

It is in these

something

in

sake of which to assert himself.

for the

society develops he lives on the whole

more

in

the civilized or spiritual world, and less in the savage


or purely natural world.

expands with the


its

'

His

institutions

will,

which

is

himself,

and ideas that form

purpose, and the history of this expansion

human

history of

more barbarously

freedom.
irrational,

Nothing

is

is

the

m ore shallow,

than to regard the pro- 7

gTESs of civilizafion" as the accumulation of restrictions.

Laws

extended

ImcT'T-nie's

capacities.

a positive nature, and


conditions,

and every

relations.

To

are "a

necessary" aspect of

Every power that we gain has


therefore

involves

positive

positive condition has negative

accomplish a particular purpose you

must go to work in a particular way, and in no other


way. To complain of this is like complaining of a

PREFATORY ESSAY.
house because

has a definite shape.

it

If

freedom
"

" freer
means absence of attributes,
than any edifice. Of course a house may be so ugly
that we may say we would rather have none at all.

empty space

may

Civilization

say

" rather

are

we

it

bring

such horrors that

savagery than this

and

spiritual,

The

but in neither case

civilization,

free.

effort

to ^grasp

and apply such an idea as

can hardly be barren.

this

we may

man becomes human,,

only in_^ivj3jzaIIanVthat

is

"

Great as are the vices of

serious.

is

brings us face to face

It

with concrete facts of history, and of man's actual

motives and purposes.

True philosophy

here,

as

everywhere, plunges into the concrete and the real


it is

the indolent abstract fancy that thrusts problems

away
mind

is

free

preacher,

moment

'

when

But

wills.

beyond

"

and

or into futile abstrac-

knows well that the


achieves what as a whole it truly

it

Plato,

refers

the allegorist

the

soul's

and

freedom

imaginative

to

a fleeting

of ante-natal choice, which he vainly strives

exempt from causal

tion,

"

Plato, the philosopher,

tion.

to

remote

into the

with

its

future,

Finally,

is
it

influence.

'Pictorial imagina-

ready reference to occurrences

in

past

the great foe to philosophic intelligence.


is

the notion of an

impossible to omit

all

reference to

immanent Deity, which forms the

very centre of Hegel's thought.


tive English reader first

When

an unspecula-.

meets with Hegel's passionate

THE OTHER WORLD.


insistence

God

that

is

and that

deny

to

a Trinity of persons,

this is to represent

who know

heathen

He

not unknowable, that

necessarily reveals himself as

not God," he

He

taken sand into his mouth.

men

as "the

feels as if
is

he had

inclined to ask

what these Neo-Platonic or mediaeval doctrines are


doing

in the nineteenth century,

dead

resuscitate

possible .value

logomachies

for

life

and why we should


can

that

not attempt here to discuss the

no
must

have

conducts. Now,

or

question of

difficult

Hegel's ultimate conception of the being of God,

and.

am bound

these pages that

though

by

conception.

no hesitation

to
I

warn any one who may read


only profess to reproduce one
most prominent

far the

side

of that

But, subject to this reservation, I have


in saying, that our

own

prejudices form

the only hindrance to our seeing that Hegel's subject-

matter

is

here, as elsewhere,

us what he takes to be the

human

He

life.

literal truth,

gives

and we

will

Verbally contradicting
have it to be metaphor.
Kant, he accepts, completes, and enforces Kant's
" Revelation can never be the true ground
thought.
of religion," said
accident,

and

Kant

religion

intelligent nature."

ledge of

God

"

is

" for revelation is

an historical

a rational necessity of man's

Revelation

is

the only true know-

and ground of religion," says Hegel,

" because revelation consists in the realization

man's

intelligent nature!"

We

are,

of God in

however, not unac-

PREFATORY ESSAY.
customed to such phrases, and our imagination
equal to

We

its

is

habitual task of evading their meaning.

take them to be a strong metaphor, meaning

that God,
off, is,

who

a sort of ghostly being a long

is

way

notwithstanding, more or less within the know-

ledge of our minds, and so

is " in "

them, as a book

London may be in my memory


when I am in Scotland. Now, right or wrong, this
is not what Hegel means.
He means what he says
that God is spirit or mind,* and exists in the medium
which

is

actually in

of mind, which
rate,

only

thought

is

is

in

actual as intelligence, for us at any

the

human

hard from

its

very simplicity,

stru ggle, as always, to avoid grasping


spirits as

made

The
and we

self-consciousness.

it.

We

imagine

of a sort of thin matter, and so as

existing just like bodies, although

we call them diswe think of this disembodied


an alternative to human form, and suppose
have somehow a purer existence apart from

embodied.

form as
spirit to

And

then

human

body.
This error really springs from imagining the two as existences of the same kind, and
so conflicting, and from not realizing the notion of
spirit as

way

mind

or self-consciousness, which

of conceiving

its

is

the only

actual presence in our world.

* The fusion of these meanings in the German " Geist


gives a force to his pleading which English cannot render.
He appeals, e.g., triumphantly to " God is a Spirit," i.e. not "

ghost " but " mind."

THE OTHER WORLD.


Mind

uses sensuous existence as

its

The poet who has

even needs

it.

so nearly,*

fails

here

symbol

perhaps

thought

hit Hegel's

" This weight of

Are they not sign and symbol of thy

body and limb,

division from

Him?"

Here we leave the track of the higher Pantheism


for that

of vulgar mysticism.

conceived
shape,

because

embodiment, or because
of

its

Now,

Hegelian idea.

human

being

somehow incompatible with

as

either

own.

Spiritual

this

incapable

of

has a quasi-material shape

it

the reverse of the

just

is

According to Hegel,

The

notion

bodily

any concrete

it

is

only in the

formJ:hat intelligence can for us find

expression.

is

its full

of a spiritual body other

than and incompatible with the natural body does


not

Spirit^exists in the

arise.

medium of consciousThe spirituali-

ness, not in a peculiar kind of matter.

zation of the natural

an

body

is

not to be looked for in

astral or angel body, but in the gait

and gesture,

the significance and dignity, that malce the" body- of

man

the civilized
distinguislT

The human
*

the outward image of his soul, and

him from the savage


soul becomes actual

as from the animal.


itself,

and

visible to

See Tennyson's " Higher Pantheism," especially the

fine

lines

" Speak to Him thou, for


meet,

Closer

is

He

He

hears,

and

Spirit with Spirit

than breathin?, and nearer than hands and

can

feet."

00/1/,

t-iicr/i i ujtr

by moulding the body into its symbol


and instrument. It ought to have been an axiom of
physiology, Hegel says, that the series of animated
forms must necessarily lead up to that of man. For
others, only

only sensuous form in which mind could

this is the

Thus anthropomor-

attain adequate manifestation.

phism

in fine art

no accident, nor an unworthy

is

portrayal of divinity.
to

sense,

it

If the

must be

in

Deity

is

to be symbolized

the image of man.

The

symbol is not indeed the reality, as the sensuous


image is not conscious thought but this is a defect
;

inherent in artistic presentation, and not attributable


to

anthropomorphism

in particular.

obvious that in the light of such a conception,

It is

a speculative import can be attached to the doctrine


of the Incarnation, and Hegel's reading of Christian
ideas
sense.

is,

in

This

views, which,

fact,
is

to

be interpreted entirely

in

this

not the place to go deeper into such

however profound,

may

perhaps continue

seem non-natural expositions of Christian dogma.


I am only concerned to show how here, also, the
speculative idea, operating upon the concrete and
actual, generates a fresh and inspiring insight into
life and conduct.
Few chapters of anthropology are
more thorough, profound, and suggestive than Hegel's,

to

account of the

"

attributes which

by stamping

it

actual soul

make

the

"

i.e.

body

of the habits and

human
Nor has

distinctively

with the impress of mind.

THE OTHER WORLD.


philosophic insight ever done better service to the
history of religion than in grasping the essence of
Christianity as the unity, (not merely the union) of the
divine

and human nature.


the things which are

Among

spiritually discerned,

an important place belongs to beauty.

As

a boun-

dary and transition between sense and thought,


is

peculiarly fitted to illustrate the reality which

claim, in contradistinction to

what

ance, for

is

best

it

we

mere sensuous appear-

Many who

life.

distrust

Hegelian formulae are convinced thafbeauty at least


is

real.

They

will

admit that

nition of beauty are not

fine art

trifles,

and the recog-

not amusements, but

rank high among the interests that gjyf

l;ff>

''<

Vf^pp
All such will find themselves in sympathy with the

purpose of a great philosopher who has bent

power of

his genius

and

all

the

his industry to vindicating

a place for art as an embodiment of the divine nature.

The
that

Introduction to Hegel's "./Esthetic," which


it

was possible

is

all

to reproduce in the present volume,

and detailed elaboration


care for thorough and
of the
noble thought on a great subject, and for a defence
of their faith in the true spiritual realities, I have

lacks, of course, the solidity


treatise.

Yet

to all

who

hope that the ensuing pages, however marred by


imperfect translation, will be welcome.

HEGEL'S .ESTHETIC.
INTRODUCTION.
CHAPTER

I.

THE RANGE OF .ESTHETIC DEFINED, AND SOME


OBJECTIONS REFUTED.

The

present course of lectures deals with " ^Esthetic."

Their subject

more

is

the wide realm of the beautiful, and,

particularly,

restrict

it,

their province

is

Art

we

may-

indeed, to Fine Art.

The name

"

^Esthetic " in

its

natural sense

not quite appropriate to this subject.

is

"^Esthetic"

means more precisely the science of sensation or


Thus understood, it arose as a new science,
feeling.
rather
as something that was to become a branch
or
of philosophy for the

first

time,* in the school

of

* InBaumgarten's" JEsthetica,"i7So. See Lotze's "^Esthetik


n Deutschland," p. 4, and Scherer's " Hist, of German Litera;ure,"

Engl. Transl.,

ii.

25.

THE RANGE OF ESTHETIC.

[Chap.

I.

when works of art were being


Germany in the light of the feelings

Wolff, at the epoch

considered in

which they were supposed

evoke

to

so inappropriate,

or, strictly

that for this reason

names,

it

feelings

of

The name was

pleasure, admiration, fear, pity, etc.

speaking, so superficial,

was attempted to form other


But this name, again, is

"Kallistic."

e.g.

unsatisfactory, for the science to be designated does

not treat of beauty in general, but merely of

We

beauty.

^Esthetic to stand, because

and so

is

permit

therefore,

shall,

it is

the

a name, therefore,

it

common

may be

name

nothing but a name,

indifferent to us, and, moreover,

a certain point passed into

artistic

has up to

As

language.

retained.

The

proper

expression, however, for our science is the "Philosophyof


>^Art," or,
a.

more

By

definitely, the "

may

we

Such a

the beauty of Nature.


subject

Philosophy of Fine Art."

the above expression

at once exclude

of our

limitation

appear to be an arbitrary demarcation,

resting on the principle that every science has the


,

prerogative of marking out

But

this is

its

boundaries at pleasure.

not the sense in which

we

are to under-

stand the limit ation of ^Esthetic to the beauty of


It is true that in

common

life

we

speaking of beautiful colour, a beautiful sky, a


river,

and, moreover, of beautiful

animals, and, above

We will

not just

now

all,

art.

are in the habit of


beautiful';

flowers, beautiful

of beautiful

human

beings.

enter into the controversy

how

ChAp.

far

I.]

ART HIGHER THAN NATURE.

such objects can justly have the attribute

beauty ascribed

them,

to

how

or

of

speaking

far,

generally, natural beauty ought to be recognized as

We

existing besides artistic beauty.

begin at once by asserting that

may, however,)

artistic

beau ty stands I

higher th an nature.

For the beauty of

art is

the

beauty_ _that__is

born

is

of

the

born

again,

mindj* and by as much

as the

are hi gher t h an

anrl

much

even

a man's head
for

content,

its

products

its

is

appearances, by so

higher than the beauty of

if

'-

higher than any product of nature

such a fancy must at

least

be characterized by

being and by freedom .t

intellectual
its

is

min d and

we look at it formally i.e. only


what way it exists, not what there is
silly fancy such as may pass through

Indeed,

considering in
it,

"

the beauty of art

nature.

in

ria1 llrp

that

In respect of'

on the other hand, the sun,

for instance/

appears to us to be an absolutely necessary factor in


the universe, while a blundering notion passes

away

own

being,

is
1

accidental and transient

but yet, in

natural existence such as the sun

not free or self-conscious, while if

"* Aus dem

Geiste

allusion

to

is

we

"born of

its

indifferent,t_js

consider
walpsr

it

in

and of the

Spirit."

t Not in the sense of fancying what you please, but in the


echnical sense of having separate existence ; detached, so to
ipeak, from the general background of things, not a mere

:oncurrence of other elements.


% Has no power of distinguishing

itself

from other

things.

THE RANGE OF ^ESTHETIC.

its

necessary connection with other things

regarding
fore,

it

by

itself

or for

its

own

[Chap.

we

are not

sake, and, there-

not as beautiful.

To

say, as

we have

said, in general

terms, that

mind and

its artistic

beauty,

no doubt to determine almost nothing.

is

"higher"

beauty stand higher than natural

For

an utterly indefinite expression, which

is

the beauty of nature and that of art as

designates
if

I.

merely standing side by side

in the

space of the

imagination, and states the difference between them


as purely quantitative, and, therefore, purely external.

But the mind and


compared with

as

its artistic

not simply relative.

Mind, and mind only,

and comprehends

_of truth,

whatever

is

beauty, in being "-higher"

nature, have a distinction which


is

in itself all that lsTscTthat

can only be really and truly

beautiful

beautiful as partaking in this higher element

created thereby.
_

is

capable

and

as

In this sense the beauty of naturei<

reveals itself -as but a reflection of the beauty wKTcTi

belongs to the . miud*. _as an imperfect.

mode

of being, as a

"element

is

contained

Moreover,

we

mod e whose
in

the mind

Tnc omplei

really substantial

itself.

shall find the restriction to fine art

very natural, for however

much has been and is said


by the ancients than by ourselves
of the beauties of nature, yet no one has taken it

though

less

head to emphasize the point of view of the


beauty of natural objects, and to attempt to
make a

into his

Chap.

BEAUTY OF NATURE EXCLUDED.

I.]

science, a systern atic_agcount of these beauties.

The

aspect of Utility, indeed, has been accentuated, and

a science,

e.g.

of natural things useful against diseases/-}

a materia medica, has been compiled, consisting

in a"'

description of minerals, chemical products, plants, and

animals that are of use for curative purposes.

realm of nature

the

has

not

been

arrayed

estimated under the aspect of beauty.

with natural beauty

and too

we

But
and

In dealing

ourselves too open to

find

which
~
would have little interest.
above prefatory remarks upon beauty in

vagueness,

destitute of a criterion ; for

"reason" such a review


""Trie

nature and in

upon the

art,

relation

between the

two, and the exclusion of the former from the region

of the subject proper, are meant to remove any idea

owing merely to

that, the limitation of our science is

choice and to caprice.

But

this is not the place to

demonstrate the above relation, for the consideration

of

it falls

within our science

and therefore

itself,

cannot be discussed and demonstrated

till

it

later.

Supposing that for the present we have limited


ourselves to the beauty of art, this first step brings
us at once into contact with fresh

The

/3.

us

is

first

thing that

whether

the difficulty
.

genius,

all

suggest

fine art

deserve, a__seientific treatment:

doubt, pervade

difficulties.

may

Beauty and

the business of

life like

to

itself

shows

itself

Jo

art,

no

a kindly

and form the bright adornment of

all

our

OBJECTIONS REFUTED.

[Chap.

I.

surroundings, both mental and material, soothing the

sadness of our condition and the embarrassments


of real

where there

is

nothing good to be achieved, occupying

the place of what

Yet

vice.

and

killing time in entertaining fashion,

life,

is

vicious, better, at

any

than

rate,

although art presses in with its pleasing

shapes on every possible occasion, from the rude

adornments of the savage to the splendour of the


temple with

these shapes themselves


real

art
if

decoration,

untold wealth of

its

purposes of

life.

appear to

And

even

do not prove detrimental

if

fall

still

outside the

the creations of

to our graver purposes,

they appear at times actually to further them by

keeping

evil

a distance,

at

still

it

is

so

far true

that art belongs rather to the relaxation and leisure


of the mind, while the substantive interests of

demand

its

exertion.

and pedantic to
is

not in

Hence

it

may seem

treat with scientific seriousness

itself of

a serious nature.

life

unsuitable

what

In any case, upon

such a view art appears as a superfluity, even

if

the

softening of the mental temper which pre-occupation

with beauty has power to produce, does not turn out


a detrimental, because effeminating influence.
In
this aspect of the matter, the fine arts

to be a luxury,

various
to

ways

their

it

has been thought necessary

to take

relation

being granted

up

in

their defence with reference

towards practical necessities, and

more especially towards morality and piety

and, as

Chap.

it.

is

I.]

ART UNWORTHY OF STUDY?

IS

impossible to demonstrate their harmlessness,

at least to

make

it

credible that the mental luxury in

question afforded a larger

With

disadvantages.

been ascribed to
various ways

art,

and

sum

of advantages than of

view very serious aims have

this

it

has been recommended in

as a mediator

between reason

and

sensuousness, between inclination and duty, as the


reconciler of these elements in the obstinate conflict

and repulsion which their collision generates. But


the opinion may be maintained that, assuming such
aims of art, more serious though they are, nothing
is

gained

and duty by

reason

for

the attempt

at mediation, because these principles, as essentially

incapable of intermixture, can be parties to no such

compromise, but demand

in

same purity which they have

their manifestation the

And

in themselves.

it

might be said that art itself is not made any more


worthy of scientific discussion by such treatment,
seeing that

is

it

still

doubly a servant

to

higher

aims, no doubt, on the one hand, but none the less^


to vacuity

and

service can at

frivolity

on the other

and

in

such

best only display itself as a means,

instead of being ah end pursued for


Finally, art, considered as a means,

under

this defect of form, that,

its

own

sake.

seems to labour

supposing

to be

it

subordinated to serious ends, and to produce results


of importance,

such purposes

still

the means employed

is deception.

by

For beauty has

art for

its

being

OBJECTIONS REFUTED.
Now, it will

in appearance.*

an aim which-is~rea4

I.

readily be admitted that

arrd< true in itself

be attaingd__by_ dece ption, and


there achieve

[Chap.

some success

if

in

ought not_to

does here and

it

this

way, that can

only be the case to a limited extent, and even then


deception cannot approve itself as the right means.

For the means should correspond to the dignity of


the end, and only what is real and true, not semblance
or deception, has power to create what is real and
true

just

-the true

as science, for instance, has


interests

of the mind in

the truth of reality and the true

In

all

these respects

were unworthy of
as

is

even

alleged,
if it

it

is

it

way

may

scientific

to

of conceiving

appear as

consideration

at best a pleasing

pursues more serious aims

consider

accordance with

is

it,

if fine art
;

because,

amusement, and
in contradiction

is at best the mere servant


amusement and of serious aims, and yet has
command, whether as the element of its being or
the vehicle of its action, nothing beyond deception

with their nature, but


alike of
at

as

and semblance.
)

y.

But, in the second place,

it is

able aspect of the question that, even

still

more prob-

if fine art

were

to form a subject of philosophical reflections in a general

way,

it

would be no appropriate matter

scientific treatment.

The beauty

for strictly

of art presents

to sense, to feeling, to perception, to imagination


* "

Das Schdne

in dem Sckeine."

itself
;

its

ART UNSUITABLE FOR STUDY?

CHAP. L]

IS

sphere

not that of thought, and the apprehension

of

its

is

and

activity

organ than that of the

what we enjoy

over,

the freedom of

in

scientific intelligence.

the beauty of art

is

precisely

the origination, as in the contemplation, of


tions
rule

we appear

and

More-

productive and plastic energy.

its

demand another

productions

its

In

its crea-

to escape wholly from the fetters of

we seek

In the forms of art

regularity.

for

repose and animation in place of the austerity of the


reign of law

thought

and the sombre self-concentration of

we would exchange

the shadowland of the

And

idea for cheerful vigorous reality.

source of artistic creations

which

Not only

self.

has^ art at

the

the free activity of fancy,

is

in her imagination

lastly,

is

more

free than nature's

command

the whole wealth

of natural forms in the brilliant variety of their appearance, but also the xreative imagination has power
to expaflate inex haust ibly

ducts of itso&m.

It

may

beyond

their

be supposed

li

mit in pro -

that, in presence

of this immeasurable abundance of inspiration and


its

free creations,

thought

will necessarily lose

courage to bring them completely before


them, and to array them under

its

it,

universal formulae.

Science, on the contrary, every one admits,

pelled

by

its

form to busy

abstracts from the

itself

the

to criticize

is

com-

with thought which

mass of particulars. For this reason,

on the one hand, imagination with its contingency


and caprice that is, the organ of artistic activity and

OBJECTIONS REFUTED.

io

enjoyment is of

[Chap.

from

necessity excluded

I.

science.

on the other hand, seeing that art is what cheers


and animates the dull and withered dryness of the
idea, reconciles with reality its abstraction and its dis-

And

sociation therefrom,

what

is

real

world

we may

think,

and supplies out of the

lacking to the notion,

it

follows,

that a purely intellectual treatment of art destroys


this very means of supplementation, annihilates it,
and reduces the idea once more to its simplicity
devoid of reality, and to its shadowy abstractness.

And

further, -it

!oT content,

is

objected that science, as a matter

occupies itself with what

is

necessary.

^'^EsthetlcTputs aside jtE'e~Eeauty of nature,

bnly gain _iiQthixig-in_ respect

jof necessity,

appearance have got further away from

it.

Now,

we

but to

not
all

For the

expression Nature at once gives us_th,ideauif_Nees-

and Uniformity,* that

sity

which

may

is

to say, of a behaviour

be hoped to be akin to science, and

But

^capable of submitting thereto.


generally,

and more particularly

in

the mind,

in the imagination,

compared with nature, caprice and lawlessness are


supposed to be peculiarly at home and these withdraw themselves as a matter of course from all scien;

tific

explanation.

Thus
in range

in all these aspects

in

fine art, instead of

scientific study,

seems rather

origin, in effect,

showing
in its

itself fitted for

own

* " Gisetsmassigkeit."

and

right to resist

THAP.

BASIS OF THE OBJECTIONS.

I.]

he regulating activity of thought, and to be uniuitable for strict scientific discussion.

These and
icientific

similar objections against a genuinely

treatment of fine art are drawn from com-

non ideas, points of view, and considerations, which


nay be read ad nauseam in full elaboration in the
)lder writers upon beauty and the fine arts, especially
n the works of French authors. And
which have a certain truth

:ontain facts

he argumentation

*_

ve choose,

there fs'lhe~fa-ct

e.g.,

we may

omnipresent

is

and from

this, if

proceed to conclude to a universal

'mpulse of Beauty in

human

the further inference

ire

Thus,

forms of beauty are as manifold as the phe-

nomenon of beauty

:o

they

in part, too,

based upon these facts appears

plausible. at_rst_sight r ihat the

in part
;

nature,

and then go on

that because ideas of beauty

so endlessly various,

and

therefore,

as

seems

are something particular,^ it follows that


can be no universal laws of beauty and of taste.
Before it is possible for us to turn from such

jbvious,
:here

:onsiderations to our subject proper,


ness to

it

is

our busi-

devote a brief introductory discussion to the


and doubts which have been raised. In

objections

:he first place, as regards the worthiness of art to


* "

Raisonnement"

a disparaging term

be

in Hegel.

" Particular "different unconnected matters, considered as


t
nerely thrown together in an aggregate, or occurring in a series

>pposed to parts or cases united by an essential principle.

OBJECTIONS REFUTED.

12

scientifically considered,

art can

it

[Chap.

I.

no doubt the case that

is

be employed as a fleeting pastime, to serve

the ends of pleasure and entertainment, to decorate

our surroundings, to impart pleasantness to the exlife, and to emphasize other


by means of ornament. In this mode of
employment art is indeed not independent, not free,

ternal conditions of our

objects

but
art

fBut what we mean to consider,

servile.

which

That

is

free in

its

end as

in its

art is in the abstract

capable of serving other

aims, and of being a mere pastime,


relation

which

it

in

as an accidental means,

and

self-determined, but determined


relations
itself

by

alien objects

this service to rise in free

to the attainment of truth, in


all

finite purposes,

in that case is not

on the other hand, science

but,

from

moreover a
For, on the

the shape of the subservient

understanding, submits to be used for

and

is

shares with thought.

one hand, science,

interference,

the

is

meansj

it fulfils

independence

which medium,

itself in

and

liberates

free from

conformity with

its

proper aims.
Fine art
|

is

not real art

and only achieves

its

it

is

highest task

in this sense free,

when

it

has taken

same sphere with religion and philosophy, and has become simply a mode of revealing to
its

till

place in the

consciousness and bringing to utterance the Divine


,

Nature,* the deepest interests of humanity, and the


*

"Das

Gdttliche?

Chap.

ART NOT UNWORTHY.

I.]

13

most comprehensive truths of the mind. It is in\;


works of art that nations have deposited the pro-]
foundest intuitipns and ideas of their hearts
and\
fine art is frequently the key
with many nations)
;

there

is

to

no other

wisdom and

the understanding of

their (

of their religion.

This is an attribute which(art) shares with religion


and philosophy, only in this peculiar mode, that it
v

represents even the highest ideas in sensuous forms, 1

thereb^bringing^ them nearer

to-,

the -character, dfjf

natural phenomena, to the ^senses, and to feeling.!

The

world, into whose depths thought penetrates, is a

supra-sensuous \world, which


erected

as

is

thus, to begin with, ^4

a beyontl over against immediate con-

sciousness and present. sensation

thus rescues
actuality

itself

and

from the

heal this schism which


itself

the power which

here, that consists in the

finiteness of sense,

thought in cognition.
rates out of

*
'

is

"

the freedom of

But the mind


its

)^

able

is

advance creates

it

to
"

gene-

the works of fine art as the

first

middle term of reconciliation between ^pure thought'^


and what is external, sensuous, and transitory, be-

tween nature with

its finite

actuality

and the

freedom of the reason that comprehends.


S. The element of art was said to be in

its

infinite

general

nature an unworthy element, as consisting in appear-

ance and deception.


devoid of justice,

if it

The

censure would be not

were possible to class appear-

"-'

OBJECTIONS REFUTED.

14

ance as something that ought not to

[Chap.

I.

An

exist.

essential to existence.

appearance or show, however,

is

Truth could not

not appear and reveal

itself,*

for

were

it

be, did

it

not truth for some one or something,

itself as also

Therefore there can be no

for Mind.

objection against appearance in general, but,

mode

against the particular


art gives actuality to

what

of appearance in which
is

in itself real

If,

in this aspect, the appearance with

its

conceptions

termed a

life

if at all,

which

and

as determinate existences

deception, this

is

true.

art gives
is

to

be

a criticism which primarily

meaning by comparison with the external


world of phenomena and its immediate contact with
us as matter, and in like manner by the standard of
receives

our

its

own world

of feeling, that

is,

the inner world of

These are the two worlds to which, in the life


of daily experience, in our own phenomenal | life, we
are accustomed to attribute the value and the title
of actuality, reality, and truth, in contrast to art,

sense.

which we

down as lacking such reality and truth.


whole sphere of the empirical inner and
outer world is just what is not th>_ world of genuine
reality, but is" to be entitled a mere appearance more
Now,

set

this

strictly

than

Genuine

is

true of art,

reality

" Schiene

The

life

is

and a crueller deception.

only to be found beyond the

und erschiene."
which we treat common circumstances and

in

sensations as, in their degree, realities.

Chap.

ART NOT UNTRUE.

I.]

15

immediacy of feeling and of external


Nothing is genuinely real but that which is

objects.l

actual in

own right,* that which is the substance of nature


and of_mind^- fixing itself indeed in present and
its

definite existence, but in this existence

still

retaining

and self-centredjbejng, and thus and no


otherwise attaining genuine reality. The dominion
of these universal powers is exactly what art accentuates and reveals.
The common outer and
inner world also no doubt present to us this essence

its

essential

of reality, but in the shape of a chaos of accidental


matters,

encumbered by the immediateness of sen-

suous presentation, and by arbitrary


characters,

etc.

.Art

liberates

the

states,

real

events,

import of

appearances from the semblance and deception of this


J

bad and

fleeting world,

and imparts

phenomenal |

to

semblances a -hig her .reali ty, born of mind. The I


appearances of art, therefore, far from being mere
semblances, have the higher reality and the more

genuine existence in comparison with the

common

realities

of

life.

Just as

little

called a deceptive

can the representations of art be

semblance

in

comparison with the

representations of historical narrative, as

the more genuine truth.

if

that

had

For history has not even

immediate existence, but only the intellectual presentation of it, for the element of its portrayals, and
* " Das An und Fiirsichseyende."

OBJECTIONS REFUTED.

its

[Chap.

I.

content remains burdened with the whole mass of

by common reality with its


and individualities. But

contingent matter formed

occurrences, complications,

the work of art brings before us the eternal powers


that hold dominion in history, without

way

fluity in the

and

any such super-

of immediate sensuous presentation

unstable semblances.

its

mode of appearance of the shapes promay be called a deception in comparison

Again, the

duced by

art

with philosophic thought, with religious or moral

Beyond a doubt the mode of

principles.

which a content attains


truest reality

in

historical narrative, the artistic

advantage that
refers

us
it

is

the

but in comparison with the show or

of immediate sensuous existence or of

semblance

which

revelation

the realm of thought

in itself

away from

it

semblance has the

points beyond

itself

itself,

and

to something spiritual

meant to bring before the mind's eye.


Whereas immediate appearance does not give itself
is

out to be deceptive, but rather to be real and

though

all

infected

by the immediate sensuous element.

the time

its

truth

is

true,

contaminated and

The

lhard rind of nature and the__com mon world give th e

[mind more trouble

mhando
But
to

art,

in

breaking through

th e products of
if,

on the one

we must no

hand, that art

is

side,

less

to_ the idea.

art.

we

assign this high position,

bear in mind, on the other

not, either in content or in form,

Chap.

ART NOT ULTIMATE TRUTH.

I.]

supreme and absolute mode of bringing the

the

mind's genuine

form of

interests

enough

art. is

Only a

tent.

certain

to a restricted con-

it

and grade of truth

circle

Such truth must have

go

own

in its

forth into sensuous form

itself therein, if it is

as is the

medium of

to be a genuinely artistic content,

There

and so

it

is

is,

no

friendly to sense as

be adequately embraced and expressed by that

medium.
of truth

Of

such a kind

and more

come

world, or, to

is

the Christian conception

especially the spirit of our


closer,

which

art

is

no longer

beyond the stage

mode assumed by man's


The peculiar mode
absolute.

the highest

consciousness of the

which

modern

of our religion and our

intellectual culture, reveals itself as

to

art.

and be adequate to

case with the gods of Greece.

longer so closely 'akin

at

is

nature the capacity^

however, a deeper form of truth, in which

to

The

consciousness.

into

to limit

capable of being represented in the

to

17

artistic

production and works of art belong

satisfies

our supreme fneed.

We are

above

the level at which works of art can be venerated


as divine,

and actually worshipped the impression


make is of a more considerate kind, and
;

which they

within

the feelings which they stir

us

higher test and a further confirmation.

and

reflection

have taken their

Those who delight


set

down

this

in

flight

require a

Thought"

above

fine art.

grumbling and censure

phenomenon

for

may

a corruption, and

OBJECTIONS REFUTED.

18

ascribe

it

to the

predominance of passion and

which scare away


and the cheerfulness of art.
interests,

feelings,

civil

and

selfish

at once the seriousness

Or we may accuse

the

political life as

hindering the

entangled in minute preoccupations, from

freeing themselves,
art,

I.

time and the complicated

troubles of the present

condition of

[Chap.

and

rising to the higher

aims of

the intelligence itself being subordinate to petty

needs and
such

which only subserve

interests, in sciences

purposes and are seduced into making

this

barren region their home.

However

all this

may

be,l it

certainly

is

the case,

that art no longer affords that satisfaction of spiritual

wants which

earlier epochs and peoples have sought


and have found therein onlyj a satisfaction
which, at all events on the religious side, was most
intimately and profoundly connected with art. The

therein,

beautiful days of

Greek

art,

and the golden time

of the later middle ages are gone by.


culture of our
for

us,

life

of to-day, makes

in respect of

The
it

reflective

a necessity

our will no less than of our

judgment, to adhere to general points of view, and


to regulate particular matters according to them, so

that general forms, laws, duties, rights,

what have

validity as

are the chief regulative force.


for

artistic

interest

maxims

are

grounds of determination and


as

for

But what
artistic

is

required

production

is,

speaking generally, a living creation, In which the

hap.

MODERN REFLECTIVENESS.

I.]

niversal
if

19

not present as law and maxim, but acts

is

one with the

mood and

the feelings, just

the imagination, the universal and rational

lined only as brought

snsuous phenomenon.
condition

niversal

is

which

finds

is

as,

con-

into unity with a concrete

Therefore, our present in

not favourable to

egards the artist himself,


eflection

it

its

As

art.

not merely that the

is

utterance

round him, and

all

he universal habit of having an opinion and passing

udgment about art infect him, and mislead him into


mtting more abstract thought into his works them:elves

but also the whole spiritual culture of the

ige is of

such a kind that he himself stands within

world and

reflective

his

mpossible for

him

its

conditions,

to abstract from

esolve, or to contrive for himself

jy

means of

elations of
ill

that

In

it

by

and

it

and bring to

is

and

will

pass,

peculiar education or removal from the

life,

a peculiar solitude that would replace

is lost.

all

these respects art

is,

and remains

for

us,

3nfhe"side of Its highest, destiny^ a thing of the past.

Herein
ind
:han

has further lost for us'

it

life,

and rather

asserts

its

is

its

transferred

into

former necessity, or

former place, in reality.

What

is

genuine "truth
our ideas

assumes

now aroused

its

in

by works of art is over and above our immediate


and together with it, our judgment;
inasmuch as we subject the content and the means
us

enjoyment,

OBJECTIONS REFUTED.

20

[Chap.

I.

of representation of the work of art and the suitability or unsuitability of the

consideration.

more pressing need


which

art,

simply as

satisfaction.

two to our

intellectual

Therefore, the science of art

Art

in
art,

is

a much

our day, than in times

was enough to furnish a

invites us

to consideration

in
full

of

it

",

by means of thought, not

to the end of stimulating

art production, but in order to ascertain scientifically

what

art

e.

As

we

is.

soon as

we propose

to accept this invitation

met by the difficulty which has already been


touched upon in the suggestion that, though art is
are

a suitable subject for philosophical reflection in the

general sense, yet

it

scientific discussion.

false

is

not so for systematic and

In this objection there

idea that a philosophical

nevertheless,

be

ideas others

may have

lies the

consideration may,

On

unscientific.

this point it can


only be remarked here with brevity, that, whatever

of philosophy and philoso-

phizing, I regard the pursuit of philosophy as utterly

incapable of existing apart from a scientific procedure,


j
Philosophy has to consider its object in its necessity,
not, indeed, in

subjective necessity or external

its

arrangement, classification,

etc.,

but

it

has to unfold

and demonstrate the object out of the necessity of its

own

inner nature.

Until this evolution *

to pass the scientific element


*

is

is

brought,;

lacking to the

"Explication?

treat-

Zhap.

ART NOT UNSUITABLE.

I.]

merit.

In as

an object

af

21

however, as the objective necessity

far,

lies essentially in its logical

and metamust

physical nature, the isolated treatment of art

be conducted with a certain relaxation of scientific


stringency.

For

art involves the

most complex pre-

suppositions, partly in reference to

medium

its

content, partly

and element,f

which

in

respect of

is

constantly on the borders of the arbitrary or acci-

dental.

its

Thus

it

is

innermost progress of

its

content and of

we must

prescribed by

necessity.

its

call to

its

media of

mind the

outline

objection that works of fine art elude the

treatment of

scientific

thought because they originate

out of the unregulated fancy and out of the


are of a

art

only as regards the essential

expression that

The

in

number and

feelings,

variety that defy the attempt to

gain a conspectus, and therefore take effect only on


feeling

and

appears

still

imagination,

raises

to have importance.

problem which

For the beauty of

appear in a form which is expressly


thought, and which the latter
abstract
contrasted with
is forced to destroy in exerting the activity which is
art does in fact

This idea coheres with the opinion that


reality as such, the life of nature and of mind, is
disfigured and slain by comprehension that, so far
its

nature.

e.g. colour, sound, heavy matter, etc.


" Element " perhaps more especially any mental function
t
entering into art sense, imagination, understanding, etc.

* " Material,"
:

OBJECTIONS REFUTED.

i-z

[Chap.

I.

from being brought close to us by the thought which


comprehends,

it

is

by

it

that such

dissociated from us, so that,

by the use

the means of grasping what has

life,

himself off from this his purpose.


fully

on

life

is

of thought as

man

We

absolutely

rather cuts

cannot speak

this subject in the present passage,

but only

indicate the point of view from which the removal of


this

difficulty,

or impossibility depending on mal-

adaptation, might be effected.

be admitted, to begin with, that the mind

It will

capable of contemplating

itself,

is

and of possessing a

consciousness, and that a thinking consciousness, of


itself

and

to think

all

innermost

is

that

is

generated by

precisely that in

and essential

nature,

is

itself

gaining

and

behaving according to

its

its

this

pro-

essential

may

display, supposing only that

Now

they have mind in them.

in

art

\vorks as generated and created by the mind


are themselves of a spiritual nature, even

mode

its

however much freedom and caprice those

products
truth

mind

In

nature.

thinking consciousness concerning


ducts, the

Thought

itself.

which the mind has

real

and

its

(spirit),

if

their

of representation admits into itself the sem-

blance of

sensuous

sensuous with mind.

being,

and pervades what

In this respect art

is,

is

to begin

with, nearer to mind and its thinking activity than is


mere external unintelligent nature in works of art,
mind has to do but with its own. And even if artistic
;

Chap.

THE MIND KNO WS ITS CREA TIONS.

I.]

23

works are not abstract thought and notion, but are an


evolution of the notion out of itself, an alienation from
towards the sensuous,

itself

thinking

(mind)

spirit

still

the power of the

lies herein,

not merely to grasp

form of the self-conscious

itself only in its peculiar


spirit (mind),

but just as

much

to recognize itself in

alienation in the shape of feeling

its

and the sensuous,

by transmuting the metamorphosed


thought back into definite thoughts, and so restoring

in

it

of

other form,

its

to

itself.

itself

And

in this preoccupation with the other

the thinking spirit

itself as if forgetting

nor

is it

what

is

not to be held untrue to

or surrendering itself therein,

so weak as to lack strength to comprehend

different from itself, but it comprehends bothx


and its opposite. For the notion is the universal, which preserves itself in its particularizations,
dominates alike itself and its " other," and so becomes
the power and activity that consists in undoing the
alienation which it had evolved. And thus the work
of art in which thought alienates itself belongs, like
thought itself, to the realm of comprehending thought,
is

itself

and the mind,


tion, is

in subjecting

inmost nature.

and notion,

when
its

it

to scientific considera-

it

For because thought

can in the

last resort

has succeeded in imbuing

activity with thought,

time

it

thereby but satisfying the want of


is

made them genuinely

its

own

essence

only be satisfied

all

the products of

and has thus


its

its

own.

for the first

But, as

we

r
,

OBJECTIONS REFUTED.

24

more

shall see

definitely below, art

is

[Chap.

far

the highest form of mind, and receives

I.

from being

its

true rati-

only from science.*

fication

Just as

does art elude philosophical con-

little

sideration

by unbridled

indicated,

it is its

caprice.

As

has already been

true task to bring to consciousness

the highest interests of the mind.

Hence

it

follows

at once with respect to the content that fine art cannot

rove in the wildness of unfettered fancy, for these

determine definite basest for

spiritual

interests

content,

how manifold and

forms and shapes

may

the forms themselves.

inexhaustible soever

The same

be.

its

its

holds true for

They, again, are not at the

Not every plastic shape % is


capable of being the expression and representation
of those spiritual interests, of absorbing and of reproducing them
every definite content determines a
mercy of mere chance.

form suitable to

it.

In this aspect too, then,

we

are in a position to

find our bearings according to the needs of thought


in the

apparently unmanageable mass of works and

types of

art.

Thus,

hope,

we have begun by

defining the

* " Philosophy," "

Wissenschaft"

t " Haltpunkte :"

ultimate points that the matter of art


of, leading ideas that must somehow

must not leave hold

dominate it.
i " Gestaltung :" shaping, as

if

arrangement of shapes.

Thap.

ART NOT

I.]

:ontent

of

our science, to which

;onfine ourselves,
irt

CAPRICIOUS.

25

we propose

and have seen that neither

is

to
fine

unworthy of a philosophical consideration, nor

is

philosophical consideration incompetent to arrive

it

a knowledge of the essence of fine

art.

CHAPTER

II.

METHODS OF SCIENCE APPLICABLE TO BEAUTY


AND ART.
If

we now

investigate the reqtiired

consideration,

ways of
to

we

mode of

scientific

here again meet with two opposite

treating the subject, each of which appears

exclude the other, and so

to

hinder us

from

arriving at any true result.

On

one side we see the science of

art merely, so to

speak, busying itself about the actual productions of


art

from the outside, arranging them

history

of

art,

initiating

discussions

in series as a

about extant

works, or sketching out theories intended to provide


the general points of view that are to govern both
criticism

On

and

artistic

production.

the other side

we

see science

abandoning

independently to reflection upon the beautiful,


and producing mere generalities which do not touch
itself

the work of art in

its

peculiarity, creating, in short,

an abstract philosophy of the beautiful.

Chap.

II.]

1.

As

ART-SCHOLARSHIP.
regards the former

from the empirical

starts

27

mode of treatment, which

side, it is

the indispensable

road for any one who means to become a student of art.

And just
he

is

as in the present

day every one, even though

not busied with natural science, yet pretends to

be equipped with the essentials of physical knowledge, so

it

has become more or

man

a cultivated

less

obligatory for

some acquaintance with

to possess

and the pretension to display one's-self as a


and connoisseur is pretty universal.

art,*

dilettante
(a) If

such information

as art-scholarship,t

The

of wide range.

acquaintance

with

is

really to be recognized

must be of various kinds and

it

first

the

necessity

immeasurable

individual works of art of ancient and

works which

is

region

modern

have actually perished,

in part

exact

an

of

times,

in part

belong to distant countries or portions of the world,


or which adverse fortune has withdrawn from one's

own
its

observation.

age, to

its

Moreover, every work belongs to

nation,

and

to

its

environment, and

depends upon particular historical and other ideas


For this reason art-scholarship further
and aims.
requires a vast wealth of historical information of a

very special

kind,

seeing

nature of the work of art

that
is

the

related

individualized
to

individual

and demands special matter to aid in its comprehension and elucidation. And lastly, this kind

detail

" Kunstkenntniss."

t " Gelehrsamkeit."

28

METHODS OF ESTHETIC

SCIENCE.

[Chap.

II.

of scholarship not only needs, like every other, a

memory

but a vivid imagination

for information,

in

order to retain distinctly the images of artistic forms

and especially in order


them present to the mind for purposes of

in all their different features,

to have

comparison with other works.

Within

{p)

this

kind of consideration, which

is

primarily historical, there soon emerge various points

of view which cannot be lost sight of in contemplating

a work of

art,

inasmuch as our judgments must be

derived from them.

these points of view, as

which have an empirical

starting-

when extracted and put together form

universal

in other sciences

point,

Now

criteria

and

rules, and, in

still

further stage of formal

This

generalization, Theories of the arts.

is

not the

place to go into detail about literature of this kind,

and

it

may,

writings in

there

therefore,

For

the most general way.

particularly,

Poetica

mention a few

to

instance,

Aristotle's " Poetics," the theory of tragedy

is

contained in which

more

suffice

"

is still

among

and Longinus's

of interest

and

to speak

the ancients, Horace's


" Treatise

"

Ars

on the Sublime

"

a general idea of the way in which this


kind of theorizing has been carried on. The general

suffice to give

formulae which were abstracted

meant to stand

by such

writers were

precepts and rules,


according to which, particularly in times of degeneration of poetry and art, works of art were meant to
especially

as

Chap.

ART-PRESCRIPTIONS.

II.]

be produced.

The

29

prescriptions, however, compiled

by these physicians of

art

had even

less

assured

success than those of physicians whose aim

was the

restoration of health.

Respecting theories of this kind,

propose merely

to mention that, though in detail they contain

that

is

instructive, yet their

from a very limited


which passed

much

remarks were abstracted

circle

of artistic productions,

the genuinely beautiful ones, but

for

yet always belonged to a but narrow range of

And

again, such

reflections

which

establishment

formulae
in their

of

are

in

part very trivial

generality proceed

although this

particulars,

art.

to

no
the

is

matter of chief concern.

The above-mentioned Horatian


these reflections, and, therefore,

but one which for

amounts
"

"

He

to nothing,

very reason contains

e.g.

carries all votes,


useful,

reader."

This

"

epistle is full of

a book for

all

men,

much

that

Omne tulit punctum qui miscuit utile dulci


Lectorem delectando pariterque monendo "

and the
e.g.

this

is

who

has mingled the pleasant

by at once charming and


is

just like so

instructing his

many copybook headings,*

Stay at home and earn an honest

which are right enough as

livelihood,"

generalities, but lack the

concrete determinations on which action depends.

Another kind of
* "

interest

was found, not

Paranetischen Lekren."

in the

METHODS OF AESTHETIC

30

SCIENCE.

[Chap.

II.

express aim of directly causing the production of

genuine works of

art,

but in the

purpose which

emerged of influencing men's judgment upon works


of art

by such theories, in short of forming taste.


Home's " Elements of Criticism,"

aspect,

this

In
the

writings of Batteux, and Ramler's " Introduction to

the Fine Arts," were works

Taste

in this sense

treatment, the

much

read in their day.

has to do with arrangement and

harmony and finish of what belongs to


work of art. Besides, they

the external aspect of a

brought

in

among

the principles of taste views that

belonged to the psychology that was then in vogue,

and that had been drawn from empirical observation


of capacities and activities of the soul, of the passions
and
it

their probable heightening, succession, etc.

remains invariably the case that every

works of

art,

man

But

judges

and incidents
insight and his feel-

or characters, actions,

according to the measure of his

and as that formation of taste only touched


what was meagre and external, and moreover drew
ings

its

precepts only from a narrow range of works of art

and from a bornf culture of intellect and feelings, its


whole sphere was inadequate, and incapable of seizing
the inmost and the true, and of sharpening- the eye
for the

apprehension thereof.

Such

theories proceed in general outline, as do the


remaining non-philosophic sciences.
The content
which they subject to consideration is borrowed from

if
*
!

>

'

Chap.

II.]

DEFINITIONS OF THE BEAUTIFUL.

our idea of

it,

as something found there

31

then further

questions are asked about the nature of this idea,

inasmuch as a need reveals itself for closer determinations, which are also found in our idea of the matter,

and drawn from


so doing,

we

it

debatable ground.
as
it

if

to be fixed in definitions.

But

in

on uncertain and
might indeed appear at first

find ourselves at once


It

the beautiful were a perfectly simple idea.

soon becomes evident that manifold sides

But

may be

in it, one of which is emphasized by one writer


and another by another, or, even if the same points of
view are adopted, a dispute arises on the question which

found

side after all

is

to be regarded as the essential one.

With a view
scientific

to such questions

it is

held a point of

completeness to adduce and to

various definitions of the beautiful.

We

criticize

will

do

the
this

neither with historical exhaustiveness, so as to learn


all

the subtleties which have emerged in the defining

process, nor for the sake of the historical interest

but

we

some
come

will

of the

simply produce by way of

more

interesting

illustration,

modern views which

pretty close in their purport to what in fact the

idea of the beautiful does involve.

For such purpose

we have chiefly to mention Goethe's account of the


beautiful, which Meyer embodied in his " History of
the Formative Arts * in Greece," on which occasion he
* "

Bildenden Kiinste." I am not sure if I have given the


It is wider than Plastik, because it includes

best rendering.
painting

and

architecture.

METHODS OF ESTHETIC

32

brings

also

forward

SCIENCE.

view,

Hirt's

[Chap.

II.

though without

mentioning him.
Hirt,
in

one of the greatest of genuine connoisseurs

the present day, in

his

brochure about

artistic

beauty (Horen* 1797, seventh number), after speaking of the beautiful in the several arts,

sums up

his

ideas in the result that the basis of a just criticism

of beauty in art and of the formation of taste

conception of the Characteristic.

That

is

defines the beautiful as the "perfect, which

be an object of eye,

ear, or imagination."

is

to say, he
is

or can

Then he

goes on to define the perfect as "that which

adequate to

its

the

is

aim, that which nature or art aimed

at producing within the given

genus and species]!

in

the formation of the object."

For which reason,

in

order to form our judgment on a question of beauty,

we ought

to direct our observation as far as possible

marks which constitute a definite


essence.
For it is just these marks that form its
characteristics.
And so by character as the law of
art he means " that determinate individual modificato the individual

tion \
*

by

whereby forms, movement and

Die Horen

the

gesture, bearing

monthly magazine whose establishment

Schiller, in

1795, fir st brought Schiller and Goethe into


It only existed for three yearsSee Scherer, Eng.

contact.

Trans.,

ii.

173.

t That is, not a caprice of nature or art, but the perfection


of the object after its kind.
\ " Individuality."

Zhap.

THE CHARACTERISTIC.

II.]

33

ind expression, local colour, light and shade, chiaro-r


scuro *

and attitude distinguish themselves,

in con-

brmity, of course, with the requirements of an object

This formula gives us at once

Dreviously selected."

something more significant than the other definitions,


[f

we go on

see that

what

to ask

" the characteristic "

involves in the

it

first

place a content,

is,

we

as, for

nstance, a particular feeling, situation, incident, action,


Individual

and secondly, the mode and fashion in


embodied in a representation,

ivhich this content is


[t

irtistic
is

law of the

''

of representation, that the

of expression shall subserve the definite indica-

tion of

its

content and be a

The

Df that content.

member

priateness with

form

irtistic

expression

abstract formula of the charac-

which the particular

sets

in

relief

intended to represent.
conception in

If

detail

of the

the content which

we
it

it

desire to illustrate

a quite popular way,

explain the limitation which


[n

in the

thus has reference to the degree of appro-

teristic

this

inasmuch

characteristic " refers,

requires that every particular element in the

it

mode

is

mode

to this, the

is

we may

involves as follows.

a dramatic work, for instance, an action forms

:he content

the

drama f is to represent how this


Now, men and women do all

iction takes place.


sorts

of things
*
t

they speak to each other from time

" Helldunkel."
"

Drama," Gr.

Spapa

= Handlung, " action."


D

METHODS OF ^ESTHETIC

34

to time, at intervals

[Chap.

in all this,

II.

put on their

eat, sleep,

one thing and another, and so

clothes, say

But

they

SCIENCE.

whatever does not stand

in

forth.

immediate

connection with that particular action considered as


the content proper,
reference to

it

is

nothing

to

be excluded, so that

may

be without import.

So,

only represented a single phase of

too, a picture, that

that action, might yet include in

it

so wide are the


a multitude

ramifications of the external world

moment have no

that

at

action in question,

of

and other matters

circumstances, persons, positions,

which

in

reference to the

and are not subservient

to

its

distinctive character.

But, according to the rule of the characteristic,

only so
belongs

much ought
to

the

to enter into the

display* and,

work of

essentially,

expression of that content and no other

must announce
This
fied

in

is

itself as otiose

a certain aspect.

view has vanished and

^.judgment, to the benefit of

may

be

Meyer, however,
it

left

as his

no

art.

the

for nothing

superfluous.

a very important rule, which

above-mentioned work, gives


this

and

art as

to

justi-

in

his

opinion that

trace, and, in his

For he thinks

that

the conception in question would probably have led


to caricature.

This judgment at once contains the

perversity of implying that such a determination of

the beautiful had to do with leading.


* "

Erscheinung."

The Philosophy

Chap.

II.]

OBJECTION TO" CHARACTERISTIC?

of art does not trouble

but

it

how

it

has displayed

works of

about precepts for

find

it

be

to

general

in

itself in actual

this, if

true,

we examine

no doubt, that

the criticism,

Hirt's definition

for

characteristic

on the other hand,

but,

even

answered at once that


speak,

is

and

productions, in

includes caricature,

character

artists,
is,

without meaning to give rules for guid-

art,

Apart from

ance.

we

itself

has to ascertain what beauty

3;

caricature

in

intensified, to exaggeration,

superfluity

of

superfluity ceases to be

may be
must be

a caricature
it

the

definite

and

is,

the characteristic.

what

is

so to

But a

properly required in

order to be characteristic, and becomes an offensive

whereby the

iteration,

made

unnatural.

caricature

shows

characteristic

Moreover, what
itself in

teristic representation

may be

itself

of the nature of

the light of the charac-

of what

of course, a distortion.

is,

is

is

ugly,

which ugliness

Ugliness, for

its

closely connected with the content, so that

it

part, is

may

be

said that the principle of the characteristic involves as

a fundamental property both ugliness and the repre-

what is ugly. Hirt's definition, of course,


no more precise information as to what is to be
characterized and what is not, in the artistically beautisentation of
gives

ful,

in

or about the content of the beautiful, but

this respect

:ontains

Then

some

a mere formal
truth,

rule,

it

furnishes

which nevertheless

although stated in abstract shape.

follows the further question

what

Meyer

36

METHODS OF ^ESTHETIC

opposes to Hirt's

artistic principle,

He

self prefers.

SCIENCE.
i.e.

what he him-

shown

in the artistic

principle, however,

of the ancients, which

clude the essential attribute * of beauty.

he

subject

this

is

and Winckelmann's
pronounces

to

himself

the

speak

to

led

principle *

of

effect

to reject nor wholly

neither

II.

treating, in the first place, ex-

is

clusively of the principle

with

[Chap.

the
that

works

must

in-

In dealing

Mengs

of

Ideal,

and

he desires

accept this law of

to

beauty, but, on the other hand, has no hesitation in

of an enlightened

attaching himself to the opinion

judge of art (Goethe), as

enigma more

solve the

Goethe

says

"

it

is definite,t

and seems

to

precisely.

The

highest

of the

principle

ancients was the significant, but the highest result of


successful treatment, the beautiful."
If

we

find in

in hand,

look closer at what this opinion implies, we


again two elements

it

we begin with what

sents itself immediately to us,

consider what

is its

and

after that

pre-

go on

to

significance or content.

former, the external element, has no value for

us simply as

behind

the content or matter

and the mode and fashion of representation.

In looking at a work of art

The

it,

it

stands

we assume something

further

something inward, a significance, by which

the external semblance has a soul breathed into


* " Bestimmung.'"
% " Begeistet wird"

" Besti?)nnend."

"Is spiritualized."

it.J

Chap.

THE SIGNIFICANT.

II.]

It is this, its soul, that

37

the external appearance indi-

For an appearance which means something,


does not present to the mind's eye itself and that
which it is qua external, but something else as does
cates.

the symbol for instance, and

more obviously the


whose moral and precept constitutes its meanIndeed eveiy word points to a meaning and has

fable,
ing.

no value
jfa.ce,
!

soul,

human

Just so the

in itself.

flesh, skin, his

mind and

still

and

whole

in this case the

meaning

something other than what shows


,

immediate appearance.

This

work of

its

art

should have

is

eye, a man's

a revelation of

figure, are

always

within the

itself

the

is

way

which a

in

meaning, and not appear

as exhausted in these mere particular lines, curves,


surfaces, borings, reliefs in the stone, in these colours,

tones, sounds, of words, or whatever other

employed

but

it

should reveal

import and mind, which


significance of a

art

work of

just

is

life,

from Hirt's principle of the


this

is

soul,

what we mean by the

art.

Thus this requirement of significance


amounts to hardly anything beyond
According to

medium

^feeling,

in a

work of

or different

characteristic.

notion, then,

we

find

distin-

guished as the elements of the beautiful something


inward, a cofitent, and something outer which has that
content as

its

significance

outer and gives itself

much

the inner shows

to be known by

as the outer points

its

itself in

the

means, inas-

away from itself to

the inner.

METHODS OF ^ESTHETIC SCIENCE.

38

We cannot go
(c)

But the

into detail

on

[Chap.

II.

this head.

earlier fashion alike of rules

and of

theories has already been violently thrown aside in

Germany

especially

owing to the appearance of

genuine living poetry,

works and

and

their effects,

the jjghts_of genius,

have had

its

their value asserted

against the encroachment of such legalities and against

the

wide watery streams of theory.

foundation both of an art which


spiritual,

with

it,

is

From

itself

this

genuinely

and of a general sympathy and communion

have arisen the receptivity and freedom which

enabled us to enjoy and to recognize the great works


of art which have long been in

those of the

existence, whether

modern world,* of the middle

even of peoples of antiquity quite alien to us


Indian productions)

foreign

content

element

common

in

to

their foreign character


is

{e.g.

works which by reason of

antiquity or of their alien nationality have,


a

ages, or

the

their

no doubt,

them, yet in view of their

all

humanity and dominating

could

not have been branded

products of bad and barbarous taste, except by

the prejudices of theory.

This recognition, to speak

works of art which depart from the


sphere and form of those upon which more especially
generally, of

:he

abstractions of theory were based, led, in the

Srst instance, to

the recognition of a peculiar kind

I have no doubt he means Shakespeare, who


was unpopular
n Germany before Goethe's time. Vide " Wilhelm Meister."

Chap.

RIGHTS OF GENIUS.

II.]

of art

that

is,

of romantic

became necessary

to

art,

and

possible for those theories.


viz.

With

its side,

its

self-con-

attained at this time,

a deeper self-knowledge in philosophy,

and was thereby


essence of

way than was

this influence there

that the idea in

scious form, the thinking mind,

on

therefore

it

apprehend the idea and the

nature of the beautiful in a deeper

co-operated another,

39

directly impelled to understand the

art, too, in

a profounder fashion.

Thus, then, even judging by the phases of this


more general evolution of ideas, the theoretical mode
of reflection upon art which we were considering
has become antiquated alike in its principles and
Only the scholarship of the hisin its particulars.
tory of art has retained its permanent value, and
cannot but retain it, all the more that the advance
of intellectual receptivity, of which

extended

its

we

range of vision on every

spoke, has
Its

side.

business and vocation consists in the aesthetic appreciation of individual

with

the

condition

historical

such

made with

works of

sense

and

circumstances

works

requisite historical

art,

and

an

in acquaintance

that

externally

appreciation

mind,

information,

supported
is

which,

if

by the

the only power'

that can penetrate the entire individuality of a

work

of art. Thus Goethe, for instance, wrote much about


Theorizing proper
art and particular works of art.
is

not the purpose of this

mode

of consideration,

METHODS OF ^ESTHETIC

40

although no doubt
abstract principles

who does

[Chap.

and

categories,

not

may

and

aware of

give

for

hinder him, but keeps

let this

which we spoke of just now,

way

But

it

him the concrete accounts of works of

before

II.

frequently busies itself with

it

to this tendency without being

a reader

SCIENCE.

it

art,

at all events furnishes

the philosophy of art with the perceptible illustrations

and

instances, into the particular historical details of

which philosophy cannot


This^ then,

the study of

may be

enter.

taken to be the

art, starting

first

mode

of

from particular and extant

works.
2. There is an essential distinction between this
and the opposite aspect, the wholly theoretical reflection, which made an effort to understand beauty as

such out of

itself alone,

and

to get to the

bottom of

its idea.

It is

well

known

that Plato

was the

first

to require

of philosophical study, in a really profound sense, that


its

objects should be apprehended, not in their par-

but in their universality, in their genius,


their own nature and its realization
inasmuch as

ticularity,
in

he affirmed that the truth of things * did not consist

good actions, true opinions, beautiful


human beings or works of art, but in goodness, beauty^
truth themselves.
Now, if the beautiful is in fact
in

to

individual

be known according to
* "

Das Wahre

its

essence and conception,

seyen nicht die einzelnen," etc.

Chap.

PURE THEORY.

II.]

this is only possible

41

by help of the thinking

idea,

by

means of which the logico-metaphysical nature of the


Idea as such, as also that of the particular Idea of the

But

beautiful enters into the thinking consciousness.

the study of the beautiful in

own

in its

idea

may

its

separate nature and

turn into an abstract Meta-

itself

and even though Plato is accepted in such art


inquiry as foundation and as guide, still the Platonic
abstraction must not satisfy us, even for the logical
idea of beauty. We must understand this idea more
profoundly and more in the concrete, for the emptiness
of content which characterizes the Platonic idea is
no longer satisfactory to the fuller philosophical
wants of the mind of to-day. Thus it is, no doubt,
the case that we, too, in modern times, must in our
philosophy of art start from the idea of the beautiful>
physic,

we ought not

but

ideas,

to abide

by

the fashion of Platonic

which was purely abstract, and was the mere

beginning of the philosophic study of beauty.

The

.3.

indicate

its

philosophic conception of the beautiful, to


true nature at least

contain, reconciled within

it,

by

anticipation,

must

the two extremes which

have been mentioned, by combining metaphysical


universality with the determinateness of real particularity.

real

own

Only thus

is it

apprehended

and explicit nature.

It is

then

in its truth, in its


fertile

out of

its

resources, in contrast to the barrenness of one-

sided reflection.

pFor

it

has in accordance with

its

42

METHODS OF AESTHETIC

own conception to develop into a


while the conception

SCIENCE.

On

and

II.

totality of attributes,

itself as well as

exposition contains the necessity of


also of their progress

[Chap.

its

its

detailed

particulars, as

transition one into

anotherj

the other hand, again, these particulars, to which

the transition
sality

and

ticulars

is

made, carry in themselves the univer-

essentiality of the conception as the par-

of which

they

consideration of which

appear.

we have

The modes

of

so far been treating,

lack both these qualities,* and for this reason

only the complete conception of which

we have

it is

just

spoken that can lead to substantive, necessary, and


self-complete determinations.
* The exhibition of particulars as contained in the
and of the principle as contained in particulars.

principle,

CHAPTER

III.

THE CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEAUTY.


'art

The Work, of Art

I.

^lFTER the above

as

Made and

prefatory remarks,

as Sensuous.

we approach

loser to our subject, the philosophy of artistic beauty,

as we are undertaking
we must begin with its

nasmuch
ifically
ill

we have

to treat it,scien-

ut the division, and with


f the science

it

Not
we map

Conceftioti.

established this conception can

the plan of the entirety

for a division, if

it is

not, as is the case

ath unphilosophical inquiries, taken in hand in a


urely external manner, must find

onception of the object

its

principle in the

itself.

demand we are at once met


"Whence do we get this conception ?

In presence of such a

y the question,
f

we begin with

eauty

itself,

that

the given conception of artistic


is

enough

on and mere assumption


re

not admitted

by

to
;

make

it

a pre-supposi-\

now, mere assumptions

the philosophical method, but

u"

44

CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEAUTY.

whatever

allows to pass must have

it

monstrated,

We

i.e.

its

[Chap.

III.

truth de-

displayed as necessary.

devote a few words to coming to an

will

understanding upon this

difficulty,

which concerns the

introduction to every philosophical branch of study

when taken in hand by itself.


The object of every science
two aspects

second place, what

in the

In ordinary science
first

of these points.

little difficulty

might even, at

It

astronomy and physics

nomena,

was a

is;

attaches to the
first sight,

were presented

look

that, in

should be demonstrated

it

sun, heavenly bodies, magnetic phe-

In these sciences, which have to do

etc.

with what

prima facie

such an object

it is.

ridiculous, if the requirement

that there

presents

in the first place, that

given to sense, the objects are taken

is

from external experience, and instead of demonstrating them

them

("

("

beweisen

weisen

").

") it is

it

may

e.g.

be doubted

sufficient to

show

Yet even within the non-philoso-

may arise about the existence of

phical sciences, doubts


their objects, as

thought

in psychology, the science of mind,


if

there

is

a soul, a mind,

i.e.

some-

thing subjective, separate, and independent, distinct

from what
is.

If,

is

material

or in theology, whether a God

moreover, the objects are of subjective kind,

are given only in the mind,

and not as external


sensuous objects, we are confronted by our conviction

i.e.

that there is -nothing in the

mind but what

its

own

ictivity

BEAUTY A FACT?

IS

Ihap. III.]

)r

This brings up the accidental

has produced.

men have produced

mestion whether

45

this inner idea

perception in their minds or not, and even

if

the

brmer is actually the case, whether they have not


nade the idea in question vanish again, or at any
:ontent has

it to a merely subjective idea, whose


no natural and independent being. So,

for instance,

the beautiful has often been regarded as

ate

degraded

not naturally
ideas,

Our

sense.

perceptions
still

and independently necessary

in

our

but as a mere subjective pleasure or accidental

more

is

external

intuitions,

observations,

and

are often deceptive and erroneous, but


this the case with the inner ideas,

even

if

they have in themselves the greatest vividness, and


are forcible

enough to transport us

passion.

irresistibly into

This doubt whether an object of inward ideas and


inward perception as such

is

or

is

not, as also the

accidental question whether the subjective conscious-

and whether the act or


before itself was in its
turn adequate to the object in its essential and independent nature all this is just what aroused in men
the higher scientific need, which demands that, even
ness has produced

it

mode

brought

in

which

it

in

itself,
it

if

we have an

idea that an object

is,

or that there

is

such an object, the object must yet be displayed or

demonstrated
This proof,

in

terms of

if it is

its

necessity.

developed in a really

scientific

46

CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEAUTY.

[Chap.

III.

way, must also satisfy the further question What an

expound this relation would carry


and we can only make the
following remarks on the point.
object

But

is.

to

us too far in this place,

If
I

we

are to display the necessity of our object,

the beautiful in

art,

we should have

to prove that art

or beauty was a result of antecedents such

when

as,

considered in their true conception, to lead us on with


idea of fine

scientific necessity to the

far as

we begin with

essence of

its

in as

treat of the

idea and of the realization of that idea,

not of antecedents which go before


its idea,

But

art.

and propose to

art,

it

as demanded by

so far art, as a peculiar scientific object, has,

for us, a pre-supposition

sideration,

which

lies

and which, being a

beyond our con-

different content, be-

longs in scientific treatment to a different branch of

^or

philosophical study,

it

whole of philosophy that

nothing short of the

is

is

the knowledge of the

universe as in itself one single organic totality which

develops

itself

out of

own

its

conception, and which,

returning into itself so as to form a whole in virtue of


the

necessity in

binds

itself

which

it

together with

is

placed towards

itself into

itself,

one single world

of truthtT In the coronal of this scientific necessity,


A each individual

returns into

part

itself,

as

is
it

just as
has,

much a

at the

same

necessary connection with other parts.


tion

is

backward out of which

it

circle that

derives

time, a

This connecitself,

as well

Chap.

WE START FROM COMMON IDEAS.

III.]

own

as a forward, to which in

its

on and on,

it is

in as far as

matter out of

range of

itself,

and issuing

knowledge.

scientific

nature

fertile

it

impels

by creating

it

47

itself

fresh

into the further

Therefore,

it

is

not

our present aim to demonstrate the idea of beauty


from, which
to
its

its

we

set out, that

is,

to derive

it

according

necessity from the pre-suppositions which are

antecedents in science.

This task belongs to an

encyclopaedic development of philosophy as a whole

and of

its

particular branches.

beauty and of art

is

system of philosophy.
discuss this system,

we have

For

us, the idea

of

a pre-supposition jjiyen in the"

But as we cannot

in this place

and the connection of

art with

it,

not yet the idea of the beautiful before us in

a scientific form; what we have at command are


merely the elements and aspects of it, as they are
or have at former periods been presented, in the
diverse ideas of the beautiful and of art in the mere
common consciousness. Having started from this
point, we shall subsequently pass to the more profound
consideration of

the views

in

question,

in

order

thereby to gain the advantage of, in the first place,


obtaining a general idea of our object, and further, by

a brief criticism effecting a preliminary acquaintance


with its higher principles, with which we shall have to

do

in the sequel.

By

this

mode

of treatment our

final introduction will act, so to speak, as the overture

to the account of the subject

itself,

and

will serve the

48

CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEAUTY.

[Chap.

III.

purpose of a general collection and direction of our


thoughts towards the proper object-matter of our
discussion.

What we know,
work of

of the

art,

general predicates
(i)

We

to begin with, as a current idea

comes under the three following

suppose the work of art to be no natural

product, but brought to pass

by means of human

activity.

To be

(2)

made for man, and, indeed,


borrowed from the sensuous and

essentially

to be more or

less

addressed to man's sense.


(3)
1.

is

To contain an end.
As regards the first

taken to be a product of

has given

rise (a) to

point, that a

human

work

of art

activity, this

view

the view that this activity, being

the conscious production of an external object, can


also be

known and expounded, and learnt, and proseFor, what one can do, it might
,

cuted by others.

seem, another can do,* or imitate,t as soon as he


is acquainted with the mode of procedure
so that,
;

supposing universal

familiarity

artistic production, it

would only be a matter of any

with

the

rules

of

one's will and pleasure to carry out the process in

a uniform way, and so to produce works of art. It


thus that the above-mentioned rule-providing

is

theories
*

and

their precepts, calculated for practical

"Machen."

"NacA-macken."

:hap.

RULES IN ART.

III.]

ibservance,

have

49

But that which can be~

arisen.

xecuted according' t o such in structio n, can only be


omething formally regular and mechanical.
mly what

mechanical

is

is

hat no more than a purely


.nd dexterity

deas

and put

is
it

required

in act

For'

of such an external kind

empty

to

exercise of will

receive

it

among

our

such an exercise not needing

be supplemented by anything concrete, or anyhing that goes beyond the precepts conveyed in

This

;eneral rules.

irecepts of the

elves to
>ut

what

most vividly displayed when

purely external and mechanical,

is

extend to the meaning-laden

f true art.
>ut

is

kind in question do not limit them-

spiritual

activity

In this region the rules contain nothing

The theme ought to


and each individual ought to be made

indefinite generalities

e interesting,

e.g. "

speak according to his rank, age, sex, and position."


Jut if rules are meant to be adequate on this subject,
3

tieir

precepts ought to have been

drawn up with

uch determinateness that they could be carried out


they are expressed, without further and
jst as
riginal activity of mind.
1

their

content,

Being abstract, however,

such rules

reveal

themselves, in

aspect of their pretension of being adequate to


ae consciousness of the

lasmuch as
1

artistic

artist, as

production

is

not formal activity

For it is
work by drawing on

accordance with given determinations.

ound

as spiritual activity to

fill

wholly inadequate,

50

its

CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEAUTY.


own

resources,

[Chap.

III.

and to bring before the mind's eye

a quite other and richer content and ampler individual

than any

creations

Such

may

rules

abstract

can

formulae

dictate.

furnish guidance in case of need,

if

they contain anything really definite, and therefore


i

of practical

utility

but their directions can only

apply to purely external circumstances.


{b)

The tendency which we have

has therefore been abandoned, and,

just

indicated

in place of

it,

the

opposite principle has been pursued to no less lengths.

For the work of

came

art

to be regarded

no longer

as the product of an activity general in mankind, but


as the

work of a^mind endowed with wholly

gifts.

This mind,

it

do but simply to give

peculiar

thought, has then nothing to

is

free

play to

its

particular

gift,

as

though

to

be entirely released from attention, to laws of

it

were a

specific force of nature,

universal validity, as also from

its

it

is

is

the interference of

reflection in its instinctively creative operation.

indeed,

and

to be guarded therefrom,

And,

inasmuch

as

productions could only be infected and tainted

by such a consciousness. In this aspect the work


of art was pronounced to be the product of talent
and genius, and stress was laid on the natural element
which talent and genius contain.
The view was
partly right.

Talent

endow

is specific,

and genius

universal

which a man has not the power to


himself simply by his own self-conscious

capability, with

Chap.

INSPIRATION IN ART.

III.]

We

activity.

treat

shall

this

51

point more fully in

the sequel.

In this place

we have only

to mention the aspect

of falsity in the view before us, in tha^all consciousness respecting the man's own_activjty was held, in
the case of artistic production, not merely superfluous^

but eyen_jnj urious.

Production on the part of talent

and genius then appears,

and, in particular, as a state of inspiration.

a state,
object,

said,

it is

and

genius

in part it

will to place itself

is

in part excited

has the power of

state,

To

such

by a given

its

own

free

therein, in which process, moreover,

the good service of the


forgotten.

in general_terms, as

champagne

bottle

This notion became prominent

in

is

not

Germany

of genius, which was introduced


by the early poetical productions of Goethe, and subsequently sustained by those of Schiller.* In their

in the so-called epoch

works these poets began everything anew,


scorn of all the rules which had then been fabri-

earliest
in

cated, transgressed these rules of set purpose, and,

while doing
I

will

so,

distanced

not enter more

all rivals

by a long

closely into

interval.

the confusions

which have prevailed respecting the conception of


inspiration and genius, and which prevail even at the
present day respecting the omnipotence of inspiration
* See Appendix to Eng. Trans, of Scherer, ii. 347. Goethe's
" Gotz von Berlichingen " appeared in 1773 ; Schiller's "Raliber"
in 1781.

52

CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEAUTY.

as such.

We

view

though the

that,

III.

need only lay down as essential the

it

essentially in need

is

of cultivation

by thought, and of

mode

it

which

and genius con-

artist's talent

tains a natural element, yet

in

[Chap.

on the

reflection

produces, as well as of practice and

main feature of such production is unquestionably external workmanship, inasmuch as the work of art has a purely technical side,
most
which extends into the region of handicraft
especially in architecture and sculpture, less so in
skill in

producing.

painting and music, least of

poetry.

all in

Skill in

comes not by inspiration, but solely by reflection,


industry, and practice and such skill is indispensable
this

to the artist, in order that he

material,

may

and not be thwarted by

Moreover, the higher an

master his external


its

stubbornness.

artist ranks, the

more

profoundly ought he to represent the depths of heart

and mind

and these are not known without learning

Ihem, but are only to be fathomed by the direction


of a man's

So

own mind

here, too, study

is

and outer

to the inner

the means whereby the

world.
artist

brings this content into his consciousness, and wins


the matter and burden of his conceptions.

In this respect one art

may

need the conscious-

ness and cognition of such matter

more than

Music, for instance, which concerns


the undefined

movement

itself

others.

only with

of the inward spiritual nature,

and deals with musical sounds

as,

so to speak, feeling

Chap.

THE NEED OF STUDY.

III.]

without thought, needs

little

53

or no spiritual content

to be present in consciousness.

It is for this reason


si

that musical talent generally announces itself in very-

empty and the 7


moved, and is capable of

early youth, while the head

heart has been but

little

is

still

attaining to a very considerable height in early years,

before

And

mind and

have experience of themselvesr

life

again, as a matter of fact

we

often

enough see

very great expertness in musical composition, as also


in execution, subsist

of

mind and

poetry.

along with remarkable barrenness

The

character.

In poetry

which must be

all

full

reverse

is

the case with

depends on the representation,

of matter and thought

</3'

of man,

of his profounder interests, and of the powers that

move

him and therefore mind and heart themselves must^


be richly and profoundly educated by life, experience,
and reflection, before genius can bring to pass any;

thing mature, substantial, and self-complete.

and

Schiller's first productions are of

Goethe's

an immaturity,

and even of a rudeness and barbarism, that are absoThis phenomenon, that the greater
lutely terrifying.
part of those attempts display a predominant mass of

thoroughly prosaic and in part of frigid and commonplace elements, furnishes the chief objection to the

common

opinion, that inspiration

youth and youthful


it

may be

said,

fire.

were the

first

of true poetry, and yet

is

inseparable from

Those two men of


it

genius,

to give our nation works

was only

their

mature

54

CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEAUTY.

manhood

* that

inspiration,

Thus,

while no less thoroughly perfect in form.


it

was not

till

III.

presented us with creations profound,

and the outcome of genuine

substantial,

[Chap.

his old

age that

Homer

too,

devised and

uttered his immortal songs.


(c)

work of

third view,

which concerns the idea of the

art as a product of

human

activity, refers to

work towards the external


appearances of nature. It was an obvious opinion
for the common consciousness to adopt on this head,
that the work of art made by man ranked below the.
product of nature. The work of art has no feeling
in itself, and is not through and through a living
the position of such a

thing, but, regarded as

an external object,

is

dead.

But we are wont to prize the living more than the

We

must admit, of course, that the work of


art has not in itself movement and life. An animated
being in nature is within and without an organization
dead.

down

appropriately elaborated
parts, while the

animation on
stone, or
is

work of

its

to

all

art attains the

its

semblance of

surface only, but within

wood and

canvas,

idea, uttering itself in

or,

minutest

is

common

as in the case of poetry,

speech and

letters.

But

this

* The " Iphigenie '" was completed in Goethe's thirty-eighth


year, fourteen years later* than " Gbtz."
The bulk of his great
works are of the same date as the " Iphigenie," or later. See

Scherer,

ii.

152,

was completed

and Appendix,

1.

c.

"
Schiller's " Wallenstein

after his thirty-fifth year.

Chap.

ART AND NATURE.

III.]

55

aspect, viz. its external existence, is not

what makes
a work into a production of fine art it is a work of
art on l y in as far as, being the offspring of mind^it
continue sjt o belong to the realm of mind, has receiver^
;

thebaptism_of the

spiritual, and only rep resents that


which has been moulded. Jn harmony with mind.

human

interest, the spiritual value

which attaches to

an incident, to an individual character, to an action in


plot and in its denoiiment, is apprehended in the

its

and exhibited more purely * and transparently than is possible on the soil of common
unartistic reality. This gives the work of art a higher
rank than anything produced by nature, which has

work of

art,

not sustained this passage through the mind.

So, for

by reason of the feeling and insight of which


a landscape as depicted by an artist is a manifestation,
such a work of mind assumes a higher rank than

instance,

the mere natural landscape.


is

better than

existence in

For everything

At any

anything natural.

nature

is

able,

like art,

divine ideals.

to

spiritual
rate,

n>'

represent

Upon that which, in works of art, the mind borrows


from its own inner life it is able, even on the side of
external existence, to confe r permanence; whereas the
i

ndivi dual living thing of nature

ing^ and mutable in


persists.

its

is

transient, vanish- -,

aspect,while the

Though, indeed,
* Free from

it is

work of

art 1

not mere permanence,

irrelevancies.

56

CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEA UTY.

[Chap.

III.

but the accentuation of the character which animation

by mind

confers, that constitutes

eminence as compared with natural

genuine pre-

its

reality.

Nevertheless, this higher rank assigned to the work

of art

common

turn disputed

in

is

consciousness.

by another idea of the

It is said that

nature and

its

products are a work of God, created by his goodness

and wisdom, whereas the work of art is merely a


human production, made after man's devising by
man's hands.

In this antithesis between natural pro-

duction as a divine creation and

merely

human

activity as a

we at once come upon the misGod does not work in man and

finite creation,

conception,

that

through man, but limits the range of his activity to


n ature al one^. This false opinion is to be entirely

abandoned
tion of art.

if

we mean

to penetrate the true concep-

Indeed, in opposition to such an idea,

we

must adhere to the very reverse, believing that God


is more honoured by what mind does or makes than
by the productions or formations of nature. For not
only
tive

is

there a divinity in man, but in

under a form that

of God, in a
nature.

the

mode

Jjod_is __a_

is

quite other

Spirit,

has the form of conscious

and

medium through which

itself.

him

it is

opera-

appropriate to the essence

it

and higher than


is

only

in

man

in

that

the divine element passes

spirit,

that actively realizes

In nature the corresponding

medium

unconscious, sensible, and external, which

is

far

is

the

below

Chap.

MAN'S NEED OF ART.

III.]

consciousness in value.
isjjperatiye neither

mena
itself

of nature

known

In

57

in the

but the divine element, as

in the

work of

God

th e products of art

more nor Jessjthan


art,

pheno-

it

makes

has attained, as being

generated out of the mind, an adequate thoroughfare


for its existence

while existence in the unconscious

sensuousness of nature

is

not a

mode

of appearance

adequate to the Divine Being.

work of art is made


we come to the last
enable us to draw a deeper result

(d) Granting, then, that the

by man

as a creation of mind,

question,

which

will

from what has been

said.

produce works of art

duction

may

What

On

man's need to

is

the one hand the pro-

be regarded as a mere toy of chance and

of man's fancies, that might just as well be


as pursued.

better

For,

means

it

may

be

let

alone

said, there are other

for effecting that

which

is

and

the aim of

art,

and man bears in him interests that are yet higher


and of more import than art has power to satisfy.
But, on the other hand,lart appears to arise from the
higher impulse and to satisfy the higher needs, at
times, indeed, even the highest, the absolute need of

man, being wedded to the religious interests of whole


epochs and peoples, and to their most universal intuitions respecting the world.~l

This inquiry concerning

the not contingent but absolute need of art

we cannot

as yet answer completely, seeing that

more con-

crete than

it is

any shape which could here be given

to

CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEAUTY.

58

the answer.*

We

[Chap.

III.

must, therefore, content ourselves

for the present with

merely establishing the following

points.

The
on

man

universal

and absolute need out of which

formal side,f arises has

its

is

its

art,

source in the fact that

a thinking consciousness,

i.e.

that he draws out

of himself, and makes explicit for himself, that which

he
/

is,

and, generally, whatever

nature are only immediate

is.

The

things of

and single, but man

as

mind

Reduplicates himself, inasmuch as prima facie he

is

but in the second place just

like the things of nature,

for himself, perceives himself, has ideas of


himself, thinks himself, and only thus is active selfas really

is

realizedness.J

This consciousness of himself

obtains in a twofold
in as far as

own

way

man

in the first place tlieoretically,

he has inwardly to bring himself into

consciousness, with

all

that

and works

breast, all that stirs


rally, to

moves

in the

his

human

therein, and, gene-

observe and form an idea of himself, to

fix

before himself what thought ascertains to be his real


being, and, in
as in

what

i.e.

what

it

is

summoned

out of his inner

self

received from without, to recognize only

Secondly,

himself.

ing on a

is

man

is

realized for himself

by

requires a definite or determinate answer, depend-

number of

ideas which cannot be explained in an

introduction.
t

i.e.

considered generally, apart from the wishes and, per-

haps, selfish aims of individual


\ " Fursichsein."

artists.

Chap.

MAN MUST

III.]

ACT.

59

practical activity, inasmuch as he has the impulse, in

the

medium which

is

directly

given to him, and

externally presented before him, to produce himself,

and therein at the same time to recognize himself.

by the modification of

"This purpose he achieves

external things upon which he impresses the seal of


his inner being,

own

and then

Man

characteristics.

subject

his

does this in order as a free

world of

the outer

to strip

them

finds repeated in

stubborn

its

and to enjoy in the shape and fashion of


things a mere external reality of himself* Even the

foreignness,

child's

impulse involves

first

cation of external things.

this practical modifi-

boy throws stones

into

the river, and then stands admiring the circles that


trace themselves on the water, as an effect in which

he attains the sight of something that

is

his

own

doing.

This need traverses the most manifold phenomena, up


to the

mode

art.

And

it

medium

of self-production in the

external things as
is

treats in this

it is

known

to us in the

man

not only external things that

way, but himself no

less,

i.e.

his

own

natural form, which he does not leave as he finds

but alters of set purpose.

This

ornament and decoration, though

is

the cause of

may

it

of

work of

it,

all

be as bar-

barous, as tasteless, as utterly disfiguring or even


destructive

as

slitting the ears

crushing Chinese ladies'

and

lips.

* Reality derivative

It is

only

from

his

feef,

among

own

reality.

or as

cultivated

CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEA UTY.

60

men
from

mode

of self-utterance emanate

spiritual education.-^

The

universal

need for expression in art %

and outer world

into a spiritual consciousness forjhim

which he recognizes his own

as an object in
satisfies the

he makes

and

all

himself,

need of

way

in this reduplication o

him into vision and into know


own mind and for that of others. This
is

in

the free rationality of man, in which, as

knowledge, so also art has


origin.

sell

freedom whei

realizes this his explici

evoking thereby,

what

ledge for his

this spiritual

that exists explicit for himself within

corresponding

in a

self without,

lies

impulse to exalt the inne

therefore, in jnan's rational

He

II]

that change of the figure* of behaviour, an<

of every kind and

self,

[Chap.

The

tradistinction

specific

all

action anc

ground and_ necessan

its

need of

art,

however, in con

to other action, political or

religious imagination

and to

moral,

t<

scientific cognition, w<

shall consider later.

We

2.

have so

work of

the

far

art in

been considering that aspect c

which

have now to pass on to


it is

made

for

man's

it

its

sense,

is

made by man.

second characteristic, tha

and

for this reason

is

mor

or less borrowed from the sensuous.


()

This reflection has furnished occasion for th

consideration to be advanced that fine art


*

He means
t "

is

intendei

as in attitude, bearing, gentle movement, etc.


\ " Bedurfniss zur Kunst."

BUdiing."

Chap.

ART AND FEELING.

III.]

to arouse feeling,
feeling

and indeed more particularly the

which we find

Looking

ing.

6t

suits us

-that,

at the question thus,

is

pleasant feel-

men have

treated

the investigation of fine art as an investigation of the

and asked what

feelings,

sion
for

it

must be held that

fear, for example, and compasand then, how these could be pleasant how,

ought to evoke,

art

feelings

example, the contemplation of misfortune could

produce

This tendency of reflection

satisfaction.

traceable particularly to

Moses Mendelssohn's

is

times,

and many such discussions are to be found in his


Yet such an investigation did not lead
writings.

men
the

far, for

mind

feeling

what

is

is felt

the indefinite dull region of

remains wrapped in the form

of the most abstract individual subjectivity,*


therefore the

distinctions

and

of feeling are also quite

and are not distinctions of the actual objectFor instance, fear, anxiety, alarm,
itself.
matter
terror, are no doubt of one and the same sort of

abstract,

feeling variously

but

modified,

in

part

are

mere

themselves have nothing to do with their content

itself,

for

in

part are forms which

quantitative heightenings, in

but are indifferent to

instance,

subject

{i.e.

an

existence

a person) has an

it.

is

In the case of

fear,

given in which

the

interest,

but at the same

time sees approaching the negative that threatens to


* i.e. you cannot describe it or picture it definitely, like a
thing with attributes, although you feel it in yourself.

CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEAUTY.

62

annihilate this existence,

and so

finds

[Chap.

III.

immediately

in

himself, as a contradictory affection of his subjectivity,

Now,

the two at once, this interest and that negative.

such fear considered

not enough to condi-

in itself is

any content, but is capable of receiving into itself


the most diverse and opposite matters.* Feeling, as
such, is a thoroughly empty form of subject ive
No doubt this form may in some cases
affection.
tion

be manifold
and,

in itself, as

again,

may

hope, grief, joy, or pleasure

is

such

in

varied contents, as there

is

diversity

a feeling of justice, moral

sublime religious feeling, and so

feeling,

the fact that such content

forms of feeling
essential

and

is

is

forthcoming

forth.

But

in different

not enough to bring to light

definite

comprehend

nature

they remain

its

purely

subjective affections of myself, in which the concrete

matter vanishes, as though narrowed into a


the utmost abstraction.!

circle of

(Therefore, the inquiry into

the feelings which art arouses, or ought to arouse,

comes
a

utterly to a standstill in the indefinite,

mode

is

of study which precisely abstracts from the

content proper and from


notion. J

and

For

reflection

its

upon

concrete essence and


feeling contents

itself

with the observation of the subjective affection in


you may be afraid of anything the fact that you are
what you are afraid of.
f My private feeling is compared to a small circle, in which
morality, justice, etc., may be, but have not room to show their
Feeling allows of no definition.
nature.
*

i.e.

afraid does not in itself indicate

Chap.

SENSE OF BEAUTY.

III.]

instead of diving into and fathoming the

its isolation,

matter in question

engaged with

and

jectivity

it,

its

the

first

the work of

itself,

In feeling

states.

place,

and, while

is

just

is

it

this

not merely retained, but

and that

fond of having emotions.

And

why men

is

for the

such a study becomes tedious from

and vacancy, and repulsive from


little

art,

simply letting go the mere sub-

vacant subjectivity that

given

63

its

its

are so

same reason
indefiniteness

attentiveness to

subjective peculiarities.

Now,

(b)

as a

work

of art

is

not merely to do in

general something of the nature of arousing emotion

for this

is

a purpose which

it

would have

in

common,

without specific difference, with eloquence, historical

but

composition, religious edification, and so forth

hit

do so only in as far as it is beautiful/ reflection


upon the 'idea, seeing that beauty was the object,

of

searching

is

to

correspond to

of

out
it,

a peculiar feeling of beauty to

and of discovering a

In this search

beauty.

no blind

it

instinct

particular sense

soon appeared that such

made

rigidly definite

a sense

is

nature,

and capable from the beginning

in its

by

own

Hence
independent essence of discerning beauty.
it followed that education came to be demanded for
this sense,

be called
tion

and

and the educated sense of beauty came to

taste,

which, although an educated apprecia-

apprehension

of

the

beautiful,

was yet

supposed to retain the nature of immediate

feeling.

CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEAUTY.

64

We

have already mentioned

how

[Chap.

abstract theories

undertook to educate such a sense of

taste,

and how

The

and one-sided that sense remained.

external

criticism of the time

III.

when those views

prevailed,

was

not only defective in universal principles, but also, in


particular

its

was

references to individual

less directed to justifying

the power to

than

of taste.

For

came

to a

art,

a definite judgment

make one not having

acquired

works of

been

at that time

advancing the general education

to

this reason

standstill

in

such education in

its

turn

the indefinite, and merely

endeavoured so to equip feeling as sense of beauty

by help

of reflection, that there might thenceforth be

capacity to find out beauty whenever and wherever


it

should exist.

Yet

the

depths

remained a sealed book to mere

demand not only

of

the

taste,

matter

for

these

and abstract
reflection, but the undivided reason and the mind
while taste was only directed to
in its solid vigour
depths

sensibility

the external surface about which the feelings play,

and on which one-sided maxims may pass for


But, for this very reason, what is called good

valid.

taste

more profound effects of art, and is


silent where the reality comes in question, and where
externalities and trivialities vanish.
For when great
passions and the movements of a profound soul are
unveiled, we are no longer concerned with the finer
takes fright at

all

distinctions of taste

and

its

pettifogging particularities.

Chap.

VALUE OF ART-SCHOLARSHIP-

III.]

65

It feels that

genius strides contemptuously over such

ground

this,

as

and, shrinking

before

power,

its

becomes uneasy, and knows not which way to


(c)

And

thus,

as

we should

abandoned the tendency

expect,

men have

works of

to consider

solely with an eye to the education of taste,

noisseur, or scholar of art,

man

of taste.

so far as

it

The

art

and with

The

the purpose of merely displaying taste.

or

turn.

con-

has replaced the art-judge,

positive side of art-scholarship,

concerns a thorough acquaintance with

the entire circumference * of the individual character


in

a given work of

art,

we have

already pronounced

to be essential to the study of art.

owing to

art,

individual,

is

its

For a work of

nature as at once material and

by particular conmost various kinds, to which belong

essentially originated

ditions of the

especially the time

and place of

the peculiar individuality of the

its

production, then

artist,

and

in parti-

cular the grade of technical

development attained

by

these aspects

his art.

Attention to

all

is

indis-

pensable to distinct and thorough insight and cogni-

and even

tion,
it

to the

enjoyment of a work of

ship, is chiefly

us in

its

occupied

own way

is

to

and

All

its

all

that

it

can do for

be accepted with gratitude.

Yet, though such scholarship


*

art

with them that connoisseurship, or art-scholar-

is

is

entitled to rank as

positive aspects or relations, age, phase, artist's

history, etc.

66

CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEAUTY.

something

essential, still

supreme element

for the sole or

general.

art in

defective side)

ought not to be taken

it

art,

which

and towards

For art-scholarship (and

is

in the relation

work of

the mind adopts towards a

[Chap. III.

this is its

capable of resting in an acquaintance

with purely external aspects, such as technical or


historical details, etc.,

and of guessing but

little,

or

even knowing absolutely nothing, of the true and


real nature of a

work of

It

art.

may

even form a

disparaging estimate of the value of more profound


considerations in
technical,

and

comparison with purely

historical information.

art-scholarship, if only

it

least strives after definite

and an

intelligent

conjoined the more

even

if

is

of a

positive,

Still,

even

so,

genuine kind, at

grounds and information,

judgment, with which

closely

is

precise distinction of the different,

partly external, aspects in a

work of

art,

and

the estimation of their importance.


(d) After these

remarks upon the modes of study

which have arisen out of that aspect of a work of


art in which,

being a sensuous object,

with a relation to

now

man

consider this aspect in

tion to art as such,

work of

it

is

invested

as a sensuous being,

and so

its

(a)

more

will

partly as regards the

art as object, (|3) partly with respect to the

and

so

relative

to

subjectivity of the artist, his genius, talent,

on

we

essential rela-

but without entering into matter

these points that can only proceed from the

know-

Chap.

HOW

ART,

III.]

ledge of art in

its

FAR SENSUOUS.

67

For we are not

universal idea.

yet on genuinely scientific ground, but have only

reached the province of external

The work

(a)

to sensuous apprehension.

It is

itself

addressed to sensuous

outer or inner, to sensuous perception and

feeling,

imagination, just as
without, or our

is

own

the nature that surrounds

may be

addressed to sensuous

Notwithstanding, the work

imagination and feeling.


is

us-

Even

sensitive nature within.

a speech, for instance,

of art

reflection.

of art then, of course, presents

not only for the sensuous apprehension as

sensuous object, but

position

its

is

of such a kind

same time essentially


addressed to the mind, that the mind is meant to
be affected by it, and to find some sort of satisfaction

that as sensuous

in

it.

it

is

is

it

at the

This intention of the work of


in

no way meant

to possess

natural

life,

to be ranked higher or lower than a mere

of

art,

it is

a right to existence only in as far as

man's mind, but not

in as far as

has separate existence by


*

mind,

it

art has

exists for

qua sensuous thing

itself.*

If

we examine

sensuous aspect has no independent warrant or justifian animal has in its own separate
So it must simply be such as is enough to appeal to man's

Its

cation, as that, for example, of


life.

work

often called in a depreciatory sense.

For the sensuous aspect of the work of

it

and

whether a natural product

is

as

how

art explains

to be a natural product

e.g.

mere surface

painting.

>

68

CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEA UTY.

more

closely in

to man,

we

[Chap.

III.

what way the sensuous is presented


that what is sensuous may bear

find

various relations to the mind.


{ad)
least

The

mode

lowest

of apprehension, and that

appropriate to the mind,

apprehension.

It consists

is

purely sensuous

naturally in mere looking,

listening, feeling, just as in seasons of


it

may

often

mental fatigue

be entertaining to go about without

thought, and just to hear and look around

The

us.

mind, however, does not rest in the mere apprehension of external things

them

objects for

is itself

by

sight

own

its

as

it

makes

impelled in a correspondingly sensuous form

to realize itself in the things,

them

and hearing,

inner nature, which then

desire.

outer world, the

and

relates itself to

In this appetitive relation to the

man

stands as a sensuous particular

over against the things as likewise particulars

he

does not open his mind to them with general ideas


,

as a thinking being, but has relations dictated


particular impulses

and

interests to

by

the objects as

themselves particulars, and preserves himself in them,

inasmuch as he uses them, consumes them, and puts


in act his

self-satisfaction

by

sacrificing

them

In this negative relation desire requires for

to

itself

it.

not

merely the superficial appearance of external things,


but themselves in their concrete sensuous existence.

Mere

pictures of the

of the animals that

it

wood

that

wants to

it

eat,

wants to

use, or

would be of no

Chap.

ART EXCLUDES

III.]

service

to

Just as

desire.

DESIRE.

little

is

desire to let the object subsist in

its

its

impulse urges

it

it

69

possible

for

For

freedom.

precisely to destroy this

just

independence and freedom of external things, and


to be destroyed

show that they are only there


and consumed. But, at the same
to

time, the subject

and

himself, as entangled in the particular limited

valueless interests of his desires,


himself, for

is

neither free in

he does not determine himself out of

the essential universality and rationality of his

will,

nor free in relation to the outer world, for his desire


remains essentially determined by things, and related
to them. This relation of desire is not that in which

man

He

stands to the work of art

allows

it

to,

and independent, and enters


apart from desire, as with an

subsist as an object, free

into relation with

it

object which only appeals to the theoretic side of

the mind.

\Yox

this reason the

work of

art,

although

existence, yet, in this point of view,

has sensuous
does not require concrete sensuous existence and
natural life; indeed, it even ought not to remain
it

on such a

level,

seeing that

the interests of mind, and


itself all desire.)

Hence

it

is
is,

it

has to satisfy "orrry

bound

to exclude from

indeed, that practical

desire rates individual things in nature, organic

of

art,

and

higher than works

which are serviceable to


which reveal themselves to be useless

inorganic,

it,

purpose, and enjoyable only for other

for its

modes of mind.

70

CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEA UTY.


Q3/3)

present

mode

second

may

in

is,

and

perception

contrast

desire,

relation to the Intelligence.

purely theoretical

no

theoretic contemplation of things has

consuming them

particulars, in

as

III.

which the externally

in

be related to the mind

with singular sensuous

[Chap.

sensuously, and in preserving itself

the

The

interest in

satisfying itself

by

their means,

but rather in becoming acquainted with them in their


universality, in finding their inner being
in conceiving

them

in

and

law,

terms of their notion.

and

There-

fore the theoretical interest lets the single things be,

and holds aloof from them as sensuous


because this sensuous particularity

is

particulars,

not what the

contemplation exercised by the intelligence looks

^For the

rational intelligence does not belong, as

desires, to the individual subject * as such, but

the individual as at the


versal.

In as far as

man

of this universality,

it

same time

for.

do the

only to

in his nature uni-

has relation to things in respect


is

his

universal reason which

attempts to find himself in nature, and thereby to

reproduce the inner essence of things, which sensuous


existence, though having

its

ground

therein, cannot

immediately display. But again,

this theoretic interest,

the satisfaction of which

work of science, is in
by art, than the

is

the

the scientific form no more shared


latter

makes common cause with the impulse of the


Science may, no doubt, start

purely practical desires.


*

i.e.

person.

Chap.

ART DOES NOT ANALYSE.

III.]

from the sensuous thing

individual presents itself in


Still, this

and may-

in its individuality,

possess a sensuous idea of the

size, etc.

71

its

way

in

which such an

individual colour, shape,

isolated sensuous thing, as such,

has no further relation to the mind, inasmuch as


the intelligence aims at the universal, the law, the

Not only, therefore,

thought and notion of the object.


does

it

abandon

all

given individual, but transforms

it

within the mind,

making a concrete object of sense into an abstract


matter of thought, and so into something quite other
than the same object qua sensuous phenomenon. The
artistic interest, as distinguished

act thus.

from science, does not

Artistic contemplation accepts the

art just as

it

work of

displays itself qua external object, in

immediate determinateness and sensuous individuality


clothed in colour, figure, and sound, or as a single
isolated perception, etc., and does not go so far
beyond the immediate appearance of objectivity which
is

presented before

it,

as to aim, like science, at appre-

hending the notion of such an objective appearance


as a universal notion.

Thus, the interest of art distinguishes


the practical interest of desire

mits

its

dence, while desire utilizes

differs

by the

On the other

it

in its

hand,

itself

fact that

object to subsist freely and

destruction.

intercourse with the thing as a

own

artistic

in

it

from
per-

indepen-

service

by

its

contemplation

from theoretical consideration by the

scientific

CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEA UTY.

72

[Chap.

III.

intelligence, in cherishing interest for the object as

individual existence,

mute

it

into

and not setting to work to trans-

universal thought

its

an

(yy) It follows, then,

and notion.

from the above, that though

the sensuous must be present in a

work of

art,

yet

it

must only appear as surface and semblance of the

work of
the mind seeks neither the concrete framework of
For, in the sensuous aspect of a

sensuous.
art,

matter, that empirically thorough completeness

and

development of the organism which desire demands,


nor the universal and merely ideal thought.
requires

is

What

it

sensuous presence, which, while not ceasing

to be sensuous,

is

to be liberated from the apparatus

merely material nature.

of

its

in

works of

art

is

And

thus the sensuous

exalted to the rank of a mere

semblance in comparison with the immediate existence


of things in nature, and the

mean between what


thought.
itself to

look,

work of

art occupies the

immediately sensuous and ideal


This semblance of the sensuous presents,

the

is

mind externally

as the shape, the visible

and the sonorous vibration of things

that the

mind

supposing

leaves the objects uninterfered with

(physically), but yet does not

descend into their inner

essence (by abstract thought), for

if it

did so,

it

would

entirely destroy their external existence as separate

individuals /<?r it. For this reason the sensuous aspect


of art only refers to the two theoretical senses of sight

and hearing, while

smell, taste,

and feeling remain

Chap.

III.]

THE SENSUOUS IN ART A SYMBOL.

excluded from being sources of

For

smell, taste,

as such,

and

and with

feeling

its

73

enjoyment.

artistic

have to do with matter

immediate sensuous

smell with material volatilization in

air,

qualities

taste with

the material dissolution of substance,* and feeling with

warmth, coldness, smoothness,

On

etc.

account

this

these senses cannot have to do with the objects of

which are destined to maintain themselves

in

art,

theirj

actuaj_mdependent_existence, and admit of no purely;

sensuous relation.
is

The

not the beautiful in

pleasant for these latter senses

art.

side purposely produces

Thus

art

on

its

sensuous

no more than a shadow-

world of shapes, sounds, and imaginable ideas


it

is

f and

absolutely out of the question to maintain that

owing to simple powerlessness and to the limitations on his actions that man, when evoking worlds
of art into existence, fails to present more than the
mere surface of the sensuous, than mere schemata.%
In art, these sensuous shapes and sounds present themselves, not simply for their own sake and for that of
it is

their

immediate structure^ but with the purpose of"

affording in that shape satisfaction to higher spiritual


interests, seeing that they are powerful to call forth

a response and echo in the mind from

all

the depths

* Nothing can be tasted which is not dissolved in a liquid,


t " Anschauungen."
X Abstract forms, which are to reality as a diagram to a
picture.
Lit. " figure," Gestalt.

;'

CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEA UTY.

74

of consciousness.
is

spiritualised,

It is

thus that, in

art,

[Chap.

III.

the sensuous

the spiritual appears in sensuous

i.e.

shape.
Q3) But for this very reason

of art only in so far as

it

we have a product

has found a passage through

the mind, and has been generated

ductive activity.

which

is

spiritually pro-

This leads us to the other question

which we have to answer


side,

by

how, that

indispensable to

art, is

is,

the sensuous

operative in the

artist as

a productive state of the subject or person.

This, the

method and fasHion of production, contains


a subjective activity just the same pro-

in

itself as

perties

which we found objectively present

work of

art

in

the

must be a spiritual activity which,


the same time has in itself the element

it

nevertheless, at

of sensuousness and immediateness.


It is neither,
on the one hand, purely mechanical work, as mere

unconscious

skill

in

sensuous sleight of hand* or

a formal activity according to fixed rules learnt by


rote

nor

is

it,

on the other hand, a

scientific pro-

ductive process, which passes from sense to abstract


ideas

and thoughts, or exercises

the element of pure thinking

itself exclusively in

rather the spiritual and

the sensuous side must in artistic production be as


one.

For instance,

creation to try

it would be possible in poetical


and proceed by first apprehending

the theme to be treated as a prosaic thought, and by


* "

Handgriffen."

THE ARTIST'S FANCY.

Zhap. III.]

:hen putting

ind so forth

so that the pictorial element would

hung upon the

simply be

ornament or decoration.
produce bad poetry, for in
is

and into rhyme,

into pictorial ideas,

it
;

75

two separate

activities

abstract reflections as an

Such a process could only


it there would be operative
that which in artistic pro-

duction has _its_rjght_ place, only as undivided unity.

mode

This genuine

of production

activity of artistic fancy.

which, qtio^spirit, -only exists in as far as

extrudes

itself into consciousness,

array before
in

so
a

it

what

import, which, however,

with the habit even of a

or wit,

the

till

it

does

it

embodies

in

Such a process may be compared

sensuous shape.

of the world,

actively

This activity has, therefore,

sensuous form.

spiritual

it

element

but yet does not

bears within itself

it

the

constitutes

It is the rational

or, again,

man

with great experience

with that of a

man

of esprit *

who, although he has complete knowledge of

main stakes of

life,

that hold

men

of what

the power

is

of the substantive interests

together, of

what moves them, and

that they recognize, yet neither

has himself apprehended this content in the form


able to explain

of general rules, nor

is

in general reflections,

but makes plain to himself and

to others

what occupies

it

to others

his consciousness always in

particular cases, whether real or invented, in adequate


instances,

and the

like.

* "

For

in his ideas, everything

Eines geistreichen?

CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEAUTY.

76

shapes

and

itself into

place,

to

III.

concrete images, determinate in time

which, therefore,

circumstances of

external

[Chap.

names and other


must not be

kinds

all

Yet such a kind of imagination rather rests


on the recollection of states that he has gone through,
wanting.

and of experiences that have befallen him, than

is

His recollection preserves


its own strength.
and reproduces the individuality and external fashion
of occurrences that had such and such results with all
creative in

and prevents the universal


But the productive
fancy of the artist is the fancy of a great mind and
heart, the apprehension and creation of ideas and of

their external circumstances,

from emerging

in its

own

shape.

shapes, and, indeed, the exhibition of the profoundest

and most universal human

interests in the definite

From

sensuous mould of pictorial representation.


this

follows

it

unquestionably
\

generally,

on

at

rests

talent

y-equires a sensuous
in the

once, that

on

in

one aspect Fancy

natural

gifts

speaking

because

its

medium.

It is true that

same way of scientific

mode

" talent,"

of production

we speak

but the sciences

only presuppose the universal capacity of thought,

which has
an
all
it

not, like

Fancy, a natural

intellectual one),

mode

(as well as

but abstracts just precisely from

that is natural (or native) in an activity and thus


would be more correct to say that there is no
;

specifically scientific

natural

endowment.

talent

in

the sense of a mere

Now, Fancy has

in

it

mode

Chap.

of

ART NEEDS NATIVE TALENT.

III.]

must

be

as

the

and sensuousness of the work of

essential plasticity
art

inasmuch

instin ct-like^, productiveness,

77

subjectively present in

the artist as

and natural impulse, and, considering that it is unconscious operation, must belong
to the natural element in man, as well as to the
rational.
Of course, natural capacity leaves room
natural

disposition

for other

elements in talent and genius, for

production

just as

is

conscious nature

much

we can but say

artistic

of a spiritual and
that

its

self-

spirituality

must, ^somehow, have an element of natural,

plastic,

For this reason, though


and forrnative tendency.
nearly every one can reach a certain point in an' art,
yet, in order to

go beyond

this point,

art in the strict sense begins,

pense with native

it

is

artistic talent of

with which the

impossible to disthe highest order.

Considered as a natural endowment, moreover,

such talent reveals


youth, and
that

is

busies

the most part in early

itself for

manifested in the impelling restlessness

with vivacity

itself,

some

and

industry,

in

medium,
utterance
and
comand in seizing on this species of
munication as the only one, or as the chief and the
creating shapes in

most

suitable

one.

technical facility, that

ment

is

without

sculptor

finds

particular sensuous

And
up

thus,

too,

precocious

to a certain grade of attain-

effort, is

a sign of natural talent.

everything

transmute

itself

into

shapes, and he soon begins to take up the clay and

78

CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEAUTY.

model

[Chap.

III.

And, speaking generally, whatever men

it.

of such talents have in their imagination, whatever


rouses and

moves

their

inner nature, turns at once

into shape, drawing, melody, or

and to conclude the content of art


some respects borrowed from the sensuous,

(y) Thirdly,
is

also in

from nature
is

poem.

or,

in

of a spiritual kind,

any
it

case,

even

if

the content

can only be seized and fixed

human

by representing

the

relations, in the

shape of phenomena with external

reality.

spiritual

fact,

such as

79

CHAPTER

III. {Continued).

THE CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEAUTY.


Part
3.

The

or the

The End of Art.

II.

question then arises, what the interest

End

is

which man proposes Jo himself when

he reproduces such a content


of art

[jy

form of works

in the

This wasTEe third point of view which' we"

set before us with reference to the

work f

the closer discussion of which will finally


transition to the actual
If in this aspect

and true conception of

we

sciousness, a current idea


(a)

The

glance at the

which

may

and

art,

make

the

art.

common

occur to us

principle of the imitation of nature.

conis

Ac-

cording to this view the essential purpose of art


consists in imitation, in the sense of a facility in copy-

ing natural forms as they exist in a

way

sponds precisely to them

s uccess

and the

that corre-

of such

a reH?ii]Ei22i exactly corresponding to nature,


is

supposed to be what affords complete

'

satisfaction.

(aJTThTs definition contains, prima' facie, nothing

CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEAUTY.

80

beyond the purely formal

made

to be

it

therein,

is

is

by man as a copy
he can do it with the means

a second time

of the former, as well as

command.

at his

III.

aim that whatever already

exists in the external world, just as

now

[Chap.

repetition as^__,_

But we
-.

may

at

once regard this

k^ufierf/unus Jfahnnr, seeing that the things

(ad)

Avhich pictures, theatrical representations,

and represent

animals,

imitate

etc.,

natural scenes, incidents in

human life are before us in other cases already, in


our own gardens or our own houses, or in cases
within our closer or

And _JooJdrig_jcQpre

ance.

labour

circle of acquaint-

closely,

superfluous

-this

more remote
as

_we_ may regard

presumptuous

sport

which
Comes

(/3/3)

restricted in its

far

short

of

nature.

means of representation

produce only one-sided d eceptions,

i.e.

For art is
and can
;

for

instance,

a semblance of reality addressed to one sense only


and, in fact,

it

invariably gives

rise, if it rests in

the

formal purpose of mere imitation, to a mere parody


of

life,

instead of a genuine vitality.

Turks, being

Mohammedans,

tolerate,

Just so the
as

well

is

known, no pictures copied from men or the like and


when James Bruce, on his journey to Abyssinia,
;

General, abstract, as

much

applicable to one thing as

to another.
t

"

Heuchelei?

lit.

" hypocrisy."

Chap.

DECEPTIVE IMITATION.

III.]

81

showed paintings of fish to a Turk, the man was


amazed at first, but soon enough made answer " If
this fish shall rise up against you on the last day, and
:

say,

'

soul,'

You have created for me a body, but no living


how will you defend yourself against such an

accusation

The

"

prophet, moreover,

it is

recorded in

women, Ommi Habiba


him of pictures in
^Ethiopian churches" These pictures will accuse
their authors on the day of judgment
There are, no doubt, as well, examples of comthe Sunna, said to the two

Ommi

and

who

Selma,

told

Zeuxis' painted grapes

pletely deceptive imitation.

have from antiquity downward been taken to be


of

the triumph of this principle of the imitation


nature, because the story

modern

the
in

We

them.

at

is

that living doves pecked

might add to

one of

Biittner's

pieces a painted cockchafer in

sions of the Insect World,"


his

example
monkey, which bit

this ancient

master,
beautiful

in

spite

of

copy of

his

this

Rosel's

"

Diver-

and was pardoned by


having thereby spoilt

valuable

work, because

of this proof of the excellence of the pictures.

when we
must

at

reflect

on these and similar


art

because they have actually

deceived even pigeons and monkeys,


to

censure the people

of art

by

it

us that, in place of com-

once occur to

mending works of

But

instances,

who mean

predicating, as

its

we ought simply
to exalt a

highest and

work

ultimate

CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEAUTY.

82

poor an

quality, so

as this.

effect

[Chap.

III.

In general,

we

saying that, as a matter of mere

may sum up by

imitation, art cannot maintain a rivalry with nature,

and,

must looklike a worm

if it tries,

after

"trying to crawl

an elephant.

(yy) Considering the unvarying failure comparaoi imitation when contrasted


tive failure, at least

_m

nature, there remains as end


nothing beyond our pleasure in the sleight of hand *

with" the original

which can produce something so


it is

doubtless open to

over again what

is

man

like nature.

And

to be pleased at producing

already present in

its

own

right,

But enjoyment
by his Jabour, skilly and jndustry
and admiration, even of this kind, naturally grow
.

frigid or chilled precisely in

proportion to the resem-

blance of the copy to the natural type, or are even

converted into tedium and repugnance.


portraits which, as has

ingly

like

There are

said, are sicken-

Kant adduces another

and

been wittily

instance

relative to this pleasure in imitation as such, viz. that

we soon grow tired of a man and there are such


men who is able to mimic the nightingale's strain

quite perfectly

man

is

and as soon as

producing the notes,

of the song.

We

a conjuring

trick,

nature, nor a
/

it

we

is

then recognize in
neither

work_ of artj

the
for

discovered that

are at once weary

free

it

nothing but

production

we expect

" Kunststuck:

of

frorn~the

CHAP.

IMITATION A CONJURING TRICK.

III.]

free productive capacity of

other than

quite

note,

it

music as

such

when, as

interests us

is

human

83

beings something
this,

which only

the case with the nightingale's

gushes forth from the creature's own vitality

without special purpose, and yet recalls the utterance


of

human

skill in

man

In general, such delight at our

feeling.

mimicking can be but

limited,

better to take delight in

of himself.

and

it

becomes

what he produces out

In this sense the invention of any un-

important and technical product has the higher value,

and man may be prouder of having invented the


hammer, the nail, and so forth, than of achieving
feats of mimicry.

ing

is

For

this fervour_ of abstract

to be evened with the feat of the _man

t3ugEt~ himself to

throw

"of

Tiis

frivolous

is

through a small

displayed~thTs"~skill

before Alexander, and Alexander presented

him with a bushel of


~~()3)

lentils

He

opening without missing.

^copy-

who had \

lentils

and meaningless

as

a reward for his

art.

^Moreover, seeing that the principle o f imitation^

purely formah_to

make

it

the end has the result that

objective beauty itself disappears.

For the question

is

no longer of what nature that is which is


to be copied, but only whether it is correctly copied
The object and content of the beautiful comes then to
in that case

mere copying, devoting one's-self to the one-sided


making a thing over again^without putting any life
"or meaning into it.
/
/ /
/
i.e.

purpose of

'

84

CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEAUTY.

[Chap.

That

be regarded as matter of entire indifference.


to say,

if

we go

men, landscapes,

and ugliness

in considering beasts,

or characters,

actions,

is

and speak of a

outside the principle

difference of beauty

III.

maxim

nevertheless, in presence of the

this

must

in question,*

be set down as a distinction that does not belong


particularly to art, for which nothing

is

left

but ab-

In this case the above-mentioned

stract imitation.

lack of a criterion in dealing with the endless forms


of nature reduces us, as regards the selection of objects

and

their distinction in

jective taste as

beauty and ugliness, to sub-

an ultimate

and admits of no

fact,

which accepts no rule

And^infact^if

discussion.

we

ing objects for representation

start

in select-

from what men

think be~aufifuTor ugly, and therefore deserving artistic


imitation

that

is,

from their

taste,

then

all circles

of

natnra1 objecti open to us, and not one of

be likely to

fail

stanceTTtis the case that at

thinks his

alone

not,

and that subjective


rule

6ne

parties.

may

may

be, every

taste for such

husband

his wife

beauty has no fixed

hold to be the good fortune of both


moreover, look quite beyond indi-

their

nations, this again

it

If we,

viduals and

contrast.

any rate every bridegroom

bride beautiful, and indeed, perhaps, he

though

Among

of a patron.

them will
meh7 for tn-

How

Which

accidental
is

often

full

taste,

to

the taste of

of extreme diversity and

we hear

it

said that a

says that the business of art

is

European

to imitate.

Chap.

NOT ALL ARTS ARE

III.]

IMITATIVE.

85

beauty would not please a Chinese or even a Hottentot, in

Chinaman has

as far as the

quite a different

conception of beauty from the negro, and the negro

from the European, and so

in turn

we look
peoples

works of

at the

Indeed,

forth.

if

art of those extra- European

their images of the gods,'for instancewhich

their fancy has originated as venerable

they

may

and

their

and sublime,

appear to us as the most gruesome

music

horrible noise

may sound

to our ears as the

idols,

most

while they, on their side, will regard our

sculptures, paintings,

and musical productions as trivial

or ugly.
(-y)

But even

principle of art,
jective

if

and

we
if

and individual

the side of art

abstract from

beauty

taste,

itself

we

is

an objective

to be based on sub-

shall

still

soon find on

that the imitation of nature,

which certainly appeared to be a universal principle


and one guaranteed by high authority, is at any rate
not to be accepted in this universal and merely abstract
form.

For

if

we look

at the different arts

it

will at

once be^aTrnfteSTthat even if painting and sculpture


"represent objects which appear like those of nature, or
the type of which

is

essentially

borrowed from nature,

yet works of architecture on the other hand and


and the proarchitecture belongs to the fine arts

ductions of poetry, in as far as they do not confine

themselves to mere description, are by no means to

be called imitations of nature.

At

least, if

we

desired

CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC SEA UTY.

86

[Chap.

III.

to maintain the principle as valid in the case of these

we

latter arts,

make a long

should have to

conditioning the proposition

by
various ways, and

in

circuit

reducing the so-called truth* at any rate to proba-

But

bility.

we admitted

if

probability

we should

again be met by a great difficulty in determining

what

is

probable and what

not

is

and

one would neither consent nor find


clude from poetry

all

still,

moreover,

possible to ex-

it

wholly arbitrary and completely

original f imaginations.
,'

The end

of art must, therefore,

diffeTenTTrom the purely formal

we

something

in

what
any case can bring t6TKe"birth
and not works of art. It is, indeed, an

find giv en,

only tricks

lie

which

imitation "of

in

element es se ntial to the work of art to have natural


shapes fo rJte^foujQda.tinn
"Eion is in

the

medium

natural phenomena.

important study to

seeing thaf

light,

representa-

In painting, for instance,

know how

the colours in their relations

of

its"

of external and therefore of


it is

an

copy with precision


to one another, the effects

reflections, etc., and,

to'

no

less,

the forms and

down to their

subtlest characteristics^

It is in this respect chiefly that

the principle of natural-

figures of objects

Of imitation.
"

Phantastischett."
"Fantastic" means "odd or wild."
Hegel only means "original," "creative."
t

X Mechanical, without origination.


" Niiancen." Context seems to forbid referring
suspect it of meaning character of outline.

it

to colour.

Chap.

ism

"

III.]

HUMANI

NIHIL."

87

and of copying nature has recovered its


modern times. Its aim is to recall an art
which has grown feeble and indistinct to the vigour
and crispness of nature or, again, to invoke against
in general

influence in

the purely arbitrary and

unnatural as

it

was

conventionalism, as

artificial

which art had strayed,

inartistic, into

the uniform, direct, and solidly coherent sequences of


nature.

But however true

right in this

that there

it is

is

something

endeavour from one point of view, yet

the naturalism at which

it

aims

is

not as such the sub-

stantive and primary concern that underlies

And,

still

fine art.

therefore, although external appearance in the

shape of natural reality constitutes an essential condition of art, yet, nevertheless, neither

natural world

its

rule,

nor

is

external appearance as external


(6)

The

its

to be presented.

and with what aim

On this subject our


the common opinion

supplies us with

the given

end.

further question then arises

true content of art,

is

the mere imitation of

What
is

is

the

this content

consciousness
that

it

is

the

task and aim of art to bring in contact with our sense,

our feeling, our inspiration, all that finds a place in

mind of man.) Art,

the
in

us

nihil

in

that

me

is

familiar saying,

alienum puto."

arousing and

tions, inclinations,

in

it

forcing the

thought, should realize


"

animating

Homo sum

aim

Its

the

and passions

human

being,

is

humani

therefore placed

slumbering

emo-

in filling the heart,

whether cultured or

CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEAUTY.

88

in

its

inmost and

to experience

move and
in its

and to

and

mind possesses

in the Idea

misfortune and

make men

and

and no

misery,

idle toyings of fancy,

make

less to

inmost nature of

and luxuriating

all

held, art

is

which our external existence

to

that

is

roving in

in the seductive

This endlessly

bound

to embrace,

partly in order to complete the natural


in

intelligible

pleasure and

all

of sense-stimulating visions.
is

thought

wickedness and crime

and, finally, to set imagination

it

that

all

its

the splendour of the noble, the

all

realize the

varied content,

able to

to present

lofty in

shocking and horrible, as also of


delight

is

depths and

its

and to perception

of real

and the true

eternal,

spells

that

all

breast in

manifold aspects and possibilities

as a delight to emotion

the

and

create,

human

to stir the

corners

secret

III.

what man's
has power

the whole range of

uncultured, to feel
soul

[Chap.

experience

and partly

consists,

with the general aim of provoking the passions of

our nature, both

may

in

order that the experiences of

not leave us unmoved, and because

attain to a receptivity that

welcomes

all

we

life

desire to

phenomena.

Now, such a stimulus is not given in this sphere


by actual experience itself, but can only come by
the semblance thereof, by art, that is, deceptively
substituting

its

The

creations for reality.

of this deception

on the fact that

by means of
all

artistic

possibility

semblance

reality must, for

rests

man, traverse

Chap.

WHA T PARTICULAR END f

III.]

medium

the

otherwise

of perception and ideas, and

penetrate the feelings and the

this process

tion

it

cannot

will.

In

quite indifferent whether his atten-

is

claimed by immediate external

is

89

or

reality,

whether
produced by another means
that is, by images, symbols, and ideas, containing or
this effect is

Man

representing the content of reality.


to_Juiosslf_-ideas_i5f_ things

though they were

actual.

that

are

Hence

it

can frame's

not actual as(


is

all

the^samejf"

to^bur feelings" whether external reality or only the

semblance of

it

is

the means of bringing in contact

with us a situation, a relation, or the import of a


Either

mode

suffices to

burden, in grief
in

horror* and

passions
fear, love,

and

awaken our response


in

rejoicing,

in

life.

to its

pathos

and

in traversing the emotions and the

of wrath, hatred, compassion, of anxiety,


reverence,

and admiration, or of the desire

of honour and of fame.


This awakening of

all feelings in us,

the dragging

of the heart through the whole significance of


realization of all such inner

life,

the

movements by means of

a presented exterior consisting merely in deception

was what, from the point of view which we


considering, constituted the peculiar and
been
have
all this

pre-eminent power of

Now,

as this

art.

mode

of treatment credits art with

the vocation of impressing on the heart and on the


*

" Ersckiittern."

'

CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEAUTY.

90

[Chap.

III.

imagination good and bad alike, and of strengthening

man

to the noblest, as of enervating

sensuous and

selfish

emotions,

it

him

most

to the

follows that the task

set before art is still purely formal,

and so

it

would

have no certain purpose, but would merely furnish

empty form
and content.

the

(c)

It is

side, in that

for every possible

kind of significance

a fact that art does include this formal


it

has power to present every possible

subject-matter in artistic dress, before perception and


feeling, just exactly as

argumentative * reflection has

the power of manipulating

possible objects and

all

modes of action, and of furnishing them with reasons


and justifications. But when we admit so great a
variety of content we are at once met by the remark
that the manifold feelings and ideas, which art aims
at provoking or reinforcing, intersect

and

by

mutual

interference

cancel

and contradict,
one

another.

Indeed, in this aspect, in so far as art inspires


to directly opposite emotions,

contradiction of our feelings


sets

them staggering

it

and passions, and

either

like Bacchantes, or passes into

sophistry and scepticism, in the

same way

as argu-

mentation.! This diversity of the material of art

" Raisonnirende ; "

men

only magnifies the

itself

a term of disparagement in Hegel,

applied to proofs, pro and con, which do not rest on a thorough


conception of the fundamental nature of what is being discussed.
t

" Raisonnement."

Chap.

"

III.]

compels

EMOLLIT MORES?

us, therefore,

an aim for

it,

91

not to be content with so formal *

seeing that rationality forces

this wild diversity,

more

of a higher and

its

way into

and demands to see the emergence


universal purpose from these

elements in spite of their self-contradiction, and to

be assured of

way

its

being attained.

the State and the social

life

Just in the

of

men

are,

same

of course,

them all human


and all individual powers are to be
developed and to find utterance in all directions and

credited with the purpose that in


capacities

with all tendencies.

But

in opposition to so

formal*

a view there at once arises the question in what unity


manifold formations must be comprehended,

these

and

what

single

end they

must have

for

their

fundamental idea and ultimate purpose.

As

such an end, reflection soon suggests the notion

and the function of

that art has the capacity

miti-

gating the fierceness of the desires.


(a)

In respect to this

ascertain in

capacity

lies

first idea,

what feature peculiar

we have only

to art

it

is

to

that the

of eliminating brutality and taming and

educating the impulses, desires, and passions.


tality in general

has

its

Bru-

reason in a direct selfishness

of the impulses, which go to work right away, and


exclusively for the satisfaction of their concupiscence.
* "

Formal " means here as

usual, empty, or general

not taking account of varieties in the matter to which


.

applied.

it

i.e.

is

CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEAUTY.

92

Now,

desire

is

[Chap.

most savage and imperious

portion as, being isolated and narrow,

whole man, so that he does not

III.

pro-

in

occupies the

it

power

retain the

of separating himself as a universal being from this


determinateness, and becoming aware of himself as
universal.

passion
I is

is

Even

if

stronger than

in

but

as this separation

"

The

true that the abstract

I," it is

still
is

only in a formal way, inasmuch

only

made

order to pronounce

in

power of the passion, the

that, against the

consists, therefore, in the

The savageness

of no account whatever.

oneness of the

with the limited content of

man

such a case says,

then separated for consciousness from the parti-

cular passion

is

man

the

its

as such

of passion

as universal

desires, so that the

has no will outside this particular passion.

Now,

such brutality and untamed violence of passion


softened through
that

it

art, to

brings before the

is

begin with, by the mere fact

man as an idea what in such


And even if art restricts

a state he feels and does.


itself to

merely setting up pictures of the passions

before the mind's eye, or even


flatter

them,

still

this

is

by

if it

itself

softening power, inasmuch as the


least

were actually

to

enough

to have a

man

thereby at

is

made aware, of what, apart from such

presenta-

For then the man observes his


impulses and inclinations, and whereas before they
bore him on without power of reflection, he now sees
them outside himself, and begins already to be free

tion,

he simply

is.

Chap.

EXPRESSION RELIEVES PASSION.

III.]

from them, in so

they form an object which

far as

Hence

he contrasts with himself.

be the case with the

frequently

it

comfort

Tears, even, are enough to bring

in art.

who

the man,

and concentrated
utter

in

his

on his own mind by repre-

feelings in its effect

senting

to

may

it

when attacked by

artist that

he softens and weakens the intensity of

grief

own

93

to begin with

is

utterly

in grief, is able thus, at

a direct fashion this


however,

his

any

sunk
rate,

inner state.

Still

more of a

what

is within in words, images, pictures, sounds, andr

relief,

is

the utterance of

this reason it was a good old custom


and funerals to appoint wailing women, in
order to bring the grief before the mind in its utterManifestations of sympathy, too, hold up the
ance.

For

shapes.

at deaths

content of a man's misfortune to his view

much
is

talked about he

thereby relieved.

that to

weep or

is

when

forced to reflect upon

And

so

it

it,

it is

and

has always been held

to speak one's

fill

is

a means to

obtain freedom from the oppressive weight of care,


or at least to find

momentary

relief for the heart.

Hence the mitigation of the violence of passion has


for its universal

reason that

immediate sunkenness*
conscious

of

it

as

man

is

released from his

a feeling,

and becomes

of something external to him,

towards which he must


relation.

in

now

Art, by means of

its

enter

into

an ideal

representations, while

* " Befangensein."

CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEAUTY.

94

[Chap.

remaining within the sensuous sphere, delivers


at the

Of

course

we may

often hear those favourite phrases


in

oneness with nature, but such oneness in

is

fjJaway

immediate
its

abstrac-

simply and solely coarseness and savagery

art, in

the very process of dissolving this oneness

him with gentle hand above and


from mere sunkenness in nature. Man's mode

man,

for

man

same time from the power of sensuousness.

about man's duty being to remain

tion
and

III.

is

raising

of occupying himself with works of art

is

always

purely contemplative,* and educates thereby, in the


first

place,

sentations
it

no doubt, merely attention to the reprethemselves, but then, going

beyond

cultivates attention to their significance, the

this,

power

of comparison with other contents, and receptivity for


the general consideration of them, and for the points
of view which
(]3)

To

it

involves.

the above there attaches itself in natural

connection the second characteristic which has been


ascribed to art as

its

essential purpose, viz. the purifi-

cation of the passio ns, instruction 3.nd-mnral perfect-

For the

mg.

characteristic that

art

was to

bridle

savageness and educate the passions remained quite


abstract and general, so that a question
arise

must again
about a determinate kind and an essential end of

this education.

* " Theoretisch" I have no doubt that it has here the meanflewpe?v without a trace of allusion to
"theory." It is

ing of

opposed

to " destructive," or " appetitive."

Chap.

ART AND

III.]

The

(aa)

suffers

ITS

"

MORAL."

95

doctrine of the purification

of passion

indeed under the same defect as the above

doctrine of the mitigation of the desires

more

closely 'looked at,

at

it

any

yet,

when

rate arrives at the


"

point of accentuating the fact that the representations

of art
their

may be

held to lack- a..standard by which

worth or unworthiness could be measured.

This

standard simply means their effectiveness in separating

pure from impure in the passions.

It therefore requires

a content that has capacity to exercise this purifying

power, and, in as far as the production of such an

taken to constitute the substantive end of


must follow that the purifying content must be
brought before consciousness in its universality and

effect is
art, it

essentiality.

In this latter aspect the end of art has been

(j3j3)

pronounced to be that

it

should

teach.

Thus, on the

one side, the peculiar character of art would consist in


the

movement

which

of the emotions and in the satisfaction

lies in this

movement, even

in fear,

compassion,

that is to say, in the


in painful pathos and shock
satisfying engagement of the emotions and passions,

and to that extent

in a

complacency, entertainment,

and

delight in the objects of art, in their representa-

tion

and

art)

is

effect

but,

on the other

held to find

its

instructiveness, in the
*

side, this

purpose (of

higher standard only in

its

fabula docet* and thus in the


The

moral.

CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEAUTY.

96

useful influence

[Chap.

III.

which the work of art succeeds

in

In this respect the Hora-

exerting on the subject.*

"Et prodesse volunt

tian saw,t
("

Poets aim at utility and entertainment alike

tains,

concentrated in a few words,

quently been elaborated

As

art.

ask,

it

or

is

")

con-

that has subse-

in infinite degrees,

regards such instruction

whether

explicitly

all

and diluted

extreme of insipidity as a doctrine

into the uttermost

of

et delectare poetae,"

meant

implicitly

we

have, then, to

to be directly or indirectly,

contained

the work of

in

art.
If,

speaking generally,

purpose which

is

we

universal

are concerned about a

and not contingent,

it

follows that this purpose, considering the essentially


spiritual nature of art,

cannot but be

and indeed, moreover, one which


but actual in

purpose

its

nature and for

in relation to

is

its

itself spiritual,

not contingent,!

own

sake.

Such a

teaching could only consist in

bringing before consciousness, by help of the work of


art,

a really and explicitly significant spiritual content.

From

this point of

higher art ranks

view

itself,

it

is

to be asserted that the

the more

essence of such a content can


*

Person,

" Kernsfiruch."

% "

i.e.,

the

exists or not.

it

find

the standard

here, audience or spectator.

much " what may or may not


which makes no difference whether it

Contingent " means, not so

exist," as

is bound to admit
and that only in the

it

into itself such a content as this,

trivial,

Chap.

III.]

THE DIDACTIC PURPOSE.

which determines whether what


priate or inappropriate.

is

97

expressed

Art was,

is

appro-

in fact, the first

instructress of peoples.

But the purpose of instruction

may

be treated as

purpose, to such a degree that the universal nature of


is doomed to be exhibited
and expounded directly and obviously as abstract

the represented content

proposition,

prosaic reflection, or general theorem,

and not merely

an indirect way

in

form _o_f_ a work of

in the concrete

By^ such a severance

art.

sensuous plastic form, which

work of arta work of

art,

"accessory, a husk which

is

is

just

what makes

thel
thel

becomes a mere otiosa


expressly pronounced to

be mere husk, a semblance expressly pronounced to be

mere semblance. But thereby the very nature of the


work of art is distorted. For the work of art ought
to bring a content before the mind's eye, not in its

generality as such, but with this generality

and sensuously

lutely individual,

the

work of

but sets in

art does not proceed


relief its generalized

made

abso-

particularized.

from

If

this principle,

aspect with the pur-

pose of abstract instruction, then the imaginative and


sensuous aspect

is

only an external and superfluous

adornment, and the work of art


against

itself,* in

is

a thing divided

which form and content no longer

appear as grown into one.

In that case the sensuously

* " In ihtn selbst gebrochenes"


an allusion to the words I use.

do not suppose there

is

CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEA UTY.

98

[Chap.

III.

become ex-

individual and the spiritually general are


ternal to one another.

And

further, if the

purpose of art

limited to this

is

didactic utility, then its other aspect, that of pleasure,

entertainment, and delight,

merely

But

does not bear


its

which

among

pronounced to be

in the utility of the teaching

attendant.

that

is

and ought to have

itself unessential,

it

amounts

this

is

Art is, in this


means which prove

us to the boundary at which art

into a

its

own

is

is

else,

case, only

useful

to

one

and are

This brings

made no

merits, seeing that

but

itself,

rooted in something

applied for the purpose of instruction.

be an end on

it

to pronouncing that art

a means.

the several

in

substance

on which

vocation and purpose in

its

conception
is

its

it is

longer to

degraded

mere toy of entertainment or a mere means of

instruction.

(yy) This

boundary becomes most sharply marked

when a question
end and aim

is

raised, in its turn,

for the

about a supreme

sake of which the passions are to

be purified and men are to be instructed.

This aim

has often, in modern times, been declared to bejmoral

improvement, and the aim of art has been placed

in

the function of preparing the inclinations and impulses


for moral perfection, and of leading them to this goal.
This idea combines purification with instruction, inas-

much

as

art

is,

by communicating an insight into


that is, by instruction,
at

genuine moral goodness

Chap.

THE MORAL PURPOSE.

III.]

same time

the

to incite to purification,

99

and

in this way-

alone to bring about the improvement of mankind as


its

useful purpose

Regarding
the

and supreme

same has prima facie

didactic purpose.

its

But

furtherance.

moral improvement,

to be said as about the

We may

must not as a principle take


and

goal.

art in reference to

readily grant that art


for its

it is

aim the immoral

one thing to take im-

morality for the express aim of representation, and

Every
genuine work of art may have a good moral drawn
from it, but, of course, in doing so much depends on
from taking morality.

another to abstain

and on him who draws the moral.


Thus one may hear the most immoral representations
defended by saying that we must know evil, or sin, in
interpretation

order to act morally

and, conversely, it has been said

Mary Magdalene,

that the portrayal of

sinner
into

who

sin,

repent,

the beautiful

many

afterwards repented, has seduced

because art makes

and you must

it

sin before

look so beautiful to

you can

the doctrine of moral improvement,

if

carried out, goes in general yet further.

repent.

But

consistently
It

would not

be satisfied with the possibility of extracting a moral

from a work of art by interpretation, but

it

would, on

the contrary, display the moral instruction as the substantive purpose of the

work of art,

and, indeed, would

actually admit to portrayal none but moral subjects,

moral characters, actions, and incidents.

For

art

has

CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEAUTY.

ioo

the choice

among

its

[Chap.III.

subjects, in contradistinction to

history or the sciences which have their matter fixed

them.

for

In order that

we may be able

to form a thoroughly

adequate estimate of the idea that the aim of art

is

moral from this point of view, we musr^ inquire

of

all for

first

the definite standpoint of the morality on which


If we look closely at the standwe have to understand it in the
present day, we soon find that its

this doctrine is based.

point of morality as
best sense at the

conception does not immediately coincide with what


apart from

way

it

we are

in the habit of calling in a general

To

virtue, respectability,* uprightness, etc.

respectable and virtuous

man moralf

is

not enough to

Morality involves

reflection

be

make

and the

definite consciousness of that

which duty prescribes,


and acting out of such a prior consciousness. Duty
itself is the law of the will, which man nevertheless

down

lays

freely out of his

own

supposed to determine himself to

and

its

and then

self,

this

duty for duty's

by doing good

fulfilment's sake,

solely from

the conviction which he has attained that

good.

Now

this law, the

* " Sittlichkeil "


It

almost

duty which

morality

is

is

it

is

the

chosen for

in

the English sense.

means the habit of virtue, without the

reflective aspiration

goodness as an ideal.
"
Moralitat" almost = conscientiousness or scrupulosity.
The above sentence is hardly true with the English word

after
t

" moral."

Chap.

THE MORALISTIC VIEW.

III.]

iei

duty's sake to be the guide of action, out of free

conviction and the inner conscience, and

upon,
will,

is,

and

taken by
is

itself,*

is

then acted

the abstract universal of the

the direct antithesis of nature, the sensuous

impulses, the self-seeking interests, the passions,

of

that

all

and the

and

comprehensively entitled the feelings

is

In this antagonism the one side

heart.

regarded as negativing the other

f
is

and, seeing that

both are present as antagonists within the subject


(person),

he

has, as determining himself out of himself,

the choice of following the one or the other.

But,

according to the view under discussion, a moral aspect


is

in

acquired by such a decision, and by the act performed

accordance with

it,

only through the free conviction

of duty on the one hand, and, on the other hand, through


the conquest, not only of the particular or separate
of the natural motives, inclinations, passions,
also

etc.,

will,

but

through that of the nobler emotions and the

higher impulses.)

For the modern moralistic view

from the fixed antithesis of the

starts

spiritual universality to its


larity,J
* "

and consists not in the completed

Fur sick, v

is

often used

velopment, and seems very like

will

in

its

sensuous natural particu-

where there

"an

is

reconciliation

no notion of de-

sich."

t "Gemiith."
%

As

e.g. if

we suppose

that

an act done

at the bidding of

natural affection cannot also be a fulfilment of the

The

would be

command

of

supposing the natural


affection, e.g. for parents, to operate as a moral motive, being
transformed by a recognition of its sacred or spiritual character.
duty.

"rejonciliation

''

in

CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEAUTY.

io2

[Chap.

III.

of these contrasted sides, but in their conflict with

one another, which involves the requirement that the


impulses which conflict with duty ought to yield to

This antithesis does not merely display

it.

itself for

our consciousness, in the limited region of moral


but also emerges as a fundamental distincand antagonism between that which is real
essentially and in its own right,* and that which
Formulated in the
is external reality and existence.
abstract, it is the contrast of the universal and partiaction

tion

cular,

the

when

the former

latter, just

more

is

explicitly fixed over against

as the latter

concretely,

it

is

over against the former

appears in nature as the opposition

of the abstract law against the abundance of individual

phenomena, each having

its

own

character

in

the

mind, as the sensuous and spiritual in man, as the


battle of the spirit against the flesh, of

sake, the cold

warm

the

command, with the

feelings,

the

duty

for duty's

individual interest,

sensuous

inclinations

impulses, the individual disposition as such

hard

conflict

necessity

conception

of inward

further, as

empty

freedom

and

of

and

as the

natural

the contradiction of the dead


in

itself

compared

with

full

concrete vitality, or of theory and subjective thought

contrasted with objective existence and experience.

These are antitheses which have not been inby the subtlety of reflection or by the

vented, either

" An undfiir sick."

Chap.

THE MORAL ANTITHESIS.

III.]

pedantry of philosophy, but which have from

and

in

the

human

all tin

manifold forms preoccupied and disquiete

culture

consciousness, although

that

them up

forced

tradiction.

was modei

it

elaborated them most

distinctly,

ar

most unbending
culture and the modern

pi;

to the point of

Intellectual

man

of understanding create in

co:

this contrast, whii

makes him an amphibious animal, inasmuch as


sets him to live in two contradictory worlds at ono
so that even consciousness wanders back and forwa:
unable to satisfy

to side,

is

side as

on the

man

common

itself

reality

01

we

and earthly

S'

ter

drivi

nature, entangled in matter, in sensuous aims ar

their

enjoyments

on the other

side,

he exalts himse

and freedoi

to eternal ideas, to a realm of thought

a will universal laws ar

imposes on himself

as

attributions, strips the

world of

ing reality and dissolves


as the

mind

is

dignity simply

maltreating

it,

it

living

and

flourish

by denying the

its

rights

and

rights of nature ar

thereby retaliating the oppression ar

Such a discrepancy

modern

its

into abstractions, inasmui

put upon vindicating

violence which itself has

for

si<

on the

by want and poverty, hard

porality, oppressed

by

as

itself

For, on the one side,

other.

a prisoner in

from

and, shuttle-cocked

in this contradiction,

culture

in life

and

its

experienced from natui

and consciousness involv


understanding the demai

that the contradiction should be resolved.

Yet

tl

CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEAUTY.

104

understanding cannot release

The

these antitheses.

consciousness a mere

itself

out finding

fro,

fixity of

and the present and

oiight,

the unrest of a per-

which seeks a reconciliation with-

Then

it.

from the

III.

solution, therefore, remains for

reality only stir themselves in

petual to and

[Chap.

the question arises, whether

such a many-sided and fundamental opposition which


never gets beyond a mere ought and a postulated
solution,

can be the genuine and complete* truth,

and, in general, the supreme purpose.

If the culture

of the world \ has fallen into such a contradiction,


it
it,

becomes the task of philosophy to undo or cancel


i.e. to show that neither the one alternative in its
nor

abstraction

possesses
dissolving

truth,
;

other

the

similar

in

one-sideness

but that they are essentially

that truth only

lies in

mediation of the two, and that this mediation

mere

postulate, but

is

in

self-

the conciliation and


is

no

nature and in reality

its

accomplished and always self-accomplishing.


intuition agrees directly with the natural

This

fajth

and

which always has present to the mind's eye precisely this resolved antithesis, and in action makes it
will,

its

purpose and achieves

does

is

of the antithesis in as far as


stitutes truth

and that not


*

" An

All that philosophy

it.

to furnish a reflective insight into the essence

is

it

shows that what con-

merely the resolution of

in the sense that

und fur sich

IVakre."

"

this antithesis,

the conflict and


Allgemeine Bildung:

its
1

Chap.

TRUTH IN SENSUOUS SHAPE.

III.]

any way are

aspects in

not,

ios

but in the sense that they

are, in reconciliation.

Now,

(d)

as an ultimate aim implied a higher stand-

we

point in the case of moral improvement,

have to vindicate
less

shall

this higher standpoint for art

nc

Thereby we at once lay aside


which has already been remarked

than for morals.

the false position,

upon, that art has to serve as a means for moral ends,

and to conduce to the moral end of the world,

by

such,

instruction

thereby has

something

substantive aim, not in

its

else.

If,

as

and moral improvement, and


therefore,

speak of an aim or purpose,

itself,

we now
we must,

but

in

continue to
in the first

instance, get rid of the perverse idea, which, in asking


"

What

is

the aim

of the question,

? "

retains the accessory

What

"

is

the use ?

The

".

ness of this lies in the point that the

meaning
perverse-

work of art would

then be regarded as aspiring to something else which


is

set before

what ought

to

consciousness as the essential and as

be

so that then the

work of

art

would

only have value as a useful instrument in the realization of

an end having substantive importance outside

the sphere of art.

Against

this

it

is

necessary to

maintain that art has the vocation of revealing the


truth in the

form of sensuous

artistic shape,

of repre-

senting the reconciled antithesis just described, and,/


therefore, has its
tion

and

purpose in

revelation.

itself,

For other

in this representa-j

objects,

such as

CONCEPTION OF ARTISTIC BEAUTY.

106

instruction, purification,

endeavour

after

[Chap.

III.

improvement, pecuniary gain,

fame and honour, have nothing

to

do

with the work of art as such, and do not determine


its

conception.
this point of view, into

which

consideration of the matter resolves

itself,

from

It is

have

apprehend

to

necessity, as indeed

of

idea

the
it

was from

in

art

reflective

inner

its

this point of view,

and

historically speaking, that the true appreciation

understanding of art took


thesis, of

general

within

discovered

grasped

it

far as
i

how

it

it

overcome

to

its

no

but

was not

till

own conception

which alone

and

and, indeed,

aesthetic

in

less

philosophy

and, just in as

this point of view, as it is the

the science of art

anti-

not only

did so, the conception of nature and of

Hence

origin,

itself felt,

this antithesis absolutely,

of philosophy in general, so also

to

For that

origin.

culture,

reflective

philosophy as such, and

that

its

which we spoke, made

we

that

is

art.

re-awakening

the re-awakening of

it is

this

as a science

art its higher estimation.

re-awakening

owes

its

true

CHAPTER

IV.

HISTORICAL DEDUCTION OF THE TRUE IDEA OF


ART IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
I

SHALL touch

briefly

upon the

the transition above alluded

partly for

to,

torical interest, partly because, in

more

closely indicate

doing

so,

important, and on the foundation of which

sha
ai

we mea

most general formi

In

lation, this basis consists in

recognizing

its

hi

its

we

the critical points which

to continue our structure.

as

side

historical

artistic

beaut

one of the means which resolve and reduce to

unit

the above antithesis and contradiction between

tr

mind and actual natur


whether that of external phenomena, or the inm
abstract self-concentrated

subjective feelings
i.

and emotions.

The Kantian philosophy

merely feeling the lack of


attaining definite

led the

way by

n<

this point of union, bi

knowledge of it, and bringing it with

the range of our ideas.*

In general, Kant treate

as his foundation for the intelligence as for the wi'


* " Vorstellung."

ART IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

108

[Chap. IV.

the self-related rationality or freedom, the self-con-

knows

sciousness that finds and

itself as in-

itself in

finite.*

This knowledge of the absoluteness of reason

in itself

which has brought philosophy to

its

turning-

point in modern times, this absolute beginning, deserves


recognition even

if

inadequate, and
refuted.

is

we pronounce Kant's philosophy


an element in

But, in as far as

Kant

it

fell

which cannot be

back again into

the fixed antithesis of subjective thought and objective


|

and the sensuous


was he more especially who

things, of the abstract universality

individuality of the will,

strained

to

the

it

highest possible pitch the above-

mentioned contradiction called morality.f seeing that


he moreover exalted the practical side of the mind

above the
antithesis,

In

theoretical.

with

its fixity

presence of this fixed

acknowledged by the under-

standing, he had no course open but to

propound the

unity merely in the form of subjective ideas of the


reason to which no adequate reality could be shown
to correspond, or again, to treat

it

as consisting in

postulates which might indeed be deduced from the

whose essential nature J was not


him knowable by thought, and whose practical
accomplishment remained a mere ought deferred to
infinity.
Thus, then, Kant no doubt brought the

practical reason, but


for

See

Or conscientiousness

Pref. Essay, p. xix.

moralistic view.

what was

above described as the

% "

An st'ch."

KANT ON JUDGMENT.

Chap. IV.]

reconciled contradiction within the range of our ide;

he succeeded

but
ing

its

true

neither

in

genuine essence nor

and

sole reality.

scientifically

presenting

unfol
as

Kant indeed pressed on

si

in

it

inasmuch as he recognized the required uni


what he called the intuitive understanding; t
here, again, he comes to a standstill in the contrad
tion of subjectivity and objectivity, so that although

further,
in

suggests in the abstract a solution of the contradicti


of concept and reality, universality and particulari

understanding and sense, and thereby points to


Idea, yet,

on the other hand, he makes

and reconciliation
one which

own

is

true

merits.*

itself

this soluti

a purely subjective one,

and actual

in its nature

and on

In this respect the Critique of

power of judgment, in which he treats of the aesthe


and teleological powers of judgment, is instruct
and remarkable.
art,

The

beautiful objects of nature a

the rightly adapted products of nature,

necting which

Kant

is

by

cc

led to a closer treatment

organic and animated beings, are regarded by h

only from the point of view of the reflection


subjectively judges of them.

wh

Indeed Kant defines

power of judgment generally as "the power of thii


ing the particular as contained under the universal

and he
it

calls the

power of judgment

has only the particular given to


* "

An

it,

reflective "

and has

undfiir sich wahrem und wirklichem."

wl

to f

ART IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

no

the universal under which

it

upon

end

this

it

has to impose

law that of

this

In the idea of freedom that belongs to the

Teleology.

practical reason, the


left

it

and Kant suggests as

itself;

To

comes."

requires a law, a principle, which

[Chap. IV.

as a mere

accomplishment of the end

" ought,"

but in the teleological

ment dealing with animated

beings,

Kant

hits

is

judg-

on the

notion of regarding the living organism in the light


that in

it

the idea, the universal, contains the particulars

as well.

Thus

in its capacity as end,

determines

it

the particular and external, the structure of the limbs,

not from without, but from within, and in the sense


that the particular conforms to the end spontaneously.

Yet even
not to

in

such a judgment, again,

know

are supposed

mode

of reflection.

cesthetic

judgment as

only to be enunciating a subjective


Similarly,

we

the objective nature of the thing, but

Kant understands the

neither proceeding from the understanding as such

qua the faculty of

ideas,

as such with

manifold variety, but from the free

its

nor from sensuous perception

play of the understanding and of the imagination.


is

in this free

agreement of the

that the thing

is

Now

knowledge,

related to the subject or person,

to his feeling of pleasure


(a)

faculties of

this

appetitive faculty.

interest,

If

and

and complacency.

complacency

be devoid of any

It

i.e.,

is,

in the first place, to

devoid of relation

we have an

interest,

curiosity for instance, or a sensuous interest

to

our

by way of
on behalf

CHAP.

THE

IV.]

"

UNIVERSAL DELIGHT?

of our sensuous want, a desire of possession and use,

then the objects are not important to us for their


sake, but for the sake of our want.

what

exists has a value only with reference to such a

want, and the relation


is

on the one

tion

we

which

relate

side,

is

distinct
If,

it.

of such a kind that the object

is

and on the other stands an


from the

for instance, I

order to nourish myself

by

it,

what Kant

asserts

is,

not of this kind.

attribu-

but to which

object,

consume the object

in

only in

this interest lies

me, and remains foreign to the object

is

own

In that case,

Now,

itself.

that the relation to the beautiful

The

aesthetic

judgment allows the

<

external existence to subsist free and independent,


giving licence to the object to have

This

is,

we saw

as

end

its

in itself.

above, an important considera-

tion.*
(3)
is

The

beautiful, in the second place, says Kant,

definable as that which, without a conception,

without a category of the understanding,


as the object

man f has no judgment about


universal
tion

mind

validity.

The

indeed to begin with, as such an abstrac-

but that which in

itself

and on

its

own

* See p. 68, supra.


" Der mensch wie er geht und steht."
t
% "

estimate\

the natural

the beautiful, seeing

judgment claims universal


is,

i.e.

perceived

To

of a universal delight.

the beautiful requires a cultivated

that this

is

An

und fur sick."

merits %

ART IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

ii2

is

true, bears in itself the attribution

[Chap. IV.

and the claim to

In this sense the beautiful,

be valid even universally.

ought to be universally recognized, although the

too,

mere conceptions of the understanding are competent

The good,

to no judgment thereupon.

which

right in particular actions,

is

tions.

subsumed under
for good

conceptions, and the act passes

universal

when

is

that, for instance,

succeeds in corresponding to these concep-

it

Beauty, on the other hand, according to the

theory, should

awaken a universal delight directly,


This amounts to nothing

without any such relation.

than that,

else

in

contemplating beauty,

we

are not

conscious of the conception and of the subsumption

under

and do not permit

it,

to take place the severance

of the individual object and of the universal conception

which

in all

other cases

is

present in the judg-

ment.
(c)

In the third place, the beautiful (Kant says) has

the form of teleology,* in as far as

character

is

At bottom

of an end.

only repeats the view

this

Any

which we have just discussed.


duction,

i.e.

logically,
its

a plant or an animal,

and

is

so immediately a

teleology that

we have no

the end, distinct from

way

a teleological

perceived in the object without the idea

its

natural

pro-

organized teleo-

datum

to us in this

separate abstract idea of

given reality.

that even the beautiful


* "

is

is

It is in this

to be displayed to us

Zweck-massigkeit."

BEAUTY A FELT NECESSITY.

Chap. IV.]

113

as teleological.
In finite teleology * end and means
remain external to one another, inasmuch as the end

stands in no essential inner relation to the material

medium

of

its

of the end in

accomplishment.

its

In this case, the idea

abstraction f distinguishes itself from

the object in which the end appears as realized.

The

on the other hand, exists as teleological in


without means and end revealing themselves

beautiful,
itself,

in

it

as distinct aspects.

For instance, the purpose of


is the vitality which exists

the limbs of an organism

as actual in the limbs themselves

cease to be limbs.

For

in

separately they

the living thing the end

and the material medium of the end are so directly


united, that the existing being only exists so long as

purpose dwells in

its

tains,

The

when considered from

not wear
it

it.

its

beautiful,

Kant main-

this point of view,

does

teleology as an external form attached to

but the teleological correspondence of the innerA

and outer

is

the

immanent nature of the

beautiful

object.
(<a?)

ful,

Lastly, Kant's treatment determines the beauti-

in the

fourth place, as being recognized, without a

conception, as object of a necessary delight.

Necessity

* i.e. in any means which we adopt in order to effect an


end which we have distinctly before us as an idea. A knife
does not include cutting, nor a spade digging, although their
But a man does include
construction is relative to these ends.
living, i.e. he is not a man if he ceases to live.
t

"Fur sick."
I

ART IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

U4
is

[Chap. IV.

an abstract category, and indicates an inner essenof two

relation

tial

because the one

The one

is,

aspects

if the

one

and

is,

then (and therefore) the other

is.

in its nature involves the other as well as

has no meaning without

itself,

just as cause,

The

delight which the beautiful involves

e.g.,

necessary consequence, wholly without


conceptions,

effect.

such a

is

relation

to

to categories of the understanding.

i.e.

Thus, for instance, we are pleased no doubt by what


is

symmetrical, and this

is

constructed in accordance

But Kant

with a conception of the understanding.


requires, to give us pleasure,

even more than the unity

and equality that belong to such a conception of the


understanding.

Now, what we

find in all these

a non-severance of that which in

supposed

in

all

Kantian laws

other cases

our consciousness to be distinct.

beautiful this severance finds itself cancelled,


,

is

is

pre-

In the

inasmuch

as universal and particular, end and means, conception

and object thoroughly interpenetrate one another.

And
an

thus, again,

agreement

Kant regards the

in

beautiful in art as

which the particular

accordance with the conception.

itself is

in

Particulars, as such,

axe prima facie contingent, both as regards one another

and as regards the

universal,

and

this

very contingent

element, sense, feeling, temper, inclination,

is

now

in

the beauty of art not merely subsumed under universal


categories of the understanding and controlled

by the

Chap. IV.]

KANTS SOLUTION SUBJECTIVE.

conception of feeling in

its

abstract universality, but

so united with the universal that

inwardly and in

By

115

reveals itself as

it

nature and realization * adequate

its

means the beauty of art becomes'


embodiment of a thought, and the material is not
externally determined by this thought, but exists
itself in its freedom.
For in this case the natural,
sensuous, the feelings and so forth have in themselves
proportion, purpose, and agreement while perception
and feeling are exalted into spiritual universality, and
thereto.

this

thought

itself,

not content with renouncing

its hostility

Thus

to nature, finds cheerfulness therein.

feeling,

and enjoyment are justified and sanctified,


so that nature and freedom, sensuousness and the
idea, find their warrant and their satisfaction all in

pleasure,

one.
is

Yet even

this apparently

complete reconciliation

ultimately inferred! to be,

merely

nevertheless,

subjective in respect of our appreciation as in respect

and not

of our production,

completely true and

to be the naturally

These we may take as the main


Kantian Criticism, so
in

far

for

the

results of the

as they have interest

for us

This criticism forms the

our present inquiry.

starting-point

and

real.

true

of

conception

artistic

Yet this conception had to overcome the

beauty.

Kantian

defects

before

it

could

assert

itself

as

the higher grasp of the true unity of necessity and


*

"An undfur sick."

By

Kant.

ART IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

n6

[Chap. IV.

freedom, of the particular and the universal, of the

sensuous and the rational.


2.

And

so

it

must be admitted that the

artistic

sense of a profound, and, at the same time, philosophic

mind was beforehand with philosophy as such, in


demanding and enunciating the principle of totality
and reconciliation as against that abstract endlessness
of reflective thought, that duty for duty's sake, that
intelligence devoid of plastic shape,

which apprehend

nature and reality, sensation and feeling as a mere


limit,

and as an absolutely

hostile

For

element.

must be credited with the great merit of


having broken through the Kantian subjectivity and
abstractness of thought, and having dared the attempt
to transcend these limits by intellectually grasping
the principles of unity and reconciliation as the truth,
Schiller

:'

\and realizing them


discussions, did

in

not

Schiller, in his aesthetic

art.

simply adhere to art and

interest without concerning himself

to

about

its

its

relation

philosophy proper, but compared his interest in

beauty with the principles of philosophy and


was only by starting from the latter, and by their
help that he penetrated the profounder nature and

artistic

it

notion of the beautiful.

Thus we

feel

it

to be a

feature in one period of his works that he has busied

himself with thought

more

perhaps than was con-

ducive to their unsophisticated beauty as works of


art.

The

intentional character of abstract reflection

SCHILLER AND GOETHE.

CHAP. IV.]

117

and even the

interest of the philosophical idea

noticeable in

many

of his poems.

are

This has been

made a ground of censure against him, especially by


way of blaming and depreciating him in comparison
with

Goethe's

objectivity.

agreeable

But

straightforwardness *

and

in this respect Schiller, as poet, did

but pay the debt of his time

and the reason lay

in

a perplexity which turned out only to the honour


of that sublime soul and profound character, and to
the profit of science and cognition.

At

the

same epoch the same

withdrew Goethe,

Yet

too,

just as Schiller

scientific

stimulus

from poetry, his proper sphere.

immersed himself

in the

study of

the inner depths of the mind, so Goethe's idiosyncrasy

him to the physical side of art, to external nature,


to animal and vegetable organisms, to crystals, to
cloud formation, and to colour. To such scientific
led

research Goethe brought the power of his great mind,

which

in these

regions put to rout \ the science of

mere understanding with its errors, just as Schiller,


on the other side, succeeded in asserting the idea of
the free totality of beauty against the understanding's
science

of

Schiller's

volition

and thought.

productions

is

whole set of

devoted to this insight of his

" Unbefangenheit."
On Goethe's discoveries in morphology and errors in
<;
Popular Lectures," series i., lecture ii.
optics, see Helmholtz's
but compare Schopenhauer, " Werke,"vol. i., " Ueber das Sehn
*
t

und die Farben"

i.i

ART IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

[Chap. IV.

into the nature of art, especially the "Letters

/Esthetic

Education."

In these letters the central

point from which Schiller starts


/

human being

vidual

an

ideal humanity.

be the
in

that every indi-

is

has within him the capacity of

This genuine

by the

says, is represented

upon

State,*

human

being, he

which he takes to

objective, universal, or, so to speak,

normal form

which t he diversity of particula r subjects o r perso ns

aims at aggregating and combining

itself into

a unity.

There were, then, he considered, two imaginable ways


in which the human being in time (in the actual
course of events) might

being in the Idea

human

coincide with the

on the one hand, by the State, qua

genus or class-idea of morality, f law, and intelligence,


destroying individuality

on the other hand, by the

individual raising himself to the level of his genus,


i.e.

by the human being_that

lives in

time ennobling

_himself into__theJiuman being of the. Idea.


reason, he thinks,

dem ands

characteiv-Jbut nature^dernands

and both these

viduality,;

diver sity a nd

legislative authorities

simultaneous claims on man.


conflict

Now

unity as such t_the_jreneric


indi-

have

In presence of the

between these antagonistic elements,

aesthetic

education simply consists in realizing the requirement


*

Compare Browning's " Luria


"

To
t

"

but the attempt of many


rise to the completer life of one."

people

is

Or " Of the moral,

etc.,

man."

^ESTHETIC EDUCATION.

Chap. IV.]

119

of mediation and reconciliation between them.

aim of

this education

For the

according to Schiller, to give

is,

such form to inclination, sensuousness, impulse, and;

may become rational in themselves,


same process reason, freedom, and
may come forward out of their abstrac-

heart, that they

by

and

the

spirituality
tion,

and

uniting with

throughout,

rationalized
flesh

the

may

Beauty

and blood.

is

the unification of the rational


this unification to

This notion of
in

and the sensuous, and


real.

may be readily recognized


of " Anmuth und Wiirde," * and in

Schiller's

poems more particularly from the

the praise of

now

be invested with

thus pronounced to be

be the genuinely

the general views

his

element,

natural
in it

women

fact that

his subject matter

he makes

because

it

was

in their character that he recognized and held up to

notice the spontaneously present combination of the


spiritual

and

natural.

Now this

Unity_of the u nive rsal and particula r, of


freedom and necessity, of thejspiritual and the nat ural,
whiclTSchiller grasped from a scientific point of view
as the principle

and essence of

art,

and laboured

indefatigably to evoke into actual existence by help

of art and aesthetic culture, was considered, by a further


advance, as the Idea itself, and was thus constituted
the principle of knowledge and of existence, while the
*

work

" Ueber

Anmuth und

Wiirde," "

of Schiller that appeared in 1793.

Of Grace and

Dignity," a

120

Idea

and

ART IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

[Chap. IV-

was recognized as the

sole truth

in this sense

By means

reality.

of this recognition, science, in

Schelling's philosophy, attained

and although

absolute standpoint,

had previously begun to assert its


and dignity in relation to the highest

art

peculiar nature
^interests of

its

was now that the actual


place in scientific theory were

humanity, yet

it

and its
Art was now accepted, even if erroneously
in one respect, which this is not the place to discuss,
yet in its higher and genuine vocation. No doubt
notion of art

discovered.

before this time so early a writer as

had been inspired by


of the ancients in a
a

new

Winckelmann

his observation of the ideals

way

that led

him

sense for the contemplation of

to develop

art,

to rescue

from the notions of commonplace aims and of


mere mimicry of nature, and to exert an immense

it

influence in favour of searching out the idea of art in

the works of art and in

its

For Winckelmann

history.

should be regarded as one of the

men who have

suc-

ceeded in furnishing the mind with a new organ and

new methods

of study in the field of

theory, however,
his

view has had


3.

To

subject,

and the

scientific

On

art.

knowledge of

the
art

less influence.

touch briefly on the further course of the

A.

W. and

Friedrich

von

Schlegel,

in

proximity to the renaissance of philosophy, being


covetous of novelty and with a thirst for what was
striking

and extraordinary, appropriated

as

much

THE SCHLEGELS.

Chap. IV.]

121

of the philosophical idea as their natures, which were

anything
critical

but philosophical, and essentially of the

stamp, were capable of absorbing.

Neither

of them can claim the reputation of a speculative

But

was they who, armed with their


set
themselves somewhere
near the standpoint of the Idea, and with great
plainness of speech and audacity of innovation,
thinker.
critical

it

understanding,

though with but a poor admixture of philosophy,


directed a clever polemic against the traditional views.

And

thus they undoubtedly introduced in several

branches of art a

new standard

of judgment in con-

formity with notions which were higher than those


that they attacked.

As, however, their criticism was

not accompanied by the thorough philosophical com-

prehension of their standard, this standard retained


a character of indefiniteness and vacillation, with the
result that

times too

much and some-

they sometimes did too


little.

No

doubt they are to be credited

with the merit of bringing afresh to light and extolling


in a loving spirit

much

that

was held obsolete and

was inadequately esteemed by

their

age,

e.g.

the

work of the older painters of Italy and the Netherand, again, they
lands, the " Nibelungen Lied," etc.
endeavoured with zeal to learn and to teach subjects
that were little known, such as the Indian poetry and
;

mythology.

Nevertheless, they attributed too high

a value to the productions of such epochs, and some-

ART IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

122

times themselves

[Chap. IV.

admiring

into the blunder of

fell

what was but mediocre,

e.g.

Holberg's comedies, and

attaching a universal importance to what had only


relative

boldly showing themselves

or even

value,

enthusiasts for a perverse tendency

standpoint as

Out of

if it

and subordinate

were something supreme.

this tendency,

and especially out of the

sentiments* and doctrines of Fried, von Schlegel, there


further

grew

Irony.

This idea had

in

one of

manifold shapes the so-called

in all its

its

its

aspects, in

deeper root,

to

art.

Fried,

it,

take

philosophy were applied

Fried,

Schelling, to pass wholly

von Schlegel to develop

it

in

peculiar fashion, and to tear himself loose from

As

a
it.

regards the intimate connection of Fichte's prin-

ciples with

one tendency (among others) of the irony,

we need only

lay stress on the following point, that

Fichte establishes the


all

it

von Schlegel, as also Schelling, started

from Fichte's point of view

beyond

we

philosophy, in so

Fichte's

far as the principles of his

if

knowledge, of

all

in the sense of the I

utterly abstract

which

and formal.

second place, this

I is

matter

is

is

is,

and

For

and that

no more than,

this reason, in the

characteristic, every attribute,

negated therein

annihilated

is

in itself absolutely simple, and,

on the one hand, every


every content

as the absolute principle of

reason and cognition

by absorption

* " Gesinnungen."

for

every positive

into this abstract

FICHTETHE EGO.

Chap. IV.]

freedom and unity

which

is

recognition

on the other

am

I, is

I,*

every content

side,

given position and

only by favour of the

only by favour of the

is

to be of value for the

123

Whatever

I.

and what

in turn able to annihilate.

Now,

if

we abide by

which have their origin


abstract

I,

and regarded \

follows that the I

is

and

in

of everything,

human

by the

be

as well

making

But

I.

or divine, profane or sacred,

I,

and that might

that

semblance, not true

actual in

and

it

is

there

not, therefore, just

This amounts

own right % a mere


its own sake and by

its

real for

within whose power and caprice

at its free disposal.

if so,

being given

own means, but a mere appearance due

its
I,

is

and

able to remain lord and master


no sphere of morality or legality,

in turn annihilated thereby.


all

real

its

anything that would not have to begin by


position

of the

in itself, but only as

produced by the subjectivity of the

of things

empty forms

these utterly

in the absoluteness

then nothing has value in

nature,

actual

to

my favour

by

is

is,

To admit

it

it

to the

remains, and

or to annihilate

it

stands purely in the pleasure of the I which has


attained absoluteness in itself
*
sie

and simply as

The Baccalaureus' speech

war

nicht, eh' ich sie

in Faust (Part
erschuf^etc, appears

I.

2)

"Die Welt,

to

be a parody

of Fichte's ideas in this aspect.


t
ist

think the order of the

nichts
't

an undfiir

sick

German must be a

und in sick selbst

"An undfiir sick seyende''

misprint.

" So

werthvoll betrachtetP

ART IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

124

In the third place, * then, the


individual,

viduality to

and

its

its

own

[Chap. IV.

a living, active

I is

consists in bringing

life

indi-

its

consciousness as to that of others,

uttering itself and taking shape in phenomena.


For every human being while he lives, seeks to realize
himself, and does realize himself.
With respect to
in

beauty and art


artist

this receives

and forming one's

the meaning of living as

life artistically.

But, accord-

ing to the principle before us, IJive a s artist

my action

and utterance

when

all

in general whenever it has


do with any content, is fo r me on the level of m ere
se mblance, and ass umes a shape w hich is wholly in my
power. So I am not really in earnest, either about
,

to

content, or generally, about

its utterance and


For genuine earnest comes into being
only by means of a substantial interest, a matter tha t
ha s someth i ng in it, tru th,_rnoralitv. and so Jorth by

this
,

realization.

means of a content which, as such (without my help)


is enough to have value for me as something essential,
so that

myself only become essential in

eyes in as far as

have immersed myself

my own
in

such a

matter and have come to be in conformity with

my

whole knowledge and

according to which the


loosest of
*

thing

The

its

a semblance for
semblance.
t

is

Not

literal.

artist is

own power,

three points are,

"

At

action.

(i.)

it.

Das alles an

The
(iii.)

in

the I that binds and

whom no

for

it

the standpoint

is

Its

abstract,

own

sich setzende

content of
(ii.)

Everya

acts, even, are

und auflosende Ich."

Chap.

CONCEIT OF THE IRONY.

IV.]

125

consciousness counts as absolute and as essentiallyreal,

but only as

an

itself

artificial

and dissoluble

semblance, such earnest can never

come

as nothing has validity ascribed to

but the formalism/

of the
I

By

I.

others, indeed,

present myself to

asmuch as they

my

self-display in

them may be taken

interpret

me

into being,
1

it

as though

concerned about the matter in hand

which

seriously, inI

were really

but therein they

shnply deceived, poor borne" creatures, without

are

talent

and capacity to apprehend and to attain my


And this shows me that not every one is

standpoint.

so free {formally * free, that

usually has value, dignity,

simply a product of his

by he

is

matters,
tent

by

living

is)

as to see in

and sanctity

own power

for

all

that

mankind,

of caprice, where-

able to set his seal on the value of such

and to determine himself and obtain a contheir means, or not.

an ironical

artist life

And

then this

apprehends

skill in

itself as

God-like geniality, \ for which every possible thing

mere dead

creature, to

which the

free creator,

is

a
a

knowing

himself to be wholly unattached, feels in no

way

bound, seeing that he can annihilate as well as create

He who

it.

has attained such a standpoint of God-

Formal freedom

is

detachment from everything, or the

(apparent) capacity of alternatives ; it is opposed to real freedom,


which is identification ofone's-self with something that is capable
of satisfying one.

of mind in
t "Genialitat:" the character or state
is

dominanthere, the mere

which genius

self-enjoyment of genius.

ART IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

126

down

like geniality looks

besides, for they are

their fixed, obligatory,

who

on

all

mankind

pronounced born^ and dull

as far as law, morality,

the individual

in superiority

[Chap. IV.

and so forth retain


and

And

essential validity.

thus lives his artist

life

in

them

for

assigns

himself indeed relation to others, lives with friends,


mistresses,

to

right

towards

it.

This

is

that

his

or

actions,

ticular

own

but as genius he sets no value on

etc.,

relation

this

determinate reality and


to

what

universal

is

the universal import of the genial God-like


I

into itself for

bonds are broken, and which

all

endure to

its

he assumes an ironical attitude

is,

irony, as that concentration of the

/which

par-

in

live in

will

the bliss of self-enjoyment*

only

This

irony was the invention of Herr Fried, von Schlegel,

and many followed him


are prating of

The proximate form


plays

itself

futility t

of

as irony
all

in prating

about

it

then, or

afresh just now.

it

that

is

is,

of this negativity which disthen,

on the one hand the

matter of

fact,

or moral

and of

substantive import in itself; the nothingness of


that

is

value.

objective,

and that has

If the

remains at this point of view,

essential

all

and actual
all

* " Selbstgenuss."
I do not think it means self-indulgence,
but the above-described enjoyment of reposing in the superiority

of the ego.
" Eitelkeil," also
t
this attitude.

= " conceit

Hegel uses

it

" which
;
on purpose.

is

the other side of

FALSE SAINTLINESS.

Chap. IV.]

appears to

own

it

and as

as nothing worth

127

futile,

excepting

which thereby becomes hollow


and empty, and itself mere conceit.* But on the

its

subjectivity,

other hand, the reverse

may

happen, and the

also_find itself unsatisfied in its

and

may

quence to

prove insufficient to
feel

itself,

itself,

so as in conse-

a craving for the solid and substantial, for

Out of this

determinate and essential interests.


arises

may

enjoyment of

there

misfortune and antinomy, in that the subject

and has a craving for


unable to abandon its isolation

desires to penetrate into truth


objectivity,

but yet

is

and ^retirement into


this unsatisfied

itself,

and to

s trip

ab stract inwardness

itself free

has a seizure of sickly yearning \ which


seen emanate from

school.

Fichte's

tent of this quiescence

feebleness,

we have also
The discon-

which

or

surrendering

inward harmony, and,

craving after the absolute,

for

remains none

unreal and empty, even though pure in

itself,

source of morbid saintlinessj and yearning.


true saintly soul acts

craving

is

does

touch anything for fear of

not like to act


its

to

and

of

mind ), and so

(of

and

is

a reality.

But

all

its

the less

the

is

For a
all

that

the feeling of the nullity of the empty

* "Eitle?
" Sehnsuchtigkeit."
t

% " Krankhafte

SchonseligkeW

Schonseligkeit seems

to

be really a word formed like Redselig, etc., but to be given an


equivocating reference to " Schbne Seele," which I have rendered
in

the next sentence

by " saintly

soul."

ART IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

128

futile * subject

escape this

[Chap. IV.

or person, which lacks the strength to

and to

its futility,*

fill

t itself

with some-

thing of substantial value.


In so

form of

however, as the Irony was treated as a

far,

did not content itself with conferring

art, it

artistic

shape upon the

of the

artist.

own

actions, etc., the artist

to produce external

The
is,

was bound

works of art as creations of his

principle of these productions,

the most part can only

form,

and particular individuality

In addition to the works of art pre-

sented by his

fancy.

life

come

which for

to the birth in poetical

due course, the^ representation of the

in

The

rjiyjne__as_Jhe_lKmical.

ironical,

"genial"

as

what
and excellent; and thus even the
objective shapes of art will have to represent the mere
individuality, consists in the self-annihilation of

is

noble,

great,

principle of absolute subjectivity,

has value and nobleness for


annihilation.

man

by displaying what
as null in

This implies, not merely that

its

we

self-

are

not to be serious about the right, the moral, and the


true,

but that the highest and best of

in

inasmuch as

it,

characters,
itself,

taken

and

and so

is

in its exhibition

actions,

irony at

in the abstract,

* " Eitlen,"

it

refutes

own

has nothing

and annihilates

expense.

This mode,

borders closely on the principle

" Eitelkeit?

This recurring phrase


reminiscence of the Platonic
t

its

all

through individuals,

may be

used etymologically, as a

irMfoxxsBiu.

COMEDY AND

Chap. IV.]

comedy

of

IRONY.

but yet within this

129

comic

affinity the

must be essentially distinguished from the

ironical.

For the comic must be limited to bringing to nothing

what

is

a false and self-contradictory

in itself null,

phenomenon

for instance,

a whim, a perversity, or

particular caprice, set over against a

mighty passion

or even a supposed reliable principle or rigid

may be shown
thing

to be null.

when what

is

in

But

reality

it

is

an individual and
is

by

his

means.

quite another

moral and

substantial content as such, exhibits

maxim
any

true,

itself as null in

Such an individual

then null and despicable in character, and weakness

and want of character are thus introduced into the


In this distinction between the ironi-

representation.
cal

and the comic

it is

therefore an essential question

what import that has which

is

brought to nothing.

In the case supposed they are wretched worthless


subjects, persons destitute of the power to abide by
their

fixed

surrender
"

it

and
and

essential
let it

purpose,

be destroyed

but
in

Irony" loves this irony of the characterless.

character involves on the one

hand an

ready

them.

to

The

For true

essential import

on the other hand, adherence to that


purpose, such that the individuality would be robbed
of its whole existence if forced to desist from and to
in its

purpose

This stability and substance constitute


Cat? can Jive only as
the keynote of character.
Roman j,rid_as_reublican. Now, if Irony is taken

abandon

it)

ART IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

3o

as the keynote of the representation, this

the supremely inartistic


of the

work of

figures

is

means that

taken as the true principle

For the

art.

[Chap. IV.

in part shapes void of

result

is

in part insipid

import and of conduct,*

seeing that their substantive nature turns out to be

a nullity

and

in part, finally, those

yearning moods

and unresolved contradictions of the heart that attach


themselves to such conceptions.

Representations of

And

kind can awake no genuine interest.

this

for

from the Irony that we have eternal

this reason it is

lamentations over the lack of profound feeling, artistic


insight,

and genius

in the public,

inasmuch as

not understand these heights of Irony.

does

it

That

is

to

say, the public does not like all this mediocrity, half

grotesque and half characterless.

And

these

natures

unsubstantial languishing

pleasure

is

well that

afford

no

a comfort that such insincerity and

is

it

it

hypocrisy are not approved, and that, on the contrary,

man

has a desire no

less for full

and genuine

interests

than for characters which remain true to the weighty


purposes of their
It

lives.

may be added

who more

as an historical remark that those

particularly adopted irony as the

principle of art were Solger

This

is

not the place to speak of Solger at the

length which
*

is

due tq him, and

Haltung: "bearing"

bearing of one

supreme
and Ludwig Tieck.

who

must content myself

in general, and more especially the


bears himself nobly by reason of a principle.

SOLGER.

Chap. IV.]

with a few observations.

131

Solger was not like the

others, satisfied with superficial philosophical culture,

but the genuine speculative need of his innermost


nature impelled

him

tical

the

descend into the depths of the

to

And

philosophic idea.

upon the

therein he hit

element of the Idea, the point to which

name

of

" infinite

of the idea in that

negates

itself as

finiteness

and just as really cancels


estab lishing thereby

give

absolute negativity," the activity

it

become

universal, so as to

dialec-^

this

the infinite and

and

particularity,

negation

theunive real and

in

turn,

infinite in the

and p articular. Solger got no further than this


negativity, and it is no doubt an element in the
finite

when conceived as this mere


and dissolution both of infinite and of
no more than an element not, as Solger mainthe entire Idea.
Unhappily Solger's life was too

speculative idea, but yet


dialectic unrest
finite

tains,

soon interrupted for him to have achieved the concrete

And

developmen t of the philosophical Ide a.

so he

never got beyond this aspect of negativity, which has


affinity
is

with the dissolution that Irony effects of what

determinate and of what has substantive value in

itself,

a negativity in which he saw the principle of

artistic activity.

Yet

in his

the solidity, seriousness,

actual

life,

and strength of

considering

his character,

he neither was himself, in the sense above depicted,

an ironical

artist,

genuine works of

nor was his profound feeling for


art,

developed

in

protracted art

132

ART IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

[Chap. IV.

an ironical nature.

So much

studies, in this respect of

in vindication of Solger,

art

whose

merit to be distinguished

life,

philosophy, and

from the previously-

mentioned apostles of irony.

As

regards

Ludwig

from that period


literary

centre.*

in

Tieck, his culture, too, dates

which

some time Jena was the


and others of these dis-

for

Tieck

tinguished people display great familiarity with the

phrases in question, but without telling us what they

mean by them.

Thus, Tieck no doubt always says

there ought to be Irony

but when he himself ap-

proaches the criticism of great works of


his recognition

and portrayal of

excellent, yet, if

we fancy

that

work

as

Romeo and

we hear no more about

Juliet,"

we

though

their greatness

now

is

tunity to explain where the Irony


"

art,

is,

e.g.

in

such a

are taken in

the Irony.

* See Scherer, Eng. Transl.,

ii.

is

the best oppor-

248.

for

CHAPTER V
DIVISION OF

After

I.

THE

SUBJECT.

the above introductory remarks,

is

it

nov

Bu

time to pass to the study of our object-matter.

we

are

in the introduction,

still

and an

introductior

cannot do more than lay down, for the sake of ex


sketch of the entire cours(

planation, the general

which

will

be followed by our subsequent


As, however,

considerations.

as

proceeding

fr

even assigned as
of the absolute

review in a

way

om
its

scientifii

we have spoken

of ar

Id ea, and havi

the absolute

end the sensuous representatior

itsel f,

we

shall

have to conduct

to show, at least in general,

how

particular divisions of the subject spring from

thi:

th<

thi

conception of artistic beauty as the representation o


the absolute.
ja.

we must attempt

very general idea of this conception


It

is

Therefore

to awakei

itself.

has already been said that the content of ar

the Idea, and that

its

form

lies in

the plastic use o

DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.

i34

images accessible to sense.


to reconcile into a full

which

attribution

this

that the content, which


representation, shall

These two

and united
involves
is

show

[Chap. V.

sides art has

The

totality.

first

the requirement

is

to be offered to artistic

be

itself to

worth y of such repres entation.

in

its

Otherwise

jiature

we only

obtain a bad combination, whereby a content that


will

not submit to plasticity and to external presenta-

tion, is forced into that form,

in its nature prosaic is

mode

and a matter which

is

expected to find an appropriate

of manifestation in the form antagonistic to

its

nature.

The

second requireme nt,

which

is

derivable from

demands of the content of art that jt should


not be anythin g abstract in itself
This does not
mean that it must be concrete as the sensuous is
concrete in contrast to everything spiritual and inthis first,

tellectual, these

and
in

abstract.

For everything that has ge nuine truth


is con crete in itself,

the mi nd as well as in nature

and

has, in spite of its universality, nevertheless,

subjectivity

and

particularity within

it.

If

we

both
say,

God that he is simply One, the supreme Being


such, we have only enunciated a lifeless abstraction

fg.,

as

being taken as in themselves simple

of

of the irrational understanding.

himself
ifford

is

Such a God, as he

not apprehended in his concrete truth, can

no material

for art, least of all for plastic art.

Hence the Jews and the Turks have not been able to

Chap. V.]

ART CONCRETE, NOT SENSUOUS.

represent their God,

such an
positive

God

135

who does not even amount

abstraction of the understanding, in

way

in

which Christians have done

in Christianity is conceived in

His

so.

truth,

to

the

For
and

Himself thoroughly concrete, as a


and more closely determined, as

therefore, as in

person, as a subject,*

mind or

spirit.

What He

is

as spirit unfolds itself to

the religious apprehension as the Trinity of Persons,

which at the same time

Here

is

in relation with itself

essentiality, universality,

and

together with their reconciled unity

One.

particularity,

and

such unity that constitutes the concrete.

it

is

only

Now,

as

must be of
demands the same concrete-

a content in order to possess truth at


this concrete nature, art

is

all

ness,

because a mere abstract universal has not in

itself

the vocation to advance to particularity and

phenomenal manifestation and to unity with

itself

therein.

a reader to ask in what person or subject


conceived to have reality. On this see below, p. 165. It
appears certain to me that Hegel, when he writes thus, is
referring to the selfkconscio usness of individual human being s
as co nstituting, and reflecting on, an ideal unity between them.
This~may seem to put a non-natural meaning on the term
" person " or " subject," as if the common element of a number
It is obvious that
of intelligences could be a single person.
the question hhi ges on the degree in which a un ity that is
I can
not sensuou s b ut ideal can be effective and actual.
only say here, that the more we consider the nature of ideal
* It is natural for

God

is

unity the higher

Essay, p.

xiv.

we

shall rate its capabilities.

See Prefatory

DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.

136

If a true

[Chap. V.

and therefore concrete content

corresponding to

it

is

to

have

a sensuous form and modelling,

sensuous form must, in the third place, be no less

this

emphatically something individual, wholly concrete in


itself,

The

and one.

character of concreteness as

belonging to both elements of


to the representation,

both

may

coincide and correspond to

as, for instance, the natural


is

is

concrete in

abandon the idea that

accident that an actual

world

is

no

itself,

it

human body

capable of represent-

and of displaying

we ought

Therefore

a mere matter of

is

phenomenon of the external

chosen to furnish a shape thus conformable

Art does not appropriate

to truth.

because

is

conformity therewith.

itself in

to

which

spirit,

one another

shape of the

such a sensuous concrete as

ing

to the content as

art,

precisely the point in which

is

it

simply finds

The

other.

it

this

form either

existing or because there

is

concrete content itself involves the

may say indeed of


But in compensation this
which a content essentially

element of external and actual, we


sensible

manifestation.

sensuous concrete, in

belonging to mind expresses

itself,

is

nature addressed to the inward being

element of shape, whereby the

reason

for

which content

and

own

in

its

its

external

content

perceptible and imaginable, has the

purely for the heart and mind.

is

made

aim of existing

This
artistic

fashioned in conformity with each other.

is

the only

shape

are

The mere

Chap. V.]

THAN

SPIRIT HIGHER

ART.

137

sensuous concrete, external nature as such, has not

purpose for

this

exclusive ground of origin.

The

plumage shines unseen, and

their

its

birds' variegated

song dies away unheard, the Cereus * which blossoms


only for a night withers without having been admired
in the wilds of southern forests,

and these

forests,

jungles of the most beautiful and luxuriant vegeta-

with the most odorous and aromatic perfumes,

tion,

perish

and decay no

unenjoyed.

less

The work of
but

art has not such a naive self-centred being,

essentially a question,
heart,

is

an address to the responsive

an appeal to affections and to minds.

Although the

bestowal of sensuous form

artistic

is in

this respect

hand

it is

not accidental, yet

on the other

mode of apprehending the


Though t is a higher mode than
by means of the s ensuous concrete.

not the highest

sp iritually concre te.


r epresentation

"Although in a relative sense abstract, yet

it

must not

be one-sided but concrete thinking, in order to be true

and

rational.

Whether a given content ha s sensuous

a rtistic represe nta tion for

its

virtue of its nature essentially

more

spiritual

embodimen t,

plays itself at once,

Greek gods with

G od

gr_jn

demands a higher an d

for instance,

as

a distinction that dis-

we compare

conceived

The Greek god

Christian ideas.
* Fackeldistel

if,

is

adequate form

is

the

accordi ng to

not abstract but


..

" Torch thistle," a plant of the genus Cereus,

Nat. Order Cactacecz.

DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.

138

[Chap. V.

human

individual,

and

shape

God is equally a concrete permode of pure spiritual existence,


His
be known as mind* and in mind.

is

closely akin to the natural

the Christian

sonality, but in the

and

to

is

medium of

existence

is

therefore essentially inward

knowledge and not external natural form, by means


of which He can only be represented imperfectly, and
not in the whole depth of His idea.

But inasmuch as the task of

art is to represent the

idea to direct perception in sensuous shape, and not


in the

form of thought or of pure spirituality as such,

and seeing that

this

work of representation has

its

value and dignity in the correspondence and the unity

of the two sides,

bodiment,

it

i.e.

its plastic emand excellency of

of the Idea and

follows that the level

art in attaining a realization

adequate to

its

idea,f

must depend upon the grade of inwardness and unity


with which Idea and Shape display themselves as
fused into one.

Thus

the higher truth is^apiritual being that has

attained a shape adequate to the conception of spirit.

This

is

what furnishes the

science of

true notion of

principle of division for the

For before the mind can attain the

art.

its

absolute essence,

a course of stages whose ground

and to
supplies
*

Or

this evolution
itself,

it

has to traverse

in this idea itself

is

of the content with which

there corresponds an evolution,

" as spirit

and

in spirit."

The

idea of

it

immeart.

THE SEVERAL ARTS.

Chap. V.]

139

diately connected therewith, of_the_plastic--fr-ms of

under the shape of which the mind as

art,

presents to itself the consciousness of

This evolution within_the


its

own nature two

velopment

itself is

artist

itself.

has again in

art-spirit

In the first place the de-

sides.

a spiritual * and universal one, in

so far -as the graduated series of definite conceptions of


the

definite but

world as the

comprehensive conscious-

ness of nature^,

man

shape

the second place, this universal de-

and, in

velopment of art
external existence

is

and, God, .gives

itself artistic

obliged to provide itself with

and sensuous form, and the

definite

modes of the sensuous art-existence are themselves a


totality of necessary distinctions in the

which are the several arts.

realm of art

It is true, indeed, that the

necessary kinds of artistic representation are on the


one hand qua spiritual of a very general nature, and
not restricted to any one material t while sensuous
;

The two

subject-matter

evolutions are, speaking roughly,


;

(ii.)

that of the particular

mode

(i.)

that of the

of art

(i.)

e.g.

you have Egyptian, Greek, Christian religion, etc., with the corresponding views and sentiments, each in its own relation to
art ; (ii.) you have, as a cross division to the former, the several
arts sculpture, music, poetry, etc., each having its special ground

and warrant.
should
T He is asking himself why sound or paint, etc.,
correspond to one type of art as theoretically denned this
these
being intellectual, not sensuous, at root and answers that
media qua natural objects have, though more latent than in
works of art, an import and purpose of their own, which reveals
itself in their suitability to

particular forms of art.

DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.

i4o

[Chap. V.

existence contains manifold varieties of matter.

But

as this latter, like the mind, has the Idea potentially


for its inner soul,

it

follows from this that particular

sensuous materials have a close affinity and secret


accord with the spiritual distinctions and types of art
presentation.

In

its

completeness, however, our science divides

jtself into three principal portions.


First,

we obtain a general part.

It

has for

tent and object the universal Idea of

this

artistic

its

con-

beauty

beauty being conceived as the Ideal together

with the nearer relation of the latter both to nature


I

and

to subjective artistic production.

Secondly, there develops itself out of the idea of


artistic

beauty a particular part, in as far as the essen-

tial differences

which

this idea contains in itself evolve

themselves into a scale of particular plastic * forms.


In the third place there results a final part, which

has for

its

subject the individualization of artistic

beauty, that consists in the advance of art to the

sensuous realization of

its

shapes and

tion as a system of the several arts t

and

its

self-comple-

and

their genera

species.

* " Gestaltungsformen." I use " plastic " all through in a pregnant sense, as one speaks of plastic fancy, etc. ; meaning ideally

determinate, and

fit

for translating into pictures, poetry, etc.

These "plastic forms" are the various modifications of the


subject-matter of art.
t

See

See note,

note, p. 139, above.

p. 139,

above.

THE IDEAL.

Chap. V.]

2.

by

With respect

to the

141

intelligible,

we must begin
make the sequel

part,

first

recalling to mind, in order to

that the Idea qua the beautiful in art

is

not the Idea as such, in the

mode

physical logic apprehends

as the absolute, but the

it

which a meta-

in

Idea as developed into concrete form

fit

for reality,

and as having entered into immediate and adequate


unity with this reality.

only in

its

shape

tive
at

For the Idea^as

the essentially and actually true,

it is

such, although

yet the truth

is

generality which has not yet taken objec;

but the Idea as the beautiful in art

once the Idea when specially determined as

essence individual

and

reality,

an

also

shape of reality essentially destined to


reveal the Idea.
r equirement

to

one another.

Idea, as

individual

embody and J

This amounts to enunciating the

that the Idea,

c oncrete reality,

isPl

in its

are to be

When

and

its

plastic

mnnlH as

made completely adequate


reduced to such form the

a reality moulded in conformity with the

conception of the Idea,

is

the Ideal.

The problem

of this conformity might, to begin with, be under-

stood in the sense that

long as the actual

any Idea would

shape,

it

shape, represented this particular Idea

But

if so,

serve, so

did not matter what

the required truth of the Ideal

and no other.
confounded

is

with mere correctness, which consists in the expression


of any meaning whatever in appropriate fashion so
that

its

import

may be

readily recognized in the shape

DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.

142

The

created.

Any

Ideal

is

content whatever

not to be thus understood.

may

attain to being repre-

sented quite adequately, judged

own

its

nature, but

it

[Chap. V.

by the standard of

does not therefore gain the right

to claim the artistic beauty of the Ideal.

Compared

indeed with ideal beauty, even the presentation will


in

such a case appear defective.

From

this point of

view we must remark to begin with, what cannot be


proved

till

that the defects of a

later,

work of

art are

not to be regarded simply as always due, for instance,


to

unskilfulness.
Defectiveness of form
from defectiveness of content. So, for example,
Chinese, Indians, and Egyptians in their artistic

individual

aris es
trie

shapes, their forms of deities,

and

their idols, never

got beyond a formless phase, or one of a vicious and


false definiteness of form,

genuine beauty

and were unable to attain

because their mythological ideas, the

content and thought of their works of

art,

were as

yet indeterminate in themselves, or of a vicious determinateness, and did not consist in the content that
absolute in
in true

itself.

The more

is

that jworks of art excel

beauty of presentatio n, the more profound

is

And

in

the inner truth of their content and though t.


dealing with this point,

we have not

perhaps of the greater or lesser

skill

to think merely

with which the

natural forms as given in external reality are appre-

hended and imitated.


consciousness and

For

in certain stages of art-

of representation, the distortion

FORM AND CONTENT.

Chap. V.]

143

and disfigurement of natural structures

is

not unin-

and want of skill, but


which emanates from the content

tentional technical inexpertness


(intentional alteration,

that

is

in

consciousness,

and

is

Thus, from this point of view, there


imperfect art, which

and

cally

may

be quite

required

thereby.

such aihing_as

is

both techni-

perfect,

in other respects, in its determinate sphere,

yet reveals itself to be defective

when compared with

the conception of art as such, and with the Ideal.

^loly-in 4he-hjghest arl_axe_ the Idea and the representation genuinely adequate to one anothe r,

sense that the outward shape given to the Idea

n the
is

in

and actually the true shap p, because


the content of the Idea, which that shape expresses,
is itself the true and real content.
It is a corollary

itself essentially

from

this,

as

we

indicated above,* that the Idea

be defined in and through

and thereby possess


of

its

and standard
and determination in external

be able to represent

herein that

God only

intellectual

God Himself

human form
it

known

in

is

bridge to phenomenal existence.


is

in

expression, because

completely

Determinateness

Himself as mind.
nateness

concrete totality,

For example, the Christian imagination

and with man's


is

must

in itself the principle

particularization

appearance.
will

itself as

is,

as

Where

it

were, the

this determi-

not totality derived from the Idea

where the Idea

is

itself,

not conceived as self-determining


See

g. 134,

above.

DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.

144

[Chap. V.

/and self-particularizing, the Idea remains abstract and


has

its

determinateness, and therefore the principle

that dictates

mode

its

particular

and exclusively appropriate

of presentation, not in itself but external to

Therefore, the Idea

when

still

abstract has even

shape external, and not dictated by


however, which
of

mode

its

that

it

is

The Idea

itself.

concrete in itself bea rs the principle

of manifestation within

means the

Thus

is

it.

its

its elf,

free process of giving

and

shape to

is

by

itself.

only the truly concrete Idea that can

generate the true shape, and this correspondence of


the two

is

the Ideal.

Now because the

J.

unity,

it

Idea

is in

this fashion concrete

follows that this unity can enter into the art-

consciousness only

by the expansion and

tion of the particularities of the Idea,


this evolution that artistic

on

it is

through

beauty comes to possess

a totality of particular stages


after

and

re-concilia-

and forms.

Therefore,

we have studied the beauty of art in itself and


own merits, we must see how beauty as a whole

its

breaks up into

its

particular determinations.

This

our second part, the doctrine of the types of art.


These forms find their genesis in the .di fferent modes
gives, as

of grasping the Idea as artis tic content,

whereby

fconditionecTa differen ce of the form i n which


fests

itself.

Hence the jtyj)_es__of

art are

it

is

mani-

nothing but

the different relations of content and shape, relations

which

em anatgjxnm

the-

THpa

it-gpl^

and furnish thereby

SYMBOLIC ART.

Chap. V.]

145

the true basis of division for this sphere.


ciple of division must always

tion

whose

For the

prin-

be contained in rVtoconcep-

particularization

and

division

is

in question.

We

have here to consider three relations of the


Idea to its outward shaping.*
First,

a.

the Idea gives rise to the beginning of

Art when, being

itself still

in its indistin ctness

obscurity, or in vicious untrue determinateness,

made
minate

it

does not yet possess in

which the Ideal demands

ality

one-sidedness leave

and

As

the import of artistic creations.

defective.

rather a

its

The

mere search

indeter-

its

abstractness and

shape to be outwardly bizarre

first

form of art

is

therefore

after plastic portrayal than a

The Idea has not

yet found the true form even within

thereafter.

is

itself that individu-

capacity of genuine representation.

fore continues to be

and
it

itself,

and there-

merely the struggle and aspiration

In general terms

the

Symbolic form of

h as

its

art.

we may

In

it

call this

form

the abstract Idea

outward shape exter nal_to_jtself f

in natural

sensuous matter, with which the process of shaping


* "

GestaltungP

do not think

this

means the process of

shaping, but the shapes taken collectively.


He means
t i,e. not in a separate ideal shape devoted to it.
that man takes a stock or stone as representation or sy mbol of
is no real connection between divinity
and the stone, it may either be left untouched and unshaped,
or be hewn into any bizarre or arbitrary shape that comes to
hand see next paragraph.

the divine, and as there

DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.

146

begins,

[Chap. V.

and from which, qua outward expression,

it is

inseparable.

Natural objects are thus p ri marily left unaltered


and_ve t at the sam e time invested with_the substantial
,

Idea as their significance, so that they receive the


vocation of expressing
as

though the Idea

the root of this

is

them an aspect

it,

itself

and claim to be interpreted


were present

in

them.

At

the fact that natural objects have in

in

which they are capable of repreBut as an adequate

Fenting a universal meaning.

correspondence

is

not yet possible, this reference can

when

only concern an abstract attriFute, as


used to

On

mean

a _ lion

is

strength.

the other hand, this abstractness of the relation

brings to consciousness no less strongly the foreign ness of the Idea to natural

phenomena

having no other reality to express


these shapes, seeks itself in

them

it,

and the Idea,

expatiates in

all

in all their unrest

and disproportion, but nevertheless does not find them


adequate to

itself.

The n

the natur al shapes and the


indefiniteness

to

exaggerate

phenomen a of

reality into

it

proceeds

and disproportion tojntoxicate ilselfjn


,

them, to seethe _and_jer ment in them to do violence to


,

them, to distort and explode them into unnatural


shapes, a nd strives

by the variety, hugeness, and splen-

dour of the forms employed* toexaltthe phenomenon


* This description is probably directed, in the first place,
to
the Indian representation of deities, and would apply to those of

ORIENTAL PANTHEISM.

CHAP. V.]

147

to the level of the Ide a.

For the Idea is here still more


or less indeterminate and non-plastic, but the natural
objects are in their shape thoroughly determinate.
Hence, in view of the unsuitability of the two
elements to each other, the relation of the Idea

becomes a negative

to objective reality

former, as in

its

nature inward,*

such an externality, and as being

one, for the

unsatisfied with

is

its

inner universal

substance t persists in exaltation or Sublimity beyond

and above

all this

inadequate abundance of shapes*

In virtue of this sublimity the natural


the

human shapes and

as they were;

though

phenomena and

incidents are accepted, and left

at the

same time undexstOQcLto

be inadequate to their significance, which


far

is

exalted

above every earthly content.

These aspects may be pronounced

in general

terms

to constitute the character of the primitive artistic

pantheism of the East, which either charges even the

meanest objects with the absolute import, or again


coerces nature with violence into the expression of
view.

By

this

many barbaric

means

religions.

it

becomes

But

its

truth

its

bizarre, grotesque,

may be

very simply

verified in daily observation of the first attempts of the uneducated at plastic presentation of their ideas, wh ere costliness
,

ingenuity l abour, or size take the place of be auty.


* " Sie ah Inneres?

which gives these partial and


f ie. an idea or purpose
defective representations all the meaning they have, although
they are incapable of really expressing

it.

DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.

U8
and

tasteless, or turns the infinite

[Chap. V.

but abstract freedom

of the substantive Idea disdainfully against

menal being as

such means

By

and evanescent.

null

pheno-

all

the import cannot be completely embodied


expression, and in spite of

all

aspiration

the

in

and endeavour

the reciprocal inadequacy of shape and Idea remains

This

insuperable.

may

Symbolic art with

art,

mystery and

its

be taken as the
its aspiration., its

form of

sublimity.

In the second form of

(j3)

first

disqu iet,*Jts

art,

which we propose

to call " Classical" the double defect of symbolic art


is

The

cancelled.

plastic

imperfect, because, in the

shape of symbolic art

first

place, the Idea in

it

is

only

enters into consciousness in abstract determinateness

or indeterminateness,and, in the second place, this

must always make the conformity of shape to import


defective, and in its turn merely abstract. The classical
form of art
is

t he

free

is'

the solution of this double difficulty

and adequate embodiment of the

the shap e tha t, according to


l

iarly appropriate to the


is

accord.

Hence, the

classical

afford the production

and to establish

The

concept ion,

i tself.

With

it,

it

is

pecu-

therefore,

capable of entering into free and complete

the Idea

Ideal,

Idea

its

I dea, in

and
it

type of art

is

intuition of the

the

first

to

completed

as a realized fact/

conformity, however, of notion and reality in

must not be taken

classical art
*

"

Gdhrung,"

lit.

in the purely forma l

" fermentation."

CLASSICAL ART.

Chap. V.]

149

sense of the agreeme n t of a content with the external


sharje__given_to_it,

any more than

case with the Ideal

be the

this could

Otherwise every copy from


and every type of countenance, every landscape, flower, or scene, etc., which forms the purport
of any representation, would be at once made classical
by the agreement which it displays between form and
itself.

nature,

On

content.

the contrary, in classical art the peculi-

arity of the content consists in being itself co ncrete


idea,

an d, as such, the concret e spiritu al

spirifuaTinhe truly inner


'ten t, then,

on

its

own

we must

To

self.

on lythf

for

suit

such a con

search out that in Nature

w hicr

merits belongs to the essence and actuality

must be the absolute * notion thai


invented the shape appropriate to concrete mind

of the mind

It

so that the subjective notion

of art

has

existence

merely found

possessing

in

this case the spirii

and brought

it,

natural

shape,

it,

into

as ar

accorc

with free individual spirituality.!

This shape, wit!

as

individually deter-

which the Idea as

spiritual

minate spiritualityinvests
as a temporal
sonification

phenomenon,

itself
is

the

when manifestec
human form. Per

and anthropomorphism have often beer

decried as a degradation of the spiritual

but

art, in a:

" Der urspriingliche Begriff" lit. " the original notion."


God or the Universe invented man to be the expressioi
t
of mind art finds him, and adapts his shape to the artistic
embodiment of mind as concentrated in individual instances.
*

i.e.

DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.

ISO

end

far as its

is

to bring before perception the spiri-

tual in sensuous form,

must advance

pomorphism, as

only in

mind

it

is

of souls

is

the

life

had necessarily

human

that

is

to such anthro-

proper body that

The

migration

in this respect a false abstraction,*

made

physiology ought to have


that

its

adequately revealed to sense.

is

[Chap. V.

it

one of

and

axioms

its

in its evolution to attain to

phenomenon
\The human form is

shape, as the sole sensuous

appropriate to mind.

the classical type of art not as mere

employed

in

sensuous

existence,

but

the exist-

exclusively as

ence and physical form corresponding to mind, and


therefore

exempt from

the deficiencies of what

all

is
is

merely sensuous, and from the contingent finiteness


of phenomenal existencej

The

outer shape must be

thus purified in or de r to express in

adequate to

its elf;

import and content

meaning which
kind.
itself

It

is

and again,
to

is

is

itself

a cont en

the conformity of

be complete, the spiritual

the content

must, that

if

must be of a

partic ular

to say, be qualified to

exp ress

ma n,

without

completely in the physical form of

projecting into another world beyond the scope of

such an expression in sensuous and bodily terms.

This condition has the

effect that

Mind

is

bv

once specified as a particular case of mind, as


*

Because

appropriate

it

represents the soul as independent

body the human

beast's body.

it

at

human
of

an

soul as capable of existing in a

ROMANTIC ART.

Chap. V.]

15

ffind,

and not a s simply absolute and ete rnal, inas

much

as

mind

latter sense is

in this

incapab le

pr oclaiming and expressing itself otherwise

o:

t han ^a;

intellectual being.*

Out of

this

latter point arises, in

its

turn, the

which brings about the dissolution of classical


and demands a transition into a third and highei

defect
art,

form,

into the romantic form of art.

viz.

(7)

The romantic form

of art destroys the com-

pleted union of the Idea and

though

in

its reality,

antagonism of two aspects which was


quished by symbolic
t he

art.

The

classical

of art

is

capable

defective, the defect

imitation of

its

in

is

spher e.

and

type attaine c

if it is

the_conception of

which

is

any

in

art as a whn1p

i.e.

em
wa's

in th<

This limitation consists

the fac t that art as such takes for

in

unvan-

left

highest excellence, of which the sensuous

bodiment
l

and recurs

a higher phase, to that difference anc

infinite

its

object

ir

Mind

concrete universality

the shape of sen suous concreteness, and in th<

phase sets up the perfect amalgamation o


spiritual and sensuous existence as a Conformity o
the two. Now, as a matter of fact, in such an am al
classical

gamat ion Mind cannot be represented according


"

tc

The nature of thought, mind, or spirit." I


cannot be here rendered by mind or spirit, because these word;
make us think of an isolated individual, a mind or soul, anc
neglect the common spiritual or intellectual nature, which i;
* " Geistigkeit."

referred to

by the author.

DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.

152

,For_mind

itstrue notion.

of the Idea^-whjch

is

[Chap. V.

the infinite subjectivit y

as ab sol ute inwardness,*

capable of finding free expansion in

is

not

true nature

its

on condition of remaining transposed into a bodily

medium as the existence appropriate to


As an escape from such a condition
form of art

it.

the romantic

in its turn dissolves the inseparable unity

of the classical phase, because

it

has

won

signifi-

cance which goes beyond the classical form of art and


its

mode

This significance we may


coincides with what Christianity

of expression.-f-

recall familiar ideas

God

declares to be true of
tinction to the
essential

G reek

Greek

if

explicitly, the

import

is

explicit, is

it

is

is

In

potentially, but

no t

purely immediate

mod e.

of man.
* It is

The

His shape

is,

circle of his

sensuous

therefore, the bodily -shape-

power and of

his being, is

mind or thought not to have its


The so-called terms of a judgment

the essence of

outside one another.

The Greek

the object of naive intuition and

imagination.

capable of adequate manifestation

an immediate and sensuous

god

for classical art.

un ity of the human and divine nature

_a unity which, just because

in

gods which forms the

and appropriate content

art the concrete

and not

as Spirit, in contradis-

faith in

good instance of parts

in thought

which are inward

to

parts

are a

each

other.

t Compare Browning's " Old Pictures in Florence."


% i. e. in the form of feeling and imagination not reflected

upon.

Chap.

V.]

individual

IMPORT OF ROMANTIC ART.


and individually

the subject,* he

is,

15:

In relation witr

limited.

an essence and a powei

therefore,

with which the subject's inner being

is

merely

ir

latent unity, not itself possessing this unity as inward

subjective knowledge.

knowledge^oi

Now

the higher stage

is

the

which as latent

is

the

this latent unity,

import of the classical form of

art,

and capable

perfect representation in bodily shape.


tion

of the~Tatent or potential

into

The.

self-conscious

knowledge produces an enormous

difference.

the infinite difference which,

separates

Man

such from the animals.


his animal functions

latent

and potential

conscious of them,

them

e.g.,

he

is

as, for instance,

self-conscious science.

It

man

animal, but even

is

as
ir

not confined within the

is

as the animal

le arns

o:

eleva-

to

know

is,

but becomes

the m, and raises

the process of digestion

By

this

intc

means Man breaks

the boundary of merely potential and immediate consciousness, so that just for the reason that he

knows

himself to be animal, he ceases to be animal, and,

as

mind, attains to self-knowledge.


If in the

above fashion the unity of the human and

divine nature, which in the Jormer phase


is

was potential

raised from an immediate to a conscious unity,

follows that the true

medium

it

for the reality of thi s

content j s no longer the se nsuous immediate existenc e


of the sp iritual, the
* Subject,

human

i. e.

bodily shape, but self-con-

conscious individual person.

DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.

154

inward

scious

God
,

Now,

intelligence*

Christianity brings

before our intelligence as spirit, or

particularized
spirit

and

individual, spirit, but

And

in truth.

[Chap. V.

mindnot

as

as

absol ute, in

for this reason Christianity

from the sensuousness of imagination into inand makes this, not bodily shape,

retires

tellectual inwardness,

medium and

the

actual existence of

its significance.

So, too, thgjinity_ofJJie humair.aruLdivine nature

is a,

by spiritual knowcontent, won by


the
new
Thus

conscious unity, only to be realized

ledge and in
this unity,

is

spirit. _

not inseparable from sensuous represen-

were adequate to it, but is freed from


immediate existence, which has to be posited t

tation, as if that

this

as negative, absorbed,

and

as art transcending
artistic

itself,

while remjiningjwithinthe

sphere and in -artistic form.

Therefore, in short,

ment

reflected into the spiritual

In this way, romantic art must be considered,

unity.

we may abide by

free, concrete intellectual being,

of revealing

world of

spirit.

must addres s
"

is_

which has the fun ction

itself as spiritual exist ence for

the inwa rd %

In conformity with such an object-

matter, art cannot

the state-

that in this third stage the object (of art )

work

itself to

Innerlickkettf

lit.

for

sensuous _perception.

It

theinward mind, which coalesces


"inwardness."

Taken, considered as or determined to be negative.


X " Inward," again, does not mean merely inside our heads,
but having the character of spirit in that its parts are not external
to one another.
A judgment is thus " inward."
t

MEDIUM OF ROMANTIC

Chap. V.]

with

object simply

its

and as though

ART.

this

15$

were

itself,*

to the subjective inwardness, to the heart, the feeling,

which, being spiritual, aspires to freedom within

and seeks and finds

its

It is this inner

within.

world that forms the content

and must therefore

of_the, -romantic,

find its repre-

sentation as such inward feeling, and in the

presentation of such feeling.


ness celebrates

its

The world

its

show or

of inward-

triumph over the outer world, and

actually in the sphere of the outer and in

manifests this

itself,

reconciliation only in the spirit

victory,

its

medium

owing to which the sensuous

appearance sinks into worthlessness.

on the ^other_ hand,

But,

this

type of Art,t like

every other, needs an external vehicle of expression.

Now

the spiritual has withdrawn i nto itself o utjjf the

For

external and Jts^ immediate oneness therewith.


tKlsTreason, the sensuous externality of concrete
is

accepted and represented, as in Symbolic

something transient and

measure
will,

is

fugitive.

even including the

peculiarity or

the individual, of character, action,

dent and plot.


is

i. e.

are n ot
*

The

as

the same
mind and
caprice
or

of

of inci-

left at

the mercy of

does not keep up a distinction between percipient and


between things in space. G oodness, n obleness, etc.,

felt

The

etc.,

art,

aspect of external existence

committed to contingency, and

object, as

And

dealt to the subjective finite

form

to

be other than or outside the mi nd.

romantic"

DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.

156

to mirror

what

given as

is

no more

likely

given, than to

throw

whose caprice

freaks of imagination,

it

is

[Chap. V.

is

the shapes of the outer world into chance medley, or


distort

them

in

classical art,

medium.

It

For

into grotesqueness.

element no longer has


in

its

own

its

this

external

notion and significance, as


sphere,

and

in

its

own

has come to find them in the feelings,

the display of which


in the external

in themselves instead of being

is

and

its

form of

and which

reality,

have the power to preserve or to regain their state of


reconciliation with themselves, in every accident, in

every unessential circumstance that takes independent


shape, in

all

Owing

misfortune and

grief,

and even

to this, the characteristics of

in difference, discrepancy,

in crime.

symbolic

and severance of Idea and

plastic shape, are here reproduced,

but with an essential

In the sphere of the romantic, the Idea,

difference.

whose defectiveness

in the case of the

symbol pro-

duced the defect of external shape, has to reveal


in the

medium

And

jtself.
/

that

it

it

is

because of
itself

this

true reality

higher perfection

from any adequate union with

the external element, inasmuch as


its

itself

of spirit and feelings as perfected in

withdraws

achieve

art,

it

can seek and

and revelation nowhere but

in

itself.

This

we may take

as in the abstract the character

of the symbolic, classical, and romantic forms of

art,

which represent the three relations of the Idea to

its

THE SEVERAL ARTS.

Chap. V.]

embodiment

the sphere of

in

157

They

art.

consist in

the aspiration after^aniihe attainment and transcend-}


]

en.ce

of the Ideal as the true Idea of beauty.

The

4.

tion to the

third part of our subject, in contradistinc-

two

just described, presupposes the concep-

tion of the Ideal,


as

it

and the general types of art, inasmuch

simply consists of their realization

with the inner development of


formity with

we have

its

in particular

Hence we have no longer

sensuous media.

to

do

beauty

in con-

general fundamental principles.

What

artistic

is how these principles pass into


how they distinguish themselves in
aspect, and how they give actuality to

to study

actual existence,
their external

every element contained


rately

as

and by

itself

a general type.

in

the idea of beauty, sepa-

as a work of art, and not merely

Now, what

art

transfers

into

external existence are the differences * proper to the


idea of beauty and

immanent

Therefore, the

therein.

general types of art must reveal themselves in this


third part, as before, in the character of the funda-

the arrangement

mental principle that determines

and

definition of the several arts

the species of art contain

in

in

other words,

themselves the same

essential modifications as those

come acquainted

with which we be-

as the general types of art.

External

objectivity, however, to which these forms are intro*

ciple.

i.e.

species, modifications naturally arising out [of a prin-

DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.

58

Suced through the

[Chap. V.

medium of a sensuous and

therefore

articular material, affects these types in the

way

of

making them separate into independent and so par-

For each

forms embodying their realization.

icular

ype finds

its

definite character in

xternal material, and

its

some one

adequate actuality

ess, its

types of

art,

being for

in

the

But, more-

lode of portrayal which that prescribes.


ver, these

definite

determinate-

all their

universal forms, break the bounds of particular

salization

by a determinate form of

art,

and achieve

xistence in other arts as well, although in suborinate fashion.

Therefore, the particular arts belong

ach of them specifically to one of the general types


f art,

nd

and constitute

its

adequate external actuality

also they represent, each of

them

after its

own

lode of external plasticity, the totality of the types


f art.*

Then, speaking generally,


lird principal division

we

nfolds itself in the several arts


lto
lis

and

a world of actualized beauty.

world

e saw,

is

more

r,

are dealing in this

with the beautiful of

Thus

is

art,

as

it

in their creations

The

content of

the beautiful, and the true beautiful, as

spiritual

being in concrete shape, the Ideal

closely looked at, the

absolute mind, and

Sculpture is the art which corresponds par


xellence to the general type called Classical Art but there is a
*

e.g.

embolic kind of sculpture, and I suppose a Romantic or modern


nd of sculpture, although neither of these types are exactly
ted to the capabilities of Sculpture.

THE TWO POLES OF ART.

Chap. V.]

the truth

159

This region, that of divine- truth

itself.

artistically represented to perception

and

forms the centre of the__whole world of

to feeling,
It is the

art.

and divine plasticity, which has


thoroughly mastered J;he external elements of form

independent,

free,

and of medium, and wears them simply as a means


to manifestation of

itself.

Still,

as the beautiful un-

folds itself in this region in the character of objective

and

reality,

in so

individual aspects

doing distinguishes within

itself its

and elements, permitting them

dependent particularity,

follows that this

it

in-

centre

erects its extremes, realized in their peculiar actuality,

into

own

its

antitheses.

comes to consist

Thus one of these extremes

an objectivity as yet devoid of

in

mind, in the merely natural vesture of God.

At

this

point the external element takes plastic shape as

something that has

its spiritual

aim and content, not

in itself, but in another.*

The

other extreme

something

known, as

is

the divine as inward, as

the

subjective existence of the

variously particularized

Deity;

it

is

the truth as

operative and vital in sense, heart, and mind of individual

subjects, not

external shapes, but

persisting in the
as

jective, individual inwardness.

Divine
*

is

at the

mould of

In such a mode, the

same time distinguished from

Architecture as relative to the purposes of


See below, p. 162.

religion.

its

having returned,, into sub-

life

its first

and of

DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.

160

nanifestation as Deity,
liversity of particulars

cnowledge

lighest stage

same

his

religion,

and

all

difference as follows.
life in its

subjective

In the

feeling.

with which art at

we

immediately connected,

is

arthly natural
ide

and passes thereby into the

which belongs to

emotion, perception,

malogous province of

[Chap. V.

we

First,

its

conceive

think of the

finiteness as standing

on one

makes God its


of objectivity and

but, then, secondly, consciousness


in

bject,

which the distinction

ubjectivity

done away.

is

And

at last, thirdly,

we

dvance from God as such to the devotion of the


ommunity, that is, to God as living and present in
subjective

tie

consciousness.

Just so these three

hief modifications present themselves in the


f art in
(a)

The

of the particular arts with

first

ccording to their fundamental principle,


egin, is architecture' considered as

isk lies in so
lat

it

orld.
i

world

independent development.

a fine art*

to
Its

manipulating external inorganic nature

becomes cognate to mind, as an

The

which,

we have

material of architecture

is

artistic

outer

matter

itself

immediate externality as a heavy mass subject


mechanical laws, and its forms do not depart from

its

forms of inorganic nature, but are merely set in


rder in conformity with relations of the abstract
le

nderstanding,
lis

i.e.

with relations of symmetry.

In

material and in such forms, the. ideal as concrete


*

Die schone Architecture

ARCHITECTURE.

Chap. V.]

spirituality does not

the reality which

admit of being

161

Hence

realized.

represented in them remains con-

is

trasted with the Idea, as something external which

it

has not penetrated, or has penetrated only to establish


an abstract relation. For these reasons, the funda-

mental type of the

fine art of building is the symbolical

form of

art.

for the

adequate realization of the God, and

its

It is architecture that

service bestows hard toil

order to disentangle

upon existing

way

in this

nature, in

from the jungle of finitude

it

and the abortiveness of chance.


levels a

pioneers the

By

this

means

it

space for the God, gives form to his external

him his temple as a fit place


concentration of spirit, and for its direction to the

surroundings, and builds


for

mind's absolute objects.

It raises

an enclosure round

the assembly of those gathered together, as a defence


against the threatening of the storm, against rain, the
hurricane,

and wild

beasts,

and reveals the

will

to

assemble, although externally, yet in conformity with

With such import

principles of art.

power to inspire
less

its

effectively, as

material and

its

as this

it

has

forms more or

the determinate character of the

work is more or
less significant, more concrete or more abstract, more
profound in sounding its own depths, or more dim
content on behalf of which

and more

superficial.

it

sets to

So much, indeed, may

archi-

tecture attempt in this respect as even to create an

adequate

artistic

existence for such an import in

its

DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.

162

shapes and in

material.

its

already overstepped
to sculpture, the

architecture

lies

its

But

in

[Chap. V.

such a case

own boundary, and

phase above

it.

is

it

has

leaning

For the limit of

precisely in this point, that

it

retains

the spiritual as an inward existence over against the


external forms of the
to

art,

what has soul only as

own

and consequently must

refer

to something other than

its

creations.

Q3) Architecture, however, as

the external world, and

purified

symmetrical order and with

we have

seen, has

endowed it with
mind and

affinity to

the temple of the God, the house of his community,

stands ready.
place, the

God

Into this temple, then, in the second


enters in the lightning-flash of indi-

which

strikes and permeates the inert mass,


while the infinite * and no longer merely symmetrical

viduality,

form belonging to mind

itself

concentrates and gives

shape to the corresponding bodily existence.


the task of Sculpture.

and

its

is

inward being which architecture can but

spiritual

indicate

This

In as far as in this art the

makes

itself at

home

in the

sensuous shape

external matter, and in as far as~these

two

sides are so adapted to

one another that neither is


predominant, sculpture must be assigned the classical
* In the sense " self-complete," " not primarily
regarded as
explained by anything outside," like a machine or an animal

contrasted with a wheel or a limb, which latter are finite,


because they demand explanation and supplementation from
without,

i.e.

necessarily

draw

attention to their

own

limit.

SCULPTURE.

Chap. V.]

form of art

as

its

163

fundamental type.

For

this reason

the sensuous element itself has here no expression

which could not be that of the


conversely, sculpture can

as,

spiritual element, just

represent no

spiritual

content which does not admit throughout of being

adequately presented to perception in bodily form.


Sculpture should place the spirit before us in

its

bodily form and in immediate unity therewith at rest

and

in

peace

and the form should be animated by

the content of spiritual

external sensuous matter


lated, either in

individuality.
is

And

so the

here no longer manipu-

conformity with

its

mechanical quality

alone, as a mass possessing weight, nor in shapes


belonging to the inorganic world, nor as indifferent to
colour, etc. ; but it is wrought in ideal forms of the

human

figure, and, it

must be remarked,

in all three

spatial dimensions.
last respect

In this
that

in

it is

it

we must

claim for sculpture,

that the inward and spiritual are

first

revealed in their eternal repose and essential self-

compieteness.

To

such repose and unity with

itself

there can correspond only that external shape which


itself

maintains

fulfilled

its

by shape

unity and repose.


in

its

And

this

abstract spatiality.*

is

The

which sculpture represents is that which is solid


in itself, not broken up in the play of trivialities and
of passions and hence its external form too is not
spirit

i.e.

shape taken simply as an object

filling

space.

DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.

164

[Chap. V.

abandoned to any manifold phases of appearance,


but appears under this one aspect only, as the abstraction of space in the

Now, after
and the hand of

whole of

its

dimensions.

architecture has erected the temple,

(y)

sculpture has supplied

it

with the

god

statue of the God, then, in the third place, this

present to sense

of his house

by

is

confronted in the spacious halls

The community

the community.

the spiritual reflection into itself of such


existence,

and

inner

which brings about the

life

is

the

animating

determining principle for the content of


as for the

medium which

sensuous

represents

it

that the

art,

in

as well

outward

form, comes to be particularization [dispersion

various shapes, attributes,


alization,

The

and the

solid unity

incidents,

subjectivity which

which the God has

and

subjectivity
result

etc.],

is

into

individu-

they require*

in sculpture

breaks

up into the multitudinous inner lives of individuals,


whose unity is not sensuous, but purely ideal, t
It is

only in this stage that

to be really
*

and truly

The terms used

in

spirit

the

God Himself comes


spirit in

His (God's)

the text explain themselves

if

we

compare, e.g., a Teniers with a Greek statue, or again, say, a


Turner with the same. " Subjectivity " means that the work
of art appeals to our ordinary feelings, experiences, etc.
Music
and poetry are still stronger cases than painting, according to
the theory.
Poetry especially can deal with eveiything.
t The unity of the individuals forming a church or nation
is not visible, but exists in common sentiments, purposes
etc.

and

in the recognition of their

community.

THE- SEVERAL ROMANTIC ARTS.

Chap. V.]

community

for

He

here begins to be a to-and-fro, an

alternation between His unity within himself


realization in the individual's

separate being, as also in the

common

And He

nature and

God

from the simple absorption

in a

by which

Him.
existence and

sculpture represents

which

into knowledge, into the reflected * appearance

displays

essentially
jectivity.

itself

the dispersion of which

same time

individual
this

inward

and

its

is

as

now

absolute shape.

we have spoken

Now, what manifests

phase as the main. thing

God

in

is

subthe

But

reveals this

and

as

itself

in

as particular spiritual being,

character.

escence of the

not the serene qui-

Himself, but appearance as

for another, self-manifestation.


hence, in the phase we have reached, all the

such, being

And

as

Therefore the higher content

spiritual nature, and that in

at the

is

self-

thus exalted into spiritual

is

his

in its

unexpanded

released from the abstractness of

bodily medium,

and

knowledge and

In the community,

union of the multitude.

identity, as well as

165

which

is

most manifold subjectivity in its living movement


and operation as human passion, action, and incident

and, in general, the wide realm of


*
it

human

feeling, will

expression constantly applied to consciousness, because

An

can look at itself. Cf.


" Tell me, good Brutus, can you see your face
'
No, Cassius ; for the eye sees not itself
'

But by

reflection,

by some other things."

Julius Casar.

DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.

66

and

negation,

its

is

for its

own sake the


conformity

In

representation.

artistic

[Chap. V.

object of

with

this

content, the sensuous element of art has at once to


,

show

made

itself as

we have

requirement

and

finally in

ward

the

in

colour, in

in-

modes

of

and

ideas

and

as

import in question by help of these

this region the

down

this

fulfil

musical sound,

media we obtain painting, music, and


subdivided

as adapted

sound as the mere indication of

perceptions

realizing

and
Media that

particular in itself

inwardness.

subjective

to

in

sensuous
its

as ideal.*

medium

In

^poetry.

displays itself as

own being and universally set


Thus it has the highest degree of

conformity with the content of

art,

and the connection of

which, as such,

import
and sensuous medium develops into closer intimacy
than was possible in the case of architecture and
is

spiritual,

sculpture.

The

unity attained, however,

inward unity, the weight of which

on the subjective
*

or

Posited or laid

made

which

a more

thrown wholly

and which,

in as far as

down

to be ideal

almost = pronounced
e.g. musical sound is

to be in the sense of

in

is

is

side,

not being;

"ideal" as existing, qua work of

moment

intelligible

art,

in

memory

actually heard being fugitive

form

only, the

a picture,
in respect of the third dimension, which has to be read into it
and poetry is almost wholly ideal, i.e. uses hardly any sensuous
element, but appeals almost entirely to what exists in the mind.
"Subdivided," " besondert," like "particu/arisirt" above; because of the variety and diversity present in the mere material
it is

of colours, musical sounds, and ideas.

Chap.

PAINTING.

V.]

167

and content are compelled to particularize themselves


and give themselves merely ideal existence, can only

come

to pass at_the expense of the objective univer-

of the content and also of

jsality

its

amalgamation

with the immediately sensuous element*

The

arts, then,

themselves

to

of which form and content exalt

ideality,

abandon

the

character of

and the classical ideal of


sculpture, and therefore borrow their type from the
romantic form of art, whose mode of plasticity they

symbolic

architecture

most adequately adapted

are

a totality of

constitute

type

is

1.

The

It

it,

they

because the romantic

itself, t

articulation of this third sphere of the indi-

vidual arts
art in

arts,

the most concrete in

And

to express.

may be

determined as follows.

which comes next to sculpture,

employs as a medium

for its content

is

The first
painting.

and

for the

Again, the subject of a Turner or Teniers is not objectively


not something that is actually
;
and literally the same everywhere and for every one. And both
painting and music (immediately sensuous elements) are less
*

universal, in the simplest sense

completely amalgamated with the ideal, represent it less solidly


and thoroughly than the statue, so far as the ideal is itself
external or plastic.
t The greater affinity of

Romantic

art with the

movement

not only in the


compared with
greater flexibility of painting, music, or poetry, as
Romantic
architecture and sculpture, but in the fact that the
Symbolic
and
the
while
least,
arts
at
three
these
type contains
Classical types had only one art each.

and variety of the modern

spirit displays itself

DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.

68

plastic

embodiment of that content

in as far as it is specialized in its

developed into colour.

employed

and coloured

but

it is

such

visibility as

own

nature,

i.e.

as

true that the material

It is

in architecture

[Chap. V.

and sculpture

is

also visible

not, as in painting, visibility

as such, not the simple light which, differentiating

of

itself in virtue

its

combination with the


This quality of

and treated as
the

abstractly

operative

in

made

rise to

in

colour.*

subjective in itself

needs neither, like architecture,

mechanical

attribute

the properties

sculpture, the

like

gives

latter,

visibility,

ideal,

and

contrast with darkness,

of

mass

as

of heavy matter, nor,

complete sensuous attributes of

space, even though concentrated into organic shapes.

The

visibility

and the rendering

visible

which belong

painting have their differences in a

to

more

ideal

form, in the several kinds of colour, and they liberate

from the sensuous completeness

art

attaches to material things,

by

in space

which

restricting themselves

to a plane surface.

On
most
find

the other hand, the content also attains the

comprehensive

room

purpose
all

in the

whatever

Whatever

can

heart, as feeling, idea,

and

specification.

human
it is

capable of shaping into act

this diversity of material is

into- the" varied

capable of entering

content of painting.

The whole realm

* This is drawn from Goethe's doctrine of colour,


which
Hegel unfortunately adopted in opposition to Newton's theory.

Chap. V.]

MUSIC.

169

of particular existence, from the highest embodiment

mind down

of

most isolated object of nature,


For it is possible even for Jinite

to the

finds a place here.

nature,* in

make

its

allusion

particular scenes

appearance
to

affinity to
ii.

its

an

element

thought and

The

and phenomena, to

realm of

in the

art, if

only some

mind endows

of

it

with

feeling.

second art in which

the romantic type

realizes itself is contrasted with painting,

and

is

music.

medium, though still sensuous, yet develops into


still more thorough subjectivity and particularization.
Its

Music, too, treats the sensuous as ideal, and does so

by

negating,! and idealizing into the individual isolation


of a singlepoint, the Jndifferent externality % of space,

whose complete semblance

by

painting.

The

(excluding space)

is

accepted and imitated

single point, qua such a negativity


is

in

itself

process of positive negation

a concrete and active


within the attributes of

He means landscape, principally.


" Aufheben,'' used pregnantly by Hegel to mean both " canThe use
cel," "annul," and, "preserve," "fix in mind," "idealize."
See " Wiss. der
of this word is a cardinal point of his dialectic.
Logik.," i. 104. I know of no equivalent but " put by," provincial
*

Scotch " put past."

The

The negation

of space

no more

is

an

attribute of

space than are


the parts of a judgment. Hegel expresses this by saying that
music idealizes space and concentrates it into a point.
\ The parts of space, though external to each other, are not
music.

parts of a chord are

distinguished by qualitative peculiarities.


" Aufkeben."

in

DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.

170

matter, in the shape of a motion

body within

material

Such an inchoate

itself

and

[Chap. V.

and tremor of the

in its relation to itself.

ideality of matter,*

which appears

no longer as under the form of space, but as temporal


ideality,!

with

sound, the sensuous set

is

down

as negated,

abstract visibility converted into audibility,

its

inasmuch as sound, so to speak, liberates the ideal


content from

its

immersion

This

in matter.

earliest

inwardness of matter and inspiration of soul into


furnishes the
itself as

medium

yet indefinite,

mind concentrates

and

tones for the heart with

and passions.
romantic

for the soul % into

and

itself;

its

it

mental inwardness

for the

which

finds utterance in its

whole gamut of feelings

Thus music forms the centre of the

arts, just

as sculpture represents the central

point between architecture and the arts of romantic

Thus,

subjectivity.

too,

it

forms the point of transi-

between abstract spatial sensuousness, such as


painting employs, and the abstract spirituality of

tion

* " Ideality of matter " the distinctively material attribute


of a sonorous body, its extension, only appears in its sound indirectly, or inferentially, by modifying the nature of the sound.
:

It is, therefore, " idealized."

t Succession in

time

a degree

is

existence in space, because

memory.
\ " Seek
ing subject.

:"

mind on

" Geist "

intelligence.

Thus

concentrate

itself into

is

its

it

more

" ideal " than co-

exists solely in the

medium

of

individual side, as a particular feelmind as the common nature of

rather

in feeling

a soul.

and

self-feeling,

mind

is

said to

POETRY.

Chap. V.]

Music has within

poetry.

171

itself, like

architecture, a

relation of quantity conformable to the understanding,

as the antithesis to emotion


also as its basis a solid

and inwardness and has


conformity to law on the part
;

of the tones, of their conjunction, and of their succession.

As

iii.

regards the third and most spiritual

of representation of the romantic art-type,

look for

in poetry.

we must

Its characteristic peculiarity lies

power with which

in the

to

it

mode

it

subjects- to the

mind and

ideas the sensuous element from- which music

its

and painting in their degree began to liberate art.


For sound, the only external _ matter which poetry
retains, is in it

but

itself,

And

is

it

crete in

of

its

no longer the feeling of the sonorous

a sign, which by itself is void of import.


a sign of the idea which has become con-

is

itself,

feeling

and

how sound

de-

and not merely of indefinite


This

nuances and grades.

velops into the

Word, as voice

is

articulate in

itself,

whose import it is to indicate ideas and notions.


The merely negative point up to which music had
developed now makes its appearance as the completely concrete point, the point which is mind, the
self-conscious individual, which, producing out of itself

the infinite space of


character of sound.
in music

was

still

its ideas,

Yet

unites

this

it

with the temporal

sensuous element, which

immediately one with inward

ing, is in poetry separated

feel-

from the content of con-

DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.

172

[Chap. V.

mind determines this


content for its own sake, and apart from all else,
into the shape of ideas, and though it employs sound
to express them, yet treats it solely as a symbol
In

sciousness.

poetry

the

Thus considered, sound


mere letter, for the
thus depressed into a mere

without value or import.

may just

as well be reduced to a

audible, like the visible,

indication

medium

of

of poetical

is

For

mind.*

this

imagination and intellectual portrayal


this

element

is

common

to

that poetry runs through

independently in each.
the

all

Poetry

is

mind which has become

and which

is

not tied to find

is

And

art, it

as

follows

and develops

itself

the universal art of

free in its

its

the poetical

itself.

types of

all

them

proper

reason the

representation

own

nature,

realization in external

sensuous matter, but expatiates exclusively in the


* Hegel seems to accept this view.
Was he insensible to
sound in poetry ? Some very grotesque verses of his, preserved
in his biography, go to show that his ear was not sensitive.
Yet his critical estimate of poetry is usually just. Shakespeare
and Sophocles were probably his favourites. And, as a matter
It must be rememof proportion, what he here says is true.
bered that the beauty of sound in poetry is to a great extent
indirect, being supplied by the passion or emotion which the
ideas symbolized by the sounds arouse. The beauty of poetical
sound in itself is very likely less than often supposed. It must
have the capacity for receiving passionate expression but that
is not the same as the sensuous beauty of a note or a colour.
If
the, words used in a noble poem were divested of all meaning,
they would lose much, though not all, of the beauty of their
;

sound.

TYPES OF ART AND IDEA OF BEA UTY.

Chap. V.]

173

inner space and inner time of the ideas and feelings.

Yet

just in this its highest phase art

scending

itself,

inasmuch as

it

jmds by

tran-

abandons the medium

embodiment of mind in sensuous


and passes from the poetry _pf imagination into

of a harmonious
form,

the prose of thought.


5.

Such we may take

of the particular arts,

be the articulated

to

totality

the external art of archi-

viz.

and the
Many
poetry.
and
subjective art of painting music
other classifications have been attempted, for a
objective

tecture,

the

work of

art presents

art

so

of

many

sculpture,

aspects, that, as has

one and then another is


often been the case,
made the basis of classification. For instance, one
first

might take the sensuous medium.


is

treated as crystallization

Thus

architecture

sculpture, as the organic

modelling of the material in its sensuous and spatial


painting, as the coloured surface and line
totality
;

while in music, space, as such, passes into the point of


time possessed of content within itself, until finally the
external

medium

is

in

poetry depressed into complete

Or, again, these differences have been

insignificance.

considered with reference to their purely abstract


Such abstract pecuattributes of space and time.
liarities

of works

medium, be

of art

consistently

may,

like

explored

in

their
their

material
charac-

but they cannot be worked out as the


teristic traits
ultimate and fundamental law, because any such
;

DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.

174

aspect itself derives

its

[Chap. V.

origin from a higher principle,

and must therefore be subordinate thereto.


This higher principle
art

symbolic,

classical,

we have found
and romantic

in

the types of

which are the

universal stages or elements * of the Idea of beauty


itself.

reality
in

For symbolic art attains its most adequate


and most complete application in architecture,

which

and

is

it

holds sway in the

ganic nature dealt with

type of

full

import of

not yet degraded to be, as

art,

by another

it

its

art.

The

classical

on the other hand, finds adequate

tion in sculpture, while

it

realiza-

only as

treats architecture

furnishing an enclosure in which

notion,

were, the inor-

it is

to operate,

and

has not acquired the power of developing painting

and music as absolute t forms


romantic type of

art, finally,

takes possession of paint-

ing and music, and in like


sentation, as substantive

modes of

utterance.

because

manner of poetic

Poetry, however,

is conformable
and extends over them

the artistic imagination

medium, and imagination

is

is

its

proper

essential to every pro-

duct that belongs to the beautiful, whatever

may

repre-

and unconditionally adequate

to all types of the beautiful,


all,

The

for its content.

its

type

be.

* " Stages or elements."


" Momente" Hegel's technical
phrase for the stages which form the essential parts or factors of
any idea. They make their appearance successively, but the
earlier are implied and retained in the later.
\ Adequate, and so of permanent value.

Chap. V.]

And,

REALIZATION OF THE IDEA.


therefore,

what the

175

particular arts realize in

individual works of art, are according to their abstract

conception simply the universal types which constitute


the self-unfolding Idea of beauty.

It is as the

ternal realization of this Idea that the wide


art

is

spirit

being erected, whose architect and builder


of beauty as

to complete
its

it

awakens

ex-

Pantheon of
is

to self-knowledge,

which the history of the world

will

the

and

need

evolution of ages.

THE END.

PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, LIMITED, LONDON AND BECCLES.