PEOPLE V QUE PO LAY

FACTS: The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US checks
and US money orders amounting to about $7000 but failed to sell the same to the Central Bank
as required under Circular No. 20.
Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the Official Gazette only on Nov.
1951 after the act or omission imputed to Que Po Lay.
Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of violating Central
Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with Sec 34 of RA 265 sentencing him to suffer 6 months
imprisonment, pay fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
the costs.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is needed for it to become
effective and subject violators to corresponding penalties.
HELD: It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a rule, circular and
regulations of the Central Bank in question prescribing a penalty for its violation should be
published before becoming effective. This is based on the theory that before the public is bound
by its contents especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published
for the people to be officially and specifically informed of such contents including its penalties.
Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with
costs de oficio.

TANADA V TUVERA
FACTS: Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus in compelling respondent public officials to publish
and/ or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letter of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders.
The general rule in seeking writ of mandamus is that it would be granted to a private individual
only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some
particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and
"it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be
subserved.
The legal capacity of a private citizen was recognized by court to make the said petition for the
reason that the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by
no less than the fundamental law of the land.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the publication of presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders is
necessary before its enforcement
1

2. Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette and Whether or not
publication in the official gazette must be in full?
3. Whether publication in the Official Gazette is still required considering the clause in Article 2
unless otherwise provided.
HELD: 1) The Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases
where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication
is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its
publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Article 2
does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
provides for the date of its effectivity.
The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties
for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue
measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular
persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published
on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. Publication is, therefore,
mandatory
2. The court held that all statute including those of local application shall be published as
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. The publication must be full or no publication at all
since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the laws.
3. Unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not with the publication
requirement which cannot be omitted as public needs to be notified for the law to become
effective. The necessity for the publication in the Official Gazette of all unpublished presidential
issuances which are of general application, was affirmed by the court on April 24, 1985. This is
necessary to provide the general public adequate notice of the various laws which regulate
actions and conduct as citizens. Without this, there would be no basis for Art 3 of the Civil Code
Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
LA BUGAL BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOC. V RAMOS
On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to govern the
exploration, development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources. R.A. No. 7942
defines the modes of mineral agreements for mining operations,[9] outlines the procedure for
their filing and approval,[10] assignment/transfer[11] and withdrawal,[12] and fixes their terms.
[13] Similar provisions govern financial or technical assistance agreements.[14]
The law prescribes the qualifications of contractorsand grants them certain rights, including
timber,[16] water[17] and easement[18] rights, and the right to possess explosives.[19] Surface
owners, occupants, or concessionaires are forbidden from preventing holders of mining rights
from entering private lands and concession areas.[20] A procedure for the settlement of conflicts
is likewise provided for.

The Act restricts the conditions for exploration,[22] quarry[23] and other[24] permits. It regulates
the transport, sale and processing of minerals,[25] and promotes the development of mining
communities, science and mining technology,[26] and safety and environmental protection.[27]
The governments share in the agreements is spelled out and allocated,[28] taxes and fees are
imposed,[29] incentives granted.[30] Aside from penalizing certain acts,[31] the law likewise
specifies grounds for the cancellation, revocation and termination of agreements and permits.
[32]
On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995 in Malaya and Manila
Times, two newspapers of general circulation, R.A. No. 7942 took effect.[33]
Shortly before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7942, however, or on March 30, 1995, the President
entered into an FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan
Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato.[34]
On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order
(DAO) No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A.
No. 7942. This was later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on December
20, 1996.
On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary demanding that
the DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40,[35] giving the DENR
fifteen days from receipt[36] to act thereon. The DENR, however, has yet to respond or act on
petitioners letter.[37]
Petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order. They allege that at the time of the filing of the petition, 100 FTAA
applications had already been filed, covering an area of 8.4 million hectares,[38] 64 of which
applications are by fully foreign-owned corporations covering a total of 5.8 million hectares, and
at least one by a fully foreign-owned mining company over offshore areas.[39]
Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
ISSUE: won EO 279 is immediately effective?
Petitioners argue that E.O. No. 279, the law in force when the WMC FTAA was executed, did not
come into effect.
E.O. No. 279 was signed into law by then President Aquino on July 25, 1987, two days before the
opening of Congress on July 27, 1987.[214] Section 8 of the E.O. states that the same shall take
effect immediately. This provision, according to petitioners, runs counter to Section 1 of E.O. No.
200,[215] which provides:
SECTION 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it
is otherwise provided.[216] [Emphasis supplied.]

On that premise, petitioners contend that E.O. No. 279 could have only taken effect fifteen days
after its publication at which time Congress had already convened and the Presidents power to
legislate had ceased.
Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the validity of E.O. No. 279 was settled in Miners
Association of the Philippines v. Factoran, supra. This is of course incorrect for the issue in Miners
Association was not the validity of E.O. No. 279 but that of DAO Nos. 57 and 82 which were
issued pursuant thereto.
Nevertheless, petitioners contentions have no merit.
It bears noting that there is nothing in E.O. No. 200 that prevents a law from taking effect on a
date other than even before the 15-day period after its publication. Where a law provides for its
own date of effectivity, such date prevails over that prescribed by E.O. No. 200. Indeed, this is
the very essence of the phrase unless it is otherwise provided in Section 1 thereof. Section 1,
E.O. No. 200, therefore, applies only when a statute does not provide for its own date of
effectivity.
What is mandatory under E.O. No. 200, and what due process requires, as this Court held in
Taada v. Tuvera,[217] is the publication of the law for without such notice and publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignorantia legis n[eminem] excusat. It would
be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
While the effectivity clause of E.O. No. 279 does not require its publication, it is not a ground for
its invalidation since the Constitution, being the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the
nation, is deemed written in the law.[218] Hence, the due process clause,[219] which, so Taada
held, mandates the publication of statutes, is read into Section 8 of E.O. No. 279. Additionally,
Section 1 of E.O. No. 200 which provides for publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, finds suppletory application. It is significant
to note that E.O. No. 279 was actually published in the Official Gazette on August 3, 1987.
From a reading then of Section 8 of E.O. No. 279, Section 1 of E.O. No. 200, and Taada v. Tuvera,
this Court holds that E.O. No. 279 became effective immediately upon its publication in the
Official Gazette on August 3, 1987.
That such effectivity took place after the convening of the first Congress is irrelevant. At the time
President Aquino issued E.O. No. 279 on July 25, 1987, she was still validly exercising legislative
powers under the Provisional Constitution.[221] Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of the 1987
Constitution explicitly states:
SEC. 6. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the first
Congress is convened.
The convening of the first Congress merely precluded the exercise of legislative powers by
President Aquino; it did not prevent the effectivity of laws she had previously enacted.
There can be no question, therefore, that E.O. No. 279 is an effective, and a validly enacted,
statute.
4

UMALI V ESTANISLAO
Facts: Congress enacted Republic Act 7167 amending the NIRC (adjusting the basic and
additional exemptions allowable to individuals for income tax purposes to the poverty threshold
level). The said Act was signed and approved by the President on 19 December 1991 and
published on 14 January 1992 in "Malaya" a newspaper of general circulation. On 26 December
1991, the CIR promulgated Revenue Regulations No. 1-92 stating that the regulations shall take
effect on compensation income from January 1, 1992. Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus
to compel the CIR to implement RA 7167 in regard to income earned or received in 1991, and
prohibition to enjoin the CIR from implementing the revenue regulation.
Issue:
Assuming that Rep. Act 7167 took effect on 30 January 1992 (15 days after its
publication in Malaya), whether or not the said law nonetheless covers or applies to
compensation income earned or received during calendar year 1991.
Ratio: The Court is of the considered view that Rep. Act 7167 should cover or extend to
compensation income earned or received during calendar year 1991. Sec. 29, par. [L], Item No. 4
of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, provides:
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, the President shall automatically adjust
not more often than once every three years, the personal and additional exemptions taking into
account, among others, the movement in consumer price indices, levels of minimum wages, and
bare subsistence levels.
The exemptions were last adjusted in 1986. The president could have adjusted it in 1989 but did
not do so. The poverty threshold level refers to the level at the time Rep. Act 7167 was enacted
by Congress. The Act is a social legislation intended to alleviate in part the present economic
plight of the lower income taxpayers.
Rep. Act 7167 says that the increased personal exemptions shall be available after the law shall
have become effective. These exemptions are available upon the filing of personal income tax
returns, done not later than the 15th day of April after the end of a calendar year. Thus, under
Rep. Act 7167, which became effective, on 30 January 1992, the increased exemptions are
literally available on or before 15 April 1992 [though not before 30 January 1992]. But these
increased exemptions can be available on 15 April 1992 only in respect of compensation income
earned or received during the calendar year 1991. The personal exemptions as increased by Rep.
Act 7167 are not available in respect of compensation income received during the 1990 calendar
year; the tax due in respect of said income had already accrued, and been presumably paid (The
law does not state retroactive application). The personal exemptions as increased by Rep. Act
7167 cannot be regarded as available as to compensation income received during 1992 because
it would in effect postpone the availability of the increased exemptions to 1 January-15 April
1993. The implementing regulations collide with Section 3 of Rep. Act 7167 which states that the
statute "shall take effect upon its approval.
The revenue regulation should take effect on compensation income earned or received from 1
January 1991. Since this decision is promulgated after 15 April 1992, those taxpayers who have
already paid are entitled to refunds or credits.
FORTUNE MOTORS V METROPOLITAN BANK
5

Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 38340
entitled Fortune Motors (Phils.) Inc., v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company et al.[1] The
appellate courts decision reversed the decision in Civil Case No. 89-5637 of Branch 150 of the
Regional trial Court of Makati City.
It appears that Fortune Motors (Phils.) Inc. obtained the following loans from the Metropolitan
Bank and Trust company: (1) P20 Million, on March 31, 1982; (2) P8 Million, on April 30, 1983; (3)
P2,500,000.00, on June 8, 1983 and; (4) P3 Million, on August 16, 1983.
On January 6, 1984, respondent bank consolidated the loans of P8 Million and P3 Million into one
promissory note, which amounted to P12,650,000.00. This included the interest that had accrued
thereon in the amount of P1,650,000.00.
To secure the obligation in the total amount of P34,150,000.00, petitioner mortgaged certain real
estate in favor of respondent bank.
Due to financial constraints, petitioner failed to pay the loan upon maturity. Consequently on May
25, 1984, respondent bank initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings and in effect,
foreclosed the real estate mortgage.
The extrajudicial foreclosure was actually conducted by Senior Deputy Sheriff Pablo Y. Sy who
had sent copies of the Notice of Extrajudicial Sale to the opposing parties by registered mail. In
accordance with law, he posted copies of the Notice of Sheriffs Sale at three conspicuous public
places in Makati -- the office of the Sheriff, the Assessors office and the Register of Deeds in
Makati. He thereafter executed the Certificates of Posting on May 20, 1984. The said notice was
in fact published on June 2, 9 and 16, 1984 in three issues of The New Record. An affidavit of
publication, dated June 19, 1984,[2] was executed by Teddy F. Borres, publisher of the said
newspaper.
Subsequently, the mortgaged property was sold at public auction for P47,899,264.91 to the
mortgagee bank, the highest bidder.
Petitioner failed to redeem the mortgaged property within the one-year redemption period and
so, the titles thereto were consolidated in the name of respondent bank by which token the latter
was entitled to the possession of the property mortgaged and, in fact possessed the same.
Petitioner then filed a complaint for the annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure, which covered
TCT Nos. 461087, 432685, 457590, 432684, S-54185, S-54186, S-54187, and S-54188.
On December 27, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment annulling the extrajudicial foreclosure
of the mortgage.
On May 14, 1992, an appeal was interposed by the respondent to the Court of Appeals. Acting
thereon, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision rendered by the lower court. Subsequently,
the motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied on April 26, 1994.
Aggrieved by the decision rendered by the Court of appeals, petitioner appealed before this
Court. On May 30, 1994, however, we issued a Resolution denying said petition. Hence, this
motion for reconsideration.
6

Petitioner raises the following issues before us, to wit:

I. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE PUBLICATION OF THE NOTICE
OF EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE WAS VALID.[3]
II. THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE NOTICES OF
EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE, AND SALE WERE DULY RECEIVED BY THE PETITIONER.[4]
III. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO ADJUDGE THE IRREGULARITIES IN THE
BIDDING, POSTING, PUBLICATION, AND THE SALE OF FORTUNE BUILDING.[5]
IV. THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RENDERING A JUDGMENT BASED ON
PRESUMPTION.[6]
Petitioner contends that the newspaper Daily Record[7] where the notice of extrajudicial
foreclosure was published does not qualify as a newspaper of general circulation.
It further contends that the population that can be reached by the Daily Record is only .004% as
its circulation in Makati in 1984, was 1000 to 1500 per week. Hence, it concludes that only 1648
out of a population of 412,069 were probable readers of the Daily Record, and that this is not the
standard contemplated by law when it refers to a newspaper of general circulation.
In the case of Bonnevie v. Court of Appeals,[8] we had already made a ruling on this point:
The argument that the publication of the notice in the Luzon Weekly Courier was not in
accordance with law as said newspaper is not of general circulation must likewise be
disregarded. The affidavit of publication, executed by the publisher, business/advertising
manager of the Luzon Weekly Courier, states that it is a newspaper of general circulation in x x x
Rizal; and that the notice of Sheriffs sale was published in said paper on June 30, July 7 and July
14, 1968. This constitutes prima facie evidence of compliance with the requisite publication.
(Sadang v. GSIS, 18 SCRA 491).
To be a newspaper of general circulation, it is enough that it is published for the dissemination of
local news and general information; that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers;
that it is published at regular intervals. (Basa v. Mercado, 61 Phil. 632). The newspaper need not
have the largest circulation so long as it is of general circulation. (Banta v. Pacheco, 74 Phil. 67).
In the case at bench, there was sufficient compliance with the requirements of the law regarding
publication of the notice in a newspaper of general circulation. This is evidenced by the affidavit
of publication executed by the New Records publisher, Teddy F. Borres, which stated that it is a
newspaper edited in Manila and Quezon City and of general circulation in the cities of Manila,
Quezon City et al., and in the Provinces of Rizal xxx, published every Saturday by the Daily
Record, Inc. This was affirmed by Pedro Deyto, who was the executive editor of the said
newspaper and who was a witness for petitioner. Deyto testified: a) that the New Record contains
news; b) that it has subscribers from Metro Manila and from all over the Philippines; c) that it is
published once a week or four times a month ; and d) that he had been connected with the said
paper since 1958, an indication that the said newspaper had been in existence even before that
year.[9]
7

Another contention posited by petitioner is that the New Record is published and edited in
Quezon City and not in Makati where the foreclosed property is situated, and that, when New
Records publisher enumerated the places where said newspaper is being circulated, Makati was
not mentioned.
This contention of petitioner is untenable. In 1984, when the publishers affidavit relied upon by
petitioner was executed, Makati, Mandaluyong, San Juan, Paraaque et. al., were still part of the
province of Rizal. Apparently, this is the reason why in the New Records affidavit of publication
executed by its publisher, the enumeration of the places where it was being circulated, only the
cities of Manila, Quezon, Caloocan, Pasay, Tagaytay, et. al., were named. Furthermore, as aptly
ratiocinated by the Court of Appeals:
The application given by the trial court to the provisions of P.D. No. 1079 is, to our mind, too
narrow and restricted and could not have been the intention of the said law. Were the
interpretation of the trial court (sic) to be followed, even the leading dailies in the country like
the Manila Bulletin, the Philippine Daily Inquirer, or The Philippine Star which all enjoy a wide
circulation throughout the country, cannot publish legal notices that would be honored outside
the place of their publication. But this is not the interpretation given by the courts. For what is
important is that a paper should be in general circulation in the place where the properties to be
foreclosed are located in order that publication may serve the purpose for which it was intended.
[10]
Petitioner also claims that the New Record is not a daily newspaper because it is published only
once a week.
A perusal of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1079 and Act 3135 shows that the said laws do not
require that the newspaper which publishes judicial notices should be a daily newspaper. Under
P.D. 1079, for a newspaper to qualify, it is enough that it be a newspaper or periodical which is
authorized by law to publish and which is regularly published for at least one (1) year before the
date of publication which requirement was satisfied by New Record. Nor is there a requirement,
as stated in the said law, that the newspaper should have the largest circulation in the place of
publication.
Petitioner claims that, when its representative went to a newspaper stand to look for a copy of
the new Record, he could not find any. This allegation can not be made a basis to conclude that
the newspaper New Record is not of general circulation. By its own admission, petitioners
representative was looking for a newspaper named Daily Record. Naturally, he could not find a
newspaper by that name as the newspapers name is New Record and not Daily Record. Although
it is the Daily Record Inc. which publishes the New Record, it does not mean that the name of the
newspaper is Daily Record.
Petitioner contends that, since it was the Executive Judge who caused the publication of the
notice of the sale and not the Sheriff, the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage should be
deemed annulled.
Petitioners contention in this regard is bereft of merit, because Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1079 clearly
provides that:
8

The executive judge of the court of first instance shall designate a regular working day and a
definite time each week during which the said judicial notices or advertisements shall be
distributed personally by him[11] for publication to qualified newspapers or periodicals xxx,
which distribution shall be done by raffle.
The said provision of the law is clear as to who should personally distribute the judicial notices or
advertisements to qualified newspapers for publication. There was a substantial compliance with
the requirements when it was the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati who
caused the publication of the said notice by the newspaper selected by means of raffle.
With regard to the second assigned error wherein petitioner claims that it did not personally
receive the notices of extrajudicial foreclosure and sale supposedly sent to it by Metrobank, we
find the same unmeritorious.
Settled is the rule that personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings
is not necessary. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 governing extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgages, as amended by Act No. 4118, requires only the posting of the notice of sale in three
public places and the publication of that notice in a newspaper of general circulation. It is pristine
clear from the above provision that the lack of personal notice to the mortgagor, herein
petitioner, is not a ground to set aside the foreclosure sale.[12]
Petitioners expostulation that it did not receive the mailed notice to it of the sale of the
mortgaged property should be brushed aside. The fact that respondent was able to receive the
registry return card from the mail in regular course shows that the postal item presented by the
return card had been received by the addressee. Otherwise, as correctly contended by
respondent, the mailed item should have been stamped Returned to Sender, still sealed with all
the postal markings, and the return card still attached to it.
As to the contention that the signature appearing on the registry return card receipt appears to
be only a dot and that the photostat copy does not contain a signature at all we find, after a
close scrutiny of the registry return card, that there are strokes before and after the dot. These
strokes appear to be a signature which signifies: a) that the registry claim card was received at
the given address; b) that the addressee had authorized a person to present the claim card at
the post office and receive the registered mail matter; and c) that the authorized person signed
the return card to acknowledge his receipt of the mail matter. Even the trial court in its decision
ruled that:
x x x the Court finds no cogent reason to overcome the presumption that Sheriff Pablo Sy
performed his task regularly and in accordance with the rules. A closer look at the assailed xerox
copy of the registry receipt and the original form which said xerox was admittedly copied would
indeed show that the xerox is not a faithful reproduction of the original since it does not bear the
complete signature of the addressee as appearing on the original. It does not, however, follow
that the xerox is a forgery. The same bears slight traces of the signature appearing on the
original but, there is no indication that the one was altered to conform to the other. Rather, there
must have been only a misprint of the xerox but not amounting to any attempt to falsify the
same.[13]

Petitioner also claims that it had transferred to a different location but the notice was sent to its
old address. Petitioner failed to notify respondent of its supposed change of address. Needless to
say, it can be surmised that respondent had sent the notice to petitioners official address.
Anent its third assigned error, petitioner assails the posting of the notices of sale by the Sheriff in
the Office of the Sheriff, Office of the Assessor and the Register of Deeds as these are not the
conspicuous public places required by law. Furthermore, it also questions the non-posting of the
notice of sale on the property itself which was to be sold.
Apparently, this assigned error of petitioner is tantamount to a last ditch effort to extricate itself
from the quagmire it is in. Act 3135 does not require posting of the notice of sale on the
mortgaged property. Section 3 of the said law merely requires that the notice of the sale be
posted for not less than twenty days in at least three public places of the municipality or city
where the property is situated. The aforementioned places, to wit: the Sheriffs Office, the
Assessors Office and the Register of Deeds are certainly the public places contemplated by law,
as these are places where people interested in purchasing real estate congregate.
With regard to the fourth assigned error of petitioner, we do not subscribe to the latters view that
the decision of the Court of Appeals was mainly based on the presumption of the regularity of the
performance of official function of the officers involved. A perusal of the records indubitably
shows that the requirement of Act No. 3135 on the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage had been duly complied with by Senior Deputy Sheriff Sy.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision rendered in CA-G.R. CV No. 38340 is hereby
AFFIRMED.
ALBINO CO V CA
Facts: In connection with an agreement to salvage and refloat asunken vessel and in payment
of his share of the expenses of the salvage operations therein stipulated petitioner Albino Co
delivered to the salvaging firm on September 1, 1983 a check drawn against the Associated
Citizens' Bank, postdated November 30, 1983 in the sum of P361,528.00. The check was
deposited on January 3, 1984. It was dishonored two days later, the tersely-stated reason given
by the bank being: "CLOSED ACCOUNT."
A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 2 was filed by the
salvage company against Albino Co with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case
eventuated in Co's conviction of the crime charged, and his being sentenced to suffer a term of
imprisonment of sixty (60) days and to indemnify the salvage company in the sum of
P361,528.00.
Co appealed to the Court of Appeals which later affirmed the decision of the lower
court. This is a petition for certiorari from the appellee under the grounds that a check issued
merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by Batasang
Pambansa Blg. 22 or the Anti - Bouncing Check Law. In Circular (No. 4), dated December 15,
1981, pertinently provided as follows:
2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure the payment of an
10

obligation, whether pre-existing or not, the drawer is not criminally liable for either estafa or
violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
However this was later reversed in administrative circular was subsequently issued on
August 8, 1984.
Issue: Whether or not Co is guilty of violating BP 22 at the time of issuance of his check?
Held: No. This was because at the time of the issuance of the check on September 1, 1983, some
four (4) years prior to the promulgation of the judgment in Que v. People on September 21, 1987,
which the RTC's conviction was relied on, the delivery of a "rubber" or "bouncing" check as
guarantee for an obligation was not considered a punishable offense, an official pronouncement
made in a Circular of the Ministry of Justice.
The new circular was delivered after almost one (1) year when Albino Co hand the
"bouncing" check to the complainant on September 1, 1983.
The Court merits this case under the maxims that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines,"
according to Article 8 of the Civil Code. "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided," declares Article 4 of the same Code, a declaration that is echoed by Article
22 of the Revised Penal Code: "Penal laws shall have, a retroactive effect insofar as they favor
the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal.
Ratio: This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental
doctrine, must be resolved in favor of the accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no
compelling reason why the doctrine of mala prohibita should override the principle of
prospectivity, and its clear implications as herein above set out and discussed, negating criminal
liability.
The assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and of the Regional Trial Court are reversed and
set aside, and the criminal prosecution against the accused-petitioner is DISMISSED, with cost de
officio.
LRTA V ATTY SALVANA
CUI V ARELLANO
FACTS: Before the school year 1948-1949 Emeterio Cui took up preparatory law course in the
Arellano University. After Finishing his preparatory law course plaintiff enrolled in the College of
Law of the defendant from school year 1948-1949. Plaintiff finished his law studies in the
defendant university up to and including the first semester of the fourt year. During all the school
years in which plaintiff was studying law in defendant law college, Francisco R. Capistrano,
brother of mother of plaintiff, was the dean of college of law and legal counsel of the defendant
university. Plaintiff enrolled for last semester of his law studies in the defendant university but
failed to pay tuition fees because his uncle Dean Francisco R. Capistrano, having severed his
connection with defendant and having accepted the deanship and chancellorship of the college
of law of the Abad Santos University graduating from the college of law of the latter university.
Plaintiff, during all the time he has studying law in Defendant University was awarded scholarship
11

grants, for scholastic merit, so that his semestral tuition fees were retured to him after the end of
semester and when his scholarship grants were awarded to him. The whole amount of tuition
fess paid by the plaintiff to defendant and refunded to him by the latter from the first semester
up to and including the first semester of his last year in college of law or the fourth year, is in
total P1,003.87. After Graduating in law from Abad Santos University he applied to take the bar
examination. To secure permission to take the bar, he needed the transcript of his records in
defendant Arellano University. Plaintiff petitioned the latter to issue to him the needed
transcripts. The defendant refused until after he paid back the P1,003.87 which defendant
refunded him. As he could not take the bar examination without those transcripts, plaintiff paid
to defendant the said sum under protest.
ISSUE: Whether the provision of the contract between plaintiff and defendant, whereby the
former waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the
equivalent of his scholarship in cash, is valid or not.
HELD: Memorandum No. 38 issued by the Director of Private Schools provides that When
students are given full or partial scholarship, it is understood that such scholarship are merited
and earned. The amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to These scholarship should not
be subsequently charged to recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to
another institution. Scholarship should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a
school.
Memorandum No. 38 merely incorporates a sound principle of public policy. The defendant uses
the scholarship as a business scheme designed to increase the business potential of an
education institution. Thus conceived it is not only inconsistent with sound policy but also good
morals. The practice of awarding scholarship to attract students and keep them in school is not
Good custom nor has it received some kind of social and practical confirmation except in some
private institution as in Arellano University.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one shall be entered
sentencing the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, with interest thereon at the
legal rate from September 1, 1954, date of the institution of this case, as well as the costs, and
dismissing the defendants counterclaim. It is so ordered.
PEOPLE V DONATO
Facts: Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on October 2, 1986 for
acts committed before and after February 1986. Private respondent filed with a Motion to Quash
alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction
over the offense charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants;
and (d) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished. This was denied. May 9, 1987
Respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed that the respondent is not entitled to bail
anymore since rebellion became a capital offense under PD 1996, 942 and 1834 amending ART.
135 of RPC. On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among
others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the
Revised Penal Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees. Judge Donato now granted the
bail, which was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed a condition that he shall report to the court
once every two months within the first ten days of every period thereof. Petitioner filed a
12

supplemental motion for reconsideration indirectly asking the court to deny bail to and to allow it
to present evidence in support thereof considering the "inevitable probability that the accused
will not comply with this main condition of his bail. It was contended that:

1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from detention
when arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA)
2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;
3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and presented
a Driver's License to substantiate his false identity;
4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false address;
5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose identity
and address were also found to be false;
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00 was
offered and paid for his arrest.
This however was denied. Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether or Not the private respondent has the right to bail.
Held: Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since the crime is not a
capital offense, therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence. It is only when it is a
capital offense that the right becomes discretionary. However it was wrong for the Judge to
change the amount of bail from 30K to 50K without hearing the prosecution.
Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty of reclusion perpetua to
the crime of rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not favorable to him.
Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case (petition for habeas corpus). Agreements
were made therein: accused to remain under custody, whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz
and Jose Milo Concepcion will be released immediately, with a condition that they will submit
themselves in the jurisdiction of the court. Said petition for HC was dismissed. Bail is the security
given for the release of a person in custody of the law. Ergo, there was a waiver. We hereby rule
that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which
is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law
The doctrine of waiver extends to the rights and privileges of any character, and since the word
"waiver" covers any conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter
which affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which he is the owner or which
belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled whether secured by contract, conferred
with statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided such rights and privileges do not infringe
on the rights of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden
by law, and does not contravene public policy.
13

Rights guaranteed to one accused of a crime fall naturally into two classes: (a) Those in which
the state, as well as the accused, is interested, and (b) those which are personal to the accused,
which are in the nature of personal privileges. Those of the first class cannot be waived, those of
the second may be. (Commonwealth v. Petrillo).
This Court has recognized waivers of constitutional rights such as the rights against
unreasonable searches and seizures, the right to counsel and to remain silent, and the right to
be heard.
The right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right personal
to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, morals or good
customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc., et al, v. Feliciano
Facts: On December 26, 1964, Jose Y. Feliciano, Chairman and General Manager of the Rice and
Corn Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of
595,400 metric tons of rice, thru a government agency which the President may designate,
pursuant to the recommendation of the National Economic Council. The President submitted said
letter to his cabinet for consideration and on December 28, 1964, the cabinet approved the
needed importation. On January 4, 1965, the President designated the Rice and Corn
Administration as the government agency authorized to undertake the importation. Considering
that said importation, the Iloilo Palay and corn Planters Association alleged that it is contrary to
RA 3453 which prohibits the government from importing rice and tat there is no law
appropriating funds to finance the same. They said that it its illegal because it is prohibited by RA
3452 which in Section 10 provides that the importation of rice and corn is only left to private
properties upon payment of the corresponding taxes. They claim that RCA is prohibited from
doing so. According to them, RA 2207 which provides that should there be an existing or
imminent shortage in the local supply of rice of suh gravity as to constitute a national emergency
and certified by the NEC, the president may authorize such importation thru any government
agency he may designate - is repealed by RA 3452.
Issue: Whether or not RA 2207 which allows importation of rice by government agency during
national emergency is repealed by RA 3452
Held: No, RA 2207 is not repealed by RA 3452.
Section 16 of RA 3452 contains a repealing clause which provides "All laws or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.". This
repealing clause is not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the
act/s that are intended to be repealed. Rather, is is a clause which predicates the intended repeal
upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. Such being
the case, the presumption against implied repeals and the rule against strict construction
regarding implied repeals apply ex proprio vigre. The failure to add a specific repealing clause
indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless on irreconcilable
inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws. Here there is no
inconsistency.
14

While the two laws are geared towards the same ultimate objective, their methods of approach
are different; one is by a total ban of rice importation and the other by a partial ban, the same
being applicable only to the government during normal period. Also, RA 3452 only authorizes
importation during normal times, but when there is shortage in the local supply of sucy gravity as
to constitute a national emergency, we have to turn to RA 2207. These two laws are therefore
not inconsistent and so implied repeal does not ensue.
TING V VELES-TING
Facts: Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez-Ting first met in 1972 while they were classmates in
medical school. They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when
respondent was already pregnant with their first child. On October 21, 1993, after being married
for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old,
Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity
of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered
from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which,
however, only became manifest thereafter.
Carmens allegations
manifestations:

of

Benjamins

psychological

incapacity

consisted

of

the

following

1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his profession;
2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell the
family car twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his debts,
because he no longer had money to pay the same; and
4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give regular
financial support to his family.
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a
respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He also pointed out that it was he who often
comforted and took care of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a
week. Both presented expert witnesses (psychiatrist) to refute each others claim. RTC ruled in
favor of the respondent declaring the marriage null and void.
Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA reversed RTCs decision. Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this case
Issues:
1. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set
forth under the Santos and Molina cases,
2. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological incapacity
for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has
been liberalized,
15

3. Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and
void is in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
Held:
1. No. respondents argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina
should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer
new.
2. The Case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on
the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions
of church tribunals.
3. There is no evidence that adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is
psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more
particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage
eighteen (18) years ago.
PESCA V PESCA
FACTS: The petitioner and respondent were married and had four children. Lorna filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part
of her husband. She alleged that he is emotionally immature and irresponsible. He was cruel and
violent. He was a habitual drinker. Whenever she tells him to stop or at least minimize his
drinking, her husband would hurt her. There was even a time when she was chased by a loaded
shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of their children. The children also suffered
physical violence. Petitioner and their children left the home. Two months later, they returned
upon the promise of respondent to change. But he didnt. She was battered again. Her husband
was imprisoned for 11 days for slight physical injuries. RTC declared their marriage null and void.
CA reversed RTCs ruling. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the guidelines for psychological incapacity in the case of Republic vs CA & Molina
should be taken in consideration in deciding in this case.
HELD: Yes. In the Molina case, guidelines were laid down by the SC before a case would fall under
the category of psychological incapacity to declare a marriage null and void. This decision has
force and effect of a law. These guidelines are mandatory in nature. Petition denied.
The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.
The rule follows the settled legal maxim legis interpretado legis vim obtinet that the
interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.
SALVACION V CENTRAL BANK
FACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts of rape and
serious illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from him several dollar checks
and a dollar account in the China Banking Corp. He was, however, able to escape from prison. In
16

a civil case filed against him, the trial court awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorneys
fees amounting to almost P1,000,000.00.
Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the China Banking
Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 exempts
foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any
court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. Salvacion
therefore filed this action for declaratory relief in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic Act No.
6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made
applicable to a foreign transient?
HELD: NO.
The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it
amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case
because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby required to comply with the writ
of execution issued in the civil case and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in
such amount as would satisfy the judgment.
Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment and award of
damages that Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then proceeded to show that the
economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore present; and even if it still
exists, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable
and oppressive. The intention of the law may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate
the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us.
The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the Offshore Banking
System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from foreign
lenders and investors and, subsequently, to give the latter protection. However, the foreign
currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD
Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws because such depositor
stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only
for a short time. Considering that Bartelli is just a tourist or a transient, he is not entitled to the
protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment,
garnishment or other court processes.
Further, the SC said: In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice.
Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which
exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative
body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign
transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused
Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that in case of
doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.
NATIONAL MARKETING CORP V TECSON
17

Facts:
December 21, 1965, National Marketing Corporation filed a complaint, docketed as civil case no.
63701 on the same court, as successor of the Price Stabilization Corporation, against the same
defendant from 10 years ago (December 21, 1955, Price Stabilization Corporation vs. Tecson).
Defendant Miguel Tecson moved to dismiss the said complaint upon the ground lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter of that and prescription of action.
More than ten years have passed a year is a period of 365 days (Art. 13, CCP). Plaintiff forgot
that 1960 and 1964 were both leap years so that when this present case was filed it was filed
two days too late.
The lower court, then, issued an order of dismissal with regards the article 13 of the civil code.
Pursuant to Art. 1144(3) of our Civil Code, an action upon a judgment must be brought within
ten years from the time the right of action accrues, the issue thus confined to the date on which
ten years from December 21, 1955 had expired.
However, National Marketing Corporation insists that the same is erroneous because a year
means a calendar year. There is no question that when it is not a leap year, December 21 to
December 21 of the following year is one year. The case reached its conclusion with the
appellants theory that contravenes the explicit provision of Article 13 of the civil code.
Issues: Whether or not the term year as used in the article 13 of the civil code is limited to 365
days.
Ruling: Yes. The term year as used in the article 13 of the civil code is limited to 365 days.
However, it is said to be unrealistic and if public interest demands a reversion to the policy
embodied in the revised administrative code, this may be done through legislative process and
not by judicial decree.
CIR V PRIMETOWN
FACTS: Gilbert Yap, Vice Chair of Primetown applied on March 11, 1999 for a refund or credit of
income tax which Primetown paid in 1997. He claimed that they are entitled for a refund because
they suffered losses that year due to the increase of cost of labor and materials, etc. However,
despite the losses, they still paid their quarterly income tax and remitted creditable withholding
tax from real estate sales to BIR. Hence, they were claiming for a refund. On May 13, 1999,
revenue officer Elizabeth Santos required Primetown to submit additional documents to which
Primetown complied with. However, its claim was not acted upon which prompted it to file a
petition for review in CTA on April 14, 2000. CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyonf the
2-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund according to Sec 229 of NIRC.
According to CTA, the two-year period is equivalent to 730 days pursuant to Art 13 of NCC. Since
Primetown filed its final adjustment return on April 14, 1998 and that year 2000 was a leap year,
the petition was filed 731 days after Primetown filed its final adjusted return. Hence, beyond the
reglementary period. Primetown appealed to CA. CA reversed the decision of CTA. Hence, this
appeal.

18

ISSUE: W/N petition was filed within the two-year period

HELD: Pursuant to EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987, a year shall be understood to be
12 calendar months. The SC defined a calendar month as a month designated in the calendar
without regard to the number of days it may contain. The court held that Administrative Code of
1987 impliedly repealed Art 13 of NCC as the provisions are irreconcilable. Primetown is entitled
for the refund since it is filed within the 2-year reglementary period.
MICIANO V BRIMO
FACTS: Juan Miciano, judicial administrator of the estate in question, filed a scheme of partition.
Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased (Joseph Brimo) opposed Micianos participation
in the inheritance. Joseph Brimo is a Turkish citizen.
ISSUE: Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the distribution of Joseph
Brimos estates.
HELD: Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that it be made and
disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island, this condition,
described as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice
the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide.
Impossible conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good morals. Thus, national
law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions.
The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such
manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.
AZNAR V GARCIA
FACTS: EDWARD Christensen died testate. The estate was distributed by Executioner Aznar
according to the will, which provides that: Php 3,600 be given to HELEN Christensen as her
legacy, and the rest of his estate to his daughter LUCY Christensen, as pronounced by CFI Davao.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen, insofar as it deprives her
of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us an
acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward in an earlier case.

As to his citizenship, we find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided in
Sacramento from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, and the deceased
appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed
his will he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended
to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. But at the time of his death, he was
domiciled in the Philippines.
ISSUE: what law on succession should apply, the Philippine law or the California law?

19

HELD: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the
lower court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession
provides.
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country where said property
may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the
term national law is used therein.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property?
The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the
California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he
desires. But HELEN invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is
as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to
follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
It is argued on executors behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of
California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the Kaufman case, should govern the
determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensens will, such law being
in force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other
hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the
doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question
should be referred back to the law of the decedents domicile, which is the Philippines.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule
applied in In re Kaufman, its internal law. If the law on succ ession and the conflict of laws rules
of California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the
principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should
apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule
laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign
element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law
should govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the
national law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have
20

prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those
domiciled in other jurisdictions.
It is argued on appellees (Aznar and LUCY) behalf that the clause if there is no law to the
contrary in the place where the property is situated in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code
refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the
Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased should govern.
This contention can not be sustained.
As explained in the various authorities cited above, the national law mentioned in Article 16 of
our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which
authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testators domicile. The
conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a
decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at
bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California; such
action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a
football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of which the
decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own
law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be
decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for
children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes
natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Edward, a citizen of California, is the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the
appellant HELEN, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of
the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of California..
NOTES: There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the
United States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only
and in force only within the state. The national law indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code
above quoted cannot, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can
refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.
BELLIS V BELLIS
FACTS: Amos Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He
had 5 legitimate children with his wife, Mary Mallen, whom he had divorced, 3 legitimate children
with his 2nd wife, Violet Kennedy and finally, 3 illegitimate children.
Prior to his death, Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines in which his distributable estate
should be divided in trust in the following order and manner:
a. $240,000 to his 1st wife Mary Mallen;
b. P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children at P40,000 each;
c. The remainder shall go to his surviving children by his 1st and 2nd wives, in equal shares.
21

Subsequently, Amos Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, USA. His will was admitted to
probate in the Philippines. The Peoples Bank and Trust Company, an executor of the will, paid
the entire bequest therein.
Preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its Executors Final
Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition where it reported, inter alia, the
satisfaction of the legacy of Mary Mallen by the shares of stock amounting to $240,000 delivered
to her, and the legacies of the 3 illegitimate children in the amount of P40,000 each or a total of
P120,000. In the project partition, the executor divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions
for the benefit of the testators 7 legitimate children by his 1st and 2nd marriages.
Among the 3 illegitimate children, Mari Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
opposition to the project partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimates as
illegitimate children.

The lower court denied their respective motions for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether Texan Law of Philippine Law must apply.
RULING: It is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof
at the time of his death. So that even assuming Texan has a conflict of law rule providing that the
same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine Law, but would still refer to Texas
Law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has conflict rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the
application of the law of the place where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since
the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however of proofs as to
the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from our appellants, position
is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, USA and
that under the Laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimates. Accordingly, since the
intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights has to be
determined under Texas Law, the Philippine Law on legitimates can not be applied to the testate
of Amos Bellis.
HERMOSISIMA V CA
In 1950, Soledad Cagigas, 33 years old (then a school teacher, later she became an insurance
underwriter), and Francisco Hermosisima, 23 years old (apprentice ship pilot), fell in love with
each other. Since 1953, both had a refular intimate and sexual affair with each other. In 1954,
Soledad got pregnant. Francisco then promised to marry Soledad. In June 1954, Soledad gave
birth to a baby girl. The next month, Francisco got married but with a different woman named
Romanita Perez.
Subsequently, Soledad filed an action against Francisco for the latter to recognize his daughter
with Soledad and for damages due to Franciscos breach of his promise to marry Soledad. The
trial court ruled in favor of Soledad. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court
22

and even increased the award of damages. The Court of Appeals reasoned that Francisco is liable
for damages because he seduced Soledad. He exploited the love of Soledad for him in order to
satisfy his sexual desires that being, the award of moral damages is proper.
ISSUE: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of promise to
marry.
HELD: No. Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. The Court of Appeals
based its award of damages on Article 2219 of the Civil Code which says in part that Moral
damages may be recovered from (3) Seduction, xxx However, it must be noted that the
Seduction being contemplated in the said Civil Code provision is the same Seduction being
contemplated in Article 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code. Such seduction is not present
in this case.
Further, it cannot be said that Francisco morally seduced (in lieu of criminal seduction) Soledad
given the circumstances of this case. Soledad was 10 years older than Francisco. Soledad had a
better job experience and a better job overall than Francisco who was a mere apprentice. Further
still, it was admitted by Soledad herself that she surrendered herself to Francisco and that she
wanted to bind by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of
clergy.
WASSMER V VELEZ
In 1954, Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned their marriage. They decided to schedule
it on September 4, 1954. And so Wassmer made preparations such as: making and sending
wedding invitations, bought her wedding dress and other apparels, and other wedding
necessities. But 2 days before the scheduled day of wedding, Velez sent a letter to Wassmer
advising her that he will not be able to attend the wedding because his mom was opposed to
said wedding. And one day before the wedding, he sent another message to Wassmer advising
her that nothing has changed and that he will be returning soon. However, he never returned.
This prompted Wassmer to file a civil case against Velez. Velez never filed an answer and
eventually judgment was made in favor of Wassmer. The court awarded exemplary and moral
damages in favor of Wassmer.

On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was because of
fortuitous events. He further argued that he cannot be held civilly liable for breaching his
promise to marry Wassmer because there is no law upon which such an action may be grounded.
He also contested the award of exemplary and moral damages against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages is proper.
HELD: Yes. The defense of fortuitous events raised by Velez is not tenable and also
unsubstantiated. It is true that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong.
However, in this case, it was not a simple breach of promise to marry. because of such promise,
Wassmer made preparations for the wedding. Velezs unreasonable withdrawal from the wedding
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. Wassmers cause of action is supported
23

under Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides in part any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an award for
moral damages as properly awarded by the lower court in this case. Further, the award of
exemplary damages is also proper. Here, the circumstances of this case show that Velez, in
breaching his promise to Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless, and oppressive manner this
warrants the imposition of exemplary damages against him
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH VS CA
FACTS:
Private respondent, Marilou Gonzales, filed a complaint dated October 27, 1987 for damages
against the petitioner for the alleged breach of their agreement to get married. She met the
petitioner in Dagupan where the latter was an Iranian medical exchange student who later
courted her and proposed marriage. The petitioner even went to Marilous house to secure
approval of her parents. The petitioner then forced the respondent to leave with him in his
apartment. Marilou was a virgin before she lived with him. After a week, she filed a complaint
because the petitioner started maltreating and threatening her. He even tied the respondent in
the apartment while he was in school and drugged her. Marilou at one time became pregnant
but the petitioner administered a drug to abort the baby.
Petitioner repudiated the marriage agreement and told Marilou to not live with him since he is
already married to someone in Bacolod. He claimed that he never proposed marriage or agreed
to be married neither sought consent and approval of Marlious parents. He claimed that he
asked Marilou to stay out of his apartment since the latter deceived him by stealing money and
his passport. The private respondent prayed for damages and reimbursements of actual
expenses.
ISSUE: Whether breach of promise to marry can give rise to cause for damages.
HELD:
The existing rule is that breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. The court
held that when a man uses his promise of marriage to deceive a woman to consent to his
malicious desires, he commits fraud and willfully injures the woman. In that instance, the court
found that petitioners deceptive promise to marry led Marilou to surrender her virtue and
womanhood.
Moral damages can be claimed when such promise to marry was a deceptive ploy to have carnal
knowledge with the woman and actual damages should be paid for the wedding preparation
expenses. Petitioner even committed deplorable acts in disregard of the laws of the country.
Therefore, SC set aside the decision of CA awarding damages to the respondent.
AMONOY V SPS GUTIERREZ

24

FACTS: In 1965, Atty. Sergio Amonoy represented Alfonso Fornilda (Formida in some records) in a
partition case. Since Fornilda had no money to pay, he agreed to make use of whatever property
he acquires as a security for the payment of Amonoys attorneys fees which amounts to P27k. In
July 1969, Fornilda died. A month later, the property was finally adjudicated and Fornilda, through
his heirs, got his just share from the property in dispute. Fornilda was however unable to pay
Amonoy. Hence, Amonoy sought to foreclose the property in 1970. The heirs of Fornilda, the
spouses Jose Gutierrez and Angela Fornilda then sued Amonoy questioning the validity of his
mortgage agreement with Fornilda. It was their claim that the attorneys fees he was collecting
was unconscionable and that the same was based on an invalid mortgage due to the existing
att0rney-client relationship between him and Fornilda at the time the mortgage was executed.
The spouses lost in the trial court as well as in the Court of Appeals but they appealed to the
Supreme Court, docketed as G.R.No. L-72306. Meanwhile, in 1973, Amonoy was able to foreclose
the property. Amonoy was also the highest bidder in the public sale conducted in view of the
foreclosure. He was able to buy the property of Fornilda for P23k. But constructed on said
property was the house of the spouses Gutierrez.
Pending the spousess appeal with the Supreme Court, Amonoy was able to secure a demolition
order and so on May 30, 1986, Amonoy started demolishing the houses of the spouses. But on
June 2, 1986, the Supreme Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against the
demolition order. On June 4, 1986, Amonoy received a copy of the TRO. Finally, on June 24, 1989,
the Supreme Court promulgated a decision on G.R.No. L-72306 where it ruled that the mortgage
between Amonoy and Fornilda is void, hence, Amonoy has no right over the property. But by this
time, the house of the spouses was already demolished because it appears that despite the TRO,
Amonoy continued demolishing the house until it was fully demolished in the middle of 1987.
The spouses then sued Amonoy for damages. It is now the contention of Amonoy that he
incurred no liability because he was merely exercising his right to demolish (pursuant to the
demolition order) hence what happened was a case of damnum absque injuria (injury without
damage).
ISSUE: Whether or not Amonoy is correct.
HELD: No. Amonoy initially had the right to demolish but when he received the TRO that right
had already ceased. Hence, his continued exercise of said right after the TRO was already
unjustified. As quoted by the Supreme Court: The exercise of a right ends when the right
disappears, and it disappears when it is abused, especially to the prejudice of others.
What Amonoy did is an abuse of right. Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to
as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the
exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties. These standards are the
following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; recognizes the primordial limitation on all
rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 and results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held
responsible.
Clearly then, the demolition of the spousess house by Amonoy, despite his receipt of the TRO,
was not only an abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right.
25

NIKKO HOTEL V AMAY BISAYA (ROBERTO REYES)

FACTS: Petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila and Ruby Lim assailed the decision of the Court of Appeals
in reversing the decision of RTC of Quezon City. CA held petitioner liable for damages to Roberto
Reyes aka Amang Bisaya, an entertainment artist.
There are two versions of the story:
Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994, Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby of Nikko
Hotel was approached by Dr. Violet Filart, a friend several years back. According to Mr. Reyes, Dr.
Filart invited him to join a birthday party at the penthouse for the hotels former General
Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart agreed to vouch for him and carried a basket
of fruits, the latters gift. He He lined up at the buffet table as soon as it was ready but to his
great shock, shame and embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotels Executive Secretary, asked him to
leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by the people around them. He was asked to leave the
party and a Makati policeman accompanied him to step-out the hotel. All these time, Dr Filart
ignored him adding to his shame and humiliation.
Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not in the manner claimed
by the plaintiff. Ms. Lim approached several people including Dr. Filarts sister, Ms. Zenaida
Fruto, if Dr. Filart did invite him as the captain waiter told Ms. Lim that Mr. Reyes was with Dr.
Filarts group. She wasnt able to ask it personally with Dr. Filart since the latter was talking over
the phone and doesnt want to interrupt her. She asked Mr. Reyes to leave because the
celebrant specifically ordered that the party should be intimate consisting only of those who part
of the list. She even asked politely with the plaintiff to finish his food then leave the party.
During the plaintiffs cross-examination, he was asked how close was Ms. Lim when she
approached him at the buffet table. Mr. Reyes answered very close because we nearly kissed
each other. Considering the close proximity, it was Ms. Lims intention to relay the request only
be heard by him. It was Mr. Reyes who made a scene causing everybody to know what
happened
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party.
HELD: Supreme Court held that petitioners did not act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the
party. Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim who did all the
necessary precautions to ensure that Mr. Reyes will not be humiliated in requesting him to leave
the party. Considering almost 20 years of experience in the hotel industry, Ms. Lim is
experienced enough to know how to handle such matters. Hence, petitioners will not be held
liable for damages brought under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.
PE V PE
FACTS: Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the time of her
disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a married
man and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory. Defendant was an adopted
son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of Lolita's father. Because of such fact
and the similarity in their family name, defendant became close to the plaintiffs who regarded
him as a member of their family. Sometime in 1952, defendant frequented the house of Lolita on
26

the pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in
love with each other and conducted clandestine trysts and exchanged love notes The rumors
about their love affairs reached Lolita's parents sometime, in 1955, and since then defendant
was forbidden from going to their house and from further seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs even filed
deportation proceedings against defendant. The affair between defendant and Lolita continued
nonetheless.On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from their house but her brothers and sisters
found a note written by the defendant.
ISSUE: Whether the defendant is liable according to Article 21 of the Civil Code
HELD: Because of the frequency of his visits to the Lolitas family who was allowed free access
because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the two
eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs. Even when the
defendant is prohibited to see Lolita, the defendant continued his love affairs with her until she
disappeared from the parental home. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed
immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury
as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code.Defendant is sentenced to pay the plaintiffs
the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigations
Alfonso committed an injury to Lolitas family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy contemplated in Article 20 of the civil code. The defendant took advantage of the
trust of Cecilio and even used the praying of rosary as a reason to get close with Lolita. The
wrong caused by Alfonso is immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man
BUNAG JR V CA
FACTS: On the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. brought plaintiffappellant to a motel or hotel where they had sexual intercourse. Later that evening, said
defendant-appellant brought plaintiff-appellant to the house of his grandmother Juana de Leon in
Pamplona, Las Pias, Metro Manila, where they lived together as husband and wife for 21 days,
or until September 29, 1973. On September 10, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and
plaintiff-appellant filed their respective applications for a marriage license with the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite. On October 1, 1973, after leaving plaintiff-appellant,
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing his application for a marriage
license.
Plaintiff-appellant contends that on the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant
Bunag, Jr., together with an unidentified male companion, abducted her in the vicinity of the San
Juan de Dios Hospital in Pasay City and brought her to a motel where she was raped.
ISSUE: Whether, since action involves a breach of promise to marry, the trial court erred in
awarding damages.
RULING: It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for
breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover
money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. 8 Generally,
therefore, a breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has
actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents thereof.
27

However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those
provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in relation
to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
moral damages. 9 Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which
leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered
material and moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the
statutes. 10
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting
private respondent and having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter
promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such
promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute acts contrary to
morals and good customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible transgressions which
indisputably warrant and abundantly justify the award of moral and exemplary damages,
pursuant to Article 21 in relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Article 2229 and 2234
of Civil Code.
Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said damages were awarded by the trial court on
the basis of a finding that he is guilty of forcible abduction with rape, despite the prior dismissal
of the complaint therefor filed by private respondent with the Pasay City Fiscal's Office.
Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In other words, criminal liability will give
rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or
injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. 11 Hence, extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. 12
In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by mere
resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage. There is no declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist. Consequently, the
dismissal did not in any way affect the right of herein private respondent to institute a civil action
arising from the offense because such preliminary dismissal of the penal action did not carry with
it the extinction of the civil action.
The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings involved are not
between the same parties. Furthermore, it has long been emphasized, with continuing validity up
to now, that there are different rules as to the competency of witnesses and the quantum of
evidence in criminal and civil proceedings. In a criminal action, the State must prove its case by
evidence which shows the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it
is sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by preponderance of evidence only. 13 Thus, in
Rillon, et al. vs. Rillon, 14 we stressed that it is not now necessary that a criminal prosecution for
rape be first instituted and prosecuted to final judgment before a civil action based on said
offense in favor of the offended woman can likewise be instituted and prosecuted to final
judgment.
28

PHIL TRANSMARINE CARRIERS V LEGASPI

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the January
5, 2012 Resolution1 and July 20, 2012 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No.
116686, which denied the petitioners motion to amend the dispositive portion of the June 29,
2011 CA Decision.
The Factual and Procedural Antecedents
Respondent Leandro Legaspi (respondent) was employed as Utility Pastry on board the vessel
"Azamara Journey" under the employment of petitioner Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc.
(petitioner). Respondents employment was covered by a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
wherein it was agreed that the company shall pay a maximum disability compensation of up to
US$60,000.00 only.
While on board the vessel, respondent suffered "Cardiac Arrest S/P ICD Insertation." He was
checked by the ships doctor and was prescribed medications. On November 14, 2008,
respondent was repatriated to receive further medical treatment and examination. On May 23,
2009, the company designated physician assessed his condition to be Disability Grade 2.
Not satisfied, respondent filed a complaint for full and permanent disability compensation against
petitioner before the Labor Arbiter (LA).
The Labor Arbiters Ruling
In its January 25, 2010 Decision,3 the LA ruled in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, respondents (now petitioner) are hereby ordered to pay complainant jointly and
severally, the following:
1. US$80,000.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment as permanent disability
compensation;
2. US$1,320.00 or its peso equivalent as sick wages;
3. Attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the total award.
SO ORDERED.
Notably, the LA awarded US$80,000.00 based on the ITF Cruise Ship Model Agreement for
Catering Personnel, not on the CBA.
Not satisfied, petitioner appealed the LA decision before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC).
The NLRCs Ruling
In its May 28, 2010 Decision, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the LA. Petitioner timely filed its
motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the NLRC in its July 30, 2010 Resolution. On
29

September 5, 2010, the NLRC issued the Entry of Judgment stating that its resolution affirming
the LA decision had become final and executory.
On October 22, 2010, during the hearing on the motion for execution before the NLRC, petitioner
agreed to pay respondent US$81,320.00. The terms and conditions of said payment were
embodied in the Receipt of Judgment Award with Undertaking,4 wherein respondent
acknowledged receipt of the said amount and undertook to return it to petitioner in the event the
latters petition for certiorari would be granted, without prejudice to respondents right to appeal.
It was also agreed upon that the remaining balance would be given on the next scheduled
conference. Pertinent portions of the said undertaking provide:
xxxx
3. That counsel (of the petitioner) manifested their willingness to tender the judgment award
without prejudice to the respondents (now petitioner) right to file a Petition for Certiorari and
provided, complainant (now respondent) undertakes to return the full amount without need of
demand or a separate action in the event that the Petition for Certiorari is granted;
4. That complainants counsel was amenable to the arrangement and accepted the offer. NOW
THEREFORE complainant and his counsel hereby acknowledge RECEIPT of the sum of EIGHTYONE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED TWENTY AND 0/100 (US$81,320.00) covered by CITIBANK
CHECK with No. 1000001161 dated October 21, 2010 payable to the order of LEANDRO V.
LEGASPI and UNDERTAKES to RETURN the entire amount to respondent PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE
CARRIERS, INC. in the event that the Petition for Certiorari is granted without prejudice to
complainants right to appeal. Such undertaking shall be ENFORCEABLE by mere motion before
this Honorable office without need of separate action.5 [Emphasis and underscoring supplied]
On November 8, 2010, petitioner timely filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.6
In the meantime, on March 2, 2011, the LA issued a writ of execution which noted petitioners
payment of the amount of US$81,320.00. On March 16, 2011, in compliance with the said writ,
petitioner tendered to the NLRC Cashier the additional amounts of US$8,132.00 as attorneys
fees and P3,042.95 as execution fee. In its Order, dated March 31, 2011, the LA ordered the
release of the aforementioned amounts to respondent.
The CAs Ruling
Unaware of a) the September 5, 2010 entry of judgment of the NLRC, b) the October 22, 2010
payment of US$81,320.00, and c) the writ of execution issued by the LA, the CA rendered its
Decision, dated June 29, 2011. The CA partially granted the petition for certiorari and modified
the assailed resolutions of the NLRC, awarding only US$60,000.00 pursuant to the CBA between
Celebrity Cruise Lines and Federazione Italianaa Transporti CISL.
Petitioner then filed its Manifestation with Motion to Amend the Dispositive Portion, submitting to
the CA the writ of execution issued by the LA in support of its motion. Petitioner contended that
since it had already paid the total amount of US$89,452.00, it was entitled to the return of the
excess payment in the amount of US$29,452.00.

30

In its assailed January 5, 2012 Resolution, the CA denied the motion and ruled that the petition
should have been dismissed for being moot and academic not only because the assailed decision
of the NLRC had become final and executory on September 5, 2010, but also because the said
judgment had been satisfied on October 22, 2010, even before the filing of the petition for
certiorari on November 8, 2010. In so ruling, the CA cited the pronouncement in Career
Philippines Ship Management v. Geronimo Madjus7 where it was stated that the satisfaction of
the monetary award rendered the petition for certiorari moot.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in its assailed July 20,
2012 Resolution.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES
I. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN
RULING THAT PETITIONER IS ESTOPPED IN COLLECTING THE EXCESS PAYMENT IT MADE TO THE
RESPONDENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE RECEIPT OF JUDGMENT AWARD SIGNED BY THE
RESPONDENT
II. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR IN INVOKING
THE RULING OF CAREER V. MADJUS
Petitioner argues that it clearly filed its petition for certiorari within the 60-day reglementary
period and, thus, the NLRC resolutions could not have attained finality. Citing Delima v. Gois,8
petitioner avers that the NLRC cannot declare that a decision has become final and executory
because the period to file the petition has not yet expired. Petitioner, thus, contends that the
finality of the NLRC judgment did not render the petition moot and academic because such is null
and void ab initio.
Petitioner also argues that the Receipt of the Judgment Award with Undertaking, which was never
refuted by respondent, clearly stated that the payment of the judgment award was without
prejudice to its right to file a petition for certiorari with the CA. Petitioner asserts that the case
relied upon by the CA, Career Philippines, is not applicable as it is not on all fours with this case.
Instead, it asserts that the applicable case should be Leonis Navigation Co., Inc. v. Villamater,9
where it was held that the satisfaction of the monetary award by the employer does not render
the petition for certiorari moot before the CA.
On the other hand, respondent reiterates the CA ruling, asserting that the voluntary satisfaction
by petitioner of the full judgment award rendered the case moot, and insists that it was a clear
indication that it had already been persuaded by the judiciousness and merits of the award for
disability compensation. He also avers that this petition is merely pro-forma as it is a reiteration
of petitioners previous issues and arguments already resolved by the CA.
The Courts Ruling
Petition for Certiorari, Not Moot
Section 14, Rule VII of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure provides that decisions, resolutions or
orders of the NLRC shall become final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt
31

thereof by the parties, and entry of judgment shall be made upon the expiration of the said
period.10 In St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC,11 however, it was ruled that judicial review of
decisions of the NLRC may be sought via a petition for certiorari before the CA under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court; and under Section 4 thereof, petitioners are allowed sixty (60) days from
notice of the assailed order or resolution within which to file the petition. Hence, in cases where a
petition for certiorari is filed after the expiration of the 10-day period under the 2011 NLRC Rules
of Procedure but within the 60-day period under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the CA can grant
the petition and modify, nullify and reverse a decision or resolution of the NLRC.
Accordingly, in this case, although the petition for certiorari was not filed within the 10-day
period, petitioner timely filed it before the CA within the 60-day reglementary period under Rule
65. It has, thus, been held that the CAs review of the decisions or resolutions of the NLRC under
Rule 65, particularly those which have already been executed, does not affect their statutory
finality, considering that Section 4,12 Rule XI of the 2011 NLRC Rules of Procedure, provides that
a petition for certiorari filed with the CA shall not stay the execution of the assailed decision
unless a restraining order is issued. In Leonis Navigation, it was further written:
The CA, therefore, could grant the petition for certiorari if it finds that the NLRC, in its assailed
decision or resolution, committed grave abuse of discretion by capriciously, whimsically, or
arbitrarily disregarding evidence that is material to or decisive of the controversy; and it cannot
make this determination without looking into the evidence of the parties. Necessarily, the
appellate court can only evaluate the materiality or significance of the evidence, which is alleged
to have been capriciously, whimsically, or arbitrarily disregarded by the NLRC, in relation to all
other evidence on record.13 Notably, if the CA grants the petition and nullifies the decision or
resolution of the NLRC on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction, the decision or resolution of the NLRC is, in contemplation of law, null and void ab
initio; hence, the decision or resolution never became final and executory.14
Career Philippines not applicable
In Career Philippines, believing that the execution of the LA Decision was imminent after its
petition for injunctive relief was denied, the employer filed before the LA a pleading embodying a
conditional satisfaction of judgment before the CA and, accordingly, paid the employee the
monetary award in the LA decision. In the said pleading, the employer stated that the conditional
satisfaction of the judgment award was without prejudice to its pending appeal before the CA
and that it was being made only to prevent the imminent execution.15
The CA later dismissed the employers petition for being moot and academic, noting that the
decision of the LA had attained finality with the satisfaction of the judgment award. This Court
affirmed the ruling of the CA, interpreting the "conditional settlement" to be tantamount to an
amicable settlement of the case resulting in the mootness of the petition for certiorari,
considering (i) that the employee could no longer pursue other claims,16 and (ii) that the
employer could not have been compelled to immediately pay because it had filed an appeal
bond to ensure payment to the employee.
Stated differently, the Court ruled against the employer because the conditional satisfaction of
judgment signed by the parties was highly prejudicial to the employee. The agreement stated
that the payment of the monetary award was without prejudice to the right of the employer to
32

file a petition for certiorari and appeal, while the employee agreed that she would no longer file
any complaint or prosecute any suit of action against the employer after receiving the payment.
In contrast, in Leonis Navigation, after the NLRC resolution awarding disability benefits became
final and executory, the employer paid the monetary award to the employee. The CA dismissed
the employers petition for certiorari, ruling that the final and executory decisions or resolutions
of the NLRC rendered appeals to superior courts moot and academic. This Court disagreed with
the CA and held that final and executed decisions of the NLRC did not prevent the CA from
reviewing the same under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was further ruled that the employee
was estopped from claiming that the case was closed and terminated, considering that the
employees Acknowledgment Receipt stated that such was without prejudice to the final outcome
of the petition for certiorari pending before the CA.
In the present case, the Receipt of the Judgment Award with Undertaking was fair to both the
employer and the employee. As in Leonis Navigation, the said agreement stipulated that
respondent should return the amount to petitioner if the petition for certiorari would be granted
but without prejudice to respondents right to appeal. The agreement, thus, provided available
remedies to both parties.
It is clear that petitioner paid respondent subject to the terms and conditions stated in the
Receipt of the Judgment Award with Undertaking.17 Both parties signed the agreement.
Respondent neither refuted the agreement nor claimed that he was forced to sign it against his
will.
Therefore, the petition for certiorari was not rendered moot despite petitioners satisfaction of
the judgment award, as the respondent had obliged himself to return the payment if the petition
would be granted.
Return of Excess Payment
As the agreement was voluntarily entered into and represented a reasonable settlement, it is
binding on the parties and may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind.18
Respondent agreed to the stipulation that he would return the amount paid to him in the event
that the petition for certiorari would be granted. Since the petition was indeed granted by the CA,
albeit partially, respondent must comply with the condition to return the excess amount.
The Court finds that the Receipt of the Judgment Award with Undertaking was a fair and binding
agreement. It was executed by the parties subject to outcome of the petition. To allow now
respondent to retain the excess money judgment would amount to his unjust enrichment to the
prejudice of petitioner.
Unjust enrichment is a term used to depict result or effect of failure to make remuneration of or
for property or benefits received under circumstances that give rise to legal or equitable
obligation to account for them. To be entitled to remuneration, one must confer benefit by
mistake, fraud, coercion, or request. Unjust enrichment is not itself a theory of reconveyance.
Rather, it is a prerequisite for the enforcement of the doctrine of restitution.19 There is unjust
enrichment when:
1. A person is unjustly benefited; and
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2. Such benefit is derived at the expense of or with damages to another.20

In the case at bench, petitioner paid respondent US$81,320.00 in the pre-execution conference
plus attorneys fees of US$8,132.00 pursuant to the writ of execution. The June 29, 2011 CA
Decision, however, modified the final resolution of the NLRC and awarded only US$60,000.00 to
respondent.1wphi1 If allowed to return the excess, the respondent would have been unjustly
benefited to the prejudice and expense of petitioner.
Petitioner's claim of excess payment is further buttressed by, and in line with, Section 14, Rule XI
of the 20 II NLRC Rules of Procedure which provides:
EFFECT OF REVERSAL OF EXECUTED JUDGMENT. Where the executed judgment is totally or
partially reversed or annulled by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, the Labor Arbiter
shall, on motion, issue such orders of restitution of the executed award, except wages paid
during reinstatement pending appeal. [Emphases supplied]
Although the Court has, more often than not, been inclined towards the plight of the workers and
has upheld their cause in their conflicts with the employers, such inclination has not blinded it to
the rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to be dispensed in the light of the
established facts and applicable law and doctrine.21
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions, dated January 5, 2012
and July 20, 2012, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Leandro Legaspi is
ORDERED to return the excess amount of payment in the sum of
US$29,452.00 to petitioner Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. The amount shall earn interest at
the rate of 12o/o per annum from the finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.

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