CASES FOR QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER

1. Cardidad De SyQuia vs Board of Power and Water Works (formerly Public Service
Commission), Rafael Ruiz, Peter Enriquez and Cyril Moses
November 29, 1976
Facts:
- December 1974, private respondents filed three separate complaints with the Board
charging petitioner as administrator of the South Syquia Apartment with the offense of
selling electricity without a permit or franchise issued by respondent board.
- Petitioner maintains that there was a contractual obligation of the tenants and that this
was beyond the boards jurisdiction.
- Petitioner says that she is not engaged in the sale of electric power but merely passes to
the apartment tenants as the end-users their legitimate current bills in accordance with
their lease contracts.
- The main complaints of the private respondents relate to the payment of the electricity for
the common areas which the petitioner advances and then reimburses from the tenants
pro rata.
- Board decided that private respondents should not be responsible to pay for the common
areas electricity, hence the current petition questioning the jurisdiction of the board to
decide on such matters.
Issue: Whether the board lacks jurisdiction.
Held: Yes, the board does not have any jurisdiction on the matter.
- The respondent board being a mere regulatory board exceeded its jurisdiction in taking
cognizance and adjudicating the complaints filed. (Powers of the board were vested by the
Public Service Act)
- The matter raised being purely civil, should be adjudged by the applicable provisions of
the Civil Code and not the Public Service Act, and adjudged by the regular courts.
- The board acquired no jurisdiction over the petitioners contractual relations with the
respondents since he is not engaged in a public service nor in the sale of electricity
without permit or franchise.
Take note, the court only said the said board had no jurisdiction to act on the issue
given to the board as the matter was purely civil in manner.
2. Globe Wireless LTD vs Public Service Comission and Antonio Arnaiz
January 21, 1987
Facts:
- Globe Wireless LTD challenged in this petition for the jurisdiction of the defunct Public
Service Commission to discipline and impose a fine upon the petitioner, a duly-organized
Philippine corporation engaged in international telecommunication business.
- A message between Maria Diaz and Arnaiz was mislaid which resulted to non-delivery of
the message. Arnaiz then complained to the Public Service Commissioner.
- PSC then, after a hearing, fined Globe.
- Hence this petition questioning the jurisdiction of the PSC.
Issue: Whether PSC has jurisdiction in the matter.
Held: No, PSC does not have jurisdiction in the matter
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Public Service Act, bested the jurisdiction, supervision and control over all public services
and their franchises, equipment and other properties.
However, section 5 of RA 4630 (legislative franchise under which petitioner was operating)
limited respondent Commissions jurisdiction over only the rate which petitioner may
charge the public.
Sec. 5. The Public Service Commission is hereby given jurisdiction over the grantee only
with respect to the rates which the grantee may charge the public subject to international
commitments made or adhered to by the Republic of the Philippines.
The act complained of had nothing to do with the rate that the petitioner was charging.
Commission was also empowered to impose an administrative fine in cases of violation of
or failure by a Public Service to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or
ay order, decisions of the Commission, in this case, the petitioner operated under a
legislative franchise thus no certificate was violated.

3. Philippine Lawyers Association vs Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of

the Philippines Patent office
Febuary 16, 1959
Facts:
- This is a petition for prohibition and injunction against Agrava.
- Agrava as the director of the Philippines Patent Office issued a circular that he had
scheduled an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as
patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent Office.
- Petitioners say that the circular was in excess of Agravas jurisdiction and is in violation of
the law as he cannot impose another condition precedent for the lawyers to practice
before the Patent Office.
Issue: Does the Director have the power and the jurisdiction to compel the lawyers to
take a test before being allowed to practice before the Patent office.
Held: No, the Director acted beyond his powers.
- Part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that
appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.
- The Supreme Court has exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to
the practice of law in the Philippines.
- Any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing, may practice law anywhere and before
any entity in the Philippines.
- Director is not expressly authorized by law to require persons desiring to practice or to do
business before him to submit to an examination, even if they are already members of the
bar.
- Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to
prescribe forms and make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to
secure the harmonious and efficient administration of his branch of the service and to
carry into full effect the laws relating to matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau. This
does not allow the chief bureau to impose additional requirements to practice in front of
them.
- Allowing the patent office to impose additional constraints to lawyers, would pave the way
for other offices to do the same.
4. Jose Guevara vs. Comelec
July 31, 1958
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Facts:
- Petitioner was ordered by the Comelec to show cause why he should not be published for
contempt for having published in the Sunday Times an article entitled Ballot Boxes
Contract Hit. (Concerning the awarding of a contract for the manufacture of bollet boxes)
- The article was said to have influenced the Commission and its members in the
adjudication of a controversy then pending investigation and determination before the
body.
- Petitioner in his answer said that the Commission has no jurisdiction to punish him and
granted that it had to power to punish him in contempt, the same cannot applied to the
instant case, where the Commission is exercising a purely administrative function of
purchasing ballot boxes.
- Hence the case was elevated to the SC, in view of the issue raised.
Issue: Whether the Commission has the jurisdiction to investigate and punish the
petitioner for contempt in connection with the alleged publication.
Held: No, the Commission does not have to power to do so.
- Constitution defines the powers of Comelec as follows: "shall have exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections and shall
exercise all other functions which may be conferred upon it by law. It shall decide, save
those involving the right to vote, all administrative questions, affecting elections, including
the determination of the number and location of polling places, and the appointment of
election inspectors and of other election officials"
- Comelec has the power to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of
elections and any controversy submitted to it in connection with elections.
- The purchasing and preparation of the necessary ballot boxes to be used in the elections Is
only a ministerial duty of the Commission.
- In proceeding with the controversy between several dealers, the Comelec only discharged
a ministerial duty and did not exercise and judicial function.
- "The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders
and mandates of courts, and, consequently, in the administration of justice"
5. Ang Tibay and National Workers Brotherhood vs. The Court of Industrial Relations
and National Labor Union Inc.
February 27, 1940
Facts:
- Teodoro owns Ang Tibay which supplied leather soles to the army.
- Teodoro claims that a shortage of leather soles made it necessary for him to temporarily
lay off the members of the NLU
- CIR then decided on the case which was subsequently reached the SC but a new motion
for a new trial was raised by the NLU saying Teodoros claims were false and unsupported.
- Ang Tibay opposes the motion for a new trial.
Issue: What is the nature of the powers of the CIR and the guiding principles which
should be observed in the trial of cases brought before it and whether there should
be a new trial.
Held: There should be a new trial and the powers of the CIR are explained below.
- The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated
in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103).
It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation.
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Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is
invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the
function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law,
is more active, affirmative and dynamic.
CIR exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between
employers and employees.
It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle
any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers
and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them.
CIR is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to
"act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and
shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such
manner as it may deem just and equitable.
These are the rights which must be followed:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones cause and
submit evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue
involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.
NLU should be given a chance to receive all evidence which may be relevant to the case.

6. Magcamit vs. Internal Affairs Service-Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency as

represented by Remeo Enriquez and Director General Dionisio Santiago
January 25, 2016
Facts:
- A letter addressed to Director Santiago by a certain Delfin gave information about an
alleged extortion done to his mother by Magcamit and other PDEA agents.
- The PDEA agents denied this allegation.
- Magcamit and his co-agents were charged with Grave Misconduct for demanding P200,000
from Luciana Jaen in exchange for her release in a buy-bust operation.
- Special Investigator V Enriquez found Magcamit and the others liable for grave misconduct
and recommended that they be dismissed from the civil service.
- They were dismissed.
- Magcamit cite several procedural lapses and say that the decision was not supported by
the evidence on record.
- CSC denied Magcamits appeal.
- CA also denied his petition for review.
- Hence this case at the SC.
Issue: Whether Magcamits dismissal was supported by the evidence.
Held: No, Magcamits dismissal was not supported by substantial evidence.
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Administrative determinations of contested cases are by their nature quasi-judicial there is

no requirement for strict adherence to technical rules that are observed in truly judicial
proceedings.
Technical rules of procedure and evidence are relaxed in administrative proceedings.
Rules stated in Ang Tibay v. CIR are again reiterated by the court.
The letters as well as some of the affidavits were never shown to Magcamit.
The way the evidence against him came out, in which he could not properly dispute the
allegations against him as he was not properly appraised of all the evidence against him
blindsided him.
The requirement that the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented
at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected was not complied with.
Magcamit was dismissed from the service based on evidence that had not been disclosed
to him.

7. Secretary of Justice vs Hon. Lantion and Mark Jimenez

January 18, 2000
Facts:
- An extradition request was given to the Philippines by the US for Mark Jimenez.
- Mark Jimenez asked to be given a copy or access to the request of the US but was denied
stating secrecy between US and the Philippines.
- Mark Jimenez then filed with the RTC of NCR to compel the Secretary of Justice, Foreign
affairs and Director of NBI to compel them to furnish the documents to him.
- The mandamus was granted.
- Secretary of Justice then initiated the proceedings with the court.
Issue: Is Mark Jimenez entitled to the two basic rights of notice and hearing during
the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings.
Held: Yes, Secretary of Justice ordered to furnish the copies of the request to Mark
Jimenez.
- During the evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings the nature of the role of the
DOJ is to file the extradition petition after the request has been forwarded by the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs.
- It is the Sec. of Foreign Affairs who is authorized to evaluate the extradition papers.
- In this case, the DOJ took it upon itself to determine the completeness of the documents
and to evaluate the same.
- The evaluation is sui generis wherein it is not a criminal investigation but also erroneous to
say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions.
- At this stage, the executive authority has the power to (a) to make a technical assessment
of the completeness and sufficiency of the extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the
request if on its face and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes indicated are
not extraditable; and (c) to make a determination whether or not the request is politically
motivated, or that the offense is a military one which is not punishable under non-military
penal legislation.
- The evaluation process is a proceeding conducted in the exercise of an
administrative bodys quasi-judicial power.
- Quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of evidence; (b) determining
facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision
supported by the facts proved
- The evaluation process is akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative
proceeding, the consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical
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assessment sets off or commences the procedure for, and ultimately, the deprivation of
liberty of a prospective extraditee.
The notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be dispensed
with.
When the individual himself is involved in official government action because such action
has a direct bearing on his life, he has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.

JUDICIAL REVIEW CASES

1. SPOUSES ABEJO V. HON. DELA CRUZ (Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction)
NO. L-63558. MAY 19, 1987
TEEHANKEE, C.J.;
FACTS:
-This case involve the question of who, between the Regional Trial Court and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the dispute between the
principal stockholders of the corporation Pocket Bell Philippines, Inc. (Pocket Bell), a "tone and
voice paging corporation.
-Namely, the spouses Jose Abejo and Aurora Abejo (hereinafter referred to as the Abejos) and the
purchaser, Telectronic Systems, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Telectronics) of their 133,000
minority shareholdings (for P5 million) and of 63 ,000 shares registered in the name of Virginia
Braga and covered by five stock certificates endorsed in blank by her (for P1,674,450.00), OR the
spouses Agapito Braga and Virginia Braga (hereinafter referred to as the Bragas), erstwhile
majority stockholders.
-With the said purchases, Telectronics would become the majority stockholder, holding 56% of
the outstanding stock and voting power of the corporation Pocket Bell.
-With the said purchases in 1982, Telectronics requested the corporate secretary of the
corporation, Norberto Braga, to register and transfer to its name, and those of its nominees the
total 196,000 Pocket Bell shares in the corporation's transfer book, cancel the surrendered
certificates of stock and issue the corresponding new certificates of stock in its name and those
of its nominees.
-Norberto Braga, the corporate secretary and son of the Bragas, refused to register the aforesaid
transfer of shares in the corporate books, asserting that the Bragas claim preemptive rights over
the 133,000 Abejo shares and that Virginia Braga never transferred her 63,000 shares to
Telectronics but had lost the five stock certificates representing those shares.
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-The Bragas assert that the regular civil court has original and exclusive jurisdiction as against
the Securities and Exchange Commission, while the Abejos claim the contrary.
ISSUE: Who has jurisdiction over the matter?
HELD:
-Disputes involving controversies between and among stockholders fall within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC under Section 5 of PD 902-A.The very
complaint of the Bragas for annulment of the sales and transfers as filed by them in the regular
court questions the validity of the transfer and endorsement of the certificates of stock, claiming
alleged pre-emptive rights in the case of the Abejos' shares and alleged loss of the certificates
and lack of consent and consideration in the case of Virginia Braga's shares.
-Such dispute clearly involves controversies "between and among stockholders/' as to the Abejos'
right to sell and dispose of their shares to Telectronics, the validity of the latter's acquisition of
Virginia Braga's shares, who between the Bragas and the Abejos' transferee should be
recognized as the controlling shareholders of the corporation, with the right to elect the
corporate officers and the management and control of its operations.
-Such a dispute and case clearly fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the SEC to decide, under Section 5 of P.D. 902-A, above-quoted.
-The restraining order issued by the Regional Trial Court restraining Telectronics agents and
representatives from enforcing their resolution constituting themselves as the new set of officers
of Pocket Bell and from assuming control of the corporation and discharging their functions
patently encroached upon the SEC's exclusive jurisdiction over such specialized corporate
controversies calling for its special competence.
-As stressed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the SEC, the Court has held that "Nowhere does
the law [PD 902-A] empower any Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] to interfere
with the orders of the Commission," and consequently "any ruling by the trial court on the issue
of ownership of the shares of stock is not binding on the Commission" for want of jurisdiction.
-Filing of action for rescission and annulment of sale of stocks before the Regional
Trial Court will in no way deprive the SEC of its primary and exclusive jurisdiction to
grant or not the writ of mandamus ordering the registration of shares so transferred.
The claims of the Bragas, which they assert in their complaint in the Regional Trial Court,
praying for rescission and annulment of the sale made by the Abejos in favor of Telectronics on
the ground that they had an alleged perfected pre-emptive right over the Abejos' shares as well
as for annulment of sale to Telectronics of Virginia Braga's shares covered by street certificates
duly endorsed by her in blank, may in no way deprive the SEC of its primary and exclusive
jurisdiction to grant or not the writ of mandamus ordering the registration of the shares so
transferred.
-The Bragas' contention that the question of ordering the recording of the transfers ultimately
hinges on the question of ownership or right thereto over the shares notwithstanding, the
jurisdiction over the dispute is clearly vested in the SEC.
2. BERNARDO V. ABALOS (Administrative Exhaustion)
G.R. No. 137266. December 5, 2001
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,J.:
FACTS:
-This is a petition for certiorari seeking the nullification of Resolution No. 98-3208 of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc promulgated on December 1, 1998 dismissing the
complaint for vote buying filed by petitioners against respondents.
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-On April 21, 1998, petitioners Antonio M. Bernardo, Ernesto A. Domingo, Jr. and Jesus C. Cruz
filed with the COMELEC a criminal complaint against respondents Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr.,
Benjamin C. Abalos, Jr., Dr. Eden C. Diaz, Romeo Zapanta and Arcadio de Vera for vote buying in
violation of Section 261, paragraphs (a), (b) and (j) of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), in
relation to Section 28 of Republic Act 6646 and Section 68 of the OEC. The complaint, docketed
as E.O. Case No. 98-110,2 alleged that:
-On April 14, 1998 (Tuesday), respondent Mandaluyong City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr., and
his son respondent Benjamin Benhur C. Abalos, Jr., candidate for City Mayor of the same city in
the May 11, 1998 elections, conspiring with respondents Dr. Eden C. Diaz, Schools Division
Superintendent, Romeo F. Zapanta, Assistant Schools Division Superintendent, and Arcadio de
Vera, President, Mandaluyong Federation of Public School Teachers, sponsored, arranged and
conducted an all-expense-free transportation, food and drinks affair for the Mandaluyong City
public school teachers, registered voters of said city, at the Tayabas Bay Beach Resort, Sariaya,
Quezon Province.
-During the whole-day affair, the background music loudly and repeatedly played over the sound
system was the political jingle advertisement of Mandaluyong City candidate for Mayor, Benjamin
Benhur Abalos, Jr., sang to the tune of the song SHA LALA LALA. Some of the participants
wore T-shirts with the name of candidate Benhur Abalos, Jr., printed in oversized colored
letters.
-Mayor Benjamin Abalos, Sr. delivered a speech wherein he offered and promised the
Mandaluyong City public school teachers and employees a hazard pay of P1,000.00, and
increasing their allowances from P1,500.00 to P2,000.00 for food, or with a total of P3,000.00
which they will get by the end of the month.
-The offers and promises to said public school teachers, who are members of the Board of
Election Inspectors of Mandaluyong City and registered voters thereat, were made a few weeks
before the election to induce or unduly influence the said teachers and the public in general (the
other guests) to vote for the candidacy of Benjamin Benhur Abalos, Jr..
-The offers and promises of Mayor Abalos, Sr., and the enthusiastic acceptance of said monetary
increase of allowances by the public school teachers and employees of Mandaluyong City, is a
violation of Section 261 pars. (a), (b) and (j) of the Omnibus Election Code against vote-buying
and vote-selling.3
-The Director4 of the Law Department of the COMELEC conducted a preliminary investigation. All
the private respondents filed separate counter-affidavits 5 with prayer to dismiss the complaint.
-On November 26, 1998, the Director of the Law Department submitted his findings to the
COMELEC En Banc recommending that the complaint be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
-On December 1, 1998, the COMELEC En Banc issued the assailed Resolution No. 9832086 dismissing the complaint for insufficiency of evidence to establish a prima facie case,
Considering that this complaint, being criminal in nature, must have all its allegations supported
by direct, strong, convincing and indubitable evidence; and that the submitted evidence of the
complainant are mere self-serving statements and uncorroborated audio and visual recordings
and a photograph; and considering further that the evidence of the respondents have more
probative value and believable than the evidence of said complainants; and that the burden of
proof lies with the complainants and not with the respondents. 7

-On February 09, 1999, petitioners, without first submitting a motion for reconsideration, filed the
instant petition with this Court. They alleged therein that the COMELEC En Banc, in issuing
Resolution No. 98-3208 dated December 1, 1998, acted with apparent grave abuse of
discretion.8
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the said
resolution.
HELD:
-Petitioners did not exhaust all the remedies available to them at the COMELEC level. Specifically,
they did not seek a reconsideration of the assailed COMELEC En Banc Resolution as required by
Section 1, Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, thus:
Section 1. What Pleadings are not Allowed.The following pleadings are not allowed:
xxx
d) motion for reconsideration of an en banc ruling, resolution, order or decision except in
election offense cases;
In its assailed Resolution, the COMELEC cited a valid reason for dismissing petitioners complaint
against private respondents for vote buying. The COMELEC found that the evidence of the
respondents have more probative value and believable than the evidence of the complainants;
and that the evidence submitted by petitioners are mere self-serving statements and
uncorroborated audio and visual recording and a photograph.
-If the error is immediately corrected by way of a motion for reconsideration, then it is
the most expeditious and inexpensive recourse, but if the COMELEC refuses to correct
a patently erroneous act, then it commits a grave abuse of discretion justifying a
recourse by the aggrieved party to a petition for certiorari.Contrary to petitioners
statement that a resort to a motion for reconsideration is dilatory, it bears stressing that the
purpose of the said motion is to give the COMELEC an opportunity to correct the error imputed to
it. If the error is immediately corrected by way of a motion for reconsideration, then it is the most
expeditious and inexpensive recourse. But if the COMELEC refuses to correct a patently
erroneous act, then it commits a grave abuse of discretion justifying a recourse by the aggrieved
party to a petition for certiorari.
-Having failed to file the required motion for reconsideration of the challenged
Resolution, the petitioners instant petition for certiorari is certainly premature.A
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, can only
be resorted to if there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,and adequate remedy in theordinary
course of law. Having failed to file the required motion for reconsideration of the challenged
Resolution, petitioners instant petition is certainly premature. Significantly, they have not raised
any plausible reason for their direct recourse to this Court.
3. INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES V. CA (Primary Jurisdiction)
G.R. No. 88550. April 18, 1990
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
FACTS:
-This petition seeks the review and reversal of the Decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 12660, which ruled adversely against petitioner herein.
-Petitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the
Government through the Bureau of Energy Development (BED) for the exploration of two coal
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blocks in Eastern Samar. Subsequently, IEI also applied with the then Ministry of Energy for
another coal operating contract for the exploration of three additional coal blocks which,
together with the original two blocks, comprised the so-called Giporlos Area.
-IEI was later on advised that in line with the objective of rationalizing the countrys over-all coal
supply-demand balance x x x the logical coal operator in the area should be the Marinduque
Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC), which was already developing the coal deposit in
another area (Bagacay Area) and that the Bagacay and Giporlos Areas should be awarded to
MMIC (Rollo, p. 37). Thus, IEI and MMIC executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby IEI
assigned and transferred to MMIC all its rights and interests in the two coal blocks which are the
subject of IEIs coal operating contract.
-Subsequently, however, IEI filed an action for rescission of the Memorandum of Agreement with
damages against MMIC and the then Minister of Energy Geronimo Velasco before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 150,2 alleging that MMIC took possession of the subject coal blocks
even before the Memorandum of Agreement was finalized and approved by the BED; that MMIC
discontinued work thereon; that MMIC failed to apply for a coal operating contract for the
adjacent coal blocks; and that MMIC failed and refused to pay the reimbursements agreed upon
and to assume IEIs loan obligation as provided in the Memorandum of Agreement (Rollo, p. 38).
IEI also prayed that the Energy Minister be ordered to approve the return of the coal operating
contract from MMIC to petitioner, with a written confirmation that said contract is valid and
effective, and, in due course, to convert said contract from an exploration agreement to a
development/production or exploitation contract in IEIs favor.
-Strangely enough, Mr. Jesus S. Cabarrus is the President of both IEI and MMIC.
-In a summary judgment, the Trial Court ordered the rescission of the Memorandum of
Agreement, declared the continued efficacy of the coal operating contract in favor of IEI; ordered
the reversion of the two coal blocks covered by the coal operating contract; ordered BED to issue
its written affirmation of the coal operating contract and to expeditiously cause the conversion
thereof from exploration to development in favor of IEI; directed BED to give due course to IEIs
application for a coal operating contract; directed BED to give due course to IEIs application for
three more coal blocks; and ordered the payment of damages and rehabilitation expenses (Rollo,
pp. 9-10).
-In reversing the Trial Court, the Court of Appeals held that the rendition of the summary
judgment was not proper since there were genuine issues in controversy between the parties,
and more importantly, that the Trial Court had no jurisdiction over the action considering that,
under Presidential Decree No. 1206, it is the BED that has the power to decide controversies
relative to the exploration, exploitation and development of coal blocks (Rollo, pp. 43-44).
-Incidentally, the records disclose that during the pendency of the appeal before the Appellate
Court, the suit against the then Minister of Energy was dismissed and that, in the meantime, IEI
had applied with the BED for the development of certain coal blocks.
ISSUE:
-Whether or not civil court has jurisdiction to hear and decide the suit for rescission of the
Memorandum of Agreement concerning a coal operating contract over coal blocks.
-Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that it is the Bureau of Energy
Development (BED) which has jurisdiction over said action and not the civil court.
HELD:
Administrative Law; Contracts; Rescission of Contracts; Jurisdiction; Continued
efficacy of the coal-operating contract and giving due course to application for coal
blocks are matters within the domain of Bureau of Energy Development.While the
10

action filed by IEI sought the rescission of what appears to be an ordinary civil contract
cognizable by a civil court, the fact is that the Memorandum of Agreement sought to be
rescinded is derived from a coal-operating contract and is inextricably tied up with the right to
develop coal-bearing lands and the determination of whether or not the reversion of the coal
operating contract over the subject coal blocks to IEI would be in line with the integrated national
program for coal-development and with the objective of rationalizing the countrys over-all coalsupply-demand balance. IEIs cause of action was not merely the rescission of a contract but the
reversion or return to it of the operation of the coal blocks. Thus it was that in its Decision
ordering the rescission of the Agreement, the Trial Court, inter alia, declared the continued
efficacy of the coal-operating contract in IEIs favor and directed the BED to give due course to
IEIs application for three (3) more coal blocks. These are matters properly falling within the
domain of the BED.
-Bureau of Energy Development, Functions of.For the BED, as the successor to the Energy
Development Board (abolished by Sec. 11, P.D. No. 1206, dated 6 October 1977) is tasked with
the function of establishing a comprehensive and integrated national program for the
exploration, exploitation, and development and extraction of fossil fuels, such as the countrys
coal resources; adopting a coal development program; regulating all activities relative thereto;
and undertaking by itself or through service contracts such exploitation and development, all in
the interest of an effective and coordinated development of extracted resources.
-Powers and Functions of Energy Development Board, transferred to Bureau of Energy
Development.That law further provides that the powers and functions of the defunct Energy
Development Board relative to the implementation of P.D. No. 972 on coal exploration and
development have been transferred to the BED, provided that coal operating contracts including
the transfer or assignment of interest in said contracts, shall require the approval of the
Secretary (Minister) of Energy (Sec. 12, P.D. No. 1206).
-Doctrine of primary jurisdiction.In recent years, it has been the jurisprudential trend to
apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many cases involving matters that demand the
special competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to
take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial in
character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized
skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate
questions of fact are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding
before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper
jurisdiction of a court. This is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. It applies where a claim is
originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play whenever enforcement of the claim
requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the
special competence of an administrative body; in such case the judicial process is suspended
pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view (United States v. Western
Pacific Railroad Co., 352 U.S. 59, italics supplied).
-Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question of
what coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal
operating contracts over said areas involves a technical determination by the BED as the
administrative agency in possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter. The Trial
Court does not have the competence to decide matters concerning activities relative to the
exploration, exploitation, development and extraction of mineral resources like coal. These issues
preclude an initial judicial determination. It behooves the courts to stand aside even when
apparently they have statutory power to proceed in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of an
administrative agency.

11

-One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of

contracts and the determination of private rights thereunder is no longer a uniquely judicial
function, exercisable only by our regular courts (Antipolo Realty Corp. vs. National Housing
Authority,153 SCRA 399, at 407).
-The application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, does not call for the dismissal of
the case below. It need only be suspended until after the matters within the competence of the
BED are threshed out and determined. Thereby, the principal purpose behind the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction is salutarily served.
-Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to an administrative agency
are secured, and the limited function of review by the judiciary are more rationally exercised, by
preliminary resort, for ascertaining and interpreting the circumstances underlying legal issues, to
agencies that are better equipped than courts by specialization, by insight gained through
experience, and by more flexible procedure (Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S.
570).
4. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
(Primary Jurisdiction)
G.R. No. 87146. December 11, 1991
MEDIALDEA, J.:
FACTS:
-This petition for certiorari assails Resolution No. 89031 dated January 17, 1989, of the Civil
Service Commission (CSC) denying the appeal of the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) from the order of the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board) dated September 2, 1988.
-As far as the service record of private respondent Salazar filed with the CSCNational Capital
Region (NCR) revealed, she was employed by GSIS as a casual laborer on September 23, 1968.
She became a permanent employee in the same office on February 28, 1974 with a designation
of stenographer. Thereafter, she was promoted to Confidential Technical Assistant Aide also
under permanent status on December 9, 1975 (p. 37,Rollo).
-Salazars GSIS Service Record however, revealed that also on December 9, 1975, she was
appointed to the position of Confidential Executive Assistant in the office of then GSIS President
and General Manager Roman A. Cruz, Jr. on a permanent status. On August 13, 1982, she was
promoted to Technical Assistant III, (p. 58, Rollo), the position she held when on May 16,1986, her
services were terminated by the newly appointed President and General Manager of the GSIS for
the reason that her position, was co-terminous with the term of the appointing authority, Roman
A. Cruz, Jr.
-Salazar filed a petition for reconsideration with the GSIS Board of Trustees, but reconsideration
was denied. Thereafter, she filed a petition for reconsideration of the denial with the Review
Committee created under Executive Order No. 17, The said Review Committee referred the
petition both to the Merit Systems Promotion Board and the Civil Service Commission, stating
that Salazars removal or separation from office was not by virtue of the general reorganization
program of the government for which the Review Committee was created,
-On July 22, 1987, the Civil Service Commission, issued Resolution No. 87230 directing the
reinstatement of Salazar, the dispositive portion of the decision reads:

12

WHEREFORE, the Commission directs the immediate reinstatement of Ms. Salazar with back
salaries and other benefits due her without prejudice to the final determination of the position, if
any, to which she may have been subsequently appointed.
x x x. (p. 38, Rollo)
GSIS, through the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration
dated September 14, 1987 (pp. 3942).
-On the other hand, the Board, acting on the same petition of Salazar referred to it by the Review
Committee, issued an Order on March 9, 1988, finding the petition of Salazar for reinstatement,
without merit and affirmed her termination. The dispositive portion of the decision is quoted as
follows:
This Board agrees with the contention of the GSIS President and General Manager that the
petitioner was not dismissed but that her employment ended with the termination of office of the
previous GSIS President, since her position as Technical Assistant III is confidential in nature,
hence, belongs to the non-career service. x x x.
x x x.
WHEREFORE, the Board finds the petition without merit. The termination of Ms. Ma. Asuncion
S. Salazar as Technical Assistant III is hereby affirmed.
SO ORDERED." (pp. 4546, Rollo)
-On April 20,1988, Salazar filed a motion for reconsideration of the Boards order and manifested
that the Commission already resolved her petition on July 22, 1987. On June 30, 1988, the Board
set aside its previous Order affirming Salazars dismissal in view of the Commissions prior
resolution of the case.
On August 18,1988, GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration of the June 30, 1988 Order of the
Board. On September 2,1988, the Board denied the motion. The pertinent portion of the Order
states:
Records show that the Resolution dated April 22, 1987, of the Review Committee created under
Executive Order No. 17 relative to the petition for reconsideration of the termination of the
services of Ms. Salazar as Technical Assistant III in the GSIS, was forwarded to the Merit Systems
Protection Board.
-In an Order dated March 9,1988, this Board affirmed the termination of the services of Ms.
Salazar. However, in a position paper dated April 20,1988 of Ms. Salazar, this Board was informed
that the same petition had already been resolved by the Civil Service Commission in a Resolution
dated July 22, 1987, directing the GSIS to reinstate her in the service. So, this Board in an Order
dated June 30, 1988, set aside its previous Order dated March 9, 1988.
ISSUE: GSIS filed the instant petition for certiorari, raising the following issues for resolution:
The questions presented in this petition may be summarized into two: (1) which body has
jurisdiction over appeals from decisions of government officers on personnel matters? and (2)
was the position last held by private respondent primarily confidential in nature?
HELD:
-Civil Service; Appeals from decisions of appointing officers involving personnel
action; Jurisdiction.When the law bestows upon a government body the jurisdiction to hear
and decide cases involving specific matters, it is to be presumed that such jurisdiction is
exclusive unless it be proved that another body is likewise vested with the same jurisdiction, in
which case, both bodies have concurrent jurisdiction over the matter. Presidential Decree No.
1409 clearly provides that the Merit Systems Board shall take cognizance of appeals from parties
aggrieved by decisions of appointing officers involving personnel action. The Commission
therefore cannot take original cognizance of the cases specified under Section 5 of P.D. 1409,
except in the case specified under Section 9 (j) of the Civil Service Decree which directly gives it
13

such power, to wit: SECTION 9. Powers and Functions of the Commission. The Commission shall
administer the Civil Service Commission and shall have the following powers and functions: x x
x j) Hear and decide administrative disciplinary cases instituted directly with it in accordance
with Section 37 or brought to it on appeal.
-Same; Same; Same.The Commission, however, is not without power. As the final arbiter on
any matter concerning personnel action in the government, the Commission is empowered by
P.D. 1409, to review the decisions of the Board, as follows: Section 8. Relationship with the Civil
Service Commission.Decisions of the Board involving the removal of officers and employees
from the service shall be subject to automatic review by the Commission. The Commission shall
likewise hear and decide appeals from other decisions of the Board, provided that the decisions
of the Commission shall be subject to review only by the Courts. In the case at bar, We note that
the appeal of Salazar was endorsed by the Review Committee created under Executive Order No.
17 to both the Merit Systems Board and the Civil Service Commission. In the absence of a
decision from the Merit Systems Board, the Commission cannot legally assume jurisdiction over
the appeal.
-Same; Career service;Primarily confidential positions;Nature of position depends
upon nature of functions.Whether the position of Technical Assistant III belongs to the
career service where the incumbent enjoys a security of tenure or primarily confidential where
her tenure is co-terminous with that of the appointing authority or endures only as long as
confidence in her exists (See Pacete vs. Acting Chairman of COA, et al., G.R. No. 39456, 7 May
1990) depends upon the nature of the functions of the office (Borres vs. Court of Appeals,
L36845, August 21, 1987). Not even the fact that the position had already classified as one under
the career service and certified as permanent by the Civil Service Commission, can conceal or
alter a positions being confidential in nature (See Hon. Simplicio Grino, et al. vs. CSC, et al., G.R.
No. 91602, February 26,1991).
5. PAAT V. CA (Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies)
G.R. No. 111107. January 10, 1997
TORRES, JR., J.:
FACTS:
-Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an action
for replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an
administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines?
-Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit
conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government?
-The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989 when the truck of private
respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan,
was seized by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, for brevity)
personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required documents
for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan, the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan, issued on May 23, 1989
an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof fifteen (15) days within which to
submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited. Private respondents, however,
failed to submit the required explanation.
14

-On June 22, 1989,1 the Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained
petitioner of Layugans action of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking
Section 68-A of Presidential Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Private
respondents filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 of the June 22, 1989 order of
Executive Director Baggayan, which was, however, denied in a subsequent order of July 12,
1989.2
-Subsequently, the case was brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to
private respondents statement in their letter dated June 28, 1989 that in case their letter for
reconsideration would be denied then this letter should be considered as an appeal to the
Secretary.3
-Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed as Civil Case 4031, was
filed by the private respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive Director
Baggayan4 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan, 5 which issued a writ ordering the
return of the truck to private respondents. 6 Petitioner Layugan and Executive Director Baggayan
filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court contending, inter alia, that private respondents had
no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
-The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in an order dated December 28, 1989. 7 Their motion
for reconsideration having been likewise denied, a petition for certiorari was filed by the
petitioners with the respondent Court of Appeals which sustained the trial courts order ruling
that the question involved is purely a legal question. 8
-Hence, this present petition,9 with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary
injunction, seeking to reverse the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was filed by the
petitioners on September 9, 1993. By virtue of the Resolution dated September 27, 1993, 10 the
prayer for the issuance of temporary restraining order of petitioners was granted by this Court.
-Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners aver that the trial
court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under administrative
seizure proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277.
-Private respondents, on the other hand, would seek to avoid the operation of this principle
asserting that the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine upon the justification
that (1) due process was violated because they were not given the chance to be heard, and (2)
the seizure and forfeiture was unlawful on the grounds: (a) that the Secretary of DENR and his
representatives have no authority to confiscate and forfeit conveyances utilized in transporting
illegal forest products, and (b) that the truck as admitted by petitioners was not used in the
commission of the crime.
HELD:
-Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records and relevant jurisprudence on the matter,
we are of the opinion that the plea of petitioners for reversal is in order.
-This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery
can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide
on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before
courts judicial power can be sought.
-The premature invocation of courts intervention is fatal to ones cause of action. 11Accordingly,
absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of
action.12 This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and
15

legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expense and
provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of
justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative
agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case. However, we
are not amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by
a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule.
-This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness
of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is a
violation of due process,13(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question, 14(3) when the
administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, 15 (4) when
there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned, 16 (5) when there is
irreparable injury,17 (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter
ego of the President bears the implied and assumed approval of the latter, 18 (7) when to require
exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, 19 (8) when it would amount to a
nullification of a claim,20 (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case
proceedings,21 (10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and
(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. 22
-In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending before the Secretary of
DENR when it was forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners of the motion for
reconsideration of private respondents through the order of July 12, 1989. In their letter of
reconsideration dated June 28, 1989,23 private respondents clearly recognize the presence of an
administrative forum to which they seek to avail, as they did avail, in the resolution of their case.
-It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents looked up to the Secretary for the
review and disposition of their case. By appealing to him, they acknowledged the existence of an
adequate and plain remedy still available and open to them in the ordinary course of the law.
Thus, they cannot now, without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
seek the courts intervention by filing an action for replevin for the grant of their relief during the
pendency of an administrative proceedings.
-Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and
regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the
primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By
the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial
intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the
trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified
encroachment into the domain of the administrative agencys prerogative. The doctrine of
primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence.25
-Administrative Law;Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Before a party is allowed
to seek the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed
of all the means of administrative processes afforded him.This Court in a long line of
cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it
is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes
afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by
giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes
within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before courts judicial power
can be sought.
16

-The premature invocation of courts intervention is fatal to ones cause of action. Accordingly,
absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of
action. This doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and
legal reasons, for one thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and
provides for a speedier disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of
justice for reasons of comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative
agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case.
Same; Same; Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction; Doctrine of primary jurisdiction does
not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the
jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence.Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules
and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the
primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. By
the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial
intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The assumption by the
trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents constitutes an unjustified
encroachment into the domain of the administrative agencys prerogative. The doctrine of
primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a
controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence.
Same; Same; Due Process;Deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked
where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.To
sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring the instant controversy beyond the
pale of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and fall within the ambit of
excepted cases heretofore stated. However, considering the circumstances prevailing in this
case, we can not but rule out these assertions of private respondents to be without merit. First,
they argued that there was violation of due process because they did not receive the May 23,
1989 order of confiscation of petiioner Layugan.
-This contention has no leg to stand on. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a
hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps many times more creditably and practicable than oral
argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated
with due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for
reconsideration, as in the instant case, when private respondents were undisputedly given the
opportunity to present their side when they filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989
which was, however, denied in an order of July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan.
6. VALMONTE V. BELMONTE (Exception: Pure Legal Question)
G.R. No. 74930. February 13, 1989
CORTS, J.:
FACTS:
-Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right
to information and pray that respondent be directed:
1. to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging
to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the
February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda
Marcos; and/or
17

2. to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their
respective loans; and/or
3. to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information.
The controversy arose when petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent Belmonte the following letter:
June 4, 1986
Hon. Feliciano Belmonte
GSIS General Manager
Arroceros, Manila
Sir:
As a lawyer, member of the media and plain citizen of our Republic, I am requesting that I be
furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who
were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guarantty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. We
understand that OIC Mel Lopez of Manila was one of those aforesaid MPs. Likewise, may we be
furnished with the certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in
connection herewith shall be borne by us.
If we could not secure the above documents could we have access to them?
We are premising the above request on the following provision of the Freedom Constitution of
the present regime.
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions or
decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. (Art.
W, Sec. 6).
We trust that within five (5) days from receipt hereof we will receive your favorable response
on the matter.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) RICARDO C. VALMONTE
To the aforesaid letter, the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS replied:
June 17, 1986
Atty. Ricardo C. Valmonte
108 E. Benin Street
Caloocan City
Dear Companero:
Possibly because he must have thought that it contained serious legal implications, President
& General Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred to me for study and reply your letter to him of
June 4,1986 requesting a list of the opposition members of Batasang Pambansa who were able
to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos.
My opinion in this regard is that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all
those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to
preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this
confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts.
As a violation of this confidentiality may mar the image of the GSIS as a reputable financial
institution, I regret very much that at this time we cannot respond positively to your request.
18

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) MEYNARDO A. TIRO
Deputy General Counsel
[Rollo, p. 40.]
-On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Govenrment Service and
Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another
letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply, (W)e are now considering ourselves free to do
whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of
public interest. [Rollo, p. 8.]
-On June 26, 1986, Valmonte, joined by the other petitioners, filed the instant suit.
-On July 19, 1986, the Daily Express carried a news item reporting that 137 former members of
the defunct interim and regular Batasang Pambansa, including ten (10) opposition members,
were granted housing loans by the GSIS [Rollo, p. 41.]
-Separate comments were filed by respondent Belmonte and the Solicitor General. After
petitioners filed a consolidated reply, the petition was given due course and the parties were
required to file their memoranda. The parties having complied, the case was deemed submitted
for decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the interpretation of the scope constitutional right to information is purely
a legal question.
HELD:
-Constitutional
Law; Bill
of
Rights; Right
to
Information;Administrative
Law;Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; As the issue involved herein is the
interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to information which is purely a
legal question, the exception of this case from the application of the general rule on
exhaustion of administrative remedies is warranted.Among the settled principles in
administrative law is that before a party can be allowed to resort to the courts, he is expected to
have exhausted all means of administrative redress available under the law. The courts for
reasons of law, comity and convenience will not entertain a case unless the available
administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given
opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum. However, the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to settled exceptions, among which
is when only a question of law is involved [Pascual v. Provincial Board, 106 Phil. 466 (1959);
Aguilar v. Valencia, et al., G.R. No. L-30396, July 30, 1971,40 SCRA 210; Malabanan v. Ramento,
G.R. No. L-2270, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359.]
-The issue raised by petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the
constitutional right to information, is one which can be passed upon by the regular courts more
competently than the GSIS or its Board of Trustees, involving as it does a purely legal question.
Thus, the exception of this case from the application of the general rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies is warranted. Having disposed of this procedural issue, We now address
ourselves to the issue of whether or not mandamus lies to compel respondent to perform the
acts sought by petitioners to be done, in pursuance of their right to information.
-Same; Same; Same; The right to information is meant to enhance the widening role
of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuses in the
government.The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech
and expression. But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and
therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far
from it. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public
19

disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the
citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuse in government.
-Same; Same;Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Mandamus; The constitutional right
to information is not an absolute right, hence, before mandamus may issue, it must
be clear that the information sought is of public interest or public concern and
that the same is not exempted by law from the operation of such constitutional right.
Yet, likely all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. As stated
in Legaspi,the peoples right to information is limited to matters of public concern, and is
further subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Similarly, the States policy of
full disclosure is limited to transactions involving public interest, and is subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law. Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the
information sought is of public interest or public concern, and is not exempted by law from
the operation of the constitutional guarantee [Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, supra, at p.
542.]
-Same; Same; Same; Public Interest and Public Concern;The information sought by
herein petitioners as to the truth of reports that some opposition members were
granted clean loans by the GSIS is a matter of public interest and concern.The
information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of reports that certain Members of the
Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to secureclean loans from the GSIS
immediately before the February 7, 1986 election through the intercession of the former First
Lady, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos. The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its
employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter.
Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46 of P.D.
1146, as amended (the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977), provide for annual
appropriations to pay the contributions, premiums, interest and other amounts payable to GSIS
by the government, as well as the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or
guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its
resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and
regulations. Thus, one of the reasons that prompted the revision of the old GSIS law (CA. No. 186,
as amended) was the necessity to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds
administered by the System [Second Whereas Clause, P.D. No. 1146.] Consequently, as
respondent himself admits, the GSIS is not supposed to grant clean loans. [Comment, p. 8.] It
is therefore the ligitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly
with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government
employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang
Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be
the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that
all its transactions were above board. In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS
and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter
of public interest and concern.
Same; Same; Right to Privacy; The right to privacy belongs to the individual in his
private capacity, it cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS.When the
information requested from the government intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a potential
conflict between the rights to information and to privacy may arise. However, the competing
interests of these rights need not be resolved in this case. Apparent from the above-quoted
statement of the Court in Morfeis that the right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private
capacity, and not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot
be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. As held in the case ofVassar College v. Loose Wills
Biscuit Co. [197 F. 982 (1912)], a corporation has no right of privacy in its name since the entire
basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a
corporation would have no such ground for relief.
20

Same; Same; Same; The right to information does not include the right to compel
custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e., to
furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the
UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7
election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos.
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to
access to official records, the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians
of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire
information on matters of public concern. It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of
mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the
thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required. The
corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be clear and specific
[Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November 29, 1968, 126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R.
No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.] The request of the petitioners fails to meet this
standard, there being no duty on the part of respondent to prepare the list requested.
5. MANGUBAT V. OSMENA (Exceptions: Patently Illegal)
[No. L-12837. April 30, 1959]
FACTS:
-Appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu ordering appellees' reinstatement
in the Police Department of Cebu City and payment of their back salaries. Petitioners
Mangubat and Mundo, who are civil service' eligibles, were detectives when their services
were terminated by the City Mayor on December 10, 1953 and January 11, 1954, respectively,
for lack of trust and confidence.
-Thereupon, respondents Bacalan and Ramos were appointed to their positions, and collected the
corresponding compensation. Having failed to secure reinstatement, petitioners instituted the
present case for quo warranto and mandamus. Subsequently, Mangubat was reinstated by the
Acting Mayor but he was not allowed to collect back salaries. After trial, the court rendered the
above-mentioned decision. Appellants seeks reversal maintaining that (a) the City of Cebu was
not included as an indispensable party and (b) petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative
remedies.
HELD: As regards the action for quo warranto, the City of Cebu is neither an indispensable nor a
necessary party. The proper parties therein, as respondents, are the holders of the office or
employment involved in the case. It is, however, an indispensable party in the action for
mandamus. In the case at bar, the funds appropriated for the positions involved have already
been collected by respondents Bacalan and Ramos, and in order that petitioners could get
back salaries, the City of Cebu would have to assume a supplemental appropriation,
corresponding to said back salaries. In this limited sense, a writ of mandamus directing the
mayor, the auditor, the treasurer and the municipal board to pass in audit and pay the back
salaries in question would amount to the imposition of an additional obligation upon the City
of Cebu, and this requires the intervention of the latter as an indispensable party.
However, those requirements have been substantially complied with in the case at bar. The
parties therein have handled the case, and the same was heard and decided in the lower
court, as if the City had been named respondent in the pleadings.
21

As to the second assignment of error, it is now well-settled that, when, from the very beginning,
the action of the City Mayor is patently illegal, arbitrary, and oppressive; when there has been
no semblance of compliance, or even an attempt to comply, with the pertinent laws; when,
manifestly, the Mayor has acted without jurisdiction, or has exceeded his jurisdiction, or has
committed a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; when his act is
clearly and obviously devoid of any color of authority, as in the case at bar, the employee
adversely affected may forthwith seek the protection of the judicial department.
6. PROSECUTOR LEO C. TABAO vs. JUDGE FRISCO T. LILAGAN
[A.M. No. RTJ-01-1651. September 4, 2001]
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
-This involves a criminal complaint for violation of the Forestry Reform Code of the Philippines,
against the captain and crew of the M/L Hadija as it was found that its documents were irregular
and incomplete.
-DENR thus took possession of tanbarks and so the consignee of the goods in M/L Hadija,
Hernandez, filed in RTC a case for replevin to recover the items seized by the DENR.
-Respondent Judge Lilagan issued a writ of replevin and directed respondent Sheriff IV Aguilar to
take possession of the items seized by the DENR and to deliver them to Hernandez after the
expiration of five days.
-This resulted to the filing of this administrative complaint against respondents by Atty. Tabao.
-Complainant claims that respondent judge cannot claim ignorance of the proceedings in I.S. No.
98-296 for the following reasons:
(1) the defendants in the replevin case were all DENR officers, which should have alerted
respondent judge to the possibility that the items sought to be recovered were being held by the
defendants in their official capacities; and
(2) the complaint for replevin itself states that the items were intercepted by the NBI for
verification of supporting documents, which should have made respondent judge suspect that
the same were being held by authority of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it was proper for Judge Lilagan to issue a writ of replevin for Hernandez, the
consignee, to take possession of the cargo consisting of tanbarks, seized and in possession of
DENR.
HELD:
NO.
-The complaint for replevin itself states that the shipment of tanbark as well as the vessel on
which it was loaded were seized by the NBI for verification of supporting documents. It also
states that the NBI turned over the seized items to the DENR for official disposition and
appropriate action.
-A copy of the document evidencing the turnover to DENR was attached to the complaint. To our
mind, these allegations would have been sufficient to alert respondent judge that the DENR has
custody of the seized items and that administrative proceedings may have already been
commenced concerning the shipment.
-Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending
before administrative agencies of special competence. Note, too, that the plaintiff in the replevin
suit who seeks to recover the shipment from the DENR had not exhausted the administrative
remedies available to him. The prudent thing for respondent judge to have done was to dismiss
the replevin suit outright.

22

-Under Section 78-A of the Revised Forestry Code, the DENR secretary or his authorized
representatives may order the confiscation of forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or
possessed or abandoned, including the conveyances used in the commission of the offense.
-In this regard, we declared in Paat v. Court of Appeals: the enforcement of forestry laws, rules
and regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the
primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
-By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by judicial
intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction.
-The assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents
constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative agencys
prerogative.
-The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority
to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body
of special competence.
7.
ARROW
TRANSPORTATION
CORPORATION,
petitioner,
TRANSPORTATION and SULTAN RENT-A-CAR, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. L-39655 March 21, 1975
FERNANDO, J.:

vs.

BOARD

OF

FACTS:
-Arrow Transportation has in his favor a certificate of public convenience to operate a public
utility bus air-conditioned-auto-truck service.
-Sultan Rent-A-Car filed a petition with the respondent Board for the issuance of a certificate of
public convenience to operate a similar service on the same line.
-Eight days later, without the required publication, the Board issued an order granting it
provisional permit to operate such auto-truck service on the line applied for.
-There was a motion for reconsideration and for the cancellation of such provisional permit filed,
but without awaiting final action thereon, this petition was filed.
-This is the explanation: "That petitioner has not waited for the resolution of his Motion for
Reconsideration before going to this Court considering that the question involved herein is purely
a legal one, aside from the fact that the issuance of the Order without the Board having acquired
jurisdiction of the case yet, is patently illegal or was performed without jurisdiction."
-It denied the allegation that there must be a publication before a provisional permit can be
issued, reference being made, as noted, to Presidential Decree No. 101, which authorized
respondent Board to grant provisional permits when warranted by compelling circumstances and
to proceed promptly along the method of legislative inquiry.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provisional permit issued by BOT to Sultan Rent-A-Car was proper.
HELD:
YES.
-It is the well-settled doctrine that for a provisional permit, an ex parte hearing suffices. The
decisive consideration is the existence of the public need.
-That was shown in this case, respondent Board, on the basis of demonstrable data, being
satisfied of the pressing necessity for the grant of the provisional permit sought.
-It is undeniable that at the time the petition was filed there was pending with the respondent
Board a motion for reconsideration. Ordinarily, its resolution should be awaited. Prior thereto, an
objection grounded on prematurity can be raised. Nonetheless, counsel for petitioner would
stress that certiorari lies as the failure to observe procedural due process ousted respondent
Board of whatever jurisdiction it could have had in the premises.
23

-This Court was impelled to go into the merits of the controversy at this stage, not only because
of the importance of the issue raised but also because of the strong public interest in having the
matter settled.
-As was set forth in Executive Order No. 101 which prescribes the procedure to be followed by
respondent Board, it is the policy of the State, as swiftly as possible, to improve the deplorable
condition of vehicular traffic, obtain maximum utilization of existing public motor vehicles and
eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of clandestine operators, as well as update the
standard of those carrying such business, making it "imperative to provide, among other urgently
needed measures, more expeditious methods in prescribing, redefining, or modifying the lines
and mode of operation of public utility motor vehicles that now or thereafter, may operate in this
country.
-It is essential then both from the standpoint of the firms engaged as well as of the riding public
to ascertain whether or not the procedure followed in this case and very likely in others of a
similar nature satisfies the procedural due process requirement. Thus its ripeness for
adjudication becomes apparent.
8. KILUSANG BAYAN SA PAGLILINGKOD NG MGA MAGTITINDA NG BAGONG PAMILIHANG
BAYAN NG MUNTINLUPA, INC. (KBMBPM) vs. HON. CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ
G.R. No. 85439 January 13, 1992
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
DOCTRINE: Exception to the Doctrine of Administrative Remedies
FACTS:
-Municipal Government of Muntinlupa, thru its then Mayor Santiago Carlos, Jr., entered into a
contract with the KBMBPM represented by its General Manager, Amado Perez, for the latter's
management and operation of the new Muntinlupa public market.
-The KBMBPM is a service cooperative organized by and composed of vendors occupying the New
Muntinlupa Public Market in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 175 and Letter of Implementation No. 23; its articles of incorporation and by-laws were
registered with the then Office of the Bureau of Cooperatives Development (thereafter the
Bureau of Agricultural Cooperatives Development or BACOD and now the Cooperative
Development Authority).
-Following his assumption into office as the new mayor succeeding Santiago Carlos, Jr., petitioner
Ignacio Bunye, claiming to be particularly scandalized by the "virtual 50-year term of the
agreement, contrary to the provision of Section 143, paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,"
and the "patently inequitable rental," directed a review of the aforesaid contract. He sought
opinions from both the Commission on Audit and the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) on the
validity of the instrument.
-Consequently, upon representations made by Bunye with the Municipal Council, the latter
approved on 1 August 1988 Resolution No. 45 abrogating the contract.
-KBMBPM filed with Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati a complaint for breach of
contract, specific performance and damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
against the Municipality and its officers, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 88-1702.
-The complaint was premised on the alleged illegal take-over of the public market effected "in
excess of his (Bunye's) alleged authority" and thus "constitutes breach of contract and duty as a
public official."
-Amado Perez filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a letter-complaint charging Bunye and his
co-petitioners with oppression, harassment, abuse of authority and violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act 10 for taking over the management and operation of the public market
from KBMBPM.
-Respondent Bunye claims that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies.
24

G. R. NO. 91927
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners have exhausted all administrative remedies.
HELD:
-YES.
-As to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the rule is well-settled that this requirement
does not apply where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of
the President, bear the implied approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him.
-This doctrine of qualified political agency ensures speedy access to the courts when most
needed. There was no need then to appeal the decision to the office of the President; recourse to
the courts could be had immediately.
Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also yields to other exceptions,
such as when the question involved is purely legal, as in the instant case, or where the
questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary or oppressive. Such is the claim of petitioners which,
as hereinafter shown, is correct.
9. NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY AND DOLE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners, vs.
WILFREDO HERVILLA, respondent.
G.R. No. L-65718 June 30, 1987
PADILLA, J.:
FACTS:
-The antecedent of this is an action for the recovery of possession and damages filed on
December 20, 1973 by Wilfredo Hervilla against DOLE Philippines involving four lots with a total
area of four hectares. On June 1, 1962, Wilfredo Hervilla, claiming to be the successor-in- interest
of his brother, Hernane Hervilla who vacated these properties, [in favor of the former], filed with
the District Land Office of the Bureau of Lands in General Santos City Free Patent Application for
the said lots. On April 1, 1963, Candido de Pedro, as claimant and occupant, filed with the Bureau
of Lands, Manila, his free patent application, having planted agricultural plants.
-On April 27, 1968, Hervilla filed an ejectment suit against DOLE, successor-in-interest of Candido
de Pedro. Counsel of Hervilla wrote the District Land Officer requesting for the
investigation of the said lots, to which a report was rendered and an order was issued as to the
adjustment of the said title numbers. The trial court dismissed the action for recovery, to which
was appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the trial court decision and declared that
the issuance of the patent title by the Bureau of Lands to Candico de Pedro is null and void. A
motion for reconsideration was filed and subsequently, a motion for new trial was filed for the
purpose of submitting original certificate of titles which was issued to the DOLE predecessor-ininterest by the Bureau of Lands while the case was pending.
-The two motions were denied.
Thus this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court in deciding a case involving recovery of possession can declare null and
void title issued by an administrative body or office during the pendency of such case?
HELD:
NO.

25

-It is now well settled that the administration and disposition of public lands are committed by
law to the Director of Lands primarily, and, ultimately, to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
-The jurisdiction of courts in possessory actions involving public lands is limited to the
determination of who has the actual, physical possession or occupation of the land in question (in
forcible entry cases, before municipal courts) or, the better right of possession (in accion
publiciana, in cases before Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts).
-In any event, petitioners' possession of the lands in question has been confirmed by the
issuance of Free Patents in favor of their predecessor-in-interest. By this act, nothing more is left
for the courts to pursue. Thus, the private respondent's cause of action has been rendered moot
and academic by the decision of the Director of Lands.
-Moreover, records do not show that private respondent Wilfredo Hervilla ever filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the Director of Lands issuing free patent over the lands in
dispute in favor of petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. Neither did he appeal said decision to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, nor did he appeal to the office of the President of
the Philippines. In short, Hervilla failed to exhaust administrative remedies, a flaw which, to our
mind, is fatal to a court review. The decision of the Director of Lands has now become final. The
Courts may no longer interfere with such decision.

10. ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. Hon.

FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as Deputy Executive Secretary, and
ASTERIO BUQUERON, respondents.
G.R. No. 75501 September 15, 1987
PARAS, J:
FACTS:
-Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation registered the location of its "Master VII
Fr." mining claim with the Mining Recorder of Toledo City.
-Private respondent Asterio Buqueron registered the declarations of location of his "St. Mary Fr."
and "St. Joseph Fr." mining claims with the same Mining Recorder.
-Atlas registered the declarations of location of its "Carmen I Fr." to "Carmen V. Fr. " with the
same Mining Recorder.
-Boquerns "St. Mary Fr." and "St. Joseph Fr." were surveyed and the survey plans thereof were
duly approved by the Director of Mines and Geo Sciences. Notice of Buqueron's lease application
was published in the February 22 and 28, 1977 issues of the Evening Post.
-During the said period of publication, petitioner filed an adverse claim against private
respondent's mining claims on the ground that they allegedly overlapped its own mining claims.
-After the hearing, the Director of Mines rendered a decision, which gave preferential rights to
Buqueron in his claim except the areas covered by the adverse claim to which Atlas Consolidated
has preferential rights.
-Atlas appealed to the Minister of Natural Resources who rendered a decision reversing the
decision of the Director of Mines.
-Subsequently this matter was appealed to the Executive Secretary, which reversed the decision
of the Minister and reinstated the decision of the Director of Mines.
-Thus this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not findings on facts based on substantial evidence by an administrative official can
be disturbed or overturned during appeals.

26

Whether or not there was a valid location and discovery of the disputed mining claims is a
question of fact best left to the determination of the administrative bodies charged with the
implementation of the law they are entrusted to enforce.
HELD:
NO.
-As uniformly held by the Court, it is sufficient that administrative findings of fact are supported
by evidence, or negatively stated, it is sufficient that findings of fact are not shown to be
unsupported by evidence.
-Substantial evidence is all that is needed to support an administrative finding of fact, and
substantial evidence is "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion."
-In the case at bar, the record amply shows that the Director of Mines' decision was supported by
substantial evidence.
-The Director of Mines established that there is in fact an overlapping of mining claims of
petitioner and private respondent and that as a matter of record petitioner's mining claims were
registered subsequent to those of private respondent with the exception of Master VII Fr. which
was registered on February 9, 1972 or prior to the registration of the mining claims of private
respondent.
-After a careful appraisal of the evidence submitted, and cognizance as we are of the provisions
of Presidential Decree No. 99-A, we are of the view that adverse claimant failed to adduce
sufficient evidence to nullify the prior claims of respondent. Stated differently, the evidence
submitted are not sufficient to destroy the prima facie character of the sworn declarations of
location of respondent's mining claims which were duly registered on the date herein before
stated.
-Thus "A location notice certificate or statement when re-examine accorded is prima facie
evidence of all the facts the statute requires it to contain and which were sufficiently set forth"
and constitute notice to all persons and to the whole world of the contents of the same (Sec. 56
of the Mining Act, as amended).
-In the light of the aforequoted provisions of law applicable on the matter, and in view of our
findings, earlier discussed, the subsequent mining claims of adverse claimant insofar as they
conflict the prior claims of respondent are hereby declared null and void.
-On the other hand, it is also our view that respondent failed to adduce sufficient evidence to
prove that the prior claim of adverse claimant (Master VII Fr.) is null and void.
-Considering that this mining claim is prior in point of location and registration, it follows that this
claim will have to prevail over that of respondent.
-As earlier stated the above findings, although reversed by the Minister of Natural Resources,
were affirmed by the Office of the President.
-However, petitioner would have this Court look into the said findings because of the
open divergence of views and findings by the adjudicating authorities in this mining
conflict involving highly contentious issues which warrant appellate review (Rollo, p.
18).
-This Court has repeatedly ruled that judicial review of the decision of an administrative official is
of course subject to certain guide posts laid down in many decided cases. Thus, for instance,
findings of fact in such decision should not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence, but
review is justified when there has been a denial of due process, or mistake of law or fraud,
collusion or arbitrary action in the administrative proceeding, where the procedure which led to
factual findings is irregular; when palpable errors are committed; or when a grave abuse of
discretion, arbitrariness, or capriciousness is manifest.
-A careful study of the records shows that none of the above circumstances is present in the case
at bar, which would justify the overturning of the findings of fact of the Director of Mines which
were affirmed by the Office of the President. On the contrary, in accordance with the prevailing
principle that "in reviewing administrative decisions, the reviewing Court cannot re-examine the
27

sufficiency of the evidence as if originally instituted therein, and receive additional evidence, that
was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned," the findings of fact in this case must
be respected. As ruled by the Court, they will not be disturbed so long as they are supported by
substantial evidence, even if not overwhelming or preponderant (Police Commission vs. Lood,
supra).
11. G.R. No. 96409 February 14, 1992
CITIZEN J. ANTONIO M. CARPIO, petitioner,
vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, THE
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and THE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.
Facts:
-Congress passed Republic Act No. 6975, a law which established the PNP and reorganized the
DILG. This is in pursuance to the constitutional provision under Article XVI, Section 6:
The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which stall be national in scope
and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national police
commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction
shall be provided by law.
-Petitioner contends that RA 6975 emasculated the National Police Commission by limiting its
power "to administrative control" over the Philippine National Police (PNP), thus, "control"
remained with the Department Secretary under whom both the National Police Commission and
the PNP were placed. In addition, by giving the Governors and Mayors the power to appoint the
PNP Provincial Director and the Chiefs of Police respectively, they went beyond the constitution
which only intended to give operational control over the day-to-day functions to local chief
executives. The grant of disciplinary powers over PNP members to the "People's Law
Enforcement Boards" (or the PLEB) and city and municipal mayors is a derogation of the
commissions powers over the PNP.
ISSUE:
Whether RA 6975 violated Article XVI, Section 6 of the constitution.

HELD:
-RA 69 75 does not violate the constitution. Under the principle that the President has control of
all executive departments, bureaus, and offices and the "Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency"
which provides that "all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the
Chief Executive. Under these principles, the PNP is still under the control of the President as
they are still under control of the executive secretaries and unless revoked by the President, the
act of the Secretary is presumed the act of the Pres. Additionally although NAPOLCOM and PNP
are both placed under the DILG, the PNP is still administered and controlled by a national police
commission as provided in Art. 14 of the assailed law, which provides for the powers and
functions of the commission.
-On the issue regarding the local Chief Executives, the court agreed with the SOLGEN that "there
is no usurpation of the power of control of the NAPOLCOM under Section 51 because under this
very same provision, it is clear that the local executives are only acting as representatives of the
NAPOLCOM. . . . As such deputies, they are answerable to the NAPOLCOM for their actions in the
exercise of their functions under that section. Thus, unless countermanded by the NAPOLCOM,
their acts are valid and binding as acts of the NAPOLCOM."
-Regarding the grant of disciplinary powers over PNP members to the PLEB and the local chief
executives, there is no derogation of powers as the Commission still exercises appellate
jurisdiction over the disciplinary cases filed against a police officer.
28

-Although the constitution provides for the 3 constitutional commissions independent from the
executive, this does not include the NAPOLCOM. It is well established that the NAPOLCOM shall
be under the control of the President through his alter ego or the Secretary of the interior and
local government.
12. G.R. No. L-67195 May 29, 1989
Heirs of Eugenio vs. Roxas
Facts:
-Petitioner corporation, Heirs of Eugenia V. Roxas, Inc.(HEVR) was incorporated by by the late
Eufrocino Roxas and his seven children for the purpose of owning and developing the properties
of Eufrocino Roxas and the estate of his late wife, Dona Eugenia V. Roxas, located in the Province
of Laguna. One of the properties is the resort, Hidden Valley Springs Resort situated in Calauan.
Laguna. One of the children, Eriberto operated a restaurant and liquor concession in the
premises under the name "Hidden Valley Agri-Business and Restaurant, Inc (HVABR). When he
died, his son Guilliermo took over the business.
-It was later found out that the corp. was operating at a loss because the primary income
generator, which was the restaurant, was not being properly managed. The board of HEVR
resolved that the restaurant should be handed over to them and failure of HVABR to comply
would require them to close the resort indefinitely in order to avoid further loss. HVABR filed for
an injunction and restraining order for the unilateral termination of the concession.
-In the meantime, HVABR filed with the Bureau of Tourism Services of the Ministry of Tourism
(MOT) ; a petition to increase the food and beverage prices at the resort restaurant. But was
contested by HEVR. Subsequently, the trial court ruled in favor of HEVR and upheld the closure of
the resort. The case was appealed to the IAC. The MOT also promulgated a resolution ordering
HEVR to take over operations of the restaurant as HVABR was operating without the requisite
license.
HEVR entered into a contract of lease with Valley Resort Corporation for the entire resort,
including the restaurant, for a period of 10 years. However, respondent Guillermo Roxas doing,
business under the name "MJB Food and Services"(MJBFS) obtained a license from the
Department of Tourism (DOT) to operate the restaurant at the Hidden Valley Springs Resort,
which was contested by HEVR.
-Subsequently a mayor's permit to engage in the restaurant business was issued by Hon. Jaime
Gasapos, the Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of Calauan, Laguna, to MJBFS and obtained the DOT license
to operate the resort restaurant. HEVR contested the issuance of such permits, filing a writ of
prohibition.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner can have an affirmative relief considering a license has already
been issued.
Held:
-As a license to operate the restaurant had already been issued to private respondents, a writ of
prohibition cannot issue. Nevertheless, it does not mean that no other affirmative relief may be
given to petitioner if found to be deserving. For it is not the title or caption of a pleading, but the
substance and averments thereof that is controlling; so that, in the interest of justice, although a
petition is styled "Prohibition", it may be considered a petition for certiorari if the facts alleged
make out a case for the issuance of the latter writ .
- It is a recognized principle that courts of justice will generally not interfere in executive and
administrative matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies,
such as, the grant of licenses, permits, leases, or the approval, rejection or revocation of
applications therefor. However, there is a limit to the deference accorded by the courts to the
actions of such agencies. Findings of fact by an administrative board or officials, following a
29

hearing, are binding upon the courts and will not be disturbed except where the board or official
has gone beyond his statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted
arbitrarily and without regard to his duty or with grave abuse of discretion.
-The court ruled that the issuance of the restaurant license in favor of MJBFS was in lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
-The DOT was fully aware of the circumstance of the ownership of the resort and that MJBFS was
prohibited from operating the restaurant. The DOT was informed of the pending cases and the
resolutions on the ownership and the rights over the resort and the restaurant as it was given
proper notice of the facts, such as the RTC rulings and the IAC injunctions in addition to the fact
that before issuance of the license that the subject restaurant was covered by the MOT approved
contract of lease between petitioner and Valley Resort Corporation.
-The Court holds that it was an arbitrary and capricious exercise of discretion on the part of
public respondents to have issued, and thereafter to have refused to revoke, the restaurant
license in favor of Guillermo Roxas and/or MJBFS knowing that: (1) the latter was not the owner of
the restaurant for which the license was sought; (2) the latter's right to possess the same was
being disputed by no less than petitioner as restaurant owner; and, (3) the subject restaurant
was already leased to Valley Resort Corporation pursuant to a contract of lease approved by the
department.
-The court ruled that the license to operate the subject restaurant in the Hidden Valley Springs
Resort issued by the DOT in favor of MJB Food and Services is NULLIFIED for being issued with
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
13. G.R. No. L-29171 April 15, 1988
INDUSTRIAL POWER SALES, INC., petitioner-appellant, vs. HON. DUMA SINSUAT etc., et
al., respondents-appellees.
Facts:
-In April of 1965 two (2) Invitations To Bid were advertised by the Bureau of Supply Coordination
of the Department of General Services. The first letter contained a proviso limiting the offers to
foreign made products on a CIF basis, Port of Manila. However the second letter said that the
Office would not have any objection to locally manufactured utility truck bodies provided they
conform to the approved technical specification of this Office as well as to the manufacturer's
standard product specification, since this type of body manufacture has been acceptable in most
government vehicles.
-Among the bidders were Industrial Power Sales, Inc.(IPSI) and Delta Motor Corporation(Delta).
IPSI subsequently won but was questioned by Delta, claiming that trucks offered by IPSI were not
factory built, as stipulated in the specifications contained in the requisition itself and in the
Invitation to Bid. The Acting Director for Supply Coordination adjudicated and resolved the issue
against Delta, claiming there was strict compliance with the requirements. Delta again filed a
protest with the Office of the Secretary of General Services claiming that IPSI's offer of locally
assembled trucks was not in accordance with the bid specification for bread new, complete and
factory-built trucks. This time it was ruled in his favor. -The secretary ruled that any amendment
to the requisition by a subordinate official should have the approval of the department head.
-IPSI filed a case with the CFI for certiorari, mandamus and injunctions. The court however ruled
in favor of Delta.
Issue:
Whether or not IPSI is the valid winner of the bidding
Whether or not IPSI could have validly gone to court without first exhausting all administrative
remedies
Held:
-Court held that Delta was fully aware of the amendments to the notice of bidders and still
participated; only raising his objections when he had lost. On the issue of whether the
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undersecretary had authority to amend the bidding notice, the court applied the principle of
regular performance of official duty. Absent a clear showing that an official act was without or
lacking authority, it is presumed to be validly done. In addition, the pertinent laws of the time
should have been applied, namely RA. 4164 which provides that the appropriation for the
purchase of equipment, supplies and materials shall be available only for those locally
manufactured unless none are available or the price exceeds those determined by the flag law
by 10%. And the Flag law which states that whenever several bidders participate in a bidding for
supplying articles, materials, and equipment for any office of the government for public use ... or
public works, the award shall be made to the domestic entity making the lowest bid, provided it
is not more than 15% in excess of the lowest bid made by a bidder other than a domestic entity.
Delta is acting merely as an agent of a foreign corporation, hence IPSI was the rightful winner.
-On the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies, there are universally accepted axioms
governing judicial review through the extraordinary actions of certiorari or prohibition of
determinations of administrative officers or agencies: first, that before said actions may be
entertained in the courts of justice, it must be shown that all the administrative remedies
prescribed by law or ordinance have been exhausted; and second, that the administrative
decision may properly be annulled or set aside only upon a clear showing that the administrative
official or tribunal has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion. There are however exceptions to the principle known as exhaustion of administrative
remedies, these being: (1) where the issue is purely a legal one, (2) where the controverted act is
patently illegal or was done without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; (3) where the
respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the
latter's implied or assumed approval, unless actually disapproved; or (4) where there are
circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
In view of such, court ruled in favor of IPSI, declaring it the rightful winner of the bidding.
14. G.R. No. L-19180
October 31, 1963
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, ET AL., petitioners-appellees, vs. THE COLLECTOR
OF CUSTOMS OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
Facts:
-The National Development Company which is engaged in the shipping business under the name
of "Philippine National Lines" is the owner of steamship "S.S. Doa Nati" whose local agent in
Manila is A. V. Rocha. On August 4, 1960, the Collector of Customs sent a notice to C.F. Sharp &
Company as alleged operator of the vessel informing it that said vessel was apprehended and
found to have committed a violation of the customs laws and regulations in that it carried an
unmanifested cargo consisting of one RCA Victor TV set 21" in violation of Section 2521 of the
Tariff and Customs Code.
A. V. Rocha was informed of the apprehension and gave a reply stating, among other things, that
the television set referred to therein was not a cargo of the vessel and, therefore, was not
required by law to be manifested. It further expressed that if explanation is not sufficient, that a
formal investigation and hearing be made. The collector of customs was unsatisfied with the
explanation and maintained that the item was not exempted from tax and imposed a fine of
P5,000. Petitioners however contest the fine, claiming that the Collector of Customs had
exceeded his authority by, issuing the fine without an investigation and hearing as requested.
-Respondent set up the following special defenses: (1) the court has no jurisdiction to act on
matters arising from violations of the Customs Law, but the Court of Tax Appeals; (2) assuming
that it has, petitioners have not exhausted all available administrative remedies, one of which is
to appeal to the Commissioner of Customs; (3) the requirements of administrative due process
have already been complied with in that the written notice given by respondent to petitioner
Rocha clearly specified the nature of the violation complained of and that the defense set up by
Rocha constitute merely a legal issue which does not require further investigation; and (4) the
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investigation conducted by the customs authorities showed that the television set in question
was unloaded by the ship's doctor without going thru the custom house as required by law and
was not declared either in the ship's manifest or in the crew declaration list.
Issue:
Whether there was denial of due process in the imposition of the fine.
Held:
The Respondent had deprived the petitioner of his right to due process, by imposing the fine
without the requested investigation and hearing.
The fact that the set in question was claimed by the customs authorities not to be within the
exception does not automatically make the vessel liable. It is necessary for the vessel, its owner
or operator, be given a chance to show otherwise. The determination of any act or irregularity
that may involve a violation of any customs law or regulation is concerned, or of any act arising
under the Tariff and Customs Code, are not judicial in character, but merely administrative. Even
in administrative proceedings, Due process is still required to be followed as enshrined in the
constitution.
That this principle applies with equal force to administrative proceedings was well elaborated
upon by this Court in the Ang Tibay case as follows:
cardinal primary rights which must be respected The first of these rights is the right
to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his
own case and submit evidence in support thereof. Not only must the party be given an
opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights
which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. While the duty
to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision.
No only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the
evidence must be substantial. The decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its
or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. The Court of Industrial
Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that
the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for
the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.
14. G.R. No. 205728
January 21, 2015
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M.
NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY.
MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.
Facts:
-Petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian
Cathedral of Bacolod. The first tarpaulin contains the message "IBASURA RH Law". The
second tarpaulin was divided in two, those who voted for the passing of the law were
classified by petitioners as comprising "Team Patay," while those who voted against it form
"Team Buhay".
-The Election Officer of Bacolod City, filed a notice for the removal of the campaign materials
for being oversized or face penal sanctions. Petitioner replied requesting they be given a
definite ruling by COMELEC Law Department regarding the tarpaulin and pending such, the
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tarpaulin be allowed to remain. COMELEC reiterated their stand. For fear

petitioner initiated proceedings for prohibition and injunction, among others.
-Respondent claims the court, whose power to review is "limited only to
rulings and orders of the COMELEC En Banc rendered in the exercise of its
quasi-judicial power. In addition, the case is violative of the hierarchy of
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.

of prosecution,
final decisions,
adjudicatory or
courts and the

Issue:
Whether the court has jurisdiction over COMELEC cases.
Held:
-As a general rule, decision must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not
of a division, certainly not an interlocutory order of a division. The Supreme Court has no
power to review viacertiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of
the Commission on Elections. However there are exceptions, such as to prevent miscarriage
of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice or the protection of labor,
when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief
is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.
-During elections, the Supreme Court has the power and the duty to correct any grave abuse
of discretion or any act tainted with unconstitutionality on the part of any government branch
or instrumentality. This includes actions by the COMELEC. Furthermore, it is this courts
constitutional mandate to protect the people against governments infringement of their
fundamental rights. This constitutional mandate outweighs the jurisdiction vested with the
COMELEC. Hence the court can take jurisdiction over the case.
-On the issue of hierarchy of courts, the court has "full discretionary power to take
cognizance and assume jurisdiction [over] special civil actions for certiorari . . .filed directly
with it for exceptionally compelling reasons. As such, the rule is not iron-clad and may be
dispensed with.
-Although the respondent claims the petitioners had violated the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies, and therefore divest the court of jurisdiction, such is not the case in
this instant. The case being already ripe for judicial adjudication and being within the
exception such as the assailed issuances violated their right to freedom of expression and
the principle of separation of church and state. This is a purely legal question. The
circumstances of the present case indicate the urgency of judicial intervention considering
the issue then on the RH Law as well as the upcoming elections. Thus, to require the
exhaustion of administrative remedies in this case would be unreasonable.

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