Todo

Case

Ov

general
Traditional IR and political representations of China are
created to contain and otherize. These ensure militarization
and war. Research has a racist agenda that reflects the govts
realist fantasies; dont trust their epistemologically limited
evidence. This lens leads to constant war and a search for
threats which creates the only conditions under which nuclear
war is thinkable, a damning prerequisite to any disad. We
advocate a shift from traditional IR to communicative
engagement which transforms realist thinking into one of
genuine understanding and negotiation. Mutuality of interests
is not based simply on objective factors, but is grounded upon
actors perception of their own interests. You cannot divorce
the plan text from the justifications of the 1ac; their solvency
args wont presume the fundamental alterations the plan
induces in Chinese negotiating tactics due to a complete
revisiting of the form and content of US engagement.

das
Frame this debate in terms of who produces the best
epistemology and has the best approach to IR theory Song 15
says that the way that we frame china orients the way that
both the US and China interact in the world. That model of
securitization and framing china as a threat makes racist
orientalist policies inevitable, which is the only and inevitable
route to a war try or die. Their extinction focus ensures a
pathological willingness of US policymakers to engage in risky
actions to contain China which makes miscalculation and
accidents more likely and ensures threatening US postures
that necessitate a Chinese response. Only we can explain
Chinas motive to fight. That approach ensures serial policy
failure Thats Bernstein. And its the only thing that makes
nuclear war thinkable Thats Glaser.

ks
Tangible change controls the only identifiable path to an
impact. The ks fails because they simply reject the structures
they oppose without providing a route to removing these
powerful forces. The state, the military, Congressional
attitudes, & institutional racism all exist independent of the af
and rejecting the af does nothing to address the residual links
to a host of status quo causes of their impacts. Theyre the
underpants gnomes: Step 1 Reject a thing, Step 2 ? Step 3
Thing is gone. Their inability to identify a mechanism for
inducing social change should make you skeptical of their
alternative. Circumventing the tough question of political
change is neither epistemologically or methodologically sound.
The afs imperfections pale in comparison to the negs
inaction.

A2: cards

containment
Kai rollback
Awkward moment when this card says nothing that they want it to
1. Card does not say that changing discussion causes roll back
2. The card says war is not always inevitable as the peaceful shift of leadership
between Great Britain and the United States in the late 1940s shows proves
realism is wrong.
3. This evidence presumes a Eurocentric perspective that posits the US as the
city on the hill, the only actor capable of appropriate exercise of hegemony.
Its epistemologically invalid.

Shambagh
Goldstein specifically answers this - a shift in the way that we interact spills over
and leads to a spiral up. This form of communicative engagement in particular is
key to eventually lead to cooperation
Communicative engagement solves suspicion because instead of internalizing the
suspicion, there is a dialogical process that alters mutual perceptions & changes
fundamental interest calculations.

Wu
This card flows aff, the card says that status quo engagement is viewed as soft
containment we shift this way of containment

Deitelhof & Muller

This card is in the context of international institutions and private neoliberal
companies inevitably competing. Doesnt apply to the aff even if they win this
card they concede the Anastasiou evidence means that we are key to macropolitical
action

discourse
Owen
They say epistemology fails but this argument is dumbfounded in the context of the
aff for reasons
1. It says that the we must examine empirical impacts before epistemology
however they concede the thesis question of the aff that the china threat is
not real
2. Epistemology in the context of IR should always come first because the way
that we construct the other shapes the way that we engage thats song
3. The card says that epistemology fails because it generalizes all IR but that
isnt something the aff does we just say that the way that we coerce china
is bad

Tuathail
This card is bad because it is only an indict of academics who focus on discussion
opposed to foreign policy thats not what we do we focus on the way that our
studies and our perception of china shapes the way that we engage with them & we
make material change in how foreign policy is conducted thats Song and Glaser

Loader
Even if they win that securitization can be good, the Moses and Goldstein evidence
indicates that INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS securitization is problematic because it
necessitates militarism

war turns structural violence

Folk
Concedes Glaser We have a war impact this is unresponsive

Goklany
This card is problematic and a reason their epistemology is Eurocentric and doesnt
view the world appropriately the aff proves this isnt true the card doesnt say
anything pertaining to xenophobia, only that people can eat food now??

extinction ow
SQ engagement ensures war and is the only path to making
nuclear war thinkable Thats Glaser
Value to life outweighs Their focus on survival reduces
humans to bags of biological material indistinct from the
processes that make their hearts beat and brains function. Life
is so much more than mere biological existence. A world
limited by racism, xenophobia, and structural bias is so
innately slanted against literally billions of people that we
should consider that impact to be on the scale of an extinction
level crisis.
Serial policy failure flips all extinction claims Ensures that in
each instance we attempt to manage mega-crises we act
inefectively because institutional and structural biases are
excluding billions of people from finding efective solutions to
all global problems. The 1% of people who dictate the global
agenda are not focused on planetary survival, but their own
gross accumulation, power, and racial and nationalistic biases.
And we outweigh on probability and magnitude risk
assessment is not neutral but is epistemologically biased
towards white male elites who discount the severity of
everyday violence in destroying marginalized populations.
Verchick 96 [Robert, Assistant Professor, University of Missouri -- Kansas City
School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School, 1989, IN A GREENER VOICE: FEMINIST
THEORY AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 19 Harv. Women's L.J. 23]
Because risk assessment is based on statistical measures of risk,
policymakers view it as an accurate and objective tool in establishing
environmental standards. n275 The scientific process used to assess risk purports to focus singlemindedly on only one feature of a potential injury: the objective probability of its occurrence. n276 Risk assessors,
who consider most value judgments irrelevant in determining statistical risk, seek to banish them at every stage.
n277 As a result, the language of risk assessment -- and of related environmental safety
standards -- often carry an air of irrebuttable precision and certainty. The EPA, for example, defines the standard
acceptable level of risk under Superfund as "10<-6>" -- that is, the probability that one person in a million would
develop cancer due to exposure to site contamination. n278 [*76] Feminism challenges this model of scientific risk
assessment on at least three levels. First, feminism questions the assumption that scientific inquiry is value-neutral,
that is, free of societal bias or prejudice. n279 Indeed, as many have pointed out, one's perspective unavoidably
influences the practice of science. n280 Western science may be infused with its own ideology, perpetuating, in the
view of the ecofeminists, cycles of discrimination, domination, and exploitation. n281 Second, even if scientific
inquiry by itself were value-neutral, environmental regulation based on such inquiry would still contain subjective
elements. Environmental regulation, like any other product of democracy, inevitably reflects elements of

serves only to
"mask, not eliminate, political and social considerations." n282 We have already
seen how the subjective decision to prefer white men as subjects for
epidemiological study can skew risk assessments against the interests of
subjectivity, compromise, and self-interest. The technocratic language of regulation

women and people of color. The focus of many assessments on the risk of cancer
deaths, but not, say, the risks of birth defects or miscarriages, is yet another
example of how a policymaker's subjective decision of what to look for can
influence what is ultimately seen. n283 Once risk data are collected and placed in a statistical
form, the ultimate translation of that information into rules and standards of conduct once again reflects value
judgments. A safety threshold of one in a million or a preference for "best conventional technology" does not spring
from the periodic table, but rather evolves from the application [*77] of human experience and judgment to
scientific information. Whose experience? Whose judgment? Which information?
These are the questions that feminism prompts, and they will be discussed shortly. Finally, feminists would argue

questions involving the risk of death and disease should not even
aspire to value neutrality. Such decisions -- which afect not only today's
generations, but those of the future -- should be made with all related
political and moral considerations plainly on the table . n284 In addition,
policymakers should look to all perspectives, especially those of society's
most vulnerable members, to develop as complete a picture of the moral
issues as possible. Debates about scientific risk assessment and public values often appear as a tug of
that

war between the "technicians," who would apply only value-neutral criteria to set regulatory standards, and the
"public," who demand that psychological perceptions and contextual factors also be considered. n285
Environmental justice advocates, strongly concerned with the practical experiences of threatened communities,
argue convincingly for the latter position. n286 A feminist critique of the issue, however, suggests that the debate is
much richer and more complicated than a bipolar view allows. For feminists, the notion of value neutrality simply
does not exist. The debate between technicians and the public, according to feminists, is not merely a contest
between science and feelings, but a broader discussion about the sets of methods, values, and attitudes to which
each group subscribes. Furthermore, feminists might argue, the parties to this discussion divide into more than two
categories. Because one's world view is premised on many things, including personal experience, one might expect
that subgroups within either category might differ in significant ways from other subgroups. Therefore, feminists
would anticipate a broad spectrum of views concerning scientific risk assessment and public values. Intuitively, this
makes sense. Certainly scientists disagree among themselves about the hazards of nuclear waste, ozone depletion,
and global warming. n287 Many critics have argued that scientists, despite their allegiance [*78] to rational
method, are nonetheless influenced by personal and political views. n288 Similarly, members of the public are a
widely divergent group. One would not be surprised to see politicians, land developers, and blue-collar workers
disagreeing about environmental standards for essentially non-scientific reasons. Politicians and bureaucrats
are two sets of the non-scientific community that affect environmental standards in fundamental ways. Their

adherence to vocal, though not always broadly representative, constituencies may lead
them to disfavor less advantaged socioeconomic groups when addressing
environmental concerns. n289 In order to understand a diversity of risk perception and to see how
attitudes and social status affect the risk assessment process, we must return to the feminist inquiry that explores

A recent national
survey, conducted by James Flynn, Paul Slovic, and C.K. Mertz, measured the risk perceptions
of a group of 1512 people that included numbers of men, women, whites, and non-whites proportional to their
ratios in society. n290 Respondents answered questions about the health risks of twenty-five
environmental, technological, and "life-style" hazards, including such hazards as ozone depletion,
the relationship between attitudes and identity. 1. The Diversity of Risk Perception

chemical waste, and cigarette smoking. n291 The researchers asked them to rate each hazard as posing "almost no
health risk," a "slight health risk," a "moderate health risk," or a "high health risk." The researchers then analyzed
[*79] the responses to determine whether the randomly selected groups of white men, white women, non-white

perceptions of risk
generally difered on the lines of gender and race. Women, for instance, perceived
men, and non-white women differed in any way. The researchers found that

greater risk from most hazards than did men. n292 Furthermore, non-whites as a group perceived greater risk from

the most striking results appeared when the

researchers considered diferences in gender and race together. They found that
"white males tended to differ from everyone else in their attitudes and perceptions -- on average, they
perceived risks as much smaller and much more acceptable than did other
people." n294 Indeed, without exception, the pool of white men perceived each of the twenty-five
most hazards than did whites. n293 Yet

hazards as less risky than did non-white men, white women, or non-white women. n295 Wary that other factors

the researchers later conducted

several multiple regression analyses to correct for diferences in income,
education, political orientation, the presence of children in the home, and age, among others. Yet even after
all corrections, "gender, race, and 'white male' [status] remained highly
significant predictors" of perceptions of risk. n296 2. Explaining the Diversity From a
feminist perspective, these findings are important because they suggest that risk assessors,
politicians, and bureaucrats -- the large majority of whom are white men
n297 -- may be acting on attitudes about security and risk that women and
people of color do not widely share. If this is so, white men, as the "measurers
of all things," have crafted a system of environmental protection that is
biased toward their subjective understandings of the world. n298 [*80] Flynn,
associated with gender or race could be influencing their findings,

Slovic, and Mertz speculate that white men's perceptions of risk may differ from those of others because in many

women and people of color are "more vulnerable, because they benefit less
they have less power and
control." n299 Although Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz are careful to acknowledge that they have not yet tested this
ways

from many of [society's] technologies and institutions, and because

hypothesis empirically, their explanation appears consistent with the life experiences of less empowered groups
and comports with previous understandings about the roles of control and risk perception. n300 Women and people
of color, for instance, are more vulnerable to environmental threat in several ways. Such groups are sometimes
more biologically vulnerable than are white men. n301 People of color are more likely to live near hazardous waste
sites, to breathe dirty air in urban communities, and to be otherwise exposed to environmental harm. n302 Women,
because of their traditional role as primary caretakers, are more likely to be aware of the vulnerabilities of their
children. n303 It makes sense that such vulnerabilities would give rise to increased fear about risk. It is also very
likely that women and people of color believe they benefit less from the technical institutions that create toxic
byproducts. n304 Further, people may be more likely to discount risk if they feel somehow compensated for the
activity. n305 For this reason, Americans worry relatively little about driving automobiles, an activity with enormous
advantages in our large country but one that claims tens of thousands of lives per year. The researchers' final
hypothesis -- that differences in perception can be explained by the lack of "power and control" exercised by women
and people of color -- suggests the importance that such factors as voluntariness and control over risk play in
shaping perceptions. [*81] Risk perception research frequently emphasizes the significance of voluntariness in
evaluating risk. Thus, a person may view water-skiing as less risky than breathing polluted air because the former is
accepted voluntarily. n306 Voluntary risks are viewed as more acceptable in part because they are products of
autonomous choice. n307 A risk accepted voluntarily is also one from which a person is more likely to derive an
individual benefit and one over which a person is more likely to retain some kind of control. n308 Some studies
have found that people prefer voluntary risks to involuntary risks by a factor of 1000 to 1. n309 Although
environmental risks are generally viewed as involuntary risks to a certain degree, choice plays a role in assuming
risks. White men are still more likely to exercise some degree of choice in assuming environmental risks than other
groups. Communities of color face greater difficulty in avoiding the placement of hazardous facilities in their
neighborhoods and are more likely to live in areas with polluted air and lead contamination. n310 Families of color
wishing to buy their way out of such polluted neighborhoods often find their mobility limited by housing
discrimination, redlining by banks, and residential segregation. n311 The workplace similarly presents workers
exposed to toxic hazards (a disproportionate number of whom are minorities) n312 with impossible choices
between health and work, or between sterilization and demotion. n313 Just as marginalized groups have less choice
in determining the degree of risk they will assume, they may feel less control over the risks they face. "Whether or
not the risk is assumed voluntarily, people have greater [*82] fear of activities with risks that appear to be outside
their individual control." n314 For this reason, people often fear flying in an airplane more than driving a car, even

If white men are more complacent about public

risks, it is perhaps because they are more likely to have their hands on the
steering wheel when such risks are imposed. White men still control the major
political and business institutions in this country. n316 They also dominate
the sciences n317 and make up the vast majority of management staff at environmental agencies. n318
though flying is statistically safer. n315

Women and people of color see this disparity and often lament their back-seat role in shaping environmental policy.
n319 Thus, many people of color in the environmental justice movement believe that environmental laws work to
their disadvantage by design. n320 [*83] The toxic rivers of Mississippi's "Cancer Alley," n321 the extensive
poisoning of rural Indian land, n322 and the mismanaged cleanup of the weapons manufacturing site in Hanford,
Washington n323 only promote the feeling that environmental policy in the United States sacrifices the weak for the
benefit of the strong. In addition, the catastrophic potential that groups other than white men associate with a risk
may explain the perception gap between those groups and white males. Studies of risk perception show that, in

individuals harbor particularly great fears of catastrophe. n324 For this

reason, earthquakes, terrorist bombings, and other disasters in which
high concentrations of people are killed or injured prove particularly
disturbing to the lay public. Local environmental threats involving toxic dumps, aging smelters, or
poisoned wells also produce high concentrations of localized harm that can
appear catastrophic to those involved. n325 Some commentators contend that the
catastrophic potential of a risk should influence risk assessment in only
minimal ways. n326 Considering public fear of catastrophes, they argue, will
irrationally lead policymakers to battle more dramatic but statistically less
threatening hazards, while accepting more harmful but more mundane
hazards. n327 [*84] At least two reasons explain why the catastrophic potential
of environmental hazards must be given weight in risk assessment . First,
concentrated and localized environmental hazards do not simply harm
individuals, they erode family ties and community relationships. An
onslaught of miscarriages or birth defects in a neighborhood, for instance, will
create community-wide stress that will debilitate the neighborhood in
emotional, sociological, and economic ways. n328 To ignore this communal
harm is to underestimate severely the true risk involved. n329 Second,
because concentrated and localized environmental hazards tend to be
unevenly distributed on the basis of race and income level, any resulting
mass injury to a threatened population takes on profound moral character.
general,

For this reason, Native Americans often characterize the military's poisoning of Indian land as genocide. n330 [*85]

Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz challenge the traditional,

static view of statistical risk with a richer, more vibrant image involving
relationships of power, status, and trust. n331 "In short, 'riskiness' means more
to people than 'expected number of fatalities.'" n332 These findings affirm the feminist
claim that public policy must consider both logic and local experience in
addressing a problem. n333 Current attempts to "re-educate" fearful communities with only risk
assessments and scientific seminars are, therefore, destined to fail. n334 By the same token, even dual
approaches that combine science and experience will fall short if the
appeal to experience does not track local priorities and values . Cynthia Hamilton
3. Understanding Through Diversity

illustrates these points in her inspiring account of how a South Central Los Angeles community group, consisting
mainly of working-class women, battled a proposed solid waste incinerator. n335 At one point, the state sent out
consultants and environmental experts to put the community's fears into perspective. The consultants first
appealed to the community's practical, experience-based side, by explaining how the new incinerator would bring
needed employment to the area and by offering $ 2 million in community development. n336 But the community
group found the promise of "real development" unrealistic and the cash gift insulting. n337 When experts then
turned to quantifying the risks "scientifically" their attempts backfired again. Hamilton reports that "expert
assurance that health risks associated with dioxin exposure were less than those associated with 'eating peanut
butter' unleashed a flurry of dissent. All of the women, young and old, working-class and professional, had made
peanut butter sandwiches for years." n338 The sandwich analogy, even assuming its statistical validity, could not
convince the women because it did not consider other valid risk factors (voluntariness, dread, and so on) and
because it did not appear plausible in the group members' experience. In the end, Hamilton explains that the
superficial explanations and sarcastic responses of the male "experts" left the women even more united and

the "science"
of risk assessment, if it is to serve effectively, must include the voices of those
typically excluded from its practice.
convinced that "working-class women's [*86] concerns cannot be dismissed." n339 Thus even

predictions bad
Cover
Linear models of predictions fail. Ramalingam says that the way their linear
predictions are created rely on an a to b to c to impact d idea, but the neg ignores
how these variables influence each other in a non linear function this makes their
shoddy link chain incoherent and inaccurate
there are too many variables to create accurate predictions
1. Balance of power is too complex to be a 1 : 1 ratio
2. Too small of samples to apply empirics
3. It is impossible to predict the catalyst of war
These all are reasons why linear predictions can never be accurate in the context of
IR

Fitzsimmons
We dont reject predictions; we say that linear predictions like the da or inaccurate
because they have a link chain from 5 different journalists who somehow make their
way to extinction the aff also relies on predictions but from a systems perspective.
We use theories backed up by robust data in psychological science.

china threat real/realism inevit

Carafano
This relies once again on the racist research paradigm that justifies us military
intervention literally a quote from this line America won't be respected in the
region if china rises and military initiatives are needed to respond to the threats
engendered by Chinese behavior. This is an exemplification of the impact and fuck
you

Heritage Foundation
First the Heritage Foundation is a racist far right think tank follows the research
paradigm that the 1ac critics. The concept of the china threat and the epistemology
produced through this paradigm is what MAKES us racist xenophobic individuals.
This evidence also doesnt say that china will attack us. All it says is that its
economy is rising and it is becoming a stronger nation the tagging proves that
they fabricate the china threat just for the purposed of sustained military
intervention

Mearsheimer
Even if realism is inevitable we still say that the way we engage china is problematic
this is not an indict to the aff the Anastasiou evidence says that even realists
agree communicative engagement is feasible
The thesis paper from the Song cards from the 1ac was written as an indict to
Mearsheimers china threat theory they just perpetuate the violent epistemology
the aff rejects

complexity theory
Gorka establishing priorities
{answer this arg with the at Cover}
They say that we dont establish priorities and thats why complexity is bad
however while we say complexity theory is good, we still establish priorities the
way in which we engage china is problematic and we change that however the
farfetched disad they read is something we should reject the aff IS the priority

Rosenau
{same as above}
This says that complexity theory leads to simple thinking we are just a rejection of
linear predictions we dont reject all predictions though, we dont completely
detatch from politics because we have a plan and we reject simplicity by embracing
a systems approach to theory building by examining fundamental motivational
processes and how those impact incentive structures in IR.

Gorka heg
This card is a link to the aff it literally says that linear models of predictions are
key to making strategic relationships in which we benefit. The way that their
predictions are made are self-fulfilling prophesy to keep the U.S. strategic position

Phelan
This card just says it is pseudoscience but has no warrant in it. We arent a full
acceptance of complexity we say that their linear predictions are bad, not that all
forms of predictions that exist. If we prove that their internal links arent credible
then that proves that linear predictions are bad

cap
Perm Do Both The perm solves the link by altering the way
we look at engmt while implementing substantive policy
changes that efect material change.
The af is a prerequisite to the alt Traditional IR and sq
political relations ensure competition and economic
competition is the root of their impact arguments. We spill up
to broad cooperation and alter fundamental calculations in
relations that address the desire for competition.
No Link We dont increase the type of engagement their link
discusses. We dont use China instrumentally for resources or
for economic gain. Our open-ended dialogue is not
instrumental, but procedural.
Capitalism is inevitable
Eadie 5 [University of Nottingham critical security professor, Pauline, Poverty And
The Critical Security Agenda, p. 142]
Following Realist notions of state security , it could be argued that human
security operates as a zero-sum game. In order for some sectors of society,
both national and international, to enjoy a level of affluence or to safeguard their
security, others become insecure. This is aided by a neo-liberal formulation of
the problem, which premises the freedom of the market and defends private
property rights. Current World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) (or Bretton
Woods) approaches to poverty, are based on this strategy, they seek solutions
through growth rather than redistribution. However, the free market and the
capitalist ideology under which it operates, is founded on a considerable
degree or permanent insecurity for all the units within it (individuals, firms,
states) (Buzan, 1991, p.235). This is because capitalism, by its very nature, is
competitive, which implies losers as well as winners. Therien states, when discussing
the United Nations attitude to poverty, that It [the UN] condemns the overriding values represented by the cult of
competition and the drive for profit because they engender various forms of social Darwinism and marginalisation
(1999 p. 735) Common or absolute human security is the ideal , where all sectors of
society enjoy a condition of existence in which human dignity, including meaningful participation in the life of the

Such security is indivisible; it cannot be pursued by or for one

group at the expense of another (Thomas, 2001, p. 161). However it becomes difficult
to devise an objective ethical formulation to the problem of how far justice
and equality should be applied as people are generally bad judges where
their own interests are involved (Aristotle, 1992[1962], p.195). In other
words meaningful solutions to poverty are always going to be inhibited
because the rich or powerful will only advocate change to the extent that
does not challenge their own position or interests .
community, can be realized.

The af is a prerequisite to the alt Traditional IR and sq

political relations ensure competition and economic
competition is the root of their impact arguments. We spill up
to broad cooperation and alter fundamental calculations in
relations that address the desire for competition.
Link Turn the new epistemology that the af endorses
condones a more accepting and equal way of negotiation which
deviates from SQ neoliberal epistemologies that say that we
must focus on individual gain, exploitation and coercion.
Institutions are not universal Specific policy changes are key
to social change
Freiwald 1 Susan Freiwald is a professor of law at the University of San Fransico.
Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace: The Case of Intermediary
Liability for Defamation 14 Harv. J. Law & Tec 569, Spring, lexis)
The fight over social policy goal choice often leads analysts to neglect to consider which institution
is best situated to realize a particular social policy goal. 43 Much cyberspace legal scholarship ignores the
institutional mechanism by which particular legal changes should be made. 44 Once the author has described how the new
cyberspace technologies affect operation of the law in practice and has advocated the legal changes required to marry the ideals
of the law with the reality of cyberspace, he or she usually leaves unspecified how the change should come about or
else assumes without discussion that Congress could and should make the change. 45 But ignoring
institutional choice often means creating inferior public policy. In fact, because the different
institutions vary so significantly in their ability to resolve legal conflicts, when a less preferred
institution decides a legal question, the results can be [*582] disastrous. 46 For example, not only
may Congress be ill-suited to make a change, but, once it does, that decision may compromise the
ability of other institutions to solve the problem. The case study tells such a story of institutional failure and the
deplorable intermediary immunity from defamation liability that resulted.

No Link We dont increase the type of engagement their link

discusses. We dont use China instrumentally for resources or
for economic gain. Our open-ended dialogue is not
instrumental, but procedural.
Alt fails Universalizing cap is bad
Pithouse 4 (Richard, a research fellow at the Centre for Civil Society, University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban,
South Africa, Solidarity, Co-option and Assimilation: The necessity, promises and pitfalls of global linkages for
South African movement)
Of course this mistake is not of the same order as the previous generations attraction to Stalinism. On the contrary the anti-capitalist movements in the
North have often developed innovative forms of non-vanguardist democratic organisation that allow for internal diversity and a large degree of
spontaneity. We have much to learn from them. But, nevertheless, a narrative fashionable in the metropole is again being imposed on actual histories and
modes of struggle (and non-struggle) by people with privileged access to the metropole. The result of this is always to disregard the agency and

We need to become militant in our insistence

that theory be subordinated to the lived experience of political life in the way that the tool is subordinated to
experience of the dominated even in the very moment of insurgency.

the artist. People before pure militants It is only when grounded in the ubiquity of resistance that revolution becomes a possibility. - John Holloway 54 The
idea of the multitude has freed many from both the fetish of the proletariat as the only viable agent of challenge to capital and the fetish of the nation as
defender against capital. Given the realities that most resistances in contemporary South Africa are at the point of consumption (basic services, housing,
health care, education 55 etc.) rather than production, and are largely community rather than union driven, as well as the complete immersion of the
South African elite into the transnational elite, these are very welcome releases. Nevertheless there are many reasons why we are not the Negrian
multitude. Antonio Negri believes that the multitude is ontological power. This means that the multitude embodies a mechanism that seeks to represent
desire and to transform the world - more accurately: it wishes to recreate the world in its image and likeness, which is to say to make a broad horizon of

The marginalised, exploited and

dispossessed do have an ontological priority in that they incarnate the experience of
domination. The authentic consciousness, Fanon argues, must recognize that the unemployed man, the starving native do not lay a claim to the
subjectivities that freely express themselves and that constitute a community of free men. 56

truth; they do not say that they represent the truth, for they are the truth. 57 And so the struggle should be by the people and for the people, for the

illusions 59 about the uniform political purity of the

desires of the multitude are a contemporary avatar of a recurring and (often ontologically predatory middle class) desire to
project collective redemptive fantasies onto the marginalised and exploited. Moreover this illusion fails to
outcasts and by the outcasts. 58 However Negris

acknowledge that desire is hardly always for communism 60 or to take into account the simple logic of Zizeks point that desire follows fantasy and so it is
fantasy and not desire that must, in his technical language, be traversed 61 . And changing fantasies, of course, requires changes in consciousness and
not merely the removal of restraint. Writing against the Negrian illusion John Holloway argues that failure to acknowledge the mutual interpenetration of
labour and capital, the multitude and Empire means both to underestimate the containment of labour within capital (and hence overestimate the power of
labour against capital) and to underestimate the power of labour as internal contradiction within capital (and hence overestimate the power of capital
against labour). If the interpenetration of power and anti-power is ignored, then we are left with two pure subjects on either side.For over a hundred
years, communism has suffered the nightmare of the Pure Subject: the Party, the working class hero, the unsullied militant. To resurrect the image of the
Pure Subject, just when it seemed at last to have died the indecent death that it merited, is not just a joke, it is grotesque. We hate capitalism and fight
against it, but that does not make us the embodiment of good fighting against evil. On the contrary, we hate it not just because we adopt the common
condition of the multitude, but because it tears us apart, because it penetrates us, because it turns us against ourselves, because it maims us.
Communism is not the struggle of the Pure Subject, but the struggle of the maimed and the schizophrenic. Unless we start from there, there is no hope. 62
Of course Holloway, the philosopher in revolt against the fetish, fetishises capital and fails to acknowledge pre and extra capitalist forms of domination.
But his argument is important for the problematic at stake here for many reasons. For example there is the simple fact that the cripplingly unreflective

self-righteousness that accompanies the fetish of

the pure subject pushes some movement

debilitating and profoundly unattractive fundamentalisms and sectarianisms 63 that

are more

intellectuals and militants into

a fundamental commitment
to radically resist the brutality of

indicative of

to being radically ontologically superior than a fundamental will

millennial capitalism. Its a curious and revealing fact that people who project fantasies of ontological purity onto the idea of multitude generally
only assume the consequent lightness of being for actually existing human beings when they are part of the same or allied small, covertly vanguardist,

critiques
of the intellectual left sub-culture have generated paranoid and hysterical responses that issue
middle class sects - the same sects that often mediate the relationships between movements. It is telling that there are certain cases where

counter-attacks infused with vastly more vigour than the responses of the same people to physical and ideological attacks on actually existing poor

inhibits self reflective praxis and critical thought about

everything aside from questions of short term strategy and repeats the ultimately disastrous anti-intellectualism
people. 64 The assumption of ontological privilege

that pervaded the anti-apartheid movementespecially so for the ANC and its ally, the South African Communist Party 65 whose intellectuals Too often
celebrating the manichean certainty of the strugglefailed to see its inner contradictions and trajectories. 66 For the discussion at hand it is perhaps
most crucial to note that the lack of critique extends to power relations within and between movements. (Power relations which are already masked by the
discourse of the multitude a discourse that is as ahistorical as the World Banks discourse about the poor. 67 ) The power relations within movements
are sometimes reinforced when they determine, who mediates between the resources of Northern movements and local communities of resistance. The
problem is not just that privileged people are better able to forge international connections. Emissaries from Northern movements often find it easier to
engage with people here who speak their languages and inhabit similar sub-cultural spaces and so local struggle elites become struggle tour guides. We
also need to remember that there are instances in which Northern movements need the political legitimacy of connections with Southern movements and
are willing to achieve this as quickly and easily as possible. Certain people here have a (often but not always unconscious) personal rather than a
collectively political stake in attaching to the glamour, power and relative visibility of movements in the metropole, or in the eye of the metropole, and in
making the exchanges to provide the appearance of that legitimacy. At times this can become more important for such people than the growth and
development of resistance. The way to avoid this is, of course, to ensure that when these negotiations are undertaken in the name of movements they
should be negotiated, in so far as it is possible, on the terrain of the movements and by a revolving set of democratically selected individuals with clear
mandates and responsibilities. At the workshop held to discuss this article it emerged that the APF has developed exemplary practice in this regard. But
the democratic practices developed by the APF need to become a standard criterion for the issuing and accepting of invitations to spaces where
solidarities are negotiated. In other words the practice of inviting individuals rather than asking organisations to elect representatives must cease.
Moreover, because the injection of resources so often lead to suspicion, resentment and division it is essential to ensure democratic accountability 68 at
every stage in their procurement and distribution. 69 The return of manicheanism has also, in some instances, led to a spontaneously unreflective and

hostility to people outside of the sect who seek to spread and/or develop rebellion. And there
are cases where projects that began as a means to an end (e.g. valorising or merely speaking in the name of a certain community, struggle,
organisation or even individual militant; channelling money in a certain direction etc.) have very quickly collapsed into an end in-itself. We
misplaced

have even seen the bizarre spectacle of a well networked person speaking with a pathological self-righteousness in the name of a dead organisation to
alternatively deny and condemn the emergence of a new organisation aimed at taking the same project forward with the same people in a democratically

it is clear that attaching to the symbolic capital of the original organisation and not the
rebellion has become the project for that individual. When enabling and legitimating resources and networks are at stake such
structured way. In cases like this

failures, and their widespread appeasement, become highly political problems. But even when we act within democratic modes of organisation and in the
interest of collective political projects global power relations that manifest in the invisibility of most of humanity can still lead to an internationalism that is
insufficiently reflective about the negotiation of solidarities. The failures of South African movements to match their excellent record of solidarity for
Palestinian resistances with equivalent support for movements battling repression in Swaziland and Zimbabwe, mass eviction in the interests of primitive
accumulation in Namibia and Botswana or the catastrophic plunder in the Congo is telling. 70 Opportunities for solidarities are constrained by the realities
of uneven development but that does not excuse the uncritical reproduction of the hierarchies that produce and feed-off this unevenness. Of course there
are also pressing material factors that severely inhibit dialogical and reflective practice. Moreover increasing state repression and the now constant
consequent struggles to find bail money, together with the more longstanding fact that movements operate on a terrain of systemic and constant crisis a
mass school exclusion this morning, the aftermath of the disconnections the day before, the prospect of a community meeting tonight at which an attempt
will be made to parachute in an newly manufactured ANC organisation to replace a democratic, popular and radical organisation often inhibit
opportunities for reflection and dialogue. But this is no excuse. Consider the 68 It is interesting to note that Peter Dwyers research has found that in the
case of the CCF debate about organisational structure is not imposed from outside or by those with an alleged political agenda as some city based
participants complained it emerges organically. p. 25 Also see naidoo & veriava p.36 for an argument about the popular demand for democratic
organisational structure in the APF. 69 This must also apply to negotiations regarding research projects. The resources, opportunities for networking,
influence and status that accompany research projects can also have a seriously divisive impact on movements. In this regard the practice of some of the
research projects funded by the Centre for Civil Society has left much to be desired. 70 Its equally telling that South African movements have invested
great energy in forming alliances with the Northern parts of the transnational anti-war movement and very little, if any, energy in support of the Iraqi
resistance. 17 circumstances under which Frantz Fanon wrote The Wretched of the Earth or Ruth Firsts description of how Govan Mbekis writing of South

Africa: The Peasants Revolt: was frequently interrupted by police raids, when the sheets of paper had to be hurriedly secreted, or moved away from where
the writer lived and worked, for his and their safe-keeping. A great slice of this book was written on slices of toilet paper when Mbeki served a two month
spell of solitary confinement. 71 Consider also, crucially, the circumstances under which a moment of praxis was reached in the mid 70s. On the one
hand, White leftists working with Black workers to form independent trade unions, on the other young Black intellectuals organizing in the townships and
schools under the umbrella of Black consciousness. Both movements had significant anti-elitist and anti-Stalinist trends, as well as implicit ideas for a

issues which urgently requires more critical attention and dialogue within movements,
and which are of direct relevance to the topic of this paper, are questions about what kinds of transnational linkages we wish
to form, who in South African movements should do this work and with what obligations to the people and movements in whose names they act.
Integration and assimilation coalescing from weakness can mean absorption, betrayal - Stokley Carmichael 73 The new manicheanism of Empire Vs
The Multitude masks very significant power relations between and within extant movements
(and between movements in their swaggering youth and movements struggling to be). This masking is nothing new. When
Marx encouraged the workers of the world to unite he was not thinking about Africans and
Europeans in quite the same way. Hardt and Negri argue that we are located in a movement towards something very similar to what
future society72

Amongst

the many

Bill Gates calls friction free capitalism (which diagnoses as the social fantasy of an ethereal medium of exchange that seeks to repress the Real of
the traumatic social antagonisms that render the space of social exchange pathalogical. 74 ) in a decentred Empire with a deterritorialized apparatus of
domination that has surpassed the old division of humanity into three worlds. In their view the fact that there are glass skyscrapers in the former third
world and shanty towns in the first mean that we are moving towards one global Empire. These claims collapse under their own evident theoretical
contradictions for example, if Empire is deterritoralized how can it be that migration towards its centre is posited as a cause of its future collapse?
Moreover, they also labour under serious empirical inaccuracies. As Giovanni Arrighi notes, the fact that there are shanty towns in the metropole and glass
skyscrapers in the periphery doesnt change the simultaneous fact that the average per capita income in the former Third World as a percentage of that in
the former First World shows a steady decrease from 6.4 in 1960, to 6.0 in 1980 to 5.5 in 1999. 75 It is true that there are nodes that simulate the
external forms of the power and privilege of First World elites in the Third World but this fact can be well understood in the old language of imperialism and
resistance. Frantz Fanon argued that when settler domination is unchallenged the indigenous population is discerned only as an indistinct mass. 76 But
when revolt emerges and can not be put down the settler or colonial elite start to make their deals with the national bourgeoisie. (T)he colonialist
bourgeoisie looks feverishly for contacts with the lite (in order) to carry out a rear-guard action with regard to culture, values, techniques and so on. 77
The colonialists dispense with their overt contempt. Attentions and acts of courtesy come to be the rule. 78 For the nationalist parties: The violent, total
demands which lit up the sky now become modest. 79 The parties proclaim abstract principles but refrain from issuing definite commandsa string of
philosophical dissertations on the rights of people to self determination, the rights of man to freedom from hunger and human dignitytheir objective is
not the radical overthrowing of the systemthey are in fact partisans of order, the new orderto the colonialist bourgeoisie they put bluntly enough the
demand which to them is the main one: give us more power. 80 Colonialism realises that a policy of crude violence is no longer viable. Its confidence
that higher finance will soon bring the truth home 81 allows it to become more elegant. But when spontaneous violent resistance outside of the control
of the anxious nationalist party continues the deal is done. Leaders are released from prison. The time for dancing in the streets has come. 82 In two
minutes colonialism endows them with independence, on condition that they restore order. 83 The colours are trooped and dignity is restored. But for
95% of the population independence brings no immediate change. 84 The warming, light-giving centre where man and citizen develop and enrich their
experience in wider and still wider fields does not yet exist. 85 If the clear contemporary resonance of these critiques of colonial and neo-colonial modes

the system that we inhabit is not one of Empire and is better described by
the term global coloniality used by radical Latin American thinkers to describe an economic-militaryideological order that subordinates regions, peoples and economies world wide via a variety of strategies that include heightened
marginalisation and suppression of the knowledge and culture of subaltern groupsthen one key consequence follows: Rebellion is only real
of simulating an autonomous modernity means that

when it prioritises the flourishing of the agency and intelligence of the dominated the invisible becoming, in Gramscian terms, historical protagonists.
This means, as Jacques Depelchin writes in an essay arguing for fidelity to the tremendous event of the Haitian revolution, approaching politics as the
realm of creativity in which all citizens, in conscience, participate, contribute their ideas from wherever they are, in order to change the situation in which
we are. The world historical event of the November 1999 Seattle protests are enormously encouraging and invigorating but much has to be done to bring
these critical energies into relations of transformative mutuality with the struggles and failures to develop overt struggles in the dominated countries. In

resistances should take their particular social

spaces, in their extant and evolving hybridity, as primary organising principles of solidarity on
the foundation of which wider alliances can be forged. The first is that particular extant culture has more
accessible resources that can be used and developed to articulate and inspire resistances than abstract
universal principle (or old traditions that only excite romantic and nationalist intellectuals). It puts agency
and creativity within the immediate grasp of the marginalised and dominated. This is particularly well argued by Sub-commandante
Insurgente Marcos and part of the project of making rebellion ordinary must be to locate it in the immediate life world of the
the struggles against global coloniality there are a variety of reasons why our
and cultural

dominated. 88 Anything else quickly reduces the poor to the role of stage managed extras in their own struggles. 89 Moreover moving too quickly from
local languages of struggle to allegedly global languages can leave everyone but the militants and movement intellectuals behind. 90 It is also the case
that while all struggles against capital have some common concerns and aims which they are more likely to achieve if they work together the fact remains
that different struggles exist in different places shaped by particular histories and occupying different positions in the global economy and thus have some
particular concerns and aims. Those who face particular challenges in a particular context have a particular interest in working together to develop
understanding and contestation around their problems. Its no surprise that Aim Csaires famous letter of resignation to the French Communist Party

peculiarities of our problems which arent to be reduced

to subordinate forms of any other problem. 91 This is hugely important in the African context where material realities are often
stressed The peculiarity of our place in the world. . . The

radically different to those assumed by global praxis in the metropole. For example digital technologies are not equally democratic everywhere. Or, for a
different kind of example, certain popular strands of autonomism assume that the problem is the control over access and management of social
infrastructure and the solution is to beat the state back. This idea can quiet usefully be imported into urban areas that emerged from apartheid with basic
infrastructure or into future communities based on newly won access to land. But it cant offer much to the destitute urban poor without social
infrastructure or the HIV positive for whom the creation of social resources remains an urgent necessity. And then there is the weight of history a weight
that demands reparation to balance the scales and which is, apparently, entirely disowned by the lightness of being communist in Europe and North
America. If The slave-trade and slavery were the economic basis of the French Revolution 92 is it not possible that contemporary coloniality is the
economic basis of the Northern revolts against market fundamentalism? If this is so we would do well to remember both Bikos well placed scorn for white
and black liberal-pseudo opposition 93 and his under-estimation of the (very few but very effective) white radicals who put their privilege in the service of
the black trade union movement. At this point Bikos critical distinction between assimilation and integration becomes important. Biko is for the integration
of people who are economically, politically and culturally equal but firmly against an assimilation and acceptance of blacks into an already established set
of norms and code of behaviour set up and maintained by whites...I am against the superior-inferior white-black stratification that makes the white a

perpetual teacher and the black a perpetual pupil. 94 In the apartheid context a central reason for Bikos rejection of assimilation is that it denied the
opportunity to create a space autonomous of the factual distortions and pejorative projections of racism in which self-motivated and organised action
could undo internalised inferiority and passivity. Moreover, because oppression operates by undermining the self respect of the oppressed real progress
requires that respect to be won back in struggles by the oppressed. A further reason for the rejection of assimilation is that it increases the likelihood of
the oppressed identifying with their oppressors (which includes liberals whose insincere challenge serves only to legitimate domination and their position
within domination) with the consequence that critical energies would be stifled. This remains disturbingly relevant to contemporary South Africas position
in global power structures where dominant discourses are riddled with phrases like in line with international norms, international experience has shown
and international experts caution which are clearly a coded way of saying that this is the Western way of doing things which is in turn a coded way of

Western

valorising capitalist modes of social organisation. And the reference to the

way of doing things comes with the clear implication that the
information to follow is beyond question. But, as was pointed out in the workshop held to facilitate the writing of this paper, marginalised people also

forms of

suppress their own agency in favour of the uncritical adoption of dominant

rebellion. Sometimes both sides of our drama are played out
in the languages developed for someone elses drama in another world whose wealth and status is built on the poverty and anonymity of our world. We

struggles, including struggles in the North. But what we learn must be taken into our struggles in accordance
not imposed onto our struggles via the condescension of others or our own
inferiority complexes - both of which can normalise the very structural inequalities against which we claim
to be in revolt. It is also the case that movement intellectuals in South Africa are often attracted to fashionable postcolonial and other
ostensibly radical theorists in the North - whose work often assumes a different material reality and which, in some instances, is predicated on
have much to learn from other

with our projects to take them forward more effectively and

a simple contempt for the majority of humanity - at the expense of thinking that takes our situation more seriously. Making a similar point in the South
American context Hosam Aboul-Ela diagnoses: Biko, 1995. p, 24. 22 a general tendency in Anglo-American postcolonialism which has come to show either

paradigms from and intellectual histories of the Global South, preferring instead to understand the matter
the South via the methods of Euro-America. In this sense, postcolonialism can be said to have lapped

disdain or disregard for

of

itself by settling in to many of the practices criticized by Edward Said in his groundbreaking text Orientalism,

a textual attitude and the

that the East proposes and the West

including the adoption of what Said criticizes in eighteenthcentury Orientalists as

reconfiguration of a version of the old colonialist proposition

disposes. 95 The material factors that encourage uncritical assimilation to Northern discourses in no way justifies
what is often, materially and psychologically, a simple case of selling out and buying in. 96 All this comes down to
the fact that we need to seek relationships with global movements that are integrated and not assimilated and to
invest just as much permanent care in not being the assimilators when working with movements in societies on
whom our society is increasingly predatory. However we must be clear that this injunction does not condemn us to
the fictions objectifying and stultifying in equal measure - of liberal or postmodern multiculturalism or nationalist
Manicheanism. People and movements move. That is the nature of being. Fanon explains that even in the
extremities of the struggles against colonialism where settler and native are originally identified as motionless
categories Many members of the mass of colonialists reveal themselves to be much nearer to the national struggle
than certain sons of the nation.Consciousness slowly dawns on truths that are only partial, limited or unstable.
97 In A Dying Colonialism 98 Fanon presents five case studies, including the famous examples of the changing role
of the veil and the radio in Algerian society, each of which shows that there can be a shift from constraining
Manicheanism to dialectical 99 progress with, in Gibsons words, its opportunity for radically new behaviour in both
public and private life, a chance for cultural regeneration and creation where positive concepts of selfdetermination, not contingent upon the colonial status quo, are generated. 100 In the case of medicine Fanon
writes that: Introduced into Algeria at the same time as racialism and humiliation, Western medical science, being
part of the oppressive system, has provoked in the native an ambivalent attitude. With medicine we come to one
of the most tragic features of the colonial situation. 101 Tragic because colonial oppression alienates the colonized
from the technologies deployed in its project of oppression even though they can also be employed in liberatory
projects. For Fanon this disabling Manicheanism must be overcome dialectically: The Algerian doctor, the native
doctor who, as we have seen, was looked upon before the national combat as an ambassador of the occupier, was
reintegrated into the group. Sleeping on the ground with the men and women of the mechtas, living the drama of
the people, the Algerian doctor became a part of the Algerian body. There was no longer that reticence, so constant
during the period of unchallenged oppression. He was no longer the doctor, but our doctor, our technician. The
people henceforth demanded and practiced a technique stripped of its foreign characteristics. 102 I have chosen
this example from Fanons five case studies of dialectical movement away from Manicheanism because of its
relevance to the AIDS issue, which stands, in its monumental catastrophe and well developed resistance, as a great
lesson. Mandisa Mbali argues 103 that Mbeki correctly identifies racist attitudes in some Western discourse around
AIDS but then makes the mistake of rejecting the entire discourse as nothing but racism. We can make a similar
argument with regard to Mbekis correct apprehension of the pharmaceutical industrys ruthless pursuit of profit and
his mistaken rejection of the technologies over which it has seized control. Moreover we can contrast Mbekis failure
with the women that make up the backbone of the Treatment Action Campaigns largest branch which is in
Khayalitsha. They have taken on both the struggle for access to treatment that began in mostly wealthy and white
gay communities in New York and San Francisco and some of the most up-to-date knowledge on anti-retoviral
therapy and work closely with the progressive doctors, Western and African, of the Medecins Sans Frontieres clinic
in Khayalitsha. Both the struggle and the medical knowledge needed to wage it are firmly rooted in their life-world.
There are isiXhosa songs about people who have died, people who have been saved and the struggles and
technologies that have saved them. Fanon concludes his article on colonialism and medicine with the comment that
The people who take their destiny into their own hands assimilate the most modern forms of technology at an
extraordinary rate. 104 And here is the dialectical movement achieved by the TAC the technologies of a

capitalism that has generally objectified and impoverished Africa are absorbed into an African life-world to serve the
interests of people on whos land, labour and communities capitalism has been so violently parasitic. But the critical
point about

dialectical overcoming

is that it

must be permanently worked for in

the vortex

of the drama of lived experience. It is never achieved in permanence. As Raya Dunayavskaya explains in the
context of Hegels thinking of the dialectic: Far from expressing a sequence of never-ending progression, the
Hegelian dialectic lets retrogression appear as translucent as progression and indeed makes it very nearly
inevitable if one ever tries to escape it by mere faith. 105 So when solidarities, local or transnational, do achieve a
useful degree of mutuality - integration in Bikos terms - it can never be assumed that this is permanent. Mutualities
- grounded in the lived experience of struggles and not the postmodern fetish of recognition - must be constantly
worked for. The movement towards mutuality has to be a permanent mode of being. There is no permanent
initiation into mutuality through some transcendent (due, ironically, to its pure immanence!) event 106 like a jol or
a clash with the police. The weight of democracy and the dance of being Walking we ask questions. 107 - SubCommandante Insurgente Marcos In this final section I want to make some brief remarks about the question of who
engages with resource, knowledge and cultural capital carrying global movements, and progressive donors and

Empire Vs The Multitude has no

is the
masking of classed, raced and gendered power diferences within movements that
results in a failure to take these up (which exactly mirrors the liberal will to ignorance attacked by Biko),
their local agents, and under what responsibilities. The Manicheanism of

resources for making sense of power relations within movements. This has two common results. One

that then results in their reinforcement. The other is a self-imposed, disabling and unhelpful reluctance by more
privileged people to act or an equally disabling permanent suspicion from sideways, or much less often, from below.
However Fanon provides a more useful framework for thinking about this. In opposition to both the Leninist idea
that a vanguard party should lead the people and the cult of spontaneity he argues that radical intellectuals and
militants should seek to develop a whole universe of resistances 108 by joining the people in the fluctuating
movement which they are just giving shape to, and which, as soon as it has started, will be the signal for everything
to be called into question. Let there be no mistake about it; it is this zone of occult instability where the people
dwell that we must come; and it is here that our souls are crystallized and that our perceptions and our lives are
transformed with light. 109 So for Fanon liberatory praxis is constructed in the open ended social space that Gibson
describes as the unstable, critical, and creative moment of negativity and transcendence. 110 Fanon makes two
points about this unstable space that are particularly important for this discussion. The first is that the intellectual
must begin from an appreciation of her estrangement. Here he echoes Antonio Gramscis view that: The philosophy
of praxis in consciousness full of contradictions in which the philosopher himself, understood both individually and
as an entire social group, not merely grasps the contradictions but posits himself as an element of the
contradictions and elevates this element to a principle of knowledge and therefore action. 111 But Fanon is clear

the intellectual must neither legislate for the people or be a yesman for the people. He is serious
about mutually transformative dialogue and learning. 112 We must also be clear that this insistence
on dialogue and hostility to vanguardism, overt or covert, does not mean that radical intellectuals or
middle class militants are unwelcome interlopers in movements. On the contrary, they often bring hugely
that

valuable capacities with regard to knowledge, resources, networking and advocacy for movements in elite publics.
This is not necessarily co-opting or predatory. In fact it can be essential and widely enabling political work. As James
noted It is on colonial peoples without means of counter-publicity that imperialism practices its basest arts. 113 In
our enthusiasm to generate or defend our much delayed May 68 114 against the totalising categories of the
Stalinist left we must not collapse into the counter pathology of what Sekyi-Otu calls the postmodern fetish of the
micro-local. This fetish renders impossible both the translation between struggles and the work to find and
communicate the universal in the particular 115 and to continually renegotiate what is considered universal in
dialogue with subaltern particularities. 116 Ashwin Desais exemplary work has shown that this is a project that can
fruitfully be taken on 117 . Without this project there is no chance of a developing a truly global movement of
movements 118 and so we need to take this advance seriously We are the Poors is our intellectual 68. Moreover
while any assumption of a right to leadership via position or charisma and from above or below - is deeply
problematic, it is a long standing reality that The leaders of a revolution are usually those who have been able to
profit by the cultural advantages of the system that they are attacking. 119 The point is simply that these
capacities must be deployed within and in constant dialogue with the movements that nourish the insurgence of
subaltern agency. Self-righteous agonising about privilege is self indulgent. It is the projects to which one dedicates
it that matter. The second point is the necessity for

political education. Fanon recommends a subjective

is necessary to facilitate the development

attitude in organized contradiction with reality 120 because this

of liberatory ideology in dialogue between intellectuals, militants and the broader base of social movements
that can counteract both the hollow rhetoric of both the nationalist middle class and the romanticising, and
potentially retrograde, nativist ideology, with its appeal to traditions. The problem of a lack of liberatory ideology is

to convert the openings created by mass movements into a moment of change a

genuine revolutionary moment. 121 As Gibson explains, the political education project has to battle both
expressed in the failure

vanguardism and the elitism that assumes that the excluded are only capable of a counter brutality against

domination.

Consciousness has to be enlightened as a permanently ongoing dialogical project

that encourages the people to reflect on their own experiences, to think for themselves. 122 The
Education Rights Project 123 is an excellent example of a South African social movement linked project that
undertakes this kind of work seriously and against the still common, although thankfully declining, fetish of pure
spontaneity. The common
understood as

positive

suspicion of organisation amongst South African social movements is well

reaction to our history of authoritarian politics and the production of co-optable

leaders. And in the here and now it is still the case that our often stultifyingly formal meeting culture 124 can act
as a break on the will to rebel and to reflect which is unable to provide the best forum for the enabling of the
articulation of experience, charisma, courage, insight, having fun 125 and, above all, taking action. Meetings can be
very alienating and can also be covertly authoritarian. We should also bear in mind that in some circumstances less
structured forms of interaction can, in practice, be more democratic than meetings. For example, as Ahmed Veriava
and Trevor Ngwanes comments in this volume show, degrees of antagonism can be collectively determined in the

these facts dont absolve us of the duty to

democratic modes of organisation as there is no other way to negotiate broader
solidarities and consequent questions of strategy, representation, resource allocation and so on without
toyi-toyi by the pace of the dance and the choice of songs. But
take up

collapsing into vanguardism. 125 Dwyer notes that the CCF activists he interviewed all highlighted how being in
the CCF was an enjoyable and creative experience. Several older participants contrasted the fun of involvement
with the CCF with dour moments and long-winded speeches that they felt characterised their previous political
experiences in the ANC, SACP and labour and student movements. p. 26. This is a central legacy of the CCF
moment which endures in the praxis of some of the community organisations that were affiliated to the CCF but
not, unfortunately, in the new movement networking forum the ESF. 28 Formal meetings are hardly the forum for

as Zizek
notes, in a truly radical political act, the opposition between a crazy destructive gesture
and a strategic decision breaks down. This is why it is theoretically and politically wrong to
oppose strategic political actstogestures of pure self-destructive ethical
insistence with, apparently, no political goal. The point is not simply that, once we are thoroughly
that reckless physical bravery the makes men follow a leader in the most forlorn causes. 126 And,

engaged in a political project, we are ready to risk everything for it, inclusive of our lives, but, more precisely, that
only such an impossible gesture of pure expenditure can change the very coordinates of what is strategically
possible within a given historical constellation. 127 But none of these facts mean that it is not possible to seriously
take forward political education without sub-ordinating all of political life to the meeting or commitments to a
particular organisation or set of organisations. Different organisational structures are appropriate for different
projects and moments in the unfolding dialectic of resistance as action and reflection. It is also true that, as
emerged in Dangors workshop report referred to above, it is often the case that ordinary grass roots participants
in movements are far more ideologically conservative (in orthodox left terms) than militants and movement
intellectuals. 128 This means that a practice of mutually transformative dialogue may slow down ideologically
movement. But going slower with more people is far better than rushing ahead without a base. Indeed It is force
that counts, and chiefly the organised force of the masses. Always, but particularly at the moment of struggle a
leader must think of his own masses. It is what they think that matters. 129 As James noted with regard to the
French revolution Without the masses the radical democrats were just voices. 130 There is no doubt that many
and perhaps most radical intellectuals and middle class militants act with exemplary democratic commitments in
the absence of movement structures that can produce and sustain dialogical interaction. But there are also
instances in which new hierarchies emerge and there are instances in which these are directly linked to deeply
problematic and sometimes racialised and gendered networks of patronage. 131 (Most commonly the middle class
activist channels resources to one or two docile grass roots activists in exchange for political credibility which in
turn is exchanged for access to prestige, travel, money etc.) Moreover many movements have suffered deeply
disabling splits and suspicions about the access to, and use of, various resources flowing from new opportunities
emerging from Northern money and power. Many of the participants at the workshop held to discuss this paper

The solution may well be for any access to resources,

movements to be determined, rigorously, in
the context of democratic decision making and accountability rather than through unaccountable elite
expressed very serious concerns about these issues.

cultural capital, travel, networks etc offered in the name of

networks within uneven democratic commitments. And a permanent project of political education is necessary to
expand the pool of people who are in a position to usefully attend meetings and so on. Amongst many other
challenges this requires a serious facing up to the dominance of English in spaces of intellectual influence within
movements. 132 But, again, the need for formal structures for democratic decision making and accountability in
certain key areas does not imply that all politics should be subordinated to the meeting. In our struggles for
integration with transnational movements and movement forums we need, as in all our struggles, the hardness of
strategy and the softness of story; the cool of reflection and the warmth of action; the drizzle of the meeting and
the storm of the event. Let seeds be planted, and their coming to life be nurtured, in a thousand soils.

Complexity takes out their root cause argument and proves the perm
solves best
Hendrick 9 (Diane, University of Bradford, Dept of Peace Studies, Complexity Theory and Conflict
Transformation: An Exploration of Potential and Implications, Centre for Conflict Resolution, June)

Sylvia Walby sees in complexity theory the opportunity to re-conceptualise old theories in sociology, making them relevant and useful and transcending dichotomies that have frustrated analysis in the past, while at the
same time reflecting a more realistic picture of social

interactions3. Key is the anti-reductionist analytic strategy of complexity theory and the re- conceptualisation

in the
face of globalisation where the systemness of connections needs to be
studied. Complexity theory provides a way out of the reductionism in sociological
of systems so that the dynamic aspects of the inter-relationships are also included. Walby finds this latter to be particularly important

perspectives, whether expressed in terms of the emphasis on the individual in rational choice theory or an exclusive focus on structures.
Interestingly, in this regard Walby sees a return to some of the concerns of classical sociology: such as combining an understanding of both
individual and social structure, that does not deny the significance of the self-reflexivity of the human subject while yet theorising changes in the
social totality. (Walby, April 2003 p. 2) Here Walby is referring to what she sees as the major strength of most classical sociology where it is
engaged analytically with individuals and social institutions and often several further ontological levels within a single explanatory framework
(Walby, April 2003 p. 2). This strength has been lost at times in sociology but Walby sees complexity theory as providing a means to revive it. Walby

by virtue of the
lack of explanatory power in relation to complex intersections of
relations. It was criticised that agency was neglected in any forms of structural or system-led explanations (Walby, 2007). Nevertheless,
argues that old versions of systems theory, requiring an understanding of systems as nested, fell into disrepute

Walby notes, the essential requirement to conceptualise social interconnections led to the use of systems analyses under other names. Complexity
theories allow a solution to this impasse by utilising a distinction between system and environment, where each system takes all other systems as

systems are not necessarily nested and the parts do

not necessarily constitute one whole: Instead, each social system (whether
economy, polity, violence nexus, or civil society) takes all other systems
as its environment. Likewise each set of social relations (e.g. gender,
ethnicity, class) is a system, taking all others as its environment. Each system, whether domain or set of social relations,
its environment (Bertalanffy, 1968). Here

can have a different spatial and temporal reach. A system does not necessarily fully saturate the space or territory that it is in. This enables us to
think of a set of social relations as not fully saturating an institution or domainit can overlap with other sets of social relations. (Walby, 2007 p.
459) In Walbys conceptualisation of institutionalised domains, they are broadened (and thus even more appropriate to a peace research approach)
where the economy includes not only free wage labour but domestic labour, the polity includes supranational entities and organised religions that
govern areas of life (such as personal life). Her inclusion of the violence nexus as a domain echoes peace research for, as she argues,:
interpersonal violence is so important in the constitution of gender and minority ethnic relations and organized military violence is so important
in the formation of nations and states. (Walby, 2007 p. 459) Walby develops a sophisticated and comprehensive approach to understanding complex
social systems that deserves attention within the field of peace research: Each set of social relations is a system. Examples of sets of social

a social system. Each of these sets of social

relations is not flattened to a culturally reductionist concept of identity, or economically
reductionist concept of class. Each set of social relations of social
inequality is understood as a social system with full ontological depth,
being constituted in the institutional domains of economy, polity,
violence, and civil society. Not only are gender relations constituted in
the economy, polity, violence, and civil society, but so also are ethnic
relations and class relations. These systems of social relations are
constituted at different levels of abstraction; one level is emergent from
another. An individual will participate with a number of different sets of
social relations. These are overlapping, non-saturating and non-nested systems of social relations.
Gender is not contained within class relations ; they are not nested.
Gender relations are a separate system; it overlaps with class, but
neither gender nor class fully saturate the institutional domains . (
relations are those of class, gender, and ethnicity; each is

Walby, 2007 p. 459)

The concept of emergence, where macro-level outcomes are the result of numerous micro- level interactions (and furthermore constitute something new in kind and not predictable from a study of the agents or components

The concept of co-evolution contributes to an understanding of

the relationship between different social systems, previously problematic in sociology, and here downward causation also plays a role. Particularly,
of the system) also provides a way through the difficulties faced in theorising the connections between agency and structure.

where the intersection of inequalities is a concern, where gender,

ethnicity and class play a mutually influencing role in the constitution of
inequality:

decol
1. Perm: Do Both The perm solves the link by altering the
way we look at engmt while implementing substantive
policy changes that efect material change.
2. Their homogenous view of legalism fails the af checks
traditional legalism
Ruskola 13 (Teemu, Professor of Law and East Asian Studies, Legal Orientalism:
China, the United States and modern law, Harvard University Press, 232-235)
The legal imagination of modernity is a global one. In the circulation of
legal Orientalism from Asia to America and back, it is impossible to pin it
down for more than one moment in more than one place. However, while law
is an extraordinarily potent discourse with an imperial history, China as a sign as
well as a political and cultural formation has an equally impressive imperial record
of its own. Hence the future of laws world is, above all, a political indeed, a
geopolitical question. Although the possibilities of politics are always limited in
some ways, by our constrained imaginations as much as by history, the future is
never foreclosed. As the global distribution of universality and
particularity is being recalibrated and there is no question that it is it
would be futile to predict what the new equilibrium might be. Perhaps China
will in fact one day submit to rule- of- law in its modern Euro- American form,
thereby confirming its universality. Or maybe it will recast laws rule in the form of
an evolving Chinese universalism an Oriental legalism, as it were. If law can
resignify China, we must be prepared to accept that China can also Sinify
law. Yet one thing seems clear. As the relationship between U.S. law and
Chinese law continues to be negotiated, the high- flying notion of rule- oflaw hinders that negotiation more than it aids it. Perhaps most
fundamentally, as an idea it is simply too broad and all- encompassing. Inevitably, it
obscures more than it illuminates. To achieve greater precision and to
enable more efective communication across legal traditions, we would do
well to stay away from a quasitheological contrast between rule- of- law
and rule- of- men and replace both with more modest and more definable
concepts instead. As David Kairys believes, Criticism or praise in terms of a
grand, amorphous notion of the rule of law, which we cannot define without
controversy among ourselves, is not constructively focused, useful, or fair.
Admittedly, whether we invoke it directly or not, it is unlikely that we can give
up the rule- of- law versus rule- of- men people dichotomy altogether,
simply through a heroic act of will. This is possibly even desirable. Certainly the
analysis of legal Orientalism in this book suggests that it is the very suppression of
laws contradictions that makes it work. It may be that the very idea of rule- oflaw demands that we regard it in an overwhelming, and overwhelmingly negative,
contrast with rule- of- men. It is entirely possible that honest views of law may result
in psychological changes in how we view it, including a certain loss of faith in laws
purity. A perfectly accurate view of law might in the end undermine its very basis,

insofar as law depends on our faith in its transparence, even transcendence.

Nevertheless, if we wish to take Chinese politics seriously indeed, if we wish
to take ourselves seriously that is the risk we have to accept: the possibility
of discovering that law is as much a religion as a political institution. While
that is a genuine risk, it seems hardly fatal, for it is unlikely that any political
system can function unless supported by the faith of those it governs. As
Antonio Gramsci insists, no political system that relies on sheer domination can last.
To survive, it must be able to produce and reproduce the consent that sustains it,
through the hegemonic institutions of civil society. Law is evidently a critically
important institution in producing the subject of consent, as Chapter 2 emphasized.
In a historical sense, the story told by this book is a genealogy of the universal: a
partial account of how one particular idea of law has become a global standard for
constituting free individual subjects as well as free and democratic states. To point
out the historically contingent nature of this particular political soteriology is to say
nothing about its emancipatory potential. It is, however, to point out that the
freedom of rights is just one kind of freedom, not freedom as such whatever that
might mean and thus to remind us not to give up on other kinds of freedom as
well. Although the discourses of legal Orientalism rely on an opposition
between the universal and the par tic u lar, it does not seem especially
useful to insist that any place or any time is more or less universal than
any other. Rather than identifying law with the universal or the particular,
for that matter it is best seen as a critical transnational discourse that
gives rise to the oppositions it seeks to manage. It is both the universal and
the particular, and the very moment of their making. In the end this book invites the
reader to step back from the present, so overwhelmingly saturated with abstract
talk of rule- of- law, and to consider the longer history of legal Orientalism, both as a
general discourse of Chinese lawlessness and as a specifically American ideology of
laws rule. That history cannot tell us what laws global future will be, or what to
think of either Chinese law or U.S. law as they exist today. It will, however, help us
see both more clearly and aid us in recognizing the stakes in legal comparison. It is
only through a critical awareness of this past and its continuing legacies
that we can understand the world that legal Orientalism has made. This
does not mean that we cannot continue to engage in an impassioned
dialogue about the demands of justice globally and locally. It does mean
giving up laws universalism as the foundation for such a dialogue
without either uncritically assuming or fully rejecting the more par tic u
lar terms in which ideas of justice are ultimately understood, and lived.
Although in late modernity the direction of cross- cultural legal exchange has been
disproportionately from West to East, one heavy symbolic cost of the United States
largely extralegal War on Terror has been that the nations claim to being the chief
custodian of the principle of rule- of- law is less persuasive today than it was at the
end of the Cold War. To be sure, the United States continues to insist that it
represents an ideal legal order. However, its claim to universality is no longer
particularly strong, or at least as particularly strong as it once was. If that is so,
where in laws world is China today? Understanding Chinas past is difficult enough,
even without trying to predict its future. But while China is certainly still regarded in

many ways as sui generis, it also seems that its values are no longer seen as
invariably and necessarily unique that is, they appear to be not quite as
universally par tic u lar as they were only some time ago. Yet even today, while
Chinas claims to economic universality, and even political dominance, are growing
stronger, the idea of Chinese law continues to strike many as an oxymoron,
haunted as it is by a long history of legal Orientalism.
educational and commercial spaces (see Campbell 1998, 6870).

3. Ivory tower DA prioritize material concerns first

theorizing sans action justifies suferingturns their
impacts
Molly Cochran 99, Assistant Professor of International Affairs at Georgia
Institute for Technology, Normative Theory in International Relations, 1999, pg.
272

To conclude this chapter, while modernist and postmodernist debates

continue, while we are still unsure as to what we can legitimately
identify as a feminist ethical/political concern, while we still are unclear
about the relationship between discourse and experience, it is particularly
important for feminists that we proceed with analysis of both the
materia l (institutional and structural) as well as the discursive. This

holds not only for feminists, but for all theorists oriented towards the
goal of extending further moral inclusion in the present social sciences
climate of epistemological uncertainty. Important ethical/political
concerns hang in the balance. We cannot aford to wait for the metatheoretical questions to be conclusively answered. Those answers may be
unavailable. Nor can we wait for a credible vision of an alternative
institutional order to appear before an emancipatory agenda can be

kicked into gear. Nor do we have before us a chicken and egg question
of which comes first: sorting out the metatheoretical issues or working
out which practices contribute to a credible institutional vision. The two
questions can and should be pursued together, and can be via moral
imagination. Imagination can help us think beyond discursive and
material conditions which limit us, by pushing the boundaries of those
limitations in thought and examining what yields. In this respect, I
believe international ethics as pragmatic critique can be a useful ally to
feminist and normative theorists generally

4. The af is a prerequisite to the alt Biased views in IR

theory put the state, not people, at the center of global
politics. Only the af materially afects the motivations
and interests of states to alter their incentives for statecentric thinking. Without the af, realist thought
overpowers the alt and ensures strong institutional biases
coopt and corrupt the alt.
5. No link: we arent imperialist
Kaplan 14 (Robert D., senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security,
In Defense of Empire, TheAltantic) JA
the critique that imperialism constitutes bad American foreign
policy has serious merit: the real problem with imperialism is not that it is
evil, but rather that it is too expensive and therefore a problematic grand
strategy for a country like the United States. Many an empire has
collapsed because of the burden of conquest. It is one thing to
acknowledge the positive attributes of Rome or Hapsburg Austria; it is
quite another to justify every military intervention that is considered by
elites in Washington. Thus, the debate Americans should be having is the following: Is an imperial-like
Nevertheless,

foreign policy sustainable? I use the term imperial-like because, while the United States has no colonies, its global
responsibilities, particularly in the military sphere, burden it with the expenses and frustrations of empires of old.

Caution: those who say such a foreign policy is unsustainable are not
necessarily isolationists. Alas, isolationism is increasingly used as a slur
against those who might only be recommending restraint in certain
circumstances. Once that caution is acknowledged, the debate gets really interesting. To repeat, the
critique of imperialism as expensive and unsustainable is not easily dismissed. As for the critique that imperialism
merely constitutes evil: while that line of thinking is not serious, it does get at a crucial logic regarding the American
Experience. That logic goes like this: America is unique in history. The United States may have strayed into empire
during the Spanish-American War of 1898 and the resultant war in the Philippines. And it may have become an

the United States was

never meant to be an empire, but rather that proverbial city on a hill,
ofering an example to the rest of the world rather than sending its
military in search of dragons to slay. This, as it happens, is more or less the position of the
imperial Leviathan of sorts in the wake of World War II. At root, however,

Obama administration. The first post-imperial American presidency since World War II telegraphs nothing so much

Obama essentially wants regional powers (such as

Japan in Asia, and Saudi Arabia and Israel in the Middle East) to rely less
on the United States in maintaining local power balances. And he wants to
keep Americas enemies at bay through the use of inexpensive drones
rather than the deployment of ground forces. Secretary of State John Kerrys energetic
as exhaustion with world affairs.

diplomacy vis--vis Iran and Israel-Palestine might seem like a brave effort to set the Middle Easts house in order,
thereby facilitating the so-called American pivot to Asia. And yet, Kerry appears to be neglecting Asia in the
meantime, and no one believes that Iran, Israel, or Palestine will suffer negative consequences from the U.S. if
negotiations fail. Once lifted, the toughest sanctions on Iran will not be reinstated. Israel can always depend on its

The dread of
imperial-like retribution that accompanied Henry Kissingers 1970s shuttle
diplomacy in the Middle East is nowhere apparent. Kerry, unlike Kissinger,
has articulated no grand strategy or even a basic strategic conception.
Rather than Obamas post-imperialism, in which the secretary of state
legions of support in Congress, and the Palestinians have nothing to fear from Obama.

appears like a lonely and wayward operator encumbered by an apathetic

White House, I maintain that a tempered imperialism is now preferable.
No other power or constellation of powers is able to provide even a
fraction of the global order provided by the United States. U.S. air and sea
dominance preserves the peace, such as it exists, in Asia and the Greater
Middle East. American military force, reasonably deployed, is what
ultimately protects democracies as diverse as Poland, Israel, and Taiwan
from being overrun by enemies. If America sharply retrenched its air and
sea forces, while starving its land forces of adequate supplies and
training, the world would be a far more anarchic place, with adverse
repercussions for the American homeland. Rome, Parthia, and Hapsburg Austria were great
precisely because they gave significant parts of the world a modicum of imperial order that they would not
otherwise have enjoyed. America must presently do likewise, particularly in East Asia, the geographic heartland of
the world economy and the home of American treaty allies. This by no means obliges the American military to

America must
roam the world with its ships and planes, but be very wary of where it
gets involved on the ground. And it must initiate military hostilities only
when an overwhelming national interest is threatened. Otherwise, it
should limit its involvement to economic inducements and robust
diplomacydiplomacy that exerts every possible pressure in order to
prevent widespread atrocities in parts of the world, such as central Africa,
that are not, in the orthodox sense, strategic. That, I submit, would be a policy direction
repair complex and populous Islamic countries that lack critical components of civil society.

that internalizes both the drawbacks and the benefits of imperialism, not as it has been conventionally thought of,
but as it has actually been practiced throughout history.

6. We empower people to become better advocates to repeal

state policies
Murray 14, PhD Candidate in the Program in Modern Thought & Literature at
Stanford University, Prefiguration or Actualization? Radical Democracy and CounterInstitution in the Occupy Movement,
http://berkeleyjournal.org/2014/11/prefiguration-or-actualization-radical-democracyand-counter-institution-in-the-occupy-movement/
The Occupy movement emerged in response to a devastating economic crisis, bringing economic inequality to the
center of political discourse. But it also emerged in response to a wave of social movements around the world that
toppled dictators, asserted the power of the people and demonstrated their desire to take control of the decisions
that affect their lives. In Occupy, as in all of these movements, the economic and the political were linked.
Participants did not merely demand an end to foreclosures or new redistributive policies to address economic
inequality; they also saw these grievances as symptomatic of a fundamentally undemocratic political system.
Though the interests and motivations of participants in the Occupy movement were highly diverse, at the core it

the underlying goal was to actualize the ideal of selforganizing communities of free and equal persons, expand and deepen democratic
participation in all spheres of life, and increase individuals and communities power over social,
economic and political institutions.[1] But in many ways, Occupy also sought to be a movement of radical
can be read as a movement for radical democracy

democracy. Rather than petitioning politicians to bring about democratizing reforms or building a party that would
hopefully instate democracy after the revolution, activists hoped to bring about a radically democratic society
through radical democratic practice. They sought to prefigure a democracy-to-come, by actualizing radical
democracy in the movement itself. They claimed public spaces as venues in which experiments in radical
democracy could be developed, tested, and propagated. They were spaces in which to organize political action and
in which all were free to participate in agenda-setting, decision-making, and political education through the process
itself. Based on fourteen months of participant-research in two Occupy sites Occupy Wall Street and an outgrowth
of the movement called Occupy the Farm this paper evaluates the different forms prefigurative politics has taken
within the movement.[2] Many

commentators have lauded the movement as an example of

prefigurative politics, which they see as the cutting edge of contemporary radical politics .[3]
However, an overemphasis on the value of prefiguration can be debilitating,

leading to a focus on internal movement dynamics at the expense of

building a broader movement, and a focus on symbolic expressions of
dissent as opposed to the development of alternatives to actually replace
existing political, economic and social institutions . Occupy Wall Street (OWS)
suffered this fate, partly due to the perception that the encampment and the decision-making
procedures were prefigurative, and the perception that prefigurative politics itself will lead to revolutionary
transformations in the political, economic and social structure. While Occupy Wall Street foundered on

the prefigurative obsession with movement process , a group of activists, students and
local residents in the San Francisco Bay Area have sought to overcome these challenges .
they have worked under the banner of Occupy the Farm (OTF) to create an
agricultural commons on a parcel of publicly owned land . Unlike OWS, OTF has worked to establish a
Since 2012,

counter-institution grounded in material resources and production, that is ultimately meant to increase participants
autonomy from the state and capitalism. In this way it has been able to link radical democracy and economic justice
in a material way, rather than merely symbolically. As it is generally practiced and conceptualized today,

prefigurative politics is an inadequate framework for developing radical

democratic political strategy . Instead of prefiguration, we should redirect our efforts
toward developing and linking democratic counter-institutions that produce
and manage common resources. Occupy the Farm illustrates some of the potential
and the challenges of such a strategy.\

7. Their alt solves their link but not their impact Thinking
diferently about decolonization doesnt remove
colonizing policies. The impact is about the material harm
from colonization & they dont have a vehicle for changing
institutions or structures that actualize colonialism.
8. Vague alts are a voting issuethey let the neg become a
moving target and spike out of all af ofense and promote
impracticable solutions instead of specific, directed action
9. Globalization makes war less likely and benefits the
poorest of nations
Pirie 12 (Dr. Madsen, researcher, founder and current President of the Adam
Smith Institute, Ten very good things 9: Globalization, Adam Smith Institute,
10/12) JA
globalization is turning the world into an integrated
economy instead of what it has been for most of its history, a series of
relatively isolated economies. The more trading that takes place, the
more wealth is created, and global trade across international frontiers has
created more wealth than ever before in human history, and had helped
lift more people out of mere subsistence than ever before. To poorer
countries globalization brings the chance to sell their relatively low cost
Over the course of decades,

labour onto world markets. It brings the investment that creates jobs, and
although those jobs pay less than their counterparts in rich economies,
they represent a step up for people in recipient countries because they
usually pay more than do the more traditional jobs available there. To people
in richer countries globalization brings lower cost goods from abroad, which leaves them with spending power to

It also brings opportunities for productive

investment in high growth industries in developing countries. Those adversely
spare and a higher standard of living.

affected by the global exchanges are the people in rich countries whose output is now undercut by the cheaper
alternatives from abroad. They often need to find new jobs or to be retrained to do work that adds higher value.

The extra wealth generated by globalization has brought an increase in

service sector employment, which provides many of the new jobs needed.
Competition from abroad forces firms to become more efficient and to use
resources more efficiently. Often they choose to go upmarket, seeking higher added value products
that face less competition from relatively unskilled labour. Thus firms which once sold cheap textiles move into

The
integration of the world economy has brought with it an interdependence.
As countries co-operate in trade with each other, they get to know each
other and grow into the habit of resolving disputes by negotiation and
agreement instead of by armed conflict. The 19th Century French economist Frederic Bastiat
expressed this pithily: "Where goods do not cross frontiers, armies will."
fashion and design, and find customers among the rising middle classes in developing countries.

10.
Globalization is not the same thing as imperialism
dont let them get away with you globalize or trade
links.
Machan 2 (Tibor R. research fellow at Hoover institution, Monday, February 11, 2002,
Globalization versus Imperialism http://www.hoover.org/research/globalization-versusimperialism

Globalization, some say, is a form of imperialism. Along with the supposed invasiveness of
American culturevia Hollywood movies, McDonald hamburgers, and Coca Cola products globalization is
seen by some as the equivalent of international aggression. A similar charge was
made some years ago at a United Nations conference in Vienna; representatives of some nondemocratic
nations complained that the idea of human rights was intrusive and
imperialistic and thus threatened the sovereignty of their countries. Some serious
political thinkers still object to the very notion of universal ethical and political principles, as if human beings as
such didn't share some basic attributes that imply certain guidelines for how they should live .

To charge that
globalization is imperialistic is like claiming that liberating slaves imposes a
particular lifestyle on the former slaves. Globalization, in its principled
application, frees trade. Barriers are removed and restraint on trade is
abolished, both the opposite of any kind of imposed imperialism. The idea
that economic principles are culturally relative confuses highly variable
human practices with ones that are uniform across all borders. The
production and exchange of goods and services are universal. The political
contingencies of various societies, born often of power, not reason, distort such universality by imposing arbitrary
impediments. Slavery, the subjugation of women, and the prohibition of wealth transfer from parents to offspring

American
intellectuals often fail to appreciate the country's goal of establishing a
are examples of conditions not natural to human liferather they are artifacts of ideologies.

political ideal for human beings in general, not for blacks, whites, women,
Catholics, or Muslims. This ideal, when exported, is the farthest thing from
imperialism. It is, in fact, the closest we have ever come to bona fide human liberation (a term
inappropriately adopted by Marxists who mean to impose a one-size-fits-all regime). Globalization has thus not been
effectively linked with what is at its heart, namely, human liberation. Because some schemes have been mislabeled
as cases of "globalization," the genuine article has tended to acquire a bad reputation. But those are exceptions. To
globalize has been to spread freedom, particularly in commerce but also in politics and civil life. Genuine
globalization should be supported not only because it is economically prudent but also because it is consistent with
a basic human aspiration to be free. This is no threat to cultural diversity, religious pluralism, or the great variety of
benign human differences with which globalization can happily coexist. Only those who wish to impose their
particular lifestyle on the rest of us would fear globalization and the spread of human freedom.

epistemic anxiety
No link the af is a nuanced evaluation of the way that
western academia constructs china and how that shapes the
way we interact the af is an attempt to deconstruct notions
of security
Perm do both the af challenges status quo conceptions of
china no reason why we cant engage in communicative
engagement and forge new IR theory
Perm do the plan then the alt the anastasiou evidence is so
good when we discuss tactics for desecuritization on both a
macropoltical and micropolitical level we can begin to
deconstruct us/them discursive practices with china, the af is
the linchpin to deconstructing the current epistime
Perm the alt when we forget the way that normative
international relations functions and get rid of the discursive
representations of china as other, we are able to engage with
communicative engagement where refuse to represent china
as someone that must be coerced.
the line by line
1. The turner 14 evidence says that we must examine our epistemological
position of china the aff does this we say that the way that squo ir
depicts china is problematic for numerous reasons probably a
justification for the perm
2. They say zhang but wqe do not see china as a problem or a paradox. We
critique the representations of china as a threat or an opportunity the
new epistemology introduced by the 1ac is a link turn to this card
3. They say chow but we dont use traditional IR theory we think that ir
theory is problematic
4. They say burke and this flows aff, it talks about how quote coercive
deiplomacy in policy making is what leads to the impacts we concede
that the china threat is what leads to environmental destruction, was, and
the loss of vtl
5. They say bleaker but the card says that it is necessary to open up
dialogical understandings that is the aff. The alt in itself fails because all
it does is forget ir not forge new paths to change ir theory in the real
world.

Also, communication-oriented foreign policy empirically yields

the best results in foreign policy. The af radically shifts the
underlying epistemology of international relations that
necessitates the academic isolation of china.
Lynch 2 (Lynch, Marc. Williams College. Why Engage? China and the Logic of
Communicative Engagement. European Journal of International Relations 2002; 8; 187).

empirical claims made for communicative engagement rest on

theoretical arguments about each of engagements goals revealing preferences,
shaping preferences and creating stable institutions. This conception of engagement begins
from the goal of achieving communication, rather than the goal of noncoercive manipulation. Communicative engagement more efectively
reveals the preferences of each side regardless of whether an actor would prefer to bluff.
Change in beliefs which is internalized through persuasion, the accepting of reasons or some other
mechanism of socialization will be more likely to produce durable changes in state
behavior (Checkel, 1997; Cortell and Davis, 2000).1 Finally, dialogue ofers an important
route towards the development of mutually acceptable institutions, although
The

the nature of these institutions contrasts sharply with the goal of the socialization of a weaker state (China) into

USChina dialogues have generated such

hostility and skepticism in large part because of this tension in the
underlying theoretical assumptions about engagement. Conservative critics
raged that appeasement doesnt work (Charles Krauthammer), dismissed it as a sham
norms and institutions established by the stronger.

(Michael Kelly), blasted it as fundamentally dishonest (Arthur Waldron). Robert Kagan and William Kristol

dismiss military to military contacts as unequal exchanges where we

share a great deal of information with them while they share nothing with
us (2001: 11). At a more academic level, David Shambaugh concludes that dialogue may increase clarity and
understanding even if it does not narrow differences but those Americans who interact with the PLA, officially
or unofficially, should be under no illusion about the depth of Chinas suspicion and animosity toward the United

Human rights campaigners express concerns that bilateral

dialogues are an inefective alternative to international pressure through
multilateral action which is marred by a lack of transparency, accountability or clear benchmarks for
progress (HRIC, 1998; Kent, 1999). To evaluate these claims it is necessary to rethink
both the theoretical foundations and the empirical record of engagement .
These criticisms of the practice of engagement should not be taken as a
fatal critique of engagement itself. The inadequacy of practice represents a
point of entry for a critical theory of engagement. Rationalist analysis relies
on a strategic conception of rationality, in which actors seek the best strategy
for realizing predetermined preferences. Habermas introduces communicative
action as a distinctive mode of rational action, in which the orientation is
toward seeking understanding rather than towards achieving immediate
goals (Habermas, 1984: 286). Critics of Habermas have challenged the distinction
between communicative and strategic action, arguing that he unnecessarily
excludes the social from strategic interaction, while neglecting the purposive
elements of commu- nicative action (Schiemann, 2000: 36; Johnson, 1991, 1993).
Habermas has defended the distinction by defining modes of actions in terms of
ends rather than means strategic action is defined by the orientation
towards achieving predefined egoistic ends, treating the other as an
States (1999/2000:

object to be manipulated, while communicative action is characterized by

the orientation towards achieving understanding, treating the other as an
equal participant. He distinguishes mere communication the exchange of
information from communicative action, which can... be distinguished from
strategic action in the following respect: the successful coordination of
action does not rely on the purposive rationality of the respective individual
plans of action but rather on the rationally motivating power of feats of
reaching understanding, that is, on a rationality that manifests itself in the
conditions for a rationally motivated agreement. (1998: 222) In other words,
communicative engagement involves an orientation towards coming to
understanding over the conditions of interaction rather than an
orientation towards achieving immediate self-interest. In such a dialogue,
only the force of the better argument should prevail, as actors abstract from
their identities and set aside power considerations in their joint pursuit of
understanding. In contrast to strategic action, in which one actor attempts
to change the others behavior, communicative action allows for the
possibility that both actors might change in the course of their dialogue .
Public deliberation under conditions approaching conditions of the free
exchange of reasoned argument among equals which produces working
consensus on underlying principles of interaction but not necessarily on
distributive outcomes ofers the route most conducive to establishing
cooperative and mutually beneficial relations.

fiat double bind

1. Fiat is an integral part of debate - make them contextualize the
argument specifically in the instance of our impacts and not fiat
alone
The song ev is a disad to the k the way that we depict china
in academic debates shapes the way that we orient our politics
our radical epistemic shift away form squo ir makes us better
humans outside of politics
2. Dont mandate roleplayingdont let them recontextualize this
evidence.
3. We will internal link turn tyrannyunderstanding the levers of
power are key to adjusting them. People become pacified by a
lack of understanding. Building confidence in institutional
understandings is key to motivating people as political subjects.
4. No logical trade offI can say the state should do something and
then go out and make the state do that thing. Making a demand
does not preclude also taking an action.
5. Ressentiment is goodbeing angry at the world serves to
motivate people towards political change. The civil rights
movement didnt happen because everyone was happy.
1. This molar thinking dooms the alternative to reproduce
the hierarchal structures we critique.
Guattari and Rolnik, schitzoanalysts, revolutionaries, 1986 [Felix and Suely,
Molecular Revolution in Brazil, p. 120-121]
Comment: It's good that you mentioned those homosexuals who worked within the system as lawyers and

Here, everyone looks down on the institutional part. Guattari: That's

silly. Comment: They think that dealing with the institutional side is reformism, that it doesn't change anything. As
succeeded in shaking it up.

far as they're concerned, the institutions should be ignored because only one kind of thing is worthwhile, anarchism
which I question deeply. I think it's very naive, as you yourself say, to ignore the state on the basis that "it's
useless," or "it oppresses us," and therefore to leave it aside and try to do something totally from outside, as though

malaise in relation to institutions is

nothing new; on the contrary, the feeling is particularly strong in our generation which, since the 1960s, has
it might be possible for us to destroy it like that. Suely Rolnik: This

taken institutions as one of its main targets. But it's true that the malaise has been especially pronounced in Brazil
over the last few years, and in my view this must have to do with an absolutely objective (and obvious) fact, which
is the hardness of the dictatorship to which we were subjected for so long. The rigidity of that regime is embodied in
all the country's institutions, in one way or another; in fact, that constituted an important factor for the permanence
of the dictatorship in power over so many years. But I think that this antiinstitutional malaise, whatever its cause,

the feeling that the institutions are contaminated territories, and

the conclusion that nothing should be invested in them, is often the expression of
a defensive role. This kind of sensation is, in my view, the flip side of the fascination with the
institution that characterizes the "bureaucratic libido." These two attitudes really satisfy the
same need, which is to use the prevailing forms, the instituted, as the sole, exclusive
parameter in the organization of oneself and of relations with the other , and thus avoid
succumbing to the danger of collapse that might be brought about by any kind of change. Those are two styles
doesn't end there:

of symbiosis with the institution: either "gluey" adhesion and identification (those who adopt this
style base their identity on the "instituted"), or else repulsion and counteridentification (those who adopt
this style base their identity on negation of the "instituted," as if there were something "outside" the institutions, a

both "alternativism" and

"bureaucratism" restrict themselves to approaching the world from the viewpoint of its
forms and representations, from a molar viewpoint; they protect themselves against accessing the
molecular plane, where new sensations are being produced and composed and ultimately force the
creation of new forms of reality,. They both reflect a blockage of instituting power, an impossibility of surrender
to the processes of singularization, a need for conservation of the prevailing forms, a difficulty in gaining
supposed "alternative" space to this world). Seen in this light,

access to the molecular plane, where the new is engendered. It's more difficult, to perceive this in the case of
"alternativism," because it

involves the hallucination of a supposedly parallel world that emanates the

unfettered autonomy and freedom of creation; and just when we think we've got
away from "squareness" we risk succumbing to it again, in a more disguised form .
In this respect, I agree with you: the institutions aren't going to be changed by pretending
that they don't exist. Nonetheless, it's necessary to add two reserves. In the first place, it's obvious that not
illusion of

every social experimentation qualified by the name of "alternative" is marked by this defensive hallucination of a
parallel world. And secondly, if we think about the context of the dictatorship, it's self-evident that in order to bear
the harshness of an authoritarian regime there is a tendency to make believe that itdoesn't exist, so as not to have
to enter into contact with sensations of frustration and powerlessness that go beyond the limit of tolerability
(indeed, this is a general reaction before any traumatic experience). And in order to survive, people try in so far as
possible to create other territories of life, which are often clandestine.

fem ir
The af is a prerequisite to the alt SQ engagement and
traditional IR use force to impose our will on China. The plan
changes that. Their link is generic to the state, not particular
to our mode of engagement that alters incentive structures
and interests. Thats Goldstein & Glaser.
The af is the alt Prioritizes listening
Ackerly, Stern, & True 6 [Brooke Ackerly, Assistant Professor in the Department of Political
Science at Vanderbilt University. Maria Stern, a Lecturer and Researcher at the Department of Peace and
Development Research, Goteborg University. Jacqui True, Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Studies at
the University of Auckland, New Zealand. Feminist Methodoliges for International Relations Cambridge University
Press]

ERH

Feminists claim no single standard of methodological correctness or feminist

way to do research (Reinharz 1992: 243); nor do they see it as desirable to construct one. Many
describe their research as a journey, or an archeological dig, that draws on different methods or tools
appropriate to the goals of the task at hand, or the questions asked, rather than on any prior methodological
commitment more typical of IR social science (Reinharz 1992: 211; Charlesworth 1994: 6; Jayaratne and Stewart
1991: 102; Sylvester 2002). Feminist knowledge-building is an ongoing process ,
tentative and emergent; feminists frequently describe knowledge-building as emerging through conversation with

Many feminist scholars prefer to use the

term epistemological perspective rather than methodology to indicate
the research goals and orientation of an ongoing project , the aim of which is
to challenge and rethink what is claimed to be knowledge , from the
perspectives of womens lives (Reinharz 1992: 241). Feminist scholars emphasize the challenge to and
texts, research subjects, or data (Reinharz 1992: 230).6

estrangement from conventional knowledge-building caused by the tension of being inside and outside ones

feminist knowledge has emerged from a deep

skepticism about knowledge which claims to be universal and objective but
which is, in reality, knowledge based on mens lives, such knowledge is
constructed simultaneously out of disciplinary frameworks and feminist criticisms of
these disciplines.7 Its goal is nothing less than to transform these disciplinary frameworks and the knowledge
to which they contribute. Feminist inquiry is a dialectical process listening to
women and understanding how the subjective meanings they attach to their
lived experiences are so often at variance with meanings internalized from
society at large (Nielsen 1990: 26). Much of feminist scholarship is both transdisciplinary and avowedly
discipline at the same time. Given that

political; it has explored and sought to understand the unequal gender hierarchies, as well as other hierarchies of
power, which exist in all societies, and their effects on the subordination of women and other disempowered people
with the goal of changing them.8 I shall now elaborate on four methodological perspectives which guide much of
feminist research: a deep concern with which research questions get asked and why; the goal of designing research
that is useful to women (and also to men) and is both less biased and more universal than conventional research;
the centrality of questions of reflexivity and the subjectivity of the researcher; and a commitment to knowledge as
emancipation.

Perm Do Both The perm solves the link by altering the way
we look at engmt while implementing substantive policy
changes that efect material change.
The alt fails Rollback
Resurreccin 13 (Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI), Asia Centre, Thailand Gender & Development Studies, Asian Institute of Technology, Thailand)
[Persistent women and environment linkages in climate change and sustainable development agendas, Women's Studies International Forum, 40 (2013) 3343
http://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/31313283/WSIF_Persisitent_women_and_environment_in_CC.pdf?
AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAJ56TQJRTWSMTNPEA&Expires=1467498012&Signature=q7v0ZeW34narH1tP8Ehxw6na6KQ%3D&response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename
%3DPersistent_women_and_environment_linkage.pdf, 7-2-16. IB.]

5 Feminist

engagements with development and environment institutions

have been problematic. Sen (2006), for instance, points out that powerful
institutions may adopt gender agendas but ultimately control how
discourses about gender are to be deployed and used. Cornwall (2007: 7)
similarly point out the domestication of feminist ideas and languages to fit
the exigencies of agency procedures and priorities. As a case in point,
Bistuer and Cabo (2004), compared the discursive space of gender in the
official UNCED Agenda 21 and Women's Action Agenda 21, which was
drafted a year earlier in The World Women's Congress for a Healthy Planet in Miami attended
by 1500 women who drew up demands for UNCED in the following year, 1992. Following the drafting of Rio's Agenda 21, many were
disappointed that the original vision of a social, economic and ecological revolution articulated earlier in

Miami was downplayed in favour of a notion of sustainable development

as a readjustment of the hegemonic economic growth model using the
environmental correctness criteria (Bistuer & Cabo, 2004: 218; see also
Boyle & McEachern, 1998). Equally noteworthy, Bistuer and Cabo (2004)
noted that Rio's Agenda 21 views women and minorities as lowly situated
and needing educational and family planning programmes, contrasting
sharply with the earlier Women's Agenda 21 that underscored women's
agency in bringing about sustainable development. Of these gender
insertions in Rio's Agenda 21, they grimly remark: the existence of the
other has been recognized, but this other is not a subject in its own
right (Bistuer & Cabo, 2004: 214).

Alt fails without legal change Institutions key

McCormick 7 (Marcia, Assistant Professor, Samford University, Cumberland
School of Law, TOO PURE AN AIR: LAW AND THE QUEST FOR FREEDOM, JUSTICE,
AND EQUALITY: ARTICLE: THE EQUALITY PARADISE: PARADOXES OF THE LAW'S
POWER TO ADVANCE EQUALITY, 13 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 515)
law has a specially cabined place in any social movement .
The law serves some important social values that, together with grassroots work,
can make effective change. The key is that the majority of resources usually need to
be devoted at the grassroots level. Law is the appropriate tool to fix problems that the law alone has
This critique of law means only that

caused. For example, if the only relief that gay men and lesbians want is access to military jobs, and the only thing
keeping them from those jobs is a law that prohibits their service, removing that law will accomplish that goal. The

The law also has an expressive

function that communicates what we as a society value and what we do
not value. n146 And so for the law to penalize something tells each of us that the thing penalized is not
kinds of problems that are caused by law alone, though, are few.

something we should value, and it may help to shape our belief systems in that way. n147 The longer the law has

The expression of a value through law may also

energize the grassroots movement or opponents of the movement. n148 The law also plays a
existed, the more effective this value may be.

vital evolutionary function. Each incremental development in the law creates a new
starting point from which to move forward . The cases striking down desegregation in
one context after another, culminating in Brown, demonstrate that process .
Additionally, one reason that women were able to eventually be protected by the Equal
Protection Clause was because the courts had developed that area of analysis in the
context of the Black rights movement first. And, one reason that the Court was able
to strike down same-sex sodomy laws n149 was because it had developed a line of
cases protecting bodily integrity and sexual autonomy for women. [*543] Finally, the law
can also operate as a backstop against backlash or ebbing of activism . Once the law
is there, it continues to operate - or at least express its values - even if a countermovement begins to protest it, and even if the original social movement loses
support for continued forward momentum. At some point, these factors might create a change in
the law, but until they do, the law continues to have some force. And so, law has a role in social
movements, but it lacks the power to make the kind of immediate transformation that we often expect it to. For
that reason, social movements should be very strategic about how they allocate their
resources to its pursuit.

The af essentializes gender categoriesmakes violence

inevitable
Carpenter 2 [R. Charli Carpenter is Assistant Professor at the University of
Pittsburgh's Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, Gender Theory in
World Politics: Contributions of a Nonfeminist Standpoint?, International Studies
Review, Vol. 4, No. 3 (Autumn, 2002), pp. 153-165 JSTOR]
A reading of Tickner's text, with an eye to the hidden assumptions within feminist
discourse, reveals a perpetuation rather than a questioning of certain gender
stereotypes. This is indicative not so much of Tickner's substantive summary but of the linguistic and
philosophical structure of the feminist subfield. For example, the notion that women but not
men are located as caretakers (pp. 50, 106) is a gendered construction that should
be destabilized, perhaps through an emphasis on "parents" rather than "mothers."
The trope "civilians now account for about 90 percent of war casualties, the majority of whom are women and
children" (p. 6) is a gendered construction of the "civilian" that flies in the face of, among other things, refugee
statistics and the widespread targeting of civilian men and boys for massacre in armed conflicts around the

Men as gendered subjects seldom appear in feminist work: of the now

numerous IR feminist books on "gender and world politics," almost none deal
explicitly with men and masculinity.5 When "masculinities" are dealt with, they are
conceptualized as a social problem; conversely, "femininities" have been greatly undertheorized,
often dropping out of phrases like "men and masculinities ... and women" (p. 134).6 Where the term
"gender violence" is used to mean "violence against women" (p. 114), other forms
of gender violence-such as against gays, against male partners by women or men,
or against children deemed "illegitimate" by a patriarchal system-are rendered
invisible, thus truncating the use of gender analytically .7 When "family violence" is
world.4

portrayed as violence against women and children, it obscures abuse of children at the hands of female adults
(pp. 63, 113). The fact that, as Tickner writes, "feminists have been reluctant to take on the question of paid
domestic service ... since it is women who usually employ, and often exploit, other women" suggests the quandary

Writing with a
declared agenda for promoting the interests of all women, feminists run up against
empirical and theoretical difficulties when the results of gender in operation conflict
that feminists encounter as simultaneously normative and explanatory researchers.

with their normative agenda. Tickner's comments on the "democratic family," for example (p. 123), have
important implications not just for husband/wife relations, but also for the license women may take with their
children. Therefore, it may not follow that understanding gender and overcoming the hierarchies it generates
may always coincide with promoting the liberties of women or the "satisfaction of women's needs" in every
context.8 If IR feminism is focused more on some areas of political life than on others, this should not be read as

feminists would be the first to emphasize

that no theory is value-neutral and detached from its political agenda. If feminist
theory is for the purpose of exposing, addressing, and ending women's
subordination, it will naturally be constructed and channeled in accordance with
that agenda. This is not a criticism of feminism (for this agenda is entirely
legitimate) so much as it is a challenge to the monopoly of feminist IR on gender
studies in IR theory. It is not for feminists to change more than is digestible within the emancipatory
an indictment of the subfield. Like other critical theorists,

framework to which they are committed, but it is the task of those not writing within that framework to recognize
and appropriate gender as an analytical instrument, separate from feminism as a critical discourse, within the

many feminists are skeptical of the possibility of

nonfeminist gender theory. Such developments have been seen as attempts to
"co-opt feminist analyses and to accommodate women within the prevailing
conception of IR [that] feminists must resist." 9 This sentiment has been echoed repeatedly in
scope of their own analyses. Yet

feminist work, especially in response to those few nonfeminist attempts to bring gender into the mainstream.

According to this perspective, attempts to incorporate feminism into the

mainstream "can be understood as an attempt to favor (certain parts of) the
mainstream by dividing and conquering the new opposition ." Research on gender
in IR faces a conundrum. Feminist approaches-while rich, diverse, and a much
needed critique-are substantively narrow as their emphasis is women in world
affairs rather than international politics itself. Yet scholars working in nonfeminist
traditions face disciplinary barriers to appropriating "gender" in conventional
frameworks.

The state is crucial to reducing gender violence and the k is

essentialist
Verloo 5 (Mieke, Senior Lecturer in Political Sciences and Gender Studies at Radboud University Nijmegen
and Research Director of an EU-funded comparative research facility, Displacement and Empowerment:
Reflections on the Concept and Practice of the Council of Europe Approach to Gender Mainstreaming and Gender
Equality, Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State and Society 12.3 (2005) 344-365)

NGOs, interest groups, and pressure groups (an

interesting choice of words avoiding reference to the feminist movement). These groups are all seen as part
of the "external actors" that can be engaged in gender mainstreaming , but their role is
conceptualized as rather limited. The report gives these groups a role in supporting the
strategy of gender mainstreaming, e.g., helping to create political will (p. 21), in
being a source of knowledge, in influencing the political agenda, or in keeping
gender mainstreaming high on the political agenda (p. 34). Even if there is some
recognition of the importance of NGOs, interest groups, and pressure groups in
improving the democratic quality of society, these groups are mentioned mainly as
part of the universe of actors that "can" be involved whenever the report is becoming more
The report is vague when it comes to the role of

prescriptive. There is no direct reference to the need to give voice to the feminist movement or to those suffering
from gender inequality. The report distinguishes between three types of techniques and tools for gender
mainstreaming. It states that often the gender problematic is not recognized as a problem, pointing at the
importance of analytical tools such as statistics, research, checklists, or Gender Impact Assessments. Next to these
analytical tools, educational techniques and tools such as training, awareness-raising, manuals, or experts are seen
as needed. The last type mentioned is about consultation and participation "of the various partners concerned by a

given policy issue." This type of tools includes think tanks, hearings, expert meetings, databases, and the
participation of both sexes in decision making. Partly because of the avoidance of expressing a preference for any
tools, and partly because of the wording used, the techniques and [End Page 351] tools mentioned position gender

There seems to be no reference at all to the possibility of

opposing political ideas on feminism or on gender equality. NGOs are hardly
mentioned in connection to any of the tools, and then only as experts, lobbyists,
and watchdogs, and the feminist movement is not mentioned at all. The expertise
mentioned seems to be unrelated to normative (feminist) beliefs. Even if implicit , this is a choice to
present the gender mainstreaming strategy as "beyond politics," as something that
just needs to be done. Unfortunately, politics does not disappear when
ignored (Bjrk 2002). The presentation of gender mainstreaming as technocratic
implies that as a strategy, it potentially excludes certain political actors, the most
important one being the feminist movement. There is simply no conceptual space
for feminist groups in the strategy as it is conceptualized . On the contrary, feminist
academics in their role as "possessing gender expertise" have a comfortable
position within the strategy, as long as they are willing to present their expertise as
"objective." Such a role in silencing the expression of feminist ideas is detrimental
to feminist political debate. As Mara Kuhl has argued, gender mainstreaming will
fundamentally and in many ways alter the interaction between the
women's movements and the state (Kuhl 2003). When some authors remark that the European
mainstreaming as technocratic.

Women's Lobby has been "legitimized" within the EU policy-making process as a result of the gender mainstreaming
activities (Mazey 2002), this could only be because the EWL presents itself as the (one and only) "expert" voice of
the feminist community. As gender equality is referred to in the definition of gender mainstreaming as the goal of
this strategy, the further definition of gender equality can be seen as an integral part of the definition. As it is, this
definition of gender equality reveals ambivalences. The wording of the goal, in the words that are accepted by the
Council of Europe, calls for a diversity perspective, yet is not all that consistent in doing so. Gender is explained
using Joan Scott's definition that "gender is a primary way of signifying relationships of power" (Scott 1986, 1067).
The explanation of gender equality addresses the problem of male domination and a male norm in society, and
states that "a history of discrimination and restraining roles is unconsciously written into everyday routines and
policies" (p. 7). It shows many examples of a difference approach and finally cumulates in the statement: " The

problem is gender hierarchy, not women. The quintessence is that the social
construction of gender leaves room for difference and does not contain a notion of
hierarchy placing men higher than women " (p. 8). While this wording of the goal
manages to move beyond simplistic "equality" or "difference" approaches, it does
not question the gender dichotomy as such, but seems to imply the possibility of
[End Page 352] abolishing gender inequality without changing the social categories or
identities of men and women. It decouples equality and difference, but is based
solidly on the dichotomy of men and women. The dichotomy between masculine and feminine is
not rejected as such. The summary of the report in terms of the most important targets for gender equality reads:
"It can be assumed that the achievement of the targets of human rights, democracy, economic independence and
education in a context of shared responsibilities between women and men to resolve imbalances, lead to a society
where both women and men experience well-being in public and private life" (p. 9). The accents on human rights
and democracy, in this summary as well as in previous parts of the report, are the hallmarks of the Council of
Europe approach to gender equality. These accents are not explained in detail. An interesting feature of the
description of gender equality as a goal in the report is that it is not defined as a blueprint, but as "something that
must be constantly fought for, promoted and protectedlike human rights of which it is an integral part" (p. 8).
Consequently, not only gender mainstreaming as a strategy, but interestingly enough, also achieving gender
equality is presented as a process, "as a continuous process that has to be constantly put into question, thought
about and redefined" (p. 8). This process approach to the goal is not explained, but the reference to "struggle"
points at a conceptualization of gender equality as a political goal. In the Message of the Committee of Ministers to
Steering Committees of the Council of Europe on Gender Mainstreaming, a very typical other element can be found.
This message (Group of Specialists 1998, p. 81) states that gender mainstreaming is an important strategy "not
only because it promotes gender equality and makes visible the gender dimension of each policy and activity, but
also because it makes full use of all human resources and should lead to better informed and better targeted policy-

making." Here, one could say mainstream goals are "added" to gender equality, and this is presented as an

next to elements of a strategy of

inclusion and reversal, there are elements in the definition of gender mainstreaming
that can be seen as connected to the strategy of displacement . Most importantly, these
are the accent on a need to change the gendered system c.q. policy processes , and
the conceptualization of gender equality as a goal that cannot be fixed but has to be
struggled about. The goal as represented in the report, although calling for what is
referred to as a broader and more comprehensive goal of gender equality, giving
value to differences and diversity, fails to give a precise definition or an articulation
that would allow "being struggled about." This weakens [End Page 353] the
transformative potential of the conceptualization of gender mainstreaming.
Empowerment is not present, except in a very indirect form: there is hardly any
voice given to the dominated, to "subaltern counterpublics " (Fraser 1989). The absence
of empowerment elements further limits the transformative potential of this
conceptualization of gender mainstreaming.
additional argument to engage in gender mainstreaming. Overall,

The plan infuses international communication with feminist

perspectives
Youngs 8 (Youngs, Gillian. Feminist Interventions in International Communication.
Chapter: Public/Private: The Hidden Dimension of International Communication. Pg. 3345. Series Editor Andrew Calabrese, University of Colorado)

How do we transform international communication into a field that ofers

insights into the grounded realities of changing communications
structures and processes and varied experiences of them? This is the question at
the heart of this anthology and this chapter on the public/private. I begin by focusing on the question of
transformation and the specific way in which I am using the term here. Then I move on to discuss why the
relationship between public and private is core to critical analysis about the international sphere. Third, I link work
on this area in feminist international relations to IC, and fourth, I consider how concrete developments from
traditional mass media to new media press us toward conceptual revisionism to take full account of public/private

Why is IC in need of transformation and how can

this happen? I would argue that the most fundamental means of addressing this
question is on the level of ontology. How do we view the world, how do we
conceive of social reality, and to what extent have dominant (masculinist)
framings of this reality been partial? How can we make it more complete,
more insightful and meaningful? These are the kinds of questions we need to consider. When
operating at the ontological level it is accepted that philosophical worldviews matter, that
they influence profoundly what we can and cannot see and give causal
significance to. When taking ontology seriously, there is recognition that claims about reality cannot be
taken for granted, that reality cannot be simply assumed. We need to interrogate
how reality is being conceived and constructed. What are the perceptual
frameworks that are impacting, shaping, and fashion- ing certain aspects
as evident (real) and others as absent or not worthy of analytical attention
(unreal or lacking in import). Ontological questioning saves us from traps
that dominant paradigms may set for us at any time. For instance, such paradigms,
through their status and influence over time, become accepted as given and
dynamics. Transformation and Ontology

thus tend to be unquestioned, or to locate any questioning as if it were outside reality, or of no significance.

These paradigms gain the status of truth telling, however problematic, in

part because they have held sway, endured, and influenced what is

understood to be meaningful and real. In a major way, the paradigm and the truth it offers,
however partial, become fused over time, inseparable, so that the truth and the manner of perceiving it become

When the
truth is sought, the dominant paradigm has the status as the only or
prime way to reach it. This is a central part of explaining the power that
the paradigm gains over time. Transformation, as I am applying it, begins with a
move away from this determinist binding of truth and dominant paradigm.
It entails an analytical prizing apart of the seemingly inevitable connection
between them and a new openness about alternative paradigms or paths
to the truth about reality, alternative perspectives that might construct
such truth quite diferently, that might introduce new forms and patterns
of causality and new questions about them. Such transformation is not sudden; it is
inherently interdependent, bound in a deterministic trap that links one inevitably to the other.

incremental, and it is made up of multiple challenges to the dominant paradigm and a recognition that this
paradigm stands in the way of understanding as much as it leads toward it. We cannot expect transformation to
happen easily or quickly in such circumstances because the very ground that established truth stands on is being

The kind of transformation that feminist critiques undertake of

dominant masculinist paradigms can be viewed rather as a gradual
chipping away at a huge stone wall until it finally crumbles (hopefully), and it is not
destabilized.

a one-way process. Just as the wall gets chipped away, it is also continually rebuilt by renewed assertions of the

the pervasive acceptance and institutionalization of the

dominant paradigm (in theory and practice) means that there are established and
powerful conditions for its new bricks to be fashioned quickly and efficiently. After all, they
represent a truth that is already widely known and accepted, largely taken for
granted indeed, while the critical chipping away is achieved on the basis of
challenges to such truth and acceptance, from a weak position outside of such truth. The
dominant paradigm. And

historically established sway of the dominant paradigm is key to its power to maintain its hold on the present and
the future. Its enduring and rebuilding status makes it clear that truth claims do not possess equal status .

Their

power has to be fought for in conditions that are likely to be highly

unequal. To achieve ontological transformation is most difficult, because it
strikes to fundamental perceptions of what is real and meaningful in the
first place. Social reality as it is generally known is being completely overturned. The familiar starting points
for thinking about the world and how it works, who has influence within it and why, how this might change, what is
possible or likely and what is not, are being removed.

New starting points are being asserted.

China containment policy is a rhetorical strategy of masculine

protection that precludes communicative engagement
disempowering women and encouraging warfare
Landreau 11 [John, associate professor of women's and gender studies at The
College of New Jersey, Fighting Words: Obama, Masculinity and the Rhetoric of
National Security, thirdspace: a journal of feminist theory & culture, Vol 10, No 1
(2011)]
Obama's stress on his careful deliberation process but not on the content of the
deliberation is reminiscent of Iris Marion Young's emphasis on the "logic of
masculinist protection" in national security thinking. This is a logic that
connects the protective role of the father in the patriarchal family with the
role of commander in chief. In both cases, she argues that one of the prices exacted
by benevolent masculinist protection is that the protected
woman/feminized citizen must concede "critical distance from decision-

making autonomy." (120). In other words, if the fatherly president's allegiance to citizens and soldiers is
expressed in the mindfulness with which he makes communal decisions of this magnitude, then it is equally true
that our allegiance to the father-president is expressed in our acceptance of his authority and judgment to do what
is best for us in these circumstances. The allegiance to the father quickly becomes the measure of our patriotism.

As a rhetorical strategy, then, Obama's description of the seriousness of

his decision-making process serves to legitimate his decision to escalate
war through an appeal to an image of protective presidential masculinity.
This appeal interpellates the audience in the role of a complicit, feminized
citizenry that needs such fatherly protection.[7] After the scant historical review, and a
summary of where we are and why we are obliged to go to war, Obama devotes a good portion of the West Point
speech to making a series of sequential points, statements of fact, and reasoned arguments. For example, he gives
three specific goals for the Afghan intervention, and outlines how those goals will be achieved and how it will all be
paid for. He also identifies three possible objections to the escalation and gives reasoned arguments for why these
criticisms are incorrect. In sum, he says "As President, I refuse to set goals that go beyond our responsibility, our
means, or our interests." (para. 37).As

feminist International Relations scholars have

argued, to talk about war in rationalist terms as Obama does here tends
to divert attention from the cruelties of war, and to imagine the truth of
war "abstracted from bodies" (Ruddick 132). It becomes difficult, in this
context, to focus on, or give weight to, the terrible details of war, and in
particular to the death and destruction that modern wars exact mostly
from civilians not soldiers.[8] As a rhetorical performance, the description of
war in terms of rational sequences and formulas also tends to give
authority to the rhetorician himself by distancing him from feminized
forms of emotionality or care work (Cohn).

Postcol
1). Alt doesnt solve the affirmative make the negative
explain how they can solve the root cause of volatile
containment otherwise vote af
2). Perm do both -- the state determines foreign policy and
must be included in any efective alternative otherwise the alt
fails
Weldes, 99 Senior Lecturer at Bristol University, Ph.D. in International Relations
from the University of Minnesota, Former Assistant Professor at Kent State
University (Jutta, Cultures of Insecurity, Chapter 1, p. 18-19)
An issue we have so far neglected but that is obviously raised by any discussion of
the social construction of insecurity is the question of agency: just who is it that
defines or constructs insecurities? Who actually articulates these
"discourses of danger" and produces particular insecurities? In statist
societies, the primary site for the production of insecurity is the institution or
bundle of practices that we know as the state. Because identifying danger and
providing security is, in modern politics, considered fundamentally to be the
business of the state, those individuals who inhabit offices in the state
play a central role in constructing insecurities. As Hans Morgenthau argued,
statesmen are the representatives of the state who "speak for it,... define
its objectives, choose the means for achieving them, arid try to maintain,
increase, and demonstrate power" (1978: 1080). It is state officials who are
granted the right, who have the authority, to define security and
insecurityto identify threats and dangers and to determine the best
solution to them, although they are often assisted by what have been called
"intellectuals of statecraft" (6 Tuathail and Agnew, 1992: 193), including the
"defense intellectuals" iCohn, 1987) associated with weapons contractors and
university research centers and the "security intellectuals" of think tanks such as
RAND (Dalby, 1990). Beyond the state narrowly defined, discourses of insecurity are
also produced and circulate through what Gramsci called the extended state (1971:
257-64 and passim)schools, churches, the media, and other institutions of civil
society that regulate populations.

3). Ivory tower DA prioritize material concerns first

theorizing sans action justifies suferingturns whiteness
ofense
Molly Cochran 99, Assistant Professor of International Affairs at Georgia
Institute for Technology, Normative Theory in International Relations, 1999, pg.
272
To conclude this chapter, while modernist and postmodernist debates continue,
while we are still unsure as to what we can legitimately identify as a feminist
ethical/political concern, while we still are unclear about the relationship

between discourse and experience, it is particularly important for feminists

that we proceed with analysis of both the materia l (institutional and
structural) as well as the discursive. This holds not only for feminists, but for all
theorists oriented towards the goal of extending further moral inclusion in the
present social sciences climate of epistemological uncertainty. Important
ethical/political concerns hang in the balance. We cannot aford to wait for
the meta-theoretical questions to be conclusively answered. Those
answers may be unavailable. Nor can we wait for a credible vision of an
alternative institutional order to appear before an emancipatory agenda can
be kicked into gear. Nor do we have before us a chicken and egg question of which
comes first: sorting out the metatheoretical issues or working out which practices
contribute to a credible institutional vision. The two questions can and should
be pursued together, and can be via moral imagination. Imagination can help us
think beyond discursive and material conditions which limit us, by pushing the
boundaries of those limitations in thought and examining what yields. In this
respect, I believe international ethics as pragmatic critique can be a useful ally to
feminist and normative theorists generally

4). no linkChina wants the plan and its bilateral cooperation

your evidence cites historical errors in study, not a predictive
claim that fatalistically disavows foreign policies towards
China.
5). even if they win a link, imperialism is justified in our
instance
a). prefer specificityonly the US has the financial and
innovative technological resources to solve climate change and
nuclear warthats Yang
6). There is no alternative either they solve and cause global
nuclear holocaust or reforms are good and inevitable and the
permutation solves
Kaplan 14 (Robert D., senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security,
In Defense of Empire, TheAltantic) JA
the critique that imperialism constitutes bad American foreign
policy has serious merit: the real problem with imperialism is not that it is
evil, but rather that it is too expensive and therefore a problematic grand
strategy for a country like the United States. Many an empire has
collapsed because of the burden of conquest. It is one thing to
acknowledge the positive attributes of Rome or Hapsburg Austria; it is
quite another to justify every military intervention that is considered by
elites in Washington. Thus, the debate Americans should be having is the following: Is an imperial-like
Nevertheless,

foreign policy sustainable? I use the term imperial-like because, while the United States has no colonies, its global
responsibilities, particularly in the military sphere, burden it with the expenses and frustrations of empires of old.

Caution: those who say such a foreign policy is unsustainable are not

necessarily isolationists. Alas, isolationism is increasingly used as a slur

against those who might only be recommending restraint in certain
circumstances. Once that caution is acknowledged, the debate gets really interesting. To repeat, the
critique of imperialism as expensive and unsustainable is not easily dismissed. As for the critique that imperialism
merely constitutes evil: while that line of thinking is not serious, it does get at a crucial logic regarding the American
Experience. That logic goes like this: America is unique in history. The United States may have strayed into empire
during the Spanish-American War of 1898 and the resultant war in the Philippines. And it may have become an

the United States was

never meant to be an empire, but rather that proverbial city on a hill,
ofering an example to the rest of the world rather than sending its
military in search of dragons to slay. This, as it happens, is more or less the position of the
imperial Leviathan of sorts in the wake of World War II. At root, however,

Obama administration. The first post-imperial American presidency since World War II telegraphs nothing so much

Obama essentially wants regional powers (such as

Japan in Asia, and Saudi Arabia and Israel in the Middle East) to rely less
on the United States in maintaining local power balances. And he wants to
keep Americas enemies at bay through the use of inexpensive drones
rather than the deployment of ground forces. Secretary of State John Kerrys energetic
as exhaustion with world affairs.

diplomacy vis--vis Iran and Israel-Palestine might seem like a brave effort to set the Middle Easts house in order,
thereby facilitating the so-called American pivot to Asia. And yet, Kerry appears to be neglecting Asia in the
meantime, and no one believes that Iran, Israel, or Palestine will suffer negative consequences from the U.S. if
negotiations fail. Once lifted, the toughest sanctions on Iran will not be reinstated. Israel can always depend on its

The dread of
imperial-like retribution that accompanied Henry Kissingers 1970s shuttle
diplomacy in the Middle East is nowhere apparent. Kerry, unlike Kissinger,
has articulated no grand strategy or even a basic strategic conception.
Rather than Obamas post-imperialism, in which the secretary of state
appears like a lonely and wayward operator encumbered by an apathetic
White House, I maintain that a tempered imperialism is now preferable.
No other power or constellation of powers is able to provide even a
fraction of the global order provided by the United States. U.S. air and sea
dominance preserves the peace, such as it exists, in Asia and the Greater
Middle East. American military force, reasonably deployed, is what
ultimately protects democracies as diverse as Poland, Israel, and Taiwan
from being overrun by enemies. If America sharply retrenched its air and
sea forces, while starving its land forces of adequate supplies and
training, the world would be a far more anarchic place, with adverse
repercussions for the American homeland. Rome, Parthia, and Hapsburg Austria were great
legions of support in Congress, and the Palestinians have nothing to fear from Obama.

precisely because they gave significant parts of the world a modicum of imperial order that they would not
otherwise have enjoyed. America must presently do likewise, particularly in East Asia, the geographic heartland of
the world economy and the home of American treaty allies. This by no means obliges the American military to

America must
roam the world with its ships and planes, but be very wary of where it
gets involved on the ground. And it must initiate military hostilities only
when an overwhelming national interest is threatened. Otherwise, it
should limit its involvement to economic inducements and robust
diplomacydiplomacy that exerts every possible pressure in order to
prevent widespread atrocities in parts of the world, such as central Africa,
that are not, in the orthodox sense, strategic. That, I submit, would be a policy direction
repair complex and populous Islamic countries that lack critical components of civil society.

that internalizes both the drawbacks and the benefits of imperialism, not as it has been conventionally thought of,
but as it has actually been practiced throughout history.

7). Perm do the plan and the alt in all other instances either
the alternative solves residual links or it cant solve at all
8). Threats are real and not constructed your authors have
zero predictive indicts and site no data err af
Knudsen 1 PoliSci Professor at Sodertorn (Olav, Post-Copenhagen Security Studies, Security
Dialogue 32:3)
Moreover, I have a problem with the underlying implication that it is unimportant whether states 'really' face

In the Copenhagen school, threats are seen as coming

mainly from the actors' own fears, or from what happens when the fears of individuals turn into
paranoid political action. In my view, this emphasis on the subjective is a misleading
conception of threat , in that it discounts an independent existence for whatever is perceived as a threat. Granted, political life is often marked by
misperceptions, mistakes, pure imaginations, ghosts, or mirages, but such phenomena do not
occur simultaneously to large numbers of politicians, and hardly most of the
time . During the Cold War, threats - in the sense of plausible possibilities of
danger - referred to 'real' phenomena, and they refer to 'real' phenomena
now. The objects referred to are often not the same, but that is a different matter. Threats have to be dealt
with both n terms of perceptions and in terms of the phenomena which are perceived to be threatening. The
point of Waevers concept of security is not the potential existence of danger
somewhere but the use of the word itself by political elites. In his 1997 PhD dissertation,
dangers from other states or groups.

he writes, One can View security as that which is in language theory called a speech act: it is not interesting
as a sign referring to something more real - it is the utterance itself that is the act.24 The deliberate disregard
of objective factors is even more explicitly stated in Buzan & WaeVers joint article of the same year. As a
consequence, the

phenomenon of threat is reduced to a matter of pure domestic

politics. It seems to me that the security dilemma, as a central notion in security
studies, then loses its foundation. Yet I see that Waever himself has no compunction about referring
to the security dilemma in a recent article." This discounting of the objective aspect of threats shifts security

What has long made 'threats' and threat perceptions

important phenomena in the study of IR is the implication that urgent action
may be required . Urgency, of course, is where Waever first began his argument
in favor of an alternative security conception, because a convincing sense of
urgency has been the chief culprit behind the abuse of 'security' and the
consequent politics of panic', as Waever aptly calls it. Now, here - in the case of urgency another baby is thrown out with the Waeverian bathwater. When real situations of urgency arise,
those situations are challenges to democracy; they are actually at the core of the
problematic arising with the process of making security policy in parliamentary
democracy. But in Waevers world, threats are merely more or less persuasive,
and the claim of urgency is just another argument. I hold that instead of
'abolishing' threatening phenomena out there by reconceptualizing them, as
Waever does, we should continue paying attention to them, because situations
with a credible claim to urgency will keep coming back and then we need
to know more about how they work in the interrelations of groups and states ( such
as civil wars, for instance), not least to find adequate democratic procedures for dealing
with them.
studies to insignificant concerns.

9). Link turn their links are about otherizing china and trying
to force china to do things thats the opposite of the
affirmative we give them an invitation and allow them to make
their own choice
10). Case disproves the critique the alts normative ethical
vision for IR is unattainable and gets coopted. Managing
insecurity through the plan is better than the alt AND only
evaluate link args if they win alt solvency
Chandler 13 (David, IR Prof @ University of Westminster, No emancipatory
alternative, no critical security studies, Critical Studies on Security, 2013 Vol. 1, No.
1, 4663)
We would argue that the removal of the prefix critical would also be useful to distinguish security study based on
critique of the world as it exists from normative theorising based on the world as we would like it to be. As long as
we keep the critical nomenclature, we are affirming that government and international policy-making can be
understood and critiqued against the goal of emancipating the non-Western Other .

Judging policy-making
on the basis of this imputed goal, may provide critical
theorists with endless possibilities to demonstrate their normative
standpoints but it does little to develop academic and political
understandings of the world we live in. In fact, no greater straw [person] man
could have been imagined, than the ability to become critical on the basis
of debates around the claim that the West was now capable of
undertaking emancipatory policy missions. Today, as we witness a narrowing
of transformative aspirations on behalf of Western policy elites, in a
reaction against the hubris of the claims of the 1990s (Mayall and Soares de Oliveira
2012) and a slimmed down approach to sustainable, hybrid peacebuilding,
CSS has again renewed its relationship with the policy sphere . Some
academics and policy-makers now have a united front that rather than
placing emancipation at the heart of policy-making it should be local
knowledge and local demands. The double irony of the birth and death of CSS is not
only that CSS has come full circle from its liberal teleological universalist
and emancipatory claims, in the 1990s, to its discourses of limits and flatter
ontologies, highlighting differences and pluralities in the 2010s but that this critical approach
to security has also mirrored and mimicked the policy discourses of leading
Western powers. As policy-makers now look for excuses to explain the failures of the promise of liberal
interventionism, critical security theorists are on hand to salve Western
consciences with analyses of non-linearity, complexity and human and non-human
assemblages. It appears that the world cannot be transformed after all. We
cannot end conflict or insecurity, merely attempt to manage them. Once critique
becomes anti-critique (Noys 2011) and emancipatory alternatives are seen to be merely
expressions of liberal hubris, the appendage of critical for arguments that
discount the possibility of transforming the world and stake no claims
which are unamenable to power or distinct from dominant philosophical
understandings is highly problematic. Let us study security, its discourses and its
practices, by all means but please let us not pretend that study is
somehow the same as critique.
and policy outcomes,

11). By framing oppression in terms of subalternity,

postcolonialism makes liberation impossible
Sethi 11 Rumina Sethi is a Professor in the department of English and Cultural
Studies at Panjab University, Chandigarh, India. She is the author of Myths of the
Nation: National Identity and Literary Representation (1999). She wrote her doctoral
thesis at Trinity College, Cambridge, and was a British Academy Fellow at Wolfson
College, Oxford. She was awarded the Rockefeller Foundation Fellowship in 2006.
(Sethi, Rumina 2011. The politics of postcolonialism: Empire, nation and resistance.
London: Pluto. Pages 70-71.)
The question then arises: how are we to respond to the deep-seated fears
and anxieties of the people? Apart from Marxism, which philosophy will take them on board? No
doubt theories of interdependence/transculturation which argue for the mutuality of the binaries
colonizer/colonized, master/slave are extremely significant in raising the issue of the effects of the local upon the
global. The arguments offered by Appadurai (2000), Hall (1996), Bhabha (1994), Gilroy (1993) and even the later
Said (1993) are compelling in undoing the grand narratives of monolithic structures, but outside their cultural
connotations their impact is limited. There is seldom any exploration of the reasons for the easy companionship
between postcolonialism and globalization or any interrogation of the way in which the rise of postcolonial studies is

there has been no attempt to intervene

in the rapidly increasing industrialization of our times by invoking agency
or subjectivity through an uncompromising political stance , as foregrounded in San
contingent on the growth of capital. Even more so,

Juan Jrs commentaries on Rigoberta Mench and Maria Barros. It is ironic that in his efforts to critique western

the native has a voice only in the splitting of imperial

discourse, between the gaps of their enunciation and the site of its
address, in the excess and slippage inherent in the replication of their
history. Anti-colonial struggles are undoubtedly triggered by colonial aggression and are not independent of it,
but to assume that the indigenous response can be no more than a
suggestion so imperceptible as to go almost unnoticed is to scarcely
give the native voice an existence independent of colonialism which emerges, on
history, Bhabha argues that

the other hand, as something of a reified structure (Bhabha 1994: 93101).17 Much postcolonial writing works on
the premise of the contagion, contamination or corruption of identities, thereby forsaking the active choices made
by people in the face of totalitarianism.

imperialism
Perm do both The perm solves the link by altering the way we
look at engmt while implementing substantive policy changes
that efect material change.
No link The af alters political containment & traditional IR
which both leverage force to impose US norms on China.
Containment is imperialist and we solve that.
Implementable plans are good Theyre stuck in cyclical
inaction
Bryant 12 [Levi, Professor of Philosophy at Collin College. In addition to working as a professor, Bryant has
also served as a Lacanian psychoanalyst. He received his Ph.D. from Loyola University in Chicago, Illinois, where he
originally studied 'disclosedness' with the Heidegger scholar Thomas Sheehan. Bryant later changed his dissertation
topic to the transcendental empiricism of Gilles Deleuze, Critique of the Academic Left,
http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpants-gnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/]

mlm

I must be in a mood today half irritated, half amused because I find myself ranting. Of course, thats not entirely
unusual. So this afternoon I came across a post by a friend quoting something discussing the environmental

the post read, For mainstream

environmentalism conservationism, green consumerism, and resource
management humans are conceptually separated out of nature and mythically placed in
privileged positions of authority and control over ecological communities and their
nonhuman constituents. What emerges is the fiction of a marketplace of raw
materials and resources through which human-centered wants , constructed as
needs, might be satisfied. The mainstream narratives are replete with such metaphors [carbon trading!].
movement that pushed all the right button. As

Natural complexity,, mutuality, and diversity are rendered virtually meaningless given discursive parameters that
reduce nature to discrete units of exchange measuring extractive capacities. Jeff Shantz, Green Syndicalism While

I cant say that I see many environmentalists

treating nature and culture as distinct or suggesting that were sovereigns
of nature I do agree that we conceive much of our relationship to the natural world in economic terms (not a
surprise that capitalism is today a universal). This, however, is not what bothers me about this passage. What I
wonder is just what were supposed to do even if all of this is true? What, given existing
conditions, are we to do if all of this is right? At least green consumerism, conservation,
resource management, and things like carbon trading are engaging in
activities that are making real differences. From this passage and maybe the entire text would
disabuse me of this conclusion it sounds like we are to reject all of these
interventions because they remain tied to a capitalist model of production
that the author (and myself) find abhorrent. The idea seems to be that if we endorse these things we
are tainting our hands and would therefore do well to reject them altogether.
The problem as I see it is that this is the worst sort of abstraction (in the Marxist sense) and
wishful thinking. Within a Marxo-Hegelian context, a thought is abstract when it ignores
all of the mediations in which a thing is embedded. For example, I understand a robust
finding elements this description perplexing

tree abstractly when I attribute its robustness, say, to its genetics alone, ignoring the complex relations to its soil,

This is the sort of

critique were always leveling against the neoliberals. They are abstract thinkers. In
their doxa that individuals are entirely responsible for themselves and that
they completely make themselves by pulling themselves up by their bootstraps, neoliberals ignore all the
the air, sunshine, rainfall, etc., that also allowed it to grow robustly in this way.

mediations belonging to the social and material context in which human beings develop that play a
role in determining the vectors of their life. They ignore, for example, that George W. Bush grew up in a family that
was highly connected to the world of business and government and that this gave him opportunities that someone
living in a remote region of Alaska in a very different material infrastructure and set of family relations does not

To think concretely is to engage in a cartography of these mediations,

a mapping of these networks, from circumstance to circumstance (what I call an ontocartography). It is to map assemblages, networks, or ecologies in the constitution of entities. Unfortunately,
the academic left falls prey to its own form of abstraction. Its good at carrying out
critiques that denounce various social formations, yet very poor at proposing any
sort of realistic constructions of alternatives. This because it thinks abstractly in its
own way, ignoring how networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes of
attraction would have to be remade to create a workable alternative. Here Im
reminded by the underpants gnomes depicted in South Park: The underpants gnomes have a
plan for achieving profit that goes like this: Phase 1: Collect Underpants
Phase 2: ? Phase 3: Profit! They even have a catchy song to go with their work: Well this is sadly how
it often is with the academic left. Our plan seems to be as follows: Phase 1: Ultra-Radical
Critique Phase 2: ? Phase 3: Revolution and complete social transformation! Our
problem is that we seem perpetually stuck at phase 1without ever explaining what is to be done at
have.

phase 2. Often the critiques articulated at phase 1 are right, but there are nonetheless all sorts of problems with
those critiques nonetheless. In order to reach phase 3, we have to produce new collectives. In order for new
collectives to be produced, people need to be able to hear and understand the critiques developed at phase 1. Yet
this is where everything begins to fall apart. Even though these critiques are often right, we express them in ways
that only an academic with a PhD in critical theory and post-structural theory can understand. How exactly is
Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only PhDs in the humanities can understand him? Who are these things
for? We seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the Naomi Kleins and
David Graebers of the world. To make matters worse, we publish our work in expensive academic journals that only
universities can afford, with presses that dont have a wide distribution, and give our talks at expensive hotels at
academic conferences attended only by other academics. Again, who are these things for? Is it an accident that so
many activists look away from these things with contempt, thinking their more about an academic industry and
tenure, than producing change in the world? If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it doesnt make a
sound! Seriously dudes and dudettes, what are you doing? But finally, and worst of all, us Marxists and anarchists
all too often act like assholes. We denounce others, we condemn them, we berate them for not engaging with the
questions we want to engage with, and we vilify them when they dont embrace every bit of the doxa that we
endorse. We are every bit as off-putting and unpleasant as the fundamentalist minister or the priest of the
inquisition (have people yet understood that Deleuze and Guattaris Anti-Oedipus was a critique of the French
communist party system and the Stalinist party system, and the horrific passions that arise out of parties and
identifications in general?). This type of revolutionary is the greatest friend of the reactionary and capitalist
because they do more to drive people into the embrace of reigning ideology than to undermine reigning ideology.
These are the people that keep Rush Limbaugh in business. Well done! But this isnt where our most serious
shortcomings lie. Our most serious shortcomings are to be found at phase 2. We almost never make concrete
proposals for how things ought to be restructured, for what new material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to
be produced, and when we do, our critique-intoxicated cynics and skeptics immediately jump in with an analysis of
all the ways in which these things contain dirty secrets, ugly motives, and are doomed to fail. How, I wonder, are we
to do anything at all when we have no concrete proposals? We live on a planet of 6 billion people. These 6 billion
people are dependent on a certain network of production and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption.
That network of production and distribution does involve the extraction of resources, the production of food, the
maintenance of paths of transit and communication, the disposal of waste, the building of shelters, the distribution
of medicines, etc., etc., etc. What are your proposals? How will you meet these problems? How will you navigate the
existing mediations or semiotic and material features of infrastructure? Marx and Lenin had proposals. Do you?
Have you even explored the cartography of the problem? Today we are so intellectually bankrupt on these points
that we even have theorists speaking of events and acts and talking about a return to the old socialist party
systems, ignoring the horror they generated, their failures, and not even proposing ways of avoiding the repetition
of these horrors in a new system of organization. Who among our critical theorists is thinking seriously about how to
build a distribution and production system that is responsive to the needs of global consumption, avoiding the
problems of planned economy, ie., who is doing this in a way that gets notice in our circles? Who is addressing the
problems of micro-fascism that arise with party systems (theres a reason that it was the Negri & Hardt contingent,
not the Badiou contingent that has been the heart of the occupy movement). At least the ecologists are thinking
about these things in these terms because, well, they think ecologically. Sadly we need something more, a melding

of the ecologists, the Marxists, and the anarchists. Were not getting it yet though, as far as I can tell. Indeed, folks
seem attracted to yet another critical paradigm, Laruelle. I would love, just for a moment, to hear a radical
environmentalist talk about his ideal high school that would be academically sound. How would he provide for the
energy needs of that school? How would he meet building codes in an environmentally sound way? How would she
provide food for the students? What would be her plan for waste disposal? And most importantly, how would she
navigate the school board, the state legislature, the federal government, and all the families of these students?

What is your plan? What is your alternative? I think there are alternatives. I saw one that
approached an alternative in Rotterdam. If you want to make a truly revolutionary
contribution, this is where you should start. Why should anyone even bother
listening to you if you arent proposing real plans? But we havent even gotten to that point.
Instead were like underpants gnomes, saying revolution is the answer! without addressing any of the
infrastructural questions of just how revolution is to be produced, what alternatives it would offer, and how we
would concretely go about building those alternatives. Masturbation. Underpants gnome deserves to be a
category in critical theory; a sort of synonym for self-congratulatory masturbation. We need less critique not
because critique isnt important or necessary it is but because we know the critiques, we know the problems.

Were intoxicated with critique because its easy and safe . We best every opponent
with critique. We occupy a position of moral superiority with critique. But do we
really do anything with critique? What we need today, more than ever, is
composition or carpentry. Everyone knows something is wrong. Everyone
knows this system is destructive and stacked against them. Even the Tea Party knows
something is wrong with the economic system, despite having the wrong economic theory. None of us,
however, are proposing alternatives. Instead we prefer to shout and denounce.
Good luck with that.

Ivory tower DA prioritize material concerns firsttheorizing

sans action justifies suferingturns their impacts
Molly Cochran 99, Assistant Professor of International Affairs at Georgia
Institute for Technology, Normative Theory in International Relations, 1999, pg.
272

To conclude this chapter, while modernist and postmodernist debates

continue, while we are still unsure as to what we can legitimately
identify as a feminist ethical/political concern, while we still are unclear
about the relationship between discourse and experience, it is particularly
important for feminists that we proceed with analysis of both the
materia l (institutional and structural) as well as the discursive. This

holds not only for feminists, but for all theorists oriented towards the
goal of extending further moral inclusion in the present social sciences
climate of epistemological uncertainty. Important ethical/political
concerns hang in the balance. We cannot aford to wait for the metatheoretical questions to be conclusively answered. Those answers may be
unavailable. Nor can we wait for a credible vision of an alternative
institutional order to appear before an emancipatory agenda can be

kicked into gear. Nor do we have before us a chicken and egg question
of which comes first: sorting out the metatheoretical issues or working
out which practices contribute to a credible institutional vision. The two
questions can and should be pursued together, and can be via moral

imagination. Imagination can help us think beyond discursive and

material conditions which limit us, by pushing the boundaries of those
limitations in thought and examining what yields. In this respect, I
believe international ethics as pragmatic critique can be a useful ally to
feminist and normative theorists generally
Perm do the af and the alt in all other instanceseither the alt
can overcome the af or it wasnt strong enough to solve all of
the other forces of imperialism in the SQ
Non-state change fails
Smucker 14 (Jonathan Matthew Smucker is a long-time organizer and theorist in grassroots movements
for social, economic and ecological justice. He has trained thousands of change agents in campaign strategy,
framing and messaging, direct action, and other skills, and is currently a doctoral student of sociology at UC
Berkeley. Can Prefigurative Politics ever Replace Political Strategy?. Berkeley Journal of Sociology.
http://berkeleyjournal.org/category/forum/power-prefiguration/ 10/7/14)

CTD

Before delving into the question of whether the concept of prefigurative politics is
genuinely descriptive of OWSlet alone of the broader wave of global uprisingslet
us first clarify what we even mean by politics. The words politics and political are
often thrown around casually and without precision. What does it mean for
something to be political or, for that matter, apolitical? For Antonio Gramsci,
whether a certain tendency is political or not ultimately comes down to its
engagement with extant power relations and structures. When Gramsci calls certain
tendenciesapoliticism,[1] his argument is not that these tendencies are not
informed by or in reaction to political events or structural relationships, or that their
adherents have no political opinions. He is asserting, rather, that the actions of
some ostensibly political groups are not genuinely intended as political
interventions, i.e., strategic attempts to shift relationships of power as well as the
outcomes of those relationships. Here we see an important distinction: between
actions (or opinions) that are informed by or in reaction to a political situation, on
the one hand, and actions that are designed to be political interventions to reshape
the world, on the other. The expression of ones values or opinions, while
informed by political realities, will not automatically amount to political
interventioneven if expressed loudly and dramatically . To be political, then,
is not merely to hold or to express political opinions about issues, either as
individuals or in groups. Rather, to be political, requires engagement with the
terrain of power, with an orientation towards the broader society and its structures.
With such a political understanding, Gramsci saw the essential task of aspiring
political challengers was the formation of a national-popular collective will, of
which the modern Prince is at one and the same time the organiser and the active,
operative expression.[2] With the term modern Prince Gramsci was referring to a
revolutionary party that must operate as both the unifying symbol and the agent of
an articulated collective will, i.e., an emerging alternative hegemony that brings
disparate groups into alignment. How does Occupy Wall Street measure up to
Gramscis political vision? OWS did not have a revolutionary party, in the sense that
Gramsci elaborated. Indeed, Occupy shared many features with the anarchist

movement that Gramsci criticized.[3] Yet, despite this anarchismwith all of its
ambivalence and hostility towards the notion of building and wielding power,
leadership, and organizationOWS did, in its first few months of existence, step
partially into this dual role of operative expression and organiser of a newly
articulated national-popular collective will. Indeed, OWSs initial success in the
realm of contesting popular meanings was remarkable. Practically overnight the
nascent movement broke into the national news cycle and articulated a popular,
albeit ambiguous, critique of economic inequality and a political system rigged to
serve the one percent. Moreover, OWS managed momentarily to align remnants
of a long-fragmented political Left in the United States, while simultaneously striking
a resonant chord with far broader audiences. Its next logical political step, had it
followed a Gramscian political roadmap, would have been to build and consolidate
its organizational capacity by (1) constructing a capable and disciplined
organizational apparatus, and (2) activating the above-mentioned latent and
fragmented organizations and social bases into an alternative hegemonic alignment
capable of shifting political outcomes (i.e., winning). Occupy, however, was deeply
ambivalent about even attempting such operations. Nonetheless, it is important to
mention that a tendency within OWS did make such attempts, and even enjoyed
notable successes, however localized or limited these may have been. Broadly
speaking, and certainly oversimplifying for the sake of clarity, there were two main
overarching tendencies within the core of OWS. One tendency leaned toward
strategic politics and the other toward prefigurative politics.[4] To follow a
Gramscian roadmap, the former tendency would have had to build a mandate
within the movement for strategic political intervention, to a greater extent than it
did. As for the prefigurative politics tendency, Gramsci would likely not have
considered much of its politics to be politics at all. This latter tendency viewed
decision-making processes and the physical occupation of public space as
manifestations of a better future now (i.e., prefiguration), rather than as tactics
within a larger strategy of political contestation. The prefigurative politics tendency
confused process, tactics, and self-expression with political content and was often
ambivalent about strategic questions, like whether Wall Street was the named
target or most anything else in its place.[5] It celebrated the act for the acts
sake, struggle for the sake of struggle, etc.[1]; Gramsci may well have called it
apoliticism. Among other related phenomena that Gramsci criticized, Occupys
prefigurative politics tendency resembled his descriptions of voluntarism,
marginalism, and especially utopianism. The attribute utopian does not apply to
political will in general, he argued, but to specific wills which are incapable of
relating means to end, and hence are not even wills, but idle whims, dreams,
longings, etc.[7] Gramscis elaboration of utopianism goes further than the popular
notion of rosy-eyed visions of how the world could one day be. He dismisses
utopianists not for the content of their vision of the future, but for their lack of a
plan for how to move from Point A to Point B, from present reality to realized vision.
In other words, dreaming about how the world might possibly someday be is not the
same as political struggleeven when the dreams are punctuated with dramatic
prefigurative public spectacles. Lifeworld I want to suggest that in the
prefigurative politics on display at Zuccotti Park, Gramscis negative concept of
utopianism interacted with Jrgen Habermas theory of the lifeworldspecifically

the latter theorists discussion of subcultural tendencies oriented towards the

revitalization of the lifeworld. Again, prefigurative politics purports to be about
modeling or prefiguring visions of utopian futures here and now. Indeed, such
prefigurative spectacles did seem to create a palpable feeling of utopianism at
Zuccotti Park. Utopianism as a feeling is hardly about the future; rather, it is felt
here and now. During my time as an active participant and organizer at Zuccotti
Park, I began to wonder if the heightened sense of an integrated identity was the
utopia that many of my fellow participants were seeking. What if the thing we were
missing, the thing we were lackingthe thing we longed for mostwas a sense of
an integrated existence in a cohesive community, i.e., an intact lifeworld?What if
this longing was so potent that it could eclipse the drive to affect larger political
outcomes? Habermas argues that under a system of advanced capitalism and
bureaucracy, both bureaucratic and capitalist logics have penetrated and colonized
thelifeworld, encroaching upon, and even annihilating, the realm of traditional and
organic social practice and organization. In such contexts, social movements have
dramatically shifted in their political contents, forms, demographics, and the
motivations of their participants. Social movement participants in advanced
capitalist nations may be more likely to emphasize fine distinctions between their
own groups and the broader society than they are to look for commonalities. That is,
they are more likely to marginally differentiate themselves and their groups as a
means of finding and deepening a sense of solidarity and belonging that they feel
themselves lacking. Habermas writes: For this reason, ascriptive characteristics
such as gender, age, skin color, neighborhood or locality, and religious affiliation
serve to build up and separate off communities, to establish subculturally protected
communities supportive of the search for personal and collective identity. The
revaluation of the particular, the natural, the provincial, of social spaces that are
small enough to be familiar, of decentralized formsall this is meant to foster the
revitalization of possibilities for expression and communication that have been
buried alive.[8] My point here is not to diminish the importance of a groups internal
life and the sense of community, meaning, and belonging experienced by
participants. I would even posit that such spaces are indispensible to social
movements ability to deepen political analysis and foster the level of solidarity and
commitment that oppositional struggle requires. The problem here is a matter of
imbalance: when a groups internal life becomes a more important
motivator than what the group accomplishes as a vehicle for change . To
the extent that a group becomes self-contentencapsulated in the project of
constructing its particularized lifeworld what motivation will participants have
to strategically engage broader society and political structures? Why would
group members want to claim and contest popular meanings and symbols if the
groups individuated lifeworld can be further cultivated by an explicit rejection of
such contests? If participants are motivated by hope of psychic completionby
community and a strong sense of belongingand such motivation is insufficiently
grounded in instrumental political goals, their energies will likely go into deepening
group identity over bolstering the groups external political achievements. The
problem is that the groups particularized lifeworld can be strengthened

without it ever having to actually winanything in the real world. Indeed, this
may help to explain why some ostensibly political groups have been able to
maintain a committed core of participants for decades without ever achieving a
single measurable political goal.

We empower advocates to efectively repeal state action;

understanding the details of state policy is key
Murray 14, PhD Candidate in the Program in Modern Thought & Literature at Stanford University, Prefiguration or
Actualization? Radical Democracy and Counter-Institution in the Occupy Movement, http://berkeleyjournal.org/2014/11/prefigurationor-actualization-radical-democracy-and-counter-institution-in-the-occupy-movement/

The Occupy movement emerged in response to a devastating economic crisis, bringing economic inequality to the
center of political discourse. But it also emerged in response to a wave of social movements around the world that
toppled dictators, asserted the power of the people and demonstrated their desire to take control of the decisions
that affect their lives. In Occupy, as in all of these movements, the economic and the political were linked.
Participants did not merely demand an end to foreclosures or new redistributive policies to address economic
inequality; they also saw these grievances as symptomatic of a fundamentally undemocratic political system.
Though the interests and motivations of participants in the Occupy movement were highly diverse, at the core it

the underlying goal was to actualize the ideal of selforganizing communities of free and equal persons, expand and deepen democratic
participation in all spheres of life, and increase individuals and communities power over social,
economic and political institutions.[1] But in many ways, Occupy also sought to be a movement of radical
can be read as a movement for radical democracy

democracy. Rather than petitioning politicians to bring about democratizing reforms or building a party that would
hopefully instate democracy after the revolution, activists hoped to bring about a radically democratic society
through radical democratic practice. They sought to prefigure a democracy-to-come, by actualizing radical
democracy in the movement itself. They claimed public spaces as venues in which experiments in radical
democracy could be developed, tested, and propagated. They were spaces in which to organize political action and
in which all were free to participate in agenda-setting, decision-making, and political education through the process
itself. Based on fourteen months of participant-research in two Occupy sites Occupy Wall Street and an outgrowth
of the movement called Occupy the Farm this paper evaluates the different forms prefigurative politics has taken

commentators have lauded the movement as an example of

prefigurative politics, which they see as the cutting edge of contemporary radical politics .[3]
However, an overemphasis on the value of prefiguration can be debilitating,
within the movement.[2] Many

leading to a focus on internal movement dynamics at the expense of

building a broader movement, and a focus on symbolic expressions of
dissent as opposed to the development of alternatives to actually replace
existing political, economic and social institutions . Occupy Wall Street (OWS)
suffered this fate, partly due to the perception that the encampment and the decision-making
procedures were prefigurative, and the perception that prefigurative politics itself will lead to revolutionary
transformations in the political, economic and social structure. While Occupy Wall Street foundered on

the prefigurative obsession with movement process , a group of activists, students and
local residents in the San Francisco Bay Area have sought to overcome these challenges .
they have worked under the banner of Occupy the Farm (OTF) to create an
agricultural commons on a parcel of publicly owned land . Unlike OWS, OTF has worked to establish a
Since 2012,

counter-institution grounded in material resources and production, that is ultimately meant to increase participants
autonomy from the state and capitalism. In this way it has been able to link radical democracy and economic justice
in a material way, rather than merely symbolically. As it is generally practiced and conceptualized today,

prefigurative politics is an inadequate framework for developing radical

democratic political strategy . Instead of prefiguration, we should redirect our efforts
toward developing and linking democratic counter-institutions that produce

and manage common resources. Occupy the Farm illustrates some of the potential
and the challenges of such a strategy.\

Link turn Anti-China rhetoric is what empowers imperialism.

We solve. Thats Goldstein.
Vague alts are a voting issuethey let the neg become a
moving target and spike out of all af ofense and promote
impracticable solutions instead of specific, directed action
Globalization makes war less likely and benefits the poorest of
nations
Pirie 12 (Dr. Madsen, researcher, founder and current President of the Adam
Smith Institute, Ten very good things 9: Globalization, Adam Smith Institute,
10/12) JA
globalization is turning the world into an integrated
economy instead of what it has been for most of its history, a series of
relatively isolated economies. The more trading that takes place, the
more wealth is created, and global trade across international frontiers has
created more wealth than ever before in human history, and had helped
lift more people out of mere subsistence than ever before. To poorer
countries globalization brings the chance to sell their relatively low cost
labour onto world markets. It brings the investment that creates jobs, and
although those jobs pay less than their counterparts in rich economies,
they represent a step up for people in recipient countries because they
usually pay more than do the more traditional jobs available there. To people
Over the course of decades,

in richer countries globalization brings lower cost goods from abroad, which leaves them with spending power to

It also brings opportunities for productive

investment in high growth industries in developing countries. Those adversely
spare and a higher standard of living.

affected by the global exchanges are the people in rich countries whose output is now undercut by the cheaper
alternatives from abroad. They often need to find new jobs or to be retrained to do work that adds higher value.

The extra wealth generated by globalization has brought an increase in

service sector employment, which provides many of the new jobs needed.
Competition from abroad forces firms to become more efficient and to use
resources more efficiently. Often they choose to go upmarket, seeking higher added value products
that face less competition from relatively unskilled labour. Thus firms which once sold cheap textiles move into

The
integration of the world economy has brought with it an interdependence.
As countries co-operate in trade with each other, they get to know each
other and grow into the habit of resolving disputes by negotiation and
agreement instead of by armed conflict. The 19th Century French economist Frederic Bastiat
expressed this pithily: "Where goods do not cross frontiers, armies will."
fashion and design, and find customers among the rising middle classes in developing countries.

Globalization is not the same thing as imperialism dont let

them get away with you globalize
Machan, 02 (Tibor R. research fellow at Hoover institution, Monday, February 11,
2002, Globalization versus Imperialism
http://www.hoover.org/research/globalization-versus-imperialism

Globalization, some say, is a form of imperialism. Along with the supposed invasiveness of
American culturevia Hollywood movies, McDonald hamburgers, and Coca Cola products globalization is
seen by some as the equivalent of international aggression. A similar charge was
made some years ago at a United Nations conference in Vienna; representatives of some nondemocratic
nations complained that the idea of human rights was intrusive and
imperialistic and thus threatened the sovereignty of their countries. Some serious
political thinkers still object to the very notion of universal ethical and political principles, as if human beings as
such didn't share some basic attributes that imply certain guidelines for how they should live .

To charge that
globalization is imperialistic is like claiming that liberating slaves imposes a
particular lifestyle on the former slaves. Globalization, in its principled
application, frees trade. Barriers are removed and restraint on trade is
abolished, both the opposite of any kind of imposed imperialism. The idea
that economic principles are culturally relative confuses highly variable
human practices with ones that are uniform across all borders. The
production and exchange of goods and services are universal. The political
contingencies of various societies, born often of power, not reason, distort such universality by imposing arbitrary
impediments. Slavery, the subjugation of women, and the prohibition of wealth transfer from parents to offspring

American
intellectuals often fail to appreciate the country's goal of establishing a
political ideal for human beings in general, not for blacks, whites, women,
Catholics, or Muslims. This ideal, when exported, is the farthest thing from
imperialism. It is, in fact, the closest we have ever come to bona fide human liberation (a term
are examples of conditions not natural to human liferather they are artifacts of ideologies.

inappropriately adopted by Marxists who mean to impose a one-size-fits-all regime). Globalization has thus not been
effectively linked with what is at its heart, namely, human liberation. Because some schemes have been mislabeled
as cases of "globalization," the genuine article has tended to acquire a bad reputation. But those are exceptions. To
globalize has been to spread freedom, particularly in commerce but also in politics and civil life. Genuine
globalization should be supported not only because it is economically prudent but also because it is consistent with
a basic human aspiration to be free. This is no threat to cultural diversity, religious pluralism, or the great variety of
benign human differences with which globalization can happily coexist. Only those who wish to impose their
particular lifestyle on the rest of us would fear globalization and the spread of human freedom.

orientalism
1. Perm Do Both The perm solves the link by altering the
way we look at engmt while implementing substantive
policy changes that efect material change.
2. The alt fails Structures and institutions impose
orientalist thought on the macropolitical world. Ignoring
them or rejecting them wont change them. Only the af
addresses the material incentives and dialogic basis for
bias in U.S. policy.
3. Implementable plans are good Theyre stuck in cyclical
inaction
Bryant 12 [Levi, Professor of Philosophy at Collin College. In addition to working as a professor,
Bryant has also served as a Lacanian psychoanalyst. He received his Ph.D. from Loyola University in
Chicago, Illinois, where he originally studied 'disclosedness' with the Heidegger scholar Thomas
Sheehan. Bryant later changed his dissertation topic to the transcendental empiricism of Gilles
Deleuze, Critique of the Academic Left, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/11/11/underpantsgnomes-a-critique-of-the-academic-left/] mlm
I must be in a mood today half irritated, half amused because I find myself ranting. Of course, thats not entirely
unusual. So this afternoon I came across a post by a friend quoting something discussing the environmental

the post read, For mainstream

environmentalism conservationism, green consumerism, and resource
management humans are conceptually separated out of nature and mythically placed in
privileged positions of authority and control over ecological communities and their
nonhuman constituents. What emerges is the fiction of a marketplace of raw
materials and resources through which human-centered wants , constructed as
needs, might be satisfied. The mainstream narratives are replete with such metaphors [carbon trading!].
movement that pushed all the right button. As

Natural complexity,, mutuality, and diversity are rendered virtually meaningless given discursive parameters that
reduce nature to discrete units of exchange measuring extractive capacities. Jeff Shantz, Green Syndicalism While

I cant say that I see many environmentalists

treating nature and culture as distinct or suggesting that were sovereigns
of nature I do agree that we conceive much of our relationship to the natural world in economic terms (not a
surprise that capitalism is today a universal). This, however, is not what bothers me about this passage. What I
wonder is just what were supposed to do even if all of this is true? What, given existing
conditions, are we to do if all of this is right? At least green consumerism, conservation,
resource management, and things like carbon trading are engaging in
activities that are making real differences. From this passage and maybe the entire text would
disabuse me of this conclusion it sounds like we are to reject all of these
interventions because they remain tied to a capitalist model of production
that the author (and myself) find abhorrent. The idea seems to be that if we endorse these things we
are tainting our hands and would therefore do well to reject them altogether.
The problem as I see it is that this is the worst sort of abstraction (in the Marxist sense) and
wishful thinking. Within a Marxo-Hegelian context, a thought is abstract when it ignores
all of the mediations in which a thing is embedded. For example, I understand a robust
finding elements this description perplexing

tree abstractly when I attribute its robustness, say, to its genetics alone, ignoring the complex relations to its soil,

This is the sort of

critique were always leveling against the neoliberals. They are abstract thinkers. In
their doxa that individuals are entirely responsible for themselves and that
they completely make themselves by pulling themselves up by their bootstraps, neoliberals ignore all the
mediations belonging to the social and material context in which human beings develop that play a
the air, sunshine, rainfall, etc., that also allowed it to grow robustly in this way.

role in determining the vectors of their life. They ignore, for example, that George W. Bush grew up in a family that
was highly connected to the world of business and government and that this gave him opportunities that someone
living in a remote region of Alaska in a very different material infrastructure and set of family relations does not

To think concretely is to engage in a cartography of these mediations,

a mapping of these networks, from circumstance to circumstance (what I call an ontocartography). It is to map assemblages, networks, or ecologies in the constitution of entities. Unfortunately,
the academic left falls prey to its own form of abstraction. Its good at carrying out
critiques that denounce various social formations, yet very poor at proposing any
sort of realistic constructions of alternatives. This because it thinks abstractly in its
own way, ignoring how networks, assemblages, structures, or regimes of
attraction would have to be remade to create a workable alternative. Here Im
reminded by the underpants gnomes depicted in South Park: The underpants gnomes have a
plan for achieving profit that goes like this: Phase 1: Collect Underpants
Phase 2: ? Phase 3: Profit! They even have a catchy song to go with their work: Well this is sadly how
it often is with the academic left. Our plan seems to be as follows: Phase 1: Ultra-Radical
Critique Phase 2: ? Phase 3: Revolution and complete social transformation! Our
problem is that we seem perpetually stuck at phase 1without ever explaining what is to be done at
have.

phase 2. Often the critiques articulated at phase 1 are right, but there are nonetheless all sorts of problems with
those critiques nonetheless. In order to reach phase 3, we have to produce new collectives. In order for new
collectives to be produced, people need to be able to hear and understand the critiques developed at phase 1. Yet
this is where everything begins to fall apart. Even though these critiques are often right, we express them in ways
that only an academic with a PhD in critical theory and post-structural theory can understand. How exactly is
Adorno to produce an effect in the world if only PhDs in the humanities can understand him? Who are these things
for? We seem to always ignore these things and then look down our noses with disdain at the Naomi Kleins and
David Graebers of the world. To make matters worse, we publish our work in expensive academic journals that only
universities can afford, with presses that dont have a wide distribution, and give our talks at expensive hotels at
academic conferences attended only by other academics. Again, who are these things for? Is it an accident that so
many activists look away from these things with contempt, thinking their more about an academic industry and
tenure, than producing change in the world? If a tree falls in a forest and no one is there to hear it, it doesnt make a
sound! Seriously dudes and dudettes, what are you doing? But finally, and worst of all, us Marxists and anarchists
all too often act like assholes. We denounce others, we condemn them, we berate them for not engaging with the
questions we want to engage with, and we vilify them when they dont embrace every bit of the doxa that we
endorse. We are every bit as off-putting and unpleasant as the fundamentalist minister or the priest of the
inquisition (have people yet understood that Deleuze and Guattaris Anti-Oedipus was a critique of the French
communist party system and the Stalinist party system, and the horrific passions that arise out of parties and
identifications in general?). This type of revolutionary is the greatest friend of the reactionary and capitalist
because they do more to drive people into the embrace of reigning ideology than to undermine reigning ideology.
These are the people that keep Rush Limbaugh in business. Well done! But this isnt where our most serious
shortcomings lie. Our most serious shortcomings are to be found at phase 2. We almost never make concrete
proposals for how things ought to be restructured, for what new material infrastructures and semiotic fields need to
be produced, and when we do, our critique-intoxicated cynics and skeptics immediately jump in with an analysis of
all the ways in which these things contain dirty secrets, ugly motives, and are doomed to fail. How, I wonder, are we
to do anything at all when we have no concrete proposals? We live on a planet of 6 billion people. These 6 billion
people are dependent on a certain network of production and distribution to meet the needs of their consumption.
That network of production and distribution does involve the extraction of resources, the production of food, the
maintenance of paths of transit and communication, the disposal of waste, the building of shelters, the distribution
of medicines, etc., etc., etc. What are your proposals? How will you meet these problems? How will you navigate the
existing mediations or semiotic and material features of infrastructure? Marx and Lenin had proposals. Do you?
Have you even explored the cartography of the problem? Today we are so intellectually bankrupt on these points
that we even have theorists speaking of events and acts and talking about a return to the old socialist party
systems, ignoring the horror they generated, their failures, and not even proposing ways of avoiding the repetition
of these horrors in a new system of organization. Who among our critical theorists is thinking seriously about how to

build a distribution and production system that is responsive to the needs of global consumption, avoiding the
problems of planned economy, ie., who is doing this in a way that gets notice in our circles? Who is addressing the
problems of micro-fascism that arise with party systems (theres a reason that it was the Negri & Hardt contingent,
not the Badiou contingent that has been the heart of the occupy movement). At least the ecologists are thinking
about these things in these terms because, well, they think ecologically. Sadly we need something more, a melding
of the ecologists, the Marxists, and the anarchists. Were not getting it yet though, as far as I can tell. Indeed, folks
seem attracted to yet another critical paradigm, Laruelle. I would love, just for a moment, to hear a radical
environmentalist talk about his ideal high school that would be academically sound. How would he provide for the
energy needs of that school? How would he meet building codes in an environmentally sound way? How would she
provide food for the students? What would be her plan for waste disposal? And most importantly, how would she
navigate the school board, the state legislature, the federal government, and all the families of these students?

What is your plan? What is your alternative? I think there are alternatives. I saw one that
approached an alternative in Rotterdam. If you want to make a truly revolutionary
contribution, this is where you should start. Why should anyone even bother
listening to you if you arent proposing real plans? But we havent even gotten to that point.
Instead were like underpants gnomes, saying revolution is the answer! without addressing any of the
infrastructural questions of just how revolution is to be produced, what alternatives it would offer, and how we
would concretely go about building those alternatives. Masturbation. Underpants gnome deserves to be a
category in critical theory; a sort of synonym for self-congratulatory masturbation. We need less critique not
because critique isnt important or necessary it is but because we know the critiques, we know the problems.

Were intoxicated with critique because its easy and safe . We best every opponent
with critique. We occupy a position of moral superiority with critique. But do we
really do anything with critique? What we need today, more than ever, is
composition or carpentry. Everyone knows something is wrong. Everyone
knows this system is destructive and stacked against them. Even the Tea Party knows
something is wrong with the economic system, despite having the wrong economic theory. None of us,
however, are proposing alternatives. Instead we prefer to shout and denounce.
Good luck with that.

4. Were a better lens for understanding and analyzing antistate resistance

Zanotti 14 (Dr. Laura Zanotti, Associate Prof. of PoliSci @ VA Tech.
Governmentality, Ontology, Methodology: Re-thinking Political Agency in the Global
World Alternatives: Global, Local, Political vol 38(4): p. 288-304. originally
published online 12/30/2013) mlm
By questioning substantialist representations of power and subjects,
inquiries on the possibilities of political agency are reframed in a way that
focuses on power and subjects relational character and the contingent
processes of their (trans)formation in the context of agonic relations.
Options for resistance to governmental scripts are not limited to
rejection, revolution, or dispossession to regain a pristine freedom
from all constraints or an immanent ideal social order. It is found instead in
multifarious and contingent struggles that are constituted within the
scripts of governmental rationalities and at the same time exceed and
transform them. This approach questions oversimplifications of the complexities
of liberal political rationalities and of their interactions with non-liberal political
players and nurtures a radical skepticism about identifying universally good or bad
actors or abstract solutions to political problems. International power interacts in
complex ways with diverse political spaces and within these spaces it is
appropriated, hybridized, redescribed, hijacked, and tinkered with.

Governmentality as a heuristic focuses on performing complex diagnostics

of events. It invites historically situated explorations and careful
diferentiations rather than overarching demonizations of power,
romanticizations of the rebel or the the local. More broadly, theoretical
formulations that conceive the subject in non-substantialist terms and focus on
processes of subjectification, on the ambiguity of power discourses, and
on hybridization as the terrain for political transformation, open ways for
reconsidering political agency beyond the dichotomy of oppression/rebellion.
These alternative formulations also foster an ethics of political
engagement, to be continuously taken up through plural and uncertain
practices, that demand continuous attention to what happens instead
of fixations on what ought to be.83 Such ethics of engagement would
not await the revolution to come or hope for a pristine freedom to be
regained. Instead, it would constantly attempt to twist the working of
power by playing with whatever cards are available and would require
intense processes of reflexivity on the consequences of political choices.
To conclude with a famous phrase by Michel Foucault my point is not that
everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not exactly
the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always have
something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to hyper- and
pessimistic activism.84

5. No Link We dont increase the type of engagement their

link discusses. We dont use China instrumentally for
resources or for economic gain. Our open-ended dialogue
is not instrumental, but procedural.
6. Link Turn China wants the plan
Sharp 12 (Paul Sharp - Professor and Head of Political Science 302b Cina Hall,
University of Minnesota Duluth, Book American diplomacy pg 63,
https://goo.gl/Hl4aUk)
Chinese perspectives on diplomacy might not vary too much from those oi' other
countries. However, the Chinese experience does point to some distinctive themes.
The strong presence of pragmatism in towards China over the past decade is one
such theme. Faced with a ' China, which is extending its influence around the world
and is economically interdependent with the United States, the government of
either party tends to adopt a pragmatic policy towards China, trying to seek
economic benefits from a growing economic relationship and to tap tacit Chinese
support for a mded world order. Such a pragmatic approach has always run into
conflicts with other aspects oflfi W macy. such as the United States' quest for
primacy, its missionary tradition, and its pluralistic political system. The pursuit of
pragmatic engagement towards China was hence never easy. On the other hand,
while the United States is unlikely to abandon its propen- sity to use coercive power
in its China diplomatic , recent leaders and diplo- mats appear more sensitive to
Chinese preferences in dealings with China. Increasingly, they display pragmatism,
professionalism, a certain level of cultural sensitivity in dealing with China, and

commitment to a cooperative bilateral rela- tionship. Along with its timely

reaffirmation of key principles such as the one- China principle, and the
appointments of .'viandarin-s eaking cabinet ministers such as Treasury Secretary
Timothy Geithner and Ambassador to China Jon Huntsman," the United States is
able to win China's support for tougher UN sanctions on lran, to relax the tying
oFChina's renminhi to the dollar and to manage generally i'ts_l conflicts with China.
In a more recent move, President sanctions on lran, to relax the tying of China's
rcnminhi to the U3 dollar and to manage generally its conflicts with China. In a more
recent move, President Obama nominated Commerce Secretary Cary Locke, a
Chinese American, to be the United States' new ambassador to China to replace
Huntsman. His Chi- nese and commercial background and high profile indicated that
President Obama is attaching high priority to relations with China, and aims to bring
the two nations closer together. As recent diplomatic stand-ois indicate, the
roblem is that while the United States would continue to adopt pragmatically a
ofcngagcment towards China, it has also been taking measures to consolidate its
global and regional leadership position and continues to aim to advance its
missionary goals towards China. Considering the complicated nature of Sino-E
relations, the Chinese expect the relationship to be constantly plagued by
competition between the two countries, along with opportunities for cooperation on
a wide-range of issues. That is new from China's side is that, as China continues to
rise - having over- taken Japan as the second lar est economy in the world in 2010 China's @- tations about ' towards China are also " ' T It seems that China wants the
United States not only to talk nicely, but also to treat China nicely. in other words,
what China now demands is that 'the United States needs both wisdom and
determination to recognize and accept China, a country that is totally different from
its own, as a power on the world stage'.''

7. We turn homogenization Academia constructs China as a

threat due to current IR theory Communicative
engagement acknowledges diferences between cultures
thats Lynch
8. Link Turn IR theory & American foreign policy represent
their values as both universal and neutral while defining
any international cultural deviation as a threat to Western
democracy foreign policy change is key
Moses 9 (Moses, J. (2009) Liberal Democratic Values and Asia Pacific Security: The
promise of peace or a path to conflict? London, United Kingdom: Millennium Annual
Conference 2009, 17-18 Oct 2009.)
In critiquing the advocates of a democratic alliance, Gideon Rachman has argued that the

formation of a
league of democracies would harden antagonisms and might even be seen
as the launching of a new cold war.71 Whilst this is an argument which could be made from a
realist position, critical discourse theory enables a deeper critique that
addresses the hidden dangers of an alliance based on shared values but
does not then insist upon a return to prudent self-interest as the only possible response. In undertaking this
analysis, I will examine

the problems of universality, hierarchy, legitimacy and the

relation of these to the use of force. From a discourse theoretical perspective the concern
is not with the very existence of an antagonism between liberal and nonliberal as every social group is necessarily premised upon some form of antagonistic relation with outsiders
but rather the representation of the shared values as universally
applicable. Drawing upon the Enlightenment metaphysics of Kant and his understanding of a humanity united
by reason, the conclusion is drawn that liberal democratic politics and the associated principles of human rights are

The danger of such universal values

is that despite the inherent denial they cannot be anything other than
contingent. If the goal of spreading universal values was to be universally
achieved, the notion of a liberal-democratic security community would
cease to have any value as a justification. Shared values only matter,
therefore, as a point of diferentiation. They gain their value, meaning and
substance through diferentiation from those who do not share the values
in question. The use of shared values and the advocacy of a league of democracies must,
therefore, be understood as being inherently antagonistic, in that the case
is presented from a platform of universal morality and yet is necessarily
premised upon exclusivity. Invoking fundamental values as the basis for
security agreements, expresses a sense of superiority and an at least implicit
and in many cases, as shown above, explicit desire to change those states that do not
currently share the values in question. The discourse established in these
agreements, as well as in league of democracies thought more broadly, is necessarily exclusive
of non-liberal democratic states until such time as they become liberal
democratic. While this may sound like a desirable principle, in practice it engenders antagonism
and division that may work against both short-term security interests as
well as longer term political change in authoritarian states. In this case, China
represents the constitutive outsider par excellence and it should come as
little surprise that the repeated references to shared values were a
source of upset for the Chinese administration and have been a hindrance
to the realisation of a broader security community in the Asia-Pacific
region. References to shared values are, moreover, central to the identity formation of the
states involved as well as being a major element of their claim to authority in
international dealings. Of particular interest in this regard is the claim by John Howard and Alexander
right and good for all people in all places and in all times.72

Downer that security talks with Japan should not be regarded with suspicion because they are natural.73 In a
similar vein, Daalder and Lindsay suggest that working with fellow democracies is our native language.74

The

use of such phrases, while perhaps intended to assuage concerns in non-democratic states,
generates the implicit idea that dealings between democracies and nondemocracies are in some way unnatural. This assumption is reinforced by
references to values gaps75

9. They read poetics but their other arguments in English

prove that the perm solves because although their
resistance is great, they have no way to actually engage
with any concrete strategies. - Poetics fail 3 reasons
a. No spillover - the only team that understands it and can extract value out of it
is the neg spectators, the judge, the aff team dont access any
epistemology claims

b. Not radical poetics have been read forever and havent changed
conceptions of ir theory. And poetics are excluded from politics. Theyre all
over the internet and bookstores everywhere.
c. Insularity da debate is the only place in which certain individuals can
criticize without immediate threats of violence means that this space is key
in order to discuss feasible to dismantle structural issues

10.
We empower advocates to efectively repeal state
action; understanding the details of state policy is key
Murray 14, PhD Candidate in the Program in Modern Thought & Literature at Stanford University, Prefiguration or
Actualization? Radical Democracy and Counter-Institution in the Occupy Movement, http://berkeleyjournal.org/2014/11/prefigurationor-actualization-radical-democracy-and-counter-institution-in-the-occupy-movement/

The Occupy movement emerged in response to a devastating economic crisis, bringing economic inequality to the
center of political discourse. But it also emerged in response to a wave of social movements around the world that
toppled dictators, asserted the power of the people and demonstrated their desire to take control of the decisions
that affect their lives. In Occupy, as in all of these movements, the economic and the political were linked.
Participants did not merely demand an end to foreclosures or new redistributive policies to address economic
inequality; they also saw these grievances as symptomatic of a fundamentally undemocratic political system.
Though the interests and motivations of participants in the Occupy movement were highly diverse, at the core it

the underlying goal was to actualize the ideal of selforganizing communities of free and equal persons, expand and deepen democratic
participation in all spheres of life, and increase individuals and communities power over social,
economic and political institutions.[1] But in many ways, Occupy also sought to be a movement of radical
can be read as a movement for radical democracy

democracy. Rather than petitioning politicians to bring about democratizing reforms or building a party that would
hopefully instate democracy after the revolution, activists hoped to bring about a radically democratic society
through radical democratic practice. They sought to prefigure a democracy-to-come, by actualizing radical
democracy in the movement itself. They claimed public spaces as venues in which experiments in radical
democracy could be developed, tested, and propagated. They were spaces in which to organize political action and
in which all were free to participate in agenda-setting, decision-making, and political education through the process
itself. Based on fourteen months of participant-research in two Occupy sites Occupy Wall Street and an outgrowth
of the movement called Occupy the Farm this paper evaluates the different forms prefigurative politics has taken

commentators have lauded the movement as an example of

prefigurative politics, which they see as the cutting edge of contemporary radical politics .[3]
However, an overemphasis on the value of prefiguration can be debilitating,
within the movement.[2] Many

leading to a focus on internal movement dynamics at the expense of

building a broader movement, and a focus on symbolic expressions of
dissent as opposed to the development of alternatives to actually replace
existing political, economic and social institutions . Occupy Wall Street (OWS)
suffered this fate, partly due to the perception that the encampment and the decision-making
procedures were prefigurative, and the perception that prefigurative politics itself will lead to revolutionary
transformations in the political, economic and social structure. While Occupy Wall Street foundered on

the prefigurative obsession with movement process , a group of activists, students and
local residents in the San Francisco Bay Area have sought to overcome these challenges .
they have worked under the banner of Occupy the Farm (OTF) to create an
agricultural commons on a parcel of publicly owned land . Unlike OWS, OTF has worked to establish a
Since 2012,

counter-institution grounded in material resources and production, that is ultimately meant to increase participants
autonomy from the state and capitalism. In this way it has been able to link radical democracy and economic justice
in a material way, rather than merely symbolically. As it is generally practiced and conceptualized today,

prefigurative politics is an inadequate framework for developing radical

democratic political strategy . Instead of prefiguration, we should redirect our efforts
toward developing and linking democratic counter-institutions that produce

and manage common resources. Occupy the Farm illustrates some of the potential
and the challenges of such a strategy.\

11.
Micropolitical theory backfires by leaving politics to
retrograde conservatives The status quo links worse
than the af
Boggs 2k [Carl Boggs, 2000 (date not specified), The End of Politics: Corporate
Power and the Decline of the Public Sphere, Pg. 213, the Postmodern Political] vv
in some contexts, postmodernism is a rather healthy break from the past.'
Surely it has helped to revitalize many aspects of intellectual and cultural life. The
problem is that the main contours of its out- look, beginning with Baudrillard and
Foucault and extending into a variety of contemporary feminist debates, tend to
devalue the general realms of power. governance, and economy. Because the
overwhelming reality of corporate, state. and military power is submerged in the
amorphous discourse of postmodernism, the very effort to analyze social forces and
locate agencies (or strategies) of change is nullified. In its reaction against the grand historical scope
of Marxism and Leninism, the new approach- oriented mainly toward the micro politics of
everyday life-tends to dismiss in toto the realm of macro politics and with it an
indispensable locus of any large-scale project of social transformation . This exaggerated
When viewed

micro focus is most visible in the work of Baudrillard and some postmodern feminists who, as Steven Best and

Kellner put it, in effect "announce the end of the political project and the end
of history and society"-a stance of a radically depoliticized culture.-" It is probably not too farfetched to argue that postmodernism, with a few important exceptions, helps
reproduce antipolitics in the academy, fully in line with the mood of defeat that has
permeated the Left in industrialized countries since the early 1980s.5 In this way,
Douglas

academic fashion coincides with broader historical trends: the strata that had been the back- bone of New-Left

Radicalism in
the academy, after the late 1970s, often is an "aesthetic pose," or its ideas are
submerged in unintelligible jargon. The working class was jettisoned as a political subject, the notion of
politics turned in larger numbers toward professional careers and affluent, suburban lifestyles.

any collective action grounded in any social constituency was increasingly viewed with contempt or scorn:
oppositional forces were likely to become assimilated into the irresistible logic of the commodity and media
spectacle, the victims of a hegemonic discourse over which they have little control. Thus, at a time of mounting
pessimism and retreat, the rhetorical question posed by Alex Callinicos becomes " What

political subject
does the idea of a postmodern epoch help constitute ?" By the 1990s any serious
discussion of political subjectivity or agency among leftist academics would seem
hopelessly pass, hardly worthy of intellectual energies. 3 A great deal of
postmodern theorizing seemed inclined to close off debate

12.
Engaging multiple sites of resistance and interim
reforms are necessary to overcome right-wing oppression
their rejection of the state cedes the terrain of politics
to neoliberals
Connolly 13 [William, Professor of Political Theory at Johns Hopkins University,
The Fragility of Things, pp. 36-42]

we do
not know with confidence, in advance of experimental action, just how far or fast changes in the
systemic character of neoliberal capitalism can be made. The structures
often seem solid and intractable, and indeed such a semblance may turn out to be true. Some may seem solid, infinitely absorptive, and
intractable when theyre in fact punctuated by hidden vulnerabilities , soft spots,
uncertainties, and potential lines of flight that become appar- ent when they are
subjected to experimental action, upheaval, testing, and strain. Indeed no ecology of late capitalism, given the variety
A philosophy attending to the acceleration, expansion, irrationalities, interdependencies, and fragilities of late capitalism suggests that

of forces to which it is connected by a thousand pulleys, vibrations, impingements, de- pendencies, shocks, and threads, can specify with supreme

The strength of structural theory, at its best, was

in identifying, institutional intersections that hold a system together; its conceit, at its worst, was the claim to know in
advance how resistant such intersections are to potential change . Without
adopting the opposite conceit, it seems important to pursue possible sites
of strategic action that might open up room for productive change. Today it seems
important to attend to the relation be- tween the need for structural change and identification of multiple sites of
potential action. You do not know precisely what you are doing when you participate in such a venture. You combine an experimental
confidence the solidity or potential flexibility of the structures it seeks to change.

temper with the appreciation that living and acting into the future inevitably contain a shifting quotient of uncertainty. The following tentative judgments
and sites of action may be pertinent. 1) Neither neoliberal theory, nor socialist productivism, nor deep ecology, nor social democracy in its classic form
seems sufficient to the contemporary condition. This is so in part because the powers of market self-regulation are both real and limited in relation to a
larger multitude of heterogeneous force fields beyond the human estate with differential powers of self-regulation and metamorphosis. A first task is to
challenge neoliberal ideology through critique and by elaborating and publicizing positive alternatives that acknowledge the disparate relations between
market processes, other cultural systems, and nonhuman systems. Doing so to render the fragility of things more visible and palpable. Doing so, too, to
set the stage for a series of interceded shifts in citizen role performances, social movements, and state action. 2) Those who seek to reshape the ecology

An interim
agenda is the best thing to focus on because in a world of becoming the more
distant future is too cloudy to engage. We must, for instance, become involved in
experimental micropolitics on a variety of fronts, as we participate in role
experimentations, social movements, artistic displaces, erotic-political shows, electoral
campaigns, and creative interventions on the new media to help recode the ethos that now occupies investment
of late capitalism might set an interim agenda of radical reform and then recoil back on the initiatives to see how they work.

practices, consumption desires, family savings, state priorities, church assemblies, university curricula, and media reporting. It is important to bear in
mind how extant ideologies, established role performances, social movements, and commitments to state action intersect.

To shift some

of our own role performances in the zones of travel, church participation, home energy use, investment, and consumption,
for instance, that now implicate us deeply in foreign oil dependence and the huge military expenditures that secure it, could make a minor
diference on its own and also lift some of the burdens of institutional
implications from us to support participation in more adventurous interpretations,
political strategies, demands upon the state, and cross-state citizen actions. 3) Today perhaps the initial target, should be on
reconstituting established patterns of consumption by a combination of direct citizen actions in consumption choices, publicity of such actions, the
organization of local collectives to modify consumption practices, and social movements to reconstitute the current state- and market-supported
infrastructure of consumption. By the infrastructure of consumption I mean publicly supported and subsidized market subsystems such as a national
highway system, a system of airports, medical care through private insurance, agribusiness pouring high sugar, salt, and fat content into foods, corporate
ownership of the public media, the prominence of corporate 403 accounts over retirement pensions, and so forth that enable some modes of consumption
in the zones of travel, education, diet, retirement, medical care, energy use, health, and education and render others much more difficult or expensive to
procure.22 To change the infrastructure is also to shift the types of work and investment available. Social movements that work upon the infrastructure
and ethos of consumption in tandem can thus make a real difference directly, encourage more people to heighten their critical perspectives, and thereby

a cross-state citizen goal

should construct a pluralist assemblage by moving back and forth
between experiments in role performances, the refinement of sensitive modes of perception,
revisions in political ideology, and adjustments in political sensibility; doing so to mobilize
enough collective energy to launch a general strike simultaneously in
several countries in the near future. The aim of such an event would be to reverse the deadly future created by
open more people to a more militant politics if and as the next disruptive event emerges. Perhaps

established patterns of climate change by fomenting significant shifts in patterns of consumption, corporate policies, state law, and the priorities of
interstate organizations. Again, the dilemma of today is that the fragility of things demands shifting and slowing down intrusions into several aspects of
nature as we speed up shifts in identity; role performance, cultural ethos, market regulation, and state policy. 4) The existential forces of hubris (expressed
above all in those confident drives to mastery conveyed by military elites, financial economists, financial elites, and CEOs) and of ressentiment (expressed
in some sectors of secularism and evangelicalism) now play roles of importance in the shape of consumption practices, investment portfolios, worker
routines, managerial demands, and the uneven senses of entitlement that constitute neoliberalism. For that reason activism inside churches, schools,
street life, and the media must become increasingly skilled and sensitive. As we proceed, some of us may present the themes of a world of becoming to
larger audiences, challenging thereby the complementary notions of a providential world and secular mastery that now infuse too many role
performances, market practices, and state priorities in capitalist life. For existential dispositions do infuse the role priorities of late capitalism. Today it is
both difficult for people to perform the same roles with the same old innocence and difficult to challenge those performances amid our own implication in

them. Drives by evangelists, the media, neoconservatives, and the neoliberal right to draw a veil of innocence across the priorities of contemporary life
make the situation much worse. 5) The emergence of a neofascist or mafia-type capitalism slinks as a dangerous possibility on the horizon, partly because
of the expansion and intensification of capital, partly because of the real fragility of things, partly because the identity needs of many facing these
pressures encourage them to cling more intensely to a neoliberal imaginary as its bankruptcy becomes increasingly apparent, partly because so many in
America insist upon retaining the special world entitlements the country achieved after World War II in a world decreasingly favorable to them, partly
because of the crisis tendencies inherent in neoliberal capitalism, and partly because so many resist living evidence around and in them that challenges a
couple of secular and theistic images of the cosmos now folded into the institutional life of capitalism. Indeed the danger is that those constituencies now
most disinclined to give close attention to public issues could oscillate between attraction to the mythic promises of neoliberal automaticity and attraction
to a neofascist movement when the next crisis unfolds. It has happened before. I am not saying that neoliberalism is itself a form of fascism, but that the
failures and meltdowns it periodically promotes could once again foment fascist or neofascist responses, as happened in several countries after the onset

The democratic state, while it certainly cannot alone tame capital or re- constitute the ethos and
infrastructure of consumption, must play a significant role in reconstituting our lived
relations to climate, weather, resource use, ocean currents, bee survival, tectonic instability, glacier flows, species diversity, work, local life,
consumption, and investment, as it also responds favorably to the public pressures we
must generate to forge a new ethos. A new, new left will thus experimentally enact new
intersections be- tween role performance and political activity, outgrow its old disgust with the very idea of
the state, and remain alert to the dangers states can pose. It will do- so
because, as already suggested, the fragile ecology of late capital requires
state interventions of several sorts. A refusal to participate in the state
today cedes too much hegemony to neoliberal markets, either explicitly or by implication.
Drives to fascism, remember , rose the last time in capitalist states after market
meltdown. Most of those movements failed. But a couple became consolidated through a series of resonances (vibrations) back and forth
between industrialists, the state, and vigilante groups in neighborhoods, clubs, churches, the police, the media, and pubs. You do not
fight the danger of a new kind of neofascism by withdrawing from either
micropolitics or state politics. You do so through a multisited politics
designed to infuse a new ethos into the fabric of everyday life. Changes
in ethos can in turn open doors to new possibilities of state and interstate
action, so that an advance in one domain seeds that in the other. And vice versa. A
positive dynamic of mutual amplification might be generated here . Could a series
of the Great Depression. 6)

of significant shifts in the routines of state and global capitalism even press the fractured system to a point where it hovers on the edge of capitalism

That is one reason it is important to focus on interim goals. Another

is that in a world of becoming, replete with periodic and surprising shifts in
the course of events, you cannot project far beyond an interim period . Another
yet is that activism needs to project concrete, interim possibilities to gain
support and propel itself forward. That being said, it does seem unlikely to me, at least, that a positive interim future
itself? We dont know.

includes either socialist productivism or the world projected by proponents of deep ecology. 7) To advance such an agenda it is also imperative to
negotiate new connections between nontheistic constituencies who care about the future of the Earth and numerous devotees of diverse religious

The new, multifaceted movement needed

today, if it emerges, will take the shape of a vibrant pluralist assemblage acting at
multiple sites within and across states, rather than either a centered
movement with a series of fellow travelers attached to it or a mere electoral constellation. Electoral victories are important, but they work best
traditions who fold positive spiritualities into their creedal practices.

when they touch priorities already embedded in churches, universities, film, music, consumption practices, media reporting, investment priorities, and the
like. A related thing to keep in mind is that the capitalist modes of acceleration, expansion, and intensification that heighten the fra- gility of things today
also generate pressures to minoritize the world along multiple dimensions at a more rapid pace than heretofore. A new pluralist constellation will build

the forgoing comments will

appear to some as "optimistic" or "utopian." But optimism and pessimism are
both primarily spectatorial views. Neither seems sufficient to the contemporary condition.
Indeed pessimism, if you dwell on it long, easily slides into cynicism, and cynicism often
plays into the hands of a right wing that applies exclusively to any set of
state activities not designed to protect or coddle the corporate estate . That is
one reason that "dysfunctional politics" redounds so readily to the advantage of
cynics on the right who work to promote it. They want to promote cynicism with respect to the state and
innocence with respect to the market. Pure critique as already suggested, does not suffice either. Pure
critique too readily carries critics and their followers to the edge of
upon the latter developments as it works to reduce the former effects. I am sure that

cynicism.

It is also true that the above critique concentrates on neoliberal capital- ism, not capitalism writ large. That is because it seems to me
that we need to specify the terms of critique as closely as possible and think first of all about interim responses. If we lived under, say, Keynesian

Capitalism writ largewhile it sets

a general context that neoliberalism inflects in specific wayssets too large and generic a target. It can
assume multiple forms, as the differences between Swedish and American capitalism suggest; the times demand a set of interim
agendas targeting the hegemonic form of today, pursued with heightened militancy at several sites. The point today is not to
wait for a revolution that overthrows the whole system. The "system," as
we shall see further, is replete with too many loose ends, uneven edges,
dicey intersections with nonhuman forces, and uncertain trajectories to make such a wholesale project
plausible. Besides, things are too urgent and too many people on the ground are
sufering too much now.
capitalism, a somewhat different set of issues would be defined and other strategies identified.25

security
Cool cursing bros. Nice work.

state pik
1. Epistemology turns the k when we are able to
examine the issues within contemporary international
relations we are able to question the very ways that
security discourse shapes our individual attatchment to
politics that is Lynch 2 and our examination of
particular state practices is key using the state as a
heuristic calls into question the very nature of control
and exclusion
Zanotti 14 (Dr. Laura Zanotti, Associate Prof. of PoliSci @ VA Tech.
Governmentality, Ontology, Methodology: Re-thinking Political Agency in the
Global World Alternatives: Global, Local, Political vol 38(4): p. 288-304.
originally published online 12/30/2013) mlm
By questioning substantialist representations of power and subjects,
inquiries on the possibilities of political agency are reframed in a way
that focuses on power and subjects relational character and the
contingent processes of their (trans)formation in the context of agonic
relations. Options for resistance to governmental scripts are not limited
to rejection, revolution, or dispossession to regain a pristine
freedom from all constraints or an immanent ideal social order. It is found
instead in multifarious and contingent struggles that are constituted
within the scripts of governmental rationalities and at the same time
exceed and transform them. This approach questions oversimplifications of
the complexities of liberal political rationalities and of their interactions with nonliberal political players and nurtures a radical skepticism about identifying
universally good or bad actors or abstract solutions to political problems.
International power interacts in complex ways with diverse political spaces and
within these spaces it is appropriated, hybridized, redescribed, hijacked, and
tinkered with. Governmentality as a heuristic focuses on performing
complex diagnostics of events. It invites historically situated
explorations and careful diferentiations rather than overarching
demonizations of power, romanticizations of the rebel or the the local.
More broadly, theoretical formulations that conceive the subject in nonsubstantialist terms and focus on processes of subjectification, on the
ambiguity of power discourses, and on hybridization as the terrain for
political transformation, open ways for reconsidering political agency
beyond the dichotomy of oppression/rebellion. These alternative
formulations also foster an ethics of political engagement, to be
continuously taken up through plural and uncertain practices, that
demand continuous attention to what happens instead of fixations
on what ought to be.83 Such ethics of engagement would not await
the revolution to come or hope for a pristine freedom to be regained.
Instead, it would constantly attempt to twist the working of power by

playing with whatever cards are available and would require intense
processes of reflexivity on the consequences of political choices. To
conclude with a famous phrase by Michel Foucault my point is not that
everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not
exactly the same as bad. If everything is dangerous, then we always
have something to do. So my position leads not to apathy but to hyperand pessimistic activism.84

2. we dont externalize ethics on to the state the

Anastasou ev is good in indicating macropolitical
discussion about strategies for dismantling securitizing
representations is key to spur a new type of way we
produce our knowledge this is a disad to the k they
dont have access to our epistemologies
3. Extend Bryant 12 being able to do something about the
thing you are kritisizing is key step one is criticism
step two is ? step three transformation
4. PERM DO BOTH
5. Perm do the plan then the alt - The af is a pre req to
the alt - Denying the centrality of the state destroys all
hope of changing it. We must analyze state policy on
international relations in the context of security in
order to understand it and reorient it
Krause & Williams, 97 (Keith and Michael, Prof. Political Sci. at Geneva
Graduate Institute of Intl Studies and Asst. Prof. Political Sci. at University of
Southern Main, Critical Security Studies, Pg, XV-XVI) mlm
in the construction of a critical
theory of international relations and, in turn, to contemporary security studies.
These (and other) critical perspectives have much to say to each other

While elements of many approaches may be found in this volume, no one perspective dominates. If anything,

several of the contributions to this volume stand more inside than outside the tradition
of security studies, which reflects our twofold conviction about the place of critical perspectives in
contemporary scholarship. First, to stand too far outside prevailing discourses is almost
certain to result in continued disciplinary exclusion. Second, to move toward
alternative conceptions of security and security studies, one must necessarily
reopen the questions subsumed under the modem conception of sovereignty and
the scope of the political . To do this, one must take seriously the prevailing claims about the nature of
security. Many of the chapters in this volume thus retain a concern with the centrality of the state as a locus not
only of obligation but of effective political action. In the realm of organized violence, states also remain the

The task of a critical, approach is not to deny the centrality of the

state in this realm but, rather, to understand more fully its structures, dynamics,
and possibilities for reorientation . From a critical perspective, state action is
flexible and capable of reorientation, and analyzing state policy need not
therefore be tantamount to embracing the statist assumptions of orthodox
conceptions. To exclude a focus on state action from a critical perspective on
preeminent actors.

the grounds that it plays inevitably within the rules of existing conceptions simply
reverses the error of essentializing the state . Moreover, it loses the possibility of
influencing what remains the most structurally capable actor in contemporary
world politics. answers. But if thats the argument, theres a pretty obvious problem with it, which Pierres
essay itself clearly shows. Heres the problem. Pierre may be right about the nature of normative questions
posed and answered by judges. As virtually everyone whos thought about it agrees, both judges and the
scholars that imitate them, when explaining what the law is, have to also explain what the law should be. If we
want to explain the law of compensation for injuries caused by badly manufactured products, were going to
have to also say what we think the law ought to be, because what it is is just not all that clear. So, theres
some normative or political or moral analysis involved in even the most ordinary legal and adjudicative
writing. Statements of what the law is will indeed include, perforce, a tad of policy analysis, a dabbling in
costs and benefits, some philosophizing over fundamental values or basic principles, and at least some
weighing of pros and cons between proffered alternatives.

6. Interpretation: Negative can run kritiks with

alternatives about methodology or rethinking, just
cant include our planbest for debate
a) Argument developmentforce 8 minutes of new arguments in the 2ac
instead of developing the 1ac against the alt
b) Perm groundPIKs destroy net benefits to permssolving the 1ac is no
longer unique to the aff. They get the alternative and status quo, we get
plan and permits reciprocal. Reciprocity is the baseline for switch-side
debateeach strategic benefit should incur a strategic cost.
c) Infinitely regressivejustifies alternative to do the plan without using
periods. Already impossible to prepare for every kritik of a representation
doing the aff to takes away ANY offense
d) Solvency deficitskritik alternatives function in a different framework
e) Case outweighsuse the affirmative against the alternative
f) Sketchy floating piks jusify severance perms

7. simulations is key for learning ways that new theories

can be applied solves the af
Silvia 12 (Chris Silvia is an assistant professor in the School of Public Affairs and
Administration at the University of Kansas. His main research interests include
collaborative governance, public service delivery, and leadership. The Impact of
Simulations on Higher Level Learning. Journal of Public Affair Education. JPAE
18(2), 397422) CTD
Experiential learning activities have been a commonly employed pedagogical
tool for centuries. The physical sciences have had laboratory sessions, language
classes have included role-playing exercises, and the health sciences have held
mock-ups, all of which were designed to allow the student to use and apply what
was read or presented in class. With the lectures and/or readings as a
foundation, many of these experiences were intended to crystallize the students
understanding of the material. For example, since the relationship between
force, mass, and acceleration is often not intuitive, many physics courses include
a lab session where students manipulate these three parameters and prove to
themselves that force is equal to mass times acceleration. Whereas classes in

the physical sciences reinforce and build upon the concepts and theories taught
in lecture with opportunities to experiment in a laboratory setting, courses in the
social sciences often do not include similar, hands-on learning opportunities.
This lack of an active learning experience may be particularly
problematic in the political science, public policy, and public
administration classrooms, for students in these disciplines must often
grapple with the conflicting facts and values that are common in public policy
debates and throughout the policy process in the real world. Since pure
laboratory experiments in many disciplines are not possible or ethical,
instructors in these fields have turned to simulations as ways to allow students a
laboratory-like experience. Simulations vary widely in their lengthsome last
only 5 to 10 minutes (Davis, 2009), and others are held over multiple class
sessions (Woodworth, Gump, & Forrester, 2005). Additionally, the format of
simulations ranges from computerized games to elaborate, role-playing
scenarios (Moore, 2009). While not all simulations involve role playing, for the
purposes of this paper, the terms role playing, role-playing simulation, and
simulations are used synonymously to refer to active learning techniques in
which students try to become another individual and, by assuming the role, to
gain a better understanding of the person, as well as the actions and motivations
that prompt certain behaviors [and] explore their [own] feelings (Moore,
2009, p. 209) Simulations give students the chance to apply theory,
develop critical skills , and provide a welcome relief from the everyday tasks
of reading and preparing for classes (Kanner, 2007). An additional benefit of
many of these simulations is the introduction of an aspect of realism into the
students experience. Such simulations are historically seen in the medical fields,
where mock-up patients take on the signs and symptoms of a certain disease or
injury and the student is asked to assess, diagnose, and/or treat the patient.
Here the students must apply what they have learned to a reasonably realistic
scenario. Further, there is evidence that the experiential learning that occurs in
role-playing simulations promotes long-term retention of course material
(Bernstein & Meizlish, 2003; Brookfield, 1990). Increasingly, public
administration, public policy, and political science courses are turning toward
simulations and role playing to help their students both better understand and
apply the material. Simulations have been used in courses such as international
relations (e.g., Shellman & Turan, 2006), negotiations (e.g., Kanner, 2007),
constitutional law (e.g., Fliter, 2009), comparative politics (e.g., Shellman, 2001),
professional development (e.g., Wechsler & Baker, 2004), economics (e.g.,
Campbell & McCabe, 2002), human resource management (e.g., Dede, 2002;
Yaghi, 2008), leadership (e.g., Crosby & Bryson, 2007), and American
government (e.g., Caruson, 2005).

8. Perm solves and alt fails engaging multiple sites of

resistance and interim reforms is necessary to foster an
ethos critical to overcome right-wing oppression their
rejection of the state cedes the terrain of politics to
neoliberals
Connolly 13 [William, Professor of Political Theory at Johns Hopkins
University, The Fragility of Things, pp. 36-42]
we do
not know with confidence, in advance of experimental action, just how far or fast changes in
the systemic character of neoliberal capitalism can be made. The
structures often seem solid and intractable, and indeed such a semblance may turn out to be true. Some may seem
solid, infinitely absorptive, and intractable when theyre in fact punctuated by hidden
vulnerabilities, soft spots, uncertainties, and potential lines of flight that become
appar- ent when they are subjected to experimental action, upheaval, testing, and
A philosophy attending to the acceleration, expansion, irrationalities, interdependencies, and fragilities of late capitalism suggests that

strain. Indeed no ecology of late capitalism, given the variety of forces to which it is connected by a thousand pulleys, vibrations, impingements, de-

The
structural theory, at its best, was in identifying, institutional intersections that hold a system together; its
conceit, at its worst, was the claim to know in advance how resistant such
intersections are to potential change. Without adopting the opposite
conceit, it seems important to pursue possible sites of strategic action
that might open up room for productive change. Today it seems important to attend to the
relation be- tween the need for structural change and identification of multiple sites of potential
action. You do not know precisely what you are doing when you participate in such a venture. You combine an experimental temper with the
pendencies, shocks, and threads, can specify with supreme confidence the solidity or potential flexibility of the structures it seeks to change.
strength of

appreciation that living and acting into the future inevitably contain a shifting quotient of uncertainty. The following tentative judgments and sites of
action may be pertinent. 1) Neither neoliberal theory, nor socialist productivism, nor deep ecology, nor social democracy in its classic form seems
sufficient to the contemporary condition. This is so in part because the powers of market self-regulation are both real and limited in relation to a
larger multitude of heterogeneous force fields beyond the human estate with differential powers of self-regulation and metamorphosis. A first task is
to challenge neoliberal ideology through critique and by elaborating and publicizing positive alternatives that acknowledge the disparate relations
between market processes, other cultural systems, and nonhuman systems. Doing so to render the fragility of things more visible and palpable.
Doing so, too, to set the stage for a series of interceded shifts in citizen role performances, social movements, and state action. 2) Those who seek
to reshape the ecology of late capitalism might set an interim agenda of radical reform and then recoil back on the initiatives to see how they work.

An interim agenda is the best thing to focus on because in a world of

becoming the more distant future is too cloudy to engage . We must, for
instance, become involved in experimental micropolitics on a variety of fronts, as we
participate in role experimentations, social movements , artistic displaces, erotic-political
shows, electoral campaigns, and creative interventions on the new media to help recode the
ethos that now occupies investment practices, consumption desires, family savings, state priorities, church assemblies, university curricula, and
media reporting. It is important to bear in mind how extant ideologies, established role performances, social movements, and commitments to state

To shift some of our own role performances

action intersect.
in the zones of travel, church
participation, home energy use, investment, and consumption, for instance, that now implicate us deeply in foreign oil dependence and the huge

could make a minor diference on its own and also lift

some of the burdens of institutional implications from us to support
participation in more adventurous interpretations, political strategies, demands upon the
military expenditures that secure it,

state, and cross-state citizen actions. 3) Today perhaps the initial target, should be on reconstituting established patterns of consumption by a
combination of direct citizen actions in consumption choices, publicity of such actions, the organization of local collectives to modify consumption
practices, and social movements to reconstitute the current state- and market-supported infrastructure of consumption. By the infrastructure of
consumption I mean publicly supported and subsidized market subsystems such as a national highway system, a system of airports, medical care
through private insurance, agribusiness pouring high sugar, salt, and fat content into foods, corporate ownership of the public media, the
prominence of corporate 403 accounts over retirement pensions, and so forth that enable some modes of consumption in the zones of travel,
education, diet, retirement, medical care, energy use, health, and education and render others much more difficult or expensive to procure.22 To
change the infrastructure is also to shift the types of work and investment available. Social movements that work upon the infrastructure and ethos
of consumption in tandem can thus make a real difference directly, encourage more people to heighten their critical perspectives, and thereby open

a cross-state citizen goal

should construct a pluralist assemblage by moving back and forth
more people to a more militant politics if and as the next disruptive event emerges. Perhaps

between experiments in role performances, the refinement of sensitive modes of perception,

revisions in political ideology, and adjustments in political sensibility; doing so to mobilize
enough collective energy to launch a general strike simultaneously in
several countries in the near future. The aim of such an event would be to reverse the deadly future created
by established patterns of climate change by fomenting significant shifts in patterns of consumption, corporate policies, state law, and the priorities
of interstate organizations. Again, the dilemma of today is that the fragility of things demands shifting and slowing down intrusions into several
aspects of nature as we speed up shifts in identity; role performance, cultural ethos, market regulation, and state policy. 4) The existential forces of
hubris (expressed above all in those confident drives to mastery conveyed by military elites, financial economists, financial elites, and CEOs) and of
ressentiment (expressed in some sectors of secularism and evangelicalism) now play roles of importance in the shape of consumption practices,
investment portfolios, worker routines, managerial demands, and the uneven senses of entitlement that constitute neoliberalism. For that reason
activism inside churches, schools, street life, and the media must become increasingly skilled and sensitive. As we proceed, some of us may present
the themes of a world of becoming to larger audiences, challenging thereby the complementary notions of a providential world and secular mastery
that now infuse too many role performances, market practices, and state priorities in capitalist life. For existential dispositions do infuse the role
priorities of late capitalism. Today it is both difficult for people to perform the same roles with the same old innocence and difficult to challenge those
performances amid our own implication in them. Drives by evangelists, the media, neoconservatives, and the neoliberal right to draw a veil of
innocence across the priorities of contemporary life make the situation much worse. 5) The emergence of a neofascist or mafia-type capitalism
slinks as a dangerous possibility on the horizon, partly because of the expansion and intensification of capital, partly because of the real fragility of
things, partly because the identity needs of many facing these pressures encourage them to cling more intensely to a neoliberal imaginary as its
bankruptcy becomes increasingly apparent, partly because so many in America insist upon retaining the special world entitlements the country
achieved after World War II in a world decreasingly favorable to them, partly because of the crisis tendencies inherent in neoliberal capitalism, and
partly because so many resist living evidence around and in them that challenges a couple of secular and theistic images of the cosmos now folded
into the institutional life of capitalism. Indeed the danger is that those constituencies now most disinclined to give close attention to public issues
could oscillate between attraction to the mythic promises of neoliberal automaticity and attraction to a neofascist movement when the next crisis
unfolds. It has happened before. I am not saying that neoliberalism is itself a form of fascism, but that the failures and meltdowns it periodically
promotes could once again foment fascist or neofascist responses, as happened in several countries after the onset of the Great Depression. 6)

The democratic state, while it certainly cannot alone tame capital or re- constitute the ethos and infrastructure of
consumption, must play a significant role in reconstituting our lived relations to
climate, weather, resource use, ocean currents, bee survival, tectonic instability, glacier flows, species diversity, work, local life, consumption, and

as it also responds favorably to the public pressures we must

generate to forge a new ethos. A new, new left will thus experimentally enact new
intersections be- tween role performance and political activity, outgrow its old disgust with the very
idea of the state, and remain alert to the dangers states can pose . It
will do- so because, as already suggested, the fragile ecology of late
capital requires state interventions of several sorts. A refusal to
participate in the state today cedes too much hegemony to neoliberal
markets, either explicitly or by implication. Drives to fascism, remember , rose the last time in
capitalist states after market meltdown. Most of those movements failed. But a couple became
investment,

consolidated through a series of resonances (vibrations) back and forth between industrialists, the state, and vigilante groups in neighborhoods,

You do not fight the danger of a new kind of

neofascism by withdrawing from either micropolitics or state politics.
You do so through a multisited politics designed to infuse a new ethos
into the fabric of everyday life. Changes in ethos can in turn open doors
to new possibilities of state and interstate action, so that an advance in
one domain seeds that in the other. And vice versa. A positive dynamic of
mutual amplification might be generated here. Could a series of significant shifts in the routines of
state and global capitalism even press the fractured system to a point where it hovers on the edge of capitalism itself? We dont know. That is
one reason it is important to focus on interim goals. Another is that in a world
of becoming, replete with periodic and surprising shifts in the course of
events, you cannot project far beyond an interim period. Another yet is that
activism needs to project concrete, interim possibilities to gain support
and propel itself forward. That being said, it does seem unlikely to me, at least, that a positive interim future includes
clubs, churches, the police, the media, and pubs.

either socialist productivism or the world projected by proponents of deep ecology. 7) To advance such an agenda it is also imperative to negotiate
new connections between nontheistic constituencies who care about the future of the Earth and numerous devotees of diverse religious traditions

The new, multifaceted movement needed

today, if it emerges, will take the shape of a vibrant pluralist assemblage acting
at multiple sites within and across states, rather than either a centered
movement with a series of fellow travelers attached to it or a mere electoral constellation. Electoral victories are important, but they work
who fold positive spiritualities into their creedal practices.

best when they touch priorities already embedded in churches, universities, film, music, consumption practices, media reporting, investment
priorities, and the like. A related thing to keep in mind is that the capitalist modes of acceleration, expansion, and intensification that heighten the

fra- gility of things today also generate pressures to minoritize the world along multiple dimensions at a more rapid pace than heretofore. A new

the forgoing
comments will appear to some as "optimistic" or "utopian." But optimism and
pessimism are both primarily spectatorial views. Neither seems
sufficient to the contemporary condition. Indeed pessimism, if you dwell on it long, easily slides into
cynicism, and cynicism often plays into the hands of a right wing that
applies exclusively to any set of state activities not designed to protect
or coddle the corporate estate. That is one reason that "dysfunctional politics"
redounds so readily to the advantage of cynics on the right who work to
promote it. They want to promote cynicism with respect to the state and innocence with respect to the market. Pure
critique as already suggested, does not suffice either. Pure critique too readily carries
critics and their followers to the edge of cynicism . It is also true that the above critique
pluralist constellation will build upon the latter developments as it works to reduce the former effects. I am sure that

concentrates on neoliberal capital- ism, not capitalism writ large. That is because it seems to me that we need to specify the terms of critique as
closely as possible and think first of all about interim responses. If we lived under, say, Keynesian capitalism, a somewhat different set of issues

Capitalism writ largewhile it sets a general context that neoliberalism

sets too large and generic a target. It can assume multiple

would be defined and other strategies identified.25

inflects in specific ways

forms, as the differences between Swedish and American capitalism suggest; the times demand a set of interim agendas targeting the
hegemonic form of today, pursued with heightened militancy at several sites. The point today is not to wait for
a revolution that overthrows the whole system. The "system," as we
shall see further, is replete with too many loose ends, uneven edges,
dicey intersections with nonhuman forces, and uncertain trajectories to make such a wholesale project
plausible. Besides, things are too urgent and too many people on the ground are
sufering too much now.

9. This molar thinking dooms the alternative to reproduce

the hierarchal structures we critique.
Guattari and Rolnik, schitzoanalysts, revolutionaries, 1986 [Felix and
Suely, Molecular Revolution in Brazil, p. 120-121]
Comment: It's good that you mentioned those homosexuals who worked within the system as lawyers and

Here, everyone looks down on the institutional part. Guattari: That's

silly. Comment: They think that dealing with the institutional side is reformism, that it doesn't change
succeeded in shaking it up.

anything. As far as they're concerned, the institutions should be ignored because only one kind of thing is
worthwhile, anarchismwhich I question deeply. I think it's very naive, as you yourself say, to ignore the state
on the basis that "it's useless," or "it oppresses us," and therefore to leave it aside and try to do something

malaise in
relation to institutions is nothing new; on the contrary, the feeling is particularly strong in our
totally from outside, as though it might be possible for us to destroy it like that. Suely Rolnik: This

generation which, since the 1960s, has taken institutions as one of its main targets. But it's true that the
malaise has been especially pronounced in Brazil over the last few years, and in my view this must have to do
with an absolutely objective (and obvious) fact, which is the hardness of the dictatorship to which we were
subjected for so long. The rigidity of that regime is embodied in all the country's institutions, in one way or
another; in fact, that constituted an important factor for the permanence of the dictatorship in power over so

the
feeling that the institutions are contaminated territories, and the conclusion
that nothing should be invested in them, is often the expression of a defensive
role. This kind of sensation is, in my view, the flip side of the fascination with the institution
that characterizes the "bureaucratic libido." These two attitudes really satisfy the same
need, which is to use the prevailing forms, the instituted, as the sole, exclusive
parameter in the organization of oneself and of relations with the other , and thus avoid
succumbing to the danger of collapse that might be brought about by any kind of change. Those are two
styles of symbiosis with the institution: either "gluey" adhesion and identification (those
who adopt this style base their identity on the "instituted"), or else repulsion and
many years. But I think that this antiinstitutional malaise, whatever its cause, doesn't end there:

counteridentification (those who adopt this style base their identity on negation of the "instituted," as if
there were something "outside" the institutions, a supposed "alternative" space to this world). Seen in this

both "alternativism" and "bureaucratism" restrict themselves to

approaching the world from the viewpoint of its forms and representations, from a molar
viewpoint; they protect themselves against accessing the molecular plane, where new
sensations are being produced and composed and ultimately force the creation of new forms of reality,.
They both reflect a blockage of instituting power, an impossibility of surrender to the processes of
singularization, a need for conservation of the prevailing forms , a difficulty in gaining access to the
light,

molecular plane, where the new is engendered. It's more difficult, to perceive this in the case of
"alternativism," because it

involves the hallucination of a supposedly parallel world that emanates

unfettered autonomy and freedom of creation; and just when we think
we've got away from "squareness" we risk succumbing to it again, in a more
disguised form. In this respect, I agree with you: the institutions aren't going to be
changed by pretending that they don't exist. Nonetheless, it's necessary to add two reserves.
the illusion of

In the first place, it's obvious that not every social experimentation qualified by the name of "alternative" is
marked by this defensive hallucination of a parallel world. And secondly, if we think about the context of the
dictatorship, it's self-evident that in order to bear the harshness of an authoritarian regime there is a tendency
to make believe that itdoesn't exist, so as not to have to enter into contact with sensations of frustration and
powerlessness that go beyond the limit of tolerability (indeed, this is a general reaction before any traumatic
experience). And in order to survive, people try in so far as possible to create other territories of life, which are
often clandestine.

10. Af is a disad to the pic without understanding how

legal systems function we can never help oppressed
populations in the short term. Theres institutionalized
racist discourse that will go unaddressed. Black power
movements prove that specifically understanding legal
freedoms mobilizes resistance.

da

da frontline
1. Their threat language reinforces a SQ that is racist &
sexist and ensures rising militarization & war thats
Glaser and Moses
2. Goldstein turns the disad 2 reasons
a. Containment ensures great power conflict
b. The plan spills up to all international relations The trust
& perceptual changes the plan engenders in China and
the US afect the whole global order and impact every
global problem. US/China relations are the fulcrum of the
global order.
3. The mentality of this time its diferent continues. This
creates bad research practices that incentivize focus on
the absurd for the sake of being new and a collective
acceptance of deeply shoddy research. We must begin
with an assumption of deep improbability for accurate
predictions of low-n events
4. Structural harms outweighs on probability and magnitude
risk assessment is not neutral but is epistemologically
biased towards privileged white male elites who discount
the severity of everyday violence in destroying
marginalized populations.
Verchick 96 [Robert, Assistant Professor, University of Missouri -- Kansas City School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School,
1989, IN A GREENER VOICE: FEMINIST THEORY AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 19 Harv. Women's L.J. 23]

Because risk assessment is based on statistical measures of risk,

policymakers view it as an accurate and objective tool in establishing
environmental standards. n275 The scientific process used to assess risk purports to focus singlemindedly on only one feature of a potential injury: the objective probability of its occurrence. n276 Risk assessors,
who consider most value judgments irrelevant in determining statistical risk, seek to banish them at every stage.
n277 As a result, the language of risk assessment -- and of related environmental safety
standards -- often carry an air of irrebuttable precision and certainty. The EPA, for example, defines the standard
acceptable level of risk under Superfund as "10<-6>" -- that is, the probability that one person in a million would
develop cancer due to exposure to site contamination. n278 [*76] Feminism challenges this model of scientific risk
assessment on at least three levels. First, feminism questions the assumption that scientific inquiry is value-neutral,
that is, free of societal bias or prejudice. n279 Indeed, as many have pointed out, one's perspective unavoidably
influences the practice of science. n280 Western science may be infused with its own ideology, perpetuating, in the
view of the ecofeminists, cycles of discrimination, domination, and exploitation. n281 Second, even if scientific
inquiry by itself were value-neutral, environmental regulation based on such inquiry would still contain subjective
elements. Environmental regulation, like any other product of democracy, inevitably reflects elements of

serves only to
"mask, not eliminate, political and social considerations." n282 We have already
seen how the subjective decision to prefer white men as subjects for
epidemiological study can skew risk assessments against the interests of
subjectivity, compromise, and self-interest. The technocratic language of regulation

women and people of color. The focus of many assessments on the risk of cancer
deaths, but not, say, the risks of birth defects or miscarriages, is yet another
example of how a policymaker's subjective decision of what to look for can
influence what is ultimately seen. n283 Once risk data are collected and placed in a statistical
form, the ultimate translation of that information into rules and standards of conduct once again reflects value
judgments. A safety threshold of one in a million or a preference for "best conventional technology" does not spring
from the periodic table, but rather evolves from the application [*77] of human experience and judgment to
scientific information. Whose experience? Whose judgment? Which information?
These are the questions that feminism prompts, and they will be discussed shortly. Finally, feminists would argue

questions involving the risk of death and disease should not even
aspire to value neutrality. Such decisions -- which afect not only today's
generations, but those of the future -- should be made with all related
political and moral considerations plainly on the table . n284 In addition,
policymakers should look to all perspectives, especially those of society's
most vulnerable members, to develop as complete a picture of the moral
issues as possible. Debates about scientific risk assessment and public values often appear as a tug of
that

war between the "technicians," who would apply only value-neutral criteria to set regulatory standards, and the
"public," who demand that psychological perceptions and contextual factors also be considered. n285
Environmental justice advocates, strongly concerned with the practical experiences of threatened communities,
argue convincingly for the latter position. n286 A feminist critique of the issue, however, suggests that the debate is
much richer and more complicated than a bipolar view allows. For feminists, the notion of value neutrality simply
does not exist. The debate between technicians and the public, according to feminists, is not merely a contest
between science and feelings, but a broader discussion about the sets of methods, values, and attitudes to which
each group subscribes. Furthermore, feminists might argue, the parties to this discussion divide into more than two
categories. Because one's world view is premised on many things, including personal experience, one might expect
that subgroups within either category might differ in significant ways from other subgroups. Therefore, feminists
would anticipate a broad spectrum of views concerning scientific risk assessment and public values. Intuitively, this
makes sense. Certainly scientists disagree among themselves about the hazards of nuclear waste, ozone depletion,
and global warming. n287 Many critics have argued that scientists, despite their allegiance [*78] to rational
method, are nonetheless influenced by personal and political views. n288 Similarly, members of the public are a
widely divergent group. One would not be surprised to see politicians, land developers, and blue-collar workers
disagreeing about environmental standards for essentially non-scientific reasons. Politicians and bureaucrats
are two sets of the non-scientific community that affect environmental standards in fundamental ways. Their

adherence to vocal, though not always broadly representative, constituencies may lead
them to disfavor less advantaged socioeconomic groups when addressing
environmental concerns. n289 In order to understand a diversity of risk perception and to see how
attitudes and social status affect the risk assessment process, we must return to the feminist inquiry that explores

A recent national
survey, conducted by James Flynn, Paul Slovic, and C.K. Mertz, measured the risk perceptions
of a group of 1512 people that included numbers of men, women, whites, and non-whites proportional to their
ratios in society. n290 Respondents answered questions about the health risks of twenty-five
environmental, technological, and "life-style" hazards, including such hazards as ozone depletion,
the relationship between attitudes and identity. 1. The Diversity of Risk Perception

chemical waste, and cigarette smoking. n291 The researchers asked them to rate each hazard as posing "almost no
health risk," a "slight health risk," a "moderate health risk," or a "high health risk." The researchers then analyzed
[*79] the responses to determine whether the randomly selected groups of white men, white women, non-white

perceptions of risk
generally difered on the lines of gender and race. Women, for instance, perceived
men, and non-white women differed in any way. The researchers found that

greater risk from most hazards than did men. n292 Furthermore, non-whites as a group perceived greater risk from

the most striking results appeared when the

researchers considered diferences in gender and race together. They found that
"white males tended to differ from everyone else in their attitudes and perceptions -- on average, they
perceived risks as much smaller and much more acceptable than did other
people." n294 Indeed, without exception, the pool of white men perceived each of the twenty-five
most hazards than did whites. n293 Yet

hazards as less risky than did non-white men, white women, or non-white women. n295 Wary that other factors

the researchers later conducted

several multiple regression analyses to correct for diferences in income,
education, political orientation, the presence of children in the home, and age, among others. Yet even after
all corrections, "gender, race, and 'white male' [status] remained highly
significant predictors" of perceptions of risk. n296 2. Explaining the Diversity From a
feminist perspective, these findings are important because they suggest that risk assessors,
politicians, and bureaucrats -- the large majority of whom are white men
n297 -- may be acting on attitudes about security and risk that women and
people of color do not widely share. If this is so, white men, as the "measurers
of all things," have crafted a system of environmental protection that is
biased toward their subjective understandings of the world. n298 [*80] Flynn,
associated with gender or race could be influencing their findings,

Slovic, and Mertz speculate that white men's perceptions of risk may differ from those of others because in many

women and people of color are "more vulnerable, because they benefit less
they have less power and
control." n299 Although Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz are careful to acknowledge that they have not yet tested this
ways

from many of [society's] technologies and institutions, and because

hypothesis empirically, their explanation appears consistent with the life experiences of less empowered groups
and comports with previous understandings about the roles of control and risk perception. n300 Women and people
of color, for instance, are more vulnerable to environmental threat in several ways. Such groups are sometimes
more biologically vulnerable than are white men. n301 People of color are more likely to live near hazardous waste
sites, to breathe dirty air in urban communities, and to be otherwise exposed to environmental harm. n302 Women,
because of their traditional role as primary caretakers, are more likely to be aware of the vulnerabilities of their
children. n303 It makes sense that such vulnerabilities would give rise to increased fear about risk. It is also very
likely that women and people of color believe they benefit less from the technical institutions that create toxic
byproducts. n304 Further, people may be more likely to discount risk if they feel somehow compensated for the
activity. n305 For this reason, Americans worry relatively little about driving automobiles, an activity with enormous
advantages in our large country but one that claims tens of thousands of lives per year. The researchers' final
hypothesis -- that differences in perception can be explained by the lack of "power and control" exercised by women
and people of color -- suggests the importance that such factors as voluntariness and control over risk play in
shaping perceptions. [*81] Risk perception research frequently emphasizes the significance of voluntariness in
evaluating risk. Thus, a person may view water-skiing as less risky than breathing polluted air because the former is
accepted voluntarily. n306 Voluntary risks are viewed as more acceptable in part because they are products of
autonomous choice. n307 A risk accepted voluntarily is also one from which a person is more likely to derive an
individual benefit and one over which a person is more likely to retain some kind of control. n308 Some studies
have found that people prefer voluntary risks to involuntary risks by a factor of 1000 to 1. n309 Although
environmental risks are generally viewed as involuntary risks to a certain degree, choice plays a role in assuming
risks. White men are still more likely to exercise some degree of choice in assuming environmental risks than other
groups. Communities of color face greater difficulty in avoiding the placement of hazardous facilities in their
neighborhoods and are more likely to live in areas with polluted air and lead contamination. n310 Families of color
wishing to buy their way out of such polluted neighborhoods often find their mobility limited by housing
discrimination, redlining by banks, and residential segregation. n311 The workplace similarly presents workers
exposed to toxic hazards (a disproportionate number of whom are minorities) n312 with impossible choices
between health and work, or between sterilization and demotion. n313 Just as marginalized groups have less choice
in determining the degree of risk they will assume, they may feel less control over the risks they face. "Whether or
not the risk is assumed voluntarily, people have greater [*82] fear of activities with risks that appear to be outside
their individual control." n314 For this reason, people often fear flying in an airplane more than driving a car, even

If white men are more complacent about public

risks, it is perhaps because they are more likely to have their hands on the
steering wheel when such risks are imposed. White men still control the major
political and business institutions in this country. n316 They also dominate
the sciences n317 and make up the vast majority of management staff at environmental agencies. n318
though flying is statistically safer. n315

Women and people of color see this disparity and often lament their back-seat role in shaping environmental policy.
n319 Thus, many people of color in the environmental justice movement believe that environmental laws work to
their disadvantage by design. n320 [*83] The toxic rivers of Mississippi's "Cancer Alley," n321 the extensive
poisoning of rural Indian land, n322 and the mismanaged cleanup of the weapons manufacturing site in Hanford,
Washington n323 only promote the feeling that environmental policy in the United States sacrifices the weak for the
benefit of the strong. In addition, the catastrophic potential that groups other than white men associate with a risk
may explain the perception gap between those groups and white males. Studies of risk perception show that, in

individuals harbor particularly great fears of catastrophe. n324 For this

reason, earthquakes, terrorist bombings, and other disasters in which
high concentrations of people are killed or injured prove particularly
disturbing to the lay public. Local environmental threats involving toxic dumps, aging smelters, or
poisoned wells also produce high concentrations of localized harm that can
appear catastrophic to those involved. n325 Some commentators contend that the
catastrophic potential of a risk should influence risk assessment in only
minimal ways. n326 Considering public fear of catastrophes, they argue, will
irrationally lead policymakers to battle more dramatic but statistically less
threatening hazards, while accepting more harmful but more mundane
hazards. n327 [*84] At least two reasons explain why the catastrophic potential
of environmental hazards must be given weight in risk assessment . First,
concentrated and localized environmental hazards do not simply harm
individuals, they erode family ties and community relationships. An
onslaught of miscarriages or birth defects in a neighborhood, for instance, will
create community-wide stress that will debilitate the neighborhood in
emotional, sociological, and economic ways. n328 To ignore this communal
harm is to underestimate severely the true risk involved. n329 Second,
because concentrated and localized environmental hazards tend to be
unevenly distributed on the basis of race and income level, any resulting
mass injury to a threatened population takes on profound moral character.
general,

For this reason, Native Americans often characterize the military's poisoning of Indian land as genocide. n330 [*85]

Flynn, Slovic, and Mertz challenge the traditional,

static view of statistical risk with a richer, more vibrant image involving
relationships of power, status, and trust. n331 "In short, 'riskiness' means more
to people than 'expected number of fatalities.'" n332 These findings affirm the feminist
claim that public policy must consider both logic and local experience in
addressing a problem. n333 Current attempts to "re-educate" fearful communities with only risk
assessments and scientific seminars are, therefore, destined to fail. n334 By the same token, even dual
approaches that combine science and experience will fall short if the
appeal to experience does not track local priorities and values . Cynthia Hamilton
3. Understanding Through Diversity

illustrates these points in her inspiring account of how a South Central Los Angeles community group, consisting
mainly of working-class women, battled a proposed solid waste incinerator. n335 At one point, the state sent out
consultants and environmental experts to put the community's fears into perspective. The consultants first
appealed to the community's practical, experience-based side, by explaining how the new incinerator would bring
needed employment to the area and by offering $ 2 million in community development. n336 But the community
group found the promise of "real development" unrealistic and the cash gift insulting. n337 When experts then
turned to quantifying the risks "scientifically" their attempts backfired again. Hamilton reports that "expert
assurance that health risks associated with dioxin exposure were less than those associated with 'eating peanut
butter' unleashed a flurry of dissent. All of the women, young and old, working-class and professional, had made
peanut butter sandwiches for years." n338 The sandwich analogy, even assuming its statistical validity, could not
convince the women because it did not consider other valid risk factors (voluntariness, dread, and so on) and
because it did not appear plausible in the group members' experience. In the end, Hamilton explains that the
superficial explanations and sarcastic responses of the male "experts" left the women even more united and

the "science"
of risk assessment, if it is to serve effectively, must include the voices of those
typically excluded from its practice.
convinced that "working-class women's [*86] concerns cannot be dismissed." n339 Thus even

5. Giving credibility to every plausible scenario breaks

down rational risk analysis extinction does not outweigh
the af
Oliver Kessler, Sociology at University of Bielefeld, 8
[From Insecurity to Uncertainty: Risk and the Paradox of Security Politics Alternatives 33
(2008), 211-232] The problem of the second method is that it is very difficult to "calculate" politically unacceptable losses. If the risk of terrorism is
defined in traditional terms by probability and potential loss, then the focus on dramatic terror attacks leads to the marginalization of probabilities. The reason
is that even the highest degree of improb- ability becomes irrelevant as the measure of loss
goes to infinity.^o The mathematical calculation of the risk of terrorism thus tends to overestimate and to dramatize the danger. This has consequences beyond the
actual risk assessment for the formulation and execution of "risk policies": If one factor of the risk calculation approaches infinity (e.g., if a case of nuclear terrorism is envisaged), then

risk manage- ment as a rational endeavor breaks down

there is no balanced measure for antiterrorist efforts, and

.
Under the historical con- dition of bipolarity, the "ultimate" threat with nuclear weapons could be balanced by a similar counterthreat, and new equilibria could be achieved, albeit on
higher levels of nuclear overkill. Under the new condition of uncertainty, no such rational balancing is possible since knowledge about actors, their motives and capabilities, is largely
absent. The second form of security policy that emerges when the deter- rence model collapses mirrors the "social probability" approach. It represents a logic of catastrophe. In contrast
to risk management framed in line with logical probability theory, the logic of catastro- phe does not attempt to provide means of absorbing uncertainty. Rather, it takes uncertainty as

uncer- tainty is a crucial precondition for catastrophies. In particular, cata- strophes happen at once,
without a warning, but with major impli- cations for the world polity. In this category, we find the impact of meteorites. Mars attacks, the
tsunami in South East Asia, and 9/11. To conceive of terrorism as catastrophe has consequences for the formulation of an adequate security policy.
constitutive for the logic itself;

Since catastrophes hap- pen irrespectively of human activity or inactivity, no political action could possibly prevent them. Of course, there are precautions that can be taken, but the
framing of terrorist attack as a catastrophe points to spatial and temporal characteristics that are beyond "ratio- nality." Thus, political decision makers are exempted from the
responsibility to provide securityas long as they at least try to pre- empt an attack. Interestingly enough, 9/11 was framed as catastro- phe in various commissions dealing with the
question of who was responsible and whether it could have been prevented. This makes clear that under the condition of uncertainty, there are no objective criteria that could serve as
an anchor for measur- ing dangers and assessing the quality of political responses. For ex- ample, as much as one might object to certain measures by the US administration, it is almost
impossible to "measure" the success of countermeasures. Of course, there might be a subjective assessment of specific shortcomings or failures, but there is no "common" cur- rency to
evaluate them. As a consequence, the framework of the security dilemma fails to capture the basic uncertainties. Pushing the door open for the security paradox, the main prob- lem of
security analysis then becomes the question how to integrate dangers in risk assessments and security policies about which simply nothing is known. In the mid 1990s, a Rand study
entitled "New Challenges for Defense Planning" addressed this issue arguing that "most striking is the fact that

we do not

even

know

who or what will constitute

the

most serious future threat,

"^i In order to cope with this challenge it would be essential, another Rand researcher wrote, to break free from the "tyranny" of
plausible scenario planning. The decisive step would be to create "discontinuous scenarios ... in which there is no plausible audit trail or storyline from current events"52 These
nonstandard scenarios were later called "wild cards" and became important in the current US strategic discourse. They justified the transformation from a threat-based toward a

even the most absurd scenarios can

a chain of potentialities, improbable events are linked and brought into
the realm of the possible, if not even the probable. "Although the likelihood of the scenario dwindles with each step, the
residual impression is one of plausibility. "54 This so-called Oth- ello effect has been effective in the dawn of the recent war in Iraq. The
connection between Saddam Hussein and Al Qaeda that the US government tried to prove was disputed from the very begin- ning. False
evidence was again and again presented and refuted, but this did not prevent the administration from presenting as the main
rationale for war the improbable yet possible connection between Iraq and the terrorist network and the improbable yet possible proliferation of
an improbable yet possible nuclear weapon into the hands of Bin Laden. As Donald Rumsfeld famously said: "Absence of evidence is not
evidence of absence." This sentence indicates that under the condition of genuine uncer- tainty, different evidence criteria prevail than in situations where
security problems can be assessed with relative certainty.
capability- based defense planning strategy.53 The problem with this kind of risk assessment is, however, that

gain plausibility. By

construct- ing

6. Linear models of predictions fail

Bernstein et al 2k ( Steven Bernstein, Richard Ned Lebow, Janice Gross Stein and Steven
Weber, University of Toronto, The Ohio State University, University of Toronto and University of California at
Berkeley. God Gave Physics the Easy Problems European Journal of International Relations 2000; 6; 43) mlm

A deep irony is embedded in the history of the scientific study of international

relations. Recent generations of scholars separated policy from theory to gain an
intellectual distance from decision-making, in the belief that this would enhance the
'scientific' quality of their work. But five decades of well-funded efforts to develop
theories of international relations have produced precious little in the way of useful,
high confidence results. Theories abound, but few meet the most relaxed 'scientific'
tests of validity. Even the most robust generalizations or laws we can state - war is
more likely between neighboring states, weaker states are less likely to attack
stronger states - are close to trivial, have important exceptions, and for the most
part stand outside any consistent body of theory. A generation ago, we might have

excused our performance on the grounds that we were a young science still in the
process of defining problems, developing analytical tools and collecting data. This
excuse is neither credible nor sufficient; there is no reason to suppose that another
50 years of well-funded research would result in anything resembling a valid theory
in the Popperian sense. We suggest that the nature, goals and criteria for judging
social science theory should be rethought, if theory is to be more helpful in
understanding the real world. We begin by justifying our pessimism, both
conceptually and empirically, and argue that the quest for predictive theory rests on
a mistaken analogy between physical and social phenomena. Evolutionary biology is
a more productive analogy for social science. We explore the value of this analogy
in its 'hard' and 'soft' versions, and examine the implications of both for theory and
research in international relations.2 We develop the case for forward 'tracking' of
international relations on the basis of local and general knowledge as an alternative
to backward-looking attempts to build deductive, nomothetic theory. We then apply
this strategy to some emerging trends in international relations. This article is not a
nihilistic diatribe against 'modern' conceptions of social science. Rather, it is a plea
for constructive humility in the current context of attraction to deductive logic,
falsifiable hypothesis and large-n statistical 'tests' of narrow propositions. We
propose a practical alternative for social scientists to pursue in addition, and in a
complementary fashion, to 'scientific' theory-testing. Newtonian Physics A
Misleading Model Physical and chemical laws make two kinds of predictions. Some
phenomena - the trajectories of individual planets - can be predicted with a
reasonable degree of certainty. Only a few variables need to be taken into account
and they can be measured with precision. Other mechanical problems, like the
break of balls on a pool table, while subject to deterministic laws, are inherendy
unpredictable because of their complexity. Small differences in the lay of the table,
the nap of the felt, the curvature of each ball and where they make contact, amplify
the variance of each collision and lead to what appears as a near random
distribution of balls. Most predictions in science are probabilistic, like the freezing
point of liquids, the expansion rate of gases and all chemical reactions. Point
predictions appear possible only because of the large numbers of units involved in
interactions. In the case of nuclear decay or the expansion of gases, we are talking
about trillions of atoms and molecules. In international relations, even more than in
other domains of social science, it is often impossible to assign metrics to what we
think are relevant variables (Coleman, 1964 especially Chapter 2). The concepts of
polarity, relative power and the balance of power are among the most widely used
independent variables, but there are no commonly accepted definitions or measures
for them. Yet without consensus on definition and measurement, almost every
statement or hypothesis will have too much wiggle room to be 'tested' decisively
against evidence. What we take to be dependent variables fare little better.
Unresolved controversies rage over the definition and evaluation of deterrence
outcomes, and about the criteria for democratic governance and their application to
specific countries at different points in their history. Differences in coding for even a
few cases have significant implications for tests of theories of deterrence or of the
democratic peace (Lebow and Stein, 1990; Chan, 1997). The lack of consensus
about terms and their measurement is not merely the result of intellectual anarchy
or sloppiness - although the latter cannot entirely be dismissed. Fundamentally, it

has more to do with the arbitrary nature of the concepts themselves. Key terms in
physics, like mass, temperature and velocity, refer to aspects of the physical
universe that we cannot directly observe. However, they are embedded in theories
with deductive implications that have been verified through empirical research.
Propositions containing these terms are legitimate assertions about reality because
their truth-value can be assessed. Social science theories are for the most part built
on 'idealizations', that is, on concepts that cannot be anchored to observable
phenomena through rules of correspondence. Most of these terms (e.g. rational
actor, balance of power) are not descriptions of reality but implicit 'theories' about
actors and contexts that do not exist (Hempel, 1952; Rudner, 1966; Gunnell, 1975;
Moe, 1979; Searle, 1995 68-72). The inevitable differences in interpretation of
these concepts lead to different predictions in some contexts, and these outcomes
may eventually produce widely varying futures (Taylor, 1985 55). If problems of
definition, measurement and coding could be resolved, we would still find it difficult,
if not impossible, to construct large enough samples of comparable cases to permit
statistical analysis. It is now almost generally accepted that in the analysis of the
causes of wars, the variation across time and the complexity of the interaction
among putative causes make the likelihood of a general theory extraordinarily low .
Multivariate theories run into the problem of negative degrees of freedom, yet
international relations rarely generates data sets in the high double digits. Where
larger samples do exist, they often group together cases that differ from one
another in theoretically important ways.3 Complexity in the form of multiple
causation and equifinality can also make simple statistical comparisons misleading.
But it is hard to elaborate more sophisticated statistical tests until one has a deeper
baseline understanding of the nature of the phenomenon under investigation, as
well as the categories and variables that make up candidate causes (Geddes, 1990
131-50; Lustick, 1996 505-18; Jervis, 1997). Wars - to continue with the same
example - are similar to chemical and nuclear reactions in that they have underlying
and immediate causes. Even when all the underlying conditions are present, these
processes generally require a catalyst to begin. Chain reactions are triggered by the
decay of atomic nuclei. Some of the neutrons they emit strike other nuclei
prompting them to fission and emit more neutrons, which strike still more nuclei.
Physicists can calculate how many kilograms of Uranium 235 or Plutonium at given
pressures are necessary to produce a chain reaction. They can take it for granted
that if a 'critical mass' is achieved, a chain reaction will follow. This is because
trillions of atoms are present, and at any given moment enough of them will decay
to provide the neutrons needed to start the reaction. In a large enough sample,
catalysts will be present in a statistical sense. Wars involve relatively few actors.
Unlike the weak force responsible for nuclear decay, their catalysts are probably not
inherent properties of the units. Catalysts may or may not be present, and their
potentially random distribution relative to underlying causes makes it difficult to
predict when or if an appropriate catalyst will occur. If in the course of time
underlying conditions change, reducing basic incentives for one or more parties to
use force, catalysts that would have triggered war will no longer do so. This
uncertain and evolving relationship between underlying and immediate causes
makes point prediction extraordinarily difficult. It also makes more general
statements about the causation of war problematic, since we have no way of

knowing what wars would have occurred in the presence of appropriate catalysts. It
is probably impossible to define the universe of would-be wars or to construct a
representative sample of them. Statistical inference requires knowledge about the
state of independence of cases, but in a practical sense that knowledge is often
impossible to obtain in the analysis of international relations.

appeasement
1. The DA exemplifies a model of IR entrenched in a
masculinized us/them dichotomy, producing their own
impacts.
Pan 12 (Chengxin Pan, Senior Lecturer at Deakin University Knowledge, Desire,
and Power in Global Politics: Western Representations of Chinas Rise 2012,
Chapter 4, page 69, CCC)
the fear of the China threat has been a recurring feature in
American politics in general and during the presidential and congressional midterm elections in particular.
During the 2010 midterm elections, for instance, New York Times reported that in a space of
just one week, at least 29 candidates from both sides of politics unveiled
advertisements accusing their opponents of being soft on China, with the
undertone that China had been the chief villain for current American
economic woes. Such is the political economic use of fear especially when it is disguised as scientific
It is in this context that

knowledge. 12 During the 1992 presidential campaign, candidate Bill Clinton fiercely campaigned on a foreign

Reinforced by the appearance

of two prominent Chinese student leaders of the Tiananmen protests at
the 1992 Democratic National Convention in New York, the butchers of
Beijing image served not only as a reminder of the danger posed by
Communist China, but more importantly as a powerful symbolism of
partisan politics to diferentiate Clinton from the incumbent candidate
George H. W. Bush. The bipartisan interest in using China as a whetstone
to attack political rivals alive and well during the 2012 Presidential campaigntestifies to an
enduring rare consensus on the importance of the China threat to the
American politics of fear among a whole spectrum of American politicians.
policy platform of confronting dictators from Baghdad to Beijing.

13 To boost his sagging re-election bid, Bush Snr. was not to be outdone by his Democrat challenger. He tapped into
another popular danger code about China, namely, its military menace to Taiwan. Against the discursive backdrop
of China as a threat to a fledgling democracy in Taiwan, Bush Snr. announced in a campaign appearance before
General Dynamics workers in Fort Worth that America would sell 150 F-16 fighters to the island for an estimated
US$6 billion. Selling F-16s to Taiwan to deter a China threat, as the then Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs James Lilley frankly stated, would help counter Bushs coddling Communist dictators
image,14 For much of the 1990s after Clinton took the White House, the use of the spectre of China for partisan
politics continued unabated, though this time it was mainly conservative Republicans turn to use the mantra of
being soft on China to attack Clinton and what they called Panda huggers in Washington. William Triplett II, coauthor of the sensational book The Year of the Rat: How Bill Clinton Compromised U.S. Security for Chinese Cash,
serves as an instructive example here. This one-time chief Republican counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations

the China threat

could mean more votes at the ballot-box. Chengxin Pan desire and power in global politics
Committee never doubted the merit of using the in the hope that a tougher stance on

China threat in Washingtons power play. For him, to expose wrongdoing by China and to frustrate and embarrass
those who were trying to improve Americas ties with Beijing are simply the two sides of the same coin.15 While

the 2008 US
presidential campaign saw the return of attention to the China menace. In
the run up to the Ohio primary in April 2008, Hillary Clinton spoke at a
trade forum in Pittsburgh: Today, Chinas steel comes here and our jobs
go there. We play by the rules and they manipulate their currency. We get
tainted fish and lead-laced toys and poisoned pet food in return. 16 There
was little doubt that the us/them dichotomy was carefully scripted in her
speech to strike a responsive chord with her mainly blue-collar audience.
the political economy of fear shifted its focus to terrorism in the wake of September 11,

Her political flirting with China-bashing was so blatant that one of her foreign policy advisers, Richard Baum,
resigned in protest, citing that she has chosen to take the low road in her effort to gain our partys presidential
nomination.17 Yet on the so-called low road she was far from a lone traveller. The other Democrat contender (and
later President) Barack Obama resorted to essentially the same tactic. Though his campaign was allegedly all about
hope, he nevertheless played the politics of fear when it came to China, accusing Beijing of grossly undervaluing
its currency, unfairly dumping goods into our market, and violating intellectual property rights.

2. US securitization is the motive for Chinese aggression It

gives China a reason to believe that the US is interfering
in Chinas economic, military, and political afairs. The US
is so powerful that defending Chinas goals is a logical
and normal response to the SQ policy of containment. We
address this central motivation.
3. Containment leads to Chinese backlash
Fong 13 (Arthur Chi Wing, Commander United States Navy, Dancing with the
Dragon: U.S.-China Engagement Policy, pg.9) S.J
China believes that the U.S. wants to protect its hegemonic position and prevent
China from becoming an Asian regional power in which the U nited States has
dominated since the end of WWII. The island disputes in the South China Sea and East China Sea have
generated friction between China and neighboring countries. China has criticized the United States for
siding with other nations against Chinas territorial claims. However, U.S. leaders have
proclaimed neutrality on the island disputes. As China has ascended to become the worlds
second-most economically powerful nation, it is becoming more assertive in its
foreign policy. China is indeed challenging the western dominated international
order.

4. Capability vs Motivations Even if the plan allows China

to acquire economic or military might, it prevents the
motivational processes that are necessary for China to
make a decision to go to war. We solve the incentives for
China to go to war.
5. Only accommodation can prevent US/China conflict
Glaser 15 (Charles L., Prof. at Elliott School of International Affairs and the
Department of PoliSci at George Washington University, A U.S.-China Grand
Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,
International Security, 39(4), p.74)
U.S. accommodation of China deserves serious analysis for two reason s.
First, both intuition and international relations theory suggest that a rising power,
especially one that has experienced tremendous growth, can reasonably
expect to increase its geopolitical influence and more fully achieve its
goals, especially when these goals involve its national security. Bargaining
theories maintain that the probability of war is greater when there is a
larger disparity between the distribution of benefits in the existing
territorial status quo and the balance of power. Accommodation that
reduces this disparity can, under some conditions, reduce the probability of

war and increase the declining states security. Second, the pressures
created by the international structurethe combination of material and
information conditions that constrain states international optionsshould
allow China to rise peacefully, which, somewhat counterintuitively, increases
the potential importance of accommodation. If the international structure
were driving the United States and China toward a major conflict, the
concessions required of the United States would be extremely large and
costly. Even then, they might do little to moderate the intense
competition. But, because the international structure is not creating such
intense pressures, concessions that do not compromise vital U.S. interests may
have the potential to greatly diminish growing strains in U.S.-China
relations, thereby moderating future military and foreign policy
competition between the two powers.

6. Their evidence is wrong Epistemologically, their authors

are biased by Western conceptions of evidence that
demonizes Chinese military power while ratifying US
military preeminence and explaining away aggressive US
postures. They cant defend their research agenda. Thats
Moses & Song.
7. China war not likely- 5 reasons
Thompson 14 (Five Reasons China Won't Be A Big Threat To America's Global
Power, 6/6/14, Loren Thomspon: writes about national security,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2014/06/06/five-reasons-china-wont-bea-big-threat-to-americas-global-power/#7bf7df91b5cd, EHS MKS)
Chinas rapid economic rise and growing assertiveness in relations with other nations has provoked concern in
Washington that America is facing a new rival for global dominance. World Bank estimates suggest China may
surpass the purchasing power of the U.S. economy as early as this year, meaning that America will cease being the
worlds biggest producer of wealth for the first time since it overtook Britain on the eve of the 1876 centennial. U.S.
critics of Beijing frequently ascribe Chinas success to mercantilist trade policies, and point to other irritants such as
growing military investment and state-directed cyber attacks to depict the Middle Kingdom as a menace on the
march. It certainly doesnt help matters when Chinese military leaders attending international forums describe
America as a nation in decline, and attribute the Obama Administrations restrained response in Ukraine to erectile
dysfunction. However, there is no need to make the administrations Pacific pivot the prelude to a new Cold War,

China looks unlikely to be any more successful in dethroning

America from global preeminence than Japan and Russia were . This is partly due to
intrinsic economic and cultural advantages America enjoys, and partly to limits on Chinas
ability to continue advancing. Those limits dont get much attention in Washington, so I thought I would
because for all its dynamism

spend a little time describing the five most important factors constraining Chinas power potential. 1.

Geographical constraints. Unlike America, which spent much of its history expanding under doctrines such
as Manifest Destiny, Chinas potential for territorial growth is severely limited by
geography. To the west it faces the barren Tibetan plateau and Gobi Desert. To the south the Himalayan
mountains present an imposing barrier to the Indian Subcontinent. To the north vast and largely empty grasslands
known as the Steppes provide a buffer with Russia. And to the east stretches the worlds largest ocean (there are
over 6,000 miles of water between Shanghai and San Francisco). So aside from the hapless Vietnamese who share
the southern coastal plain and Chinas historical claim to Taiwan, there isnt much opportunity for wars of conquest

Chinas disputes with neighbors over the disposition of minor

islands and reefs underscores how little real potential Beijing has for growing its
territory the way other powers have. 2. Demographic trends. At 1.3 billion, China has the
on Chinas periphery. Ironically,

largest population of any country. However, that population is aging rapidly due to the one-child policy imposed in
1979. The current fertility rate of 1.6 children per woman is well below the level of 2.1 required to maintain a stable
population over the long run, and also far below the birthrates seen in other emerging Asian nations. What this

within
a few years, the working age population will reach a historical peak and then begin
a sharp decline. The vast pool of cheap labor that fueled Chinas economic miracle has already begun
disappearing, driving up wages and leading some labor-intensive industries to move out . In the years
ahead, a growing population of old people will undermine efforts to stimulate
internal demand while creating pressure for increased social-welfare spending. 3.
Economic dependency. China has followed the same playbook as its Asian neighbors in using trade as a
means in economic terms, to quote a paper recently published by the International Monetary Fund, is that

springboard to economic development. According to the CIAs 2014 World Factbook, exports of goods and services
comprise over a quarter of Chinas gross domestic product. But even if the low-cost labor that made this possible
wasnt drying up, the reliance of an export-driven economy on foreign markets makes Chinas prosperity per
capita GDP is below $10,000 much more vulnerable than Americas. China has sold over $100 billion more in
goods to the U.S. so far this year than it has bought, but that longstanding boost to the Chinese economy wont
persist if the labor cost differential between the two countries keeps narrowing or Washington decides Beijing is a

China is so dependent on offshore resources, markets and

investors to keep its economy growing that it cant run the risk of really scaring its
trading partners. 4. Political culture. Because the Communist Party monopolizes
power in China, there is little opportunity for fundamental reform of the political
system. Party officials at all levels routinely leverage that monopoly to engage in epic corruption. Bribery,
embezzlement, kickbacks and property theft are endemic. The Guardian reports that military posts are sold
for the equivalent of hundreds of thousands of pounds each, creating a vicious
circle as officers who have paid for their places seek to recoup the cost. Favoritism
towards state-controlled industries and well-connected industrialists results in
massive inefficiencies. President Xi Jinpings crackdown on graft resulted in over 8,000 cases being
real danger to its interests.

investigated during just the first three months of this year, suggesting a culture of corruption reminiscent of New
Yorks Tweed Ring. But Tweed was driven from power through democratic processes, whereas Chinas political

Military weakness. That brings me to the subject with which most defense
analysts would have begun this commentary Chinese military power. Military.com reports today that the
Pentagon is out with its latest ominous assessment of Chinas military buildup,
which is said to encompass everything from stealthy fighters to maneuvering antiship missiles to anti-satellite weapons. Those programs actually exist, but the threat
they pose to the U.S. at present is not so clea r. For instance, Beijing doesnt have the
reconnaissance network needed to track and target U.S. warships, and if it did the
weapons it launched would face the most formidable air defenses in the world. Much
culture offers no such solution. 5.

has been written about Chinas supposedly growing investment in nuclear weapons, but the best public information
available suggests that China has about 250 warheads in its strategic arsenal, most of which cant reach America;
the U.S. has 4,600 nuclear warheads available for delivery by missile or plane, and an additional 2,700 in storage.

Beijings decision to sustain only a modest some would say minimal nuclear
deterrent seems incompatible with the notion that it seeks to rival U.S. power . Until
recently it has not possessed a credible sea-based deterrent force, it still does not have a single operational aircraft
carrier, and many of its submarines use diesel-electric propulsion rather than nuclear power. When these less-thanimposing features of the Chinese military posture are combined with widely reported deficiencies in airlift,
reconnaissance, logistics and other key capabilities, the picture that emerges is not ominous. China is an emerging
regional power that is unlikely to ever match America in the main measures of military power unless dysfunctional
political processes in Washington impair our nations economy and defenses. In fact, secular trends are already at
work within the Chinese economy, society and political culture that will tend to make the Middle Kingdom look less
threatening tomorrow, rather than like a global rival of America.

ASEAN
Theres no tradeof with ASEAN cred internal politics ensures
compromise is inevitable
Jones 10 (Lee, lecturer in politics at Queen Mary, University of London. His research focuses on issues of
sovereignty, intervention, state-society relations, regionalism, and governance, particularly in developing countries,
Still in the Drivers Seat, But for How Long? ASEANs Capacity for Leadership in East-Asian International Relations,
in: Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 29, 3, 95-113. ISSN: 1868-4882 (online), ISSN: 1868-1034 (print)) RR

there is no clear consensus among ASEAN states on

exactly how far to go in order to secure their collective credibility in the eyes of
Part of the reason for this is that

external powers. Much has been written about the ASEAN Way of regionalism, which emphasises consensual

some suggesting that this reflects cultural norms specific to

the region, e.g., Malay village practices of mufakat and musyawarah. In fact, because of the
anarchic nature of international relations, the extent of all international
cooperation is determined by the degree of consensus among states. The EU
decision-making, with

may operate through voting rather than consensus, but the decision to adopt this decision-making process was
ultimately based on member-states consent and its continued use depends on it not being so abused to the
detriment of some member-states interests that this consent would be withdrawn. In practice, the EU spends a
great deal of time trying to manufacture consensus among its ruling elites to avoid this happening. Like other
groups of states, the EU is not always successful in reaching consensus, as disagreements over the EU Constitution/
Lisbon Treaty and over how to respond to the politico-economic crisis in Greece illustrate. ASEAN is therefore far

The only thing

unique to ASEAN is the specific interests of the dominant socio-political
coalitions within the region, which ultimately set the possible bounds of consensus among its
member-states. At a basic level, the forces ruling all ASEAN states generally accept the
important of presenting a relatively united front to external powers , and of
safeguarding ASEANs collective image and credibility in order to continue
to enjoy a platform from which to advance their own specific interests .
from unique in being limited by the bounds of consensus among its member-states

Because ASEAN states are heavily dependent on extra-regional markets for trade and investment, and many are
also dependent in terms of aid, their leaders understand the necessity of maintaining good relations with external
economic partners and donors by accommodating their agendas to some degree (or at least appearing t

Link turn Communicative engagement with China spills up to

broad cooperation throughout the region. Relations with China
are the fulcrum for global relations. Thats Goldstein.
Their impact constructs abstract threats that instill broad
securitization in ASEAN which ensures arms races and
militarization that prevent cooperation. Thats Song & Glaser.
ASEAN credibility lowChinese pressure retracts joint
communique
Beech 16 (Hannah Beech, TIME's East Asia and China Bureau Chief, June 15,
2016, "ASEAN Retracts Statement on South China Sea Tensions," TIME,
http://time.com/4369660/asean-south-china-sea-statement) NV
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations has withdrawn a communiqu on rising maritime tensions after reported
pressure from Beijing It was there and then it wasnt. On Tuesday evening, Foreign Ministers from the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) performed a diplomatic magic trick. First, after a meeting with their Chinese
counterpart in southwest China, they

issued a statement on the rising tensions in the

South China Sea, parts of which are claimed by six regional governments. The language, for a body
that prides itself on consensus-making and group photos of grinning dignitaries, was stern: We
expressed our serious concerns over recent and ongoing developments,
which have eroded trust and confidence, increased tensions and which
may have the potential to undermine peace, security and stability in the
South China Sea. The nation that was eroding trust and confidence in the strategic waterway
was unnamed. But China, which has embarked on an ambitious island-building campaign in disputed
waters, and has blamed the U.S. formasterminding any regional conflict, was mentioned elsewhere in
the statement. We also cannot ignore what is happening in the South China Sea, the
communiqu read, as it is an important issue in the relations and cooperation
between ASEAN and China. While that sentence might seem anodyne, it implies a repudiation of
Chinas preferred approach of negotiating bilaterally with each rival claimant, rather than facing the united front of

The ASEAN statement also cautioned against militarization in

the South China Sea, a clear rebuke against Chinas defense buildup, which
a regional body.

includes not only the new islands complete with runways that can welcome military jets, but also missile batteries,
radar facilities and a coast guard that regularly comes into conflict with fishing boats from other littoral nations.

But, less than three hours after the ASEAN statement was released by the Malaysian
Foreign Ministry, a spokeswoman retracted the document, saying that urgent
amendments were needed. By the end of the evening, Chinese Foreign Minister
Wang Yi had made his own statement refuting the contention that the South China Sea
dispute was a sticking point between his country and the regional body as a
whole. This isnt an issue between China and ASEAN, he said. Cooperation between China and ASEAN is far
greater than any specific discord, including the South China Sea dispute. That may be.

China, after all, is

ASEANs largest trading partner. One senior regional diplomat told TIME that, in the busy minutes
after the ASEAN statement went out, Beijing had lobbied regional ministers to make the embarrassing
backtrack. Beijings foreign policymakers, he said, had specifically pressured Laos, which is this years
ASEAN chair, to force the statements recall. (ASEAN requires consensus among all of its 10
members to issue any statement.) When the dragon roars, the little countries need to stay away from the fire

A day
later, and no new ASEAN statement has been issued and it isnt clear whether one
coming out of its mouth, says the diplomat. We have no choice but to acknowledge this political reality.

would be forthcoming at all. Instead, individual announcements from various Southeast Asian countries have

The diplomatic mess recalled an incident in 2012 when, for the first time in
ASEAN history, the group wrapped up a summit without a joint communiqu
because of what was widely perceived to be Chinese pressure on Cambodia to avoid the sensitive
South China Sea issue. This is turning out to be another fiasco in which ASEANs
credibility has been damaged because of a lack of unity , says Ian Storey, a senior
fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute in Singapore. It really looks not only like ASEAN is in
disarray but also that it lacks any backbone.
dribbled out.

Bilateralism stabilizes great power relations in Asia forces

countries to reconsider rash action
Jones 10 (Lee, lecturer in politics at Queen Mary, University of London. His research focuses on issues of
sovereignty, intervention, state-society relations, regionalism, and governance, particularly in developing countries,
Still in the Drivers Seat, But for How Long? ASEANs Capacity for Leadership in East-Asian International Relations,
in: Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 29, 3, 95-113. ISSN: 1868-4882 (online), ISSN: 1868-1034 (print)) RR
In this sense,

ASEANs capacity to stabilise great power relations in Asia

correlates with the incapacity of great powers to successfully mediate
their relationships fully on their own. However, it also depends on the rivalry among the great
powers remaining within tolerable bounds. The current healthy competition yields considerable benefits to ASEAN

if this
escalated into a more hostile rivalry (e.g., through China adopting an
aggressive military posture in the South China Seas ), ASEAN would be
faced with its nightmare scenario of having to choose between strategic
partners.5 It is thus in ASEANs interests and arguably everyone elses to try to
moderate this rivalry, which is why the Association has focused on
elaborating peaceful norms of interstate conduct and enmeshing the great powers in a
as they are courted with offers of funding, investment and free-trade agreements. However,

bewildering web of regional bodies, dialogue partnerships, cooperative projects, free-trade areas, and so on.

Those who criticise, for example, the bilateralism

that characterises trade cooperation in the

region as irrational, since it is less efficient than multilateralism, to some extent miss the point (e.g.,
Dieter 2009: 89-113). These arrangements are not always about the concrete material benefits they can be

sometimes they are simply one more strand through which to

tie-in the great powers, providing one more reason for these states to
think twice before acting rashly. We might visualise this as many Lilliputians tying down a few
expected to yield;

Gullivers. The ropes may not be very strong, even in combination, but so long as the Gullivers do not cooperate to
help free one another, they have little choice but to play the Lilliputians game. Great-power relations have
improved encouragingly of late, particularly between Japan and China, but residual conflicts and wariness seem
likely to prevail in the short-to-medium term, providing a continued need for something like the ARF. Speculation
that the Six Party Talks could evolve into a permanent Northeast Asian security institution seem overly optimistic at
present.

Chinese ptx
1. No Link The afs tactic of communicative engagement is
perceived well when we stop viewing china as the other
we stop trying to dismantle the ways that their politics
interact.
2. Their epistemology is wrong Their ev presumes the
Western conception of the Chinese govt as antagonistic
and militaristic while ignoring the jingoism and
nationalism inherent in American policy. This conception
is both wrong and dangerous, making war inevitable.
Thats Song.
3. Xi credibility declining
The Guardian 5/4 (Chinas Xi Jinping denies House of Cards power struggle but attacks
conspirators, http://mindanaoexaminer.com/chinas-xi-jinping-denies-house-of-cards-power-struggle-but-attacksconspirators-the-guardian/)

Experts also see Xis decision last month to take on the title of commander-inchief of Chinas joint battle command centre as a potential indicator of trouble at the
top. Since coming to power Xi has amassed an unusual plethora of official titles including
general secretary of the Communist party, president of the Peoples Republic of China, chairman of the central
military commission, leader of the national security commission and head of the leading group for overall reform.
One academic has dubbed him the chairman of everything. Roderick MacFarquhar, a Harvard University expert in
elite Communist party politics, said: Xi Jinpings donning of uniform and giving him his new military title is a
warning to his colleagues that he has the army behind him. Whether he actually has or not, one doesnt know. But

the new title could be a sign of

weakness rather than strength, noting that not even Mao Zedong had accumulated such a
glut of titles. Chairman Mao never needed titles. Everyone knew who was in
charge, he said. Xi has made a high-profile anti-corruption campaign one of his administrations key missions,
disciplining hundreds of thousands of officials, including top party and military figures. But experts say the war
on corruption has generated discontent among officials, caused political
paralysis and fueled suspicions Xi is using the campaign as a pretext to
purge his political enemies.4
that is his bulwark, as it was Maos. However, MacFarquhar said

4. Link turn - Popular nationalism in China is built on a

mistrust of foreign powers and public memory of
containment by the world community. Perceptions of
containment and violations of sovereignty provoke
nationalist reactions.
Johnson 9 (KENNETH D. JOHNSON is a colonel in the United States Army, Colonel Johnson is a member of
the U.S. Army War College Class of 2009. CHINAS STRATEGIC CULTURE: A PERSPECTIVE FOR THE UNITED STATES,
Strategic Studies Institute Carlisle Papers Series, June 17, 2009,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=924)

The crucial national narrative of the Century of Humiliation at the hands of

imperialist and hegemonic powers is central to Chinese nationalism today.39
The weight of the past, it seems, is particularly heavy in Chinait is evident that these

historical events drastically shaped the strategic culture of the Chinese

people. As General Li Jijun of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) said in an address at the U.S Army War College
in 1997: Before 1949, when the Peoples Republic of China was established, more than 1000 treaties and
agreements, most of which were unequal in their terms, were forced upon China by the Western powers. As many
as 1.8 million square kilometers were also taken away from Chinese territory. This was a period of humiliation that

the people of China show such strong emotions

concerning our national independence, unity, integrity of territory and
sovereignty. This is also why the Chinese are so determined to safeguard them
under any circumstances and at all costs. Chinese suspicion of foreign
intentions becomes easy to understand and to place in context. Even after its immediate
the Chinese can never forget. This is why
in matters

establishment, the fledging PRC was faced with isolation and containment by the world community, along with
uncertain intentions by U.S. military forces along its borders in Korea, and later Vietnam. Ironically, the PRC itself
was the product of a movement with strong nationalist credentials; it was hardly distinctively communist in its early
years. Today, Chinese nationalism in its basic form encompasses the pride of being Chinese, the collective memory
of the humiliations of the past, and the aspiration for a return to greatness.
political, and military power

has been accompanied by

Chinas rise as an economic,

nationalism among

an outburst of

its population.

5. Anti-Americanism doesnt link to dialogue like the af

Gross 7 (Neil, Asst Pf Sociology @ Harvard, 1/14, The many stripes of anti-Americanism,
http://archive.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2007/01/14/the_many_stripes_of_anti
_americanism/)

anti-Americanism involves more distrust than outright

The distinction is crucial. Where there is distrust, people may be
skeptical of US motives and claims, but are open to considering the American
point of view. Anti-American bias, by contrast, occurs when policies
and actions undertaken by the US government and American corporations are seen as
expressions of an unchangeable national identity and character, such that
dialogue over disagreements is deemed to have no value. It is distrust
rather than bias that seems to characterize Chinese antiAmericanism, for example. Political scientists Alastair Johnston and Daniela Stockmann, who
Second, in most countries,
bias.

contributed the China chapter, observe that Chinese "amity" toward the United States is in decline as
China asserts itself as a budding superpower. However,

Chinese dislike for US economic

and cultural power is "still quite distant from the level of hatred and bias" the Chinese
direct at Japan and the Japanese.

6. No instability Their evidence is Western misperception

Lundquist 12 (David, Tsinghua University western philosophy lecturer, Why China
Won't Collapse, 6-22, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/china-isnt-headed-collapse7046?page=1)
china is said to be headed for collapse for several reasons, any and all of which might combine to
overwhelm its increasingly expensive repressive apparatus. Within this supposed house of horrors is
corruption, exorbitant housing prices, costly education, an antsy middle class and college graduates with
dreams deferrednot to mention frustration stemming from Chinas shortage of females, dubbed Chinas

those reasons take a narrow view of political change,

assuming dissatisfaction will morph into regime change. For a more
bachelor bomb. But

nuanced perspective, economic analysis has to give way to political analysis. One well-articulated Chinacollapse theory comes from Gordon Chang, who says that the country is enjoying the tail end of a threedecade upward supercycle spurred by Deng Xiaopings reforms, globalization and demography. Changs

although
China is slowing, a hard landing is looking less likely . But Chang has more
analysis might be entirely on point, but it doesnt suggest a dramatic collapse. For one thing,

than economic arguments. And thats where his case weakens severely; he foresees economic weakness

aggravating deep-seated tensions in Chinese leadership and society, tensions which in turn will bring
conflict among decision makers and general discontent among the masses. Its a plausible picture, but the
evidence behind it is lacking. We must ask: How exactly could an economic crisis destabilize China? That
is, how do graphs and pie charts become chaos in the streets? Charting Revolutions The textbook example
of a similar change might be Irans 1979 revolution, widely thought be propelled by a dramatic fall in
global oil prices. But the Chinese economy is no oil-addicted dictatorship, and China has no Ayatollah
Khomeini antagonizing it through sermons on scratchy cassette tapes. Contrary

to the banal
collapse theories, there are reasons to believe that a slowing Chinese economy
will bring a chill of calm to the simmering cauldron of society. China is a modern, complex
polity with an adept, agile government. In his landmark work Political Order in Changing
Societies, Samuel Huntington argued that violence is a mark of modernizing societies. To Huntington, modernity meant
three things: the government gains recognition as the legitimate wielder of force; the division of labor is divided between
military, administrators, scientists and the judiciary; there is mass political participation, by which Huntington meant all
forms of participation, be it democratic or totalitarian (as in the Cultural Revolution). By Huntingtons standards, the PRC is
a quite modern polity, one he would deem civic because its institutions are developed beyond its level of political

Beijing is well-prepared to
confront, divert or grant concessions to popular discontent. With firm
institutions established, a state is less susceptible to economic
vagaries, something Changs argument doesnt consider. By proactively heading off economic
activity. In short, the system can withstand economic pressure. Indeed,

distress, the PRC might even stand to gain trust and legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens. After all, as
Western governments rushed to ease the liquidity crunch of 20082009, baffled and nervous citizens said
nary a word of protest as unelected bureaucrats worked their money-printing and bailout magic. Only after
the crisis, years later, did diverse Occupy Wall Street movements include this as a minor detail in their
failed campaign against capitalist excesses. A

faltering economy does not

necessarily cause disorder,

even when effective institutions are absent. A recent New York

Times editorial opposing Western sanctions on Iran broaches this notion, arguing that the Iranian people
might stand up to oppression once well-fed and prospering. The same very well could be true for China.
Reform in China There

are hundreds of thousands of conflicts between the Chinese people and the
state every year. But putting aside egregious land-grab cases like the one in the southern Chinese village of Wukan last
year,

they rarely rise to

the level of

many such events are simply labor disputes.

violencemuch less regime-changeas

The participants have little notion of a future democratic

China, unlike some of their middle-class counterparts, who in contrast have few material incentives to
protest but much to lose. Chinese people generally do not have revolutionary intentions, Gordon Chang
recognizes. But reform is another story. No Chinese citizen goes unaffected by the governments heavyhandednessthe paternalistic, technocratic, socialist or vulgarly utilitarian blemishes in its laws and
administration. That means theres a lot to fix. Unfortunately, important domestic-reform initiatives often
receive comparatively little attention from Western media, fostering the perception that China is a radically
illegitimate oligarchy powered by the blood of its treasured working class. This is a distorted picture that

however slowly
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has accrued political capital
by improving the lives of its people in ways many bygone regimes could not. In late February,
panders to democratic, wishful thinking about Chinese society. The truth is that
and ham-handedly,

the World Bank issued a report entitled "China 2030. Its suggestions for Chinas economic health include decreasing
state ownership of major industries, establishing protections for societys most vulnerable citizens, as well as calls for tax
reform, reduced carbon emissions and green energy. Lost in the foofaraw of a lone Chinese man interrupting a bank press
conference to defend state-owned enterprises (SOEs) was the fact that the PRCs State Council coauthored the report. A
Chinese government body signed off on prescriptions counter to the interests of SOE monopolistsa milestone for the
development of civil society there. SOEs have been criticized in China as price manipulators and as magnets for rent
seeking. For example, oil companies like Sinopec have stymied fuel-quality regulations and refused to supply petro to
stations, running them out of business. Often shielded by nationalistic sentiment, SOEs have now come under assault by
academics and newspaper editorials that echo the World Bank report, identifying SOEs as special interests, distinct from
public interests. Elsewhere in China, regional governments are having a crack at mending the controversial hukou system,
which threatens to fragment China into two entrenched groups: legally recognized urbanites and migrant workers, the
latter of whom generally enjoy no entitlement to medical care or education in the cities where theyve come to toil. In a
country of peasants, internal migration is not just a matter of civil rights. Its a matter of economic transformation, as
those former farmers have settled into cities and long forgotten tilling a field. As Chinas population urbanizes, policy
makers have proven adaptive and willing to experiment. The CCP has demonstrated a concern for Chinas social fabric.
Beijing has decreed that television programming, including wildly popular dating shows, avoid the depths of crass sexual
and material indulgence. Obviously, such policies might be in the ultimate interest of self-preservation (especially given
Hu Jintaos less than subtle warning about Western cultures ideological penetration of China). And its debatable whether
traditional, native values are what China or any country needs for stability or prosperity. Granted, on some reform
proposals, like liberalization of criminal law, conflict has emerged. But do these disagreements reveal cracks in the party

leadership, as Chang implies? Probably not. First, these are practical differences among technocrats who are after the
same thing: stability via steady growth. Second, policy disputes are also a sign that Chinas decision making is more
consultative and decentralized than before. As the hukou example above illustrates, once delegated certain powers,
provinces and municipalities can innovate on a smaller scale than the central government, as in the U.S. federal system.
Finally, interest groups and factions are nothing new to Chinese politics. Thus, its unrealistic to think factional tension
could paralyze party leadership, military and police at the same time that protesters agitate and show potential for
violence and greater lawlessness. Whats more, scholarly work on factional politics over recent decades, often with a focus

factions can coexist and even thrive by nearing some sort

competitive equilibrium. This may explain the relative quietude of Chinese elite politics
since 1989. Why China Wont Fall The political must be analyzed alongside the economic . Chinas
institutions are still significantly ahead of the demands of its society.
on China, has shown how

of

Beijings apparent influence by Huntingtons theories is not surprising, as his works are popular among the
PRC-establishment intellectuals, especially those on the government payroll. Meanwhile, the authoritarian
CCP junta keeps the trains running fast and on time. This means a lot to the swaths of Chinas massive,
aging population. Hard landing or soft, dont look for the Beijing to suffer any hits to the head in 2012.
Collapse theories are rooted in idealism, but theyre no more likely to pan out because of it.

7. Capital doesnt generate reforms Xi is too strong now

Pei 5/6 (Minxin, professor of government at Claremont McKenna College, Two ways to break
Beijing's political stalemate, http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Minxin-Pei-Two-ways-tobreak-Beijing-s-political-stalemate)
Observers of the Chinese economy can be forgiven for their puzzlement over an apparent paradox.

While China undoubtedly now has its most powerful leader since Mao
Zedong, the country's economic policy appears to be defying the wishes of
the new strongman, Xi Jinping, general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party. Take, for
example, the progress of radical structural reform, which is part of Xi's blueprint
for an ambitious overhaul of the economy. Since its much heralded unveiling in late 2013, little
structural reform has happened. Worse still, in recent months, the
Chinese government has adopted policies obviously aimed at
maintaining short-term growth at the expense of long-term structural
reform. For instance, instead of forcing zombie companies into bankruptcy and channeling resources
into consumption, Beijing has once again opened the credit spigot to fund fixed-asset investments -mainly infrastructure -- and keep moribund companies, most of them stateowned, on life support. In the first quarter alone, according to the People's Bank of China,
Chinese banks increased their loans by a mammoth 4.67 trillion yuan ($720 billion), a new record. The
immediate impact of this monetary stimulus might have propped up the Chinese economy, as reflected in
the recovery of gross domestic product. However, the long-term consequences will be ugly .

China's
debt-to-GDP ratio will increase, overcapacity will continue to plague the
economy and the eventual cost of recapitalizing the financial system will
explode. Behind this apparent disconnect between Xi's power and the
difficulties he has encountered in executing his reform plan lies a political stalemate
which, if prolonged, could produce even worse economic uncertainties
and consequences. One manifestation of this stalemate -- bureaucratic paralysis -is well-known. Xi's anti-corruption drive has frightened and alienated
many Chinese officials. Denied what they consider legitimate rewards for toiling for the party,
resentful bureaucrats have been on a work stoppage in the hope that
deteriorating economic performance will force Xi to call off the anti-corruption campaign and return
to business as usual.

elections
Clinton winsshe has Sanders formal supportgives her the
swing votes as well
Economist 7/13/16 (Economist- international news organization, After a long
wait, Sanders endorses Clinton,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2016/07/bern-balm) RK
THE body language was a little stilted and there were scattered squabbles between supporters, but on July 12th Senator Bernie

Sanders at last stood in a New Hampshire high-school gymnasium and said words that Democratic
leaders have been waiting to hear for weeks: I am endorsing Hillary Clinton for president. For
die-hard Sanders supportersthe mostly young, ardent left-wingers who call themselves Bernie or Bust votersthere were lines in
their heros speech that reminded them why they dislike and mistrust the former Secretary of State, senator and first lady. With Mrs
Clinton standing at his side, Mr Sanders reminded the crowd that he had won 13m votes, helping him to come first in primaries and

He noted that Mrs

would go into the Democratic National Convention in Philadelphia with a lead of 389
pledged delegates and a lot more superdelegatesa reference to the party grandees who are free to vote as they
caucuses in 22 statesa startling and unexpected success funded by 2.5m small individual donors.
Clinton

wish in the presidential nominating contest and without whom Mrs Clinton could not have secured final victory. There were boos
from the crowd at that reminder, that the party establishment has strongly favoured Mrs Clinton from the start over Mr Sanders, a
self-described democratic socialist who sits as an independent senator for Vermont.

Mr Sanders told the crowd

that it is no secret that he and

Mrs Clinton disagree on a number of issues. He

reeled off a list of areas in which his campaignwhich he has spent a year pitching as a political revolution, designed to rein in and
tax Wall Street banks and greatly increase the scope and size of the federal government in such fields as health care and higher
educationhad influenced the Democratic Party policy platform drafted at a special meeting that ended in Orlando on July 10th. A

Clinton has indeed made some high-profile

concessions to Mr Sanders, notably by agreeing to a plan to ofer free tuition at
public colleges and universities for students from lower-income families .
month after she effectively secured the nomination Mrs

During the long and often contentious primary contest Mrs Clinton had cited Mr Sanderss talk of free college as an example of his
lack of political realism, noting that his promises were based on the (not very plausible) assumption that governors in Republican
states would add large sums to those federal funds he proposed to raise by taxing the financial sector. But for all that, other words

he told his supporters that Mrs Clinton has won

the Democratic nominating process and I congratulate her for that. She
will be the Democratic nominee for president and I intend to do everything
I can to make certain that she will be the next president of the United
States. That may sound like a technicality, but when devoted Sandernistas meet online and in person, many seethe with talk
of Mr Sanders mattered a lot more. First,

of alleged irregularities in this primary or that, to the point that some are happy to call the primary election stolen. Just as

Sanders at last took his booming indignation at an economy and

a political system that he calls rigged for the benefit of the richest 1%,
and aimed it not at Mrs Clinton but at the presumptive Republican presidential nominee, Donald
Trump. He accused Mr Trump of showing the same old Republican contempt for working families when it comes to the
importantly, Mr

minimum wage, access to health care or the cost of medicines. The Vermont senator cast Mr Trump as rejecting science and
believing that climate change is a hoax, like most Republicans. With a nod to recent, racially-charged shootings of black men

Sanders charged Mr Trump with dividing

Americans in stressful times for our country, and of insulting Mexicans, Muslims, women, blacks and veterans. After each
swipe at Mr Trump, Mr Sanders told the crowd that, in contrast , Mrs Clinton
understands what is at stake. He addressed the possibility of apathy
among his supportersa point that worries the Clinton campaign, as they
ponder how few votes they won on college campuses, among other
Sanders hotspots. If you dont believe this election is important, take a
moment to think about the Supreme Court justices that Donald Trump will
nominate, and what that means to civil liberties, equal rights and the
future of our country, he said. That there is work for the Clinton campaign to do
and of white police officers in cities across the country, Mr

is clear. A national poll by the Pew Research Centre, conducted in late June, found voters aged under 30 unusually engaged in the
election, with nearly three-quarters saying that they had given it quite a lot of thoughta much higher proportion than in 2012. But
only about a quarter of young people said they were satisfied with the available choices for president, compared to 60% who were
satisfied in 2012, and 68% in 2008, the year of Obamamania. If the Clinton camp has its eyes on Mr Sanderss young supporters, the
Trump campaign has ambitions to pick up a different block of Sanders fans: disgruntled blue-collar workers or ex-workers from rust
belt post-industrial states, many of whom thrilled to the Vermont senators fierce attacks on global free trade deals. It is striking that
Mr Sanders, in his prepared endorsement remarks, made no mention of trade policy at all. That may be because when thelargely
non-binding and symbolicDemocratic Party platform was being negotiated in recent weeks, the Sanders campaign lost a tangible
battle. Team Sanders wanted the party officially to oppose the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a major trade pact with Asia-Pacific nations
that President Barack Obama still hopes to see ratified by Congress before he leaves office, perhaps in the lame-duck session
between Novembers general election and the inauguration of the next president in January. In the end, though, the draft platform
that will be voted on at the national convention merely says that Democrats will oppose trade agreements that do not support good
American jobs. The Trump campaign issued a statement wooing Sanders supporters over trade, via the possibly high-risk route of
an attack on Mr Sanders. Bernie is now officially a part of a rigged system the statement said, accusing him of endorsing one of

Clinton
moved past a long-awaited milestone thanks to the endorsement Mr
Sanders, in short. But as the election contest enters its final months, the sunlit uplands do not beckon.
the most pro-war, pro-Wall Street and pro-offshoring candidates in the history of the Democratic Party. Mrs

1ac Goldstein evidence says that we start out small

negotiating things and after trust has been developed, we
begin to make policies. That means that the US and china dont
create policies that trump can capitalize on until after the
election
Trump cant win Electoral College system
Waldaman 16 [Paul Waldaman, 5-4-2016, "Why the outcome of the 2016
election is already crystal clear," The Week,
http://theweek.com/articles/622075/why-outcome-2016-election-already-crystalclear]
The general election between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump promises to be one of the weirdest,
nastiest, and most fascinating cultural/political events of any of our lifetimes. So bear with me for a little while as I

outcome, while not

is already clear to see. That's because of the strange and rather
undemocratic feature of our presidential voting system known as the Electoral College. While an essay in
favor of eliminating it will have to wait for another day, the key fact about the college is that it makes the
race matter only in those states where both sides have some chance of
winning, what we usually call the "battleground" states. There aren't very
many of them, and even before the general election begins i.e., even
before Republicans nominate Donald Trump, perhaps the most unpopular
major party nominee in history the Democratic nominee has a serious
advantage. Let's take the last four elections, two won by Barack Obama and two won by George W. Bush, as
suck all the life out of it and explain why it's actually going to be pretty simple. The likely
completely preordained,

our starting point. There were 17 states (plus D.C.) that Democrats won in all four of those elections: California,
Oregon, and Washington in the West; Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, and Michigan in the Midwest; and everything in
the Northeast from Maryland on up, with the exception of New Hampshire. Just those states give the Democrats 242
of the 270 electoral votes they need to take the White House. The Republicans, on the other hand, won 22 states in
all four of those elections, covering parts of the Deep South, th e Midwest, and the Mountain West, plus Alaska. But

While there are a few states in those two groups

where things might become competitive Republicans will contest Wisconsin, and
Democrats think they have a chance in Arizona, for instance the truth is that even in this unusual
election year, none of them are likely to flip. Donald Trump could strangle
a puppy on live television and he would still win Idaho and Mississippi;
Hillary Clinton could make Martin Shkreli her running mate and she'd still
those states only add up to 180 electoral votes.

win California and Massachusetts. But if any of those states do change,

it's likely to be in Clinton's direction, given Trump's unpopularity. That
Democratic advantage, 242-180 at the outset, may be the single most
important pair of numbers to understand in determining the ultimate
outcome of the race. What it means is that Donald Trump will have to not just do
well in swing states, he'll have to sweep almost all of them in order to win.
Here's a revealing comparison. In 2004, George W. Bush beat John Kerry by 2.5
percentage points nationwide close, but compared to the 2000 election, a relatively easy victory.
In doing so, he took the swing states of Florida, Ohio, Virginia, North Carolina, Iowa, Colorado, Nevada, and New

Yet Bush won the Electoral

College by a margin of only 35 electoral votes, 286-251. Contrast that with 2012, when
Barack Obama beat Mitt Romney by 4 percentage points a little more
comfortable than Bush's 2004 win, but not hugely diferent . On the state level,
Obama bested Bush's 2004 results only by taking New Hampshire. Yet Obama's margin in the
Electoral College was enormous: 332-206, or 126 votes. If Hillary Clinton starts
with those 242 electoral votes, she only needs 28 more to win. As it
happens, Florida has 29 electoral votes, so she could win there, lose every
other swing state, and still win. Or she could take Virginia (13 EVs) and North Carolina (15 EVs)
Mexico. The only true swing state Kerry won was New Hampshire.

and lose all the others. Or she could take Ohio (18), New Hampshire (4), and Iowa (6) and lose all the others.

There are a whole variety of ways Clinton could win,

while Trump has to run the table. That isn't to say that the national result doesn't matter; it's only
Or...well, you get the idea.

been in the rarest of circumstances (like 2000) that the total vote and the electoral vote pointed in opposite

few people are saying that Donald Trump has such fantastic
appeal to working class white men that he can steal states in the Midwest,
or tap some heretofore unnoticed vein of votes. And you can forget about
the momentary disgruntlement from supporters of Bernie Sanders playing
a major role; in November, Clinton will retain the votes of nearly all
Democrats. Barack Obama got the votes of 92 percent of Democrats in 2012, and she'll be in the same
directions. But by now

neighborhood. Will Donald Trump do as well among Republicans? He might, as they realize that the alternative is

Trump
only needs to bleed a couple of points in his party for the election to fall
well out of his reach. Looking at the election this way can make the daily
back-and-forth of the campaign seem unimportant. But that's true only if you think that
Clinton, so they might as well go with their party's nominee even if he wasn't their first choice. But

the final outcome is all that matters. It isn't; the campaign is an opportunity for us to discuss all kinds of issues and
get to know ourselves as a country better, even if we don't always like what we see. This election will by turns be

it's all
over, the chances that anyone will be saying the words "President Trump"
are pretty low.
fascinating, outrageous, appalling, disgusting, disheartening, and perhaps even inspiring. But when

Foreign policy not key to the elections

Saunders 1/26 (Elizabeth N. Saunders-assistant professor of political science
and international affairs at George Washington University, Will foreign policy be a
major issue in the 2016 election? Heres what we know,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/01/26/will-foreignpolicy-be-a-major-issue-in-the-2016-election-heres-what-we-know/)
At the last two Republican debates, the looming center-stage presence wasnt Donald Trump; it was the Islamic

news articles have suggested that 2016 will be the rare election in
which foreign policy will be central to the campaign. Will those predictions come
State. Many

true? Not likely. But while foreign policy may only feature occasionally in the campaign, the voters chosen
candidate will matter significantly for U.S. foreign policy. What do we mean by foreign policy issues, and how do
voters think about it? Many international issues get mentioned in campaigns, whether in general terms or by
referring to a specific country or region. Most of these issues fall under the broad categories of foreign economic
policy (such as free trade, currency policy, or foreign aid) or national security issues (such as military readiness,
nuclear proliferation, crisis diplomacy, and what we now call homeland security issues like terrorism, though

From decades of research, we know voters do

not pay much attention to foreign policy. Some research shows that the public has stable,
coherent attitudes on foreign policy, but few dispute that most voters have little
concrete foreign policy information. Rather than follow debates closely,
voters generally look to elites and the media for information, even for specific foreign
policy issues. As the Monkey Cage frequently reminds readers, the economy is fundamental in
terrorism concerns long predate 9/11).

presidential elections. You might think, therefore, that voters would pay attention to an economic issue like free
trade. But while trade policy has had its moments (think Japan in the 1980s or periodic attention to agreements like
NAFTA or the TPP), voters rarely focus on it. Recent research suggests that people do not think about trade policy in
purely self-interested terms, and may lack the economic knowledge to understand how trade policy would affect

Public opinion research has shown that even in

wartime, the public used elite cues as a shortcut for understanding
conflicts ranging from Iraq and Vietnam to World War II. If elite opinion about a
conflict is divided along partisan lines, then the partisan split will likely
show up in public opinion. Partisanship can even afect perceptions of
facts: in a survey conducted by Adam Berinsky in 2004, Republican respondents were more likely to
them. What about national security?

underestimate the number of casualties in Iraq, while Democratic respondents were somewhat more likely to

the media can help inform the public, but that is not
automatic, even in democracies. So voters generally leave foreign policy to
elites. This strategy may make sense for busy people focused on matters closer to home. But it brings us to our
overestimate. Political parties and

next question.

The RNC is a shitstorm right now since trump isnt even

backed by his own party, there is no way he can get all
conservative voters behind him
Voters dont swing based on policies like the plan
Gelman et al 15 (Andrew, professor of statistics and polisci @ Columbia, The
Mythical Swing Voter,
http://www.stat.columbia.edu/~gelman/research/unpublished/swing_voters.pdf ) MLJ

there is a puzzle: candidates appeal to swing voters in debates ,

campaigns target advertising toward swing voters, journalists discuss
swing voters, and the polls do indeed swingbut it is hard to find people
who have actually switched sides. Partly this is because most polls are based on
But

independent cross-sections of voters, so change must be inferred from aggregate shifts in candidate
preference, while most election panels are too small to provide reliable data on shifts of a few

But aside from scant data about actual swing voters, it is difficult to
reconcile substantial vote shifts with the high degree of partisan
polarization that now exists in the American electorate (Baldassarri and Gelman
2008; Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Levendusky 2009). It seems implausible that many
voters will switch support from one party to the other because of minor
campaign events.
percent.

Trump is dumb he wont notice when we start talking to china

diferently he didnt even know that Brexit happened
The public doesnt know anything about policies
Somin 13 (Ilya, Professor of Law at George Mason University, 10/11, Democracy
and Political Ignorance, http://www.cato-unbound.org/2013/10/11/ilyasomin/democracy-political-ignorance)
Political ignorance in America is deep and widespread. The current
government shutdown fight provides some good examples. Although
Obamacare is at the center of that fight and much other recent political
controversy, 44% percent of the public do not even realize it is still the law. Some
80 percent, according to a recent Kaiser survey, say they have heard nothing at
all or only a little about the controversial insurance exchanges that are a major
part of the law. The shutdown controversy is also just the latest
manifestation of a longstanding political struggle over federal spending.
But most of the public has very little idea of how federal spending is
actually distributed. They greatly underestimate the percentage that goes
to entitlement programs such as Medicare and Social Security, and vastly
overestimate that spent on foreign aid. Public ignorance is not limited to
information about specific policies. It also extends to the basic structure
of government and how it operates. A 2006 survey found that only 42 percent
can even name the three branches of the federal government: the executive, the
legislative, and the judicial. There is also much ignorance and confusion about
such matters as which government officials are responsible for which
issues. I give many more examples of public ignorance in my book.

Clinton wont be tied to Obamadiferent policies on TPP,

immigration, Syria, healthcare, environment
Bradner 15 (Eric, reporter for CNN Politics, 10/7/15, 5 times Clinton broke from
Obama, http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/06/politics/hillary-clinton-5-differencespresident-obama/ ) MLJ

Hillary Clinton insists on the campaign trail that she's her own woman -- and in
recent weeks, she's really tried to prove it. In a huge blow to President Barack Obama's trade agenda, the
Democratic front-runner now says she opposes the 12-nation Trans-Pacific Partnership, a massive trade deal she

Clinton has broken from her vocal

support of several of Obama's policies on several high-profile issues in
recent weeks -- including immigration, Syria and the Keystone pipeline. Here's a look at five
major issues on which the two Democratic leaders have diferences: 1.
Trans-Pacific Partnership Clinton has a long history with free trade. After all, it was her husband,
once helped negotiate as secretary of state. But that's not all.

President Bill Clinton, who signed the first regional mega-deal: the North American Free Trade Agreement. And
Clinton herself as secretary of state helped get the ball rolling in negotiations over the 12-country Trans-Pacific
Partnership -- once calling it the "gold standard" of trade pacts. What is TPP? The massive trade deal, explained. But

she delivered a major blow to the deal on Wednesday, announcing her

opposition to it just two days after Obama's top trade negotiator
announced that the United States has, after years of negotiations,
reached an agreement. "As of today, I am not in favor of what I have
learned about it," Clinton told PBS on Wednesday. "I don't believe it's going to meet the high bar I have
set." As a presidential candidate, she had previously criticized two of its elements. She's called for more of a focus
on currency manipulation, which is being addressed on the sidelines of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. And she has
joined Sen. Elizabeth Warren, D-Massachusetts, in criticizing the deal's inclusion of a mechanism that allows
companies to challenge whether countries' laws and regulations live up to their international trade commitments.

2. Deportations
Obama's administration has aggressively enforced immigration laws,
ramping up deportations in an effort to immunize the White House from being accused of lax security
But that, too, was the subject of last-minute changes designed to appease liberal critics.

efforts as it worked with Congress to pass immigration reform (an effort which failed). Deportations reached an alltime high of 438,421 in 2013.

Clinton has previously said Obama has little choice but to enforce the laws on
the books. But in an interview with Telemundo on Monday, she said it's time for a diferent
approach. Asked if she thinks Obama has done everything within his
executive power to improve the current immigration system, Clinton cited
the President's increased enforcement of deportation laws as a mistake .
"The deportation laws were interpreted and enforced very aggressively
during the last six and a half years, which I think his administration did in
part to try to get Republicans to support comprehensive immigration
reform," Clinton said. "It was part of a strategy. I think that strategy is no longer workable." She added:
"I'm not going to be breaking up families. And I think that is one of the differences. I totally
understand why the Obama administration felt as though they did what they did under the circumstances. But I
think we've learned that the Republicans, at least the current crop, are just not acting in good faith." Clinton has
supported Obama's executive actions to forestall deportations for so-called "Dreamers" -- undocumented
immigrants who were brought to the United States as children -- as well as the undocumented parents of U.S.

3. Syria Clinton has also cast herself as

an independent voice from Obama in Syria. In her book "Hard Choices," she wrote that as
secretary of state, she urged the President to arm Syrian rebels -- much earlier than he ultimately did . Clinton
has prodded the administration to allow more Syrian refugees into the
United States, too, pinning her goal at 65,000 -- many more than the 10,000 the White House is currently
making plans to accommodate. And most recently, Clinton has called for a no-fly
zone in Syria -- which Obama opposes. It's a split not just with Obama, but with Vermont Sen.
citizens. She's promised to expand on those actions.

Bernie Sanders, who has complained that a no-fly zone could lead to the United States becoming further enmeshed
in the conflict there. Obama dinged Clinton for her position in a news conference last week. "Hillary Clinton is not
half-baked in terms of her approach to these problems," he said. "But I also think that there's a difference between

4. Cadillac tax Clinton has broadly promised to

protect and even expand on Obama's signature health care law. But
there's at least one element she wants to roll back: the so-called "Cadillac
running for president and being president."

tax" on premium insurance plans. The tax was designed to hit those who can best afford it,
helping pay for the law's expansion of Medicaid and subsidies for lower-income insurance buyers. Obama's White
House has consistently supported it, saying that it's necessary to keep down the cost of the law. But labor unions
have blasted it, calling it a thorn in the side as they attempt to negotiate more favorable health insurance plans for
workers at school districts, governments and companies. "I have proposed new reforms to build on the progress
we've made and lower out-of-pocket costs for families," said Clinton in a statement issued September 29. "That's
why, among other steps, I encourage Congress to repeal the so-called Cadillac tax, which applies to some employerbased health plans, and to fully pay for the cost of repeal."

5. Keystone Clinton was at the helm

of the State Department when it began a years-long environmental review
of the Keystone XL pipeline. That review still isn't finished -- and for
months, she deflected questions about her position on whether the
pipeline should move forward or not, saying she wants her old agency to
finish its work first. It's the same posture the White House has taken -Obama has yet to rule on the 1,179-mile Canada-to-Texas pipeline. But in
September, Clinton finally ran out of patience -- with the process, and with the political hits she was taking for
ducking the issue. Liberals have long opposed the pipeline, blocking attempts by congressional Republicans to
override the State Department and green-light the project. Sanders and O'Malley were highlighting Clinton's refusal
to take a position as evidence that they better suited the party's base. Last month, she announced her opposition to
the pipeline. "I think it is imperative that we look at the Keystone pipeline as what I believe it is -- a distraction from
important work we have to do on climate change," Clinton told a community forum in Des Moines,
Iowa. "And unfortunately from my perspective, one that interferes with our ability to move forward with all the other
issues. Therefore, I oppose it." It wasn't just a change of rhetoric for a presidential candidate. Her opposition
was also a reversal for Clinton herself, who had said in 2010 as secretary of state that she was "inclined" to approve
the pipeline.

GOP cant cast Clinton as soft on China

Sanger 15 (David, Staff @ NYT, "Chinas Vulnerability Is a Test for U.S.
Presidential Candidates," 8/28,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/29/us/politics/chinas-vulnerability-is-a-test-for-uspresidential-candidates.html)
Rightly or wrongly, Mrs. Clinton is considered to be more confrontational with
the Chinese than Mr. Obama, after a famous flare-up with her Chinese
counterpart over the countrys territorial claims. As a result, the Republicans
know that if Mrs. Clinton emerges as the Democratic nominee, it will be difficult
to cast her as soft on China. A bigger problem may be in their own party.
The American opening to China was a Republican presidents project. It is
considered one of the greatest accomplishments of Richard M. Nixons checkered
presidency, and todays mainline Republican foreign policy establishment
takes a very nuanced view of balancing Chinese power. Whoever emerges
from the scrum of 17 Republican candidates will seek the wisdom and the
endorsement of Henry A. Kissinger, Mr. Nixons national security adviser and
secretary of state, and at 92 still the partys greatest foreign policy mind. The
architect of the American relationship with Beijing , who four years ago
published a book on Americas dealings with China, is not one to call for cutting
of relationships with Beijing

Warming
Trump won't reverse Obama-led environmental actions
Murray 5/17/16 (Bill, Energy policy contributor @ RealClearPolitics, "Would
Trump Undo Obama's Environmental Legacy?,"
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2016/05/17/would_trump_undo_obamas_en
vironmental_legacy_130583.html)
analysts express doubt about Trumps ability or desire to upend
current environmental trends, believing the long-standing administrative
rules regarding public comment and judicial review may make any rollback of Obamas
actions not worth Trumps time or energy. He cant undo it all. He can
reinterpret a lot, but reinterpreting doesnt necessarily make it gone forever, or
even reverse the trend, said Kevin Book, a principal at ClearView Energy Partners. If elected, he has
the administrative power, but if youre going to reverse findings, after all that has
happened, youre going to need a lot of ink, a lot of time and a lot of
lawyers. A Trump administration would need support from Congress, and
given the possibility that Democrats may regain control of the Senate,
Trumps deal-making tendencies scare any number of Republican energy
purists. Trumps complete lack of ideological obligations considering
environmental policy, and his desire to negotiate big changes in U.S.
policy, mean it is possible he could ofer Democrats a national tax on
carbon in return for comprehensive tax reform or immigration reform ,
Other

according to some analysts.

GOPs not as bad on climate as it seems---its primary

pandering that will change
Alan Neuhauser 8/14, US News, "The Climate Change Election", 2015,
www.usnews.com/news/the-report/articles/2015/08/14/the-2016-election-is-criticalfor-stopping-climate-change
Among the Republicans, eight of the 17 candidates have hedged: Jeb
Bush, Carly Fiorina, Lindsey Graham, Jim Gilmore, Bobby Jindal, John
Kasich, George Pataki and Rand Paul have acknowledged that humans do
contribute to global warming, but have questioned or stopped short of saying how much
a position at odds with the findings of a vast majority of scientists. "The climate is changing; I don't think anybody can argue it's
not. Human activity has contributed to it," Bush said in an email interview with Bloomberg BNA in July a statement that notably did
not mention how much humans were at fault. During a campaign stop in New Hampshire in June, he had previously told listeners,
"The climate is changing, whether men are doing it or not," one month after calling it "arrogant" to say climate science is settled.
The rest of the GOP field including three senators who rejected a January amendment tying human activity to climate change has
dismissed the issue outright. Paul also voted against the amendment. "As a scientist it's very frustrating to hear politicians basically
saying, 'This isn't true,' or, 'They're just making it up to get government money,'" Hayhoe says. "A thermometer is not Democrat or
Republican. What observations are telling us is not political it is what it is." And there are conservative solutions for warming.
Some party members, in fact, see it as an inherently Republican issue: Carbon emissions, for example, distort the free market,
forcing others to pay the higher and indirect costs of climate change (storm recovery, disaster relief) plus the health costs
associated with air pollution. "We allow the coal industry to socialize its costs, and we conservatives don't like allowing people to
socialize anything," says former South Carolina Rep. Bob Inglis, who now explores free-market solutions to climate change as head
of the Energy and Enterprise Institute at George Mason University. A revenue-neutral carbon tax, one that does not support other
programs and instead goes back to households, could fix that distortion, he and others argue. "The question is not, 'Is there going
to be a tax on carbon?' It's, 'Do you want a tax that you have a voice in and control, or do you want to keep writing checks after
disasters that you have no control over?'" says retired Rear Admiral David Titley, who has advised some of the GOP presidential
candidates and directs the Center for Solutions to Weather and Climate Risk at Penn State University. "That $60 billion relief bill for
Hurricane Sandy that passed very quickly through a Republican-led House, did you get a vote on that tax? Because that's a tax."
Yet Inglis, himself is a living example of what can happen to conservatives who call for climate action. The recipient of the JFK Profile
in Courage Award in April, he was unseated in the Republican primary in 2010 after shifting his position on global warming.

"Republicans say, 'Look at what happened to him when he said it was real. Do you want that to happen to you?'" Hayhoe describes.
Oil, gas and coal companies, along with billionaire Libertarian industrialists David and Charles Koch, rank among the biggest

popular sentiment
among voters appears to be changing: Most Republican voters say they
support climate action, and last week, Shell did not renew its membership
in the Koch-backed American Legislative Exchange Council because of the
group's opposition to climate action. Even the climate statements by the
eight Republicans who have hedged on warming, vague as they were, may
signify a kind of progress especially during the primaries, when
candidates play to their parties' more extreme bases . "In the Great
Recession in 2010, it was this very atheistic position with regard to
climate change: 'We don't believe,'" Inglis says. "Then, in the 2014 cycle, 'I'm not
a scientist,' that was an agnostic position. These are data points on a
trend line toward a tipping point." Republicans can exploit a distinct
advantage on climate action, too, he adds: Voters tend to support the
presidents who buck party stereotypes. "Nixon goes to China, Bill Clinton signs welfare reform
the country will trust a conservative to touch climate," Inglis argues.
campaign donors, and often seem as allergic to new taxes as a bubble boy to fresh pollen. But

Iran
Impact should have been triggered- Iran has been developing
the bomb for a while before the Iran deal
Deal doesnt stop iran prolifno deal will
Rubin 15--Opinion writer Washington, D.C.[Jennifer Rubin October 19,
Chasing a bad deal with Iranhttp://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/rightturn/wp/2014/10/19/chasing-a-bad-deal-with-iran/]RMT
This is simply one more long slide down the slippery slope, says former
ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton. No enrichment activity should
be permitted as long as the ayatollahs remain in power. Every retreat from that
principle and this is a long one makes it easier for Iran to enrich to
weapons-grade levels quickly and efficiently. All of these plans share a
common flaw. Bolton argues that this entire negotiation assumes that the
United States has perfect knowledge about Irans nuclear program, and
that nothing is hidden from our view. We obviously dont have
intelligence this sophisticated, as was proved whenever a secret enrichment
plant eventually popped up or when the administrations assessments of threats
throughout the region turned out to be dead wrong. (If President Obama blames the
intelligence community for missing the rise of the Islamic State, why should we
assume we would have perfect knowledge of a concealed Iranian nuclear program?)
Moreover, to this day Iran has not allowed unrestricted inspections of all
facilities (such as the Parchin military complex where an explosion recently
occurred). Iran has yet to clear up existing inspection issues with the
International Atomic Energy Agency. If it is not complying now, what makes the
administration think Iran wont interfere with or throw out inspectors as sanctions
are gradually lifted? Letting Iran keep thousands of centrifuges is contrary to the
position of this, the previous administration and six U.N. resolutions. The reason is
obvious. Mark Dubowitz of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies
observes that we would have little recourse under the scheme being
floated if Iran simply decided to halt the transfer of enriched materials .
One day, it would find an excuse why it no longer can ship its [enriched
uranium] to Russia and why it needs to stockpile it at home, he said. This
idea is not even new. We tried this out when Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad was still in office before Iran got several more years of
enrichment and development of even faster centrifuges. Michael Makovsky
of JINSA explains, If Iran shipped all or almost all of its fuel out plus accepted other
restrictions on enrichment then would be welcome, but I doubt thats whats on the
table. Moreover if it plans to ship the materials to Russia, for example, our ability to
monitor what is coming out is further limited. (Syria managed to keep some of its
chemical weapons in a similar arrangement.) The administration is struggling
how to allow Iranians to adhere to their red line while reducing its nuclear
program in the near-term, says Makovsky. And that circle isnt easily
squared especially since weve unilaterally reduced our leverage over last
year [by partially rolling back sanctions]. It is not clear if the current proposal

is one more variation on another idea experts like Robert Joseph, former
undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, has
already discredited. He wrote this summer: To break the impasse over
centrifuges, the negotiators reportedly are considering a different metric to limit
Irans uranium-enrichment capability: separative work units, or SWU, as the concept
is known. . . . On the surface, SWU provides a politically defensible means to
measure output for enrichment. It is a unit of calculation used widely in the
nuclear-energy industry, as well as by the IAEA in its quarterly reports on Irans
nuclear program. But using SWU as a substitute for limiting the number of
centrifuges is nothing more than sleight of hand. While it is necessary for
any agreement to limit how much enriched material Iran can produce and
stockpile, this is not the stated U.S. goal. That goal to extend the time of
breakout requires strict and verifiable limits on centrifuges along with additional
prohibitions on next-generation replacements and effective constraints on
maintenance, research, and development. Joseph therefore concludes, Moving
away from a centrifuge limit to the SWU metric would represent the next
step to a failed outcome. But whether SWU is adopted or not, if there are no
restrictions on missiles, no effective constraints on R&D, only managed access on
inspections, no tight controls on imports and manufacture of equipment, and other
gaps that Iran can and will exploit (such as failing to come clean on past
weaponization activities), the agreement will allow Iran to remain what it is today: a
nuclear-weapons-threshold state. In sum, taking away Irans illicitly enriched
materials (presumably without coming clean on its past military program) but not
the centrifuges would be nothing more than a thinly disguised capitulation to the
mullahs. Likewise, switching to a SWU metric would be conceding Iran will
control the timing of its nuclear breakout. While these schemes might be
acceptable to the administration, Congress will no doubt see things
diferently and refuse to lift sanctions. Moreover, Israel has already
warned it will not be bound by (i.e. refrain from military action) by a bad
deal. And a bad deal seems to be precisely what the administration is
chasing.

No US-Iran war Iran is focused on regime stability they

know external conflict puts that in jeopardy
Marashi, 16, director of research at the National Iranian American Council and
a former Iran desk officer at the U.S. Department of State (Reza, Can Iran Get Out
of Its Own Way?, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/can-iran-get-out-its-own-way15071)
Iran wasted no time seizing its newfound diplomatic maneuverability. Two
weeks after its nuclear deal with global powers was implemented, President Hassan
Rouhani arrived in Italy and France with a clear message to the world: Iran is open
for business. De-escalating tensions with the West facilitated $55 billion
worth of deals in four days. Far from freelancing, Iran is moving to implement a
strategic development visionone that has been on the books for over a decade.
Reducing external conflict has proven to be the easy part. Getting out of its
own way has long been Irans Achilles heel. If this seems like dj vu, thats because

it is. Irans global outreach during the presidencies of Hashemi Rafsanjani and
Mohammad Khatami produced robust economic relationships with much of Europe
and Asia. Like Rouhani today, they traveled around the world to foster improved
political ties that would facilitate much needed foreign investment. Their success
helped spur Irans ruling elite to debate and compose a strategic vision for the
Islamic Republic. Despite perpetually conflicting power centers, they were able to
hammer out a common visionsigned off by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Irans
strategic plancalled the Twenty Year National Vision, or Vision 2025outlines
political, economic and social goals that facilitate its broader ambition:
Becoming the Middle Easts top power by the year 2025. More specifically,
the plan seeks to create a progressive, knowledge-based society with economic
growth based on a large portion of human and social capital, and growth of human
and social capital through education and economic capacity building. Creating this
knowledge-based society requires Irans leaders to prioritize the
generation and transfer of knowledge, technology, jobs and foreign
investment. To that end, Vision 2025 acknowledges that Irans development
depends on productive interactions with the world. Minimizing tensions
while maximizing peace and trust facilitates the acquisition of foreign
investment and technologies needed to develop the country. Iran is
pursuing this agenda in an efort to increase government legitimacy and
security among Iranian society through improved economic conditions. A
glance at the deals signed in Rome and Paris illustrates the Rouhanis
governments prioritization of economic and technological cooperationin
energy, construction, aviation and finance, to name a few. This distinction should
not be overlooked: Vision 2025 is a roadmap for Iran to achieve its goals
of survival and regional primacy through economic and technological
progress, rather than simply through military capabilities or hegemony.
Recognizing that some degree of accommodation with the United States
and European Union is necessary to achieve stability and development,
Rouhanis team views decreasing internal cohesionnot external tensions
as the most significant threats to Irans national security. To that end,
they emphasize the need to resolve external tensions because of the
political space it provides to address internal fissures that could threaten
the Islamic Republics survival. Alliances and enmities shift regularly in
Iranian politics, but survival of the system is the shared goal of all
stakeholders. Thus far, Rouhanis political coalition has won Irans internal
political debate by arguing that survival is better guaranteed through
flexibility than intransigence. This pragmatic approach has shown a
greater capacity to contextualize issues and assess policies on a more
evenhanded cost/benefit analysis. In doing so, they have demonstrated that
resolving the nuclear issue was instrumental to their real goal of recognition and
reintegration in the international system as an equal playera core tenet of Vision
2025. It has taken the Iranian government over a decade to reach this
point because a combination of geopolitical tensions and misguided
domestic policies caused Iran to deviate from its stated goals. As external
tensions with Western countries spiked under Ahmadinejad, hardliners
justified empowering the military-security apparatus as a necessary

instrument for countering threats to the Islamic Republics survival. To hear

senior Iranian officials tell it, Tehran invested more money into security and
intelligence operations, budget allocations ballooned, and new projects proliferated
all of which likely would not have happened under normal circumstances. Iranian
stakeholders were unable to argue against the need to protect their survival, and
Irans overall development was impeded as a result. With the nuclear deal
establishing new channels to reduce external tensions, Iranian
stakeholders can no longer blame foreign powers for threatening their
survival. Only one threat to the Islamic Republics survival remains: Irans
misguided economic policies. The Iranian economy has continuously
underperformed, and suffered from a litany of shortcomings, including but not
limited to: Mismanagement, corruption, unemployment, insufficient legal
frameworks for foreign investment, politicized decision-making and the lack of an
economic doctrine.

1ar uq
Clinton winsshe has Sanders formal supportgives her the
swing votes as well
Economist 7/13/16 (Economist- international news organization, After a long
wait, Sanders endorses Clinton,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2016/07/bern-balm) RK
THE body language was a little stilted and there were scattered squabbles between supporters, but on July 12th Senator Bernie

Sanders at last stood in a New Hampshire high-school gymnasium and said words that Democratic
leaders have been waiting to hear for weeks: I am endorsing Hillary Clinton for president. For
die-hard Sanders supportersthe mostly young, ardent left-wingers who call themselves Bernie or Bust votersthere were lines in
their heros speech that reminded them why they dislike and mistrust the former Secretary of State, senator and first lady. With Mrs
Clinton standing at his side, Mr Sanders reminded the crowd that he had won 13m votes, helping him to come first in primaries and

He noted that Mrs

would go into the Democratic National Convention in Philadelphia with a lead of 389
pledged delegates and a lot more superdelegatesa reference to the party grandees who are free to vote as they
caucuses in 22 statesa startling and unexpected success funded by 2.5m small individual donors.
Clinton

wish in the presidential nominating contest and without whom Mrs Clinton could not have secured final victory. There were boos
from the crowd at that reminder, that the party establishment has strongly favoured Mrs Clinton from the start over Mr Sanders, a
self-described democratic socialist who sits as an independent senator for Vermont.

Mr Sanders told the crowd

that it is no secret that he and

Mrs Clinton disagree on a number of issues. He

reeled off a list of areas in which his campaignwhich he has spent a year pitching as a political revolution, designed to rein in and
tax Wall Street banks and greatly increase the scope and size of the federal government in such fields as health care and higher
educationhad influenced the Democratic Party policy platform drafted at a special meeting that ended in Orlando on July 10th. A

Clinton has indeed made some high-profile

concessions to Mr Sanders, notably by agreeing to a plan to ofer free tuition at
public colleges and universities for students from lower-income families .
month after she effectively secured the nomination Mrs

During the long and often contentious primary contest Mrs Clinton had cited Mr Sanderss talk of free college as an example of his
lack of political realism, noting that his promises were based on the (not very plausible) assumption that governors in Republican
states would add large sums to those federal funds he proposed to raise by taxing the financial sector. But for all that, other words

he told his supporters that Mrs Clinton has won

the Democratic nominating process and I congratulate her for that. She
will be the Democratic nominee for president and I intend to do everything
I can to make certain that she will be the next president of the United
States. That may sound like a technicality, but when devoted Sandernistas meet online and in person, many seethe with talk
of Mr Sanders mattered a lot more. First,

of alleged irregularities in this primary or that, to the point that some are happy to call the primary election stolen. Just as

Sanders at last took his booming indignation at an economy and

a political system that he calls rigged for the benefit of the richest 1%,
and aimed it not at Mrs Clinton but at the presumptive Republican presidential nominee, Donald
Trump. He accused Mr Trump of showing the same old Republican contempt for working families when it comes to the
importantly, Mr

minimum wage, access to health care or the cost of medicines. The Vermont senator cast Mr Trump as rejecting science and
believing that climate change is a hoax, like most Republicans. With a nod to recent, racially-charged shootings of black men

Sanders charged Mr Trump with dividing

Americans in stressful times for our country, and of insulting Mexicans, Muslims, women, blacks and veterans. After each
swipe at Mr Trump, Mr Sanders told the crowd that, in contrast , Mrs Clinton
understands what is at stake. He addressed the possibility of apathy
among his supportersa point that worries the Clinton campaign, as they
ponder how few votes they won on college campuses, among other
Sanders hotspots. If you dont believe this election is important, take a
moment to think about the Supreme Court justices that Donald Trump will
nominate, and what that means to civil liberties, equal rights and the
future of our country, he said. That there is work for the Clinton campaign to do
and of white police officers in cities across the country, Mr

is clear. A national poll by the Pew Research Centre, conducted in late June, found voters aged under 30 unusually engaged in the
election, with nearly three-quarters saying that they had given it quite a lot of thoughta much higher proportion than in 2012. But
only about a quarter of young people said they were satisfied with the available choices for president, compared to 60% who were
satisfied in 2012, and 68% in 2008, the year of Obamamania. If the Clinton camp has its eyes on Mr Sanderss young supporters, the
Trump campaign has ambitions to pick up a different block of Sanders fans: disgruntled blue-collar workers or ex-workers from rust
belt post-industrial states, many of whom thrilled to the Vermont senators fierce attacks on global free trade deals. It is striking that
Mr Sanders, in his prepared endorsement remarks, made no mention of trade policy at all. That may be because when thelargely
non-binding and symbolicDemocratic Party platform was being negotiated in recent weeks, the Sanders campaign lost a tangible
battle. Team Sanders wanted the party officially to oppose the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a major trade pact with Asia-Pacific nations
that President Barack Obama still hopes to see ratified by Congress before he leaves office, perhaps in the lame-duck session
between Novembers general election and the inauguration of the next president in January. In the end, though, the draft platform
that will be voted on at the national convention merely says that Democrats will oppose trade agreements that do not support good
American jobs. The Trump campaign issued a statement wooing Sanders supporters over trade, via the possibly high-risk route of
an attack on Mr Sanders. Bernie is now officially a part of a rigged system the statement said, accusing him of endorsing one of

Clinton
moved past a long-awaited milestone thanks to the endorsement Mr
Sanders, in short. But as the election contest enters its final months, the sunlit uplands do not beckon.
the most pro-war, pro-Wall Street and pro-offshoring candidates in the history of the Democratic Party. Mrs

1ar link
95% dont care about foreign policy
Lawton 15 (Kim Lawton- PBS, quoting Akram Elias, president of a Washingtonbased international consulting firm, the Capital Communications Group, Do
Americans Care about Foreign Policy?, 8/20/15,
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/religionandethics/blog/americans-care-foreign-policy/)
my seminar is focused on foreign affairs, specifically U.S. relations with the
Muslim world. But do most Americans even care about these issues? According to Akram Elias, president of
a Washington-based international consulting firm, the Capital Communications Group, studies show that at least 95
percent of Americans have little or no interest in foreign policy . Elias spoke to our
Much of

group on American Federalism, Separation of Powers and Congressional Influencers. His lively presentation was much more interesting than the title
suggested.

U.S. domestic policy almost never originates with the government. Rather, civil
society networksnongovernmental organizations and advocacy groupsgenerate domestic policy and push it
Elias said

forward.

In stark contrast, he asserted that almost every single foreign policy and security
policy issue originates with the government. Of the five percent or less of
Americans who are interested in those things, most come at it from a business or
trade point of view. The net result is that very small numbers of average Americans have input
in the nations foreign affairs, while those with specific agendas have a disproportionate influence. This is something Elias believes works against the
pursuit of the common good.

Right now, there is a lot of advocacy around the Iran deal. In recent years, faith-based
groups have been involved in international issues, including religious freedom and human rights, war and peace, trafficking and
humanitarian concerns. But by and large, these activities are exceptions to the rule .

Foreign policy is either not salient or subject to change

Saunders 1/26 (Elizabeth, staff @ Wash Post, Will foreign policy be a major issue in the 2016
election? Heres what we know., https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2016/01/26/will-foreign-policy-be-a-major-issue-in-the-2016-election-heres-what-we-know/)

From decades of research, we know voters do not pay much attention to foreign
policy. Some research shows that the public has stable, coherent attitudes on
foreign policy, but few dispute that most voters have little concrete foreign policy
information. Rather than follow debates closely, voters generally look to elites and
the media for information, even for specific foreign policy issues. As the Monkey
Cage frequently reminds readers, the economy is fundamental in presidential
elections. You might think, therefore, that voters would pay attention to an
economic issue like free trade. But while trade policy has had its moments (think
Japan in the 1980s or periodic attention to agreements like NAFTA or the TPP),
voters rarely focus on it. Recent research suggests that people do not think about
trade policy in purely self-interested terms , and may lack the economic knowledge
to understand how trade policy would affect them. What about national security?
Public opinion research has shown that even in wartime, the public used elite cues
as a shortcut for understanding conflicts ranging from Iraq and Vietnam to World
War II. If elite opinion about a conflict is divided along partisan lines, then the
partisan split will likely show up in public opinion. Partisanship can even affect

perceptions of facts: in a survey conducted by Adam Berinsky in 2004, Republican

respondents were more likely to underestimate the number of casualties in Iraq,
while Democratic respondents were somewhat more likely to overestimate. Political
parties and the media can help inform the public, but that is not automatic, even in
democracies. So voters generally leave foreign policy to elites. This strategy may
make sense for busy people focused on matters closer to home. But it brings us to
our next question.

India relations
1. India is not wary of U.S. relations with China- the countries
are more friends than foes
Schafer 9 (Schaffer, Teresita C. Center for Strategic & International Studies. India and the
United States in the 21st Century: Reinventing Partnership. Chinas Rise, and Indias (Pages 139-141).
June 16th, 2009)
More generally, India sees Chinas military modernization efforts as the foundation of a future effort to increase
Chinas footprint in Indias strategic neighborhood. The areas that have been a particular focus for Chinas military
upgrades, strategic nuclear forces, surface-to-surface missiles, space warfare, and navy are all elements in long-

U.S. interests vis--vis China

have strong similarities to Indias. Neither the United States nor India
wants to see a single power dominate Asia. Both have a substantial
economic stake in China, and both want to ensure that Chinas and Indias
massive energy needs are met without disrupting international energy
markets. The predominant U.S. analysis of Chinas military modernization
is more benign than Indias, however. It starts from the premise that a significant
military upgrade is a natural and inevitable consequence of Chinas
economic development. With some exceptions, U.S. observers do not believe that
China aims at a long-term presence in the Indian Ocean in the next decade or two.
They find the concerns of the Indian security establishment exaggerated .
U.S. and Indian policy responses to this major challenge have both
similarities and diferences. For both, engagement is the heart of their
diplomatic approach. U.S. policy stresses strong relations with the other
major Asian powers, Japan and more recently India. Indian policy is moving in that
direction, with a growing relationship with Japan. A major U.S. goal is to have China
become, as then-deputy secretary of state Robert Zoellick put it, a responsible stakeholder in
the international community. The one major element in U.S. policy that is largely absent from
range power projection, and hence strengthen New Delhis concerns.

Indias has to do with Taiwan. For the United States, averting conflict over Taiwan is central to relations with China
and to the peace of East Asia. India has largely sidestepped the Taiwan issue , although it
established a nonofficial mission there in 1995. Indian trade with Taiwan is modest ($2.6 billion in 20062007).

Indias basic strategy for expanding its international role despite Chinas
head start is twofold: to tend its own power base, strengthening its military and
especially its economy; and to develop a well-rounded set of relationships with the rest
of Asia. Indian strategists see this as the best pathway to emerging as an
alternative center of power. India has no interest in forming alliances,
formal or informal, against China. Such a move would undercut the
engagement that has been mutually beneficial to both countries and
would probably alienate Indias other friends in Asia, none of which wants
to pick a fight with China. Indian policy represents a kind of double hedge
against being taken for granted by either the United States or China . India
and China share a desire to see the region and the world become more
multipolar. They also share a strict concept of sovereignty and
noninterference in other countries internal afairs, which they apply to the operation of
multilateral organizations. For India, the fact that there are international issues on
which it works with China and in opposition to the United States
represents an example of foreign policy independence , politically useful to Indian

governments in spite of the strong political consensus behind todays close relationship with Washington .

At the
same time, Indian leaders understand that China is watching their growing
ties with the United States, and they hope that the U.S. connection will
expand Indias margin for maneuver vis--vis China.

2. No link The US has broad relations with China now &

retains relations with India. Trade, military, climate, and cyber
prove. Empirically denies the impact.
3. NUQ Increasing climate coop now Paris ensures broad
based future cooperation with China to control emissions.
4. India and China will not go to war- they have too much at
stake to risk conflict
Mitra & Mukherji 15 (Mitra, Subrata Kumar. Director and Visiting Research Professor at the Institute
of South Asian Studies (ISAS) at the National University of Singapore (NUS). Mukherji, Rahul. Associate Professor in
the South Asian Studies Programme at the NUS and Honorary Senior Fellow at ISAS. Partnership without Alliance?
The Contained Volatility of Indo-US Relations, and a Prognosis. No. 217 3 December 2015- Institute of South Asian
Studies. National University of Singapore.)

It is impossible to conclude a discussion on the nature of India-US

relations without reflecting on China. We have noted that India and the US
will continue to work closely on maritime security in the India Ocean and
perhaps in the South China Sea as well. And, the US, India and Japan are working within a
trilateral cooperative framework.28 While this is a cause for concern in China, China
respects India because of its capacity to entice the US into a deep
cooperative frame. Deep cooperation between India and the US drives
Sino-Indian relations as well. Chinas commercial engagement with India
compares favourably with the United States engagement with India; and,
its engagement with the US is far deeper than that with India . The positive
sum in Indo-US and Sino-US relations should mitigate the chances of
driving any one of these countries to an insecure corner in a world of
security alliances that often drive trade preferences. That India is walking
with, rather than following, the US is clear from some actions that may not
have pleased the US. India has joined and contributed to the BRICS Bank because it views an
internationalising renminbi as contributing to a more balanced international financial system that will provide it
greater access to credit.

Along with China, India has raised its voice within the G-

20 to align International Monetary Fund (IMF) voting rights with a countrys weight in the world economy.29 This
would reduce the decision-making power of the US and Europe within the IMF. Beyond cooperation in designing the

there are significant possibilities for Sino-Indian

cooperation for investing in and developing climate-friendly technologies .
India will give global economic interdependence the best chance to drive peace in Asia. China has
articulated a view of Asian solidarity based on a Chinese variant of the
Marshal Plan. Chinese investments will be driven by Chinas excess
production capacity when rising wages and slow global economic growth cannot sustain Chinese
production systems in full throttle. Chinese infrastructure and investments in other
parts of Asia will drive Chinese growth at a time when thegovernment has
downgraded its 2015/2016 growth forecast to a historic low of 7%.30 The Chinese
international financial architecture,

government is articulating a vision for developmental cooperation where

Asian commerce will drive away conflict. India like China wishes for a
period of prolonged prosperity as neither Indian nor Chinese
developmentalism can aford wars. Like many states in Southeast Asia, India, for reasons
highlighted in the previous section, tends to remain somewhat wary of Chinas rise
because of the sheer size of the Chinese economy, its defence spending, the countrys
claims in the South China Sea, and Indias own border dispute with China. Moreover, India and the US
have common interests in persuading China to open up vital sectors such as financial
services, telecom, logistics and media to foreign investors. Why does India not join the United
States in the global campaign for democracy in an anti-China alliance? The
Indian tendency to be ambivalent on issues that some on the Capitol Hill consider
fundamental to American interests sometimes comes across as
exasperating to Indias American interlocutors. However, the issue of Indias
relationship with China is not as simple as it might appear to certain lobby groups
in the United States. India cooperates with China despite serious
diferences on substantial issues. After all, India has an unresolved border
issue with China. Chinas assistance to Pakistans nuclear programme is
unwelcome to the Government of India, to say the least. But Indians have learnt
to engage China rather than raise a wall of diplomatic separation. In
consequence, China and India have developed a sweet-and-sour
relationship when it comes to competition in South Asia, Africa and Central Asia for
infrastructure investment, oil and other natural and agricultural resources. And yet, as canny players
in the game of development, they also know that a no-holds-barred
competition between the two suitors would only drive up costs and retard
progress. So, they have worked out a sophisticated system of signalling that
amounts to implicit cooperation. Their relationship which had moved on from the heady
HindiChini-bhai bhai (India and China are brothers) of the 1950s-vintage to Hindi-Chini-bye bye in the wake of
the 1962 border war, has now reached a vigorous Hindi-Chini-buy-buy to mark the solid gains in bilateral trade.

Finally, both are Asian powers, and there are people in India whotake the
concept of Asian solidarity seriously. No government in New Delhi can
lightly brush aside this lobby.

5. No Asia war
Nick Bisley 14, Professor of IR @ La Trobe University (Australia) and Executive
Director of La Trobe Asia, Its not 1914 all over again: Asia is preparing to avoid
war, 3/10, http://theconversation.com/its-not-1914-all-over-again-asia-is-preparingto-avoid-war-22875
Asia is cast as a region as complacent about the risks of war as Europe was in its belle poque. Analogies are an understandable way of trying to make

the historical parallel is deeply misleading.

sense of unfamiliar circumstances. In this case, however,

Asia is
experiencing a period of uncertainty and strategic risk unseen since the US and China reconciled their differences in the mid-1970s. Tensions among key

there are very good

reasons, notwithstanding these issues, why Asia is not about to tumble
into a great power war. China is Americas second most important trading
partner. Conversely, the US is by far the most important country with
which China trades. Trade and investments golden straitjacket is a basic reason
to be optimistic. Why should this be seen as being more effective than the high levels of interdependence between Britain and Germany
before World War One? Because Beijing and Washington are not content to rely on markets alone to keep the peace. They are acutely
powers are at very high levels: Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe recently invoked the 1914 analogy. But

aware of how much they have at stake. Diplomatic infrastructure for peace The two powers
have established a wide range of institutional links to manage their
relations. These are designed to improve the level and quality of their
communication, to lower the risks of misunderstanding spiralling out of
control and to manage the trajectory of their relationship. Every year, around 1000 officials
from all ministries led by the top political figures in each country meet under the auspices of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. The dialogue has
demonstrably improved US-China relations across the policy spectrum, leading to collaboration in a wide range of areas. These range from disaster relief
to humanitarian aid exercises, from joint training of Afghan diplomats to marine conservation efforts, in which Chinese law enforcement officials are hosted

Unlike the near total absence of diplomatic

engagement by Germany and Britain in the lead-up to 1914, todays two
would-be combatants have a deep level of interaction and practical co-operation. Just as
the extensive array of common interests has led Beijing and Washington
to do a lot of bilateral work, Asian states have been busy the past 15
years. These nations have created a broad range of multilateral
institutions and mechanisms intended to improve trust, generate a sense of common cause
and promote regional prosperity. Some organisations, like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), have a high
on US Coast Guard vessels to enforce maritime legal regimes.

profile with its annual leaders meeting involving, as it often does, the common embarrassment of heads of government dressing up in national garb.

there are
more than 15 separate multilateral bodies that have a focus on regional
security concerns. All these organisations are trying to build what might be described as an
infrastructure for peace in the region. While these mechanisms are not flawless, and many
have rightly been criticised for being long on dialogue and short on action, they have been crucial in managing
specific crises and allowing countries to clearly state their commitments and priorities.
Others like the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting Plus Process are less in the public eye. But

Japan
The alliance is resilient
Piling 15 David Pilling, Asia editor of the Financial Times. 4-22-2015, "An
unsinkable Pacific alliance," Financial Times, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e32282d8e8cf-11e4-87fe-00144feab7de.html#axzz3cPkFBAkt
The closeness between America and Japan, forged in the ashes of war, goes
beyond the ideological If the Americans and Japanese went in for that kind of
thing they might describe themselves as being as close as lips and teeth. In actual
fact, that it is how China and North Korea have traditionally categorised their
relationship. Washington and Tokyo prefer to talk soberly about their shared
values as fellow democracies and market economies . Yet, despite the lack of
colourful language, theirs has been one of the closest and most enduring of
postwar relationships. They stand shoulder to shoulder on most issues from
terrorism to intellectual property. That closeness, forged in the ashes of the second
world war, goes beyond the ideological. In tangible ways, the two lean on each
other heavily. The US regards Japan as its representative in Asia. It depends on
Japan to help fund its debt: Tokyo not Beijing is the biggest holder of US Treasuries,
if only just. Japan has supported Washingtons military interventions, with cash and,
increasingly, with logistical support. Tokyo relies on the US nuclear umbrella and on
the protection afforded by 35,000 US troops stationed on its territory. In a candid
description of the relationship, Yasuhiro Nakasone, prime minister in the mid-1980s,
referred to Japan as Washingtons unsinkable aircraft carrier in the Pacific.
Next week Shinzo Abe, perhaps Japans strongest leader since Mr Nakasone, will
celebrate 70 years of that relationship with a rare speech to a joint session of
Congress. He will stress Japans concerted effort to revive its economy. He will urge
Congress to give Barack Obama, the US president, the fast-track authority he needs
to conclude the Trans Pacific Partnership. He will express some contrition for the
war, though perhaps not enough for the taste of some in congress. He will paint a
future in which Japan, released from postwar constitutional handcuffs, can play a
more active role in helping the US to keep the world a safe and lawful place. He is
unlikely to mention China. But everyone will know what he means. Mr Abe will
mostly be warmly received. Washington hopes Abenomics will work and is prepared
to tolerate a little Abenesia the downplaying of Japans war record if that is
the price of a strong leader. Indeed, many in Washington regard Mr Abe as the best
Japanese prime minister in a generation.

Relations arent zero-sum Japan welcomes cooperation.

Mifune 11 [Emi Mifune (Professor at Komazawa University, visiting professor at China Foreign
Affairs University), Japans Perspectives towards a Rising China, in Herbert S. Yee, ed. China's Rise:
Threat or Opportunity? London and New York: Routledge, 2011,
http://www.la.utexas.edu/dsena/courses/globexchina/readings/yee-japan.pdf]

On his first trip to Asian countries as the US president in November 2009, President
Obama said the US would seek to strengthen its tie with a rising China even as it
maintains close ties with allies like Japan. There are questions about how the US

perceives China's emergence as a global power, how its seeking to build stronger
ties with China wields influence over the Japan-US relations and the Japan-US-China
triangle relations, and how Japan should engage the expanding US-China relations.
Some Japanese worry that the deepening US-China relations in a new era
afects the Japan-US relations, causing Japan's position to retreat. However,
others believe that Japan welcomes the idea that the US and China have
an increasingly broad base of cooperation and share increasingly
important common responsibilities on many major issues concerning
global stability and prosperity. It is important for Japan to welcome a
strong, prosperous, and successful China that plays a greater role in world
afairs by interacting with the United States. According to lEA (lntemational
Energy Agency), China exhausted 21 percent of the world's carbon dioxide in 2007,
the US exhausted 20 percent, the EU exhausted 14 percent, Russia exhausted 6
percent, India exhausted 5 percent, and Japan exhausted 4 percent. Both China and
the US must find way to mitigate climate change and should combine eforts.
Without dramatically significant actions by the US and China, the global climate
crisis will leave human beings with no future. China's role in the Six-Party Talks
concerning North Korea is crucial to regional security in Asia. China's influence over
North Korea is not absolute, but there is no one that can afect North Korea as
much as China can. Without China's cooperation with the US on the North
Korea issue, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula cannot be expected.
China has recently increased its economic, military, and diplomatic influence in
countries in South Asia, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. China's investments in
these countries are large and will continue to increase. It is seeking to develop its
influence over those countries to ensure its energy import and to build its sea-lane.
It has obstacles in these places because there is historical antagonism among these
countries even though the governments have now developed better relations. The
countries and sea around them are so important for Japan's sea-lane that Japan
needs to build cooperative relationships with them without causing a
confrontation with China. The US has decided to encourage more Americans to
study in China by launching a new initiative to send 100,000 students to China over
the forthcoming four years. China has sent the United States a lot of students in the
past. This new project of sending American students to China is going to cultivate
US experts on China. It will also develop personal channels between China and the
US. Japan also needs to develop personal exchanges. Recently, there have been a
lot of Chinese scholars and celebrities who have conveyed propaganda to Japan
about the preferred ideas and politics of China. However, there have been few
Chinese specialists in Japanese affairs. The current relation between US and China
poses challenges for Japan. The Japan-US relation is not a zero-sum game
towards the US- China relation. While the Japan-US relation is one of being
allies, the US-China relation is a partnership to negotiate and resolve many
issues concerning global and regional stabilities and prosperity. These two
bilateral relationships are completely diferent. Seeking to build common
ties to China and the US is necessary for Japan, and now is the appropriate
time to get into the act. However, the Hatoyama Administration forms abstract
ideas of the Japan-US and the Japan- China relations, which might harm those
relations in the near future. Japan does not need to fear a rising China;

however, the Japanese government needs a grand foreign strategy with mid-term
and long- term views to cope with a rising China.

Turn reliance on the US drives nationalism and nuclearisation

Chanlett-Avery & Nitkin 9

Specialist in Asian afairs for

Congressional Research Service, and Nikitin, analyst in Congressional
Research Service Library of Congress
(Emma Chanlett-Avery, Mary Beth, 2-19-09, Japans Nuclear Future: Policy Debate,
Prospects, and U.S. Interests, Congressional Research Service,
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL34487.pdf, accessed 7-1-16, JSW)
While Japanese public opinion remains, by most accounts, firmly anti-nuclear, some
social currents could eventually change the conception of nuclear
development. Many observers have recognized a trend of growing
nationalism in Japan, particularly among the younger generation. Some
Japanese commentators have suggested that this increasing patriotism
could jeopardize closer cooperation with the United States : if Japan feels
too reliant on U.S. forces and driven by U.S. priorities, some may assert
the need for Japan to develop its own independent capability. Another wild
card is the likelihood that Japan will face a major demographic challenge because of
its rapidly ageing population: such a shock could either drive Japan closer to the
United States because of heightened insecurity, or could spur nationalism that may
lean toward developing more autonomy.

No Link The plan couldnt be perceived as abandoning

strategic cooperation with Japan. The af resolves the need for
military cooperation by removing the need for militarization in
general.
Turn The af alters the global calculus for competition and
cooperation. We send a shot around the world against realism
by vocally altering the way we work with one of our chief
rivals. It afects every nation. Thats Goldstein.
Nuclear deterrence solves the impact
Rowberry 14 (Ariana Navarro, Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow, Brookings,
Advanced Conventional Weapons, Deterrence and the U.S.-Japan Alliance,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2015/01/06-advancedconventional-weapons-deterrence-us-japan-alliance-rowberry/advancedconventional-weapons-deterrence-and-the-usjapan-alliance--rowberry.pdf)
The U.S. extended nuclear deterrent is the supreme guarantor of Japans security
and a central component of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Japans protection under the
U.S. extended nuclear deterrent has assured Tokyo when China and North Korea
have engaged in provocative actions that threatened Japans security. Moreover, the
U.S. extended nuclear deterrent has been a key factor in dissuading Japan from
developing its own nuclear weapons capability, which it has considered on several occasions since

Moving forward, the importance of the U.S. extended nuclear

deterrent to Japan will be crucial in assuring Tokyo and deterring adversaries . While the
the end of World War II.

unique value of nuclear deterrence is irreplacable, the integration and expansion of advanced conventional

As the only state

to be the victim of nuclear weapons use, Japan adopted anti-nuclear policies at the
end of World War II. While the constitution does not explicitly mention nuclear
weapons, it is widely interpreted as prohibiting their development. Moreover, in 1967,
Prime Minister Eisaku Sato announced the Three Nos, renouncing the manufacture,
possession, or introduction of nuclear weapons in Japan. Sato later changed the three nos to the four
pillars of nuclear policy: 1) promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear
energy; 2) eforts toward global nuclear disarmament; 3) reliance and
dependence on U.S. extended deterrence, based on the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation
and Security; and 4) support for the three non-nuclear principles under the
weapons into the U.S.-Japan alliance can complement the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent.

circumstances where Japans national security is guaranteed by the other three policies. 8

SQ engagement thumps- Paris deal, anti-piracy exercises, and

cyberwarfare agreements should have already triggered the
link
Japan wont proliferate
Berger 15, senior research fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (9-20-15 accessed 71-16 Pacifism bill: Why Japan wont build a nuclear weapon quickly <
http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/20/opinions/japan-military-opinion-berger/>)
Japan's upper house of parliament approved a controversial security bill that would allow it to engage in defensive
military action overseas in the event that the national security of its allies is severely threatened. For the first time
since the end of World War II, Japanese troops can deploy in overseas operations in a combat role in support of its
allies; in other words, for collective self-defense. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's attempts to explain the
change to domestic and international audiences have not gone smoothly. He has faced opposition at home, with fist
fights breaking out between lawmakers debating the bill. In the wider region, China, which Japan perceives to be
one of its greatest security threats, has raised the specter of a less-restrained Japan with possible nuclear weapons
ambitions. China itself has nuclear weapons, making its first test 1964. Chinese officials and experts have
periodically tied Japan's reinterpretation of its military posture to the country's domestic nuclear capability in order
to raise concerns that Japan could in future become more aggressive. While it is reasonable to debate the new

Here's why Japan is unlikely to ever build a

nuclear bomb. Since the 1960s, Tokyo has developed one of the most advanced
civilian nuclear energy programs that exists amongst the international community .
security bill, such insinuations are unwarranted.

That program generates approximately one third of the country's electricity at present, but could in theory also be
used to produce material for use in a nuclear weapon. Some assess that the scale and sophistication of Japan's
nuclear infrastructure would enable it to build a nuclear weapon in a matter of months, should the unlikely political
decision be taken to do so. Strategic rival China has sought to draw attention to this fact, issuing loud warnings over

But it should be noted that under the terms of

the Non-Proliferation Treaty -- which Japan ratified in 1976 -- states are entitled to
peaceful nuclear technology for energy purposes if they forswear nuclear weapons.
To ensure that the country's nuclear sites remain exclusively for peaceful use, they
are subjected to intensive scrutiny by the International Atomic Energy Agency in
Vienna. The Agency consistently verifies the accuracy and completeness of Japan's
declarations regarding its nuclear facilities, material, and activities and conducts
monitoring and inspections at relevant facilities. Its role in Japan will continue to be
particularly important in order to dispel any fears that the country may harbor
nuclear weapons intentions. China and the International Atomic Energy Agency are not the only ones following Japan's nuclear
Japan's stocks of nuclear material, for example.

activity closely. Two other audiences are noteworthy. The first is Japan's public, who have become increasingly wary of the risks and dangers associated with nuclear technology -whether for civilian or military applications -- following the disaster at Fukushima in 2011 The second is the country's closest ally, the United States, who is similarly
attentive to the state of Japan's nuclear program. In fact, it is because of Japan's alliance with the United States that the former has even less of an
.

incentive to build a nuclear weapon. In order to guarantee the security of Japan against major threats in its region, whether a militarily assertive China or a belligerent and
nuclear-armed North Korea, Washington has vowed to respond to any serious armed aggression against Japan using whatever means necessary, including nuclear weapons. By
demonstrating the depth of its resolve to defend Japan, the U.S. hopes to deter any potential aggressors from attacking in the first place. U.S. troops stationed in Okinawa are a visible
reminder of the alliance and the commitment that underpins it. As long as Japan believes in the strength of the U.S.'s so-called "extended deterrence" guarantee it is unlikely to see any
merit in having its own nuclear weapons capability . For this reason, both countries work tirelessly to ensure the credibility and durability of their defence

partnership -- an immeasurably important aim. Despite what many may think, the Abe administration sees the new security bill as part of this broader
effort to contribute to a two-way military relationship -- not as a legal green light for offensive action. The bill creates the framework for Japan to give as
much to the relationship as it receives, by enabling it to come to the aid of the United States if necessary. More than anything else, history is likely to
undermine any temptation Japan might have to build a bomb. Japan was the first and only country to ever be attacked with nuclear weapons. Over
100,000 Japanese citizens were killed in the August 1945 bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Seventy years on, Japan's nuclear history will not be
forgotten any time soon. Indeed, it is because of that history that Japan has become one of the most active signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Tokyo has invested significant resources into preventing the illegal spread of nuclear weapons-relevant materials and technology, promoting the conditions

. The non-proliferation
norm is one that Japan will have little incentive to abandon in the short, medium, or
likely even in the long-term. Contrary to the suggestions of some watching
legislative developments in Japan, the new security bill is not going to change that.
needed for nuclear disarmament, and reminding the world of the grotesque effects of the use of an atomic bomb

Turn The epistemological assumptions they make about

proliferation risks and impacts are biased. They presume Asian
nations are riskier owners of weapons than Western nations
and that Japan is likely to overreact to US actions rather than
to appropriately understand US motivations and
consequences. The Japanese govt is smarter than their
journalists give them credit for.
Empirics prove that weapons dont increase the risk of war
Tepperman 9 (Jonathan Tepperman a journalist based in New York City. Why Obama
should learn to love the bomb Newsweek Nov 9, 2009
http://jonathantepperman.com/Welcome_files/nukes_Final.pdf)

A growing and compelling body of research suggests that nuclear

weapons may not, in fact, make the world more dangerous, as Obama and most
people assume. The bomb may actually make us safer. In this era of rogue states
and trans-national terrorists, that idea sounds so obviously wrongheaded that few
politicians or policymakers are willing to entertain it. But thats a mistake. Knowing
the truth about nukes would have a profound impact on government policy.
Obamas idealistic campaign, so out of character for a pragmatic administration,
may be unlikely to get far (past presidents have tried and failed). But its not even
clear he should make the effort. There are more important measures the U.S.
government can and should take to make the real world safer, and these mustnt be
ignored in the name of a dreamy ideal (a nuke free planet) thats both unrealistic
and possibly undesirable. The argument that nuclear weapons can be agents of
peace as well as destruction rests on two deceptively simple observations. First,
nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945. Second, theres never been a
nuclear, or even a nonnuclear, war between two states that possess them.
Just stop for a second and think about that: its hard to overstate how remarkable it
is, especially given the singular viciousness of the 20th century. As Kenneth Waltz,
the leading nuclear optimist and a professor emeritus of political science at UC
Berkeley puts it, We now have 64 years of experience since Hiroshima. Its striking
and against all historical precedent that for that substantial period, there has not
been any war among nuclear states. To understand whyand why the next 64
years are likely to play out the same wayyou need to start by recognizing that all

states are rational on some basic level. Their leaders may be stupid, petty,
venal, even evil, but they tend to do things only when theyre pretty sure they can
get away with them. Take war: a country will start a fight only when its
almost certain it can get what it wants at an acceptable price. Not even
Hitler or Saddam waged wars they didnt think they could win. The problem
historically has been that leaders often make the wrong gamble and
underestimate the other sideand millions of innocents pay the price. Nuclear
weapons change all that by making the costs of war obvious, inevitable,
and unacceptable. Suddenly, when both sides have the ability to turn the other to
ashes with the push of a button and everybody knows itthe basic math shifts.
Even the craziest tin-pot dictator is forced to accept that war with a nuclear state is
unwinnable and thus not worth the effort. As Waltz puts it, Why fight if you cant
win and might lose everything? Why indeed? The iron logic of deterrence and
mutually assured destruction is so compelling, its led to whats known as the
nuclear peace: the virtually unprecedented stretch since the end of World War II in
which all the worlds major powers have avoided coming to blows. They did fight
proxy wars, ranging from Korea to Vietnam to Angola to Latin America. But these
never matched the furious destruction of full-on, great-power war (World
War II alone was responsible for some 50 million to 70 million deaths). And since the
end of the Cold War, such bloodshed has declined precipitously. Meanwhile, the
nuclear powers have scrupulously avoided direct combat, and theres very good
reason to think they always will. There have been some near misses, but a close
look at these cases is fundamentally reassuringbecause in each instance, very
diferent leaders all came to the same safe conclusion. Take the mother of all
nuclear standoffs: the Cuban missile crisis. For 13 days in October 1962, the United
States and the Soviet Union each threatened the other with destruction. But both
countries soon stepped back from the brink when they recognized that a war would
have meant curtains for everyone. As important as the fact that they did is the
reason why: Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchevs aide Fyodor Burlatsky said later on,
It is impossible to win a nuclear war, and both sides realized that, maybe for the
first time. The record since then shows the same pattern repeating: nuclear armed
enemies slide toward war, then pull back, always for the same reasons. The best
recent example is India and Pakistan, which fought three bloody wars after
independence before acquiring their own nukes in 1998. Getting their hands on
weapons of mass destruction didnt do anything to lessen their animosity.
But it did dramatically mellow their behavior. Since acquiring atomic
weapons, the two sides have never fought another war.

Pursuing a nuclear program doesnt cause arms race- North

Korean prolif proves
Lack of political support makes the risk of nuclearization
remote pacifism is too entrenched.
Gady 15 (Franz-Stefan Gady, senior fellow at the EastWest Institute and associate
editor for The Diplomat, 9/18/2015, Japan's Improbable Military Resurgence,
http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/japans-improbable-military-resurgence/)

In 2004, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made a case for Japan to restore its military capabilities, writing in his book,
Determination to Protect This Country, that if Japanese dont shed blood, we cannot have an equal relationship with America.
Since then, Abe has sought to revive the countrys defensive capabilities , mostly
toward fortifying its claim over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, an island chain in the East China Sea that Beijing says belongs
to China. He has requested a record five trillion yen ($42 billion) defense budget for fiscal year 2016 (if approved, it will be Tokyos

and reinterpreted the constitution to allow Japan to exercise

the right of collective self-defense. The eforts have provoked growing
alarm. A June 2015 survey found that 57 percent of South Koreans believe that Japan is in a militaristic state, and 58 percent
largest in 14 years)

said that Tokyo poses a military threat. In comparison, only 38 percent surveyed thought that China was the bigger threat. China,
too, is worried. It has repeatedly warned that Abe is leading the country down a more dangerous path toward militarization.

Whatever Abes intentions, however, Japanese militarism was buried for good in August 1945
and will not likely rise agai n. The reason: the Japanese people. Defeat Suits After the
atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Emperor Showa, popularly known as Hirohito, gave a radio address explaining to his
people that continuing the fight against the Allies would result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation. And
so Japan surrendered. Unlike the Germans, though, the Japanese people had no Adolf Hitler or Nazi Party to blame for a war that had
killed at least 2.7 million Japanese servicemen and civilians and destroyed 66 major cities. Although the Japanese emperor had been
accused of overseeing war crimesmass rapes and killings in China and Southeast AsiaU.S. General Douglas MacArthur thought it
politically expedient to keep him in power and successfully ran a campaign to exonerate Hirohito. The Japanese people came to
regard Hirohito as innocent and subsequently turned against the military, accusing the services of deceiving them and drawing the
country into a perilous war. Japanese police reports immediately after the surrender note the peoples grave distrust, frustration,

Civilian contempt for the

military quickly spread to the rank and file of the 3.5 million-strong Imperial Japanese
Army. And so, after the war, Japanese soldiers were both defeated and
despised. In a letter from an anonymous former soldier dated May 9, 1946, Not a single person gave me a kind word. Rather,
and antipathy toward military and civilian leaders and general hatred of the military.

they cast hostile glances my way. Military uniforms were nicknamed defeat suits, and military boots were called defeat shoes.
Even one of the most reverent expressions of gratitude during the war yearsthanks to our fighting men (heitaisan no okage
desu)turned into an expression of contempt. Thanks to our fighting men, lives and property had been destroyed. Thanks to our
fighting men, Japans overall economic and political situation was absymal. As the historian John W. Dower outlines in Embracing
Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, no one listened to the returning soldiers who spoke out about the differences between the
military leadership and common servicemen. The Tokyo War Crimes Trials, which lasted from 1946 to 1948, revealed the extent of
the atrocities committed by the Japanese military during World War II and also the extreme antipathy that the Japanese people felt
for the military. For example, during the 1945 Battle of Manila, the Japanese military mutilated and massacred between 100,000 and
500,000 Filipino civilians. Shortly after the news reached Tokyo, a Japanese woman wrote a letter to the Japanese national paper
Asahi Shimbun expressing her revulsion. Even if such an atrocious soldier were my son, she wrote, I could not accept him back
home. Let him be shot to death there. The poet Saeki Jinzaburo also penned a few lines expressing his disgust with the army after
the war crimes revelations: Seizing married women, raping mothers in front of their childrenthis is the Imperial Army. In 1947, a
Japanese poetry magazine published the following verse after the end of the Tokyo tribunal: The crimes of Japanese soldiers, who
committed unspeakable atrocities in Nanking [China] and Manila, must be atoned for. Former Prime Minister Hideki Tojo, an army
general, was openly ridiculed for a botched suicide attempt in September 1945. One Japanese novelist and poet, Takami Yoshio (who
went by the pen name Jun Takami), wrote at the time, Cowardly living on, and then using a pistol like a foreigner, failing to die.
Japanese cannot help but smile bitterly. . . . Why did General Tojo not use a Japanese sword as Army Minister Anami did ? These

postwar sentiments against the military were so strong that even

textbooks during that period systematically skipped over any references
to past Japanese victories and military heroes. And they remain absent
from schoolbooks to this day. Ashes of Hiroshima Distrust and ridicule of all things military did not abate in the
postwar years. After the war, the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), Japans de facto postwar army created at the behest of the United
States, were generally accepted. In the 1960s, though, new recruits were occasionally pelted with stones while walking down the

Japans
military was seen as serving no real purpose and ofering little protection .
Then, as now, the public felt that the U.S.-Japanese security treaty ofered
a better guarantee of security than the SDF. After all, since its founding, the SDF had neither
street, and when they appeared in public spaces, people would get up and leave. Throughout the Cold War,

achieved a single military victory nor ever engaged in combat operations. Although the end of the Cold War brought a new raison
dtre to the SDFUN Peacekeeping operations the

Japanese still regard the force as useful

primarily for disaster relief rather than defense. According to a 2015 public opinion poll
conducted by Japans Cabinet Office, 82 percent of Japanese think that the SDFs primary
role is disaster relief, and 72.3 percent believe that this should remain its
main duty in the future. Perhaps that is why, to this day, the SDF refers to its weapons as equipment and
artillery brigades as technical brigades in order to downplay the military aspects of Japans armed forces. Tanks even used to be
called special vehicles, although they are now referred to as tanks again. In the same poll, 92 percent of those surveyed had a
positive impression of the SDF, but a positive impression does not mean support or approval. According to Thomas Berger, a

professor of international relations at Boston University, Japans best and brightest do not flock to join the armed forces, and the
SDF is hardly celebrated in Japanese society. Indeed, according to the same 2015 public opinion poll, less than half of people
questioned thought that being a soldier was a respectable occupation, and only 25.4 percent perceived the job to be a challenging
one. As Berger explained to me, Internal [SDF] surveys showed that the majority joined the forces because they hoped for material
betterment. It is a safe, reliable job, and the legal status is the same as being a post office clerk. The SDF also has the reputation of
being a holding center for high school and college dropouts. It recruits heavily from Japans backwaters, such as southern Kyushu
and northern Honshuand especially from Akita prefecture and Hokaido, where young people face limited job prospects. Most of
those enlisted belong to the lower and lower middle classes, although the officer corps is staffed primarily by those from the middle
class. Once these young men and women have joined, they tend to serve until quiet retirement in their early 50s. Japan doesnt
have the sort of hero worship of military things that can boost the career of a retired officer, according to Robert Dujarric, director

That is why the Japanese have

resisted Abes attempts to revive the military. In August 2015, in one of the largest
of the Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies at Temple University in Japan.

demonstrations in Tokyo against Abe, tens of thousands hit the street. One protester told the Financial Times, This is the last

Japanese military
radicalization could be triggered only by a fundamental change in the
security architecture of East Asia, such as a unilateral U.S. withdrawal
from Japan or a North Korean nuclear missile attack. Both are far-fetched
scenarios. But given the current political climate, it was not surprising that
an August 2015 public poll found only 11 percent of the Japanese were supportive of
Abes policy to reinterpret the power that the constitution gives its
military. His personal ratings have also slipped, with some analysts
predicting his resignation. The moral and military defeat of the Japanese
army in World War II was so total that it echoes to this day. Despite Abes
historical revisionism and fearmongering, the Japanese public appears
unwilling to trust another military clique. Thats why, for all the talk of
Japanese militarism, a relatively pacifist country is here to stay.
chance we have to preserve Japans worldwide reputation as a country of peace. In reality, however,

North Korea
1. Relations low now - North Korea calls for nuclear war with
China
Raven 3/31 (David, reporter for Mirror, 3/31/16 WWIII fears as Kim Jong-un threatens China with 'nuclear
war' and declares country 'an enemy' Mirror, http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/wwiii-fears-kim-jong-un7665166) jf

Kim Jong-un has threatened China with 'nuclear war' after declaring the country an
'enemy of North Korea .' The portly despot reportedly launched a scathing attack on Beijing for taking part
in UN sanctions against his regime. Officials circulated a document dated March 10 which
slams China for "betraying socialism" and threatens to clamp down on them with
the force of "a nuclear storm." It states: We must no longer go easy on the Chinese and instead
deal with them equally in order to change their attitude of taking us lightly. The report, which positioned China as
'the detested enemy' was published by the Workers Party of North Korea and picked up by South Korea-based news

"All Party members and workers must join in soundly crushing

Chinas pressuring schemes with the force of a nuclear storm for its betrayal of
socialism. China defended North Korea in the 1950-53 Korean War and was seen as the country's closest ally
site Daily NK. It adds:

and largest trading partner. But earlier this month the country agreed to a US proposal that would dramatically
tighten existing restrictions after North Korea's nuclear test on January 6.

2. N. Korea wont use nukes

Kim 5/7 (Sam, reporter for Bloomberg News, 5/7/16, North Korea's Kim Says He Won't Use Nukes Unless Attacked
Bloomberg News, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-08/north-korea-s-kim-says-he-won-t-use-nuclear-armsunless-attacked) jf

North Korean leader Kim Jong Un said he will only use nuclear weapons if his
country comes under a nuke attack, and called for improving relations with other
nations as a nuclear power.
Kim said at the first Workers Party congress in 36 years that North Korea should try
to send more satellites into space, according to the Korean Central News Agency.
The comment reaffirms his intention to develop long-range rockets that the U.S.
says can be converted into inter-continental ballistic missiles. Kims comments at
the biggest political event under his rule confirm North Korea remains unwilling to
abandon its nuclear-arms development or reform its centralized economy anytime
soon. After its fourth nuclear test, conducted in January, the country has reiterated
its demand that the U.S. treat it as a nuclear power in future negotiations. As a
responsible nuclear weapons state, our republic will not use a nuclear weapon
unless its sovereignty is encroached upon by any aggressive hostile forces with
nukes, Kim said at the congress in Pyongyang, KCNA reported. North Korea will
cooperate with efforts to stop the spread of nuclear weapons for the eventual goal
of global denuclearization, he said, according to KCNA.

3. No link The US has broad relations with China now &

retains relations with India. Trade, military, climate, and cyber
prove. Empirically denies the impact.
4. NUQ Increasing climate coop now Paris ensures broad
based future cooperation with China to control emissions.
5. Strong relations solve North Korean denuclearization
prevents war and broad prolif
Xiyu 15 (Yang Xiyu is Senior Research Fellow at China Institute of International Studies. North
Korean Nuclear Issue in China-U.S. Relations. July 10, 2015. http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/201507/10/content_8062011.htm)
Cooperation and Disagreement on North Korean Nuclear Issue Between China and the United States As
for their policies toward the North Korean nuclear issue, both China and the United States

have demanded the complete denuclearization of North Korea, and they

share the same position and policy goal of a nuclear-weapons-free Korean
Peninsula. Moreover, since the Six-Party Talks were initiated by China, both countries have stated
that the talks are the only feasible approach to the settlement of the issue, so they have made close
communication and coordination with each other under and beyond the framework. Given that

both China and the United States play unique roles in the eforts to
achieve a peaceful settlement of North Koreas nuclear issue through
dialogue, the issue has become a vital subject of their presidential
meetings, the China-U.S. Strategic and Economic Dialogue, as well as
other diplomatic conferences and negotiations at all levels. Due to the impact of
North Koreas second nuclear test, the Cheonan incident, Yeonpyeong Island shelling and other crises, the issue has
hit the gridlock. Against this backdrop, both heads of state, after meeting with each other in January 2011, made a
joint statement reconfirming their further cooperation on the nuclear issue and reiterating their deep concerns over
the uranium enrichment plan announced by North Korea. They called for early resumption of the Six-Party Talks

The coordination and

cooperation between China and the United States on the North Korean
nuclear issue prevent it from spinning out of control, avoid nuclear
nonproliferation and the outbreak of conflicts, and promise a peaceful
settlement of the complicated security issue through the Six-Party Talks. If
through necessary measures, so as to address the issue and related ones.[17]

we make a comparison between Chinas policies on the nuclear issue with that adopted by the three
U.S. presidents, it is not hard to see that the two nations have differences not only in the consistency
and stability of their policies, but also in substantive content . First, China has maintained

consistency and stability on the issue throughout the past decade while
the United States has adopted diferent policies since the Clinton
administration. These changes in policy have not only hindered a smooth
settlement of the issue, but also cooperation on it. Second, China has
always called for increasing mutual trust, narrowing disagreement with
the United States through dialogue, and gradually creating conditions for
a nuclear-free peninsula through political, security, economic and
diplomatic approaches; in comparison, the United States is overdependent on imposing pressure and sanctions on North Korea, seeking to
force it to give up its nuclear program unconditionally . Since the nuclear issue broke
out again in October 2002, both the Republican Bush administration and the Democratic Obama administration
have refused official talks with North Korea. Each time when the United States senses that it lacks measures to
impose pressure on North Korea, it asks China to join the sanction club by taking advantage of Chinas resources.

Their different intentions and thinking, characterized by Chinas call for dialogue and the United States preference
for imposing pressure, have led to growing mutual suspicion between the two countries. Third ,

Chinas
advocacy of denuclearization of North Korea is part of its eforts to secure
a peninsula that is free of nuclear weapons and its recognition that North
Korea has the same right to peaceful use of nuclear energy as other
sovereign states. However, since the Bush administration, the United States has called on North Korea to
abandon its entire nuclear program, including the peaceful use of nuclear energy . This disagreement
has not yet been solved. Nonetheless, the common interests and
agreement between China and the United States on the denuclearization
of the Korean Peninsula have fundamental and strategic significance. This
common ground is the basis of their long-term cooperation on the issue as
well as a vital field for cooperation in their joint eforts to establish a new
model of China-U.S. relations. China and the United States Should Enhance
Cooperation and Narrow Diferences Since the end of the Cold War, it seems that the Korean
Peninsula has been trapped in a periodic loop of a crisis every four years. When the first North Korean nuclear
crisis broke out in 1994, the United States and North Korea were on the brink of war. The 1994 U.S.-DPRK Agreed
Framework helped ease the crisis and improved their relations, but four years later in 1998, North Koreas test
launch of a long-range ballistic missile triggered a second crisis, leaving the two countries in confrontation again.
Thanks to hard but substantial negotiations, their relationship was turned around, characterized by their first highlevel exchange visits: In October 2000, Jo Myong-rok, Vice Marshal of the Korean Peoples Army, visited Washington
as a special envoy, during which the two sides signed the U.S.-DPRK Joint Communiqu in order to establish a new
model for the relationship between the two countries in the 21st century. After that, Albright, U.S. Secretary of
State, paid a visit to Pyongyang and attended political meetings with Kim Jong-il.[18] Given the transfer of power in
the United States, the issue of North Koreas uranium enrichment touched off a third crisis four years later at the
end of 2002, but thanks to Chinas active mediation and efforts, the parties concerned initiated the Six-Party Talks.
In September 2005, they signed the historic September 19 Joint Statement, which not only resolved the crisis, but
also put the nuclear issue back on the right track of multilateral dialogue and negotiations. However, these efforts
failed to end the crisis loop. In 2006, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test regardless of strong opposition
from the international community, leading to the fourth crisis. Although the Six-Party Talks mechanism brought the
parties concerned back onboard to resolve the crisis and facilitate the launch of substantive disablement,
worryingly, the crisis loop still exists and the cycle has been shortened to a more frequent level: Three years after
the fourth crisis in 2006, another crisis broke out on the Korean Peninsula; merely one year later in 2010, the
Cheonan incident and Yeonpyeong Island shelling ignited military confrontation. Three years after Yeonpyeong
Island shelling, the headquarters of the Korean Peoples Army (KPA) suddenly made an announcement, saying, The
army groups on the front, ground forces, the navy, air and anti-air units, strategic rocket units of the KPA, the
Worker-Peasant Red Guards and the Young Red Guards have launched an all-out action according to the operational
plan finally signed by the dear respected Supreme Commander Kim Jong Un. North Korean authorities also called
on the staff in foreign embassies in Pyongyang and all civilians in Seoul to evacuate. This announcement intensified
the tensions between North and South Korea to the brink of war. Why cannot North Korea end the loop of crisis
more than two decades since the end of the Cold War? Though the causes of crises differ, the loop of crisis has
persisted for a profound reason, namely two continuing abnormal situations. First, the Korean Peninsula is still at
war. The Korean Armistice Agreement signed in July 1953 was only a ceasefire agreement, prescribing that the
warring factions should sign a peace agreement through negotiations so as to end the state of war. However, the
parties concerned failed to reach a consensus to replace Korean Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty in the
1954 Geneva Conference or the Geneva Four-Party Talks from 1997 to 1999. Therefore, the north and south of the
Korean Peninsula remain in a virtual state of war from a legal perspective, and clashes between them frequently
have occurred at the provisional Military Demarcation Line, as well as in waters off the controversial Five West Sea
Islands. Moreover, as the military ally of the ROK, the United States stations large military forces there, indicating
that the United States and North Korea are still at war. This is the fundamental reason why the Korean Peninsula can
hardly sustain long-term peace. Given that, the September 19 Joint Statement, as an outcome of the Six-Party Talks,
emphatically pointed out, The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean
Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.[19] Second, the Korean Peninsula is still in a cold war. Although the
worldwide Cold War has long ended, the one on the peninsula has been exacerbated. North Korea on one side and
the U.S.-ROK alliance on the other are implementing similar deterrent strategies so that a mutual deterrence
structure has emerged. That is to say, the present peace and no war are based on mutual deterrence and even
a balance of threat that assures mutual destruction. This security structure, reminiscent of the Cold War,
constitutes the reason why North Korea insists on the development of nuclear weapons. The above two abnormal
situations are the root causes of the peninsulas constant state of crisis and the lack of peace and stability. If they
remain unchanged, the North Korean nuclear issue will not be solved and the peninsula will not be able to escape

the vicious circle of periodic crises. Thus, any attempts to promote the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and
the settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue must take into consideration these two root causes. As mentioned

China and the United States have common goals and interests in the
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, while their respective foreign
policies are diferent due to their distinctive judgments on the root causes
of the issue and their responses accordingly. As a matter of fact, the North Korean nuclear
above,

issue covers more than nuclear proliferation and nuclear threat; it is a product of the long-term military
confrontation between North Korea and the U.S.-ROK alliance, as well as an outcome of serious imbalance in the
security structure of the peninsula since the end of the Cold War. For North Korea, the issue is basically about

This complicated security issue shaped by the long-standing

state of war in the form of a cold war cannot be addressed simply by
carrying out the model of denuclearization in exchange for
compensation, nor through isolation, sanctions or military strikes.
Instead, the relevant parties should agree on a package of plans in accordance
survival and security.

with the September 19 Joint Statement in order to build a new security relationship on the peninsula, realize the
normalization of relations between the two sides, and establish a peace and cooperation mechanism in Northeast

Only through these eforts can the North Korean nuclear issue be
solved and can the peninsula become a nuclear-free area with long-term
stability. Therefore, the point of departure of efective cooperation between
China and the United States on the issue is how to carry out a package of
plans to comprehensively resolve it and build a permanent peace regime
according to the commitment for commitment, action for action
principle[20] included in the September 19 Joint Statement. These attempts will also
provide basis for China and the United States to narrow their diferences
and play more positive roles in achieving a peaceful settlement of the
issue. In fact, the framework of the Six-Party Talks serves as a practical
and efective platform for both countries to expand cooperation and
narrow diferences on the North Korean nuclear issue.
Asia.

6. No risk of tensions escalating.

Mullen and Novak 15 (Jethro and Kathy, CNN correspondents citing Jamie
Metzl, North Korea ratchets up tensions after trading fire with South
http://www.cnn.com/2015/08/21/asia/koreas-tensions/)
The question now is whether the situation will escalate further. North Korea has
used similarly alarming language in previous periods of high tension In 2013,
the country announced it had entered "a state of war" with South Korea. That
situation didn't result in military action, although North Korea did temporarily shut down the two
countries' joint industrial zone, which lies on its side of the border. During that period, North Korea kept up a
barrage of bombastic threats against the United States, South Korea and Japan. But at the same time, it
continued accepting tourists and hosting international athletes in
Pyongyang for a marathon. South Korea said Friday that it was limiting the
number of its citizens entering the joint industrial zone , but the complex
was still operating. There are currently 83 South Koreans in Pyongyang
attending a youth soccer event, including players and coaches, according to the South Korean Unification
Ministry. Jamie Metzl, an Asia expert for the Atlantic Council in New York , said he
thought it was unlikely that the current crisis would escalate further.
"North Korea has more to gain from conflict theater than from a conflict
that would quickly expose its fundamental weakness," he said, suggesting

leaders in Pyongyang might be trying to "make trouble because they feel

ignored by the international community and feel they have something to
gain negotiating their way out of a mini-crisis."

Philippines
1. Tensions in the SCS decreasing nowDuterte favors
reconciliation with China
Tiezzi 7/1 (Shannon Tiezzi is Editor at The Diplomat. Her main focus is on China, and she writes on Chinas
foreign relations, domestic politics, and economy. 7/1/16. China Congratulates Philippines' New President Duterte;
The Diplomat. http://thediplomat.com/2016/07/china-congratulates-philippines-new-president-duterte/) NTT

Its interesting, however, that Beijing has shifted its rhetoric from denouncing the
Philippines in general to holding the Aquino administration responsible. That
leaves the door open for potential reconciliation now that Aquino is gone
providing, of course, that Duterte is willing to play by Beijings rules and disavow
or at least downplay the case. Duterte seems inclined to do so, judging by recent
comments. In a recent Cabinet meeting, Duterte reportedly said that his
government would tread carefully if the ruling goes the Philippines way, as
expected: it should be a soft landing for everybody [if] we do not really taunt or
flaunt it. He added that the case would be a moral victory and put a country in an
awkward position, with a country likely referring to China. However, Duterte
continued to say that the Philippines must also take into account the reality.
Likewise, Foreign Secretary Perfecto Yasay Jr. said he was adverse to the idea,
raised by foreign governments in his talks, that the Philippines should make
stronger statements if the ruling is in their favor. I told them in no unmistakable
terms that the first thing that we will do when we get that decision is to study its
implications and its ramifications, Yasay explained. Earlier this week, Defense
Minister Delfin Lorenzana told Reuters that his main priority would be rooting out
militant groups in the countrys south, rather than the disputes with China and other
claimants. While he acknowledged that [w]e cannot ignore the West Philippine Sea
(South China Sea), Reuters reported Lorenzana planned to invest in more speed
boats and helicopters to help flush out the [Abu Sayyaf militant] group based on
southern Jolo island, rather than divert funds into maritime security. These remarks
seem to reflect a general tendency on Dutertes part to downplay the disputes and
return to dialogue with China particularly if that leads to increased Chinese
investments. Small wonder, then, that China was so eager to congratulate him on
his victory. Despite its stated plan to ignore the PCA ruling, Beijings neuralgia over
the South China Sea arbitration case is evident from its intense efforts to drum up
support for its viewpoint over the past weeks. While the PCA is widely expected to
rule mostly in Manilas favor, that wont matter as much if the Philippine
government itself refrains from embarrassing China with the legal victory. However,
Duterte will be constrained by popular sentiment in how far he can go in smoothing
over tensions. Aquinos tough stance was generally popular in the Philippines; the
former president was considered the most trusted official and most popular top
official in the country. Meanwhile, a September 2015 survey by the Pew Research
Center found that an astonishing 91 percent of respondents in the Philippines were
concerned about the maritime disputes with China. Still, the same survey found that
a majority (54 percent) of Filipinos reported a favorable impression of China,
meaning Duterte will likely have public support for reconciliation provided China
allows him to do so without completely capitulating on Manilas claims.

2. No link The US has broad relations with China now &

retains relations with India. Trade, military, climate, and cyber
prove. Empirically denies the impact.
3. Turn Their image of the Philippines as both so weak theyre
fully dependent on the U.S. and so aggressive that without us
theyll start a war is Orienatlist, biased, and wrong. Thats
Song & Bernstein.
4. No LashoutNew Philippine administration is pushing for
peace with China
Mo 16 (Mo Jingxi is a reporter for the China Daily News. 6/22/16. Philippines Says No War With China Over
South China Sea; China Daily. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2016-06/22/content_25811305.htm) NTT

China is willing to push its bilateral ties with the Philippines back to healthy
development with the new government, after the Philippine president-elect said on
Tuesday that the country's territorial dispute with China in the South China Sea is no
reason to go to war with China. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said
on Wednesday, "to properly handle relevant issues between Beijing and Manila, and
to push bilateral relationship back to the track of healthy development conform to
the fundamental interests of both countries and their people." "China is willing to
work together with the new government of the Philippines for this end," said Hua at
a press conference. According to the Manila Times, Rodrigo Duterte made his policy
clear during a speech at a business forum against further fanning the conflict over
such a little issue as the Huangyan Island. Duterte, who will take office on June 30,
explained that he will not go to war because of this, and he will wait for the result of
an arbitration unilaterally launched by the Philippines against China before deciding
on his next move.

5. NUQ Increasing climate coop now Paris ensures broad

based future cooperation with China to control emissions.

ptx

Generally
Everything is controversial Race, guns, Zika, energy, medical
tech, & criminal justice all thump
Hawkings 7/11 (David, staff @ Roll Call, No, Congress Won't Get More
Productive Come Fall, http://www.rollcall.com/news/hawkings/no-congress-wontget-productive-come-fall)
Leaders of both parties committed themselves Friday to searching for a
legislative response to the national divide on questions of policing and
race. These have only grown more anguished since five Dallas police officers were shot dead and seven more
wounded during demonstrations against police shootings of African Americans in Louisiana and Minnesota. But
such bipartisan successes have been few and far between , as evidenced
by last weeks collapse of eforts to find consensus on making it tougher
for people on terrorist watch lists to buy weapons. Gun control has only
been forced onto the agenda by Democrats in the past month. This
summers other high-profile impasses are dooming legislation that for
much of the year displayed strong prospects for success. Disagreement
about how much funding is needed to fight Zika means the government
wont have anything extra to spend against the mosquito-borne virus
before fall, by which time the public health crisis may have peaked. Provisions
that each side is insisting on, and which the other side cannot abide, have deadlocked talks on the most

A classic dispute between deregulatory

Republicans and strong-government Democrats has hobbled legislation to
accelerate approvals of new medicines and medical devices and boost
federal research funding. Hardening anxieties on both sides of the law-and-order divide have
comprehensive rewrite of energy policies in a decade.

sidetracked what might have been the most comprehensive rewrite since the 1990s of laws governing federal
criminal punishment.

Obama is a lame duck he cant influence congress

Zelizer 7/8 (Julian E. Zelizer is a historian at Princeton University and a fellow at the New
America Foundation. Is America Repeating the Mistakes of 1968? 7/8/16
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/07/is-america-repeating-the-mistakes-of1968/490568/) CTD

The problem today is that politics might once again be moving in the wrong
direction, not unlike what happened in 1968. Structural racism has to be
addressed, but Obama is a lame-duck president with a Republican Congress
that is unwilling to work on any legislative proposal that this White House
sends them. The prospects of this Congress making progress on any kind
of federal criminal-justice reforms are slim to none. And though Democratic
nominee Hillary Clinton has taken a much tougher stand in calling for criminaljustice reform and fighting for racial justice, she does not have an extensive record
of dealing with institutional racism, and in the 1990s, she supported federal crime
policies that only bolstered the law-and-order approach. Like Humphrey, she has
shown a willingness to allow the political fears of the right push her toward a more
conservative stance on these issues.

No link The plan is a diplomatic change that doesnt require

Congressional action. Were the State Department.
No link The plan doesnt result in immediate legislative
change. We start with diplomatic policy and afect
congressional action further down the line after low-key
engagement in the interim.
Wiinners win active president keeps opponents of-balance
Waldman, Washington Post opinion columnist, 14
(Paul, Washington Post, 12-22-14, Is President Obama reinventing the bully
pulpit?, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/wp/2014/12/22/ispresident-obama-reinventing-the-bully-pulpit/, Accessed: July 5, 2016, CEW)
President Obamas policy change on Cuba was remarkable in many ways,
not least because it came as such a surprise. The administration managed
to keep the negotiations secret, then made a dramatic announcement on
an issue that most people in politics hadnt given much thought to in
years. The result, particularly for a lame-duck president supposedly on the
ropes after his party lost the midterm elections, was striking: Everyone
was suddenly talking about Obamas action a widely popular one, it
should be noted and Republicans were stunned. In his last two years in
office, Obama seems to be creating a new version of the bully pulpit, one
that takes executive action as the starting point but depends on
Republicans playing their role. And what is that role? Its equal-parts
outrage and legislative nitpicking. To wit: Opponents of President Obamas
diplomatic opening toward Cuba began plotting for the long road ahead to block the
administrations new policy, focusing on areas where congressional consent is
necessary. The most likely targets are funding for new diplomatic operations in
Havana as well as the requirement for Senate confirmation of an ambassador, and
while the issue has divided Republicans, key conservatives with long anti-Castro
records occupy powerful positions in Congress and could thwart Obamas overtures
toward Cuban President Ral Castro. In other words, Obama seized the agenda,
saw his initiative dominating the front pages and television news
discussions and sent Republicans in Congress scrambling to find some
legislative barrier they can throw in his path. The conflict, then, ends up
pitting an active, forceful president against a reactive bunch of legislators
spending their time devising arcane (and mostly fruitless) procedural
schemes. They might be able to do something like holding up the
confirmation of an ambassador, but that wont keep the policy change
from moving forward, and it will probably make them look petty and
resentful in the process. This could well be the template for much of the next
two years. As Glenn Thrush writes, Obama is diving headlong into what
amounts to a final campaign this one to preserve his legacy, add policy
points to the scoreboard, and last but definitely not least to inflict the
same kind of punishment on his newly empowered Republican enemies,
who delighted in tormenting him when he was on top. Moves like the Cuba

change or his executive actions on immigration and climate change

infuriate Republicans both because of their substance and because they
shut them out of the process, leaving them able to do nothing but try to
find some way to thwart what the president has initiated. Congress always
takes secondary status to the president in political conflicts, but when the
agenda no longer revolves around legislation, theyre degraded much
further. While they may be able to force some issues into the news by
passing legislation, Obama can do it much easier and unlike them, he
can actually see his actions take efect. Ironically, by moving the idea of
significant legislation on major issues from an unlikely prospect to a
virtual impossibility, the Republican takeover of Congress may have
actually enhanced the power of Obamas bully pulpit. Im sure that driving
Republicans crazy gives Obama some satisfaction, but the political benefits are
far more significant. My guess is that hidden on someones laptop in the
White House is a calendar of the next two years with one presidential
initiative after another marked out in carefully spaced intervals, timed to
keep hold of the national agenda, accomplish goals that have been either
underdeveloped or ignored before now, and create howls of rage from his
opponents.

Zika
Zika funding compromise wont pass
Kelly 7/14 (Nora, staf @ The Atlantic, Fighting Zika Without Additional Funding,
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/07/zika-congress-cdc/491591/)

Public-health officials will continue their strategizing as temperatures rise. As for Congress? They arent back in
town until early September. Its

possible Zika talks could continue over the summer

Fauci told me hed continue lobbying members while theyre away but
lawmakers this past week looked more divided on Zika than ever . In the latest
iteration of the funding fight, members sparred over a $1.1 billion package negotiated in conference meetings
between House and Senate Republicans. Senate Democrats blocked it for the second time Thursday; it had already

They oppose multiple provisions in the deal, not least of

which are the spending cuts used to pay for it and provisions that block
money from Planned Parenthood affiliates. Meanwhile, Republicans have
insisted repeatedly that the administration doesnt have to wait on
Congress to find money for Zika. In a letter Thursday to the president, lawmakers noted that most
of the repurposed Ebola money hasnt been spent. They called for the administration to
aggressively use funds already available to mount a strong defense
against the virus, and to reprogram other funds through HHS and the
State Department, too. (An HHS representative told Politico it takes time to get funds distributed, and
said the notion that money is sitting unused is misleading.) Both parties have accused the
other of politicizing a public-health crisis. Republicans have unfortunately chosen to put
passed the House in June.

their ideological battles against Planned Parenthood and womens health providers ahead of the health needs of

She helped
craft a $1.1 billion bipartisan compromise on Zika that passed the Senate
but went no further. Tom Cole, the Oklahoma congressman who leads the House subcommittee that
women and children nationwide, Washington Senator Patty Murray said in a statement Thursday.

handles health-agency funding, told me its Democratic ideology thats holding back Zika funds. I have a perfectly
clear conscience as to what weve done in this, Cole said. He added: I think Democrats are trying to exploit a
tragic situation for political purposes. And I think they are so ideological hung-up on things like, This has to be
emergency spending or Im sorry, we cant accept any pro-life [provisions] that its gummed up the process.
House Republicans have insisted on offsetting much of the costs. Fauci, for one, is concerned about what happens

One of the things that were all afraid of is

Congress abandoning its ongoing appropriations process and using a
continuing resolution to fund the government, which Politico reports will almost certainly
be necessary to stave off a shutdown once the fiscal year ends in September. Legislators are
already considering whether it should last through the end of 2016 or into
2017. A CR almost certainly is not going to have any provision for Zika, Fauci said. Cole, a chief player in the
in the fall when Congress comes back.

Zika debate, confirmed there would be no specific line item for Zika in a normal continuing resolution. Which
means aside from federal agencies reassigning funds for Zika, as Cole suggestsand with the likelihood of passing
emergency funding slimno additional money from Congress would come through.

Diseases wont cause extinction burnout or variation

York 14 (Ian, head of the Influenza Molecular Virology and Vaccines team in the
Immunology and Pathogenesis Branch, Influenza Division at the CDC, former
assistant professor in immunology/virology/molecular biology (MSU), former RA
Professor in antiviral and antitumor immunity (UMass Medical School), Research
Fellow (Harvard), Ph.D., Virology (McMaster), M.Sc., Immunology (Guelph), Why
Don't Diseases Completely Wipe Out Species? 6/4, http://www.quora.com/Whydont-diseases-completely-wipe-out-species#)

mostly diseases don't drive species extinct. There are several reasons for that. For one,
the most dangerous diseases are those that spread from one individual to
another. If the disease is highly lethal, then the population drops, and it
becomes less likely that individuals will contact each other during the infectious
phase. Highly contagious diseases tend to burn themselves out that way. Probably
the main reason is variation. Within the host and the pathogen population
there will be a wide range of variants. Some hosts may be naturally resistant. Some
pathogens will be less virulent. And either alone or in combination, you end up
with infected individuals who survive. We see this in HIV, for example. There is
a small fraction of humans who are naturally resistant or altogether immune to HIV,
either because of their CCR5 allele or their MHC Class I type. And there are a handful of people
who were infected with defective versions of HIV that didn't progress to disease. We
can see indications of this sort of thing happening in the past, because our genomes
contain many instances of pathogen resistance genes that have spread
through the whole population. Those all started off as rare mutations that conferred a strong
But

selection advantage to the carriers, meaning that the specific infectious diseases were serious threats to the
species.

Emergency appropriations solve Zika

Weixel 7/15 (Nathanial, staff @ Bloomberg News, Senate to Adjourn Without
Addressing Zika Funding, http://www.bna.com/senate-adjourn-withoutn73014444876/)
House and Senate Republican appropriators sent a letter to
President Barack Obama urging the administration to continue to use
available funds that were allocated in the fiscal year 2016 appropriations
bill. If Senate Democrats continue to block consideration of Zika
legislation, we urge you to aggressively use funds already available to
mount a strong defense against the virus, the letter said. We also note that the fiscal
year 2016 appropriations bills allow the Administration access to
additional funds. Congress has supported re-prioritization of existing resources for Zika response, but
there are reports the administration has only spent about one-sixth of
that funding, the letter said. The letter was signed by Sens. Blunt, Thad Cochran (R-Miss.) and Lindsey
Following the vote,

Graham (R-S.C.) and Reps. Harold Rogers (R-Ky.), Tom Cole (R-Okla.) and Kay Granger (R-Texas), who are all leaders
of their chambers Appropriations committees and subcommittees with jurisdiction over Zika matters .

The
secretary of health and human services has transfer authority that can be
used as an additional source for Zika preparedness, the lawmakers wrote. They noted
the previous HHS secretary did not hesitate to use this authority to
support the failing Afordable Care Act exchanges.

Impact is post-brink Funding losses are irreversible now

CIDRAP 7/14 (Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy, Senate impasse
postpones Zika funding talks till fall, http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/newsperspective/2016/07/senate-impasse-postpones-zika-funding-talks-till-fall)

Hamburg, interim president and chief executive officer of Trust for

a Washington-based public health advocacy group, said in a
statement, "By the time Congress returns in a couple of months, the damage
to our nation from Zika will likely be irreversible. This failure to act
After today's Senate vote, Richard
America's Health,

severely hampers the full response that is greatly needed ." He said without
additional funding, state and community health departments are on their
own and will need to shift money earmarked for other eforts to cover
mosquito testing, disease surveillance, and other actions. At the scientific level,
the funding gap will also slow work on vaccines, treatment, and new tests,
Hamburg said. "While this will undoubtedly have short-term consequences, this failure has the
potential to cause drastic future problems as researchers find government
an unreliable partner in supporting innovation."

Labor
Labor actions dont require pc- overwhelming support from
voters
Johnson 16 (Fawn Johnson is a correspondent for National Journal, covering a
range of issues including immigration, transportation and education. Johnson is a
long-time student of Washington policymaking, previously reporting for Dow Jones
Newswires and the Wall Street Journal where she covered financial regulation and
telecommunications. She is an alumnus of CongressDaily, where she covered health
care, labor, and immigration. , Poll: Voters Like Obama's New Overtime Rule,
https://morningconsult.com/2016/05/27/poll-voters-like-obamas-new-overtimerule)/JS
eforts in Congress to roll back a recently finalized rule from the Labor
Department doubling the salary threshold for salaried workers who are eligible for overtime pay , but there
will be little sympathy among the public . A Morning Consult poll shows
that voters think the rule is a great idea, and almost four out of 10 say the
new threshold should be even higher. Six out of 10 respondents in a
national poll of 2,001 registered voters said they approve of the rule,
which will allow most workers who earn less than $47,476 annually to be
eligible for overtime pay. Less than half as many respondents (26 percent)
oppose the change, and 14 percent didnt express an opinion on the
matter. Under the rule, which takes effect Dec. 1, employees making up to $47,476 a year, or $913 a week, can
There will be

collect time-and-a-half pay if they work more than 40 hours per week. The current cut-off is $23,660 a year. The
overtime threshold hasnt been significantly updated in more than 40 years. Overtime rules were intended to
provide middle-class salaried workers with protections against being forced to work extra hours. But the current
threshold, at just over $23,000, is below poverty level for a family of four. In 1975, 65 percent of salaried workers
qualified for overtime pay based on their pay levels, according to data compiled by the liberal Economic Policy
Institute. As of 2013, only 11 percent of those workers were eligible. In changing the threshold, the Obama
administration said it was bringing the wage law back to its original intent, which is to ensure that middle class
people arent putting in extra hours without compensation. The business community has protested loudly about the
new rule, arguing that small companies will halt hiring or lower starting salaries to make up for the wage
requirements. Workers below the $47,476 threshold will be required to log their hours, which is expensive, and they
could have work taken away from them, these businesses argue. But in the public, those complaints seem to fall on
deaf ears. Almost four out of 10 voters believe that the overtime threshold should be higher than $47,000; 19
percent say it should be $60,000 annually, and 18 percent say it should be $75,000. About one-fourth of voters (24

The vast majority of voters (81 percent) think that

people earning less than $23,000 should get overtime pay . Almost no one
(1 percent) says employees should never receive overtime pay. That kind
of thinking is relatively consistent across income levels , although people
earning less than $50,000 a year are slightly less likely to support the
forthcoming threshold than people who make more than that amount . About
percent) say $47,000 is about right.

two-thirds of respondents who earn more than $100,000 annually (66 percent) or between $50,000 and $100,000
(65 percent) approve of the new rule, while 56 percent of lower-paid workers said they like the rule. Healthy
majorities of independents (58 percent) and Republicans (57 percent), also said they support the rule, along with 64
percent of Democrats. The poll was conducted May 20 through May 24 among a national sample. Results from the
full survey have a margin of error of plus or minus 2 percentage points. See toplines and crosstabs.

Economy resilient debt ceiling and gridlock prove even if crises

hinder growth, they dont prevent it
Perez 13

{Tom, US Secretary of Labor, former law professor (Maryland), M.A. Public Policy
(Harvard), Ph.D. in Law (Harvard), The Resilience of the American Economy, US
Department of Labor, 11/8, http://social.dol.gov/blog/the-resilience-of-the-americaneconomy/#THUR}

The American economy is resilient. Octobers jobs report demonstrates

continued steady growth, with the addition of 212,000 total private sector jobs in October. The
unemployment rate, which fell in September to a nearly-five year low of 7.2 percent, remains
essentially unchanged at 7.3 percent, while American manufacturers added 19,000
jobs in the month of October. But while American businesses continue to add jobs
7.8 million over the last 44 months of private sector job growth they do so in spite of Congress,
not because of it. Octobers job growth was undoubtedly restrained by the
brinksmanship and uncertainty created by the federal government
shutdown and the near-default on the nations debt. The American economy is
resilient, but it is not immune to manufactured crises. We see signs that suggest the
shutdown had a discouraging efect on Americas continued recovery. We
remain concerned about the drop in the labor force participation rate, and American workers on temporary layoffs

The American
people deserve leadership that focuses on growing the economy not holding it
rose by nearly 448,000, the largest monthly increase in the history of that series of data.

hostage. Lets keep our eye on the ball by passing immigration reform, which has bipartisan support and would
inject a trillion dollars into the economy, and investing in infrastructure upgrades that would create thousands of
middle class jobs right now. Instead of erecting political roadblocks, lets work together to pave bipartisan roads to

employment numbers are a reminder that while the economy

continues to grow and create new jobs, it remains on uncertain footing. Too
full recovery. Todays

many Americans still find the rungs on the ladder of opportunity beyond their reach. We need to move forward with
common-sense proposals that will create jobs, strengthen the middle class, reduce our deficit and expand
opportunity for American families. The president and I stand ready to work with Congress to do just that.

No impact to economic decline prefer new data

Drezner 14 (Daniel, IR prof at Tufts, The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great
Recession, World Politics, Volume 66. Number 1, January 2014, pp. 123-164)
The final significant outcome addresses a dog that hasn't barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border
conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple

analysts asserted

that

the

financial

crisis would lead states to

increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.42 They

voiced genuine concern that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflictwhether

through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of

great power conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the
disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in global public disorder. The aggregate
data suggest otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has concluded that "the
average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007."
Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis, as have
military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great
Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict, as Lotta Themner and Peter
Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five
years."44 The secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed. Rogers
Brubaker observes that "the

crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist

nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected."

Turn: fiduciary rule disproportionately impacts lower and

middle class citizens by increasing hurdles in financial security
-

less flexibility
fewer options
less information that can be accessed legally

Larsen 7/17 (Richard, staff @ Idaho State Journal, More lost freedom the
DOL fiduciary rule, http://idahostatejournal.com/members/more-lost-freedom-thedol-fiduciary-rule/article_b468619e-c208-5dfb-8dfd-6de30a0becec.html) KC
The Obama Administration continues its eight-year assault on the middleclass and lower income citizens. The Department of Labor finalized its
recommendations to redefine a fiduciary in the retirement income
space, and the implications will be significant for restricting investment
options and advice for most Americans who need it most . In 1974, Congress passed
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, which addressed many concerns with regard to company sponsored
defined benefit (pension) plans. It established minimum standards for such plans in the private sector, and spelled
out the extensive rules on the federal income tax effects of all such plans and transactions within those plans. It
also required disclosure of financial and other information to plan participants and beneficiaries, and established
standards of conduct for plan fiduciaries. From our partners: Analyst: Weak Wage Growth Is Market-Friendly
Investopedia presents the traditional definition of a fiduciary. A fiduciary is responsible for managing the assets of
another person, or of a group of people. Asset managers, bankers, accountants, executors, board members, and
corporate officers can all be considered fiduciaries when entrusted in good faith with the responsibility of managing
another partys assets. This is basically the definition employed by ERISA for private sector pension plans, and is

The
fiduciary duty relationship will now expand to include investment advisory
and some brokers including insurance brokers. The efect of the rule will
have wide implications for whoever serves as your investment advisor,
even for self-directed IRAs (Individual Retirement Accounts) or advisors
who provide just one-time guidance or recommendations . John Berlau, wrote in
American Spectator recently, The term would apply to many financial professionals
who do not even give advice, such as custodians of self-directed IRAs.
Since those deemed fiduciaries would have to follow the mandate to only
handle investments that adhere to what the government deems as savers
best interests, individual choice of holdings in IRAs and 401(k)s would be
sharply restricted. It is logical that those who manage assets are classified as
fiduciaries, since theyre responsible and accountable for said assets. Those
entirely logical and appropriate. What Obamas Department of Labor is now doing, is redefining the term.

who simply proffer advice, which the client may or may not follow, are completely different. Metaphorically, it would
be like classifying your father as a government recognized car salesman for giving advice on which car to buy, and
regulating and monitoring him accordingly. The Financial Planning Coalition describes the changes, Under the
Department of Labor (DOL)s proposed definition, a fiduciary adviser is any individual receiving compensation for
providing advice that is individualized or specifically directed to a particular plan sponsor (e.g., an employer with a
retirement plan), plan participant, or IRA owner for consideration in making a retirement investment decision. Such
decisions can include, but are not limited to, what assets to purchase or sell and whether to rollover from an
employer-based plan to an IRA. The fiduciary adviser can be a broker, registered investment adviser, insurance

It is important to note that the DOL will determine

who is a fiduciary based not on the advisers title, but rather on the advice
provided to the client. The end results will be a) less flexibility for
individuals managing their retirement accounts, b) fewer options available
to such individuals, and c) less information and education that the
investment professional can legally provide investors . Financial Planning
magazine published a piece a few months ago explaining the deleterious
agent, or other type of adviser.

efects of the new rule. Unlike the DOLs insistence on a one-size-fits-all

service solution to retirement accounts, we believe in allowing investors
(not the government) to choose what type of investment relationship and
structure is best suited to their needs and goals. We believe in full
investor protections and in freedom of choice for investors. Th e DOLs rule
actually restricts choice. Investment products, services and account
structures have expanded dramatically in response to investor demand.
We can all agree that investors are best served by working with a highly
trained and professional financial advisor who has access to the best
products and services available. We also believe advice and counsel
should be available to all investors, not just some. Under the new rule,
some smaller investors could be pushed into automated solutions that are
less transparent and do not include an advisor. The new DOL rule will also significantly
effect those who offer financial advice electronically or via broadcast, like Dave Ramsey. The immensely popular
radio personality who renders insightful and common sense-based financial advice would be deemed a fiduciary
and rendered handicapped in what he can and cannot say, even if its in the best interest of his callers and
listeners. The First Amendment to the Constitution has been a guarantor of free speech, but as with all of our
citizens rights, free speech is being whittled away by the government, unaccountable bureaucrats, and the courts.
Rep. Phil Roe (R-TN), chairman of the Education and the Workforce Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor,
and Pensions says of the new rule, In

todays economy, too many families are

struggling to save for retirement. Thats why its crucial Americans have
access to the retirement advice they need to make the best decisions for
the future. Unfortunately, the administrations misguided rule does just
the opposite. This new regulatory scheme will hinder access to retirement
advice for low- and middle-income families and make it harder for small
businesses to help their employees plan for retirement . Rep. Ann Wagner (R-MO),
who serves on the Committee on Financial Services concurs. The DOLs fiduciary rule hurts
those it claims to protect: low- and middle-income families who are
looking for sound investment advice in the midst of a savings crisis. The
unquestionably flawed rule raises costs, limits choices and restricts access
to investments for hardworking Americans.

Overtime pay hurts the economy- inefficient and kills

employment opportunities
Furchtgott-Roth, 5-22(Diana, Diana Furchtgott-Roth is a senior fellow at the
Manhattan Institute, director of the Institutes e21 program, and a columnist for
MarketWatch.com and Tax Notes. During 200305, she was chief economist of the
U.S. Department of Labor. In 200102, Furchtgott-Roth was chief of staff of President
George W. Bushs Council of Economic Advisers., "Three Ways Obamas New
Overtime Rule Hurts the Economy and Workers, 5-22-2016,
http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/2016/05/22/Three-Ways-Obama-s-NewOvertime-Rule-Hurts-Economy-and-Workers)/JS
The new rule requires employers to pay white-collar workers overtime if they earn less than $47,476 annually,
instead of less than $23,660, the case at present. (Manual workers generally have to be paid overtime at all

will be (1) to raise costs to employers, discouraging

employment; (2) to prohibit flexible time for employees; and (3) to stunt
American productivity and economic growth. Consider Rob, an analyst at a consulting firm,
earnings levels.) The effect

who earns a salary of $45,000 a year. Now if he works late one night he can come in later the following day, or take

extra time off. He can duck out of the office to attend his childs kindergarten concert. He can come home for dinner
and catch up with his work in the evenings. With the Labor Departments new overtime rule, effective December 1,
this will change. Along with others who make under $47,476 annually, Rob will have to keep track of his hours by

Because of the need to track hours, telecommuting will be

difficult. If he works longer one week then his employer will not be legally allowed to give him comp time
clocking in and out.

(time off instead of the extra hours), but will have to pay him overtime instead. Not that Rob will necessarily earn
more than what he is making now. Either Robs employer will make sure he never works more than 40 hours in a
week, or his rate of base pay will be lowered to make up for the extra hours worked. The Labor Departments new
salary test means only that Rob is protected with the right to time-and-a-half pay rate for any hours worked over

Most workers afected never

get the chance to work over 40 hours per week. The administration
estimates that about 4.2 million workers would qualify for overtime in
2017. The administration touts the overtime rule as a device to raise the
incomes of workers, but their own analysis calculates only $1.2 billion
annual increase in wages of afected workers. The real efect of the rule
will be to add significant administrative costs. One cost is familiarization,
the initial time and efort that each employer must expend to understand
the requirements and assess what needs to be done. A second cost is the
initial wage classification adjustment costs. Firms need to identify each
employee afected by the higher salary test, to decide for each case
whether to raise their salary to the new threshold or to convert the status
to non-exempt hourly. In the case of conversions, there will be further efort to
determine what base hourly rate to establish and what usual hours
requirement and policies to set for assignment and approval of overtime
hours. A third cost is management costs. Workers converted from salaried
to hourly status will require additional management supervision time for
checking time records and for approval of overtime hours. The
administrative costs of the new rule could total $18.9 billion the first year
over 15 times greater than the $1.2 billion of increased wages that the
administration estimates will be received by workers . In subsequent years, the
ongoing management supervision costs imposed by the rule could total
around $3.4 billion each year, almost three times the $1.2 billion of wage
gains generated. In an article in the Huffington Post, National Institutes for Health Director Francis Collins
40 per week, but he never works over 40 hours, it is an empty benefit.

and Labor Secretary Thomas Perez write that the overtime rule will improve pay for the 38,000 junior scientists who
are critical to biomedical research. NIH plans to raise its salaries above the $47,476 threshold to enable scientists to
continue to put in long hours without having to pay overtime. At the same time, Collins and Perez admit that other
research institutions that employ postdocs will need to readjust the salaries they pay to postdocs that are
supported through other means, including other types of NIH research grants. While NIH might raise salaries, there
is nothing in the law that prevents the other labs from reducing the scientists rate of base pay, and giving them the

Unless science labs get more funding, the labs will either
reduce base pay, reduce hours, or both to meet the new requirement . Even
the most advanced labs cannot manufacture dollars out of nowhere. The fundamental problem in
science is not lack of overtime protection, but that the United States
undervalues science research. Science pays far less than law, business, or
finance, and so the brightest American minds are going to other fields .
same paycheck.

Perhaps Collins can fix that problem by raising funds and awareness. Most of the workers who will be affected by
the new overtime rule will see no increase in their paychecks. Their only benefit will be to know that they will not be

Instead of extra pay,

most will lose the schedule flexibility, prestige, and career opportunities
that they now enjoy as salaried workers.
required to work more than 40 hours in a week without getting overtime pay.

Russia/China relations
1. No Link Their evidence is about the Arctic. We dont afect
that Their Ev
Pezard & Smith 16 (Stephanie, Ph.D. in political science from the Graduate
Institute of International and Development Studies, and Timothy, assistant policy analyst at
RAND, 5/6/16, FRIENDS IF WE MUST: RUSSIA AND CHINA IN THE ARCTIC,
http://warontherocks.com/2016/05/friends-if-we-must-russia-and-chinas-relations-in-thearctic/)

The Sino-Russian relationship in the Arctic is fragile. As with most

marriages of convenience, changes in circumstances can alter the costbenefit calculation of either partner and lead to a renegotiation of
the terms of the relationship, if not a breakup. In the short term, the
Sino-Russian relationship could deteriorate if an energy partnership
with China in the Arctic proves a poor replacement of the West, For

instance, China cannot help with technology for offshore

drilling, which was largely provided before 2014 by Norwegian companies that have since pulled
out of joint projects with Russia. Finally, as both Russia and China are experiencing economic
slowdowns with important consequences on their bilateral trade opportunities for cooperation
may decrease as well. Prospects for a mutually beneficial relationship are even more uncertain in the
medium- to long-term. The Northern Sea Route will become more and more accessible and no easier
to control, making Russia increasingly nervous about a foreign presence along its coast. Russian or

Chinese ties with the West may warm up, reducing their
incentives to find a friend in each other. And China may distance
itself from Russia if Russia becomes more aggressive in the Arctic,
threatening Chinese investments and access. This could happen if
Russian President Vladimir Putin decides to respond forcefully to
some perceived encroachment from the West in the Arctic, or if he responds
with a coup de force to a negative outcome to Russias submission to the U.N. Commission on the
Limits of the Continental Shelf, which overlaps with similar claims from Denmark and Canada. As
Arctic partners go, China is probably one of the last that Russia would choose if given a choice. As
Beijing slowly but steadily invests in a region that clearly represents a long game, a lot can happen to
derail a relationship that is built on little more than fleeting mutual interests.

2. Relations are not zero sum

Chen and Xue 15 (Yonglong, Director of Center of American Studies
at the China Foundation for International Studies, Junying, Research Fellow
of Center of American Studies at the China Foundation for International
Studies, Wheres the New China-U.S.-Russia Triangle Headed?, China US
Focus, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/wheres-the-new-chinau-s-russia-triangle-headed/) KM

The just-concluded G7 summit passed a leaders declaration that condemns Chinese and Russian
attempts to change status quo with force. It claims that G7 nations are concerned by tensions in
the East and South China Seas, strongly oppose the use of intimidation, coercion or force, as well as
any unilateral actions that seek to change the status quo, such as large-scale land reclamation; and it
reiterates condemnation of illicit annexation of Crimea. The declaration can be read as the United
States latest stance regarding China and Russia, which has attracted global interest: Will the U.S. take
on two world powers, China and Russia in this case, simultaneously with two fists? Where will the new
China-U.S.-Russia triangle be headed? Before discussing these two questions, we have three others to
answer: Has the U.S. declined? Has Russia recovered? Has China risen? My answers to the three are

neither definite yes or no. U.S. power has not declined. Only that it no longer appears that
outstanding with the normal changes in relative strengths of countries in a time of peace. Russia
might has seen recovery, more or less. But it is far from being comparable with the days of tsarist
Russia or the former Soviet Union. Its economy grew by a meager 0.3 percent last year, and its
conditions are pretty difficult under harsh sanctions by the U.S. and Europe. China is indeed on its way
to rejuvenation. But it has a very long way to go before achieving modernity. Its no. 2 status is more
hypothetical than realistic. There is no denying that the China-U.S.-Russia triangle is an important
factor affecting the strategic pattern of the contemporary world, as well as a key variable in future
world order. The present China-U.S.-Russia triangle is obviously different from the China-U.S.-Soviet
Union one of the 1970s. Against the Cold-War backdrop of East-West confrontation, the former triangle
featured a clear structure and two opposite sides. With two parties joining hands against the third, it
was a standard pattern of zero-sum gaming. With the Cold War gone and the Cool War dawning,
against the background of economic globalization and political multi-polarization,

the China-

U.S.-Russia triangle appears more complex. Beyond contradictions and

conflicts, the parties also share broad common interests, so
cooperation between any two parties will not automatically be at
the price of undermining the third. Though U.S.-Russia ties have nosedived to a
post-Cold War nadir in the wake of the Ukraine crisis, President Obama said, This is not another Cold
War After all, unlike the Soviet Union, Russia leads no block of nations, no global ideology. Nor does
the United States, or NATO, seek any conflict with Russia. The U.S. is rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific,
and enhancing containment of China. But by and large it remains focused on prevention, and is aimed

Generally speaking, there

has been more cooperation and transparency and less
confrontation among the parties. Now lets return to the first two questions. Will the
at creating a favorable strategic environment for the U.S.

U.S. simultaneously take on China and Russia? In fact, in geopolitical terms, each of the three has
considerable strategic depth, so much so that even if the stronger two team up against the third, there
is no chance of a complete triumph, much less if any one party takes on the other two at the same
time. From fanning the flames to rushing to the very forefront in the South China Sea, to ganging up
with European countries in condemning and sanctioning Russia, what has it achieved? The parties
eventually will have to cool tensions and work together. Then what would be the future course of the

development of the three pairs of

bilateral ties in the China-U.S.-Russia triangle is unbalanced. In
short, China and Russia are busy cooperating, China and the U.S.
are busy coordinating and managing their volatile ties, the U.S. and
Russia are busy with sanctions and counter-sanctions. In politics and national
security, China-Russia ties have far outgrown China-U.S. ones; in
economic and social concerns, China-U.S. relations have far
outshone China-Russia ones. Given that any one country in the three is more or less in
three-nation drama? For the time being,

a certain partnership in some areas with the other two, issue-specific partnership, instead of alliance
may become an outstanding feature of the China-U.S.-Russia triangle in the future. These days, the
resolution of global problems and coordination of global governance are very important. But that is
precisely what is lacking in the present triangle. The U.S. will remain no.1 in international affairs for a
very long time. It is advisable that the U.S. be a little more democratic and respectful in dealing with

This is essential for avoiding the past tragedies of major-country rivalries and
blazing a new trail for major-country relations featuring mutual
respect and win-win cooperation. Let the China-U.S.-Russia
triangle contribute more positive energy to the international
community.
the other two.

3. No link The US has broad relations with China now &

retains relations with India. Trade, military, climate, and cyber
prove. Empirically denies the impact.
4. NUQ Increasing climate coop now Paris ensures broad
based future cooperation with China to control emissions.
5. Their impact is epistemologically biased China and Russia
are only seen as threats because of their authors Western
bias. We see China and Russia as threats because theyre
diferent, not because of their innate aggression. The idea that
theyre naturally hostile is threat construction thats wrong
and make war inevitable.
6. China-Russian relations down
Linehan 16 (Merlin, founder of Rising Powers, 6/27/16, Whats the future for SinoRussian relations?, https://rising-powers.com/2016/06/27/whats-the-future-for-sinorussian-relations/)
Two years ago China and Russia signed a massive energy deal which

appeared to cement the growing ties between the two Eurasian giants
at a time when Russias ties with Europe were collapsing thanks to the Ukrainian conflict.
The gas deal had been under negotiations for many years and was finally pushed through
by a dire need to shore up the Russian economy as it faced the prospect of economically
crippling European and US sanctions. Worth around USD 400 billion over 20 years the
compact promised to provide energy hungry China with a (relatively speaking) low carbon
and less polluting fuel source to keep the lights on in Chinese households and factories,
while Russia would receive much needed cash and investment in return. Unfortunately for
Russia this new energy axis has failed to materialise, low energy prices, a slowing Chinese
economy, a Russian recession and a reluctance on both sides to strike

further investment deals has meant the Sino-Chinese alliance is

for now on hold. Moscow is attracted to Beijings power, it rightly sees its neighbour
as key to achieving its aim of a multi-polar world. At the same time Russians are concerned
that Chinese influence will push it out of Central Asia and even worse potentially come to
dominate Russia itself. Chinese firms have been investing in Russia but not on the scale
that was envisaged two years ago and in fact direct investment has dropped from around
USD 4 billion a year (2013) to around USD 500 million in 2015. Chinese firms have found
more lucrative prospects elsewhere and have discovered they cannot access much
coveted advanced Russian technology in the hydrocarbon and military sectors. On a
personal level the two Presidents Xi and Putin are said to enjoy a good working
relationships and clearly share an authoritarian world view. This has meant a number of
deals have gone to key firms owned by key Putin allies, like the Silk Road Funds purchase
of a stake in Yamal energy. The purchase was facilitated by Gennady Timochenko, an
oligarch with the ear of the Putin. This and several other deals have been

done by key Putin allies as a form of economic diplomacy. The

Chinese leadership view these deals with as a way of keeping
Russia onside without having to spend a lot of money in a
troubled economy. Chinese policy banks are also lending heavily
to Russia, filling some of the gap vacated by European
institutions. Despite the compatibilities of the two respective
economies and similar political outlooks, it is difficult to see China
and Russia becoming closer allies. Beijings Belt and Road Initiative although

rooted in a desire to rise peacefully is a clear challenge to Russian influence over Central
Asia. Russia for its part is desperate for outside investment since the onset of sanctions,
but with the Chinese unwilling to provide this on a large scale economic relations will
remain as they are. China has to play a balancing act, it wants to keep Russia onside and
friendly while pursuing its Belt and Road Initiative, closer cooperation could see

the two nations working together to help develop Central Asia

and Eastern Russia, but mutual suspicion means there will always
be a lingering tension between the two.

7.Containment makes the Russia/China alliance aggressive

engagement solves
Feng 15 (Huiyi, Senior Researcher at the Danish Institute for
International Studies, WILL CHINA AND RUSSIA FORM AN ALLIANCE
AGAINST THE UNITED STATES?, Defence and Security Studies,
https://www.diis.dk/files/media/publications/publikationer_2015/diis_report
_07_the_new_geostrategic_game_web.pdf) KM

Despite divergent economic and strategic interests, the rapid development of bilateral relations in the

The full partnership between the

two states is primarily driven by the perception of common threat
from the United States. The common threat and economic interests have mutually
reinforced the strengthening of bilateral relations between the two nations. Will this full
partnership become a formal military alliance against the U nited
States, or challenge the Western order in the future? The answer is: it depends on
what the United States does. Right now, the full partnership
between the two powers is at best a soft balancing strategy
against the United States. However, if the United States
continuously pushes Russia through NATO and China through its
rebalancing in the Asia Pacific, it will certainly drive Russia and
China to move closer to each other. The deepening economic and security
cooperation between the two will not only serve to beef up their military
capabilities, but it might also create a military platform for
alliance formation. When US threats towards both countries reach
a certain point, a Sino-Russian alliance could become a harsh
reality for the United States and the Western order. Russias arms trade
second decade of the 2000s is remarkable.

with China is not all about money. It is by no means easy for China and Russia to move to a military
alliance. Their bitter history may preclude them from trying, because of what they had experienced

In the new geopolitical game, in which the United

States, at least for the time being, remains hegemon, the US
actually holds the first-move advantage to determine how the
game will play out. It is natural for the hegemon to try hard to preserve its hegemonic
during the Cold War.

position. Moreover, as Quansheng Zhao (2007) points out, the rise of China does not necessarily mean
the decline of the United States and the managed great power relations between the United States
and China might lead to a peaceful power transition in the 21st century. Nevertheless,

if the

United States tries to take both Russia and China down

simultaneously in the game, it might produce a self-ful lling
prophecy: that successful soft balancing by the Sino-Russian
partnership will accelerate US decline instead of safeguarding US
hegemony. US policymakers and European leaders should therefore
reflect on their policies toward China and Russia. Why can two former

enemies move so close despite their previous huge ideological, material and ideational differences?

It

is time for the United States and European countries to consider how to reset
their relations with China and Russia before it is too late. China and Russia will also
need to be cautious in testing the red lines of the US and the West in general. Even though a ChineseRussian alliance is formidable, the differences between the two major powers are obvious, and the
areas of possible frictions are ever-mounting. Neither has the intention to sever completely their
relationship with the West, particularly with the US, nor to sacrifice their Western link for the sake of
the alliance.

8.Relations are limited too many diferences

Belostotskaya 16 (Anastasia, SKOLKOVO Analyst, 6/9/16, Russia and
China unfulfilled potential of complementarity, Russia Beyond the
Headlines, http://rbth.com/opinion/2016/06/09/russia-and-china-unfulfilledpotential-of-complementarity_601145) KM
Neither China nor Russia includes such topics in their bilateral
agenda. What is already on the table and has lots of potential for growth is aquaculture, which
accounted more than 70 percent of Russian agriculture exports to China in 2015. Regardless of

it is a
challenge to make it truly complementary and mutually beneficial.
What complicates it even more is a huge gap between the
countries in social aspects, language, business culture and
attitudes. Both Russia and China are able to work with the West
much better than they are with each other. Today, Russia and China must learn
internal factors, which contribute to the development of the bilateral relationship,

to work together to bridge this gap, and make this a priority.

SoKo
The alliance is resilient structural factors the KORUS FTA
ensure cooperation
Snyder 12 (Scott Snyder, senior fellow for Korea studies and director of the
program on U.S.-Korea policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, U.S. Policy
Toward the Korean Peninsula: Accomplishments and Future Challenges,
Kokusaimondai (International Affairs), No.614, September 2012,
The U.S.-South Korea alliance has flourished under Presidents Obama and Lee
Myung-bak. In fact, it is difficult to find words of criticism for the alliance in
either Washington or Seoul in the run-up to new presidential elections and
potential transitions in leadership at the end of 2012. Both leaders have
strengthened policy coordination toward North Korea and embraced a
Joint Vision for the Alliance in June 2009 that has served to broaden alliance
roles and functions beyond the peninsula to an unprecedented degree. 1 In
addition, they successfully secured ratification of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement (KORUS FTA). These two agreements represent a deepening of
U.S.-ROK interests and an expansion of cooperation beyond
extraordinarily close policy and security coordination toward North Korea,
which has traditionally provided the main rationale for U.S.-ROK security
cooperation. The U.S.-ROK alliance has proven to be an unexpected source
of relative stability for Obama administration policymakers during a
turbulent phase in East Asian relations and heightened tension in
relations with North Korea . In comparison with growing concerns over
Chinese assertiveness and a preoccupation with internal difficulties in the
U.S.-Japan alliance that came into relief following an unprecedented
transition in power in Japan from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP ) to
the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), the level of U.S.-ROK coordination in
response to North Korean provocations has mainly been a good news story
for the Obama administration. In contrast, the inability of the United States and
Japan to implement previously agreed adjustments to U.S. bases in Okinawa
became a proccupation in the U.S.-Japan relationship that obscured the broader
security vision of the U.S.-Japan alliance. 2 But it remains to be seen how and
whether South Korea will be able to capitalize on its increased relative capacity and
standing in Washington to carve out a stronger regional role or whether renewed
North Korean challenges might inhibit an expanded regional role for the U.S.-ROK
alliance.

Nuclear umbrella solves prolif desires

KBS 16 (World Radio, 6/30/16,US Umbrella Prevents South Korea, Japan From Nuclear
Development: Blinken,

http://world.kbs.co.kr/english/news/news_In_detail.htm?

No=120051)
Blinken has emphasized the importance of
Washington maintaining its security commitments to its allies including
South Korea and Japan, as a crucial means of preserving the global nonU.S. Deputy State Secretary Tony

proliferation regime. In a speech on Wednesday at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies(CSIS) in Washington, Blinken argued that without security guarantees
from the U.S., Japan and South Korea will seek to develop their own
nuclear weapons, plunging the world into a regional nuclear arms races. His remarks are
understood as a call on the U.S. to provide a nuclear umbrella to South Korea
and Japan so that they would not try to arm themselves with nuclear
weapons, in defense against North Korea's nuclear threats. Blinken also
defended the diplomatic policies under the Barack Obama administration against the criticism by
Republican U.S. Presidential Candidate Donald Trump that Obamas East Asia policies have failed and
that U.S. allies, including South Korea, should pay 100 percent of the cost of stationing American
troops. In an apparent swipe at Trump, Blinken stressed that the U.S. allies have shouldered
appropriate costs and responsibilities to station American soldiers in return for security guarantees
from Washington. He also stressed that the benefits of alliances greatly outweigh their costs.

Chinese engagement critical to noko denuclearization k2

relations
Pritchard et. al. 10 (Charles L. Pritchard, Director of Asian Affairs for the
National Security Council, John H. Tilelli, Jr., United States Army four-star general
who served as Vice Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army, Scott Snyder, senior fellow for
Korea studies and director of the program on U.S.-Korea policy at the Council on
Foreign Relations, 2010, "U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula", Council on
Foreign Relations, Independent Task Force Report No. 64)
Chinese cooperation is essential to the success of denuclearization on the
Korean peninsula and to ensuring regional stability. Sino-U.S. cooperation
to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is in the
mutual interests of both countries and will be a critical proving ground for
the relationship. Failure to make progress toward denuclearization of the
Korean peninsula would be a significant setback for eforts to promote a
cooperative approach to regional security in Northeast Asia. The level of
Chinas cooperation and involvement is the main factor that will determine
whether it is possible to achieve a strategy that goes beyond containment
and management of North Koreas nuclear and missile aspirations to
rollback. The United States should pursue the following measures designed to
enhance prospects for Chinas cooperation in dealing with North Korea.
Determine that it is a top priority in U.S.-China relations to make progress
in bringing North Korea back to the path of denuclearization. Engage
China, on the basis of prior consultations with allies South Korea and Japan, in a
dialogue designed to provide strategic reassurance regarding U.S. intentions toward
the Korean peninsula, with the objective of expanding the level and scope of SinoU.S. policy coordination toward North Korea. Emphasize to China that because
North Korea is the only state to have joined and then walked away from the NPT, it
will be treated as the prime suspect and target of retaliation in the event of any
potential act of nuclear terrorism conducted by nonstate actors. Work with China
to augment its export control regime and strengthen efforts to freeze financial
transfers from North Korean companies suspected of exporting nuclear- or missilerelated materials. Work with China to promote the Six Party Talks as the premier
venue for negotiating the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

Turn The ROK wants engagement with China

Snyder 15 (Scott, senior fellow for Korea studies, 10/15/15, South Korea: At the
Epicenter of a Geostrategic Danger Zone, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/southkorea-the-epicenter-geostrategic-danger-zone-14090)

South Korea finds itself at the epicenter of a geostrategic danger zone that is all the
more fragile today as a result of frictions resulting from Chinas rise. More than ever,
a volatile and self-isolated North Korean leadership is perceived as the trigger that
could set off the regional powderkeg. Hence, South Korean President Park Geunhyes discussion with U.S. President Barack Obama regarding the North
Korean issue will be an important and timely one. She will need strong
support from the United States in her eforts to maintain South Koreas
delicate position between China and Japan and to stabilize the Korean
peninsula. The immediate challenge facing both presidents is about finding a way
to disrupt North Koreas pattern of missile and nuclear tests that have occurred
every three years since 2006. Existing UN Security Council sanctions have slowed
but not stopped North Koreas pursuit of a capability to deliver a nuclear strike on
the U.S. mainland. Both leaders have called upon Chinese President Xi Jinping to
pressure North Korea to stop violating UN resolutions halting these tests. Rather
than negotiating North Koreas denuclearization, however, North Koreas impulsive
leader, Kim Jong-un, has doubled down on a self-contradictory policy (byungjin) of
parallel nuclear and economic development. At the same time, the August interKorean mini-crisis at the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), ultimately defused through
marathon negotiations, underscores North Koreas fragility and weak hand despite
Kims efforts to strengthen political control at home. The United States and
South Korea seek to reverse North Koreas destabilizing pursuit of nuclear
weapons, which prevent the Kim regime from achieving greater economic
development. As part of her strategy to deal with the North, Park Geun-hye has
strengthened her relationship with Xi Jinping, most recently through her
participation last month in bilateral talks alongside Beijings
commemoration of the seventieth anniversary of the end of World War II.
Parks controversial presence on the rostrum with Xi and Putin at the
parade has elicited criticism from Western observers but has drawn
domestic support from Koreans, who see a symbolic victory in Parks
replacement of North Koreas Kim on the rostrum. Yet, China sent its highest-ranking
leader in years, Chinese Communist Party Politburo member Liu Yunshan, to stand
on the rostrum at Kim Jong-uns own military parade commemorating the seventieth
anniversary of the Korean Workers Partys founding. Therefore, it remains unclear
for now how closely the United States and South Korea will be able to work with
China to deter North Korea from conducting further nuclear and missile tests. From
a broader regional perspective, the South Korean strategy of avoiding
choices between the United States and China is under increasing strain.
The Park administration walked a tightrope between the two countries by joining the
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as a charter member despite the
Obama administrations objections based on South Koreas own economic interests,
especially given the competitiveness of many South Korean companies in the
construction sector. Beijing has also pressed Seoul to reject the deployment of the

U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, which, if deployed, could
do much to assist South Korea counter North Korean advances in missile technology.
Japanese observers have criticized Parks diplomacy toward Beijing, as the move
has been accompanied by a deterioration in Japan-South Korea relations. From
Japans perspective, Seoul is a point on a line between Beijing and Tokyo on a twodimensional plane; Seoul moving toward Beijing is moving away from Tokyo.
The United States too remains concerned about frictions between the two
pivotal allies in the region as the U.S. rebalance to Asia could benefit
greatly from a better relationship between Seoul and Tokyo. U.S. officials,
however, are not alarmed by South Koreas diplomacy toward China as
many Japanese observers are. Washington recognizes that the twodimensional view of South Korean diplomacy is inaccurate because the
U.S.-South Korea alliance is an anchor that prevents Seoul from moving
into Beijings strategic embrace. Even so, the United States does hope to see
Japan and South Korea fully stabilize their relationship by addressing differences
over history forthrightly on the foundation of past understandings in order to
expand bilateral and trilateral cooperation.

Turn The af alters the global calculus for competition and

cooperation. We send a shot around the world against realism
by vocally altering the way we work with one of our chief
rivals. It afects every nation. Thats Goldstein.
ROK wants US/China coop
Pollack 14 (Jonathan, Interim SK-Korea Foundation Chair in Korea Studies, 9/24/14,
The Strategic Meaning of China-ROK Relations: How Far Will the Rapprochement Go and
with What Implications?,

http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2014/09/strategic-meaning-china-southkorea-relations-pollack)
The growing ties between China and the Republic of Korea are among the
most consequential changes in East Asian politics, economics, and
security of the past several decades. From modest beginnings in

1992 when Beijing formally accepted the reality of two Koreas

rather than one, China and the ROK have built an increasingly
diversified and interactive relationship, now described by both leaderships
as pursuit of a matured strategic cooperative partnership. By

numerous measures meetings between senior officials, trade

and investment, social, cultural, and educational exchanges,
and high levels of public support in both countriesrelations have progressed to
levels unimaginable only a few years ago. The personal connection between President Xi
Jinping and President Park Geun-hye evident during their state visits to each others
capitals in 2013 and 2014 further attests to this forward momentum. Will the growth of
China-ROK relations entail larger strategic consequences, as distinct from the broad
management of overlapping economic and political interests? Are there inherent
limitations under conditions of a still divided peninsula, or do the two leaderships attach
intrinsic value to their mutual ties both before and after unification? At a time when
Chinas relations with many regional neighbors are badly frayed and in several cases could

prove confrontational, Beijings rapprochement with Seoul is a conspicuous exception. How

congruent are the interests and expectations of both countries? What will determine the
scope and scale of longer term ties, and what are the possible challenges to the durability
and scope of relations? Current ties between Beijing and Seoul involve far more than the
management of bilateral relations. Though neither capital is yet prepared to fully
acknowledge larger possibilities, the links between the two speak to a quiet but inexorable
strategic transformation in Northeast Asia. China is a reemerging world power, and South

actor positioned at the epicenter

of the globes most important region. The advances in China-ROK
Korea is a robust and increasingly capable

relations have not undermined the US-Korea alliance; if anything, they

have increased Seouls incentives to reinforce security ties with
Washington. At the same time, the China-ROK relationship afords growing
possibilities for facilitating the peninsulas ongoing transition and
provides a potential channel for crisis management, though these larger
possibilities have yet to be tested. Economic Foundations Bilateral

trade dominated the first decade of full state-to-state

relations. For Seoul, the conferring of legitimacy and sovereignty by its
Korean War adversary (and still Pyongyangs nominal treaty ally) provided ample
validation, though the political relationship remained circumscribed. The parallelism
between Deng Xiaopings developmental model and the state-centered path pursued under
Park Chung-hee in earlier decades further enhanced the logic of Sino-ROK accommodation.
In 1985, seven years before the normalization of relations, Chinas trade with South Korea
had already surpassed total trade with the North; it is now approximately 40 times the
level of trade between China and the DPRK. Complementary economic interests became far
more pronounced following Chinas entry into the WTO in 2001 and Beijings unambiguous
pursuit of export-led growth. In 2003, China became the ROKs largest trading partner,
with exports to China exceeding imports from China by ever increasing margins. As
investment began to grow, the ROKs commitments in China far outstripped the more
modest undertakings of Chinese companies in Korea. In 2005, two-way trade surpassed
$100 billion and in 2011 it exceeded $200 billion. According to Chinese estimates, trade
reached nearly $275 billion in 2013, with an agreed-upon target of $300 billion for the end
of 2015, though recent declines in South Korean exports make this goal somewhat less
certain. But this latter objective would approach the level of Chinas 2013 trade with Japan
($315 billion), a remarkable development given Japans decades-earlier entry into the
Chinese market and the far larger size of the Japanese economy. South Koreas trade with
China already exceeds its combined trade with Japan and the United States. Though some
observers note that these transactions frequently involve processing trade rather than
deeper economic integration, Koreas inroads into the Chinese market are inescapable, and
attest to the shifting center of economic gravity for South Korea. Both have also pledged
to complete negotiations on an FTA by the end of 2014, which is likely to appreciably
facilitate trade and investment. The Shadow of North Korea Chinas diminished relations
with North Korea continue to shape the political and strategic contours of China-ROK
relations. Not surprisingly, this dimension of relations between Beijing and Seoul has taken
much longer to develop than trade ties. Following the first nuclear crisis, the death of Kim

the negotiation of the Agreed Framework, China

sought to maintain the semblance of working relations with
Pyongyang. In the early 2000s, Beijings role as convener and host of
Il-sung, and

the Six-Party Talks and periodic facilitator of US-DPRK diplomacy elevated

Chinas prominence in peninsular afairs. This process enabled increased
Chinese contact with senior ROK officials and diplomats, resulting in a
closer relationship between both governments. But potent political

constituencies in China (especially in the party and the

military) remained protective of the historical relationship with
the DPRK and wary of US strategic intentions on the peninsula.
From the mid-2000s, Beijing again increased trade and
economic assistance to the North, calculating that a successor
leadership would ultimately pursue an internal economic transition and more
normal relations with the outside world. Chinas growing alienation from North Korea in
the aftermath of Kim Jong-ils death and the ascension of Kim Jong-un has accelerated the
accommodation process with Seoul; it also correlates closely with Xi Jinpings advance to
the top position in Beijing. Though officials are loath to openly compare relations with the
two Koreas, the asymmetries are inescapable. An open, globalized South is increasingly
committed to deeper ties with Beijing while a defiant, nuclear-armed North resents its
dependence on its erstwhile ally and fears the consequences of a more open economy.
China is not prepared to jettison its ties with the North for fear of triggering a larger crisis,
while Pyongyang remains unwilling to accommodate to Chinese expectations. Open
estrangement between Beijing and Pyongyang has yet to fully transpire, but Beijing no
longer reflexively defers to the Norths preferences, enabling China to more vigorously
explore longer term possibilities with Seoul. These developments were much in evidence
during Xi Jinpings state visit in July 2014. Xi was accompanied by a full array of senior
officials and several hundred leading entrepreneurs, with both sides professing a shared
commitment to respect the others social system, development model and core
interests. A Chinese commentary argued that there had been a comprehensive
upgrading of ties with Seoul, describing the prevailing conditions as hot in economy,
warm in politics. Immediately prior to Xis visit, a prominent Chinese academic argued in
Peoples Daily that the China-ROK relationship had assumed global strategic
significance, further contending that South Korea plays a crucial role in maintaining

peace, stability, and denuclearization on the peninsula. The

world has placed too much emphasis on U.S.-DPRK relations or China-U.S.
relations, and has given inadequate attention to the role of South Korea .
Now we have to update our understanding. Though these judgments
might have reflected an overly efusive mood of the moment, they convey
the enhanced value of the ROK to Chinese interests. Beijing no longer sees
the need to choose between the two Koreas, and prevailing sentiment
within China increasingly views the South as an asset and the North as a
liability determined to frustrate Beijings policy goals. At the same

time, Chinas increasing distance from

North Korea is an objective

indicator of its fundamental interests, which ineluctably enhances the importance of the
ROK to Beijing. Though there is as yet no definitive alteration in Chinas dealings with the
DPRK, without major changes in North Korean strategy, the gravitational pull in Chinese
policy on the peninsula continues to move in Seouls direction. Which interests and which
policy paths might dominate Chinas future orientation toward the two Koreas? China still
does not preclude a more evolutionary process in North Korea, but it no longer assumes
one, and it does not seem optimistic about the prospects. If North Korea fails to change its
policy direction and proves able to sustain its strategic goals (in particular an operational
nuclear weapons capability, including the means of delivery), China will confront a
fundamental policy choice about the viability of its relationship with the DPRK. A discreet
but portentous debate might then begin within China on the possibilities of Seoul led
unification. The United States would prefer to envision Sino-American

consultations on a question of such profound importance to the Northeast

Asian future. Chinas natural gravitation toward major power relationships

(in particular with the United States) seems plausible under such
circumstances, but it is not beyond imagination that it would deem the
ROK its interlocutor of first choice. This moment has yet to arrive, as
evidenced by the lack of Chinese reference to Parks declared unification strategies during
Xis state visit, but it is inconceivable that China has failed to weigh these longer term
possibilities in its internal deliberations. In the event that unification becomes a more
realistic prospect, the future will increasingly depend on how two considerations interact:
Seouls vision of its long-term strategy, and the strategic weight that China is prepared to
accord to South Korea as unification approaches. Toward a Bridging Strategy South Korea is in
no way oblivious to the strategic implications of an increasingly powerful China. There is a lively ongoing debate

The ROK calculates that vesting

China in an ever larger and increasingly diversified set of relations,
beginning with trade and investment but extending to the full spectrum of
political and strategic concerns, is the most prudent and productive path
that it can follow. But it is premised on an undiminished alliance with the
United States, without which Seoul would be unable to interact with China
in full confidence. Not unlike US China policy, the viability of Koreas strategy depends on
Chinas longer term political, economic, and security evolution . For Seoul, its
within Korean strategic circles reflecting this inescapable reality.

geographic proximity to China and its modest size relative to its much larger neighbor defines the essential
requirements of national strategy. China will always be South Koreas near neighbor in a divided peninsula and, it
will be its direct neighbor following unification. The operative tests for it are thus twofold: will China accord Korea
full status as a major middle power, and can the ROK successfully impart to Beijing that its core national interests
are not negotiable? These issues underlie the ongoing dynamics in relations between both states. Seoul clearly

A bridging strategy that attaches

enduring importance to relations with the United States while enhancing
Koreas strategic identity and interests through closer ties with China
seems self-evident. Its leaders have concluded that the congruence of
interests between South Korea and China far outweighs the risks. Support
for the relationship, though not unambiguous within South Korea, is
broadly held across the political divide. The warier voices (also expressed by American and
understands its distinctive in between strategic position.

Japanese critics of the ROKs accommodation with China) fear that Seoul is on a slippery slope that will ultimately
envelop Korea in a China-centered political and economic order that will undermine Americas parallel alliance
arrangements in Northeast Asia.

The ROK discounts these concerns and rejects the

zero sum argument that it must make a choice between China and the
United States. The continued enhancement of Chinese-Korean relations
has been at no discernible cost to the US-ROK alliance, which has rarely if
ever seemed closer than at present. Claims that Chinas larger goal is to
degrade Seouls alliance with Washington have no validity so long as
Koreas leaders unambiguously convey to Beijing that its first order
strategic interests are not negotiable. The Chinese, for example, have expressed clear
objections to continued US-ROK military exercises on the peninsula and to pending possibilities of enhanced US
missile defense deployments there. There is every reason to conclude that the ROK will determine its interests and
preferences in both areas and (should Beijing raise objections) fully defend its policy decisions, which are not
directed at China. Koreas relations with Japan necessarily represent a more complex case. China and South Korea
have both put forward heated objections to the policies of the Abe administration, in particular the prime ministers
equivocal stance on Japans earlier acknowledgments of its wartime conduct and his advocacy of collective selfdefense and an expansion of Japans security role. Japan was conspicuous by its absence from the PRC-ROK Joint
Statement issued during Xis state visit, which focused exclusively on the enhancement and institutionalization of
bilateral relations. However, in his speech at Seoul National University, Xi made extended reference to shared
historical antipathies toward Japan, thereby seeking to establish common cause with Seoul. Xis open effort to
exploit Koreas shared objections to present-day Japanese policy (no matter how deeply felt these sentiments may
be in both countries) seemed jarringly out of place. South Korea, thus, faces the need to define its interests and
shape its policies, mindful of its ample and growing stake in long-term relations with China, while remaining able to

There is a profound diference

between close links to China and being overly enveloped in Beijings
strategies, without full attentiveness to Koreas interests and needs.
Success in realizing these multiple goals will be the ultimate test of the
viability of a bridging strategy, on which Koreas security and well-being
clearly depend.
define its own course apart from overt Chinese pressure.

Turn The epistemological assumptions they make about

proliferation risks and impacts are biased. They presume Asian
nations are riskier owners of weapons than Western nations
and that Seoul is likely to overreact to US actions rather than
to appropriately understand US motivations and
consequences. The Seoul govt is smarter than their journalists
give them credit for.
Prolif is impossible laundry list of warrants.
Stangarone 16 (Troy, Senior Director of Congressional Afairs and Trade, 2/29/16,
Going Nuclear Wouldnt Be Easy for South Korea,

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/going-nuclear-wouldnt-be-easy-south-korea15345)
South Korean public has also shown support for domestic nuclear
weapons. Polls taken shortly after the closing of the Kaesong Industrial Complex show domestic support ranging
from 52.2 percent to 67.7 percent and polling done by the Asian Institute for Public Policy after
North Koreas third nuclear test indicated that South Korean faith in U.S.
extended deterrence was waning. However, South Koreans are rarely asked
if they would be willing to bear the costs of a domestic nuclear weapon .
The

Those cost would likely come in the form of diminished international standing, economic hardship, and uncertain

For South Korea to develop its own nuclear weapons program

it would have to join North Korea as the only country to withdraw from the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), an ignominious club for sure. Withdrawal
would dent Seouls growing international standing and make it the only
member of MIKTA, an emerging club of middle powers, to have a nuclear weapon, something
which would not enhance South Koreas middle power prestige . While a loss of
strategic benefits.

international stature to ensure domestic security might be an acceptable trade of, there would likely be economic

Developing a nuclear weapon would have consequences for So uth

Koreas own nuclear industry. Nuclear power provides a third of South
Koreas electricity and represents 13 percent of its primary energy
consumption. Lacking adequate domestic reserves of nuclear fuel, South Korea is dependent
upon members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group which conditions supply on
the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Pursuing a nuclear option would put
the fuel supply for South Koreas domestic reactors at risk. South Korea also has
costs as well.

designs on becoming a major exporter of nuclear power plants. In 2009, it won a $40 billion contract to construct and
manage four nuclear power plants in the UAE and in 2013 a bid for a research reactor in Jordan. Those deals and any

South Korea would also potential face

economic sanctions. Iran and North Korea have both faced significant
financial and economic sanctions for their pursuit of nuclear weapons,
while India and Pakistan faced sanctions as well. Because South Korea is
future potential exports would be put risk.

perhaps one of the worlds most trade dependent nations it would be

especially vulnerable to external economic pressure.

SQ engagement thumps- Paris deal, anti-piracy exercises, and

cyberwarfare agreements should have already triggered the
link

Taiwan
1. US-Taiwan relations downDPP actions tank China relations

Casey 16 (Michael Casey, graduate student in security policy studies at The

George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs, 6-12-2016,
"Time to Start Worrying about Taiwan," National Interest,
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/time-start-worrying-about-taiwan-16551?page=2)
NV In January 2016, Taiwanese voters elected Tsai to be the Republic of Chinas
first female president, while handing a legislative majority to her Democratic Progressive
Party (DPP) in a sweeping victory against the incumbent Kuomintang (KMT). Unlike the KMT, which favors closer relations with
mainland China, the DPP rejects the 1992 Consensus that established the One
China Principle and officially calls for independence in its party charter. (The
principle broadly states that mainland China and Taiwan belong to the same China and that both sides interpret the meaning of

The ROCs foreign policy depends on the extent to

which President Tsai can tame the most radical elements of her party and enlist the Legislative Yuan, the ROCs legislative
body, to support her agenda. The DPPs ideology emphasizes Taiwanese
nationalism and the notion of a Taiwan that is politically and culturally distinct from
mainland China. It also advocates social liberalism and is commonly associated with small- to medium-sized companies
China according to their own definitions.)

and organized labor. While the DPP wishes for greater independence from mainland China, the party is divided on the nature of that
independence. One faction argues for the status quo, which entails de facto separation from mainland China; the other side points
to Hong Kong as evidence of the dangers of one country, two systems and supports de jure independence. They believe the ROC
would weather the diplomatic, economic and military fallout of official independence (especially if they believe the United States
would support or at least grudgingly accept such a move). To reassure Beijing and the international community against this

Tsai has repeatedly expressed her support for consistent, predictable,

and sustainable cross-Strait relations based on existing realities and
political foundations. Despite the wishes of more radical elements in the DPP, President Tsai does not
want a major disruption to the status quo. She hopes to conduct her administration in a way that
possibility, President

maximizes the longevity of DPP control of the government. Voters opted for a change in government largely because of domestic

Tsai does not wish to

repeat the mistakes of the DPPs previous experience in power, when Chen Shui-bian was elected as president
and particularly economic issues, rather than as a referendum on the KMTs foreign policy.

in 2000. Chens administration, which also suffered a series of corruption scandals, advanced policies that were provocative towards
the mainland and alienated Taiwan internationally. These policies included a referendum on whether Taiwan should rejoin the United

Tsai believes
these policies were counterproductive to Taiwans national interests and
resulted in the DPPs crushing defeat to the KMT in the 2008 elections. Even
though President Tsai espouses a more moderate approach to cross-Strait
relations than her DPP predecessor, her policies and especially the actions
of her party threaten cross-Strait relations. For example, after her swearing in last
month, President Tsai established a mechanism to resolve maritime disputes with
Japan. ROC Premier Lin Chuan also dropped charges against anti-Beijing protesters
Nations as well as changes to historical textbooks to separate Taiwanese and Chinese history. President

and described his newly appointed representative to the United States as an ambassador, suggesting that Taiwan is a sovereign

moves such
as these undermine Beijings confidence in its ability to work with the
newly elected government. Both sides enjoyed closer relations during the previous KMT administration of
President Ma Ying-jeou from 2008 to 2016, and the PRC will do what it can to precipitate a
return to KMT rule. There is some indication that Beijing will aggressively pressure the
new president and explore how far it can go in imposing its own terms on the
relationship. It has already begun to limit cross-Strait travel and renewed diplomatic relations with Gambia, ending a
tacit truce against further diminishing the ROCs small list of diplomatic partners.
Much depends on the ability of the United States to navigate its declared
nonsupport for the ROCs independence and its statutory security
commitments to Taipei. The United States benefited from improved cross-Strait relations under the
previous KMT administration. Improved relations freed scarce resources, such as the time and attention of
country with all the attendant diplomatic privileges. While not constituting a regime shift in government policy,

permitted the Obama administration to improve bilateral

relations between the United States and ROC. The United States has an abiding interest in peace and
stability between Beijing and Taipei. A return to the hostile noncontact that characterized relations from
2000 to 2008 threatens the peaceful management of other regional issues, such
as North Korea or territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas . For
the first time in nearly a decade, U.S. policymakers must consider the
possibility of armed confrontation between the PRC and ROC , or even
China and the United States, over the fate of Taiwan.
national security decisionmakers, and

3. No link The US has broad relations with China now &

retains relations with India. Trade, military, climate, and cyber
prove. Empirically denies the impact.
4. NUQ Increasing climate coop now Paris ensures broad
based future cooperation with China to control emissions.
5. Increased influence allows Taiwan to pursue own claims
Tiezzi 15 (Shannon Tiezzi, Editor at The Diplomat, 11-4-2015, "Taiwan's South
China Sea Headache," Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/taiwans-southchina-sea-headache/) NV
Taiwan is in something of a bind when it comes to the South China Sea issue.
On the one hand, no government wants to relinquish territorial claims in Taiwans
case in particular, the constitution dictates that the territory of the Republic of China within its existing national
boundaries shall not be altered except by a resolution of the National Assembly. That means, legally speaking,

And
theres no evidence that Taipei is interested in doing so . In response to the events of
Taipei could not simply relinquish its claim over the South China Sea features even if it were so inclined.

last week, Taiwans Executive Yuan made sure to reiterate that Taiwan will take all necessary steps to defend its
sovereignty in the South China Sea. Taiwans Ministry of National Defense, meanwhile, said that it will plan
emergency response measures for potential conflicts in the area and will continue to improve combat capability
for the defense of Taiping Island, the largest of the Spratlys (at least before Chinas artificial island-building), which

However, though Taiwans claims in the South China Sea are

as extensive and ambiguous as Beijings, Taipei does not want to be labeled a violator of
is occupied by Taiwan.

international law. Nor does it want to alienate the United States, which still functions as Taiwans main security
partner. President Ma Ying-jeou tried to thread the needle by announcing his vision for a South China Sea Peace

Taiwan will uphold its claims to

sovereignty, but calls for all parties to put aside disputes in favor of peaceful settlements in accordance with
international law. Ma even proposed pursuing joint development of natural
resources in the area.
Initiative earlier this year. The Peace Initiative stipulates that

6. That means theyll accept Chinese justifications or

expansionthats bad
Tiezzi 15 (Shannon Tiezzi, Editor at The Diplomat, 11-4-2015, "Taiwan's South
China Sea Headache," Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/taiwans-southchina-sea-headache/) NV
when it comes to the Philippines arbitration case, Taiwan has less
wiggle room. A key part of the case calls into question the validity of the nine-dashed line. Though
the case specifically mentioned the nine-dashed line only in reference to
However,

mainland China, the ruling would have implications for Taiwans similar
claims. Thus Taipei has been at pains to emphasize that the ruling has nothing to do with Taiwan. A statement
from Taiwans Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasized that: The Philippines has not invited the ROC to participate in
its arbitration with mainland China , and the arbitral tribunal has not solicited the ROCs views. Therefore, the
arbitration does not affect the ROC in any way, and the ROC neither recognizes nor accepts related awards. The
statement also makes it clear that Taiping Island indisputably qualifies as an island according to the specifications
of Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; the Executive Yuan has said that Taiping
certainly can claim [an] exclusive economic zone and continental shelf. However, Taiwan is not limiting its claim
to Taiping Island, as the MOFA statement made clear: Whether from the perspective of history, geography, or
international law, the Nansha (Spratly) Islands, Shisha (Paracel) Islands, Chungsha Islands (Macclesfield Bank), and
Tungsha (Pratas) Islands (together known as the South China Sea Islands), as well as their surrounding waters, are

Beijing was pleased with Taiwans response,

which is viewed as in line with the Peoples Republics own claims to the
South China Sea. Chinese people from both sides of the Straits have the
responsibility and obligation to jointly uphold territorial sovereignty and
maritime rights and interests of the country, Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hua
Chunying told reporters. Beijing was particularly pleased to see Taiwan saying it
neither recognizes nor accepts the tribunals ruling although Taipeis rationale
an inherent part of ROC territory and waters.

for doing so is very different than Beijings. China has tried before to get Taiwan to coordinate an approach to the
South China Sea, but Taiwan has been adamant about pursuing its own approach (Mas South China Sea Peace

Taiwanese officials have said they will not cooperate with China on
territorial issues. But that should not be taken to mean Taipei is giving up
its own claims. On the contrary, just before the Philippines presented its oral arguments on the jurisdiction
Initiative).

question before the arbitral tribunal, Ma Ying-jeou vowed that Taiwan would staunchly defend its sovereignty over
Taiping [Island] and every right held by the country under international law.

7. Turn The af alters the global calculus for competition and

cooperation. We send a shot around the world against realism
by vocally altering the way we work with one of our chief
rivals. It afects every nation. Thats Goldstein.
8. Multiple mitigating factors prevent Asia war
Kaplan 14 (Robert, Chief Geopolitical Analyst @ Stratfor, Senior Fellow @ the Center for New American Security, The
Guns of August in the East China Sea, March 17, Foreign Policy, http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/03/17/the-guns-of-august-in-the-eastchina-sea/)

Europe was a
landscape, with large armies facing one another inside a claustrophobic terrain with few natural
barriers, East Asia is a seascape, with vast maritime distances separating national capitals.
The sea impedes aggression to a degree that land does not. Naval forces can cross water and storm beachheads,
though with great difficulty, but moving inland and occupying hostile populations is nearly impossible. The
Taiwan Strait is roughly four times the width of the English Channel, a geography that continues to help
preserve Taiwans de facto independence from China. Even the fastest warships
travel slowly, giving diplomats time to do their work. Incidents in the air are more likely, although
Asian countries have erected strict protocols and prefer to posture verbally so as to avoid
actual combat. (That said, the new Chinese Air Defense Identification Zone is a particularly provocative protocol.) Since any such
incidents would likely occur over open water there will be few casualties, reducing the
prospect that a single incident will lead to war. And because of the speed, accuracy, and destructiveness of
postmodern weaponry, any war that does break out will probably be short albeit with serious economic consequences.
Something equivalent to four years of trench warfare is almost impossible to imagine . And remember that it was World War
But before one buys the 1914 analogy, there are other matters to consider. While 1914

Is very grinding length that made it a history-transforming and culture-transforming event: it caused 17 million military and civilian casualties; the
disputes in the Pacific Basin are certainly not going to lead to that.

World War I also featured different and unwieldy alliance systems.

Asia is simpler: almost everyone fears China and depends militarily at least on the United States.

This is

not the Cold War where few Americans could be found in the East Bloc, a region with which we did almost no trade.
Millions of Americans and Chinese have visited each others countries, tens of
thousands of American businessmen have passed through Chinese cities, and Chinese party
elites send their children to U.S. universities. U.S. officials know they must steer between the two extremes of
allowing Chinas Finlandization of its Asian neighbors and allowing nationalistic governments in Vietnam, the Philippines, and Japan to lure the United
States into a conflict with China. Nationalistic as these democracies may be, the best way to curb their excesses and make them less nervous is to give
them the assurance of a U.S. security umbrella, born of credible air and sea power.

A strong

U.S.-China

relationship can

keep the peace

in Asia. (South Korea also fears Japan, but the United States is successfully managing that tension.) Unlike empires
mired in decrepitude that characterized 1914 Europe, East Asia features robust democracies in South Korea and Japan, and strengthening democracies in
Malaysia and the Philippines. An informal alliance of democracies that should also include a reformist, de facto ally like Vietnam is the best and most
stable counter to Chinese militarism. Some of these democracies are fraught, and fascist-cum-communist North Korea could implode, but this is not a
world coming apart. Limited eruptions do not equal a global cataclysm. Yet the most profound difference between August 1914 and now is historical selfawareness. As Modris Eksteins meticulously documents in his 1989 book Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age, European
capitals greeted the war with outbursts of euphoria and a feeling of liberation. Because 19th century Europe had been relatively peaceful since the
Napoleonic Wars ended in 1815, people had lost the sense of the tragic that enables them to avoid tragedy in the first place.

Aging,

one-child

societies like those of China, Japan, and South Korea, with memories of war, revolution,
and famine, are less likely to greet violent struggle with joy and equanimity. And the United
States, the paramount military player in Asia, by its very conscious fear of a World War I scenario, will take
every measure to avoid it.

Uighurs
1. ?

2. China reforming human rights now

Holden 14. [Activists urge China to abolish 'black jails' Al-Jazeera- Human
Rights July 12th 2014 URL:
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/07/activists-urge-china-abolishblack-jails-201471011532461581.html]
government's pledge to dismantle re-education through labour centres
is part of slow-motion moves towards reform of law enforcement and
punishment, but it is not clear if these moves will be extended any time
soon, he said. "One can speculate about the forces at work inside the
government that have on the one hand produced this trend and on the
other resisted it and made it so slow." Perry Link, a widely respected scholar on the
The

imprisonment of China's leading activists for human rights and democratic change, said: "People in China call for

Even some reform-minded

government officials have dared to publicly echo these appeals. "But
others inside the government - especially at the top - are most worried
about maintaining power," he added, "and want to continue with arbitrary
arrest of critics, use of black jails, torture, extra-legal intimidation and
muggings, and even 'accidental' killings - all in order to stay on top."
the shutting down of re-education camps and black jails quite a bit."

3. China not interested in fixing human rights abuses until the

US does
Guardian 16. The Guardian is the 3rd most read newspaper in the world. [China
accuses US of rape and murder after criticism of human rights record March 10 th
2016 The Guardian, United Nations URL:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/10/china-attacks-us-hypocrisy-unhuman-rights-council]
China has strongly rejected US-led criticism of its human rights record at
the UN Human Rights Council on Thursday, accusing the United States of
hypocrisy and crimes including the rape and murder of civilians. The US is
notorious for prison abuse at Guantnamo prison, its gun violence is
rampant, racism is its deep-rooted malaise, Chinese diplomat Fu Cong
told the Council, using unusually blunt language. The United States
conducts large-scale extra-territorial eavesdropping, uses drones to
attack other countries innocent civilians, its troops on foreign soil commit
rape and murder of local people. It conducts kidnapping overseas and
uses black prisons. Fu was responding to a joint statement by the United
States and 11 other countries, who criticised Chinas crackdown on human
rights and its detentions of lawyers and activists. These actions are in contravention of
Chinas own laws and international commitments, said US Ambassador Keith Harper, who read out the statement backed by
Australia, Japan, and nine northern European countries. These extra-territorial actions are unacceptable, out of step with the
expectations of the international community, and a challenge to the rule-based international order. Harper read the statement
straight after UN human rights chief Zeid Raad Al Hussein gave his main annual speech to the council. He recalled his message to
China in mid-February, when he cited a very worrying pattern of detentions.

Fu said Zeid should refrain

from making subjective comments not backed up by real facts. He also

criticized Japans support for the joint statement, saying Japan had
refused to take responsibility for conscripting 100,000 comfort women
in Asian countries during the second world war. In China, police have detained about 250
human rights lawyers, legal assistants, and activists since a nationwide crackdown began last July, although many have
subsequently been released. Sophie Richardson, China director at Human Rights Watch, said the message delivered by Harper was
the first collective joint statement on China in the 10 history of the council. The statement shows that while President Xi may think
he can eradicate dissent at home, the world stands with embattled human rights defenders across China, she said in a statement.

4. No ! All of their I/L and ! ev have been disproven through

the terrorist attacks that have been taking place around the
world since their ev was realized and we havent seen anything
close to etx

cp

cp frontline
Even if they win that hypothetically the cp could solve the af
you cant look at the cp text in a vacuum the justifications for
DOING the counterplan is what matters. The reason behind the
cp is ________ - there securitizing rhetoric and perpetuation of
the Asian threat is a reason to reject the cp because that
means they cant access the epistemology claims - thats song.
Our claim from the beginning is that justification for actions
matter the securitizing nb is a reason to why you dont solve
epistemology

consult Japan
1. Perm: Do the CP
2. Consultation CPs are plan-plus They add a timeframe
and certainty to the plan. Legitimate CPs must be both
textually and functionally competitive. Only both
limitations prevent normal means CPs which are
conceptually unlimited, ruin af predictability, and
sidestep the topic, ruining resolutional education and
focusing the debate on the negs process args at the
expense of the afs topic content advs. This hurts
competitive equity by eliminating the adv to being af, the
ability to parametricize the resolution. Perm Do the CP is
legitimate.
3. No solvency The CP doesnt specify who they consult
with. The Japanese govt is big. The metric by which we
judge Japan to have said no is unclear. Can the Japanese
prime minister say no but the Diet say yes? Who do we
accept the response from? Who in the U.S. judges the
outcome to have been yes or no? If its Congress, theyll
sabotage the CP by applying an overly strict lens on what
is allowed. The details of how consultation goes down are
missing from the CP and mean that the threshold for
saying no is low.
4. China says no to the CP, China doesnt like strong US and
Japanese relations
Chanlett- Avery, Rinehart 16 [Emma Chanlett-Avery, Specialist in Asian
Affairs, Ian Rinehart, Analyst in Asian Affairs, 2/9/16, The U.S.- Japan Alliance
Congressional Research Service.]
Chinese officials regularly raise complaints when the United States and Japan move
to strengthen alliance capabilities, calling the alliance a relic of the Cold War and
accusing Japan of remilitarizing. China has appeared to give concessions in its
dealings with North Korea based on a fear that Japan will use North Korean
provocations as an excuse to upgrade its military posture . Reportedly, U.S.
diplomats and defense officials have quietly warned Beijing that Pyongyangs
repeated missile and nuclear tests provide ample justification for improving U.S. and
allied BMD capabilities in the region. At the same time, defense planners in the
United States and Japan are concerned about the quantitative and qualitative
increases in Chinese military acquisitions, particularly cruise and ballistic missiles.
China already has the ability to severely degrade U.S. and Japanese combat
strength through conventional missile attacks on facilities in Japan, and the Chinese

military fields anti-ship ballistic missiles that may be capable of destroying an

aircraft carrier at sea.

5. Japan says no
Fukushima 99 [Akiko Fukushima, Senior Fellow Asia International Center
Aoyama Gakuin University, Multilateralism and Security Cooperation in China
Stimson Center.
While there are benefits for Japan and the United States to engage China through
security dialogue, there are obstacles as well. To engage China, the three parties
need to share similar values. There is a basic mistrust, however, particularly
between China and Japan. Japans historical legacy with China and Chinese concern
about the revival of Japanese militarism brings this sharply into focus . Issues related
to human rights between China and the United States are also a quagmire.
Furthermore, the respective China policies of Japan and the United States are
becoming fluid and unpredictable. Coordination was perhaps easier during the Cold
War, as containment was the common factor in both nations China policy. It is more
difficult to coordinate engagement policies, as they cover a wide range of security,
economic, and social aspects. This means, the United States and Japan must
practice more active consultation, dialogue, and policy coordination to make their
engagement of China more effective.

The CP fails to retain any sticks to manage Russian

expectations; appeasement escalates conflict by encouraging
misbehavior
Charap & Shapiro 16 (Samuel, senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia at the International Institute for
Strategic Studies, & Jeremy, director of research at the European Council on Foreign Relations, BULLETIN OF THE
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 2016 VOL. 72, NO. 3, USRussian relations: The middle cannot hold,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2016.1170366)

The policy response to the current crisis should then be structured around
achieving that long-term goal. This does not mean that the United States should
simply accommodate Russian demands the proposed bargain requires all parties,
including Russia, to make difficult compromises. The West would have to accept that the
model that worked so well in Central and Eastern Europe will not work for the rest of the continent. Russia
would have to strictly adhere to the limits the new arrangements would impose on its
influence in the region and to foreswear further military intervention in the affairs of its
neighbors. And negotiations will likely have to be combined with elements of
coercion in order to succeed. Such a strategy would offer Russia a path toward security in its
neighborhood without confrontation with the West, but it would also entail isolation and
confrontation if Russia refuses to engage on the new bargain. Pursuing talks
offers a path to stable USRussia relations and is the only means to avoid a new Cold War. Successful talks would
not just produce great power comity; negotiating new institutional mechanisms for the regional architecture in the
former Soviet region would give these countries a chance at security, reform, and prosperity. Pursuing the status
quo of geopolitical competition is a recipe for continued insecurity, political dysfunction, and economic
backwardness. The problem today is that neither side believes that the other wants stability. Russia is convinced

The West is
convinced that Russias use of force and threatening behavior reflect an
absolute commitment to aggression against its neighbors. Sadly, these threat
that the West is trying to extend its reach right up to Russias borders (and even inside of them).

perceptions are not completely baseless. To avoid a new Cold War, both sides will
have to make compromises: the United States and its allies, regarding further enlargement of EuroAtlantic institutions; Russia, about its interventions and military behavior. Skeptics can rightly point to numerous
reasons why such talks might fail. However, the grave consequences of a protracted confrontation more than justify
an attempt to find agreement. One Cold War was enough

6.
7. The CP wont spillover to broad relations The US already
consults on tons of issues with Japan but has tensions in
other areas. Proves one-time consultation over the plan
doesnt ensure a strong relationship.
8. Consultation after the fact or without a veto power solves
Japan doesnt have the power to repeal US policy in any
area now and giving them that power wouldnt even be a
reasonable expectation for Japan to have. Other forms of
consultation that dont compete with the af address the
impact. Perm Do the plan and consult Japan and perm
do the plan then consult Japan both solve the impact.
Should means recommended, not required
Washington State Bar 6 (http://www.wsba.org/LegalCommunity/Committees-Boards-and-Other-Groups/~/media/Files/WSBA-wide
%20Documents/LLLT/Rules%20and%20Regulations/20130820%20APR%2028.ashx)
Words of authority:
(a) "May" means "has discretion to," "has a right to," or "is permitted to".APR 28
Page 2
Effective August 20, 2013
(b) "Must" or "shall" mean "is required to.
(c) "Should" means recommended but not required.

consult Russia
1. Perm: Do the CP
2. Consultation CPs are plan-plus They add a timeframe
and certainty to the plan. Legitimate CPs must be both
textually and functionally competitive. Only both
limitations prevent normal means CPs which are
conceptually unlimited, ruining af predictability, and
sidestep the topic, ruining resolutional education and
focusing the debate on the negs process args at the
expense of the afs topic content advs. This ruins
competitive equity by eliminating the adv to being af, the
ability to parametricize the resolutional limitation. Perm
Do the CP is legitimate.
3. No solvency The CP doesnt specify who they consult
with. The Japanese govt is big. The metric by which we
judge Japan to have said no is unclear. Can the russian
prime minister say no but the Diet say yes? Who do we
accept the response from? Who in the U.S. judges the
outcome to have been yes or no? If its Congress, theyll
sabotage the CP by applying an overly strict lens on what
is allowed. The details of how consultation goes down are
missing from the CP and mean that the threshold for
saying no is low.
4. Perm: The U.S. should allow Russia to suggest
modifications to proposals and should implement those
modifications. Do the plan. Open consultation solves best.
Potter 15 (William, Director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute
of International Studies, BOTH SEEM CONTENT WITH STALEMATE, http://perspectives.carnegie.org/us-russia/seemcontent-stalemate/)

even during the bleakest moments of

the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were able to set aside
their ideological and political diferences to cooperate meaningfully and in a sustained
fashion in a number of areas, most notably nuclear nonproliferation. It would be tragicand very
In charting a course forward, it is useful to recall that

dangerouswere such cooperation to diminish in the post-Cold War period. As such, it is worth considering the
value added of reviving the high-level biannual nonproliferation meetings that covered the entire range of
proliferation concerns held by either party. More generally, it would be desirable to expand the number of bilateral
and multilateral working groups at the Track 1, Track 1.5, and Track 2 levels that conduct business largely below the
radar screen of politicians and the media. It also is highly desirable to facilitate more exchanges among different
groups of students and professionals in both countries, including educators, military personnel, agricultural experts,
etc., and to promote collaborative educational activities such as joint graduate degree programs. To the extent that
one sought to return to the summit process,

it might make more sense to convene an

agenda-free summit at which the U.S. and Russian leadership could

discuss global afairs in a broad and largely unstructured way (perhaps the
closest model is the December 1989 Bush-Gorbachev summit at Malta). Such a discussion of shared and
divergent threat perceptions should lead to the recognition that on many, if not most,
issues the two parties desire similar outcomes but difer mainly on the
means to obtain them.

5. Russia says no They want independence, not ties with

the West
Sussex 15 (Matthew, fellow @ Lowy Institute, Dec, Russias Asian rebalance,
http://www.lowyinstitute.org/files/russia-asian-rebalance.pdf)

Russias recent boldness stems from a fear of weakness just over the horizon.
Moscow has no wish to become Chinas raw materials supplier, but it sees no
advantage in turning to the West either. Instead, it seeks a degree of
independence through Putins great power vision of Russia as a Euro-Pacific
actor. To achieve this, Russia will need to follow through with its pivot to Asia,
and deepen its energy, trade, and military presence.

The CP fails to retain any sticks to manage Russian

expectations; appeasement escalates conflict by encouraging
Russian misbehavior
Charap & Shapiro 16 (Samuel, senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia at the International Institute for
Strategic Studies, & Jeremy, director of research at the European Council on Foreign Relations, BULLETIN OF THE
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, 2016 VOL. 72, NO. 3, USRussian relations: The middle cannot hold,
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2016.1170366)

The policy response to the current crisis should then be structured around
achieving that long-term goal. This does not mean that the United States should
simply accommodate Russian demands the proposed bargain requires all parties,
including Russia, to make difficult compromises. The West would have to accept that the
model that worked so well in Central and Eastern Europe will not work for the rest of the continent. Russia
would have to strictly adhere to the limits the new arrangements would impose on its
influence in the region and to foreswear further military intervention in the affairs of its
neighbors. And negotiations will likely have to be combined with elements of
coercion in order to succeed. Such a strategy would offer Russia a path toward security in its
neighborhood without confrontation with the West, but it would also entail isolation and
confrontation if Russia refuses to engage on the new bargain. Pursuing talks
offers a path to stable USRussia relations and is the only means to avoid a new Cold War. Successful talks would
not just produce great power comity; negotiating new institutional mechanisms for the regional architecture in the
former Soviet region would give these countries a chance at security, reform, and prosperity. Pursuing the status
quo of geopolitical competition is a recipe for continued insecurity, political dysfunction, and economic
backwardness. The problem today is that neither side believes that the other wants stability. Russia is convinced

The West is
convinced that Russias use of force and threatening behavior reflect an
absolute commitment to aggression against its neighbors. Sadly, these threat
perceptions are not completely baseless. To avoid a new Cold War, both sides will
have to make compromises: the United States and its allies, regarding further enlargement of Eurothat the West is trying to extend its reach right up to Russias borders (and even inside of them).

Atlantic institutions; Russia, about its interventions and military behavior. Skeptics can rightly point to numerous
reasons why such talks might fail. However, the grave consequences of a protracted confrontation more than justify
an attempt to find agreement. One Cold War was enough

6.
7. The CP wont spillover to broad relations The US already
consults on tons of issues with Japan but has tensions in
other areas. Proves one-time consultation over the plan
doesnt ensure a strong relationship.
8. Consultation after the fact or without a veto power solves
Japan doesnt have the power to repeal US policy in any
area now and giving them that power wouldnt even be a
reasonable expectation for Japan to have. Other forms of
consultation that dont compete with the af address the
impact. Perm Do the plan and consult Japan and perm
do the plan then consult Japan both solve the impact.
Should means recommended, not required
Washington State Bar 6 (http://www.wsba.org/LegalCommunity/Committees-Boards-and-Other-Groups/~/media/Files/WSBA-wide
%20Documents/LLLT/Rules%20and%20Regulations/20130820%20APR%2028.ashx)
Words of authority:
(a) "May" means "has discretion to," "has a right to," or "is permitted to".APR 28
Page 2
Effective August 20, 2013
(b) "Must" or "shall" mean "is required to.
(c) "Should" means recommended but not required.

human rights
1. The CP is a front for neoliberalism; conditions wont
promote human rights
Pan 4 (Chengxin Pan, Discourses of China In International Relations, a study in
western theory as IR practice, august 2004) mlm
even at the Chinese elite level Western liberal
theory and practice do not always have as 'positive' an effect as is commonly
believed. For example, while the new Chinese middle classes seem to have
developed a ravenous appetite for things western, they have so far shown little
genuine interest in embracing the ideas of equality, democracy, or meaningful
political reforms. This has not been helped by the liberal engagement policy
trumpeted in the West, which, rather than proliferating liberal democracy, seems to
be most interested in coddling the ruling authoritarian elites . Importantly also, there is the
In the foregoing chapter, I argued also that

rising salience of the New Left in the Chinese intelligentsia, whose critical responses to the march of global
capitalism and the excesses of China's domestic neoliberal reform agenda demonstrates that there remains a
significant segment of the Chinese elite which does not necessarily want to be carried away by the dominant
neoliberal consensus. The New Left, as an alternative political movement, is likely to be a vibrant force to be
reckoned with on China's foreign policy as well as domestic agendas in the decades to come. And of course, there is
another dramatic dimension to be added to the largely untold story associated with the story of neoliberal
globalisation and China. A story which confirms that globalisation, in prising open enormous market and investment
opportunities in China, is driving a great number of Chinese enterprises to bankruptcy and exacerbating an already

These
globalisation forces have begun to boost Chinese economic capability , of course,
and a desire to compete with the West at its own game, thereby creating an
economic 'intimate enemy' which could well become the kind of geopolitical
problem foreseen by realist analysts (e.g., John Mearsheimer). None of this should be too surprising.
As noted in Chapter 6, the liberal way of framing and dealing with China has not been
designed for the causes of Chinese democracy and human rights per se or for
genuine equal partnership between the West and China. Rather, it serves primarily as a
ticking time-bomb of massive unemployment in the industrial and agricultural sectors alike.

legitimating code for easier and greater access to Chinese markets and more control over the Chinese mind on

while neoliberal discourse

preaches democracy and human rights, it is always ready to compromise
these principles for the sake of profits and stable market access.9 Similarly,
matters deemed important to W'estern interests. Consequently,

while neoliberalism favours non- coercive means of engagement, it has never purged itself of the will to power. And
for that matter: nor has it quite forgotten the usefulness of a Cold War-style, geopolitical strategy of containment as
a kind of insurance policy. This is a theme articulated by one of the most ardent neoliberals Thomas Friedman: who
acknowledges (rightly) that "The hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden f1st.

2. No enforcement The CP doesnt specify what human rights

theyre referring to, who determines compliance, or who
controls the plans reversal if they dont meet. Given our
central contention that the US wants to contain China, expect
that the govt will presume China is not meeting or even lie
to establish that they havent met and yank the plan away.
The af is a disad to the CP.
3.Condition CPs are plan-plus They add a timeframe and
certainty to the plan. Legitimate CPs must be both
textually and functionally competitive. Only both
limitations prevent normal means CPs which are
conceptually unlimited, ruining af predictability, and
sidestep the topic, ruining resolutional education and
focusing the debate on the negs process args at the
expense of the afs topic content advs. This ruins
competitive equity by eliminating the adv to being af, the
ability to parametricize the resolution. Perm Do the CP is
legitimate.
4. Perm do both Communicative engagement is critical to
address neorealist containment policies and induce deeper
cooperation critical to making pressure efective. The af is a
prerequisite to the CP. The plan gives the US more efective
leverage.
8. The impact evidence is empirically denied Years of
pressure have failed to result in human rights reforms
and lack of complete human rights doesnt ensure nuclear
war. The af certainly doesnt completely eliminate all
human rights which is the high threshold their impact sets
up.
9. The human rights paradigm relies on an archaic form of
power that obscures disciplinary power, reinforces
legalistic domination, and normalizes individuals in the
name of a true human nature.
Pickett 2000 [Brent, Professor of Political Science at Chadron State College,
Foucaultian Rights?, The Social Science Journal, Volume 37, Number 3, pages 403
421, Elsevier]
To adequately discuss the idea of a Foucaultian right, it is first necessary to see why Foucault thought that
traditional, liberal rights failed to impede the most important power relations . His critique
of rights was largely derived from the account of power he gave in such works as Discipline and Punish. There he
described a decisive transformation in the forms and locations of power that occurred in the West from the 17th to

the early 19th century. Before this change, during the Middle Ages and what Foucault called the classical era,
which was roughly the 16th and early 17th centuries, power had largely been a matter of the state. Yet, the slow
development of various techniques of normalization and discipline within asylums, military barracks, monasteries,
hospitals, schools, and prisons, and the subsequent diffusion of those techniques throughout society, fundamentally
altered the nature of power. It led to the modern era where power surmounts the rules of right which organize and

With power now primarily located

at levels below the state, rights lost the effectiveness they had during the classical
era. Because rights were (and still are) connected to an archaic notion of power as
vested in the state, which Foucault called the principle of sovereignty, they only
limited state power, while leaving untouched the new disciplines. Liberal rights thus
delimit it and extends itself beyond them (Foucault, 1980, p. 96).

became outmoded. Beyond an inaccurate view of where power is located in society at large, however, the social
contract theory, which has historically provided the justification for rights, also fails to recognize the actual practice
of disciplinary power. Contracts in general, and social contracts providing for the protection of natural rights in
particular, are fundamentally reciprocal and egalitarian. There are two or more signatories, each of which is equally
bound by the terms of the contract. The sovereign, for Locke, Madison, and others, is given the power to make laws
and to punish transgression of that law, while having limits placed on its power, particularly in regards to
fundamental rights. In contrast to this formal, contractual equality, the disciplines are essentially nonegalitarian
and asymmetrical (Foucault, 1979, p. 222). One person, for instance, administers the examination, the other is
examined. Or, to take another example, the guard in the tower of the Panopticon observes the prisoner, patient, or
pupil in his cell, who becomes the object of information, never a subject in communication (p. 200). Thus,
although social contract theory emphasizes the contractual relations in society, the actual diffusion of the
disciplines has had the effect of undermining our formal equality and instead introducing innumerable relations of

although these rights establish areas of protected

action, the disciplines extend beyond and below the level of law and rights,
establishing an infra-penality; they partitioned an area that the laws had left
empty (Foucault, 1979, p. 178). The disciplines, both on their own and through the human
sciences that they serve as the basis for, establish norms and categories that one
must live up to or fall within. If one does not, one is subject to the micropenalties
that the disciplines rely on, even when one is obeying the law. The areas of protected action
asymmetry and domination. Furthermore,

and privacy that rights were meant to establish thereby become infiltrated by disciplinary power and its system of
punishments and rewards. The result is that a range of behaviors that were left untouched under the premodern
system of punishment have now become, despite the formal protection of rights, subject to penalties (p. 105)

Rights are, therefore, according to Foucault, incapable of restricting the most important sites
of normalization and production of docile bodies. Although formal, equal rights were
gradually extended to larger sections of the population, they were in fact becoming
irrelevant: in the principal institutions of society, persons were not equal but instead
always subject to hierarchies and disciplinary punishment, and the rights they held
did nothing to combat the spread of modern power. Furthermore, precisely because
traditional rights were obsolete, because they were focused on a premodern form of
power and viewed society in terms of contractual relations, they directed attention
away from the actual functioning of modern power. Rights have, therefore, become a system. . .
superimposed upon the mechanisms of discipline in such a way as to conceal its actual procedures, the element of
domination inherent in its techniques. (Foucault, 1979, p. 105) Although philosophers and jurists in the 17th and
18th centuries dreamt of a contractual society that established fundamental rights, there was a second dream,
originating in the military but spreading well beyond it, that imagined meticulously subordinated cogs of a
machine. . . . permanent coercions. . . automatic docility (Foucault, 1979, p. 169) The dark underside of the dream
of the social contract philosophers, and its partial realization, was the nightmare of the diffusion of the techniques

The critique of liberal rights goes beyond the charge of

ineffectiveness and misdirection. Foucault also argued that liberal rights help to
support modern power, that they are integral to a system of brutality (Foucault, 1980,
p. 95). There are two reasons for this. The first is that the set of institutions that rights help to
legitimate, the laws, courts, police, and prisons charged with protecting citizens
rights, function as a system of domination. Although these governmental bodies can
only exist on a more fundamental level of disciplines, Foucault argued that they in
for the coercion of bodies.

turn reinforce those basic tactics of power. A rights-based legal order, then, works
through the systematic application of violence through the police and prisons, and
perhaps more important, it helps to reinforce the larger web of modern power that
has colonized rights and the law over the past two and half centuries. The second
way in which traditional rights contribute to this system of domination is that they
aid in the normalization of persons. The modern, rights-bearing individual is him
or herself a product of power. Rights have typically been justified by an account of
what people are supposed to be by nature. For example, the Lockean rights-bearing
self is, by nature, rational, industrious, and under universal duties to be sociable
and have a friendly disposition (Locke, 1960, paragraphs 63, 77, 128; Locke, 1965, p. 129; Locke, 1975,
p. 402). Alan Gewirth (1982) relied on a view of the self as motivated by reason and universal principles derived
from that reason. Charles Taylor (1985) gave a qualified defense of rights as offering protection for important

Foucault considered any and

every account of human nature to be deeply misguided. We do not take any specific
form by nature; even those good capacities of reason and moral agency have to
be forced on us through meticulous rituals of power. As Nietzsche (1969) expressed this idea,
how much blood and cruelty lie at the bottom of all good things! (p. 62). Persons who do not live up
to any specific conception of what human beings ought to be by nature are thus in
danger of being slandered, marginalized, and disciplined. Yet such action would be
largely arbitrary, rather than an expression of the natural order, because any
description of human nature is itself largely arbitrary. If the allegedly natural
category is drawn from the discipline of psychiatry, the persons marginalized are
labeled as insane or deviant; if the category is drawn from the law, they are
criminals; if drawn from religion, they are unnatural, or sodomites, or some other
aberration. Or, when what falls below the definition of normal are parts of an otherwise normal self, they are
neuroses, passions, and addictions. Traditional rights, in Foucaults view, were part of the
problem because of their reliance on a view of people as having a true nature,
because this reinforces the process of normalization.
human capacities such as reason, moral agency, and autonomy. In contrast,

10.
Political human rights rhetoric justifies military
intervention
Baxi 5 [Upendra Baxi, Professor of Law, University of Warwick, Fall 1998, accessed
8/1/05, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems]
the telling of large global stories
("metanarratives") is less a function of emancipation as it as an aspect of the politics of
intergovernmental desire that ingests the politics of resistance. Put another way, meta-narratives
serve to co-opt into mechanisms and processes of governance the languages of human rights
such that bills of rights may adorn many a military constitutionalism with impunity
and that socalled human rights commissions may thrive upon state/regime
sponsored violations. Not surprisingly, the more severe the human rights violation, the
more the power elites declare their loyalty to the regime of human rights . The nearuniversality of ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women ( CEDAW), for
example, betokens no human liberation of women . Rather, it endows the state with the
power to tell more Nietschzean lies. n68 All too often, human rights languages become
stratagems of imperialistic foreign policy through military invasions as well as
through global economic diplomacy. n69 Superpower diplomacy at the United Nations
The post-modernist critique of human rights further maintains that

is not averse to causing untold suffering through sanctions whose manifest aim is to
serve the future of human rights. n70 The United States, the solitary superpower at
the end of the millennium, has made sanctions for the promotion of human rights
abroad a gourmet feast at the White House and on Capitol Hill.

11.
US pressuring China on human rights tanks relations
Garthof 97 [Raymond Garthoff, Relations With the Great Powers: Russia, Japan,
China, Brookings Institution, p.
http://www.brookings.edu/articles/1997/spring_globalgovernance_garthoff.aspx]
The first policy, born of a campaign promise to stop "coddling dictators" in Beijing, involved a
single-minded focus on promoting human rights in China. It was based on the assumption that only
intense pressure, principally through the threat to revoke China's most-favored-nation trade status,
could force Beijing to improve its human rights record. High-level contact with China was to be withheld until progress
had been achieved. By the end of 1993, however, it had become increasingly evident
that China was not succumbing to the American pressure on human rights
and that other aspects of the relationship warranted attention. At that point the
administration unveiled its second China policyone that it called "comprehensive engagement." It entailed more
frequent exchange of cabinet-level visits to discuss a broader bilateral agenda. The aim was to show that, on
these other issues, the United States and China might find areas of cooperation and thus bring the overall relationship into better balance. The
problem was that the overall purpose of "engagement" was never effectively conveyed to Beijing. Even after
the Clinton administration withdrew its threat to revoke Beijing's most-favored-nation status in the name of continued economic engagement with
China, many Chinese

concluded that "engagement" was simply a euphemism for containment and that
American policy was really intended to keep China weak and divided so that it would never
seriously challenge American preeminence in Asia. The 1995 controversy over Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui's visit to
the United States, and the subsequent Chinese military exercises in the Taiwan Strait, showed how deeply China had come to mistrust American
intentions. From Beijing's perspective, the visa granted to Lee Teng-hui showed that Washington now planned to promote the independence of
Taiwan as part of its overall strategy of containing the rise of Chinese power.

track 2
Perm Do Both
The af is a prerequisite to the CP Official containment
policies contradict the message of the CP and undermine all
tracks of dialogue. The bias of the SQ influences all potential
conversational interlocuters the CP might utilize. Any low level
US officials will display Western bias preventing the CP from
solving unless we change govt policy.
Visible signaling is critical to global spillover The alt wont
address Goldsteins case for spilling up to better global
relations. Only the af creates the shot heard around the world
against neorealist foreign policy. Their lack of visibility is a
disad.
Track 2 is higher in the status quo than ever - CP is not
inherent
Tanner 15 (Travis Tanner, US-hina Strong Foundation, COUNTERING U.S.- CHINA
STR ATEGIC RIVALRY BY ELE VATING PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE EXCHANGE: A brief for the
U.S.-China Relations in Strategic Domains Project, NBR,
http://www.nbr.org/downloads/pdfs/psa/US-China_brief_tanner_Sept2015.pdf,
September 2015) atn
P2P exchange has long played an important role in the development of the
U.S.-China relationship. More than 200 years ago, the U.S. commercial vessel
Empress of China visited the port of Guangzhou, marking the beginning of P2P ties.
Over 40 years ago, ping-pong players broke the diplomatic ice between
the United States and China, heralding the normalization of the bilateral
relationship several years later. Since then, P2P eforts have expanded
communication channels and contributed to a deeper understanding
between the people of both countries. Today, the level of P2P engagement
has reached an unprecedented level. In 2014 alone there were 4.3 million
trips made by Chinese and U.S. citizens across the Pacific Ocean. The
number of exchanges occurring between students, scientists, artists,
tourists, and athletes is growing. For example, 275,000 Chinese students
studied in the United States in 2014, a 17% increase over the previous year,
designating China as the largest source of foreign students studying in the United
States. Likewise, between 2010 and 2014 more than 100,000 American students
studied in Chinaachieving the goal of President Obamas 100,000 Strong Initiative.
For the past six years, the two governments have held annual dialogues
focused on formalizing and enhancing P2P exchanges. The U.S.-China
Consultation on People-to-People Exchange (CPE), launched in 2010, is the
first of its kind to be held at the cabinet level and has been an incredibly
valuable tool for promoting engagement. It has convened a broad range of

stakeholders from both countries to advance initiatives and projects resulting in

over four hundred bilateral deliverables. Although these achievements are
impressive, the breadth of exchanges coordinated under the CPE has not effectively
aligned with the broader U.S.-China strategic agenda. In order to decrease rivalry
and manage the growing number of strategic and economic challenges facing the
bilateral relationship, P2P activities must be expanded beyond the realm of cultural
exchange to include strategic issues. There is a great deal of activity happening in
the P2P domain that is not captured under the official CPE. In fact, a majority of
P2P activity happens in an organic way that is not directed by either
government. And while this trend of grassroots engagement should
continue to be strongly encouraged, there is also value in the government
prioritizing certain P2P activities. By doing so, the government can bring more
resources to bear through its own contributions as well as by attracting support
from the nonprofit and private sectors.

Af is a disad to the counterplan - When the elites are out of

the eyes of the public they have no incentive to cooperate or
negotiate when it comes to reducing securitization and
militirization
Kaye 5 (Dalia Dassa Kaye, Director of the Center for Middle East Public Policy at
the RAND Corporation,
http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/Clingendael_20050601_cdsp_paper_di
plomacy_3_kaye.pdf, Rethinking tract two diplomacy: the Middle East and South
Asia, ) mlm
Obstacles to track two regional security dialogues can be found at three levels: tle
participating elites; the domestic contexts from which track two participants come;
and the larger regional environment. Two common problems emerge at the elite
level: dialogues include the 'wrong' type of people or they include the 'right' type of
people with limited inuence onl policy and little legitimacy in their domestic
environments. The first problem relates to dialogues that are dominated by
ideological individuals who do not believe in the value of cooperation with the
adversary and merely attend such forums to repeatedly state well-known and
deeply entrenched positions. Often such individuals are government oficials acting
in an unofiicial capacity but who nonetheless feel the need to state conventional
positions and are much more cautious about exploring new ideas and approaches to
regional security for fear of censure back home. Elites - official and unoficial - also
may enter such processes with skeptical and even hostile positions because they
come fi'om security cultures that are adverse to cooperative security ideas.
Mainstream positions in regions like the Middle East and South Asia favor
unilateralist and self-help notions that help foster zero-sum thinking. In such
environments, it is difficult to find independent minded elites who can break out of
these conceptual frameworks and who are willing to consider new ideas, such as
notions of mutual security where a gain for one side can improve, rather than
undermine, the position of the other. Analysts of track two dialogues in other
regions, like the Asia Pacific, have also observed that it is often diicult for track

two to break new ground because the participating elites are too connected to
governments and are thus unable to introduce new ideas in such dialogues,
resulting in minimal impact on security policy." Similar problems emerge in South
Asian dialogues, with some analysts suggesting that track two participants are often
too close to government circles, leading to 'status quo' thinking and a continuing
divide between those inside and outside the establishment." It is even harder to find
oficial mentors who will listen to new ideas and transmit them into actual policy,
since oicial security elites are also exposed to a security culture emphasizing
competitive thinking and operate in dangerous neighborhoods. In such
environments, it is dificult for regional dialogues to support a cooperative regional
security agenda. On the other hand, the ability to find independent-rninded
individuals who will clearly express national perspectives and perceptions but still
be open to listening to the other sides' views can greatly improve the prospects for
track two dialogues." However, the problem is that such individuals, usually coming
from unofficial circles (academia, think tanks, NGOS) often have limited inuence
with oficial policymakers and are disconnected from grassroots groups or other
broadly-based societal movements. In short, such elites are often self-selected
individuals who believe in the value of dialogue and conflict resolution but who do
not necessarily represent mainstream views from the societies from which they
come. The converted are essentially talking to the converted. Thus, the challenge of
track two dialogues is to find a core group including the 'right' type of individuals
who also have inuence and represent a broad spectrum of constituencies back
home. Still, even if such an appropriate group of individuals can be found, the
participating elites may still reject a cooperative security agenda. Such elites may,
through the process of dialogue and interaction in unoficial settings, develop more
rather than less negative views of the adversary, or simply fail to buy on to
cooperative security concepts. Ifelites take on such views, they have little incentive
to spread the ideas any further and sell new policies at home. For instance, a
heated exchange between an Israeli and Egyptian on the nuclear issue at one
dialogue left a negative impression with an Israeli participant, who began to
question the value of such activity and felt that such exchanges only hardened
positions."

Perm do both increase communicative engagement through

track 1.5/2 negotiations and track one negotiations
Perm do both -- Track 1.5/2 diplomacy is very inefective and
consistently fails however an application of 1 and 2
substantially reduces the impacts
Mapendere 7 (Jeffrey Mapendere, Assistant Director Conflict Resolution Program Carter
Center, Track One and a Half Diplomacy and the Complementarity of Tracks, pg. 68) mlm

Weaknesses of Track Two Diplomacy Regardless of its advantages, Track Two

Diplomacy also has several weaknesses. The first weakness is that Track Two
participants have limited ability to influence foreign policy and political power
structures because of their lack of political power . Second, Track Two interventions
can take too long to yield results. Third, Track Two has limited ability to influence

change at the war stage of a conflict. Fourth, Track Two participants rarely have
resources necessary for sustained leverage during negotiations and for the
implementation of agreements. Fifth, Track Two is not effective in authoritarian
regimes where leaders do not take advice from lower level leaders. Sixth, Track Two
actors due to their lack of political power, are in most cases not accountable to the
public for poor decisions. Seventh, because of their multiplicity Track Two
actors/organizations are notoriously known for their lack of coordination . As already
mentioned elsewhere in this paper, the definitions of Track One and Track Two
Diplomacy do not cover the full range of peacemaking activities found in the current
field of conflict. In addition, both tracks, because of their limitations leave certain
gaps in the peacemaking and peacebuilding activities which have already been
filled in by certain unique individuals such as retired politicians, religious leaders,
and by organizations such as The Carter Center, the Community of SantEgidio
(Bartoli, 2005), the Conflict Management Group, the Norwegian Refugee Council,
Caucasus Links (Nan, 2005), the Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, and the Crisis
Management Initiative. Since these individuals and organizations activities do not
fit in the definitions of Track One and Track Two Diplomacy, evidence in the following
section shows that these activities can be labelled Track One and a Half Diplomacy.
The first disadvantage of Track One and a Half mediation or facilitation is that the
mediator is sometimes viewed by the parties as representing his/her home
countrys foreign policy. Such an attitude may jeopardize the process if the home
country has an aggressive foreign policy towards one of the parties. Another
disadvantage is that Track One and a Half mediators have limited ability to use
inducements and directive mediation techniques because they do not have the
political power to command resource s. Track One and a Half actors have no
technical, financial, and military resources needed either to encourage an
agreement or to support or enforce agreement implementation . Moral authority is
one of the major strengths of Track One and a Half actors such as Jimmy Carter,
Nelson Mandela and others, and yet it is one of the biggest weaknesses of their
organizations. Successes driven by moral integrity of the mediator cannot be
duplicated by others in the same organization because such successes depend on a
particular individuals personality. Last, Track One and a Half interveners activities
may run contrary to their countrys foreign policy; this may undermine their peace
efforts. However, one of the most efective ways of reducing the impact of
the weaknesses of the three forms of diplomacy on peacemaking is by the
complementary application of the various diplomatic activities (Nan, 1999).

Track two diplomacy is not equipped to deal with real global

issues because the policies they produce are only more of the
same
Kraft 2k (Herman Joseph S. Kraft, political science professor at University of the
Philippines at Diliman, The Autonomy Dilemma of Track 2 Diplomacy in Southeast
Asia (2000) Strategic & Defence Studies Centre and S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies, pg 168, 2010) atn
Track 2 activities have been instrumental in the emergence of common
understandings of security in the region (a shared discourse). The unofficial

nature of Track 2 makes it the channel of choice for discussing sensitive

security issues, which normally would never be brought up in official
meetings. It is the forum where non-traditional perspectives in security
can be introduced. Indeed, Track 2 has been credited with efecting
changes in official perspectives on broad issues of security. Yet in 1997,
Track 2 processes dealing with security issues (especially ASEANISIS and
CSCAP) showed that they were not equipped to deal with the security
concerns created by the financial crisis. That crisis exposed the
vulnerability of peoples lives to the efects of globalization, and
traditional approaches to security do not adequately provide answers to
such concerns. Despite avowed adherence to a comprehensive
understanding of security, Southeast Asian governments have used a
security discourse that is largely state-centric, and Track 2 networks have
helped propagate this discourse. Consequently, Track 2 has not lived up to
its potential for conveying new understanding of security . ASEAN-ISIS has
pushed the envelope of security in the region. The ASEANISIS Colloquium
on Human Rights held annually since 1994 is partially based on a broad
framework of security. Also, 1994 the Asia Pacific Roundtable had a panel on
non-traditional security (NTS) issues and a plenary session on human rights. Since
1996, ASEAN-ISIS (with special Canadian support) has included a session on gender
and international security. These NTS issues, however, remain on the margins of
security discourse in the region. The great majority of Track 2 activities are about
mainstream security issues, with their focus on state security. The meetings on
NTSissues focus mostly on the relationship between economics and security (even
prior to the 19971998 financial crisis). Even there, little attention is given to how
regional economic relations affect peoples lives.19 ASEAN has to go beyond a
state-centric security frame if it is to address the objectives stipulated in its Vision
2020.20 Track 2 institutions like ASEAN-ISIS need to work on the substance behind
the idea of equitable and just societies. These issues go to the heart of maintaining
the credibility and legitimacy of Track 2 processes in the region.21

Perm do the cp
Track two diplomacy fails- discussion becomes arbitrary when
nations aren't bound to an agenda.
Bratton 15 (Patrick Bratton, Associate Professor of Political Science at Hawaii
Pacific University, 2015, "Overview of the Diplomatic Landscape", The Journal of
International Relations, Peace Studies, and Development, 1(1),
http://scholarworks.arcadia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1002&context=agsjournal) KS
The criticism is often made that, while intellectually stimulating, these
groups end up being mere talking shops and nothing comes from their
forums, and that because they are unofficial and do not involve
policymakers, they will have little efect on events. Moreover, it is often
argued that they bring together "like-minded people " who already interact
in other forums and would likely agree anyway: journalists with
journalists, activists with activists, etc. These critics believe that more efort

should be done to bring in the more militant or hard-line actors who truly
need the interaction with those of opposing views. Regardless of the
criticism, track-two and track-1.5 diplomacy have been among the fastest growing
areas of diplomacy in the past twenty years.20

Track 2 fails-lack of experts, funding and diferent political

climate and language barrier
Konishi 13 (Weston S. Konishi, Director of Asia-Pacific Studies The Institute for Foreign Policy
Analysis, Rowing Together Developing Parallel Paths to Stability, Denuclearization, and a Peace
Regime on the Korean Peninsula, December 2013, A Compendium Workshop Report Published by The
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, Inc, pg.9, HY)

Track II activities with real policy relevance, U.S. institutions face a number of challenges. First, they
must find the right Chinese collaborators, partners that will bring to the table capable
experts with strong connections and reputations, thereby ensuring that Track
II discussions will be reported to the highest levels of the Chinese
leadership. These partner organizations must also be highly skilled in organizing logistics for joint activities. American
institutions must also adapt to sudden changes in the political climate between the two
countries. Those examining issues related to military afairs must navigate daunting obstacles to deal
with the most closed sector of the Chinese policy apparatus. Most importantly, they
must locate dependable sources of funding that will sustain their
programs over the long term. Given changing priorities on the part of donor
organizations, this is becoming harder and harder . The limited number of
world-class foreign policy scholars also leads to what several respondents referred to as a usual
suspects phenomenon, whereby the same small group of individuals appears at
most Track II activities, many of whom are not very deeply involved in the issue
being discussed. Some respondents expressed frustration with the increasing tendency
of Chinese institutes to shift costs to their American partners. In the past, when most Chinese
To conduct

institutions were solely (or heavily) subsidized by their government parent bodies, it was usual for the Chinese side to pay all in-country costs for
participants in Track II programs taking place in the PRC, while the American partner would pay international travel costs; reciprocal arrangements were
made when Chinese delegations visited the United States. However, several phenomena in recent years have made this gentlemans agreement less of
a given. First, many Chinese institutions now have to obtain private funding for some or all of their activities and projects. In addition, expansion of Track
II activity in recent years has led to a certain level of competition among American institutions to maintain partnerships with Chinese counterparts. This
gives the Chinese organizations an opening to seek a better deal by asking potential American partners to bear some or all of their own expenses when
they visit China. Some well-funded American organizations are receptive to this, preferring to pay part of their incountry costs to avoid ceding control over
such things as where their delegates stay, how they travel in China and, sometimes, the Chinese participants in the program. Others, however, are
alarmed at the rising cost of holding events in the PRC. One program director complained that Chinese institutions now have a lot of money but they are

One respondent
asserted that in recent years some Chinese organizations have begun to
prioritize their relationships with foreign institutions based upon how
much financial support these institutions provide, and that bilateral
exchanges are becoming a commercial enterprise. In some cases, the
respondent said, even journalists calling to interview Chinese scholars are
re-routed to the institutions division for international exchanges, which
charges a fee for the interview. None of the other respondents expressed as strong a point of view, although some
still free-riders. The Chinese need to be pushed to use their own budgets to support these activities.

mentioned that Chinese organizations assisting American partners with meetings or co-hosting events now routinely ask for service fees that go beyond
what would seem a normal amount to cover necessary staff time and other indirect costs. It has also become common for Chinese organizations to
request that American institutions provide honoraria to all conference participants, even those who do not give formal presentations. (Apparently, giving

Some participants pointed to the language barrier

as a significant obstacle to Track II exchanges. There are a limited number of Chinese foreign policy
honoraria even to observers has become customary in China.)

experts with a good grasp of English, and even fewer American foreign policy specialists with the kind of Chinese language skills necessary to
communicate confidently about sensitive subjects without benefit of interpretation. The case is true for written materials as well. While most Chinese
foreign policy specialists can handle English language materials and quite a few American China specialists have sufficient language ability to access open
Chinese language sources, including those being produced by participants in Track II dialogues, often senior officials attending such meetings have to rely
on an eclectic collection of translated materials that do not necessarily accurately reflect foreign policy developments in the other country.

vagueness (:40)
1. W/M: the af plan specific as per our method that
communicative engagement necessitates talking about
specific issues that are important among both party
interests. This limits the scope of issues to things both
China and the U.S. want to accomplish. Anti corruption
climate cooperation the pacific rim anti cyberterror
etc.
2. C/I: The af must defend a mechanism in which we engage
diplomatically with china
3. Standards
a. Topic specific educationUnderstanding the way in
which the usfg engages with china allows us to analyze
the way that foreign policy functions. They have so
much ground literally anything that endorses current
international relation theory.
b. GroundOur Communicative Engagement compensates
the specific lack of issues discussed via the specificity
of the method. This means they have more ground on
the solvency flow. They have so much ground they
have access to literally anything that endorses current
international relation theory.
4. Impact turn ends oriented policy that attempts to pass a
bill or something is what we criticize. Communicative
engagement means putting aside preimposed impositions
and making compromises with china that eventually leads
to a policy, the interpretation just perpetuates shitty
coercive IR
Cx checks all their abuse we define communicative
engagement as a dialogical process of exchanging reasons for
resolving issues that cant be resolved by general cooperation
this is DISTINCT from strategic engagement
Reasonability checks good is good enough

1ar
JORDAN:
This card is bad for 2 reasons
1. This is about using vague language when committing to an action not in the
context of the aff because ours is just a new framework to engagement.
2. Even if we are vague, communicative engagement gives the sign to china
that we are no longer trying to coerce them and that prevents the impact
thats glaser

KESSLER:
This card isnt in the context of the aff we dont set political goals using vague
language we say that the way in which we engage must be changed. We dont set
vague goals. Even if this is true, the anastasiou evidence indicates that even if we
dont make a substantial legislative change the aff is key to change the way that
macropolitics functions because there is a spiral up

T qpq (1:40)
1. W/M: {read un underlined part of their ev and find a
diferent way}
2. A QPQ is intrinsically related to violent xenophobia thats
the entirety of the 1ac a) QPQ is rooted in western imperialism that assumes US
values are neutral and universal and that in order to engage in
IR the US deserves to extract resources from China their
interpretation creates a bankrupt form of education thats only
relevant within the US debate space but not the real world
thats Lynch
b) This interp upholds the false idea that western values
are universally applicable which renders countries without
these western views are the disposable other this an ethics
and epistemology argument that comes first and creates
violent education - thats moses
3). C/I: engagement is collaboration with a target state
Evan Resnick, Journal of International Affairs, 0022197X, Spring 2001, Vol. 54,
Issue 2 Database: Academic Search Premier Defining Engagement (only the blue
highlighting)
I propose that we define
engagement as the attempt to influence the political behavior of a target state through the comprehensive
establishment and enhancement of contacts with that state across multiple issue-areas (i.e. diplomatic,
military, economic, cultural). The following is a brief list of the specific forms that such contacts might include:
In order to establish a more effective framework for dealing with unsavory regimes,

DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS Extension of diplomatic recognition; normalization of diplomatic relations Promotion of

target-state membership in international institutions and regimes Summit meetings and other visits by the head of
state and other senior government officials of sender state to target state and vice-versa MILITARY CONTACTS
Visits of senior military officials of the sender state to the target state and vice-versa Arms transfers Military aid
and cooperation Military exchange and training programs Confidence and security-building measures Intelligence
sharing ECONOMIC CONTACTS Trade agreements and promotion Foreign economic and humanitarian aid in the
form of loans and/or grants CULTURAL CONTACTS Cultural treaties Inauguration of travel and tourism links Sport,

Engagement is an iterated process in which the sender and

target state develop a relationship of increasing interdependence , culminating in the endpoint of
artistic and academic exchanges(n25)

"normalized relations" characterized by a high level of interactions across multiple domains.

Engagement is

a quintessential exchange relationship: the target state wants the prestige and material
resources that would accrue to it from increased contacts with the sender state, while the sender state seeks to
modify the domestic and/or foreign policy behavior of the target state. This deductive logic could adopt a number of
different forms or strategies when deployed in practice.(n26) For instance, individual contacts can be established by
the sender state at either a low or a high level of conditionality.(n27) Additionally, the sender state can achieve its
objectives using engagement through any one of the following causal processes: by directly modifying the behavior
of the target regime; by manipulating or reinforcing the target states' domestic balance of political power between
competing factions that advocate divergent policies; or by shifting preferences at the grassroots level in the hope
that this will precipitate political change from below within the target state. This definition implies that three
necessary conditions must hold for engagement to constitute an effective foreign policy instrument. First, the
overall magnitude of contacts between the sender and target states must initially be low. If two states are already
bound by dense contacts in multiple domains (i.e., are already in a highly interdependent relationship),
engagement loses its impact as an effective policy tool. Hence, one could not reasonably invoke the possibility of
the US engaging Canada or Japan in order to effect a change in either country's political behavior. Second, the

material or prestige needs of the target state must be significant, as engagement derives its power from the
promise that it can fulfill those needs. The greater the needs of the target state, the more amenable to engagement
it is likely to be. For example, North Korea's receptivity to engagement by the US dramatically increased in the wake
of the demise of its chief patron, the Soviet Union, and the near-total collapse of its national economy.(n28) Third,
the target state must perceive the engager and the international order it represents as a potential source of the
material or prestige resources it desires. This means that autarkic, revolutionary and unlimited regimes which
eschew the norms and institutions of the prevailing order, such as Stalin's Soviet Union or Hitler's Germany, will not

This reformulated conceptualization avoids the pitfalls of

prevailing scholarly conceptions of engagement. It considers the policy as a set of means rather than ends,
does not delimit the types of states that can either engage or be engaged, explicitly encompasses
contacts in multiple issue-areas, allows for the existence of multiple objectives in any given instance of
engagement and, as will be shown below, permits the elucidation of multiple types of positive sanctions.
be seduced by the potential benefits of engagement.

Engagement is non-coercivemeans no QPQs

Smith 5 (Karen E, Senior Lecturer in International Relations, London School of
Economics, Engagement and conditionality: incompatible or mutually reinforcing?,
May 2005, Global Europe: New Terms of Engagement,
http://scholar.googleusercontent.com/scholar?q=cache:83RqE0TzFMJ:scholar.google.com/
+engagement+positive+incentives+bilateral&hl=en&as_sdt=0,14)
First, a few definitions.

Engagement is a foreign policy strategy of building close

ties with

the government and/or civil society and/or business community of another state. The
intention of this strategy is to undermine illiberal political and economic practices, and socialise government and

engagement entail primarily building

economic links, and encouraging trade and investment in particular. Some observers
other domestic actors into more liberal ways. Most cases of

have variously labeled this strategy one of interdependence, or of oxygen: economic activity leads to positive
political consequences.19Conditionality,

in contrast, is the linking, by a state or

benefits to another state(such as aid or trade concessions) to the
fulfilment of economic and/or political conditions. Positive conditionality entails
promising benefits to a state if it fulfils the conditions; negative conditionality
international organisation,

of

perceived

involves reducing, suspending, or terminating those benefits if the state violates the conditions (in other words,

engagement implies ties, but

with no strings attached; conditionality attaches the strings. In another way of
applying sanctions, or a strategy of asphyxiation).20 To put it simply,

looking at it, engagement is more of a bottom-up strategy to induce change in another country, conditionality more
of a top-down strategy

4). The Counter-Interpretation doesnt under-limit the topic

a) It doesnt under-limit the topic: defining engagement as
non-coercive collaboration excludes for-China afs and
QPQs. The af has to propose a realistic cooperation
mechanism which guarantees the neg access to solvency
and say no arguments
QPQs over-limit: QPQs functionally limit the topic because
there are a small number of conditions that China would say
yes to and that avoid counterplans.
5) QPQs also resubmit the problems of status quo IR that
insist on strong-arming China to achieve political goals.
6). Reasonability--If the neg isnt able to prove that the afs
interpretation is bad only that their interpretation is a little bit
better than they are only engaging in semantics and
distracting from the core of the topic

1ar
1. Extend the 1 w/m, the af is an invitation, means china
can accept or decline, means there are conditions
2. Extend the author w/m, says engagement is a multiplicity
of things, means we win any type of engagement
3. Extend the Resnick and Celik evidence, says engagement
is trying to influence behavior, we meet that because we
try to influence china to join the TPP
a. Prefer out interp for limits, qpq results in less
predictable afs because of random lit combos, solves
their education and clash claims
4. Limits debate: their interpretation underlimits the topic
resulting in worse education. Having just a few core afs
ensures stale uninteresting debates. Topic specific
education as a whole instead of a small portion of the
topic. Real world education, need to know multiple
components of an argument to understand, not just one
specific part
5. Ground Debate
a. Af flex is good because it allows for neg flex. All the
reasons why limits are bad for the af is cross
applicable to why neg limits are bad
b. Predictable ground- qpq leads to any combination of
conditions that doesnt need a solvency advocate,
destroys predictability and any lit base arguments
they are making. This internal link turns their
fairness claims
6. Reasonability, good is good enough, we are the core of
the topic. [answer competing interps good stuf here]
competing interps leads to a race to the bottom to find
the most exclusive definition, destroys fairness because
the neg will always have some new rando t shell we
werent prepared for
st

T increase
W/M we increase the amount of communicative engagement
in the status quo
C/I - Increase doesnt require preexistence
Reinhardt 5 (U.S. Judge for the UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT (Stephen, JASON RAY
REYNOLDS; MATTHEW RAUSCH, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. HARTFORD FINANCIAL SERVICES GROUP, INC.; HARTFORD FIRE INSURANCE
COMPANY, Defendants-Appellees., lexis)

Specifically, we must decide whether charging a higher price for initial insurance than the insured would otherwise have been charged
because of information in a consumer credit report constitutes an "increase in any charge" within the meaning of FCRA. First, we examine
the definitions of "increase" and "charge." Hartford Fire contends that, limited to their ordinary definitions, these words apply only when a
consumer has previously been charged for insurance and that charge has thereafter been increased by the insurer. The phrase, "has previously
been charged," as used by Hartford, refers not only to a rate that the consumer has previously paid for insurance but also to a rate that the
consumer has previously been quoted, even if that rate was increased [**23] before the consumer made any payment. Reynolds disagrees,
asserting that, under [*1091] the ordinary definition of the term, an increase in a charge also occurs whenever an insurer charges a
higher rate than it would otherwise have charged because of any factor--such as adverse credit information, age, or driving record 8
--regardless of whether the customer was previously charged some other rate . According to Reynolds, he was charged an increased rate
because of his credit rating when he was compelled to pay a rate higher than the premium rate because he failed to obtain a high insurance
score. Thus, he argues, the definitions of "increase" and "charge" encompass the insurance companies' practice. Reynolds is correct.
Increase" means to make something greater. See, e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) ("The action, process, or fact
of becoming or making greater; augmentation, growth, enlargement, extension."); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF
AMERICAN ENGLISH (3d college ed. 1988) (defining "increase" as "growth, enlargement, etc[.]"). "Charge" means the price demanded for
goods or services. See, e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989) ("The price required or demanded for service rendered, or
(less usually) for goods supplied."); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN ENGLISH (3d college ed. 1988) ("The
cost or price of an article, service, etc."). Nothing in the definition of these words implies that the term "increase in any charge for" should
be limited to cases in which a company raises the rate that an individual has previously been charged.

Standards
1. Limits their interpretation underlimits the aff their interpretation only
allows for non inherent affs, it we are already diplomatically engaged with
china in one respect, its conceptually impossible to increase amounts of
diplomatic engagement in the certain field their interpretation leads to lazy
aff writing because we dont search for new solutions to issues at hand, all we
do is talk about why an exiting politcy is good
2. Ground we dont limit neg ground they still have accesss to literally every
DA that predicates a link based off of engagement with china they still have
access to everything
3. Bredth over depth it is better to learn about more things than one or two
preexisting policies all year
4. Default to reasonability good is good enough, their interpretation limits out
every aff on the topic competing interpretations cause a race to the bottom
which over-incentivizes going for t and moots aff ground and predictability

theory

Condo bad
Conditionality is bad for debatevote af
1. Interp: the neg should be allowed to run 1 conditional
advocacy
2. Ground We only have one plan and we already have the
burden of topicality. Allowing the neg multiple advocacies with
no standards skews ground, makes debate unfair. Skews the
2AC, making debate impossible or uneducational
3. Kills 2ac strategic thinking and ofensejustifies running
contradictory advocacies and conceding turns on one to
strengthen the otheraf cant make strategic concessions
5. If they win condo that justifies severance perms

Floating PIKs Bad

1. Interpretation: Negative can run kritiks with alternatives
about methodology or rethinking, just cant include our
planbest for debate
2. Perm groundPIKs destroy net benefits to permssolving
the 1ac is no longer unique to the af. They get the
alternative and status quo, we get plan and permits
reciprocal
3. They have no right to this groundthe 1ac is sacrosanct.
There job is to negate the resolution, not do the plan with
a diferent methodology. Topical PIKs justify the
resolution and are a reason to vote affirmative
4. Sketchy floating piks jusify severance perms

Vague alts
Vague alts bad, we are held to our precise plan text, hold them
to a precise alt. key 2 fairness from preventing block
explosion. If it is unclear then it wont solve, because people
wont know how to follow. Reject the alt and view the K as a
linear DA.

PICs Bad
1. Counterplans that solve harms through diferent
mechanisms with net benefits generated of plan
mechanism best for debate:
2. Plan focus: negs job is to attack the 1AC on the whole
increases topic specific education
3. Increases vague plan writing: unpredictable PICs are the
root of bad plan texts - removing the threat solves their
ofense
4. Forces trivial debates: shifts focus to trivial parts of the
plan instead of engaging the substance and desirability of
the plan as a whole
5. Justifies severance perms: its reciprocal if neg can sever
part of the plan for a PIC, af should be allowed to perm
justifies perm do CP. Reciprocity is the baseline for
switch-side debate each strategic benefit should incur a
strategic cost. And, Perm: do the CP solves.
6. Voter for fairness and education

Process CPs
1. Negative gets counterplans with solvency advocates held
to the same specificity as planbest for debate
2. Rational decision makingthere would never be a
situation where someone could choose between the plan
and a __________________there are literally ZERO advocates
in the literaturedivorcing debate from rational decisionmaking destroys its value
3. Infinitely regressivehundreds of diferent processes the
negative could useimpossible to prepare for every
possible processdestroys true cost-benefit analysis
anything seems like a good idea if we cant answer it
4. Process counterplans that do the entirety of the plan are
uniquely bad
5. Cannot garner any ofense from 1ackills argument
development
6. They justify severance perms

Consult cps
1. Interp the cp must be textualy and functually competitive
2. Textual comp is best it checks infinite regression to the
worst counterplans which short-circuit clash with the af
and decrease topic-specific education, it ensures core neg
ground, and doesnt allow bad perms
3. Functional Competition good- checks infinite regression
and ensures specificity of links, thats key to clash and
decreases topic educations and doesnt allow for bad
perms
4. Lack of competition on either level justifies severance
perms
5. Theyll have no OFFENSIVE REASON to prefer infinite bad
counterplans over select challenging ones, all their
reasons textual comp is bad are CREATED by functional
counterplans, and disads alone check
6. Voter because it proves the counterplan isnt competitive

At ASPEC
1). Counter-interpretation
a). USFG is all three branches otherwise the res would have
specified
b). And, the is a mass noun
2). Their interpretation is bad:
a) Justifies three resolutions, expanding the negatives research
burden.
b). Is infinitely regressive, killing predictability and the ability to
leverage stable advantages.
3). Defense
a). Cross-x & Reasonability checks- you had 3 entire minutes to
ask us about the agent and mechanism of the affirmative. Youre not
only wasting your own time but everyone elses in the room.