Article X.

Local Government
(Consolidated cases)

SUBMITTED BY:
LLB-4C

Article X. Local Government

Section 1. Territorial and Political Subdivisions of the Philippines
Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA, GR No. 79956, January 26, 1990
FACTS:

Executive Order No. 220, issued by the President in the exercise of her legislative
powers, created the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR), which covers the provinces
of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province and the City of
Baguio. It was created to accelerate economic and social growth in the region and to
prepare for the establishment of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras. Its main
function is to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in
the region, particularly, to coordinate with the local government units as well as with the
executive departments of the National Government in the supervision of field offices and
in identifying, planning, monitoring, and accepting projects and activities in the region. It
shall also monitor the implementation of all ongoing national and local government
projects in the region. The CAR shall have a Cordillera Regional Assembly as a policyformulating body and a Cordillera Executive Board as an implementing arm. The CAR
and the Assembly and Executive Board shall exist until such time as the autonomous
regional government is established and organized.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the E.O. 220 thereby creates a territorial and political subdivision.

HELD:

No. The CAR is not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does
not have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities.
Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally granted to public corporations, e.g.
the power to sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose of property, the power to
create its own sources of revenue, etc.

The CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of
programs and services in the covered areas. It is more similar to the regional
development councils which the President may create under Article X, Section 14.
The Constitution provides in Article X: Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions
of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras
as hereinafter provided.

Section 2. Local Autonomy

Limbona v. Conte Mangelin, et al, GR No. 80391, February 28, 1989

FACTS:
Petitioner was elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly or Batasang
Pampook of Central Mindanao (Assembly),petitioner in his capacity as Speaker of the
Assembly of Region XII was invited in a consultation/dialogue with local government
officials. Petitioner accepted the invitation and informed the Assembly members that
there shall be no session in November as his presence was needed in the house
committee hearing of Congress. However, the Assembly held a session in defiance of
Limbona's advice, where he was unseated from his position. Petitioner prays that the
session's proceedings be declared null and void and be it declared that he was still the
Speaker of the Assembly. Respondents argue that petitioner had "filed a case before
the Supreme Court against some members of the Assembly on a question which should
have been resolved within the confines of the Assembly.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the courts of law have jurisdiction over the autonomous governments or
regions.

HELD:
Autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There
is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of
government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and
accountable". At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns.

The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local
affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense
that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the
other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments
units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to
chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central
authorities.

San Juan v. CSC, 196 SCRA 69 (1991)

FACTS:
The Provincial Budget Officer of Rizal (PBO) was left vacant; thereafter Rizal Governor
San Juan, petitioner, nominated Dalisay Santos for the position and the latter quickly
assumed position. However, Director Abella of Region IV Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) did not endorse the nominee, and recommended private
respondent Cecilia Almajose as PBO on the ground that she was the most qualified.
This appointment was subsequently approved by the DBM. Petitioner protested the
appointment of Almajose before the DBM and the Civil Service Commission who both
dismissed his complaints. His arguments rest on his contention that he has the sole
right and privilege to recommend the nominees to the position of PBO and that the
appointee should come only from his nominees. In support thereof, he invokes Section
1 of Executive Order No. 112.

ISSUE:

Whether or not DBM is empowered to appoint a PBO who was not expressly nominated
by the provincial governor.

HELD:
The petitioner's power to recommend is subject to the qualifications prescribed by
existing laws for the position of PBO. Consequently, in the event that the
recommendations made by the petitioner fall short of the required standards, the
appointing authority, public respondent DBM is expected to reject the same.
Petitioner states that the phrase of said law: "upon recommendation of the local chief
executive concerned" must be given mandatory application in consonance with the state
policy of local autonomy as guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution under Art. II, Sec. 25
and Art. X, Sec. 2 thereof. He further argues that his power to recommend cannot
validly be defeated by a mere administrative issuance of public respondent DBM
reserving to itself the right to fill-up any existing vacancy in case the petitioner's
nominees do not meet the qualification requirements as embodied in DBM's Local
Budget Circular No. 31.

This case involves the application of a most important constitutional policy and principle,
that of local autonomy. We have to obey the clear mandate on local autonomy. Where a
law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacaang
and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of
autonomy.
Thereby, DBM Circular is ultra vires and is, accordingly, set aside. The DBM may
appoint only from the list of qualified recommended nominated by the Governor. If none
is qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one
meets the legal requirements and ask for new recommended who have the necessary
eligibilities and qualifications.

Magtajas v. Pryce Properties, GR No. 111097, July 20, 1994

FACTS:
PAGCOR decided to lease a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Corporation, Inc.,
renovated and equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its Casino there during
the Christmas season. Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The religious
elements echoed the objection and so did the womens groups and the youth.
Demonstrated were led by the mayor and the city legislators. The media trumpeted the
protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of the city. The contention of
the petitioners is that it is violative of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro
City Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino
and Ordinance No, 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. On the other hand, the
respondents invoke P.D. 1869 which created PAGCOR to help centralize and regulate
all game of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Philippines. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are valid.

HELD:
No. Cagayan de Oro City, like other political subdivisions, is empowered to enact
ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly
vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause now
embodied in Section 16 as follows:
Sec. 16. General Welfare Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily impliedly there from, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare.

Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and
support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health
and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and
support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice,
promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and
preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
There is a requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute. Municipal
governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only
delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking
body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than
those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo
the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and
negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.

Leynes v. COA, GR No. 143596, Dec. 11, 2003

FACTS:

The Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, sought the opinion of the Provincial Auditor and the
Provincial Budget Officer regarding any budgetary limitation on the grant of a monthly
allowance by the municipality to petitioner jugde Tomas C. Leynes. The SB unanimously
approved Resolution No. 101 increasing petitioner judges monthly allowance,Provincial
Auditor Salvacion Dalisay sent a letter to the Municipal Mayor and the SB of Naujan
directing them to stop the payment of the P1,600 monthly allowance to petitioner judge
and to require the immediate refund of the amounts previously paid to the latter. She
opined that the Municipality of Naujan could not grant RATA to petitioner judge in
addition to the RATA the latter was already receiving from the SC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Municipality of Naujan can validly provide RATA to its
Municipal Judge, in addition to that provided by the Supreme Court.

HELD:

The LGC of 1991 was specially promulgated by Congress to ensure the autonomyof
local governments as mandated by the Constitution. By upholding, in the present case,
the power of LGUs to grant allowances to judges and leaving to their discretion the
amount of allowances they may grant, depending on the availability of local funds.
The Court affirm the power of the Municipality of Naujan to grant the questioned
allowance to petitioner Judge Leynes in accordance with the constitutionality mandated
policy of local autonomy and the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991. The
Court also sustains the validity of Resolution No. 101, series of 1993, of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan for being in accordance with the law.

Batangas CATV v. CA and Batangas City, GR No. 138810, September 29, 2004

FACTS:
Respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Resolution granting petitioner a permit
to construct, install, and operate a CATV system in Batangas City. Section 8 of the
Resolution provides that petitioner is authorized to charge its subscribers the maximum
rates specified therein, provided, however, that any increase of rates shall be subject to
the approval of the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Sometime in November 1993, petitioner
increased its subscriber rates from P88.00 to P180.00 per month. As a result,
respondent Mayor wrote petitioner a letter threatening to cancel its permit unless it
secures the approval of respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod, pursuant to Resolution
No. 210.Petitioner then filed with the RTC, Branch 7, Batangas City, a petition for
injunction alleging that respondent Sangguniang Panlungsod has no authority to
regulate the subscriber rates charged by CATV operators because under Executive
Order No. 205, the National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) has the sole
authority to regulate the CATV operation in the Philippines.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a local government unit (LGU) may regulate the subscriber rates
charged by CATV operators within its territorial jurisdiction.

HELD:

No. The logical conclusion, therefore, is that in light of the above laws and E.O. No. 436,
the NTC exercises regulatory power over CATV operators to the exclusion of other
bodies. Like any other enterprise, CATV operation maybe regulated by LGUs under the
general welfare clause. This is primarily because the CATV system commits the
indiscretion of crossing public properties. The physical realities of constructing CATV
system the use of public streets, rights of ways, the founding of structures, and the
parceling of large regions allow an LGU a certain degree of regulation over CATV
operators. But, while we recognize the LGUs power under the general welfare clause,
we cannot sustain Resolution No. 210. We are convinced that respondents strayed from
the well-recognized limits of its power.

Section 3. Local Government Code

Garcia v. COMELEC, 227 SCRA 100 (1993)

FACTS:
Petitioners filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambansang
Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 which includes the Municipality of Morong as part of
the Subic Special Economic Zone in accord with the RA No. 7227.
The municipality did not take any action on the petition within 30 days after its
submission; so, they resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government
Code of 1991. They solicited the required number of signatures to repeal the said
resolution, the Vice Mayor, Hon. Edilberto de Leon, and the Presiding Office of the
Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong wrote a letter to deny the petition for local initiative
and referendum.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Pambansang Kapasyahan is the proper subject of an initiative and
referendum.
HELD:
The 1987 Constitution installed back the power to the people regarding legislation
because of the event in February 1986. The new Constitution became less trusting of
public officials.
Through initiative, the people were given the power to amend the Constitution under
Sec. 2 Art. 17 which provides amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least 12% of the total
number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be represented by at
least 3% of the registered voter therein.The Comelec was also empowered to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an initiative and
referendum.

Malonzo v. COMELEC, 269 SCRA 380 (1997)

FACTS:

Petitioners office as Mayor was put to serious question when Punong Barangays and
Sangguniang Barangay members and Sangguniang Kabataan chairmen, constituting a
majority of the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly of the city of Caloocan,
met, and upon deliberation and election, voted for the approval of Preparatory Recall
Assembly Resolution No. 01-96 expressing loss of confidence in Mayor Malonzo, and
calling for the initiation of recall proceedings against him.
PRA Resolution No. 01-96 was filed with the COMELEC for appropriate action. In
response, Mayor Malonzo filed a petition with respondent Commission alleging,
principally, that the recall process was deficient in form and substance, and therefore,
illegally initiated. COMELEC dismissed the petition. Hence the current petition was filed
before the Supreme Court.
Issue:

ISSUE:
Whether or not the recall process was illegally initiated.
HELD:
No. The law did not prescribe an elaborate proceeding neither did it demand a specific
procedure. What is fundamental is compliance with the provision that there should be a
session called for the purpose of initiating recall proceedings, attended by a majority of
all members of PRA, in a public place and that the resolution resulting from such
assembly be adopted by a majority of all the PRA members.

Section 4. Supervision by the President

Ganzon v. CA, 200 SCRA 271

FACTS:

Tumambing contracted the services of Ganzon to haul 305 tons of scrap iron from
Mariveles, Bataan, to the port of Manila on board the lighter LCT Batman; pursuant to
the agreement, Ganzon sent his lighter Batman to Marivelles where it docked;
Tumambing delivered the scrap iron to Filomeno Niza, captain of the lighter, for loading;
about half of the scrap iron was already loaded, Mayor Jose Advincula of Mariveles,
Bataan, arrived and demanded P5,000.00 from Tumambing BUT resisted the
shakedown and after a heated argument between them, Advincula drew his gun and
fired at Tumambing, because of which he sustained physical injuries.
Acting Mayor Basilio Rub, accompanied by three policemen, ordered captain Niza and
his crew to dump the scrap iron where the lighter was docked; the rest was brought to
the compound of NASSCO; Rub issued a receipt stating that the Municipality of
Mariveles had taken custody of the scrap iron
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a breach of contract of transportation.
HELD:
Yes. the scraps were unconditionally placed in the possession and control of the
common carrier owned by Ganzon, and upon their receipt by the carrier for
transportation, the contract of carriage was deemed perfected; hence, Ganzons
extraordinary responsibility for the loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods
commenced; pursuant to Art. 1736, such extraordinary responsibility would cease only
upon the delivery, actual or constructive, by the carrier to the consignee, or to the
person who has a right to receive them; the fact that part of the shipment had not been
loaded on board the lighter did not impair the said contract of transportation as the
goods remained in the custody and control of the carrier, though still unloaded Ganzon
has failed to show that the loss of the scraps was due to any of the causes enumerated
in Art. 1734; hence he is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently; he
could have been exempted from any liability had he been able to prove that he
observed extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods in his custody,

according to all the circumstances of the case, or that the loss was due to an
unforeseen event or to force majeure, but he failed to do so theory of case fortuity not
applicable.

Joson v. Torres, 290 SCRA 279

FACTS:
Private respondents filed a letter-complaint charging petitioner Eduardo Nonato Joson,
Governor of the said province with grave misconduct and abuse of authority. President
Ramos instructed then Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments (SILG) Robert
Barbers to "take appropriate preemptive and investigative actions.
Secretary Barbers directed petitioner to submit his verified/sworn answer. Petitioner,
through counsel, filed a "Motion to Dismiss." Petitioner alleged that the DILG had no
jurisdiction over the case and no authority to require him to answer the complaint.
On recommendation of Secretary Barbers, Executive Secretary Ruben Torres issued an
order, by authority of the President, placing petitioner under preventive suspension for
sixty (60) days pending investigation of the charges against him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the DILG Secretary had jurisdiction over the case and authority towards
the case.

HELD:

Yes. The Secretary of the Interior and Local Government is the Investigating Authority,
who may act by himself or constitute an Investigating Committee. The Secretary of the
DILG, however, is not the exclusive Investigating Authority. In lieu of the DILG
Secretary, the Disciplining Authority may designate a Special Investigating Committee.

Drilon v. Lim, 235 SCRA 135 (1994)

FACTS:

The Secretary of Justice had declared Ordinance No. 7794, known as Manila Revenue
Code, null and void for noncompliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment
of tax ordinance and for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy. It
declared Sec.187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional because of its
vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over local governments in
violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the specific
provision conferring on the President of the Philippines only the power of supervision
over local government.

ISSUE:

Whether or not, the Secretary of Justice can exercise control rather than supervision
over the local government.

HELD:
The judgment of the lower court was reversed in so far as its declaration that
Section 187 of the Local Government Code was unconstitutional but affirmed the said
lower courts finding that the procedural requirements in the enactment of the Manila
Revenue Code had been observed. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to
review only the Constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance. Secretary Drilon did set
aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version.

Province of Negros v. COA, GR No. 182574, September 28, 2010

FACTS:
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Negros Occidental passed a resolution allocating P4,
000,000 of its retained earnings for the hospitalization and health care insurance
benefits of 1,949 officials and employees of the province. After a post-audit
investigation, the Provincial Auditor issued Notice of Suspension suspending the
premium payment because of lack of approval from the Office of the President as
provided under Administrative Order No. 103 (AO 103).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the grant of additional compensation needs the approval of the
President to be valid.
.
HELD:

The President may only point out that rules have not been followed but the President
cannot lay down the rules, neither does he have the discretion to modify or replace the
rules. Thus, the grant of additional compensation like hospitalization and health care
insurance benefits in the present case does not need the approval of the President to
be valid.

Section 5. Power of Taxation by Local Government

LTO v. City of Butuan, 322 SCRA 805

FACTS:

An Ordinance regulating the Operation of Tricycles-for-Hire, providing mechanism for

the issuance of Franchise, Registration and Permit, and imposing Penalties for
Violations thereof and for other purposes was passed by the local council of the City of
Butuan. The ordinance provided for, among other things, the payment of franchise fees
for the grant of the franchise of tricycles-for-hire, fees for the registration of the vehicle,
and fees for the issuance of a permit for the driving thereof. LTO explains that one of the
functions of the National Government that indeed has been transferred to LGUs is the
franchising authority over tricycles-for-hire of the LTFRB but not the authority of LTO to
register all motor vehicles and to issue to qualified persons of licenses to drive.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the taxing powers of LGUs include the registration of tricycles-for-hire
and the issuance of licenses or permits for the driving thereof.

HELD:

No. The power over tricycles granted under Section 458 of the Local Government Code
is the power to regulate their operation and to grant franchises for operation thereof.
The clause contained in the tax provision of Section 133 must not be construed as to
withdraw the express power of LTO to cause the registration of all motor vehicles and
the issuance of licenses for driving thereof.Said powers remain under LTOs exclusive
jurisdiction. Thus, what is devolved to the LGU is the power to regulate the operation
and grant franchises thereof but they are subject to the guidelines prescribed by DOTC.

Lina v. Pano, 364 SCRA 76 (2001)

FACTS:
Respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the PCSO to install Terminal OM 20
for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of San Pedro,
Laguna, for a permit to open lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquiz on the
ground that an ordinance was passed by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna
entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T.1995 which reads: ISANG KAPASIYAHAN
TINUTUTULAN ANG MGA ILLEGAL GAMBLING LALO NA ANG LOTTO SA
LALAWIGAN NG LAGUNA As A Result of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint
for declaratory relief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining
order.

ISSUE:
Whether Kapasiyahan Blg. 508, T.1995 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna is
valid.

HELD:
RULING: The Petition is denied. The Court ruled that the ordinance merely states the
objection of the council to said game. It is but a mere policy statement on the part of
the local council, which is not self-executing. Nor could it serve as a valid ground to
prohibit the operation of the lotto system in the province of Laguna. As a policy
statement expressing the local governments objection to the lotto, such resolution is
valid. This is part of the local governments autonomy to air its views which maybe
contrary to that of the national governments. However, this freedom to exercise contrary
views does not mean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go
against laws duly enacted by Congress.

Petron v. Mayor, GR No. 158881, April 16, 2008

FACTS:

A specific prohibition is imposed barring the levying of any other type of taxes with
respect to petroleum products. In accordance to the New Navotas Revenue Code or
Ordinance 92-03, petitioner Petron Corporation was assessed a total tax of
P6,259,087.62. Petron filed a letter protest arguing that it is exempt from paying local
business taxes as provided by Article 232 (h) of the Implementing Rules of the Local
Government Code.
The letter-protest was denied. A Complaint for Cancellation of Assessment was filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malabon. The RTC dismissed the Complaint
and required Petron to pay the assessed tax. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed but
it was later denied by the court.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a local government unit is empowered under the Local Government
Code (LGC) to impose business taxes on persons or entities engaged in the sale of
petroleum.

HELD:

Yes. This ability of local government units to impose business or other local taxes is
ultimately rooted in the 1987 Constitution. Section 5, Article X assures that [e]ach local
government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy
taxes, fees and charges, though the power is subject to such guidelines and limitations
as the Congress may provide.

Yamane v. BA Lepanto Condominium, GR No. 154993, October 25, 2005

FACTS:

Respondent BA-Lepanto Condominium Corporation is a duly organized condominium

corporation. Its membership comprises the various unit owners of the Condominium.
The Corporation is authorized, under Article V of its Amended By-Laws, to collect
regular assessments from its members for operating expenses, capital expenditures on
the common areas, and other special assessments as provided for in the Master Deed
with Declaration of Restrictions of the Condominium. The Corporation received a Notice
of Assessment signed by the City Treasurer. The Notice of Assessment stated that the
Corporation is liable to pay the correct city business taxes, fees and charges, for the
years 1995 to 1997. The Notice of Assessment was silent as to the statutory basis of
the business taxes assessed.

ISSUE:
Whether a local government unit can compels a condominium corporation to pay
business taxes.
HELD:

Yes. The power of local government units to impose taxes within its territorial jurisdiction
derives from the Constitution itself, which recognizes the power of these units to create
its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such
guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy
of local autonomy. These guidelines and limitations as provided by Congress are in
main contained in the Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code).

Philippine Petroleum v. Municipality of Pililla, GR No. 90773, June 3, 1991

FACTS:

Petitioner filed a petition for Certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the decision of the
Regional Trial Court. Accordingly, RTC ERRED in ordering the payment of the Business
tax in the right of Provisional Circular No. 26-73. On the other hand, the respondent
clarified the motion of petitioner that the exercise by local government of the power to
tax is ordered by the present constitution. And only guidelines and limitations that may
be established by Congress could define and limit such power of local government.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the power of local governments to raise revenues may be limited by
administrative order.

HELD:

No. Under Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, only guidelines and limitations
that may be established by Congress can define and limit such power of local
governments. Premises considered with the modification that business taxes accruing
prior to 1976 are not be paid by PPC.

John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition v. Lim, GR No. 119775, October 24, 2003

FACTS:

President Ramos declaring a portion of Camp John Hay as a Special Economic

Zone(SEZ) and creating a regime of tax exemption within the John Hay Special
Economic Zone. In the present petition, petitioners assailed the constitutionality of the
proclamation. The Court also held that it is the legislature, unless limited by a provision
of the Constitution, that has the full power to exempt any person or corporation or class
of property from taxation, its power to exempt being as broad as its power to tax. The
challenged grant of tax exemption would circumvent the Constitution's imposition that a
law granting any tax exemption must have the concurrence of a majority of all the
members of Congress. Thus, the Court declared that the grant by Proclamation No. 420
of tax exemption and other privileges to the John Hay SEZ was void for being violative
of the Constitution. However, the entire assailed proclamation cannot be declared
unconstitutional, the other parts thereof not being repugnant to the law or the
Constitution. The delineation and declaration of a portion of the area covered by Camp
John Hay as a SEZ was well within the powers of the President to do so by means of a
proclamation. Where part of a statute is void as contrary to the Constitution, while
another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the invalid, as in the case at bar,
may stand and be enforced.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing to this case.

HELD:

The grant by the law on local government units of the right of concurrence on the bases'
conversion is equivalent to vesting a legal standing on them, for it is in effect a
recognition of the real interests that communities nearby or surrounding a particular
base area have in its utilization.
Thus, the interest of petitioners, being inhabitants of Baguio, in assailing the legality of
Proclamation No. 420, is personal and substantial such that they have sustained or will

sustain direct injury as a result of the government act being challenged. Theirs is a
material interest, an interest in issue affected by the proclamation and not merely an
interest in the question involved or an incidental interest, for what is at stake in the
enforcement of Proclamation No. 420 is the very economic and social existence of the
people of Baguio City..

Manila Electric v. Province of Laguna, GR No. 131359, May 5, 1999

FACTS:

Th e P r o v i n c e o f L a g u n a i s s u e d resolutions through their respective municipal

councils granting franchise in favor of Meralco for the supply of light, heat and power
within the concerned areas.
T h e p r o v i n c e o f L a g u n a e n a c t e d L a g u n a P r o v i n c i a l O r d i n a n c e which
imposed tax on businesses enjoying a franchise at a rate of the gross annual receipts.
T h e p r o v i n c i a l t r e a s u r e r s e n t a d e m a n d l e t t e r t o m e r a l c o f o r the tax
payment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Laguna Provincial Tax Ordinance is valid, binding, reasonable and
enforceable.

HELD:

Yes. Under the present Constitution, where there is neither a grant nor a prohibition by
statute, the tax power must be deemed to exist although Congress may provide
statutory limitations and guidelines. The reason for this is to safeguard the viability and
self-sufficiency of local government units by directly granting them general and broad
tax powers. The LGC of 1991 explicitly authorizes provincial governments,
notwithstanding any exemption granted by law, to impose tax on businesses enjoying
a franchise.

Batangas Power v. Batangas City, GR No. 152675, April 28, 2004

FACTS:

BATANGAS POWER CITY registered itself with the Board of Investments (BOI) as a
pioneer enterprise. On September 23, 1992, the BOI issued a certificate of registration
to BPC as a pioneer enterprise entitled to a tax holiday for a period of six (6) years. The
construction of the power station in respondent Batangas City was then completed.
BPC operated the station.

ISSUE:
Whether NPCs tax exemption privileges under its Charter .

HELD:

Considered as the most revolutionary piece of legislation on local autonomy, the LGC
effectively deals with the fiscal constraints faced by LGUs. It widens the tax base of
LGUs to include taxes which were prohibited by previous laws.Neither can the NPC
successfully rely on the Basco case as this was decided prior to the effectivity of the
LGC, when there was still no law empowering local government units to tax
instrumentalities of the national government.
Consequently, when NPC assumed the tax liabilities of the BPC under their 1992 BOT
Agreement, the LGC which removed NPCs tax exemption privileges had already been
in effect for six (6) months. Thus, while BPC remains to be the entity doing business in
said city, it is the NPC that is ultimately liable to pay said taxes under the provisions of
both the 1992 BOT Agreement and the 1991 Local Government Code.

Smart Communications v. City of Davao, GR No. 155491, September 16, 2008

FACTS:

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the Smart Communications, Inc. to
annul the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Smart contends that its telecenter in
Davao City is exempt from payment of franchise tax to the city. The respondents
invoked the power granted by the Constitution to local government units to create their
own sources of revenue.

ISSUE:
Whether or not City of Davao has the power to create its own sources of revenue.

HELD:

The Court held that Local governments units has the power to create their own sources
of revenue as stated in article X, section 5.

Section 6. Share in National Taxes

Pimentel v. Aguirre, 336 SCRA 201 (2000)

FACTS:

Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeks the following: (1) to annul Section 1 of
Administrative Order (AO) No. 372, insofar as it requires local government units to
reduce their expenditures by 25 percent of their authorized regular appropriations for
non-personal services; and (2) to enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of
the Order, which withholds a portion of their internal revenue allotments.

ISSUE:
Whether (a) Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs" LGUs to reduce their
expenditures by 25 percent; and (b) Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10
percent of their internal revenue allotments, are valid exercises of the President's power
of general supervision over local governments.
.
HELD:
The Petition is partly meritorious. Hand in hand with the constitutional restraint on the
President's power over local governments is the state policy of ensuring local autonomy.
The provision is merely an advisory to prevail upon local executives to recognize the
need for fiscal restraint in a period of economic difficulty. Indeed, all concerned would
do well to heed the President's call to unity, solidarity and teamwork to help alleviate the
crisis. It is understood, however, that no legal sanction may be imposed upon LGUs
and their officials who do not follow such advice. It is in this light that we sustain the
solicitor general's contention in regard to Section 1.

Province of Batangas v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 152774, May 27, 2004

FACTS:

The Province of Batangas represented by its Governor, Hermilando I. Mandanas, filed

for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus to declare as unconstitutional and void certain
provisions contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAA) of 1999, 2000, and 2001,
insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of five
billion pesos (P5, 000, 000, 000.00) of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for Local
Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) and imposed conditions for the
release thereof.

ISSUE:

Whether or not assailed provisions contained in the GAA of 1999, 2000, and 2001 are
unconstitutional

HELD:

The Court held that petitioners constitutional claim is, in substance, that the assailed
provisions in GAA, contravenes Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, mandating the
automatic release of their share in the national taxes.

Alternative Center v. Zamora, GR No. 144256, June 8, 2005

FACTS

The GAA appropriated PhP 111,778,000,000.00 of IRA as programmed fund. It

appropriated a separate amount of P10B of IRA under the classification of programmed
fund, the latter amount to be released only upon the occurrence of the conditions stated
in the GAA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the questioned provision violate the constitutional injunction .

HELD:

Article X Section 6 of the Constitution provides: LGUs shall have a just share, as
determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.
While automatic release implies that the just share should be released to them as a
matter of course, withholding its release pending an event contravened the
constitutional mandate.

League of Cities v. COMELEC August 24, 2010

FACTS:

Congress enacted into law RA 9009 amending Section 450 of the Local Government
Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into
a city from P20 million to P100 million to restrain the mad rush of municipalities to
convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment
despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence. Prior to its enactment, a
total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in Congress.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for
violation of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal
protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of
municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue
Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside
for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X

HELD:

Yes, it was ruled that Section 6, Article X was violated because the Cityhood Laws
infringed on the just share that petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention shall receive
from the national taxes (IRA) to be automatically released to them.

Section 7. Equitable Share in the National Wealth

Section 8. Term of Local Officials
Borja v. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157

FACTS:

Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on1988 for a
term ending June 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law,
upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. On May 11, 1992, he ran and was
elected mayor for a term of three years which ended on 1995. On May 8, 1995, he was
reelected mayor for another term of three years ending June 30, 1998.
Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capcos
disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for
three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for
another term after that.

ISSUE:
Whether or not succession into office is not counted as one (1) term for purposes
of the computation of the three-term limitation under the Constitution and the Local
Government Code.

HELD:
In both the Constitution and the Local Government Code, the three-term limitation refers
to the term of office for which the local official was elected. It made no reference to
succession to an office to which he was not elected. In the case before the Commission,
respondent Capco was not elected to the position of mayor in the January 18, 1988
local elections. He succeeded to such office by operation of law and served for the
unexpired term of his predecessor. Consequently, such succession into office is not
counted as one (1) term for purposes of the computation of the three-term limitation
under the Constitution and the Local Government Code.

Lozanida v. COMELEC, GR No. 135150, July 28, 1999

FACTS:

Petitioner was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of
San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections
Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed winner.
He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was
contested by his opponent who filed an election protest. The court rendered a judgment
declaring the results of the said election last May 8, 1995, as null and void on the
ground that there was a failure of election.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio

Zambales from May 1995 to 1998 may be considered as service of one full term for the
purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local government officials.

HELD:

No. The petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term
because he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. Involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few
months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in
compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that
effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service
and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral terms.

Adormeo v. COMELEC, GR No. 147927, February 4, 2002

FACTS:

Respondent Talaga was elected Mayor of Lucena City in 1992, re-elected in 1995, but
lost to Tagarao in 1998 elections. Tagarao was recalled and in the May 12, 2000 recall
elections, Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001.
Talaga was candidate for Mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections, and a petition for
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was filed on the ground that he has served as
Mayor for three consecutive terms.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Talaga has served as Mayor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms.

HELD:

Talaga did not serve for 3 consecutive terms. For nearly 2 years, he was a private
citizen. The continuity of his mayor ship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998
elections. Thus, he could still run for the next election because he had not served 3 full
terms.

Socrates v. COMELEC, 391 SCRA 457 (2002)

FACTS:

The COMELEC called for a recall election for the mayoralty post in Puerto Princesa City
in September 2002. Former Mayor Edward Hagedorn filed his Certificate of Candidacy

in August 2002.Several petitions were filed by different petitioners all of which sought
for the disqualification of Hagedorn to run for the recall election and for the cancellation
of his COC arguing that Hagedorn should be disqualified from running since he has
already served as Mayor of the city for 3 consecutive full terms prior to the 2002 recall
election.COMELECs First Division dismissed the consolidated petitions for lack of merit
and allowed Hagedorn to run.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Hagedorn who has been elected and served for 3 consecutive full terms
as Mayor may be qualified to run in the subsequent recall election.

HELD:

Yes, Hagedorn is qualified. The Court held that a subsequent recall election is not the
immediate re-election after 3 consecutive terms which Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution
prohibits. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same position
following the end of the 3rd consecutive term.
Hagedorns candidacy in the 2002 recall election in September 2002 is not an
immediate re-election after his 3rd consecutive term which ended in June 2001.
Between the end of his third term and the recall election there was an interruption thus
breaking the successiveness.

Latasa v. COMELEC, GR No. 154829, Dec. 10, 2003

FACTS:

Latasa have been elected for 3 consecutive terms as mayor, however for his last term
the municipality of Digos was converted into a city. For the 2011 election, Latasa filed

again his candidacy for city mayor and was protested by respondent Sunga. The first
division of COMELEC cancelled the candidacy of Latasa for reason that he has already
served for 3 consecutive terms.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Latasa the candidacy of Latasa as city mayor of Digos after serving 3
consecutive terms.

HELD:

No. In the conversion of the municipality into a city, there has been no change in
territory or in constituency. Thus, the three-term limit still applies, the petition is
DISMISSED

David v. COMELEC, 271 SCRA 90 (1997)

FACTS:

The petitioner filed a petition for prohibition in the Supreme Court, under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, to prohibit the holding of the barangay election scheduled on the second
Monday of May 1997. Petitioner contends that under sec.2 of RA NO. 6653, approved
on May 6, 1988,the term of office of barangay officials shall be for five (5) years. This
is reiterated in RA No. 6679, approved which reset the barangay elections from the
second Monday of November 1988 to March 28, 1989 and provided in Sec. 1 thereof
that such five-year term shall begin on the first day of May 1989 and ending on the
thirty-first day of May 1994.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the term of office of barangay chairmen and other barangay officials who
elected are three years or five years.

HELD:
As stated in RA 7160, The Local Government Code, was enacted later that RA 6679. It
is basic that in case of an irreconcilable conflict between two laws of different vintages,
the later enactment prevails. The rationale is simple: a later law repeals an earlier one
because it is the later legislative will. Under the Civil Code, laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones- and not the other way around. Section 43-c of RA 7169 provides that
the term of office of barangay officials was fixed at three (3) years which shall begin
after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994. This
provision is clearly inconsistent with and repugnant to Sec 1 of RA 6679 which states
that such term shall be for five years.

Montebon v. COMELEC, 551 SCRA 50

FACTS:

Petitioner Montebon admitted that he had been elected for three consecutive terms as
municipal councilor. However, he claimed that the service of his second term in 20012004 was interrupted on January 12, 2004 when he succeeded as vice mayor of
Tuburan due to the retirement of Vice Mayor Petronilo L. Mendoza. Consequently, he is
not disqualified from vying for the position of municipal councilor in the 2007 elections.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners assumption of office as vice-mayor by operation of law an
involuntary severance from his office as municipal councilor and therefore an
interruption in the service of his term.

HELD:

Yes. When he assumed the office of Vice-Mayor, his assumption was by operation of
law. It was an involuntary severance from his office as municipal councilor resulting in
an interruption in the service of his 2001-2004 terms. He did not serve the full 20012004 term.

Ong v. Alegre, GR No. 163295, January 23, 2006

FACTS:

Respondent filed with the COMELEC Provincial Office a Petition to Disqualify Ong.
The petition was predicated on the three-consecutive term-rule, Ong having, according
to Alegre, ran in the May 1995, May1998, and May 2001 mayoralty elections and have
assumed office as mayor and discharged the duties thereof for 3 consecutive full terms
corresponding to those elections. Ong alleged that he could not be considered as
having served as mayor from 1998 to 2001 because he was not duly elected to the
post; he merely assumed office as a presumptive winner.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the term for which the petitioner was invalidly elected be counted for the
purposes of the 3-term limit.

HELD:

Yes. For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to apply, one requisite
is that the official has fully served 3 consecutive terms. Being a presumptive winner did
not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation as the duly elected
mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his
continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should
legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the 3-term rule.

Dizon v. COMELEC, GR No. 182088, January 30, 2009

FACTS:
Private respondent, in the last month of his third term, was ousted by a final decision
declaring his election invalid. Petitioner alleges that the private respondent has fully

served the three consecutive terms as a Mayor and no longer eligible and qualified to
run as Mayor of the Municipality of Mabalacat, Pampanga for the next election after his
third term.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the three-term limit applies whenever there is an involuntary break in
ones service of term.

HELD:

The three-term limit does not apply whenever there is an involuntary break. The
Constitution does not require that the interruption to be full term of three (3) years. What
the law requires is for an interruption, break or a rest period from a candidates term of
office for any length of time.In sum, the three-term limit is not applicable in the instant
case because the private respondent has failed to serve the entire duration of the term
when he was ousted from office on May 16, 2007, more than a month prior to the end of
his supposed term.

Alboin v. COMELEC, GR No. 184836, December 23, 2009

FACTS:

The respondent was elected councilor for three consecutive terms for the 1998-2001,
2001-2004, 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007
term of office the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation
with a criminal case he then faced. The Court, however, subsequently lifted the
Sandiganbayan's suspension; hence, he resumed performing the function of his office
and finished his term.

ISSUE:

Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official constituted interruptions that

allows him to run for a fourth term.

HELD:

Preventive suspension is a remedial measure that operates under closely -controlled

conditions. Thus, while a temporary incapacity in the exercise of power results, no
position is vacated when a public official is preventively suspended. Thus, the
preventive suspension of a local elective official does not interrupt his term for purposes
of computing the 3-term limit.

David v. COMELEC, GR No. 127116, April 8, 1997

Facts: Petitioner Alex L. David, in his capacity as barangay chairman of Barangay

77, Zone 7, kalookan City and as a president of Liga ng mga Barangay sa
Pilipinas filed a petition for prohibition to prohibit the holding of the barangay

election scheduled on the second Monday of May 1997. The Court resolved to
require the respondents to comment on the petition within non- extendible period
of fifteen days ending on January 29, 1997. The Solicitor General filed his four
page Comment siding with petitioner and praying that the election scheduled on
May 12, 1997 be held in abeyance. Respondents Commission on Elections filed a
separate Comment opposing the petition.

Issue: Whether or not the three-year term is repugnant to the constitution

Whether or not the petitioner estopped from challenging their three year
term
Held: Sec. 8, Article X of the constitution States: The term of office of elective
local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall
be three years, and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.
Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter Posits that by excepting
barangay officials whose term shall be determined by law from the general
provision fixing the term of elective local officials at three years, the
Constitution thereby impliedly prohibits congress from legislating a three year
term for such officers.
This Court cannot and will not grant its imprimatur to such untenable proposition.
If they want to continue serving, they must get a new mandate in the elections
scheduled on May 12, 1997.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED for being completely devoid of merit.

Section 9. Sectoral Representatives

Supangan Jr. v. Santos, GR No. 84662, August 24, 1990

Section 10. Creation, Abolition, Change of Boundaries

Tan v. COMELEC, 142 SCRA 727 (1986)

League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC, GR 176951, Nov. 29, 2008

Sema v. COMELEC, 558 SCRA 700

Camid v. Office of the President, GR No. 161414, January 17, 2005

Navarro v. Executive Secretary, GR No. 180050, February 10, 2010

Section 11. Metropolitan Political Subdivisions

MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association Assoc., GR No. 135962, March 27, 2000

MMDA v. Garin, GR No. 130230, April 15, 2005

Gancayco v. City Government of Quezon City, 658 SCRA 853

Section 12. Highly Urbanized Cities, Component Cities

Abella v. COMELEC, GR No. 100710, September 3, 1991

Section 13. Local Government Units Grouping Themselves

Section 14. Regional Development Councils and Other Similar Bodies
Section 15. Autonomous Regions
Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, GR No. 196271, October 18, 2011

Section 16. General Supervision of the President

Section 17. Powers Not Vested to the ARMM
Sections 18 and19. Organic Act for Autonomous Regions
Abbas v. COMELEC, 179 SCRA 287 (1989)

Ordillos v. COMELEC, 192 SCRA 100 (1990)

Badua v. CBA, 194 SCRA 101 (1991)

Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA, GR No. 82217, Jan. 29, 1990

Pandi v. CA, GR No. 116850, April 11, 2002

Sema v. COMELEC, GR No. 177597, July 16, 2008

Section 20. Legislative Powers of the Autonomous Regions

Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Philippines Peace Panel, 568
SCRA 492

Section 21. Preservation of Peace and Order