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1NC Frontline
Surveillance doesnt affect the majority of Muslim populations
poll data backs us up
Sidhu 7 Dawinder S. Sidhu, Associate Professor of Law, B.A. 2000 from
University of Pennsylvania, M.A. 2003 from Johns Hopkins University, J.D. 2004 from
The George Washington University, Member of the Maryland Bar, served as a fellow
at the Supreme Court of the United States, received a Distinguished Service Award,
taught at the Georgetown University Law Center and University of Baltimore School
of Law, held visiting research posts at the Oxford University Faculty of Law and
Georgetown University Law Center, held fellowships at Harvard University and
Stanford University research centers, presented at various law schools, including
the University of Pennsylvania Law School and Stanford Law School, participated in
programs at leading think tanks, such as the Aspen Institute and Council on Foreign
Relations, served as a legal observer of the military commissions at Guantanamo,
cited by the Solicitor General of the United States and U.S. Department of Justice,
cited in briefs submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States, 2007 (The
Chilling Effect of Government Surveillance Programs on the Use of the Internet by
Muslim-Americans, 7 U. Md. L.J. Race, Religion, Gender & Class, Available online at
handle=hein.journals/margin7&collection=journals&page=375, Accessed on
Identity: Of the 311 respondents, all identified themselves as Muslims.83
General Internet Usage: A vast majority of respondents (80.1%) used the Internet
prior to 9/11, while the rest did not. After 9/11, the Internet usage of the
respondents increased 7.7 %, with 87.8% stating that they have used the
Internet after the terrorist attacks, while only 11.9% reporting that they have
not. The trend towards greater Internet usage continued, as 90.4% of
respondents note that they "currently use" the Internet, and only 9.3% state
that they do not.
Views Regarding Government Surveillance: 71.7% of respondents believe (48.9%
strongly, 22.8% somewhat) that the government is currently monitoring the
activities of Muslims in the United States. By contrast, only 4.2% (1.6%
somewhat and 2.6% strongly) disbelieve that such monitoring is taking
place. Similarly, 70.7% of respondents believe (45.0% strongly, 25.7%
somewhat) that the government is currently monitoring the Internet
activities of
Muslims in the United States. Only 4.8% disbelieve (2.9% somewhat, 1.9%
strongly) that such monitoring is taking place.
Alterations in Behavior--Generally: 86.8% of respondents said they have not
changed at all their general activities after 9/11 due to a concern that the

government may be monitoring their activities. Only 11.6% of

respondents changed their general activities (6.1% made slight changes,
2.3% made moderate changes, 1.6% made many changes, 1.6% made significant
changes) due to this concern.
65.9% of respondents stated that they were not personally aware of any
other Muslims in the United States who changed, in any way, their general
activities after 9/11, because of a concern that the government may be
monitoring their activities. 25.4% of respondents stated they were personally
aware of any other Muslims in the United States who changed, in any way, their
general activities after 9/11, because of a concern that the government may be
monitoring their activities.
Alterations in Behavior-Internet Usage: 89.1% of respondents said they have
not changed their Internet usage at all -the sites they visit or the amount
of time they spend on the Internet-after 9/11 due to a concern that the
government may be monitoring their activities. Only 8.4% of respondents
changed their Internet usage (3.9% made slight changes, 1.6% made moderate
changes, 1.9% made many changes, 1.0% made significant changes) due to this
concern. Of those who stated that they have made changes in their Internet usage,
57.6% noted that they did not visit websites after 9/11, because of a concern that
the government may be monitoring their online activities.
77.2% of respondents stated that they were not personally aware of any
other Muslims in the United States who changed, in any way, their
Internet usage after 9/11, because of a concern that the government may
be monitoring their activities. 11.9% of respondents stated they were personally
aware of any other Muslims in the United States who changed, in any way, their
Internet usage after 9/11, because of a concern that the government may be
monitoring their activities. Of these respondents, 45.6% stated that they are
personally aware of other Muslim-Americans who have not visited certain web sites
after 9/11, because of a concern that the government may be monitoring their
online activities.

This card is probably takes out the aff

McMillen 06 [Lucas McMillen, University of St. Thomas, Eye on Islam: Judicial

Scrutiny Along the Religious Profiling/Suspect Description Reliance Spectrum,
after the September 11th terrorist attacks, Attorney General John Ashcroft
in those early
hours," said Ashcroft in a 2002 press conference announcing the Bureau's
reorientation, "the prevention of terrorist acts became the central goal of
the law enforcement and national security mission of the FBI. "l But, while

converted the Federal Bureau of Investigation into a counterterrorism agency: "That day,

Ashcroft may have properly redirected the FBI toward confronting the
primary threat to United States safety and security, his identification of
our enemy was not as particular as it could have been. In 2004, the 9/11
Commission aimed for further clarity: [T]he enemy is not just "terrorism,"
some generic evil. This vagueness blurs the strategy. The catastrophic
threat at this moment in history is more specific. It is the threat posed by
Islamist terrorism -especially the al Qaeda network, its affiliates, and its ideology. 2 Indeed, no
characteristic unites the perpetrators of recent terrorist acts so much as
their Muslim identity. Middle Eastern nationality may be thought to
provide the link, but this trait proves to be underinclusive : to name just a few
examples, Richard Reid, the "shoe bomber," is a Muslim who was born and educated in the United Kingdom,3 as
were the four July 7th London Underground bombers.4 Zacarias Moussaoui, the only person to be charged and
convicted by United States courts in connection with the September 11th terrorist attacks, is a French Muslim.5
Earnest James Ujaama, an indicted al-Qaeda associate, is a Muslim convert who was born in Denver and raised in
Seattle.6 Furthermore,

of the twenty-six terrorists currently on the FBI's Most

Wanted List, three are from the Philippines; two are from Kenya; one, Abdul
Rahman Yasin, is from Indiana-all are Muslims.7 Nor does Arab ethnicity serve as a
reliably accurate terrorist-identifying characteristic: on December 5th,
2005, a white woman who was raised as a Catholic in Belgium became the
first European Muslim suicide bomber when she detonated herself in
Baquba.8 Indeed, the use of stereotype-defying terrorist operatives is entirely
consistent with al-Qaeda's expressed intent to employ deceptive tactics in
carrying out its attacks.9 Of course, the one characteristic that Islamist
radicals cannot obscure by selective conscription is Islamic identity.
Accordingly, Muslim identity should be considered the attribute that
correlates most positively with terrorist involvement ; or, in the words of Abdel
Rahman aI-Rashed, the general manager of Al-Arabiya, a top pan-Arab television station in the Middle East,10 " It
is a certain fact that not all Muslims are terrorists. but it is equally certain,
and exceptionally painful, that almost all terrorists are Muslims ."11 Our
question then becomes, what is the proper role for Muslim identity in our
law-enforcement offIcials' preventive counterterrorism efforts? It is a
question that calls for a survey of our Constitution as well as our
conscience, as the answer may compel us to contemplate taking
permissible but regrettable measures against a particular religious group.
In 1785, James Madison wrote: "[A just government] will be best supported by
protecting every citizen in the enjoyment of his Religion with the same equal hand
which protects his person and his property."12 But what shall be done when
those two ideals are incompatible, when protecting persons and their
property requires the government to take action that may infringe on
others' religious enjoyment? We are faced with bad (ostracizing Muslims)
and worse (suffering another terrorist attack) choices, a predicament
expressed in the dour words of the reliably relevant Winston Churchill, who,
speaking in a different context, said, "We seem to be very near the bleak choice
between War and Shame. My feeling is that we shall choose Shame, and then have
War thrown in a little later on even more adverse terms than at present." 13 To
assist legal and law enforcement authorities in avoiding both Shame and War, this
Article will aim to provide a legal framework allowing law enforcement

officials greater flexibility in targeting religious groups. In doing so, it will

focus exclusively on religious-group targeting and will not address the
related issues of racial and ethnic profiling, which have been adequately
covered by other commentators. I will begin by discussing the difference
between acts of religious profiling and acts of suspect description
reliance, and then discuss how most acts of religious-group targeting can
be plausibly characterized as either. Finally, I will recommend that courts
adopt a view toward religious-group targeting that allows lawenforcement officials greater flexibility in countering the Islamist terrorist
threat .

Solvency is impossibleMuslims will always be unsure of whether

they are being surveyed and any policy will be circumvented
Kundani 14 [Arun Kundani, The Guardian, March 28, 2014, No NSA Reform can fix the
American Islamophobic Surveillance Complex, ] JMOV
Friday 28 March 2014 11.02 EDTLast modified on Friday 3 October 201409.03 EDT Share on Facebook Share on

Better oversight of the

sprawling American national security apparatus may finally be coming: President
Obama and the House Intelligence Committee unveiled plans this week to reduce
bulk collection of telephone records. The debate opened up by Edward Snowden's whistle-blowing is
about to get even more legalistic than all the parsing of hops and stores and metadata. These reforms may
be reassuring, if sketchy. But for those living in so-called "suspect communities" Muslim Americans, leftTwitter Share via Email Share on LinkedIn Share on Google+ Shares 1,972

wing campaigners, "radical" journalists the days of living on the receiving end of excessive spying wont end

How come when we talk about spying we don't talk about the lives of ordinary
people being spied upon? While we have been rightly outraged at the government's warehousing of troves
of data, we have been less interested in the consequences of mass surveillance for
those most affected by it such as Muslim Americans. In writing my book on Islamophobia and
the War on Terror, I spoke to dozens of Muslims, from Michigan to Texas and Minnesota to
Virginia. Some told me about becoming aware their mosque was under surveillance only after discovering an FBI

informant had joined the congregation. Others spoke about federal agents turning up at colleges to question every

All of them said they felt unsure whether their

telephone calls to relatives abroad were wiretapped or whether their
emails were being read by government officials . There were the young
Somali Americans in Minnesota who described how they and their friends were
questioned by FBI agents for no reason other than their ethnic background. Some
had been placed under surveillance by a local police department, which disguised
its spying as a youth mentoring program and then passed the FBI intelligence on
Somali-American political opinions. There were the Muslim students at the City University of New York
student who happened to be Muslim.

who discovered that fellow students they had befriended had been informants all along, working for the New York

There was no reasonable

suspicion of any crime; it was enough that the targeted students were active in the Muslim Students
Police Department's Intelligence Division and tasked with surveilling them.

Association. And then there was Luqman Abdullah, a Detroit-based African-American imam, whose mosque was
infiltrated by the FBI, leading to a 2009 raid in which he was shot and killed by federal agents. The government had
no evidence of any terrorist plot; the sole pretext was that Abdullah had strongly critical views of the US

These are the types of people whom the National Security Agency can
suspect of being two "hops" away from targets. These are the types of "bad guys" referred toby

outgoing NSA director Keith Alexander. Ten years ago, around 100,000 Arabs and Muslims in America had some sort
of national security file compiled on them. Today, that number is likely to be even higher. A study published last
year by the Muslim American Civil Liberties Coalition documented the effects of this kind of mass surveillance. In
targeted communities, a culture of enforced self-censorship takes hold and relationships of trust start to break
down. As one interviewee said: "You

look at your closest friends and ask: are they

informants?" This is what real fear of surveillance looks like: not knowing whom to
trust, choosing your words with care when talking politics in public, the
unpredictability of state power. Snowden has rightly drawn our attention to the
power of what intelligence agencies call "signals intelligence" the surveillance of
our digital communications but equally important is "human intelligence", the
result of informants and undercover agents operating within communities.
Underpinning all the surveillance of Muslim Americans is an assumption that Islamic ideology is linked to terrorism.
Yet, over the last 20 years, far more people have been killed in acts of violence by right-wing extremists than by
Muslim American citizens or permanent residents. The huge numbers being spied upon are not would-be terrorists
but law-abiding people, some of whom have "radical" political opinions that still ought to be protected by the First
Amendment to the constitution. Just the same, there are plenty of other minority Americans who are not would-be

So let's reform the

NSA and its countless collections. But let's not forget the FBI's reported 10,000
intelligence analysts working on counter-terrorism and the15,000 paid informants
helping them do it. Let's not forget the New York Police Department's intelligence
and counter-terrorism division with its 1,000 officers, $100m budget and vast
program of surveillance. Let's not forget the especially subtle psychological terror of
being Muslim in America, where, sure, maybe your phone calls won't be stored for
much longer, but there's a multitude of other ways you're always being watched.
"home-grown" terrorists but they still live in fear that they might be mistaken as one.

Alt cause local policies enforce racist surveillance, plan cant

reform these
AP 12 Samantha Henry, Matt Appuzzo, Wayne Perry, reporters for the
Associated Press, American multinational nonprofit news agency, 2012 (New Jersey
Muslims Angry Over NYPD Surveillance Findings, The Huffington Post, May 25,
Available online at, Accessed on 6/14/15)
TRENTON, N.J. -- Muslim leaders in New Jersey say they are angry but uncertain what
their next step will be after the state's attorney general found that New York City police did not violate any laws in
its surveillance of Muslim businesses, mosques and student groups in New Jersey. Several mosque leaders who

they were shocked he

found no violation of state criminal or civil laws by the NYPD in operations
that many Muslims considered unjustified surveillance based solely on
religion. "This is a big violation of our civil rights , and we need to go to our
attended a meeting Thursday with Attorney General Jeffrey S. Chiesa said

communities and explain it?" Imam Mohammad Qatanani, the spiritual leader of the Islamic Center of Passaic
County said Thursday as he left the meeting. Qatanani said he would not tell his congregants to stop collaborating

"We need from them to show us the same

seriousness and honesty in building bridges with the Muslim community."
with law enforcement, but added,

Chiesa had been asked by Gov. Chris Christie, who appointed him, to look into operations in New Jersey that were
part of a widespread NYPD program to collect intelligence on Muslim communities both inside New York and

Undercover officers and informants eavesdropped in Muslim cafes

and monitored sermons, even when there was no evidence of a crime.
They infiltrated Muslim student groups, videotaped mosque-goers or

collected their license plate numbers as they prayed. The result was that
many innocent business owners, students and others were cataloged in
police files. The interstate surveillance efforts, revealed by The Associated Press earlier
this year, angered many Muslims and New Jersey officials. Some, like Newark Mayor Cory
Booker and the state's top FBI official, criticized the tactics. Others, like Christie, focused more on the fact that the
NYPD didn't tell New Jersey exactly what it was up to. In response, Chiesa launched what he described as a factfinding review. Further, authorities found that New Jersey has no laws barring outside law enforcement agencies
from secretly conducting operations in the state, representatives of the attorney general's office told the AP.
However, New York police have agreed to meet with New Jersey law enforcement regularly to discuss
counterterrorism intelligence and operations, the attorney general said.

NSA reforms cant solve racist targeting too deeply ingrained to

Kundnani 14 Arun Kundnani, an Adjunct Professor of Media, Culture, and
Communication at New York University, teaches terrorism studies at John Jay
College, has been a Visiting Fellow at Leiden University, Netherlands, an Open
Society Fellow, and the Editor of the journal Race and Class, author of The End of
Tolerance: Racism in 21st Century Britain, 2014 (No NSA reform can fix the
American Islamophobic surveillance complex, The Guardian, March 28, Available
online at, Accessed on 6/20/15)
I spoke to dozens of Muslims, from
Michigan to Texas and Minnesota to Virginia. Some told me about becoming aware their
In writing my book on Islamophobia and the War on Terror,

mosque was under surveillance only after discovering an FBI informant had joined the congregation. Others spoke

All of
them said they felt unsure whether their telephone calls to relatives
abroad were wiretapped or whether their emails were being read by
government officials. There were the young Somali Americans in
Minnesota who described how they and their friends were questioned by
FBI agents for no reason other than their ethnic background. Some had been
placed under surveillance by a local police department, which disguised its spying as a
youth mentoring program and then passed the FBI intelligence on SomaliAmerican political opinions. There were the Muslim students at the City University of New York who
discovered that fellow students they had befriended had been informants all
along, working for the New York Police Department's Intelligence Division and tasked with
surveilling them. There was no reasonable suspicion of any crime; it was
about federal agents turning up at colleges to question every student who happened to be Muslim.

enough that the targeted students were active in the Muslim Students
Association. And then there was Luqman Abdullah, a Detroit-based African-American
imam, whose mosque was infiltrated by the FBI, leading to a 2009 raid in which he was shot and killed
by federal agents. The government had no evidence of any terrorist plot;
the sole pretext was that Abdullah had strongly critical views of the US
government. These are the types of people whom the National Security Agency can suspect of being two
"hops" away from targets. These are the types of "bad guys" referred to by outgoing
NSA director Keith Alexander. Ten years ago, around 100,000 Arabs and Muslims in

America had some sort of national security file compiled on them. Today,
that number is likely to be even higher. A study published last year by the Muslim American
Civil Liberties Coalition documented the effects of this kind of mass surveillance. In targeted
communities, a culture of enforced self-censorship takes hold and
relationships of trust start to break down. As one interviewee said: "You look at
your closest friends and ask: are they informants?" This is what real fear of
surveillance looks like: not knowing whom to trust , choosing your words with care when
talking politics in public, the unpredictability of state power. Snowden has rightly drawn our
attention to the power of what intelligence agencies call "signals intelligence"
the surveillance of our digital communications but equally important is
"human intelligence", the result of informants and undercover agents
operating within communities. Underpinning all the surveillance of Muslim Americans is an
assumption that Islamic ideology is linked to terrorism. Yet, over the last 20 years, far more people
have been killed in acts of violence by right-wing extremists than by
Muslim American citizens or permanent residents. The huge numbers
being spied upon are not would-be terrorists but law-abiding people, some
of whom have "radical" political opinions that still ought to be protected
by the First Amendment to the constitution. Just the same, there are plenty of
other minority Americans who are not would-be "home-grown" terrorists
but they still live in fear that they might be mistaken as one. So let's reform the
NSA and its countless collections. But let's not forget the FBI's reported 10,000
intelligence analysts working on counter-terrorism and the 15,000 paid
informants helping them do it. Let's not forget the New York Police
Department's intelligence and counter-terrorism division with its 1,000
officers, $100m budget and vast program of surveillance. Let's not forget
the especially subtle psychological terror of being Muslim in America,
where, sure, maybe your phone calls won't be stored for much longer, but
there's a multitude of other ways you're always being watched.

Aff cant solve Anti-Arab sentiment is entrenched in mainstream

media and history
Salaita 6 Steven George Salaita, scholar, author and public speaker, received
his B.A. in political science from Radford University in 1997, his M.A. in English from
Radford in 1999, and completed his Ph.D. at the University of Oklahoma in Native
American studies with a literature emphasis, became an assistant professor of
English at University of Wisconsin in Whitewater, where he taught American and
ethnic American literature until 2006, associate professor of English at Virginia Tech,
won a 2007 Gustavus Myers Outstanding Book Award for writing the book Anti-Arab
Racism in the USA: Where It Comes from and What it Means for Politics Today, 2006
(9/11, Anti-Arab Racism, and the Mythos of National Pride, Beyond Orientalism
and Islamophobia, Fall, Available online at, Accessed
on 6/23/15)

anti-Arab racism is not confined to the political right also

Racism, as writers from Elizabeth Cook-Lynn to bell hooks have illustrated, is never
limited to particular social or discursive movements, nor is it ever rooted
in consistent sites of cultural or linguistic production. Any comprehensive
survey of popular opinion in the United States over the past decade (a time
frame that purposely straddles 9/11) will demonstrate that the blatant anti-Arab
My second observation that
is worth analysis.

racism of the political right is, using a vocabulary appropriate to specific political agendas,
reinscribed continually in the discourse , or at least the ethos, of
mainstream and progressive media . For instance, leftist liberal publications such
as Dissent, Tikkun, and have been guilty of expressing racist attitudes either
in the form of support for Palestinian dispossession or by totalizing all Arabs and Muslims as potential terrorists; or

A similar guilt is
shared by mainstream (supposedly liberal) publications such as the New York Times,
Newsweek, Los Angeles Times, and, which, given their corporate obligations,
cannot realistically be expected to attack anti-Arab racism when it is so
fundamental to the interests of American capitalism (and to the survival of the
the racism arrives subtly by precluding Arabs from speaking on their own behalf.

publications). Of major concern to this essay is the recognition that, in keeping with the seminal work of Louis

we cannot seriously interrogate racism by attributing it

solely to one political ideology without analyzing how the racism is
interpolated through a multitude of discourses at the benefit of various
ideologies. Beyond this intercultural observation, we can say that anti-Arab racism has
specific historical dimensions that render it unique even as it has been an
inheritor of countless tensions and anxieties. Some of those dimensionstravel
narratology, Orientalist scholarship, imperialismhave been discussed by others in some detail; the
dimension I invariably find most interesting is the relationship of anti-Arab
racism with settler colonization, both in the New World and Holy Land.
This relationship indicates that a centuries-old Holy Land mania in the
United States not only facilitated what Cook-Lynn (2001) calls antiIndianism, but has allowed the antiIndianism to evolve into support for a
new Messianic conquest that positions todays Arabs in a fascinating
theological continuum. If Natives were the first victims of racism in North America, then Arabs,
Althusser and Terry Eagleton,

the new schematic evildoers, are merely the latest to be the first .

Security Good
Security endorsement is necessary to explore human becoming and
open space for life possibilities
Booth 2005 (Ken visiting researcher US Naval War College, Critical Security Studies and World Politics, p.

The best starting point for conceptualizing security lies in the real conditions of insecurity suffered by people and

some degree of insecurity, as a lifedetermining condition, is universal. To the extent an individual or group is insecure,
to the extent their life choices and changes are taken away; this is because
of the resources and energy they need to invest in seeking safety from
domineering threatswhether these are the lack of food for ones children, or organizing to resist a
foreign aggressor. The corollary of the relationship between insecurity and a
determined life is that a degree of security creates life possibilities.
Security might therefore be conceived as synonymous with opening up
space in peoples lives. This allows for individual and collective human
collectivities. Look around. What is immediately striking is that

becoming the capacity to have some choice about living differently consistent with the same
but different search by others. Two interrelated conclusion follow from this. First, security can be
understood as an instrumental value; it frees its possessors to a greater or lesser extent from life-determining
constraints and so allows different life possibilities to be explored. Second,

synonymous simply with survival .

security is not

One can survive without being secure (the experience of

Security is therefore more

than mere animal survival (basic animal existence). It is survival-plus , the plus
being the possibility to explore human becoming. As an instrumental
value, security is sought because it free people(s) to some degree to do
other than deal with threats to their human being. The achievement of a
level of securityand security is always relative gives to individuals and groups some
time, energy, and scope to choose to be or become, other than merely
refugees in long-term camps in war-torn parts of the world, for example).

surviving as human biological organisms. Security is an important dimension of the

process by which the human species can reinvent itself beyond the merely biological.

Realism and securitization are inevitable
Thayer 2004

Thayer has been a Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and has taught at Dartmouth College and the University of
Minnesota (Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict, University of
Kentucky Press, 2004, pg. 75-76)

The central issue here is what causes states to behave as offensive realists predict. Mearsheimer advances a powerful argument

The fact that there is no world

government compels the leaders of states to take steps to ensure their
security, such as striving to have a powerful military, aggressing when
forced to do so, and forging and maintaining alliances. This is what
neorealists call a self-help system: leaders of states arc forced to take these steps because nothing else
can guarantee their security in the anarchic world of international relations. I argue that evolutionary theory also
offers a fundamental cause for offensive realist behavior. Evolutionary
theory explains why individuals are motivated to act as offensive realism
expects, whether an individual is a captain of industry or a conquistador. My argument is that anarchy is even more important
than most scholars of international relations recognize. The human environment of evolutionary
adaptation was anarchic; our ancestors lived in a state of nature in which
resources were poor and dangers from other humans and the environment
were greatso great that it is truly remarkable that a mammal standing three feet highwithout claws or strong teeth, not
that anarchy is the fundamental cause of such behavior.

particularly strong or swiftsurvived and evolved to become what we consider human. Humans endured because natural selection

This environment produced the behaviors

examined here: egoism, domination, and the in-group/out-group
distinction. These specific traits arc sufficient to explain why leaders will
behave, in the proper circumstances, as offensive realists expect them to
behave. That is, even if they must hurt other humans or risk injury to
themselves, they will strive to maximize their power, defined as either control over others (for
gave them the right behaviors to last in those conditions.

example, through wealth or leadership) or control over ecological circumstances (such as meeting their own and their family's or
tribes need for food, shelter, or other resources).

AT: Threatcon -> War

Construction of threats does not cause wars
Kaufman 09 (Stuart J, Prof Poli Sci and IR U Delaware, Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case,
Security Studies 18:3, 400 434)

Even when hostile narratives, group fears, and opportunity are strongly
present, war occurs only if these factors are harnessed . Ethnic narratives
and fears must combine to create significant ethnic hostility among mass
publics. Politicians must also seize the opportunity to manipulate that hostility, evoking
hostile narratives and symbols to gain or hold power by riding a wave of chauvinist mobilization. Such
mobilization is often spurred by prominent events (for example, episodes of violence)
that increase feelings of hostility and make chauvinist appeals seem
timely. If the other group also mobilizes and if each sides felt security
needs threaten the security of the other side, the result is a security
dilemma spiral of rising fear, hostility, and mutual threat that results in violence. A virtue of
this symbolist theory is that symbolist logic explains why ethnic peace is
more common than ethnonationalist war. Even if hostile narratives, fears, and
opportunity exist, severe violence usually can still be avoided if ethnic elites
skillfully define group needs in moderate ways and collaborate across
group lines to prevent violence: this is consociationalism. 17 War is likely only if
hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity spur hostile attitudes, chauvinist
mobilization, and a security dilemma.

Terror Apoc good

Critical terror studies are garbage
Jones and Smith 9 * University of Queensland, Queensland, Australia AND **
King's College, University of London, London, UK (David and M.L.R.,We're All
Terrorists Now: Criticalor HypocriticalStudies on Terrorism?, Studies in Conflict
& Terrorism, Volume 32, Issue 4 April 2009 , pages 292 302, Taylor and Francis)
The journal, in other words, is not intended, as one might assume, to evaluate critically those state or non-state

the journal's ambition is to

deconstruct what it views as the ambiguity of the word terror, its manipulation by
ostensibly liberal democratic state actors, and the complicity of orthodox
terrorism studies in this authoritarian enterprise. Exposing the deficiencies in any field of study is,
actors that might have recourse to terrorism as a strategy. Instead,

of course, a legitimate scholarly exercise, but what the symposium introducing the new volume announces
questions both the research agenda and academic integrity of journals like Studies in Conflict and Terrorism and
those who contribute to them. Do these claims, one might wonder, have any substance? Significantly, the original
proposal circulated by the publisher Routledge and one of the editors, Richard

Jackson , suggested some

uncertainty concerning the preferred title of the journal. Critical Studies on Terrorism appeared last on a list where
the first choice was Review of Terror Studies. Evidently, the concision of a review fails to capture the critical
perspective the journal promotes. Criticism, then, is central to the new journal's philosophy and the adjective
connotes a distinct ideological and, as shall be seen, far from pluralist and inclusive purpose. So, one might ask,
what exactly does a critical approach to terrorism involve? What it Means to be Critical The editors and
contributors explore what it means to be critical in detail, repetition, and opacity, along with an excessive
fondness for italics, in the editorial symposium that introduces the first issue, and in a number of subsequent
articles. The editors inform us that the study of terrorism is a growth industry, observing with a mixture of envy
and disapproval that literally thousands of new books and articles on terrorism are published every year (pp. l-2).
In adding to this literature the editors premise the need for yet another journal on their resistance to what currently
constitutes scholarship in the field of terrorism study and its allegedly uncritical acceptance of the Western
democratic state's security perspective. Indeed, to be critical requires a radical reversal of what the journal
assumes to be the typical perception of terrorism and the methodology of terrorism research. To focus on the
strategies practiced by non-state actors that feature under the conventional denotation terror is, for the critical
theorist, misplaced. As the symposium explains,

acts of clandestine non-state terrorism are

committed by a tiny number of individuals and result in between a few hundred and
a few thousand casualties per year over the entire world (original italics) (p. 1). The United
States's and its allies' preoccupation with terrorism is, therefore, out of proportion to its effects. 1 At the same time,
the more pervasive and repressive terror practiced by the state has been silenced from public and academic

The complicity of terrorism studies with the increasingly

authoritarian demands of Western, liberal state and media practice, together with
the moral and political blindness of established terrorism analysts to this
relationship forms the journal's overriding assumption and one that its core contributors repeat
discourse (p. 1).

ad nauseam. Thus, Michael Stohl, in his contribution Old Myths, New Fantasies and the Enduring Realities of
Terrorism (pp. 5-16), not only discovers ten myths informing the understanding of terrorism, but also finds that
these myths reflect a state centric security focus, where analysts rarely consider the violence perpetrated by the
state (p. 5). He complains that the press have become too close to government over the matter. Somewhat
contradictorily Stohl subsequently asserts that media reporting is central to terrorism and counter-terrorism as
political action, that media reportage provides the oxygen of terrorism, and that politicians consider journalists to
be the terrorist's best friend (p. 7). Stohl further compounds this incoherence, claiming that the media are far
more likely to focus on the destructive actions, rather than on grievances or the social conditions that breed
[terrorism]to present episodic rather than thematic stories (p. 7). He argues that terror attacks between 1968
and 1980 were scarcely reported in the United States, and that reporters do not delve deeply into the sources of
conflict (p. 8). All of this is quite contentious, with no direct evidence produced to support such statements. The
media is after all a very broad term, and to assume that it is monolithic is to replace criticism with conspiracy
theory. Moreover, even if it were true that the media always serves as a government propaganda agency, then by
Stohl's own logic, terrorism as a method of political communication is clearly futile as no rational actor would

the notion that an inherent

pro-state bias vitiates terrorism studies pervades the critical position . Anthony Burke, in
engage in a campaign doomed to be endlessly misreported. Nevertheless,

The End of Terrorism Studies (pp. 37-49), asserts that established analysts like Bruce Hoffman specifically
exclude states as possible perpetrators of terror. Consequently, the emergence of critical terrorism studies may
signal the end of a particular kind of traditionally state-focused and directed 'problem-solving' terrorism studiesat
least in terms of its ability to assume that its categories and commitments are immune from challenge and
correspond to a stable picture of reality (p. 42). Elsewhere, Adrian Guelke, in Great Whites, Paedophiles and
Terrorists: The Need for Critical Thinking in a New Era of Terror (pp. 17-25), considers British government-induced
media scare-mongering to have legitimated an authoritarian approach to the purported new era of terror (pp.
22-23). Meanwhile, Joseba Zulaika and William A. Douglass, in The Terrorist Subject: Terrorist Studies and the
Absent Subjectivity (pp. 27-36), find the War on Terror constitutes the single, all embracing paradigm of analysis
where the critical voice is not allowed to ask: what is the reality itself? (original italics) (pp. 28-29). The
construction of this condition, they further reveal, if somewhat abstrusely, reflects an abstract desire that
demands terror as an ever-present threat (p. 31). In order to sustain this fabrication: Terrorism experts and
commentators function as realist policemen; and not very smart ones at that, who while gazing at the
evidence are unable to read the paradoxical logic of the desire that fuels it, whereby lack turns toexcess (original

Booth, in The Human Faces of Terror: Reflections in a Cracked Looking Glass (pp. 6579), reiterates Richard Jackson's contention that state terrorism is a much more
serious problem than non-state terrorism (p. 76). Yet, one searches in vain in these
italics) (p. 32). Finally, Ken

articles for evidence to support the ubiquitous assertion of state bias :

assuming this bias in conventional terrorism analysis as a fact seemingly does not
require a corresponding concern with evidence of this fact, merely its continual
reiteration by conceptual fiat. A critical perspective dispenses not only with
terrorism studies but also with the norms of accepted scholarship. Asserting what
needs to be demonstrated commits, of course, the elementary logical fallacy petitio principii. But critical
theory apparently emancipates (to use its favorite verb) its practitioners from the confines
of logic, reason, and the usual standards of academic inquiry. Alleging a constitutive
weakness in established scholarship without the necessity of providing proof to support it, therefore, appears to

The unproved state centricity of terrorism studies serves as a

platform for further unsubstantiated accusations about the state of the
discipline. Jackson and his fellow editors , along with later claims by Zulaika and Douglass, and Booth,
again assert that orthodox analysts rarely bother to interview or engage with those
involved in 'terrorist' activity (p. 2) or spend any time on the ground in the areas most affected by
define the critical posture.

conflict (p. 74). Given that Booth and Jackson spend most of their time on the ground in Aberystwyth, Ceredigion,
not a notably terror rich environment if we discount the operations of Meibion Glyndwr who would as a matter of
principle avoid pob sais like Jackson and Booth, this seems a bit like the pot calling the kettle black. It also overlooks
the fact that Studies in Conflict and Terrorism first advertised the problem of talking to terrorists in 2001 and has
gone to great lengths to rectify this lacuna, if it is one, regularly publishing articles by analysts with first-hand
experience of groups like the Taliban, Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah. A consequence of avoiding primary
research, it is further alleged, leads conventional analysts uncritically to apply psychological and problem-solving
approaches to their object of study. This propensity, Booth maintains, occasions another unrecognized weakness in
traditional terrorism research, namely, an inability to engage with the particular dynamics of the political world (p.
70). Analogously, Stohl claims that the US and English [sic] media exhibit a tendency to psychologize terrorist
acts, which reduces structural and political problems into issues of individual pathology (p. 7). Preoccupied with
this problem-solving, psychopathologizing methodology, terrorism analysts have lost the capacity to reflect on both
their practice and their research ethics. By contrast, the critical approach is not only self-reflective, but also and,
for good measure, self-reflexive. In fact, the editors and a number of the journal's contributors use these terms
interchangeably, treating a reflection and a reflex as synonyms (p. 2). A cursory encounter with the Shorter Oxford
Dictionary would reveal that they are not. Despite this linguistically challenged misidentification, reflexivity is
made to do a lot of work in the critical idiom. Reflexivity, the editors inform us, requires a capacity to challenge
dominant knowledge and understandings, is sensitive to the politics of labelling is transparent about its own
values and political standpoints, adheres to a set of responsible research ethics, and is committed to a broadly
defined notion of emancipation (p. 2). This covers a range of not very obviously related but critically approved
virtues. Let us examine what reflexivity involves as Stohl, Guelke, Zulaika and Douglass, Burke, and Booth explore,
somewhat repetitively, its implications. Reflexive or Defective?


to challenge dominant

knowledge and understanding and retain sensitivity to labels leads inevitably to a

fixation with language, discourse , the ambiguity of the noun, terror, and its
political use and abuse. Terrorism, Booth enlightens the reader unremarkably, is a politically loaded term
(p. 72). Meanwhile, Zulaika and Douglass consider terror the dominant tropic [sic] space in contemporary political
and journalistic discourse (p. 30). Faced with the serious challenge (Booth p. 72) and pejorative connotation that
the noun conveys, critical terrorologists turn to deconstruction and bring the full force of postmodern obscurantism
to bear on its use. Thus the editors proclaim that terrorism is one of the most powerful signifiers in contemporary
discourse. There is, moreover, a yawning gap between the 'terrorism' signifier and the actual acts signified (p.
1). [V]irtually all of this activity, the editors pronounce ex cathedra, refers to the response to acts of political
violence not the violence itself (original italics) (p. 1). Here again they offer no evidence for this curious assertion
and assume, it would seem, all conventional terrorism studies address issues of homeland security. In keeping with
this critical orthodoxy that he has done much to define, Anthony Burke also asserts the instability (and thoroughly
politicized nature) of the unifying master-terms of our field: 'terror' and 'terrorism' (p. 38). To address this he
contends that a critical stance requires us to keep this radical instability and inherent politicization of the concept
of terrorism at the forefront of its analysis. Indeed, without a conscious reflexivity about the most basic definition
of the object, our discourse will not be critical at all (p. 38). More particularly, drawing on a jargon-infused
amalgam of Michel Foucault's identification of a relationship between power and knowledge, the neo-Marxist
Frankfurt School's critique of democratic false consciousness, mixed with the existentialism of the Third Reich's
favorite philosopher, Martin Heidegger, Burke questions the question. This intellectual potpourri apparently
enables the critical theorist to question the ontological status of a 'problem' before any attempt to map out, study
or resolve it (p. 38). Interestingly, Burke, Booth, and the symposistahood deny that there might be objective data
about violence or that a properly focused strategic study of terrorism would not include any prescriptive goodness
or rightness of action. While a strategic theorist or a skeptical social scientist might claim to consider only the
complex relational situation that involves as well as the actions, the attitude of human beings to them, the critical

The critical approach to language

and its deconstruction of an otherwise useful, if imperfect, political vocabulary has
been the source of much confusion and inconsequentiality in the practice of
the social sciences. It dates from the relativist pall that French radical post structural philosophers like Gilles
theorist's radical questioning of language denies this possibility.

Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Foucault, and Jacques Derrida, cast over the social and historical sciences in order to
demonstrate that social and political knowledge depended on and underpinned power relations that permeated the

This radical assault on the

possibility of either neutral fact or value ultimately functions unfalsifiably, and as a
substitute for philosophy, social science, and a real theory of language. The problem
landscape of the social and reinforced the liberal democratic state.

with the critical approach is that, as the Australian philosopher John Anderson demonstrated, to achieve a genuine
study one must either investigate the facts that are talked about or the fact that they are talked about in a certain
way. More precisely, as J.L. Mackie explains, if we concentrate on the uses of language we fall between these two
stools, and we are in danger of taking our discoveries about manners of speaking as answers to questions about

in so far as an account of the use of language spills over into

ontology it is liable to be a confused mixture of what should be two distinct
investigations: the study of the facts about which the language is used, and the
study of the linguistic phenomena themselves. It is precisely, however, this confused
mixture of fact and discourse that critical thinking seeks to impose on the study of
terrorism and infuses the practice of critical theory more generally. From this
confused seed no coherent method grows. What is To Be Done? This ontological confusion
notwithstanding, Ken Booth sees critical theory not only exposing the dubious links
between power and knowledge in established terrorism studies, but also offering an
ideological agenda that transforms the face of global politics . [C]ritical knowledge, Booth
what is there.2 Indeed,

declares, involves understandings of the social world that attempt to stand outside prevailing structures,
processes, ideologies and orthodoxies while recognizing that all conceptualizations within the ambit of sociality
derive from particular social/historical conditions (original italics) (p. 78). Helpfully, Booth, assuming the manner of
an Old Testament prophet, provides his critical disciples with big-picture navigation aids (original italics) (p. 66) to
achieve this higher knowledge. Booth promulgates fifteen commandments (as Clemenceau remarked of Woodrow
Wilson's nineteen points, in a somewhat different context, God Almighty only gave us ten). When not stating the
staggeringly obvious, the Ken Commandments are hopelessly contradictory.

Critical theorists thus should

avoid exceptionalizing the study of terrorism,3 recognize that states can be agents
of terrorism, and keep the long term in sight. Unexceptional advice to be sure
and long recognized by more traditional students of terrorism. The critical student, if
not fully conversant with critical doublethink, however, might find the fact that she
or he lives within Powerful theories that are constitutive of political, social, and
economic life (6th Commandment, p. 71), sits uneasily with Booth's concluding injunction
to stand outside prevailing ideologies (p. 78). In his preferred imperative idiom, Booth further
contends that terrorism is best studied in the context of an academic international relations whose role is not
only to interpret the world but to change it (pp. 67-68). Significantly, academicor more precisely, critical
international relations, holds no place for a realist appreciation of the status quo but approves instead a Marxist
ideology of praxis. It is within this transformative praxis that critical theory situates terrorism and terrorists. The
political goals of those non-state entities that choose to practice the tactics of terrorism invariably seek a similar
transformative praxis and this leads critical global theorizing into a curiously confused empathy with the motives
of those engaged in such acts, as well as a disturbing relativism. Thus, Booth again decrees that the gap between
those who hate terrorism and those who carry it out, those who seek to delegitimize the acts of terrorists and
those who incite them, and those who abjure terror and those who glorify itis not as great as is implied or
asserted by orthodox terrorism experts, the discourse of governments, or the popular press (p. 66). The gap
between us/them is a slippery slope, not an unbridgeable political and ethical chasm (p. 66). So, while terrorist
actions are alwayswithout exceptionwrong, they nevertheless might be contingently excusable (p. 66). From
this ultimately relativist perspective gang raping a defenseless woman, an act of terror on any critical or uncritical
scale of evaluation, is, it would seem, wrong but potentially excusable. On the basis of this worrying relativism a
further Ken Commandment requires the abolition of the discourse of evil on the somewhat questionable grounds
that evil releases agents from responsibility (pp. 74-75). This not only reveals a profound ignorance of theology, it
also underestimates what Eric Voeglin identified as a central feature of the appeal of modern political religions from
the Third Reich to Al Qaeda. As Voeglin observed in 1938, the Nazis represented an attractive force. To
understand that force requires not the abolition of evil [so necessary to the relativist] but comprehending its
attractiveness. Significantly, as Barry Cooper argues, its attractiveness, [like that of al Qaeda] cannot fully be
understood apart from its evilness.4 The line of relativist inquiry that critical theorists like Booth evince toward
terrorism leads in fact not to moral clarity but an inspissated moral confusion. This is paradoxical given that the
editors make much in the journal's introductory symposium of their responsible research ethics. The paradox is
resolved when one realizes that critical moralizing demands the ethics of responsibility to the terrorist other. For
Ken Booth it involves, it appears, empathizing with the ethic of responsibility faced by those who, in extremis
have some explosives (p. 76). Anthony Burke contends that a critically self-conscious normativism requires the
analyst, not only to critique the strategic languages of the West, but also to take in the side of the Other or
more particularly engage with the highly developed forms of thinking that provides groups like Al Qaeda with
legitimizing foundations and a world view of some profundity (p. 44). This additionally demands a capacity not only
to empathize with the other, but also to recognize that both Osama bin Laden in his Messages to the West and
Sayyid Qutb in his Muslim Brotherhood manifesto Milestones not only offer well observed criticisms of Western
decadence, but also converges with elements of critical theory (p. 45). This is not surprising given that both
Islamist and critical theorists share an analogous contempt for Western democracy, the market, and the
international order these structures inhabit and have done much to shape. Histrionically Speaking Critical theory,
then, embraces relativism not only toward language but also toward social action. Relativism and the bizarre
ethicism it engenders in its attempt to empathize with the terrorist other are, moreover, histrionic. As Leo Strauss
classically inquired of this relativist tendency in the social sciences, is such an understanding dependent upon our
own commitment or independent of it? Strauss explains, if it is independent, I am committed as an actor and I am
uncommitted in another compartment of myself in my capacity as a social scientist. In that latter capacity I am
completely empty and therefore completely open to the perception and appreciation of all commitments or value
systems. I go through the process of empathetic understanding in order to reach clarity about my commitment for
only a part of me is engaged in my empathetic understanding. This means, however, that such understanding is
not serious or genuine but histrionic.5 It is also profoundly dependent on Western liberalism. For it is only in an
open society that questions the values it promotes that the issue of empathy with the non-Western other could
arise. The critical theorist's explicit loathing of the openness that affords her histrionic posturing obscures this
constituting fact. On the basis of this histrionic empathy with the other, critical theory concludes that democratic
states do not always abjure acts of terror whether to advance their foreign policy objectives or to buttress order
at home (p. 73). Consequently, Ken Booth asserts: If terror can be part of the menu of choice for the relatively
strong, it is hardly surprising it becomes a weapon of the relatively weak (p. 73). Zulaika and Douglass similarly

At the core of this critical, ethicist,

relativism therefore lies a syllogism that holds all violence is terror: Western states
use violence, therefore, Western states are terrorist. Further, the greater terrorist
uses the greater violence: Western governments exercise the greater violence.
assert that terrorism is always a weapon of the weak (p. 33).

Therefore, it is the liberal democracies rather than Al Qaeda that are the greater
terrorists. In its desire to empathize with the transformative ends, if not the means of terrorism generally and
Islamist terror in particular, critical theory reveals itself as a form of Marxist unmasking. Thus, for Booth terror has
multiple forms (original italics) and the real terror is economic, the product it would seem of global capitalism (p.
75). Only the engagee intellectual academic finding in deconstructive criticism the philosophical weapons that
reveal the illiberal neo-conservative purpose informing the conventional study of terrorism and the democratic
state's prosecution of counterterrorism can identify the real terror lurking behind the manipulation of the politics of
fear (p. 75). Moreover, the resolution of this condition of escalating violence requires not any strategic solution

Booth, Burke, and

the editors contend that the only solution to the world-historical crisis that is facing
human society globally (p. 76) is universal human emancipation . This, according to Burke,
that creates security as the basis for development whether in London or Kabul. Instead,

is the normative end that critical theory pursues. Following Jurgen Habermas, the godfather of critical theory,
terrorism is really a form of distorted communication. The solution to this problem of failed communication resides
not only in the improvement of living conditions, and the political taming of unbounded capitalism, but also in
the telos of mutual understanding. Only through this telos with its strong normative bias towards non violence

In other words, the only

ethical solution to terrorism is conversation: sitting around an un-coerced table
presided over by Kofi Annan, along with Ken Booth, Osama bin Laden, President
Obama, and some European Union pacifist sandalista, a transcendental
communicative reason will emerge to promulgate norms of transformative justice. As
(p. 43) can a universal condition of peace and justice transform the globe.

Burke enunciates, the panacea of un-coerced communication would establish a secularism that might create an

un-coerced norm projection is not

concerned with the world as it is, but how it ought to be. This not only compounds
enduring architecture of basic shared values (p. 46). In the end,

the logical errors that permeate critical theory, it advances an ultimately

utopian agenda under the guise of soi-disant cosmopolitanism where one
somewhat vaguely recognizes the human interconnection and mutual vulnerability
to nature, the cosmos and each other (p. 47) and no doubt bursts into
spontaneous chanting of Kumbaya . In analogous visionary terms, Booth defines real security
as emancipation in a way that denies any definitional rigor to either term. The struggle against terrorism is, then, a
struggle for emancipation from the oppression of political violence everywhere. Consequently, in this Manichean

Booth further maintains

that universities have a crucial role to play. This also is something of a concern for
those who do not share the critical vision, as university international relations
departments are not now, it would seem, in business to pursue dispassionate
analysis but instead are to serve as cheerleaders for this critically inspired vision.
struggle for global emancipation against the real terror of Western democracy,

Overall, the journal's fallacious commitment to emancipation undermines any ostensible claim to pluralism and

Over determined by this transformative approach to world politics, it

necessarily denies the possibility of a realist or prudential appreciation of politics
and the promotion not of universal solutions but pragmatic ones that accept the
best that may be achieved in the circumstances . Ultimately, to present the world how it
ought to be rather than as it is conceals a deep intolerance notable in the contempt
with which many of the contributors to the journal appear to hold Western
politicians and the Western media.6 It is the exploitation of this oughtistic style of thinking
that leads the critic into a Humpty Dumpty world where words mean exactly
what the critical theorist chooses them to meanneither more nor less. However, in
order to justify their disciplinary niche they have to insist on the failure of
established modes of terrorism study . Having identified a source of government grants and academic

perquisites, critical studies in fact does not deal with the notion of terrorism as such, but instead the manner in

which the Western liberal democratic state has supposedly manipulated the use of violence by non-state actors in
order to other minority communities and create a politics of fear. Critical Studies and Strategic TheoryA Missed
Opportunity Of course, the doubtful contribution of critical theory by no means implies that all is well with what
one might call conventional terrorism studies. The subject area has in the past produced superficial assessments
that have done little to contribute to an informed understanding of conflict. This is a point readily conceded by John
Horgan and Michael Boyle who put A Case Against 'Critical Terrorism Studies' (pp. 51-74). Although they do not
seek to challenge the agenda, assumptions, and contradictions inherent in the critical approach, their contribution
to the new journal distinguishes itself by actually having a well-organized and well-supported argument. The
authors' willingness to acknowledge deficiencies in some terrorism research shows that

critical self-

reflection is already present in existing terrorism studies . It is ironic, in fact, that

the most clearly reflective, original, and critical contribution in the first edition should come from established
terrorism researchers who critique the critical position. Interestingly, the specter haunting both conventional and
critical terrorism studies is that both assume that terrorism is an existential phenomenon, and thus has causes and
solutions. Burke makes this explicit: The inauguration of this journal, he declares, indeed suggests broad
agreement that there is a phenomenon called terrorism (p. 39). Yet this is not the only way of looking at terrorism.
For a strategic theorist the notion of terrorism does not exist as an independent phenomenon. It is an abstract
noun. More precisely, it is merely a tacticthe creation of fear for political endsthat can be employed by any
social actor, be it state or non-state, in any context, without any necessary moral value being involved. Ironically,

strategic theory offers a far more critical perspective on terrorism than do the
perspectives advanced in this journal. Guelke, for example, propounds a curiously orthodox

standpoint when he asserts: to describe an act as one of terrorism, without the qualification of quotation marks to
indicate the author's distance from such a judgement, is to condemn it as absolutely illegitimate (p. 19). If you are

Terrorism is simply a method to achieve an end. Any

moral judgment on the act is entirely separate. To fuse the two is a category
mistake. In strategic theory, which Guelke ignores, terrorism does not, ipso facto, denote absolutely illegitimate
a strategic theorist this is an invalid claim.

violence. Intriguingly, Stohl, Booth, and Burke also imply that a strategic understanding forms part of their critical
viewpoint. Booth, for instance, argues in one of his commandments that terrorism should be seen as a conscious
human choice. Few strategic theorists would disagree. Similarly, Burke feels that there does appear to be a
consensus that terrorism is a form of instrumental political violence (p. 38). The problem for the contributors to
this volume is that they cannot emancipate themselves from the very orthodox assumption that the word terrorism
is pejorative. That may be the popular understanding of the term, but inherently terrorism conveys no necessary
connotation of moral condemnation. Is terrorism a form of warfare, insurgency, struggle, resistance, coercion,

All violence is
instrumental. Grading it according to whether it is insurgency, resistance, or atrocity
is irrelevant. Any strategic actor may practice forms of warfare. For this reason Burke's
further claim that existing definitions of terrorism have specifically excluded states
as possible perpetrators and privilege them as targets, is wholly inaccurate (p. 38).
atrocity, or great political crime, Burke asks rhetorically. But once more he misses the point.

Strategic theory has never excluded state-directed terrorism as an object of study, and neither for that matter, as
Horgan and Boyle point out, have more conventional studies of terrorism. Yet, Burke offersas a critical revelation
that the strategic intent behind the US bombing of North Vietnam and Cambodia, Israel's bombing of Lebanon, or
the sanctions against Iraq is also terrorist. He continues: My point is not to remind us that states practise terror,
but to show how mainstream strategic doctrines are terrorist in these terms and undermine any prospect of
achieving the normative consensus if such terrorism is to be reduced and eventually eliminated (original italics) (p.
41). This is not merely confused, it displays remarkable nescience on the part of one engaged in teaching the next
generation of graduates from the Australian Defence Force Academy. Strategic theory conventionally recognizes
that actions on the part of state or non-state actors that aim to create fear (such as the allied aerial bombing of
Germany in World War II or the nuclear deterrent posture of Mutually Assured Destruction) can be terroristic in
nature.7 The problem for critical analysts like Burke is that they impute their own moral valuations to the term
terror. Strategic theorists do not. Moreover, the statement that this undermines any prospect that terrorism can be

those interested in a
truly critical approach to the subject should perhaps turn to strategic theory for
some relief from the strictures that have traditionally governed the study of
terrorism, not to self-proclaimed critical theorists who only replicate the flawed
eliminated is illogical: you can never eliminate an abstract noun. Consequently,

understandings of those whom they criticize. Horgan and Boyle conclude their thoughtful
article by claiming that critical terrorism studies has more in common with traditional terrorism research than
critical theorists would possibly like to admit. These reviewers agree: they are two sides of the same coin.

Conclusion In the looking glass world of critical terror studies the conventional analysis of terrorism is ontologically
challenged, lacks self-reflexivity, and is policy oriented. By contrast, critical theory's ethicist, yet relativist, and
deconstructive gaze reveals that we are all terrorists now and must empathize with those sub-state actors who
have recourse to violence for whatever motive. Despite their intolerable othering by media and governments,
terrorists are really no different from us. In fact, there is terror as the weapon of the weak and the far worse
economic and coercive terror of the liberal state. Terrorists therefore deserve empathy and they must be

At the core of this understanding sits a radical pacifism and an

idealism that requires not the status quo but communication and human
emancipation. Until this radical post-national utopia arrives both force and the
discourse of evil must be abandoned and instead therapy and un-coerced
conversation must be practiced. In the popular ABC drama Boston Legal Judge Brown
perennially referred to the vague, irrelevant , jargon-ridden statements of
discursively engaged.

lawyers as jibber jabber . The Aberystwyth-based school of critical internationalist

utopianism that increasingly dominates the study of international relations in Britain
and Australia has refined a higher order incoherence that may be termed Aber jabber .
The pages of the journal of Critical Studies on Terrorism are its natural home.

Internal Link Defense

The aff is woefully inadequate the deep-rooted anti-Muslim bias is
rooted in american psyche, discourse, and alternate policy
question the effectiveness of the affirmatives method
Ali 12 [Yaser, Managing Attorney at Yaser Ali Law and J.D at University of California,
Berkeley - School of Law, Shariah and CitizenshipHow Islamophobia Is Creating a
Second-Class Citizenry in America, CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, 8-1-2012,
article=4176&context=californialawreview] alla
One would assume that anti-Muslim sentiment reached its high water
mark after 9/11. To the contrary, however, it has increased dramatically in
the third phase of Islamophobia, which began during President Obamas
2008 campaign . If Volpps contentions about Muslims being relegated to secondclass citizenship were true in 2002, then today that distinction has
crystallized even further.136 Whereas a vast majority of the incursions in
the second phase occurred under the umbrella of national security,
Islamophobia has now evolved beyond simply encouraging profiling and
other surveillance techniques aimed at Muslims under the professed
interests of national security. An institutionalized version of Islamophobia
in this third phase now focuses on the "creeping threat of Shariah" and, in
the process, more explicitly threatens the foundational conceptions of
citizenship described by Professor Bosniak. Further, while citizens enjoy some
fundamental level of respect for their individual beliefs and practices, this
is no longer the case with regard to Muslims, both in journalism and
politics today. Whereas it is widely recognized as socially unacceptable to be
openly disparaging toward minority groups, the privilege reflected in that
norm is increasingly denied to Muslims . In this third phase of Islamophobia ,
mainstream discourse now explicitly challenges the notion that American
Muslims deserve the same liberal notions of rights that other citizens
enjoy. One might surmise that since the contours of this phase cannot easily be
demarcated, the third phase is in fact a difference in degree rather than in
kind. It is true that unlike the transition from the first to the second
phase, there is no single demonstrable event or tipping point that
represents the transition from the second to third period; however, there
was a gradual progression that increased in intensity since the
presidential campaign of 2008 when the term "Muslim" was actually
converted into a slur , as political opponents "accused" then-Senator Obama of secretly being a Muslim.
The suggestion that a Muslim citizen would be less suited for office
represents the deep-seated fear and mistrust of Muslims in the American

consciousness . President Obama's opponents recognized this fact and knew that it would be a powerful
tool for discrediting him. Yet what was perhaps most striking about the "allegations" was not the partisan claims

Obama felt
compelled to reject the "accusations," doing his best to distance himself
from the Muslim community and choosing not to make any campaign stops
in mosques or meet with any Muslim organizations during the campaign
themselves, but the responses that President Obama and other government leaders offered.

(despite making numerous stops at churches and synagogues). President Obama did not state, that although he
was not a Muslim, there was nothing wrong with Muslims per se. Instead,

he reiterated the bias by

referring to the accusations on his website as a "smear."

Further, during one

campaign rally, his aides asked two young Muslim women dressed in headscarves to exit the stage area where he
would be speaking. Arguably, the pervasiveness of such insidious discourse from the President helped

normalize the notion to the public that American Muslims are not
"citizens," but indeed "others ."

Strict Scrutiny Standard Defense

Strict Scrutiny is arbitrary which undercuts solvencystatus quo legal
standards are better
Riccucci 7 [Norma Riccucci, Rutgers University, June 2007, Moving Away From a
Strict Scrutiny Standard for Affirmative Action Implications for Public Management,] JMOV
This article addresses the concept of strict scrutiny, the burden of persuasion test
used by the courts to determine the constitutionality of affirmative action. Through
a systematic analysis of U.S. Supreme Court decisions, it illustrates that strict
scrutiny has been applied in an inconsistent, arbitrary manner and, therefore,
should not serve as the basis for judicial review of affirmative action
programs. It shows that the rule of law established under the Civil Rights Act
provides an equally if not more compelling basis for judging the legality of
affirmative action programs. Relying on the legal standards advanced by the courts
under civil rights statutes provides managers with greater flexibility in developing
and implementing affirmative action programs. In effect, the ability of governments
to promote diversity of their workforces is greatly enhanced.

Seriously it sucks
Riccucci 7 [Norma Riccucci, Rutgers University, June 2007, Moving Away From a
Strict Scrutiny Standard for Affirmative Action Implications for Public Management,] JMOV
The constitutional litmus test for judging affirmative action is a failureit gets an
unequivocal F. It lacks reliability, validity, and hence legitimacy, characteristics
that even the most basic civil service tests are required to demonstrate. More over,
it becomes almost impossible for policymakers in educational or employment
settings to develop affirmative action policies that will meet some rule of law, when
those rules are hollow and inconstant. It must be questioned at this point in the
history of affirmative action: why does the Court continue to wrestle with
appropriate standards of review, when it will ultimately disregard those standards
on a whim or apply them in an erratic, illogical manner? Perhaps strict scrutiny is
simply one area where the Court will expressly continue to legislate from the
bench. As argued here, the framework advanced under Title VII is much less
cryptic, arcane, and mercurial, and therefore, could be applied more broadly to all
questions of law concerning affirmative action programs and policies. This will
greatly facilitate the work of managers and policymakers who are striving to create
culturally diverse environments for public employees and students in public
universities. As the composition of the Supreme Court has changed since the 2003
Grutter ruling, it becomes imperative for public administrators and policymakers to
engage in a dialogue around the irrelevance of strict scrutiny.

Strict scrutiny failsspecifically in the context of Muslim

Figueroa 12 (Tiffani B. Figueroa, associate in Morrison Foersters Litigation Department, J.D. magna cum

the fear of Muslims or those perceived as Muslim has

resulted in the government's failure to protect Americans' First
Amendment right to receive information. n332 The strict scrutiny test [*499]
that courts normally employ when assessing the content-neutrality of a
regulation on speech has not been effective in light of the increased development of
Islamophobia. n333 Following the 9/11 attacks, Islamophobia has impacted
the free speech rights of Muslims and the mobility of foreign scholars, as well as the right to
receive information for all Americans. n334 "In an age of official insecurity and anxiety, the
most difficult constitutional problem may not be controlling arbitrariness in permitting, but
compensating for a chronic tendency to overestimate the likelihood of any
damage to public security from public exercises of freedom of speech." n335 Given the current
state of events and the vulnerability of the right to receive information, a
new standard to deal with the right to receive information in times of political
controversy is required. In order to resolve this issue of dealing with national security and the right to receive
information, courts should adopt a specific test under First Amendment speech
analysis where: (1) there is a political conflict and (2) there is a clear
group that society and the government targets because of the conflict. As
discussed earlier, the government may restrict the content of speech in certain
situations; however, it cannot favor one viewpoint over another. n336 The test
As discussed above,

will essentially focus on the effects of a regulation on speech when a specific group is targeted by the government

Once the court determines there is a disparate impact on a

certain group, the court will then resolve the issue as to whether the
government has curtailed the right to receive information through this
disproportionate treatment of the specified group. By first looking at the effects of a
action. n337

government action, courts will provide a framework for which they can work through their First Amendment

When dealing with political conflicts, such as [*500] the war on

terror, there are often certain groups that are discriminated against through
practices that seem constitutional. Such discrimination is not only
overlooked, but it has a subsequent effect on all Americans who are willing
to explore different ideas other than those the government makes readily
available. n339 The government's actions discussed above, such as dealing with speech at a
protest, n340 forcing a woman to remove her hijab in prison, n341 and revoking
the visas of foreign scholars n342 serve as examples. These actions appear
analysis. n338

to be neutral; however, the effects of the actions unevenly target one

particular group: Muslims and those perceived as Muslim . n343 It is
important that the courts look beyond the language of the laws or
government actions in order to gauge whether the government is in fact
practicing viewpoint discrimination and violating the First Amendment
right to receive information for Americans. n344 When looking at the effects of government

A law [may] not discriminate against a particular viewpoint on its

face, and there [may be] no evidence of an improper legislative purpose in
enacting the law. Within that framework of facial neutrality, however, we must examine
restrictions on speech with particular care when their effects fall unevenly
on different viewpoints and groups in society. n345 Looking at the effects of
regulation on speech is something that the Supreme Court itself has taken
into consideration when looking at the right to receive information . n346 As
determined in Martin v. Struthers, n347 the Court explained that, " in considering legislation which
thus limits the dissemination of knowledge, we must "be astute to
examine the effect of the challenged legislation' and must "weigh the
circumstances and appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in
support of the regulation.'" n348 Courts have taken a similar stance in other cases. n349 The [*501]
bottom line is: courts must look at the effects of government regulations

because laws that have a disparate impact on one viewpoint run the risk
of being viewpoint-based . n350 As in the case of Islamophobia, it is easy to
target a specific group because some Americans automatically associated
the 9/11 hijackers with all Muslims and those perceived as Muslim . n351
Similarly, in the interest of national security, the government at times partook
in practices that people may view as discriminatory. The government
failed to protect the free speech rights of Muslims as a targeted group, and these
actions subsequently harmed the right to receive information for
Americans. Although the government's purpose in enforcing the laws
discussed in this Note was not to close off Muslim ideas, the effects may show
otherwise. n352 Justice Antonin Scalia stated, "the vice of content-based legislation - what renders it
deserving of the high standard of strict scrutiny - is not that it is always
used for invidious, thought-control purposes, but that it lends itself to use
for those purposes." n353 "Unavoidable targeting" stemming from a government regulation
is included within this "vice of content-based legislation." This phenomenon may
shine light on what has occurred following the 9/11 attacks. By employing an effects test in the
First Amendment analysis, courts will more efficiently investigate whether
there is viewpoint discrimination affecting the right to receive information
since the courts must first establish if a government action falls
disproportionately on a specific group. n354 [*502] VI. Conclusion Surely, the government has
a highly supported interest in protecting the United States at all times. However, protection should not
ensue at the expense of severely limiting civil liberties and substantially
restricting the marketplace of ideas. In times of political strife, such as
facing terrorism today, the courts' current approach to dealing with First
Amendment violations of the right to receive information fails to protect
civil liberties. By looking at the discriminatory effects of regulations on
speech, the court can protect a thriving marketplace of ideas.

Lack of specificity makes it harder for social justiceturns solvency

Bunker et al. 11 [MD Bunker, Clay Calvert, William C. Nevin, Strict in Theory, But
Feeble in Fact? First Amendment Strict Scrutiny and The Protection of Speech,]
Professor Gerald Gunther famously declared strict scrutiny to

be strict in theory and fatal in fact in

1972. Although Professor Gunther's pithy and influential slogan may have been a reasonably accurate

time, strict scrutiny in the realm of the First Amendment is now

much less fatal to government regulation of expression . This article explores the beginnings of
characterization at that

the strict scrutiny test and the underpinnings of its subsequent dilution. The article examines the multiple ways

courts can avoid applying strict scrutiny and argues that compelling state interests are
proliferating in a manner that is harmful to robust speech protection. It also
critiques the lack of precision in narrow tailoring analysis. The article concludes that First
Amendment strict scrutiny has serious weaknesses that threaten to undermine
vigorous protection for expression and offers suggestions for increasing the rigor
and precision of the doctrine.

Profiling is distinct from description reliancethey conflate the two

its constitutional and logical to investigate suspects based on

McMillen 06 [Lucas McMillen, University of St. Thomas, Eye on Islam: Judicial

Scrutiny Along the Religious Profiling/Suspect Description Reliance Spectrum,
"Religious profiling," in this Article, will be understood as the situation in
which law-enforcement authorities act on the inference that a particular
adherent of a certain religion is more likely to engage in criminal or
terrorist behavior than any particular adherent of another religion.14 Put
an-other way, acts of religious profiling stem from an unfair prejudice
towards members of a religious group, a prejudice that attributes criminal
or terroristic propensities to all members of the group. But discriminatory
bias will not account for all counterterrorist action based on the trait of
Muslim identity. Muslim identity can simply be a part of a suspect
description, and be as legitimate a trait for the police to rely upon in
targeting potential suspects as height. weight. gender, or skin color. This
Article's next section will discuss the difference between religious profiling
and suspect description reliance , a difference that becomes crucial when
determining the degree of judicial scrutiny to give police action that targets
Muslims. A. Suspect Description Reliance, Religious Profiling, and the Question of
Discrimination Profiling-understood as presuming a person's criminal
propensity from their membership in a particular group-is located at the
unconstitutional end of the investigative-technique gamut. The other end of
this spectrum is maintained by the permissible and wholly logical lawenforcement technique of relying on suspect descriptions. Whether a court
will consider law-enforcement targeting of Muslims to be unconstitutional will

largely tum on which end of the suspect description reliance/religious profiling

spectrum that the court locates the targeting, as religious profiling will trigger
the nearly insurmountable strict scrutiny, while suspect description
reliance triggers the deferential rational basis scrutiny. Suspect
description reliance is the rather simple concept that police officers, in
choosing whom to investigate, may take into account certain
characteristics-e.g., race, gender, physical markings, visible religious
manifestations-because those characteristics match the physical description of the
suspect provided by a victim or witness. 15 Such a technique is neither
invidious nor unconstitutional; it is, simply put, "police work." For example,
if a white robbery suspect is seen running into a bar where only three of
the bar's patrons are white, the sole fact that the three men are white
undoubtedly provides the police with the reasonable suspicion needed to
justify detaining those men (or even probable cause justifying their arrest).16
While this police action involves targeting persons based on race, it is not
"profiling" -presuming criminality from group membership; it is seeking
and arresting individuals who match the suspect's description, which in
this case happens to be based on race.

Difference between strict scrutiny and rational basisand

explanation by Justice Kennedy

McMillen 06 [Lucas McMillen, University of St. Thomas, Eye on Islam: Judicial

Scrutiny Along the Religious Profiling/Suspect Description Reliance Spectrum,
For the issue of religious-group targeting, of course, one must address an issue that
Oneonta did not. While Oneonta's issue of racial profiling is a Fourteenth
Amendment question exclusively, the issue of religious-group targetinginvolving a potentially discriminatory infringement of religious exerciserepresents a point of convergence for the protections of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.25 When these two constitutional claims are
collapsed, a court's analysis of them collapses as well, such that a court will
use the Fourteenth Amendment's analytical framework to evaluate the
state's imposition on First Amendment free exercise rights. Put another
way, in reviewing a potentially unconstitutional state infringement on free
exercise, a court will evaluate the infringement with one of two levels of
scrutiny26: it will determine whether the infringement is either (1)
rationally related to a legitimate government purpose ("rational basis
scrutiny"),27 or (2) whether it is necessary to achieve a compelling
government purpose ("strict scrutiny ").28 The question of which level of
scrutiny will be applied is, of course, the crux of the matter, as rational basis
scrutiny is enormously deferential, while strict scrutiny has generally
proven to be, to quote Professor Gunther, " strict in theory and fatal in
fact ."29 1. Level of Scrutiny In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah,30 the Court employed the converged First-and-FourteenthAmendment analysis and established that its critical question of scrutiny

turns on whether government officials, in imposing upon religious

exercise, have done so with intent to suppress the targeted religiondiscriminatory intent. At issue in Lukumi was the constitutionality of the City of
Hialeah's animal sacrifice prohibition, a prohibition contained in a series of
ordinances that the city's Santeria practitioners challenged as being a thinly veiled
effort to curtail their religious activities.3l Justice Kennedy, writing for the
Lukumi majority, began describing the mechanics of the Court's merged
First-and-Fourteenth-Amendment analysis by discussing Employment
Division v. Smith,32 the case in which the Court gave a rational basis
review to an Oregon peyote prohibition that frustrated Native American
religious practice.33 According to Kennedy, Smith establishes the first
direction that a court can take in the merged analysis: when it finds that
conditions similar to those in Smith are present-Le., when the state's
action is neutrally postured towards religion-a court should review that
action with light scrutiny. To this effect, Kennedy wrote, "A law that is
neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling
governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of
burdening a particular religious practice."34Kennedy then continued,
moving on to describe the second direction of the merged analysis, which
he deemed to be the proper direction to take in Lukumi: when a court
finds that the conditions of Smith are not met, such that discriminatory
intent is the state action's raison d'etre, the state's action will be
subjected to strict scrutiny . Kennedy worded the second direction this way: "If
the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious
motivation, the law is not neutral; and it is invalid unless it is justified by a
compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest."3s Ultimately,
the Court determined that discriminatory intent lay behind Lukumi's
animal sacrifice prohibition-that it "had as [its] object the suppression of
religion"-and struck it down as unconstitutional.

Strict scrutiny is not applied on prisons and prisoners religious


Nelson 09 [James D. Nelson, graduated from the University of Virginia School of

Law, where he was Editor-in-Chief of the Virginia Law Review and received the Roger
and Madeleine Traynor Prize and the Robert E. Goldsten Award for distinction in the
classroom. After graduating, he clerked for Judge Jerry E. Smith of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Nelson then served as a trial attorney in the Civil
Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, before joining Columbia Law School as an
Associate in Law and Lecturer in 2012. He is also the Editor-at-Large of Columbia
Law Schools Blog on Corporations and the Capital Markets,

More specifically, federal courts have divided over the question of how to
apply strict scrutiny under RLUIPA. According to the statute, government
policies imposing a substantial burden on a prisoners religious exercise
must be justified as the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling
state interest. But courts have not agreed on how this standard of review
should be applied in the prison context. Some courts apply a deferential
model of review, finding most religious burdens to be insubstantial and
relying on the judgment of prison administrators regarding the weight of
state interests. Other courts, however, are applying a hard look model
of review that takes more seriously claims that prison policies burden
religion and requires prison officials to demonstrate the need for such
policies. The rise of a hard look model under RLUIPA is surprising. First, in
reviewing claims for religious accommodation outside the prison context,
courts have often applied strict scrutiny with far less stringency than the
standard traditionally requires . Courts have held that burdens on
religious practice had to be unbearable in order to count as substantial,
while accepting less than compelling government interests to satisfy
the standard.6 Second, commentators predicted that courts would be even
more deferential in the prison context. Of those who might bring claims
for religious exemptions, incarcerated persons would be among the least
likely to benefit from judicial review of governmental action.7 There are a
number of reasons for such skepticism. First, courts may doubt that prisoners
are sincere in the religious beliefs they claim and hold suspicion that such
beliefs are feigned in an effort to obtain special treatment.8 Second, courts
may generally lack sympathy for those convicted of criminal offenses.9 Finally,
courts may doubt their own institutional competence to review decisions regarding
the administration of a prison.10 In light of these considerations, few expected to
see a change in the level of deference accorded to prison officials.

No Solvency/ Squo Solves

Some Profiled Surveillance has to be justified- the Aff is incredibly
bias and the method is problematic--We cite 4 examples that their
aff tries to spin as offense
Spencer 14 [Robert Spencer, July 13, 2014, 4 Muslims Who Deserve to Be Under
Surveillance,] JMOV
Leftists and Islamic supremacists are enraged this week over the revelation that the FBI and NSA, despite their
officially politically correct See-No-Islam Hear-No-Islam Speak No-Islam stance, have had four prominent Muslim
leaders in the U.S. under surveillance.

They have appealed to Barack Obama to stop this

surveillance and all related monitoring of Muslims immediately , which he almost certainly
will, and have mounted a Twitter campaign based around the bitterly ironic hashtag #IAmATarget, which applies
more to infidels in the line of jihad attacks than it ever will to Muslim leaders in the United States.

The only

problem with all the righteous indignation that Leftists and Islamic
supremacist leaders have summoned about this surveillance is that it is
entirely justified. The uproar began with an expos titled Under Surveillance:
Meet the Muslim-American Leaders the FBI and NSA Have Been Spying On, written by
none other than Glenn Greenwald, along with another far-Left journalist ,

Murtaza Hussain. Greenwald

and Hussain purport to demonstrate that five Muslim leaders whom the NSA and FBI
have been watching are undeserving of such scrutiny, as theyre honest, patriotic
Americans whose only misdeed is to oppose administration policies. This is, of
course, absurd. Opposing U.S. government policies from the Left wont get you placed under surveillance;
itll get you media adulation, foundation grants, and awards from philanthropic groups. Obamas IRS persecutes
conservative groups, not Leftists, and several military presentations in recent years have claimed that right-wing
extremists are a terror threat, with nary a word about genuinely violent Left-wing extremist groups such as the
Occupy movement and others.

Bizarrely, and perhaps because they couldnt find enough

Muslims to fit their victim paradigm, Greenwald and Hussain include in their list of
persecuted Muslims Hooshang Amirahmadi, an Iranian-American professor at
Rutgers, who is a professing atheist; for the actual Muslims on their list, they gloss
over the genuine reasons why the FBI and NSA have placed these men under
surveillance: 4. Faisal Gill Faisal Gill is a longtime Republican Party operative and one-time candidate for
public office who held a top-secret security clearance and served in the Department of Homeland Security under
President George W. Bush.

Greenwald and Hussain note that he worked as a consultant

for the American Muslim Council, which was founded by the political activist Abdul

Rahman al-Amoudi to encourage participation by American Muslims in the political

process. Later he joined the Department of Homeland Security. Gills problems
began, according to Greenwald and Hussain, in 2003, when al-Amoudi was
arrested for participating in a Libyan plot to assassinate Saudi Crown Prince
Abdullah and for illegal financial transactions with the Libyan government, crimes
for which he eventually pleaded guilty. Gill was investigated, disclaimed any close relationship with
Alamoudi, and returned to work at the DHS. But he was, we now learn, kept under surveillance.


outraged over this surveillance, but Greenwald and Hussain dont mention that,
according to Discover the Networks, the plot to assassinate Abdullah involved two
U.K.-based al Qaeda operatives, and that he ultimately pled guilty to, and was
convicted of, being a senior al Qaeda financier who had funneled at least $1
million into the coffers of that terrorist organization. Faisal Gill worked as a
consultant for Alamoudis group that is, a group founded and headed by a
confessed senior al Qaeda financier.

Would Greenwald and Hussain be this outraged that he was

under surveillance if he had worked as a consultant for a group headed by a senior Ku Klux Klan financier?
Somehow I doubt it.

3. Asim Ghafoor Asim Ghafoor is a prominent attorney who has

represented clients in terrorism-related cases. He had some controversial clients, including the Al
Haramain Islamic Foundation, which has been linked to Osama bin Laden, and Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, bin
Ladens brother-in-law. But

everyone is entitled to representation, and representation does

not require that an attorney endorse his clients actions. However, here again
Greenwald and Hussain leave out salient details.

Discover the Networks reports that,


Ghafoor was a political consultant, spokesman, and public relations director for the
Global Relief Foundation (GRF), which the U.S. government shut down in
December 2001 because of the organizations ties to terrorism .GRF is not the only
organization with ties to terrorism with which Ghafoor has been involved . While he was
with GRF,

Ghafoor was also the spokesman for Care International . The December 6,

2002 Wall Street Journal reports: Records indicate close ties between [Care
International] and the Boston branch of Al Kifah Refugee Center, the Brooklyn
branch of which was named by prosecutors as the locus of the 1993 conspiracy to
bomb the World Trade Center. Reason enough to put Ghafoor under surveillance?
How could it not be? 2. Agha Saeed Agha Saeed is a former political science professor
at California State University who champions Muslim civil liberties and Palestinian
rights including, say Greenwald and Hu ssain, the right of Palestinians to armed resistance
against occupation if peaceful means faila right affirmed in a series of resolutions
by the United Nations General Assembly. The fact that the corrupt and morally
compromised UN endorsed the Palestinian jihad is hardly a ringing affirmation of

its moral rectitude, and in any case, the groups that pursue armed resistance
against occupation are jihad terror groups such as Hamas, Hizballah, and Islamic
Jihad. Saeed supports this armed resistance, so he may be in contact with some of
the leaders or members of such groups, and surveillance could reveal something
that could be used to stop their jihad terror attacks against civilians . So here again,
surveillance is warranted. 1. Nihad Awad Nihad Awad is the executive director of the
Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the largest Muslim civil rights
organization in the country. (Greenwald, the article fastidiously notes, has given paid speeches before
CAIRs regional affiliates.) Despite its political moderation and relationship to federal law enforcement agencies,
say Greenwald and Hussain, CAIR became a primary target of hardline neoconservatives after 9/11. This
apparently resulted in the fact that in 2007, the Justice Department named the group as one of more than 300
unindicted co-conspirators

in its controversial prosecution of the Holy Land Foundation,

then the largest Muslim charity in the U.S., which was eventually convicted of
providing material support to Hamas. Greenwald and Hussain notes that in 1994, Awad
voiced public support for Hamasbefore the groups campaign of suicide attacks
against civilians and subsequent placement on the State Departments terrorist list
in 1997. But it adds: I do not support Hamas, Awad says today, pointing out that the group was not involved
in terrorist activities at the time he made the statement. It was not on the list of organizations that sponsor or
conduct terrorism by the State Department. And when the organization took those acts, CAIR has condemned it,

So we are to understand that Awad supported Hamas in 1994, but in

1997, when it was placed on the State Departments terrorist list, he stopped
supporting it. Here is part of the old Hamas websites Glory Record of attacks
against Israelis the terrorist organizations own record of its murderous actions. On
a page that remained on its website well after 9/11, it celebrated the pre-1994
murders of Israeli civilian Yacoub Berey; civilians on a bus to Tel Aviv attacked by
Hamas jihadi Ahmed Hussein Shukry; civilians in a crowd in Jaffa who were
murdered by another Hamas jihadi in 1992; and a civilian at Beit Lahya who was
murdered by a member of Hamass al Qassam Brigades. The site also celebrated
the stabbings by Hamas members of an Israeli bus driver, a group of Israelis at a
bus station in Keryat Youval, a group of Israeli citrus packers, and a group of Israelis
who were run down by jihadist cab driver Jameel Ismail al-Baz. All these acts were
committed and publicly celebrated before 1994, when Awad professed his support
for Hamas. That they give Awad a platform for his dissembling is typical of the
dishonesty of the entire Greenwald/Hussain piece. But it will accomplish its
purpose: the ending of surveillance of these and other Muslim leaders and

the further weakening of counter-terror operations in general. And

Americans will be in even greater danger than they were before.

Indiscriminate Surveillance inevitable and harms are only felt after

surveillance activity is reported
Serwer 14 [Adam Serwer, Reporter at MSNBC, Feb 20, 2014, Judge throws out
lawsuit challenging NYPDs spying on Muslims,] JMOV
Religious profiling is okay, as long as you have a really good reason. Thats the logic
behind a decision reached by federal judge William Martini Thursday, in dismissing a lawsuit against New York Police
Department over the NYPDs surveillance of Muslim American communities in the region.

The police

could not have monitored New Jersey for Muslim terrorist activities
without monitoring the Muslim community itself, Martini wrote. The motive for
the program was not solely to discriminate against Muslims, but rather to find
Muslim terrorists hiding among ordinary, law-abiding Muslims. Any harm suffered by Muslims
who were spied on, Martini wrote, was not the fault of the NYPD , but of the
Associated Press reporters who first revealed the existence of the
surveillance effort. MELISSA HARRIS-PERRY, 1/19/14, 1:09 PM ET The downside to living in an
electronic age Nowhere in the Complaint do Plaintiffs allege that they suffered harm prior to the unauthorized
release of the documents by the Associated Press. This confirms that Plaintiffs alleged injuries flow from the
Associated Presss unauthorized disclosure of the documents, Martini wrote. The

harms are not

fairly traceable to any act of surveillance. The Associated Press declined to comment on
the ruling.

National Data collection and Local Police reform are uniquely key to
preventing oppression toward minorities
Natarajan 14 Ranjana Natarajan (Racial profiling has destroyed public trust in
police. Cops are exploiting our weak laws against it, December
15,,Accessed 6/21/15)
The #BlackLivesMatter movement has sparked nationwide protests and
has raised awareness worldwide about the unequal treatment of black
people by police in the United States. Listening to the voices from the movement and

its clear that

two issues need to be addressed: racial profiling and police use of
excessive force. Both run afoul of the U.S. Constitution, but remain common practices in law enforcement,
too often with tragic results. In Garners case, for example, police targeted him for
the petty crime of selling loose cigarettes the types of crimes black
people are targeted for at higher rates and then attempted to arrest
him with a chokehold, banned by the department. Whatever else we have learned from
learning from the death of Eric Garner and the series of other deaths of unarmed black men

the recent tragedies of police violence, it is clear that we need comprehensive federal, state and local policies that

Racial profiling as well as profiling based on

to plague our nation despite the
constitutional guarantee of equal treatment under the law. In a 2011 report, the
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights found evidence of widespread racial
profiling, showing that African Americans and Hispanics are disproportionately likely to be stopped and
searched by police, even though theyre less likely to be found possessing
contraband or committing a criminal act. In Illinois, for example, black and Hispanic drivers
outlaw racial profiling and rein in police excessive force.
religion, ethnicity and national origin continues

were twice as likely to be searched after a traffic stop compared to white drivers, but white drivers were twice as

The NYPDs controversial stop-and-frisk program shows

similar evidence of racial profiling, with police targeting blacks and
Latinos about 85 percent of the time. In nearly nine out of 10 searches, police
find nothing. Likewise, excessive force by police persists despite the
Constitutions prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures. In lawsuits
and investigations, the U.S. Department of Justice has concluded that a number of major police
departments have engaged in a pattern or practice of excessive force. The
likely to have contraband.

Cleveland Police Department was most recently found to be an offender, but it follows a long line of other wayward
law enforcement agencies: Seattle, New Orleans, Portland, Newark and Albuquerque among them. Clearly ,

cases like Eric Garners are not isolated police use of excessive force is
a systemic, national problem. The DOJ has recommended revising and clarifying local policies
regarding appropriate uses of force, improving officer training and supervision, and implementing rigorous internal

Conquering this
systemic issue demands a national mandate. Profiling undermines public safety and strains
police-community trust. When law enforcement officers target residents based on
race, religion or national origin rather than behavior, crime-fighting is less
effective and community distrust of police grows. A study of the Los Angeles Police
Department showed that minority communities that had been unfairly targeted in
the past continue to experience greater mistrust and fear of police
officers. To root out this ineffective tactic that undermines public confidence, we need stronger policies against
accountability systems, among other things. But recommendations are not enough.

racial profiling at all levels from local to federal as well as more effective training and oversight of police

Twenty states have no laws prohibiting racial

profiling by law enforcement, according to an NAACP report released in September. Among states
that do, the policies vary widely in implementation and effectiveness. Only 17 of those states
require data collection on all police stops and searches, and only 15
require analysis and publication of other racial profiling data. Limited and
inconsistent data collection makes it impossible to devise effective remedies for racial profiling. Last week, the
U.S. Department of Justice unveiled a newly revised guide on use of
profiling by law enforcement, distinguishing between legitimate uses (such as using race and other
officers, and systems of accountability.

characteristics in a suspect description) and illegitimate uses (such as criminal stereotypes). Among other things,

the guide explains that uses of race and other characteristics should be
based on particularized and trustworthy information relevant to the

specific investigation, rather than generalized stereotypes. The policy also provides
general provisions on training, data collection and accountability, and it was expanded to include national origin,
religion, gender, sexual orientation and gender identity. Civil rights groups have been calling for this updated guide
for years. However, the Department of Justice did not address all concerns . Civil
rights advocates had also called for the elimination of loopholes for national security and border enforcement,

This Guidance does not apply to Federal

non-law enforcement personnel, including U.S. military, intelligence, or
diplomatic personnel, and their activities . In addition, this Guidance does not
apply to interdiction activities in the vicinity of the border, or to
protective, inspection, or screening activities. The DOJ policy, however, is far clearer and
stronger than policies held by many states and localities. As the NAACP found , some states and
localities ban the use of pretextual traffic stops, others explicitly prohibit racial profiling,
and still others require mandatory data collection but few contain all of the elements of an
effective racial profiling ban, and many states lack profiling laws
altogether. Since Americans encounter local police in far greater numbers
than any federal law enforcement officers, the adoption of state and local
laws and policies banning profiling is critical. Excessive force and racial profiling are two
destructive modes of police misconduct that require concerted, vigilant action to reduce and eliminate. While
racial profiling can end in tragic police killings of unarmed individuals,
such as with Eric Garner or Michael Brown, it also results in many
unnecessary stops and searches, harassment and intimidation, and even
confiscation of property without due process. The steps to curb this are clear: At all levels
of government, we need definitive anti-profiling laws and policies, training of
officers on the elimination of explicit and implicit bias, data collection on
traffic stops and other police-community contacts, and development of
internal and external accountability systems. With these efforts, police
departments across the country can rebuild public trust and ensure that
policing methods reinforce rather than undermine our democratic values.
which the DOJ did not adopt. The document states:

Squo solves, Federal govt already expanding rules, but local law
enforcement is not
Apuzzo 14, Matt Apuzzo(U.S. to Expand Rules Limiting Use of Profiling by Federal
Agents,January 16,, Accessed 6/21/15)
The Justice Department will significantly expand its definition of racial
profiling to prohibit federal agents from considering religion , national
origin, gender and sexual orientation in their investigations, a government official said
Wednesday. The move addresses a decade of criticism from civil rights groups
that say federal authorities have in particular singled out Muslims in
counterterrorism investigations and Latinos for immigration
investigations. The Bush administration banned profiling in 2003, but with
two caveats: It did not apply to national security cases, and it covered
only race, not religion, ancestry or other factors. Since taking office, Attorney General
Eric H. Holder Jr. has been under pressure from Democrats in Congress to eliminate those provisions. These
exceptions are a license to profile American Muslims and Hispanic-


Senator Richard J. Durbin, Democrat of Illinois, said in 2012. President George W. Bush said in
2001 that racial profiling was wrong and promised to end it in America. But that was before the terrorist attacks of
Sept. 11. After those attacks, federal agents arrested and detained dozens of Muslim men who had no ties to
terrorism. The government also began a program known as special registration, which required tens of thousands of
Arab and Muslim men to register with the authorities because of their nationalities. Putting an end to this practice
not only comports with the Constitution, it would put real teeth to the F.B.I.s claims that it wants better
relationships with religious minorities, said Hina Shamsi, a national security lawyer with the American Civil
Liberties Union. It is not clear whether Mr. Holder also intends to make the rules apply to national security
investigations, which would further respond to complaints from Muslim groups. Adding religion and national origin
is huge, said Linda Sarsour, advocacy director for the National Network for Arab American Communities. But if
they dont close the national security loophole, then its really irrelevant. Ms. Sarsour said she also hoped that Mr.
Holder would declare that surveillance, not just traffic stops and arrests, was prohibited based on religion. The
Justice Department has been reviewing the rules for several years and has not publicly signaled how it might

Mr. Holder disclosed his plans in a meeting on Wednesday with

Mayor Bill de Blasio of New York, according to an official briefed on the
meeting who spoke on the condition of anonymity because the
conversation was private. Mr. de Blasio was elected in November after
running a campaign in which he heavily criticized the Police Departments
stop-and-frisk tactic, which overwhelmingly targets minorities and which a
federal judge declared unconstitutional. The mayor and attorney general did
not discuss when the rule change would be announced, the official said. A senior
change them.

Democratic congressional aide, however, said the Obama administration had indicated an announcement was

The Justice Department would not confirm the new rules on Wednesday night but
released a short statement saying that the mayor and the attorney
general discussed preventing crime while protecting civil rights and civil
liberties. In the past, Mr. Holder has spoken out forcefully against
profiling. Racial profiling is wrong, he said in a 2010 speech. It can leave a lasting scar on communities and

individuals. And it is, quite simply, bad policing whatever city, whatever state. Officials in the Bush
administration made similar statements, however, which is why civil rights groups have eagerly waited to hear not
just Mr. Holders opinion, but also the rules he plans to enact. As written ,

the Justice Departments

rules prohibit federal agents from using race as a factor in their
investigations unless there is specific, credible information that makes
race relevant to a case. For example, narcotics investigators may not increase traffic stops in minority
neighborhoods on the belief that some minorities are more likely to sell drugs. They can, however, rely on
information from witnesses who use race in their descriptions of suspects.
The rules cover federal law enforcement agencies such as the F.B.I. They
do not cover local or state police departments. That is significant because
Muslim groups have sued the New York Police Department over
surveillance programs that mapped Muslim neighborhoods, photographed
their businesses and built files on where they eat, shop and pray. Mr. Holders
comments about the new racial profiling rules came up in a conversation about that topic, the official said. William J.

While the rules

directly control only federal law enforcement activities, their indirect
effect is much broader, said Fahd Ahmed, the legal director of the Queensbased South Asian immigrant advocacy group Desis Rising Up and Moving.
For instance, he said, immigration bills in Congress have copied the Justice
Department profiling language. And civil rights groups can use the rules to pressure state and local
agencies to change their policies. Federal guidelines definitely have an impact, Mr. Ahmed said . Local
organizers can say, These policies are not in line with whats coming from
the federal level.
Bratton, the citys new police commissioner, has said he will review those practices.

Status quo solves Sensitive Operations Review Committee checks

discrimination practices
Bullard 13 (Ben Bullard; June 14, 2013; Personal Liberty; The FBI Can Pull Back
Your Curtain, But Mosques Are Off-Limits;
Ever since Islamic groups cried out against the FBIs semi-successful
surveillance into terrorist plots that emanated from mosques, the agency
has been forced to turn its attention elsewhere in the ongoing campaign
to uncover domestic terrorism. In February 2011, the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU) joined the Council for American-Islamic Relations of Greater
Los Angeles in filing a Federal class-action lawsuit against the FBI for
infiltrating mosques in Southern California and allegedly gathering general
information without probable cause. Regardless of the merits of that suit, the
backlash over the Southern California case had a subversive effect on
Federal domestic surveillance policy. Later that same year, the Administration
of President Barack Obama established a review panel within the
Department of Justice called the Sensitive Operations Review Committee ,
effectively carving out special treatment for the religious, political,
journalistic and academic spheres: A sensitive investigative matter (SIM) is
defined as an investigative matter involving the activities of a domestic public
official or domestic political candidate (involving corruption or a threat to the
national security), a religious or domestic political organization or individual
prominent in such an organization, or the news media; an investigative matter
having an academic nexus; or any other matter which, in the judgment of the
official authorizing the investigation, should be brought to the attention of FBI
Headquarters (FBIHQ) and other DOJ officials. (Attorney Generals Guidelines for
Domestic FBI Operations (AGG-I Dom), Part VILN.) As a matter of FBI policy,
judgment means that the decision of the authorizing official is
discretionary. Whether the FBI should be indiscriminately watching any individual
or affiliated group is a matter for a separate article (indeed, weve written several of
them), and recent scandals showing that the Nations vast enforcement empire is
doing just that are both loathsome and alarming. But if Obama is going to watch
most of us, its only fair (and makes a fair amount of sense) that he watch all
of us.

The aff doesnt solve racist local police tactics like stop and frisk,
fusion centers, biometric scanningcomparatively more invasive
Cyril 15 [Malkia Amala, founder and executive director of the Center for Media
Justice (CMJ) and co-founder of the Media Action Grassroots Network, a national

network of 175 organizations working to ensure media access, rights, and

representation for marginalized communities, March 30, 2015, Black America's
State of Surveillance,] alla
This model is deceptive, however, because it presumes data inputs to be neutral. They arent. In a racially
discriminatory criminal justice system, surveillance technologies reproduce injustice. Instead of reducing

predictive policing is a face of what author Michelle Alexander

calls the New Jim Crowa de facto system of separate and unequal
application of laws, police practices, conviction rates, sentencing terms,
and conditions of confinement that operate more as a system of social
control by racial hierarchy than as crime prevention or punishment. In New
York City, the predictive policing approach in use is Broken Windows.
This approach to policing places an undue focus on quality of life crimes
like selling loose cigarettes, the kind of offense for which Eric Garner was
choked to death . Without oversight, accountability, transparency, or
rights, predictive policing is just high-tech racial profiling indiscriminate
data collection that drives discriminatory policing practices . As local law
enforcement agencies increasingly adopt surveillance technologies, they use
them in three primary ways: to listen in on specific conversations on and
offline; to observe daily movements of individuals and groups; and to
observe data trends. Police departments like Brattons aim to use sophisticated technologies to do all
three. They will use technologies like license plate readers , which the Electronic Frontier
Foundation found to be

disproportionately used in communities of color and

communities in the process of being gentrified . They will use facial recognition,
biometric scanning software, which the FBI has now rolled out as a national system, to be
adopted by local police departments for any criminal justice purpose. They
intend to use body and dashboard cameras, which have been touted as an effective step toward accountability
based on the results of one study, yet storage and archiving procedures, among many other issues, remain unclear.
They will use Stingray cellphone interceptors. According to the ACLU, Stingray technology is an invasive cellphone
surveillance device that mimics cellphone towers and sends out signals to trick cellphones in the area into
transmitting their locations and identifying information. When used to track a suspects cellphone, they also gather
information about the phones of countless bystanders who happen to be nearby. The same is true of domestic
drones, which are in increasing use by U.S. law enforcement to conduct routine aerial surveillance. While drones are
currently unarmed, drone manufacturers are considering arming these remote-controlled aircraft with weapons like

They will use fusion centers. Originally designed to

increase interagency collaboration for the purposes of counterterrorism,
these have instead become the local arm of the intelligence community.
rubber bullets, tasers, and tear gas.

According to Electronic Frontier Foundation, there are currently seventy-eight on record. They are the clearinghouse
for increasingly used suspicious activity reportsdescribed as official documentation of observed behavior
reasonably indicative of pre-operational planning related to terrorism or other criminal activity. These reports and
other collected data are often stored in massive databases like e-Verify and Prism. As anybody whos ever dealt with
gang databases knows, its almost impossible to get off a federal or state database, even when the data collected is

Predictive policing doesnt just lead to racial and

religious profilingit relies on it. Just as stop and frisk legitimized an
initial, unwarranted contact between police and people of color, almost 90
incorrect or no longer true.

percent of whom turn out to be innocent of any crime, suspicious activities

reporting and the dragnet approach of fusion centers target communities
of color. One review of such reports collected in Los Angeles shows approximately 75 percent were of people of

Fusions centers are the only way that Federal and Local law
enforcement data is sharedthose failmeans federal changes
dont affect local communities
subcommittee of the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
LOCAL FUSION CENTERS, October 3, 2012,
sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CCYQFjAB&u,d.cWw] alla
Sharing terrorism-related information between state, local and Federal
officials is crucial to protecting the United States from another terrorist attack.
Achieving this objective was the motivation for Congress and the White
House to invest hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars over the last nine
years in support of dozens of state and local fusion centers across the United
States. 1 Congress directed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to lead
this initiative. A bipartisan investigation by the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations has found, however, that DHSs work with those state and local
fusion centers has not produced useful intelligence to support Federal
counterterrorism efforts. The Subcommittee investigation found that DHSassigned detailees to the fusion centers forwarded intelligence of
uneven quality oftentimes shoddy, rarely timely, sometimes
endangering citizens civil liberties and Privacy Act protections,
occasionally taken from already-published public sources, and more often
than not unrelated to terrorism . The Subcommittee investigation also found
that DHS officials public claims about fusion centers were not always
accurate. For instance, DHS officials asserted that some fusion centers
existed when they did not. At times, DHS officials overstated fusion
centers success stories. At other times, DHS officials failed to disclose
or acknowledge non-public evaluations highlighting a host of problems at
fusion centers and in DHSs own operations.

Modeling args are wrongno correlation between grants and

modelingonly our studies include the broader law enforcement
environmentother things are more important than federal
Burruss et al 12 [George W. Burruss has a Ph.D. in Criminology & Criminal Justice
at Southern Illinois University Carbondale, Joseph A. Schafer has a Ph.D from
Michigan State in Social Science (Criminal Justice), Matthew J. Giblin, an associate
professor and undergraduate program director in the Department of Criminology
and Criminal Justice at Southern Illinois University Carbondale, Melissa R. Haynes,
Member of the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Homeland Security
in Small Law Enforcement Jurisdictions: Preparedness, Efficacy, and Proximity to BigCity Peers, September 2012,]
Second, much of the literature implicitly or explicitly assumes that
homeland security preparedness can be improved through funding
allocations (e.g., grants), particularly from state and local governments (Davis
et al., 2006; Gerber et al., 2005). Alternatively, other writings have assumed that
preparedness is simply a byproduct of, or rational response to, the potential for a
terrorist attack in a jurisdiction (Davis, 2004; Henry, 2002). What these studies
tend to ignore is the larger environment . The efficacy of efforts to
enhance homeland security may not be just a function of perceived/actual
risk or funding, but both of those forces and others. For example, enhanced
preparedness and innovative practices may also flow from written
products such as books and journals, as well as conferences, training, and
other professional networks and channels. These sources, as shown in a study of
Illinois law enforcement agencies, play a significant role in determining
preparedness levels, independent of risk and resource allocation (Burruss, Giblin, &
Schafer, 2010). To date, however, researchers have largely ignored these
sources (termed institutional pressures) as determinants of homeland security
practices. Moreover, if these channels are salient, the proximity of small
agencies to big-city peers might be irrelevant as learning and modeling is
indirect rather than direct. This omission is glaring considering that
research verifying the significance of these factors could be used to shape
the diffusion of a range of innovations across the law enforcement

No federal modeling internal linklocal law enforcement models

regional agenciesour ev is comparative
Burruss et al 12 [George W. Burruss has a Ph.D. in Criminology & Criminal Justice
at Southern Illinois University Carbondale, Joseph A. Schafer has a Ph.D from
Michigan State in Social Science (Criminal Justice), Matthew J. Giblin, an associate
professor and undergraduate program director in the Department of Criminology
and Criminal Justice at Southern Illinois University Carbondale, Melissa R. Haynes,

Member of the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Homeland Security

in Small Law Enforcement Jurisdictions: Preparedness, Efficacy, and Proximity to BigCity Peers, September 2012,]
Respondents were asked a range of questions designed to assess the
extent to which institutional pressures influenced their approaches to
homeland security. The measures address factors that are independent of
any one person in the organization; that is, they focus on the influence of
other agencies, professional associations, and publications without
addressing who within the organization was specifically affected by these
factors .10 Table 8 reports the results of a number of questions measuring
whether agency practices were influenced by the actions of their peers. In
evaluating their own homeland security performance, 25.8 percent of
respondents indicated they paid significant attention to other agencies
like their own . An additional 59.8 percent of agencies paid some attention to similar agencies. Less than
one percent of responding agencies reported that they paid no attention to similar agencies in evaluating their
homeland security performance. Participating agencies were asked to what extent their agency modeled homeland
security policies and practices after other agencies that they viewed as successful. The majority of agencies
indicated they did engage in such modeling often (35.3 percent) or occasionally (54.9 percent). Other sources of

defining homeland
security practices and approaches agencies might be influenced by the
resources offered by these other entities. Respondents were asked to rate
the influence of four sources of influence on a three-point scale from not
at all influential (0.0) to very influential (2.0). Peer agencies were
institutional pressure are professional associations and relevant publications. In

reported to be the most influential . Strong influence was also indicated for professional
associations and government publications. Journal articles and books were the least influential, with an average
rating between somewhat influential and not at all influential. Grant programs and other funding opportunities were
generally less influential. In relative terms, federal and state grant funding for equipment and training were most
influential. Private or community funding sources were least influential in formulating homeland security
approaches and practices.

Massive alt causelocal police bigotry and racism disproportionally

impacts black people(exposure to local police is more common and
direct than exposure to federal law enforcement--so the alt cause
outweighs the affs internal link)
Lee 14 [Jaeah, Jaeah reports, writes, codes, and charts at Mother Jones. Her
writings have appeared in The Atlantic, the Guardian, Wired, Christian Science
Monitor, Global Post, Huffington Post, Talking Points Memo, and Grist, Exactly How
Often Do Police Shoot Unarmed Black Men?, Aug. 15, 2014,] alla
killing of Michael Brown by police in Ferguson, Missouri, was no
anomaly: As we reported yesterday, Brown is one of at least four unarmed black
men who died at the hands of police in the last month alone. There are many more

cases from years past. As Jeffrey Mittman, executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union's Missouri chapter

put it in a statement of condolence to Brown's family, " Unarmed

African-American men are

shot and killed by police at an alarming rate. This pattern must stop ." But
quantifying that pattern is difficult. Federal databases that track police use of force or
arrest-related deaths paint only a partial picture. Police department data
is scattered and fragmented. No agency appears to track the number of
police shootings or killings of unarmed victims in a systematic,
comprehensive way. Here's some of what we do know: Previous attempts to analyze
racial bias in police shootings have arrived at similar conclusions. In 2007,
ColorLines and the Chicago Reporter investigated fatal police shootings in
10 major cities, and found that there were a disproportionately high
number of African Americans among police shooting victims in every one ,
particularly in New York, San Diego, and Las Vegas. "We need not look for individual racists to say that we have a
culture of policing that is really rubbing salt into longstanding racial wounds," NAACP president Cornell Williams
Brooks told Mother Jones. It's a culture in which people suspected of minor crimes are met with "overwhelmingly
major, often lethal, use of force," he says. In Oakland, California,

the NAACP reported that out of

45 officer-involved shootings in the city between 2004 and 2008, 37 of

those shot were black. None were white . One-third of the shootings resulted in fatalities.
Although weapons were not found in 40 percent of cases, the NAACP found, no officers were charged. (These
numbers don't include 22-year-old Oscar Grant, who was shot and killed by a transit authority officer at the Fruitvale

The New York City Police Department has

reported similar trends in its firearms discharge report, which shows that
more black people have been shot by NYPD officers between 2000 and 2011 than have
Hispanics or whites. When you look at the racial breakdown of New Yorkers, black
people are disproportionately represented among those targeted as
criminal shooting suspects, firearms arrestees, and those fired upon or
struck by police gunfire. Often, the police officers do not get convicted or sentenced. Delores JonesBART station on New Year's Day of 2009.)

Brown, a law professor and director of the Center on Race, Crime, and Statistics at the John Jay College of Criminal
Justice in New York City, has identified dozens of black men and women who have died at the hands of police going
back as far as 1994. She notes that while these incidents happen regularly, it often takes a high-profile case, such

the patterns that

we've been seeing recently are consistent: The police don't show as much
care when they are handling incidents that involve young black men and
women, and so they do shoot and kill," says Jones-Brown, a former assistant prosecutor in
Monmouth County, New Jersey. "And then for whatever reason, juries and prosecutor's offices are
much less likely to indict or convict." Between 2003 and 2009, the DOJ reported that 4,813
as Brown's, to bring other recent incidents to national attention. "Unfortunately,

people died while in the process of arrest or in the custody of law enforcement. These include people who died
before an officer physically placed him or her under custody or arrest. This data, known as arrest-related deaths,
doesn't reveal a significant discrepancy between whites, blacks, or hispanics. It also doesn't specify how many
victims were unarmed. According to the FBI, which has tracked justifiable homicides up to 2012, 410 felons died at

black people are more likely than

whites or Hispanics to experience a police officer's threat or use of force,
according to the Department of Justice's Police Public Contact Survey in
2008, the latest year for which data is available. Of those who felt that police had used or
the hands of a law enforcement officer in the line of duty.* But

threatened them with force that year, about 74 percent felt those actions were excessive. In another DOJ survey of
police behavior during traffic and street stops in 2011, blacks and Hispanics were less likely than whites to believe
that the reason for the stop was legitimate. The Justice Department has investigated possible systemic abuse of

Police shootings of unarmed black people aren't

limited to poor or predominantly black communities. Jones-Brown points
power by police in at least 16 cities.

to examples where police officers have shot unarmed black men and
women in Hollywood, Riverside (California), and Prince Georges Countya
Maryland suburb known as the most affluent US county with an AfricanAmerican majority. "Part of the problem is that black people realize that you don't
have to be poor, you don't have to be in your own community...and this
can happen to you ," she says. These killings occur against black people of
varying socioeconomic backgrounds: "Actors, professional football
players, college students, high school grads. They happen to black cops, too." Yet, the lack
of comprehensive data means that we can't know if there's been an upsurge in such cases, says Samuel Walker, a
criminal justice scholar at the University of Nebraska in Omaha and author of The Color of Justice: Race, Ethnicity,
and Crime in America. "It's impossible to make any definitive statement on whether there were more incidents in
the last 5 to 10 years than in the past," he says. "We just don't have that kind of data." But what is certain, Walker
says, is that the fatal shooting in Ferguson "was just the tip of the iceberg."

Local-federal police data distribution failsits too unorganized

local law enforcement cellphone data collection is another alt cause
Ackerman 13 [Spencer, national security editor for Guardian US and won the
2012 National Magazine Award for Digital Reporting, Data-sharing among US law
agencies amounts to 'organised chaos' report, December 10, 2013,] alla
sharing of crucial intelligence about counter-terrorism between the FBI,
the Department of Homeland Security and local police departments takes
place through a patchwork process that amounts to organized chaos ,

according to a new report. The report, released Tuesday by the Brennan Center for Justice, a public-policy institute

inconsistent rules, inadequate oversight, apparent wastefulness and
insufficient regard for civil liberties nationwide. This poorly organized
system not only wastes time and resources; it also risks masking reliable
intelligence that could be crucial to an investigation, the report says, warning that a
din of data is overwhelming law enforcement. Theres a lot of irrelevant
information being collected, said Michael Price, a counsel with the Brennan Center and the author
of the report. As a result of that, it seems pretty easy for information to slip through
the cracks. A Department of Homeland Security spokesman took vigorous exception to the reports factual
at New York University law school that has a track record of being skeptical of government surveillance,

presentation and its conclusions, saying that much of the responsibility for the patchwork rules should properly be
attributed to discrepancies in laws across the 50 states and arguing that the fusion centers contribute strongly to

Scrutiny of the wide-reaching intelligence

apparatus in federal, state and local law enforcement since 9/11 has
largely taken a backseat during the past six months worth of revelations
from whistleblower Edward Snowden about the National Security Agencys
surveillance activities . But this week, several reports pointed to an
national security while protecting civil liberties.

enormous amount of data collected by police departments particularly

from cellular towers . The Brennan Center report examined 16 major police departments

across the US, along with 19 affiliated fusion centers controversial

data-sharing pools between federal, state and local agencies and 14 of
the FBIs joint terrorism task force partnerships with police. It found,
among other problems, inconsistent quality control, which permitted a
flood of local tips some as innocuous as ordering food at a restaurant
and leav[ing] before the food arrives (an example from California, according to a Fusion
Center training document obtained by the report's authors) into fusion centers. Data like that does
not meet the legal standard for "reasonable suspicion" normally required
to pursue surveillance, let alone the requirements of probable cause . Yet
it can be stored within fusion centers and accessed by a variety of law
enforcement and homeland security agencies for up to a year , the report said.
Despite efforts by the Department of Homeland Security, most of the
fusion centers operate with minimal oversight, or no oversight
whatsoever, the report found. Out of 19 centers reviewed, only five
require independent audits of retained data. Were calling for clear, consistent processes
and stronger standards for collecting and sharing information to reduce some of the noise coming from this din of
data, Price said. A Department of Homeland Security spokesman contended Tuesday that the report
misrepresented the complexities of data-sharing across local, state and federal agencies, and strongly defended the
relevance and performance of fusion centers. This report fundamentally misunderstands the role of fusion centers
within our national security structure and their value to state and local law enforcement, said DHS press secretary
Peter Boogaard. As pointed out by congressional leaders and major law enforcement organizations across the
country, fusion centers greatly improve information sharing and co-ordination between federal, state and local law
enforcement. By receiving classified and unclassified information from the federal government and assessing its
local implications, fusion centers help law enforcement on the front lines better protect their communities from all
threats, whether it is terrorism or other criminal activities. The FBI did not respond to a request for comment made

Fusion centers have been the

subject of criticism from both civil libertarians and powerful elected
officials. A 2012 investigation by the bipartisan Senate permanent
subcommittee on investigations of more than 80,000 fusion center
documents could not find any contribution the centers had made to
disrupt[ing] an active terrorist plot. DHS disputes the results of that investigation, as do
after a media embargo on the Brennan Center report lifted.

several legislators on committees overseeing the department. Senator Tom Coburn, an Oklahoman who serves as
the top Republican on the Senate government reform and homeland security committee, has emerged as a leading
legislative critic of fusion centers and joint terrorism task forces, for many of the same reasons detailed in the
Brennan Center report. After a government inquiry indicated many federal data-sharing efforts were duplicative,
Coburn issued a statement in April calling them a vital component of national security, but adding, that is not an
excuse to waste taxpayer funds. The Brennan Centers report comes as

police departments

widespread use of cellphone data is attracting new scrutiny. On Monday, the

Washington Post revealed that police departments around the country
relied 9,000 times last year on so-called tower dumps, or data collected
from cellphone signals that went to a given cellphone tower during a
certain period of time. That data necessarily includes call information from
cellphone subscribers who are never suspected of any crime. There are
serious questions about how law enforcement handles the information of
innocent people swept up in these digital dragnets,

congressman Ed Markey, a

Massachusetts Democrat who plans to introduce legislation limiting tower dumps, told the Post. Also on Monday,

a quarter of police departments in the US have

employed tower dumps, and at least 25 departments around the country
USA Today reported that approximately

employ a portable piece of spoofing hardware, called a Stingray, that

tricks cellphones into thinking it is a cell tower, allowing it siphon data and
send it directly to police. And all that information is on top of the fruits of the NSAs vast data
collection efforts, which are not entirely off limits to federal law enforcement. The controversial bulk collection of
Americans phone data has been repeatedly described by the NSA as a tool to aid the FBI in detecting domestic
terrorism activity. NSA deputy director John C Inglis recently stated that the FBI cannot search directly through the
NSAs data troves, but the agency shares telephone metadata with the bureau following searches through its
databases based on reasonable articulable suspicion of connections to specific terrorist organizations. The
Brennan Center report did not specifically analyze law enforcement tower dumps, but Price called the reports of
them alarming. This is another indication of the vast trove of information that state and local police are collecting
about law abiding Americans, Price said. To date, that information does not appear to be particularly useful in
preventing terror attacks.

Fusion centers faillocal law enforcement doesnt have oversight

Price 13 [Michael, serves as counsel for the Brennan Centers Liberty and National
Security Program, NATIONAL SECURITY AND LOCAL POLICE, December 10, 2013,
Police_web.pdf] alla
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, many s tate

and local law enforcement agencies

have assumed a critical but unfamiliar role at the front lines of the
domestic fight against terrorism. The federal government has encouraged their participation,
viewing them as a tremendous force multiplier2 with approximately 800,000 officers nationwide.3 Indeed, by
collecting and sharing information about the communities they serve, police departments have been able to
significantly increase the data accessible to members of the federal intelligence community.4 At the same time,

however, the headlong rush into counterterrorism intelligence has

created risks for state and local agencies, with too little attention paid to
how to manage them. Although prevention of terrorist attacks is often
described as a new, post-9/11 paradigm for law enforcement, the
prevention of all crime has been a central tenet of modern policing since
its debut nearly 200 years ago.5 Intelligence activities, including the use of
surveillance, undercover officers, and informants, have helped fulfill this
mandate. But due to the potential for abuse that came to light during the
1960s and 70s, many courts and legislatures placed checks on police
intelligence operations. Most importantly, they required officers engaged in intelligence activities to
have reasonable suspicion that a person or group is involved in criminal activity before collecting, maintaining, or
sharing information about them. Of course, this rule does not apply to most other police activities. Officers
responding to an emergency, for example, may record a victims statement or document an eyewitness account
without suspecting either individual of wrongdoing. But for many police departments, reasonable suspicion became

Since 9/11, some police departments have

established counterterrorism programs to collect and share intelligence
information about the everyday activities of law-abiding Americans, even
in the absence of reasonable suspicion.7 This information is fed into an
array of federal information sharing networks, creating mountains of
data.8 Whether these practices have made us safer is debatable.9 What is clear is that they raise issues of
a prerequisite for creating intelligence files.6

accountability and oversight in ways that have not been given sufficient attention. The centerpiece of this new
counterterrorism architecture is a national information sharing network connecting police departments and federal

But there is little consistency

regarding the types of information that local law enforcement agencies
collect and share with their federal counterparts. The policies and
procedures governing such activities are often opaque or unavailable to
agencies, known as the Information Sharing Environment (ISE).

the public, while a deliberately decentralized system produces rules that

vary considerably across the country. Inconsistent rules jeopardize the
quality of shared intelligence and raise serious civil liberties concerns . In
some jurisdictions, for example, police have used aggressive information gathering
tactics to target American Muslim communities without any suspicion of wrongdoing.
Such practices have not generated investigative leads or proven especially useful in preventing potential terrorist
attacks.10 But they have strained community relations with law enforcement, thereby jeopardizing the very

state and local intelligence

programs lack adequate oversight. While federal agencies operate under
the watch of independent inspectors general, there is often no equivalent
for state and local information sharing ventures. Very few local governments have built
terrorism prevention mission they are intended to accomplish.11 Many

the kind of oversight structures that should accompany such a significant expansion of police functions.

Multitude of barriers to data-sharinglocalized law enforcement

cannot effectively model/cooperate with federal agencies
AFCEA International 7 [The Armed Forces Communications and Electronics
Association (AFCEA) established in 1946, is a non-profit membership association
serving the military, government, industry, and academia as an ethical forum for
advancing professional knowledge and relationships in the fields of
communications, information technology, intelligence, and security, The Need to
Share: The U.S. Intelligence Community and Law Enforcement, April 2007,
KthG2NXEpzngYQ_75f9lLQ&bvm=bv.96339352,d.cWc] alla
The committee believes certain steps can help the intelligence and law enforcement communities move forward in
their ability to share information and intelligence better. Communicate and Reinforce the Need for Sharing:

People have a natural tendency to resist change. For this reason, leaders
throughout the intelligence and law enforcement communities must
consistently and repeatedly deliver the message of change and ensure
that everyone understands the importance of sharing information .
Analysts who have been told for years that releasing certain types of
information violates the law must now be strongly encouraged to
exchange the information with others . The new Director of National Intelligence, Mike
McConnell, has made a strong statement to all intelligence professionals with his direction that it is not enough to

Earn Public Trust: Abuses of the past

have made the public skeptical about the governments role in personal
lives. Yet, the public wants and deserves a collaborative intelligence and
law enforcement community effectively working together to prevent
another terrorist attack. A Markle Foundation task force7 noted, For information sharing to succeed,
share intelligence: There is a responsibility to provide it.

there must be trust. Building trust requires strong leadership, clear laws and guidelines, and advanced
technologies to ensure that information sharing serves important purposes and operates consistently with American
values. The communities must ensure compliance with the law and make the commitment visible to the public.
Manage Risk: The intelligence and law enforcement communities have been risk averse in the past regarding

The risk of
sharing information must be balanced against the risk of not connecting
sharing informationoften for good reasons. Todays environment calls for a different approach.

the dots. What is the true value of having important informationeven if

it comes from a tenuous source in some casesif the information is never
shared with others who may need it and who may add value to the
information? As a first step, local law enforcement should have a formal
role and presence within the NCTC. This would give law enforcement
officials early warning about terrorist tactics used overseas before the
terrorists try to apply them in the United States, and it would help law
enforcement plan and train better. Create Clear, Understandable, and Consistent Guidelines:
Many current guidelines and policies are complex, confusing, inconsistent, and make sharing information difficult to
achieve. This complexity causes delays in sharing data and undermines its utility. People are more apt to give up if

The owners do not

always appreciate why information they control could be significant to
others. For sharing to be effective, those who have a broader picture may
be the best advocates regarding what needs to be shared. For example,
local and state law enforcement, fire, and public health organizations can
make a critical contribution in terms of detection, prevention, and
response. The federal intelligence or law enforcement communities may
not be taking full advantage of these capabilities and skills because they
do not have a clear understanding of what they can contribute. These
individuals on the front lines may hold key pieces of the puzzle. The fact
that some of their information comes from an unclassified source does not
automatically mean it is not useful or important. Use Technology in a Meaningful
Way: Most of the obstacles to meaningful change in this arena are
cultural, but technology still can play an important role. Most, if not all, of
the technological impediments to protecting sources and methods while
enabling effective information sharing have been solved. Technology should be
the rules are too hard to follow. Eliminate the Construct of Data Ownership:

embraced as a key in easing the administrative burdens of sharing information. Emphasize Training: Effective and
focused training can improve the confidence of community members and the publics perception that information is
being handled appropriately. The right training, coupled with intelligence policies, will better enable sharing and
ultimately will help change the cultures. Share Good Ideas and Lessons Learned: The District of Columbia, among
others, has taken first and useful steps. It has initiated discussions in the law enforcement and intelligence
communities to broaden understanding of what types of information are needed and why .

Once state or
local law enforcement organizations articulate and justify specific needs,
and it becomes clear the contribution they can make to mission success,
the willingness to share information will improve significantly. Other steps
are possible. In the early 1980s the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
partnered with local law enforcement to educate U.S. police officers on the
trends, tactics, and patterns of the South American drug cartels. As a
result, local law enforcement officers knew what behavior, precursor
chemicals, and modes of transportation were associated with major
trafficking and violent crimes of the international cartels. Such partnerships work.
Leaders in both communities should look to the partnership model within the Joint Terrorism Task Force as an
approach to enabling information sharing. The Director of National Intelligence has recently created an Information
Sharing Steering Committee (ISSC) and declared the ISSC will move the Intelligence Community beyond the need
to share philosophy and more to a responsibility to provide.8 This commitment can steer the federal, state, and
local communities closer to the goal of a shared information environment. Conclusion Since September 11, 2001,
the intelligence and law enforcement communities have struggled to adapt to new challenges and to refocus and
reorder priorities.

Nonetheless, the seam between federal, state, and local

communities has inhibited the United States ability to fight terrorism.

Although Congress has removed many of the existing barriers to

cooperation, and limited examples of progress exist, implementation is
lagging. The key to change is strong leadership in both communities.
Leaders must understand and nurture cultural change that emphasizes a
responsibility for providing informationnot just for sharing it.

They must also

communicate to their subordinates a willingness to accept risk in sharing data and must deemphasize data
ownership. These steps, along with clear guidelines, inter-community training, the exchange of lessons learned, and
the effective use of technology, can open doors of cooperation that have been closed for too long.

Alt Causes
Local Police Departments are oppressive federal data and Maple
Heights proves
Dewan 14, Shaila Dewan, Reporter for the New York Times, 2014 (Mostly White
Forces in Mostly Black Towns: Police Struggle for Racial Diversity, New York Times,
September 9,, Accessed on 6/20/15)
Maple Heights police officers with a driver stopped for a traffic violation. The department has only two black officers
out of 35. Credit Michael F. McElroy for The New York Times MAPLE HEIGHTS, Ohio The population of this workingclass Cleveland suburb has gone from nearly all white to two-thirds black since its mayor declared more than 35
years ago that he did not know what a minority is. But its police and fire departments have not kept pace: The
Maple Heights police force today still has only two black officers out of 35; the fire department is 100 percent white.

Across the country, police departments still struggle

to hire and retain minority candidates in some cases despite great
efforts, in others because of a lack of initiative. But now, the problem has
taken on new relevance since the fatal shooting of a young black man last
month in Ferguson, Mo., where just four of the 53 police officers are black ,
Maple Heights is far from unique.

according to the police chief. Nationwide, the total number of minority police officers has risen, but they remain
heavily concentrated in larger cities, with the numbers falling off sharply in smaller ones, like Ferguson and Maple
Heights. In 1977, Maple Heights agreed to increase minorities in its police and fire departments. But officials did not
follow through. Credit Michael F. McElroy for The New York Times

Data from a federal survey of

police departments in 2007, analyzed for The New York Times by Andrew A. Beveridge, a sociologist at
Queens College, found that nearly 400 departments, most with fewer than a
hundred officers, were substantially whiter than the populations they
served. In these departments, the share of white officers was greater than the
share of white residents by more than 50 percentage points. Ferguson and Maple
Heights are about the same size, just over 20,000 people, and in both, the black population has surged in recent
decades. Both cities have white mayors and largely white political leaderships. And both police departments have
fallen far short of reflecting the communities they serve even as some of Maple Heightss neighboring police

Critics point to the lack of racial

balance in police departments as evidence of systemic racism . But experts say
departments have achieved much higher levels of diversity.

the experiences of the two towns illustrate the obstacles to achieving diversity in law enforcement, even for
departments that have made it a priority. I see all these pundits come on the Sunday talk shows and say: Of
course you can hire more black people. Of course theyre not trying, said Nelson Lim, a senior sociologist at the
RAND Corporations Center on Quality Policing who has consulted with departments in Los Angeles and San Diego.
But its very, very, very difficult. There is little hard evidence that diversity correlates with better performance, in
part because it is difficult to control for complex variables and to know which outcomes, from crime rates to
brutality cases, to measure. In fact, one study of a Florida police department found that black officers were more
likely than white to use force against black suspects. A review of court cases going back to the early 1990s revealed
only a handful of civil rights or excessive-force cases against the Maple Heights police, two of which involved a
white officer who is no longer with the department, and none that involved a fatality like the shooting in Ferguson.

it is an accepted tenet of community policing that when departments

reflect the communities they serve, they have an easier time building
trust and defusing, rather than escalating, tense situations. In Maple Heights,

some residents said they would like to see more black officers, while others said that it was the attitude, experience
and training of the officer, not race, that mattered. Chris Turney, a home renovator who lives with his wife and two
daughters, said it was more important for officers to live in the city. All but one do not. The police come here, they
do their jobs, they dont try to get to know anybody, said Mr. Turney, who is black. The police dont wave.

Hundreds of police departments across the nation have forces with a

white percentage that is more than 30 percentage points higher than the

communities they serve.

Other residents drew a contrast between police attitudes in Maple Heights

and neighboring Bedford Heights, where three-quarters of the residents, and nine of 28 police officers, are black.
Bedfords not going to do you like Maple, said Carlos Walker, 41, who is black. You have to do something real
stupid for Bedford. Maple, soon as they get behind you, you sweating. In her 11 years as an officer in Bedford
Heights, Detective Ericka Payne, who is black, has often provided backup on calls in Maple Heights. Th ere


definitely differences in the ways the departments interact with the

outside community, Detective Payne said. We try to be a little bit more community oriented. Because
we are a little bit more diverse, we understand those dynamics and maybe have a little bit more ease dealing with
that. Several Maple Heights officials said the diversity of the police and fire departments had never been a major
issue. It is hard to find qualified candidates of any race, said John C. Popielarczyk, who has been with the Maple
Heights Police Department since 1990 and the acting police chief since May. Maple Heights, devastated by the
foreclosure crisis, has fallen on hard times, and the police force has shrunk. And with most officers staying on the
job for 25 years, Chief Popielarczyk said, the opportunity to hire is scarce. Of eight recent hires, two were black.
One, the chief said, was fired for cause before his probationary period ended. The department has advertised in
minority newspapers and changed the private company that administers its Civil Service exam in hopes that more
minority candidates would pass, he said. But he added: The real goal of the department is to provide qualified
officers who are competent and can provide quality service regardless of race. I dont think people really care about
the color of the officer that responds; they care that the officer responds quickly, is effective, treats them well and is
respectful. The acting fire chief, James Castelucci, said much the same, adding that one promising black candidate
withdrew when his current employer offered him more money. The obstacles to diversity are many, Dr. Lim, the
sociologist, said. Candidates usually must pass written tests, physical agility tests, psychological tests, polygraphs
and background checks, some of which can have a disparate impact on minority candidates. Qualified black
candidates are sought after not just by competing police departments, but also by employers in other industries.
And some police chiefs have cited a negative attitude toward law enforcement among blacks that hinders
recruiting. Police departments have tried all kinds of remedies, from personal trainers to help with physical fitness
tests to tailored recruiting. (A RAND survey found that women were attracted to the good salaries in policing, blacks
to the professions prestige and Asians to the excitement of the job.) But many small departments lack the
resources, or the will, to conduct an exhaustive review of their hiring practices. In Maple Heights, job candidates are
ranked by how well they score on the written exam, earning bonus points for factors like previous training, military
experience and city residency. For each opening, the candidates are considered one by one, in order of their score.
Frank Ross said he did not accept the citys explanations for having few minority police officers. Credit Michael F.
McElroy for The New York Times Some nearby suburbs like Bedford Heights and Cleveland Heights where about
40 percent of the residents and 22 of 102 officers are black do things differently. The chiefs of both departments
said officials were allowed to consider the top 10 candidates on the list, which helps them hire more minority
candidates. Both chiefs said their cities took an aggressive approach to diversity as early as the 1970s. Cleveland
Heights has two types of officer positions, one that requires a Civil Service exam and a college degree, and a lower
tier, called basic patrol, that does not. Once a basic patrol officer is hired, the city will reimburse tuition costs, and
many eventually earn a degree and work their way to the upper tier. The diversity of neighboring police
departments poses a challenge to cities like Maple Heights, Dr. Lim said: If the leadership, if the police chief, is
dedicated to getting more diversity in the work force, how hard is it to figure out how the other department is doing
such a good job? Asked why Maple Heights considered only one candidate at a time, Chief Popielarczyk said:
Weve always done it that way. My understanding is that thats how were supposed to do it. Some Maple Heights
residents have tried to persuade the city to hire more blacks, forming a committee called the Maple Heights
Citizens for Change. In 2012, Elaine Stone, a committee member who runs a blog called the Maple Heights African
American Gazette, was digging around and discovered a long-forgotten affirmative action agreement, signed by the
mayor, a citizens committee and a representative from the federal Justice Department in 1977. In that deal,

Maple Heights, at the time about 96 percent white, agreed that within three years
minorities would make up at least 4 percent of its police and fire
departments. But it soon became clear that the city was less than fully
committed to this goal. I figure were all minorities, the mayor at the time, Emil J. Lisy
Jr., told reporters when he was criticized for failing to live up to the agreement. The first thing is to find out what a
minority is, and I havent figured that out. Federal officials threatened to withhold $500,000 in funds, but backed
down after the mayor submitted a 65-page response. When Ms. Stone learned about the agreement, she contacted

Frank Ross, the only surviving signer of the document . Mr. Ross was a teacher in his
20s when he came to Maple Heights, at a time when real estate brokers steered black customers to a part of town

agreed to go to meetings of the

committee, where he suggested that the group call the Community
Relations Service of the Justice Department, the same office that helped broker the earlier
deal. Though new discussions were opened between the city and the
called Presidential Row. He now lives 12 miles away, but

service, which provides mediation and training to governments, residents

feel the talks have stalled. Neither the mayor nor the Maple Heights legal director returned calls for
comment for this article, and the service does not publicly discuss its work. Participation by local governments is
strictly voluntary. Ms. Stone said economics, not overt racism, had kept the police and fire departments largely
white. There was white flight, but people were trying to hold on to their jobs, she said. I can understand you

Mr. Ross said apathy among black voters was partly to blame for the situation.
does not accept the citys excuses. Theyre telling me in 40 years
they cant find any African-American policemen? he said. Forty years
later its very emotional for me. Forty years later, Im still dealing with
the same thing.
dont want to give up that job.
But he

Alt cause Local police is the problemcommunity oriented policing

is failing
Jrank Law Library, No Date, (,No Date,, Accessed 6/19/2015)

cooperation and communication between police and minorities has

been troubled. Williams and Murphy described a history of policing shaped
by the enforcement of laws that have discriminated against minority
groups, particularly African Americans. Slavery, segregation, and discrimination are
historical realities that shaped the current distrustful, strained, and often
hostile relationship between police and minority citizens. This poor relationship

reached its pinnacle during the police-citizen crisis of the 1960s. The civil rights movement had gained momentum
and become more militant. Protesters gathered to demonstrate against race discrimination and injustice within the

Police officers responded to protesters with physical

brutality, which increased the tension between minorities and the police.
criminal justice system.

This tension exploded in the form of riots and civil disobedience, often sparked by incidents involving the police

reports and research findings

questioning the effectiveness of "professional" police organizations , police
(Walker, 1999). As a result of several crime commission

organizational strategies evolved to focus on strengthening relationships and creating partnerships between the
police and citizens. Police departments attempted to improve community relations through the creation of policecommunity relations units, race relations training for officers, and the hiring of more minorities and women. Some of
these techniques were relatively successful. As reported by Walker (1999), African American officers represented a
majority of the force in departments such as Detroit, Washington, and Atlanta in 1993. In addition, African
Americans were selected as police chiefs in several large departments, including New York City, Los Angeles,
Atlanta, Chicago, Houston, and others. Furthermore, by the mid-1990s, women represented 13 percent of all officers
in large police departments. Despite these advances ,

police still struggle with minority

community relations. In 1993, the acquittal of four officers accused of beating Rodney King, an African
American motorist in Los Angeles, sparked race riots across the country. Other major cases of police abuse of force
in the 1990s (e.g., the Louima and Diallo cases in New York City) further increased tension between the police and

26 percent of African American citizens surveyed reported

they had very little or no confidence in the police, compared to only 9
percent of white respondents (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1996). Furthermore, when asked about
attitudes toward use of force, 60 percent of whites had favorable attitudes compared
to 33 percent of African Americans and 42 percent of Hispanics (Huang and
Vaughn). Serious questions regarding police discrimination remain. Studies routinely show that minorities
are overrepresented as suspects who have force used against them, and
minorities. In 1996,

who are shot and killed by officers. Worden's analysis of 1977 data showed that police were
more likely to use both reasonable and unreasonable force against black male suspects. This is also true of the use

changes in police departments' administrative policies

led to decreases in the use of deadly force by officers . In a study of the New York City
Police Department, Fyfe found that changes in the department's formal policies governing
police shootings in 1972 reduced the average numbers of shots fired by
officers by 30 percent. The total number of uses of deadly force decreased by nearly 50 percent from
of deadly force. However,

1970 to 1984. In that same time period, the ratio of African Americans to whites who had deadly force used against
them decreased from six-to-one to three-to-one (Walker, 1999). Reductions in police use of deadly force toward
minorities were also noted after the fleeing-felon standard guiding police use of deadly force was ruled

African Americans
are also disproportionately arrested more often than whites. It is unclear whether
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Tennessee v. Garner, 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985).

these disparities in arrest statistics represent actual discrimination (i.e., disparity based on extra legal factors, such
as race). When other factors are taken into consideration (e.g., seriousness of the offense, the evidence available,
demeanor of the suspect, etc.), it appears that arrest decisions are influenced more by situational and legal factors

police are more likely to police innercity neighborhoods, which are predominantly minority areas. In this sense,
police may be showing a form of contextual discrimination by heavily
policing particular neighborhoods or particular types of crimes . A concern is that
police officers are profiling citizens based on race and ethnicity . The term DWB
or driving while black is a vivid descriptor of this phenomenon. Minority groups claim that police
are more likely to pull over motorists simply because of their race. In fact,
than strictly race (Riksheim and Chermak). However,

studies of New Jersey State Police have shown that minorities are pulled over disproportionately. This same
argument is made in urban areas, where minorities believe they have become the targets of police harassment
through tactics of aggressive enforcement of minor crimes. Studies of police have shown that African Americans

Surveys of
citizens also indicated that African Americans and Hispanics are more
likely to be stopped and interrogated by police . One survey of African American high
school students revealed that 80 percent had been stopped by police and 62 percent
of those stopped said the police treated them disrespectfully (Walker, Spohn, and
and Hispanics are disproportionately stopped, questioned, and frisked by police (Browning et al.).

DeLone). At the same time, however, minority citizens complain that police are not responding to their needs in

Citizens allege that police are not providing adequate protection

or attention in their neighborhoods. According to Walker, this apparent contradiction can be
these areas.

explained by "the diversity within racial and ethnic minority communities . . . . Complaints about police harassment

Most members of
racial minority communities, however, are law-abiding adults with jobs and
families. Like their white counterparts, they want more not less police protection" (1999, p. 222). In the 1980s,
new strategies of community oriented policing have encouraged the
partnership between citizens and the police. Research has shown, however, that
strategies of community policing tend to have the strongest impact on
neighborhoods where they are least needed. Satisfaction with community policing
generally come from young males who have a high level of contact with the police.

techniques is highest in homogeneous, higher socioeconomic status communities, and lowest in heterogeneous,
lower socioeconomic status communities (Bayley, 1988). It is clear that new approaches to improve police-minority
relations are needed.

Alt CauseUnderrepresentation of local minorities in the police

force is a larger problem
Badger, Keating, and Elliot 14 Emily Badger, Dan Keating, and Kennedy Elliot,
(Where minority communities still have overwhelmingly white police, August 14,, Accessed on 6/21/15)

There is something unsettling about the scenes this week out of Ferguson,
Mo., that goes beyond the rare sight of military equipment on city streets
or the disproportionate deployment of it. In so many of these images, the
unarmed residents are black. But almost all of the officers facing them are
white. The fatal police shooting Saturday of an unarmed black teen that set off these confrontations in a St. Louis
suburb has raised questions not just about the conduct of one officer, but the makeup of an entire police force.

How could a community that's two-thirds black have a police force that's
almost entirely white? How could such divisions ubiquitous in the 1960s persist in 2014? Across
the country, this racial imbalance is not rare. Fifty years after the Civil Rights movement
called attention to the under-representation of minorities in police departments, the pattern is still widespr ead.
More than three quarters of cities on which the Census Bureau has
collected data have a police presence that's disproportionately white
relative to the local population. Meanwhile, in more than 40 percent of cities, blacks are
under-represented among police officers, a Washington Post analysis of
Census data revealed. While the pattern is widespread, broad variations exist. The charts below show
which cities have the greatest and smallest disparities between population and police. These numbers
are more encompassing than a mere count of officers in a municipal police
department. From the point of view of residents in each community, they reflect the larger
police presence one might encounter. The center line in each chart represents equality or
how we might expect a police force to look if it perfectly reflected the demographics of the city it serves. NonHispanic white representation in most cities is above this line; in other words, the share of white police officers in

If we count cities within

five percentage points of that line as having relative equality , just one in
10 cities and towns in America meets that standard. If we look at the data
from the perspective of black officers, about 45 percent of cities and
towns meet this definition of equality. That number, though, is largely driven by cities with few
or no black officers but also very small black populations. Remove cities where less than 5
percent of the population is black, and 72 percent of all such places 446
in total have police forces where blacks are under-represented. In the
609 communities where Hispanics make up at least 5 percent of the
population, they are under-represented among police as well in 66 percent
of places. Even the best intentions by police departments won't
automatically create perfect equality because city demographics shift over
time in some places more rapidly than others. The Department of Justice, which has
Memphis or Charlotte is higher than the share of whites living in those cities.

filed hundreds of lawsuits against discriminatory local agencies since the 1970s, has historically looked at
demographic data like this, along with hiring and recruiting practices .

It is striking on the above

charts, however, that many of America's biggest cities are hovering more
closely around equality than others. These are the same cities where fierce
battles were fought and federal lawsuits waged over unequal hiring
practices after 1972, when amendments to the Civil Rights Act extended protection from discrimination
to state and local government employers. "Politicians realized that they couldnt have an all-white police force in a
city with a substantial minority population," says Richard Ugelow, who worked on such lawsuits in the Civil Rights
Division of the DOJ for 29 years. "That changed the culture of the police departments and the willingness of law

in Chicago, New York,

Atlanta, in these large cities. They want to have a diverse workforce . You
dont have those same pressures in these smaller communities ." The public outcry and federal
pressure that made such inequality so visible in Chicago prompting dramatic
change there hasn't historically extended to places like Ferguson , a suburb of 21,000
enforcement, police and fire departments to become more diverse. You see that

with 53 commissioned police officers. "It's hard for the government to bring a lawsuit," Ugelow says, "against a

police force of 100 people." The above charts show many places with either all-white or no-black police forces.
Many of them are smaller cities, such as Niagara Falls, N.Y., where 20 percent of the population is black but all 250
police are white, according to the data. In Florissant, Mo., a quarter of the population is black, but none of the 25

Some seemingly unequal communities have also experienced

demographic shifts that have exacerbated the imbalance between the
police presence and the population. Ferguson is an example of such a place: In 1990, the city
was almost three-quarters white. By 2010, it was two-thirds black . Its police force today may in
some ways be a legacy of the makeup and policies of an earlier moment of
time. Ugelow doubts that the picture above is the result of intentional discrimination today "blacks need not
apply." But some of the same historic practices and applicant tests that
effectively excluded minorities may still exist in departments that never
updated their policies. During the recession, small-town police agencies that have had to cut resources
police are.

may have trimmed the HR staffs and recruitment programs that address this issue. Ugelow also worries that, since

the issue of
inequality in police departments has focused on the relationship between
blacks and whites. But as the country's Hispanic population continues to
grow, communities have to take into account demographic patterns that
encompass more than white and black. In San Antonio, for instance, blacks and whites only
the Bush Administration, the DOJ has eased up on its civil rights litigation. Historically,

account for one-third of the local population, and a slightly higher proportion of the police; Hispanics make up 63
percent of the population, and 58 percent of the police. As a note ,

the data above draws from a

special 2010 Census count of workers in 755 cities and towns, including
every place with a population of at least 50,000 at that time . Once a decade, the
Census creates this employment file for federal agencies that monitor employment practices and enforce civil rights

The data include the number and demographics of police officers

counting police and sheriff's patrol officers, and transit and railroad police
working in each city. The data do not include detectives, security guards or parking enforcement


MASSIVE alt causethey cant solve racial profiling by local law

enforcement agenciescomparatively more exposure to them than
federal law enforcement
Harris 99 [David A., Distinguished Faculty Scholar and Professor of Law at
NATION'S HIGHWAYS, June 1999,] alla
hot summer afternoon in August 1998, 37-year-old U.S. Army Sergeant
First Class Rossano V. Gerald and his young son Gregory drove across the
Oklahoma border into a nightmare. A career soldier and a highly decorated
veteran of Desert Storm and Operation United Shield in Somalia, SFC
Gerald, a black man of Panamanian descent, found that he could not travel
more than 30 minutes through the state without being stopped twice:
first by the Roland City Police Department, and then by the Oklahoma
On a

Highway Patrol. During the second stop, which lasted two-and-half hours, the troopers
terrorized SFC Gerald's 12-year-old son with a police dog, placed both
father and son in a closed car with the air conditioning off and fans
blowing hot air, and warned that the dog would attack if they attempted

to escape. Halfway through the episode perhaps realizing the extent of

their lawlessness the troopers shut off the patrol car's video evidence
camera. Perhaps, too, the officers understood the power of an image to
stir people to action. SFC Gerald was only an infant in 1963 when a stunned nation watched on
television as Birmingham Police Commissioner "Bull" Connor used powerful fire hoses and vicious police attack dogs
against nonviolent black civil rights protesters. That incident, and Martin Luther King, Jr.'s stirring I Have a Dream
speech at the historic march on Washington in August of that year, were the low and high points, respectively, of

How did it
come to be, then, that 35 years later SFC Gerald found himself standing on the side
of a dusty road next to a barking police dog, listening to his son weep
while officers rummaged through his belongings simply because he was
black? I feel like I'm a guy who's pretty much walked the straight line and
that's respecting people and everything. We just constantly get harassed.
So we just feel like we can't go anywhere without being bothered... I'm not
trying to bother anybody. But yet a cop pulls me over and says I'm
weaving in the road. And I just came from a friend's house, no alcohol,
nothing. It just makes you wonder was it just because I'm black?" James, 28,
advertising account executive Rossano and Gregory Gerald were victims of discriminatory racial
profiling by police. There is nothing new about this problem. Police abuse
against people of color is a legacy of African American enslavement,
repression, and legal inequality. Indeed, during hearings of the National Advisory Commission on
the great era of civil rights legislation: the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Voting Rights Act.

Civil Disorders ("The Kerner Commission") in the fall of 1967 where more than 130 witnesses testified about the
events leading up to the urban riots that had taken place in 150 cities the previous summer, one of the complaints
that came up repeatedly was "the stopping of Negroes on foot or in cars without obvious basis." Significant blame
for this rampant abuse of power also can be laid at the feet of the government's "war on drugs," a fundamentally
misguided crusade enthusiastically embraced by lawmakers and administrations of both parties at every level of

the war on drugs has in fact been a war on people and

their constitutional rights, with African Americans, Latinos and other
minorities bearing the brunt of the damage. It is a war that has, among
other depredations, spawned racist profiles of supposed drug couriers. On
our nation's highways today, police ostensibly looking for drug criminals
routinely stop drivers based on the color of their skin. This p ractice is so
government. From the outset,

common that the minority community has given it the derisive term,
"driving while black or brown" a play on the real offense of "driving while intoxicated." One of
the core principles of the Fourth Amendment is that the police cannot stop
and detain an individual without some reason probable cause, or at least
reasonable suspicion to believe that he or she is involved in criminal
activity. But recent Supreme Court decisions allow the police to use traffic
stops as a pretext in order to "fish" for evidence. Both anecdotal and
quantitative data show that nationwide, the police exercise this
discretionary power primarily against African Americans and Latinos. No
person of color is safe from this treatment anywhere, regardless of their
obedience to the law, their age, the type of car they drive, or their station
in life. In short, skin color has become evidence of the propensity to
commit crime, and police use this "evidence" against minority drivers on
the road all the time.

NYPD is an example of local, racist policies that the plan cant

AP 12 Samantha Henry, Matt Appuzzo, Wayne Perry, reporters for the
Associated Press, American multinational nonprofit news agency, 2012 (New Jersey
Muslims Angry Over NYPD Surveillance Findings, The Huffington Post, May 25,
Available online at, Accessed on 6/15/15)
Muslim leaders said they were told that every instance of NYPD activity in New Jersey had been justified by a lead,

the attorney general would not provide any details on the nature of
any of those leads, saying the fact-finding was ongoing. Imam Mustafa El-Amin of the Newark-based
Masjid Ibrahim said he was concerned that Chiesa refused to explain what leads
had been received. With the NYPD compiling a map of every mosque in Newark including his he
said he wanted to know about any problems or potential dangers in his
mosque he might be unaware of. "We understand the need for surveillance
and security," said El-Amin, "We just don't appreciate how this was done.
We as Muslims feel we were violated, simply because we are Muslims."
Several Muslim leaders at Thursday's meeting said that they did not find the assertion that
the NYPD had leads for all their operations in New Jersey credible , adding that
but that

efforts to maintain communication between the community and law enforcement would be hurt by the findings that
the NYPD had done nothing wrong and could keep doing what they have been doing. "It was basically an, `FYI,
good Thursday afternoon, let it die in the media before the Memorial Day weekend,'" said Mohamed El-Filali,

If the
surveillance of every mosque, burger joint and barbershop targeted was
justified, he asked, why were no arrests made? Aref Assaf of the American Arab Forum
said the attorney general made them feel like second-class citizens. "I said to
him it's not only insulting, it's offensive to our sense of justice , that you bring us to
Trenton to tell us that you accept as legal and valid the actions of the NYPD, and I will not be surprised
if you're issuing an order informing your law enforcement officials that
they too can spy on American Muslisms because if it's legal for NYPD, than
it must be legal for NJ to do the same." The Muslim leaders said they would consider all legal
executive director of the Islamic Center of Passaic County, across the Hudson River from New York.

options, including renewed appeals for action by the U.S. Justice Department. A federal civil rights lawsuit has also
been considered.

Local police surveillance targeted at Muslims is unchangeable

Friedersdorf 13 Conor Friedersdorf, staff writer at The Atlantic, where he
focuses on politics and national affairs, has a Masters degree in Journalism from
New York University and a BA in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics from Pomona
college, 2013 (The Horrifying Effects of NYPD Ethnic Profiling on Innocent Muslim
Americans, The Atlantic, March 28, Available online at, Accessed on 6/16/15)
the NYPD's clandestine spying on Muslims to the public's
attention in a series of vital stories. Starting shortly after the September 11 terrorist
The Associated Press brought

attacks, officers infiltrated Muslim communities and spied on hundreds or

perhaps thousands of totally innocent Americans at mosques, colleges,
and elsewhere. These officers "put American citizens under surveillance
and scrutinized where they ate, prayed and worked, not because of
charges of wrongdoing but because of their ethnicity ," the news agency reported,
citing NYPD documents. Informants were paid to bait Muslims into making
inflammatory statements. The NYPD even conducted surveillance on
Muslim Americans outside its jurisdiction, drawing a rebuke from an FBI
field office, where a top official charged that "the department's
surveillance of Muslims in the state has hindered investigations and
created 'additional risks' in counterterrorism." NYPD brass and Mayor Michael Bloomberg
defend these policies as counterterrorism efforts that are necessary to keep New Yorkers safe. As you ponder the
specific costs of these policies, as evocatively described below, keep in mind one thing about the ostensible

"In more than six years of spying on Muslim neighborhoods,

eavesdropping on conversations and cataloguing mosques," the
Associated Press reported, "the New York Police Department's secret

Demographics Unit never generated a lead or triggered a terrorism

investigation ." They acknowledged, in court testimony, having generated
zero leads.


DA Links

Terror Links
Muslim surveillance is key to stop terrorism France proves
Kamisar 1/7 (Ben; January 7, 2015; The Hill; GOP rep: French attack shows need
for more Muslim surveillance;
Rep. Pete King (R-N.Y.) said Wednesday that the terrorist attack on a
French satirical newspaper underscores the need for increased
surveillance in Muslim communities. We should put political correctness
aside and realize that it is important to have police in the communities,
using sources, using informants, he said on Fox Newss Americas Newsroom.
Lets face it: The threat is coming for the most part out of the Muslim
community. Its a small percentage, but thats where its coming from, King said.
King added that that its not clear that increased surveillance would have stopped
the attack but said the French attack shows the absolute necessity of
having those programs. Hes called for these policies after previous terrorist
attacks and defended of the now-defunct New York Police Department program that
assigned undercover officers to Muslim communities. King noted that police
similarly targeted the Italian community while working to stamp out mob
organizations, among other examples. The New York Republican also said
Wednesdays attack in France should serve as a wake-up call for Congress to iron
out differences on Department of Homeland Security (DHS) funding. King warned
that Congresss fight over immigration and DHS funding shouldnt also jeopardize
the nations counterterrorism programs. We have not funded the Department of
Homeland Security, and thats because of this [fight] over immigration, he said.
Whatever we do on that as far as immigration cannot in any way be allowed to
interfere with our counterterrorism methods. As retribution for President Obamas
recent executive order that granted work permits and deferred deportation for
millions of immigrants living in the U.S. illegally, Republicans led a charge to only
authorize DHS funding until the end of February. That way, GOP leaders will be able
to negotiate the agencys funding with more leverage, since the party now controls
both houses of Congress. But King said that negotiators should not put U.S.
security at risk and also keep optics in mind. The juxtaposition would be
terrible: a terrorist slaughter in Paris and the U.S. cuts back on Homeland
Security funding, he said. We cannot in any way allow the funding or the
programs that stop terrorism in this country to be impeded in any way

The US is experiencing a spike in Islamic terrorist strikes

surveillance is necessary to prevent attacks
Inserra 6/25 (David - a Research Associate for Homeland Security and Cyber
Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security
Policy; June 25, 2015; The Heritage Foundation; Terrorist Plot No. 71: Rise in

Terrorism Calls for Increased Vigilance;
On Monday, the FBI charged Justin Sullivan with attempting to provide
material support to a terrorist group as well as two weapons charges. Sullivan was
planning to attack a public venue, such as a bar or a concert, with a rifle in
support of the Islamic State (ISIS). This is the 71st Islamist terrorist plot
or attack against the U.S. homeland since 9/11 according to publicly
available information. It is the third plot foiled this month alone and part
of an ongoing spike in terrorist activity within the U.S. The U.S. must recognize that
terrorists have not stopped trying to strike us and, indeed, have only
grown bolder in the past few months. While the U.S. should not give in to fearmongering, it
cannot naively ignore the threat that confronts it. The U.S. must use all the tools of its
national power to prevent terrorists from striking. In April 2015, Sullivans father called
9-1-1 after Sullivan began to destroy various household items, particularly religious items, seemingly in support of
ISIS. Sullivans father said that they were scared to leave the house. Following this incident, the FBI assigned an
undercover agent (UC) to communicate with Sullivan. Sullivan praised ISIS and swore his allegiance to it, describing
himself as a mujahid, a guerilla fighter engaging in violent jihad. Sullivan told the UC that the two of them should
remain in the U.S. to support ISIS since they would likely be captured if they tried to travel. Instead, Sullivan had
settled on attacking a U.S. target with a gun, saying that [yo]u only need 600 dollars for the gun and bullets.[1]
Sullivan said that he would be purchasing an AR-15 rifle in about two weeks at a nearby gun show, promising that
Ill kill people this month. Sullivan estimated that he and the UC could kill 1,000 people with AR-15s.[2] Sullivan
then began to talk about firearm silencers and poisons that could be used on the bullets or in a bomb. He asked if
the UC could make the silencers for use in June or possibly July. In addition to seeking out a silencer and poisons,
Sullivan also sought 100-round drum magazines for the AR-15 as well.[3] After gaining as much information as
possible from Sullivan, the FBI then provided him with a silencer that Sullivan believed was homemade on June 19.
The FBI then raided the Sullivans house, finding the silencer and arresting Sullivan. Sullivan admitted that he was
planning to use the silencer during an attack on a bar or a concert between June 21 and June 23. He intended to
buy a rifle from a gun show on June 20.[4] This 71st plot is the ninth Islamist terrorist plot in this calendar year and
the third in June alone. As was the case with all the other plots this year, Sullivan was inspired by ISIS. Sullivans
was also the 60th plot or attack involving a homegrown terrorist, meaning one who was radicalized here in the U.S.
In targeting a bar or a concert, Sullivan was also going after the third most common terrorist target: different types
of mass gatherings (plots against the U.S. military and New York City are the most and second most common
targets, respectively). Together with the recent release of State Department research showing a spike in global
terrorism in 2014, the U.S. must come to grips with the true nature of the terrorist threat, both at home and abroad.
[5] To combat the real and growing threat of terrorism, Congress should: Ensure that the FBI shares information
more readily and regularly with state and local law enforcement and treats state and local partners as critical actors
in the fight against terrorism. In this case, a local 9-1-1 call seems to have triggered FBI involvement. While using
state and local partners as important sources of information is half the battle, local partners must also receive
timely information from the FBI. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should play a role in supporting these
partners efforts by acting as a source or conduit for information and coordinating information sharing between the
FBI and its partners. Designate an office in DHS to coordinate countering violent extremism (CVE) efforts. CVE
efforts are spread across all levels of government and society. DHS is uniquely situated to lead the federal
governments efforts to empower local partners. Currently, DHSs CVE working group coordinates efforts across DHS
components, but a more substantial office will be necessary to manage this broader task. Support state, local, and
civil society partners. Congress and the Administration should not lose sight of the fact that all of the federal
governments efforts must be focused on empowering local partners. The federal government is not the tip of the
spear for CVE efforts; it exists to support local partners who are in the best position to recognize and counter
radicalization in their own communities. Maintain essential counterterrorism tools. Support for important
investigative tools is essential to maintaining the security of the U.S. and combating terrorist threats.

Legitimate government surveillance programs are also a vital component

of U.S. national security and should be allowed to continue. The need for effective
counterterrorism operations, however, does not relieve the government of its obligation to follow the law and

As the
U.S. experiences the highest level of terrorist activity since 9/11, Congress
must remember that this is not a short-term skirmish but a long war.
respect individual privacy and liberty. In the American system, the government must do both equally well.

Failure to recognize the nature of this conflict, our enemy, or the reality of
the threat will leave the U.S. unprepared. Instead, the U.S. must remain
vigilant and provide U.S. counterterrorism officials with additional legal
tools to confront the growing threat.

Targeted surveillance is necessary Boston bombing proves

Careccia 13 (John; June 17, 2013; Western Journalism; Islamic Mosques:
Excluded From Surveillance By Feds;
Homeland Insecurity: The White House assures us that tracking our every phone call
and keystroke is necessary to stop terrorists, and yet it wont snoop in mosques,
where the terrorists emanate from. Fact Many of the terrorists have been
radicalized in Mosques and Muslim agencies right here in America.
According to the NSA the governments sweeping surveillance of our most private
communications excludes Mosques and Muslim affiliated facilities. Supposedly this
is done to protect the sensibilities of innocent Muslims who worship in Mosques.
Since October 2011, mosques have been off-limits to FBI agents. Surveillance or
undercover sting operations are not allowed without high-level approval from a
special oversight body at the Justice Department dubbed the Sensitive Operations
Review Committee (SORC). Who makes up this body, and under what methodology
do they review requests nobody knows. The names of the chairman, members and
staff are kept secret. Why is it necessary to keep the names and titles of the people
who decide whether or not to protect the rest of the country from radical Muslims,
secret? We do know the panel was set up under pressure from Islamist groups who
complained about FBI stings at mosques. Just months before the panels formation,
the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR) teamed up with the ACLU to sue
the FBI for allegedly violating the civil rights of Muslims in Los Angeles by hiring an
undercover agent to infiltrate and monitor mosques in Americas second largest city.
Another defeat for the politically correct imbeciles in our government. Before
mosques were excluded from the otherwise wide domestic spy net the
administration has cast, the FBI launched dozens of successful sting
operations against homegrown radicals inside mosques, and disrupted
dozens of plots against innocent American citizens across the United
States. If only they were allowed to continue, perhaps the many innocent
victims of the Boston Marathon bombings would not have lost their lives
and limbs. The FBI never canvassed Boston mosques until four days after the April
15 attacks, and it did not check out the radical Boston mosque where the Muslim
bombers worshiped even though they were supposedly on the governments watch
list. The bureau didnt even contact mosque leaders for help in identifying their
images after those images were captured on closed-circuit TV cameras and
cellphones. As I have repeatedly pointed out, the Politically Correct attitude of
the Obama administration is dangerous to the well being of the average
hard working American citizen. There are many religious communities in the
United States. How can the government attack one of the oldest and most
established religions in the United States and choose to defend the actions of

another belief system that espouses violence and murder of Westerners who they
classify as infidels. Even though the FBI was tipped by Russia more than a year
before about the leanings of the two Boston bombers, they apparently chose to
ignore it. Now after the fact we learn that one of the Muslim bombers made
extremist outbursts during worship, yet because the mosque wasnt
monitored, red flags didnt go off inside the FBI about his increasing
radicalization before the attacks.

Arab Americans wont give up their radicals surveillance is key

Careccia 13 (John; June 17, 2013; Western Journalism; Islamic Mosques:
Excluded From Surveillance By Feds;
Why didnt the Imam contact the FBI? Why dont these people of peace
speak up when they hear people in their congregation espousing hate of
the country they have adopted. Maybe its because they see us as an
opportunity to expand their Caliphate and dont really care what happens
to the infidels in their way who dont deserve to live. This is particularly disturbing
in light of recent independent surveys of American mosques, which reveal
some 80% of them preach violent jihad and distribute violent literature to
worshipers. Even though Islam is not a religion in the strict sense (it is more of a
socio-economic way of life), if Church doors are open to anyone or anything then
Mosques should be too. If Muslims have nothing to hide then they should not
object to being treated the same or equal to other religious organizations.
If our Federal agencies are going to protect us from attack, they have to
adopt strong measures to root out these radicals and a plan to counter
those who would commit atrocities against citizens of the the United

Muslim Surveillance is essential to stop terrorism

Moore and Lemire 12 (Tina and Jonathon; March 3, 2012; Daily News; Ray
Kelly defends spying on students, calling it an essential safety strategy for city;
Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly gave an impassioned defense of the
NYPDs controversial Muslim surveillance program Saturday declaring it
essential for the citys safety. The tactics, which allegedly include spying on
mosques, cafes and shops, have come under fire from Muslim and civil rights
groups, but Kelly said the Police Departments strategy has been
misrepresented. For some, the very act of intelligence gathering seems
illegitimate when applied to the crime of terrorism, Kelly said in his most
wide-ranging remarks to date on the hot-button topic. In fact, the Police

Department uses many of the same methods to find and stop terrorists
that we use to arrest drug dealers, human traffickers and gang leaders,
the commissioner told a Fordham Law School alumni group. Even as more than 100
protesters demonstrated outside his speech, Kelly did not back down, declaring
that the surveillance program was not just legal, but a vital part of the
successful takedowns of more than a dozen terror plots since Sept. 11,
2001. A broad base of knowledge is critically important to our ability to
investigate terrorism, said Kelly, who suggested that the NYPD did not do
enough after the first World Trade Center attack. It was precisely our
failure to understand the context in 1993 that left us vulnerable in 2001,
he said. We wont make that mistake again on Mayor Bloombergs watch or
mine. Claiming reconnaissance was necessary to gather intelligence needed to
penetrate dangerous groups, Kelly defended the NYPDs focus on Muslim
neighborhoods and student groups. We know that while the vast majority of Muslim
student associations and their members are law-abiding, Kelly said, we have seen
too many cases in which such groups were exploited.

Terror Rollback
French Attacks prove rollbackNumerous foreign governments
strengthen surveillance toothats devastating for the aff
Business Insider 1/11/15 [Business Insider, January 11, 2015, The Paris
Attacks Could Be Used As Justification For Tighter Borders And More
Internet Surveillance ,] JMOV
Increased Internet surveillance and tighter border checks are
"urgently" needed to foil jihadist attacks of the sort that rocked Paris this
week, European, US and Canadian security ministers agreed Sunday. The
gathering of interior and justice ministers at the French interior ministry was held
before a massive anti-terror march in Paris that included dozens of foreign leaders.
Paris (AFP) -

A joint statement by the ministers -- representing 11 EU nations including France, Britain, Germany, Sweden and

US Attorney General
Eric Holder -- emphasized their "determination to fight together against terrorism".
They said it was "essential" that major Internet providers cooperate with
governments in closely monitoring and, if necessary, removing online content "that
aims to incite hatred and terror". They also want to "step up the detection
and screening of travel movements of European nationals" leaving or entering the
Poland, as well as the European commissioner for migration and home affairs, and

EU's external borders, and modify Europe's internal Schengen freedom-of-movement rules to widen information
sharing and subject suspect passengers to greater checks.

They saw a "crucial and urgent need" to establish an

EU-wide database of passenger information for travel inside Europe and for flights leaving or entering the 28-nation
bloc. The proposed measures are to be discussed further at a February 12 EU summit focused on reinforcing
security. Holder announced a broader February 18 summit in Washington to be hosted by US President Barack
Obama. The steps were unveiled after three days of carnage in Paris by three gunmen who claimed allegiance to
Al-Qaeda in Yemen and the rival Islamic State group. The violence began with a bloody attack on the satirical
newspaper Charlie Hebdo on Wednesday, when two of the gunmen killed 12 people. Twin assaults by French
commandos on the gunmen holed up in two separate locations -- in a town outside Paris and in a Jewish
supermarket in the capital -- ended with the Islamists' deaths on Friday .

Civil liberty concerns REUTERS

Holder said Sunday that the announced US summit would "discuss ways in which we
can counteract this violent extremism that exists around the world". "Only if we
work together, through sharing of information, by pooling our resources, will we
ultimately be able to defeat those who are in a struggle with us about our
fundamental values," he told reporters. The interior and justice ministers stressed in their joint statement
that the enhanced monitoring of the Internet should be done with respect to it remaining "a forum for free

But there are fears by some civil liberty groups that such state pressure
on private Internet companies could erode citizens' rights and freedom of
expression online, especially in the wake of the scandal over electronic snooping by
the United States' NSA. The increased checks on travel by Europeans was also of concern. The European

parliament and others want to ensure limits are imposed on the sharing of passenger data with the US to prevent
Europeans being exposed to unwarranted prying. Undermining Schengen freedoms that have opened up most of
the EU's internal borders are also seen as a slapdown of one of the bloc's most cherished principles. European-born
jihadists Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve speaks to the press at the offices of the French satirical newspaper
Charlie Hebdo on January 7, 2015 in Paris, France. In the wake of the Paris attacks, though, voices demanding
reinforced domestic security against jihadists were louder than those championing personal freedoms. The EU
commissioner for migration and home affairs, Dimitris Avramopoulos, said authorities are "determined to move
ahead in coordinating our efforts within Europe and with our international friends in order to give an end to this
drama and this phenomenon". French Interior Minister Bernard Cazeneuve emphasised the problem of "foreign
jihadist fighters in Syria and Iraq" many of whom come from EU countries -- particularly those with sizeable Muslim
populations such as France, Britain and Germany. Information on them and on "terrorist networks" must be shared
between the allied countries, he said. "We
a news conference.

are resolved to fight against terrorism ," Cazeneuve told

Plan links to politics the house and the senate dont like Islamic
sensitivity bills
CAIR 13 ( Council on American Islamic Relations Chicago; March 19, 2013; THE
A select group of expert propagandists wield considerable influence in
congressional politics. These so-called scholars and activists compile
misinformation that is widely discredited and peddle it to sympathetic
right-leaning politicians who regurgitate its resulting hateful rhetoric on
the national stage. The most odious of these misinformation experts include
Brigette Gabriel, Frank Gaffney, Daniel Pipes, Walid Phares, Zuhdi Jasser and David
Yerushalmi, just to name a few. Their rhetoric is bigoted and incorrect, yet
insidiously shapes our national discourse through their political allies who
hold influential positions in House Committees. The most influential
political allies include: Rep. Peter King, Rep. Allen West, Rep. Sue Myrick,
Rep. Michele Bauchman, and Rep. Paul Broun among others. Through their
various think tanks and advocacy organizations, misinformation experts
fear-monger and propagate baseless and inflammatory rhetoric that shapes
state and national discourse and policy.

Detention CP

Detention CP
Text: The Unites States federal government should end
Islamophobic indefinite detention policies.
Counterplan solves Islamophobic detention policies shape the War
on Terror
Ralph 6 (Diana Ralph, PhD in Psychology and a Master of Social Work. She is an Associate Professor of Social
IMPERIAL CONQUEST", The Hidden History of 9-11-2001 Research in Political Economy, Volume 23, Emerald Group
Publishing Limited, pp.261-298,

Standing with Muslims against the War on Terror In this chapter, I have
demonstrated that: The overriding motive for Bushs war on terror is to secure
control over the Middle East and Central Asia for U.S. oil, military, and
corporate interests. Bushs handlers have been planning imperial conquest of the world since the Soviet
Union collapsed in 1989. From the evidence here and elsewhere, it is difficult to draw another conclusion than that

They have
continued to justify the war on terror by claiming that Muslim terrorists
pose an immanent danger to Americans. In fact, however, terrorism actually
poses minimal risk to Americans. The war on terror is a concept modeled on Israels assaults on
Bushs associates organized the 9-11 attacks to kick start popular support for this war.

Palestinians to provide a cover for campaigns of territorial conquest. Far from being under attack, America has
pre-emptively attacked and conquered two sovereign states, and is threatening military domination of the entire
world. In other words, Bushs war

on terror is a massive con job, perpetrated by a

few oil and military elites, at the expense of Muslims particularly, but
threatening the security and well-being of virtually everyone on the
planet . An immensely wealthy and powerful republic has been hijacked by a small cabal of individuals... The
American people have...been deliberately lied to, their interests cynically misrepresented and
misreported, the real aims and intentons of this private war of Bush the son and his junta concealed with complete
arrogance." (Said, 2003) Thomas Donnelly, author of the RAD blueprint for Bushs war on terror, recently
reaffirmed the neo-conservative commitment, not to protect Americans from terrorism, but to conquer the world.
This war, properly understood, is a struggle to build a [new] ... order throughout the greater Middle East, that
giant swath of the planet that extends from West Africa to Southeast Asia. ...Operation Iraqi Freedom represented
the first step in a generational commitment to Iraq, but also the commitment of many generations to transforming
the greater Middle East....The vision of the Bush Doctrine is hugely ambitious; in embracing this great vision, the
United States must obligate the resources and create the institutions necessary to realize it." (Donnelly, 2004, pp.

Fear and hatred of a

scapegoated enemy are powerful tools by which despots confuse
people into believing that their oppressors are their salvation. Just as antiSemitism served to divide and silence progressive German movements in the
early Nazi era, Islamophobia is dividing and silencing us now. No one wants to
associate with terrorists, much less be labelled and persecuted as one. Many
progressive Western people fear and despise fundmentalist Muslims,
and thereby fall into the trap of allying themselves with, or at least not opposing,
Islamophobic laws and practices in the name of opposing terrorism. They
thereby collude in undercutting the fabric of rights, due process, and equality
on which they too depend. The Bush Doctrine rhetoric has succeeded in
convincing most white Americans that terrorists pose a serious threat to
their personal safety, and that the war on terror is necessary to protect them.
Islamophobic language and values have seeped into the fiber of our daily
ix, 111) 4.1. Either you are with us, or you are with the Terrorists

lives . Bookstores now have terrorism sections, displaying some of the 5,036 mostly new books on the topic.15
Several U.S. colleges and universities now offer degrees in homeland security. Media images of Arab extremists
have become routine. Most Americans now believe that terrorism is such a big problem, that they should pay with
their taxes, their freedoms, their decimated public services, and their childrens lives. In the summer of 2005, polls
found that 79 percent of Americans believed that the threat of terrorism against the U.S. has increased or stayed
about the same (Polling, 2005). Seventy-six percent thought Osama bin Laden himself is currently
planning a significant terrorist attack against the United States, and 64 percent supported the Patriot Act. Sixtyfour percent would be willing to give up some of [their] personal freedom in order to reduce the threat of
terrorism (, 2005). Almost half of all Americans believe the U.S. government should restrict the
civil liberties of Muslim-Americans (Dean, 2005). In the wake of Hurricane Katrina and shocking revelations of
torture at Abu Ghraib prison, however, popular support for the war on terror plummetted. In November, 2005, 55
percent of Americans disapproved of the way Bush is dealing with the war on terrorism (, 2005).
4.2. Which Side are you on? Before 9-11, the anti-globalization movement had been rapidly gaining
influence and unity worldwide. Opposition to U.S.-dominated institutions like the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund, the G-8, NATO and APEC, had succeeded in disrupting and exposing several of their gatherings. And
in their place, the World Social Forum and other progressive peoples movements were demonstrating that indeed

the war on
terror derailed these hopeful movements and imposed crippling constraints
on dissent, democracy, and national sovereignty . Under cover of
there are excellent alternatives to globalization and corporate rule. The 9-11 attacks and

Islamophobic targeting of Muslims, the U.S. is waging war on all

movements for social justice both domestically and internationally, using its new post
9-11 legislative powers and bloated military and policing budgets. Domestically, the
Bush administration is attacking democracy, abortion rights, the judiciary, environmental protections, social
security, public education, womens rights, union rights, and civil rights (Dorhrn, 2003). Internationally, it pressures
other nations to enact similar anti-terror laws and policies, as well as demanding that they open their economies
to full U.S. corporate rule. As Bernadette Dorhn points out: The result is a chilling effect. That is to
say, people around the targets back away, get silent, dont stand up when they see the cost of simply expressing
your opinion or even making a joke, let alone publicly objecting to whats going on (2003). Many progressive
groups oppose Islamophobia and support Muslim victims of U.S. and Israeli assaults. These include civil liberties
associations, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, anti-Zionist Jewish and Christian groups, unions, peace
groups, and student organizations like the Canadian Federation of Students. Secular, Jewish, and Christian groups
have formed alliances with Palestinians and Iraqis in oppostion to the Israeli occupation of the West Bank.

In the

U.S. the C enter for C onstitutional R ights works to end arbitrary

detention of Muslim detainees in Guantanamo Bay and elsewhere. In Canada,
the Campaign to Stop Secret Trials in Canada has mobilized broad support for Muslim
detainees and their rights. However, even these groups have not dared to
challenge the Islamophobic base of the anti-terror legislation, for fear of
being called pro-terrorist. They are thereby left arguing that the particular individuals for whom
they advocate arent terrorists, while implicitly condoning the myth that real
terrorists are lurking in the shadows. But under the Bush Doctrine, all Muslims are presumed to be
either current or potential terrorists, and their civil liberties have been sacrificed in the name of national security.

To defeat the Bush plot for world control, we will need to challenge Islamophobic
fear of terrorists, to assert clearly that there is little substantive


threat . What terrorism there is could better be addressed through criminal justice systems and international
law. More importantly we need to insist that the U.S. desist from both overt preemptive wars and covert state-

The actual security of both Americans and all other people

will be best served by ending the occupations of the West Bank, Iraq, and Afghanistan,
and recognizing the right of all nations to self-determination (including oil
policies). We need to stand in solidarity with all Muslims, regardless of their religious
financed terrorism.

Islamophobia is the key barrier to effective mobilization

against the Bush regime.
beliefs. At this juncture,

No aff can solve islamophobia but the counterplans challenge to
indefinite detention policies is sufficient to challenge islamophobia.
Butler 06 (Judith Butler, Professor at UC Berkeley, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence Ch.
3: Indefinite Detention, p. 50, 2006)

If a person is simply deemed dangerous, then it is no longer a matter of

deciding whether criminal acts occurred. Indeed, "deeming" someone
dangerous is an unsubstantiated judgment that in these cases works to preempt
determinations for which evidence is required. The license to brand and categorize and
detain on the basis of suspicion alone, expressed in this operation of "deeming," is
potentially enormous. We have already seen it at work in racial profiling, in
the detention of thousands of Arab residents or Arab-American citizens,
sometimes on the basis of last names alone ; the harassment of any
number of US and non-US citizens at the immigration borders because some
official "perceives" a potential difficulty; the attacks on individuals of Middle Eastern
descent on US streets, and the targeting of Arab-American professors on
campuses. When Rumsfeld has sent the US into periodic panics or "alerts," he has not told the population
what to look out for, but only to have a heightened awareness of suspicious activity. This objectless
panic translates too quickly into suspicion of all dark-skinned peoples,
especially those who are Arab, or appear to look so to a population not
always well versed in making visual distinctions, say, between Sikhs and
Muslims or, indeed, Sephardic or Arab Jews and Pakistani-Americans.
Although "deeming" someone dangerous is considered a state
prerogative in these discussions, it is also a potential license for prejudicial
perception and a virtual mandate to heighten racialized ways of looking
and judging in the name of national security. A population of Islamic
peoples, or those taken to be Islamic, has become targeted by this
government mandate to be on heightened alert , with the effect that the
Arab population in the US becomes visually rounded up, stared down,
watched, hounded and monitored by a group of citizens who understand
themselves as foot soldiers in the war against terrorism . What kind of public culture
is being created when a certain "indefinite containment" takes place outside the prison walls, on the subway, in
the airports, on the street, in the workplace? A falafel restaurant run by Lebanese Christians that does not exhibit
the American flag becomes immediately suspect, as if the failure to fly the flag in the months following September
Il, zooi were a sign of sympathy with al-Qaeda, a deduction that has no justification, but which nevertheless ruled
public culture-and business interests_at that time. If it is the person, or the people, who are deemed dangerous, and
no dangerous acts need to be proven to establish this as true, then

the state constitutes the

detained population unilaterally, taking them out of the jurisdiction of

the law , depriving them of the legal protections to which subjects under
national and international law are entitled . These are surely populations
that are not regarded as subjects, humans who are not conceptualized
within the frame of a political culture in which human lives are
underwritten by legal entitlements, law, and so humans who are not
humans. We saw evidence for this derealization of the human in the photos of the shackled bodies in

Guantanamo released by the Department of Defense. The DOD did not hide these photos, but published them
openly. My speculation is that they published these photographs to make known that a certain vanquishing had
taken place, the reversal of national humiliation, a sign of a successful vindication. These were not photographs
leaked to the press by some human rights agency or concerned media enterprise. So the international response
was no doubt disconcerting, since instead of moral triumph, many people, British parliamentarians and European
human rights activists among them, saw serious moral failure. Instead of vindication, many saw instead revenge,
cruelty, and a nationalist and self-satisfied flouting of international convention. So that several countries asked that

there is something more in this degradation

that calls to be read. There is a reduction of these human beings to animal
their citizens be returned home for trial. But

status , where the animal is figured as out of control, in need of total restraint . It is
important to remember that the bestialization of the human in this way has little , if
anything, to do with actual animals, since it is a figure of the animal
against which the human is defined. Even if, as seems most probable, some or all of these
people have violent intentions, have been engaged in violent acts, and murderous ones, there are ways to deal with

The language with which they are

described by the US, however, suggests that these individuals are
murderers under both criminal and international law.

exceptional , that they may not be individuals at all, that they must be
constrained in order not to kill, that they are effectively reducible to a
desire to kill, and that regular criminal and international codes cannot
apply to beings such as these . The treatment of these prisoners is
considered as an extension of war itself , not as a postwar question of
appropriate trial and punish- ment. Their detention stops the killing. If
they were not detained, and forcibly so when any movement is required,
they would appar- ently start killing on the spot ; they are beings who are
in a permanent and perpetual war.

It may be that al-Qaeda representatives speak this way-

some clearly do-but that does not mean that every individual detained embodies that position, or that those
detained are centrally concerned with the continuation of war. Indeed, recent reports, even from the investigative
team in Guantanamo, suggest that some of the detainees were only tangentially or transiently involved in the war
effort." Other reports in the spring of 2003 made clear that some detainees are minors, ranging from ages thirteen
to sixteen. Even General Dunlavey, who admitted that not all the detainees were killers, still claimed that the risk is
too high to release such detainees. Rumsfeld cited in support of forcible detention the prison uprisings in

In this
sense, the war is not, and cannot be, over; there is a chance of battle in the prison, and
there is a warrant for physical restraint, such that the postwar prison becomes the
Afghanistan in which prisoners managed to get hold of weapons and stage a battle inside the prison.

continuing site of war . It would seem that the rules that govern combat are in
place, but not the rules that govern the proper treatment of prisoners
separated from the war itself. When General Counsel Haynes was asked, "So you could in fact hold
these people for years without charging them, simply to keep them off the street, even if you don't charge them?"
he replied, "We are within our rights, and I don't think anyone disputes it that we may hold enemy combatants for
the duration of the conflict. And the confiict is still going and we don 'z see an erm' in sig/zz right now" (my
emphasis). | 1 If the war is against terrorism, and the definition of terrorism expands to include every questionable
instance of global difficulty, how can the war end? Is it, by definition, a war without end, given the
lability of the terms "terrorism" and "war"? Although the pictures were published as a sign of US triumph, and so
apparently indicating a conclusion to the war effort, it was clear at the time that bombing and armed confiict were

the war was not over, and even the photographs, the
degradation, and the indefinite detention were continuing acts of war. Indeed,
war seems to have established a more or less permanent condition of
continuing in Afghanistan,

national emergency, and the sovereign right to self-protection outfianks

any and all recourse to law.

Chow K

The aff is engaged in a war of words when in reality they do nothing
for the Muslims being surveilled by the NSA- the starting point for
advocacy should be to confront our own privilege
Chow 93. Rey Chow, Professor of English and Comp Lit, Writing Diaspora: tactics
of intervention in contemporary cultural studies, pg. 17
While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary for many reasons especially
in cases where underprivileged groups seek privilege I remain skeptical of the
validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is hegemony formed through
intellectual power. The question for me is not how intellectuals can obtain
hegemony (a question that positions them in an oppositional light against dominant
power and neglects their share of that power through literacy, through the culture
of words), but how they can resist, as Michel Foucault said, the forms of power that
transform them into its objects and instrument in the sphere of knowledge, truth,
consciousness and discourse. Putting it another way, how do intellectuals struggle against a hegemony
which already includes them and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society in Gramscis terms,
nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational space? Because borders have so clearly meandered into
so many intellectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation between borders and the field no longer
holds, intervention cannot simply be thought as the creation of new fields. Instead, it is necessary to think primarily
in terms of borders of borders, that is, as para-sites that never take over a field in its entirety but erode it slowly
and tactically. The work of Michel de Certeau is a helpful for the formulation of this parasitical intervention. De

Certeau distinguished between strategy and another practice tactic in the

following terms. A strategy has the ability to transform the uncertainties of history
into readable spaces. . Strategy therefore belongs to an economy of the proper
place and to those who are committed to the building, growth,, and fortification of a
field. A text, for instance, would become in this economy ?a cultural weapon, a
private hunting preserve,? or ?a means of social stratification? in the order of the
Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A tactic, by contrast, is a calculated action
determined by the absence of a proper locus (de Certeau, p. 37). Betting on time
instead of space, a tactic concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far
back as the age-old rules of fishes and insects that disguise or transform
themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case ben concealed by the form of rationality
currently dominant in Western culture (de Certeau. P. xi). Why are tactics useful at this moment? As discussions
about multiculturalism, interdisiplinarity, the third world intellectual, and other companion issue develop in the
American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put

Essentialist notions of culture

and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the
otherness ensuring from them; unattested claims of oppression and victimization
that are used merely to guilt-trip and to control; sexist and racist reaffirmations of
sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness
all these forces creates new solidarities whose ideological premises
remain unquestioned. These new solidarities are often informed by a strategic
attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. The weight of old ideologies
being reinforced over and over again is immense. We need to remember as
intellectuals that the battles we fight are battles of words. Those who argue the
oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are
most certainly not directly changing the downtrodden lives of those who seek their
forth, many deep-rooted, politically reactionary forces return to haunt us.

survival in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan space alike. What academic

intellectuals must confront is thus not their victimization by society at large (or their
victimization-in-solidarity-with-the-oppressed), but the power, wealth, and
privilege that ironically accumulate from their oppositional viewpoint,and the
widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward
mobility they gain from such words. (When Foucault saidintellectuals need to
struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely
to this kind of situation.) The predicament we face in the West, where intellectual
freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, is that if a professor wishes to
denounce aspects of big business,. . . he will be wise to locate in a school whose
trustees are big businessmen.28 Why should we believe in those who continue to
speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising?
How do we resist the turning-into-propriety of oppositional discourses, when the
intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper?
How do we prevent what begin as tactics that which is without any base where it
could stockpile its winnings? (deCerteau, p.37)from turning into a solidly fenced-off
field, in the military no less than in the academic sense?

The affs victimization of Arab Americans projects more surveillance

onto these communities
Spivak and Barlow 04. GayatriChakravortySpivak, Avalon Foundation Professor in
the Human- ities and Director of the Center for Comparative Literature and Society
at Columbia University, Tani E. Barlow, T.T. and W.F. Chao Professor of History and
director of the Chao Center for Asian Studies at Rice University,Not Really a
Properly Intellectual Response: An Interview with GayatriSpivak, positions: east
asia cultures critique, Volume 12, Number 1, Spring 2004, pg. 140

GayatriChakravortySpivak: My problem is that I am unable to give a general

response. It is a pity in all of this postnational talk that this cruel
nationalismtaking pleasure in the death of othersbegins with the shock
of the death of ones own. It is a cause for great sorrow that this event brings
out the worst kind of herd mentalityto quote Nietzschein human
beings, and it falls under nationalism. Bushs spin doctors have told him to say
that Islam is a wonderful religion and the hijackers hijacked it. There- fore one must
now endlessly be nice to Arab Americans even as there is relentless racial
profiling and undercover incarceration. Feminism is show- ing its problems
too. Why are members of the Revolutionary Association of Women of
Afghanistan suddenly taken to be prophets? We dont know much about
their values. They are a good group. They havent appeared all of a sudden,
but they have only now been picked up because the Taliban hate their
women. But people know little about their specific problems. They also cannot
give them real informed sympathy because they are taken as a kind of
fetish that will justify support for the war, although they themselves
oppose it. On the other side, you have the picture that CNN showed of U.S. women

on aircraft carriers who are actually chief programmers, wielding sextants and so
on. And the guy even said that there can be no more sexist jokes about women
drivers. There is this wonderful blond girl. Midwestern-looking, freckled cheeks,
saying, If I can drive an aircraft carrier, I can drive a truck. These are issues I
wrote about in Can the Subaltern Speak? twenty years ago. Who could question
that these are terrible things? You would be foolish to say there was any
justification for burning widows or stoning adulter- esses. On the other
hand, this sudden exposure of visible violence by people, justifying war,
killing Afghans, does nothing to guarantee that the subaltern womens
epistemic production will be one iota altered. I am interested not only in the
fact that men do harm to women, but the fact that when it comes to the
subaltern woman, nobody is interested in the patience that is required, in
order to make her not acquiesce when they arrive at the point of visible

The aff acts as the maoist criticizing civil society while also
benefiting from their own privilege
Chow 93. Rey, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities at Brown Writing
Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, pg. 10-11
The Orientalist has a special sibling whom I will, in order to highlight her significance
as a kind of representational agency, call the Maoist. ArifDirlik, who has written extensively on
the history of political movements in twentieth-century China, sums up the interpretation of Mao Zedong commonly
found in Western Marxist analyses in terms of a "Third Worldist fantasy""a fantasy of Mao as a Chinese
reincarnation of Marx who fulfilled the Marxist premise that had been betrayed in the West."16 The Maoist was the
phoenix which arose from the ashes of the great disillusionment with Western culture in the 1960s and which found
hope in the Chinese Communist Revolution.17 In the 1970s, when it became possible for Westerners to visit China
as guided and pampered guests of the Beijing establishment, Maoists came back with reports of Chinese society's
absolute, positive difference from Western society and of the Cultural Revolution as "the most important and
innovative example of Mao's concern with the pursuit of egalitarian, populist, and communitarian ideals in the
course of economic modernization" (Harding, p. 939). At that time, even poverty in China was regarded as
"spiritually ennobling, since it meant that [the] Chinese were not possessed by the wasteful and acquisitive
consumerism of the United States" (Harding, p. 941). Although the excessive admiration of the 1970s has since
been replaced by an oftentimes equally excessive denigration of China, the

Maoist is very much alive

among us, and her significance goes far beyond the China and East Asian fields. Typically,
the Maoist is a cultural critic who lives in a capitalist society hut who is fed up with
capitalisma cultural critic, in other words, who wants a social order opposed to the
one that is supporting her own undertaking . The Maoist is thus a supreme example
of the way desire works: What she wants is always located in the other, resulting in
an identification with and valorization of that which she is not/does not have. Since
what is valorized is often the other's deprivation"having" poverty or "having"
nothingthe Maoist's strategy becomes in the main a rhetorical renunciation of the
material power that enables her rhetoric . In terms of intellectual lineage, one of the
Maoists most important ancestors is Charlotte Brontes Jane Eyre . Like Jane, the
Maoists means to moral power is a specific representational position the position
of powerlessness. In their reading of Jane Eyre, Nancy Armstrong and Leonard Tennenhouse argue that
the novel exemplifies the paradigm of violence that expresses its dominance through a representation of the self as
powerless: Until the very end of the novel, Janeis always excluded from every available form of social power. Her
survival seems to depend on renouncing what power might come to her as a teacher, mistress, cousin, heiress, or

missionarys wife. She repeatedlyflees

from such forms of inclusion in the field of power, as if

her status as an exemplary subject, like her authority as narrator, depends entirely on her
claim to a kind of truth which can only be made from a position of powerlessness. By
creating such an unlovely heroine and subjecting her to one form of harassment after
another, Bronte demonstrates the power of words alone.This reading of Jane Eyre
highlights her not simply as the female underdog who is often identified by feminist and
Marxist critics, but as the intellectual who acquires power through a moral rectitude
that was to become the flip side of Western imperialisms ruthlessness.

Lying at the core

of Anglo-American liberalism, this moral rectitude would accompany many territorial and economic conquests
overseas with a firm sense of social mission. When Jane Eyre went to the colonies in the nineteenth century, she
turned into the Christian missionary. It is this understandingthat Brontes depiction of a socially marginalized
English woman is, in terms of ideological production, fully complicit with Englands empire building ambition rather
than opposed to itthat prompted GayatriSpivak to read Jane Eyre as a text in the service of imperialism. Referring
to Brontes treatment of the madwoman, Bertha Mason, the white Jamaican Creole character, Spivak charges Jane
Eyre for, precisely, its humanism, in which the native subject is not created as an animal but as the object of what
might be termed the terrorism of the categorical imperative. This

kind of creation is imperialisms

use/travesty of the Kantian metaphysical demand to make the heathen into a
human so that he can be treated as an end himself.In the twentieth century, as Europes
former colonies became independent, Jane Eyre became the Maoist. Michel de Certeau describes the affinity
between her two major reincarnations, one religious and the other political, this way: The place that was formerly
occupied by the Church or Churches vis--vis established powers remains recognizable, over the past two centuries,
in the functioning of the opposition known as leftistThere

is a vis--vis the established order , a

relationship between the Churches that defended an other world and the parties of the
left, which since the nineteenth century, have promoted a different future. In both
cases, similar functional characteristics can be discerned. The Maoist retains many of Janes
awesome features, chief of which are a protestant passion to turn powerlessness into truth
and an idealist intolerance of those who may think differently from her. Whereas the great
Orientalist blames the living third world natives for the loss of the ancient non-Western
civilization, his loved object, the Maoist applauds the same natives for personifying and
fulfilling her ideals. For the Maoist in the 1970s, the mainland Chinese were, in spite

of their backwardness, a puritanical alternative to the West in human forma

dream come true.

Their project amounts to a politics of self-subalternization, where

the judge is encouraged to find solidarity with the other of the 1ac their rhetorical strategy amounts to nothing more than a sham
renunciation authorized by the same structures of power that
produce alterity in the first place
Spivak 88.GayatriChakravortySpivak, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities and Director of the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia
University, Can the Subaltern Speak? in Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture,
edited by Carl Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, pg. 24-25

SOME OF THE most radical criticism coming out of the West today is the
result of an interested desire to conserve the subject of the West, or the
West as Subject. The theory of pluralized subject-effects gives an illusion
of undermining subjective sovereignty while often providing a cover for

this ' subject of knowledge. Although the history of Europe as Subject is

narrativized by the law, political economy, and ideology of the West, this
concealed Subject pretends it has no geopolitical determinations. The
much publicized critique of the sovereign subject thus actually
inaugurates a Subject. . . . This S/subject, curiously sewn together into a
transparency by denegations, belongs to the exploiters side of the
international division of labor. 5 It is impossible for contemporary French
intellectuals to imagine the kind ' of Power and Desire that would inhabit
the unnamed subject of the Other of Europe. It is not only that everything
they read, critical or uncritical, is caught within the debate of the
production of that Other,supporting or critiquing the constitution of the
Subject as Europe. It is also that, in the constitution of that Other of Europe,
great care was taken to obliterate the textual ingredients with which such
a subject could cathect, could occupy (invest?) its itinerary - not only by
ideological and scientific production, but also by the institution of the law. . . . In
the face of the possibility that the intellectual is complicit in the
persistent constitution of Other as the Selfs shadow, a possibility of
political practice for the intellectual would be to put the economic under
erasure, to see the economic ' factor as irreducible as it reinscribes the
social text, even as it is erased, however imperfectly, when it claims to be
the final determinant or the transcendental signified. The clearest
available example of such epistemic violence is the remotely orchestrated,
far-flung, and heterogeneous project to constitute the colonial subject as
Other. This project is also the asymetrical obliteration of the trace of that
Other in its precarious Subjectivity. It is well known that Foucault locates
epistemic violence, a complete overhaul of the episteme, in the redefinition of
sanity at the end of the European eighteenth century. But what if that particular
redefinition was only a part of the narrative of history in Europe as well as in the
colonies? What if the two projects of epistemic overhaul worked as dislocated and
unacknowledged parts of a vast two-handed engine? Perhaps it is no more than to
ask that the subtext of the palimpsestic narrative of imperialism be recognized as
subjugated knowledge, a whole set of "knowledges that have been disqualified as
inadequate to their task or insufficiently elaborated: naive knowledges, located low
down on the hierarchy, beneath the required level of cognition or scientificity
(Foucault 1980: 82). This is not to describe the way things really were or to
privilege the narrative of history as imperialism as the best version of
history. It is, rather, to offer an account of how an explanation and
narrative of reality' - was established as the normative one. . . . Let us now
move to consider the margins (one can just as well say the silent, silenced
center) of the circuit marked out by this epistemic violence, men and
women among the illiterate peasantry, the tribals, the lowest strata of the
urban subproletariat. According to Foucault and Deleuze (in the First World,
under the standardization and tegimentation of socialized capital, though they do
not seem to recognize this) the oppressed, if given the chance (the problem of
representation cannot be bypassed here), and on the way to solidarity through
alliance politics (a Marxist thematic is at work here) can speak and know their
conditions. We must now confront the following question: On the other side

of the international division of labor from socialized capital, inside and

outside the circuit of the epistemic violence of imperialist law and
education supplementing an earlier economic text, can the subaltern
speak?. . .

Close your eyes to the 1acany knowledge or political productivity

they can generate will be redeployed to destroy the very subjects
they hope to help.
Spanos 00.William V. Spanos, distinguished professor of English and comparative
literature at Binghamton University, Binghamton, New York; he is a founder and editor of the critical
journal boundary 2, PhD, 1964, University of Wisconsin, Madison: Literary theory, literature and
philosophy, Americas Shadow: An Anatomy of Empire 2000. p. 48-50

To restore a region from its present barbarism to its former classical

greatness; to instruct (for its own benefit) the Orient in the ways of the
modern West; to subordinate or underplay military power in order to
aggrandize the project of glorious knowledge acquired in the process of
political domination of the Orient; to formulate the Orient, to give it
shape, identity, definition with full recognition of its place in memory, its
importance to imperial strategy, and its "natural" role as an appendage to
Europe; to dignify all the knowledge collected during colonial occupation with the title "contribution to modern
learning" when the natives had neither been consulted nor treated as anything except as pre-texts for a text whose
usefulness was not to the natives; to feel oneself as a European in command, almost at will, of Oriental history,

to divide,
deploy, schematize, tabulate, index, and record everything in sight(and out of
sight); to make out of every observable detail a generalization and out of
every generalization an immutable law about the Oriental nature,
time, and geography; to institute new areas of specialization; to establish new disciplines;

temperament, mentality, custom, or type; and, above all, to transmute living reality into the stuff of texts, to
possess (or think one possesses) actuality mainly because nothing in the Orient seems to resist one's powers: these

enabled and
reinforced by Napoleon's wholly Orientalist en- gulfment of Egypt by the instruments of
Western knowledge and power.89 Nor, finally, is it an accident that the emergent Linnaean system
are the features of Orien- talist projection entirely realized in the Description de l'gypte, itself

of classification of identifying, naming, and classifying the flora and fauna of nature inaugurated the global
taxonomic projects, most no- tably that of his student Anders Sparrman,90 that became the essential European
means of producing a modern orneoimperialist

discourse, a discourse that,in the name of

the truth of empirical science, invents or constructs the Other in the
image of the First World. I am referring to what Mary Louise Pratt, in her Foucauldian study of the
relation- ship between scientific travel writing and colonialism in South Africa and Latin America, has called the
"anti-conquest narrative." This is the narrative "in which the naturalist
naturalizes the bourgeois European'sown global presence and authority"
to differentiate its "benign" truth- producing motive from an earlier,
overtly violent imperial narrative. In a way that recalls Foucault's and Said's differentiation of the
visible and "inefficient" deployment of power in the ancien regime from the more invisible and materially and
politically economical version of the Enlightenment, Pratt observes: Natural history asserted an urban, lettered,
male authority over the whole of the planet; it

elaborated a rationalizing, extractive,

dissociative understanding which overlaid functional, experiential relations among people, plants,

and animals. In these respects,it

figures a certain kind of global hegemony, notably

one based on possession of land and resources rather than control over
routes. At the same time, in and of itself, the system of nature as a descriptive paradigm was an utterly benign
and abstract appropriation of the planet. Claiming no transformative potential whatsoever, it differed sharply from

The system
created... a Utopian, innocent vision of European global authority, which I
refer to as an anti-conquest. The term is intended to emphasize the relational meaning of natural
overly imperial articulations of conquest, conversion, territorial appropriation, and enslavement.

history, the extent to which it became meaningful specifically in contrast with an earlier imperial, and prebourgeois,
European expansionist presence.91 The

difference between an earlier, preEnlightenment, and a later, post-Enlightenment, configuration of the

internal space of the imperial circle is, of course, crucial to any
understanding of the essence of imperial practice. But my purpose in thus invoking
Foucault's analysis of the complicity of the classificatory table of the Enlightenment with the domination
of the Other in the disciplinary society, and Said's and Pratt's extension of Foucault's
genealogical insight to includethe modern European imperial project, is not to bring a
story about the development of the technology of European colonialism to its
fulfillment and narrative closure, one that renders prior technologies of
power anachronistic. It is, rather, to retrieve a fundamental dimension of
this story that has been obliterated from memory even as it resonates
unthought in the very contemporary language these postcolonial critics
use to indict the truth discourse of the West as "imperial ." I want to
suggest that the classificatory table, as microcosm of a larger spatial
totality and as the model for wider "imperial" practices (the mass production process,
the pan- optic penal system, the medical and psychiatric hospital, the family, the classroom, the nation-state, the
colonial administration, and so on), is grounded in and enabled by the metaphysical principle of principles or, as
Enrique Dussel puts it, "the ideology of ideologies":92 that Identity is the condition for the possibility of difference
and not the other way around.Unlike its predecessor in the ancien regime, metaphysical inquiry at this advanced
Enlightenment stage does not obliterate the contradictory, amorphous, unimproved, and "ahistorical" Other from
the vantage point of a visible "center elsewhere."It

"acknowledges" this Other's claims as

contributive to(the knowledge of)the larger self-identical Whole. In other words, it
"classifies" the amorphous Others from the vantage point of an invisible "center elsewhere." It
differentiates these Others into discrete phenomena attributes
distinguishing identities to them within and in behalf of a prior encompassing self-present total
Identity. This individuation of the amorphous Other conveys a sense of the
sovereign integrity of the differentiated entities, but it obscures the fact
that their uniqueness is entirely dependent on a dominant synchronic
Totality, the always present and determining center of which is always out of sight. To acquire validity
the differentiated entity must accommodate its differential partiality to
the prior Totality, must, that is, objectify and subordinate itself to take
its proper place within the gridded structure of the dominant Identity. To
become a subject it must heed the call the hailing of the Subject. As his invocation of the ontological
metaphorics of the center and the circle should suggest, what the Lacanian Marxist Louis Althusser says about "the
interpel- lation of the individual as subject" the (subjected) subject invented by the bourgeois capitalist
Enlightenment applies by extension to the spatial economy of the (neo)imperial project as such:

Islam Link
The 1AC victims of discrimination based on their Islamic nature
and defining the West based on its Islamophobia recreates the
violent categorical differences only the alternative can solve the
case by charting a course between America and Islam
Spivak and Barlow 04. GayatriChakravortySpivak, Avalon Foundation Professor
in the Human- ities and Director of the Center for Comparative Literature and
Society at Columbia University, Tani E. Barlow, T.T. and W.F. Chao Professor of
History and director of the Chao Center for Asian Studies at Rice University, Not
Really a Properly Intellectual Response: An Interview with GayatriSpivak, positions:
east asia cultures critique, Volume 12, Number 1, Spring 2004, pg 160

GCS: Yes, we do not tend to notice that Euro-U.S. globality, which is tac- itly
offered as the unmarked global as such, with endless invocations of the
transnational subject and satellite dishes in Nepalese villages, is the one that
conjures with nation-state alliances. It is in that other globality called Islamic that archaic and residual, moving, globalizing frontiers are in
conflict with the idea of the nation-states. As in the case of the Gulf War, it is
the case of people one way, the state another. We must complicate the
global in order to get a grip upon this fast-evolving situation. In the last
quarter of the nineteenth century, Amir Abd-ur-Rahman of Afghanistan tried to think
through such explanations between the provisional globality of something called
Islam and the urgent need for the emergence of a practical nation- state. I do not
have access to his autobiography in Farsi, but I have carefully studied its English
translation, attempting to read as much as possible be- tween its lines. Not all of it
is by his hand of course; one is not gullible about the evidentiary strength of
autobiography, just as one is aware of the linea- ments of the autobiographical in
the most objective organization of facts. This characteristic of devising and
charting a course between the existing solidarity of Islam and the
consolidation of the frontiers and boundaries of the nation-states, loosely
established as Afghanistan by Ahmad Shah Durani in 1747, is so pervasive in this
text that it is hard to isolate a quotation. In 1876 he drew up agreements to
create peace between all of the various groups in that area: Hindus, Muslims,
tribals, gypsies, you name it. There were over two hundred Firmans of this sort in
existence in Farsi. It could have consol- idated a nation-state negotiating between
Islam and the commonality of religions and ways of life, interchangeable at this
time, accessing the larger dimensions of this other word, haq, which is translated
into English rather misleadingly as right, and so on. So again, an unmarked
centrality was not allowed to emerge in Afghanistan, and no one knows anything
about this now as they are talking and talking about whats going on.

Alt Solves
Alternative solvesresults in individual methods of revolt against
violence such as Islamophobia like self-immolationcreates a better
method of resolving problems
Spivak 11 GayatriChakravortySpivak, Avalon Foundation Professor in the Humanities and Director of the Center for Comparative Literature and Society at Columbia
University, Can the Subaltern Speak? Frontier Vol. 43, No. 25, May 22-28, 2011,
The subaltern is a position without identity. If you think you can claim to
be specifically a subaltern, the only thing to do with it is to lead in the
name of the subaltern, a grounding error in the same category as tracing
Bach, only reversed, from above, not from below.7 Jonathan Chauveau, a
French journalist (like many politically correct folk in that part of the world, anxious
to have me endorse a speaking subaltern), e-mailed me as follows : the popular
revolts in Africa and their political consequences were neither anticipated nor
envisaged by the countries concerned and even less by international diplomacy.
Can one explain this blindness by the fact that leadership came from young people
and women not belonging to recognized circles of the "official opposition." It would
thus be their subaltern position a population not recognized as a "classically"
constituted political force which would explain that no one anticipated these
events definitively, because no one had, at their disposal, the means for hearing
them, listening to them, or yet understanding them. Do you agree with this
analysis? Is it not a case of the subaltern grabbing the right to speak? ...Given that
these popular uprisings seem identical. Can one envisage a regional political
alliance in future? I replied :I am of course tremendously impressed by what's
happening in North Africa, but it's not necessarily "the subaltern
speaking." It is rather the awe-inspiring spectacle of citizens claiming
citizenship. It is possible that the urban subproletariat mingled with the largely
metropolitan, class-mixed, gender-mixed crowd we saw in Tahrir Square. There was
also a phenomenon of "prendre la parole" by the private sector, by civil society, by
the citizen. Unfortunately, if the term "subaltern" has to remain useful, it
cannot be identified with varieties of national liberation movements. It
must, however, be said, that the young man who burnt himself to death in
despair in Tunisia might be thought of as a subaltern bringing himself to
crisis, "speaking," and there being an infrastructure of political will,
created, paradoxically, by the predatory state, able to "hear" him and
complete his speech act.8

AT: Framework
Rather than attempting to know the Truth of Islamophobia, we
should refuse attempts to locate our politics in the reality of the
present and FIRST AND FOREMOST seek to interrogate our subject
positions in academia to allow others to speak for themselves.
Owen 97. David Owen, professor of social sciences at Southampton University,
1997, Maturity and Modernity: Nietszche, Weber, Foucault and the ambivalence of
reason, Routledge publishers, published July 22, 1997
In our reflections on Foucaults methodology, it was noted that, like Nietszche and
Weber, he commits himself to a stance of value-freedom as an engaged refusal to
legislate for others. Foucaults critical activity is oriented to human autonomy yet
his formal account of the idea of autonomy as the activity of selftransformation entails that the content of this activity is specific to the
struggles of particular groups and individuals. Thus, while the struggle
against humanist forms of power/knowledge relations denotes the formal
archiectonic interest of genealogy as critique, the determination of the main
danger which denotes the filling in of this interest is contingent upon the
dominant systems of constraint confronted by specific groups and
individuals. For example, the constitution of women as hysterical, of blacks
as criminal, of homosexuals as perverted all operate through humanist
forms of power/knowledge relations, yet the specificity of the social
practices and discourses engaged in producing these identities entails
that while these struggles share a general formal interest in resisting the
biopolitics of humanism, their substantive interests are distinct. It is
against this context that Foucaults stance of value-freedom can be read as
embodying a respect for alterity. The implications of this stance for
intellectual practice became apparent in Foucaults distinction between
the figures of the universal and specific intellectual . Consider the following
comments: In a general way, I think that intellectuals-if this category exists, which is
not certain or perhaps even desirable- are abandoning their old prophetic function.
And by that I dont mean only their claim to predict what will happen, but also the
legislative function that they so long aspired for: See what must be done, see what
is good, follow me. In the turmoil that engulfs you all, here is the pivotal point, here
is where I am. The greek wise man, the jewish prophet, the roman legislators are
still models that haunt those who, today, practice the profession of speaking and
writing. The universal intellectual, on Foucaults account, is that figure who
maintains a commitment to critique as a legislative activity in which the
pivotal positing of universal norms (or universal procedures for generating
norms) grounds politics in the truth; of our being (e.g. our real interests). The
problematic form of this type of intellectual practice is a central concern of
Foucaults critique of humanist politics in so far as humanism simultaneously
asserts and undermines autonomy. If, however, this is the case, what alternative
conceptions of the role of the intellectual and the activity of critique can Foucault
present to us? Foucaults elaboration of the figure of the specific inellectual
provides the beginnings of an answer to this question: I dream of the

intellectual who destroys evidence and generalities, the one who, in the
inertias and constraints of the present time, locates and marks the weak
points, the openings, the lines of force, who is incessantly on the move,
doesnt know exactly where he is heading nor what he will think tomorrow
for he is too attentive to the present. The historicity of thought, the
impossibility of locating an Archimedean point outside of time, leads Foucault to
locate intellectual activity as an ongoing attentiveness to the present in
terms of what is singular and arbitrary in what we take to be universal and
necessary. Following from this, the intellectual does not seek to offer grand
theories but specific analyses, not global but local criticism. We should be
clear on the latter point for it is necessary to acknowledge that Foucaults
position does not entail the impossibility of acceding to a point of view
that could give us access to any complete and definitive knowledge of what
may constitute our historical limits and, consequently, we are always in the
position of beginning again (FR p. 47). The upshot of this recognition of the
partial character of criticism is not, however, to produce an ethos of fatal
resignation but, in far as it involves a recognition that everything is
dangerous, a hyper-and pessimistic activism (FR p. 343). In other words, it is
the very historicity and partiality of criticism which bestows on the activity of
critique its dignity and urgency. What of this activity then? We can sketch the
Foucault account of the activity of critique by coming to grips with the opposition he
draws between ideal critique and real transformation. Foucault suggests that the
activity of critique is not a matter of saying that things are not right as
they are but rather of pointing out what kinds of assumptions, what
kinds of familiar, unchallenged, uncontested modes of thought and
practices we accept rest (PPC p. 154). This distinction is perhaps slightly
disingenuous, yet Foucaults point is unintelligible if we recognize his concern to
disclose the epistemological grammar which informs our social practices as the
starting point of critique. This emerges in his recognition that criticism (and
radical criticism) is absolutely indispensable for any transformation: A
transformation that remains within the same mode of thought, a
transformation that is only a way of adjusting the same thought more
closely to the reality of things can merely be a superficial transformation .
(PPC p. 155) The genealogical thrust of this critical activity is to show that things
are not as self-evident as one believed, to see that what is accepted as self-evident
is no longer accepted as such for as soon as one can no longer think things as one
formerly thought them, transformation becomes both very urgent, very difficult, and
quite possible (PPC p. 155). The urgency of transformation derives from the
contestation of thought (and the social practices in which it is embedded)
as the form of our autonomy, although this urgency is given its specific
character for modern culture by the recognition that the humanist grammar of this
thought ties us into the technical matrix of biopolitics. The specificity of
intellectual practice and this account of the activity of critique come
together in the refusal to legislate a universal determination of what is
right in favour of the perpetual problematisation of the present. It is not
a question, for Foucault, of invoking a determination of who we are as a
basis for critique but of locating what we are now as the basis for a

reposing of the question, who are we? the role of the intellectual is thus
not to speak on behalf of others (the dispossessed, the downtrodden) but
to create the space within which their struggles become visible such that
these others can speak for themselves. The question remains, however, as to
the capacity of Foucaults work to perform this critical activity through an
entrenchment of the ethics of creativity as the structures of recognition through
which we recognize our autonomy in the contestation of determinations of who we

Our framework accesses the best internal link to intellectual

activismstar this argument because its the only thing that makes
this debate matter outside of the ballot
Constable 95 (Elizabeth L. Constable, professor of philosophy at the University
of California, Irvine, Review of: Rey Chow, Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in
Contemporary Cultural Studies, South Central Review, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Spring, 1995),
pg. 74, jstor)
Rey Chow's collection of eight essays provides a vigorous, insightful
analysis of the political, pedagogic, and institutional challenges facing
intellectuals in a world where, for Chow,diasporic consciousness defines
"the reality of being intellectual"(15). Atatime when cultural studies has
become increasingly accepted in educational institutions , the field has
also inevitably become, not only critical, but in its turn, constitutive of our
institutions. Chow's sharp observations and energetic inquiries intend to restore
the critical, self-questioning edge to intellectuals' work in cultural studies. As the
title iindicates, her interest lies in "tactics of in to triggering intervention,"
finding ways to rresist the "turning-into-propriety of oppositional
discourses (17).

AT: Perm
The perm is a standard imperialist strategy that marginalizes and
interprets criticism rather than listening to it.
Briggs and Sharp 04 John Briggs and Joanne Sharp, professors at the
Department of Geography and Geomatics University of Glasgow, Indigenous
knowledges and development: a postcolonial caution, Third World Quarterly, 25
(4). pg. 661-676
Yet to receive much critical attention in development theory and practice is the
nature of the inclusion of indigenous knowledges in development thinking. A central
tenet of postcolonial theory is its concern with the ontological and epistemological
status of the voices of subaltern peoples in Western knowledge systems, and a
postcolonial interrogation of the inclusion of indigenous knowledges in development
suggests caution. Indeed, Spivak(1988)has questioned whether the subaltern can
ever speak; even when apparently expressing her own views, the subaltern is not
able to express her true self.Writing about attempts to recover the voices and
experiences of the subaltern in South Asian historiography, Spivak has argued that the
subaltern cannot speak, so imbued must she be with the words, phrases and cadences of
Western thought in order for her to be heard. In order to be taken seriously to be seen as
offering knowledge and not opinion or folklore the lifeworld of the subaltern has to be
translated into the language of science, development or philosophy, dominated by Western
concepts and Western languages. For Spivak (1988), the implications of this epistemic

violence mean that the ways of knowing the world and knowing the self in nonWestern culture are trivialised and invalidated by Western scientists and experts.
Hence, the subaltern must always be caught in translation , never truly expressing
herself, but always already interpreted. Furthermore, postcolonial theorists(for
example, Spivak 1988; hooks 1990; Goss 1996)have questioned the degree to which
academics and experts in the West really want to engage with people elsewhere , an
engagement which requires a de-centring of themselves as experts .Some
postcolonial theorists have already bemoaned the lack of true engagement with the
knowledges and voices of the Wests others, and, despite claims to be interested
in others, suggest that the West is only interested in hearing its own voice (hooks
1990; Spivak 1988; Mohanty 1988). Hooks (1990) autobiographical approach tells a similar
tale to Spivak in her attempt to be heard from the margins. For her, the margins are a site

of radical possibility which reject the politics of inside and outside, because to be
on the margins is to be part of the whole but outside the main body (hooks
1990:341). It is a hybridised indigenous knowledge which she believes offers a
unique and important perspective which is not distorted by the power and
prejudices of the centre. However, hooks has felt silenced by those who seek the
experience, but not the wisdom, of the other . She argues thatI was made other
there in that space...they did not meet me there in that space. They met me at the
center(hooks 1990:342). The experiences of the marginalised are used in the West,
but without opening up the process to their knowledges, theories and explanations.
When there is a meeting, it is at the metropolitan centre, in
the(predominantly)Western institutions of power/knowledge(aid agencies, universities,
the pages of journals)and in the languages of the west(science, philosophy, social

science and so on, expressed in English, French, Spanish and so on). So by approaching the

institutions of knowledge, she has been forced to the centre, a location both
metaphorical in its control of authority and geographical in its physical presence.
For local knowledge and narratives to be heard at all, they have to move to this
central terrain, where they may be accepted and subsequently appropriated .She
claims to have met a reluctance to abandon the mark of authority, experiencing instead only
a desire for material from which explanations can be made.Western researchers want to
know about her experiences, but not her own explanations.

1. Curtail means to restrict
Websters 15 Webster's New World College Dictionary, 4th Ed., curtail,
To curtail is defined as to restrict something , stop something or deprive of

An example of curtail is when a town wants to stop drunk driving.

2. Violation - Restrictions are direct governmental limitations

Viterbo 12 (Annamaria, Assistant Professor in International Law University of
Torino, PhD in International Economic Law Bocconi University and Jean Monnet
Fellow European University Institute, International Economic Law and Monetary
Measures: Limitations to States' Sovereignty and Dispute, p. 166)
In order to distinguish an exchange restriction from a trade measure, the Fund chose not
to give relevance to the purposes or the effects of the measure and to adopt, instead, a
technical criterion that focuses on the method followed to design said measure.
An interpretation that considered the economic effects and purposes of the
measures (taking into account the fact that the measure was introduced for balance
of payments reasons or to preserve foreign currency reserves) would have
inevitably extended the Fund's jurisdiction to trade restrictions, blurring the
boundaries between the IMF and the GATT. The result of such a choice would have
been that a quantitative restriction on imports imposed for balance of payments
reasons would have fallen within the competence of the Fund.
After lengthy discussions, in 1960 the IMF Executive Board adopted Decision No.
1034-(60/27).46 This Decision clarified that the distinctive feature of a restriction
on payments and transfers for current international transactions is "whether it
involves a direct governmental limitation on the availability or use of exchange
as such*.47 This is a limitation imposed directly on the use of currency in itself, for all

3. The plan does not curtail - enacting Strict Scrutiny Standards

may have an effect of possibly curtailing surveillance in the
distant future, but it does not have a direct effect as of the 1ac
plantext of curtailing surveillance much less restricting it.
Assess whether the means themselves are a limit---allowing actions
that effect a reduction ruins precision
Randall 7 (Judge Court of Appeals of the State of Minnesota, Dee Marie
Duckwall, Petitioner, Respondent, vs. Adam Andrew Duckwall, Appellant, 3-13, 950313.html#_ftnref2)
[2] When referring to parenting time, the term "restriction[,]" is a term of art that is
not the equivalent of "reduction" of parenting time. "A modification of visitation
that results in a reduction of total visitation time, is not necessarily a restriction' of

visitation.' Danielson v. Danielson, 393 N.W.2d 405, 407 (Minn. App. 1986). When
determining whether a reduction constitutes a restriction , the court should
consider the reasons for the change as well as the amount of the reduction." Anderson

v. Archer, 510 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn. App. 1993).

4. Voting issue--a. Limits---allowing effectual reductions explodes the topic. Any

action can potentially result in less surveillance. Limits are key to
depth of preparation and clash. They get more ground to weigh as
offense against counterplans or to link turn DAs like politics, at the
expense of negative preparation, because its impossible to
research every single non-topical trick the aff could deploy. That
crushes competitive equity which comes first because debate is a
game. Its very unlikely that a direct effect of the plan is a
curtailment of surveillance, hold them to a very high standard.
b. Ground---our interpretation is key to establish a stable
mechanism of legal prohibition that guarantees core ground based
on topic direction. They allow the Aff to defend completely different
processes like oversight that dodge core DAs and rob the best
counterplan ground. The aff must be a decrease in surveillance, not
an increase in policies that might lead to a decrease in surveillance
we lose ground on generics like the terror disad or any
surveillance bad argument or link the aff can potentially spike out
of any 1nc offense, creating an extreme amount of aff ground.