Republic vs CA, 208 SCRA 428 G.R. No.

120961
FACTS : La Tondea Distillers , Inc. (LTDI) filed a case against Distilleria Washington for
the seizure of 18,157 empty bottles bearing the blown-in marks of La Tondea Inc. and
Ginebra San Miguel. Said bottles were being used by Washington for its own products
without the consent of LTDI.LTDI asserted that as the owner of the bottles they were
entitled for the protection extended by RA no. 623 (An Act to regulate the use of duly
stamped or marked bottles, boxes, kegs, barrels and other similar containers). Washington
countered that RA no. 623 should not apply to alcoholic beverages and the ownership of
the bottles were lawfully transferred to the buyer upon the sale of the gin and the containers
at a single price. The trial court rendered a decision favoring Washington and ordered LTDI
for the return of the seized bottles. LTDI appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court reversed the court a quo and ruled against Washington.
ISSUE : Whether or not ownership of the empty bottles was transferred to Washington?
HELD : The fact of the matter is that R.A. 623, as amended, in affording trademark
protection to the registrant, has additionally expressed a prima facie presumption of illegal
use by a possessor whenever such use or possession is without the written permission of
the registered manufacturer, a provision that is neither arbitrary nor without appropriate
rationale. The above-quoted provisions grant protection to a qualified manufacturer who
successfully registered with the Philippine Patent Office its duly stamped or marked bottles,
boxes, casks and other similar containers. The mere use of registered bottles or containers
without the written consent of the manufacturer is prohibited, the only exceptions being
when they are used as containers for "sisi," "bagoong," "patis" and similar native products.
It is to be pointed out that a trademark refers to a word, name, symbol, emblem, sign
or device or any combination thereof adopted and used by a merchant to identify, and
distinguish from others, his goods of commerce. It is basically an intellectual creation that is
susceptible to ownership and, consistently therewith, gives rise to its own elements
of jus posidendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi, jus disponendi and jus abutendi, along with the
applicable jus lex, comprising that ownership. The incorporeal right, however, is distinct
from the property in the material object subject to it. Ownership in one does not necessarily
vest ownership in the other.
Thus, the transfer or assignment of the intellectual property will not necessarily constitute a
conveyance of the thing it covers, nor would a conveyance of the latter imply the transfer or
assignment of the intellectual right.

Martinez v Martinez March 31, 1902 G.R. No. 445

Facts: This is an action brought by Pedro Martinez Ilustre, the son and the compulsory legal
heir, against Francisco Martinez Garcia for a declaration of prodigality against the father.
The son claimed that the father is dissipating and squandering his estate by making
donations to his second wife and to her parents of properties amounting to over $200,000;
that he has given over the administration of this estate to the management of his wife; that
the defendant has a propensity for litigation and has instituted groundless actions against
the plaintiff in order to take possession of the property held in common with the plaintiff to
give it to his wife and her relatives.
The defendant alleged that he has executed in favor of the plaintiff a general power of
attorney under which the plaintiff has administered the community estate for several years;

that the plaintiff has caused the ships Germana, Don Francisco, and Balayan, belonging to
the estate, to be registered in his own name without the consent of the father and is
otherwise mismanaging and misappropriating the property of the estate, which caused the
defendant to revoke the power of attorney given to plaintiff, and that the suit brought by the
defendant against the plaintiff was due to the attitude of the son, who, notwithstanding the
fact that the power of attorney had been revoked, refused to render an account of his
administration.
The Court of First Instance rendered judgment against the plaintiff and adjudged the costs
against him. The plaintiff has appealed to this court.
Issue: Is the father suffering from prodigality thereby injuring the estate of his son?
Held: No. Petition dismissed
Ratio: The acts which constitute prodigality are not defined in the Civil Code owing to the
difficulty of applying general rules to the varying circumstances of the case and the different
situations of persons.
Under our law it may inferred that the acts of prodigality must show a morbid state of mind
and a disposition to spend, waste, and lessen the estate to such an extent as is likely to
expose the family to want of support, or to deprive the forced heirs of their undisposable
part of the estate.
Donations are considered as acts of liberality dictated by generosity and affection. All
persons who can contract and dispose of property may make donations. (Art. 624 of the
Civil Code.)
Public policy requires that limitations of the character mentioned should be imposed upon
the owner, but a law which would impose restrictions further than such as are required by
public policy may well be regarded unjust and tending in a contrary direction, as destroying
the incentive to acquire property, and as subduing the generous impulse of the heart.
While some of the witnesses state that the possessions of the wife have greatly increased
since her marriage, there is no evidence whatever to show that there has been any
perceptible diminution of the defendants property. This can be accounted for only on the
grounds that the father, so far from being a prodigal, is still in the full exercise of his
faculties and still possesses the industry, thrift, and ability that resulted in the accumulation
of a splendid estate after the date of his marriage with the mother of the plaintiff, to one-half
of which estate the plaintiff has succeeded as heir of the mother.
A careful consideration of the evidence is sufficient to induce the belief that the plaintiff
himself possesses that propensity for instituting lawsuits which he unjustly attributes to his
father.

Perez vs. Mendoza G.R. No. L-22006. July 28, 1975.

Facts: In 1922, Felisa Montalbo-Ortega exchanged the land she inherited from her father
with the land of her aunt, Andrea Montalbo, because the latter wanted to donate a piece of
land to the municipality of Taysan, Batangas, to be used as a school site and the
municipality preferred the land belonging to Felisa as it was adjacent to the other properties
of the municipality. After the exchange, Andrea donated almost
one-half of the land to the municipality and gave the other to her daughter Margarita when
the latter married Nicolas Mendoza in 1972. Since then, Margarita and Nicolas possessed
and occupied the land continuously, in the concept of owners.

When Nicolas sought the transfer of the property in their names he submitted the deed of
exchange of property executed by Felisa and Andrea in the presence of, and witnessed by
the Municipal Secretary, Rafael Manahan. When Basilio Perez came to know of the alleged
deed of exchange, he had it investigated and found that the signature of the municipal
secretary was forged. Accused of falsification of private document, Mendoza was convicted;
but the Court of Appeals acquitted him for insufficiency of evidence.
On March 20, 1959, petitioner Basilio and his wife Petra brought an action against
respondent spouses Margarita and Nicolas for quieting of title, alleging that the land in
dispute was inherited by Petra and Felisa from Estanislao Montalbo who died in 1918; that
the heirs partitioned said land in 1934 and the share of Felisa, the land in question, was
sold by her husband, Jose Ortega, and her children to petitioners; that they leased the said
parcel of land to respondents in 1946, but that when the lease expired in 1951, the latter
refused to return the land prompting the former to file an unlawful detainer action which was
still pending during the trial of this case. The trial court dismissed the complaint and
declared respondents with a better right over the property in litigation. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial
court in toto.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in its decision.
Held:
NO. Finding no reversible error, Supreme Court affirmed the judgment under review with
costs against petitioners. The claim of private respondents that they are the owners of the
land in dispute must be upheld on the ground that they were in actual and continuous
possession of the land, openly, adversely, and in the concept of owners thereof since 1927
thereby acquiring ownership of the land through acquisitive prescription. Possession is an
indicium of ownership of the thing possessed and to the possessor goes the presumption
that he holds the thing under a claim of ownership. Article 433 of the Civil Code provides
that "(A)ctual possession under claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of
ownership. The true owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of the property."
Article 538 of the Civil Code provides that possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the
same time in two different personalities except in the cases of co-possession. Should a
question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if
there are two possessors, the one longer in possession; if the dates of possession are the
same, the one who presents a title; and if all these conditions are equal, the thing shall be
placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership through
proper proceedings.

United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)

FACTS: Government planes fly over a private property at such low altitude as to practically touch
the tops of the trees. Herein respondent, owner of the said property filed a complaint against public
respondent on grounds that there was an intrusion into the superjacent rights of the former entitling
the same to payment of just compensation because the owner was deprive of the use of the said
property. Petitioner contends that there has been no taking because flights are made within the
navigable airspace and, there was no divestiture of title.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a taking of superjacent space which entitles for just
compensation.
HELD: Yes. Superjacent space is not part of private property because being a public domain,
ownership of the same is vested in the State. However, if flying or occupying over it so low and
frequent as to create a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the land
underneath it, then a taking is considered, entitling the owner for a just compensation.

Hilario v. Salvador, G.R. No. 160384 (April 29, 2005)

Facts: Hilario filed a complaint with the RTC against Salvador alleging that they were the co-owners
of the parcel of land where Salvador constructed his house without their knowledge and refused to
vacate despite their demands.
Salvodor filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. He contended
that the complaint did not state the assessed value of the property, which determines the jurisdiction
of the court.
Hilario maintained that the RTC had jurisdiction since their action was an accion reinvindicatoria, an
action incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus, regardless of the assessed value of the subject
property, exclusive jurisdiction fell within the said court. Also, in their opposition to Salvador's motion
to dismiss, they mentioned the increase in the assessed value of the land in the amount of P3.5
million. Moreover, they maintained that their action was also one for damages exceeding
P20,000.00, over which the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not the action filed by Hilario was an accion reinvindicatoria.
Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the complaint filed by Hilario.
Held: The action filed by Hilario did not involve a claim of ownership over the property. They prayed
that Salvador vacate the property and restore possession to them. Hence, it was an accion
publiciana, or one for the recovery of possession of the real property. It was not an aaccion
reinvindicatoria or a suit for the recovery of possession over the real property as owner.
The nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction is determined by the
material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the law in effect
when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims
asserted therein.
The complaint did not contain an allegation stating the assessed value of the property. Absent any
allegation in the complaint of the assessed value of the property, it could not thus be determined
whether the RTC or the MTC had original and exclusive jurisdiction over the action.

The law also explicitly excluded from the determination of the jurisdictional amount the demand for
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses, and costs.
Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action, all the proceedings therein, including the decision
of the RTC, were null and void.

Santos v. Ayon G.R. No. 137013, 458 SCRA 83

Facts: Santos was the registered owner of three lots while the spouses Ayon were the registered
owners of an adjacent parcel of land. The previous occupant of this property built a building which
straddled both the lots of Santos and the Ayons. The Ayons had been using the building as a
warehouse.
When Santos bought the three lots, he informed the Ayons that the building occupies a portion of his
land. However, he allowed them to continue using the building. However, later he demanded that
the Ayons demolish and remove the part of the building encroaching his property. They refused,
continuing to occupy the contested portion.
Santos filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the Ayons. The MTCC found in favor of
Santos. On appeal, the RTC upheld the finding of the MTCC that the Ayons' occupation of the
contested portion was by mere tolerance. Hence, when Santos needed the same, he had the right
to eject them through court action. The CA reversed and held that the proper remedy should have
been an accion publiciana before the RTC, not an action for unlawful detainer.
Issue: Whether or not prior physical possession of the property by tolerance precludes an action for
unlawful detainer
Held/Ratio: No, prior physical possession of the property by tolerance does not preclude an action
for unlawful detainer. The SC reinstated the RTC decision.
A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of the possession or
the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. Here,
there is an allegation in the complaint that respondents' occupancy on the portion of his property is
by virtue of his tolerance. Possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful
when the possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon demand made by the owner. Thus, a
person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract
between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing
which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him.

Ganila v CA GR 150755 28 June 2005

Overview: Herrera filed ejectment complaints against Ganila et al with the MCTC. On appeal, Ganila
et al questioned the jurisdiction of the MCTC. The SC ruled that being a case for unlawful detainer, it
was within the jurisdiction of the MCTC and that Ganila et al are barred from raising their opposition
for the first time on appeal.
Statement of the Case: Petition for review on certiorari
Facts: Violeta Herrera filed 21 ejectment complaints alleging that she owns Lot 1227 of Jordan,
Guimaras and that she tolerated Ganila et al (18 persons and the Baptist Christian Learning Center)
to construct residential houses or other improvements on certain portions of the lot without rental.
When she asked Ganila et al to vacate, they refused. Barangay conciliation failed; hence, she filed
the complaints.

8 claimed that Lot 1227 was formerly a shoreline. 8 maintained that their houses stood on
Lot 1229. 3 assrted that Lot 1227 is a social forest area. Geodetic engineers surveyed the area and
reported that all the houses were inside Lot 1227. MCTC rendered decision in favor of Herrera and
ordered Ganila et al to vacate. RTC dismissed the appeal and the CA affirmed the denial.
Applicable Laws:
Issues:
WON MCTC erred in taking jurisdiction over and deciding the case and WON RTC and CA
erred in sustaining the MCTCs judgment? No.
Rationale
Ganila et al insist that Herrera should have filed an action to recover possession de jure, not
a mere complaint for ejectment because (1) they possessed Lot 1227 in good faith for more than 30
years and (2) there was no withholding of possession since Herrera was not in prior possession of
the lot. The SC agrees with Herrera that there was no error in her choice of remedy. The complaint
itself is defined by the allegations therein, not the allegations of Ganila et al. Besides, Ganila et al
have admitted in their preliminary statement that the complaints filed are indeed for unlawful
detainer, and that the only issue to be determined is mere physical possession and not juridical
possession.
While petitioners assert that this case involves only deprivation of possession, they confuse
the remedy of an action for forcible entry with that of unlawful detainer. In unlawful detainer, prior
physical possession by the plaintiff is not necessary. It is enough that plaintiff has a better right of
possession. Actual, prior physical possession of a property by a party is indispensable only in
forcible entry cases. Also, the defendant is necessarily in prior lawful possession of the property but
his possession eventually becomes unlawful upon termination or expiration of his right to possess.
Thus, the fact that petitioners are in possession of the lot does not automatically entitle them to
remain in possession. And the issue of prior lawful possession by the defendants does not arise at
all in a suit for unlawful detainer, simply because prior lawful possession by virtue of contract or
other reasons is given or admitted. Unlike in forcible entry where defendants, by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth, deprive the plaintiff or the prior physical possessor of possession. Here
there is no evidence to show that petitioners entered the lot by any of these acts.
An unlawful detainer is different from a possessory action and from a reinvidicatory action in
that the first is limited to the question of possession de facto. Aside from the summary action of
ejectment, accion publiciana or the plenary action to recover the right of possession and accion
reinvidicatoria or the action to recover ownership which includes recovery of possession, make up
three kinds of actions to judicially recover possession.
Herreras allegations sufficiently present a case of unlawful detainer: (1) she owns Lot 1227, (2) she
tolerated Ganila et al to construct houses, (3) she withdrew her tolerance, and (4) Ganila et refused
to heed her demand. The suit was well-within the jurisdiction of MCTC. Besides, Ganila et al raised
their opposition only for the first time in their appeal, they are now stopped from doing so.
Judgment: petition is denied.

Peralta-Labrador v Bugarin G.R. No. 165177; August 25, 2005

FACTS: On January 18, 1996, petitioner Lilia V. Peralta-Labrador filed a case for Recovery of
Possession and Ownership, with the MTC of San Felipe, Zambales against respondent Silverio
Bugarin alleging the following:

She is the owner of the land, with an area of 400 sq. m. located at San Felipe, Zambales,
having purchased the same from spouses Artemio and Angela Pronto and that she was issued Tax
Declaration and paid the taxes due thereon.

DPWH constructed a road that traversed the land thereby separating 108 sq. m. from the
rest of petitioners lot, for which she was issued Tax Declaration.

Sometime in 1994, respondent Silverio Bugarin forcibly took possession of the 108 sq. m. lot
and refused to vacate the same despite the pleas of petitioner.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION: The area claimed by petitioner is included in the 4,473 square
meter lot, covered by the OCT No. P-13011; and that he has been in continuous possession and
occupation thereof since 1955; that MTC has no jurisdiction since the action has already prescribed.
In his Amended Answer with Counterclaim, however, respondent failed to allege that the questioned
lot is covered by the OCT No. P-13011, and instead asserted that he planted fruit bearing trees in
the property.
The court a quo ruled in favor of respondent declaring him as the owner of the controverted lot on
the basis of the OCT No. P-13011. The complaint was dismissed for failure of petitioner to prove
prior physical possession and ownership thereof. The RTC affirmed MTC. Hence, petitioner filed
petition for review before the Court of Appeals. CA denied petition for insufficiency of evidence to
prove ownership or prior actual physical possession. MR likewise denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not MTC has no jurisdiction over the complaint on the ground of prescription?
HELD: YES. MTC HAS NO JURISDICTION. Considering her allegation that the unlawful
possession of respondent occurred two years prior to the filing of the complaint, the cause of action
for forcible entry has prescribed and the MTC had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
It is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived by the parties or cured by their
silence, acquiescence or even express consent. Hence, the failure of respondent to insist on the
defenses of lack of cause of action and prescription stated in his Amended Answer with
Counterclaim will not vest the MTC with jurisdiction over the case.
An action for forcible entry is a quieting process and the one year time bar for filing a suit is in
pursuance of the summary nature of the action. Thus, we have nullified proceedings in the MTCs
when it improperly assumed jurisdiction of a case in which the unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession had exceeded one year.
After the lapse of the one year period, the suit must be commenced in the RTC via an accion
publiciana, a suit for recovery of the right to possess. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine
the better right of possession of realty independently of title. It also refers to an ejectment suit filed
after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action or from the unlawful
withholding of possession of the realty independently of title. Likewise, the case may be instituted

before the same court as an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover ownership as well
as possession.
Corrollarily, jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations of the complaint. Thus, in
ascertaining whether or not the action falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior courts, the
averments of the complaint and the character of the relief sought are to be examined.
It is clear that petitioners averment make out a case for forcible entry because she alleged prior
physical possession of the subject lot way back in 1976, and the forcible entry thereon by
respondent. Petitioners complaint therefore should have been filed with the proper RTC.
Moreover, even if the MTC has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the complaint should still be
dismissed because petitioner failed to prove that the controverted 108 sq. m. lot is part of Cadastra
Lot No. 2650. Failing to discharge this burden, the dismissal of the complaint is proper.

German Management Services vs. CA, GR No. 76217 September 14, 1989
Facts:
Spouses Jose are the owners of a parcel of land in Antipolo. They executed a special power of
attorney authorizing German management Services to develop their property into a residential
subdivision. However, the property was being occupied by private respondents and twenty other
persons. They were asked to vacate but refused. PR filed an action for forcible entry and alleged
that they are mountainside farmers of the area and have occupied and tilled their farmholdings prior
to the promulgation of PD 27. They stated that they have been deprived of their property without
due process of law by means of force, violence and intimidation.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner forcibly entered the property of the PR ( I know this is RPC- but
involved and prop)
Ruling:
Yes, the petitioner forcibly entered the property of the PR. In forcible entry, ownership is not
an issue. It may be a fact that the German Management was duly authorised by the owners to
develop the subject property, the actual possessors of the land, the Prs, can commence a forcible
entry case against the petitioner. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines
the actual title to an estate.

Republic vs. CA Republic of the Philippines G.R. No. L-43938

Doctrine: The owner of a piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything
underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. The rights over the land are
indivisible and the land itself cannot be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be
categorical; the land must be either completely mineral or completely agricultural.
Facts: These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February
11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria,
Benjamin and Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9
lots and covered by plan Psu-225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la
Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964.

The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big
Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9.
In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject
land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after
the Liberation.
Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on
September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in
September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had
been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, as evidenced
by its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its geological mappings, geological
samplings and trench side cuts, and its payment of taxes on the land.
For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma
and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded
on January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased
from these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous
and exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by its annual assessment work on the
claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its payment of annual taxes thereon.
The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought to
be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217
dated February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under
the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
The trial court denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of
possession and ownership of the land sought to be registered.
The applicants appealed to the respondent court, which reversed the trial court and recognized the
claims of the applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims.
In other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land
while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining
claims. Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior right of
ownership.
Issue: Whether respondent courts decision, i.e. the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land
while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining
claim, is correct.
Held: No. Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by
virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935
prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested
rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to
the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared
simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes. It is true
that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the Central Cordillera Forest
Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at that time. Such
rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution against the
alienation of all lands of the public domain except those agricultural in nature for this was made
subject to existing rights. The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land

and under the laws then in force removed it from the public domain. By such act, the locators
acquired exclusive rights over the land, against even the government, without need of any further
act such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. As the land had become the
private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and
Atok. The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is no conflict of interest between the
owners of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is
a well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to
everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. Under the aforesaid
ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to
separate claims of title. This is also difficult to understand, especially in its practical application.

The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half
agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either
completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land
which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral and
completely mineral once the mining claims were perfected. As long as mining operations were
being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so and become agricultural, even if
only partly so, because it was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were
unlawfully occupying the surface.
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the benefit
of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be
found in public and even private land devoted to agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or
(for) any purpose other than mining. Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which
minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize
the said minerals without the permission of the State to which such minerals belong.
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land could
be used for both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that
once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time,
such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the
exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be
used by any private party, including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will
impede the mining operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is
of course entitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation
proceedings.
Caveat: Anyone who claims this digest as his own without proper authority shall be held liable under
the law of Karma.