Geoforum 77 (2016) 4750

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Geoforum
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/geoforum

Critical review

Brexit geopolitics
Veit Bachmann a,, James D. Sidaway b
a
b

Institut fr Humangeographie, Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt am Main, Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 6, PEG Gebude, 60629 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Department of Geography, National University of Singapore, 10 Kent Ridge Crescent, Singapore 119260, Singapore

a r t i c l e

i n f o

Article history:
Received 21 September 2016
Received in revised form 27 September
2016
Accepted 2 October 2016

Keywords:
European Union
Nationalism
Populism
Inequality
Fragmentation

a b s t r a c t
In this review we bring together a line of comments and arguments on the Brexit vote that revolve
around five key terms: populism, nationalism, imperialism, fragmentation and inequality. We argue that
Brexit is caught up with right-populism, racism, ultra-nationalism, socio-economic inequalities and outright misery across Europe. While these trends are across the entire continent, we will focus on the UK as the place where, in form of the Brexit vote, populism has now left the biggest mark. We contextualize
Brexit in British imperial geography and argue that factors leading to the rise of nationalism(s) and populism in the UK hinge on geopolitical decline and heightened uneven development and inequality. We
view these fragmentations in British society through the lens of wider debates around territorial, relational and multi-scalar conceptions of EU space.
2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Contents
1.
2.
3.
4.

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Empire, nationalism and uneven development . . . . . . . .
Social fragmentation along relational-territorial divides .
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

1. Introduction
Britain cannot leave Europe any more than Piccadilly Circus can
leave London. Europe is where we are, and where we will
remain. Britain has always been a European country, its fate
inextricably intertwined with that of the continent, and it
always will be. But it is leaving the European Union. Why?
[Garton Ash, 2016]

Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: bachmann@em.uni-frankfurt.de (V. Bachmann), geojds@nus.
edu.sg (J.D. Sidaway).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2016.10.001
0016-7185/ 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.

47
48
48
50
50
50

The question posed by the British historian Timothy Garton Ash

has been frequently asked after a slim (52:48) majority in the United Kingdom voted leave in the referendum on EU membership
on 23 June 2016. We will not attempt a decisive answer here.
We neither map the geopolitical consequences for the EU itself of
future Brexit nor make detailed predictions. In a remarkable
speech a week after the referendum, the Governor of the Bank of
England talked about the UKs regime shift and went on to measure geopolitical uncertainty (Carney, 2016). We will leave measurement for another day, for so much is unclear about hows/
whens/ifs of Brexit. Instead we will bring together a line of comments and arguments that have emerged in the wake of the Brexit

48

V. Bachmann, J.D. Sidaway / Geoforum 77 (2016) 4750

vote that revolve around five key terms: populism, nationalism,

imperialism, fragmentation and inequality. These terms are inherently linked with the Brexit vote.
Before we start, we come back to Garton Ash, siding with his
opinion that despite all its faults, the Union is still worth saving.
I stand by my adaptation of that great English European Winston
Churchills famous remark on democracy: this is the worst possible
Europe, apart from all the other Europes that have been tried from
time to time (Garton Ash, 2016; see also Bachmann, 2013). In contrast to Garton Ashs Europhilia, the German-Hungarian writer
Timur Vermes takes a more cynical view on, arguing that folk
do not turn crazy all of a sudden. Instead we were merely temporarily rational as a result of the catastrophe of World War
Two. In Europe, we currently live in a historically unusual
world: it has been largely peaceful for 70 years. . ..And it is
exactly this awareness that is disappearing now like never
again alcohol-vows on day three after a heavy bender. After
70 years, the hang-over is over, and it all looks like as if Europeans just wanted to have another bender. Can we avoid this?
[Vermes, 2016]
We are not as skeptical as Vermes, or as sanguine about how the
EU prevents wars. Moreover Brexit does not imply war. However, it
is caught up with right-populism, racism, ultra-nationalism, socioeconomic inequalities and outright misery across Europe. While
these trends are across the entire continent, we will focus on the
UK as the place where, in form of the Brexit vote, populism has
now left the biggest mark. We will advance our argument as follows. In the next section, we contextualize the Brexit vote in British
imperial geography and argue that factors leading to the rise of
nationalism(s) and populism in the UK hinge on geopolitical
decline and heightened uneven development and inequality. We
view these fragmentations in British society through the lens of
wider debates around territorial, relational and multi-scalar conceptions of EU space (Jones, 2009; Painter, 2010; Sidaway, 2006).
2. Empire, nationalism and uneven development
The leave campaign made take back control a key slogan. The
perceived loss of control hit home. It has multiple faces, yet it is
omnipresent, from the Trump supporters in the US, to revitalization of radical right-wing parties in Europe and other advanced
capitalist nations (notably Australia). Yet in a country that has once
ruled a quarter of the world, the perceived loss of control over their
own political system, their economic perspectives, their destiny
weighs heavier than in other places. Tomlinson and Dorling
(2016) therefore argue that Brexit is rooted in the British Empire
for two overlapping reasons: the post- war migration of workers
from the former colonies to the UK, which sets the racist terms
for subsequent discussions on immigration, and geopolitical
decline of a once hegemonic country:
The lower classes were encouraged to believe in their economic,
political, social and racial superiority to the rest of the subjects
of empire. The domestic underclass could become the imperial
over class and all British classes could unite in a national patriotic superiority. The strength of this solidarity is still present in
the 21 century and goes some way to explaining the xenophobia, racism and hostility that is still such an obvious part of the
British heritage.
[Tomlinson and Dorling, 2016]
The electoral geography of the 52:48 Brexit vote is complex (for
initial analyses, see Harris and Charlton, 2016; Watkins, 2016), but
Europeanization, and Brussels in particular, became associated
with lack of control incited by the speeches of leading British

politicians and one of the worlds most effective right-wing tabloid

press, in plutocratic hands (Mail, Express and Sun). Those politicians and media seldom talk about control in class terms or with
reference to American power (are not NATO-membership and
USAF bases across eastern Britain limits on sovereignty too?) and
Americanization, which arguably changed British homes and
streets far more than immigration.
Persistent uneven development and growing inequality in the
UK have amplified disquiet amongst the working class and older
population about cosmopolitism and of globalization that the City
and elites are thriving on. In an insightful compilation of short
essays on the Brexit in the London Review of Books, Wolfgang
Streeck outlines how the
decomposition of the modern state has reached a new stage, in
the very country where the modern state was invented. Under
the aegis of the EU [itself so buffeted by crisis and shaped by
neoliberalism], the UK has reverted to being two nations, a
nation of winners using the globalised world as their extended
playing field, and a nation of losers driven from their commons
by another firestorm of primitive accumulation. Seeking refuge
in democratic protection, popular rule, local autonomy, collective goods and egalitarian traditions, the losers under neoliberal
internationalism, unexpectedly returning to political participation, place their hopes on their nation-state. But the existing
architecture of statehood is no longer designed to accommodate
them, certainly not in the land of Thatcher, Blair and Cameron.
[Streeck in Runciman et al., 2016]
While many governments of EU member states employ similar
strategies, British governments and latterly the right have been the
most successful in blaming negative developments on the EU
even if these result from processes encouraged and written into
the EUs DNA through British initiative since the 1980s. In the years
before Thatcher there was a sense of crisis in the UK (Beckett,
2002), in which Scotlands status became one of an array of constitutional and class questions that were only temporarily muzzled
by Thatcherism (Nairn, 1977). Today the territorial-national questions that the Brexit vote now heightens in the UK for Scotland,
where the new Prime Minister first visited after her appointment,
and Northern Ireland, whose relationship with the Irish Republic
will be open to fresh debate, is largely beyond our scope here. Each
merits detailed scrutiny and all are part of the shifting tectonic
plates and a sense that the Brexit vote and its immediate aftershocks are not yet the bigger quake that may come.
Moreover, the different outcomes of the Brexit vote in different
parts of the UK might thereby only be an indicator if wider fragmentations. For instance, whilst in England, Europe appears to
have developed as Englishnesss other [. . .] that does not currently seem to be the case for Scottishness, Welshness or, in England at least, Britishness (Henderson et al., 2016, p. 198).
Paradoxically, through these territorial fragmentations between
the UKs nations and within them in terms of class, age and
socio-economic status, it might be precisely part of what yielded
the longing for re-establishing British greatness through the Brexit,
that then threatens the viability of the UK as a state (Henderson
et al., 2016, p. 198) and thus might spell the end of the United
Kingdom (Garton Ash, 2016).
3. Social fragmentation along relational-territorial divides
Fragmentations are clearly not exclusive to the UK. Europe is
full of them and the EUs regional and cross-border programmes
in search of integration have arguably been swamped (to use a
metaphor beloved of Brexiters). As Petrakos et al. (2016, p. 699)
chart:

V. Bachmann, J.D. Sidaway / Geoforum 77 (2016) 4750

The EU experience has shown that deeper integration may coincide with increasing imbalances in competitiveness, trade relations, and development levels. . .Especially at the regional level,
the evidence in the literature seems to shift progressively from
the widespread euphoria of the convergence models in the
1990s. . .to the uncomfortably repeated divergence (or very
slow convergence) findings in the 2000s. . .. At the theoretical
level, these findings come to add their weight to old and new
debates concerning the relationship between growth, integration, and regional inequality.
What is more, the Euro did not work as hoped, instead compounding uneven development in ways that far exceed the worst
fears of commentary at its advent (Pollard and Sidaway, 2002a,
2002b), and does not bode well now (Stiglitz, 2016). Varoufakis
(2016, p. 134) is probably right when, with the benefit of hindsight,
he notes how the Euro can be thought of as a club whose rules of
entry were meant to be violated and whose functions were
designed as mind-boggling paradoxes. Deep seated structures of
uneven development have deepened. Could it have been otherwise? Watkins (2016, p. 9) claims that:
Beneath the EUs overarching institutions, nationally determined growth models have worsened imbalances. Faced with
rising competition from China, Germany fought to retain its
high-end industrial export sector, at the expense of wage
growth and domestic consumption, while Italys smaller manufacturing firms struggled to stay afloat. Spain, Greece and Ireland relied on credit-driven expansion, the ex-Comecon states
on supplying a cheap pool of non-unionized labour and lax
environmental controls.
The UKs pursuit of finance-based accumulation added to the
mix, whilst reinforcing the spatial divisions of labour between
the City and its outliers and the rest of the country. In Germany,
such divisions traditionally have been strongly pronounced in form
of a separation of an agricultural, rural, inward-looking East focusing on the value of territory (the Prussian Junkers) on the one hand
and an industrial mercantile West with its historic centers in the
Ruhr area and Hamburg focusing on international connections
and trade. In a very crude way the dividing line between these
parts was the river Elbe, though German the map of uneven
development is now more variegated (Hendrikse and Sidaway,
2014). We find similar ascriptions of regional culture and divisions
between East/West in many Central Eastern European countries
echoing the deep North/South ones in Italy and Iberia. In a theoretically and empirically rich volume on phantom borders Claudia
Kraft (2015, p. 172) explains how the border separating Europe
in East and West is highly mobile, the attributions to these two
separated territories, however, are surprisingly stable. Historical
borders, so their argument goes, are like phantoms overlying
contemporary societies, structure those and shed light on ongoing
socio-economic differentiation (Hirschhausen et al., 2015).
Whilst we are cautious to not conflate their arguments on phantom borders in East Europe with the current situation in the UK, we
believe nevertheless that this approach illuminates fragmentations
in British society that have come to the fore through the Brexit
vote. Phantom borders in contemporary British society are not
solely based on territorial divisions, but on social and class divisions and imperial legacies that have long existed in the UK
(Nairn, 1977). These continue to structure, overlay and divide British society.
When the British Empire started to falter, the UKs special relationship with the USA still emitted a sense of a continuation of a
hegemonic position. But after Suez in 1956, segments of the British
ruling class came to advocate a continental solution. This crystalized around the modernizing Edward Heath, who as Prime Minis-

49

ter took the UK into the EEC in 1973. English Tories in the early
1970s saw more benefits from becoming part of the integrating
European polity at a time when US hegemony first started to be
questioned, with an integrating Europe re-emerging on the geoeconomic scene and offering fresh avenues for a post-Empire British capitalism. In the subsequent decades, the European integration project has periodically been positioned as a better
geopolitical alternative at times of geopolitical flux, such as the
end of the Cold War, the Balkan Wars, US neo-conservatism, a
growing China or a resurfacing Russia (Bachmann and Sidaway,
2009).
Beyond some residual imperial and racist Tory and Unionist
fringes who were never reconciled to the continental solution,
Eurosceptic rumblings in the Conservative party grew under
Thatcher in the 1980s and spiraled out of control in the 1990s.
With the financial crisis in 2007, which became a fundamental
dent for the European integration process, British support was further weakened the UK was half in half out (or best of both worlds
as was said), as the only major EU economy intent on permanently
staying outside the Euro. What is more, with the influx of refugees
(fleeing from a war resulting from to some extent from/across the
consequences British and French interventions in North Africa, the
Levant and the Mashreq) to Europe, other reservations were
voiced. With the British Empire gone, the UKs special relationship
with the United States on geopolitical withdrawal and unresolved
fiscal, national and social problems for Britain, Brexit would not
seem an obvious choice. Brexitonomics may prove painful yet;
but the leave camp won. As James Surowiecki (2016) put it British
voters decided that ideological considerations trumped economic
ones. They can hardly complain if Europe makes the same choice.
Immanuel Wallerstein identifies four key matters underlying
this outcome: popular anger at the so-called Establishment and
its parties; the geopolitical decline of the United States; the politics
of austerity; and identity politics (Wallerstein, 2016). The second
factor, US decline, remained largely outside the control of British
(and other European) politicians or populace. For the other three
factors, however, British politicians have been highly successful
in channeling public anger and opinion away from themselves
and towards resentment against the EU. As regards austerity politics, implemented widely as a response to the financial crisis,
resentment against German-dominated austerity in the Eurozone
has been an important factor despite the UK not being affected
by it and London being the centre of a financial industry that
played a major role in causing the problems in the first place. As
regards identity politics, British politicians have succeeded in convincing a sufficient number of voters that the decline has external
factors first and foremost external rule from Brussels. Moreover, and maybe most importantly, as regards popular anger
against the Establishment, the Leave-campaign managed to
exploit the difficult socio-economic situation of the British lower
classes and to project their dissatisfaction with the British elites,
growing simultaneously with inequality in the country, onto the
EU.
So this is where fragmentations within and between elites and
lower classes across the ramshackle UK come out into the open.
The phantom border between them has always existed but long
been glossed over by the geopolitical and geo-economic constellations alluded to above. And now, at yet another time of geopolitical
and geo-economic flux, European integration no longer appears as
a better alternative to a sufficient number to have become a
groundswell. Applied to the social fragmentation in the UK, this
means that the sentiments of Leave voters felt themselves to be
losing out rather than winning in the relational networks of contemporary global political economy (Amin, 2002). That rising
inequality and socio-economic precarity invite national-scale reactions is an old theme; as Habermas (2016) points out in an inse-

50

V. Bachmann, J.D. Sidaway / Geoforum 77 (2016) 4750

cure daily life a national and cultural sense of belonging are indeed
stabilising elements. At the same time, the focus of the British
economy on an internationally highly connected financial sector,
and its spatial concentration in the City, has for too long neglected,
even furthered, the socio-spatial division of the country and incremental exclusion. Here again we cite Habermas (2016) arguing
that the perception of the drastic rise in social inequality and
the feeling of powerlessness, that your own interests are no longer
represented at the political level, [. . .] forms the background to the
mobilisation against foreigners, for leaving Europe behind, for hating Brussels.
The channeling of the resentment of those parts of the population that feel disempowered by the political and economic elites,
including in Brussels, was a key factor for the victory of the Leave
camp. Territorial imaginations of British (and English) sovereignty
thus trumped relational and multi-scalar ones of EU citizenship. In
Britain post imperial reflex bolstered Leave, which became a symptom of a deeper malaise. Less of a phantom border perhaps than a
phantom limb syndrome, associated with an empire that is no
longer there.
4. Conclusion
Tomlinson and Dorling (2016) close their account of Brexit by
arguing that
Perhaps the Brexit referendum is the last death throes of Empire
working its way out of our systems. From one canal to another,
from the Suez crisis of 1956 through to the Panama Papers
60 years later, the stories of our lives in Britain have largely
been a story of just how hard some of us find it to adjust to
no longer being top dog.
In the light reports that British ministers suggested Britain
should draw inspiration from the days of Empire (Swinford,
2016), at the first meeting of Theresa Mays (herself an Oxford
geography graduate) cabinet, it is an earlier Oxford Professor
who provides us with a closing quote as we now ponder Brexit
geopolitics. On the last page of his landmark Britain and the British
Seas, Halford Mackinder (1907, p. 358) argued that
By virtue of her neighbourhood to the Continent, Britain is the
end of the Old World: by virtue of the ocean-arm, which isolates
her from the Continent, she is at the beginning of the New.
Dover belongs to the New World, yet Liverpool is still of the
Old. Geographical position has given to Britain a unique part
in the worlds drama.
In the next lines, Mackinder talked about how Britains daughter nations, as he called the Anglosphere and Empire, growing to
maturity and expanding into the Navy of the Britains would
determine the whole course of future history. Over a century
and two World Wars later that is not on the cards anymore. The
main channel of future history probably does not flow through
Brussels, let alone London, when it seems fair to say that Britains
role in global affairs is fogged in uncertainty (Cusick, 2016, p. 19).
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Kanchana Ruwanpura for her editorial
guidance and kind support. Of course, the views expressed here
are our own and we remain responsible for them.

References
Amin, A., 2002. Spatialities of globalisation. Environ. Plan. A 34 (3), 385399.
Bachmann, V., 2013. A step outside: observations from the Worlds Youngest State.
Geography Compass 7 (11), 778789.
Bachmann, V., Sidaway, J.D., 2009. Zivilmacht Europa: a critical geopolitics of the
European Union as a global power. Trans. Inst. British Geogr. 34 (1), 94109.
Beckett, A., 2002. Pinochet in Piccadilly: Britain and Chiles Hidden History. Faber,
London.
Carney, M., 2016. Uncertainty, the Economy and Policy. Bank of England <http://
www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2016/
speech915.pdf> (accessed on 20/19/2016).
Cusick, J., 2016. Chilcots Tough Lesson. Prospect <http://www.prospectmagazine.
co.uk/features/chilcots-tough-lesson-iraq-inquiry-6th-july-analysis>. 08 July
2016. (accessed on 20/09/2016).
Garton Ash, T., 2016. As an English European, This Is the Biggest Defeat of My
Political
Life.
The
Guardian
<http://www.theguardian.com/
politics/commentisfree/2016/jun/24/lifelong-english-european-the-biggestdefeat-of-my-political-life-timothy-garton-ash-brexit>.
24
June
2016.
(accessed on 29/06/2016).
Habermas, J., 2016. Die Spieler Treten Ab. Die Zeit <http://www.zeit.de/2016/29/eukrise-brexit-juergen-habermas-kerneuropa-kritik/komplettansicht>
(English
version accessible on <http://www.zeit.de/kultur/2016-07/juergen-habermasbrexit-eu-crises-english/komplettansicht>) 07 July 2016. (accessed on 14/07/
2016).
Harris, R., Charlton, M., 2016. Voting out of the European Union: exploring the
geography of leave. Environ. Plan. A.
Henderson, A., Jeffery, C., Lieira, R., Scully, R., Wincott, D., Wyn Jones, R., 2016.
England, Englishness and Brexit. Political Q. 87 (2), 187199.
Hendrikse, R.P., Sidaway, J.D., 2014. Financial wizardry and the Golden City:
tracking the financial crisis through Pforzheim, Germany. Trans. Inst. British
Geogr. 39 (2), 195208.
Hirschhausen, B.v., Grandits, H., Kraft, C., Mller, D., Serrier, T., 2015.
Phantomgrenzen. Rume Und Akteure in Der Zeit Neu Denken. Wallstein
Verlag, Gttingen.
Jones, M., 2009. Phase space: geography, relational thinking, and beyond. Prog.
Hum. Geogr. 33 (4), 487506.
Kraft, C., 2015. Phantomgrenzen und Zeitschichten im Postsozialismus. Ist der
Postsozialismus postkolonial. In: Hirschhausen, B.v., Grandits, H., Kraft, C.,
Mller, D., Serrier, T. (Eds.), Phantomgrenzen. Rume Und Akteure in Der Zeit
Neu Denken. Wallstein Verlag, Gttingen, pp. 166190.
Mackinder, H.J., 1907. Britain and the British Seas. Clarendon, Oxford.
Nairn, T., 1977. The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism. NLB, London.
Painter, J., 2010. Rethinking territory. Antipode 42 (5), 10901118.
Petrakos, G., Tsiapa, M., Kallioras, D., 2016. Regional inequalities in the European
Neighborhood Policy countries: the effects of growth and integration. Environ.
Plan. C: Gov. Policy 34 (4), 698716.
Pollard, J.S., Sidaway, J.D., 2002a. Editorial: Eurolandeconomic, cultural and
political geographies. Trans. Inst. British Geogr. 27 (1), 710.
Pollard, J.S., Sidaway, J.D., 2002b. Nostalgia for the future: the geoeconomics and
geopolitics of the Euro. Trans. Inst. British Geogr. 27 (4), 518521.
Runciman, D., Ascherson, N., Butler, J., Clark, T.J., Coe, J., Douglas-Scott, S., Finn, D.,
Foster, D., Harding, J., McKibbin, C.K., Marlire, P., Meek, J., Mishra, P., Mller, J.W., Pedersen, S., Pocock, J.G.A., Richardson, N., Spice, N., Streeck, W., Trilling, D.,
2016. Where are we now? Responses to the referendum. London Rev. Books 38
(14), 815.
Sidaway, J.D., 2006. On the nature of the beast: re-charting political geographies of
the European Union. Geogr. Ann. 88 B (1), 114.
Stiglitz, J.E., 2016. The Euro: And Its Threat to the Future of Europe. Allen Lane,
London.
Surowiecki, J., 2016. The Financial Page. Brexitonomics. The New Yorker, p. 32 (July
11 & 18).
Swinford, S., 2016. Theresa May Vows Brexit Deal Will Limit Migration Whatever
the Impact on EU Trade. The Telegraph <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
2016/08/31/theresa-may-vows-to-make-controls-on-eu-migrants-a-red-lineduri/>. 31 August 2016. (accessed on 20/09/2016).
Tomlinson, S., Dorling, D., 2016. Brexit Has Its Roots in the British Empire So How
Do We Explain It to the Young? New Statesman - The Staggers <http://www.
newstatesman.com/politics/staggers/2016/05/brexit-has-its-roots-britishempire-so-how-do-we-explain-it-young> (accessed on 06/07/2016).
Varoufakis, Y., 2016. And the Weak Suffer What They Must?: Europe, Austerity and
the Threat to Global Stability. The Bodley Head, London.
Vermes, T., 2016. Europische Werte: Vorbergehend Vernnftig. SpiegelOnline,
Kultur
<http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/nach-dem-brexitstimmung-in-europa-bleib-irrational-a-1100180.html>.
29
June
2016.
(accessed on 06/07/2016).
Wallerstein, I., 2016. Brexit: Symptom, Not Cause, of Turmoil. Immanuel
Wallerstein:
Commentaries
(No.428,
1
July
2016).
<http://
iwallerstein.com/commentaries/> (accessed on 06/07/2016).
Watkins, S., 2016. Casting Off? New Left Rev. 100 (July Aug), 531.