Music and Linguistic Speech

Musical and Linguistic Speech Acts
Author(s): Justin London

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 54, No. 1 (Winter, 1996), pp. 4964
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics
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JUSTIN LONDON
Musical and Linguistic Speech Acts
Haydn's String Quartet in E-flat, op. 33, no. 2,
while Bonds rightly describes what is anom-
ends with a musical joke, giving it its familiar
alous about this ending, he does not explain the
nickname:
source of its humor. Why is this ending funny?

For the fact that there is an unexpected adagio,
m. 153
followed by a rhythmically fragmented repe-
tition of the opening theme, and then the opening two measures yet again, might just as easily
be regarded as a compositional flaw, or per-
P~~~~~~~~~GP
haps even as a printing error, rather than as a

joke.
In this paper I hope to show not only that a
1 161
speech act analysis of Haydn's quartet can allow
GP.
G.P.
us a better understanding of how its joke works,

but also that such an analysis is essential if we
wish to understand why the ending is funny. In-
deed, it is precisely by focusing on a particular

level of analysis-the speech act-and by ignoring other potential parallels (real or imag1I66
172
G.P.
ined) between musical and linguistic structure

that significant relationships between music and
language may become apparent.
But I have a larger purpose here as well. For

I want to start by arguing that, as a result of our
enculturated belief that music is a kind of language, we can and often do treat music as a linWhy is this ending funny? What makes it a
guistic phenomenon. That is, we acquire our
"Joke"? Bonds correctly and concisely notes
mechanisms for dealing with intentional com-
that in this ending:
municative behavior through our acquisition of

a linguistic framework. Language becomes the
Haydn violates the conventions of musical closure in
prototypical framework for dealing with all
such a way that only the initiated listener can be cer-
other kinds of meaningful communicative be-
tain at just what moment the piece actually ends....
havior which we encounter. I will explore the
What had first functioned as an opening antecedent
roots of this framework in the next section of
phrase now serves as the final cadence of the work,
this paper, where, drawing upon the work of
and the rhythmic play on the conventions of closure
Lakoff, Johnson, and Turner, I propose that we
makes the listener all the more conscious of those
often employ a MUSIC IS LANGUAGE metaphor in
very conventions. I
our understanding of music.2 If this metaphor is

present, it then follows that we have good rea-
Yet something is missing from this account. For
sons for treating a composer and his or her
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 54:1 Winter 1996
50 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

works in the same fashion as we treat a speaker
cent work in the philosophy of language and
and his or her utterances.
metaphor has challenged the traditional model.

As Lakoff and Johnson have noted:
Metaphor is for most people a device of the poetic
In claiming that music and language are meta-
imagination and the rhetorical flourish-a matter of
phorically related, I am not using a traditional
extraordinary rather than ordinary language. More-
definition/conception of metaphor. Johnson sum-
over, metaphor is typically viewed as characteristic of
marizes the traditional approach to metaphor as
language alone, a matter of words rather than thought
follows:
or action. For this reason, most people think they can
A metaphor is an elliptical simile used for stylistic,
found, on the contrary, that metaphor is pervasive in
rhetorical, and didactic purposes, but which can be
everyday life, not just in language, but in thought and
translated into a literal paraphrase without any loss of
action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of
get along perfectly well without metaphor. We have
cognitive content.3
which we both think and act, is fundamentally
metaphorical in nature.6
and later, more precisely:

According to Lakoff and Johnson, metaphors do
(1) The human conceptual system is essentially lit-
much more than point out hidden or fanciful
eral-literal language ("words proper') is the
pre-existing similarities between, for example,
only adequate vehicle for (a) expressing one's
music and language. At the heart of this theory
meaning precisely, and (b) making truth claims,
of metaphor is the thesis that metaphor is not
which together make possible correct reasoning
merely linguistic, but rather a basic aspect of
by the philosopher.
human thought. Linguistic metaphors are a re-
(2) Metaphor is a deviant use of words in other than
flection of our innate propensity for metaphori-
their proper senses, which accounts for its ten-
cal understanding. Lakoff and Johnson, through
dency to confuse and deceive.
copious examples, show how metaphors are not
(3) The meaning and truth claims of a metaphor (if
extraordinary in language, but rather are part
there are any) are just those of its literal para-
and parcel of ordinary usage. The words we use,
phrase.4
even in ordinary discourse, are usually linked to

larger, overarching metaphors which structure
Thus, according to the traditional model, meta-
our understanding of the topic in question.
phors are essentially abbreviated similes and
Lakoff and Johnson ask us to consider the fol-
hence represent a special use of language,
lowing examples:
though they often become conventionalized.5

While metaphors often hinge upon similarities
Your claims are indefensible.
between the entities which are being metaphor-
He attacked every weak point in my argument.
ically connected, metaphors do not make these
His criticisms were right on target.
connections. Rather, they merely reflect the
I demolished his argument.7
structural similarities which already exist in

their referents. So, for example, one often finds
These examples are instances of a larger
that there are striking similarities between the
metaphor, the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor (x is
pattern of voices in a conversation-their rhy-
thm, turn taking, interjections and non se-
Y [all in capitals] is Lakoff and Johnson's notation for metaphors, and I will use it here as
quiturs, and so forth-and the disposition of the
well). In our culture this metaphor informs and
instrumental parts in classical chamber music.
underlies our understanding of arguments as
Nonetheless, these striking similarities do not
well as the way we behave when we participate
then require that we understand the music as a
in an argument. Lakoff and Johnson go on to
conversation-just as if we say that a cloud
note that:
looks like a horse, we do not then, on the basis

of this similarity, believe that the cloud is a horse. It is important to see that we don't just talk about arHowever, not all metaphors are alike, and reguments in terms of war. We can actually win or lose
London
Musical
and
Linguistic
Speech
Acts
51
arguments. We see the person we are arguing with as
It is in this sense that the MUSIC IS LANGUAGE
an opponent. We attack his positions and defend our
metaphor is one we live by in this culture; it struc-
own. ... Though there is no physical battle, there is a
tures the actions we perform in listening."12
verbal battle, and the structure of an argument-attack, defense, counterattack, etc.-reflects this. It is
And considering that we usually acquire the
in this sense that the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor is
MUSIC IS LANGUAGE framework in our musical
one we live by in this culture; it structures the actions
childhood, it is well entrenched and hence quite
we perform in arguing.8
powerful. Since the MUSIC IS LANGUAGE framework is so well established in our musical train-
ARGUMENT IS WAR functions as a cognitive

framework for the understanding of certain
ing and the language we use to describe music,
kinds of linguistic exchanges. Once we start
using this framework it subsequently has the
teners music becomes a subclass of linguistic

phenomena. Conversely, to be able to describe
ability to influence our understanding of the

structural elements of a conversation-certain
deemed a mark of musical (and not to mention
it becomes wholly transparent-for many lis-
musical structure in nonlinguistic terms is
moves are attacks, others are retreats, and so

forth. ARGUMENT IS WAR plays what Johnson
calls a "constitutive role in the structuring of our
musicological) erudition and sophistication.

The musicologist, though, is not free from meta-
experience."9
and criticism that are proffered can also be con-
Consider then the following rather typical descriptions of music:
phor, as other frameworks for musical analysis

strued as constitutive metaphors: MUSIC IS TONAL
PROLONGATION; MUSIC IS MOTIVIC GROWTH;
MUSIC IS COMPOSITIONAL PROBLEM-SOLVING,
The principal theme is stated by the first violins.

The basses reject the motive proffered by the cellos.
The flute answers the questioning oboe.
and so forth. These other frameworks are r

seen in metaphoric terms. Instead, we feel that
we have moved toward a truer (if not a perfectly
true) account of musical structure, one which
These sentences were not culled from program

notes (though they easily could have been) but
goes beyond linguistic analogy.

In order to account for the transparency of the
were constructed using terms from a list of
MUSIC IS LANGUAGE metaphor, it is worth ex-
speech act categories given by Bach and Harnish.10 Kivy similarly remarks that we have a
amining the structure of metaphorical mapping
natural tendency to "animate" musical sounds
as human gestures. 1I1 Tellingly, most of Kivy's

examples of animation are linguistic gestures:
questions, answers, singing voices, speaking,
in general and the mapping from language to

music in particular. First, as Lakoff and Turner
have noted, "a metaphor with the name A IS B iS
a mapping of part of the structure of our knowledge of the source domain B onto target domain
and so forth. Why are we so ready to describe

musical structures in terms of language and
A."13 Thus, in the MUSIC IS LANGUAGE meta-
linguistic behavior? The descriptions of music
knowledge structure of language-and map it
phor, language is the source-we take our
given above are remarkably like the sentences

onto a musical target (e.g., a particular chord,
proffered by Lakoff and Johnson in their premotive, phrase, etc.). There is a particular strucsentation of the ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor.
ture to this mapping in the case of the MUSIC IS
Thus I would claim that, in a profoundly similar
LANGUAGE metaphor because it is in the class of
way, a MUSIC IS LANGUAGE metaphor structures what Lakoff and Turner call a "basic conceptual
the actions we perform in listening. To parametaphor," a category of metaphors that "are
phrase Lakoff and Johnson, it is not that we hear
part of the common conceptual apparatus shared
"a flute phrase followed by an oboe phrase," butby members of a culture."14 Basic metaphors
rather that we "really hear the oboe answering
are used conventionally, unconsciously, autothe flute." To extend the paraphrase:
matically, and usually without notice. Not all
basic metaphors are alike, however. Lakoff and
"We don't just talk about musical gestures in terms of
Turner illustrate the differences between two
linguistic speech acts. Rather, we can actually hear
kinds of basic metaphors with their examples
these gestures as greetings, questions, jokes, answers. EVENTS ARE ACTIONS and LIFE IS A JOURNEY:

the end of a piece
of music
as a
a "peroraIn a metaphor like LIFE IS Ascribes
JOURNEY
there
is
desig-
EVENTS ARE ACTIONS metaphor, the mapping consists
tion," one is creating a sense of musical "topic"

(and a summation thereof), which, given that
music lacks the ability to predicate or refer, cannot be said to come from the music itself. Similarly, more general properties in the source do-
not in a list of fixed correspondences, but rather in
main often are mapped onto properties in the
nated ontological mapping: a certain list of slots in

the JOURNEY schema maps in exactly one way onto a
corresponding list of slots in the LIFE schema (e.g.,

DESTINATIONS correspond to LIFE GOALS). But in the
higher-order constraints on what is an appropriate
target domain. For example, in language one
mapping and what is not. ... We will refer to meta-
may use the term "voice" to refer to those fea-
phors like EVENTS ARE ACTIONS as "generic-level
tures which distinguish one speaker from an-
metaphors" since they lack specificity in two respects:
other ("I could recognize her voice"), and then
they do not have fixed source and target domains, and
use the same term in a musical context to de-
they do not have fixed lists of entries specified in the
scribe a composer who creates his or her own
mapping. We will refer to metaphors like LIFE IS A
idiosyncratic style or idiom (as in "Beethoven
JOURNEY as "specific-level metaphors" since they are
found his own voice in his op. 18 quartets").17
specified in these two ways. We will continue to refer
One final caution regarding mapping from lan-
to conventionalized specific-level metaphors as "basic
guage onto music: metaphorical mappings are
metaphors" when we are not interested in contrasting
not complete, and thus we should not expect
them with generic-level metaphors. 15
every aspect of language to map onto every as-
The MUSIC IS LANGUAGE metaphor is not
main outside the domain of the metaphor.
pect of music. Rather, many aspects of each regeneric, but is another example of a specific-
Metaphorical mapping has a great power to
level metaphor which has fixed aspects between
structure our knowledge and understanding of
its source and target domains. 16 Here is a list of
one thing in terms of another-or rather, of one
some of the ways in which slots in the LAN-
thing as another. For the MUSIC IS LANGUAGE
GUAGE schema map onto corresponding slots in

the MUSIC schema:
metaphor this mapping is especially useful in at

least two respects. First, it allows us "to borrow
patterns of inference from the source domain to

LANGUAGE onto MUSIC
use in reasoning about the target domain."'8
SPEAKERS
Thus we can, for example, regard contrapuntal
COMPOSERS
HEARERS LISTENERS/AUDIENCE
alternations between instruments as analogs to
UTTERANCES MELODIES
turn-taking in conversation or argument, musi-
(notes, chords, motives)

SPEECHES
MOVEMENTS
(extended discourse) (i.e., large musical structures)
cal discontinuities as parenthesis, and so forth.

Second, MUSIC IS LANGUAGE allows us to evaluate musical gestures as we would linguistic utterances; a specific instance of this is discussed
below where anomalous musical structures are

And more specifically:
considered as a species of Gricean flouting. If

the MUSIC IS LANGUAGE metaphor is present, we
CONVERSATION PARTS IN A CLASSICAL

STRING QUARTET
DEBATE
CONCERTO
may then assume that listeners, to the best of

their abilities, will regard musical structures
as compositional utterances made by a com-
(rhetorical contest) (soloist vs. orchestra)
poser/speaker and employ the same discursive
Of course, there are some nonspecific aspects to
contexts in order to recover the composer's in-
this mapping as well. For example, while in

some cases the mapping consists of correspondences between "slots" which exist independently in each domain (for example, the com-
tent in choosing a particular musical gesture in

a particular musical context.
strategies in musical as they would in linguistic
II
POSERS ARE SPEAKERS metaphor), in other cases
the target slot is wholly or partially created in

the process of map-making. Thus, when one de-
Let us now return to the compositional choices

Haydn made at the end of his quartet, and what
London Musical and Linguistic Speech Acts 53
allows us to regard them as a joke. An account

of the ending of op. 33, no. 2 cast only in terms
of its nonconformance to conventions of melodic, harmonic, and formal closure will not reveal the source of its humor, nor the means by
which the listener is able to recognize it as hu-
morous. To recognize in what sense the ending

is conventionally anomalous is important and
necessary. But it is only the first step toward an
analysis of the joke. Here is a fuller account of
the ending and of the musical context in which
it occurs:
1. The movement conforms to the conventions of a
rondo finale until m. 148. Indeed, listeners with a
knowledge of the typical ABACA rondo script may

well recognize m. 140 as a potential "beginning of
the end" for the movement; that is, having heard
the previous A, B, A, and C sections, we anticipate
another A section (though perhaps with some alterations to create a greater sense of overall finality
and closure).19
2. Rather than continuing with a well-formed A sec-
tion (one which would roughly parallel mm. 1-36

or mm. 72-107), we get the following:
a) An adagio "insert" starting at m. 149, which in

some sense replaces mm. 9-28;
b) A fragmented repeat of the opening theme,

parallel to mm. 29-36 (at mm. 153-156);
c) - PAUSE - (mm. 167-170), and then, suddenly, mm. 1-2 (!).
It should be pointed out that the anomaly does

not stem from the adagio passage, but rather
from what follows it. For notice how the following ending, composed by the author, could
have brought the movement to a predictable and
satisfactory close following the adagio:
[2.d
A..t Iz P G.t~^7 P.P~ 1I~
. p
14
This, of course, does not happen, but example

two does help to explain the formal function of
the adagio: it sets up the dismembered presentation of the main theme and final "!". Example
two also shows us that the real joke lies in the
last two measures.
Following the stuttering presentation of the
rondo theme we have a wholly implausible presentation of mm. 1-2. Yet we do not write off
these measures as a mistake on the part of either

Haydn or the performers. Instead, we believe
that Haydn composed the end of the quartet,
with its dismembered theme of mm. 153-166
(which correspond to mm. 29-36) and repeat

of mm. 1-2, with some aesthetic purpose in
mind-and thus we will try to make sense of
the seeming nonsense of Haydn's ending. Furthermore, we believe that Haydn himself knew
that his listeners would try to do so, and we believe that he gives us credit for our ability to find
meaning and coherence in his music.20
We can find meaning and coherence in the
closing bars of the quartet in the following way.
The stuttering presentation of the theme (in contrast to the continuous presentation of the same
material at mm. 29-36 and analogous passages)
arrests the rhythmic momentum of movement; if
the adagio passage was the musical equivalent
of slamming on the brakes, mm. 153-166 are a
few final taps of the brake pedal which bring the
slowing quartet to a stop. The discontinuous

manner of thematic presentation here serves a
larger formal function, for as a result of the
rhythmic fragmentation, there is a clear sense of
arrival at m. 166 (note how m. 166 is a variant of
m. 36 in the original presentation of the rondo
theme, a variant with stronger cadential structure). Measures 171-172 are the exclamation
point to this arrival-and these measures are
the real joke. For Haydn realizes that following
the adagio and fragmentation we need some sort
of closural confirmation, some additional mark
of rhythmic punctuation. But rather than an
echo of mm. 165-166, as in example two

(which would be the most conventional and pre-
as speakers, we are unencumbered in pondering
dictable sort of confirmation), we get mm. 1-2.
Haydn's meaning in using a beginning motive
And so we are forced to recognize the latent ca-
as an ending cadence. MUSIC IS LANGUAGE al-
dential potential of this gesture:
lows us, without hesitation, to treat Haydn's ending as an illocutionary act, and by treating it as
st v 1in
an illocutionary act, we are able both to make

sense of the ending and to get Haydn's joke.21 I
hasten to add that what I am not saying here is
2nd vin, via
that we are justified in employing our knowledge of speech acts whenever we encounter purposeful behavior of any sort. Nor do I wish to
cell.o
imply that artistic intentions are wholly, or even

primarily, communicative; composers write mu-
sic for all sorts of reasons (e.g., treating a piece
In example three the notes circled in the melodyas an instance of compositional problem-solv-
are the structural backbone of the melody, a descent which goes "mi-re-do." This descent, cou-
ing, or as a play with favorite numbers or notes,
pled with the I-V-I harmonization underneath, is
perfect sonata form, and so forth). What I am
a common cadential pattern-indeed, the arrival on "do" in the melody coupled with the mo-
music) are at least in some sense a manifestation
or as an attempt to create a near-as-possible-tosaying is that cultural artifacts (like pieces of
tion from V-I in the bass creates what is referred
of meaningful public behavior on the part of
to in music-theory nomenclature as a "perfect
their composers. As such, listeners are justified
authentic cadence." However, we do not regard
in approaching a musical structure as product of
this as a cadence at the beginning of the piece
this behavior, as the carrier of "some meaning"
for two reasons, (a) it occurs too early in the
between them and its composer.
phrase-not every V-I motion coupled with "redo" creates a cadence, after all, and more im-
III
portantly, (b) the "structural" melodic descent is

obscured by the ornamentation which reaches
In How To Do Things With Words J. L. Austin
upward, creating a sense of beginning rather
develops the thesis that language is not just used
than ending. But at the end of the quartet Haydn
for the exchange of information, but rather-
forces us to attend to the structural descent
and perhaps primarily-that language is used as

the modus operandi of social interaction.22 In
which underlies the surface ornamentation.

The crux of the matter is our realization that
describing and analyzing this process, Austin
at the end of this quartet Haydn does not simply

"mean what he says," for that would be "here is
considers three aspects of each speech act: locu-
the beginning again," which would be musical
will make these three aspects clear. Suppose I go
tion, allocution, and perlocution. An example
nonsense. The problem created by this musical
into a record shop and ask the proprietor "How
non sequitur is twofold, for (a) we have to admit
much is that recording of Haydn's 'Joke' Quar-
that Haydn means something by concluding the
tet that is displayed in the window?" Here my lo-
quartet in this fashion, and (b) having admitted

this, we then need a means of figuring out what
his meaning might be. The situation we have
here at the end of this quartet is precisely analogous to a situation in which a speaker does not
literally mean what he says in a certain context,
and thus the hearer is forced to pursue the
speaker's meaning (or at least a possible/plausible meaning) in order to make sense of the situation. Given the presence of the MUSIC IS LANGUAGE metaphor, however, we are readily able
to do so. That is, because we think of composers
cutionary act is the utterance of a question, which
involves the production of a set of phonemes in
a particular language, with a particular syntactic arrangement, such that the utterance is recognized as a question. Here my utterance has
both the semantic (the "How much" marker)
and phonological form (spoken with rising intonation) of a question. In hearing this locution,
and inferring from my very presence in the shop
that I am a potential customer, the proprietor
recognizes that my illocutionary act is a request
for information. My perlocutionary act is to af-

fect the proprietor by making this request, and
sical gestures and linguistic illocutions under
so in her desire to sell me the recording (as well
the MUSIC IS LANGUAGE metaphor.
as to keep my esteem as a potential and/or future
To demonstrate this separability Searle gives
customer) the proprietor responds, perlocution-
a particularly elegant (and oft-cited) example of
arily, with the price of the CD. That is, after the
a complex speech act:
proprietor recognizes my illocutionary intent,

(i.e., what is sometimes called illocutionary up-
Suppose that I am an American soldier in the Second
take), she then produces a linguistic response-
World War and that I am captured by Italian troops.
though this perlocutionary effect could also be
And suppose also that I wish to get these troops to be-
some other behavioral response (i.e., pointing to
lieve that I am a German soldier in order to get them
a sign with the price of the CD, shaking her head
to release me. ... So I, as it were, attempt to put on a
as if to indicate that the CD is not for sale, and
show of telling them that I am a German soldier by
so forth).
reciting those few bits of German I know, trusting
Asking a question in the manner described
that they don't know enough German to see through
above is an example of a direct speech act-
my plan. Let us suppose I know only one line of Ger-
where the semantic content of the locution is in
man which I remember from a poem I had to memo-
direct accord with the illocutionary intent of the
rize in a high school German course. Therefore I, a
utterance. But one can also proceed indirectly.
captured American, address my Italian captors with
For example, if a colleague says, "Gee, I don't
the following sentence: Kennst du das Land wo die
know how I'm going to get to the concert on
Zitronen bliihen?24
Wednesday," the locutionary act is ostensibly a

statement of bewilderment, but we do not regard
Here the locutionary act is the quotation from
it as such-rather, it is a polite request for a ride.
Wilhelm Meister; its literal meaning is that of a
The illocutionary intent of this locution is not to
geographical question. Yet here we see how this
give me information about the speaker's state of
same utterance can be used to perform a wide
mind, but, in making the request in this fashion,
variety of illocutionary acts: "Kennst du das
my colleague allows me some latitude in my
Land ..." can function as a literal question, as a
reply. So while the locutionary act is one of a
poetic reminiscence within a work of fiction, or
statement/assertion, the illocutionary act is one

of making a request. The perlocutionary effect
example in a philosophy paper). As Searle him-
as a tactical ruse on a battlefield (as well as an
would be for me to alter my plans so that my col- self has succinctly noted:
league gets a ride to the concert.23
In the first example the speaker uses an utter-
We thus detach the notions of referring and predicat-
ance in the form of a question to ask a question,
ing from the notions of such complete speech acts as
moreover, the speaker uses a question that is se-
asserting, questioning, commanding, etc., and the
mantically pertinent to the illocutionary act she
justification for this separation lies in the fact that the
wishes to perform. By contrast, in the "fishing
same reference and predication can occur in the per-
for a ride" example my hypothetical colleague
formance of different complete speech acts.25
uses an assertion to make her request, and indeed, if I knew we were both trying to go to the
concert she could have made an even more
Locution and illocution may be regarded as independent variables in the locution, illocution,
oblique remark, "Oh no, my car just died, and
and perlocution schema. The same locution may
won't be fixed for a week," which I could just

as readily recognize as a request. Thus there is
map into several different illocutionary acts, and
more than one way to perform a given illocutionary act. This many-to-one connection be-
fulfilled by several different locutionary acts.
tween various locutions and a given illocution is
far more complex, however, than Searle's own
mirrored by a many-to-one relationship between a single locution and the potential for its
would-be captors to take his illocutionary intent
use in different illocutionary acts. As a result,

locution and illocution are separable, and this
illocutionary act is a false assertion has nothing
separability allows for a mapping between mu-
to do with the effectiveness of the speech act.
likewise, the same illocutionary intent may be
The American soldier's illocutionary act is
analysis would admit. The soldier wants his

to be an assertion of his Germanness. That this

Indeed, the desired perlocutionary effect de-
whereby the state of affairs in the game is
pends on the Italian captors making justifiable
changed. True enough, but in baseball the um-
(but false) inferences about this illocution.
pire need not say a word, for by making certain
Searle treats this example as if the American's
hand gestures he or she can convey a ruling
principal ruse is to utter "Ich bin ein Deutscher
of "safe" or "out." Similarly, in the class of ex-
Soldat," and that the Italians also assume that
ercitives, which includes such acts as appoint-
what the American is trying to utter is "Ich bin
ing, dismissing, dedicating, sentencing, and so
ein Deutscher Soldat." But since our soldier is
forth, one can imagine a king granting knight-
quite clever, he realizes that if the Italians do not

know German, then any string of German will
hood to a soldier in his service by touching his
do, since they will regard it, at the very least, as

an assertion of his "Germanness" whether or not
sword to the knight's shoulders, with nary a

word spoken. And of course, under Austin's
class of behabitives, which includes greetings,
the Italians believe that our hero is actually as-
farewells, challenges, and so forth, there are many
serting that he is a German soldier (in German
kinds of gestures (hand-waving, clapping, rais-
or any other language). And it is at this point
ing certain fingers, etc.) which can signify our
that the soldier and I part company with Profes-
feelings and/or intuitions without language.27
sor Searle, for simply by the Italians' recogni-
On the other hand, some classes of speech
tion of the soldier's utterance as a vague asser-
acts are wholly dependent on language, for one
tion of Germanness, a series of perlocutionary
of two reasons. Austin's category of commis-
effects should follow, which, with a bit of luck,
sives, which includes promises and other cov-
will allow the American soldier to escape. For it
enants, declarations of intent or consent, as well
is not just that a single instance of predication
as declarations of opposition, would seem to re-
and reference can work in different illocution-
quire the capacity for making tensed statements
ary contexts-the "German soldier" example
(a promise is a future obligation; a declaration
points to a conclusion far more bold. Without
of purpose may include the present and past, but
any predication or reference the illocutionary

act can still be successful, since if the Italians
also impinges upon one's future actions; a retrodiction may involve a recasting of the under-
really do not know German, then any string of
standing of past events, and so forth), and hence
German-sounding gibberish will work. Thus
would require a linguistic vehicle for their exe-
while it is important that the American soldier's
cution. Similarly, expositives, all of which in-
utterance have the appropriate phonological
clude a propositional component "that p" (e.g.,
form (both in its phonetic content and in its
affirmations, mentions, rejoinders, postulates,
overall intonation), it need not have any particu-
declarations, illustrations, etc.), would also
lar syntactic or semantic form.
seem to require a linguistic vehicle for their ex-
The next move is to investigate various categories of speech acts to see how both linguistic
pression. Thus the capacity for making tensed
and nonlinguistic locutionary acts may be
these two classes of speech acts, as well as for
and/or predicate statements is necessary for
mapped onto the same illocutionary act; by ex-
some types of speech acts which fall into other
amining these categories we shall come to a bet-
categories. As such, these sorts of speech acts
ter understanding of the way(s) in which speech

acts may be usefully mapped onto music. Austin
can be regarded as "purely" linguistic, and thus

we would not expect to find (nor in fact do we
lists five broad categories of speech acts: ver-
find) any musical corollaries of these sorts of
dictives, exercitives, commissives, behabitives,

and expositives.26 In laying out his taxonomy
Austin gives several illustrations for each
ercitives, and [especially] behabitives) are less

pure, and it is here that we may find musical in-
speech act category, some of which can be per-
stances of speech acts.
formed both with and without language. Thus,

for example, as an instance of a verdictive
Austin cites an umpire's ruling ("out" versus
"safe") as a case where the utterance of the umpire, empowered by his position as referee and
by the rules of the game, counts as a ruling
speech acts. But other classes (verdictives, ex-
On the basis of this distinction between linguistically pure versus impure speech acts we
can refine the ways in which the MUSIC IS LAN-
GUAGE metaphor will map properties of linguistic discourse onto music. In the case of specific
mappings, we require a reasonably fixed corre-

spondence between the source and target do-
warnings or threats are behabitives, authoritar-
mains. Therefore, there must be some necessary
ian orders are verdictives. Even though there are
set of characteristics which defines the structure
various phonological features to orders and
of the source domain, and these characteristics
other verdictives (e.g., an umpire usually yells
are then mapped onto the target. If this is the
"out" or "safe," and hence relative loudness is
case, then we can see which classes of speech
part of its "emphatic intonation'), these musical
acts will map in a more or less "direct" fashion
qualities do not in and of themselves engender a
onto music. First, and most obviously, commis-
mapping from these linguistic speech act cate-
sives and expositives simply cannot map di-
gories onto language. Rather, under the MUSIC
rectly onto music since music cannot fulfill the
IS LANGUAGE metaphor, in order to define slots
requirements of tense and/or predication that
for COMPOSITIONAL GESTURES ARE SPEECH ACTS,
these classes of speech acts require. Similarly,
we would want to restrict SPEECH ACTS to BE-
since verdictives and exercitives require a
HABITIVE SPEECH ACTS for purely instrumental
specifically-defined institutional role for the
music. However, in the case of music which
speaker (e.g., speaker-as-umpire, speaker-asking, speaker-as-priest, etc.) which gives au-
involves a text, either as a sung lyric or as a pro-
thority and force to their words, and since com-
"Pastoral" Symphony or the more detailed story
grammatic title or discourse (e.g., Beethoven's
posers do not fulfill such institutionally-defined
which accompanies Berlioz's Symphonie Fan-
roles, it follows that musical gestures could not
tastique), we may loosen this restriction and
count as these types of speech acts either.28
thus attend to the match (or mismatch) of mu-
This leaves the category of behabitives (a cate-
sical and phonological qualities in judging
gory which Austin himself labeled "a shocker
the appropriateness (or inappropriateness) of
this").29 According to Austin, behabitives "are
the musical setting of the particular lyric or
a very miscellaneous group, and have to do with
program.
attitudes and social behaviour [Austin's emphasis]. Examples of behabitives are apologizing,
One may also consider the ways in which
nonspecific mappings may occur from SPEECH
congratulating, commending, condoling, curs-
ACTS to COMPOSITIONAL GESTURES. In these
ing, and challenging."30 Since behabitives often
cases, we may countenance those mappings even
involve little or no propositional content, and
where certain essential features of the source
since as the coins of social exchange they are all
domain are lost in mapping to the target do-
performed in the present tense (or indeed in a
main. We may loosen the behabitive restriction
tenseless fashion), the mapping of a speech act
on musical speech acts in those cases where
slot such as greeting onto a musical motive can
nonbehabitive speech acts are strongly implied
proceed in a straightforward fashion.

Furthermore, behabitives are speech acts
by parallels between the musical structure and

the phonological form of the speech act. I have
which are strongly marked by intonation as well
in mind the relatively common characterization
as other paralinguistic features. As Haverkate
of a passage which involves an interplay be-
has pointed out:
tween two (or more) discernible instruments or

musical lines as an argument. An argument may
At the articulatory level, it is particularly intonation
be described as an imbricated series of exposi-
contour and intensity accent which serve to bring
tives-an assertion "P" followed by a rejoinder
about specific perlocutionary effects. Thus, for ex-
"not P" then followed by "Well, of course P"
ample, an emphatic intonation pattern is a character-
and then topped with "Well, all right, but P only
istic device for uttering a warning, a threat or an au-
if Q," and so forth. For in the case of argu-
thoritarian order.31
ments, whose phonological form is so distinc-
Thus behabitives such as warnings, threats,
without a knowledge of what the P in question
greetings, etc., require the listener to attend to
is, one may nonetheless be justified in characterizing an exchange as an argument. For ex-
tive and so ripe for musical abstraction, even
the "musical" qualities (pitch, tone of voice,

loudness, rhythm, and articulation) of the locu-
ample, I am able to know that my neighbors in
tion in order to comprehend the illocutionary
the adjacent apartment are having an argument,
act. Now, as some may have already noted, while
and even an argument in a foreign language,

without a knowledge of the substance of their
disagreement. In the musical analog to this case

(as well as others, e.g., when we regard a series
2.d f~~~~~I
of musical phrases as a question followed by an

answer), the overarching presence of the MUSIC
cce 1 vl~l, vl~l i f
IS LANGUAGE metaphor, coupled with the morphological parallels between the linguistic and
Pp
musical sounds, engenders a speech act analysis
based on general properties of the source and

target domains.
We have seen that some (but not all) types of
linguistic speech acts can be mapped onto instrumental music. With regard to those types
which are mappable, we can find clear parallels
in music to the locutionary, illocutionary, and
perlocutionary aspects of a linguistic speech

act; what might be termed tonary, intonary, and
pertonary aspects of a musical phrase.32
These are the opening measures of Haydn's
String Quartet, op. 33, no. 5 (G major). The first

two measures are, of course, the close of an archetypal cadence-yet the piece begins with
this gesture.33 It is rather like a preacher beginning a prayer with the 'Amen." Clearly some-
thing peculiar is going on, as this putative cadence cannot be the ending of any phrase,
period, or section. Crucial to our subsequent understanding of these measures as well as the rest
of the movement is to acknowledge that Haydn
had some "intonary intent" in starting his quar-
A i~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
tet this way-whether it was to unsettle the listener by starting the quartet in this fashion, to
16 tonic chord with ii6 (supertonic chord V (chord built on I (tonic again, but
3rd in bass) built on "ret" also 5th note of scale) with root of
with 3rd in bass) chord in the
bass)
We can describe the tonary aspect(s) of this mu-
sical "utterance" in terms of its harmonic structure (16-ii6-V-I); in Western tonal music in gen-
eral, and in the late-eighteenth-century Viennese
set up a formal problem (i.e., if this is an ending,

where is the real beginning, since the following
measure begins a phrase which smacks offs pas-
sage in medias res), to set a less serious tone for

the movement and for the quartet as a whole,
and so forth.
style in particular, this progression is a stock ca-
dential progression, signifying the close of a

musical period or section (indeed, this is a more
elaborate instance of the same cadential archetype discussed in example three). The intonary
function-and one would assume, the intonary
intention of the composer in putting this progression at a particular place within a piece-is
to bring the period or section to a close (a sort

of "topic-closing function" in the musical dis-
course). If I recognize the composer's intonary

intent in making this declaration of closure I
have succeeded at the intonary uptake of the
gesture, and indeed, if I feel that the music has

come to a close, then the composer has achieved
his or her desired pertonary effect.
As in language, to understand any given in-
tonary act requires an understanding of the context in which it is made. Consider the tonary act
from example three when it is placed in the following context:
IV
Speech act analyses are often applied to music as
a means of explaining infelicities in the musical

discourse, and these infelicities are often detailed in surprisingly Gricean terms. In his seminal paper "Logic and Conversation," Grice de-
veloped his cooperative principle as a basis for

linguistic exchanges:
Make your conversational contribution such as it is
required, at the stage at which it occurs by the ac-
cepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in

which you are engaged.34
Grice then suggests four (though there may be

more) maxims of cooperation: quantity-give
the amount of information that is required, neither more nor less; quality-do not give false information; relation-be relevant; and manner-
be perspicuous. The first three maxims pertain

to what is being said, while manner pertains to

how something is said. To further define man-
ner, Grice notes that one should avoid obscurity,
VI..
&0
00
il;
Rio
fio
No
avoid ambiguity, be brief, and be orderly.35

If these maxims were perfectly fulfilled, then
VI.
$a
eja
all of the elements in a conversation would follow in a logical order, but, of course, they usually do not. Grice notes that there are four ways
in which the cooperative principle may be violated: (1) a speaker may unconsciously or un-
1
pf
P~~~~~~~~P
VI.
.O
knowingly mislead and thus inadvertently violate a maxim, (2) a speaker may opt out of the
conversation, (3) a speaker may be faced with a

clash between conflicting maxims, e.g., when
!i.
_.
al.
P~~~~~~~~~P
PP
the subject broached may require a detailed ex-
planation but time does not allow for it (quantity

here clashes with manner), or (4) a speaker may
knowingly and purposefully flout a maxim.
Grice gives the following example:
S ~~~~~i -7 _i _1 __I ___

bJ:S~~~~~~F _ _ _ JE
~~~~~~~~~~~~~7ff7?z~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~- f
A is writing a testimonial about a pupil who is a candidate for a philosophy job, and his letter reads as follows: "Dear Sir, Mr. X's command of English is ex-
cellent, and his attendance at tutorials has been

regular. Yours, etc."36
Here, by damning with faint praise, A, though he

knows a great deal about his pupil, intentionally
withholds information in his response. The
maxim of quantity is only apparently violated
The tenfold repetition of this motive cannot be
here, for by appeal to the cooperative principle
explained in terms of any normative thematic or
we realize that not enough has been said, and
phrase-building procedure. Rather, the effect is
thus we are able to recover the conversational
precisely the opposite: the overabundant repeti-
implicature, namely, that A has tactfully told us
tion serves to obliterate any sense of phrase this
that Mr. X is not very good at philosophy.
passage might have. The repetition of this mo-
Pieces of music are not conversations but
tive is a violation of the maxim of quantity.
thoughtfully composed artworks (even when
Moreover, over the course of the passage the
they imitate conversations). Nonetheless, when
motive which initially served a melodic func-
we find in them violations of the cooperative
tion is transformed into an accompaniment-it
principle, we tend to assume that these viola-
changes from a figure to a ground, so to speak.
tions are intentional floutings of one (or more)
By failing to fulfill the melodic promise of the
of the principle's maxims. Indeed, we often encounter musical descriptions precisely along
motive, Beethoven also violates the maxim of

manner, as the melody does not continue as it
these lines: themes that are too long or too short
has done in previous presentations. Once this
are described in terms of overstatement or un-
transformation has occurred, we normally would
derstatement, i.e., violations of quantity; me-
expect a new melodic figure to enter; this does
lodic and harmonic non sequiturs (for example,
not happen, and we are now faced with another
a "deceptive" cadence) are violations of rela-
violation of manner (and perhaps of relation
tion; ambiguous (especially tonally ambiguous),
as well). The great tension and expectation
rhythmically chaotic, or overly dense musical
this passage achieves stems in large part from
textures are violations of manner.37 Consider
these violations of the cooperative principle-
the following example, taken from Beethoven's
Beethoven is stubbornly refusing to give us what
"Pastoral" Symphony:
we want to hear in the way we wish to hear it.38

eating the chilies) which is causing me a modest
discomfort.41
The end of the "Joke" Quartet can be seen as a

similar exercise in flouting, a particularly outrageous violation of the maxims of manner and
Though they may at first seem redundant, note

that L2 and L3 are the ways by which we recognize the presence of the reflexive intentions of
the speaker. In L2 the semantic content of the
relation. The informal analysis of Haydn's joke

given above was in fact based upon a seven-step
utterance is recovered, and in L3 this content is
model for the analysis of nonliteral speech acts
recognized as the content of the speaker's locuproposed by Bach and Harnish. Nonliteral
tion. L4 is our first attempt at illocutionary upspeech acts are those "where it would not be reatake, in which we construe the speaker's resonable to suppose that the speaker is F*-ing
that p" (that is, literally asserting some proposi- marks literally. This attempt fails in L5, and
thus we try again in L6. L6 is in some sense a
tion p with a particular illocutionary intent in
"trap door" in the speech act schema that allows
some particular linguistic context).39 For exam-
ple, suppose I am having some spicy salsa with
a companion, and after swallowing a mouthful

of green chilies I say "My mouth is on fire!"
The analysis of this speech act would take the
following form:
LI. S is uttering e.
L2. S means ... by e.
L3. S is saying that *( ... p ...).
L4. S, if speaking literally, is F*-ing that p.
us to return to L2 and reinterpret the meaning of

the speaker's utterance. Once this reinterpretation takes place, then L3 and L4 again follow
(which we could designate as L3' and L4'), with
L7 = L4', so to speak.
Our understanding of the last two measures of

the "Joke" Quartet may also be fitted into this
schema:
LI. At the very end of the quartet, Haydn presents us
L5. S could not (under the circumstances) be F*-ing
with a repeat of mm. 1-2.
L2. These measures have previously marked the start
that p.
L6. Under the circumstances there is a certain recog-
nizable relation R between saying that *( ... p ... )

and some F-ing that P, such that S could be F-ing
that P.
L7. S is F-ing that P.40
In the case of this particular speech act my illocution would map to their schema as follows:
LI. I utter "My mouth is on fire."
L2. By this, H assumes that I mean "S's mouth is on
fire."
L3. I am saying that my mouth is on fire.
of the 8 mm. rondo theme; thus Haydn must mean

that these two measures are yet another beginning.
L3. Haydn is stating "here is the beginning of rondo

theme."
L4. If Haydn is "speaking literally," then he would be

asserting that the music is continuing/beginning
yet again.
L5. As nothing else follows these measures, Haydn

cannot really be telling us that the rondo theme is
beginning again.
L6. In this context, we are forced to consider alterna-
tive interpretations for these measures, and thus
find the weak cadence embedded within the

phrase.
L4. If I am speaking literally, I am asserting that my L7. Haydn is telling us that the beginning was an endmouth is aflame, burning, etc.
L5. However, I could not (under the circumstances)

really be asserting that my mouth is undergoing
some form of combustion.
L6. Under the circumstances, however, there is another way of construing my remarks, namely that
the chilies are very spicy/hot (spicier perhaps than
I had anticipated), and as a result I am suffering

from a minor physical discomfort.
L7. I am really asserting that there is a certain acid
chemical sensation in my mouth (as a result of
ing all along.
The goodness-of-fit between the linguistic

model and the musical analysis is suggestive, to
say the least. For every step in the analysis/recovery of the illocutionary act of a speaker, we
can map a clear corollary in recovering the compositional intentions of the composer. What is
especially useful is to see that we may use the
same pattern of inference here as in its linguistic analog, whereby we reject an initial interpre-

tation of Haydn's musical utterance, and then re-
What essential linguistic communication is in-
place it with a more suitable analysis.
volved here? The answer must be: none.
Furthermore, consider for a moment what an
In this case, the MUSIC IS LANGUAGE meta-
analysis of the "Joke" Quartet's ending would
phor which drives my speech act analysis of
look like if we do not consider Haydn's illocu-
music, while perhaps an interesting cultural cri-
tionary intent (and flouting)-viz., what would
tique, does not pass muster as an adequate ac-
our analysis would then look like if we assume
count of our understanding of musical structures
that Haydn did not wish to have his listener re-
and their relationship with the composers who
gard the ending of the "Joke" Quartet as a pun.
create them and the listeners who interpret
In that case, the final two measures of the quar-
them. Similarly, if one believes in a relatively
tet become a musical pratfall, a faux pas. As a

result, our laughter is now at Haydn's expense,
as we should have to claim that the manipula-
tions of the ending which elaborately set up the

ending-as-pun were accidental, and that the pun
itself is a matter of dumb luck. It is more plau-
sible and prudent to admit into the analysis

Haydn's purposeful violation of a Gricean maxim
than to exclude it.
strict form of musical autonomy, then no form of
musical representation, other than a purely musical one, will suffice, and the MUSIC IS LAN-
GUAGE metaphor (like all other metaphors) must

be rejected out of hand. On the other hand, if one
admits that our representations of music need

not be (and perhaps cannot be) purely musical,
then MUSIC IS LANGUAGE iS not only a possible

representation for music, but a rather attractive
one for what it buys us in our understanding of

musical structure.
VI
Recall again Searle's "German soldier" ex-
While the accounts of our metaphorical motiva-
tion for a speech act analysis of music, of the application of Gricean analysis to musical dis-
course, and the relative ease with which a model

for illocutionary acts in language may be employed in musical contexts that I have given in
the previous sections may provide an accurate

account of how some (perhaps most) listeners
treat musical structure, some philosophers will
nonetheless regard it as a case of the tail wagging the dog. That is, even though it is possible
to regard musical structures as speech acts, and
even if it is easy to do, and even if everybody
seems to be doing it, we cannot validly conclude
that music is like language in some essential
way(s). For the problem, as some readers may
have already noted, is this: what exactly does
Haydn say in the first two measures of his quar-
tet? (And a corollary: how is this utterance at
ample, which, as noted above, does not require

any sense of reference or predication in order to
function as a successful illocutionary act. Now,

many readers may be quick to observe that even
if there is no precise predication or reference in
Searle's soldier's utterance, there is nonetheless
at least a crude sense of meaning (i.e., "I am

German") which follows from the American's
use of (putatively) German phonemes, and that

the speech act analysis given above depends
upon the recoverability of this rough meaning.

This is quite true. However, there is not any
sense of "reference" involved in the American's
German babbling, but there is a sense of signification: when the American produces German-
sounding language (in the given context) this

expression counts as a sign of his Germanness.42 Note that the disclaimer "in the given
context" is crucial to the sense of significance

my American soldier is trying to achieve, for if
odds with what he ought to say at the end of the
he were to attempt this ruse with two fluent Ger-
quartet?) My explanation of what Haydn means
man speakers, it would quickly fail. Therefore,
(and hence what he says) is wholly contextual: I
the fact that the significance of an utterance
relate later occurrences of the "beginning mo-
is context-dependent for its recognition need
tive" to its initial presentation, and it is this pre-
not disarm its illocutionary potential. And what,
sentation which "defines" the meaning of the
indeed, is the illocutionary intention that our
utterance. But I would be at a loss to say what
soldier has? He intends (reflexively) that his
Haydn means (in the sense of meaning/saying
"that p") at the beginning of the quartet, or if I
potential captors believe that he is German

(perlocutionary effect #1) and then also, on ac-
were to hear this phrase played out of context.
count of that belief, release him (perlocutionary

effect #2). What does Haydn intend? He in-
of our lives-most of our interactions with an-
tends to tell a joke. Telling a joke would not
other person are linguistic interactions. It is thus
seem to involve any "real" propositional content
not surprising that if and when we acknowledge
(as the assertions that occur within the story-
that some sort of communication between com-
world of the joke are regarded as fictional). Yet
poser and listener occurs, it follows that in such
joketellers and punsters have reasons for telling
instances we often rely upon our linguistic com-
their tales: they wish to demonstrate their lin-
petence. This competence is a powerful tool
guistic cleverness; they wish to affirm a sense of
which we reflexively employ to understand mu-
community (between those who get the joke and
sical structure(s) in terms of linguistic interac-
those who do not); they wish to entertain and to
tion. And, of course, speech acts are not the
be seen as witty and entertaining, and so forth.
whole story in musical analysis and criticism
These intentions entail various illocutionary as-
(recall the other constitutive metaphors for
pects; by telling a particularly witty joke a joke-
music given above). But MUSIC IS LANGUAGE iS
ster asserts his cleverness and sophistication;
he invites membership into a certain social com-
munity; and so forth. I would argue that Haydn

reflexively intends many of these same things:
to demonstrate his musical cleverness, to enter-
tain us, to affirm a sense of community with the

musically sophisticated (and to make fun of the
musically unsophisticated). And of course, he
does make us smile, laugh, or groan.
Perhaps the key to the linguistic grounding of
music in general (and Haydn's "Joke" in particular) lies with our knowledge and understanding of indirect speech acts. The point here is that
the prototypical case of "not meaning what you
say" (or, perhaps better, "not meaning what you

signify") is a linguistic case, for language provides a rich enough context for disambiguation
and decoding of discursive infelicities.43 Thus,
when we come to the end of the "Joke" Quartet,
we realize that Haydn cannot really "mean what
he says," musically speaking-we are then

thrust into a situation analogous to an indirect
speech act. As was noted above, without an appeal to Gricean concerns we may just as easily
regard the joke as a pratfall than as a sort of musical bon mot; this situation is just like the problem we have when trying to distinguish between
a large part (and for some listeners perhaps the
central part) of the story. It is a part which deserves to be moved out of the musicological
shadows and into the light of philosophical and
musicological scrutiny so that we may better understand its workings, its benefits, its weaknesses, and its dangers. One can admit the pres-
ence of a substantial "linguistic overlap" without

negating music's aesthetic and cognitive inde-
pendence. For without invoking conversational
analysis, all we can do is comment on the degree

of closure (or lack thereof) in Haydn's quartet
and the degree of its conformance (or noncon-
formance) to cadential archetypes. To deny the

linguistic presence in this music both disenfran-
chises the listener and greatly impoverishes the

skill and power of the composer's voice. Without reference to language, Haydn's music is di-
vested of much, perhaps most, of the compositional richness and skill for which we value both
him and his art.44
JUSTIN LONDON
Department of Music
Carleton College
Northfield, Minnesota 55057
a malapropism and a pun. That is, the hearer

cannot determine whether she should laugh at or
with the speaker-or, in this case, with Haydn.
Thus the invocation of speech act theory for musical analysis has serious implications for our
aesthetic judgment of Haydn's musical work: Is
he in control of his material? Is he marshaling
INTERNET: JLONDON@CARLETON.EDU
1. Mark Evan Bonds, "Haydn, Laurence Sterne, and the
Origins of Musical Irony," Journal of the American Musicological Society 44 (1991): 70-7 1.
his musical gestures in an interesting and con-
2. Mark Johnson, ed., Philosophical Perspectives on
vincing fashion? Is the resulting work well
Metaphor (University of Minnesota Press, 1981); Mark
formed? And so forth.
Johnson, The Body in the Mind (University of Chicago

Press, 1987); George Lakoff, Women, Fire, and Dangerous
Of course, string quartets are not literally con- Things:
versations. But language is a pervasive aspect
What Categories Reveal About the Mind (University
of Chicago Press, 1987); George Lakoff and Mark Johnson,

Metaphors We Live By (University of Chicago Press, 1980);
20. It is worth mentioning that our willingness to go to
George Lakoff and Mark Turner, More Than Cool Reason: A
such lengths in making sense of Haydn's non-sense is pre-
Field Guide to Poetic Metaphor (University of Chicago
cisely because it is Haydn's nonsense; were this the work of
Press, 1989).
a lesser (or student) composer, we might well reject it out of
3. Johnson, Philosophical Perspectives on Metaphor, p. 4.
hand. The humor of this ending depends on Haydn's au-
4. Ibid., p. 12.
thority as a master composer and the trust such authority en-
5. For a thorough critique of the traditional model of
genders.
metaphor see Lakoff and Turner, More Than Cool Reason,

pp. 110-135.
21. I also would note that speech act analysis provides a

useful articulation of how the MUSIC IS LANGUAGE metaphor
6. Lakoff and Johnson, Metaphors We Live By, p. 3.
is used for just this purpose. First and foremost, the pres-
7. Ibid., p. 4.
ence of this metaphor invokes several presuppositions which
8. Ibid., p. 4.
are crucial to the successful execution of illocutionary acts.
9. Johnson, The Body in the Mind, p. 73.
As Bach and Harnish point out, speech acts depend on a
10. Kent Bach and Robert M. Harnish, Linguistic Com-
communicative presumption, "the mutual belief prevailing in
munication and Speech Acts (MIT Press, 1979).
1 1. Peter Kivy, Sound Sentiment (Temple University

Press, 1989), p. 58.
a linguistic community to the effect that whenever someone
says something to somebody, he intends to be performing

some identifiable illocutionary act" (Linguistic Communica-
12. Here I am pursuing an interpretation of musical
tion and Speech Acts, p. 12). Furthermore, speakers and
metaphor that runs counter to that proposed by Daniel Put-
hearers are both aware of these intentions in a particular
nam (in "Some Distinctions on the Role of Metaphor in
fashion: "These intentions are reflexive, and their fulfill-
Music," The Journal of Aesthetic Education 23 [19891:
ment consists in their recognition" (ibid., p. 15). It is not just
103-104), who argues that metaphorical interpretations of
that hearers know that speakers have certain intentions, and
music are primarily "orientational" (using Lakoff and John-
that it is their job in a linguistic exchange to figure out what
son's terminology-see their Metaphors We Live By, pp. 14-
those intentions may be; it is also that speakers know that
24), i.e., that most metaphorical accounts of musical structure
hearers know that they (the speakers) have certain inten-
are cast in spatial terms (up, down, movement, and motion,
tions. Speakers may then depend upon the hearer's accep-
etc.). The MUSIC IS LANGUAGE metaphor moves beyond a
tance of the communicative presumption when they choose
spatialization of music, and transforms the perception of

music into language. Hence it is precisely an example of
then assume that their interlocutors will attempt to construe
what Lakoff and Johnson have called an "ontological"
their utterances in the most relevant and meaningful fashion
metaphor (ibid., pp. 25-32).
relative to their immediate linguistic contexts. Similarly, com-
to speak indirectly and/or nonliterally, for speakers may
13. Lakoff and Turner, More Than Cool Reason, p. 59.
posers may assume that listeners will attempt to construe
14. Ibid., p. 51.
their compositional gestures in the most relevant and mean-
15. Ibid., pp. 80-81.
ingful fashion relative to their immediate musical contexts.

22. J. L. Austin, How To Do Things With Words (Harvard
16. It is also quite possible to consider a generic metaphor

that could (and probably does) impinge on the MUSIC IS LANGUAGE metaphor, and that would be a COMMUNICATION IS
SPEECH (or some similar) metaphoric structure. This is an-
University Press, 1962).

23. The causal distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts is problematic (see Bach and Harnish, Lin-
other way of saying what I said before-that our under-
guistic Communication and Speech Acts, pp. 12-18). For
standing of semiotic and other purposively communicative
while it is true that in some sense my colleague "got me to
behavior is grounded in our understanding of language,
give her a ride" in this case, it is also true that I am not wholly
since it is the most pervasive and familiar form of human
at her linguistic mercy in responding to her illocution. For,
communication. One may accept this generic-level meta-
of course, the perlocutionary response to a request (or other
phor but reject the specific MUSIC IS LANGUAGE metaphorin which case my subsequent discussion of linguistic to mu-
the speaker. If I reply to my colleague "Sorry, but our car is
sical correspondences would not be viewed as structures per

se, but rather as constraints upon the frameworks one would
make in order to comprehend music. As such, this still would
allow for a speech act analysis of music (for example), but it
would necessarily be a weaker analysis, with correspondingly weaker ontological claims.
17. For a complete account of the process of metaphoric
mapping see Lakoff and Turner, More Than Cool Reason,

pp. 61-65. The discussion in this and the next paragraph is
modeled after their analysis of the structure of the LIFE IS A
JOURNEY metaphor.
illocutionary act) may not always be the response desired by

in the shop," I have denied her request for a ride. In which
case, I have recognized the illocutionary act performed by
my colleague-my "illocutionary uptake" has been successful-but my response did not yield the desired perlocutionary effect. For the purposes of this paper, I will not
speak of perlocutionary acts, but simply of perlocutionary
effects that are the result of successful illocutionary uptake.

24. John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philoso-
phy of Language (London: Cambridge University Press,

1969), p. 44.
25. Ibid., p. 23.
18. Lakoff and Turner, More Than Cool Reason, p. 65.

19. The events which follow m. 148 are not without clever
foreshadowing on Haydn's part, i.e., in the quirky use of the
opening material in the B and C sections of the rondo (mm.
37-71 and mm. 108-140, respectively). Both of these episodic sections end with rhythmic and melodic fragmentation (mm. 66-73 and mm. 130-142).
26. Austin., How To Do Things With Words, p. 15 1. Subsequent authors expand upon the number of classes of speech
acts and/or give a more fine-grained account of various sub-
classes within each of Austin's categories (indeed, one could

say that a large part of the debate over speech acts subsequent
to Austin's seminal work has been over their taxonomy-see,
for example, Bach and Harnish, Linguistic Communication

and Speech Acts, p. 40 and passim). However, for our pur-
poses an examination of Austin's categories will suffice.
39. Bach and Harnish, Linguistic Communication and

Speech Acts, p. 65.
27. It is worth noting that under the legal doctrine of "reli-
40. N.B., Bach and Harnish use the presence/absence of
ance" there are whole areas of contract law which deal with
an asterisk to indicate the presence/absence of a literal
nonlinguistic undertakings and exchanges. I am grateful to
speech act. Thus in steps L6 and L7 when we shift from a
my colleague Matthew Kramer for pointing this out to me.
literal to a nonliteral interpretation of the speech act, the as-
28. However, since verdictives and exercitives are, for the
terisk is omitted (see ibid., pp. 61-66).
most part, highly arbitrary and formulaic locutions, it would
41. My utterance could also be part of a nonliteral indirect
be quite possible to have musical substitutes for these utter-
speech act, in that along with asserting that I am in some
ances. For example, if some branch of the Catholic Church
small physical discomfort I might also be requesting for my
decided that whenever a priest, hearing a confession,
companion to get some water (i.e., if none were at hand), or
hummed the musical motive "mi-sol-do" this would count as
acknowledging her prior warning that the peppers were very
a sign of absolution, then by humming "mi-sol-do" in the
hot, etc.
proper context the priest could absolve me of my sins.

29. Austin, How To Do Things With Words, p. 151.
30. Ibid., p. 152.

31. Henk Haverkate, 'A Speech-Act Analysis of Irony,"
Journal of Pragmatics 14 (1990): 77.
32. I wish to acknowledge the contribution of my colleague,
Gary Iseminger, who proposed these names. I, of course, take

full responsibility for their definition and usage here.
33. While this is not a complete performance of the caden-
tial archetype, it is clear enough, both in containing the most

important part of the cadence (the V-I chord progression at
the end) and one of its characteristic melodic motions (sol-lati-do). It is also worth noting that while placement of the double bar (which indicates that these measures will be absent
when this part of the quartet is repeated, as is customary)
gives the players in the quartet a big clue as to the illocutionary game that is afoot, the listeners who do not have the scoreas-a-musical-road-map are not privy to this information.
34. H. Paul Grice, "Logic and Conversation," in Syntax

and Semantics, eds. P. Cole and J. L. Morgan (New York:
Academic Press, 1975), p. 45.
35. Ibid., p. 46.
42. This demonstrates that rather subtle and/or complex

linguistic transactions are possible even with rather large
and sloppy linguistic utterances. If this is the case, then rough
categories of musical expression (i.e., such as a simple opposition between "happy" versus "sad" as discussed in Kivy,
Sound Sentiment) may be adequate input for the finegrained output of our analysis of particular musical gestures
in particular structural and performance contexts. Studies
of musical expression and of musical semiotics often stumble
on the observation that, if music has any capacity for refer-
ence (or at least a capacity to induce widespread "associations" between certain classes of musical gestures and cer-
tain affects), it would seem to be rather modest, with a fairly

limited number of semantic categories. The limited "lexicon" of music is then a problem for subsequent accounts of
meaning-with only a few entries, and limited combinatorial possibilities of those entries, music would seem to have
an impoverished capacity for expression and signification.

However, an appeal to the use of these semantic categories
in the context of a musical illocution allows one to restore

much of the richness to our understanding of the meaning of
a musical gesture.
43. Haverkate has also argued that the recovery of verbal
36. Ibid., p. 52.
irony-which he defines as "saying something different
37. I have omitted the maxim of quality from this list, since from what you mean" ('A Speech-Act Analysis of Irony,"
it usually does not apply to music, it being grounded in the
truth or falsehood of an assertion. However, since Grice, in a

discussion of quality, notes that conversational contributions
should be "genuine and not spurious" ("Logic and Conversation," p. 47), one might have floutings of quality in musical
p. 77) is not based on the propositional content of an utterance (and some convention whereby the utterance is marked
for a nonliteral interpretation) but rather is dependent on a
recovery of illocutionary intent: "We have to look for the ori-
gin of the irony [in Haverkate's various examples] at another
contexts. For instance, one may have musical gestures that
level than that of the proposition. This other level, then, is
are intentionally spurious, such as "false recapitulations" in a
the level of illocutionary force" (ibid., p. 86).
sonata-form movement, or individual gestures, as in melodic

lines played on penny whistles in Haydn's "Toy" symphony.
44. Portions of this paper have been presented at Pomona
College, during its 1992 Music Department Lecture Series,
38. In Emotion and Meaning in Music (University of
and at the Second International Conference on Music Per-
Chicago Press, 1956), Leonard Meyer discusses this passage
ception and Cognition (February 1992). I am grateful to
in terms of saturation: the repetitions serve to arouse expec-
Lawrence Archbold, James Buhler, Brian Hyer, Gary
tation for change, and more repetition causes greater expec-
Iseminger, Kristin Knittel, and Matthew Kramer, as well as
tation (p. 136). However, Meyer's explanation of this pas-
three anonymous readers, for their comments on earlier
sage, based upon general principles of pattern perception
drafts of this paper. I am especially grateful for the contin-
and cognition, does not consider it as a deliberate act on the
uing comments and criticisms of Betsey Buckheit. Research
part of Beethoven. The tension created by Beethoven's will-
on this project was supported by a faculty development
ful melodic overstatement and its subsequent deformation
grant from Carleton College and by the Institute for Re-
from figure to ground does as much, if not more, to raise ex-
search in the Humanities at the University of Wisconsin-
pectation(s) in the listener's mind as does the plain fact of
Madison.
pattern repetition.

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Musical and Linguistic Speech Acts

Author(s): Justin London

Musical and Linguistic Speech Acts

Haydn's String Quartet in E-flat, op. 33, no. 2,

while Bonds rightly describes what is anom-

ends with a musical joke, giving it its familiar

alous about this ending, he does not explain the

source of its humor. Why is this ending funny?

followed by a rhythmically fragmented repe-

be regarded as a compositional flaw, or per-

haps even as a printing error, rather than as a

speech act analysis of Haydn's quartet can allow

us a better understanding of how its joke works,

deed, it is precisely by focusing on a particular

ined) between musical and linguistic structure

But I have a larger purpose here as well. For

guistic phenomenon. That is, we acquire our

"Joke"? Bonds correctly and concisely notes

mechanisms for dealing with intentional com-

that in this ending:

municative behavior through our acquisition of

Haydn violates the conventions of musical closure in

prototypical framework for dealing with all

such a way that only the initiated listener can be cer-

other kinds of meaningful communicative be-

tain at just what moment the piece actually ends....

havior which we encounter. I will explore the

What had first functioned as an opening antecedent

roots of this framework in the next section of

phrase now serves as the final cadence of the work,

this paper, where, drawing upon the work of

and the rhythmic play on the conventions of closure

Lakoff, Johnson, and Turner, I propose that we

makes the listener all the more conscious of those

often employ a MUSIC IS LANGUAGE metaphor in

our understanding of music.2 If this metaphor is

Yet something is missing from this account. For

sons for treating a composer and his or her

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 54:1 Winter 1996

50 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism

cent work in the philosophy of language and

and his or her utterances.

metaphor has challenged the traditional model.

In claiming that music and language are meta-

imagination and the rhetorical flourish-a matter of

phorically related, I am not using a traditional

extraordinary rather than ordinary language. More-

definition/conception of metaphor. Johnson sum-

over, metaphor is typically viewed as characteristic of

marizes the traditional approach to metaphor as

language alone, a matter of words rather than thought

or action. For this reason, most people think they can

A metaphor is an elliptical simile used for stylistic,

found, on the contrary, that metaphor is pervasive in

rhetorical, and didactic purposes, but which can be

everyday life, not just in language, but in thought and

translated into a literal paraphrase without any loss of

action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of

get along perfectly well without metaphor. We have

which we both think and act, is fundamentally

and later, more precisely:

much more than point out hidden or fanciful

eral-literal language ("words proper') is the