Historical Capitalism PDF

Historical Capitalism
with
Capitalist Civilization
IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN
VERSO
London New York
I M M A N U E L WALLERSTEIN was born in 1930 in N ew York. He

received his B A in 1951 and his doctorate in 1959 from Columbia
University, and w ent on to teach in the universitys sociology
departm ent. His prim ary area o f research in the period 1955-1970
was Africa. In 1961 he published Africa: the Politics o f Independence
and in 1967 Africa: the Politics o f Unity. After active involvement in
the reform m ovem ent at Colum bia in 1968, he took up a post at
McGill University in M ontreal in 1971. Since 1976 he has been
Distinguished Professor o f Sociology at B ingham ton University,
and D irector o f the Fernand Braudel C enter for the Study o f Econ
omies, Historical Systems, and Civilizations. In 1994 he was elected
President o f the International Sociological Association. T he m ulti
volum e work, The Modem World-System, has had three volumes
published to date (1974, 1980 and 1989).
Im m anuel Wallerstein 1983

Second Impression 1984
T hird Impression 1987
F ourth Impression 1989
Fifth Impression 1992
Sixth Impression 1993
Seventh Impression (new edition incorporating Capitalist Civilization) 1995
Eighth Im pression 1996
Verso
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Contents
H is t o r ic a l C a p it a l is m
Introduction
The Com m odification o f Everything:

Production o f Capital
11
The Politics o f Accumulation:

Struggle for Benefits
45
T ru th as Opiate:
Rationality and Rationalization
73
Conclusion:
O n Progress and Transitions
95
C a p it a l is t C iv il i z a t io n
A Balance Sheet
113
Future Prospects
139
HISTORICAL CAPITALISM
Introduction
This b o o k had its im m ediate origin in tw o successive requests.

In the au tu m n o f 1980, T h ierry Paquot invited m e to w rite a
short b o o k for a series he w as editing in Paris. H e suggested as
m y topic C ap italism . I replied that I w as, in principle, w ill
in g to do it, b u t th at I w ished m y topic to be H istorical
C apitalism .
I felt th at m uch had been w ritte n about capitalism by M arx
ists and oth ers on the political left, b u t that m ost o f these
books suffered from one o f tw o faults. O n e variety w ere basic
ally logico-deductive analyses, startin g from definitions o f
w hat capitalism w as th o u g h t to be in essence, and then seeing
how far it had developed in various places and tim e s. A second
variety concentrated on presum ed m ajor transform ations o f
the capitalist system as o f some recent p o in t in tim e, in w hich
the w h o le earlier p o in t o f tim e served as a m ythologized foil
against w hich to treat the em pirical reality o f the present.
W h a t seemed u rg e n t to m e, a task to w hich in a sense the
w hole corpus o f m y recent w o rk has been addressed, was to
see capitalism as a historical system , o v er the w hole o f its
history and in concrete unique reality. I, therefore, set m yself
the task o f describing this reality, o f delineating precisely w hat
was always ch anging and w h at had no t changed at all (such
that w e could d enote the e n tire reality u n d er one nam e).
I believe, like m any others, th at this reality is an integrated

w hole. B ut m any w ho assert this view argue it in the form o f
an attack on others for their alleged eco n o m ism or their
cultural idealism or their over-em phasis on political, voluntaristic factors. Such critiques, alm ost by their nature, tend to
fall by reb o u n d in to the sin opposite to the one they are at
tacking. I have therefore tried to present quite straig h t
forw ardly th e overall integrated reality, treating successively
its expression in the econom ic, political, and cu ltu ra l-id e o logical arenas.
Shortly after I agreed in principle to do this b o o k , I received
an in v itatio n from the D ep artm en t o f Political Science at the
U niversity o f H aw aii to give a series o f lectures. I seized the
o p p o rtu n ity to w rite this b o o k as those lectures, given in the
sp rin g o f 1982. T h e first version o f the first th ree chapters was
presented in H aw aii, and I am grateful to m y lively audience
for their m any com m ents and criticism s w hich enabled m e to
im prove th e p resentation considerably.
O n e im provem ent I m ade was to add the fo u rth chapter. I
realized in th e course o f the lectures th at one problem o f
exposition persisted: the enorm ous subterranean stren g th of
th e faith in inevitable progress. I realized to o that this faith
vitiated o u r und erstanding o f the real historical alter
natives before us. I, therefore, decided to address the question
directly.
Finally, let m e say a w o rd about K arl M arx. H e w as a
m o n u m en tal figure in m odern intellectual and political
h isto ry . H e has bequeathed us a great legacy w hich is concep
tually rich and m orally inspiring. W h e n he said, how ever,
that he w as n o t a M arxist, w e should take him seriously and
not sh rug this aside as a bon mot.
Introduction
H e kn ew , as m any o f his self-proclaim ed disciples o ften do

not, th at he was a m an o f the nineteenth century, w hose vi
sion was inevitably circum scribed by th at social reality. H e
knew , as m any do n o t, th at a theoretical form ulation is only
understandable and usable in relation to the alternative fo r
m ulation it is explicitly or im plicitly attacking; and that it is
entirely irrelevant vis-a-vis form ulations about o th er problem s
based on o th er premisses. H e knew , as m any do n o t, that
there was a tension in the presentation o f his w o rk betw een
the exposition o f capitalism as a perfected system (which had
nuver in fact existed historically) and the analysis o f the co n
crete day-to-day reality o f the capitalist w o rld .
Let us, therefore, use his w ritin g s in the only sensible
way th at o f a com rade in the struggle w h o knew as m uch as
he knew .
1.
The Commodification of
Everything:
Capitalism is first and forem ost a historical social system. T o

understand its orig ins, its w o rk in g s, o r its cu rren t prospects,
we-have to look at its existing reality. W e m ay o f course a t
tem pt to sum m arize th a t reality in a set o f abstract statem ents,
b u t it w o u ld be foolish to use such abstractions to ju d g e and
classify the reality. I propose therefore instead to try to des
cribe w h at capitalism has actually been like in practice, h o w it
has functioned as a system , w h y it has developed in the ways it
has, and w here it is presently heading.
The w o rd capitalism is derived from capital. It w o u ld be
legitim ate therefore to presum e that capital is a key elem ent in
capitalism. B ut w h a t is capital? In one usage, it is m erely ac
cum ulated w ealth. B ut w h en used in the context o f historical
capitalism it has a m o re specific definition. It is no t ju s t the
stock of consum able goods, m achinery, o r authorized claims
to material things in the form o f m oney. C apital in historical
capitalism does o f course continue to refer to those accum ula
tions o f the efforts o f past labour w hich have no t yet been ex
pended; b u t if this w ere all, then all historical systems back to
those o f N eanderthal m an could be said to have been capitalist,
since they all had som e such accum ulated stocks that incar
nated past labour.
W hat distinguishes the historical social system w e are call
ing historical capitalism is that in this historical system capital
14
came to be used (invested) in a very special w ay. It came to b

used w ith th e prim ary objective or in te n t o f self-expansion. L
this system , past accum ulations w ere capital only to the ex
tend they w ere used to accum ulate m ore o f the same. T he pro
cess was no d o u b t com plex, even sinuous, as w e shall see. Bu
it w as this relentless and curiously self-regarding goal o f th[
holder o f capital, the accum ulation o f still m ore capital, ane
the relations this holder o f capital had therefore to establisl
w ith o th er persons in order to achieve this goal, w h ich w;
d enom inate as capitalist. T o be sure, this object was no t ex
elusive. O th er considerations intruded u p o n the productioi
process. Still, the question is, in case o f conflict, w h ich con
siderations tended to prevail? W h en ev er, over tim e, it w as thi
accum ulation o f capital that regularly to o k p rio rity over alter
native objectives, w e are justified in saying that w e are observ
ing a capitalist system in operation.
A n individual or a g ro u p o f individuals m ig h t o f coursi
decide at any tim e that they w o u ld like to invest capital witt
th e objective o f acquiring still m ore capital. B ut, before a cer
tain m o m en t in historical tim e, it had never been easy for sud
individuals to do this successfully. In previous system s, tht
long and com plex process of the accum ulation o f capital wa!
alm ost always b locked at one or another p o in t, even in those
cases w h ere its initial co n d itio n the ow nership, or amal
g am ation, o f a stock o f previously un co n su m ed goods in the
hands o f a few existed. O u r p u tativ e capitalist always needed
to obtain the use o f labour, w hich m eant there had to be per
sons w h o could be lured or com pelled to do such w o rk . Once
w o rk ers w ere obtained and goods produced, these goods had
to be m ark eted in som e w ay, w hich m eant there had to be
b o th a system o f d istrib u tio n and a g ro u p o f buyers w ith the
w h erew ith al to purchase the goods. T h e goods had to be sold
15
at a price that was g reater than the to tal costs (as o f the point
o f sale) incurred by the seller, and, fu rth e rm o re, this m argin
o f difference had to be m o re than the seller needed for his o w n
subsistence. T here h ad, in o u r m odern language, to be a p ro
fit. T he o w n er o f the profit then had to be able to retain it u n
til a reasonable o p p o rtu n ity occurred to invest it, w hereupon
the w hole process had to renew itself at the point o f p roduc
tion.
In fact, before m odern tim es, this chain o f processes
(sometimes called th e circuit o f capital) was seldom com
pleted. For one th in g , m any o f the links in the chain w ere
considered, in previous historical social system s, to be irra
tional a n d /o r im m o ral by the holders o f political and m oral
authority. B ut even in the absence o f direct interference by
those w h o had the p o w er to interfere, the process was usually
aborted by th e non-availability o f one o r m ore elem ents o f the
process the accum ulated stock in a m o n ey form , the labourpower to be utilized b y the producer, the n etw o rk o f dis
tributors, the consum ers w h o w ere purchasers.
O ne or m ore elem ents w ere m issing because, in previous
historical social system s, one or m ore o f these elem ents was
not com m odified o r w as insufficiently com m odified. W h a t
this means is th at th e process was no t considered one that
could or should be transacted th ro u g h a m a rk e t. H istorical
capitalism involved therefore the w idespread com m odification
o f processes not m erely exchange processes, b u t p roduction
processes, distrib u tio n processes, and investm ent p ro
cesses th at had previously been conducted o th er than via a
m arket. A nd, in the course o f seeking to accum ulate m ore
and m ore capital, capitalists have sought to com m odify m ore
and m ore o f these social processes in all spheres o f econom ic
life. Since capitalism is a self-regarding process, it follow s that
16
no social transaction has been intrinsically exem pt from possi

ble inclusion. T h at is w h y w e m ay say that the historical deve
lopm ent o f capitalism has involved the th ru s t tow ards th[
com m odification o f everything.
N o r has it been enough to com m odify the social processes,
P ro d u ctio n processes w ere linked to one an o th er in complej
co m m o d ity chains. For exam ple, consider a typical produci
th at has been w idely produced and sold th ro u g h o u t thi
historical experience of capitalism , an item o f clo th in g . To
produce an item o f clo th in g , one typically needs at the verj
least clo th , thread, some kind o f m achinery, and labour
p o w er. But each o f these items in tu rn has to be produced,
A nd the item s that go into their production in tu rn have alsc
to be p ro duced. It was no t inevitable it was n o t even com
m o n th at every subprocess in this com m odity chain was
com m odified. Indeed, as w e shall see, pro fit is often greatei
w h en n o t all links in the chain are in fact com m odified. Whal
is clear is th a t, in such a chain, there is a very large and dispers
ed set o f w o rk ers w h o are receiving som e sort o f remuneration
w h ic h registers on th e balance-sheet as costs. T h e re is also a fai
sm aller, b u t also usually dispersed, set of persons (w h o are fur
th erm o re usually no t united as econom ic partners b u t operate
as distinct econom ic entities), w h o share in som e w ay in the
u ltim ate m a rg in th at exists in the co m m o d ity chain between
th e total costs of p rod u ctio n of the chain and the to tal income
realized by the disposal of the final pro d u ct.
O nce there w ere such com m odity chains lin k in g multiple
production processes, it is clear that the rate of accumulation
for all the capitalists p u t to g eth er becam e a fun ctio n of how
w id e a m arg in co uld be created, in a situation w h e re this mar
gin could fluctuate considerably. T he rate o f accum ulation foi
p articular capitalists, how ever, w as a fun ctio n o f a process o(
17
co m petitio n , w ith h ig h er rew ards going to those w h o had

greater perspicacity o f ju d g e m e n t, greater ability to control
their w ork-force, and greater access to politically-decided co n
straints on particular m ark et operations (k n o w n generically as
m o n o p o lie s).
This created a first elem entary contradiction in the system .

W hile the in terest o f all capitalists, taken as a class, seem ed to
be to reduce all costs o f p ro d u ctio n , these reductions in fact
frequently favoured p articu lar capitalists against others, and
some therefore preferred to increased their share o f a smaller
global m argin rather than accept a sm aller share of a larger
global m argin. F u th erm o re, there was a second fundam ental
contradiction in th e system . As m ore and m ore capital was ac
cum ulated, m o re and m ore processes com m odified, and m ore
and m ore com m odities produced, one of the key requirem ents
to m aintain th e flow w as th at there be m ore and m ore p u r
chasers. H o w ev er, at th e same tim e, efforts to reduce the costs
of production often reduced the flow and d istrib u tio n of
money, and thu s in h ib ited the steady expansion of purchasers,
needed to com plete th e process o f accum ulation. O n the o th er
hand, redistributions o f global p ro fit in w ays th at could have
expanded the n etw o rk o f purchasers often reduced the global
margin of profit. H ence individual entrepreneurs found th e m
selves pushing in one d irectio n for their o w n enterprises (for
example, by reducing th eir o w n labour costs), w hile sim ulta
neously pushing (as m em bers o f a collective class) to increase
the overall n etw o rk o f purchasers (w hich inevitably involved,
for some producers at least, an increase in labour costs).
The econom ics o f capitalism has thus been governed by the
rational in ten t to m ax im ize accum ulation. B ut w h a t w as ra
tional for the en trep ren eu rs w as n o t necessarily rational for the
workers. And even m o re im p o rtan t, w hat was rational for all
18
entrepreneurs as a collective g ro u p w as n o t necessarily ration;)

for any given entrepreneur. It is therefore no t en o u g h to saj
th at everyone w as p u rsu in g th eir o w n in terests. Each person
o w n interests often pushed th em , quite ra tio n a lly , to engag
in co n trad icto ry activities. T he calculation o f real long-teru
interest thereby becam e exceedingly com plex, even if w e ig
nore, at p resen t, the degree to w hich ev ery o n es perception
o f th eir o w n in terests was clouded over and d isto rted b y com
plex ideological veils. For th e m o m en t, I provisionally assunn
th at historical capitalism did in fact breed a homo economicus,
b u t I am adding th at he was alm ost inevitably a b it confused,
T his is ho w ev er one objective co n strain t w h ich limitet
th e confusion. If a given individual co n stan tly m ade errors ii
econom ic ju d g e m e n t, w h e th e r because o f ignorance, fatuity
o r ideological prejudice, this individual (firm ) tended no t t(
survive in the m arket. B ankruptcy has been the harsh cleans
in g fluid o f th e capitalist system , constantly forcing all eco
nom ic actors to keep m ore or less to the w ell-trodden rut
pressuring th em to act in such a w ay th at collectively there hai
been even fu rth er accum ulation o f capital.
H istorical capitalism , is, thus, th at concrete, tim e-bounded
space-bounded in teg rated locus o f productive activities withii
w hich th e endless accum ulation o f capital has been the eco
no m ic objective or la w th at has governed or prevailed in fun
dam ental econom ic activity. It is th at social system in whicl
those w h o have operated by such rules have had such great im
pact on th e w hole as to create conditions w herein the other!
have been forced to conform to the p atterns or to suffer thi.
consequences. It is th at social system in w h ich the scope ol
these rules (the law o f value) has g ro w n ever w id er, the en
forcers o f these rules ever m ore in tran sig en t, the penetratioc
o f these rules in to the social fabric ever g re ater, even whili
19
social opposition to these rules has g ro w n ever louder and

m ore organized.
U sing this description o f w h a t one m eans by historical
capitalism, each o f us can determ ine to w h ich concrete, tim ebounded, space-bounded integrated locus this refers. M y o w n
view is th at the genesis o f this historical system is located in
late-fifteenth-century E urope, th at the system expanded in
space over tim e to cover th e entire globe by the late nineteenth
century, and th at it still to day covers the entire globe. I realize
that such a curso ry delineation o f th e tim e-space boundaries
evokes doubts in m any m inds. These doubts are how ever of
tw o different kinds. F irst, em pirical doubts. W as R ussia in
side or outside the E uropean w orld-econom y in the sixteenth
century? Exactly w h en w as the O tto m a n E m pire incorporated
into the capitalist w orld-system ? C an w e consider a given in
terior zone of a given state at a given tim e as tru ly in te g ra te d
into the capitalist w o rld-econom y? These questions are im p o r
tant, b o th in them selves, and because in attem p tin g to answ er
them w e are forced to m ake m ore precise our analyses of the
processes o f historical capitalism . B ut this is neither the m o
m ent n o r place to address these num erous em pirical queries
th at are under co n tin u in g debate and elaboration.
The second kind o f d o u b t is th at w hich addresses the very
utility o f th e inductive classification I have ju s t suggested.
There are those w h o refuse to accept th at capitalism can ever
be said to exist unless there is a specific form o f social relation
in the w orkplace, th a t o f a private en trepreneur em ploying
wage-labourers. T h ere are those w h o w ish to say th at w h en a
given state has nationalized its industries and proclaim ed its
allegiance to socialist doctrines, it has, b y those acts and as a
result of th eir consequences, ended the participation o f th at
state in th e capitalist w orld-system . These are no t em pirical
20
queries b u t theoretical ones, and w e shall try to address then

in th e course o f this discussion. A ddressing them deductivelj
w o u ld be pointless h o w e v er as it w o u ld lead not to a ration^
debate, b u t m erely to a clash o f o p p o sin g faiths. W e sha|
therefore address them heuristically, arg u in g that o u r induo
tive classification is m ore useful than alternative ones, becaus
it com prehends m o re easily and elegantly w h a t w e collectivel)
k n o w at presen t ab o u t h istorical reality, and because it afford;
us an in terp re tatio n of this reality w hich enables us to ac
m o re efficaciously on the present.
Let us therefore look at how the capitalist system actuallj
has functioned. T o say that a p ro d u c e rs objective is the ao
cu m u latio n o f capital is to say that he w ill seek to produce ai
m uch o f a given good as possible and offer it for sale at thi
highest p ro fit m argin to him . H e w ill do this how ever withii
a series o f econom ic constraints w hich exist, as w e say, in thi
m a rk e t. H is to tal pro d u ctio n is perforce lim ited by the (reli
tively im m ediate) availability o f such things as m aterial inputs,
a w o rk -fo rce, custom ers, and access to cash to expand his in
vestm ent base. T h e am ount he can profitably produce and thi
p rofit m arg in he can claim is also lim ited b y the ability o f hii
c o m p e tito rs to offer the same item at lo w er sales prices; not
in this case com petitors anyw here in the w o rld m ark et, but
those located in the same im m ediate, m o re circum scribed local
m ark ets in w h ich he actually sells (how ever this m arket b(
defined in a given instance). T h e expansion o f his production
w ill also be constrained by the degree to w hich his expanded
p ro d u c tio n w ill create such a price-reducing effect in the
local m arket as to actually reduce the real to tal profit realized
on his total p ro d u ctio n .
T hese are all objective constraints, m eaning they exist in the
absence o f any particular set o f decisions by a given produce
21
or by others active in the m ark et. T hese constraints are the

consequence of the to ta l social process th at exists in a concrete
time and place. T h ere are always in addition of course o th er
constraints, m ore open to m anipulation. G overnm ents m ay
adopt, m ay already have adopted, various rules w hich in som e
way transform econom ic options and therefore the calculus o f
profit. A given p ro ducer m ay be the beneficiary o r the victim
of existing rules. A given producer m ay seek to persuade poli
tical authorities to change their rules in his favour.
H ow have pro d u cers operated so as to m axim ize th eir abili
ty-to accum ulate capital? L abour-pow er has always been a cen
tral and q u an titatively significant elem ent in the productionprocess. T he pro d u cer seeking to accum ulate is concerned
w ith tw o different aspects o f labour-pow er: its availability and
its cost. T h e problem o f availability has usually been posed in
the follow ing m anner: social relations o f p ro d u ctio n th at w ere
fixed (a stable w o rk -fo rce for a given producer) m ight be low cost if the m arket w ere stable and the size o f his w ork-force
optimal for a given tim e. B ut if the m arket for the product
declined, the fact that th e w ork-force w as fixed w ould in
crease its real cost for th e p roducer. A nd should the m arket for
the product increase, th e fact , that the w ork-force w as fixed
w ould m ake it im possible for the producer to take advantage
o f the profit o p p o rtu n ities.
O n th e o th er han d , variable w ork-forces also had disadvant
ages for th e capitalists. V ariable w ork-forced w ere b y defini
tion w ork-forces that w ere not necessarily continuously w o rk
ing for the same pro d u cer. Such w orkers m ust therefore, in
terms of survival, have been concerned w ith their rate o f
rem uneration in term s o f a tim e-span lo n g en o u g h to level out
variations in real incom e. T h a t is, w orkers had to be able to
make enough from th e em ploym ent to cover periods w hen
22
they did not receive rem uneration. C onsequently, variab)

w ork-forces often cost producers m ore per hour p er individuj
than fixed w ork-forces.
W h e n w e have a contradiction, and w e have one here in tli
very heart o f the capitalist p ro d u ctio n process, w e can be sut
th at the result w ill be a historically uneasy com prom ise. Let u
review w h a t in fact happened. In historical systems preceding
historical capitalism , m ost (never all) w ork-forces w ere fixed
In som e cases, the p ro d u c ers w ork-force w as only him self o
his fam ily, hence by definition fixed. In som e cases, a noi
kin-related w ork-force w as bonded to a particular produce
th ro u g h various legal and/ or custom ary regulations (includinj
various form s of slavery, debt bondage, serfdom , permanen
tenancy arrangem ents, etc.). Som etim es the b o n d in g was life
tim e. Som etim es it was for lim ited periods, w ith an option of
renew al; b u t such tim e-lim itation w as only m eaningful j
realistic alternatives existed at the m om ent o f renew al. Nov
the fixity o f these arrangem ents posed problem s n o t only fa
th e particular producers to w h o m a given w ork-force was
bonded. It posed problem s to all o th er producers as w ell, sinct
obviously o th er producers could only expand their activities t
th e ex ten t th at there existed available, non-fixed work-forces,
These considerations form ed the basis, as has so often been
described, o f the rise o f the in stitu tio n o f w age-labour, where
in a g ro u p o f persons existed w h o w ere p erm an en tly available
for em p lo y m en t, m ore or less to the highest bidder. W e refer
to this process as th e operation o f a labour m ark et, and to the
persons w h o sell their labour as proletarians. I do n o t tell you
an y th in g novel to say th at, in historical capitalism , there has
been increasing proletarianization of the w ork-force. The
statem ent is not only not novel; it is not in the least sur
prising. T he advantages to producers o f the process o f pro-
23
'anization have been am ply docum ented. W h a t is surpris,e 3 . n o t th at there has been so m uch proletarianization, b u t
that there has been so little. F our hundred years at least into
the existence o f a historical social system , the am o u n t o f fully
roletarianized lab o u r in the capitalist w orld-econom y today
cannot be said to to tal even fifty per cent.
To be sure this statistic is a function o f h o w you m easure it
and whom you are m easuring. If w e use official governm ent
statistics on the so-called econom ically active labour-force, p ri
marily adult males w h o m ake them selves form ally available for
rem unerated labour, w e m ay find th at th e percentage o f w age
workers is said today to be reasonably high (although even
then, w hen calculated w o rld -w id e, the actual percentage is
smaller than m ost theoretical statem ents presum e). I f how ever
we consider all persons w hose w o rk is incorporated in one
way or another in to the com m odity chains thus em bracing
virtually all adult w o m e n , and a very large p ro p o rtio n o f per
sons at the pre-adult and post-prim e adulthood age range (that
is, the y o u n g and th e o ld) as w ell then o u r percentage o f
proletarians drastically drops.
Let us fu rth erm o re take one additional step before w e do
our m easuring. Is it conceptually useful to .ap p ly the label
proletarian, to an individual? I d o u b t it. U n d er historical
capitalism, as un d er previous historical system s, individuals
have tended to live their lives w ith in the fram ew ork of
relatively stable stru ctu res w hich share a com m on fund o f c u r
rent incom e and accum ulated capital, w hich w e m ay call
households. T he fact th a t the boundaries o f these households
are constantly ch anging by the entries and exits o f individuals
does not m ake these households less the unit o f rational calcu
lation in term s of rem u n eratio n and expenditure. People w ho
wish to survive co u n t all their potential incom e, from no m a t
24
ter w h a t source, and assess it in term s o f the real expenditure;

they m u st m ake. T hey seek m inim ally to survive; then w it|
m o re incom e, to enjoy a life-style w h ich they find satisfying;
and ultim ately, w ith still m ore, to enter the capitalist gam e at
accum ulators o f capital. For all real purposes, it is the house'
hold th at has been the econom ic u n it th at has engaged in these
activities. T h is household has usually been a kin-related unit,
b u t som etim es not o r, at least, not exclusively. T his household has for th e m ost part been co-residential, b u t less so as
com m odification proceeded.
It is in th e co ntext o f such a household stru ctu re that a
social d istin ctio n betw een productive and u n p ro d u ctiv e work
began to be im posed on the w o rk in g classes. D e facto, pro
ductive w o rk came to be defined as m oney-earning work
(prim arily w age-earning w o rk ), and non -p ro d u ctiv e w o rk as
w o rk th a t, albeit very necessary, was m erely subsistence act
ivity and therefore was said to produce no su rp lu s which
anyone else could possibly appropriate. T his w o rk was either
totally non-com m odified o r involved p e tty (but then truly
petty) com m odity production. T he differentiation between
kinds o f w o rk was anchored by creating specific roles attached
to th em . P roductive (w age) labour becam e the task primarily
o f the adult m ale/fa th e r and secondarily o f o th er (younger)
adult m ales in the household. N o n -p ro d u ctiv e (subsistence)
labour becam e the task prim arily o f the adult fem ale/m othei
and secondarily o f o th er females, plus the children and the
elderly. P roductive labour was done outside the household in
the w o rk place. N o n -productive labour w as done inside the
household.
T h e lines o f division w ere not absolute, to be sure, b u t they
becam e u n d er historical capitalism quite clear and com pelling.
Production o f C apital
25
A division o f real labour by gender and age w as n o t o f course

invention o f historical capitalism . It has probably always
e x is te d if only because for som e tasks there are biological pre
requisites and lim itations (of gender, b u t also o f age). N o r was
a hierarchical family a n d /o r household stru ctu re an invention
o f capitalism. T h at too had lo n g existed.
W hat was new u n d er historical capitalism w as the correla
tion of division o f labour and valuation o f w o rk . M en m ay
often have done different w o rk from w o m en (and adults diff
erent w o rk from children and the elderly), bu t u n d er historical
capitalism there has been a steady devaluation o f the w o rk of
wom en (and o f th e y o u n g and old), and a corresponding em
phasis on th e value o f the adult m ales w o rk . W hereas in
other systems m en and w o m en did specified (but norm ally
equal) tasks, u n d er historical capitalism the adult m ale w ageearner was classified as the b re ad w in n er, and the adult female
hom e-w orker as the ho u sew ife. T h u s w hen national sta
tistics began to be com piled, itself a pro d u ct o f a capitalist
system, all breadw inners w ere considered m em bers o f the eco
nomically active labour-force, b u t no housewives w ere. Thus
was sexism in stitu tio n alized . T he legal and paralegal apparatus
o f gender distinction and discrim ination follow ed quite
logically in the wake o f this basic differential valuation of
labour.
W e may note here th a t the concepts o f extended child
hood/adolescence and o f a re tire m e n t from the w ork-force
not linked to illness o r frailty have been also specific con
comitants o f the em erg in g household structures o f historical
capitalism. T hey have o ften been view ed as progressive ex
emptions from w o rk . T h ey m ay how ever be m ore accurately
viewed as redefinitions o f w o rk as n o n -w o rk . Insult has been
26
added to injury by labelling childrens training activities ar,

th e m iscellaneous tasks o f retired adults as som ehow fun
and the devaluation o f their w o rk con trib u tio n s as th e reasot
able co u n terp art o f their release from the d ru d g e ry o f red"
w o rk .
As an ideology, these distinctions helped ensure th at t!
com m odification o f labour was extensive bu t at the same tin
lim ited. For exam ple, if w e w ere to calculate h o w mac
households in the w orld-econom y have obtained m ore th;
fifty per cent o f their real incom e (or to tal revenue in j
form s) from w ag e-w o rk outside the household, I th in k \\
w ould be quickly am azed by the low ness o f the percentagi
this is th e case not only in earlier centuries b u t even todaj
alth o u g h th e percentage has probably been steadily growin
over th e historical developm ent o f the capitalist world
econom y.
H o w can w e account for this? I d o n t th in k i t s very difl
icult. O n th e assum ption th at a producer em ploying wagt
labour w o u ld prefer to pay less rath er th an m o re, always anf
everyw here, th e low ness o f the level at w h ich wage-worket
could afford to accept em ploym ent has been a function o f tt
kind o f households in w hich the w age-w orkers have bea
located th ro u g h o u t their life-spans. P ut very sim ply, for ideti
tical w o rk at identical levels o f efficiency, the wage-worke
located in a household w ith a hig h percentage o f w age incom
(let us call this a proletarian household) had had a highe
m o n etary threshold below w hich he w o u ld have found t
m anifestly irrational for him to do w age w o rk th an a wage
w o rk e r located in a household th at has a lo w percentage o
w age incom e (let us call this a sem i-proletarian household).
T he reason for this difference o f w h a t w e m ig h t call thi
m inim um -acceptable-w age threshold has to do w ith the eco
21
nobles f survival. W h e re a proletarian household depended

arily upon w age-incom e, then that had to cover the m inimal costs o f survival and reproduction. H o w ev er, w h en wages
fo r m e d a less im p o rtan t segm ent o f to tal household incom e, it
w o u ld o f t e n be rational for an individual to accept em ploy
ment at a rate o f re m u n eratio n w hich co n trib u ted less than its
p r o p o r tio n a t e share (in term s o f hours w o rk ed ) o f real inc o rtie_ - w h i l s t
nevertheless resulting in th e earning o f
n e c e ssa ry liquid cash (the necessity frequently b ein g legally im
p o se d ) or else involved the su b stitu tio n o f this w ageremunerated w o rk for labour in still less rem unerative tasks.
W hat happened th en in such sem i-proletarian households is
that those w h o w ere p ro d u cing o th er form s o f real incom e
that is, basically household pro d u ctio n for self-consum ption,
or sale in a local m ark et, or o f course b o th w h e th e r these
were other persons in th e household (of any sex o r age) or the
same person at o th er m om ents o f his life-span, w ere creating
surpluses w hich low ered the m inim um -acceptable-wage thres
hold. In this w ay, no n -w age w o rk p erm itted some producers
to rem unerate th eir w o rk -force at low er rates, thereby reduc
ing their cost o f p ro d u ctio n and increasing their profit
margins. N o w o n d er th en , as a general rule, th at any
employer o f w ag e-labour w o u ld prefer to have his w a g e
workers located in sem i-proletarian rath er than in proletarian
households. If w e n o w look at global em pirical reality
throughout the time-space o f historical capitalism , w e sudden
ly discover th at the location o f w age-w orkers in sem i-pro
letarian rath er th an in proletarian households has been the sta
tistical n o rm . Intellectually, o u r problem suddenly gets tu rn ed
upside d o w n . F rom explaining the reasons for th e existence o f
proletarianization, w e have m oved to explaining w h y th e p ro
cess was so incom plete. W e n o w have to go even fu rth e r
28
w h y has proletarianization proceeded at all?

Let m e say im m ediately th at it is very d o u b tfu l th at increa!
in g w o rld proletarianization can be a ttrib u te d p rim arily to til
socio-political pressures o f entrepreneurial strata. Q u ite tlf
co n trary . It w ould seem they have had m any m otives to draj
th eir feet. First o f all, as w e have ju s t argued, the transform^
tion o f a significant num ber o f sem i-proletarian households igl
to proletarian households in a given zone tended to raise tli(
real m inim um -w age-level, paid by the em ployers o f wagf
labour. Secondly, increased proletarianizatio n had politic!
consequences, as w e shall discuss later, w hich w ere bot|
negative for th e em ployers and also cum ulative, thereby even:
tually increasing still fu rth er the levels o f w age-paym ents I
given geographico-econom ic zones. Indeed, so m uch werj
em ployers o f w age-labour unenthusiastic about proletarianiza
tion th a t, in addition to fostering the g en d e r/ag e division o|
lab o u r, they also encouraged, in th eir em ploym ent pattern!,
and th ro u g h th eir influence in the political arena, recognition
o f defined eth n ic g ro u p s, seeking to link them to specific alloi
cated roles in the labour-force, w ith different levels o f real;
rem uneration for their w o rk . E thnicity created a cultural crusl
w hich consolidated the p atterns o f sem i-proletarian household
structures. T h at the em ergence o f such ethnicity also played)
politically-divisive role for the w o rk in g classes has been i
political bonus for the em ployers b u t n o t, I th in k , the prime
m over in this process.
Before how ever w e can understand h o w th e re has com e to
be any increase at all in proletarianization over tim e in
historical capitalism , w e have to re tu rn to the issue o f the
co m m o d ity chains in w hich the m u ltip le specific production
activities are located. W e m u st rid ourselves o f the simplistic
29
- th at the m a rk e t is a place w here initial producer and

ultim ate consum er m eet. N o d o u b t there are and alw ays have
U n such m arket-places. B ut in historical capitalism , such
arket-place transactions have co n stitu ted a small percentage
o f the w hole. M ost transactions have involved exchange b e
tween tw o interm ediate producers located on a lo n g com
m odity chain. T h e purchaser w as purchasing an in p u t for his
production process. T h e seller was selling a sem i-finished p ro
d u ct s e m i- f in is h e d th at is in term s o f its u ltim ate use in
direct individual co n su m p tion.
The struggle over price in these interm ediate m a rk e ts
represented an effort by th e buyer to w rest from the seller a
proportion o f th e p ro fit realized from all p rio r labour processes
throughout the co m m o d ity chain. T his stru g g le to be sure
was determ ined at particu lar space-tim e nexuses by supply and
demand, b u t never u n iquely. In the first place, o f course, sup
ply and dem and can be m anipulated th ro u g h m onopolistic
constraints, w hich have been com m onplace rath er than excep
tional. Secondly, th e seller can affect the price at the nexus
through vertical in teg ra tio n . W henever the seller and the
buyer were in fact u ltim ately the same firm , the price could
be arbitrarily ju g g led in term s o f fiscal and o th er considera
tions, but such a price never represented the interplay o f sup
ply and dem and. V ertical in teg ra tio n , ju s t like the h o riz o n
tal m onopoly, has n o t been rare. W e are o f course fam iliar
with its m ost spectacular instances: the chartered com panies o f
the sixteenth to eig h teen th centuries, the g re at m erchant
houses o f the n in eteen th , th e transnational corporations o f the
tw entieth. T hese w ere global structures seeking to encom pass
as many links in a p articu lar co m m o d ity chain as possible. B ut
smaller instances o f vertical in teg ra tio n , covering only a few
30
(even tw o ) links in a chain, have been even m ore widesprea;

It seems reasonable to argue th at vertical in teg ra tio n has bee
th e statistical n o rm o f historical capitalism rath er than thq
m a rk e t nexuses in com m odity chains in w hich seller an
buyer w ere tru ly distinct and antagonistic.
N o w co m m o d ity chains have n o t been random in th eir ge;
graphical directions. W e re they all p lo tte d on m aps, \j
w o u ld notice th at they have been centripetal in form . The
points o f origin have been m anifold, but th eir points o f des!
n ation have tended to converge in a few areas. T h a t is to saj
they have tended to m ove from th e peripheries o f the capital):
w o rld-econom y to the centres o r cores. It is hard to contei
this as an em pirical observation. T he real question is w hy tlii
has been so. T o talk o f co m m o d ity chains m eans to talk of j
exten d ed social division o f labour w h ic h , in the course t
capitalism s historical developm ent, has becom e m o re an
m o re functionally and geographically extensive, and simull
aneously m o re and m ore hierarchical. T his hierarchization ?
space in th e stru ctu re of productive processes has led to an eve
g reater p olarization betw een the core and peripheral zonest
th e w orld -eco n o m y, no t only in term s o f d istributive criteii
(real incom e levels, quality o f life) b u t even m ore important!
in th e loci o f the accum ulation o f capital.
Initially, as this process began, the spatial differentials wei
rath er sm all, and the degree o f spatial specialization limits)
W ith in th e capitalist system , how ever, w h atev er differential
existed (w h eth er for ecological or historical reasons) w ere a
aggerated, reinforced, and encrusted. W h a t w as crucial in thi
process was the intrusion o f force into the determ ination t
price. T o be sure, the use o f force by one p arty in a marke
transaction in order to im prove his price was no in v e n tio n
31
. U nequal exchange is an ancient practice. W h a t

was rem arkable ab out capitalism as a historical system was the
way in w hich this unequal exchange could be hidden; indeed,
hidden so w ell th a t it is only after five h u n d red years o f the
o p e r a tio n o f this m echanism th at even the avow ed opponents
of the system h av e b eg u n to unveil it system atically.
The k ey to hid in g th is central m echanism lay in th e very
structure o f th e capitalist w orld-econom y, th e seem ing sepa
ration in the capitalist w o rld-system o f the econom ic arena (a
world-wide social division o f lab o u r w ith in teg ra te d p ro d u c
tion processes all o p eratin g for the endless accum ulation o f
capital) and th e political arena (consisting ostensibly o f sepa
rate sovereign states, each w ith au to n o m o u s responsibility for
political decisions w ith in its ju risd ic tio n , and each disposing o f
armed forces to su stain its au th o rity ). In th e real w o rld o f
historical capitalism , alm ost all co m m o d ity chains o f any
importance have traversed these state frontiers. T his is no t a
recent innovation. It has been tru e from the very begin n in g o f
historical capitalism . M oreover, the transnationality o f c o m
modity chains is as descriptively tru e o f th e six teenth-century
capitalist w o rld as o f th e tw en tieth -c en tu ry .
How did this unequal exchange w o rk ? S tarting w ith any
real differential in th e m ark et, o ccu rrin g because of either the
(temporary) scarcity o f a com plex p ro d u c tio n process, or ar
tificial scarcities created manu militari, com m odities m oved b e
tween zones in such a w ay th at the area w ith th e less scarce
item sold its item s to th e o th e r area at a price th a t incarnated
more real in p u t (cost) th an an equally-priced item m ov in g in
the opposite d irectio n . W h a t really happened is th at there w as
a transfer o f part o f th e to ta l profit (or surplus) being produced
from one zone to an o th er. Such a relationship is th a t o f core
ita lis m
32
ness-peripherality. By extension, w e can call the losing zone:

p erip h ery and the gaining zone a co re. These names in faq
reflect th e geographical stru ctu re o f the econom ic flow s.
W e find im m ediately several m echanism s th at historically
have increased the disparity. W henever a vertical integration
o f any tw o links on a com m odity chain occurred, it was possi
ble to shift an even larger segm ent o f the total surplus toward;
th e core th an had previously been possible. Also, th e shift o;
surplus tow ards th e core concentrated capital there and madf
available d isp ro p o rtio n ate funds for fu rth e r mechanization;)
b o th allow ing producers in core zones to gain additional com
petitiv e advantages in existing p roducts and p e rm ittin g them
to create ever new rare products w ith w h ich to renew the
process.
T he co n cen tration o f capital in core zones created b o th the
fiscal base and the political m o tiv a tio n to create relatively
stro n g state-m achineries, am ong w hose m any capacities was
th at o f en su rin g th at th e state m achineries o f peripheral zones
becam e o r rem ained relatively w eaker. T h ey could therebj
pressure these state-structures to accept, even promote^
g reater specialization in their ju risd ictio n in tasks lo w er down
th e hierarchy o f com m odity chains, u tilizin g lower-paid
w o rk -fo rces and creating (reinforcing) th e relevant household
stru ctu res to perm it such w ork-forces to survive. Thus did
historical capitalism actually create the so-called historical
levels o f w ages w hich have becom e so dram atically divergent
in different zones o f the w orld-system .
W e say this process is hidden. By th at w e m ean th at actual
prices always seemed to be negotiated in a w o rld m ark et on
th e basis o f im personal econom ic forces. T h e enorm ous ap
paratus o f latent force (openly used sporadically in w ars and
33
Ionization) has n o t had to be invoked in each separate tra n

saction to ensure th at th e exchange was unequal. R a th e r, the
aratus o f force came in to play only w h en there w ere signi
ficant challenges to an existing level o f unequal exchange.
O nce the acute political conflict w as past, the w o rld s en tre
preneurial classes could p reten d th at the econom y w as o p erat
ing solely by considerations of supply and dem and, w ith o u t
a c k n o w l e d g i n g h o w th e w orld-econom y had historically ar
rived at a particular p oint o f supply and dem and, and w h a t
structures o f force w ere sustaining at th at very m o m en t the
custom ary differentials in levels o f w ages and o f the real
quality o f life o f th e w o rld s w ork-forces.
W e may n o w re tu rn to the question o f w h y there has been
a n y proletarianization at all. Let us rem em ber th e fundam ental
c o n tr a d ic t io n b etw een th e individual interest o f each e n t r e
preneur and the collective interest o f all capitalist classes. U n
equal exchange b y d efin ition served these collective interests
but not m any individual interests. It follow s th at those w hose
interests w ere n o t im m ediately served at any given tim e (be
cause they gained less th an th eir com petitors) co nstantly tried
to alter th in g s in th eir favour. T hey tried , th at is, to com pete
m ore successfully in th e m ark et, either b y m aking their o w n
production m ore efficient, o r by using political influence to
create a new m onopolistic advantage for them selves.
Acute com petition am o n g capitalists has always been one o f
the differentia specijica o f historical capitalism . Even w h en it
seemed to be v o lu n tarily restrained (by cartel-like arrange
m ents), this was p rim arily because each co m p etito r th o u g h t
that such restraint o p tim ized his o w n m argins. In a system
predicated on th e endless accum ulation o f capital, no partici
pant could afford to d ro p this en d u rin g th ru st tow ards long-
34
ru n pro fitab ility except at the risk o f self-destruction.

T h u s m onopolistic practice and com petitive m otivatij
have been a paired reality o f historical capitalism . In such c j f
cum stances, it is evident th at no specific p attern linking t\
p ro ductive processes could be stable. Q u ite the contrary; j
w o u ld always be in th e interests o f a large n u m b er o f con
p eting en trepreneurs to try to alter the specific pattern t
given tim e-places w ith o u t sh o rt-term concern for the glofe,
im pact o f such behaviour. A dam S m ith s unseen h a n d uj
questionably operated, in the sense th at the m a rk e t set c0<
straints on individual behaviour, b u t it w o u ld be a vef
curious read in g o f historical capitalism th at suggested that tj
o u tco m e has been harm ony.
R a th e r, th e outcom e has seemed, once again as an empirici
observation, to be an altern atin g cycle o f expansions a
stagnations in the system as a w hole. T hese cycles have involi
ed fluctuations o f such significance and reg u larity th a t it i
hard n o t to believe th at th ey are intrinsic to the w orkings o
th e system . T h ey seem, if the analogy be p erm itted , to be t |
b reath in g m echanism o f the capitalist organism , inhaling ti
p u rify in g oxygen and exhaling poisonous w aste. A nalogies at
always dangerous b u t this one seems particularly apt. Tli
w astes th a t accum ulated w ere th e econom ic inefficiencies tha
re cu rre n tly g o t politically encrusted th ro u g h th e process c
unequal exchange described above. T h e purifying oxygen wa
th e m ore efficient allocation o f resources (m ore efficient i
term s o f p e rm ittin g fu rth e r accum ulation o f capital) w hich tl
regular re stru ctu rin g o f the co m m o d ity chains perm itted.
W h a t seems to have happened every fifty years o r so is tha
in the efforts o f m ore and m ore entrepreneurs to gain fo;
them selves th e m ore profitable nexuses o f co m m o d ity chains
35
.. ot)0rtions o f in v estm ent occurred such th a t w e speak,

somewhat m isleadingly, o f o verproduction. T h e only solution
these disproportions has been a shakedow n o f the p roduc
tive system, resu ltin g in a m ore even d istrib u tio n . T his sounds
1
-cai and sim ple, b u t its fall-out has always been m assive. It
has meant each tim e fu rth e r co n c en tratio n o f operations in
those links in th e c o m m o d ity chains w hich have been m ost
dogged. T his has involved th e elim ination o f b o th som e
entrepreneurs and som e w o rkers (those w h o w o rk e d for en tre
preneurs w h o w e n t o u t o f business and also those w h o w o rk
ed for others w h o fu rth e r m echanized in order to reduce the
costs o f u n it p ro d u c tio n ). Such a shift also enabled e n tre
preneurs to d em o te operations in th e hierarchy o f the com
modity chain, th ereb y enabling them to devote investm ent
funds and effort to innovative links in the co m m o d ity chains
which, because initially offering scarcer in p u ts, w ere m ore
profitable. D e m o tio n o f particular processes o n th e h ie r
archical scale also o ften led to geographical relocation in p art.
Such geographical relocation found a m ajor attra ctio n in the
move to a low er labour-cost area, th o u g h from the p oint o f
view of th e area in to w h ich th e in d u stry has m oved the new
industry usually involved an increase in th e w age-level for
some segm ents o f th e w ork-force. W e are living th ro u g h pre
cisely such a m assive w o rld -w id e relocation rig h t n o w o f the
worlds autom obile, steel, and electronics industries. T his
phenomenon o f relocation has been part and parcel o f
historical capitalism from th e o u tset.
There have been th ree m ajor consequences o f these re
shuffles. O n e is the co n stan t geographical re stru ctu rin g itself
of the capitalist w o rld -sy stem . N onetheless, alth o u g h com
m odity chains have been significantly restru ctu red every fifty
36
years or so, a system o f hierarchically-organized commodity:

chains has been retained. P articular pro d u ctio n processes havef
m oved d o w n the hierarchy, as new ones are inserted at the
to p . A n d particular geographic zones have housed ever-shift-I
in g hierarchical levels o f processes. T h u s, given products have
had p ro d u ct cycles, startin g off as core products and even-!
tually b ecom ing peripheral products. F u rth erm o re , given loci!
have m oved up or d o w n , in term s o f com parative well-being
o f th eir in h ab itan ts. B ut to call such reshuffles developm ent
w e w o u ld first have to d em onstrate a reduction o f th e global
p o larizatio n of the system . Em pirically, this sim ply does not5
seem to have happened; rather p olarization has historically in
creased. These geographical and p ro d u ct relocations th en may
be said to have been tru ly cyclical.
H o w ev er, there was a second, quite different consequence
o f the reshufflings. O u r m isleading w o rd , o v erp ro d u ctio n
does call atten tio n to the fact th at the im m ediate dilem m a has!
always operated th ro u g h the absence o f sufficient w orldw ider
effective dem and for som e key products o f the system . It is in;.
this situ atio n th at the interests o f the w ork-forces coincided
w ith th e interests o f a m in o rity o f entrepreneurs. W ork-forces
have always so u g h t to increase their share o f the surplus, and;
m om ents o f econom ic b reak d o w n of the system have often,
provided b o th extra im m ediate incentive and som e ex tra;
o p p o rtu n ity to pursue th eir class struggles. O n e o f the most;
effective and im m ediate ways for w ork-forces to increase real
incom e has been the further com m odification o f their own;
labour. T h ey have often sought to su b stitu te w age-labour for.
those parts o f the household p ro d u c tio n processes w h ich have1
b ro u g h t in lo w am o u n ts o f real incom e, in particu lar fori
various kinds o f p etty co m m o d ity p ro d u c tio n . O n e o f the m a
jo r forces behind proletarianization has been the w o rld s ;
w ork-forces them selves. T h ey have u n d erstood, often b e tte r ,
31
than their self-proclaim ed intellectual spokesm en, h o w m uch

ter the ex p lo itatio n is in sem i-proletarian than in m ore
fully*proletarianized households.
It is at m om ents o f stagnation th at som e ow ner-producers,
in part responding to political pressure from the w ork-forces,
in part believing th at stru ctu ral changes in the relations o f p ro
duction w o u ld benefit th em vis-a-vis com peting o w n e r p ro
ducers, have jo in e d forces, b o th in the p ro d u c tio n and political
arenas, to push for th e fu rth e r p ro letarianization o f a lim ited
segment o f the w ork -fo rce, som ew here. It is this process
which gives us th e m ajor clue as to w h y there has been any in
crease in p ro letarian izatio n at all, given th at proletarianization
has in the long term led to reduced p ro fit levels in the capital
ist w orld-econom y.
It is in this co n tex t th a t w e should consider th e process o f
technological change w hich has been less the m o to r than the
consequence o f historical capitalism . Each m ajor technological
innovation has been prim arily the creation o f new scarce
products, as such h ig h ly profitable, and secondarily o f labourreducing processes. T h e y w ere responses to the d o w n tu rn s in
the cycles, w ays o f ap p ro priating th e in v en tio n s to fu rth e r
the process o f capital accum ulation. These innovations no
doubt frequently affected th e actual organization of p ro d u c
tion. T h ey pushed historically tow ards the centralization o f
many w o rk processes (the factory, the assem bly line). B u t it is
easy to exaggerate h o w m u ch ch ange there has been. Processes
of concentration o f physical p ro d u c tio n tasks have frequently
been investigated w ith o u t regard to co u n teractin g decen
tralization processes.
This is especially tru e if w e p u t in to the picture the th ird
consequence o f th e cyclical reshuffling. N o tice th a t, given the
two consequences already m entioned, w e have a seem ing p ara
dox to ex p lain. O n th e one hand, w e spoke o f the continuous
38
co n c en tratio n o f capital accum ulation in historical polarization

o f d istrib u tio n . Sim ultaneously, h ow ever, w e spoke o f a slow,
b u t nonetheless steady, process o f proletarianization w hich,
w e argued, actually has reduced profit levels. O n e easy resolu
tio n w o u ld be to say the first process is sim ply greater than the
second, w h ich is tru e. B ut in addition th e decrease in profit
levels occasioned by increased proletarianization has h ith erto
been m o re th an com pensated by a fu rth er m echanism m oving
in th e op p o site direction.
A n o th e r easy em pirical observation to m ake about historical
capitalism is th a t its geographical situs has g ro w n steadily
larger over tim e. O nce again, the pace o f the process offers the
best clue to its explanation. T h e in corporation o f n ew zones
in to th e social division o f lab o u r o f historical capitalism did
n o t occur all at once. It in fact occurred in periodic spurts,
alth o u g h each successive expansion seemed to be lim ited in
scope. U n d o u b ted ly part o f the explanation lies in the very
technological developm ent o f historical capitalism itself.
Im p ro v em en ts in tran sp o rt, com m unications, and arm am ents
m ade it steadily less expensive to incorporate regions fu rth er
and fu rth e r from th e core zones. B ut this explanation at best
gives us a necessary b u t n o t sufficient co n d itio n for the
process.
I t has som etim es been asserted th at th e explanation lies in
th e co n stan t search for n ew m arkets in w hich to realize the
profits o f capitalist production. T his explanation how ever
sim ply does n o t accord w ith the historical facts. Areas external
to historical capitalism have on the w hole been relu ctan t p u r
chasers o f its p ro d u cts, in part because they d id n t n eed them
in term s o f their ow n econom ic system and in part because
they o ften lacked the relevant w h erew ith al to purchase them .
T o be sure there w ere exceptions. B ut by and large it was the
39
capitalist w o rld th at sought o u t the products o f the external

arena and n o t the o th er w ay around. W h e n ev er particular loci
w ere m ilitarily conquered, capitalist entrepreneurs regularly
complained o f th e absence o f real m arkets there and operated
th rough colonial governm ents to create tastes.
T he search for m arkets as an explanation sim ply does n o t
hold. A m uch m o re plausible explanation is the search for
low -cost labour forces. It is historically the case th at virtually
every new zone in corporated in to the w orld-econom y estab
lished levels o f real re m u n eratio n w hich w ere at th e b o tto m o f
the w o rld -sy stem s hierarchy o f w age-levels. T h ey had v ir
tually no fully p ro letarian households and w ere n o t at all en
couraged to develop th e m . O n the co n trary , th e policies o f the
colonial states (and o f the re stru ctu red sem i-colonial states in
those in co rp o rated zones th a t w e re n o t form ally colonized)
seemed designed precisely to p ro m o te the em ergence o f the
very sem i-proletarian household w hich, as w e have seen, m ade
possible the low est possible w age-level threshold. Typical state
policies involved co m bining tax atio n m echanism s, w hich
forced every h o usehold to engage in som e w age-labour, w ith
restrictions on m o v em ent or forced separation o f household
m em bers, w h ich reduced considerably the possibility o f full
proletarianization.
If w e add to this analysis the observation th at n ew incor
porations in to th e w orld-system o f capitalism tended to co r
relate w ith phases o f stagnation in the w orld-econom y, it
becomes clear th at geographical expansion o f the w orldsystem served to counterbalance the profit-reducing process o f
increased p ro letarianization, by in corporating new w o rk
forces destined to be sem i-proletarianized. T h e seem ing
paradox has disappeared. T h e im pact o f p ro letarianization on
the process o f p o larization has been m atched, perhaps m ore
40
th an m atched, at least h ith e rto , by the im pact o f incorpora

tions. A nd factory-like w o rk processes as a percentage o f the
w h o le have expanded less than is usually asserted, given the
steadily expanding denom inator o f th e equation.
W e have spent m uch tim e on delineating h o w historical
capitalism has operated in the narrow ly econom ic arena. W e
are n o w ready to explain w h y capitalism em erged as a h isto r
ical social system . T his is n o t as easy as is o ften th o u g h t. O n
th e face of it, far from being a n atu ra l system , as som e apol
ogists have tried to argue, historical capitalism is a p aten tly ab
surd o ne. O n e accum ulates capital in order to accum ulate
m ore capital. C apitalists are like w h ite m ice o n a treadm ill,
ru n n in g ever faster in order to ru n still faster. In the process,
no d o u b t, some people live w ell, b u t others live m iserably;
and h o w w ell, and for h o w lo n g , do those w h o live w ell live?
T h e m ore I have reflected upon it the m o re absurd it has
seemed to m e. N o t o n ly do I believe th at the vast m ajo rity of
the p opulations o f the w orld are objectively and subjectively
less w ell-o ff m aterially than in previous historical system s b u t,
as w e shall see, I th in k it can be argued that th ey have been
politically less w ell off also. So im bued are w e all by the selfju stify in g ideology o f progress w h ich this historical system has
fashioned, th at w e fin d it difficult even to recognize the vast
historical negatives o f this system . Even so stalw art a d e
nouncer of historical capitalism as K arl M arx laid great em
phasis on its historically progressive role. I do n o t believe this
at all, unless b y progressive one sim ply m eans th a t w hich is
historically later and w hose origins can be explained b y som e
th in g th at preceded it. T h e balance-sheet o f historical capital
ism , to w h ich I shall re tu rn , is perhaps com plex, b u t the in
itial calculus in term s o f m aterial d istrib u tio n o f goods and
allocation o f energies is in m y view very negative indeed.
If this is so, w h y did such a system arise? Perhaps, precisely
41
to achieve this end. W h a t could be m o re plausible than a line

of reasoning w h ich argues that the explanation o f the origin o f
a sv s te m was to achieve an end that has in fact been achieved? I
know that m odern science has turned us from the search for
final causes and from all considerations o f intentionality
(especially since they are so inherently difficult to dem onstrate
e m p ir ic a lly ) . But m odern science and historical capitalism have
been in close alliance as w e k n o w ; thus, w e m ust suspect the
a u t h o r i t y o f science on precisely this question: the m odality o f
know ing th e origins o f m odern capitalism . Let m e therefore
simply o u tlin e a historical explanation o f the origins o f
historical capitalism w ith o u t attem p tin g to develop here the
e m p ir ic a l base for such an argum ent.
In the w o rld o f the fo u rteen th and fifteenth centuries,
Europe was the locus o f a social division o f labour w h ich , in
com parison w ith o th e r areas o f the w o rld , w as, in term s o f th e
forces o f p ro d u c tio n , th e cohesion o f its historical system , and
its relative state o f h u m an know ledge, an in-betw een zone
neither as advanced as som e areas nor as prim itive as others.
M arco P o lo , w e m ust rem em ber, com ing fro m one o f the
m ost culturally and econom ically advanced subregions o f
Europe, w as quite overw helm ed w ith w h a t he encountered on
his Asian voyages.
The econom ic arena o f feudal Europe was go in g th ro u g h a
very fu n d am ental, in ternally generated, crisis in this period
that was shaking its social foundations. Its ruling classes w ere
d estroying each o th er at a great rate, w hile its land-system
(the basis o f its econom ic structure) was com ing loose, w ith
considerable reo rg an izatio n m oving in the direction o f a far
m ore egalitarian d istrib u tio n than had been the no rm . F u r
therm ore, small peasant farm ers w ere dem o n stratin g great ef
ficiency as producers. T h e political structures w ere in general
g ettin g w eak er and their preoccupation w ith the internecine
42
struggles o f the politically pow erful m eant that little tim e was
left for repressing th e g ro w in g stren g th o f the masses o f the
po p ulation. T h e ideological cem ent of C atholicism was under
great strain and egalitarian m ovem ents w ere being b o rn in the
v ery bosom o f the C h u rc h . T h in g s w ere indeed falling apart.
H ad E urope co n tin u ed on the path along w hich it w as go in g ,
it is difficult to believe th at the patterns o f m edieval feudal
E urope w ith its highly structured system o f orders could
have been reconsolidated. Far m ore probable is that the E u ro
pean feudal social stru ctu re w ould have evolved tow ards a
system o f relatively equal small-scale producers, fu rth er flat
ten in g o u t th e aristocracies and decentralizing th e political
structures.
W h e th e r this w o u ld have been g o o d or bad, and for w h o m ,
is a m atter o f speculation and o f little interest. B ut it is clear
that the prospect m u st have appalled E uropes upper strata
appalled and frig h ten ed th em , especially as they felt their
ideological a rm o u r w as d isintegrating too. W ith o u t su g
g e stin g th a t anyone consciously verbalized any such a tte m p t,
w e can see by com paring the Europe o f 1650 w ith 1450 th at
th e fo llo w in g th in g s had occurred. By 1650, the basic stru c
tures o f historical capitalism as a viable social system had been
established and consolidated. T h e trend tow ards egalitarianization o f re w ard had been drastically reversed. T he upper
strata w ere once again in firm control politically and ideo
logically. T h e re was a reasonably h ig h level o f c o n tin u ity b e
tw een the families th at had been h ig h strata in 1450 and those
th at w ere h ig h strata in 1650. F u rth erm o re , if one substituted
1900 for 1650, one. w o u ld find th at m ost o f the com parisons
w ith 1450 still hold tru e. It is o n ly in the tw e n tie th century
th at there are some significant trends in a different direction, a
sign as w e shall see that the historical system o f capitalism has,
43
after four to five h u n d red years o f flourishing, finally com e in

to stru ctu ral crisis.
N o one m ay have verbalized the in te n t, b u t it certainly
seems to have been the case th at the creation o f historical
capitalism as a social system dram atically reversed a trend th at
the upper strata feared, and established in its place o n e th at
served th e ir interests even b etter. Is th at so absurd? O n ly to
those w h o w ere its victim s.
2.
The Politics
o f Accumulation:
Struggle for Benefits
The endless accum ulation o f capital for its o w n sake m ay seem

prima facie to be a socially absurd objective. It has had how ever
its defenders, w h o usually justified it by the lo n g -term social
benefits in w h ich it purported to result. W e shall discuss later
the degree to w h ich these social benefits are real. Q u ite aside
how ever from any collective benefits it is clear th at the am as
sing o f capital affords the o p p o rtu n ity and the occasion for
much increased con su m p tio n by m any individuals (a n d /o r
small g roups). W h e th e r increased consum ption actually im
proves th e quality o f life o f the consum ers is an o th er question
and one w e shall also postpone.
The first question w e shall address is: w h o gets the im
m ediate individual benefits? It seems reasonable to assert th at
m ost people have n o t w aited u p o n evaluations o f long-term
benefits o r th e quality o f life resulting from such consum ption
(either for th e collectivity o r for the individuals) to decide th at
it is w o rth w h ile to stru g g le for the im m ediate individual
benefits th at w ere so obviously available. Indeed this has been
the central focus o f political struggle w ith in historical capital
ism. T his is in fact w h a t w e m ean w h e n w e say th at historical
capitalism is a m aterialist civilization.
In m aterial term s, n o t only have the rew ards been great to
those w h o have com e o u t ahead, b u t the differentials in
m aterial rew ards b etw een the to p and the b o tto m have been
48
g re at an d g ro w in g g reater o v er tim e in the w orld-system

taken as a w hole. W e have already discussed th e econom ic
processes th at accounted for this p olarization o f distrib u tio n o f
rew ard . W e should n ow tu rn o u r atten tio n to h o w people
have m anoeuvred w ith in such an econom ic system to get the
advantages fo r them selves and thereby deny them to others.
W e should also look at h o w those w h o w ere th e victim s of
such m ald istrib u tio n m anoeuvred, first o f all to m inim ize
th eir losses in the o p eration o f the system , and secondly to
tran sfo rm this system w hich was responsible for such m anifest
injustices.
H o w in historical capitalism did people, g ro u p s o f people,
conduct th eir political struggles? Politics is about changing
p o w e r relations in a direction m ore favourable to o n e s in
terests and thereby redirecting social processes. Its successful
p u rsu it requires finding levers o f change that p erm it th e m ost
advantage for the least in p u t. T he stru ctu re o f historical
capitalism has been such that the m ost effective levers of
political ad ju stm en t w ere the state-structures, w hose very
co n stru c tio n was itself, as w e have seen, one o f the central in
stitu tio n al achievem ents o f historical capitalism . It is th u s no
accident that the co n tro l o f state pow er, the conquest o f state
p o w e r if necessary, has been th e central strategic objective of
all the m ajor actors in the political arena th ro u g h o u t the
histo ry o f m odern capitalism .
T he crucial im p o rtance o f state p o w er for econom ic p ro
cesses, even if defined very n arrow ly is strik in g the m om ent
one looks closely at h o w the system actually operated. T he
first and m ost elem entary element o f state p o w e r w as ter
rito rial ju risd ictio n . States had boundaries. These boundaries
were ju rid ically d eterm ined, p artly by statutory proclam ation
Struggle fo r Benefits
49
on the part o f the state in question, partly by diplom atic

recognition on the part o f o th e r states. T o be sure, boundaries
could be, and regularly w ere, contested; th at is, th e juridical
recognitions com ing fro m the tw o sources (the state itself and
other states) w ere conflicting. Such differences w ere u ltim ate
ly resolved eith er b y adjudication o r b y force (and a resulting
eventual acquiescence). M any disputes endured a latent form
for very lo n g periods, th o u g h very few such disputes survived
m ore th an a g eneration. W h a t is crucial was th e continuing
ideological p resu m p tio n o n everyones part th at such disputes
could and w o u ld be resolved eventually. W h a t was concep
tually im perm issible in the m odern state-system w as an ex
plicit reco g n itio n o f p erm an en t overlapping jurisdictions.
Sovereignty as a concept w as based on the A ristotelian law of
the excluded m iddle.
T his philosophical-juridical doctrine m ade it possible to fix
responsibility for th e co n tro l o f m ovem ent across frontiers, in
and out o f given states. Each state had form al jurisdiction over
its o w n frontiers o f the m ovem ent o f goods, m oney-capital,
and lab o u r-p o w er. H ence each state could affect to som e
degree the m odalities b y w h ich the social division o f labour of
the capitalist w o rld -econom y operated. F u rth erm o re, each
state could constan tly adjust these m echanism s sim ply by
changing th e rules g o verning the flow o f the factors o f p ro
duction across its o w n frontiers.
W e norm ally discuss such frontier co n tro ls in term s o f the
antinom y b etw een to ta l absence o f controls (free trade) and
total absence o f free m ovem ent (autarky). In fact, fo r m ost
countries and for m ost m o m ents o f tim e, state policy has lain
in practice betw een these tw o extrem es. F u rth erm o re, the
policies have been quite specifically different for the m ovem ent
50
o f goods, o f m oney-capital, and o f lab o u r-p o w er. In general,

th e m o vem ent o f labour-pow er has been m ore restricted than
th e m o v em en t o f goods and o f m oney-capital.
F rom the p o in t o f view o f a given producer located som e
w h ere on a com m odity chain, freedom o f m ovem ent was
desirable w hilst this producer was econom ically com petitive
w ith o th er producers o f the same goods in the w o rld m arket.
But w h en this was no t the case, various b o u n d ary constraints
against rival producers could raise the la tte rs costs and benefit
an oth erw ise less efficient producer. Since, by definition, in a
m arket in w hich th ere w ere m ultiple producers o f any given
good, a m ajority w ould be less efficient than a m inority, there
has existed a con stant pressure for m ercantilist constraints on
free m ovem ent across frontiers. Since how ever the m in o rity
w h o w ere m o re efficient w ere relatively w ealthy and p o w e r
ful, there has been a constant counter-pressure to open fro n
tiers, o r m o re specifically, to open som e frontiers. H ence the
first great stru g g le a ferocious and co n tin u in g o n e has been
o ver the fro n tier policy o f states. Since fu rth e rm o re any given
set o f producers (but particularly big and pow erful ones) w ere
directly affected by the state frontier policies o f not only the
states in w hich their econom ic base w as physically located
(w hich m ay o r m ay n o t have been the ones o f w hich they
w ere citizens) b u t also those o f m any o th er states, given eco
nom ic producers have been interested in pursu in g political
objectives sim ultaneously in several, indeed o ften in very
m any, states. T h e concept that one o u g h t to restrict o n e s
political involvem ent to o n e s o w n state was deeply an ti
thetical to those w h o w ere pursuing the accum ulation of
capital for its ow n sake.
O n e w ay, o f course, to affect th e rules about w h a t m ay or
may not cross fro ntiers, and under w h at term s, was to change
51
the actual fro n tiers th ro u g h to tal in corporation b y one state

o f ano th er (unification, Anschluss, colonization), th ro u g h seiz
ure o f som e territo ry , th ro u g h secession o r decolonization.
T he fact th at fro n tier changes have had im m ediate im pacts on
the p attern s o f th e social division o f labour in the w orld-eco
no m y has been central to the considerations o f all those w ho
favoured o r opposed particular fro n tier changes. T he fact that
ideological m o b ilizations around the definition o f nations
could m ake m ore, o r less, possible certain specific fro n tier
changes has given im m ediate econom ic co n ten t to nationalist
m ovem ents, insofar as participants and others presum ed the
likelihood o f specific state policies follow ing upon the p ro
jected fro n tier changes.
T he second elem ent o f state pow er o f fundam ental concern
to th e operations o f historical capitalism was the legal rig h t o f
states to determ ine th e rules g overning the social relations o f
pro d u ctio n w ith in th eir territorial ju risd ictio n . M odern statestructures arrogated to them selves this rig h t to revoke or
am end any cu sto m ary set o f relations. As a m a tte r o f law the
states recognized no constraints o n their legislative scope o th er
than those th at w ere self-im posed. Even w h ere particular state
co nstitutions paid ideological lip service to constraints deriv
ing from religious o r natural law doctrines, they reserved to
some co n stitu tio n ally -defined body or person the rig h t to in
terpret these doctrines.
T his rig h t to legislate the m odes o f lab o u r c o n tro l was by
no m eans m erely theoretical. States have regularly used these
rights, o ften in w ays th at involved radical transform ations o f
existing p attern s. As w e w o u ld expect, in historical capital
ism, states have legislated in w ays that increased the com
m odification o f lab o u r p o w er, by abolishing various kinds o f
custom ary con strain t o n the m ovem ent o f w o rk ers fro m one
52
kind of em p lo y m en t to another. T hey fu rth e rm o re im posed

on th e w o rk -fo rce fiscal cash obligations w hich often forced
certain w o rk ers to engage in w age-labour. B ut, on the other
hand, as w e have already seen, the states by their legal actions
often also discouraged full-fledged p roletarianization by im
p o sin g residential lim itations or insisting th at the kin g roup
retain certain kinds o f w elfare obligations to its m em bers.
T h e states co n tro lled the relations o f p ro d u c tio n . T hey first
legalized, later o u tlaw ed , particular form s of coerced labour
(slavery, public labour obligations, in d en tu re, etc.). They
created rules gov ern ing w age-labour contracts, including gua
rantees o f th e c o n tra ct, and m in im u m and m ax im u m recipro
cal o b ligations. T hey decreed the lim its of the geographical
m o bility o f th e lab o ur force, not only across their frontiers b u t
w ith in th em .
All these state decisions w ere taken w ith direct reference to
the econom ic im plications for the accum ulation o f capital.
This can be easily verified by go in g th ro u g h the enorm ous
nu m b er of debates, recorded as they occurred, over alternative
sta tu to ry or adm inistrative choices. F u rth erm o re , the states
have regularly spent considerable energy in enforcing their
reg u latio n s against recalcitrant groups, m ost particularly recal
citra n t w o rk -fo rces. W o rk e rs w ere seldom left free to ignore
legal constraints on their actions. Q u ite the co n tra ry w o rk e r
rebellion, individual or collective, passive or active, has usually
b ro u g h t fo rth a ready repressive response from the statem achineries. T o be sure, organized w orking-class m ovem ents
w ere able, in tim e, to set certain lim itations to repressive acti
vity, as w ell as ensure th at the governing rules w ere m odified
som ew hat in th eir favour, b u t such m o v em en ts obtained these
results largely by th eir ability to affect the political com position o f th e state-m achineries.
'
53
A third elem ent in the pow er of the states has been the
pow er to tax. T ax atio n was by no m eans an invention o f
historical capitalism ; previous political structures also used
taxation as a source o f revenue fo r th e state-m achineries. But
historical capitalism transform ed tax atio n in tw o w ays. T a x a
tio n becam e th e m ain (indeed overw helm ing) regular source of
state revenue, as opposed to state revenue deriving from ir
regular requisition b y force from persons inside or outside the
form al ju risd ic tio n o f the state (including requisition from
other states). Secondly, taxation has been a steadily expanding
p henom enon over th e historical developm ent o f the capitalist
w o rld -eco n o m y as a percentage o f to tal value created or accu
m ulated. This has m eant th at the states have been im p o rtan t
in term s o f the resources they controlled, because the resources
not only p erm itted them to fu rth er the accum ulation o f capital
b u t w ere also them selves d istrib u ted and thereby entered
d irectly o r indirectly in to the fu rth er accum ulation o f capital.
T ax atio n was a p ow er w hich focused h o stility . and resis
tance u p o n th e state-structure itself, as a sort o f disincarnated
villain, w h ich w as seen as appropriating the fruits o f the
labours of o thers. W h a t m u st always be b o rn e in m in d is th at
there w ere forces o u tsid e the governm ent pushing for p a rti
cular taxations because the process w o u ld either result in
direct re d istrib u tio n to th em , or perm it the governm ent to
create external econom ies w hich w o u ld im prove their econo
mic p o sition, or penalize others in w ays th at w o u ld be econo
m ically favourable to the first g ro u p . In short, the p ow er to
tax w as one o f th e m o st im m ediate ways in w hich the state
directly assisted th e process o f the accum ulation of capital in
favour o f som e g ro u p s rath er than others.
T he redistributive pow ers of the state have been discussed
for th e m ost part only in term s o f their equalization potential.
54
This is the them e o f th e w elfare state. But re d istrib u tio n has in

fact been far m ore w idely used as a m echanism to polarize dis
trib u tio n th an to m ake real incom es converge. T here are three
m ain m echanism s th a t have increased the p olarization o f re
w ards over and above th a t polarization already resu ltin g from
th e o n g o in g operations o f the capitalist m ark et.
G overnm ents first o f all have been able to am ass, th ro u g h
th e tax atio n process, large sum s o f capital w hich th ey have re
distrib u ted to persons or groups, already large holders of
capital, th ro u g h official subsidies. T hese subsidies have taken
the form o f o u trig h t g ra n ts, usually on th in excuses o f public
service (involving essentially overpaym ents for services). B ut
th e y have also tak en th e less direct form of th e state bearing
the costs o f product d evelopm ent w h ich could presum ably be
am ortized by later profitable sales, only to tu rn over the eco
n o m ic activity to n o n -g overnm ental entrepreneurs at nom inal
cost at precisely the p o in t o f com pletion o f the costly develop
m en tal phase.
Secondly, governm ents have been able to amass large sums
of capital th ro u g h form ally legal and o ften legitim ated chan
nels o f tax atio n w h ich have th e n becom ing sittin g ducks for
large-scale illegitim ate bu t de facto unconstrained abscondings
o f public funds. Such th e ft o f public revenues as w ell as the
correlate c o rru p t p rivate tax atio n procedures have been a m a
jo r source o f private accum ulation o f capital th ro u g h o u t
historical capitalism .
Finally, g o v ern m e n ts have redistributed to the w e alth y by
u tilizin g th e principle o f the individualization o f p ro fit b u t the
socialization of risk. O v er the w hole history o f the capitalist
system , the larger th e risk and the losses th e m ore likely it
has been for g o v ern m en ts to step in to prevent bankruptcies
55
and even to re stitu te losses if only because o f the financial t u r

m oil they w ished to avoid.
W h ile these practices o f anti-egalitarian redistribution have
been the sham eful side o f state pow er (sham eful in the sense
th at governm ents w ere som ew hat em barrassed about these
activities and so u g h t to keep them hidden), the provision of
social overhead capital by governm ents has been openly flau n t
ed, and indeed advocated as an essential role o f the state in the
m aintenance o f historical capitalism .
E xpenditures crucial to the reduction o f costs o f m ultiple
groups o f ow n er-p ro ducers th a t is, the basic energy, tra n s
p o rt, and info rm ational infrastructure o f the w o rld -eco
n o m y have largely been developed and su p p o rted by public
funds. W h ile it has no d o u b t been th e case th a t m o st persons
have derived some b en e fit fro m such social overhead capital, it
has n o t been th e case th at all have derived equal benefit. T he
advantage has accrued disproportionately to those already
large holders o f cap ital w hile being paid out o f a far m ore
egalitarian system o f taxation. H ence social overhead capital
co n stru ctio n has served to fu rth er the accum ulation o f capital
and its co n cen tratio n .
Finally, states have m onopolized, or so u g h t to m onopolize,
arm ed force. W h ile police forces w ere geared largely to the
m aintenance o f in ternal order (that is, the acceptance b y the
w o rk force o f th eir allotted roles and rew ards), armies have
been m echanism s w hereby producers in one state have been
able to affect directly the possibilities th at their com petitors
located in o th er states have had to invoke the protective cover
in g o f th eir o w n state-m achineries. This is fact brings us to the
last feature o f state pow er w hich has been crucial. W h ile the
kinds o f p o w er each state has exercised have been sim ilar, the
56
degree o f p o w er given state-m achineries have had has varied

enorm ously. States have been located in a hierarchy o f effective
p o w er w h ich can be m easured neither by the size and co
herence o f th eir bureaucracies and armies nor by th eir ideo
logical form ulations about them selves b u t by th eir effective
capacities over tim e to fu rth e r the co n cen tratio n o f accu
m ulated capital w ith in th eir frontiers as against those rival
states. T his effective capacity has involved the ability to con
strain hostile m ilitary forces; the ability to enact advantageous
regulations at hom e and to prevent o th er states from do in g the
same; and th e ability to constrain their o w n w o rk forces and
to u n d erm in e th e capacity o f rivals to do as w ell. T h e tru e
m easurem ent o f th eir s tre n g th is in the m ed iu m -term eco
nom ic o u tco m e. T h e o vert use o f force by the state-m achinery
to co n tro l th e internal w o rk force, a costly and destabilizing
technique, is m o re o ften the sign o f its w eakness than its
stren g th . T ru ly stro n g state-m achineries have been able, by
one m eans o r an o th er, to co n tro l their w ork-forces by subtler
m echanism s.
T h u s th ere are m any different w ays in w hich th e state has
been a crucial m echanism for the m axim al accum ulation of
capital. A ccording to its ideology, capitalism w as supposed to
involve the activity o f private entrepreneurs freed from the in
terference o f state-m achineries. In practice, how ever, this has
never been really tru e anyw here. It is idle to speculate w h e th e r
capitalism could have flourished w ith o u t the active role o f the
m o d ern state. In historical capitalism , capitalists relied upon
their ability to utilize state-m achineries to their advantage in
the various w ays w e have outlined.
A second ideological m y th has been that o f state sovereign
ty. T h e m o d ern state was never a com pletely au to n o m o u s
political en tity . T h e states developed and w ere shaped as in
57
tegral parts o f an in te rsta te system , w h ich w as a set o f rules

w ith in w h ich the states had to operate and a set o f leg itim iza
tions w ith o u t w h ich states could not survive. F rom the p oint
o f view o f th e state-m achineries o f any given state, the in te r
state system rep resented constraints on its will. T hese w ere to
be found in th e practices o f diplom acy, in the form al rules
g overning ju risd ictio n s and contracts (international law ), and
in the lim its o n h o w and under w h a t circum stances w arfare
m ig h t be co n ducted. All o f these constraints ran counter to
the official ideology o f sovereignty. Sovereignty how ever was
neyer really in ten d ed to m ean to tal auto n o m y . T he concept
was rath er m eant to indicate th at there existed lim its on the
legitim acy o f interference by one state-m achinery in the opera
tions o f an o th er.
T h e rules o f th e interstate system w ere o f course not enforc
ed by consent or consensus, b u t by the w illingness and the
ability o f th e stro n g er states to im pose these restrictions, first
u p o n th e w eaker states, and second u p o n each o th er. T h e
states, rem em b er, w ere located in a hierarchy o f p o w e r. T h e
very existence o f this hierarchy provided th e m ajor lim itation
on the au to n o m y o f states. T o be sure, the overall situation
could tip to w ard s th e disappearance o f the p o w er o f the states
alto g eth er to th e e x te n t th at the hierarchy w as constructed
w ith a pyram idal peak rather than a plateau at th e to p . T his
possibility was n o t hy pothetical as the dynam ic o f th e concen
tratio n o f m ilitary p o w e r led to recu rren t th ru sts to transform
th e in terstate system in to a w orld-em pire.
If such th ru sts never succeeded in historical capitalism , it
was because th e stru ctu ral base o f the econom ic system and the
clearly-perceived interests o f the m ajor accum ulators o f capital
w ere fundam entally opposed to a tran sfo rm atio n o f the w o rld econom y in to a w orld-em pire.
58
First o f all, th e accum ulation o f capital was a gam e in w hich

there w as con stan t incentive for com petitive en try , and thus
there was always som e dispersion o f the m ost profitable p ro
ductive activities. H ence at any tim e num erous states tended
to have an econom ic base th at m ade them relatively strong.
Secondly, accum ulators o f capital in any given state utilized
their o w n state structures to assist th em in the accum ulation
of capital, b u t they also needed som e lever of co n tro l against
th e ir o w n state-structures. F or if th e ir state-m achinery becam e
to o stro n g , it m ig h t, fo r reasons of internal political equi
librium , feel free to respond to internal egalitarian pressures.
A gainst this th rea t, accum ulators o f capital needed the threat
o f circu m v en tin g th eir ow n state-m achinery by m aking al
liances w ith o th er state-m achineries. T his th reat w as only pos
sible as lo n g as no one state dom inated the w hole.
T hese considerations form ed the objective basis o f the socalled balance o f p o w e r, by w hich w e m ean th at th e num erous
stro n g and m ed iu m -stro n g states in the interstate system at
any given tim e have tended to m aintain alliances (of if need be,
shift them ) so that no single state could successfully conquer
all th e others.
T h at the balance o f p o w er w as m aintained b y m o re than
political ideology can be seen if w e look at the three instances
in w h ich one o f the strong states achieved tem p o rarily a period
of relative dom inance over the o th ers a relative dom inance
th at w e m ay call heg em ony. T he three instances are the hege
m o n y o f th e U n ited Provinces (N etherlands) in th e m id-seven
teen th cen tu ry , th at o f G reat B ritain in the m id -n in eteen th ,
and th at o f th e U n ite d States in the m id -tw e n tie th .
In each case, heg em ony came after the defeat o f a m ilitary
preten d er to conquest (the H apsburgs, France, G erm any).
Each h egem ony w as sealed by a w o rld w a r a m assive, land-
Struggle fo r Benejits
59
centred, highly d estructive, th irty-year-long in te rm itte n t

stru g g le in v olving all the m ajor m ilitary pow ers o f the tim e.
T hese w ere respectively the T h irty Y ears W a r of 1618-48,
the N apoleonic W a rs (1792-1815), and the tw en tieth -c en tu ry
conflicts b etw een 1914 and 1945 w hich should properly be
conceived as a single, lo n g w o rld w a r. It is to be noted th a t,
in each case, th e v icto r had been prim arily a m aritim e p ow er
prior to w o rld w a r , b u t had transform ed itself in to a land
p o w er in order to w in this w ar against a historically strong
land pow er w h ich seemed to be try in g to transform the
w o rld -eco n o m y in to a w orld-em pire.
T h e basis o f th e v icto ry w as n o t h o w e v er m ilitary . T h e p ri
m ary reality was econom ic: th e ability o f accum ulators of
capital located in th e particular states to o u tco m p ete all others
in all three m ajor econom ic spheres agro-industrial p ro d u c
tio n , com m erce, and finance. Specifically, for b rief periods,
the accum ulators o f capital in the hegem onic state w ere m ore
efficient th an th eir co m petitors located in o th er stro n g states,
and th u s w o n m ark ets even w ith in the la tte rs h o m e areas.
Each o f these hegem onies was brief. Each came to an end
largely for econom ic reasons m ore than for politico-m ilitary
reasons. In each case, the tem porary triple econom ic advantage
came up against tw o hard rocks of capitalist reality. F irst, the
factors th at m ade for greater econom ic efficiency could always
be copied b y o th ers no t by th e tru ly w eak b u t those w h o had
m edium stre n g th and latecom ers to any given econom ic p ro
cess ten d to have th e advantage o f not h av in g to am ortize
older sto ck . Secondly, th e hegem onic p o w er had every interest
in m ain tain in g u n in te rru p te d econom ic activity and therefore
tended to b u y lab o u r peace w ith internal red istrib u tio n . O v er
tim e, this led to reduced com petitiveness thereby ending h eg e
m o n y . In ad d itio n , th e conversion of the hegem onic pow er to
60
one w ith far-flung land and m aritim e m ilitary resp o n

sibilities involved a g ro w in g econom ic b u rd e n o n th e h eg e
m onic state, th u s u n d o in g its pre-w o rld w a r lo w level ex
pen d itu re on th e m ilitary.
H ence, th e balance o f p o w e r constraining b o th the w eak
states and the s tro n g w as not a political epiphenom enon
w hich could be easily undone. It was ro o ted in the very ways
in w h ich capital w as accum ulated in historical capitalism . N o r
was th e balance o f p o w e r m erely a relationship b etw een statem achineries, because th e internal actors w ith in any given state
regularly acted beyond their o w n boundaries either directly or
via alliances w ith actors elsew here. T herefore, in assessing the
politics o f any given state, the in te rn a l/e x te rn a l distinction
is qu ite formal and it is n o t too helpful to o u r understanding
o f h o w th e political struggles actually occurred.
But w h o in fact w as stru g g lin g w ith w h o m ? This is not as
obvious a question as one m ig h t th in k , because o f the c o n tra
d icto ry pressures w ith in historical capitalism . T he m ost ele
m en tary stru g g le, and in som e w ays the m ost obvious, was
th at betw een the small g ro u p o f great beneficiaries o f the
system and the large g ro u p o f its victim s. This struggle goes
by m any names and under m any guises. W h e n ev er th e lines
have been d ra w n fairly clearly b etw e en the accum ulators o f
capital and th eir w o rk force w ith in any given state, w e have
tended to call th is a class struggle betw een capital and labour.
Such class struggles to o k place in tw o locales th e econom ic
arena (b o th at the locus o f actual w o rk and in the larger am o r
phous m a rk e t) and th e political arena. It is clear th at in the
econom ic arena there has been a direct, logical, and im m ediate
conflict o f interests. T h e larger the rem u n eratio n o f th e w o rk
force the less surplus w as left as p ro fit. T o be sure, this con
flict has been often softened by lo n g er-term , larger-scale c o n
61
siderations. B oth th e particular accum ulator o f capital and his

w o rk-force shared interests against o th e r pairings elsew here in
th e system . A n d g reater re m u n eratio n to w ork-forces could
u n d er certain circum stances re tu rn to the accum ulators o f
capital as deferred p ro fit, via th e increased global cash purchas
ing p o w e r in th e w o rld-econom y. N onetheless, none o f these
o th er considerations could ever elim inate the fact th at the divi
sion o f a given su rp lu s w as a zero-sum , and thus th e tension
has been perforce a co n tin u in g one,. It has therefore found con
tinuing expression in com petition fo r political p o w er w ith in
the various states.
Since, h o w ev er, as w e k n o w , the process o f the accum ula
tion o f capital has led to its concentration in som e geographic
zones, since th e unequal exchange w hich accounts for this has
been m ade possible b y the existence o f an interstate system
containing a hierarchy o f states, and since state-m achineries
have som e lim ited p o w e r to alter the operations o f the system ,
the stru g g le b etw een w o rld w id e accum ulators o f capital and
the w o rld w id e w o rk -force has found considerable expression
too in th e efforts o f various groups to com e to p o w er w ith in
given (w eaker) states in o rd er to u tilize state pow er against ac
cum ulators o f capital located in stronger states. W h en ev er this
has o ccurred, w e have tended to speak o f anti-im perialist
struggles. N o d o u b t, here too, th e question was often
obscured b y th e fact that the lines internal to each o f the tw o
states involved did n o t alw ays coincide perfectly w ith th e
underlying th ru st o f the class struggle in th e w orld-econom y
as a w hole. Some accum ulators o f capital in the w eaker state
and som e elem ents o f the w ork-force in the stro n g er found
sh o rt-term advantages in defining the political issues in purely
national rath er th an in class-national term s. B ut great m obilizational th ru sts o f anti-im perialist m ovem ents w ere never
62
possible, and therefore even lim ited objectives w ere seldom

achieved, if th e class co n ten t o f the struggle w ere n o t there
and used, at least im plicitly, as an ideological them e.
W e have n o ted also that the process o f eth n ic-g ro u p form a
tio n was integrally linked w ith th at o f labour-force form ation
in given states, serving as a ro u g h code o f p osition in the eco
nom ic structures. T herefore, w herever this has occurred m ore
sharply o r circum stances have forced m ore acute sh o rt-term
pressures on survival, the conflict betw een the accum ulators of
capital and th e m ore oppressed segm ents o f the w ork-force
have tended to take th e form of linguistic-racial-cultural stru g
gles, since such descriptors have a hig h correlation w ith class
m em bership. W herever and w henever this has occurred, w e
have tended to talk o f ethnic or nationality struggles. Exactly,
h o w ev er, as in th e case o f the anti-im perialist struggles, these
struggles w ere rarely successful unless they w ere able to
m obilize th e sentim ents that em erged ou t o f the underlying
class stru g g le for th e appropriation o f the surplus produced
w ith in th e capitalist system .
N o n eth eless, if w e pay a tte n tio n only to the class struggle,
because it is b o th obvious and fundam ental, w e shall lose from
view ano th er political struggle that has absorbed at least as
m uch tim e and energy in historical capitalism . For the capital
ist system is a system th at has pitted all accum ulators o f capital
against one another. Since the m ode by w hich one pursued the
endless accum ulation o f capital w as that o f realizing th e profits
com ing from econom ic activity against the com petitive efforts
o f o th ers, no individual entrepreneur could ever be m ore than
the fickle ally o f any o th er entrepreneur, on pain o f being
elim inated from th e com petitive scene altogether.
E n trep ren eu r against entrepreneur, econom ic sector against
econom ic sector, th e entrepreneurs located in one state, or
63
ethnic group, against those in another the struggle has been

by definition ceaseless. A nd this ceaseless stru g g le has co n
stan tly taken a political form , precisely because o f the central
role o f th e states in the accum ulation o f capital. Som etim es
these struggles w ith in states have m erely been over personnel
in the state-m achineries and sh o rt-ru n state policies.
Sometim es, h ow ever, they have been over larger c o n stitu
tio n a l issues w h ich determ ine the rules g o v ern in g the con
duct o f sh o rter-ru n struggles, and thus the likelihood o f one
faction or an o th er prevailing. W henever these struggles w ere
co n stitu tio n a l in n ature, they required greater ideological
m obilization. In these cases, w e heard talk o f re v o lu tio n s
and great reform s and the losing sides w ere often given o p
probrious (but analytically inappropriate) labels. T o the extent
that the political struggles for,say, dem ocracy or lib e rty
against feudalism or tra d itio n have not been struggles o f
th e w o rk in g classes against capitalism , th e y have been essen
tially struggles am o n g th e accum ulators o f capital for the ac
cum ulation o f capital. Such struggles w ere no t th e triu m p h o f
a progressive bourgeoisie against reactionary strata bu t infrabourgeois struggles.
O f course, using universalizing ideological slogans about
progress has been politically useful. It has been a w ay o f as
sociating class stru g g le m o bilization to one side o f intra-accu
m u lator struggles. B ut such ideological advantage has often
been a double-edged sw o rd , unleashing passions and w eak en
ing repressive restraints in the class stru g g le. This w as o f
course one o f th e o n g o in g dilem m as o f th e accum ulators o f
capital in historical capitalism . T hey w ere forced by the opera
tions o f th e system to act in class solidarity w ith one another
against the efforts o f the w ork-force to pursue its co n trary in
terests, b u t sim ultaneously to fight each o ther ceaselessly in
64
b o th the econom ic and political arenas. T his is ex actly w h a t

w e m ean by a co n trad iction w ith in the system .
M any analysts, noticing th at there are struggles o ther than
class struggles w hich absorb m uch o f the total political energy
expended, have concluded th at class analysis is o f dubious rele
vance to th e u n d erstanding o f political struggle. T his is a
curious inference. It w o u ld seem m ore sensible to conclude
th at these non-class-based political struggles, th at is, struggles
am ong accum ulators for political advantage, are evidence o f a
severe stru ctu ral political w eakness in the accum ulator class in
its o n g oing w o rld w id e class struggle.
These political struggles can be rephrased as struggles to
shape th e in stitu tio n al structures o f the capitalist w orld-econ o m y so as to co n stru ct the kind o f w o rld m ark e t w hose
operation w o u ld autom atically favour particular econom ic ac
tors. T h e capitalist m a rk e t was never a given, and even less a
co n stan t. It was a creation that was regularly recreated and ad
ju sted .
A t any given tim e, the m a rk e t represented a set o f rules or
co n straints resulting from the com plex interplay o f four m ajor
sets o f in stitu tio n s: th e m ultiple states linked in an in terstate
system ; th e m u ltip le n atio n s, w h e th e r fully recognized or
stru g g ling for such public definition (and including those sub
nations, the ethnic g ro u p s), in uneasy and un certain relation
to the states; th e classes, in evolving occupational c o n to u r and
in oscillating degrees o f consciousness; and th e incom ep o o lin g u n its eng ag ed in co m m o n householding, co m bining
m u ltip le persons eng aged in m ultiple form s o f lab o u r and o b
tain in g incom e from m u ltip le sources, in uneasy relationship
to the classes.
T here w ere no fixed lodestars in this constellation o f in stitu
tio n al forces. T here w ere no p rim o rd ial entities th at tended
65
to prevail against th e in stitu tio n al form s pressed for by the ac

cu m ulators o f capital in tandem w ith , and in opposition to,
the struggle o f the w o rk -fo rce to resist appropriation of their
econom ic p ro d u c t. T he boundaries o f each variant of an in
stitu tio n al fo rm , th e rig h ts w h ich it w as legally and de facto
able to sustain, varied from zone to zone o f the w orld-eco
no m y , over b o th cyclical and secular tim e. If the careful
analysts head reels in reg ard in g this in stitu tio n al vortex, he
can steer a clear p ath b y re m em b erin g th at in historical capital
ism accum ulators had no hig h er object than fu rth er accu
m u latio n, and th at w ork-forces could therefore have no higher
object than survival and reducing th eir burden. O nce th at is
rem em bered, one is able to m ake a great deal o f sense out of
the political h isto ry o f the m odern w orld.
In particu lar, one can begin to appreciate in their com plexi
ty the circum locutory and often paradoxical or contradictory
positions o f the anti-system ic m ovem ents th a t em erged in
historical capitalism . Let us begin w ith the m ost elem entary
dilem m a o f all. H istorical capitalism has operated w ith in a
w orld-econom y b u t n o t w ith in a w orld-state. Q u ite the c o n
trary. As w e have seen, structural pressures m ilitated against
any co n stru ctio n o f a w o rld -state. W ith in th is system , w e
have underlined th e crucial role o f th e m ultiple states at once
the m ost p ow eful political structures, and yet o f lim ited
pow er. Hence re stru ctu rin g given states represented for w o rk
forces at one and th e same tim e the m ost prom ising p ath o f
im p ro v ing th eir p o sitio n , and a path o f lim ited value.
W e m u st b eg in b y lo o k in g at w h a t w e m ig h t m ean b y an
anti-system ic m o v em ent. T he w o rd m ovem ent im plies som e
collective th ru st o f a m ore than m o m en tary nature. In fact, o f
course, som ew hat spontaneous protests or uprisings o f w o rk
forces have occurred in all k n o w n historical system s. T hey
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have served as safety-values for pen t-u p anger; o r som etim es,
som ew hat m ore effectively, as m echanism s th at have set m in o r
lim its to exploitative process. But generally speaking, rebel
lion as a technique has w o rk e d o n ly at the m argins o f central
au th o rity , particularly w hen central bureaucracies w ere in
phases o f d isintegration.
T he stru ctu re o f historical capitalism changed som e o f these
givens. T h e fact th at states w ere located in an interstate
system m eant th at th e repercussions o f rebellions o r uprisings
w ere felt, often qu ite rapidly, beyond the confines o f th e im
m ediate political ju risd ictio n w ith in w hich they occurred. Socalled o u tsid e forces therefore had stro n g m otives to com e to
th e aid o f assailed state-m achineries. T his m ade rebellions
m ore difficult. O n th e o th er hand, the in tru sio n o f the accu
m ulators o f capital, and hence o f state-m achineries, in to the
daily life o f the w ork-forces was far m ore intensive in general
under historical capitalism than under previous historical
system s. T h e endless accum ulation o f capital led to repeated
pressures to restru ctu re the organization (and location) o f
w o rk , to increase the am ount o f absolute labour, and to b rin g
about the psycho-social reconstruction o f the w ork-forces. In
this sense, for m ost o f th e w o rld s w ork-forces, the d isru p
tio n , the discom bobulation, and the exploitation w as even
greater. A t the same tim e, the social disruption underm ined
placatory m odes o f socialization. All in all, therefore, the
m o tivations to rebel w ere strengthened, despite the fact that
the possibilities o f success w ere perhaps objectively lessened.
It was this extra strain w hich led to the great innovation in
the technology o f rebellion that was developed in historical
capitalism . This in n ovation was the concept o f perm anent
o rg an izatio n . It is only in the nin eteen th cen tu ry th at w e
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begin to see th e creation o f co n tin u in g , bureaucratized stru c

tures in th eir tw o great historical variants: labour-socialist
m ovem ents, and nationalist m ovem ents. B oth kinds o f m ove
m ent talked a universal language essentially that o f the
French R ev o lu tio n : liberty, equality, and fraternity. B oth
kinds o f m ovem ent clothed them selves in th e ideology o f the
E n lig h tm e n t the inevitability o f progress, th at is hum an
em ancipation ju stified by inherent hum an rig h ts. B oth kinds
o f m o v em en t appealed to the future against the past, the new
against th e old. Even w hen trad itio n was invoked, it w as as
the-basis o f a renaissance, a rebirth.
Each o f th e tw o kinds o f m ovem ent had, it is true, a diff
erent focus, and hence at first a different locus. T h e laboursocialist m ovem ents focused on the conflicts betw een the u rb
an, landless, w age w o rk ers (the proletariat) and the ow ners o f
the econom ic structures in w hich they w o rk ed (the b o u r
geoisie). T hese m ov em ents insisted th at the allocation o f
reward for w ork was fundam entally inegalitarian, oppressive,
and u n ju st. It was natural th at such m ovem ents should first
em erge in those p arts o f the w orld-econom y th at had a signifi
cant industrial w o rk -fo rce in particular, in w estern Europe.
T he nationalist m ovem ents focused on the conflicts b e
tw een th e n u m erous oppressed peoples (defined in term s of
linguistic a n d /o r religious characteristics) and the particular
d o m in an t peoples o f a given political ju risd ictio n , the form er
having far fewer political rig h ts, econom ic o p p o rtu n ities, and
legitim ate form s o f cu ltu ral expression than the latter. These
m ovem ents insisted th at th e allocation o f rig h ts w as fu n
dam entally inegalitarian, oppressive, and un ju st. It was
natu ral th at such m o vem ents should first em erge in those
sem iperipheral regions o f the w orld-econom y, like th e A ustro-
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H u n g a rian E m pire, w h ere the uneven assignm ent o f eth n o national groups in th e hierarchy o f labour-force allocation was
m ost obvious.
In general, up u n til quite recently, these tw o kinds of
m o v em en t considered them selves very different fro m , som e
tim es even antagonistic to , the o th er. Alliances b etw e en th em
w ere seen as tactical and tem porary. Yet from the b eg in n in g ,
it is strik in g the degree to w hich b o th kinds o f m ovem ent
shared certain stru ctu ral sim ilarities. In the first place, after
considerable debate, b o th labour-socialist and nationalist
m o v em en ts m ade the basic decision to becom e organizations
and th e co n cu rren t decision th at their m ost im p o rta n t political
objective w as the seizure o f state p o w e r (even w hen, in the
case o f some n ationalist m ovem ents, this involved th e creation
o f n ew state b o u n daries). Secondly, the decision on the
strateg y th e seizure o f state p o w e r required th at these
m o v em en ts m obilize p opular forces on the basis o f an antisystem ic, th at is, rev o lutionary, ideology. T h ey w e re against
the ex istin g system historical capitalism w h ich w as b u ilt
on th e basic capital-labour, core-periphery stru ctu re d inequali
ties th at th e m ovem ents w ere seeking to overcom e.
O f course, in an unequal system , there are always tw o ways
in w h ich a lo w -ran k in g g ro u p can seek to get o u t o f its low
ran k . It can seek to restru ctu re the system such th at all have
equal rank. O r it can seek sim ply to m ove itself in to a higher
ran k in th e unequal d istrib u tio n . As w e k n o w , anti-system ic
m o v em en ts, no m a tte r h o w m u ch th ey focused on egalitarian
objectives, always included elem ents w hose objective, initially
or eventually, w as m erely to be upw ardly m o b ile1 w ith in the
existing hierarchy. T h e m ovem ents them selves have always
been aw are o f this to o . T h ey have h o w ev er tended to discuss
this p roblem in term s o f individual m otivations: th e p u re of
heart versus the betrayers o f the cause. But w hen on analysis
69
the betrayers o f th e cause seem om nipresent in every par

ticular instance o f th e m ovem ents as they have historically
developed, one is led to look for structural rather than m o tiv a
tio n al explanations.
T h e key to the pro blem m ay in fact lie in the basic strategic
decision to m ak e th e seizure o f state p o w e r the p iv o t o f the
m o v em en ts activities. T h e strategy had tw o fundam ental
consequences. In th e phase o f m o b ilizatio n , it pushed each
m ovem ent to w ard s entering into tactical alliances w ith groups
that w ere in no w ay anti-system ic in order to reach its stra
tegic objective. T hese alliances m odified the stru c tu re o f the
anti-system ic m o v em ents them selves, even in th e m obilization
stage. Even m o re im p o rtan tly , the strategy eventually suc
ceeded in m any cases. M any o f the m ovem ents achieved partial
or even to tal state p o w e r. These successful m ovem ents w ere
then confronted w ith the realities o f the lim itations o f state
p o w er w ith in th e capitalist w orld-econom y. T h ey found th a t
they w e re constrained b y the fu n ctio n in g o f th e in terstate
system to exercise th e ir p o w er in w ays th at m u ted the antisystem ic objectives th at w ere th eir raison d etre.
T his seems so obvious that one m u st then w onder w h y the
m ovem ents based their strategy on such a seem ingly self-defeating objective. T h e answ er w as q u ite sim ple: given the
political stru ctu re o f historical capitalism , th e y had little
choice. T h ere seem ed to be n o m ore prom ising alternative
strategy. T h e seizure o f state p o w e r at least prom ised to
change the balance o f p o w e r b etw een co n ten d in g groups
som ew hat. T h a t is to say, the seizure o f p o w er represented a
reform o f th e system . T h e reform s in fact did im prove the situ
ation, b u t always at th e price o f also stren g th en in g the system .
C an w e therefore sum m arize the w o rk o f the w o rld s antisystem ic m ovem ents for o v er one hu n d red and fifty years as
sim ply th e stren g th en in g o f historical capitalism via refor
70
m ism ? N o , but that is because the politics o f historical
capitalism was m ore than the politics o f the various states. It
has been th e politics o f th e interstate system as w ell. T h e antisystem ic m ovem ents existed from the b eg in n in g n o t only in
dividually b u t also as a collective w hole, albeit never b u re a u
cratically organized. (T he m ultiple internationals have never
included the to ta lity o f these m ovem ents.) A key factor in the
stren g th o f any given m ovem ent has always been the existence
o f o th er m ovem ents.
O th e r m ovem ents have provided any given m ovem ent w ith
three kinds o f su p p o rt. T he m ost obvious is m aterial; helpful,
b u t perhaps o f least significance. A second is diversionary sup
p o rt. T he ability o f a given stro n g state to intervene against an
anti-system ic m ovem ent located in a w eaker state, for ex am
ple, w as alw ays a fu n ctio n o f how m any o th e r th in g s w e re on
its im m ed iate political agenda. T h e m o re a given state w as
preoccupied w ith a local anti-system ic m o v em en t, th e less
ability it had to be occupied w ith a faraw ay anti-system ic
m ovem ent. T h e th ird and m ost fundam ental suppo rt is at the
level o f collective m entalities. M ovem ents learned from each
o th e rs errors and w ere encouraged by each o th e rs tactical
successes. A nd the efforts o f the m ovem ents w o rld w id e affect
ed the basic w o rld w id e political am biance the expectations,
the analysis o f possibilities.
As th e m ovem ents g rew in num ber, in h isto ry , and in tac
tical successes, they seemed stro n g er as a collective p h en o
m en o n , and because they seemed stro n g er they w ere.
T h e greater collective strength w orldw ide served as a check on
rev isionist tendencies o f m ovem ents in state p o w e r no
m ore, b u t no less, than th a t and this has been greater in its
effect on u n d erm in in g th e political stability o f historical
capitalism than the sum o f the system -strengthening effects o f
the seizure o f state p o w e r by successive individual m ovem ents.
71
Finally, o ne o th er factor has com e in to play. As the tw o

varieties o f anti-system ic m ovem ents have spread (the laboursocialist m ovem ents from a few stro n g states to all o th ers, the
nationalist m ovem ents from a few peripheral zones to every
w here else), th e d istin ctio n b etw een the tw o kinds o f m ove
m ent has becom e increasingly b lurred. Labour-socialist m ove
m ents have found th a t nationalist them es w ere central to their
m o b ilizatio n efforts and th eir exercise o f state p o w e r. B ut
nationalist m ovem ents have discovered the inverse. In o rd er to
m obilize effectively and govern, they had to canalize the co n
cerns o f th e w o rk -fo rce for egalitarian re stru c tu rin g . As the
them es began to overlap heavily and th e distinctive o rg an iza
tional form ats tended to disappear or coalesce into a single
stru ctu re, th e stren g th o f anti-system ic m ovem ents, especially
as a w o rld w id e collective w hole, w as dram atically increased.
O n e o f the stren g th s o f the anti-system ic m ovem ents is that
they have com e to p o w e r in a large num ber o f states. T his has
changed th e o n g o in g politics o f the w orld-system . B ut this
s tre n g th has also been a w eakness, since the so-called p o st
revolutionary regim es co n tin u e to fu n ctio n as part o f the social
division o f labour o f historical capitalism . T hey have thereby
o perated, w illy nilly, under the relentless pressures o f the drive
for th e endless accum ulation o f capital. T he political conse
quence internally has been the continued exploitation o f the
labour-force, if in a reduced and am eliorated form in m any in
stances. T his has led to in tern a l tensions paralleling those
found in states th at w ere n o t p o st-rev o lu tio n ary , and this in
tu rn has b red the em ergence o f new anti-system ic m ovem ents
w ith in these states. T h e stru g g le for the benefits has been g o
ing on b o th w ith in these post-revolutionary states and every
w here else, because, w ith in the fram ew ork o f the capitalist
w o rld -eco n o m y , th e im peratives o f accum ulation have operat
ed throughout the sytem . C hanges in state structures have
72
altered th e politics o f accum ulation; they have n o t yet been
able to end th em .
Initially, w e p o stponed th e questions: h o w real have been
the benefits in historical capitalism ? h o w great has been the
change in th e quality o f life? It should be clear n o w th a t there
is no simple answ er. F or w h o m ? , w e m ust ask. H istorical
capitalism has involved a m on u m en tal creatio n o f m aterial
goods, b u t also a m o n u m e n ta l polarization o f rew ard . M any
have benefited en o rm ously, b u t m any m ore have k n o w n a
substantial reduction in their real to tal incom es and in the
quality o f th eir lives. T he polarization has o f course also been
spatial, and hence it has seemed in som e areas n o t to exist.
T h at to o has been the consequence o f a struggle for the b en e
fits. T h e geography o f benefit has frequently shifted, thus
m asking th e reality o f p olarization. B ut over the w h o le o f the
tim e-space zone encom passed by historical capitalism , the
endless accum ulation o f capital has m eant the incessant w id en
in g o f th e real gap.
3.
Truth as Opiate:
Rationality
and Rationalization
H istorical capitalism has been, w e k n o w , P rom ethean in its

aspirations. A lth o u g h scientific and technological change has
been a con stan t o f hu m an historical activity, it is only w ith
historical capitalism th at P rom etheus, always there, has been
u n b o u n d , in D avid Landess phrase. T he basic collective im
age w e n o w have o f this scientific cu ltu re o f historical capital
ism is th at it w as propounded b y noble k n ig h ts against the
stau n ch resistance o f the forces o f trad itio n al, non-scientific
cu ltu re. In th e seventeenth cen tu ry , it w as Galileo against the
C h u rch ; in th e tw e n tie th , the m o d ern iz er against the
m ullah. A t all p o in ts, it w as said to have been ra tio n a lity
versus su p erstitio n , and freedom versus intellectual o p
p ression. T h is w as presum ed to be parallel to (even identical
w ith ) th e revolt in th e arena o f the political econom y o f the
bourgeois en trep ren eu r against th e aristocratic landlord.
T his basic im age o f a w o rld w id e cultural struggle has had a
hidden prem iss, nam ely one about tem porality. M o d ern ity
was assum ed to be tem porally n ew , w hereas tra d itio n was
tem porally old and p rio r to m odernity; indeed, in som e stro n g
versions o f th e im agery, trad itio n was ahistorical and therefore
virtually eternal. T his prem iss was historically false and
therefore fundam entally m isleading. T h e m u ltip le cultures,
the m u ltip le tra d itio n s th at have flourished w ith in the tim espace b o undaries o f historical capitalism , have been no m ore
16
prim o rd ial than the m ultiple in stitu tio n al fram ew orks. T hey
are largely th e creation o f the m o d ern w o rld , p art o f its ideo
logical scaffolding. Links o f the various tra d itio n s to groups
and ideologies th at p red ate historical capitalism have existed,
o f course, in the sense th a t they have often been constructed
usin g som e histo rical and intellectual m aterials already exis
te n t. F u rth erm o re , th e assertion o f such transhistorical links
has played an im p o rta n t ro le in the cohesiveness o f groups in
th eir politico-econom ic struggles w ith in historical capitalism .
B u t, if w e w ish to u n d erstand the cultural forms these stru g
gles take, w e cannot afford to take tra d itio n s at th eir face
value, and in p artic u la r w e cannot afford to assum e th a t tra d i
tio n s are in fact traditional.
It was in the interests o f those w h o w ished to facilitate the
accum ulation o f capital, th a t w ork-forces be created in th e
rig h t places and at th e lo w e st possible levels o f rem uneration.
W e have already discussed h o w the lo w er rates o f pay for p eri
pheral econom ic activities in the w o rld -eco n o m y w ere m ade
possible by th e creation o f households in w h ich w age labour
played a m in o rity role as a source o f incom e. O n e w ay in
w hich such households w e re created, th at is, pressured to
stru ctu re them selves, w as th e eth n iciza tio n o f co m m u n ity
life in historical capitalism . W h a t w e m ean by ethnic g ro u p s
are sizeable gro u p s o f people to w h o m w ere reserved certain
o ccu p atio nal/eco n o m ic roles in relation to o th er such groups
living in geographic p ro x im ity . T he o u tw a rd sym bolization
o f such labour-force allocation was the distinctive c u ltu re o f
the ethnic g ro u p its religion, its language, its values, its
particular set o f everyday behaviour patterns.
O f course, I am n o t suggesting that there was an y th in g like
a perfect caste system in historical capitalism . B ut, provided
R ationality and R ationalization
77
w e keep o u r occupational categories sufficiently broad, I am

suggesting that there is, and always has been, a rather high
correlation b etw een ethnicity and occu p atio n /eco n o m ic role
th ro u g h o u t the various tim e-space zones o f historical capital
ism . I am fu rth e r suggesting th a t these labour-force alloca
tions have varied over tim e, and that as they varied, so did
eth n icity in term s o f the boundaries and defining cultural
features o f th e g ro u p , and further that there is alm ost no
correlation b etw een present-day ethnic labour-force allocation
and th e p attern s o f th e p u rp o rte d ancestors o f present-day
ethnic groups in periods p rio r to historical capitalism .
T he eth n icizatio n o f the w o rld w ork-force has had three
m ain consequences th at have been im p o rta n t for the fun ctio n
ing o f th e w o rld -eco n om y. First o f all, it has m ade possible the
rep ro d u ctio n o f th e w o rk -fo rce, n o t in the sense o f providing
sufficient incom e for the survival o f groups b u t in the sense o f
pro v id in g sufficient w orkers in each category at appropriate
levels o f incom e expectations in term s b o th o f to ta l am ounts
and o f th e form s th e household incom e w o u ld take. F u rth e r
m o re, precisely because the w ork-force w as ethnicized, its
allocation w as flexible. Large-scale geographical and occupa
tional m o b ility has been m ade easier, n o t m ore difficult, by
ethnicity. U nder the pressure o f changing econom ic co n d i
tions, all that was required to change w ork-force allocation
w as for som e enterp rising individuals to take the lead in geo
graphical or occupational resettlem ent, and to be rew arded for
it; this p ro m p tly exerted a natural p u li on o th er m em bers o f
th e ethnic g ro u p to transfer their locations in th e w o rld econom y.
Secondly, ethn icization has provided an in-built training
m echanism o f th e w o rk -fo rce, ensuring th at a large p art o f the
78
socialization in occupational tasks w o u ld be done w ith in the

fram ew o rk o f ethnically-defined households and n o t at the
cost o f either em ployers o f w age-w orkers, or the states.
T h ird ly , and probably m ost im p o rta n t, eth n icizatio n has
encrusted ra n k in g o f occupational/econom ic roles, providing
an easy code for overall incom e d istrib u tio n clothed w ith the
leg itim izatio n o f tra d itio n .
It is this th ird consequence th at has been elaborated in
greatest detail and has form ed one o f the m ost significant
pillars o f historical capitalism , in stitu tio n al racism . W h a t w e
m ean by racism has little to do w ith the xenophobia th at ex
isted in various p rio r historical system s. X enophobia was
literally fear of th e stran g e r. R acism w ith in historical
capitalism had n o th in g to do w ith strangers. Q u ite the co n
trary . R acism was th e m ode by w hich various segm ents o f the
w o rk -fo rce w ith in th e same econom ic stru ctu re w ere con
strained to relate to each o th er. R acism w as the ideological
ju stificatio n for the hierarchization o f the w ork-force and its
hig h ly unequal distributions o f rew ard. W h a t w e m ean by
racism is th at set o f ideological statem ents com bined w ith th at
set o f co n tin u in g practices w h ich have had the consequence o f
m ain tainin g a h ig h correlation o f ethnicity and w ork-force
allocation over tim e. T he ideological statem ents have been in
th e form o f allegations th at genetic a n d /o r long-lasting
cu ltu ra l traits o f various groups are the m ajor cause o f dif
ferential allocation to positions in the econom ic structures.
H ow ever, th e beliefs th at certain groups w ere su p erio r to
others in certain characteristics relevant to perform ance in the
econom ic arena always came into being after, rather than
before, th e location o f these groups in the w ork-force. R acism
has always been post hoc. It has been asserted th at those w h o
have been econom ically and politically oppressed are culturally
19
in ferio r. If, for any reason, the locus in the econom ic hierar
chy changed, th e locus in the social hierarchy tended to follow
(w ith som e lag, to be sure, since it always to o k a generation or
tw o to eradicate the effect o f previous socialization).
Racism has served as an overall ideology ju stify in g inequali
ty . B ut it has been m uch m ore. It has served to socialize
groups in to their o w n role in the econom y. T h e attitudes in
culcated (the prejudices, the overtly discrim inatory behaviour
in everyday life) served to establish the fram ew ork o f appro
priate and leg itim ate behaviour for oneself and for others in
o n e s o w n hou seh o ld and eth n ic g ro u p . R acism , ju s t like sex
ism , fu n ctio n ed as a self-suppressive ideology, fashioning e x
pectations and lim itin g them .
R acism was certainly n o t only self-suppressive; it was
oppressive. It served to keep lo w -ran k in g groups in line, and
u tilize m id dle-ranking groups as the unpaid soldiers o f the
w o rld police system . In this w ay, n o t only w ere the financial
costs o f th e political structures reduced significantly, b u t the
ability o f anti-system ic groups to m obilize w ide populations
w as rendered m o re difficult, since racism structually set vic
tim s against victim s.
R acism w as n o t a sim ple phenom enon. T h ere w as in a sense
a basic w o rld -w id e fault line, m ark in g off relative status in the
w orld-system as a w h ole. T his was the co lo u r line. W h a t
was w h ite or u p p er stratu m has o f course been a social and
no t a physiological p h en o m en o n , as should be evident by the
historically-shifting position, in w o rld w id e (and national)
socially-defined co lo u r lines, o f such groups as southern
E uropeans, A rabs, L atin A m erican m estizos, and East Asians.
C o lo u r (or physiology) w as an easy tag to utilize, since it is
inh eren tly h ard to disguise, and, insofar as it has been historic
ally convenient, given the origins o f historical capitalism in
80
E u ro p e, it has been u tilize d . B ut w henever it w as n o t co n v e

nien t, it has been discarded o r m odified in favour o f o th er
id en tify in g characteristics. In m any particular places, th e sets
of identifiers h ave th u s becom e quite com plex. W h e n one c o n
siders th e additional fact th a t th e social division o f labour was
constan tly evolving, eth n ic/racial identification tu rn ed o u t to
be a hig h ly unstable basis for delineating th e boundaries o f the
existing social groups. G roups came and w e n t and changed
th eir self-definitions w ith considerable ease (and w e re perceiv
ed by o th ers as hav in g d ifferent boundaries w ith equal ease).
B ut the volatility o f any given g ro u p s boundaries was n o t in
consistent w ith , indeed was probably a fu n c tio n of, th e p er
sistence of an overall hierarchy o f groups, th at is, the eth n ici
zatio n o f th e w o rld w ork-force.
R acism has th u s been a cu ltu ral pillar o f historical capital
ism . Its intellectual v acuity has no t prevented it fro m unleash
ing terrible cruelties. N onetheless, given the rise of the
w o rld s anti-system ic m ovem ents in th e past fifty to one h u n
dred years, it has recently been u n d er sharp attack. Indeed, to
day racism in its crude variants is u n d erg o in g som e
d eleg itim izatio n at th e w o rld level. R acism , h ow ever, has not
been th e only ideological pillar o f historical capitalism . R acism
has been of greatest im portance in co n stru ctio n and rep ro d u c
tio n o f appropriate w o rk forces. T heir re p ro d u ctio n
nonetheless was insufficient to p erm it th e endless accum ula
tio n o f capital. W o rk -fo rces could n o t be expected to perform
efficiently and co n tin u o u sly unless they w ere m anaged by
cadres. C adres to o have had to be created, socialized,
reproduced. T h e p rim ary ideology th a t operated to create,
socialize, and reproduce th em was n o t the ideology o f racism .
It w as th a t of universalism .
U niversalism is an epistem ology. It is a set o f beliefs about
w h a t is kno w ab le and h o w it can be k n o w n . T h e essence of
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this view is th a t th ere exist m eaningful general statem ents

ab out th e w o rld th e physical w o rld , the social w o rld th at
are universally and perm anently true, and th at the object o f
science is th e search for these general statem ents in a fo rm th a t
elim inates all so-called subjective, th a t is, all historically-con
strained, elem ents fro m its form ulation.
T he belief in universalism has been the keystone o f the ideo
logical arch o f historical capitalism . U niversalism is a faith, as
w ell as an epistem ology. It requires n o t m erely respect b u t re
verence for th e elusive b u t allegedly real phen o m en o n o f tru th .
T h e universities have been b o th the w o rk sh o p s o f the ideology
and the tem ples o f th e faith. H arvard em blazons Veritas on its
escutcheon. W h ile it has always been asserted th a t one could
never k n o w tru th definitively this is w h a t is supposed to dis
tin g u ish m o d ern science from m edieval W e ste rn th eology it
was also constantly asserted th a t the search for tru th was the
raison d etre of th e u n iversity, and m ore w idely o f all intellec
tual activity. K eats, to ju stify art, told us th a t tru th is beauty,
b eau ty t r u t h . In th e U n ited States, a favourite political ju s tifi
cation o f civil liberties is th at tru th can only be k n o w n as a
result o f th e interplay th a t occurs in th e free m arket-place of
ideas.
T ru th as a cu ltu ral ideal has functioned as an opiate, perhaps
th e only serious opiate o f the m odern w o rld . K arl M arx said
th at religion was th e opiate o f the masses. R ay m o n d A ro n re
to rte d th at M arxist ideas w ere in tu rn the opiate o f the in tel
lectuals. T h ere is perspicacity in b o th these polem ical th ru sts.
B ut is perspicacity tru th ? I w ish to suggest th a t perhaps tru th
has been th e real opiate, o f b o th the masses and the intellec
tuals. O p iates, to be sure, are n o t u n re m ittin g ly evil. T hey
ease pain. T h ey enable people to escape from h ard realities
w h en th ey fear th a t co n fro n tatio n w ith reality can only
precipitate inevitable loss or decline. B ut nonetheless m ost o f
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us do n o t recom m end opiates. N eith er M arx nor R ay m o n d

A ro n did. In m o st states and for m o st purposes they are il
legal.
O u r collective education has tau g h t us th at th e search for
tru th is a disinterested v irtu e w h en in fact it is a self-interested
ratio n alizatio n . T h e search for tru th , proclaim ed as th e corner
stone o f progress, and therefore o f w ell-being, has been at the
very least consonant w ith the m aintenance o f a hierarchical,
unequal social stru ctu re in a num ber o f specific respects. T h e
processes involved in the expansion o f the capitalist w orldeconom y th e peripheralization o f econom ic stru ctu res, the
creation o f w eak state structures participating in and co n
strain ed by an in terstate system involved a n u m b e r o f pres
sures at th e level o f culture: C hristian proselytization; the im
p osition o f E uropean language; in stru ctio n in specific tech n o
logies and m ores; changes in th e legal codes. M any o f these
changes w ere m ade m an u m ilitari. O th ers w ere achieved by
the persuasion o f ed u cato rs, w h o se a u th o rity w as ultim ately
backed by m ilitary force. T h at is th at com plex o f processes w e
som etim es label w e ste rn izatio n 1, or even m o re arrogantly
m o d e rn iz a tio n , and w hich w as legitim ated b y the desirabili
ty o f sharing b o th th e fruits o f and faith in the ideology o f u n i
versalism .
T h ere w ere tw o m ain m otives behind these enforced
cultural changes. O n e w as econom ic efficiency. If giv en p e r
sons w ere expected to p erfo rm in given w ays in th e econom ic
arenas, it w as efficient b o th to teach th em the requisite
cultural n orm s and to eradicate com peting cultural norm s.
T h e second was political security. It was believed th at if the
so-called elites o f peripheral areas w ere w e ste rn ized , they
w o u ld be separated from their m asses, and hence less likely
to re v o lt certainly less able to organize a fo llo w in g for
revolts. T his tu rn ed o u t to be a m o n u m en tal m iscalculation,
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b u t it w as plausible and did w o rk for a w hile. (A th ird m otive

was hybris on the part o f the conquerors. I do n o t discount it,
b u t it is n o t necessary to invoke it in order to account for the
cultural pressures, w hich w o u ld have been ju s t as great in its
absence.)
W h e rea s racism served as a m echanism o f w o rld -w id e c o n
tro l o f direct producers, universalism served to direct th e acti
vities o f th e bourgeoisie o f o th e r states and various m iddle
strata w o rld -w id e in to channels th at w o u ld m axim ize the
close in teg ra tio n o f p ro d u c tio n processes and the sm o o th o p
eration o f th e in terstate system , th ereb y facilitating the accu
m u latio n o f capital. T his required the creation o f a w orld
bourgeois cu ltu ral fram ew ork th at could be grafted o n to na
tio n al variations. T h is w as particularly im p o rtan t in term s o f
science and technology, b u t also in the realm o f political ideas
and th e social sciences.
T h e concept o f a neutral universal cu ltu re to w hich th e
cadres o f th e w o rld division o f labour w o u ld be assim ilated
(the passive voice b eing im p o rta n t here) hence came to serve as
one o f the pillars o f th e w orld-system as it historically evolved.
T h e ex altation o f progress, and later o f m o d e rn iz a tio n , sum
m arized this set o f ideas, w hich served less as tru e norm s of
social action than as status-sym bols o f obeisance and o f p artici
p atio n in the w o rld s upper strata. T h e break from the su p
posedly cu ltu ra lly -n a rro w religious bases o f kno w led g e in
favour o f supposedly trans-cultural scientific bases o f
k n o w led g e served as the self-justification o f a particularly p e r
nicious form o f c u ltu ra l im peralism . It dom inated in th e nam e
o f intellectual liberation; it im posed in the nam e o f scepticism .
T h e process o f ra tio n alizatio n central to capitalism has re
qu ired th e creation o f an interm ediate stratu m com prising the
specialists o f this ratio n alizatio n , as adm inistrators, tech n i
cians, scientists, educators. T he very com plexity o f not only
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th e technology b u t th e social system has m ade it essential th at

this stratu m be large and, over titne, expanding. T he funds
th at have been used to sup p o rt it have been d ra w n from the
global surplus, as extracted th ro u g h entrepreneurs and states.
In this elem entary b u t fundam ental sense these cadres have
therefore been part o f the bourgeoisie w hose claim to p ar
ticip atio n in the sh aring-out o f the surplus has been given
precise ideological fo rm in the tw e n tie th -c e n tu ry concept of
hum an capital. H aving relatively little real capital to transm it
as th e h eritage o f th eir household, such cadres have so u g h t to
guarantee succession b y securing preferential access for their
children to th e educational channels w h ich guarantee position.
T his preferential access has been conveniently presented as
achievem ent, supposedly legitim ated by a narrow ly-defined
equality o f o p p o rtu n ity .
Scientific cu lture th u s became th e fraternal code o f th e
w o rld s accum ulators o f capital. It served first o f all to ju stify
b o th their o w n activities and the differential rew ards from
w h ich th ey benefited. It p ro m o ted technological innovation.
It leg itim ated th e harsh elim ination o f barriers to th e ex pan
sion o f p ro d u c tiv e efficiencies. It generated a form o f progress
th at w o u ld be o f benefit to all if n o t im m ediately th en even
tually.
Scientific cu ltu re w as m o re how ever than a m ere ra tio n ali
zatio n . It w as a fo rm o f socialization o f the diverse elem ents
th at w ere th e cadres o f all the in stitu tio n al structures th at
w ere needed. As a language com m on to cadres b u t n o t d irect
ly to th e labour-force, it becam e also a m eans o f class cohesion
for the upper stratu m , lim itin g the prospects or ex ten t of re
bellious activ ity on th e p art o f cadres w h o m ig h t be so te m p t
ed. F u rth erm o re, it w as a flexible m echanism for the re p ro
d u ctio n o f these cadres. It lent itself to th e concept k n o w n to
day as m erito cracy , previously la carriere ouverte aux
Rationality and Rationalization
85
tale n ts. Scientific cu ltu re created a fram ew o rk w ith in w h ich

individual m o b ility was possible w ith o u t th reaten in g hierar
chical w ork -fo rce allocation. O n the co n trary , m eritocracy
reinforced hierarchy. Finally, m eritocracy as an o peration and
scientific cu ltu re as an ideology created veils th at hindered
perception o f th e u nderlying operations o f historical capital
ism . T h e great em phasis on the rationality o f scientific activity
w as th e m ask o f th e irratio n ality o f endless accum ulation.
U niversalism and racism m ay seem on the surface strange
bedfellow s, if n o t virtually antithetical doctrines one open,
th e o th er closed; one equalizing, the o th er polarizing; one in
v itin g rational discourse, the o ther incarnating prejudice. Y et,
since these tw o doctrines have spread and prevailed co n
co m itan tly w ith th e evolution o f historical capitalism , w e
should look m o re closely at the ways in w h ich they m ay have
been com patible.
T h ere w as a catch to universalism . It did n o t m ake its w ay
as a free-floating ideology b u t as one propagated by those w h o
held econom ic and political pow er in the w orld-system o f
historical capitalism . U niversalism w as offered to the w o rld as
a g ift o f th e p o w e rfu l to th e w e ak . Timeo Danaos et dona
ferentesl T h e g ift its e lf h arboured racism , for it gave th e reci
pient tw o choices: accept the gift, thereby acknow ledging th at
one was lo w on the hierarchy o f achieved w isdom ; refuse the
g ift, thereby d enying oneself w eapons th at could reverse the
unequal real p o w e r situation.
It is n o t strange th at even the cadres w h o w ere being co
o p ted in to privilege w ere deeply am bivalent about the m essage
o f universalism , vacillating b etw een enthusiastic discipleship
and a cultural rejection b ro u g h t on b y repugnance for racist as
su m ptions. T his am bivalence w as expressed in the m ultiple
m ovem ents o f cu ltu ral renaissance. T he very w o rd renais
sance, w h ich w as w idely used in m any zones o f the w o rld ,
86
itself incarnated th e am bivalence. By speaking o f re b irth , one

affirm ed an era o f p rio r cultural g lo ry b u t one also ac k n o w
ledged a cu ltu ral in feriority as o f th at m o m en t. T h e w o rd re
b irth w as itself copied fro m the specific cultural h isto ry o f
Europe.
O n e m ig h t have th o u g h t th at the w o rld s w ork-forces w ere
m o re im m u n e from this am bivalence, never having been in
vited to sup at th e lo rd s table. In fact, how ever, th e political
expressions o f th e w o rld s w ork-forces, the anti-system ic
m o v em ents, have them selves been deeply im bued w ith the
same am bivalence. T h e anti-system ic m ovem ents, as w e have
already rem arked, clothed them selves in th e ideology o f the
E n lig h te n m en t, itself a prim e p ro d u c t o f universalist ideology.
T h ey th ereb y lay for them selves th e cu ltu ra l trap in w h ich
they have rem ained ever since: seeking to u n d erm in e historical
capitalism , using strategies and setting m ed iu m -term objec
tives th at derived fro m the very ideas o f the ru lin g classes
they so u g h t to destroy.
T h e socialist variant o f anti-system ic m ovem ents w as, fro m
th e o u tset, co m m itted to scientific progress. M arx, w ish in g to
distin g u ish him self from o th ers he denounced as U topians,
asserted th at he w as advocating scientific socalism . His
w ritin g s laid em phasis o n the w ays in w h ich capitalism was
progressive. T h e concept th at socialism w o u ld com e first in
the m ost advanced countries suggested a process w hereby
socialism w o u ld g ro w o u t o f (as w ell as in reaction to) the fu r
th er advancem ent o f capitalism . T he socialist revolution
w o u ld th u s em ulate and come after the bourgeois re v o lu tio n .
Some later theorists even argued that it w as therefore th e d u ty
o f socialists to assist in the bourgeois rev o lu tio n in th o se c o u n
tries in w h ich it had n o t yet occurred.
T h e later differences b etw een the Second and T h ird In te r
nationals did n o t involve a disagreem ent over this epistem o-
87
logy, w h ich b o th shared. Indeed, b o th Social-D em ocrats and

C o m m u n ists in p o w e r have ten d ed to give great p ro rity to the
fu rth e r developm ent o f the m eans o f p ro d u ctio n . L en in s
slogan th at C o m m unism equals socialism plus electricity still
hangs to day in en o rm ous banners on the streets o f M oscow .
Insofar as these m ovem ents, once in p o w e r Social-D em o
crats and C o m m u n ists alike im plem ented S talins slogans o f
socialism in one c o u n try , they thereby necessarily furthered
the process o f th e com m odification o f every th in g th at has been
so essential to th e global accum ulation o f capital. Insofar as
they rem ained w ith in the in terstate system indeed struggled
to rem ain w ith in it against all attem pts to oust th e m they ac
cepted and fu rth ered the w o rld -w id e reality o f the dom inance
o f th e law o f value. Socialist m a n looked suspiciously like
T aylorism ru n w ild.
T here have been o f course socialist ideologies w hich have
p u rp o rte d to reject the universalism o f the E n lig h ten m en t,
and have advocated various indigenous varieties o f socalism
for peripheral zones o f the w orld-econom y. T o the ex ten t that
these fo rm ulations w ere m ore than m ere rhetoric, they seemed
to be de facto attem p ts to use as a base u n it o f the process of
com m odification not the new households that share incom e
b u t larger co m m u n al entities th at were, it w as argued, m ore
tra d itio n a l. By and large, these attem p ts, w hen serious,
tu rn ed o u t to be fruitless. In any case, the m ainstream o f
w o rld socialist m o vem ents tended to denounce these attem pts
as non-socialist, as form s o f a re tro g rad e cultural nationalism .
A t first view, th e nationalist variety o f anti-system ic m ove
m en ts, by the very centrality o f their separatist them es, seem
ed less beholden to the ideology o f universalism . A closer
look, h o w ev er, belies this im pression. C ertainly, nationalism
inevitably had a cultural co m ponent, in w h ich particular
m ovem ents argued for the reinforcem ent o f national trad i
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tio n s , a n atio n al language, often a religious heritage. B ut was

cultu ral nationalism cu ltural resistance to the pressures o f the
accum ulators o f capital? In fact, tw o m ajor elem ents o f
cultural nationalism m oved in opposite directions. F irst, the
u n it chosen as th e vehicle to contain the culture tended to be
the state that w as a m em ber o f the interstate system . It w as
m ost o ften this state th at was invested w ith a n atio n al
cultu re. In virtually every case, this involved a d isto rtio n of
cultu ral co n tin u ities, frequently very severe. In alm ost all
cases, th e assertion of a state-encased national culture in ev it
ably involved as m u ch suppression of continuities as reasser
tion o f th em . In all cases, it reinforced the state structures, and
thus the interstate system , and historical capitalism as a w o rld system .
Secondly, a com parative look at the cultural reassertions
a m o n g all these states m akes clear th at w h ile th ey varied in
form , th e y tended to b e identical in co n ten t. T h e m orphem es
o f the languages differed b u t the vocabulary list began to c o n
verge. T h e rituals and theologies o f the w o rld s religions
m ig h t all have been reinvigorated b u t they began to be less
different in actual co n ten t than previously. A n d the
antecedents o f scientificity w e re rediscovered u n d er m any diff
e ren t nam es. In sh o rt, m u ch o f cultural nationalism has been a
gigantic charade. M ore than th at, cultural nationalism like
socialist c u ltu re has often been a m ajor stalw art of the universalist ideo lo g y o f th e m odern w o rld , purveying it to the
w o rld s w ork-forces in w ays th ey found m o re palatable. In
this sense, the anti-system ic m ovem ents have often served as
the cu ltu ra l interm ediaries o f the pow erful to the w eak ,
v itiatin g rather th an crystallizing their deep-rooted sources o f
resistance.
89
T he co ntradictions inherent in the state-seizure strategy o f

anti-system ic m o v em ents com bined w ith their tacit acceptance
o f the universalist epistem ology has had serious consequences
for these m o v em en ts. T hey have had to deal increasingly w ith
the p h en o m en o n o f disillusionm ent, to w hich their m ajor
ideological response has been the reaffirm ation o f the central
ju stificatio n o f historical capitalism : the autom atic and in
evitable quality o f progress, o r as it is n o w popular to say in
the u s s r th e scientific-technological re v o lu tio n .
B eginning in th e tw e n tie th century, and w ith increasing
vehem ence since the 1960s, the them e of the civilizational
p ro jec t, as A n o u a r A bdel-M alek likes to call it, has b eg u n to
g ain stren g th . W h ile for m an y the n ew language o f en
dogenous alternatives has served as m erely a verbal variant o f
old universalizing cu ltu ra l nationalist them es, for others there
is genuinely n ew epistem ological co n ten t in the them e. T he
civilizational p ro je c t has reopened the question o f w h eth er
transhistorical tru th s really exist. A form o f tru th , w hich
reflected th e p o w er realities and econom ic im peratives o f
historical capitalism , has flourished and perm eated the globe.
T h at is tru e, as w e have seen. B ut h o w m uch light does this
fo rm o f tru th shed u p on the process o f decline o f this historical
system , or on th e existence o f real historical alternatives to
historical system based on the endless accum ulation o f capital?
T h erein lies the question.
T his n ew er form o f fundam ental cu ltu ral resistance has a
m aterial base. T h e successive m obilizations o f the w o rld s
anti-system ic m o v em ents have increasingly over tim e recruited
elements economically and politically m ore m arginal to the
fu n ctio n in g o f the system and less likely to p ro fit, even even
tually, from th e accum ulated surplus. A t the same tim e, the
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successive d em y th o lo g izations o f these m ovem ents them selves

have u n d erm in ed th e rep ro d u ctio n o f universalist ideology
w ith in th em , and th e m ovem ents have thus begun to be open
to m o re and m o re o f these elem ents w h o have questioned ever
m o re o f th eir prem isses. C om pared w ith the profile o f th e
m em bership o f th e w o rld s anti-system ic m o v em en ts from
1850 to 1950, th e ir p ro file from 1950 onw ards con tain ed m o re
fro m peripheral zones, m ore w o m en , m ore from m in o rity
g ro u p s (how ever defined), and m o re o f th e w o rk -fo rce
tow ard s th e unskilled, low est-paid end o f th e scale. T his was
tru e b o th in th e w o rld as a w h o le an d w ith in all th e states,
bo th in th e m em bership and in the leadership. Such a shift in
social base could n o t b u t alter the cultural-ideological predilec
tions o f th e w o rld s anti-system ic m ovem ents.
W e have tried thus far to describe h o w capitalism has in fact
op erated as a historical system . H istorical system s how ever are
ju s t th a t historical. T hey com e in to existence and eventually
go o u t o f existence, th e consequence o f in tern a l processes in
w h ich th e exacerbation o f th e internal contradictions lead to a
structural crisis. S tru ctural crises are m assive, n o t m o m en tary .
T h ey take tim e to play them selves o u t. H istorical capitalism
. en tered in to its stru ctu ral crisis in the early tw e n tie th ce n tu ry
and w ill p ro b ab ly see its dem ise as a historical system
som etim e in th e n ex t century. W h a t w ill follow is hazardous
to p redict. W h a t w e can do n o w is analyze the dim ensions o f
the stru c tu ra l crisis itself and try to preceive th e directions in
w h ich th e system ic crisis is taking us.
T h e first and pro b ab ly m o st fundam ental aspect o f this crisis
is th at w e are n o w close to the com m odification o f every
th in g . T h at is, historical capitalism is in crisis precisely
because, in p u rsu in g the endless accum ulation o f capital, it is
beg in n in g to ap p roxim ate th a t state o f being A dam Sm ith as
R a tio n a lity and R ationalization
91
serted w as n a tu ra l to m a n b u t w hich has never historically

e s te d . T h e p ro p e n sity [o f hum anity] to tru c k , barter, and
exchange one th in g for a n o th e r has entered in to dom ains and
zones previously u n to u ch ed , and th e pressure to expand co m
m odification is relatively unchecked. M arx spoke o f the
m ark e t as being a veil that hid the social relations o f p ro d u c
tio n . T h is was only tru e in the sense th at, in com parison w ith
d irect local appropriation o f surplus, in d irect m ark e t (and
therefore extra-local) appropriation o f surplus was harder to
discern and th u s m o re difficult to co m b at politically for the
w o rld s w ork -fo rce. T h e m a rk e t how ever operated in th e
q u an titativ e term s o f a general m easure, m o n ey , and th is clari
fied ra th e r th an m ystified h o w m u ch was actually being ap
pro p riated . W h a t th e accum ulators o f capital have co u n ted on
as a political safety-net is th at o n ly part o f the labour has been
so m easured. Insofar as m ore and m ore labour is com m odified,
and ho u seh o ld in g becom es m ore and m ore a nexus o f com
m o d ity relations, th e flow o f surplus becomes m o re and m ore
visible. T h e political counterpressures th e re b y becom e m o re
and m o re m obilized, and the stru ctu re o f th e econom y m o re
and m o re a direct targ e t o f th e m obilization. T h e ac
cum u lato rs o f capital, far from seeking to speed up p ro
letarianization, try to re ta rd it. B ut th ey cannot do so entirely,
because o f th e co ntradictions o f th eir o w n interests, being
b o th individual e n tre p ren e u r and m em bers o f a class.
T his is a steady, ceaseless process, im possible to contain as
lo n g as th e econom y driven by the endless accum ulation o f
capital. T h e system m ay p ro lo n g its life by slow ing d o w n
some o f th e activities w h ic h are w e arin g it o u t, but death
always loom s som ew here on the horizon.
O n e o f th e w ays in w h ich the accum ulators o f capital have
pro lo n g ed th e system is th e political constraints they have
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b u ilt in to it, w h ich have forced anti-system ic m ovem ents

along th e paths o f the creation o f form al organizations using a
strateg y o f seizure o f state p o w er. T h ey had no real choice,
b u t the. strateg y w as a self-lim iting one.
H o w ev er, as w e have seen, the contradictions o f this
strateg y have them selves b re d a crisis at the political level.
T his is n o t a crisis o f th e interstate system , w hich is still func
tio n in g very w ell in its p rim ary m ission to m aintain hierarchy
and co n tain o p position m ovem ents. T he political crisis is the
crisis o f th e anti-system ic m ovem ents them selves. As th e dis
tin ctio n betw een socialist and nationalist m ovem ents begins to
blu r, and as m o re and m o re o f these m ovem ents achieve state
p o w e r (w ith all its lim itations), the w o rld w id e collectivity o f
m ovem ents has forced u p o n it a reassessm ent o f all its pieties
deriv in g from th e orig inal analyses o f the n in eteen th century.
As th e success o f accum ulators in accum ulating has created to o
m u ch com m odification w h ich threatens the system as such, so
the success o f th e anti-system ic m ovem ents in seizing pow er
has created to o m uch reinforcem ent o f the system w h ich
threatens to break th ro u g h the acceptance b y the w o rld s
w ork -fo rces of this self-lim iting strategy.
Finally, the crisis is cultural. T he crisis o f the anti-system ic
m ov em en ts, th e q u estio n in g o f basic strategy, is leading to a
questioning o f the premisses o f universalist ideology. This is
goin g on in tw o arenas: the m ovem ents w here the search for
civilizational alternatives is for the first tim e being taken
seriously; and intellectual life, w here the w hole intellectual ap
paratus w hich cam e into bein g from the fo u rteen th ce n tu ry on
is being slow ly placed in d o u b t. In p a rt, once again, this d o u b t
is the p ro d u ct o f its success. In the physical sciences, the in te r
nal processes o f en quiry generated by m odern scientific
m eth o d seem to be leading to the questio n in g o f th e existing
R a tio n a lity and R ationalization
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o f the universal law s w hich w ere its prem iss. T oday there is
talk o f insertin g tem p o ra lity in to science. In the social
sciences, a p o o r relation at one level, b u t the queen (th at is,
the culm ination) o f the sciences at another level, the w h o le
developm entalist p aradigm is today being explicity questioned
at its heart.
T h e re-o p en in g o f intellectual issues is on the one hand
therefore the p ro d u c t o f in tern al success and internal c o n
tradictions. B ut it is also the p ro d u c t of the pressures o f the
m ovem ents, them selves in crisis, to be able to cope w ith , fight
m o re effectively against, the structures o f historical capitalism ,
w hose crisis is th e startin g -p o in t o f all other activity.
T h e crisis o f historical capitalism is often spoken o f as the
tran sitio n from capitalism to socialism. I agree w ith the for
m u la, b u t it does n o t say m uch. W e do n o t k n o w yet h o w a
socialist w o rld order, one that radically narrow s the gap o f
m aterial w ell-being and disparity o f real p o w e r betw een all
persons, w o u ld operate. E x istin g states or m ovem ents w h ich
call them selves socialist offer little gu id e to the fu tu re. T h e y
are phenom ena o f the present, th at is o f the historical capitalist
w o rld -sy stem , and m u st be evaluated w ith in th a t fram ew ork.
T h ey m ay be agents o f the dem ise o f capitalism , though hard
ly uniform ly so, as w e have indicated. B ut the fu tu re w o rld
order w ill co n stru c t itself slowly, in w ays w e can barely im
agine, never m ind p redict. It is therefore som ew hat a leap of
faith to believe th at it w ill be good, or even b etter. B ut w h a t
w e have w e k n o w has n o t been good, and as historical
capitalism has proceeded o n its historical p ath , it has in m y
v iew by its v ery success g o t w orse, n o t b etter.
4.
Conclusion:
On Progress and
Transitions
If there is one idea w h ich is associated w ith the m odern w o rld ,

is indeed its centrepiece, it is th at o f progress. T h a t is n o t to
say th at everyone has believed in progress. In the great public
ideological debate b etw een conservatives and liberals, w hich
p artly preceded, b u t m o re especially follow ed, the French
R ev o lu tio n , th e essence o f the conservative position lay in
d o u b t th at the changes th at Europe and the w o rld w ere u n d e r
go in g could be considered progress, or indeed th at progress
w as a relevant and m eaningful concept. N evertheless, as w e
k n o w , it w as th e liberals w h o heralded the age and incarnated
w h a t w o u ld becom e in the n in etee n th century the dom inant
ideology o f th e lon g -ex istin g capitalist w orld-econom y.
It is n o t surprising that liberals believed in progress. T he
idea o f progress justified th e entire transition from feudalism
to capitalism . It legitim ated the b reak in g of the rem aining o p
po sition to th e com m odification o f e v e ry th in g , and it tended
to w ipe aw ay all the negatives of capitalism on the grounds
th at th e benefits o u tw eig h ed , by far, the h arm . It is n o t at all
surprising, therefore, th a t liberals believed in progress.
W h a t is surprising is th at their ideological opponents, the
M arxists th e anti-liberals, the representatives o f the oppress
ed w o rk in g classes believed in progress w ith at least as m uch
passion as the liberals. N o d o u b t, this belief served an im p o r
tan t ideological purpose for them in tu rn . It ju stified the acti
vities o f the w o rld socialist m ovem ent on the grounds th at it
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in carn ated the inevitable tren d o f historical developm ent. F u r

th erm o re, it seem ed v ery clever to p ro p o u n d this ideology, in
th a t it p u rp o rte d to use the very ideas o f bourgeois liberals to
co n fo u n d them .
T h ere w ere u n fo rtunately tw o m inor shortcom ings w ith
the seem ingly astute and certainly enthusiastic em brace o f this
secular faith in progress. W h ile th e idea o f progress justified
socialism, it ju stified capitalism to o . O n e could hardly sing
hosannas to th e p ro letariat w ith o u t offering p rio r praise to the
bourgeoisie. M arx s fam ous w ritin g s on India offered am ple
evidence of this, b u t so indeed did the Communist Manifesto.
F u rth erm o re, th e m easure o f progress being m aterialist (and
could M arxists n o t assent to this?), th e idea o f progress could
be turn ed , and has been tu rn ed in the past fifty years, against
all the experim ents in socialism . W h o has no t heard the con
dem nations o f th e u s s r on the grounds th at its standard o f liv
ing is belo w th at o f th e u s a ? F u rth erm o re , despite
K ru sh ch ev s boasts, there is little reason to believe th at this
disparity w ill cease to exist fifty years from n o w .
T h e M arxist em brace o f an ev olutionary m odel o f progress
has been an enorm ous trap, w hich socialists have begun to
suspect only recently, as one elem ent in th e ideological crisis
th a t has been part o f the overall structural crisis o f the capital
ist w o rld -eco n o m y .
It is sim ply not tru e th a t capitalism as a historical system has
represented progress over the various previous historical
system s th at it destroyed or transform ed. Even as I w rite this,
I feel th e trem o u r that accom panies th e sense o f blasphem y. I
fear the w ra th o f th e gods, for I have been m oulded in the
same ideological forge as all m y com peers and have w o rsh ip p
ed at the same shrines.
O n e o f the problem s in analyzing progress is the one-sidedness o f all m easures proposed. It is said th at scientific and tech
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nological progress is unquestionable and b reath tak in g , w hich

is surely tru e , especially insofar as m o st technical know ledge is
cum u lativ e. B ut w e never seriously discuss h o w m uch k n o w
ledge w e have lost in the w o rld -w id e sweep o f the ideology o f
universalism . O r if w e do, w e categorize such lost know ledge
as m ere (?) w isd o m . Y et, at the sim ple technical levels o f agri
cu ltu ra l p ro d u c tiv ity and biological w holeness, w e have been
discovering o f late th at m ethods o f hum an action discarded a
cen tu ry or tw o ago (a process enforced by enlightened elites
u p o n b ack w ard masses) often need to be revived because they
tu rn o u t to be m ore, no t less, efficacious. M ore im p o rtan tly ,
w e are discovering at the very frontiers o f advanced science
th e ten tativ e reinsertion o f premisses triu m p h an tly discarded a
century, or five centuries, ago.
It is said th at historical capitalism has transform ed the
m echanical outreach o f hum anity. Each input o f hum an
energy has been rew arded w ith steadily greater o u tp u ts o f p ro
ducts, w h ich is surely tru e as w ell. B ut w e do not calculate to
w h a t degree this has m eant th a t h u m an ity has reduced or in
creased th e to tal in p u ts o f en erg y th a t individuals separately,
or all people w ith in the capitalist w orld-econom y collectively,
have been called u p o n to invest, w h e th e r per u n it o f tim e or
per lifetim e. C an w e be so sure th a t the w o rld is less b u rd e n
some un d er historical capitalism th a n under p rio r systems?
T h ere is am ple reason to d o u b t this, as is attested b y the incor
p o ra tio n w ith in o ur very superegos o f the com pulsion to
w o rk .
It is said th at under no previous historical system did people
live as co m fortable a m aterial life or have such a range o f alter
native life-experiences at their disposal as in this present
system . O n ce again, this assertion rings tru e , is revealed by
those com parison w e regularly m ake w ith the lives o f o u r im
m ediate ancestors. Still, doubts in this dom ain have g ro w n
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steadily th ro u g h o u t the tw e n tie th century, as our n o w fre

qu ent references to quality o f life and m o u n tin g concern
w ith anom ie, alienation, and psychic m aladies indicate. Finally
it is said th at historical capitalism has b ro u g h t a m assive in
crease in the m arg in o f hum an safety against h u rt and death
from endem ic dangers (the four horsem en o f the Apocalypse)
and against erratic violence. O n ce again this is incontestable at
a m icro level (despite the recently rediscovered dangers o f u rb
an life). B ut has this really been tru e at a m acro level, even up
to n o w , and even o m ittin g the D am oclean sw ord of nuclear
w ar?
It is, let m e say, at th e very least by no m eans self-evident
th a t there is m o re lib erty , equality, and fratern ity in the w o rld
today th an there w as one thousand years ago. O n e m ig h t
arguably suggest th at the opposite is tru e. I seek to paint no
idyll o f th e w o rld s before historical capitalism . T h e y w ere
w orlds o f little liberty, little equality, and little fraternity. T he
only q u estion is w h e th e r historical capitalism represented p ro
gress in these regards, or regression.
I do n o t speak o f a m easure o f com parative cruelties. T his
w o u ld be hard to devise, lugubrious also, alth o u g h there is lit
tle reason to be sanguine about the record o f historical capital
ism in this arena. T h e w o rld o f th e tw e n tie th ce n tu ry can lay
claim to have ex h ib ited som e unusual talents o f refinem ent in
these ancient arts. N o r do I speak o f the m o u n tin g and tru ly
incredible social w aste th a t has been the result o f th e com
petitive race for th e endless accum ulation o f capital, a level o f
w aste th at m ay begin to border on the irreparable.
I rath er wish to rest m y case on m aterial considerations, no t
those o f the social fu tu re b u t those o f the actual historical
period o f th e capitalist w orld-econom y. T h e a rg u m e n t is sim
ple if audacious. I w ish to defend the one M arxist pro p o sitio n
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w h ich even o rth o d o x M arxists tend to b u ry in sham e, the

thesis o f th e absolute (n o t relative) im m iseration o f the p ro
letariat.
I hear the friendly w hispers. Surely y o u cant be serious;
surely y o u m ean relative im m iseration? Is no t th e industrial
w o rk e r strik in g ly b e tte r o ff to d ay th an in 1800? T h e in
d u strial w o rk e r, yes, or at least m an y industrial w o rk ers. B u t
industrial w o rk ers still com prise a relatively sm all p art o f the
w o rld s p o p ulation. T h e ov erw h elm in g p ro p o rtio n o f the
w o rld s w ork-forces, w h o live in ru ral zones or m ove b etw een
th em and u rb a n slums, are w orse off th an their ancestors five
h u ndred years ago. T h ey eat less w ell, and certainly have a less
balanced diet. A lth o u g h they are m o re likely to survive the
first year o f life (because o f the effect o f social hygiene u n d er
taken to p ro tec t the privileged), I d o u b t th at the life prospects
o f th e m ajo rity of the w o rld s p o pulation as o f age one are
g reater th an previously; I suspect the opposite is true. T hey
unquestionably w o rk harder m ore hours per day, per year,
per lifetim e. A nd since they do this for less to ta l rew ard, the
rate o f ex p lo itatio n has escalated very sharply.
A re th ey politically and socially m ore oppressed or m ore ex
ploited econom ically? This is harder to analyze. As Jack
G oody once said, social science possesses no euphorim eters.
T h e small co m m unities w ith in w hich m ost people led their
lives in p rio r historical systems involved a form o f social con
tro l w hich certainly constrained h u m an choice and social
variability. It no d o u b t appeared to m an y as a p h en o m en o n o f
active oppression. T h e o th ers, w h o w e re m o re satisfied, paid
for th e ir c o n te n t w ith a n arro w vision o f hu m an possibility.
T h e co n stru ctio n o f historical capitalism has involved, as w e
all k n o w , th e steady d im in u tio n , even th e to ta l elim ination, o f
th e role of these small co m m u n ity structures. B ut w h a t has
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taken th eir place? In m an y areas, and for lo n g periods, the

p rio r role o f the co m m u n ity structures has been assum ed by
p lan tatio n s, th at is, by the oppressive co n tro l o f large-scale
p olitico-econom ic stru ctu res co n tro lled by e n tre p re n e u rs.
T h e p lan tatio n s o f the capitalist w orld -eco n o m y w h e th e r
based on slavery, im prisonm ent, share-cropping (forced or
co n tractu al), or w age-labour can scarcely be said to have
provided m ore leew ay for in d iv id u ality . T h e plan tatio n s
can be considered an exceptionally effective m ode o f ex tractin g
surplus-value. N o d o u b t th ey existed before in hu m an history,
b u t never before w e re th ey used as extensively for agricultural
p ro d u c tio n as distinct from m in in g and the co n stru c tio n o f
large-scale in frastru ctu re, b o th o f w h ich , how ever, have tend
ed to involve m any few er people in global term s.
Even w h ere one form or an o th er o f direct au th o ritarian con
tro l o f ag ricultural activity (w h at w e have ju s t labelled planta
tio n s ) w as n o t su b stitu ted for the p rio r laxer co m m u n ity
structures o f co n tro l, th e disintegration o f th e co m m u n ity
stru ctu res in ru ral zones w as n o t experienced as a lib era tio n ,
since it w as inevitably accom panied, indeed frequently directly
caused, by a co n stan tly g ro w in g co n tro l by the em ergent state
structures w h ich increasingly have been u n w illin g to leave the
direct p ro ducer to his au to n o m o u s, local decision-m aking p ro
cesses. T h e th ru st has all been in the direction o f forcing an in
crease in lab o u r-in p ut and in the specialization o f this labour
activity (w hich, from the p oint o f view o f the w o rk e r,
w eakened his n eg o tiatin g position and increased his ennui).
N o r was this all. H isto rical capitalism developed an ideo
logical fram ew o rk o f oppressive h u m iliatio n w h ich h ad never
previously existed, and w h ich to d ay w e called sexism and
racism . L et m e be clear. B o th th e d om inant p o sitio n o f m en
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over w o m en and generalized xenophobia w ere w idespread,

virtually universal, in p rio r historical system s, as w e have
already n o ted . B u t sexism w as m ore th a n the do m in an t posi
tio n o f m en over w o m en , and racism m ore th a n generalized
x enophobia.
Sexism w as th e relegation o f w o m en to th e realm o f n o n
p ro d u ctiv e labour, doubly hum iliatin g in th a t the actual
lab o u r required o f th em w as if an y th in g intensified, and in
th a t p ro d u ctiv e labour becam e in the capitalist w orldeconom y, for th e first tim e in hum an history, th e basis o f the
leg itim atio n o f privilege. T his set up a double b in d w h ich has
been in tractable w ith in the system .
R acism was n o t h atred or oppression o f a stranger, of som e
one outside th e historical system . Q u ite the contrary, racism
w as the stratificatio n o f the w ork-force inside the historical
system , w h o se object was to keep the oppressed groups inside
th e system , n o t expel th e m . It created the justification o f lo w
rew ard for p ro ductive labour, despite its prim acy in the defini
tio n o f th e rig h t to re w ard . It did this by defining w o rk w ith
th e low est re m u n eratio n as rem u n eratio n for the low estquality w o rk . Since this w as done e x definitio, no change in the
quality o f w o rk co u ld ever do m ore than change the form o f
th e accusation, y et the ideology proclaim ed the offer o f a re
w ard o f individual m ob ility for individual effort. T h is double
b in d w as equally intractable.
B oth sexism and racism w ere social processes in w h ich
b io lo g y defined p o sitio n . Since biology w as in any im
m ediate sense unchangeable socially, w e had seem ingly a
stru ctu re th a t was socially-created b u t w as n o t am enable to
social d ism antling. This was o f course no t really so. W h a t is
tru e is th at the stru c tu rin g o f sexism and racism could n o t and
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can n o t be dism antled w ith o u t dism antling the entire historical

system w h ich created th em and w h ich has been m ain tain ed in
critical w ays by th eir operation.
H ence, in b o th m aterial and psychic term s (sexism and
racism ), th ere w as absolute im m iseration. T h is m ean t o f
course that there has been a g ro w in g g ap in th e co n su m p tio n
o f th e surplus b etw e en th e u p p e r ten to fifteen per cent o f the
p o p u latio n in th e capitalist w orld-econom y and the rest. O u r
im pression th a t this w as n o t so has been based on three facts.
First, the ideology o f m eritocracy has tru ly functioned to
m ake possible considerable individual m obility, even the
m o b ility o f specific eth n ic a n d /o r occupational gro u p s in the
w o rk -fo rce. T h is occurred how ever w ith o u t transform ing
fundam entally th e overall statistics o f the w orld-econom y,
since individual (or subgroup) m obility w as co untered by an
increase in the size o f the low er stratu m , either by incor
p o ra tin g n ew p opulations into the w orld -eco n o m y or b y dif
ferential dem ographic rates o f g ro w th .
T h e second reason w h y w e havent observed the g ro w in g
gap is that our historical and social science analyses have co n
cen trated on w h at has been h appening w ith in the m iddle
classes th a t is, to that ten to fifteen per cent o f the popula
tio n o f the w o rld -econom y w h o consum ed m ore surplus than
th ey them selves produced. W ithin this sector th ere really has
b een a relatively dram atic flattening o f the curve b e tw e e n the
v ery to p (less than one per cent o f the to ta l population) and
the tru ly m id d le segm ents, or cadres (the rest o f the te n to
fifteen per cent ). A good deal of th e progressive politics of
the past several h u n d re d years o f historical capitalism has
resu lted in the steady d im in u tio n o f the unequal d istrib u tio n
o f w o rld surplus-value a m o n g th at small g ro u p w h o have
shared in it. T he shouts o f trium ph of this m id d le sector
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over the reduction o f their gap w ith the upper one per cent
have m asked th e realities o f the g ro w in g gap betw een th em
and the o th er eighty-five per cent .
Finally, th ere is a third reason w h y the p h enom enon o f the
g ro w in g gap has n o t been cen tral to o u r collective discussions.
It is possible th a t, w ith in the past ten to tw e n ty years, under
the pressure o f the collective stren g th o f the w o rld s antisystem ic m ov em en ts, and the approach to the econom ic
asym ptotes, th ere m ay have been a slow ing d o w n o f absolute,
th o u g h n o t o f relative, polarization. Even th is should be
asserted w ith cau tio n , and placed w ith in the co n tex t o f a five
h u n d re d years historical developm ent o f increased absolute
polarization.
It is crucial to discuss the realities that have accom panied the
ideology o f progress because, unless w e do th a t, w e cannot in
telligently approach the analysis o f transitions from one
historical system to another. T he theory o f evolutionary p ro
gress involved n o t m erely the assum ption that the later system
w as b e tte r th an the earlier b u t also the assum ption th a t som e
n ew d o m in an t g ro u p replaced a p rio r d o m in an t g roup.
H ence, n o t only was capitalism progress over feudalism b u t
this progress was essentially achieved by the triu m p h , the
rev o lu tio n ary triu m p h , o f the bourgeoisie over the landed
aristocracy (or feudal elem ents). B ut if capitalism was no t
progressive, w h a t is the m eaning o f the concept o f the b o u r
geois rev o lu tio n ? W as there a single bourgeois revolution, or
did it appear in m ultiple guises?
W e have already argued that the im age o f historical capital
ism hav in g arisen via the o v erth ro w o f a b ac k w ard aristocracy
by a progressive bourgeoisie is w ro n g . Instead, the correct
basic im age is th at historical capitalism was b ro u g h t in to ex
istence by a landed aristocracy w h ich transform ed itself into a
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bourgeoisie because the old system w as d isintegrating. R a th e r

th a n let th e d isin teg ratio n continue to uncertain ends, they
engaged in radical stru ctu ral surgery them selves in order to
m ain tain and significantly expand their ability to exploit the
direct producers.
If this n ew im age is correct how ever, it radically am ends
our p erception o f th e present transition from capitalism to
socialism , from a capitalist w orld-econom y to a social w orldorder. U p to n o w , the proletarian re v o lu tio n has been
m odelled, m o re or less, o n th e bourgeois re v o lu tio n . As the
bourgeoisie o v erth rew the aristocracy, so the p roletariat
w o u ld o v e rth ro w the bourgeoisie. T his analogy has been the
fu n d am en tal b u ild ing-block o f the strategic action o f the
w o rld socialist m o v em en t.
I f there was no bourgeois revolution, does th at m ean there
has been or w ill be no proletarian revolution? N o t at all, logi
cally or em pirically. B ut it does m ean w e have to approach the
subject o f transitions differently. W e need first to distinguish
betw een change th ro u g h disintegration and co n tro lled
change, w h a t Sam ir A m in has called the distinction b etw een
decadence and re v o lu tio n , b etw een the kind o f decadence
w h ich he asserts occurred w ith the fall o f R o m e (and is, he
says, occurring now ) and that m ore controlled change w h ich
o ccu rred w h en g o in g from feudalism to capitalism .
B u t this is n o t all. For th e controlled changes (A m in s re
v o lu tio n s) need n o t be progressive, as w e have ju s t argued.
T h erefo re, w e m u st distinguish betw een th e k in d o f stru ctu ra l
tran sfo rm atio n th a t w o u ld leave in place (even increase) the
realities o f th e ex p lo itatio n o f labour, and one th a t w o u ld u n
do this k ind o f ex p lo itatio n or at least radically reduce it.
W h a t this m eans is th at the political issue o f our tim es is n o t
w h e th e r th ere w ill be a transition from historical capitalism to
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so m eth in g else. T h a t is as certain as w e can be about such

th in g s. T h e political issue o f o u r tim es is w h e th e r this som e
th in g else, th e o u tc o m e o f the tran sitio n , w ill be m o rally fu n
dam entally different from w h a t w e have n o w , w ill be p ro
gress.
Progress is n o t inevitable. W e are stru g g lin g for it. A n d th e
fo rm th e stru g g le is tak in g is n o t th a t o f socialism versus
capitalism , b u t th a t o f a transition to a relatively classless
society versus a tran sitio n to som e n e w class-based m ode o f
p ro d u ctio n (different fro m historical capitalism b u t not
necessarily b etter).
T h e choice for th e w o rld bourgeoisie is n o t betw een m ain
tain in g historical capitalism and suicide. It is b etw een on the
one hand a conservative stance, w h ic h w o u ld result in the
co n tin u ed d isin teg ratio n o f the system and its resultant tran s
fo rm atio n in to an u n ce rtain b u t probably m ore egalitarian
w o rld order; and, on the o th er hand, a bold a tte m p t to seize
co n tro l o f the process o f transition, in w h ich th e bourgeoisie
itself w o u ld assum e socialist clothing, and seek to create
th ereb y an alternative historical system w hich w o u ld leave in
tact the process o f exp lo itatio n o f the w o rld s w ork-force, to
the benefit o f a m in o rity .
It is in the lig h t o f these real political alternatives open to
the w o rld bourgeoisie that w e should assess the h isto ry o f
b o th the w o rld socialist m ovem ent and those states w here
socialist parties have com e to p o w e r in one form or another.
T h e first and m o st im p o rtan t th in g to rem em ber in any
such assessment is th a t the w o rld socialist m ovem ent, indeed
all form s o f anti-system ic m ovem ents, as w ell as all revolu
tio n ary a n d /o r socialist states, have them selves been integral
products o f h isto rical capitalism . T h ey w ere n o t structures ex
ternal to the historical system b u t the excretion o f processes
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in te rn a l to it. H en c e th e y have reflected all th e c o n tra d ic tio n s
a n d c o n s tra in ts o f th e sy stem . T h e y c o u ld n o t an d c a n n o t do
o th e rw is e .
T h e ir faults, th e ir lim ita tio n s , th e ir n e g a tiv e effects are p a rt
o f th e b a la n c e -sh ee t o f h isto ric a l c a p ita lism , n o t o f a h y p o
th e tic a l h isto ric a l sy stem , o f a socialist w o rld -o rd e r, th a t does
n o t yet e x ist. T h e in te n s ity o f th e e x p lo ita tio n o f lab o u r in
re v o lu tio n a ry a n d /o r socialist states, th e d enial o f p o litic al
free d o m s, th e p ersiste n c e o f sexism a n d racism all have to d o
far m o re w ith th e fact th a t th ese states c o n tin u e to b e lo cated
in p e rip h e ra l an d se m i-p e rip h e ral zo n es o f th e c a p ita list w o rld ec o n o m y th a n w ith th e p ro p e rtie s p ecu liar to a n e w social
sy stem . T h e fe w c ru m b s th a t have e x iste d in h is to ric a l ca p ita l
ism fo r th e w o r k in g classes have alw ays b e e n c o n c e n tra te d in
co re areas. T h is is still d is p ro p o rtio n a te ly tru e .
T h e assessm ent o f b o th th e an ti-sy ste m ic m o v e m e n ts and
th e re g im e s w h ic h th e y h av e h a d a h a n d in c reatin g ca n n o t
th e re fo re be e v a lu a te d in term s o f th e g o o d so cieties th e y
h av e o r h av e n o t c re a te d . T h e y can o n ly b e sensibly ev a lu a te d
b y a s k in g h o w m u c h th e y have c o n tr ib u te d to th e w o rld -w id e
stru g g le to e n su re th a t th e tra n s itio n fro m cap italism is to
w a rd s an e g a lita ria n socialist w o rld -o rd e r. H e re th e a c c o u n t
in g is necessarily m o re a m b ig u o u s , b ecau se o f th e w o r k in g s o f
th e c o n tra d ic to ry processes th em selv es. A ll p o sitiv e th ru sts in
v o lv e n e g a tiv e as w ell as p o sitiv e co n seq u en ces. E ach w e a k e n
in g o f th e sy stem in o n e w a y s tre n g th e n s it in o th e rs. B u t n o t
necessarily to eq u al degrees! T h e w h o le q u e stio n is th e re .
T h e re is n o d o u b t th a t th e g re a te st c o n tr ib u tio n o f th e an tisystem ic m o v e m e n ts has o c c u rre d in th e ir m o b iliz in g phases.
O r g a n iz in g re b e llio n , tra n s fo rm in g co n scio u sn ess, th e y have
b e e n lib e ra tin g forces; a n d th e c o n trib u tio n s o f in d iv id u a l
O n P rogress an d T ra n sitio n s
109
m o v e m e n ts h e re have b e c o m e g re a te r o v er tim e, th r o u g h a
feedback m ech an ism o f h isto ric a l le a rn in g .
O n c e su ch m o v e m e n ts h av e a ssu m ed p o litic a l p o w e r in state
s tru c tu re s , th e y have d o n e less w e ll, because th e pressures o n
th e m to m u te th e ir a n ti-sy ste m ic th r u s ts , f ro m b o th w ith o u t
an d w ith in th e m o v e m e n ts , have in creased g e o m e trica lly .
N e v e rth e le ss, th is has n o t m e a n t a to ta lly n e g a tiv e balancesheet for su ch r e fo rm is m an d re v isio n ism . T h e m o v e m e n ts
in p o w e r have b e e n to so m e e x te n t th e p o litic a l p riso n e rs o f
th e ir id e o lo g y a n d h en ce su b ject to o rg a n iz e d pressu re fro m
th e d irect p ro d u c e rs w ith in th e re v o lu tio n a ry state and fro m
th e an ti-sy ste m ic m o v e m e n ts o u tsid e it.
T h e real d a n g e r o ccu rs precisely n o w , as h isto ric a l c a p ital
ism ap p ro ach es its m o s t c o m p le te u n fo ld in g th e fu rth e r e x
te n sio n o f th e c o m m o d ific a tio n o f e v e ry th in g , th e g ro w in g
s tre n g th o f th e w o rld fam ily o f a n ti-sy ste m ic m o v e m e n ts, th e
c o n tin u e d ra tio n a liz in g o f h u m a n t h o u g h t. I t is th is c o m p le te
u n fo ld in g th a t w ill h a ste n th e co llap se o f th e h isto ric a l sy stem ,
w h ic h has th riv e d b ecau se its lo g ic has h ith e r to b e e n o n ly p a r
tially realized . A n d p recisely w h ile a n d because it is co llap sin g ,
th e b a n d w a g o n o f th e forces o f tra n s itio n w ill seem ever m o re
a ttra c tiv e , an d therefore th e o u tc o m e w ill b e ev er less c e rta in .
T h e stru g g le fo r lib e rty , e q u a lity , an d fra te rn ity is p ro tra c te d ,
co m ra d e s, an d th e locu s o f th e s tru g g le w ill b e ev er m o re in
side the w o rld w id e fam ily o f an ti-sy ste m ic forces th em selves.
C o m m u n is m is U to p ia , th a t is n o w h e re . I t is th e av ata r o f
all o u r re lig io u s e sch ato lo g ies: th e c o m in g o f th e M essiah, th e
se co n d c o m in g o f C h r is t, n irv a n a . It is n o t a h isto ric a l p r o
spect, b u t a c u rre n t m y th o lo g y . Socialism , b y c o n tra s t, is a
rea liza b le h isto ric a l system w h ic h m a y o n e d a y b e in s titu te d in
th e w o rld . T h e re is n o in te re s t in a so cialism th a t claim s to
110
b e a te m p o r a r y m o m e n t o f tra n s itio n to w a rd s U to p ia . T h e re
is in te re st o n ly in a c o n c re te ly h isto rical socialism , o n e th a t
m e ets th e m in im u m d e fin in g c h a ra c teristic s o f a h isto ric a l
sy stem th a t m a x im iz e s e q u a lity a n d e q u ity , o n e th a t increases
h u m a n ity s c o n tr o l o v e r
liberates th e im a g in a tio n .
its
ow n
life
(d e m o cra cy ),
an d
CAPITALIST CIVILIZATION
A Balance Sheet
T h e m o d e m w orld-system , w h ich is a capitalist w orld-econom y,

cam e in to existence d u rin g th e long six teen th cen tu ry in parts o f
E urope and th e A m ericas, and has since expanded to include th e
entire globe. H istorical capitalism has a n u m b e r o f characteristics
u n iq u e to it as a historical system. O n e o f th em , one th a t has
seldom received its d u e notice, is th a t it is a system w h ich has been
celebrated by som e b u t vigorously denou n ced by others virtually
fro m the outset. Indeed it was som e th ree centuries in to its
developm en t before the celebrators even began to seem nu m ero u s
and outspoken. I can n o t th in k o f any o th e r histo rical system th at
has been subjected to so m u c h in tern al, and contradictory,
evaluation by th e m ass o f its participants as w ell as b y its thinkers.
T h e idea th a t one can deb ate w ith in th e system th e balance sheet
o f its virtues and vices, its positive and negative consequences a
d ebate I shall a tte m p t to sum m arize-is probably u n iq u e to this
system, and is in any case one o f its defining features. W h y this
particular historical system alone should have given rise to this
enduring pub lic controversy is itself a question w e shall w ant to
explore.
T h e strangest p art o f th e debate is th a t th ere are broadly
speaking tw o sets o f critics, and th e tw o sets seem to co n trad ict
each other. O n e set o f critics lam bastes capitalism because it is too
egalitarian, too disruptive o f social peace and co m m u n al harm ony.
A nd the o th e r set o f critics finds historical capitalism to be, beneath
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a m y th o f th e h a rm o n y o f all interests, quintessentially inegali

tarian.
O n e m ig h t be tem p ted to perceive such opposite criticism s as a
sign th a t th e propo n en ts o f capitalist civilization h o ld th e strategic
cen tre o f m o deration, against obviously ex trem ist positions. O n e
m ig h t be thus tem p ted , w ere this th e a rg u m e n t th a t celebrators
m ake. B u t th ey do n o t say this. Instead, in answ er to those w ho
argue th e virtues o f a hierarchical, h arm o n ic social order, the
advocates o f historic capitalism have vaun ted its revolutionary,
progressive characteristics, said to be destructive o f privilege. A nd
to those critics w h o see capitalism as a system o f inegalitarian,
oppressive structures, its defenders have v au n ted its ability to
recognize and encourage w h a t th ey call individual m e rit and
asserted n o t only th e desirability b u t also th e inevitability o f
differential rew ard, o f earn ed privilege, so to speak.
T h u s th e defenders o f capitalism seem to be as self-contradic
to ry as th e opponents. B o th critics and defenders, denouncers and
celebrators, occupy th e identical extrem e positions, w ith n o one (or
virtually no one, it seems) to advocate th e golden m ean. T h is is a
strange anom aly and o n e particularly strange in th a t it has been
persistent. W h a t purpose can it possibly serve for all th e players to
p u t them selves in such a confused lin e-u p ? It is as th o u g h th ere
w ere tw o sports team s w h ic h w o re th e sam e u n iform s and m illed
aroun d in th e sam e arena in very m ix ed -u p form ations.
In this case, can th e re be a score? C an th ere be a balance sheet? I
do n o t even ask, can th e re be an im p artial balance sheet, b u t can
th ere be one at all? I th in k th a t w e w ill n o t be able to address this
question u n til w e so rt o u t w hy and h o w it is possible th a t such a
confused struggle has been sustained.
A B alance Sheet
117
The Four Horsemen o f the Apocalypse, or Basic Needs

O ver th e past 5,000 years, h u m a n ity has developed an array o f
religions, all o f w h ic h have shared at least one basic feature. T h ey
have attem p ted to give som e response to, som e solace for, the
perceived m aterial m iseries o f th e w orld. T hese are sum m arised
q u ite w ell in th e C hristian im agery o f th e F our H orsem en o f the
Apocalypse. T h e fo u r are w ar (that is, w ar b etw een peoples or
states); civil war; fam ine; and death by pestilence, plague, or wild
beasts. T hese Four H o rsem en are th e horrors o f the w orld, the
disrupters o f peace, pleasure, and satisfaction.
T h e religions o f th e w o rld offered w hatever solace they could,
b u t they did so o n th e p re m ise th a t th e re existed n o political (that
is, no w orldly) so lu tio n to these evils. T h e evils w ere inevitable,
unless and u n til th e re w ere a m essianic era (at least in th e case o f
som e religions), o r som e o th e r w ay o f getting beyond history.
C apitalist civilization was extraordinary in th a t it laid claim to
being able to get bey o n d history w ith in history, to resolve the
dilem m as o f inevitable evils, to create th e k in g d o m o f G od upon
earth, in short, to overcom e th e m enace o f th e F our H orsem en o f
th e Apocalypse. F ro m th e beginning, th e celebrators have argued
th a t capitalism as a historical system w ould, at th e very least, m eet
the basic needs (to use th e term in o lo g y o f recen t decades) o f all
persons living w ith in its bounds.
T h e a rg u m e n t was in a sense q u ite sim p le and straightforw ard.
C apitalism , by increasing th e efficiency o f p ro duction, has
increased collective 'w ealth vasdy. E v en i f th is w ealth has been
unequally d istributed, th e re has b een e n o u g h to en su re th a t
everyone received m o re th a n th e level possible u n d e r o th e r and
previous historical systems. T his has been called th e trickle d o w n
theory o f d istrib u tio n , itse lf m erely th e specification o f the
invisible h a n d th e o ry o f p ro d u ctio n . It is because o f these
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presum ed beneficial consequences th a t th e p ro p o n en ts o f capitalist

civilization n o t m e re ly h av e argued th a t a capitalist system is
distinctive fro m and b e tte r th a n all o th ers b u t also h av e sim ul
taneously claim ed th a t it is th e o n ly n a tu ra l system.
W h a t evidence have these proponents offered fo r these views?
Fundam entally, th e evidence has been dem onstrative. Look, they
say, at th e m o d e m w orld. Is it n o t richer th a n any o th e r k n o w n
w orld? H ave n o t technological achievem ents been fabulous? Is
everyone n o t in som e real sense b etter offr1A nd, in particular, is it
n o t th e case th a t those countries w h ere capitalism seem s to be
accepted and p ractised m o st fully are precisely th e countries th a t
are th e w ealthiest an d th e m o st econom ically advanced?
T his a rg u m en t fro m d em o n stratio n has been, fo r som e tw o
h u n d re d years now , an extrem ely persuasive one to very large
nu m b ers o f persons an d should therefore be ta k e n quite seriously.
It is based v ery heavily o n th e cen tral role o f applied science w ith in
historical capitalism . O n c e again using th e evidence o f d e m o n
stration, it is argued th a t o n ly w ith in th e fram ew ork o f historical
capitalism have science and technology tru ly flourished, since it is
only w ith in th is system th a t scientists h av e been released fro m the
constraints im posed u p o n th em by previous systems. A nd this in
tu rn has b een tru e
scientific activity by
rew arding to these
plausibility o f th e
because th e d irect and in d irec t subsidy o f

en trep ren eu rs was ultim ately m aterially very
entrepreneurs. L et us try to evaluate the
arg u m en ts in term s o f each o f the Four
H orsem en, ta k e n in reverse order.

Has capitalist civilization postponed (it obviously could n o t
totally elim inate) d eath by pestilence, plague, and w ild beasts? T h is
is th e question o f h ealth and sanitation in its broadest sense. In the
fo u rte e n th century, th e E urasian landm ass suffered fro m the B lack
D eath . O u r im p erfect estim ates suggest th a t a b o u t o n e -th ird o f the
p o p u la tio n in affected zones died p rem atu re deaths because o f it.
A Balance S h eet
119
T his was u n d o u b te d ly n o t th e first such p an d em ic in th e history o f

th e w o rld , b u t it seem s to have been th e last k n o w n one o f such
extensiveness. W h y ? T w o reasons basically. T h e first is safe
guarding th e individual. M edical know ledge has advanced to such
an e x ten t th a t w e h av e learned b e tte r b o th h o w to av ert th e onset o f
such diseases (e.g., by inoculation) and h o w to m in im ize their
im pact once they have b een contracted by individuals. T h e second
reason is safeguarding th e collectivity. W e h av e learned h o w to
create a b e tte r pub lic h e a lth e n v iro n m e n t as w ell as techniques to
c o n ta in th e spread o f disease. (O ne o f th e earliest and m o re
p rim itiv e o f such tech n iq u es was th e q u aran tin e, a w ord th a t is
derived fro m th e fo rty -d ay iso latio n p e rio d im p o sed o n persons
arriving in th e p o rt o f Ragusa d u rin g th e B lack D eath.)
Is th e re an y o th e r k in d o f dem onstrative evidence to p u t in to the
balance sheet? T h ere are at least three p h e n o m e n a w h ic h m ove in
the opposite direction. First, th ere w ere th e devastating conse
quences o f th e m ix in g o f parasitic gene pools because o f precisely
th e technological advances in tran sp o rt th a t w ere p a rt and parcel o f
th e expansion o f a capitalist w o rld econom y. T h is has been m o st
clearly stu d ied in th e case o f th e transoceanic exchanges betw een
1500 and 1700. V ery large p ro p o rtio n s o f th e populations
indigenous to th e A m ericas far m o re th a n a th ird w ere w iped
o u t in th is process. Sim ilar p h e n o m e n a o ccurred in O ceania and
th e re m o te r zones o f Africa, Asia, and E urope.
Secondly, m edical research o f o n ly th e last tw o decades is
m aking clear h o w m an y diseases have actually expanded in n u m b e r
due to en v iro n m en tal changes directly linked to the econom ic
technologies th a t h av e b een p a rt and parcel o f capitalist civilization.
T hirdly, it is q u ite possible th a t w h o lly n e w disease pattern s are
em erging o u t o f and, in som e sense, because of, th e dram atic
d em ograp h ic expansion th ro u g h o u t th e globe. T h e re is som e
suggestion th a t this m ay be a m ajor factor in th e n e w AIDS
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epidem ic (as w ell as th a t o f o th e r a u to -im m u n e diseases). W e m ay

thus be at th e thresh o ld o f n ew d ram atic plagues o f a different
kind.
H o w do w e com pare th e n u m b e r o f lives ex tended th ro u g h
m ed ical advances against th e n u m b e r o f lives never created
because o f sudden parasitic exchanges? T h e la tte r in p articu lar is
difficult to quantify, and thus th ere is n o very good way to m ake
this co m p ariso n fo r th e m o m en t. B u t w e should n o te at least the
assessm ent is n o t sim ple and surely n o t one-sided. It is clear th a t
in fan t m o rta lity has declined significantly in th e m o re in d u strial
ized states o f th e w orld-system . It seems to have declined in the
S outh as w ell in th e tw e n tie th century, alth o u g h w h e th e r this is
tru e in periods o f stagnation in th e w o rld -eco n o m y o r only true o f
th e periods o f expansion is less clear. W e k n o w th at, in the
industrialized countries, those aged sixty o r old er have a greater
ability to survive ailm ents th a n previously because o f advances in
m edical technology. T hese tw o changes decline o f in fa n t
m o rta lity and extension o f life for those w ho have reached sixty
years account fo r a large part, even perhaps all, o f th e increased
average longevity. W h e th e r those w ho have survived infancy are
m o re likely to reach sixty years o f age th a n previously is far less
clear. W h e th e r n ew plagues w ill change even th e overall figures is
certainly unclear. B u t w e can tentatively cred it capitalist civiliza
tio n w ith a positive, i f very geographically uneven, record in the
struggle against disease.
W h a t o f th e struggle against hunger? Is fam ine less o f a th re at
today th a n in tim es past? In th e p re -m o d e m era, th e m ain pro b lem
for h u m a n ity was sh o rt-ru n w eath er shifts w h ich affected
p ro d u c tio n annually. G iven th e w eakness o f tran sp o rt systems, the
lim ite d a m o u n t o f lo n g -te rm food storage, and th e w idespread
rarity o f in d iv id u al m oney reserves, any significant d im in u tio n o f
local supply o f staple foods caused im m ed iate grave problem s. It is
A B alance Sheet
121
largely th e case today th a t technological advances have sheltered

m an y (perhaps m ost) parts o f th e w o rld fro m th e predictable
vagaries o f th e sh o rt-te rm w eather.
B u t w h a t o f th e m e d iu m -te rm shifts in en v iro n m ental co n d i
tions? T h e very sam e technological advances th a t have allow ed us
to in tru d e u p o n n a tu ra l biospherical conditions in the short ru n
have upset biospherical conditions in th e m e d iu m run. T h e
evisceration o f forests, th e d esertification o f savannah zones all
involve co n tin u in g d e stru c tio n o f peoples and th e ir lo n g -te rm food
supply. W e are as y et u n ab le to assess fully th e dam age fro m
chem ico-biological p ollution, so accentuated in th e tw en tieth
century. I f th e ozone layer is fu rth e r depleted, th e d estru ctio n o f
lives (directly, and th ro u g h its im p act o n th e food supply) m ay be
enorm ous.
So, o n th e one h an d , th e re has been a rem arkable expansion o f
the total p ro d u c tio n and p ro d u ctiv ity o f food p ro d u ctio n , and on
th e o th e r h an d an extraordinarily skew ed d istrib u tio n system,
su b stitu tin g m e d iu m -ru n th reats for s h o rt-te rm th reats for the
m ajority o f th e w o rld s populatio n , particularly th e 50 to 80 p er
cent at th e bottom .
W h a t o f civil war? H as it decreased? I include in this category all
violence b etw een groups th a t is n o t form ally a w a r betw een tw o
geographically d istin ct states o r peoples o r a rebellion o f a
conquered te rrito ry against an im perial ruler. In a sense, one could
argue th a t civil w a r is an in v en tio n o f th e cap italist w o rld econom y. It is th e p ro d u c t o f th e com plex relationship betw een th e
co n stru c t p eo p le and th e c o n stru ct state in a system w hereby
th ere is an ex trem ely h ig h degree o f adm ixture and p ro p in q u ity in
u rb an zones o f groups defined socially as different peoples. T his is
n o t accidental, b u t is derived fro m th e intrinsic stru c tu rin g o f the
capitalist w o rld -eco n o m y .
T h e capitalist w o rld -e c o n o m y has req u ired fo r its o p tim al
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fu nctio n in g w idespread and con tin u o u s m ig ratio n s o f people (both
forced and voluntary) in o rd er to fulfil lab o u r-fo rce needs at
p artic u la r geographical locations. A long w ith th is has gone an
ethnicization o f th e w o rld s w o rk force, such th a t in any given
locale, th e p o p u la tio n is seen as divided in to various ethnic
group in g s (w hether th e m ark er o f such eth n icity is perceived skin
colour, language, religion, o r som e o th e r cu ltu ra l construct). T h ere
tends to be a t all tim es a h ig h correlation o f households betw een
th e ir eth n ic stratu m (as defined locally) and th e ir occupational and
class location. O f course, th e details constantly change th e
definition o f eth n ic boundaries, w h ic h eth n ic gro u p correlates w ith
w h ich occupational stra tu m b u t th e stratification principle is an
en d u rin g feature o f th e capitalist w orld -eco n o m y , serving both to
reduce overall costs o f la b o u r and to contain thrusts to delegitim ize
th e state structures.
T h is process o f ethnicization has a clear dow nside in term s o f
an y balance sheet. It creates th e stru c tu ra l fo u n d a tio n o f con
tinuou s struggle b o th b etw een u p p e r and lo w er e th n ic strata, and
am ong eth n ic strata at th e low er level. T hese struggles ten d to
becom e m o re acute each tim e th ere is a cyclical d o w n tu rn in th e
w o rld -eco n o m y , w h ic h is h a lf th e historical tim e. T h e struggles
have frequently d eterio rated in to v io len t form s, fro m m in o r riots
to w holesale genocides.
T h e crucial ele m e n t is th a t th e ethnicization o f th e w o rld s w o rk
force has req u ired an ideology o f racism , in w h ic h large segm ents
o f th e w o rld s p o p u latio n h av e been defined as u n d e r classes, as
inferio r beings, and th erefo re as deserving ultim ately o f w hatever
fate comes th e ir w ay o u t o f the im m ed iate political and social
struggles. T hese civil w ars have n o t g ro w n few er w ith tim e but, if
anything, have b ecom e m o re oppressive and deadly in th e
tw en tieth century. T his is a very large m in u s in th e balance sheet o f
o u r c u rre n t w orld-system .
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123
Finally, th e re is w a r itself. W a rs b etw een states a n d /o r peoples

seem to h av e existed u n d e r all historical system s for as long as w e
have som e recorded evidence. W a r is q u ite clearly n o t a
p h e n o m e n o n p a rtic u la r to th e m o d e m w orld-system . O n th e o ther
hand, once again th e technological achievem ents o f capitalist
civilization serve as m u c h ill as good. O n e b o m b in H iroshim a
killed m o re people th a n w h o le w ars in p re -m o d e m times.
A lexander th e G reat in his w hole sw eep o f th e M iddle East could
n o t com pare in destructiveness to th e im p act o f th e G u lf W a r on
Iraq and K uw ait.
Finally, w e m ust take in to full account th e m aterial polarization
o f th e w orld-system . T h e total m aterial w ealth has grow n
im m ensely, i f w e m ean by m aterial w ealth all com m odified and
com m odifiable objects, even i f this econom ic g ro w th has been at
the cost o f largely exhausting som e p rim ary n atu ral materials. A nd
this surplus-value has been distributed am ongst a far larger
percentage o f th e p o p u la tio n th a n in an y previous historical system.
B efore 1500, in th e various historical systems th a t existed, th ere was
alm ost always a rich o r rich er stratum . B ut, b efo re 1500, this
stratum was extrem ely small in size. Symbolically w e m ay refer to
one per cen t o f th e p o p u latio n , th o u g h in som e cases the
percentage m ay have b een larger.
In capitalist civilization, th e n u m b e r o f persons w h o have shared
in the surplus-value has been m u c h larger. T h is is th e group
referred to as th e m id d le classes. T h e y are a significant stratum . B ut
it w ould be q u ite in e rro r to exaggerate th e ir size. T his group,
w orldw id e, has p robably never exceeded o n e-sev en th o f the
w o rld s p opulation. T o be sure, m an y o f these m id d le strata are
concentrated in certain geographical zones, and thus, in the core
countries o f th e capitalist w orld -eco n o m y , th e y m ay be a m ajority
o f the citizenry. Indeed, th e h ig h concen tratio n o f m iddle strata
w ith in th e political boundaries o f one state is today a defining
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feature o f core zones. B u t w o rld w id e th e percentage is far lower.

Perhaps as m u c h as 85 p e r cen t o f th e people w h o live w ith in th e
structures o f th e capitalist w o rld -eco n o m y are clearly n o t living at
standards h ig h e r th a n th e w o rld s w orking p opulations o f 500 to
1,000 years ago. Indeed, it could be argued th a t m any, e v en m ost, o f
th e m are m aterially w orse off. In an y case, they certainly w o rk
m u c h h ard er in order m erely to scrape by; th e y m ay eat less, b u t
they surely b u y m ore.
Has th e n capitalist civilization defeated th e Four H o rsem en o f
th e Apocalypse? A t m ost, o n ly partially and even th e n very
unevenly. T hus far, how ever, w e have only discussed th e question
quantitatively. W e m u st discuss it qualitatively as well. T h ese are
all th e issues usually debated u n d e r th e ru b ric q u a lity o f life.
The Quality o f Individual Life

T h e first issue is th e quality o f m aterial life. T h is has to do w ith
co m fo rt and w ith variety o f co n su m p tio n beyond th e basic needs
o f survival. H ere too th e p ic tu re is m ixed. O u r co n su m er society
o f th e tw en tieth cen tu ry is to be sure a fu n c tio n o f science and its
gadgetry. W e h av e m echanism s u n d re a m t o f in previous civiliza
tions: electricity, telephones, radios and television, in d o o r
p lu m b in g , refrigerators and air conditioners, autom obiles, to n am e
o n ly th e m o st obvious and to d ay th e m ost w idespread. In 1500,
even a b o o k w as an extraordinary luxury.
O n ce again, how ever, w e also k n o w th a t d istrib u tio n is
extraordinarily unev en . M ost A m erican fam ilies have a car;
exceedingly few C hinese o r In d ian fam ilies do, alth o u g h m ost o f
th e m m a y have access to a radio, i f o n ly as th e collective pro p erty
o f a village. A t an absolute level, even th e poorest strata probably
have m o re o f these gadgets th a n did th e ir ancestors, ev en i f th e
relative gap b etw een th e b o tto m and th e top is n o t m erely
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125
im m en se b u t grow ing. It is not, how ever, ev en sure th a t the

absolute c u rv e is a lin ear u p w ard one. W e m a y w e ll have reached
th e top o f th e curve for th e b o tto m 50 to 80 p e r cent, and face the
possibility that th e absolute curve for th em m ay tu rn d o w n again.
T h e situation is ev en starker w h e n w e tu rn to one o f the m ost
rem arkable inventions o f capitalist civilization, tourism . In no
previous historical system did th e re exist the concept th a t people,
even w ealth y and p o w erfu l people, w o u ld spend a p art o f th eir
lifetim e ex em p t fro m in co m e-p ro d u cin g w o rk in order to travel,
observe, and enjoy pleasures th a t w ere n o t p art o f th eir ordinary
ongoing life pattern . W h a t originated in early m o d e rn times as the
sport o f a h an d fu l o f aristocrats has becom e in th e late tw entieth
century th e norm al expectation o f th e w o rld s m id d le strata. T his
has o f course been m ade possible by th e sam e technological
advances. B u t n o te tw o things. A t th e v e ry m ost, 5 to 10 per cent o f
th e w o rld s p o p u la tio n can engage e v e n once in a tou rist
expedition. B u t also, ev en th is a m o u n t has p u t such a strain o n the
intrinsic possibilities o f bearing th e b u rd e n o f to u rist depredation
th a t th e v ery existence o f th e hig h est-q u ality objects o f tourism are
in peril. T o u rism is deeply destructive i f th e re is an overload. T h e re
is today already an overload, and th a t at a p o in t w h ere 80 p e r cent
o f the w orlds p o p u la tio n are still excluded fro m participation. If
the num b ers w ere to expand, safeguarding tourist sites could only
be handled by some k in d o f form al rationing system, at w hich
point, at th e level o f th e individual, th e benefits w ould decline
m arkedly.
T h e debate a b o u t th e c o m fo rt and variety o f individual m aterial
satisfactions is o n e m ajo r source o f contrary evaluations. T h e critics
o f capitalist civilization p o in t to the gaping differential betw een
w h at is available to o n e-sev en th o f th e w o rld s p o p u latio n and life
as it is lived in th e u rb a n slum s and ru ral p o v erty zones o f the
w orld. T h e contrast is dram atic, ev en terrifying. T h e defenders o f
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capitalist civilization argue th a t th e gap is o n ly relative, and th a t in

absolute term s th e w o rld s p o o r are less p o o r th a n 500 years ago.
T h e evidence o n th e absolute gap is, I have suggested, itself a
subject o f em pirical debate. T h e m o ra l q uestion is w h e th e r even a
grow ing gap th a t is o n ly relative is acceptable. T h e response o f the
defenders is to argue th a t th e gap no longer seems to be grow ing
and m ay soon dim inish.
D efenders o f capitalist civilization argue fu rth e r that, even i f th e
p ictu re on individual c o m fo rt and v ariety o f consum ption is
m ixed, one unalloyed b e n e fit o f capitalist civilization has been the
creation and g eom etric expansion o f th e w o rld s educational
institutions. T h is expansion has h ad th e effect, th e y argue, o f
p e rm ittin g all individuals to realize b etter th e ir p o tential and som e
individuals to cross class b arriers by d em onstrating th e ir abilities.
T h e v ery concept o f universal form al education is a p ro d u ct (and
a relatively late product) o f th e capitalist w orld-econom y.
E ducational in stitu tio n s have steadily expanded in both the len g th
o f tim e students spend in school and h o w accessible schools are to
divers groups in th e w o rld s population. T h is expansion has been
going o n for som e tw o centuries now , b u t was particularly
accelerated in th e p o s t- 1945 period. T o d ay th e re is virtually no
political ju risd ic tio n in w h ic h prim ary ed u catio n is n o t available, at
least in theory, to all m ale children, and in m o st to all fem ale
children as well. T h e re has been a sim ultaneous expansion (albeit a
lesser one) o f secondary and te rtia ry education.
It is said th a t increased education m eans increased access to
higher levels o f fu ll-tim e em ploym ent. O f course, this is true as a
relative m atter. T h a t is to say, there is a h ig h co rrelation betw een
years o f education and earned incom e. B u t as an absolute assertion,
it is v ery dubious. T h e expansion o f educational facilities has led
directly to an escalation o f educational p rerequisites for given
em ploym ents. H ence, th e person w h o has com pleted a prim ary
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127
school ed u catio n in 1990 m ay be eligible for th e exact sam e jo b

th a t a perso n w ith n o fo rm al ed ucation obtained in 1890.
O n e im p o rta n t consequence o f b u rg eo n in g educational in stitu
tions has been th e rem o v al o f w h o le age cohorts d u rin g daytim e
hours both fro m the household and fro m w orkplaces outside the
hom e. W h o le age cohorts no lo n g er earn in co m e fo r th eir
households but, o n th e contrary, cost th e households significant
am ounts o f rev en u e even i f th e re is n o school tuition. T hus, th e
households are m an d ated to invest in w h a t has been som ew hat
grandiosely designated as h u m a n capital. D o th e benefits exceed
the costs for m ost households in th e w orld-system ?
A second m ajo r consequence o f universal education has been the
developm ent and an ch o rin g o f th e concept and in dividual reality
o f m u ltip le stages o f life. In previous historical systems, a persons
life was o n e long p erio d o f w o rk and social participation, bracketed
o n each side w ith a sh o rt p erio d o f total dependency at th e outset
and a sh o rt p erio d (if one at all) o f relatively h ig h dependency on
th e tail end. N o w , w e pass a relatively long p erio d as partially
d ep en d en t ch ild ren outside th e w o rk force. T h is long childhood
has com e to be divided in to units corresponding w ith th e school
system: early ch ild h o o d for n u rsery schools, tru e child h o o d for
elem entary school, adolescence for secondary school, and late
adolescence for u n iv ersity education, n o w being su p p lem ented by
young ad u lth o o d fo r advanced university train in g a n d /o r first years
o f fu ll-tim e w ork. T h is story th e n continues fo r fu rth e r age
groupings: m a tu re adulthood, th e th ird age, and now even th e
fo u rth age. T h e c o n te n t o f role allocation d u rin g m a tu re adu lth o o d
has o f course ten d ed to be different for w o m e n th a n for m en.
T h e g reat plus in th is social d ifferentiation o f m u ltip le life
segm ents is said to be th e specialized a tte n tio n and ad ju stm en t it
m akes possible in term s o f h u m a n fulfilm ent. N o d o u b t th is is true
u p to a certain point. B u t it should be n o ted th a t this plus com es
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w ith a reasonably large m inus: th e exclusion fro m full p aticip ad o n

in p o w e r and m aterial benefits o f all those outside th e no w far
narro w er range o f years defining m ale m a tu re adulthood. U n d e r
th e u m b rella o f egalitarian c o m m o n passages th ro u g h lifes stages,
w e h av e erected a q uite rig id curvilinear age h ie ra rc h y w h ic h is
probably m o re consequential th a n th e less com plex age hierarchies
o f previous historical systems.
T h e u ltim a te question is, nonetheless, w h e th e r and to w h a t
degree th e ed u catio n is educational, th a t is, to rev ert to its
etym ological origins, h o w m u c h education has led people o u t o f1
(ieducere) n arro w er horizons to w id er ones. T h e basic assum ption is
th a t local, h o m e-b ased socialization in to k n o w led g e and values is
intrinsically parochial, b u t th a t form al ed u catio n offers literacy,
num eracy, em pirical know ledge, and analytic skills w h ic h p e rm it
its recipients to transcend th e ir parochial lim itatio ns and share in
som e universalist awareness o f h u m a n potential in general and
th e ir o w n in particular.
H ow ever, for as lo n g as th e re has b een w idespread form al
education, th ere h av e been critics w h o h av e asserted th e failures o f
each and every p a rtic u la r local o r n atio n al variety. T h e critics have
always argued th a t exactly this fu n ctio n o f leading people o u t o f1
parochial vision tow ards som e larger vision (some call it truth,
others call it sensitivity to diversity) has n o t in fact occurred. H ow
strong a case can be m ad e th a t it has in fact occurred? E d u catio n
has certainly n o t red u ced th e p h e n o m e n o n o f civil w a r; it m ay
indeed have enhanced it; it m ay even be its principal source o f
nourish m en t. T h e g reater fu lfilm en t o f individual p otential, to the
degree th a t it has occurred, m ay w ell be th e consequence as m u c h
o f increased geographical m o b ility as o f increased education. M ost
parents see education as an u rg e n t econom ic necessity for their
children, ru n n in g very fast to keep up w ith th e co n tin u in g
escalation o f form al educational req u irem en ts for job allocation.
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129
B u t m o st persons a tte n d in g school see school as a b u rd e n and an

exclusion fro m th e w o rk w orld. A re w e absolutely c e rta in th a t the
appreciation o f th e ch ild ren is so irrational?
The Quality o f Collective Life

T h e re are tw o sup rem e virtues in th e co n stru ctio n o f o u r social life
th at th e advocates o f capitalist civilization claim as its accom plish
m en t, or at least its prom ise: universalism , and dem ocracy. Y e t once
again, th e critics argue precisely th e opposite. T h e y p o in t to the
absence o f these same tw o phen o m en a as th e suprem e vice in
capitalist civilization. As in o th er parts o f th e balance sheet, a
ju d g m e n t depends o n w h o m and w h a t one is m easuring. W h a t is
universalism ? It has m a n y dom ains. U niversalism is th e arg u m en t
th a t there are tru th s th a t are rational, objective, and eternal hence
universal. T o d ay w e call this science. U niversalism is also th e
arg u m en t th a t th ere exists som e sort o f n atu ral law th a t determ ines
a universal ethic, and consequently som e social practices w h ich all
should accept and follow . T o d ay w e call this h u m a n rights.
U niversalism is, as well, th e b elief th a t th e re exist objective
standards o f com p eten ce th a t d eterm in e appropriate allocations o f
positions in th e w o rk force. T o d a y w e call th is m eritocracy. It is this
universalist trio o f science, h u m a n rights, and m eritocracy th a t is
th e pride o f th e advocates o f capitalist civilization. O n e can see w hy
there is such an em phasis o n science, w hy science has becom e a
v irtual secular religion, w ith its tru th s revealed to m ere m ortals by
its priests w h o alone h av e tru e access to universal know ledge. For
m o d e m science is th e u n d e rp in n in g o f m o d e rn technology, and it
is m o d e rn technology th a t is credited w ith th e presum ed
achievem ent th a t th e w o rld today b o th m eets th e basic needs o f
m ankind and has h eig h ten ed th e q u a lity o f individual life. T his
faith in science reflects (reflects, ra th e r th a n is th e basis o f) the
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confidence in th e endlessly expanding possibilities o f capitalist

accum ulation.
T h e vision o f science as th e relentless m a rc h tow ards the
fo rm u latio n o f universal laws, w h a t w e m ay call the B aconianN ew to n ian vision o f science, has been th e d o m in a n t vision for
som e 500 years now . B ut, b eg in n in g in th e late n in e te e n th century,
and w ith considerably grow ing stren g th in th e last tw en ty years,
this vision o f science has com e u n d er severe challenge w ith in the
scientific co m m u n ity itself T h is has taken the fo rm o f the new
science w ith its concepts o f th e norm ality b o th o f chaos and o f
open system s far fro m eq uilibrium , as w ell as th e pervasiveness o f
dissipative structures leading to bifurcations going in in h eren tly
unpredictable (but nonetheless orderly) directions.
T h e basic questio n th a t th e n ew science raises fo r o u r balance
sheet is th e issue o f w h a t scientifi c questions h av e n o t been asked
for 500 years, w h ic h scientific risks h av e n o t been pursued. It raises
th e questio n o f w h o has decided w h a t scientific risks w ere w o rth
taking, and w h a t h ave been th e consequences in term s o f th e pow er
structures o f th e w orld. O n e w onders, for exam ple, i f o u r present
ecological dilem m as, th e d irect result o f th e extem alization o f costs
by capitalist en trepreneurs, w ould n o t have been at least lessened, if
n o t altog eth er avoided, by a m o re h olistic scientific ap p ro a ch th at
w ould have m ade th e study o f dissipative structures and inevitable
bifurcations central to its analysis, ra th e r th a n by one th a t relegated
such system ic dilem m as to th e category o f ex tern al obstacles
in h eren tly capable o f a tech n ical solution, w h ile p resu m in g th a t the
linear trends in place w o u ld sim ply continue.
T o ask th e question is to answ er it, since it suggests th a t socalled universalist science has b e e n b o th constricted a n d p articu larist w h ile asserting th e co n trary . If th e n w e are to m ake a balance
sheet o f its achievem ents, w e m u st m easure n o t m erely the
technology it has p e rm itte d to be created, but th e alternatives that
A B alance Sheet
131
w ere missed o r failed to b e pursued. W e m u st recite n o t m erely the

credit b u t th e blam e. T h e n ex t th irty years o f scientific activity m ay
p erm it us to have a m ore sober evaluation o f th e last 500.
If n o t tru th , th e n a t least freedom ? H as n o t capitalist civilization
offered the w o rld th e first flourishing o f a universalizing m odel o f
freedom ? Is n o t th e v ery concept o f th e legal and m o ral p rio rity o f
h u m a n rig h ts an in v e n tio n o f th e m o d ern w orld? N o d o u b t it is.
T h e language o f in trin sic h u m a n rig h ts represented a significant
advance beyond th e previous language o f w o rld religions in term s
o f its universal applicability and its thisw orldliness. Capitalist
civilization m ay w ell be credited w ith legitim ating such language
and o f fu rth e rin g its spread.
A n d y e t w e k n o w th a t h u m a n rights are sorely lacking in the
real practices o f th e w orld. It is tru e th at in previous historical
systems th ere was v ery little preten ce to h u m a n rights. T oday all
political entities claim to be its defenders. B u t A m nesty In te r
national finds n o d ifficulty in draw ing u p long lists o f its violation
everyw here o n th e globe. Is th e pro clam atio n o f h u m a n rights
m ore than th e h y pocritical hom age vice pays to virtue?
O n e arg u m en t m ay be th a t h u m a n rights are better observed in
som e parts o f th e w o rld -sy stem th a n in others. N o d o u b t this is
true, albeit even in th e c o u n tries w h ere it is ap parently less o f a
problem , th ere are still en tire intern al zones and strata o f th e
p o p u latio n w hose h u m a n rights are regularly violated. A nd the
w o rld s m igrants, w h o are an increasing and n o t a decreasing
p ro p o rtio n o f th e w o rld s population in o u r p resent w orld-system ,
are notoriously deprived o f such h u m a n rights.
B u t even i f w e acknow ledge th a t w e can show a range o f
observance o f h u m a n rig h ts such th a t th ere are b e tte r and w orse
locales, w h a t does this th e n prove? For it is easy to see there exists a
correlation b etw een ric h e r and m o re p ow erful states an d few er (or
less obvious) violations, and o f p o o rer and w eaker states and grosser
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violations. O n e can use th is correlation in tw o opposite ways. For

som e it proves th a t th e m o re capitalist th e state, th e m o re the
acceptance o f h u m an rights, and o f course th e n vice versa. B u t to
others it proves in one m ore w ay the c o n cen tratio n o f advantages
in one zone o f th e w orld-system , and th e concentration o f negative
effects in th e other, itse lf seen as th e o u tco m e o f historical
capitalism , in w h ic h h u m a n rig h ts are precisely n o t a universal
value b u t a rew ard o f privilege.
W ith b o th universal science and universal h u m a n rights com ing
in to question, th e advocates often tu rn to th e ir strongest claim,
universalist allocation o f position, or m eritocracy. In th e m ythology
o f capitalist civilization, in all p rio r historical systems, individuals
w ere b o rn to th e ir position; in historical capitalism alone th e re is
said to be allocation by m e rit th e career o p en to talents
proclaim ed by th e F ren ch R evolution.
O n ce again w e m u st be careful to com pare m y th and reality. It is
n o t tru e th a t individual social advancem ent was u n k n o w n in
previous historical system s. It always existed. Else, h o w could w e
have h ad th e c o n sta n t tu rn o v e r o f aristocracies, largely via m ilitary
prowess, th a t was pervasive everywhere? A nd religious structures
also always incorporated social ascent by m erit, in th e ir case by
non -m ilitary prowess. Indeed, even ascent via th e m ark et was
w idespread if n o t com m onplace.
W h a t is different in capitalist civilization has been tw o things.
First, th e process o f m eritocracy has been proclaim ed as an official
v irtu e instead o f being m erely a de facto reality. T h e c u ltu re has
been different. A nd secondly, th e percentage o f th e w o rld s
p o p u la tio n for w h o m such ascent was possible has gone up. B ut
even th o u g h it has gone up, m eritocratic ascent rem ains very m u ch
th e attrib u te o f a m in o rity . For m eritocracy is a false universalism .
It proclaim s a universal o p p o rtu n ity th at, by definition, is only
m eaningful i f it is n o t universal. M eritocracy is intrinsically elitist.
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133
F urth erm o re, w e m u st investigate th e degree to w h ic h th e

institu tio n s th a t translate m erito cracy in to practice m ake th eir
decisions in fact o n g rounds o f m erit. T h is brings us back to the
question o f th e operations o f educational structures. D o they
indeed p erfo rm a p erfect triage o n th e basis o f m erit? O f course,
th e y are able to q u an tify m e rit in term s o f scores. B u t since the
scoring is d one locally by locals according to locally chosen criteria,
these scores are d o u b tfu lly com parable. W h a t is probably the m ost
th a t can be said fo r m erito cratic scoring is th a t it can easily
distinguish th e sm all g ro u p o f q u ite exceptional persons and th a t o f
q u ite in c o m p e te n t persons, leaving a very large g ro u p in betw een
am ong w h o m th e scoring process does n o t allow us to choose in
reliable ways. In te rm s how ever o f a jo b stru ctu re th a t needs at
m ost a q u a rte r o f th e 80 p e r cen t in th e m id d le co m p eten cy group
in h ig h e r p aying positions, choices m u st be m ade, and th ere is clear
evidence th a t h e re th e c rite rio n o f fam ily social position in tru d e s in
a m ajor w ay. T h e institutionalized m eritocratic system helps a few
to gain access to positions they m e rit and fro m w h ich they m ig h t
otherw ise be barred. B u t it allows m an y m o re to gain access to
positions o n th e basis o f ascribed status u n d e r th e cover o f having
gained this access by achievem ent.
T h e second m ain claim to v irtu e o f capitalist civilization has
been th a t it has n o u rish ed dem ocracy and m ade it flourish. L et us
define dem ocracy q u ite sim ply as th e m axim izatio n o f participa
tio n in decisio n -m ak in g at all levels o n th e basis o f equality. T hus,
one perso n one v o te has becom e one sym bol o f a dem ocratic state
structure, e v en i f it alone is m erely a first step in dem ocratic
participation. T h e basic d riv e for dem ocracy is an egalitarian drive.
T h e co u n ter-d riv es are two: th e drive for privilege, and the drive
for c o m p eten t perform ance. B oth co u n ter-d riv es result in hier
archies.
T h e existence o f tw o co u n ter-d riv es ra th e r th a n one explains the
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p ro fo u n d g u lf in th e in te rp re ta tio n o f reality. T h e defenders o f

capitalist civilization argue th a t it has been the first historical
system to have ended th e h ie ra rc h y o f privilege. O f course, they
add, th e hierarchy o f c o m p e te n t perform ance has b een and has had
to be m aintained. For exam ple, an in fa n t can n o t be p erm itte d to
have equal say w ith th e parent. T h e critics o f capitalist civilization
charge a vast deception. T h e y assert th a t th e hierarchy o f privilege
m asquerades as the h ierarch y o f co m p eten t perform ance, and th a t
the hierarchy th a t m ay be legitim ate in a lim ited range o f social
situaions (the issue o f th e social a u to n o m y o f th e infant) is w idely
and inappropriately applied to a far w ider range o f situations in
w o rk an d th e c o m m u n ity w here in fact dem ocratic (that is,
egalitarian) n o rm s sh o u ld prevail. H e re w e see th e lin k b etw e en the
debate a b o u t m erito cracy and the debate ab o u t dem ocracy.
If w e are to draw u p a balance sheet o f historical capitalism , w e
m u st take in to account th e totality o f social arenas th a t exist in the
w orld-system , evaluate each in term s o f th e degree to w h ic h a
hierarchy o f d ecision-m aking is or is n o t tru ly ju stifie d in term s o f
th e needs o f co m p e te n t p erform ance (as opposed to those o f
privilege), an d sum m arize these evaluations for o u r c u rre n t w o rld system in com parison w ith parallel sum m ary evaluations o f
previous historical systems. T his is a d au n tin g task. T h e principal
arg u m e n t in favour o f th e thesis o f greater dem ocracy w ith in
historical capitalism has been th e spread o f political voting systems.
T o be sure, o n th e o th e r side, skepticism is freq u ently expressed
ab o u t th e substantive significance o f form al suffrage. B u t even
leaving this aside, the principal argum ent against the thesis o f
dem ocratization via capitalist civilization has beeii the decline o f
co m m u n ita ria n in stitu tio n s in the m o d e rn w o rld sim ultaneous
w ith th e rise o f v oting systems. W h a t was gained in the one arena,
it is asserted, was m o re th a n lost in th e other.
T h is brings us to th e discussion o f alienation. It is a t this p o in t
A Balance S heet
135
th a t conservative a n d radical critics o f capitalist civilization jo in

forces. A lienation is th e opposite o f fu lfilm en t o f potential, the
already noted claim a b o u t the virtue o f fo rm al education.
A lien atio n refers to ways in w h ic h w e becom e alien fro m ourselves,
o u r true n a tu re , indeed o u r potential. B o th th e conservative and
the radical critiques o f capitalist civilization have centred on th e
degree to w h ic h co m m odification, in particular b u t n o t only o f
labour-po w er, is p ro fo u n d ly dehum anizing.
For th e defenders o f capitalist civilization, this is m ysticism
w h ic h c a n n o t co m pare w ith th e real m aterial b enefits o f the
m o d e m w orld. T h e y challenge w h e th e r it is possible in any
significant w ay to operationalize the concept o f alienation. For the
critics, how ever, it seems easy to concretize. T h e y point to the
m ultiple form s o f p ro fo u n d psychic and socio-psychological
m alaise o f th e m o d e m w orld. O n ce again o u r m easurem ents are
weak. W e k n o w th e m adnesses o f ou r ow n historical system. W e
have som e w eak idea o f th e madnesses th a t w ere k n o w n in o ther
historical systems. W e are ill equipped to com pare them . W e can
nonetheless assert th re e things. O ne, th e madnesses, o r i f yo u w ill
the form s o f malaise, o f o u r system are extensive. T w o, a case can
be m ade for som e clear linkages betw een these psychic problem s
and th e specific social structures o f o u r h istorical system . T h ree, i f
anything, th e extensiveness o f these psychic p roblem s seems to
have increased w ith in o u r system as tim e has gone on. T h is last
m ay perhaps be m e re ly th e o u tco m e o f closer social m o n ito rin g o f
reality fo r exam ple, o f ra n d o m u rb an violence. B u t som e p a r t o f
the perceived increase seem s to be subject to solid m easu rem en t
for exam ple, th e addictions to drugs.
N o r m u st w e fo rg et trees. T h e n atu ral beauties o f th e physical
w orld are p art o f w h a t creates h u m a n pleasure. C o m m odification
has led, inevitably, to a w holesale d estruction o f these natural
beauties. T o be sure, o th e r beauties have been constructed. Perhaps
136
they are better. B u t th e alternative beauties are them selves

com m odified, and hence less dem ocratically available to th e
view ers th a n w ere trees. T h e artificial beauties are available
p rim arily to a m inority.
Cui Bond, and W hy a Debate?

W e can n o w tu rn to th e balance sheet. Yes, it is possible to argue
one, at least a qualitative one. It is clear fro m th is review o f th e
argum en ts th a t th e p ic tu re is n o t one-sided. Is th e re h o w e v er som e
underly in g th re a d w h ic h can sum m arize th e pros and cons? I th in k
there is. I sta rt w ith th e assu m p tio n th a t all k n o w n historical
system s h av e been systems th a t incarnated a h ierarchy o f privilege.
T h e re never was a gold en era. T h e question is th u s a choice n o t
b etw een good an d bad historical systems, b u t b etw een b e tter and
worse. H as capitalist civilization been b e tte r or w orse th a n p rio r
historical systems? (I leave aside for th e m o m e n t w h e th e r fu tu re
ones could be b etter o r w orse, o r w ill probably be b etter o r worse.)
It seems to m e th e o n ly p e rtin e n t questio n is: cui bond'? It is clear
th a t th e size o f th e privileged strata as a percen tag e o f th e w h o le has
grow n significantly u n d e r historical capitalism. A nd for these
people, th e w o rld th e y k n o w is better o n th e w h o le th a n any their
earlier cou n terp arts knew . T h e y are certainly better o ff m aterially
and in term s o f health, life opportunities, and freedom from
arbitrary constraints im posed b y small rulin g groups. W h e th e r they
are b etter o ff psychically is open to m u ch question, b u t perhaps
th e y are n o w orse off.
B u t fo r th e o th e r end o f th e spectrum , th e 50 to 85 p er cen t o f
th e w o rld s p o p u latio n w h o are n o t th e recipients o f privilege, the
w orld they know is alm ost certainly worse th an any th eir earlier
counterp arts knew . It is likely they are w orse o ff m aterially, despite
th e technological changes. In substantive as opposed to form al
A Balance S heet
13 7
term s, th e y are m ore, n o t less, subject to arb itrary constraints, since

th e central m echanism s are m o re pervasive and m o re efficient. A nd
they bear th e b ru n t o f th e various kinds o f psychic m alaise, as w ell
as o f th e destructiveness o f civil w ars.
T h e w o rld o f capitalist civilization is a polarized an d a polarizing
w orld. H o w th e n has it survived this long? T h is is w h ere th e public
debate ov er th e balance sheet has com e in. W h a t has preserved the
system thus far has b een th e hope o f increm en tal reform ism , the
eventual brid g in g o f th e gap. T h e debate has itse lf fed this hope
doubly. T h e assertion o f th e virtues has served to persuade m any o f
th e 'long -term ben efits o f th e system. A n d th e discussion o f the
vices has .made m an y feel th a t they could thereby organize
effectively to b rin g about political transform ation. C apitalist
civilization has n o t o n ly been a successful civilization. It has above
all been a seductive one. It has seduced even its victim s and its
opponents.
B u t i f y o u believe, as I do, th a t all historical systems w ith o u t
exception have lim ited lives and m u st eventually give w ay to o th er
successor systems, y o u m u st assume th a t o u r w orld-system cannot
be stable forever. It is to this them e, th e fu tu re prospects o f
capitalist civilization, th a t w e shall next turn.
Future Prospects
C apitalist civilization has reached th e a u tu m n o f its existence.

A utum n, as w e know , is a w o n d erfu l season, at least in the regions
wher.e capitalist civilization was born. Past th e first b lo o m o f spring,
past the full richness o f sum m er, w e reap th e harvest in autum n.
B u t in a u tu m n it is also tru e th a t th e leaves fall fro m th e trees. And
w h ilst w e k n o w th a t th e re is m u c h to enjoy in autum n, w e know
also th a t w e m u st p rep are for th e w in te r frost, th e end o f th e cycle,
th e end too o f a historical system.
If w e w ish to u n d erstan d h o w a system approaches its end, w e
m u st look at its contradictions, since all historical systems (indeed
all systems) have in b u ilt contradictions, w h ich is w hy they all have
lim ited lives. I shall discuss th ree basic contradictions w hose
increasing strain d ete rm in e th e fu tu re prospects o f historical
capitalism . T h e y are th e dilem m a o f accum ulation, th e d ilem m a o f
political legitim ization, and th e dilem m a o f th e geocultural agenda.
E ach dilem m a has been w ith us fro m th e beginning o f the system;
each has been approaching th e th reshold o f the p o in t w here th e
co n trad ictio n can no lo n g er be contained, th at is, th e p o in t at
w h ich th e necessary adjustm ents to m a in tain the norm al
functio n in g o f th e system w ill have so h ig h a cost th at they cannot
b rin g th e system in to te m p o ra ry equilibrium .
142
The Dilemma o f Accumulation

T h e endless accu m u latio n o f capital is th e raison d etre and the
central activity o f capitalist civilization. W e have already seen, in
review ing the balance sheet, th a t its successful accom plishm ent is
one o f its boasts and one o f its justifications. B ut w h a t is its
contradiction, its dilem m a?
T h e basic strain is th a t m axim izing profits and therefore
accum ulation requires achieving relative m onopolies o f p ro d u c
tion. T h e g reater th e degree o f m onopolization, th e greater the
possibility o f obtaining a w ide gap betw een total p ro d u c tio n costs
and effective sales prices. T herefore, all capitalists seek to
m onopolize. H ow ever, h ig h profits are attractive, and others w ill
always seek to enter th e m arkets w here they can be m ade. H ence,
m onopolies in v ite com petition, w h ich u n d erm ines m onopolies
and h ig h profits sim ultaneously. B u t each tim e th e sources o f high
profits are debilitated, capitalists (singly and collectively) search for
n ew sources o f h ig h profits, th a t is, n e w ways to m onopolize sectors
o f production. T h is tension betw een th e need to m onopolize and
its self-destructive character explains th e cyclical n atu re o f
capitalist econom ic activity, an d accounts for the underlying axial
division o f lab o u r betw een core products (highly m onopolized) and
periph eral p roducts (highly com petitive) in a capitalist w o rld econom y.
E conom ic m onopolies are never achieved in the m arket.
M arkets are in h e re n tly anti-m onopolistic. T h e advantage o f one
producer over others is always tem porary, since o th er producers
always can and w ill copy th e elem ents th a t gave one p ro d u c er the
advantage. This is dictated by the need o f all p roducers to survive in
the struggle to be a locus o f accum ulation. Since, how ever,
significant accu m u latio n is never possible for long via m ark et
m echanism s, all producers m u st look beyond th e m ark et to p e rm it
Future Prospects
143
th em to succeed. T h e y look to tw o institutions: th e state, w h ic h is

quite concrete as an institution; and c u sto m , w h ic h is quite
am orph o u s b u t nonetheless real as an institution.
W h a t can states do for producers? T w o things essentially. T hey
can create co nditions that lead to the m o n o p o lization o f sales. And
they can create conditions that lead to the m o nopsonization o f
purchases o f th e factors o f pro d u ctio n . T h e sim plest w ay to do this
is by form al legislation. B ut form al legislation has tw o constraints.
O n e is th a t it applies o n ly w ith in the frontiers o f the state th at is
legislating, w hereas th e real m ark et exists w ith in th e w o rld ec.onomy as a w hole. T h e second is th a t th e state is subject to m any
political pressures against such legislation fro m entrepreneurs
w h o are left out, and fro m all those n o n -p ro d u c e r groups w hose
econom ic p o sitio n is h u r t by such legislation. For these reasons, the
full legislative ro u te has seldom been follow ed. W h e n it has, as in
the case o f the so-called (now m ostly form er) socialist states, it has
revealed its inefficacy as a m echanism o f lo n g -te rm accum ulation
o f capital. T h e ro u te th at has been m ore usual is th e selective, and
often indirect, in tru sio n o f states in to the m arket. T hey in tru d e
first o f all as states vis-a-vis o th er states, and especially as strong
states vis-a-vis w eaker states, im posing preferential access, and
m ost im portantly, preventing denial o f access to m arkets in the
w eaker countries w h ile sim ultaneously m aking it difficult for
com petito rs in w eaker countries to copy efficiencies. T h e y in tru d e
secondly th ro u g h th e ir budgetary, fiscal, and redistributive
decisions designed to favour som e sets o f p roducers against any and
all com petition. T h e y in tru d e th ird ly by p rev en ting sellers o f
factors o f p ro d u c tio n (especially, o f labo u r-p o w er) from com bating
the m onopsonistic positions o f certain sets o f producers.
T h e specifi c acts o f states vary constantly, because w o rld m arket
conditions constantly change, th e balance o f po w er in th e interstate
system constantly changes, and the in tern al political situation
144
w ith in states constantly changes. T h e a ttitu d e o f sets o f producers

tow ards th e ir o w n state therefo re constantly changes as w ell, as the
likelihood th a t state action w ill h elp or h u r t th e m in p articular
changes. B u t w h a t is co n stan t is th e search by som e pow erful
producers for state en h a n c e m en t o f th eir m ark et position, and the
largely positive response o f th e states to such dem ands. H ad this n o t
been a constant o f th e capitalist w o rld -eco n o m y, capitalist
civilization w o u ld never have flourished.
Producers have n o t h o w ev er relied only o n th e state. T h e y have
relied also o n cu sto m . As I noted, this is am o rp h ous b u t n o t
thereby insignificant. C u sto m includes th e creatio n o f m arkets via
th e creatio n o f tastes. A dvertising an d m ark etin g are obvious
constructions o f custom b u t they are only a sm all p a rt o f this story.
A far larger p a rt is th e shaping o f th e en tire value system as fostered
and re p ro d u ced by all th e institutions o f socialization created and
refined over 500 years o f m o d e rn history. It is to this vast
fram ew ork w e p o in t w h e n w e speak o f th e existence o f the
consum er society. T h e need to acquire certain kinds (and n o t
o th e r kinds) o f m aterial objects is a social creation o f capitalist
civilization. Its broad u n d erp in n in g s are assured by a range o f o th er
institutions. O n this fo u n d atio n , given sets o f producers can
develop argum ents to persuade large groups o f purchasers to buy
specific kinds o f products. T h is is no dou b t a key elem ent in the
ability to establish relative m onopolies.
C ustom also w orks in still other, subtler ways. T h e re have been
established w id e linguistic and c u ltu ra l channels th at ensure th e
greater lik elih o o d th a t g iv en econom ic groups w ill ten d to deal
w ith given o th e r ones ra th e r th a n w ith those w ith w h o m m ark et
rationality alone w o u ld dictate. Real econom ic transactions in the
capitalist w o rld -eco n o m y have depended to a greater extent th a n
w e ad m it o n links o f c o m m u n ity and family, fam iliarity and trust.
A nd w hile, u p to a p o in t, th is reduces transaction costs and
Future Prospects
145
therefore is rational in m a rk e t term s, th a t p o in t has been readily

and regularly exceeded, pushing tow ards a custo m ary m o n o p o
lizing o f p ro d u ctio n n o t d eterm in ed by m a rk e t considerations.
C om p etitio n , w e h av e said, always com es along to u n derm ine
the m onopolies. B u t in order to do so, com petitors also cannot rely
sim ply o n th e m arket, for th e m ark et has been rigged against
com petition by states and by custom . P otential com petitors m ust
usually act first to change the states and to change custom . T hey
have done this by using one set o f states against another, or by
creating political coalitions w ith in states to change state policy, or
by acting in th e social a ren a to change' th e social definitions o f
custom ary an d expected behavior, in p a rt by changing im m ediate
taste preferences, in p a rt by attacking m o re fu n d am ental value
premises.
Thus, th e politics o f accum ulation has been a constant battle,
w h ic h has led to th e sapping o f th e m onopolies th a t have ensured
overall expansion o f th e w orld-econom y, th is regular sapping o f
m onopolies, how ever slow it is, this repeatedly increased degree o f
com petition, has led to th e p ro fit squeezes and lo n g stagnations we
call K o n d ratieff B-phases. E ach tim e there is such a stagnation, the
system is o u t of equilibrium . T o p e rm it the system to resum e its
expansion and th erefore its ability to ensure the endless accum ula
tion o f capital, som e ad justm ents m u st be made.
T h re e standard kin d s o f adjustm ents are possible, all o f w h ich
serve to augm ent overall levels o f profit, and th erefore to provide
th e basis o f ren ew ed expansion o f th e w o rld -eco n o m y. O n e can
seek to lo w er th e cost o f p ro d u cin g com p etitiv e products. O n e can
seek to find n ew buyers for com p etitiv e products. O n e can find
n ew pro d u cts to p ro d u ce w h ic h w ill be relatively m o nopolized yet
have a significant m ark et. All th re e o f these adjustm ents have been
m ade each tim e th e re has been a global p ro fit squeeze.
O ne w ay to lo w er th e costs o f p ro d u ctio n is to reduce the cost o f
146
inputs. B u t w h ile this m ay increase profits for one producer, it m ay

low er th e m for ano th er. Globally, it m ay change little. T h e m ore
effective w ay to lo w er costs o f p ro d u ctio n is to lo w er the costs o f
labour by fu rth e r m echanization, b y changing law or custom
causing low er real wages, or by geographical d isplacem ent o f
p ro d u c tio n to zones o f lo w e r lab o u r costs. T hese tactics w ork; they
do reduce the cost o f labour.
How ever, these tactics co n trad ict th e o th e r m ode o f increasing
profits, i f n o t p ro fit rates, w h ic h is th a t o f increasing effective
dem and. In o rd er to increase effective dem and, the global absolute
level o f rew ard for lab o u r in p u t m u st go up, n o t dow n. H o w can
these tw o needs be reconciled? H istorically, th e re has been only
one w ay by geographical disjuncture. W h en ever, in m ore
favoured regions o f th e w orld-system , political steps are ta k en to
raise in som e w ay effective d em an d (increases in wage levels, and in
th e social w age or state-co n tro lled redistribution), steps have been
ta k en in o th e r parts o f th e w orld-system to increase th e n u m b e r o f
p ro d u cers a t low w age levels. T h e latter has taken tw o m a in form s:
transform ing rural, land-b ased w orkers in to m o re urban, p art
lifetim e w age w orkers; and ex p an d in g th e boundaries o f the w o rld econom y to include in th e w o rld s w o rk force peoples w h o have
previously been ru ral producers, often largely subsistence p ro d u
cers.
T h e th ird and m o st publicized w ay to restore p ro fit levels has
been o f course th ro u g h technological change, th a t is, the creation
o f n e w so-called leading p ro d u cts w h ich can serve as th e locus o f
m onopolized, h ig h -p ro fit operations. T his too req u ires consider
able state in terv en tio n and reco n stru ctio n o f cu sto m to ensure
m onopo lizatio n . W ith o u t this, th e efforts o f im aginative en tre
preneurs are likely to be stillborn.
In th is m odel o f th e dilem m a o f accum ulation, th e repeated
p attern o f m o nopolization, leading to p ro fit squeeze because o f
Future Prospects
147
increased com petition, an d th e restoration o f p ro fit levels (and thus

o f equilibrium ) by co u n ter-actio n , w h erein do w e find constraints
on th e possibility th a t effective adjustm ents can indefinitely be
made? T h ese constraints p ro b ab ly do n o t lie in th e arena o f
continued technological inventiveness, alth o u g h these new products
m ay be m o v in g tow ards exhausting th e ecological balance o f
th e biosphere. T h e y are m o re likely to be fo u n d in th e arena o f
increasing effective dem and, since this requires political action th a t
in th e long ru n u n d erm in es profitability in o th e r ways. T h is w ill be
th e next d ile m m a w e discuss.
It is in th e fi rst m ech an ism o f adjustm ent, enlarging th e low cost
sector o f th e w age force, th a t w e fin d the strongest co n straint o f the
three, since there are tw o in h e re n t limits in this process: new zones
to include in th e w o rld -eco n o m y , a lim it w e seem already to have
reached; exhaustion o f th e reserve o f rural, land-based labour to
pull in as u rb an p a rt lifetim e wage w orkers, a lim it w e will
approach in th e n ear future. Can w e substitute a reserve arm y o f
u rb a n m arginals (a very fast-grow ing segm ent o f th e w o rld s
p o pulatio n ) for th a t o f ru ral land-based w orkers? Perhaps, b u t
u rb a n m arg in als are a far g reater th re a t to th e legitim ization o f
states th a n ru ra l lan d -b ased w orkers.
It is clear th a t th e dilem m as o f accum ulation lead us directly
into th e dilem m as o f legitim ization o f political institutions,
perhaps a still greater Achilles heel o f capitalist civilization.
The Dilemma o f Political Legitimization

T h e dilem m a o f legitim izatio n o f capitalist civilization is straight
forw ard. All historical systems survive by rew ard in g th e cadres o f
the system. All k n o w n historical systems have also h a d to h o ld in
lin e large masses o f th e p o p u latio n w h o are m aterially and socially
ill-rew arded. T h e usual w ay to do th e latter has been a com bination o f
148
force and fa ith faith in th e sanctity o f rulers com bined w ith

b e lie f in the inevitability o f hierarchy.
For several centuries (roughly betw een the late fifteen th and the
end o f eig h teen th centuries), capitalist civilization th o u g h t it could
utilize the a n c ie n t m o d e o f legitim ation. T h is w as th e period o f the
co n structio n o f the central states p rim arily via absolutist m onarchs,
as w ell as the co n stru ctio n o f th e interstate system . It was the period
o f creating th e w in n ers, and establishing a h ierarchy o f states
w ith in th e in te rsta te system . T h e cadres o f th e system w ere offered
rew ards for enterin g in to close linkage to th e w in n in g state
structures. W e have already seen h o w im p o rta n t it has always been
for entrep ren eu rs to have th e su p p o rt o f strong state structures.
T hese states did receive th e su p p o rt o f th e cadres.
H ow ever, capitalist civilization, as has been repeatedly analysed
for 150 years now , was u n d e rm in in g those b elief systems th a t
assured th e relative acquiescence o f the mass o f the population. T h e
co m b in atio n o f scientism (linked to the req u irem en ts o f tec h n o
logical innovation), bu reau cratizatio n o f th e state structures
(required for th e efficiency o f th e accu m u latio n process), and the
system atic m o b ility o f large p o pulations (required by the evolving
w o rk force needs o f capitalist productive activity) req u ired a
massive ren o v atio n o f political culture. It was th e F rench R evolu
tion th a t served as th e catalyst o f this renovation. Its im pact was to
m ake th e co n cep t o f p o p u lar sovereignty th e n e w m oral ju stifica
tio n for th e p o litical system o f historical capitalism .
T h e dilem m a th en becam e h o w to co n tin u e to rew ard the
cadres w hile som ehow ensuring th e loyalty o f the large m a jo rity o f
the pop u latio n w ho had becom e the theoretical depository o f
legitim acy. In th e n in eteen th century, this dilem m a was posed as
the pro b lem o f how to in co rp o rate the w o rk in g classes as w ell as
the cadres into th e state structures o f the core states o f the capitalist
w o rld-eco n o m y , w h ic h a t th e tim e w ere located p rim a rily in
Future Prospects
149
w estern E u ro p e and N o rth A m erica. It constituted a dilem m a in

that, given th e level o f absolute surplus-value at th e tim e, if the
rew ard for th e w o rk in g classes w ere too high, th e rew ard for th e
cadres w o u ld be seriously affected. T his was th e so-called class
struggle, a struggle th a t was in fact successfully contained histo ri
cally.
T h e m o d e o f reconciling th e prom ise o f ever-increasing rewards
for th e cadres and the dem ands o f the w o rk in g classes for a quid pro
quo for th e ir loyalty to the state was to offer th e latter a small piece
o f the pie. W h a t w as offered was n o t e n o u g h to th re a te n the
accum ulation o f capital indeed it perhaps even enlarged it
through th e expansion o f w orld effective d e m a n d b u t this offer
was com bined w ith h o p e th a t this sm all p art o f th e pie w o u ld

expand over tim e along w ith th e expansion o f capital accum ula
tion.
T h e solution was m ade o f a d ju stm en t th a t solved the problem in
the short term b u t reinforced it in the long term , as it created a
co n tin u al pressure to realize th e hope by increasing th e share o f the
w orking classes. D u rin g th e n in e te e n th century, nonetheless, the
ad justm en t m echanism w o rk ed rem arkably well. O ver th at period,
th e w orking classes o f th e core co u n tries w ere offered tw o paths o f
increased rew ard: th e p a th o f political particip atio n in elections, or
th e slow b u t co n tin u o u s expansion o f the suffrage; an d th e p a th o f
state-im posed red istrib u tio n , or th e slow b u t co n tin u ous expansion
o f social legislation and th e social w age or w elfare state. A long w ith
this w e n t socially guaranteed hope, incarnated not m erely in the
d o m in a n t ideology o f liberalism but in the supposedly alternative
ideology o f socialism.
By 1914, w e saw th e results w o rk in g classes in th e core
countries w ell in te g ra te d in to th e ir respective states, having
becom e both p atrio tic and reform ist. T his solution did n o t in fact
im pede the ability o f th e cadres to expand significantly th eir ow n
150
incom es, because th e solution took place w ith in a fram ew ork o f

m assive expansion o f total w orldw ide accum ulation, and the
significantly increased exploitation o f w h at w e today call the South.
T h e First W o rld W a r w eakened the political hold o f the core
states o n th e South. T h e political integration o f their populations
now becam e critical for th e stable fu n ctio n in g o f th e w orld-system .
T h e dilem m a o f political legitim ization, played o u t in the
nin eteen th c e n tu ry w ith in th e core states, was replicated for the
w'hole w o rld in the tw en tieth century. T h e question was still how
to offer th e cadres ever-increased rew ard b u t also to offer the
masses (now o f the w h o le w orld) a small p a rt o f the pie and
reform ist hope. T h is solution was w h a t w e call W ilsonianism ,
w h ic h offered to repeat o n a w orld scale w h at had been done
w ith in th e core states previously. W ilso n ian ism offered an analogy
to th e suffrage in n atio n al self-determ ination (the political parity o f
all states w ith in in terstate structures parallel to the political parity
o f all citizens w ith in a state). A nd W ilsonianism also offered an
analogy to social legislation and the w elfare state in the concept o f
the econom ic d ev elo p m en t o f underdeveloped nations assisted by
dev elo p m en t aid (or th e w elfare state o n a w o rld level).
T his ad ju stm en t seem ed at first to w o rk as well, culm inating in
the political decolonizations and th e co m in g to pow er in the 194565 p e rio d o f national lib eration m o v em en t th ro u g h o u t th e T h ird
W orld. U n lik e th e adjustm ents o f the n in e te en th century,
how ever, th e ad justm ents o f th e tw en tieth century w ere not, and
could n o t be, u n d e rw ritte n by a fu rth e r geographical expansion o f
the capitalist w o rld -eco n o m y . T herefore, the lim its o f w h a t could
be offered in w'orld red istrib u tio n w ith o u t h aving a serious
negative im p act on th e share o f surplus value accorded to the
cadres o f th e system w ere reached circa 1970. Since th at tim e,
W ilsoniam ism has been in retreat. T h e very norm al d o w n tu rn o f
th e w o rld -eco n o m y , th e w o rld econom ic stagnation w e have been
F uture Prospects
151
in since then, has seen all th e usual processes o f ad justm ent

discussed previously in term s o f the d ilem m a o f accum ulation. But
the capacities o f th e w orld -sy stem to m ake th e adjustm ents
necessary to m ain ta in th e legitim izatio n o f the nation-states has
show n acute signs o f strain.
W e have th erefo re seen, as a g ro w in g process in the 1970s and
1980s, th e political collapse o f the erstw hile national liberation
m ovem ents in th e South, o f th e C o m m u n ist parties in w h a t used to
be the socialist bloc, and even o f K eynesianism /social-dem ocracy
in the core states. T h ese collapses have been the result o f the
w ithdraw al o f mass su p p o rt for these m ovem ents w h ich had
previously, after a century o f struggle, actually come to political
pow er. B u t th is w ith d raw al o f p o p u la r su p p o rt m arked also the
ab an d o n m en t o f refo rm ist hope. It thereby rem oved one o f the
b in din g forces o f th e system o f states, and rem oved in effect th eir
popular legitim ization. If, how ever, the states are no longer
legitim ized, they cannot contain the political struggles. F rom the
p o in t o f view o f th e capitalist w orld-system , this collapse o f left
strategy has been a disaster, since far from being revolutionary the
classical left strategy has served as p a rt o f th e integrating glue o f
capitalist civilization.
The Dilemma o f the Geocultural Agenda

C apitalist civilization has also been b u ilt aro u n d a geocultural
th e m e w h ic h has n ev er previously been d o m in an t: th e centrality o f
th e individual as th e so-called subject o f history. Individualism
presents a dilem m a, because it is a d o uble-edged sword. O n the one
hand, by placing the em phasis on individual initiative, capitalist
civilization has harnessed self-interest b o th to th e flourishing and
to th e m ain ten an ce o f th e system . T h e P ro m eth ean m y th has
encouraged, rew arded, and legitim ated th e effort o f individuals
152
n o t m erely en trep ren eu rs, b u t th e w orking classes as w ell to

m axim ize efficiency and to release th e po w er o f h u m a n im ag in
ation. Indeed, th e P ro m eth ean m y th h is d o n e still m ore, fo r w h ich
it is seldom given credit. It is also responsible for the in v en tio n o f
th e concept o f fo rm al political organizations o f individuals,
in clu d in g th e creatio n an d vast expansion paradoxically o f th e an tisystemic m ovem ents themselves. T hus, even an ti-individualist
social consciousness has been p redicated on th e su m m atio n o f
individual energies and o n individual faith in th e efficaciousness o f
such social action. A nd, as w e have seen, th e resu lt has been socially
constructed hope, w h ic h in tu rn has served as a key preservative o f
th e w orld-system .
T h e re is, how ever, an o th e r face to individualism , w h ic h is w hy
there is a dilem m a o f th e geocultural agenda. For individualism
encourages th e race o f all against all in a particu larly viru le n t form ,
since it legitim izes this race n o t for a sm all elite alone b u t fo r th e
en tirety o f m an k in d . F urtherm ore, it is logically lim itless. Indeed, a
good deal o f philosophical and social science discourse o f m o d ern
tim es has cen tred o n th e collective and individual dangers o f this
social release o f unalloyed self-seeking.
T h e p ro b lem for capitalist civilization, fro m th e outset, has been
h o w to reco n cile th e positive and negative consequences o f having
established th e individual as th e subject o f history. Conservative
ideologists have o f course always w arn ed o f im p en d in g disaster, as
have socialist theorists, alth o u g h in practice n e ith e r the conserva
tive n o r th e socialist ideologists (nor th e m o v em en ts th e y have
inspired) have been w illing for very long to struggle directly against
this geocultural agenda. R ather, they h av e acco m m odated th e m
selves to it and so u g h t to tu rn it tow ards th e ir o w n ends.
B y w h a t m echanism s th e n has th e co n tradiction been
contained? It has been contained by em phasizing sim ultaneously
tw o
opposite
them es,
p u rsu in g
th e m
sim ultaneously,
and
Future Prospects
153
zigzagging b etw een them . T h e tw o em phases, o r practices, have

been universalism on th e one h an d and racism -sexism on the other.
T h e y are both quintessential products o f capitalist civilization.
T h e y are seem ing opposites, b u t in fact q u ite com plem entary. It is
in the strange and precarious lin k betw een th e tw o th at capitalist
civilization has contained th e d ilem m a o f th e geocultual agenda o f
th e individual as th e subject o f history.
W h a t is th e praxis o f universalism ? It involves theoretically th e
m oral h o m o g en izatio n o f m an k in d . It is n o t only th e assertion th at
all persons are endow ed w ith th e same h u m a n rights but also the
assertion th a t th ere are universals o f h u m a n b ehaviour w e can
ascertain and analyse. T herefore, universalism tends to view
askance any and all in cru statio n either o f h u m a n privilege or o f th e
claim th a t som e groups in h e re n tly p erfo rm b etter th an others.
T h e praxis o f racism and sexism is exactly th e opposite. It is th e
assertion th a t all persons are n o t endow ed w ith th e same h u m a n
rights, b u t are ra th e r arrayed in a biologically o r culturally
definitive hierarchy. T h is h ierarch y determ ines th eir rights and
privileges, and th e ir place in th e collective w o rk process. It is
explained and ju stifie d by th e fact th a t some groups in h eren tly
p erform d ifferently fro m (and better than) others.
T h e m ost extrao rd in ary fact o f capitalist civilization over 500
years is th a t th e intensity o f b elief in these tw o them es, a n d the
degree to w h ich they have been im plem ented in social practice,
have g ro w n side by side, in tandem . It has been as th o u g h any
increase in th e one praxis b ro u g h t fo rth th e increase in th e other. If
w e re tu rn to th e tw o faces o f in dividualism individualism as the
spur o f energy, initiative, and im agination; and individualism as the
limitless struggle o f all against all it can be seen ho w th e tw o
practices (universalism and racism -sexism ) em erge fro m and lim it
th e e x te n t o f th e d isequilibrating im p act o f th e contradiction
involved in th e g eocultural agenda.
154
O n th e one hand, universalism leads to the conclusion th a t the

contradictio n is not real, since th e lim itless struggle is in fact the
spur to initiative, and th erefore any privilege th a t em erges is
ju stified as the consequence o f superior perform ance in a situation
w h ere all h av e equal o p p o rtu n ity to try. T h is a rg u m e n t has been
codified in th e tw e n tie th cen tu ry as m eritocracy, in w h ic h those on
to p in th e process o f capitalist accum ulation have m e rite d th eir
position.
O n th e o th e r hand, racism -sexism becom es the explanation o f
w h y those on th e b o tto m h av e g o tte n there. T h e y h ave sh o w n less
initiative, ev en w h e n th e possibility has been offered th e m . T h ey
have lost out in the lim itless struggle o f all against all because they
are inherently (if not biologically, th en at least culturally) incapable
o f doing better. T o re tu rn to o u r discussion o f th e balance sheet,
universalism becom es th e explanation and ju stificatio n o f the
im proved balance sheet for the m inority, and racism -sexism
becom es th e explanation and ju stificatio n o f the w orse balance
sheet for th e m ajority.
T h e w ay in w h ich these tw o practices contain each other is that
it has always been possible to use the one against the other: to use
racism -sexism to p rev en t universalism fro m m oving too far in the
d irection o f egalitarianism ; to use universalism to prevent racism sexism fro m m oving too far in th e d irectio n o f a caste system th a t
w ould in h ib it th e w o rk force m o b ility so necessary for th e capitalist
accu m u latio n process. T h is is w h a t w e m ean by th e zigzag process.
T h e con strain t o n this zigzag com es from the escalation o f
dem ands u p o n the states com b in ed w ith th e in h eren t im possibility
o f m eeting th e m th e strained dilem m a o f accu m u lation leading to
to the strained dilem m a o f political legitim ation. As a result, there
have been ever greater dem ands to realize th e egalitarian p o tential
o f universalism com bined w ith ever greater dem ands to realize the
inegalitarian caste-like p o ten tial o f racism and sexism.
Future Prospects
155
W h a t has b eg u n to h ap p en is th a t th e tw o practices, far from

containing each other, are m aking each o th e r fly fu rth e r and
fu rth er apart. W e see this in th e debates th at have com e to the
surface ab o u t th e cu ltu ral content o f o u r educational systems, one
o f th e c e n tra l purveyors o f th e g eo cu ltu ral agenda. If th e schools
are to be universalist, is th is th e universalism o f one particular
group, the w o rld u p p er stratum ? B u t if th e y are to be m u lti
cu ltu ra l, are w e n o t p ro m o tin g the cu ltu ral disunity the edu
cational system is theoretically designed to overcom e? If th e
individual is th e subject o f history, should w e n o t provide access via
individual m erit? B u t i f th e individual is the subject o f history,
m u st w e n o t restore to individuals fro m th e low er strata the
opportu n ities o f w hich th ey have been socially deprived in o rd er to
p erfo rm objectively w ell? T h is debate is increasingly a dialogue o f
the deaf, in w h ich how ever both sides are increasingly m obilized,
politically and culturally.
Crisis o f the Historical System

Let us p u t the th ree pieces together. C apitalist civilization has been
elaborated w ith in contradictions. T h is is n o t unusual; all historical
system s have contradictions. In th e case o f historical capitalism,
th ere are three p rin cip al contradictions, w h ic h I have tried to
describe briefly. Each co n trad ictio n has been historically contained
by ad ju stm en t m echanism s. B u t in each case these adjustm ent
m echanism s have becom e strained. W e m ay say th a t th e c u m u la
tion o f these strains m eans th a t the m o d e m w o rld -system as such is
approaching, is probably already in, a system ic crisis.
A system ic crisis m ay be described as a situ ation in w h ich th e
system has reached a b ifu rcatio n point, or th e first o f successive
bifurcatio n points. W h e n systems come to be far from points o f
equilibrium , th e y reach b ifu rcatio n points, w h e re in m ultiple, as
156
opposed to unique, solutions to instability becom e possible. T h e

system has at th a t p o in t w h a t w e m ay th in k o f as choice betw een
possibilities. T h e choice depends both on th e history o f th e system
and the im m ed iate stren g th o f elem ents external to th e in tern al
logic o f th e system. T h ese external elem ents are w h a t w e call noise
in term s o f th e system . W h e n systems are fu n ctio n ing norm ally,
noise is ignored. B ut in situations far fro m equilibrium , the
random variations in the noise have a m agnified effect because o f
th e h ig h increase in th e disequilibrium . T h ereu p o n , th e system,
n o w acting chaotically, w ill reco n stru ct itself q u ite radically in
ways th a t are in ternally u n predictable, b u t w h ic h lead nonetheless
to new form s o f order. T h e re can be, th e re usually is, u n d e r such
conditions, n o t one b u t a cascade o f bifurcations u n til a new
system , th a t is, a new stru c tu re o f lo n g -te rm relative eq u ilibrium , is
established and once again w e fin d ourselves in a situ a tio n o f
determ inistic stability. T h e n e w em ergent system is p robably m o re
com plex; it is in an y case d ifferen t fro m th e old system.
If w e apply this general schem a w h ic h applies to all system s
fro m physico-chem ical to biological to social system s to o u r
im m e d ia te concern , i.e., th e fu tu re prospects o f capitalist civiliza
tion, w e can sum m arize th e situation as follows. T h e capitalist
w o rld -eco n o m y is a historical system th a t has been relatively stable,
th at is, operating w ith in th e logic o f certain rules for som e 500
years now . W e have tried to evaluate its balance sheet, a n d th e n to
indicate th e strains on th e processes o f ad ju stm en t necessary to
m aintain its equilibrium . W e have suggested the reasons w h y it is
reaching o r has reach ed b ifu rcatio n p oints. W e seem to be in th e
m id st o f a process o f cascading bifurcations th a t m a y last som e 50
m o re years. W e can be sure som e n e w historical o rd er w ill em erge.
W e ca n n o t be sure w h a t th a t o rd er w ill be.
C oncretely, w e m ay sym bolize the first b ifu rcatio n as the effect
o f th e w o rld rev o lu tio n o f 1968 w h ich c o n tin u e d up to and
Future Prospects
15 7
includin g th e so-called collapse o f th e com m u n ism s in 1989, th e

second bifurcation. In th e m u ltip le local expressions o f th e w o rld
rev o lu tio n o f 1968 w e had th e expression, o f course, o f a rebellion
against capitalist civilization and its im m ed iate m ain supporting
structure, US h eg em o n y in th e w orld-system , w ith w h ic h the
USSR was seen as being in collusion. B u t w e also had a rejection o f
all the old an ti-system ic m ovem ents social-dem ocrats in the
W est, th e C o m m u n ist parties in th e socialist bloc, the national
liberation m o v em en ts in th e T h ird W o rld as ineffective failures,
and w orse still, as tacit legitim ators o f th e existing w orld-system .
For the revolutionaries o f 1968, th ere was an equation o f
reform ism , E n lig h te n m e n t values, an d th e faith in state structures
as political in stru m en ts o f change. T h e y opposed all three. T h e
cou n tercu ltu ral clothes o f th e 1968 revolutionaries w ere not so
m u c h an affirm atio n o f in dividualism in general (as is often said) as
th ey w ere a specific affirm atio n o f one o f th e thrusts (that tow ards
individual fulfdm ent) and a specific rejection o f th e contradictory
th ru st (that tow ards egotistic consum erism ).
T h e events o f 1968 aro u n d th e w o rld follow ed th e typical fo rm
o f initial bifurcations. T h e swings in social sen tim en t w ere
extrem ely strong. T h e events w ere a ru p tu re, break ing for th e first
tim e in a significant w ay th e w idespread leg itim ation o f state
structures as such, w h ic h had been such a stabilizing force in
capitalist civilization. O f course, th e im m ed iate dem ands o f th e
1968 revolutionaries w e re in p art m e t by ad justm ents o f state social
policy, in p a rt suppressed b y th e authorities. T h e adjustm ents w ere
m ore freq u en t in th e core zones o f th e capitalist w o rld -eco n o m y
th an in th e p erip h ery . T h e y w ere least m ad e in th e socialist
countries. O n th e contrary, B rezhnevian stagnation was specifically
suppressive o f 1968 dem ands. T h e reason w h y few er adjustm ents
w ere m ade in th e peripheral zones was th a t th e w orld accum ula
tio n process left th e m w ith less flexibility. T h e ir state structures all
158
suffered severe financial squeezes in th e K o n d ratieff B-phase, and

w ere in n o position to b uy o ff protest. F u rth erm o re, these
governm en ts in po w er w ere by and large precisely those o f th e
anti-system ic m ovem ents, w h ic h m ean t th e pressure on govern
m e n t policy such m ovem ents w ould n o rm ally m ake was absent.
O n e by one, these g o v ern m en ts cam e u n done, and w ere forced
in to IMF tu telag e (and national illegitim acy) by th e careening oil
prices, th e d eb t im broglio, and falling term s o f trade. T h e last o f
these governm ents to fall w ere th e C o m m u n ist regim es o f eastern
Europe, w h ic h have n o w gone th e w ay o f o th e r T h ird W o rld
countries. T h e second in th e cascade o f bifurcations is thus
sym bolized by 1989. Seem ingly quite different fro m 1968, it
actually p u rsu e d parallel them es: disillusionm ent w ith th e possib
ility o f a state-led reform ist p a th to equality in th e w orld-system .
T h is collapse o f th e C o m m u n ism s was an even bigger blow to
th e stability o f cap italist civilization th a n th e 1968 events.
Previously some w ould excuse th e failures o f som e anti-system ic
m o vem en ts by suggesting th a t th e y had been insufficiently on th e
Soviet m odel, and therefo re in h eren tly weak. B u t w h en even the
Soviet m o d el collapsed, and fro m d isillusionm ent w ithin, the
possibility o f progressive steady social change seem ed to becom e
v ery rem o te. T h e loss o f h o p e in L eninism has really been th e loss
o f h o p e in centrist liberalism . T h e e x -C o m m u n ist countries have
sim ply becom e rein teg rated in term s o f p erception into the
category o f n o n -co re zones o f th e w orld-system . T h e particularity
o f th is second b ifu rcatio n was th a t it b ro u g h t in its tra in th e
disintegratio n o f state structures w ith o u t th e o ptim istic (and
stabilizing) effect o f th e p o s t- 1918 and p o s t-1945 nationalist deco
lonizations. T h e W ilson ian call for self-d eterm in ation has n o t yet
lost all its p o w e r p erhaps, b u t it has definitely lost its bloom .
W h e re th en is capitalist civilization m oving? O n th e one hand,
the capitalist w o rld -eco n o m y w ill m o v e steadily forw ard on its
Future Prospects
159
w e ll-w o rn ru ts th e recreatio n o f m ajo r poles o f accum ulation,

Jap an (probably in collaboration w ith th e U D ) o n th e one hand,
and (western) E urope o n th e other. B etw een them , in the early
tw enty-first century, w e should see a new m ajo r expansion o f
w orld p ro d u c tio n based o n n ew m onopolized p ro d u ctio n sectors.
H ow ever, because o f th e co n tractio n o f th e pool o f w o rld reserve
labour, it is n o t sure th a t they w ill be able to m ain tain th e sam e
h ig h rate o f a c c u m u la tio n as heretofore.
W ith this expansion w ill com e necessarily a fu rth e r polarization
o f rew ard and o f social structures. W e hav e already argued w h y this
is p u ttin g an im possible strain o n political legitim ation. W e are
th u s m o v in g into, a tim e o f massive local, regional, and w orld
disorders, a tim e o f troubles, w h ich w ill be far less stru ctu red (and
therefore far less contained) th a n th e G erm an -U S w orld w ars o f
th e tw en tieth c e n tu ry an d th e w ars o f n atio n al lib e ra tio n th a t cam e
in their wake.
T h e strain o n political legitim ation, th e inability to contain th at
dilem m a, is leading to th e disintegration o f th e faith in progress
th a t contained th e d ilem m a o f th e g eo cu ltu ral agenda. Since people
no lo n g e r believe th a t th e o m n ip o te n t in dividual is in d eed the
subject o f history, they have been searching for th e p ro tectio n o f
groups. T h e n ew geocu ltu ral th em e has already been proclaim ed: it
is the th em e o f identity, id en tity as encrusted in a very elusive
concept called c u ltu re , o r to be m o re exact in cu ltu res. B ut this
new th em e sim ply creates a new dilem m a o f th e geocultural
agenda. O n th e one hand, th e call fo r m u ltip le identities is a call for
the equality o f all cu ltu res. O n th e o th e r hand, it is a call for th e
particularity, and th erefo re th e tacit hierarchy, o f all cu ltu res. As
people m ove b etw een th e tw o contrad icto ry thrusts, th e re w ill be
the constant red efin itio n o f th e boundaries o f th e groups th a t have
these cu ltu res. B ut th e very concept o f c u ltu re is based on the
assum ed stability o f these boundaries.
160
W e m ay therefo re expect explosions in all directions. T hose

w hose c u ltu re s seem to be excluded fro m c u rre n t privilege w ill
tu rn to th e th re e k inds o f political m echanism s th a t can offer
political exit fro m th e in eq u ality o f th e groups. O n e m echanism is
the cultivation o f radical alterity. A second m echanism is th e
constitu tio n o f larger units w ith effective arm ed pow er. T h e th ird
is individual transgression o f th e cultural boundaries, escape by
u pw ard individual c u ltu ra l ascent. N o n e o f these m echanism s is
new, b u t all w ere previously subordinated to th e state-oriented
re fo rm ist/p seu d o -rev o lu tio n ary searches for state p o w er as th e
road to transform ation. T h e collective p ow er o f in dividuals is no w
being replaced by th e p articu lar p o w er o f collectivities.
In th e tw enty-five to fifty years to com e, w e are likely to see
differen t form s o f d isorder in th e S outh and in th e N o rth . In th e
South, th e re w ill probably be no m o re o f th e n ational liberation
m o v em en ts th a t h av e d o m in ated th e landscape th ro u g h o u t th e
tw e n tie th century. T h e y h av e played th eir h istorical role, fo r good
o r ill. Few believe th e y h av e a fu rth e r role to play. Instead w e w ill
see th e th re e options th a t h av e com e to p ro m in en ce in the last tw o
decades. I shall call th e m th e K h o m ein i option, th e Saddam
H u ssein op tio n , an d th e b o at p eo p le op tio n . In te rm s o f the
equ ilib riu m o f capitalist civilization, each is equally unsettling.
T h e K h o m e in i o p tio n is th e o ption o f radical alterity, o f total
collective refusal to play by th e rules o f th e w orld-system . W h e n
engaged in by a large e n o u g h g ro u p w ith e n o u g h collective
resources, it can pro v id e a form idable challenge to system ic
equ ilib riu m . A single instan ce o f it m ay perhaps be tam ed, i f only
w ith great difficulty. B ut m u ltip le sim ultaneous explosions w o u ld
w re ak havoc.
T h e Saddam H ussein option is q u ite different b u t equally
difficult to handle. It is th e p a th o f in vestm ent in the creation o f
larger states th a t are heavily m ilitarized w ith th e in te n t o f engaging
Fu ture Prospects
161
in actual w arfare w ith th e N o rth . I t is n o t an easy o p tio n to pursue

and it m ay seem possible, after th e G u lf w ar, for th e N o rth to stand
u p to it com fortably. L et us n o t be deceived by appearances. As this
o p tio n becom es th e policy o f m ore and m ore states, it w ill be
increasingly difficult to c o u n te r it easily. As it is, let us n o t fail to
notice th a t total m ilitary defeat was insufficient to e n d p e rm a n en t
ly a Saddam H ussein option even in Iraq.
Finally th ere is th e boat people option, th e massive, relentless
d rive o f households to m ig rate illegally to w ealth ier climes, to
escape fro m th e South to th e N o rth . Boat people can be sent back,
b u t w ith difficulty; and m o re w ill keep com ing. O v er the com ing
tw enty-five to fifty years, w e m ay expect enorm ous num bers to
succeed in this S o u th -N o rth m igration. T h e double reality o f th e
m aterial conditions gap and th e d em ographic gap m akes it highly
im probable th a t any state policy in th e N o rth can be seriously
effective in stem m in g th e flow.
W h a t th e n w ill h ap p en in th e econom ically still b uoyant N o rth ?
Recall th a t w e are pred icatin g a decline in th e efficiency o f state
structures, even in th e N o rth . T h e p h e n o m e n o n o f th e T h ird
W o rld w ith in in th e core zones o f th e capitalist w o rld -eco n o m y
w ill becom e m assive as th e dem ographic balance shifts. N o rth
A m erica has th e largest sou th co n tin g en t today. W e ste rn E urope is
catching up. T h e p h en o m en o n is beginning even in Japan, w h ich
has erected th e strongest legal and cultu ral barriers o f any state in
th e N orth.
T h e d em ographic transform ation, caused by w eakening state
structures, w ill in tu rn w eaken th e m further. Social disorder w ill
once again becom e no rm al in the core zones. In th e last tw enty
years there has been m u ch discussion o n this u n d er th e false label
o f increased crim e. W h a t w e shall be seeing is increased civil
w arfare. T h is is th e face o f th e tim e o f troubles. T h e scram ble for
p ro tectio n has already begun. T h e states can n o t prov ide it. For one
162
th ing th e y do n o t hav e th e m oney; for an o th e r they do n o t have the

legitim atio n . W e shall see instead th e expansion o f private p ro tec
tio n arm ies and police structures by the m u ltip le c u ltu ra l groups,
by th e co rp o rate p ro d u c tio n structures, by local co m m u n ities, by
religious bodies, and o f course by crim e syndicates. T h is should n o t
be term ed anarchism ; it is ra th e r determ inistic chaos.
W h e re shall w e co m e out? For o u t o f chaos com es n e w order.
W e can n o t k n o w for certain, except for o n e thing. C apitalist
civilization w ill be over; its particu lar h istorical system w ill be no
m ore. T h e m ost w e can say beyond th a t is to o u tlin e a few
alternative possible historical trajectories o u tlin e them , th a t is, in
broad b ru sh strokes w ith o u t th e in stitu tio n al detail th a t is en tirely
unforeseeable.
T h re e types o f social fo rm u lae seem plausible in th e lig h t o f th e
histo ry o f th e w orld-system . O n e is a sort o f n eo -feudalism th a t
w o u ld rep ro d u ce in a far m o re equilibrated fo rm th e developm ents
o f the tim e o f troubles a w o rld o f parcellized sovereignties, o f
considerably m o re autarkic regions, o f local hierarchies. T h is m ig h t
be m ade com patible w ith m aintaining (but probably n o t
furthering) th e c u rre n t relatively h ig h level o f technology. Endless
accu m u latio n o f capital could n o lo n g er fu n ctio n as th e m ainspring
o f such a system, b u t it w o u ld certainly be an inegalitarian system.
W h a t w o u ld legitim ate it? Perhaps a re tu rn to a b elief in natural
hierarchies.
A second fo rm u la m ig h t be a sort o f dem ocratic fascism. Such a
form ula w o u ld involve a caste-like division o f th e w orld in to tw o
strata, th e top o n e in co rp o ratin g perhaps a fifth o f th e w o rld s
population. W ith in th is stratu m , th e re could be a h ig h degree o f
egalitarian distribution. O n th e basis o f such a c o m m u n ity o f
interests w ith in such a large group, they m ig h t have th e stre n g th to
keep the o th e r 80 p e r cen t in the position o f a to tally disarm ed
w orking proletariat. H itle rs n e w w o rld o rd er had such a vision in
Future Prospects
163
m ind. It failed, b u t th e n it defined itself in term s o f too n a rro w a

top stratum .
A th ird fo rm u la m ig h t be a still m o re radical w o rld w id e highly
decentralized, h ighly egalitarian w orld order. T his seems th e m ost
u to p ia n o f th e th ree b u t it is scarcely to be ru le d out. T h is k in d o f
w orld o rd er has been foreshadow ed in m u c h in tellectual m usings
o f the past centuries. T h e increased political sophistication and
technological expertise w e n ow have m akes it doable, b u t n o t at all
certain. It w ould require accepting certain real lim itations in
co n su m p tio n expenditures. B ut it does n o t m ean m erely a
socialization o f poverty, for th e n it w ould be politically im possible
to realize.
Are th ere still o th e r possibilities? O f course th e re are. W h a t is
im p o rta n t to reco g n ize is th a t all th ree historical o p tions are really
there, and th e choice w ill depend o n o u r collective w orld
behavio u r over th e n ex t fifty years. W h ic h e v e r o p tio n is chosen, it
will n o t be th e e n d o f history, b u t in a real sense its beginning. T h e
h u m a n social w orld is still very young in cosm ological time.
In 2050 o r 2100, w h en w e look back at capitalist civilization,
w h a t w ill w e th in k ? W e w ill possibly be q u ite unfair. W h ich ev er
op tio n w e choose for a n ew system, w e m ay feel it necessary to
denigrate th e one ju s t past, th a t o f capitalist civilization. W e w ill
em phasize its evils and ignore w hatever it did achieve. By the year
3000, w e m ay re m e m b e r it as a fascinating exercise in h u m an
historyeith er an exceptional and aberran t period, b u t ju s t
possibly a historically im p o rta n t m o m e n t o f very lo n g transition to
a m ore egalitarian w orld; o r an in h eren tly u nstable form o f h u m a n
exploitation after w h ic h th e w o rld re tu rn e d to m o re stable forms.
Sic transit gloria!

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Historical Capitalism

London New York

I M M A N U E L WALLERSTEIN was born in 1930 in N ew York. He

Im m anuel Wallerstein 1983

The Com m odification o f Everything:

The Politics o f Accumulation:

This b o o k had its im m ediate origin in tw o successive requests.

I believe, like m any others, th at this reality is an integrated

H e kn ew , as m any o f his self-proclaim ed disciples o ften do

Capitalism is first and forem ost a historical social system. T o

came to be used (invested) in a very special w ay. It came to b

no social transaction has been intrinsically exem pt from possi

co m petitio n , w ith h ig h er rew ards going to those w h o had

This created a first elem entary contradiction in the system .

entrepreneurs as a collective g ro u p w as n o t necessarily ration;)

social opposition to these rules has g ro w n ever louder and

queries b u t theoretical ones, and w e shall try to address then

or by others active in the m ark et. T hese constraints are the

they did not receive rem uneration. C onsequently, variab)

ter w h a t source, and assess it in term s o f the real expenditure;

A division o f real labour by gender and age w as n o t o f course

added to injury by labelling childrens training activities ar,

nobles f survival. W h e re a proletarian household depended

w h y has proletarianization proceeded at all?

- th at the m a rk e t is a place w here initial producer and

(even tw o ) links in a chain, have been even m ore widesprea;

. U nequal exchange is an ancient practice. W h a t

ness-peripherality. By extension, w e can call the losing zone:

Ionization) has n o t had to be invoked in each separate tra n

ru n pro fitab ility except at the risk o f self-destruction.

.. ot)0rtions o f in v estm ent occurred such th a t w e speak,

years or so, a system o f hierarchically-organized commodity:

than their self-proclaim ed intellectual spokesm en, h o w m uch

co n c en tratio n o f capital accum ulation in historical polarization

capitalist w o rld th at sought o u t the products o f the external

th an m atched, at least h ith e rto , by the im pact o f incorpora

to achieve this end. W h a t could be m o re plausible than a line

after four to five h u n d red years o f flourishing, finally com e in

The endless accum ulation o f capital for its o w n sake m ay seem

g re at an d g ro w in g g reater o v er tim e in the w orld-system

on the part o f the state in question, partly by diplom atic

o f goods, o f m oney-capital, and o f lab o u r-p o w er. In general,

the actual fro n tiers th ro u g h to tal in corporation b y one state

kind of em p lo y m en t to another. T hey fu rth e rm o re im posed

This is the them e o f th e w elfare state. But re d istrib u tio n has in

and even to re stitu te losses if only because o f the financial t u r

degree o f p o w er given state-m achineries have had has varied

tegral parts o f an in te rsta te system , w h ich w as a set o f rules

First o f all, th e accum ulation o f capital was a gam e in w hich

centred, highly d estructive, th irty-year-long in te rm itte n t

one w ith far-flung land and m aritim e m ilitary resp o n

siderations. B oth th e particular accum ulator o f capital and his

possible, and therefore even lim ited objectives w ere seldom

ethnic group, against those in another the struggle has been

b o th the econom ic and political arenas. T his is ex actly w h a t

to prevail against th e in stitu tio n al form s pressed for by the ac

begin to see th e creation o f co n tin u in g , bureaucratized stru c

the betrayers o f th e cause seem om nipresent in every par

Finally, o ne o th er factor has com e in to play. As the tw o

H istorical capitalism has been, w e k n o w , P rom ethean in its

R ationality and R ationalization

w e keep o u r occupational categories sufficiently broad, I am

socialization in occupational tasks w o u ld be done w ith in the