185240
SALIMBANGON,
Petitioners, Present:
- versus SPS. SANTOS AND ERLINDA TAN,
January 20, 2010
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the admissibility of testimony that tends to
modify a written agreement among the parties and the extinction of
the easement of right of way upon consolidation in one person of the
ownership of the dominant and the servient estates.
The Facts and the Case
Guillermo Ceniza died intestate on July 11, 1951, leaving a parcel of
land at Poblacion, Mandaue City. Twenty years later on July 17,
1973 his children Benedicta, Guillermo, Jr., Victoria, Eduardo, and
Carlos executed an extrajudicial declaration of heirs and partition,
adjudicating and dividing the land among themselves as follows:
1. To Benedicta T. Cabahug, Lot A subject to a perpetual and
grat[u]itous road right of way 1.50 m. wide along its NW. boundary in
favor of Lots B, E, and D, of the subdivision;
2. To Eduardo Ceniza, Lot B subject to a perpetual and grat[u]itous
road right of way 1.50 m. wide along its SW. boundary in favor of
Lots A, D & E of the subdivision;
3. To Carlos Ceniza, Lot C;
4. To Guillermo Ceniza Jr., Lot D subject to a perpetual and
grat[u]itous road right of way 1.50 m. wide along its NE. boundary in
favor of Lot B and E of the subdivision; and
5. To Victoria Ceniza, Lot E, subject to a perpetual and grat[u]itous
road right of way 1.50 m. wide along its SW. boundary in favor of Lot
D of the subdivision.[1]
Roughly, the lots including the easement of right of way would take
the following configurations,[2] not drawn here to accurate size and
proportion but illustrative of their relative locations:
But, realizing that the partition resulted in an unequal division of the
property, the heirs modified their agreement by eliminating the
easement of right of way along Lots A, D, and E, and in its place,
imposed a 3-meter wide alley, an easement of right of way, that ran
exclusively along the southwest boundary of Lot B from Lots D and E
to the street.[3]Thus:
Victoria (now petitioner Victoria Salimbangon) later swapped lots with
Benedicta with the result that Victoria became the owner of Lot A,
one of the three lots adjacent to the city street. Victoria and her
husband (the Salimbangons) constructed a residential house on this
lot and built two garages on it. One garage abutted the street while
the other, located in the interior of Lot A, used the alley or easement
of right of way existing on Lot B to get to the street. Victoria had this
alley cemented and gated.
Subsequently, however, respondent spouses Santos and Erlinda Tan
(the Tans) bought Lots B, C, D, and E from all their owners. The Tans
built improvements on Lot B that spilled into the easement
area. They also closed the gate that the Salimbangons built. Unable
to use the old right of way, the Salimbangons lodged a complaint with
the City Engineer of Mandaue against the Tans. For their part, the
Tans filed an action with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue
against the Salimbangons in Civil Case MAN-3223 for the
extinguishment of the easement on Lot B and damages with
One. The Salimbangons point out that the CA ought to have rejected
Eduardo Cenizas testimony that the heirs had intended to establish
the easement of right of way solely for the benefit of the interior Lots
D and E which had no access to the city street. The partition
agreement also made Lot A, now owned by the Salimbangons, a
beneficiary of that easement. Thus:
2. To Eduardo Ceniza [now the Tans], Lot B subject to a perpetual
and grat[u]itous road right of way 1.50 m. wide along its SW.
boundary in favor of Lots A, D & E of the subdivision;
[6] (Underscoring supplied)
The parol evidence rule, said the Salimbangons, precluded the
parties from introducing testimony that tended to alter or modify what
the parties had agreed on above.
But the exclusionary provision of the parol evidence rule admits of
exceptions. Section 9, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
states:
Sec. 9. Evidence of written agreements. - When the terms of an
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as
containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the
parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms
other than the contents of the written agreement. However, a party
may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the
written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
DORIS
CHIONGBIAN-OLIVA, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CEBU CITY, Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for certiorari assails (1) the Decision1 dated August 7,
2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 74409, reversing
the Decision2 dated December 13, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, Branch 12 in SP. Proc. No. 10746-CEB, and (2) the
Resolution3 dated March 17, 2004, denying the motion for
reconsideration.
The following facts are undisputed.
Petitioner Doris Chiongbian-Oliva is the registered owner of a parcel
of land in Talamban, Cebu City, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 5455.4 This title originated from Original Certificate
of Title (OCT) No. 1066 from a free patent granted on September 11,
1969 under Commonwealth Act No. 141,5 as amended. The free
patent, OCT No. 1066, and TCT No. 5455 contained the condition
that a forty-meter legal easement from the bank of any river or
stream shall be preserved as permanent timberland.6
On October 1, 2001, petitioner filed a petition for reduction of legal
easement docketed as SP. Proc. No. 10746-CEB before the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 12. Petitioner alleged that
the property is residential as shown by the tax declaration7 and the
Certification8 of the Office of the City Assessor. Thus, the applicable
legal easement is only three meters pursuant to Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order
No. 99-21,9 and not forty meters, which applies to timberlands and
forest lands. Petitioner also alleged that enforcing the forty-meter
legal easement would virtually deprive her of the use and enjoyment
of the property since it consists only of 1,000 square meters.
(i) That the applicant agrees that a strip forty meters wide starting
from the bank on each side of any river or stream that may be found
on the land applied for, shall be demarcated and preserved as
permanent timberland to be planted exclusively to trees of known
economic value, and that he shall not make any clearing thereon or
utilize the same for ordinary farming purposes even after patent shall
have been issued to him or a contract of lease shall have been
executed in his favor. (Emphasis supplied.)
To implement this, the DENR promulgated A.O. No. 99-21 which
provides the guidelines in the processing, verification, and approval
of isolated and cadastral surveys. Pertinent to this case are the
following provisions:
2.1 Original Surveys:
2.1.a Public Lands:
All alienable and disposable (A and D) lands of the public domain
shall be surveyed pursuant to Section 1 Par. (1) of R.A. 1273 [C.A.
No. 141, Section 90(i)] whereby a strip of forty (40) meters wide
starting from the banks on each side of any river or stream that may
be found on the land shall be demarcated and preserved as
permanent timberland.
Likewise, to be demarcated are public lands along the banks of
rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout
their entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban
areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters
in forest area, along their margins which are subject to the easement
for public use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage,
fishing and salvage.
xxxx
2.3 Survey of Titled Lands:
2.3.1 Administratively Titled Lands:
The provisions of item 2.1.a and 2.1.b shall be observed as the
above. However, when these lands are to be subdivided,
consolidated or consolidated-subdivided, the strip of three (3) meters
which falls within urban areas shall be demarcated and marked on
the plan for easement and bank protection.
The purpose of these strips of land shall be noted in the technical
description and annotated in the title.
xxxx
Running in parallel vein is the Water Code of the Philippines17 which
provides:
Art. 51. The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas
and lakes throughout their entire length and within a zone of three (3)
meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and
forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to
the easement of public use in the interest of recreation, navigation,
floatage, fishing and salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in
this zone longer than what is necessary for recreation, navigation,
floatage, fishing or salvage or to build structures of any kind.
Since the property in this case was originally alienable land of the
public domain, the application for free patent contained the condition
that a forty-meter legal easement from the banks on each side of any
river or stream found on the land shall be demarcated and preserved
as permanent timberland. However, after the property was
administratively titled, it underwent several surveys for purposes of
subdivision, consolidation, or consolidation-subdivision as evidenced
by TCT No. 5455. This title provides that it is a transfer from TCT
Nos. 3975 and 436018and describes the property as Lot 2 of the
consolidation-subdivision plan Pcs-07-002121, being a portion of Lot
6 and 7 Pcs-07-000974.19 Thus, presently only three meters is
required to be demarcated and preserved as permanent timberland.
In this case, the trial court properly took judicial notice that Talamban,
Cebu City is an urban area. Judicial notice is the cognizance of
certain facts which judges may properly take and act on without
proof because they already know them.20 A municipal jurisdiction,
whether designated as chartered city or provincial capital, is
considered as urban in its entirety if it has a population density of at
least 1,000 persons per square kilometer.21 The City of Cebu was
created on October 20, 1934 under Commonwealth Act No. 58.22 It
is a highly urbanized city classified as entirely urban.23 Thus, all its
barangays, including Talamban, are considered urban.
Conformably with the foregoing considerations, the reduction of the
legal easement of forty meters on petitioners property covered by
TCT No. 5455 to three meters now is in order.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated August 7, 2003 and Resolution dated March 17, 2004
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV. No. 74409 are REVERSED,
and the Decision dated December 13, 2001 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 12 in SP. Proc. No. 10746-CEB is
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner-spouses Victor and Jocelyn Valdez purchased via a
January 11, 1993 Deed of Absolute Sale[1] (the deed) from
respondent-spouses Francisco Tabisula and CaridadTabisula a 200
square meter (sq.m.) portion (the subject property) of a 380 sq. m.
parcel of land located in San Fernando, La Union, which
380 sq.m. parcel of land is more particularly described in the deed as
follows:
A parcel of land classified as residential lot, bounded on the North by
Lot No. 25569, on the East, by Lot No. 247, 251, on the South, by a
Creek and on the West, by Lot No. 223-A, declared under Tax Decl.
No. 52820, with an area of 380 square meters, more or less, and
assessed at P 17100.00 for the current year. It is not registered
under Act 496 nor under the Spanish Mortgage Law. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The pertinent portions of the deed read:
xxxx
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
xxxx
ARTICLE 199. Penalty for Refusal or Failure of Any Party or Witness
to Appear before the Lupon or Pangkat. Refusal or willful failure of
The award for moral damages being thus baseless, that for
exemplary damages must too be baseless.
tracks lay, was claimed by Bomedco as its own and was declared for
tax purposes in its name. [5]
It was not until 1989 when private respondents discovered the
aforementioned claim of Bomedco on inquiry with the Bureau of
Lands. Through their lawyer, they immediately demanded the legal
basis for Bomedco's claim over Cadastral Lot No. 954 but their letter
of inquiry addressed to petitioner went unheeded, as was their
subsequent demand for payment of compensation for the use of the
land.[6]
On June 8, 1989, respondent heirs filed a Complaint for Payment of
Compensation and/or Recovery of Possession of Real Property and
Damages with Application for Restraining Order/Preliminary
Injunction against Bomedco before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu.
[7] Respondent heirs alleged that, before she sold the land to Valdez,
Sr. in 1935, Santillan granted Bomedco, in 1929, a railroad right of
way for a period of 30 years. When Valdez, Sr. acquired the land, he
respected the grant. The right of way expired sometime in 1959 but
respondent heirs allowed Bomedco to continue using the land
because one of them was then an employee of the company.[8]
In support of the complaint, they presented an ancient document
an original copy of the deed of sale written in Spanish and dated
December 9, 1935[9] to evidence the sale of the land to
Magdaleno Valdez, Sr.; several original real estate tax
receipts[10] including Real Property Tax Receipt No. 3935[11] dated
1922 in the name of Graciano de los Reyes, husband of Feliciana
Santillan, and Real Property Tax Receipt No. 09491[12] dated 1963
in the name of Magdaleno Valdez, Sr. Magdaleno Valdez, Jr. also
testified for the plaintiffs during the trial.
On the other hand, Bomedcos principal defense was that it was the
owner and possessor of Cadastral Lot No. 954, having allegedly
bought the same from Feliciana Santillan in 1929, prior to the sale of
the property by the latter to Magdaleno Valdez, Sr. in 1935. It also
contended that plaintiffs claim was already barred by prescription
and laches because of Bomedcos open and continuous possession
of the property for more than 50 years.
Bomedco submitted in evidence a Deed of Sale[13] dated March 18,
1929; seven real estate tax receipts[14] for the property covering the
period from 1930 to 1985; a 1929 Survey Plan of private land for
Bogo-Medellin Milling Company;[15] a Survey Notification Card;
[16] Lot Data Computation for Lot No. 954;[17] a Cadastral Map for
None of the above options to acquire title over the railroad right of
way was ever pursued by petitioner despite the fact that simple
resourcefulness demanded such initiative, considering the
importance of the railway tracks to its business. No doubt, it is
unlawfully occupying and using the subject strip of land as a railroad
right of way without valid title yet it refuses to vacate it even after
demand of the heirs. Furthermore, it tenaciously insists on ownership
thereof despite a clear showing to the contrary.
We thus uphold the grant by the Court of Appeals of attorneys fees in
the amount of P10,000 considering the evident bad faith of petitioner
in refusing respondents just and lawful claims, compelling the latter
to litigate.[44]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed decision dated
November 17, 1995 and resolution dated March 2, 1996 of the Court
of Appeals are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.Petitioner BogoMedellin Milling Company, Inc. is hereby ordered to vacate the
subject strip of land denominated as Cadastral Lot No. 954, remove
its railway tracks thereon and return its possession to the private
respondents, the heirs of Magdaleno Valdez, Sr. It is also hereby
ordered to pay private respondents attorney's fees in the amount
of P10,000.
SO ORDERED.
The area comprising the 15-meter wide roadway was originally part
of a vast tract of land owned by the Tuasons in Quezon City and
Marikina. On 1 July 1949 the Tuasons sold to Philippine Building
Corporation a portion of their landholdings amounting to 1,330,556
square meters by virtue of a Deed of Sale with Mortgage. Paragraph
three (3) of the deed provides that x x x the boundary line between
the property herein sold and the adjoining property of the VENDORS
shall be a road fifteen (15) meters wide, one-half of which shall be
taken from the property herein sold to the VENDEE and the other
half from the portion adjoining belonging to the VENDORS.
On 7 December 1951 the Philippine Building Corporation, which was
then acting for and in behalf of Ateneo de Manila University
(ATENEO) in buying the properties from the Tuasons, sold, assigned
and formally transferred in a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of
Mortgage, with the consent of the Tuasons, the subject parcel of land
to ATENEO which assumed the mortgage.The deed of assignment
states The ASSIGNEE hereby agrees and assumes to pay the mortgage
obligation on the above-described land in favor of the MORTGAGOR
and to perform any and all terms and conditions as set forth in the
Deed of Sale with Mortgage dated July 1, 1949, hereinabove
referred to, which said document is incorporated herein and made an
integral part of this contract by reference x x x x
On their part, the Tuasons developed a part of the estate adjoining
the portion sold to Philippine Building Corporation into a residential
village known as La Vista Subdivision. Thus the boundary between
LA VISTA and the portion sold to Philippine Building Corporation was
the 15-meter wide roadway known as the Mangyan Road.
On 6 June 1952 ATENEO sold to MARYKNOLL the western portion
of the land adjacent to Mangyan Road. MARYKNOLL then
constructed a wall in the middle of the 15-meter wide roadway
making one-half of Mangyan Road part of its school campus. The
Tuasons objected and later filed a complaint before the then Court of
First Instance of Rizal for the demolition of the wall. Subsequently, in
an amicable settlement, MARYKNOLL agreed to remove the wall
and restore Mangyan Road to its original width of 15 meters.
Meanwhile, the Tuasons developed its 7.5-meter share of the 15meter wide boundary. ATENEO deferred improvement on its share
and erected instead an adobe wall on the entire length of the
boundary of its property parallel to the 15-meter wide roadway.
development of such right of way shall be for the full account of the
VENDEE. In the future, if needed, the VENDOR is therefore free to
make use of the aforesaid right of way, and/or Mangyan Road
access, but in such a case the VENDOR shall contribute a pro-rata
share in the maintenance of the area.
Subsequently, Solid Homes, Inc., developed a subdivision now
known as Loyola Grand Villas and together they now claim to have
an easement of right-of-way along Mangyan Road through which
they could have access to Katipunan Avenue.
LA VISTA President Manuel J. Gonzales however informed Solid
Homes, Inc., that LA VISTA could not recognize the right-of-way over
Mangyan Road because, first, Philippine Building Corporation and its
assignee ATENEO never complied with their obligation of providing
the Tuasons with a right-of-way on their 7.5-meter portion of the road
and, second, since the property was purchased for commercial
purposes, Solid Homes, Inc., was no longer entitled to the right-ofway as Mangyan Road was established exclusively for ATENEO in
whose favor the right-of-way was originally constituted. LA VISTA,
after instructing its security guards to prohibit agents and assignees
of Solid Homes, Inc., from traversing Mangyan Road, then
constructed one-meter high cylindrical concrete posts chained
together at the middle of and along the entire length of Mangyan
Road thus preventing the residents of LOYOLA from passing
through.
Solid Homes, Inc., complained to LA VISTA but the concrete posts
were not removed. To gain access to LOYOLA through Mangyan
Road an opening through the adobe wall of ATENEO was made and
some six (6) cylindrical concrete posts of LA VISTA were
destroyed. LA VISTA then stationed security guards in the area to
prevent entry to LOYOLA through Mangyan Road.
On 17 December 1976, to avert violence, Solid Homes, Inc.,
instituted the instant case, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-22450,
before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal and prayed that LA
VISTA be enjoined from preventing and obstructing the use and
passage of LOYOLA residents through Mangyan Road. LA VISTA in
turn filed a third-party complaint against ATENEO. On 14 September
1983 the trial court issued a preliminary injunction in favor of Solid
Homes, Inc. (affirming an earlier order of 22 November 1977),
directing LA VISTA to desist from blocking and preventing the use of
Mangyan Road. The injunction order of 14 September 1983 was
These certainly are indubitable proofs that the parties concerned had
indeed constituted a voluntary easement of right-of-way over
Mangyan Road and, like any other contract, the same could be
extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the
owner of the dominant estate. Thus respondent Court of Appeals did
not commit a reversible error when it ruled that Concerning the pivotal question posed herein on the existence of an
easement, we are of the belief, and thus hereby hold that a right-ofway was properly appreciated along the entire route of Mangyan
Road.Incidentally, the pretense that the court a quo erred in holding
that Mangyan Road is the boundary road between La Vista and
Ateneo (page 31, Appellants Brief) does not raise any critical
eyebrow since the same is wholly irrelevant to the existence of a
servitude thereon from their express admission to the contrary
(paragraph 1, Answer).
Ones attention should rather be focused on the contractual
stipulations in the deed of sale between the Tuason Family and the
Philippine Building Corporation (paragraph 3, thereof) which were
incorporated in the deed of assignment with assumption of mortgage
by the Philippine Building Corporation in favor of Ateneo (first
paragraph, page 4 of the deed) as well as in the deed of sale dated
October 24, 1976 when the property was ultimately transferred by
Ateneo to plaintiff-appellee. Like any other contractual stipulation, the
same cannot be extinguished except by voluntary rescission of the
contract establishing the servitude or renunciation by the owner of
the dominant lots (Chuanico vs. Ibaez, 7 CA Reports, 2nd Series,
1965 edition, pages 582; 589, cited in Civil Law Annotated, by
Padilla, Volume II, 1972 Edition, pages602-603), more so when the
easement was implicitly recognized by the letters of the La Vista
President to Ateneo dated February 11 and April 28, 1976 (page 22,
Decision; 19 Ruling Case Law 745).
The free ingress and egress along Mangyan Road created by the
voluntary agreement between Ateneo and Solid Homes, Inc., is thus
legally demandable (Articles 619 and 625, New Civil Code) with the
corresponding duty on the servient estate not to obstruct the same
so much so that When the owner of the servient tenement performs acts or
constructs works impairing the use of the servitude, the owner of the
dominant tenement may ask for the destruction of such works and
the restoration of the things to their condition before the impairment
After all, the intervention does not appear to have been filed to delay
the proceedings. On the contrary, it seems to have expedited the
resolution of the case as the incidents brought forth by the
intervention, which could have been raised in another case, were
resolved together with the issues herein resulting in a more thorough
disposal of this case.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of respondent Court of Appeals dated
22 May 1990 and its Resolution dated 6 September 1990, which
affirmed the Decision of the RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City, dated 20
November 1987, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MIGUEL
FABIE
Y
GUTIERREZ, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
JULITA LICHAUCO, AND THE CHILDREN OF FRANCISCO L.
ROXAS, respondents-appellants.
MAPA, J.:
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Land Registration.
The petitioner applied for the registration of his property, situated at
22 Calle San Jacinto, district of Binondo, Manila, free from all
incumbrances, with the exception of an easement of right of way
which he recognizes as existing in favor of the estates of the
respondents Lichauco and Hijos de Roxas, which adjoin the property
of the petitioner on the right and left of its entrance, respectively. In
addition to the said easement of rigth of way the respondents claim
that of light, view, and drainage in favor of their respective properties;
said claim was modified in part during the course of the litigation as
far as it referred to Julita Lichauco, who finally reduced her
opposition (fol. 138) to the easement of right of way and of light and
view.
In the judgment appealed from it is held that the easement of right of
way exits in favor of the respective properties of Julita Lichauco and
Hijos de Roxas, and the latter are further entitled to the easement of
drainage. The claim of both respondents as to other easements was
dismissed.
(a) Opposition made by Julita Lichauco. This opponent invokes as
the only legal foundation for her claim the provisions of article 541 of
the Civil Code. The language of said provisions is as follows:
that twenty and one fourth varas and three and a half inches stated
in the instrument when it was alienated for the first time in October,
1848. Twenty years thereafter that is, on the 13th of September,
1869 the house was surveyed and appraised by Achitect Luciano
Oliver at the request of the person who then owned it, and in the
certificate issued by the said architect, (fol. 94) it is set forth that the
house measures 16 meters on the front facing Calle San
Jacinto which confirms and corroborates the measurement stated in
the aforesaid instrument. Now then, according to the plan on folio
137, Exhibit I of the respondent (Lichauco), the house was now a
frontage of 18 meters and 60 centimeters, of which 16 meters and 60
centimeters correspond to the main part of the same, and 1 meter
and 90 centimeters to the gallery in question. It results, therefore,
that at the present day, the house has nearly 2 meters more frontage
than when it was alienated by Santa Coloma, the original owner
thereof, or rather by the executors of his estate on the 31st of
October, 1848.
According to this it is evident that the frontline of the house was
increased by about 2 meters after the same was sold by Santa
Coloma and it also seems clear to us that it is the gallery mentioned
above which constitutes the increase, both because it measures 1
meter and 90 centimeters, which, with a difference of a few
centimeters, exactly represents such excess, and because it has
neither been alleged nor claimed by the said respondent, that the
rest which froms the main part of the house has suffered and
alteration in its frontage since the year 1848.
There is furthermore another detail in support of said conclusion. As
stated by the respondent, the gallery is supported by columns
erected on the lot of the petitioner, so that it is not merely a body
projecting over the said lot without materially resting thereon but a
construction erect and having foundations in the lot of the petitioner
inasmuch as the columns that support the said gallery are planted
therein. Therefore, at the present day the house is erected partly on
the land belonging to the owner and partly, the gallery, over a lot
belonging to another; that is, over that of the petitioner. When it was
sold in October, 1848, no portion of the house occupied the lot last
mentioned, but the entire building was erected over a lot belonging to
the owner as set forth in the instrument of sale.
To the foregoing considerations the following may be added in
conclusion: In view of the fact that the two buildings namely, that
reference to right of way and drainage from the roof have been
allowed in favor of the property of the respondents; therefore, the
easements of light, view, and balconies remain in dispute in the
present instance. The easement with reference to eaves mentioned
also in the brief of the respondents should, in our opinion, be
discarded inasmuch as it is included in this case in the easements of
drainage from the roof acknowledged in the judgment appealed from.
(p. 7 of the bill of exceptions).
The Court of Land Registration in order to dismiss the opposition
with reference to the easement of light and view bases its decision
on the fact that, the same being negative, according to article 533 of
the Civil Code, because the owner of the servient estate is prohibited
to do something which he could lawfully do if the easement did not
exist, that time of possession for prescription (and it is a matter of
prescription for the reason that respondents hold no title) should
begin to run, not from the date of the existence of the windows or
balconies, but from the day when the owner of the dominant estate,
by means of a formal act, might have prohibited the owner of the
servient estate to do something which he could properly execute if
the easement did not exist; this was never carried out by the
opponents or by their principals as agreed to by the parties at the
hearing.
In rebuttal of this portion of the judgment the respondents state in
their brief as follows:
We agree with the trial court that as a general rule the easement with
reference to view is a negative one ...; but we understand that there
are cases in which the easements is meant is positive because it
imposes on the owner of the servient estate the obligation to allow
the owner of the dominant estate to do on the property of the former
something which the latter could not lawfully do if the easement did
not exist, ... such as happens in the present case in which the
windows have a balcony projecting over the lot of the petitioner. In
the case of bar there exists the positive fact of windows with
projecting balconies opening over the land of the servient estate
which is not a right inherent to the dominion of the owner of the
dominant estate, but a real invasion of the right of another, a positive
act which limits the dominion of the owner of the servient estate
which, constituting easement, imposes on him the obligation to
permit with balconies projecting over his estate.
has not been proven as shown therefor, said pretension fails and
cannot prosper in any way. It is unnecessary to discuss the questions
of law to which said fact might give rise had it been duly proven at
the hearing.
For the reason above set forth, the judgment appealed from is
affirmed in all its parts with the costs of this instance against the
appellants. So ordered.