THE BACHRACH MOTOR CO., INC.

, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TALISAY-SILAY MILLING CO., ET AL

This proceeding originated in a complaint filed by the Bachrach Motor Co., Inc.,
against the Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc., for the delivery of the amount P13,850 or
promissory notes or other instruments or credit for that sum payable as bonus in
favor of Mariano Lacson Ledesma. The Philippine National Bank filed a third party
claim alleging a preferential right to receive any amount which Ledesma might be
entitled to from the respondent. as bonus, because that would be civil fruits of the
land mortgaged to said bank.
Issue: WON the such income should be considered as civil fruits.
Held: No, Article 355 of the Civil Code considers three things as civil fruits: First, the
rents of buildings; second, the proceeds from leases of lands; and, third, the income
from perpetual or life annuities, or other similar sources of revenue. That is why we
say that by "civil fruits" the Civil Code understands one of three and only three
things, to wit: the rent of a building, the rent of land, and certain kinds of income.
Assuming that in broad juridical sense of the word "income" it might be said that
the bonus in question is "income" under article 355 of the Civil Code, it is obvious to
inquire whether it is derived from the land mortgaged by Mariano Lacson Ledesma
to the appellant bank for the benefit of the central; for it is not obtained from that
land but from something else, it is not civil fruits of that land, and the bank's
contention is untenable.

Equatorial v Mayfair; G.R. No. 133879

Facts: ("Camelo" ) used to own a parcel of land, together with two 2-storey buildings
constructed thereon, located at Claro M. Recto Avenue, Manila. Carmelo entered
into a Contract of Lease with Mayfair Theater Inc. ("Mayfair") for a period of 20
years. The lease covered a portion of the second floor and mezzanine of a twostorey building with about 1,610 square meters of floor area, which respondent used
as a movie house known as Maxim Theater. Both leases contained a provision
granting Mayfair a right of first refusal to purchase the subject properties. Mayfair
entered into a second Contract of Lease with Carmelo for the lease of another
portion of the latter's property. the subject properties were sold by Carmelo to
Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. ("Equatorial") without their first being offered to
Mayfair.
Issue: WON petitioner has the right to the backrentals.
Held: no. Rent is a civil fruit that belongs to the owner of the property producing it
by right of accession. the sale to Equatorial may have been valid from inception, but
it was judicially rescinded before it could be consummated. Petitioner never

acquired ownership, not because the sale was void, as erroneously claimed by the
trial court, but because the sale was not consummated by a legally effective
delivery of the property sold.

Bernardo vs bataclan
Facts: By a contract of sale executed from Pastor Samonte and others ownership of
a parcel of land of about 90 hectares situated in sitio Balayunan, Silang, Cavite. To
secure possession of the land from the vendors. When plaintiff entered upon the
premises, however, he found the defendant herein, Catalino Bataclan, who appears
to have been authorized by former owners, as far back as 1922, to clear the land
and make improvements thereon. . In this case, plaintiff was declared owner but the
defendant was held to be a possessor in good faith, entitled to reimbursement in
the total sum of P1,642, for work done and improvements made.
Issue: WON defendant has the right to be reimbursed.
Held yes, The Civil Code confirms certain time-honored principles of the law of
property. One of these is the principle of accession whereby the owner of property
acquires not only that which it produces but that which is united to it either
naturally or artificially.Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of another, and
the improvements or repairs made thereon, belong to the owner of the land.Where,
however, the planter, builder, or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights
arises between the owners and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the
improvements without causing injustice to the owner of the land. In view of the
impracticability of creating what Manresa calls a state of "forced coownership"), the
law has provided a just and equitable solution by giving the owner of the land the
option to acquire the improvements after payment of the proper indemnity or to
oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower to pay the proper rent
(art. 361). It is the owner of the land who is allowed to exercise the option because
his right is older and because, by the principle of accession, he is entitled to the
ownership of the accessory thing.

Ignacio v Hilario; G.R. No. L-175

Facts: Elias Hilario and his wife Dionisia Dres as plaintiffs, and the herein petitioners
Damian, Francisco and Luis, surnamed Ignacio, as defendants, concerning the
ownership of a parcel of land, partly rice-land and partly residential. plaintiffs are
the owners of the whole property. That the defendants are entitled to hold the
position of the residential lot until after they are paid the actual market value of
their houses and granaries erected thereon, unless the plaintiffs prefer to sell them
said residential lot, in which case defendants shall pay the plaintiffs the
proportionate value of said residential lot taking as a basis the price paid for the
whole landthe plaintiffs prayed for an order of execution alleging that since they
chose neither to pay defendants for the buildings nor to sell to them the residential

lot, said defendants should be ordered to remove the structure at their own expense
and to restore plaintiffs in the possession of said lot. Defendants objected to this
motion which, after hearing, was granted by Judge Natividad.
Issue: WON defendants may be ordered to remove the structure at their own
expense.
Held: no , The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by
another, is entitled to retain the possession of the land until he is paid the value of
his building, under article 453. The owner of the land, upon the other hand, has the
option, under article 361, either to pay for the building or to sell his land to the
owner of the building. But he cannot, as respondents here did, refuse both to pay
for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner of the building to remove
it from the land where it is erected. He is entitled to such remotion only when, after
having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the same.

Sarmiento v Agana; G.R. No. 57288

Facts: It appears that while ERNESTO was still courting his wife, the latters mother
had told him the couple could build a RESIDENTIAL HOUSE . ERNESTO did construct
a RESIDENTIAL HOUSE on the LAND. was probably assumed that the wifes mother
was the owner of the LAND and that, eventually, it would somehow be transferred
to the spouses.
It subsequently turned out that the LAND had been titled in the name of Mr. & Mrs.
Jose C. Santos, Jr. who, on September 7, 1974, sold the same to petitioner
SARMIENTO, SARMIENTO asked ERNESTO and wife to vacate.

Issue: Whether or not the land owner is compelled to exercise either option: to buy the building or to sell
the land?

Held: yes .
Ernesto and his wife (BPS) were clearly in good faith as they believed that Rebeccas
mother has the capacity to eventually transfer the title of the land to them. In line
with this, Sarmiento (LO) was required to exercise only 2 options: To purchase the
house or to sell the land to them, in this case, based on the value decided by the
courts. Since Sarmiento failed to exercise the option within the allotted period, and
based on Art. 448, the LO is compelled by law to exercise either option. Not
choosing either is a violation of the law.
Depra v Dumlao; G.R. No. L-57348. May 16, 1985
Facts: Plaintiff-appellee, Francisco Depra, is the owner of a parcel of land while ,
Agustin Dumlao, defendant-appellant, owns an adjoining lot. when DUMLAO
constructed his house on his lot, the kitchen thereof had encroached on an area of
thirty four (34) square meters of DEPRA's property, Beatriz Depra after writing a
demand letter asking DUMLAO to move back from his encroachment, filed an action

for Unlawful Detainer. the Municipal Court found that DUMLAO was a builder in good
faith, and applying Article 448 of the Civil
Issue: . Whether or not the land owner can be compelled to accept rent payments
by the court (with both LO and BPS being in good faith)?
Held : The Court remanded the case to the RTC to determine the fair price of the
land, the expenses incurred by the BPS (Dumlao), the increase in value of the land,
and whether the value of the land is considerably more than the value of the
kitchen built on it. The RTC shall then give Depra 15 days to exercise such option.

Tecnogas Phil v CA; G.R. No. 108894

Facts: That plaintiff the registered owner of a parcel of land situated Paraaque, that
said land was purchased by plaintiff from Pariz Industries, Inc. in 1970, together with
all the buildings and improvements including the wall existing thereon; that the
defendant is the registered owner of a parcel of land that said land which adjoins
plaintiff's land. plaintiff agreed to demolish the wall at the back portion of its land
thus giving to defendant possession of a portion of his land previously enclosed by
plaintiff's wall; that defendant later filed a complaint before the office of Municipal
Engineer of Paraaque, Metro Manila as well as before the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Rizal against plaintiff in connection with the encroachment or occupation
by plaintiff's buildings and walls of a portion of its land but said complaint did not
prosper; that defendant dug or caused to be dug a canal along plaintiff's wall, a
portion of which collapsed in June, 1980, and led to the filing by plaintiff of the
supplemental complaint in the above-entitled case and a separate criminal
complaint for malicious mischief
Issue: WON petitioner is a build in badfaith.
Held: There is no question that when petitioner purchased the land from Pariz
Industries, the buildings and other structures were already in existence. The record
is not clear as to who actually built those structures, but it may well be assumed
that petitioner's predecessor-in-interest, Pariz Industries, did so. Article 527 of the
Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof exists to show that the
encroachment over a narrow, needle-shaped portion of private respondent's land
was done in bad faith by the builder of the encroaching structures, the latter should
be presumed to have built them in good faith. Good faith consists in the belief of the
builder that the land he is building on is his, and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his
title. 23 Hence, such good faith, by law, passed on to Pariz's successor,

Geminiano v CA; G.R. No. 120303

Facts: The land In question is owned by petitioners mother geminiano ,

Subsequently, the petitioners' mother executed a contract of lease over a 126
square-meter portion of the lot, including that portion on which the house stood, in
favor of the private respondents. The private respondents then introduced additional
improvements and registered the house in their names. After the expiration of the lease
contract in November 1985, however, the petitioners' mother refused to accept the monthly
rentals.

Issue: WON respondents are builders in goodfaith

Held: no . It has been said that while the right to let property is an incident of title
and possession, a person may be lessor and occupy the position of a landlord to the
tenant although he is not the owner of the premises let. 9 After all, ownership of the
property is not being transferred, 10 only the temporary use and enjoyment thereof. Being
mere lessees, the private respondents knew that their occupation of the premises
would continue only for the life of the lease. Plainly, they cannot be considered as
possessors nor builders in good faith therefore article 1678 of the NCC shall apply ,
stating to wit; because the situation sought to be avoided and which would justify the
application of that provision, is not present in this case. Suffice it to say, "a state of forced
coownership" would not be created between the petitioners and the private respondents.
For, as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the right of the private respondents as
lessees are governed by Article 1678 of the Civil Code which allows reimbursement to the
extent of one-half of the value of the useful improvements.
.. It must be stressed, however, that the right to indemnity under Article 1678 of

the Civil Code arises only if the lessor opts to appropriate the improvements. Since
the petitioners refused to exercise that option, 20 the private respondents cannot compel
them to reimburse the one-half value of the house and improvements. Neither can they
retain the premises until reimbursement is made. The private respondents' sole right then is
to remove the improvements without causing any more impairment upon the property
leased than is necessary

Pleasantville Devt Corp v CA; G.R. No. 79688; February 1, 1996.

Facts: Edith Robillo purchased from petitioner a parcel of land designated as Lot 9,
Phase II and located at Taculing Road, Pleasantville Subdivision, Bacolod City. In
1975, respondent Eldred Jardinico bought the rights to the lot from Robillo. At that
time, Lot 9 was vacant. It was then that he discovered that improvements had been
introduced on Lot 9 by respondent Wilson Kee, who had taken possession thereof.
Kee bought on installment Lot 8 of the same subdivision from. After discovering that
Lot 9 was occupied by Kee, Jardinico confronted him. The parties tried to reach an
amicable settlement, but failed.
Issue: Was Kee a builder in good faith?
Held: Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is
his and his ignorance of any defect or flaw in his title. And as good faith is
presumed, petitioner has the burden of proving bad faith on the part of Kee.

At the time he built improvements on Lot 8, Kee believed that said lot was what he
bought from petitioner. He was not aware that the lot delivered to him was not Lot
8. Thus, Kees good faith. Petitioner failed to prove otherwise.
To demonstrate Kees bad faith, petitioner points to Kees violation of paragraphs 22
and 26 of the Contract of Sale on Installment
We disagree. Such violations have no bearing whatsoever on whether Kee was a
builder in good faith, that is, on his state of mind at the time he built the
improvements on Lot 9. These alleged violations may give rise to petitioners cause
of action against Kee under the said contract (contractual breach), but may not be
bases to negate the presumption that Kee was a builder in good faith.
Kee is a layman not versed in the technical description of his property, he had to
find a way to ascertain that what was described in TCT No. 69561 matched Lot 8.
Thus, he went to the subdivision developers agent and applied and paid for the
relocation of the lot, as well as for the production of a lot plan by CTTEIs geodetic
engineer. Upon Kees receipt of the map, his wife went to the subdivision site
accompanied by CTTEIs employee, Octaviano, who authoritatively declared that the
land she was pointing to was indeed Lot 8. Having full faith and confidence in the
reputation of CTTEI, and because of the companys positive identification of the
property, Kee saw no reason to suspect that there had been a misdelivery. The steps
Kee had taken to protect his interests were reasonable.
Felices v Iriola; G.R. No. L-11269.
Facts : It appears that plaintiff and appellee Silverio Fences was the grantee of a
homestead of over eight hectares located in barrio Curry, Municipality of Pili,
Province of Camarines Sur, under Homestead Patent The month following the
issuance of his patent, on February 24, 1949, appellee conveyed in conditional sale
to defendant and appellant Mamerto Iriola a portion of his homestead of more than
four hectares, for the consideration. Two years after the sale, on April 19, 1951,
appellee tried to recover the land in question from appellant, but the latter refused
to allow it unless he was paid the amount of P2,000 as the alleged value of
improvements he had introduced on the property.
Issue: WON iriola shall be reimbursed for the improvement made to the property in
question.
Held: no The rule of Art. 453 of the Civil Code invoked by appellant 1 can not be
applied to the instant case for the reason that the lower court found, and appellant
admits, that the improvements in question were made on the premises only after
appellee had tried to recover the land in question from appellant, and even during
the pendency of this action in the court below. After appellant had refused to restore
the land to the appellee, to the extent that the latter even had to resort to the
present action to recover his property, appellee could no longer be regarded as
having impliedly assented or conformed to the improvements thereafter made by
appellant on the premises. Upon the other hand, appellant, recognizing as he does
appellee's right to get back his property, continued to act in bad faith when he

made improvements on the land in question after he had already been asked extrajudicially and judicially, to surrender and return its possession to appellee; and as a
penalty for such bad faith, he must forfeit his improvements without any right to
reimbursement therefor. "He who builds, plants or sows in bad faith on the land of
another, loses that is built, planted, or sown without right to indemnity" (Art. 449,
New Civil Code)..

Sps Nuguid v CA (2005); G.R. No. 151815

Facts: Pedro P. Pecson owned a commercial lot located at 27 Kamias Road, Quezon
City, on which he built a four-door two-storey apartment building. For failure to pay
realty taxes, the lot was sold at public auction by the City Treasurer of Quezon City
to Mamerto Nepomuceno, who in turn sold it for P103,000 to the spouses Juan and
Erlinda Nuguid. by virtue of the Entry of Judgment of the aforesaid decision in G.R.
No. 105360, the Nuguids became the uncontested owners of the 256-square meter
commercial lot. After an entry of judgment was made, the Sps. Nuguid filed a
motion with the RTC for a motion for delivery of possession of the lot and the
apartment bldg citing Art. 546 of the CC. The RTC issued an order declaring that the
owner of the lot and apartment bldg were the Sps. Nuguid and to pay the
construction cost of the apartment before a writ of possession would be issued and
to pay rent to the spouses. Pecson moved for reconsideration but the Trial court did
not act on it, instead it issued a writ of possession. The CA affirmed in part the
decision declaring the cost of construction can be offset from the amount of rents to
be collected and that since Sps. Nuguid opted to appropriate the improvement,
Pecson is entitled to be reimbursed the cost of construction at the time it was built
in 1965 which is at P53k and the right the retain the improvement until full
indemnity is paid.
Issue: Whether or not Art. 448 and 546 applies in the case at bar
Held: yes. With regard to Art. 448, the provision on indemnity may be applied in
analogy. Whoever is the owner of the land may appropriate whatever has been
built, planted or sown after paying indemnity. However, it does not apply when the
owner of the land is also the builder of the works on his own land who later on loses
ownership by sale or donation. Art. 546 refers to the necessary and useful expenses which
shall be refunded to the possessor in good faith with right of retention. However, it does not state how
to determine the value of the useful improvement. The respondents [court and private respondents
alike] espouses as sufficient reimbursement the cost of construction in 1965, however, this is
contrary to previous rulings which declares that the value to the reimbursed should be the present
market value of said improvements so as not to unjustly enrich either of the parties. [the trial court
erred in ordering Pecson to pay rent since the Sps. Nuguid has yet to pay the indemnity therefore
Pecson has the right to retain the improvements and the income thereof. The case was remanded to

the trial court for determination of the current market value of the apartment bldg and ordered the
Sps to pay Pecson otherwise it shall be restored to Pecson until payment of indemnity.]

Republic v CA; G.R. No. L-61647

Facts: espondents Benjamin Tancinco, Azucena Tancinco Reyes, Marina (should be
"Maria") Tancinco Imperial and Mario C. Tancinco are registered owners of a parcel
of land situated at Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan bordering on the
Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. There are facts and circumstances in the record
which render untenable the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that
the lands in question are accretions to the private respondents' fishponds. The
petitioner submits that there is no accretion to speak of under Article 457 of the
New Civil Code because what actually happened is that the private respondents
simply transferred their dikes further down the river bed of the Meycauayan River,
and thus, if there is any accretion to speak of, it is man-made and artificial and not
the result of the gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters of the river.
The private respondents submit that the foregoing evidence establishes the fact of
accretion without human intervention because the transfer of the dike occurred
after the accretion was complete.
Issue: WON there is accretion
Held: no. The above-quoted article requires the concurrence of three requisites
before an accretion covered by this particular provision is said to have taken place.
They are (1) that the deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be made
through the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that the land where
accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of rivers. The requirement that the
deposit should be due to the effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This
excludes from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all deposits caused by human
intervention. Alluvion must be the exclusive work of nature. In the instant case,
there is no evidence whatsoever to prove that the addition to the said property was
made gradually through the effects of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue
rivers. there is evidence that the alleged alluvial deposits were artificial and manmade and not the exclusive result of the current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue
rivers. The alleged alluvial deposits came into being not because of the sole effect
of the current of the rivers but as a result of the transfer of the dike towards the
river and encroaching upon it. The land sought to be registered is not even dry land
cast imperceptibly and gradually by the river's current on the fishpond adjoining it.
It is under two meters of water. The private respondents' own evidence shows that
the water in the fishpond is two meters deep on the side of the pilapil facing the
fishpond and only one meter deep on the side of the pilapil facing the river

The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the right to any land or alluvion
deposited by a river is to compensate him for the danger of loss that he suffers
because of the location of his land.

Grande v CA; G.R. No. L-17652

Facts: Petitioners are the owners of a parcel of land located at barrio Ragan,
municipality of Magsaysay province of Isabela. When it was surveyed for purposes
of registration sometime in 1930, its northeastern boundary was the Cagayan River
Since then, and for many years thereafter, a gradual accretion on the northeastern
side took place, by action of the current of the Cagayan River, so much so, that by
1958, the bank thereof had receded to a distance of about 105 meters from its
original site, and an alluvial deposit of 19,964 square meters (1.9964 hectares),
more or less, had been added to the registered area . petitioners instituted quiet
title to said portion formed by accretion alleging in their complaint that they and
their predecessors-in-interest, were formerly in peaceful and continuous possession
thereof, until September, 1948, when respondents entered upon the land under
claim of ownership. respondents claim ownership in themselves, asserting that they
have been in continuous, open, and undisturbed possession of said portion, since
prior to the year 1933 to the present.
Issue: WON respondent shall be entitled to the property resulted from alluvium on
the ground of prescription.
Held: yes. As a legal proposition, the first ground relied upon by the trial court, is
not quite correct. An accretion to registered land, while declared by specific
provision of the Civil Code to belong to the owner of the land as a natural accession
thereof, does not ipso jure become entitled to the protection of the rule of
imprescriptibility of title established by the Land Registration Act. Such protection
does not extend beyond the area given and described in the certificate. To hold
otherwise, would be productive of confusion. It would virtually deprive the title, and
the technical description of the land given therein, of their character of
conclusiveness as to the identity and area of the land that is registered. Just as the
Supreme Court, albeit in a negative manner, has stated that registration does not
protect the riparian owner against the erosion of the area of his land through
gradual changes in the course of the adjoining stream (Payatas Estate Development
Co. v. Tuason, 53 Phil. 55), so registration does not entitle him to all the rights
conferred by Land Registration Act, in so far as the area added by accretion is
concerned. What rights he has, are declared not by said Act, but by the provisions of
the Civil Code on accession: and these provisions do not preclude acquisition of the
addition area by another person through prescription.
There can be no dispute that both under Article 457 of the New Civil Code and
Article 366 of the old, petitioners are the lawful owners of said alluvial property, as
they are the registered owners of the land which it adjoins. The question is whether
the accretion becomes automatically registered land just because the lot which

receives it is covered by a Torrens title thereby making the alluvial property

imprescriptible. We agree with the Court of Appeals that it does not, just as an
unregistered land purchased by the registered owner of the adjoining land does not,
by extension, become ipso facto registered land. Ownership of a piece of land is one
thing, and registration under the Torrens system of that ownership is quite another.
Ownership over the accretion received by the land adjoining a river is governed by
the Civil Code. Imprescriptibility of registered land is provided in the registration
law. Registration under the Land Registration and Cadastral Acts does not vest or
give title to the land, but merely confirms and thereafter protects the title already
possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by occupation of third parties.
But to obtain this protection, the land must be placed under the operation of the
registration laws wherein certain judicial procedures have been provided. The fact
remain, however, that petitioners never sought registration of said alluvial property
(which was formed sometime after petitioners' property covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 2982 was registered on June 9, 1934) up to the time they
instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance of Isabela in 1958. The
increment, therefore, never became registered property, and hence is not entitled
or subject to the protection of imprescriptibility enjoyed by registered property
under the Torrens system. Consequently, it was subject to acquisition through
prescription by third persons.

Heirs of Navarro v IAC; G.R. No. 68166

Facts: On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual filed an application for foreshore
lease covering a tract of foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having an area
of approximately seventeen (17) hectares. This application was denied on January
15, 1953. So was his motion for reconsideration. Subsequently, petitioners'
predecessor-in-interest, also now deceased, Emiliano Navarro, filed a fishpond
application with the Bureau of Fisheries covering twenty five (25) hectares of
foreshore land also in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan. Initially the application was denied,
eventually however the grant was given. Pascual claimed that this land is an
accretion to his property, The Talisay River as well as the Bulacan River flow
downstream and meet at the Manila Bay thereby depositing sand and silt on
Pascual's property resulting in an accretion thereon. Sinforoso Pascual claimed the
accretion as the riparian owner. On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands,
represented by the Assistant Solicitor General, filed an opposition thereto stating
that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-interest possessed sufficient title to the
subject property, the same being a portion of the public domain and, therefore, it
belongs to the Republic of the Philippines. On November 10, 1975, the courta
quorendered judgment finding the subject property to be foreshore land and, being
a part of the public domain, it cannot be the subject of land registration
proceedings. On appeal, the respondent court reversed the findings of the courta
quoand granted the petition for registration of the subject property but excluding
certain areas. A motion for reconsideration was filed by in the CA but the same was

denied. Anchoring their claim of ownership on Article 457 of the Civil Code,
petitioners vigorously argue that the disputed 14-hectare land is an accretion
caused by the joint action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers which run their course
on the eastern and western boundaries, respectively, of petitioners' own tract of
land.
Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners can rightfully claim the land under the principle of
accretion

Held:

The petitioners claim is misplaced. The principle of accretion is only applicable to

owners whose estates are adjacent to rivers as stated in Article 457 of the Civil
Code. The disputed land is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on
what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which adjoined petitioners' own tract of
land on the northern side. As such, the applicable law is not Article 457 of to Civil
Code but Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. The disputed property is an
accretion on a sea bank, Manila Bay being an inlet or an arm of the sea; as such, the
disputed property is, under Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, part of
the public domain. As part of the public domain, the herein disputed land is
intended for public uses, and "so long as the land in litigation belongs to the
national domain and is reserved for public uses, it is not capable of being
appropriated by any private person, except through express authorization granted
in due form by a competent authority."Only the executive and possibly the
legislative departments have the right and the power to make the declaration that
the lands so gained by action of the sea is no longer necessary for purposes of
public utility or for the cause of establishment of special industries or for coast
guard services.Petitioners utterly fail to show that either the executive or legislative
department has already declared the disputed land as qualified, under Article 4 of
the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, to be the property of petitioners as owners of
the estates adjacent thereto.

Baes v CA; G.R. No. 108065

Facts : The controversy began in 1962, when the government dug a canal on a
private parcel of land, identified as Lot 2958 and covering an area of P33,902 sq.m.,
to streamline the Tripa de Gallina creek .This lot was later acquired by Felix Baes,
who registered it in his name. In exchange for Lot 2958-B, which was totally
occupied by the canal, the government gave Baes a lot with exactly the same area
as Lot 2958-B through a Deed of Exchange of Real Property dated June 20, 1970.
The property, which was near but not contiguous to Lot 2956-C, later registered in the name

of Felix Baes under TCT No. 24300. The soil displaced by the canal was used to fill up the old
bed of the creek, Meanwhile, Baes had Lot 2958-C and a portion of Lot 2958-A

designated as Lot 1, Blk., 4, resurveyed and subdivided. On January 12, 1968, he

submitted a petition for the approval of his resurvey and subdivision plans, claiming
that after the said lots were plotted by a competent surveyor, it was found that
there were errors in respect of their bearings and distances. The only remaining
dispute relates to Lot 1-B (TCT No. 14405), which the petitioners, relying on Article
461 of the Civil Code, are claiming as their own. The government rejects this claim
and avers that the petitioners had already been fully compensated for it on June 20,
1970 when they agreed to exchange their Lot 2958-B with Lot 3271-A belonging to
the government.

Issue: WON the land in question shall be owned by the petitioner .

Held: no , River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the course
of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new
course in proportion to the area lost. However, the owners of the land adjoining the
old bed shall have the right to acquire the same by paying the value thereof, which
value shall not exceed the value of the area occupied by the new bed.
This article (461) refers to a natural change in the course of a stream. If the change
of the course is due to works constructed by concessioners authorized by the
government, the concession may grant the abandoned river bed to the
concessioners. If there is no such grant, then, by analogy, the abandoned river bed
will belong to the owners of the land covered by the waters, as provided in this
article, without prejudice to a superior right of third persons with sufficient title. If
the riparian owner is entitled to compensation for the damage to or loss of his
property due to natural causes, there is all the more reason to compensate him
when the change in the course of the river is effected through artificial means. The
loss to the petitioners of the land covered by the canal was the result of a deliberate
act on the part of the government when it sought to improve the flow of the Tripa de
Gallina creek. It was therefore obligated to compensate the Baeses for their loss. We
find, however, that the petitioners have already been so compensated. Felix Baes
was given Lot 3271-A in exchange for the affected Lot 2958-B through the Deed of
Exchange of Real Property dated June 20, 1970. This was a fair exchange because
the two lots were of the same area and value and the agreement was freely entered
into by the parties. The petitioners cannot now claim additional compensation
because, as correctly observed by the Solicitor General,

Binalay v Manalo; G.R. No. 92161

Facts: The late Judge Taccad originally owned a parcel of land situated in Tumauini,
Isabela having an estimated area of twenty (20) hectares. The western portion of
this land bordering on the Cagayan River has an elevation lower than that of the
eastern portion which borders on the national road. Through the years, the western
portion would periodically go under the waters of the Cagayan River as those waters

swelled with the coming of the rains. The submerged portion, however, would reappear during the dry season from January to August. It would remain under water
for the rest of the year, that is, from September to December during the rainy
season. During the cadastral survey conducted at Balug, Tumauini, Isabela on 21
October 1969, the two (2) parcels of land belonging to respondent Manalo were
surveyed and consolidated into one lot, designated as Lot No. 307, Pls-964. Lot 307
which contains 4.6489 hectares includes: (a) the whole of the 1.80 hectares
acquired from Gregorio Taguba; and (b) 2.8489 hectares out of the 8.65 hectares
purchased from Faustina Taccad. As the survey was conducted on a rainy month, a
portion of the land bought from Faustina Taccad then under water was left
unsurveyed and was not included in Lot 307.
Issue: Whether or not Manalo owns Lot 821 by way of accretion
Held: The disputed property is not an accretion. It is the action of the heavy rains
that cause the highest ordinary level of waters of the Cagayan River during the
rainy season. The depressed portion is a river bed and is thus considered property
of public domain, the requisites of accretion in article 457 were not satisfied. These
are: 1) that the deposition of the soil or sediment be gradual and imperceptible; 2)
that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river (or sea); and 3) the land
where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks of the rivers (or the sea
coast). The accretion shouldve been attached to Lot 307 for Manalo to acquire its
ownership. BUT, the claimed accretion lies on the bank of the river; not adjacent to
Lot 307 but directly opposite it across the river. Aside from that, the dike-like
slopes which were very steep may only be formed by a sudden and forceful action
like flooding. The steep slopes could not have been formed by the river in a slow
and gradual manner.

Siari Valley Estates v Lucasan;

Facts: