Bishop (Auth.) - Mathematical Enculturation - A Cultural Perspective On Mathematics Education

MATHEMATICAL ENCUL TURA nON
Mathematics Education Library

VOLUME 6
Managing Editor
A.J. Bishop, Cambridge, U.K.
Editorial Board
H. Bauersfeld, Bielefeld, Germany

J. Kilpatrick, Athens, U.S.A.
G. Leder, Melbourne, Australia
S. Turnau, Krakow, Poland
G. Vergnaud, Paris, France
The titles published in this series are listed at the end 0/ this volume.
ALAN J. BISHOP
Department of Education,
University of Cambridge
MATHEMA TICAL
ENCUL TURA TION
A Cultural Perspective on Mathematics
Education
KLUWER ACADEMIC PUBLISHERS

DORDRECHT I BOSTON I LONDON
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Bishop, Alan J.
Mathematical encuIturation.
(Mathematics education library)
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Mathematics-Study and teaching.
II. Series.
QA11.B545 1988
507
ISBN-13: 978-0-7923-1270-3
DOl: 10.1007/978-94-009-2657-8
I.
Title.
87-32329
e-ISBN-13: 978-94-009-2657-8
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
xi
PREFACE
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
xiii
CHAPTER 11 Towards a Way of Knowing
The conflict
My task
Preliminary thoughts on Mathematics education and
culture
1.4. Technique-oriented curriculum
1.5. Impersonal learning
1.6. Text teaching
1.7. False assumptions
1.8. Mathematical education, a social process
1.9. What is mathematical about a mathematical education?
1.10. Overview
1.1.
1.2.
1.3.
CHAPTER 21 Environmental Activities and Mathematical Culture
3
7
9
10
12
13
16
18
20
Perspectives from cross-cultural studies

The search for mathematical similarities
Counting
Locating
Measuring
Designing
2.7. Playing
2.8. Explaining
2.9. From 'universals' to 'particulars'
2.10. Summary
20
22
23
28
34
38
42
48
55
59
CHAPTER 31 The Values of Mathematical Culture
60
2.1.
2.2.
2.3.
2.4.
2.5.
2.6.
3.1.
3.2.
3.3.
3.4.
3.5.
3.6.
3.7.
Values, ideals and theories of knowledge

Ideology - rationalism
Ideology - objectism
Sentiment - control
Sentiment - progress
Sociology - openness
Sociology - mystery
v
60
62
65
69
72
75
77
vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 4/ Mathematical
Culture and the Child
4.1.
4.2.
4.3.
4.4.
Mathematical culture - symbolic technology and values

The culture of a people
The child in relation to the cultural group
Mathematical enculturation
5.1.
5.2.
5.3.
5.4.
5.5.
5.6.
5.7.
5.8.
The curriculum project

The cultural approach to the Mathematics curriculum five principles
5.2.1. Representativeness
5.2.2. Formality
5.2.3. Accessibility
5.2.4. Explanatory power
5.2.5. Broad and elementary
The three components of the enculturation curriculum
The symbolic component: concept-based
5.4.1. Counting
5.4.2. Locating
5.4.3. Measuring
5.4.4. Designing
5.4.5. Playjng
5.4.6. Explaining
5.4.7. Concepts throl:lgh activities
5.4.8. Connections between concepts
The societal component: project-based
5.5.1. Society in the past
5.5.2. Society at present
5.5.3. Society in the future
The cultural component: investigation-based
5.6.1. Investigations in mathematical culture
5.6.2. Investigations in Mathematical culture
'5.6.3. Investigations and values
Balance in this curriculum
Progress through this curriculum
6.1.
6.2.
Enculturation - The Curriculum
Enculturation - The Process
Conceptualising the enculturation process in action

6.1.1. What should it involve?
6.1.2. Towards a humanistic conception of the process
An asymmetrical process
82
82
84
87
89
92
92
95
95
95
96
96
97
98
99
100
100
101
102
102
103
103
108
110
111
112
113
114
116
117
117
119
120
124
124
124
125
128
T ABLE OF CONTENTS
6.3.
6.4.
6.2.1. The role of power and influence

6.2.2. Legitimate use of power
6.2.3. Constructive and collaborative engagement
6.2.4. Facilitative influence
6.2.5. Metaknowledge and the teacher
An intentional process
6.3.1. The choice of activities
6.3.2. The concept-environment
6.3.3. The project-environment
6.3.4. The investigation-environment
An ideational process
6.4.1. Social construction of meanings
6.4.2. Sharing and contrasting Mathematical ideas
6.4.3. The shaping of explanations
6.4.4. Explaining and values
CHAPTER
7.I.
7.2.
7.3.
7.4.
7.5.
7/ The Mathematical Enculturators
People are responsible for the process

The preparation of Mathematical enculturators preliminary thoughts
The criteria for the selection of Mathematical
enculturators
7.3.I. Ability to personify Mathematical culture
7.3.2. Commitment to the Mathematical enculturation
process
7.3.3. Ability to communicate Mathematical ideas and
values
7.3.4. Acceptance of accountability to the Mathematical
culture
7.3.5. Summary of criteria
The principles of the education of Mathematical
enculturators
7.4.1. Mathematics as a cultural phenomenon
7.4.2. The values of Mathematical culture
7.4.3. The symbolic technology of Mathematics
7.4.4. The technical level of Mathematical culture
7.4.5. The meta-concept of Mathematical enculturation
7.4.6. Summary of principles
Socialising the future enculturator into the Mathematics
Education community
7.5.I. The developing Mathematics Education
community
7.5.2. The critical Mathematics Education community
vii
128
130
131
132
135
135
135
139
142
147
151
151
154
157
159
160
160
161
164
164
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166
167
168
168
169
170
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172
173
175
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178
viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
NOTES
180
BIBLIOGRAPHY
184
INDEX OF NAMES
192
APPENDIX
195
To Jenny
with grateful thanks for her patience and support
PREFACE
Mathematics is in the unenviable position of being simultaneously one of the

most important school subjects for today's children to study and one of the
least well understood. Its reputation is awe-inspiring. Everybody knows how
important it is and everybody knows that they have to study it. But few
people feel comfortable with it; so much so that it is socially quite acceptable
in many countries to confess ignorance about it, to brag about one's incompetence at doing it, and even to claim that one is mathophobic!
So are teachers around the world being apparently legal sadists by inflicting
mental pain on their charges? Or is it that their pupils are all masochists,
enjoying the thrill of self-inflicted mental torture? More seriously, do we
really know what the reasons are for the mathematical activity which goes on
in schools? Do we really have confidence in our criteria for judging what's
important and what isn't? Do we really know what we should be doing?
These basic questions become even more important when considered in the
context of two growing problem areas. The first is a concern felt in many
countries about the direction which mathematics education should take in the
face of the increasing presence of computers and calculator-related technology in society. The second problem area concerns children whose home and
family culture does not fully resonate with that of the school and the wider
society, be they in London, in Aboriginal Australia or in a Navajo reservation.
These problem areas are not unrelated of course. The first provokes many
thoughts about educational values, about the importance attached by society
to different kinds of knowledge, and about the relationship individuals have
with that knowledge. And so does the second.
I therefore felt the need to explore the relationship between developments
in these two problem areas, and to do this through their common denominator - culture.
This book is all about Mathematics as "a way of knowing". It takes a
cultural look at this supposedly familiar subject, and it analyses the educational consequences of the cultural perspective. In the first half of the book I
explore a range of anthropological, cross-cultural and historical literature
concerning Mathematics and culture. My aim is to create a new conception of
Mathematics which both recognises and demonstrates its relationship with
culture - the notion of mathematics as a cultural product, the environmental
and societal activities which stimulate mathematical concepts, the cultural
values which mathematics embodies - indeed the whole cultural genesis of
mathematical ideas.
Xl
xii
PREFACE
Such a broad conception is bound to have many implications for mathematics education and so in the second half of the book I elaborate on the most
significant of these, which concern the mathematics curriculum, the teaching
process and teacher preparation. The notion of 'mathematical enculturation'
is the integrating construct which runs throughout the book, which is why it is
the title of the book. It is a formulation whose exploration drew me into some
unexpected analyses, and these have had some quite unforeseen consequences. I hope that the reader enjoys engaging with the story of this
exploration as much as the author enjoyed making the voyage.
But talking of the reader, who did I have in mind whilst writing the book?
The short answer would be: anyone else who is interested in the two problem
areas described earlier. The longer answer is that the book requires not a lot
of specialist mathematical knowledge, some knowledge of education issues,
rather more of a willingness to criticise traditional practice, and a lot of
sympathy for the process of creative problem solving applied to the field of
mathematics education. Those requirements exclude no specific group of
people, to my knowledge.
Cambridge, Spring, 1988.
ALAN
J. BISHOP
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This book, like all results of human endeavour, is essentially a social product.
I have written it, but many people have contributed to it in various ways.
I must first acknowledge the debt lowe to three educators who stimulated
my developing interest in the cultural aspect of mathematics education. The
first was Adam Curle whom I met when I was a young graduate student at
Harvard. Adam's course in Comparative Education was an eye-opener for
me and changed my educational vision completely. The next was John Reeves
who, through his work for the British Council, enabled me to dabble my toes
in the cross-cultural water, first in Iran and then in Uganda. Thirdly, Glen
Lean who gave me a total immersion experience in Papua New Guinea, from
which I have never completely recovered (I am pleased to say). I know that I
have often bored colleagues and friends alike with my "When I was in Papua
New Guinea" stories, and there are those among my critics who feel that that
experience has blinkered my vision.
I therefore also must acknowledge all those who have criticised my ideas
from time to time. The balance between the friendliness of collegial endeavour and the challenge of critical appraisal is difficult to achieve but is crucial
if one is not to become either just another friend, or a lone wolf crying in the
wilderhess. That balance is one of the achievements I value in the BACOMET group, to whose members lowe another large debt.
Then there are my students who, over many years, have acted, often
unwittingly, as a sounding board for my developing ideas. Like all teachers
everywhere lowe my students a debt of gratitude. I have been fortunate to
teach some excellent people, and two of them have been particularly stimulating, Lloyd Dawe and Norma Presmeg. I am pleased to see that neither of
them appears to have suffered unduly from the experience of working with
me.
Four individuals who are impossible to categorise, have also pushed and
pulled my thoughts - Ken Clements, whose Australian directness is good for
my sanity; Jeremy Kilpatrick, whose cultural awareness keeps me from
straying too far into the margins of academic life; Heinrich Bauersfeld, whose
vision and angUlarity always makes me see another view; and Hans Freudenthal
whose authority acts as an inspiration when writing appears pointless.
I would like to thank Oxford University Press for permission to quote from
Morris Kline's Mathematics in Western Culture, Cambridge University Press
for permission to reprint a diagram from B. Bolt's Mathematical Activities, D.
Kerslake for permission to quote from Language Teaching and Learning No.
6, the Association of Teachers of Mathematics for permission to quote from
xiii
xiv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
D. Farnham's Language and Mathematical Understanding, D. Lingard's

Mathematical Investigations in the Classroom, G. Plummer's 'Responses to
Snowflakes' (in Mathematics Teaching 116) and J. Williams' 'Practical
Applied Mathematics' (in Mathematics Teaching 116).
Finally I thank Marie Collins, my long-suffering secretary, without

whom none of my ideas would be readable, and the Kluwer staff, who
continue to support the journal Educational Studies in Mathematics and this
book series so understandingly.
CHAPTER 1
TOWARDS A WAY OF KNOWING
1.1. THE CONFLICT
Picture the situation. Two of today's modern teenagers, wearing just the
'right' clothes, with their hairstyle a La mode, are discussing cars with their
friends. They know the latest models, they are aware of the subtle differences
in manufacture, in engine sizes, fuel capacity, performance figures, and they
appreciate the style, and the shape, and the dimensions of the interior. They
are surrounded by gadgets and engineered equipment of all kinds. Their
imagination is fired by images of human achievements and products, the
Space Age, the Media, the Computer Games, the Personal Stereo.
At the same time they are worried. The news is full of disasters and wars.
They hear about the international arms industry, the plight of starving people
in the poorest regions of the world, the exploitation and greed of multinational corporations. And they don't know whether they will have a job indeed they don't know if they even want a job.
They are excited, inspired, worried, frustrated, and clearly confused.
Education should help, and mathematics education in particular might be
expected to help because mathematics, it is said, is at the root of modern
technological society. Certainly mathematics is felt to be one of the most
important subjects in the school curriculum by educators, parents and society
at large - second only to the national language. Anyone who wants to get on
today needs to study mathematics (and preferably computing too, nowadays);
that is the 'received wisdom' for many parents in many countries of the world.
So millions of children all over the world grapple with the complexities of
computations, equations, triangles and fractions, while millions of teachers
grapple with the complexities of instilling mathematical understanding in
their young charges.
But what results from all this effort? Certainly some children succeed; that
is, they learn how to do the mathematical techniques, get the right answers,
use the right methods, and pass the examinations. Many of these get jobs in
industry, banking, commerce, multi-national corporations, the civil service
and the armed forces. Some get jobs in universities, a very few of them doing
research in mathematics; some of them bec<?me teachers and some of those
become teachers of mathematics. Most of the 'successful' ones never question
their mathematical knowledge or their mathematics education - after all,
there's no need if you are successful. As Keddie (1971) says as a result of her
research "It would be the failure of high-ability pupils to question what they
are taught in schools that contributes in large measure to their educational
achievement" (p. 156).
1
CHAPTER I
The situation is rather different, though, for the majority of young people
who don't succeed. Mathematics is still felt to be important, but it's also
difficult - impossibly so for many - mysterious, meaningless and boring. It is
not 'about' anything, and it creates feelings of fear, feelings of lack of
confidence and, indeed, feelings of hatred. For some it even creates feelings
of oppression and of being dominated by someone, they know not whom.
Probably mathematics itself would not be questioned by these people but
certainly their so-called mathematics education would be questioned, criticised and maligned. They blame the teachers for never understanding them,
they blame the mathematics curriculum for all its irrelevant and mindnumbing exercises, and of course they blame The Education System which
cheated them. It was The System which made them feel that mathematics
was, and is, important to study, and it was The System which failed them. The
System created the need but failed to satisfy the need.
This, then, is the conflict which stimulated this book.
On the one hand we have a rapidly changing technological environment,
increasingly dependent on mathematical knowledge and understanding, which
creates satisfactions for some people in the world but worries for many
others. We have an increasingly complex social system to enable us to handle
our increasingly complex environment, and we have now to live within a
computer-oriented and calculator-familiar society. It seems clear that the
needs for a strong mathematics education are more important than they have
ever been, although it is also clear that the needs are changing as the
technology is changing.
On the other hand, study after study shows us not only how much mathematical misunderstanding occurs as a result of our teaching, but also how
limited that understanding is even if it is 'correct'. We learn constantly of
individuals rejecting mathematics, fearing it, disliking it and, if they continue
to study it (which many don't), resorting to rote and instrumental methods to
cope with the examination-oriented demands. If mathematics education is
about helping people to relate better to their environment, then it is clearly
failing in this task.
This conflict is bad enough to contemplate as I have described it, but it is
actually much worse than this. What I have described is what I can see, and
know, of the situation in a Western-European country where the conditions
for living, working and education are reasonably favourable. How much
worse is it in countries where survival is more important a goal than living,
where work can seem like a dreamed-of luxury to many or where education is
seen as a way out of a desperate poverty-spiral? What possible relevance can
there be for the niceties of mathematical patterns, the routines of column
arithmetic and the purity of geometric shapes? And why should the syllabuses
and curricula of more-technological societies be taken as the appropriate
models for those in less-technological societies, particularly when they are
even inappropriate, and failing, in the former situation?
TOW ARDS A WAY OF KNOWING
1.2. MY TASK
What I am searching for, through writing this book, is an elaboration of what

I feel is a more appropriate way to conceive of mathematics education, in the
situation of an ever-increasingly complex technological environment and
society.
The approach which I wish to explore in this book develops from the fact
that mathematics is a cultural phenomenon, and my exploration will lean
towards the anthropological. I want to use this idea to develop an approach
which by its nature criticises what presently passes for mathematics education. I want to generate ideas about the mathematics curriculum, about the
actual teaching process in classrooms and about teacher education. I want to
discover what order of difference exists between what is, now, and what might
be, in order to become clearer about how we should begin to change our
approach in practice. My search is for new principles to guide our next
developments.
I feel that we are at a crucial stage in the evolution of mathematics
education. We have gone through the 'arithmetic - algebra - and geometry'
era. We have recognised the importance of teaching mathematics as an
integrated subject. We are now in the period of trying to teach mathematics
to all. We know it can be done and we are trying to do it in many versions
around the world. But I feel that we now need to move conceptually from the
idea of 'teaching mathematics to all' towards 'a mathematical education for
all'. 1
Educating people mathematically consists of much more than just teaching
them some mathematics. It is much more difficult to do, and the problems and
issues are much more challenging. It requires a fundamental awareness of the
values which underlie mathematics and a recognition of the complexity of
educating children about those values. It is not enough merely to teach them
mathematics, we need also to educate them about mathematics, to educate
them through mathematics, and to educate them with mathematics.
Teaching children to do mathematics emphasises knowledge as 'a way of
doing'. A mathematical education seems to me, in contrast, to be essentially
concerned with 'a way of knowing'. That then speaks to me of a cultural
perspective on mathematical knowledge.
1.3. PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON MATHEMATICS EDUCATION AND
CULTURE'
The relationships between education and anthropology have not been developed to any great extent, although as might be expected, where anthropologists have studied so-called 'primitive' cultures, the emerging ideas have
fuelled debates about the problems of formal education in relation to those
cultures.
CHAPTER I
However, the idea of 'culture' has certainly been a powerful stimulant for
educational thinking in general and many writers, philosophers and sociologists have recognised this power. As a result, the nuances and 'levels' of
culture developed as educational images have been, and are, many. Its very
richness and power could bring about its own demise through over-use and
over-stretching: Is culture about a people? Is it about a heritage? Is it about a
set of values? Does it concern the family, the village, the country or the
region? Could it be about the classroom, the school or the system? And what
can any of these considerations offer us here? Indeed a book has been written
solely for the purpose of providing "a critical review of concepts and definitions" of culture (Kroeber and Kluckhohn, 1952) and this offers many fertile
avenues for exploration in the field of education.
Perhaps a good, encompassing start is offered to us by Tylor's (1871)
definition: "Culture, or civilisation, taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is
that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law,
customs, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member
of society" (p. 1). However the context of formal education means that
certain particular aspects of culture are likely to be of more particular interest
to me in this book, and one writer offers a useful entree into the issues.
Entwistle (1977) has developed an analysis of culture from an educational
perspective and he makes first of all the important distinction between the
'descriptive' and the 'normative' approach to culture. The first of these
approaches attempts merely to describe and document whereas the second
applies a set of values to the totality so described. This then, particularly for
consideration of educational issues, offers various 'versions' of culture, judged to
be worthy of inclusion in some educational enterprise. Table I shows his
scheme of analysis.
Whereas Cl includes the total way of life of a people, C2 is a conception
"with reference only to the totality of artefacts which constitute the arts,
sciences and philosophy". C3 is a further restriction while C4 could be
TABLE I
Concepts of culture
Descriptive
CI
C2
C3
C4
Anthropological - 'whole way of life'

- totality of activities and artefacts.
The product of intellectual and artistic
activity.
The arts (that is, C2 minus philosophy.
science, history).
Recreation ('leisure' activities).
Normative
Cln
C2n
C3n
C4n
Totality (Cl) minus its dysfunctional

elements.
The best that has been thought and
said.
The best art ('art', music. painting,
sculpture, etc.).
'Wholesome recreation.
regarded as 'popular culture'. C4n then excludes those aspects of popular

culture which have 'undesirable' values attached to them - e.g. drugs,
alcoholism. The educational decisions are therefore concerned firstly with
what range and variety of a culture's total way-of-life are to be transmitted to
its young. The restrictions on that range will lie along the two dimensions
described by Entwistle. For the problem at hand, it is likely that we are most
concerned with the mathematical aspects of C2 and C2n, although we will
want a more detailed analysis of values than merely Entwistle's idea of "the
best that has been thought and said". Clearly the notion of a selective
approach to culture is important in education. Education is an intentional and
deliberate form of cultural transmission, and as such it must be selective. We
will surely return to decisions about choice of mathematical 'culture' for a
mathematical education, particularly in Chapter 5.
Entwistle's analysis also raises the crucial issue as to whether a culture is
defined as a set of ideas, or a set of people with certain ideas. Clearly
Entwistle refers more to the former than to the latter, but other writers,
including Stenhouse (1967), link the two more closely. Stenhouse says this:
"Culture consists of a complex of shared understandings which serves as a
medium through which individual human minds interact in communication
with one another" (p. 16). To the extent therefore that people share a
'complex of understandings', to that extent also do they belong to the same
cultural group. To the extent that the 'complex of understandings' is shared
by a group of people, to that extent also does that complex become 'their
culture'. This idea enables us to talk about a European culture, an upper-class
culture and a drug culture, and indeed to recognise that the same person can
be a part, or a member of, all three of those cultures.
So how does this issue relate to my problem in this book? Well, to put it as
a simple dichotomy first, am I concerned with a 'culture of mathematics', or
with a cultural group perhaps called 'mathematicians'? The first view is nobly
illustrated by Morris Kline's book Mathematics in Western Culture where he
advances the thesis that "mathematics has been a major cultural force in
Western civilization" (p. 15). His concern is clearly educational and he too
deplores the fact that schools have presented 'mathematics' as a set of
meaningless techniques. The aim of his book is to "survey mathematics to
show how its ideas have helped to mould twentieth-century life and thought"
(p. 16). He presents mathematics as a set of ideas, as a 'complex of understandings', and he hopes that "new light will be shed on mathematics and on
the dominant characteristics of our age by this account of mathematics as a
fashioner of modern civilization".
Kline's work therefore relates closely to mine and I shall be referring to it
again. But he is not specifically concerned with formal educational problems,
nor is he trying to formulate proposals for a general mathematical education.
If Kline's book is about, as he says, the 'major cultural force in Western
CHAPTER I
civilization' then I want this book to be about the kind of mathematical

education which will enable that cultural force to be recognised, absorbed,
but also evaluated.
What about the ideas/people dichotomy? Kline does of course refer to
people in his book but essentially only as individual producers of ideas within
a cultural and societal context. Wilder, however, in his book Evolution of
Mathematical Concepts (1978) while ostensibly dealing with the same core
history and development of mathematical ideas deals directly with the
people/ideas issue. Wilder overtly states his cultural stance this way: "What I
have tried to do here is to study the mathematical subculture from the
standpoint of the anthropologist, rather than that of a mathematician"
(p. xiv) and also, rather like that of an historian, one might add. Early on in
his book, when he considers various preliminary ideas and issues about
'culture', much as I am doing now, he makes his position clear about 'people'
when he says "those people who do mathematics - the 'mathematicians' - are
not only the possessors of the cultural element known as mathematics but,
when taken as a group in their own right, so to speak, can be considered as
the bearers of a culture, in this case mathematics" (p. 26). So, for Wilder, the
culture of that complex of understandings, is the mathematics, and the
cultural group is the 'mathematicians'. Wilder's interest is with how mathematical ideas evolve and with who 'evolves' them.
This cultural group is not my specific concern however, as it offers no basis
for contemplating a general mathematical education for all. Nonetheless I
have to find ways of including this group in the design since they clearly have
an important function in mathematical culture. But a good general mathematical education should not be an obstacle to their development. Wilder's
ideas are important and we will return to them.
But neither Wilder nor Kline refer to the rest of us, except as parts of
'Western civilization' (Kline), or of 'the host culture' (Wilder). Do we who
are not mathematicians (in Wilder's sense) have any cultural role to play? Are
we merely recipients of other people's cultural evolution or are we part of the
evolution as well? And what are the educational implications of the answers
to these questions?
Anthropologists usually deal with this problem by labelling the cultural
group first and then describing their culture - so we see books on the Navajo
Indians and on the Eskimos. Sometimes the definition of the people under
consideration is taken seriously, often it is not, so that one is never certain,
for example, whether the culture being described relates to every person with
any Navajo blood in them, or only to those wholly Navajo and living on the
reservation. One can immediately see the problem if one attempts to clarify
who are those Europeans who possess the European culture, or worse still,
who are the 'Westerners' who are part of Kline's 'Western Culture'?
But I am not concerned with the anthropologists' problems nor with the
historians'. Nor indeed am I specifically concerned with those of the mathe-
maticians, though of course they are of rather more interest. My concern is

with the problems of mathematics education and I have to find educationally
significant ways of relating people and their mathematical culture. In particular I have to find ways of relating children with their mathematical culture.
I should like to begin by casting a critical eye over what happens in a
majority of mathematics teaching situations at present. Of course it is easy to
be critical, and in a book such as this it is almost obligatory to be so early on
so that the reader can gain some orientation to the problem as the author sees
it. This criticism will also throw up some issues which I shall certainly have to
address.
From my perspective of a cultural view on mathematics education, I see
four major areas of concern about the present state of mathematics teaching.
They are the technique-oriented curriculum, impersonal learning, text teaching, and the assumptions which lie behind these.
1.4. TECHNIQUE-ORIENTED CURRICULUM
The first major area of concern to me is the mathematics curriculum which

exists in most countries of the world, and which is strongly directed towards
the performance of techniques. Arithmetical computation is entrenched as
the basis of the mathematics curriculum, with the 'four rules' gradually being
developed to handle more and more complicated 'numbers' - natural, integer, fractions, decimals, complex and, later, matrices and vectors. Algebraic
work develops the skills of solving more and more complicated 'equations'
and of rearranging complicated expressions so that they can be 'solved'.
Geometry, if it is taken seriously at all, is developed as an area to which one
can apply arithmetical and algebraic techniques, be it thereby trigonometry or
coordinate geometry. And for those who have succeeded at, or survived, that
diet, the gateway to further delights is the calculus, with its myriad of integrals
and differential equations waiting to be recognised, classified, and of course,
'solved'.
The technique curriculum is a curriculum of procedures, methods, skills,
rules and algorithms which portrays mathematics as a 'doing' subject. Mathematics is therefore not portrayed as a reflective subject. It is not a way of
knowing. Of course it is necessary to think, within this curriculum, but it is a
limited and constrained type of thinking, related to adopting the appropriate
procedure, using the correct method of solution, following the rules and
obtaining the correct answer. It is therefore a curriculum in which 'practice
makes perfect' with examples to be emulated, and exercises to be carried out.
But my characterisation - perhaps it is a caricature for some people doesn't explain why I am criticising it. Most people would probably recognise
the characterisation and many would probably reinforce and support it. And
clearly it also can be justified in part. So why am I offering it for criticism
here?
CHAPTER I
My concern is that it is in essence a 'user's' curriculum, which purports to

develop a comprehensive and wide-ranging 'tool-kit' for the user. The aim is
for the learner to be able to use the techniques, both inside and outside
mathematics, and 'development' in terms of this curriculum means mastering
an ever more complex and wide-ranging set of techniques. It leads logically to
the notion of 'mastery' which is becoming established as the criterion of
evaluation in this curriculum.
But 'technique-performance' is precisely what calculators and computers
can do, as one might expect, since they are only electronic versions of
mechanical devices. They are technique-handlers par excellence - that is their
strength - and therefore one simple criticism of the technique curriculum is
that it is merely developing in humans the ability to do what calculators and
computers can do faster and more accurately in any case. The irony is that
computers were developed in order to do these techniques faster and more
accurately than humans ever could! So why should we still be concentrating
our curriculum on these techniques? Surely what is needed now is more
understanding and critical awareness of how, and when, to use these mathematical techniques, why they work, and how they are developed? This
requires not only much greater thought, but also a different kind of thinking
and therefore it requires a very different approach to the curriculum.
At a more fundamental level, however, the technique curriculum is based
on the expectation of the pupil becoming a user. That, depending on one's
definitions of course, will be true in a Pure Mathematics context for only a
minute proportion of the population. Some, it is true, will go on to a job in
which they will use some mathematical techniques, but in general, as studies
such as Fitzgerald's (1981) show us, specific jobs usually require specific and
well-established techniques. Business, commerce and industry are too economically controlled to allow the average employee to experiment with her
'bag of tools'. So the idea of the average person as a peripatetic problemsolver armed with a tool-bag of mathematical techniques and looking for
problems to solve is a myth. But it is such a powerful myth. It dominates
mathematics education at present, has done so for a long time, and probably
will continue to do so for a long time to come, despite such attempts as this to
discredit it.
One excuse used for perpetrating this myth is that a small proportion of the
successful mathematics learners will use some mathematical methods in their
jobs. But why should this myth dominate the education of the rest of the
population? Will it help them solve their 'non-mathematical' problems better? Will it help them take a critical stance towards technological development?
Clearly, my answer is 'no'. A technique curriculum cannot help understanding, cannot develop meaning, cannot enable the learner to develop a
critical stance either inside or outside mathematics. In my opinion a technique
curriculum therefore cannot educate. It can only instruct and it can only train,
TOW ARDS A WAY OF KNOWING
provided that it is successful, but however successfully it does those things it

cannot, by itself, educate. Moreover if it fails to instruct and if it fails to train
then it does nothing positively for the child. For the successful child it is at
best a training, for the unsuccessful child it is a disaster.
1.5. IMPERSONAL LEARNING
The second area of concern is what I call impersonal learning, whereby the
task for the learner is conceived of as being independent of the person of the
learner. That is, what is considered important is that the learner learns the
mathematics, not that the learner strives for some personal meanings from
mathematical education. I am not criticising teachers here, because the whole
system of mathematics education perpetuates this idea. Syllabuses, examinations, textbooks., teacher training and research are all dominated by the
emphasis on subject knowledge and technique performance.
There is of course a strong connection here with the previous point. A
technique curriculum of right answers offers no scope for personal interpretation and invention. The rules must be learnt, the procedures accepted and the
skills practised. It doesn't matter what sort of person the learner is, the
mathematical result is the same. It doesn't matter ultimately if you are a
visualiser or someone who prefers analysing the logic of the situation, because
(a + b) (a - b) will still equal a2 - b 2 It doesn't matter what the learner brings
to the situation, as long as they take away the same thing. That is the message
received.
So, in that situation there is no need for discussion, no need for 'views' and
'opinions' and therefore no real need to provide opportunity for talk. Questions from the teacher demand certain answers (already known by the
teacher), problems in the textbook demand certain kinds of solution (already
shown in the text). Given this problem: "Show how you would measure the
height of a building using a barometer" an answer such as "Lower the
barometer to the bottom using a piece of string and measure the length of the
string" is not acceptable. It is not playing the 'game' according to the 'rules'.
Anyone who has been taught 'properly' would surely be expected to know the
kind of answer which would be acceptable!3
Of course, this is the aspect which many learners really like: "You know
where you are with mathematics". There is a security associated with right
answers and correct procedures that appeals to many learners, be they
children or adults. Moreover, this is one of the strengths of mathematics
itself; the theorem of Pythagoras is true throughout the world. A mathematical truth is geographically and personally independent, and can be verified by
anyone (in theory).
But I would argue that learning these mathematical truths does nOL
constitute an adequate mathematics education. Just because mathematical
truths hold everywhere, and for everyone, that is no reason for saying that
10
CHAPTER I
mathematics education should look the same everywhere, and for everyone. Even if mathematical truths are universal, that does not mean that
mathematics education should ignore the individuality of the learner, nor
the social and cultural context of education. A mathematical education
needs to do more than merely inform learners of these truths.
There is of course an 'agreed' aspect of mathematics learning - that is, the
shared meanings we have of mathematical truths. But there is an (arguably)
equally important personal side to those meanings as well. Meaning is about
the connections we make between ideas, and only some of those connections
will be the agreed, shared, 'official', mathematical connections and meanings.
Others will be personal connections, of imagery and metaphor, of examples
from home or of other experiences, of significant events from learning other
subjects, or associations with other people. We all construct personal meanings for ourselves, which give significance to our lives.
Impersonal mathematics learning totally ignores these connections and the
personal meanings, and by doing so, depersonalises the learning process. 'No
persona). meanings' means that no 'persons' are actually in these mathematics
classrooms; what you have is a teacher of mathematics and several learners of
mathematics. The task of that teacher is therefore to communicate 'the
mathematics' as effectively and as efficiently as possible, so that the learners
can learn 'the mathematics'. 'The mathematics' is an impersonal object to be
transmitted in a one-way communication. The teacher's personal views and
meanings are irrelevant and will only 'get in the way', while the learners are
all supposed to learn the same things; they exist not as people but as a
generalised 'learner'. They are rarely allowed to be people, to express
personal feelings, personal intuitions, personal meanings and personal interpretations.
Impersonal learning is surely, at root, non-educational.
1.6. TEXT TEACHING
The third major area of concern follows on from the last - from impersonal
learning to impersonal teaching, characterised for me by 'text teaching'.
Many mathematics classrooms of the world bear witness to the subordination
of teacher-teaching to textbook teaching and teachers who shun such texts are
rare indeed. In some educational systems there is one textbook and it is
mandatory to use it. It is the 'bible' - school mathematics enshrined. In other
systems the teachers can choose from a recommended set while in even more
open systems the teachers are free to exploit what resources they like. But
most educational systems of the world expect their teachers to use some
textbook or other.
But whose are these books? Who writes them and for whom, and why?
Does the author know the learners who will use them or the teachers who will
teach from them? Will the author accept the responsibility for the children's
11
failure to learn? Does the author accept the credit if the learner succeeds?
That the textbook controls is well-known (that is why there are many systems
in the world which are based on only one book). That it controls both teacher
and taught is also well-known by anyone who has taught with a textbook or
who has learned with a textbook. So where lie the responsibility and the
accountability which should accompany this control? The teacher is usually
held accountable, of course. But if the teaching is being controlled by the
textbook then should the teacher be the one held accountable?
If teachers are to be held accountable, as I believe they should, then they
must not at the same time be controlled by the textbook. They must be helped
and supported with materials and activities over which they have control, in
order that they can help their learners to be successful, because only the
teacher can know the learners, and only the teacher can judge their success or
failure in understanding.
The control by the textbook therefore effectively prevents the teachers
from knowing their learners and thereby prevents them from helping their
learners effectively. The 'teacher-proof' textbook was devised to be used by
unskilled teachers, so that one can imagine how a detailed and carefully
worked-out textbook could actually de-skill a teacher, and not only be less
effective in the short term but also be thoroughly debilitating to teachers in
the long term.
At the other extreme, some children are taught their mathematics even
more impersonally than that - they use so-called "individualised materials".
The designers of these materials cannot assume anything about the teacher or
even that there is a teacher there. At least a textbook author can produce a
teachers' text to accompany it. But the 'beauty' of individualised materials, it
is said, is that you don't need a real teacher to be there. Some of these
materials are now appearing on microcomputer screens - the electronic
individualised material- the 'high-tech' ultimate extension of text teaching. It
may be individualised but it can never be personalised. The only person who
can possibly personalise the teaching is the teacher - if she is given a chance.
But the more the text, or the machine, intervenes, the less chance the teacher
has to personalise the teaching.
We should therefore have systems which do not rely on the textbook, and
we should educate the teacher not to be dependent on the textbook. We need
to enable the teacher to control the materials, not vice versa, and we need to
demonstrate that the responsibility for the teaching lies with the teacher not
with the text. 4
What a teacher really needs is not a text, but activities and resources to heIp
the learners develop. What the learner really needs is not a text, but an
involving, warm, sympathetic, and intellectually challenging learning environment. Neither of the partners in the pedagogical process needs a text. So
why should texts be so dominant?
12
CHAPTER I
1.7. FALSE ASSUMPTIONS
It is of course no accident that we have the technique curriculum, impersonal
learning and text teaching. These have all evolved to meet conditions which
have existed and they are all based on certain assumptions. They are dominant practices - all three can be found in all countries of the world - because
of these assumptions. But these assumptions now need questioning and, in
the context of a mathematical education, I believe that they are all false
assumptions.
The technique curriculum is essentially based on the assumption that a
'top-down' approach to mathematics education is optimal. This means that
one plans one's' school curriculum on the basis of the need to produce
competent top-level mathematicians and ultimately mathematics researchers.
Everyone else drops out at different levels when the mathematics becomes
too difficult, or too meaningless, or too irrelevant for them personally. It is a
'drop-out' approach therefore as well as being one which does not have
education as its goal. Of course it is necessary to provide for different interests
and expertise within the education system, but a general curriculum based on
the needs of the expert is non-educational.
How can mathematical culture be revealed to children without it being seen
as 'top-down' knowledge?
Impersonal learning, as I said earlier, is based on the assumption that the
view of the universality of mathematics implies a universality of mathematics
education. It is also closely connected to the 'top-down' approach, firstly,
because it makes no distinction between what different learners bring with
them to the classroom, and secondly, because it portrays the idea of mathematical knowledge as being handed down 'from on high'. In that sense it
assumes that because the mathematical store of knowledge is essentially
dehumanised knowledge, that must also characterise mathematics education.
It is not that the teacher does not recognise the humanity and personal
interests of the individual learners, but that mathematics ~ducation doesn't
recognise it.
How can individual learners retain their individuality in a 'cultural' approach?
Text teaching is also sustained in the 'top-down' approach to mathematics
education since the textbook in effect embodies and objectifies the 'top-down'
curriculum. But there is another aspect to this as well. The top-down curriculum is designed to develop mathematical experts and, by the same token, the
texts themselves are the product of the experts - not necessarily the same
ones, of course, although that has happened and continues to happen.
Nevertheless, texts are produced by people who think they know better than
the teachers what is best for their learners. There is an arrogant assumption of
expertise which text writers have towards the teacher (and of course towards
13
the learner) which necessarily puts the teacher in a subordinate position, and
which therefore ultimately deskills and deprofessionalises the teacher.
How can materials be made available to teachers without their being
accorded the 'expert' status?
The other assumption on which text teaching is based concerns impersonality - the teacher's job is demonstrated to be that of teaching mathematics,
not teaching people. A text, with its carefully worked progressions and
sequences, makes assumptions about the 'generalised' learner - which as I
said earlier is not a real person. A teacher, constrained by the text, cannot
therefore teach people and can only attempt to teach mathematics. Moreover, the mathematics which is taught is presented as if it is value-free.
Because it is dehumanised, depersonalised and (of course) decontextualised,
it has been felt necessary to remove all references to values and other cultural
associations in order presumably for the mathematics to retain its 'purity'.
What has mathematics as a culture to do with people?
A corollary of this assumption is that mathematics teaching needs to
become 'systematised'. This assumption is derived from business and industrial organisations, with the teacher being the educational version of 'The
Organisation Man'. So we can find a strong feeling of hierarchy (experts!
teachers), mechanisms of organisation (planned curricula, controlled textbooks, prescribed aids, sequenced testing) and an overriding criterion of
'efficiency'. The teacher is then thought of as merely one type of 'instructional
delivery system' and no doubt, an inefficient one at that!5 Such an assumption
puts a premium on efficient management and organisation, and devalues
teachers' personal qualities, individual initiatives and abilities. Moreover it
ignores the fact that education is essentially an interpersonal process and so it
seeks to depersonalise and dehumanise. The more the 'system' strives for
efficiency, then, the more it will try to control, and ultimately the less it will
educate.
Far from being an educational philosophy, the 'systematised' assumption
makes us focus on production, i.e. to seek efficiently produced 'products',
with quality control being the safeguard, and with textbook teaching being a
key part of the system's mechanism. But how can a society organise a
mathematical education for its children without falling into the 'system' trap?
1.8. MATHEMATICAL EDUCATION, A SOCIAL PROCESS
It should be clear by now that, fundamentally, education for me must be
recognised as being a social process, and therefore a mathematical education

must also have at its core the assumption of being a social process. It seems so
trivial to say this and yet, as I have just said, the social, the human, the
essentially interpersonal nature of education is so often ignored in the rush for
14
CHAPTER 1
the acquisition of mathematical techniques and in the desire for so-called

efficiency in mathematics education.
If we therefore consider these social aspects of mathematics education, we
find that there are five significant levels of scale involved:
Cultural
Societal
Institutional
Pedagogical
Individual
The largest social group is the cultural group and mathematics as a cultural
phenomenon is clearly supra-societal in nature. Mathematics is used in every
society, mathematics is the only subject taught in most schools in the world,
and the rapid growth of the international mathematics education community
is an illustration of the subject's supra-societal status.
At the societal level mathematics is mediated by the various institutions in
society and is subject to the political and ideological forces in that society. As
I said earlier, even if mathematics is an international and cultural phenomenon, there is no necessary reason why the mathematics education in anyone
society should be the same as that in another society. This was the thesis
explored by Swetz (1978) in his book Socialist Mathematics Education. He
considered mathematics education as it appeared to observers of seven
socialist societies (USSR, German Democratic Republic, Peoples Republic of
China, Yugoslavia, Sweden, Hungary, Tanzania). The cross-cultural studies
referred to in the next chapter also show, for example, how mathematics
education in a predominantly agricultural society could be markedly different
from that in a highly technological society. At the societal level, then, we can
see how different societies use their various formal and informal educational
institutions to shape mathematics education to their societal goals and aspirations.
At the next educational level, we can consider the within-institutional
influences which shape even further the children's mathematical education.
Each institution works on the intended curriculum, and implements it according to the strengths, weaknesses, constraints and resources of its staff.
The internal structure and 'politics' of the institution is a significant factor as is
the perceived status of mathematics in the school curriculum, which is often
high. The mechanisms for grouping pupils, for examining them, for resourcing the subjects, and for teaching them, also have profound effects on the way
the subject of mathematics is 'seen' by teachers and pupils. Once again, even
though the subject 'mathematics' may have the same label in different schools
there is no necessary reason why school mathematics should be the same in a
school in one society as that in a school in another society. There will be
similarities, of course, as in Swetz' book, but there will also be differences. A
15
High School Algebra 1 course in USA will differ markedly from the integrated
mathematics taught to 13 year olds in England, and they are both different
from the mathematical diet in a Belgium Gymnasium course for 13 year olds.
At the pedagogical level the social influences on the child's mathematical
education are much more easily identified with particular, and known people
- the teacher and the rest of the classroom group. Within the constraints set
by society and by the institution, the teacher and the group mould, in
interaction, the values which the individual child will receive concerning
mathematics. Through activities, with reinforcement and negotiation, the
child becomes enculturated into ways of thinking, behaving, feeling and
valuing. Arguably the classroom participants are the most significant shapers
of values, but we must never lose sight of the constraints set by society, the
within-institutional influences and of course the cultural values carried by
mathematics itself. A 'mathematics classroom' is already defined in such a
way that only certain kinds of activities are possible and therefore certain
kinds of values are developed.
Perhaps it seems rather strange, or at least unnecessary, to have a social
'level' called individual but I feel it is most important to recognise that when
viewing mathematics education as a social process it is the individual who
negotiates, integrates, and makes sense of, the different value messages
existing. The child does not arrive in school as an empty vessel, nor does the
child offer nothing to the educational enterprise.
The child, as the individual learner and meaning maker, brings a personal
dimension to the enterprise - from their family, from their history, from their
home 'culture'. No two learners are alike and therefore even if the value
messages being transmitted can be considered the 'same', the message received will certainly be different because the receivers are different. The
receiver contributes the conceptual context which gives meaning to the
message, so that any communication is differentially affected by the personality of the individual.
More than this, the individual contributes values to the educational process
and, as part of the classroom group, helps to influence the shaping process at
the pedagogical level. The child continually brings influences from outside the
institution, from outside formal education, into the formal education process,
and thereby influences this formal education process. The child is no mere
receiver of education and no mere sponge for values - the child has a critical
role to play in the social dynamic of mathematics education.
A child then, in a particular classroom group, with a particular teacher, in a
particular school, in a particular society, participates in a very particular
educational experience. And if the subject matter is mathematics, the child
participates in a very particular kind of mathematical educational experience.
Nevertheless it is also a mathematical experience and that experience
therefore has a cultural basis. Mathematics is not a product of one society
alone, and mathematics in school is not a 'societal' subject in the say that
16
CHAPTER 1
civics, or national history, or even perhaps language is. Mathematics is a

cultural phenomenon and as such, it transcends societal boundaries in the
same way that music does, or religion, science, art, dance or sport. The
'loneliness of the long distance runner' competing in today's Olympic marathon is an experience every bit as cultural as the emotion engendered by a
Handel oratorio or the beauty expressed by a few deceptively simple Japanese brush strokes. The actual values may be quite different but the suprasocietal roots of those values are surely clear. The delight and satisfaction
engendered by the Pythagorean proof, or by Gauss' method of summation is,
likewise, no mere societal phenomenon. Neither is the surprise of the discovered pattern, nor the secure predictability of the tested algorithm. When we
talk of the power of the mathematical method, we don't see this power as
being seen within narrow societal boundaries, we imagine it being visible
anywhere and everywhere.
1.9. WHAT IS MATHEMATICAL ABOUT A MATHEMATICAL EDUCATION?
That perhaps seems rather a strange question until one remembers the point
raised earlier about choice of mathematical culture. Perhaps the question
should be narrowed to "what should the mathematical basis of a mathematical education look like"? Clearly one can't include everything mathematical
or even everything mathematically simple, for the young learners. So how
should we choose and, more importantly for this introductory chapter, what
kind of conceptual framework gives us a good structural basis for choosing?
Let me first of all reject not just the 'totality of mathematics' idea but also a
'chronological' framework. There is clearly a value in books such as Kline's,
or Wilder's, but the chronology of mathematical culture doesn't have any
necessary claim to offering the ideational scaffolding for mathematical education for a particular time and place. What is necessary is a scheme which
relates mathematics education to its societal environment, and mathematics
as a cultural phenomenon offers us a way to do this.
White (1959) gives us a promising start in his book The Evolution of Culture
in which he argues, as others do, that "the functions of culture are to relate
man to his environment on the one hand, and to relate man to man, on the
other" (p. 8). White, though, goes further, and divides the components of
culture into four categories:
- composed of beliefs, dependent on symbols,
philosophies; .
sociological - the customs, institutions, rules and patterns of
interpersonal behaviour;
sentimental - attitudes, feelings concerning people, behaviour;
technological - manufacture and use of tools and implements.
ideological
17
Moreover whilst showing that these four components are interrelated he

argues strongly that "the technological factor is the basic one; all others are
dependent upon it. Furthermore, the technological factor determines, in a
general way at least, the form and content of our social, philosophic, and
sentimental sectors" (p. 19).
There is the supporting argument from Washburn (1960) and others based
on recent archeological evidence, that man became man through the use and
development of tools and implements. According to Washburn, "the prevaling view held that man evolved nearly to his present structural state and then
discovered tools and the new ways of life that they made possible. Now it
appears that man-apes ... had already learned to make and use tools. It
follows that the structure of modern man must be the result of the change in
terms of natural selection that came with the tool-using way of life" (p. 11).
That White's social institutions of a people are dependent on their technology is clear from the earliest times. The processes of hunting or fishing,
farming or herding animals, all the processes of food production, for example, were and are not just technological processes they are also social
processes. The technologies of the heavy industrial period created many
social institutions, forged many social processes and developed many of the
social customs which are with us today.
Similarly with the ideological or philosophical factor. The technology of a
culture relates closely to its ideology, and changes in that technology will
create changes in the philosophy of the culture. "Large scale farming as a
capitalist venture, made possible today by machinery and tractors, carries
with it a philosophy quite different from that of farming with mules or oxen in
1850 as a way of life" (p. 23).
The sentimental factor is less obviously affected by technology according to
White, who feels that this is due to the fact that "sentiments themselves are
less significant in an explanation of cultural systems that social institutions and
systems of belief" (p. 24). Nevertheless he shows once again how changes in
technology can affect sentiments and suggests we consider in their light such
things as "attitudes towards chastity, euthenasia, slavery, divorce, industry,
frugality or waste, specific rules of warfare, and a thousand others" (p. 26).
We will certainly find White's ideas of 'sentiment' of value in Chapter 3.
Stenhouse, while preferring not to focus entirely on what he calls "material
culture" but rather to concentrate on "ideas, thoughts and feelings", nevertheless supports White's general stance by saying "Culture, then, must be
adapted to the demands of the material environment and kept in contact with
ideas preserved from the past" (p. 18). Clearly then, White's technology of a
culture, or cultural phenomenon, is an important bridge to the 'material
environment', and we should explore the idea further.
The idea of cultural technology must not of course be restricted to
machinery or implements like axes, spades or rope. Writers such as Bruner
(1964) have argued that man has developed by "linking himself with new,
external implementation systems rather than by any conspicuous change in
18
CHAPTER 1
morphology" (p. 1). The implementation systems are of three kinds, according to Bruner:
- amplifiers of human motor capacities
- amplifiers of sensory capacities
- amplifiers of human ratiocinative capacities
The crucial human development in his third category relates to symbols.
Humans are unique among animals in their ability and desire to create
symbols and symbol systems. The greatest of these, and the forerunner of
others was speech, but of more significance to us here is written language, and
of course, mathematical symbolisation. Mathematics is an example of an
"amplifier of human ratiocinative capacities" par excellence and as a cultural
phenomenon, it has an important 'technological' component, to use White's
terminology. Mathematics is essentially a 'symbolic technology'.
Bruner talks about it this way: "By an amplifying tool is meant a technological feature, be it soft or hard (in the language of computers) that permits
control by the individual of resources, prestige and deference within the
culture. An example of a middle-class cultural amplifier that operates to
increase the thought processes of those who employ it is the discipline loosely
referred to as 'mathematics'. To employ mathematical techniques requires
the cultivation of certain skills of reasoning, even certain styles of deploying
one's thought processes. If one were able to cultivate the strategies and styles
relevant to the employment of mathematics then that range of technology is
open to one's use. If one does not cultivate mathematical skills, the result is
'functional incompetence', and inability to use this kind of technique" (Cole
and Bruner, 1971, p. 872). However White's schema also offers us an
opportunity to explore the ideology, sentiment and sociology driven by this
symbolic technology. It is with the help of this schema therefore that I shall
try in Chapter 3 to focus on the values inherent in a mathematical education.
1.10. OVERVIEW
In the next chapter I propose to explore in more detail the technological

component of what I shall call mathematical culture, remembering always that
this phrase is for me a shorthand for 'a cultural view of mathematics' or
'mathematics, the cultural phenomenon'. I am not implying that the whole of
culture is mathematical nor that is should be. Perhaps the reader would
prefer to think of it as the mathematical sub-culture, or the mathematical
component of our culture. I am happy with either, provided they do not
coincide with Wilder's elitist view of the 'mathematicians' sub-culture', nor
the 'middle class' culture to which Bruner and Cole obliquely referred.
There are two challenging results of this analysis - the first is that mathema-
19
tics is a pan-cultural phenomenon: i.e. it exists in all cultures. The second

result is that the mathematics which is exemplified by Kline's Mathematics in
Western Culture is a particular variant of mathematics, developed through the
ages by various societies. I shall characterise it as 'Mathematics' with a capital
'M'.
In Chapter 3 I shall examine the non-technological components of Mathematical culture, which will suggest some ideas about the values in a Mathematical education - the ideological, sentimental and sociological components
of our Mathematical culture.
In Chapter 4 I begin the more detailed analysis of Mathematical education
from the cultural perspective. I call the chapter 'Mathematical Culture and
the Child', which results in the notion that Mathematical Enculturation, as it
is termed, is both 'object' and 'process'. Chapter 5 therefore deals with the
'objectifying' - namely the Mathematical curriculum - while Chapter 6
focusses on the enculturation process as it can and should happen in classrooms.
In the final chapter the attention necessarily moves towards those responsible for the whole Mathematical enculturation process, whom I have called the
Mathematical Enculturators. This group includes not just teachers but
teacher educators too, and others, and the focus of the chapter is on the
teacher education necessary to enable Mathematical Enculturation to become
a reality.
CHAPTER 2
ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVITIES AND MA THEMA TICAL

CULTURE
2.1. PERSPECTIVES FROM CROSS-CULTURAL STUDIES
In 1967 a book was published which stimulated a great deal of research and
development. TheNew Mathematics and an Old Culture (Gay and Cole,
1967) reported research undertaken in Liberia by an American team of
researchers who were intrigued about the difficulties experienced by the
young Kpelle pupils in handling the concepts and processes demanded by 'the
new mathematics' in their 'Westernised' schools. The motive grew to try to
understand more about the indigenous mathematics of the Kpelle - and to
this end the researchers devised many experiments and ran many interviews
to find out about the Kpelle's use of classifications, numbers, operations,
geometry, measurements, spatial language and logic.
The book makes fascinating reading and it shows convincingly, why the
Kpelle children found it so difficult to cope with 'Western' mathematics.
Among the statements indicating the kinds of problems faced by the Kpelle
are the following:
- the linguistic potential for classification does not guarantee that the process
will occur (p. 39)
- there are few occasions for counting beyond approximately 30 or 40 (p. 42)
- all arithmetic activity is tied to concrete situations (p. 50)
- the Kpelle name only those geometric shapes in common use in their
culture (p. 61)
- units of measure are, in general, not parts of an interrelated system but are
specific to the objects measured (p. 75)
- the Kpelle have in their language a negative, several conjunctive expressions, disjunctive expressions (both inclusive and exclusive) and several
expressions for implication. They can only express equivalence in a complicated way (p. 83).
A host of fascinating questions are provoked by such a list, particularly for
a skilled mathematics teacher who enjoys the challenge of a pedagogical
problem or two - how could one create meaningful learning experiences for
counting beyond 40? How could one 'move' a Kpelle child from the particularity of the measures used to a more generalised system? How could one best
develop the specialist language necessary to handle equivalence? etc.
At this level the questions are all about techniques for teaching - they are
all 'how to' questions - given a learning 'problem' how could one best solve
it? In a sense they are technical questions, based on the assumption that it is
20
ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVITIES
21
necessary and important to solve those problems. But at the level of culture
that assumption is itself worth questioning, as indeed are other assumptions
concerning both the 'stance' of the researchers towards their subjects, and
also the peculiarities of the cultural traditions of the researchers themselves.
As I said at the start of the chapter, that book stimulated a great deal of
research and development. We have seen studies of a similar nature undertaken with other people and cultures, such as in Papua New Guinea (Lancy,
1983 and Lean, 1986), with Aboriginal Australians (Harris, 1980) and with
the Amerindians, the indigeneous people of the Americas (see, for example,
Closs, 1986 and Pinxten, 1983). We now have several studies on specific
geometric aspects, on numbers, and on language complexities and growth,
and an increasing awareness of t~e value of anthropological data, and of the
many comparative and cross-cultural studies, has developed a wealth of
inter-cultural information. It is clear that much of this analytical research is
provoked by a genuine fascination for, and curiosity about, contrasts - for
example, what mathematics educator could not be intrigued by the task of
collating information on over 500 different counting systems in Papua New
Guinea as Lean (1986) is doing? Where do you start, what do you assume?
Perhaps you should first ask yourself how many different counting systems
you know yourself?
However we can begin to learn something else and perhaps something
more general from studies like these - we can learn about mathematics as a
cultural phenomenon from these contrasts. As George Kelly (1955) argues,
we grow cognitively by handling contrasts. Contrasts not only give us differences but they also make us recognise similarities, because two phenomena
must be similar in some way ill order for their differences to be recognised.
So what is interesting to me here about cultural studies like these is what
they tell us about the similarities between cultural groups, in terms of
mathematical activities and ideas. They tell us something of the cultural
phenomenon called mathematics, and they enable us to understand more
about the roots of mathematical thinking.
At first sight, for example, a study like Gay and Cole's seems to offer more
about differences than about similarities. The Kpelle culture seems to be one
in which mathematical thinking is almost non-existent, and the Kpelle live in a
society which seems relatively unaffected by mathematical ideas. Gay and
Cole themselves were from America - a culture that is strongly influenced by
mathematical thinking - and therefore we find in that book implications about
their culture. The language used in the book is also that of a culture which
sees itself as dominant: for instance constructions like 'not', 'few', 'tried to',
'only', in the quotations earlier all imply an unfavourable connotation. It is
clearly a book written by foreigners coming from a culture which sees itself to
be superior to the Kpelle culture in some way.
Nevertheless, by careful probing, and by ignoring the implied dominance of
the researchers' stance, we can find not just information about what the
22
CHAPTER 2
Kpelle can't do but about what they can do. We can begin to learn about the
strengths of Kpelle culture. By doing this with all such studies we can begin to
control the culturo-centrism which anyone suffers from when viewing other
cultures. Indeed we can start to see mathematical similarities between 'us'
and 'them'. We can begin to recognise the possibility that all cultures engage
in mathematical activity.
2.2. THE SEARCH FOR MATHEMATICAL SIMILARITIES
My first draft of this chapter covered what I considered to be the four key
areas of mathematics - number, measurement, geometry and language/logic.
I soon realised, and my critics confirmed, that I should have included more
aspects, but my problem was how to describe and label them. Also 'topics'
like these turned out not to be the best way to approach the similarities I was
after. Imagine, as a ridiculously extreme example, that one had chosen to
explore the spread of occurrence of an idea such as 'simultaneous linear
equations'. The idea has in fact appeared in two or three cultural groups, but
it is clearly not universal, nor would one necessarily expect it to be. It is also
dependent on many other ideas and is a product of a certain kind of algebraic
development. So not only is that topic a poor first approximation to a
candidate for cross-cultural analysis, it also fails to show why an approach
which examines topics is inappropriate. Mathematical ideas are essentially
products of various processes, and we could hypothesise that the character of
those products may well differ from one culture to another.
For example it is now well established that all human groups communicate,
and also that all cultures develop language. But there exist in the world many
different kinds of language, some of which can be written while some cannot.
Written languages are undoubtedly further along the evolutionary line than
are spoken languages but we can clearly understand that language is a product
developing from the need for, and the activity of, communicating. We also
have well-established journals like Anthropological Linguistics. But this state
of knowledge hasn't always existed - it has taken years of painstaking
research to establish.
I am therefore provoked to ask the parallel question "Do all cultures
develop mathematics?" and my search must then be for the activities and
processes which lead to the development of mathematics. What, in short, are
the mathematical activities equivalent to that of "communicating" which
developed language?l
I have chosen to present six activities for consideration in this chapter. I
don't believe that particular number is important, but what concerned me
more in making the choice was the way in which they conceptualised and
defined the field. The two most obvious candidates were counting and
measuring. Both are concerned with ideas relating to number but which are
23
rather different kinds of ideas. The discrete aspect of counting is its very
significant feature and contrasts markedly with the continuity of the phenomena onto which one imposes measure systems. It is not just the concept
that is different; the whole societal context for developing these two sets of
ideas seemed significantly different and therefore worth separating.
Spatial structuring has also been highly significant in developing mathematical ideas, and again I have chosen to separate out two very different types
of structuring which give rise to different kinds of geometric ideas. I call these
activities locating, where the emphasis is on the topographical and cartographical features of the environment, and designing, which concerns the conceptualisations of objects and artefacts, and which leads to the fundamental
idea of 'shape'.
Culture, though, doesn't just link us to our physical environment, as White
reminds us, and therefore we need to define some activities which are more
concerned with relating us to each other - linking us as individuals with our
social environment. The two which I shall argue are mathematically very
important for that purpose are playing and explaining. Playing is concerned
with social procedures and rules of performance, and also stimulates the "as
if" feature of imagined and hypothetical behaviour. Explaining is the final
activity to be described and is there to point to the various cognitive aspects of
enquiring into, and of conceptualising, the environment and of sharing those
conceptualisations.
All these activities are motivated by, and in their turn help to motivate,
some environmental need. All of them stimulate, and are stimulated by,
various cognitive processes, and I shall argue that all of them are significant,
both separately and in interaction, for the development of mathematical ideas
in any culture. Moreover all of them involve special kinds of language and
representation. They all help to develop the symbolic technology which we
call 'mathematics'.
Let us then examine each of these activities in detail, firstly to test the
conjecture that they represent a similarity between cultures, then to see what
other ideas they relate to, and finally to explore the differences which develop
as the environment changes. In particular we will need to analyse the effects
of acting in what is now an increasingly complex technologically-oriented
environment.
2.3. COUNTING
We begin with perhaps the most obvious activity suggesting mathematical

development, and one which is probably the best researched mathematical
activity in the cultural literature. Counting and the association of objects with
numbers clearly has a long history, and that history is becoming well documented. Menniger's (1969) book is the classic resource, and baseline analysis.
24
CHAPTER 2
The more recent anthropological and cultural studies, however, sensitise us to

some particular aspects of difference, which have significance for mathematics
education in all countries.
Firstly, the range of counting systems in existence has been, and still is,
enormous and is well exemplified by Zaslavsky's survey (1973) which shows
both the similarities and the differences between the counting systems in
Africa. For example, despite the word 'one' being very differently described
in the thousand or more languages of Africa, the names for two, three and
four show a remarkable degree of agreement across half the continent. "Two
is usually a form of Ii or di. The word for three contains the syllable ta or sa
and 'four' is generally a nasal consonant, like ne. 'Five' has a variety of terms;
frequently it is the word for hand" (p. 39). Linguists have apparently speculated that these similarities have their basis in the dispersion of Bantuspeaking people throughout the continent.
Zaslavsky also refers to different bases for the counting systems, to gesture
and finger counting and moreover, in a section on numbers and money, she
demonstrates that, when the social and environmental need exists, so-called
'primitive' peoples can develop ways of describing very large numbers.
Different sources quoted to her the use of cowrie shells to develop systems
capable of representing 24000, 64 000, and even in one system (the Igpo
people) 96 000 000. Once again the symbolic technology develops in response
to perceived needs, in the same way as does 'object' technology.
Other studies show us that counting occurs even in societal situations where
there is no need of very large numbers. For example Harris's (1980) survey of
Aboriginal mathematics shows that the 'one-two-many' caricature of the
primitive counting system so enjoyed by armchair culturocentrists is, like all
caricatures, both an exaggeration and also only part of the story. While
"almost all Australian languages contain only two or three cardinal numbers"
(p. 13) there is clearly much use made of body-counting - an extension, or
perhaps a forerunner, of finger counting - where the number names are
synonymous with the name for the part of the body pointed to. Harris quotes
an example from Howitt, writing in 1903, "By the above manner of counting
they are able to reckon up to thirty, with names for each place" (p. 698).
Menninger argues that these latter types of counting systems represent a
phase in the historical development of number, and that other societies have
progressed beyond that primitive stage. That may well be a correct assertion,
from an historical analysis, but when looked at cross-culturally one feels that
is misses the point. Harris says: "Where Western mathematics, in keeping
with the Western European world view, emphasises many calculations with
large numbers the Aborigines have always been intimately concerned with
individuals and small numbers" (p. 14). Necessarily so, one might add, and
indeed that concern is reflected in a "richness" of language for small number.
She quotes Stokes' work on one of the Australian languages, Anindilyakwa,
25
showing that in contrast with the English, and relatively primitive, distinction
between singular and plural, Anindilyakwa classified into four categories:
Singular - one
Dual- two
Trial - three
Plural - four or more
Moreover "subject, verb and object all repeat the details of number"
(Stokes, 1976, p. 3). This level of detail is complemented in other Australian
languages by rich constructions for describing intra-family relationships, once
again in contrast with the relatively primitive English terms (e.g. where a
mother's brother and a father's brother have the same 'name' - uncle). This
same 'grammatical number' phenomenon is also present in virtually all Papua
New Guinea languages (Lean, personal communication).
Another aspect of interest is that some card games played by the Aboriginals (e.g. kuns) require a sophisticated knowledge about number combinations. It appears therefore that where there is less environmental need for
large numbers or even for the 'infinite', there may be more use made of small
finite numbers as well as of 'combinatorical' thinking about numbers. As
Denny (1986) says when discussing the Inuit and the Ojibway, two predominantly hunting groups: "In the case of counting, enumeration serves as a way
of apprehending objects which cannot be perceptually or conceptually identified. Such conditions rarely arise for hunters, since their relatively unchanging environment and small number of man-made artifacts will normally allow
things to be perceived and conceptualised as individual objects. Therefore,
occasions for counting are few and mostly restricted to lower numbers." (pp.
178-9).
One of the most extensive surveys of counting systems was carried out in
Papua New Guinea, and first reported in Lancy (1978), and also in Lancy
(1983). Drawing on the various resources of the two Universities there, he
was able to analyse 225 counting systems into the following four types:
Type
I - a body parts tally system with the number of body parts varying
from 12 to 68;
Type II - a tally system using counters, like sticks. The base number is
usually between 2 and 5;
Type III - mixed bases of 5 and 20 using compound number names like
"two hands and a foot" to mean 15;
Type IV - base 10 system with several discrete, rather than compound
number names.
This work is being continued by Glen Lean at the University of Technology,
26
CHAPTER 2
and the number of counting systems he has now documented is over 500. 2
Studies like these surely convince us, if we needed convincing of it, that
there are not just two systems of numbers - 'civilised' and 'primitive' - as used
to be the conventional wisdom, but a rich variety of systems, varying in line
with the environmental need, both physical and social. Lancy, for example,
refers to Type IV and Type II systems being used in different circumstances
by the same people, and of course this exists in other cultures as well. In
English, for example, we can find combinations of ideas with many 'quantifiers' such as 'each', 'some', 'all', 'none', 'every', 'many', 'few', which all refer
to events. We can still find specialised number-words, mostly for two, such as
'pair', "couple', 'twin', 'duet', 'brace', etc. and we can then begin to understand different stages of counting development, of using number-words as
qualifiers, e.g. 'a brace of pheasant' which is surely more specialised than 'two
pheasants'. Both of these forms precede the use of 'two' as a noun or indeed
as an object of concern in itself. We are all thoroughly familiar with the
practice of using all kinds of number 'systems' in our daily lives.
Menninger's classic work Number Words and Number Symbols supports
our thinking in this field, providing us with a wealth of data and analysis which
leaves us in no doubt of the universality of counting and of number ideas.
Data from every continent now exist and just as we can appreciate the
universality of 'communicating' and of 'language' so too can we see this for
'counting' and for 'numbers'. We can also see that with the growth in sizes of
numbers in the community and with the growing complexity of societies,
more and more complex number systems have evolved. It is clearly no
accident that nomadic Aboriginal groups have developed a system for handling their small numbers in a subtle way nor that, for example, the development of a large society such as China's necessitated much growth in number
recording and calculating methods (see for example, Ronan, 1981). We can
understand the development of statistical recording in the same light, of
course.
Moreover as the development of systems of numbers has grown so the
methods of symbolising and documenting numbers have had to become more
sophisticated. Numbers are recorded in many different ways in different
societies, for example with notches being cut, strokes made with chalk,
hieroglyphs, burnt marks on wood, abacuses, beads, and perhaps most
intriguing of all, knots in string. The best example of this last method of
symbolisation is the quipu, a knot system used by the Incas, and well
documented by the Aschers (1981). The Incas had no written language
system, but with such a highly developed society as theirs, there was a clear
need for very careful and systematic accounting and recording. The quipu was
the method used and some idea of the sophistication of this method is very
well conveyed by the Aschers' book. 3
Another aspect of interest picked out by Lancy (1938) focusses on the need
27
for accuracy. He states: "our ethnographic studies suggest that there is some
interinformant and situational variation in the use of counting. Apparently
not one of the Papua New Guinea counting systems has the sort of rigid
characteristics associated in our minds with number and counting" (p. 103).
Counting, which is so closely related to trade, wealth, employment, property,
and status in a society, is therefore strongly related to the social values in that
group, and accuracy is part of that relationship. I am reminded of a pupil who
wrote 0.7 x 0.7 = 4.9 and who, when shown the correct answer of 0.49,
remarked "It's almost right". It certainly is, but our so-called 'advanced'
culture is not interested in 'almost' except in very particular and precisely
defined (sic) situations! We shall see more of this issue in the section on
"measuring" later.
Gay and Cole bring another aspect to our attention, namely what can be
counted in Kpelle culture, and they sensitise us to their taboos associated with
number, and to the magical or mysterious attributes given to certain numbers
by a people. For the Kpelle it is not safe to count certain things - for example,
"it is not proper to count chickens or other domestic animals aloud, for it is
believed that some harm will befall them" (p. 41). Zaslavsky (1973) confirms
the widespread concern across Africa about the dangers of counting. She also
hints at a very interesting symbolic development: taboos are not just quaint or
exotic ideas, they may well have contributed to the actual development of
number use by provoking the development of indirect ways of counting. If
one is not permitted to count objects or people directly then one can use
sticks or pebbles to represent the objects, and then count those. 4
We may tend to consider some of these ideas of taboos as being faintly
amusing of course, until we remember the superstitions many people have in
so-called 'modern' societies about the number thirteen or the number seven.
Also we know the possible 'dangers' accruing to the demands by officers of
our governments who wish to know exactly how much we earned in a year, or
exactly how big our, house is! Numerical information is potentially very
powerful information and although 'formally' we may have no fear of counting, nor any actual taboos about numbers, it can still be a source of some
anxiety. It depends on the social institutions and on the importance of
number in our societies. Numerology and the mystical fascination with
numbers has been an important feature of many societies and, linking as it
does with astrology, religion, prediction and beliefs, it helps us perhaps to
understand more about the explanatory power of mathematics through numbers. We should not treat ideas like these lightly if we are trying to understand
mathematics as cultural product. 5
In summary then, counting, which we may perhaps have thought to be an
important but relatively simple activity, is shown by this cultural perspective
to involve many aspects, with subtle variations in the type of language and
representational forms used to communicate the products of counting. It is an
28
CHAPTER 2
activity relating firmly to environmental needs, and is subject to various social

pressures. It is stimulated by, and in turn affects, the cognitive processes of
classifying and pattern-seeking, and in our search for the cultural 'universals'
of mathematics it clearly offers many ideas.
2.4. LOCATING
I choose to place this activity next, not to satisfy any 'mathematical' ordering
principle but because it seemed necessary to demonstrate the significance of
the spatial environment for the development of mathematical ideas early on
in the search for universals. It could even be that the demands of navigating
on land on sea, of 'knowing' one's home area well, and of searching for food
are so basic that a case could well be made for putting this activity before that
of counting. Whatever one feels about that argument, there can be no
doubting the universality of this activity.
As might be expected all societies have developed relatively more- and
less-sophisticated ways to code and symbolise their spatial environment. In
particular different societies in very different geographical locations find different
aspects to be of significance. For example, in some of the Papua New Guinea
languages in the Highlands area, which are very mountainous, there are words
for different degrees of steepness of slopes, but no easy ways to describe the idea
of 'horizontal'. The Islanders don't have that difficulty of course.
Surprisingly, in cultural studies of mathematical ideas, locating has received relatively less attention than counting, and as a result it is less well
documented. Nevertheless we can find important and interesting data, not
only to substantiate the claim of 'universality' but also to indicate the significance of locating for mathematical development. This time of course the ideas
relate predominantly to geometrical notions, although, as we shall see in the
section on 'designing, this activity only provides us with some of the geometrical notions which exist in all cultures. It provides us with the kinds of ideas
characterised by Freudenthal (1984) as Topographical.
A study which looks in detail at a particular culture's way of conceptualising space and which gives us a foundation for this section is Pinxten's work
with the Navajos of Northern America (Pinxten, van Dooren and Harvey,
1983). This comprehensive study attempts to set out the Navajo philosophy
and phenomenology of space, and provides us with some fascinating notions.
Pinxten uses this study to illustrate an 'analytical tool' which he has
developed for studying spatial ideas in different cultural contexts, called the
Universal Frame of Reference (UFOR). It is a thesaurus of spatial notions
and provides a checklist with which any culture's spatial concepts can be
elaborated. It refers to three 'levels' of space:
- physical space, or object space
- sociogeographical space,
- cosmological space.
29
The second of these levels seems to be the most relevant for our analysis here,
and we can see from the following list of entries just how significant the spatial
world is from the prespective of mathematical ideas, not just in terms of
obvious geometric notions, but also through ideas of direction, order, finiteness, etc. which relate strongly to our imagery of numbers and counting.
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
211
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
221
222
Near, separate, contiguous

Part/whole
Bordering, bounding
Overlapping
Internal/external; central/peripheral
Open/closed
Converging/diverging
Volume ness/plane ness
Preceding/following (in front of, in
back of)
Deep, far (dimension of depth)
Distant (metric)
Upon/under; abovelbelow
Vertical, upright (dimension)
High/deep (metric)
Lateral; next to
Left/right
Horizontal (dimension)
Wide, broad (metric)
Cardinal points, cardinal directions
223
224
225
226
227
228
229
230
231
232
233
240
241
242
243
244
245
Coordinate systems
Multidimensionally extended (metric)
Geometric notions
Geometrically linear, straight
Geometrically pointing, panillel, being
an angle
Geoso: surface, volume in
sociogeographical space
Map, scale
Resting; moving
Being (on) a path; orienting
Navigating
Having a direction in movement
Global characteristics of
sociogeographic space
Absolute/relative
Finite/infinite
Bounded/unbounded
Continuous/discontinuous
Homogenous/heterogeneous
(The categories for the other two spatial levels of UFOR are similar to these.)
Pinxten argues for the universality of spatial referents this way: "All
cultures have their specific ways of representing the world. Yet, all of them
refer to the same sun, moon or earth 'out there' and all do this by means of
the same basic 'tools' to gather knowledge and understanding, that is, by
manipulating matter with the hands, by looking at the world through identical
eyes, by moving around a uniformly structural body in an identical way (e.g.
walking forwards and backwards, turning in a horizontal plane), and so on"
(p. 45). Having established his similarities Pinxten then identifies for us some
important differences between what he calls 'Western' space and Navajo
space:
1. Although there are basic notions in Navajo space (he calls them move-
ment, volumeness/planeness, dimensions) the way that spatial ideas are

organised appears not to be hierarchical, as in the Western view.
2. Although the part/whole distinction plays a central role in Western thinking, it does not for the Navajos who "tend to speak of the world in terms of
process, event and fluxes, rather than parts and wholes or clearly distinguishable static rea lites" (p. 161).
30
CHAPTER 2
3. Navajo space is essentially dynamic rather than static. Whereas we will

separate out objects and consider their relationships to each other, for the
Navajo "everything moves", although the terrestial time-scale involved
may not always permit us to see the movement.
Clearly Pinxten and his colleagues have unearthed a complex spatial system
with many details of interest to us. In particular, he reveals the object versus
process issue in the classification of space, an issue which goes back at least to
the early Greek period in 'Western' culture. The Democritean view of space
which has dominated 'Western' thought from that time is the 'object' view
whereas the Heraclitean view is much more akin to that of the Navajos. It was
Heraclitus who pointed out that you can never step into the same river twice,
an opinion which one intuitively feels would be very acceptable to the
Navajos.
What else can we learn about 'locating' from studies on other continents?
The Aborigines' ability to find their way in what to anyone else would be a
featureless landscape has been part of Australian folklore for many years.
When asked by an anthropologist what they do if they get lost, some
Aborigines answered "We go home". They had no concept of getting lost!
Lewis's (1976) fascinating study of their route-finding and spatial orientation
shows us two aspects of significance here. Firstly there was no doubt that the
people he studied carried an internalised compass system in their heads - as
one indigenous informant pointed out "Aborigines knew north, south, east
and west before the white man's compass" (p. 265). They could talk about
this system and their use of it - its relationship to the sun, and to the
temperature of the wind - and their languages reflect this ability. The intimate
relationships between seasons, directions, temperature, and sun is wellillustrated by the calendar in figure 1 (from Harris, 1984, p. 11).
More significant, however, for the specific ideas of locating, was their
intricate knowledge of the landscape in relation to their myths, and to their
history within that landscape. Lewis tells us "The Pintupi sang the Dreamings
of every rock outcrop, creek-bed or plain, hour after hour-;-all day as we drove
through their 'country' .... Constant reference was made, in every conceivable context, to the network of Dreaming tracks that criss-crossed the land,
testifying, one would imagine, to the survival value to the nomad of this lore"
(p. 276). Therefore not only was the topographical landscape known in detail,
it was also totally saturated with stories and knowledge of historical and
mythical fact.
Earlier, Lewis (1972) had done a very detailed study of the locating
methods used by Polynesian navigators on long sea journeys, and as well as
finding the expected use of stars he also uncovered their intimate topographical knowledge of the sea - its swells, wave-patterns, and their intersections.
Their ability to relate this knowledge to the position of islands was one key to
their survival, and his account really demonstrates better than any other
example the fact that environmental need stimulates intellectual knowledge.
31
Fig. 1
Interestingly they also developed maps made of stone and wood to symbolise
and represent their knowledge. These are not merely scaled down islands, for
example, but also involve representing the swells and wave patterns in
specially coded ways.
Navigation has clearly been a powerful influence on the development of
spatial recording systems in all continents, requiring as it does the ability to
document information about a situation which may be invisible to the observer at the time. This may happen, for example, when wishing to travel long
distances by land, or when out of sight of the land when travelling by sea, or
when instructing young navigators. It is therefore no surprise to learn how
significant the sun, the wind and the stars were to early navigators everywhere
and still are to those today who do not use technological aids. The study of the
32
CHAPTER 2
heavens was not just provoked by their wonder and beauty, there was also a
highly practical significance to this work.
The sun has of course been of particular importance for locating, both
informally and formally. I recall being very surprised, and feeling very
disoriented, when in the Southern Hemisphere I discovered that the shadows
'went the other way'. More formally, though, the positions of sunrise and
sunset have always had a mystical significance for humans. Christian churches
are oriented towards the 'East' i.e. in the direction of sunrise, as a legacy from
former 'Pagan' traditions - indeed there are often more accurate orientations
than just 'eastwards'. Churches named after Saints were often built to face
sunrise on the Saint's day in the year in which they were begun. The pyramids
in Egypt, however, were oriented according to the points of the compass, as
are many other ancient buildings. The old city of Peking was in fact oriented
to magnetic North/South. Furthermore, although there has long been controversy over the meaning of monuments, stone circles and menhirs, such as
Stonehenge, the field of astro-archeology still has many proponents. 6
In Chinese culture the study of geomancy was very sophisticated and was
considered to be a highly significant form of knowledge. Ronan (1986), with
Needham, defines it as being "the art of adapting residences of the living and
tombs for the dead so as to co-operate and harmonise with the local currents
of the cosmic breath" (p. 6). He also says, a few sentences later, "The history
of the magnetic compass is only understandable in the context of this system
of ideas, for this is the matrix in which it was generated". He gives a
remarkably detailed account of a geomantic compass, containing some 24
concentric rings surrounding the compass needle, each of these rings containing particular sets of information such as compass points, star directions and
astrological determinants.
The impact of the magnetic compass on locating processes was vast of
course, but the relationship with geomancy, which connects once again with
prediction, divination and religion is important. Indeed the whole historical
development of technological aids for 'locating' could make a fascinating
mathematical chapter on its own. The knotted string of the Kamal, the Jacob
Staff, the astrolabe, the compass, sun-dials and all the surveyor's equipment,
contain within them the bases of many of the geometric ideas with which we
are familiar. A different kind of dimension, however, is offered to us by the
geomancers' compass, which reveals the intricacy with which physical and
'cosmic' phenomena have been and continue to be intertwined. It reminds us
that we must take care not to evaluate ideas solely from the perspective of our
'scientific' tradition. Yet even from that perspective Ronan and Needham say
"although geomancy itself was always a pseudo-science, it was nevertheless
the true mother of our knowledge of terrestial magnetism, just as astrology
was of astronomy and alchemy of chemistry" (p. 36).
Anthropological writings inform us about the orientation and locating
phenomena on all continents and as well as noting the similarities, we can
33
certainly recognise differences between cultures as a result of different environmental and cultural pressures. For example, those of us who live in
complex and largely urban societies do seem to have a desire for precise
location, which is manifested in a set of prepositions, e.g. in, on, behind,
under. We use these together with a variety of systems for spatial location
(compass directions, angles, distances, coordinates, city blocks, etc.). However, for the Kpelle, their location names "function as dependent nouns" for example I would say "in the house" where the Kpelle translation would be
"the underneath part of the house". Gay and Cole conclude that "these terms
form a useful flexible body of function words of definite geometrical significance" (p. 60) and we can see that as with the language of counting, the
language of locating has variety too. Gay and Cole's "dependent nouns" are
rather like the specialised number names mentioned a few pages ago, which
were developed in accordance with a particular need demanded by certain
kinds of physical and social environment.
Littlejohn (1963) too reports on the rich spatial meanings understood by
the Temne people of Sierra Leone. Among other things he says this:
For us the cardinal points are co-ordinates for establishing location. The Temne never use them
this way, though should the necessity arise they will use one of them to indicate the general
direction in which a place lies. Their cardinal points contain meanings which qualify activities and
events in various ways .... East and West are not only opposite directions in the operation of
intellect but existential contraries with the East the life-sustaining direction, West the destructive
one .... Since East is "where you take direction from" the word for North is that for 'Ieff and
the word for South is that for 'right'. (pp. 9-10).
In trying to understand mathematics as a cultural phenomenon we must

take care not to decontextualise the ideas too rapidly. We are reminded by
such studies of the deep human values of existense and the meaning of life
which fuel the construction of knowledge. Those of us living in highly
technologically-oriented societies can so easily forget the bask human needs
of satisfying the coexistences of mind, body, soul and environment. We have
much to learn from the different perspectives of other cultures.
Nevertheless despite the differences which we have seen at all levels of
knowledge, there can be no doubting the universality of the activity of
locating. We can begin to understand how the actual features of the spatial
environment affect the language and representation of locating as does the
societal need for consistency and precision.
Maps are scaled-down models of the environment and, once more, the
anthropological and cultural data available show us that the symbolising of
the spatial environment is culturally specialised. There are different ways of
describing and representing locations, but through the similarities of language
and maps we can see the roots of many of our geometric ideas. It is no
accident that on paper, North is up, 'horizontal' means across the page and
'vertical' means straight down it. It is no accident that we use two and three
dimensional axis systems, and it is no accident either that much of the
34
CHAPTER 2
informal language and imagery of geometry is taken from perambulations and

locations in large scale space, e.g. 'turn through 90 degrees', 'a straight line
between two points', 'height of a triangle', 'rotate about a point', 'reflection in
a plane'. Many familiar geometrical ideas have developed, and continue to
develop, from the universal activity of locating.
2.5. MEASURING
Measuring is the third 'universal' and significant activity for the development
of mathematical ideas, and is concerned with comparing, with ordering, and
with quantifying qualities which are of value and importance. All cultures
recognise the importance of certain things but once again, all cultures do not
value the same things to the same extent. Much depends on the local
environment and the needs which it provokes.
Typically it is the immediate local environment which furnishes the qualities to be measured as well as the units of measurement. For example, the
human b(')dy was probably the first measuring device to have been exploited
by all cultures. We have the ell (six hands' breadths or 24 fingers), the cubit,
the digit (or finger width), the foot, the handspan, the pace and the fathom
(distance that the two arms can fathom), all of which are convenient measures
of length. These or their counterparts exist in most societies.
However, we must be very careful when looking cross-culturally not to be
blinkered by our own measurement systems. For instance several studies have
shown that in some cultures not only do similar independent units to ours not
exist, the particular quality of interest to us may not be quantified at all. For
example, in Papua New Guinea, Jones (1974) collected data from several
informants about spatial quantities and measures including statements like
these:
"The local unit of distance is a day's travel
which is not very precise."
"It could be said (that two gardens are equal in
area) but it would always be debated."
(Comparing volume of rock with volume of water)
"This kind of comparison doesn't exist, there
being no reason for it".
Harris' similar survey among the Aboriginal groups also located plenty of
evidence like those above:
"No word for volume: no local units (p. 56).
There were others, though, which were equally revealing of other skills or
needs:
35
"People 'measure' via a mental picture or by

'eye'. There's hardly anyone here who can't
buy a dress for a relative by simply looking
at the dress - they nearly always buy the
correct size" (p. 52).
(Concerning 'area') "Small areas were equated
with camp. Each man needs his own camp or
area - a space in relation to other families"
(p. 53).
One of my own informants (Bishop, 1979) told me that in his village in
Papua New Guinea, when there were disputes about areas of gardens the
measure used was that of adding the length and the width (the gardens were
roughly rectangular). For him, to multiply these was the 'white man's system'
which he had learnt at school, but at home he would always add! As we saw
earlier it is easy to dismiss such ideas as quaint, and faintly amusing, but
provided the gardens are approximately the same shape then adding the
length to the width gives a perfectly acceptable measure of area, for comparative purposes.
Of course this implies that in general before developing units for measuring, there is a clear cultural need for the language to be able to express
qualities in some comparative and also ordered manner. Measuring relates to
ideas like 'more than' and 'less than' since the need for measuring only occurs
if phenomena are to be compared. As one of Jones's informants pointed out
above, if there is no reason to compare the volume of water with the volume
of rock it is unlikely that the language will contain the words and structure to
make that comparison.
In the section on 'counting' we referred to the precise and important
quantifiers used in the language of mathematics, and here in this section we
can see the development of what we might call comparative quantifiers heaviest, longer, faster, slowest, etc. Certainly the Kpelle have a linguistic
construction enabling comparison to be made, though it was clearly not an
easy matter. Gay and Cole also tell us that there was a "tendency to prefer the
concept 'greater than' to the concept 'less than' " (p. 49). This finding was
supported by Jones (1982) with Papua New Guinea children who acquired the
correct use of 'more' before 'less' although they experienced great difficulty
with both terms, when they were used in a mathematical context. Nevertheless from these data it seems that everyone seems to value more of something
rather than less of it!
Comparing more than two or three objects develops another idea, that of
ordering. Clearly estimating 'by eye' is a world-wide non-verbal technique for
putting objects in order, but as the quality grows in significance and the
number of objects increases, so the language develops both the number words
36
CHAPTER 2
of order (first, second, third, etc.) and the 'objectification' of the quality (e.g.
from 'heavy' to 'heaviest' to 'weight'). The 'adjectival' words predate the
nouns.
Regarding the development of units, and systems of units, there is a clear
progression, with the main idea being that of the stronger the environmental
and social need the more detailed, systematic and accurate the measure.
Littlejohn (1963) reporting on the spatial ideas of the Temne, says about
distances:
Ordinary Temne space is neither arithmetically measured nor geometrically analysed. The main
unit for denoting medium-long distances is angurula, which means both 'the interval between any
two villages' and 'waste-land'. As villages are not evenly spaced this is not so much a measure
applied to space as a meaning proffered by the physiognomy of Temne landscape as they have
appropriated it. For longer distances estimates are used like 'a day's journey' and, for shorter
distances, the earshot. Approaching a village one places one's distance from it by the noises one
hears, particularly that of rice being pounded, then that of human voices. For short lengths the
main unit is anfatim, which is the outstreched arms of any adult man. (p. 4).
Gay and Cole refer to the unit called 'Kopi', a cup, much used for
measuring rice, and it was clear from their study how skilled the Kpelle were
in using this measure. For example, in comparison with the American
researchers they were much better at estimating how many cupfuls of rice
were in a certain container. They also give examples to show how units can
combine - one informant said that a bucket contains 24 cups of rice and the
tin (another 'standard') contains 44 cups of rice - very close to the actual
arithmetical measures. Rice for the Kpelle is a very important commodity,
hence the internal coherence and the complexity of measures associated with
it.
Harris also presents data relating to a system of measurement based on
local artifacts (local here meaning "immediately available" rather than belonging to the indigenous culture). She quotes one informant talking about
measuring weights:
" 'fruits' (the name for the unit!)
When mining - large fruit tins (5 lb) used by individuals.
14 fruits = 1 bag
18 fruits = 1 x 44 gall drum of mineral" (p. 53).
Zaslavsky refers us once again to body-measures used for length (the
Ganda of Uganda refer to the mukono, the same as cubit, the distance from
the elbow to the tip of the outstretched middle finger), but also to a basket
holding about ten pounds, a package of coffee beans, and a bundle of sweet
potatoes, all 'standard' measures to the local people, but with that element of
inaccuracy which allows for commercial negotiation! She quotes the old
Ethiopian proverb "Measure ten times, tear the cloth once".
Zaslavsky also documents the wide variety of items used as currency in
37
Africa (in the index to her book there is no reference to 'Money' it simply says
"see Currency"). Under 'currency' she lists:
beads
brass rod
cloth
coins
guns and alcohol
hoes
iron bars
ivory discs
livestock
manillas
rupees
salt
other
See also Cowrie shell currency; Gold
Convenience and rarity value combine to provide the measures of 'economic value' which we call currency. One item not mentioned on her list is
'people' although judging by the barbaric way they were treated in the
slave-trade perhaps they were rarely thought of as 'people'. No doubt the
slave owners conceptualised them in the same category as cattle. In any event
they were also, however distasteful it seems to us today, merely treated as
currency - a measure of economic worth.
Clearly measuring is deeply embedded in economic and commercial life.
As well as involving numerical features therefore it undoubtedly has a strong
social aspect, as we have already seen.
Gay and Cole document another nice illustration whereby "the cup the
trader uses to buy rice has the bottom rounded out by long and careful
pounding, but the cup he uses to to sell rice does not have the rounded
bottom. This is the source of his profit" (p. 64). Leach (1973) makes a crucial
observation on this aspect of measuring as follows "It is a peculiarity of
scientific society that an ideal scale should be one which is unambiguous and
exact; under other conditions people have preferred scales which were easy to
use. Where the criterion of a good scale is its convenience, too much precision
may even be a nuisance" (p. 139).
So accuracy is not necessarily to be valued highly, it depends on the
purpose of measuring - for those of us living in a more mathematically
oriented culture the need of science to have greater and greater accuracy in
measurement seems to have filtered out into the general culture. The danger
for us is that we overgeneralise this need to measure accurately - as Eshiwani
(1979) comments "It is one of the weaknesses of people brought up in a
mathematical/scientific tradition that they tend to suppose that which they
cannot easily quantify or measure to be insignificant. Nothing could of course
be further from the truth" (p. 35).
We take accurate measurement in our society so much for granted that
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"inaccuracies" and "inconsistencies" will worry us. It is left to anthropologists to point out our enculturation which makes us see other approaches as
different or even as "wrong". Biersack (1978) working with the Paiela - a
Highland people in Papua New Guinea - describes the way they understand
spatial phenomena and she concludes "it means that size (for them) would be
like value (for us) not absolute or gauged by objective measures but relative,
dependent upon the subjective factors of evaluation and scale of comparison" .
Perhaps, in fact, our views have become distorted. Perhaps it is the
development of more and more accurate measures which have somehow
enlarged the value we place on qualities. Consider time as an example. The
Kpelle have words for 'day', 'week', 'month' and 'year', though as Gay and
Cole explain "All show the character of the time rather than the passage of a
definite amount of time. [The adjectival aspect again? AJB] The day is the
time of light, when the sun is up .... The week is the time leading up to a
market day" (p. 71). There is no interrelated system of units, but rather the
time words relate to events or social phenomena of significance. Zaslavsky
supports this view within African society generally and also reports the
presence of variously measured weeks - "the market economy is linked to a
calendrical week of three, four, five, six, seven or eight days" (p. 64). There is
clearly not felt the need for the kind of accuracy of measure offered by today's
sophisticated digital watches - but then one can ask, do the wearers of these
watches actually require that degree of accuracy? The market economy is
linked to another kind of time-scale - a more natural, living world time-scale,
where other values have to be taken into account.
When I asked my Papua New Guinea informant about the areas of the
gardens in his village, I drew two rectangles (Figure 2) and asked him, if these
were gardens, which he would prefer to own? "It depends on many things" he
said "the soil, the shade, whether it drains well ... " It was clear that my
so-called mathematical education had made me look only at the relationship
between the numerical sizes of the two gardens. For him, the size of the
garden was in many ways its least important feature.
2.6. DESIGNING
In the first chapter I referred to the idea of technology and its role in shaping
the environment. It is important therefore to describe a widespread activity
which epitomises this idea, and I have chosen to call it 'designing'. Where the
'locating' activities refer to positioning oneself and other objects within the
spatial environment, the activities of designing concern the 'manufactured'
objects, artifacts and technology which all cultures create for their home life,
for trade, for adornment, for warfare, for games and for religious purposes.
In addition designing can apply to the spatial environment itself, for example
to houses, villages, gardens, fields, roads, and even towns.
39
Fig. 2
The essence of designing is transforming a part of nature, i.e. taking some

natural phenomenon, be it wood, clay or ground, and fashioning it into
something else - perhaps a carved ornament, a cooking pot or a garden.
Designing involves imposing a particular structure on nature. When one is
walking and finds a branch of a tree on the path, one can remove the
unnecessary parts, cut it to a convenient length and make a walking stick.
Walking sticks are all different, yet they are similar. One has a 'design' in
mind which one is able to impose on that branch. Or one might cut it another
way, remove other parts, take it home, smooth off some rough parts and stain
it, because we think it will look attractive on a table, as an objet d'art.
Designing involves imagining nature without the 'unnecessary' parts, and
perhaps even emphasising some aspects more than others. To a great extent,
then, designing concerns abstracting a shape from the natural environment.
That is why I have chosen to focus (for mathematical purposes) on 'designing'
rather than on 'making'. The actual finished product is not important mathematically, whereas it may be in the development of scientific ideas, where one
is often concerned with the actual properties of matter. What is important for
us in mathematics education is the plan, the structure, the imagined shape,
the perceived spatial relationship between object and purpose, the abstracted
form and the abstracting process.
All cultures design but, as might be expected, what they design differs and
the sheer amount of designed forms also differs markedly from one culture to
40
CHAPTER 2
another. What is designed depends on the perceived need, e.g. for farming,
protection or adornment, and also on the available material. So carving, both
utilitarion and ornamental, occurs in regions where wood or stone are
plentiful, whilst weaving and plaiting require wool, fibre, grasses, reeds etc.
Nevertheless, houses have certain similarities the world over, be they igloos,
mud huts, grass on wood, or bricked and tiled. Amongst other things, they
are usually either circular or rectangular, sometimes square. Spoons usually
consist of a circular hollowed-out part and a straight handle, pots are usually
circular, spears are straight.
The designing of objects offers the possibility of imagined form, shape and
pattern in the environment. This is not to say of course that form, shape and
pattern don't occur in the natural environment but that it is when shapes are
drawn, made, and designed that the form itself becomes the focus of attention. Consider the representation of nature rather than the design of implements. For example, whether we are discussing cave paintings of animals,
wood carvings of humans, or Eskimo rock carvings of sea mammals, it is clear
that the designer has chosen to emphasise some features and to ignore others.
The idea of form or shape is developed by designing, and by representing.
The variety and sheer number of designed forms is overwhelming even with
relatively 'natural' and rural societies. It has often been remarked that it is
through being a tool-maker that man has developed in ways that no other
animal has (see Bruner, 1964). It was this thought that led White to argue that
it is man's technological development which has "driven" the social, philosophic and sentimental aspects of culture. The idea has been taken further by
Oswalt (1976) who had developed the notion of "techno-units" by which one
can compare cultures and societies in terms of the variety and number of
"subsistants" (tools, weapons, etc.) that they have designed, While not
wanting to go too far down Oswalt's particular research route, it is extremely
interesting to me that he is implicitly focussing on the designing of objects
rather than merely the making of them. Oswalt coins the words "mental
template" to describe what I have been referring to as the form, the shape
and the structure. For example, Oswalt says: "The idea of blade as a
structural entity is far more important than the particular material used to
produce the blade" and "Thus, structure or form, not material or production
technique, assumes the greatest importance in attempting to make broadscale
comparisons of technology on a cross-cultural basis" (p. 37).
This 'mental template' is somehow represented by the designed object, and
in an interesting wayan object serves as the representation of the design by
which other objects can be constructed. In particular we know that imitation
and copying are the major ways in which designed forms are preserved. Man
has of course developed other ways to represent designs, notably by drawing
in the sand, or by constructing models, or later by drawing on paper and on
electronic screens. All of these developments have been created by the need
to consider aspects of the designed form without having actually to make the
41
object. This need is of course greatest when designing very large-scale

'objects' such as agricultural land, gardens, obelisks and monuments, but it
will also be important if the material from which the object is to be made is
expensive or rare, or both.7 It is easy to see how needs such as these have
created a demand for important mathematical ideas concerning shape, size,
scale, measure, and many other geometric concepts.
Other researchers have also been struck by the geometric and mathematical potential of many of the designed forms to be found in all cultures (see for
example, Pinxten, 1983). Zaslavsky (1973) also documents the rich geometric
tradition in African societies which come from decorative designs. She cite3 as
examples the brass weights of the Asante, the patterns on dress cloths in East
Africa, the interlacing patterns from weaving and fish nets in Kuba art, and
Benin artwork generally. She also describes the architecture of the African
peoples, showing the typical shapes of houses to be circular or rectangular,
with more sophisticated designs based on those.
Gay and Cole substantiate this with the fact that the Kpelle have a
developed technology for making their houses with ways of constructing right
angles, and circles. "They know that if the opposite sides of a quadrilateral
are of equal length and if the diagonals are also of equal length, the resulting
figure will be a rectangle" (p. 61). They also add that "They do not verba lise
these rules but they know the procedure".
The right-angle 'shape' and the right-angled triangle is a familiar shape in
several cultures and of course in China there were the by-now famous
'Chinese' solutions to the 'Pythagorean' theorem (see Ronan, 1981). The use
of string 'triangles' to measure right angles was an interesting and powerful
application of this knowledge. Circles also play a large part in symbolic
representations, as in the mandalas, those beautiful contemplative drawings
from the Indian subcontinent. Squares, triangles, pentagons, pentagrams,
heptagons, octogons, have indeed all played a symbolic role in helping man to
imagine relationships between phenomena.
Gerdes in several papers (see for example, Gerdes, 1986) gives us examples
of mathematical ideas inherent in the designing work of Mozambican artisans
and argues strongly for the recognition of this mathematical work in their
school curriculum in order that "By unfreezing this frozen mathematics, by
rediscovering hidden mathematics in our Mozambican culture, we show
indeed that our people, like every other people, did mathematics" (p. 12).
Another kind of material evidence which is challenging to those of us raised
in the belief that geometrical ideas were invented by the Ancient Greeks
alone, is the Neolithic stone-work recently analysed in Britain (see for
example, Crichlow, 1979). In a book which is full of challenging ideas about
early designing, Critchlow presents photographs of carved stone spheres and
spherical shapes which show the 'Platonic solids' in existence a millennium
before Plato's time. These carved shapes are truly remarkable in their
precision and sheer beauty, and the photography of Rod Bull does them
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CHAPTER 2
justice. Like other books referred to, the data and ideas presented by
Critchlow leave us in no doubt that mathematical thinking was and is a
widespread phenomenon.
A cultural introduction to geometrical thinking through the activity of
designing and the idea of shape, would not however be complete without
reference to the significance of the spiral. While tools and technology have
fuelled much geometrical thinking from a practical perspective, and ornaments and decorations have appealed to our artistic nature, there is another
dimension altogether which is suggested by the spiral.
One of the simplest forms of designing gives us this profound shape. An
easy way to make a clay pot is to form the clay into a thin roll and then coil it
around and around until you can build up the sides into as big a pot as you
wish. The gaps can be filled, the sides smoothed, and the opening finished
with whatever decoration one wishes. The coil pot also has its straw analogue,
the coil mat which again can grow into the coil basket. The technology is
relatively simple, but the basic shape itself is not.
In a beautifully illustrated book, The Mystic Spiral, Jill Purce (1974) shows
us how mathematical thinking can relate to the sense of man's place in the
infinity of space and time. The spiral, seen in so many natural guises, is a
shape which has existence in the 'here and now' but which has no beginning
and no end. It becomes infinitely small one way and infinitely large in
another. As Purce says "It denotes eternity, since it may go on for ever. But
because we necessarily conceive infinity in our own, and therefore finite,
terms, we are forced to limit the limitless. It is only by imposing limits that we
can make infinity accessible to US."8
Through the chosen illustrations, Purce shows us how significant the spiral
has been, and continues to be, to many cultures all over the world. She links it
with labyrinths and mazes, with vortex spheres, with dances (whirling Dervishes), with mythology and religion, with the natural and the supernatural,
with mandalas and other contemplative diagrams, with astronomy and with
calendars. The coiled clay pots and coiled straw mats give us a practical
connection as we have seen, but in our cultural reflection on mathematical
activity the significance of the spiral is more mystical than practical. It
reminds us, if we needed reminding, that mathematical thinking is concerned
essentially with imagination and not with manufacture, and that our imagination is fed by feelings and beliefs, just as much as it is by figures and objects.
2.7. PLAYING
Playing may seem initially to be a rather strange activity to include in a

collection of activities relevant to the development of mathematical ideas,
until one realises just how many games have mathematical connections. It is
even more important to include it, when approaching Mathematics education
from an anthropological and cultural perspective, because of the vast doc-
43
umentation of games, and playing, around the world. One is forced then to
realise just how significant 'play' has been in the development of culture.
All cultures play and what is more important, they take their play very
seriously! By that I mean that it is essential not to treat playas a relatively
unimportant aspect of cultural life. For example, Norbeck (1977), in the
'Johan Huizinga' address to the first annual meeting of the Association for the
Anthropological Study of Play quotes from Huizinga's classic work 'Homo
Ludens' (1949): "The spirit of playful competition is, as a social impulse,
older than culture itself and pervades all life like a cultural ferment ... "
(p. 173). Huizinga, according to Norbeck, also characterises play with terms
like these:
-
voluntary, free
not a task, not ordinary, not real
essentially unserious in its goals although often seriously executed
outside the immediate satisfactions itself, but an integral part of life and a
necessity
repetitive
closely linked with beauty in many ways but not identical with it
creates order and is order; has rules, rhythms and harmony
often related to wit and humour but is not synonymous with them
has elements of tension, uncertainty, chanciness
outside the antitheses of wisdom and folly, truth and falsehood, good and
evil, vice and virtue, has no moral function
Clearly playing is a form of social activity which is different in character

from any other kind of social intercourse which has been mentioned so far playing takes place in the context of a game, and people become players. The
real/not real boundary is well established and players can only play with other
players if everyone agrees not to behave 'normally'.
Could these characteristics be at the root of hypothetical thinking? Could
playing represent the first stage of distancing oneself from reality in order to
reflect on and perhaps to imagine modifying that reality? Certainly, Vygotsky
(1978) argued that "the influence of play on a child's development is enormous" (p. 96) in that action and meaning can become separated and abstract
thinking can thereby begin.
However it would be wrong to think of playing, and games, as solely
children's activities. It is true that children's games serve various functions,
particularly in the enculturation process, but it is also important to recognise
playing as an adult activity. Indeed one might wonder who plays more, the
adult or the child? (As a commentator remarked "It is only a matter of the
toys becoming bigger and more expensive as one grows older.")
Let us first consider, then, playing as a significant adult activity, and one is
immediately struck by the fact that there is no shortage of classifications of
play in the anthropological literature. Walter Roth (1902) produced a very
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detailed description of Aboriginal games which he discovered in his Queensland area. He grouped them under seven headings:
Imaginative games
Realistic games
Imitative games
Discriminative games
Disputative games
Propulsive games
Exultative games
- for example fable-telling, legend etc. judged by

their cleverness and humour,
- pleasures derived from actual objects of nature,
organic and inorganic, e.g. playing with pets, mud
sliding,
- included the largest number of games and were of
two types
1. games where aspects and objects of nature are
imitated by movements, gestures and by string
games (like Cat's cradle), and
2. children's imitative games where they imitate
adult activities,
- for example hide-and seek, and guessing games,
- like tug-of-war and wrestling,
- with toys involving some form of motion, like
tops, balls, throwing-sticks,
- include music, song, dance and other entertainments.
Already it is clear that, although the characteristics of 'play' as described by

Huizinga can be seen in Roth's list of games, the notion of 'game' is more
restricted than that of 'play'. It seems as if 'playing' is the general activity
(which is why I chose it as the section heading) and the idea of 'game' is a
formalisation of playing. We can certainly think of the game as a form and a
'representation' of playing. By this I mean the following - every activity being
described in this chapter develops its own form of representation - counting
develops number language, number imagery and number systems, locating
develops spatial language, images and coordinate systems, measuring develops the language of quantifiers, units and measurement systems, designing
develops images, shapes and geometrical ideas. Playing seems to develop the
idea of 'game'.
So all cultural groups engage in playing, and they all develop games, of
different kinds, and to different degrees. As with other sections of this chapter
it is striking however to notice how common certain kinds of games are
around the world. For example, not only can one find Roth's seven kinds of
games existing in every culture but one can also find exactly the same games.
One could clearly anticipate this with respect to, for example, the disputative
games of physical prowess, and the exultative games of song and dance. One
might be a little more surprised to find string games being so universal (see for
example, Jayne, 1962). In fact, string games are played on every continent
and in every kind of environment. Again one might expect this in situations
45
where vegetation grows profusely but it personally came as a surprise to me to

learn that there is a large number of string games played by Eskimos.
What is also interesting about string games and string figures is that Roth
classifies them as 'imitative' in that many of them are representations, in
string, of either real objects or real situations e.g. "two boys carrying spears",
"a kangaroo pouch". Also the category of 'imitative games' contained the
largest number of games in Roth's inventory. (One is provoked to wonder
whether that is true for all cultural groups or only for the particular groups
which Roth studied.) Certainly imitation, or the modeling of reality, is a
feature of many games, and has much importance for use here. It is another
aspect of abstracting from reality certain forms and structures, as was described in the section on 'designing'.
Laney and Tindall (1977) describes this well in this paragraph about Kpelle
children's play:
Hunting play is quite similar to make believe play in that actual situations are dramatized. But
now certain features of reality are greatly abstracted and rules are added, as in a game where the
object is to shoot arrows into a target. The bow and arrow is a hunting weapon and the target may
be called by the name of an antelope, but the hunt is reduced to the moment of shooting. Rules
specify that each player stands behind a line while shooting and he is given only four arrows to
shoot. Turns are taken in rotation and so on (p. 85).
As with 'designing', the quality of the form developed in play can become
valued for its own sake. Because, as Huizinga pointed out, play is essentially
unserious in its goals, its performance becomes its own reward. So string
figures and other play-forms become of interest in themselves, and the roots
of artistic and aesthetic appreciation can again be seen. The play-form may be
musical, as in Roth's 'exultative' games or story-like as in 'imaginative'
games. The pleasures of aesthetic appreciation must surely account for the
popularity and longevity of many games and play activities in all cultural
groups.
Once the play-form itself becomes the focus, and a 'game' develops, then
the rules, procedures, tasks and criteria become formalised and ritualised.
They are also products of 'playing'. Games are often valued by mathematicians because of their rule-governed behaviour which it is said, is like
mathematics itself. I think that it is not too difficult to imagine how the
rule-governed criteria of mathematics have developed from the pleasures and
satisfactions of rule-governed behaviour in games. Within what Huizinga
delightfully calls the "Magic Circle" of the game, rule-bound behaviour is the
prime concern. And there is no doubt that people everywhere, adults and
children, enjoy participating in the rule-bound behaviour of games, perhaps
because they are, unlike reality, social settings where the players all know the
rules and all agree to play by those rules. Perhaps we all secretly wish for
more consistency in our social reality?
Two other game situations which, like string games, are amazingly widespread are board games and gambling games, both of which have a great deal
46
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of interest for us here. Zaslavsky documents what she calls the "world's oldest
game", the board game called, variously, mancala, wari, oware, soro, omweso, ayo, adi and hundreds of other names across Africa. This is played with
a number of hollows in which seeds or pebbles are distributed according to
various rules, the aim being to capture all the opponent's seeds or pebbles.
The numbers of holes, rows, and seeds all vary but the spirit of the game is the
same everywhere. It can be played as a chance game alone but it can also be
played with strategy and cunning, with lightning calculations being made by
the players. (Like kuns, the Aboriginal card game, the numbers are not
infinite but it is their combinations which are critically important.) As one of
the oldest 'board' games in existence its modelled imagery of grain, treasure,
capturing the opponent's wealth, etc. help us see the practical and social roots
of this hypothetical operating, and as the game developed in importance, so
the move from mere chance and ritual to strategy, anticipation and guile can
easily be imagined. Board games abound in the world and, like mancala and
its variants, and like chess and its variants, they can all be traced back to some
modelling of reality. That modelling is critical in mathematical development.
Chess also provides us with an interesting link to another idea, that of
prediction. Once again in doing the research for this book I was very
surprised by the evidence I came across. Ronan (1986), working with Needham's texts on China, has written a chapter called 'Magnetism and Electricity'
which describes much of the data concerning the inventions connected with
lodestones, the naturally occurring magnetic rocks. After sections dealing
with aspects of geomancy, to which I have already referred in the section on
'locating', we come to one called 'The Magnet, Divination and Chess'. Chess
has many connections with prediction and with divination, and apparently in
the ancient Chinese dynasties, before chess travelled to India and became the
'army' game which we know today, the pieces were often thrown onto the
board whence the diviners interpreted their positions, and predicted various
future events. In one particular form the chess pieces were made with
lodestones in them and they mutually interacted with each other.
Chess then, originated not as the battle game of strategy and tactics, but as
a diviners' aid, with a concern for prediction and with foretelling the future.
Other connections are hinted at by Ronan and Needham:
We cannot here embark on a history of all Chinese games and divination techniques but it is clear
that from the earliest periods throwing things lent itself to divination as well as to games. One of
the earliest was the 'pitch pot' game, where arrows were thrown into a pot. ... It would only
need markings or numbers on the arrows to have an object which by compression would become
a dice, and by extension and unfolding would give rise to dominoes on the one hand, and playing
cards on the other (p. 55).
Chance and gambling games, as we know, have their attractions worldwide, and gambling is not only concerned with gaining wealth. It still has a
great deal to do with predicting the future and has widespread conceptual
links with astrology, one of the oldest applied scientific ventures. Of course I
47
am not trying to suggest that the person busily engaged in losing money on a
gambling machine is developing mathematical understanding. Indeed one
measure of an adequate mathematical understanding might be the reluctance
to engage in such a 'fruitless' quest! Gambling however is another culturally
widespread form of play for whatever reasons and is usually, though not
always, an exclusively adult pursuit. The modelling of life's 'ups and downs' is
clear in the game of chance, as is the idea of risk-taking. As in all games, this
risk-taking is in a protected and rule-bound micro-world which to some extent
can protect the players, and we see again how 'playing the game' enables the
players to practise skills of prediction, guessing, estimation, conjecture and
wit away from the harsh realities of living. To lose in real life is not worth
contemplating and is "not worth the gamble", but a game can always be
played again, and who knows what might happen next time?
One other aspect of playing is worth considering here, and that is the value
for mathematical development of what we might call 'solitaire' games, that is
games which one plays alone. Although I haven't restricted the discussion so
far, this section could have been read up to now as if playing was entirely a
social phenomenon, requiring two or more people. That was not the intention
but, to make the point, let us consider specifically the 'solitaire' situation. We
can see that many string games would come into this category as could some
board games and some gambling games.
A good example of this aspect is the Magic Square - a pattern of numbers
which obeys certain rules. These are not only very ancient but also very
widespread - the one in the figure below (Figure 3) having appeared in
Chinese, Hebrew, Arabic and Indian manuscripts.
The pleasures and satisfactions of playing with numbers this way can easily
be seen to be the driving force for interesting mathematical developments.
Similarly, 'playing' with shapes, with measures, and with locations, in order
to see what structures enable the ideas to fit together satisfactorily bears all
the hall marks of investigative mathematical activity.9
It was generally surprising to me to learn how relatively little writing
existed about the relevance for education of games and playing, from a
Fig. 3
48
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cultural perspective. Indeed it was rather disappointing to come across an

article entitled 'Games and sports: missing items in cross-cultural psychology'
(Hopkins and Wober, 1973) which confirmed this lack. There is no doubt in
my mind, nor do I hope in the reader's by now, that playing is a crucial
activity for mathematical development, and I hope therefore that the anthropological and cross-cultural data base will be filled out more to enable us to
exploit educationally the significance of this universal activity for cultural
growth.
2.8. EXPLAINING
The sixth and final 'universal' activity I call 'explaining', and it is this activity
which lifts human cognition above the level of that associated with merely
experiencing the environment. It focusses attention on the actual abstractions
and formalisations themselves which derive from the other activities, and
where these are related to answering the relatively simple questions of "How
many?", "Where?", "How much?", "What?" and "How to?", explaining is
concerned with answering the complex question of "Why?".
Explaining is the activity of exposing relationships between phenomena
and the "quest for explanatory theory" as Horton (1967) describes it "is
basically the quest for unity underlying apparent diversity; for simplicity
underlying apparent complexity; for order underlying apparent disorder; for
regularity underlying apparent anomaly" (p. 209). Or as Bateson (1972)
would have it, the search is for "the pattern that connects".
The most significant explanatory relationship concerns similarity. It is the
security of things familiar which probably makes us seek 'sameness' or
similarity, and language is of course a fundamental 'similarity representation'.
'Bird', 'stone', 'happy', 'run', are words which represent classes of similar
phenomena and explaining is in that sense as universal as language.
It may seem that merely attaching a label to something is hardly worth
calling explaining but a few non-mathematical examples may help - "a
professional footballer is an entertainer", "a teacher is a policeman", "religion is the opium of the masses". All of these sentences establish connections
between different phenomena thus explaining aspects of those phenomena.
Admittedly the explanations are brief, non-elaborated, and rely heavily on
the reader's experiences, or on the ability to imagine experiences. (You may
never have taken opium but you know what is meant, and the explanation is
no less meaningful for lack of direct experience!) So, at an elementary level of
explaining, the nouns, adjectives, verbs and adverbs of languages, and
sentences which link these, help us in our quest for "unity underlying
apparent diversity".
But although classifying is a universal activity, the classifications obtained
are not. The diversity of languages brings a diversity of classifications. For a
start, word structures differ - for example, Harris (1980) cites verbs in
49
Warlpiri (an Aboriginal language) which indicate the direction of the action
in relation to the speaker:
parukami
parukamirni
parukamirra
parakamimpa
- running
running towards the speaker
running away from the speaker
running across the speaker
Moreover the structure of the classifications differs. Lancy (1983) reports

the extensive work carried out in Papua New Guinea on classification systems
and reveals an enormous range of types and levels of classification. He
focusses in one section of the book on the idea of hierarchical classification
which is the standard form in 'Western' cultures, whereby 'primitive' terms
are subsumed under more general concepts which are also subsumed under
yet more general concepts. This produced the typical 'tree representation' of
a hierarchical taxonomy so well known to us in science and mathematics
(Figure 4).
Fig. 4
Lancy discusses whether taxonomising is a universal phenomenon and says

"While taxonomising is undoubtedly important in complex societies, it is not
the only or even the preferred mode for representing and processing information for humans. Just as societies may forego quantification, we believe they
can and do forego hierarchicalization" (p. 115). He cites examples of other
kinds of classification to support his conjecture. For example he came across
what he called an 'edge classification' which allowed the speaker "to move
across the connections rather than up or down a hierarchical taxonomy".
(Figure 5)
This develops into what Lancy calls a preference for 'pairing' rather than
taxonomising: 'sky and earth, sun and moon, night and day'.
It seems safe to say that whenever the Melpa wish to generalise or to create a category, they do so
not by utilising a single superordinate lexeme but rather by specifying a pair that, by way of
contrast or complementarity between members of the two halves, constitute a totality. (p. 166).10
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CHAPTER 2
meat
arm-band
Fig. 5
As another example of a difference of classification, Philp (1973) quotes a

personal communication from Kelly which includes this vivid illustration
concerning the Melpa people "For example, 'weapon' which is ... things
designed specifically for killing man or animal (i.e. bows and arrows, and
spears). A 'stone' cannot be a 'weapon', even when used to break someone's
head. (It is the most common instrument of murder used in Hagen). A stone
is a stone is a stone." (p. 173).
Pinxten, in discussing the Navajo's concept of space also refers to their
system of classification, and he says
In contrast to the neatly regular hierarchical structure and development that were shown in the
Western space conceptualization, Navajo space appears to be founded on at least three equally
important 'basic' notions ... none of them are really 'primitive' in the sense that Western
notions are: they are clearly composite themselves, and have spatial notions as their constituents;
they co-determine themselves. Hence, they exhibit a certain circularity. (p. 161).
It is interesting to see researchers like Lancy, Philp, Kelly and Pinxten

struggling to understand another culture's way of classifying, and it perhaps
shows us just how fundamental classification is to a culture's knowledge. It
reflects the fact that, whereas with each of the other five activities a culture
can 'borrow' and adopt terms and notions from other cultures (a new game, a
new number word, a new design), the ways in which ideas and phenomena
are connected and related within a culture's knowledge are much more
resistant to change. New ideas can relatively easily be 'assimilated' into a
culture's schema, but 'accommodating' that culture's systems of classification
will happen only rarely in a culture's development.
This point becomes even more valid when we consider more complex forms
of explaining. So far we have only discussed classification, which, though
fundamental and universal, only represents a simple kind of explaining. What
about explaining dynamic phenomena, the processes of life, and the ebband-flow of events?
Here, the fundamental and universal representation is the 'story'. Every
culture has its stories, its folk-tales, and its story-tellers, and the "Once upon
a time ... " phrase is known everywhere, even if the actual wording is
51
different. Of course, stories are used by cultures for more reasons than
explaining. They have powerful social functions, they form the historical
'glue' of a culture and, particularly for oral cultures, they represent the
accumulation of a culture's wisdom and knowledge. They become 'folk-tales',
and are well documented in the anthropological literature (see for example,
Vansina, 1985).
Story-telling can also be a fun, game-like situation, and stories in that
context are often exaggerated, or even bizarre, and give an opportunity for
the tellers and the listeners to engage in fantasy-building. Stories can be
moralistic, and have a 'message', and the tellers of these stories can become
revered and even specially privileged as the 'wise men', the 'elders', the
'judges', the 'philosophers'.
The time-scale can of course also be much longer and the story becomes the
history. "Once upon a time ... " grows into "In the beginning was the
word ... ". The events of long ago become shrouded in mystery, and the
growth of mysticism, of myth, of legend, and of religious belief can be found
everywhere. Stories can also be predictive and, for example, dreaminterpretation can be developed as a highly sophisticated form of explaining.
The dream-interpreter can be a very significant person in a culture, particularly because these interpretations are intended to be predictive as well.
The 'story', then, is a universal phenomenon, and from the point of view of
developing mathematical ideas, one interesting aspect is the ability of the
language to connect discourse in rich and varied ways. In research terms,
much attention has focussed on the 'logical connectives' in a language which
allow propositions to be combined, or opposed, extended, restricted, exemplified, elaborated, etc.
The Indo-European languages have rich sets of these logical connectives
and in English, the definitive work was done by Gardner (1977). He managed
to produce 1000 test items for testing the understanding of some 800 different
connectives. Strevens (1972) also shows that there are many other kinds of
logico-grammatical words in the English language, as in Table II.
Clearly, in terms of richness of expression the English language, like others
of the Indo-European group seems almost obsessed with logic, with forming
complex propositions and with linking chains of these. Moreover as Bridgman
(1958) says "It begins to look as though formal logic as we know it, is an
attribute of the group of Indo-European languages with certain grammatical
features" .
However, care must be taken here. As with the taxonomies discussed
earlier, there is no reason to assume that all languages will share this
relationship with formal logic, and so the key phrase, in Bridgman's statement, is "as we know it". It is the case that other languages, from other
language groups, will have their own grammatical features with their own
logics "as they know them".
For example, Gay and Cole looked at the Kpelle language from the
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CHAPTER 2
TABLE II
Some classes of logico-grammatical items
Note:
These categories are 'notional'; they are not presented

in order of descending importance; the categories and
lists are not exhaustive.
Linking and logical sequence of ideas
and, also, besides, furthermore, moreover, simultaneously,
thus, too;
apart from, as well as, in addition to.
Paraphrase and apposition
like, similarly;
as if, in the same way, in like manner.
Causality
accordingly, as, because, consequently, hence, once
(something has occurred), since, therefore, until,
whenever;
as long as, as a result of, by means of, due to, for the
purpose of, in order to, it follows that, on account of,
owing to;
necessary and sufficient condition.
Opposition or contrast
alternatively, although, but, if, however, nevertheless,
notwithstanding, otherwise, whereas, yet;
even though, in spite of, irrespective of, on the other
hand;
necessary but not sufficient condition.
Restriction
except, impossible, occasionally, only, trivial,
uncertain, unless;
only if, if and only if, only when.
Hypothesis
conclude, confirm, consider, deduce, imagine, infer,
invalidate, refute, suppose, theoretically, validate;
in principle, it follows, it would seem that ...
Enquiry
how big? how long? how many? ... etc.;
what? when? which? who? why? how? with what purpose?
to what end? to what extent?
'Western' perspective and focussed on negation, conjunction, disjunction,

implication and equivalence. They found the Kpelle able to express all of
these with, moreover, a better and more precise way of expressing disjunction. In English the word 'or' has both an inclusive and an exclusive meaning
and this difference in the languages resulted in the Kpelle subjects doing
rather better than their American counterparts on an experimental test
concerned with understanding disjunction.
So the ability of the language to connect discourse is an important feature
53
of explanations. Another is what one might term the ultimate source of

explanatory power. As an example to begin with consider this Kpelle situation:
A Kpelle college student accepted all the following statements; (1) the Bible is literally true, thus
all living things were created in the six days described in Genesis; (2) the Bible is a book like
other books, written by relatively primitive peoples over a long period of time and contains
contradiction and error; (3) all living things have gradually evolved over millions of years from
primitive matter; (4) a 'spirit' tree in a nearby village had been cut down, had put itself back
together, and had grown to full size again in one day. He had learned these statements from his
Fundamentalist pastor, his college bible course, his zoology course, and the still-pervasive
animist culture. He accepted all, because all were sanctioned by authorities to which he feels he
must pay respect. (Gay and Cole, 1967, p. 35).
The situation in what Vansina (1985) calls 'oral societies', like that of the
Kpelle, is that they "tend to have a simpler notion of historical causality, one
which negates gradual change altogether. They tend to view institutions and
techniques as unitary phenomena that came into existence fully fledged as
they are at present .... So history becomes a sequence of greater or lesser
culture heroes" (p. 131). Despite the rather perjorative nature of those
statements it is easy to understand that in such an oral culture, people are
clearly highly significant as authorities.
For the fundamental Muslims the Qur'an is the ultimate reference source
for explanation. As Rahman (1981) explains: "The source of mathematical
studies, as of other sciences, in Islam is the concept of Tawhid - Oneness of
God. God is One; hence the number one in the series of numbers is the most
direct and most intelligible symbol of the Source. And the series of numbers
themselves is a ladder by which man ascends from the world of multiplicity to
the One" (p. 79).
In trying to look for explanations of stone circles and other Neolithic
artefacts, Critchlow (1979) turned to Ancient Shamanism as the root source.
As he says "Shamanism has been described as a surviving form of an archaic
religion. It has been studied as far afield as Siberia, North and South
America, Indonesia and the Pacific Islands .... However difficult analysis
and understanding of the techniques of shamanistic ecstasy are, and were, for
Western observers, what does stand out as strictly determined is the fundamental structure of their cosmology: particularly in the number of 'heavens'
which are given as seven or nine according to perspective and circumstance"
(p. 51). He then goes on to explore the significance of these numbers and that
cosmology for understanding more about Neolithic stone circles.
For the ancient Chinese a different explanatory source prevailed. Ronan
(1981) tell us "there was no belief in the idea of a creator deity, and hence of a
supreme law-giver; this, combined with the conviction that the whole universe was an organic, self-sufficient system, led to the concept of an allembracing Order in which there was no room for Law, and hence few
54
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regularities to which it would be profitable to apply theoretical mathematics

in the mundane sphere" (p. 63).
One of the other significant systems of explanation was, and is, provided by
astrology. This practical application of astronomical study has enjoyed both
favour and disfavour over the millenia as it has competed with other explanatory systems. But there is no denying that from Mesapotamia to China, from
Mexico to India, on every continent, there has been, and still is, a strong
interest in astrological prediction.
It could be thought of as the first application of science and it has had a
profound effect on mathematical development. It stimulated calculating,
prediction, calendrical creativeness, the search for pattern and the desire for
control of phenomena. The relationships with numerology and with geomancy are deep and are not to be dismissed. Mathematics is not science, and
its truths must not be understood as empirically verifiable. That view offers us
only a limited range of interpretation of phenomena.
As we shall see in the next chapter the dominant world-view or ideology
has a profound effect on the kind of explanation ultimately acceptable in any
culture, and the cross-cultural perspective makes us realise how necessary it is
to keep as open a mind as possible about other cultures' explanations.
Vansina (1985) again:
In many cultures truth is what is being faithfully repeated as content and has been certified as true
by the ancestors. But sometimes truth does not include the notion that x and y really happened.
When Trobrianders (New Guinea) hear assertions that run counter to their everyday ideas about
natural laws, the words of their ancestors, while true, should still be backed up by a trace of the
event visible in the landscape. Otherwise the tradition is true, but not factual (p. 129).
And later:
A correlation between truth and rank seems to occur in some stratified societies: the higher the
rank of the speaker the truer what he says, even if he speaks about the past (p. 130).
How can we come to terms with that word 'truer'?

Once again it is the differences between cultures which are of interest, not
because of showing any simplistic cultural superiority but rather because they
sensitise us to the similarities. In this case it is 'explaining' which can clearly
be seen to be universal, for cultural and social development generally and for
mathematical development in particular.
All cultures structure their language, all classify, all have explanatory
stories, all have their ways of connecting ideas through discourse, and all have
some ultimate source for validating explanations. Explaining is as universal as
language and is clearly critical in mathematical development.
55
2.9. FROM 'UNIVERSALS' TO 'PARTICULARS'
My aim in the last six sections has been two-fold: firstly, to explore, with the
help of the available cross-cultural evidence, the hypothesis that these six
activities are 'universal', and secondly, to argue that they are, and were, the
significant activities for the development of mathematical aspects of culture.
I should at this point caution the reader about the word 'universal'. I first
came upon this idea in a paper by Murdoch (1945) called 'The Common
Denominator of Cultures' - a good title for a mathematics educator interested
in anthropology! In this paper, Murdoch lists various 'cultural universals' of
which the following could be of interest to us:
calendar
cosmology
decorative art
dream interpret ration
education
ethics
games
gestures
inheritance rules
joking
kin terminology
language
law
numerals
tool-making
trade
A list like this does support some of my reasoning in the preceding sections,
of course, but it does nothing to establish whether such activities are indeed
universal. The problem is of course that one can only infer from the available
evidence.
Also I hope that 'plausibility' is a reasonable criterion to use here, so that I
can argue that it is at least plausible that these six activities are universal. It is
however conceivable that there may exist a remote society somewhere which
does not have these elements in its culture. Indeed Denny (1986) argues that
hunters like the Ojibway and the Inuit have no need for mathematical
thought. However that does not devalue the idea that these activities are
widespread and significant features of culture, for our purposes. Perhaps a
safer label would in any case be 'culturo-centric universals' i.e. universals
from our culturo-centric position, since we are describing the phenomena as
'counting' etc. This then makes it plain that one can never establish the
universality of phenomena, one is merely choosing to describe a highly
extensive set of similarities in a certain way. Within this context of meaning,
to be understood, I shall then continue to use the word 'universal' to
characterise the six activities which I have just described. II
If they are universal, and if I have argued successfully that they are
significant activities for the development of mathematical aspects of culture,
then the corollary must be that all cultures develop mathematics - that
mathematics is a pan-cultural phenomenon.
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CHAPTER 2
Furthermore, in no sense can I argue that 'mathematics' began at a certain

point in cultural history. Rather we can now see that the symbolic technology
of mathematics is continually evolving in all cultures and in all societies as a
result of these six activities carried out separately, and in interaction.
There is not, from this perspective, one mathematics - indeed it is perhaps
fitting that in English, and in some other languages also, the word 'mathematics' is in a plural form. There are, clearly, different mathematics - we have
seen plenty of evidence of different numbers and counting systems, different
location terms, different measures, different designs and technology, different
games, and different ways of explaining. We can read of Chinese mathematics, Greek mathematics, Roman Mathematics, African mathematics, Islamic
mathematics, Indian mathematics, and Neolithic mathematics to mention just
a few (see for example, Ronan, 1986; Ronan, 1983; Nasr, 1976; Heath, 1921;
Critchlow, 1979; Zaslavsky, 1973).12
But surely I hear the sceptics remark, we do have this unified discipline
which we call 'Mathematics', don't we? Negative times negative gives a
positive, wherever we are in the world, and in all triangles drawn everywhere
the sum of the interior angles approximates to 180 degrees, doesn't it?
Unfortunately this line of argument confuses the 'universality of truths' of
Mathematics with its cultural basis - Mathematical truths like these hold
irrespective of geographical context, but that does not deny the cultural roots
of those truths. Why do we have negative numbers and positive numbers?
Why is it 180 degrees and not 200?
How are we to account for the existence of this discipline of 'Mathematics'
which we all appear to recognise?
Well, so far we have considered culture and cultural groups as separate,
discrete entities and we have ignored culture contact, or indeed culture
conflict. It is no accident that in order to understand mathematics as a cultural
phenomenon, it has been necessary to look at some studies involving groups
of people which have been relatively un-contaminated by 'Western' culture.
These are situations where 'other' cultures have continued to flourish, in
some cases despite large-scale attempts to extinguish them. Culture contact
and conflict does much to reduce cultural diversity and Papua New Guinea is
an excellent example of this. The interior of the country was relative uncontacted until this century and as a result anthropologists have uncovered more
than 750 different languages and, as I already pointed out, Lean at the
University of Technology in Lae now has data on more than 500 different
counting systems. Bllt already Lean is aware of these systems dying out as the
people become acculturated into Western culture. In a few generations of
culture conflict the immense cultural diversity of Papua New Guinea is likely
to disappear. The three 'weapons' of the conflict - trade, religion and
education - will almost certainly prove irresistible, as they have in other
countries. Fortunately, before this happens, the variety is being documented,
and this does allow us to recognise certain differences, as well as similarities.
57
Culture contact therefore has its negative connotations in that some cultures can virtually eliminate others - some cultures can, and have, become
dominant oyer others. The details of this process are not for us to analyse
here, although clearly the three 'weapons' above are involved, together with a
fourth, 'warfare', which has certainly resulted in much cultural elimination in
human history.
It would however be wrong to consider culture contact as a wholly negative
phenomenon. Whatever the process consists of, culture contact has also
stimulated cultural growth. From the particular perspective of this book, the
growth of Mathematics (as the internationalised discipline we know) is the
result of developments both within cultures and between cultures. Mathematics (with a capital 'M' as I shall now denote it) is certainly not the product of
one culture, nor is the result of the activities of one cultural group. It has a
truly multi-cultural past which writers such as Kline and Wilder and others
have tried to document. Mathematics. is therefore not just a subset of all the
mathematics which different cultures have developed, it is a particular line of
knowledge development which has been cultivated by certain cultural groups
until it has reached the particular form which we know today.
The symbolisations and concepts of Mathematics have developed and
grown in certain particular ways, but the six activities are still discernible.
Counting, locating, measuring, and designing have been, and still are, the
bases of science, engineering, manufacturing industry, trade, agriculture,
war, etc. The numbers and number system have become more complex infinitely large, infinitely small, infinitely divisible, systems of numbers, new
'numbers' like vectors and matrices, operations with all of these, with analyses of all possible numerical systems and algebraic systems. Locating has
given us much of our geometry - lines and angles, axes, coordinates, rectangular and polar, graphs, graph theory, etc.
Measuring has always been at the heart of science's use of mathematics more and more accuracy, extremely large phenomena, extremely small,
developments of measure systems and measure theories, approximation,
estimation, probabilistic and statistical means for handling large numbers,
etc. Designing is still at the heart of technological development - not just
geometric shapes, but designing everything from traffic flows to space shuttles
and computer systems. Most of the environment in technically advanced
societies is now designed and manufactured. Even the natural environment
like woodlands and lakes is becoming subject to more and more design
demands.
The other two activities have been, and continue to be, no less important.
Playing is indeed a most serious business, with games not only modelling
reality for experimental purposes but also for educational purposes. Much of
modern life has been analysed by game theorists and the idea of the 'game' is
fundamental in understanding social intercourse. Playing can still also be fun,
of course!)
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CHAPTER 2
Finally, explaining has become a thoroughly refined and sophisticated

activity. I have already referred to Gardner's study showing our obsession
with the logic of explanations, which reaches its culmination with proof - the
classic form of Mathematical explanation. Proof explains questions of the
type "Why is it that ... ?" by providing a series of statements linked by the
appropriate logical connectives. Mathematics also of course explains by
providing models and conceptual structures for phenomena external to its
symbolic system. Mathematics has in fact grown to become a very particular
and powerful means of explanation.
This Mathematical line of development, moreover, is traceable through
societies which are characterisable as increasingly technology-centred. The
historical documentation, and the anthropological, both point to that conclusion. The story is of a continuing interplay between humans creating technology in order to gain more control over their environment, the technology then
becoming part of that environment thereby necessitating the invention and
creation of more technology. This is not just the case for the physical
technology of tools, artefacts and implements, it is equally the case with
symbolic technologies like language and mathematics. Both language and
mathematics are continually evolving, not just through what one might term
'internal' development but because of pressure from the external environment, both physical and social.
The Mathematical link with the ever-increasing technological environment
is clear. As Marshal Stone says "the teaching of mathematics is coming to be
more and more clearly recognised as the true foundation of the technological
society which it is the destiny of our times to create" p. 18). Stenhouse's view
(from the first chapter) of "the demands of the material environment" is also
relevant here. In today's modern societies the material environment is increasingly a manufactured and artificial one. Lancy (1983) points out "It is
only comparatively recently that the diversity of man-produced artifacts has
equalled and then eclipsed the diversity in nature" (p. 202). This is clearly
true for the urban dweller, almost by definition, but it is becoming increasingly true for the rural dweller too, by virtue of man's technological approach
to farming and to the environment in general. Certainly for many children in
the modern world the environment will be essentially man-made rather than
natural. This influence of the man-made environment increases even further
when one takes into account the many and varied social institutions which
exist, and which are also man-made.
It is of course now necessary to add one further phenomenon to the
environment - the computer. A product of mathematics and of mathematicians, this ubiquitous machine now enters into, and affects, many of our
material and social institutions. We live in the Information Technology era
and Mathematics, via the computer, is controlling many more aspects of our
existence. The computer simultaneously enables us to control more and more
of our environment while it also controls more and more of our activities.
This technology, as White would have said, is increasingly influencing our
59
philosophies and our ideologies (see Weizenbaum, 1976), and it is having

profound effects on our social institutions. Many of these influences are
benign (such as improving the powers of communication of mentally and
physically handicapped youngsters) while others are felt to be potentially
dangerous (such as data banks on citizens). The computer analogy of the
brain is exerting a strong influence on cognitive research and on our imagery
of thinking; and the possibilities of information storage, retrieval and analysis
are offering potential solutions to hitherto unimagined problems.
The new technology is furthermore a powerful driving force for mathematics: "In present-day society technology influences the development of mathematics either directly, by placing technical problems capable of mathematical
treatment before the expert, or indirectly through physics, chemistry and
other natural sciences" (Struik, 1963). Equally significant is the developing
concern with algorithmic methods.
Once again we see that White's approach to, and analysis of, the evolution
of culture is so pertinent because he points out clearly to us the importance of
the environment in the evolution of the 'mathematical technology' of our
culture. As our environment becomes more complex, so this culture responds
by developing more ways to handle it. Of course as we develop more 'ways',
these then become subsumed into the 'environment' and the process of
cultural development continues.
2.10. SUMMARY
I have presented the case that six key 'universal' activities are the foundations
for the development of mathematics in culture. I have also demonstrated that
it is the case that all cultures have necessarily developed their own symbolic
technology of mathematics in response to the 'demands' of the environment
as experienced through these activities. As a result however of certain
within-cultural developments, and also of different cultures interacting and
conflicting, so a particular and traceable line of development has emerged.
This has produced Mathematics, as we know the internationalised discipline
today, a very powerful version of mathematics in culture. The main thrust in
the growth of this Mathematics has come from the increasingly technologically-centred environment, by which I mean that most of us now live in
societies which are more and more designed, and which are increasingly
dependent on technological development. We could indeed think of modern
industrialised society as being based on a Mathematico-technological culture.
What is also becoming apparent therefore is that Mathematics, as well as
being a certain kind of symbolic technology, is also the bearer of, and the
product of, certain values. If we only seek to understand Mathematics as a
particular symbolic technology we will only understand a small part of it perhaps indeed, for education and for our future, the least important part.
Let us then turn to an analysis of the values of Mathematics to see what
implications they have for us in mathematics education.
CHAPTER 3
THE VALUES OF MATHEMATICAL CULTURE
3.1. VALUES, IDEALS AND THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE
David Lancy (1983) in his major cross-cultural study in Papua New Guinea
gives us a helpful introduction to the analysis of the values of Mathematical
culture. He developed a stage theory to account for the differences he found
in his research and compared his stages with those of Piaget. He first of all
came to the conclusion that, regarding cognitive development culturally, it is
not individuals who achieve concrete operational or formal operational
stages, but rather it is societies which make such transitions (p. 169). Moreover he preferred a more general stage model from that proposed by Piaget,
as follows:
Stage I corresponds to Piaget's sensory-motor and pre-operational stages and

partially overlaps the concrete-operational stage. Lancy argues that "the
accomplishments of this stage are shared by all human beings" (p. 203) and
suggests that this is the stage where genetic programming has its major effect.
At the end of this stage "the cognitive structures are in place waiting to be
activated" .
Stage II is where enculturation begins and takes over from socialisation,
which characterised the caretaker-child relationship of the previous stage:
Lancy states "What happens to cognition during Stage II, then, has much to
do with culture and environment and less to do with genetics" (p. 205). It is
during this stage that different cultures attend to different kinds of phenomena, and develop different kinds of knowledge. From the perspective of
this book, the six activities in the previous chapter develop different mathematics in different cultures, and these different mathematics are typical of
Stage II differences.
Greenfield and Bruner (1966), quoted by Laney, also offer the idea that
;'some environments push cognitive growth better, earlier and longer than
others:" but interestingly "what does not seem to happen is that different
cultures produce completely divergent and unrelated modes of thought"
(p. 652). As we have already seen, in the cross-cultural studies referred to
earlier, 'other' cultures studied do count and use numbers, do measure, do
develop geometric concepts, do play rule-bound games, and do develop
explanations. There does appear, from this sampling, to be support for
Greenfield and Bruner's statement.
Laney argues however that it is also necessary to have a Stage III in his
developmental theory of cognition. It is not sufficient, particularly from the
60
VALUES OF MATHEMATICAL CULTURE
61
point of view of education, merely to record differences and then to allocate

them to Stage II aspects. His Stage III concerns the metacognitive level.
Lancy characterises this stage, which he says "begins in infancy and continues
throughout adulthood" (p. 208) in the following terms:
In addition to developing cognitive and linguistic strategies, individuals acquire 'theories' of
language and cognition. They learn what kinds of knowledge are important for what purposes;
they learn the relationship between knowledge and status; they learn the appropriate occasions
for knowledge acquisition and display; and so forth (p. 208).
As well as learning particular knowledge then, they learn about knowledge;

they learn metaknowledge.
According to this perspective, the 'formal operational' stage of Piaget's
scheme therefore represents the particular theory of knowledge which the
'Western' cultural group emphasises. Other cultural groups may, and do,
emphasise other 'theories of knowledge', and therefore emphasise other
"Stage Ill's". The Navajo 'world view' outlined by Pinxten and his colleagues
is a good example. Moreover, with particular reference to the topic of the
present book, Lancy also says "In Western society the model [of the thinkerproblem-solver] is that of the scientist who uses formal, logical principles to
solve problems and make inferences" (p. 208).
These models or "theories of knowledge" as Lancy calls them, therefore
represent the ideals and the principles lying behind the actual language or
symbols developed by a culture. They are the values which implicity, or
explicity, the cultural group believes in and sustains. Moreover Kroeber and
Kluckhohn (1952) say: "Values provide the only basis for the fully intelligible
comprehension of culture, because the actual organisation of all cultures is
primarily in terms of their values" (p. 340) Therefore we must try to come to
grips with the values of Mathematics if we are to understand them sufficiently
to enculturate our children properly. It is all too easy, as we have seen in the
first chapter, to become totally engrossed in the symbolic and manipulative
aspects of mathematics through the technique curriculum, and thereby ignore
values entirely. This of course does not mean that we don't teach values at
present. On the contrary, I am convinced that we do teach them, unconsciously, implicitly and, of greater concern for education, uncritically.
White's theory is that these values have come about as a result of technological development - that is, it is the development of technology which
'drives' the ideological, sentimental and sociological components of culture.
In a sense this supports Lancy's thesis that individuals learn the theory of their
culture's knowledge through learning the particulars of language and in our
case Mathematics. Without wishing to stick rigidly to White's three (other)
components, I have nevertheless identified six different sets of ideals and
values which relate to these three components, in complementary pairs.
I have not chosen six again in order to relate this chapter to the last, nor
have I any numerological significance in mind! I must admit however that I
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CHAPTER 3
find the three complementary pairs aesthetically satisfying as well as conceptually complete: they are for me the three dimensions of values.
My objective then, in the following sections, is to offer what I feel are the
principal values associated with Mathematics, relying on historical and cultural documentation for my arguments. Unlike the last chapter I will not be
claiming that these values are in any way 'universal' nor that they are
associated with mathematics as it exists in any culture. At present we just do
not have the evidence nor the documentation to be able to substantiate that
claim. The only universality I have assumed is that of White's cultural
components, which the following values are intended to reflect within Mathematical culture. At this stage, too, I will leave open the question of the
educational significance of these values, although I shall of course take up that
question later.
3.2. IDEOLOGY - RATIONALISM
The first and most obvious set of values associated with Mathematics I have
grouped under the label of 'rationalism', and clearly this is an ideological
component of culture, to use White's term. We have already seen, in the
section on 'explaining', how rich the language of logic is - the many logical
connectives, the variety of logical forms. Rationalism, logic and reason have a
very well elaborated vocabulary.
Rationalism is at the heart of Mathematics. If one had to choose a single
value which has guaranteed the power and authority of Mathematics (and the
ideal of Mathematicians) it is rationalism. Since the time of the Egyptian and
Hellenistic civilisations where the power of reason was becoming established,
it has become a primary ethic. Rationalism, with its focus on deductive
reasoning as the only true way of achieving explanations and conclusions,
challenged and eventually superceded trial-and-error pragmatism, rules of
pratice, traditional wisdom, inductive reasoning and analogistic reasoning.
That was the time when Mathematics began to be different from Science.
Both were, and are, concerned with explaining but where Science uses
empirical validation as the test of its explanations, Mathematics became
concerned with 'internal' criteria of logic, completeness and consistency.
It is rationalism which has continued to develop the core of Mathematics, it
was rationalism which provided Descartes with his guiding light, it was rationalism which fostered the new geometries and algebras in the 19th century,
and it was r,ltionalism which provoked G6del's theorem. Rationalism,
as opposed to tradition, religious dogma, personal status or experience, is the
guiding principle for Mathematical development. Moreover, now that computers are coming more and more into our environment, the ideology is
extending even further. Weizenbaum (1976) says in support of this thesis:
"the introduction of computers into our highly technological society has ...
63
merely reinforced and amplified those antecedent pressures that have driven
man to an ever more highly rationalistic view of his society" (p. 11).
As Kline (1972) says "In its broadest aspect mathematics is a spirit, the
spirit of rationality. It is this spirit that challenges, stimulates, invigorates, and
drives human minds to exercise themselves to the fullest. It is this spirit that
seeks to influence decisively the physical, moral, and social life of man, that
seeks to answer the problems posed by our very existence, that strives to
understand and control nature, and that exerts itself to explore and establish the deepest and utmost implications of knowledge already obtained"
pp. (26-27).
It is not just Mathematicians who feel this ideology - it has spread to the
host cultures also. There are strong feelings for more rational and reasoned
processes in social institutions, as Lancy has already shown. Arguments are
acceptable and tolerated of course, but lack of logic in an argument is not.
One often hears complaints about people who are "illogical", and one of the
greatest weapons for a critic is to find inconsistency in someone's argument.
The institutionalising within society of debates, disputations, arguments,
criticism, litigations, moots and discussions of all kinds, legitimises and
upholds the widespread belief in rationalism. Despite the fact that logic is
only about deductive reasoning, i.e. about connections between ideas, and is
not about the bases of those ideas, the concern has increasingly been with the
logic and with reasoning. It is acceptable, we feel, for two people to differ in
their interpretations of situations but we are extremely concerned if they
differ in their interpretations of what makes an argument logical. This is true
whether one is talking of mathematical proof or of everyday argument.
One generally understood emotion concerns the desire to 'rationalise'
inconsistency, disagreement and incongruity. This verb incidentally seems to
have developed some negative connotations in the present century though it
is difficult to see clearly why this should be. Perhaps it is related to the idea of
the "loss of certainty" regarding knowledge, or perhaps to the dislike of some
politician's misuse of deductive reasoning! Be that as it may, there is still a
strong feeling that in a system of any sort which is supposed to abide by the
canons of logic, there is no place for inconsistency. We can easily understand
Gay and Cole's discomfort as they described the Kpelle student's acceptance
of seemingly conflicting statements in the previous chapter on p. 53. The
inconsistencies which Gay and Cole clearly felt didn't bother the Kpelle
student, so there was no need for him to rationalise them, unless one counts
the deference to different authorities as the rationalisation.
So when we criticise a line of reasoning, when we disprove a hypothesis,
when we find a counter-example, when we pursue a line of reasoning 'to its
logical conclusion' and find that it is in contradiction to something already
known to be true, and when we reconcile an argument, we are guided by, and
are also upholding, the values of rationalism. To rationalise is to seek to forge
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CHAPTER 3
a logical connection between two ideas which may hitherto have been either
unconnected or connected by incongruity.
Another aspect of particular importance to us in education is the fact that it
is not the tangible world of material objects that is logical, it is not people or
things that are rational, it is Mathematical explanations which are rational and
logical. Rationalism refers directly only to arguments, inferences, stories, and
explanations - rationalism is only transferred to people and objects through
the 'explanation' of those concrete phenomena. Somebody behaves logically,
to us, only if we can find a logical explanation for their behaviour.
It is therefore the separation of 'object' and idea which allows rationalism
to flourish. It was the Pythagoreans and the Platonists who secured the
significance of the object/idea distinction which led to the focus on abstractions as being the 'material' of descriptions and explanations. We already saw
in the previous chapter how the activities of 'designing', 'playing' and 'explaining' offer the possibilities and potential of abstraction to a culture, but it
was only in certain societal circumstances that this idea was developed fully. It
required a leisured class, with a drive to explain their origins, such as existed
in the early Greek civilisations. The philosophers, with slaves to do all their
menial work, were well placed to see the value of separating thought from
concrete reality!
There was, and still is, also an aesthetic dimension to rationalism. There is
a beauty of completeness and wholeness about logical argument, where the
'loose ends are tied up', where 'fuzziness' and imprecision are replaced by
clarity and certainty, where greyness and shadowy half-truths are illuminated
by the bright light of reason. We search for consistency and cohesion, and we
react to inconsistency in reasoning as if it were a challenge to our sensibilities.
The Pythagoreans' love of beauty and symmetry guided their analyses of
figurate numbers and of planetary motions, and we have inherited their
aesthetic valuation in Mathematical explanation. It is no accident that we
often use the phrase "an elegant proof'.
So explanations are about abstractions, and these are the life-blood of
Mathematics, as in proof, the pure form of Mathematical explanation. As
well as valuing logic therefore, we must also accept the power of abstracting
and of operating with ideas. To use another word, 'theorising' is also what is
being valued here. In other aspects of our culture the actual objects themselves are valued, as I pointed out in the previous chapter, but in Mathematics
it is a particular way of theorising about phenomena that is being valued.
Therein lies its applicative power. Kline points to the importance of
abstraction when he says "The insignificance of Roman achievements in the
fields of mathematics, science, philosophy, and many of the arts is the best
answer to those 'practical' people who condemn abstract thought that is not
motivated by utilitarianism. Certainly one lesson to draw from the history of
the Romans is that people who scorn the highly theoretical work of mathematicians and scientists and decry its usefulness are ignorant of the manner in
which practical and important developments have arisen" (p. 109).
65
For young people to appreciate rationalism therefore, it is also necessary to

make them aware of explaining, of abstracting, and of theorising. Rationalism essentially refers to criteria associated with a particular kind of theorising.
Without understanding this, the language and symbols of Mathematics will be
as meaningless to our children as are those of an alien culture.
3.3. IDEOLOGY - OBJECTISM
Rationalism has clearly then been a driving force in the development of

Mathematics and it has shaped the character of Mathematics. However a
second and complementary ideology, offering us some rather different sets of
values, has also powerfully influenced the nature and character of Mathematics. This ideological strand I have labelled 'objectism' in attempting to
characterise a world-view dominated by images of material objects.
I have already referred to the difference between a world-view based on
'objects' and one based on 'processes' in my discussion of Pinxten's analysis of
the Navajo's conception of space. In Western culture we can trace the
dichotomy back to the early Greek period. Heroclitus, in the period 600-500
B.C., argued that the essential feature of phenomena is that they are continuously changing -like a flame burning or a river flowing. As Ronan (1983) says
from the perspective of the development of science: "he saw everything there
in an unstable state of flux, so that what we perceive with the senses is
something transitory, not true knowledge - a view which was later to receive
wide currency and mitigate against setting too much store by practical
observation" (p. 71). From the Pythagoreans, and later Democritus, the
preferred world-view of 'atoms' and objects grew. Their predominant feel for
numbers, the discrete quantity, helped to emphasize this view amongst the
Pythagoreans, and Heroclitus's ideas never gained wide acceptance amongst
the Mathematical communities. (See Waddington, 1977, for a recent analysis.)
Horton (1967) describes objectism in another way, however, by comparing
what he saw as the predominant African preference for explanation using
personal idiom and the 'Western' preference for the impersonal. He argued
that this developed for the traditional African the sense that the personal and
social 'world' is knowable whereas the impersonal and the 'world of things' is
essentially unknowable. The opposite tendency holds for the Westerner.
Horton's argument proceeds as follows:
In complex, rapidly changing industrial societies the human scene is in flux. Order, regularity,
predictability, simplicity, all these seem lamentably absent. It is in the world of inanimate things
that such qualities are most readily seen. This is why many people can find themselves less at
home with their fellow men than with things. And this too, I suggest, is why the mind in quest of
explanatory analogies turns most readily to the inanimate. In the traditional societies of Africa.
we find the situation reversed. The human scene is the locus par excellence of order, predictability, regularity. In the world of the inanimate [by which he means 'natural' rather than man-made,
A.J .B.]' these qualities are far less evident. Here, being less at home with people than with
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CHAPTER 3
things is unimaginable. And here, the mind in quest of explanatory analogies turns naturally to
people and their relation (p. 224).
SO, once again we see, with objectism as with rationalism, an ideology

which is in some sense dehumanised. Rationalism is about certain criteria of
theories, divorced from their human creators, while objectism is based on
inanimate objects and not on animate phenomena, such as humans. Mathematics favours an objective, rather than a subjective, view of reality.
It may seem rather strange to be suggesting here that the Mathematical
world-view is based on objects when, in discussing rationalism, I was presenting the evidence for the separation of objects from ideas. That distinction is of
course critical for the development of rational values, but what I am pointing
out now is the fact that the ideas are essentially ideas about objects. In other
words whereas the ideology of rationalism has forced the detailed and specific
analysis of deductive reasoning between ideas, it has had little influence on
the origins of those ideas. On the other hand, there is plenty of evidence to
show that, not only do the ideas originate in our interaction with the environment, but also that it is material objects which provide the intuitive and
imaginative bases for these ideas. Newman (1959) said:
How do mathematicians work and make discoveries if they are to abstain from any geometric
intuition? Of course they don't abstain .... One of our purposes is to use some of our
geometrical notions ... as a guide, as we grope towards the proof of a new theorem. When it is
found, we shalI carefulIy remove alI trace of geometry or mechanics from our strictly axiomatic
proof; and the man who reads it wilI probably put them in again as he grapples with the
arguments.
Intuitions, as well as helping Mathematical development, can of course

become an obstacle to progress, and a very good example of this is offered by
Cantor's work on infinite numbers. He battled against the old intuitions and
emerged with ideas which many found, and generations of students still find,
difficult to accept. The significance of intuitions in Mathematics is clear just from
this one example (see Fischbein, 1987, for a full elaboration of this argument).
Generally, and even in the purest of pure Mathematics, Mathematicians still
clearly work with ideas as if they were objects. As Davis and Hersh (1981) say
"Most writers on the subject seem to agree that the typical working mathematician is a Platonist on weekdays and a formalist on Sundays. That is, when he is
doing mathematics he is convinced that he is dealing with an objective reality
whose properties he is attempting to determine" (p. 321).
We are well aware, as I showed earlier, that Mathematics is concerned with
abstractions and at school level there is a great deal of effort put into
developing "abstract thought" as it is often called. What is now particularly
important to realise is that in Mathematics it is also the power of 'objectivising' those abstractions which enables them to be handled so precisely. This
situation must also be attended to in education.
Furthermore, the network of logical connections developed with Mathe-
67
matical ideas by proofs, extensions, examples, counter-examples, generalisations and abstractions helps to give them an objective meaning and thus
enables them to be dealt with as if they were objects. The language of "if",
"suppose" and the conditional tense also forces an imagined reality onto the
conscious level and thereby enables it to be manipulated as if it were an
objective reality. Thus, as well as encouraging children to develop their
ability to abstract, we need also to encourage thpm in the ways of concretising
and objectivising abstract ideas.
The most important vehicle for this is of course our rich repertoire of
symbols. One way in which Mathematics differs from other forms of theorising is by its use of symbolic representation, rather than semantic representation, and it is the whole network of conventionalised and explicitly defined
symbols which gives to the Mathematician, and to all of us, the concretised,
yet clearly hypothetical, reality to explore and analyse.
Wilder (1978) supports this line of reasoning with an analogy:
The function of the special symbolism in mathematics can be compared to the function served by
habit in our daily activities. We need not think through the processes of tying our shoes, for
instance; we have developed a habit that does it for us. Similar.ly, solving a quadratic equation
takes no thought once the formula embodying the solution has been memorized; we have
developed a symbolic 'habit' to do it for us (p. 165).
From the earliest stages of Mathematical development this relationship

with objects, and with an objectivised reality, has been apparent. As I said
earlier, the Pythagoreans, who did so much to secure the first footholds of
Mathematics, were actually 'atomists' in their mathematising of nature, and
this way of viewing the world linked well with the fact that number was the
first Mathematical entity to be developed. Not only was it important to them
that anything could be counted, but also two other ideas about number were
significant. First, numbers build up, from one to many, just as elementary
particles build up to create larger objects - the growth of numbers parallels
the 'growth' of objects. Second, numbers at that stage of development did not
exist separately from the objects - abstraction had not yet been developed.
Numbers, therefore, to the Pythagoreans were objects, literally. They were
points, stones, particles. They were things. When abstraction did develop,
then, and number became of concern in abstraction, the ideas about number
were still firmly rooted, conceptually, in the world of countable things objects. Whether the focus of concern was the 'heavens', or music, their
understanding was reduced to number relationships between the planets, or
between plucked string lengths.
This 'world view' was most clearly illustrated in geometry, as one might
expect. The tetractys (the numbers 1,2,3, and 4) were highly significant, and
'fournesses' were a strong conceptual force. The four geometric elements
were point, line, surface and solid, a conceptual 'picture' which has always
been satisfying to us. It embodies the 'basic' nature of the atomistic approach,
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i.e. with these four bases, any objects could be described. Certainly the four
bases of geometry have survived in our collective cultural store of knowledge
far longer than has that other fourness, earth, air, fire and water, offered by
Plato a little later in history.
Much as we might be tempted to characterise as rather 'primitive' this
atomistic approach to nature, we can now perhaps begin to understand the
intuitive basis for axiomatic argument. Rationalism emphasises the logic of
reasoning but objectism gave Mathematics the intuitive basis for the search
for the 'atoms' of argument. What, after all, are axioms if they are not the
elementary particles of reasoning from which complex propositions, theorems
and proofs are constructed? The imagery is inescapable.
Another set of values associated with objectism emerged as technological
development accelerated. As I showed in the section on 'designing' in the
previous chapter the possibilities for abstracting design from natural materials
are many, and as the designing of tools, implements and simple mechanical
devices grew, so these ideas fed the imagination of the thinkers. This imagination, already enculturated with ideas of atomism and rationalism, began
looking for explanations of natural phenomena in technological imagery.
Loci, simply created by man-made devices, informed the understanding of
planetary motion. Indeed cosmology, linked as it so emotionally was with
profound ideas about deities, about the origin of the universe and about
man's role in that universe, was a very fertile soil for the development of
Mathematics as a powerful force in culture. Kepler's theory of planetary
motion was a perfect example of this, and the latt:r development of 'planetaria' was also no mere accident.
In general, materialism developed a picture of reality as some kind of
complex mechanism, with nature being composed of objects moving in ways
akin to machinery. The technology of the day always feeds the imagination of
all, including mathematicians, whose ideas are acceptable to the wider culture
when they accord with the accepted perceptions of reality. The history of the
development of Mathematics is the story of the confrontation of new ideas,
rationally derived, with the current 'world-view', and that world-view has
now become increasingly dominated by artificial (i.e. non-natural) objects.
For example, it should come as no surprise to us to learn of earlier images of
the brain which were like complex, cog-filled machines, since that was the
technology of the day. Neither should it surprise us nowadays to find computer analogies being used in current cognitive research, and of course
developments in surgery techniques encourage us to imagine the human body
as a machine - to be serviced regularly, well-oiled, kept moving, fed with
appropriate energy and fitted with replacement parts when pieces wear out. It
is a perfectly logical extension of the objectism of our world-view, and it has,
as we know, brought its benefits and also its drawbacks.
Mathematics as well as being affected by this world-view has also contributed to it, particularly through its use within the physical sciences. Mathe-
69
matical principles explained dynamic phenomena in terms of matter in nwtion,

and both of these were imaginable according to the current perceptions of
nature and technology. As the principles became more developed and as their
applicability grew so that world-view of the 'behaviour' of nature was not only
reinforced but the status of Mathematics as the ultimate explainer of phenomena grew profoundly. The role of 'automata' in spreading the Mathematically related notions of mechanisms is documented by Keller (1972), and they
seem to have played a similar part in popularising Mathematical ideas as
video games are doing for the computer today.
The 'extreme' version of this materialism was what became known as
determinism - not only can natural phenomena be explained by mathematical
principles but also these same principles actually determine the natural phenomena. While we would nowadays not perhaps subscribe to this extreme
view, the ever increasingly man-made, non-natural, artificial and technological character of our environment carries with it the greater probability of the
perception of consistent and determined phenomena. Mathematics is constantly reinforcing the materialistic world-view precisely because it is the basis
of technological advance. Equally, the more pre-determined, planned, organised, predictable, efficient and precise our live become as a result of our
technologically-informed world-view, the more this reinforces our belief in
the fundamental nature of Mathematics in our society.
The logical nature of Mathematics is complemented by its analogical side its imagery - which is clearly rooted in society'S world-view and in environmental interaction. The imagery is object-oriented and materialistic, and can
of course be a force for good or for evil in society, depending on one's view.
Mathematics has helped to develop technology which can save lives but
equally it has contributed to instruments of large-scale death and destruction.
There are those who will therefore argue that there are no values inherent
in Mathematics, since it can be equally exploited for 'good', or for 'evil', ends.
That, I am bound to say, is too simplistic a position. Mathematics is inextricably entwined with objectism and that perspective inevitably implies certain
values, as we have seen. It is the interaction between these values and others
present in society which determine the ultimate effects of the Mathematical
influence, and Mathematical Education has a duty to encourage reflection on
those values.
3.4. SENTIMENT - CONTROL
Rationalism and objectism are then the two complementary ideologies which
have been developed in Mathematics and now I wish to turn to what White
calls the 'sentimental component'. This perhaps rather misleading term is
concerned essentially with feelings and attitudes, and it is possible once again
to identify two highly significant and complementary sentiments which have
driven, and indeed have also been reinforced by, Mathematical culture. The
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first of these I call 'control', which relates closely to the previou,s ideology of
objectism, and 'progress'.
As we saw in the last section, materialism has been a powerful source of
analogy, but it is also easy to detect strong feelings for control and security.
The quest for knowledge, and explanations of natural phenomena, is associated with a desire to predict, and the ability to predict is indeed powerful
knowledge. Knowledge is about control, in that sense. To know that the
planets will behave in certain ways is also to know that they will not behave in
other ways - in particular, it is to know that they will not behave unpredictably, or randomly. To know that is to gain a sort of security within our
ever-changing world. Bacon and Descartes typified this spirit in the early
Renaissance period, although it had of course appeared much earlier.
The gradual rise of materialism to its position of stature in the eighteenth
century gives testimony to the growing security offered by Mathematical
knowledge. Not only was there developing the understanding that Mathematics can explain any aspect of the natural or man-made environment, but
there was also the growing desire to do this. As a result, Schaaf (1963) says,
"The spirit of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, is typified by man's
increasing mastery over his physical environment" (p. 15).
Today we can easily recognise just how significant the 'control' value is
within the general culture, because when a natural disaster occurs - a flood, a
drought or an earthquake perhaps - there is not just a feeling of compassion
for the victims. There is also a genuine concern that such things might have
been prevented, or at least that they might have been predicted, and protective measures taken. There is a measure of annoyance, regret, and even guilt
attached to our inability to control some of the forces of nature.
The development of science through Mathematics shows us the well-known
progression from description, through explanation to prediction, and as
science with its applications has grown in respectability, and acceptability, so
the pace of scientific research has increased. In all fields the thrust is towards
control of environment, or matter, and the tools are of course Mathematical.!
With reference to Horton's point which I mentioned earlier, it is interesting
to see how we are now attempting to explain and control our (unknowable?)
social environment through the development of social science. The procedure
is to try to understand human and social phenomena in Mathematical terms,
in order to find rationally acceptable explanations of those phenomena and to
help us handle social 'problems'. To do that however, we must first objectivise them, and that is where the ideas can conflict with the perceived reality.
Can we really treat people, their behaviours and feelings, and their relationships with others as 'objects'? Nevertheless that is what is being attempted
and we do not yet really know the consequences of the attempt. What we can
see, though, is that Mathematics, through science, is again being used to
further our control over the environment, in this case the social environment,
and the idea of Mathematics as a tool for gaining that control is once again
being strongly reinforced.
71
The power of Mathematical knowledge can also be well understood by any

learner of Mathematics. The 'facts' and algorithms of familiar Mathematics
can offer feelings of security and control which are hard to resist. It is possible
to kindle a glow of satisfaction and aesthetic pleasure, when a learner is faced
with a messy collection of number facts, or a set of seemingly random shapes
and, by a certain organisation or structuring, the pattern is suddenly revealed,
and order reigns where all seemed chaos! Mathematics so clearly is about
control. Facts are facts, theorems are proved. The abstract objects under
consideration behave predictably, and according to the well-formulated rules
of the Mathematical game. It is still amazing to some to realise that it is not
necessary to check empirically the results of a long multiplication which you
have just completed algorithmically because you just know that the answer
must be right.
Where other subjects in the school curriculum offer merely 'authoritative'
opinions, or conflicting stories, or the dubious evidence of selective examples,
the security offered by Mathematical knowledge is great indeed. And it is not
just young children who can feel this. As one progresses in Mathematics, the
objects, the symbols, the rules become so familiar that they take on a certain
kind of friendliness. So, when one has not done any Mathematics for some
time, it is nice to get back to the 'friends' again and to rediscover the
fascination and pleasure of secure predictability and control, within the
'Magic Circle' of the Mathematical game.
The feeding of Mathematical ideas back into society via technological
developments is another example of this desire for control, since technology
can have control built into it. Also, since artifacts are inevitably simpler than
natural phenomena, it is easier to establish control over those artifacts than
over nature, and the satisfactions and security accruing from this increased
control will surely speed technological development even more.
Control, however, is a double-edged sword since, in order to control
something, one's behaviour also needs to be modified and it is that 'something' which does the modifying! As various people have pointed out, not
only does a programmer program the computer but the computer also
programs the programmer! In Ellul's (1980) terms, humans themselves are
now trapped in the very technological environment which they have created,
and in order to survive they have had to adapt. They have thus become
merely pieces in the whole technological system, just 'cogs in the machine'.
The control offered by Mathematical knowledge via technological development has been so great that the process cannot now be reversed. Hence
Ellul's pessimism.
Yet there is no doubting the fact that when Mathematics is understood and
mastered it develops strong feelings of control, security and even mastery in
the adept. Not only does one learn this within Mathematics, so to speak,
through the algorithms, the rules, the procedures and the criteria which,
when adhered to, will necessarily have certain corollaries. One also learns it in
relation to the external world in that phenomena can be seen to 'obey' laws
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derived from Mathematics. It was the Greeks who first sought a Mathematical
interpretation of the whole universe, and it was they who first postulated the
Mathematical design of nature. Since that time, as I pointed out in the
previous chapter, designing has had a great deal to do with environmental
control, and Mathematical designing offers an infinitely generalisable tool, a
powerful symbolic technology for creating environmental control and therefore a kind of security in our ever-changing world.
3.5. SENTIMENT - PROGRESS
There is, however, a second strong feeling and attitude surrounding Mathematics and I choose the label of 'progress' for this, the complementary
partner to 'control'. Progress represents a more dynamic feeling than the
previous one: control, with its overtones of security, has a more static set of
associations.
So we have here the feelings of growth, of development, of progress, and of
change, and the first point of importance about this value is that the unknown
can become known. Mathematics developed because it proved itself. With
the early offering of rational and material explanations, which could be
checked against empirical evidence, came the exciting feeling that it is
possible to understand more, that one need not forever be ignorant about
certain phenomena. Mathematics offered the first real opportunity for the
cumulative growth of knowledge. As we saw for the atomists earlier, the
logical growth of Mathematical knowledge was the aim. It is only sustained of
course by virtue of the security and control gained by previous generations
and by the fact that the knowledge which they generated can be checked and
verified by later generations. But growth is achieved and is therefore felt to be
continually achievable.
Once again the learner of Mathematics can understand this feeling. Having
developed, say, an algorithm for solving a certain problem it is extremely
revealing to know then that other problems are therefore solvable. This
realisation soon develops the idea that one can indeed tackle 'unknown'
problems to try to find ways to solve them. It is the abstractions of Mathematics that enable this generalisation from one 'known' problem to another
'potentially solvable' problem, to be made.
Another way this value can be seen is when control and security are
challenged. This can be a personal, or indeed collective, challenge. In the
elementary school adding and multiplying always made things bigger, while
subtracting and dividing made things smaller. Then, perhaps in the secondary
school, one meets 'nasty' things like fractions, and negative numbers which
don't behave themselves at all! Not only can you multiply certain numbers
together and get a result smaller than either, but you can also take something
away and get an answer bigger than you started with! What you then learn is
that, because this is Mathematics, all this seeming chaos will be organised,
VALUES OF MATHEMA TICAL CULTURE
73
structured, and thus explained, in such a way that the knowledge will once
again offer security. That is Mathematical progress experienced personally.
Collectively, of course, Mathematicians have also gone through this kind of
challenge often, be it when the possibility of different geometries became a
reality, for example, or when Godel's theorem became known. But, if
Mathematics can't assimilate the new ideas it has to change its collective
'schema' by accommodation. Even so these accommodations are slow to filter
into the general culture - most people are still very satisfied by the feelings of
control and predictability offered by Mathematical ideas, even if Mathematicians know that progress has taught us that these ideas are just as open to
change as are any other ideas.
One characteristic associated with progress is that of alternativism - the
recognition and valuing of alternatives. This is such a fundamental point that
it is often overlooked, particularly in the cross-cultural literature. Horton
(1967) is one writer who does recognise it, however: "in traditional cultures
there is no developed awareness of alternatives to the established body of
theoretical tenets; whereas in scientifically oriented cultures, such an awareness is highly developed" (p. 230).
Fasheh (1982) does too: "the main objective of teaching mathematics in
developing countries, is (to teach students) to doubt, to inquire, to discover,
to see alternatives, and, most important of all, to construct new perspectives
and convictions" (p. 3) sentiments with which many in more developed
countries would also concur. Nowadays, in Mathematics, this spirit is very
strong - definitions, procedures, algorithms, axioms, proofs, are all capable
of rich variation, and the exploration of alternatives is a powerful source of
new research. In 'Western' society generally the spirit of alternativism seems
to be alive and well, with alternative economies developing, alternative
religions being studied and alternative lifestyles being pursued.
However, another perspective on Mathematical progress is offered by our
increasingly technologically oriented society. Technology, and the artificial
environment, not only gives us control and security but it also encourages the
pursuit of progress through further technological developments. The presence now of the ubiquitous computer has of course spurred on this process
even faster. Alternatives can be explored quickly via simulations, possibilities
evaluated, imagined lines of development compared and 'progress', far from
being a dramatic and impressive concept, is taken for granted, just as
'alternativism' is starting to be.
Lancy (1983), amongst others, sounds an important note of caution about
this situation. With reference to his stage theory with which I began this
chapter, he says: "If culture takes over the cognitive processes that nature
provides after Stage I and shapes them to its own ends during Stage II, the
processes that are engendered in Stage III have the potential to supercede the
culture that bred them and begin to take over as steering mechanisms as in
Huxley'S Brave New World" (p. 209). Change, for example, can come to be
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valued for its own sake. Progress can be seen as its own reward and the quest
for Mathematically-inspired technological solutions to the human predicament carries with it an implicit (and therefore, unexamined) goal of 'improvement'.
One of the dangers of the desire for 'progress' and change is that this
necessarily creates dissatisfactions and concerns about the extent of 'control'
and security which one has over the environment. The very richness of
available alternatives creates its own insecurity! Horton, from the perspective
of the anthropologist says:
Like the quest for purity of motive, however, the faith in progress is a double-edged weapon. For
the lingering insecurity which is one of the roots of this faith leads all too often to an excessive
fixation of hopes and desires on an imagined utopian future. People cling to such a future in the
same way that men in pre-scientific cultures cling to the past. In doing so, they inevitably lose
much of the traditionalists ability to enjoy and glorify the moment he lives in (p. 255).
Another danger is that if society puts too great a store on technological

'progress' as in some s0cieties, the result can be the proliferation of products
not necessarily needed by that society, and for which the 'need' has to be
created. The economies of these societies are now so dependent on technology and on technological 'solutions' to problems that their social institutions
are now 'trapped' by this manufactured environment. The difficulty is how to
progress by offering non-technological solutions to problems created by, and
defined in terms of, technological growth and achievement.
To make matters worse, many of these manufactured products can create
more problems than they solve. Whether one considers pesticides, medicines,
aeroplanes, food additives or armaments it is now vitally important for
educators to consider the question, do the disadvantages of technologically
defined progress outweigh the advantages? Kothari (1978) says, "what man
has discovered everywhere be it an affluent country or a poor country, is that
this link between science, technology and productivity is not enough for the
welfare ofthe people. You can have great science, great technology and great
productivity, and yet there can be appalling poverty" (p. 17).2.
Dahrendorf (1979) echoes this sentiment and goes even further "The
discovery that science is morally ambivalent, that its creative force is balanced
by its destructive force, has changed fundamentally the readiness of people to
regard 'rational' as synonymous with 'good' ". Another writer who has
pursued this theme is Habermas (1971) who says "The capacity for control
made possible by the empirical sciences is not to be confused with the capacity
for enlightened action" (p. 56).3
I have dwelt on this point at length in order to re-emphasise the point made
earlier that it is impossible to treat Mathematics as if it were value-free. These
complementary feelings of control and progress, which, so constructively,
have enabled Mathematical culture to develop and prosper, have at the
same time shown us their own destructive potential. The Mathematico-
V ALUES OF MATHEMATICAL CULTURE
75
technological world-view has its dangers as well as its benefits, once again.
We are at a highly significant phase of our culture's development, in that
these values of control and progress are really being put to the test. Only in
this generation has it become technologically possible to completely destroy
the world and all its cultures. Do we now have the faith we once had in this
technologically-defined control and progress?
In relation to the specific area of this book, namely a certain kind of
cultural knowledge, I wonder whether these values still have the emotional
power to offer us an appropriate balance? Or could it be that as our faith in
technological solutions becomes undermined, so other 'sentimental' values
become more significant? Education, generally has a responsibility to face
these challenges.
3.6. SOCIOLOGY - OPENNESS
Let us now examine the values associated with White's sociological component. For us these concern relationships between people, and within social
institutions, in relation to Mathematical knowledge, and we can again detect
two complementary sets of values. The first of these I call 'openness', and
concerns the fact that Mathematical truths, propositions and ideas generally,
are open to examination by all. The second I call 'mystery', related to where
Mathematical ideas come from and who generates them.
First of all, as I have said earlier, Mathematics is clearly felt not to be that
part of our culture where opinions rule. Opinions are held by certain people,
whereas Mathematics deal with 'facts', like Pythagoras's theorem, which can
be verified again and again, in whatever school (or planet) one likes, and it
will hold true. It was one of the triumphs of the Greeks that they developed
the skills of articulation and demonstration in Mathematics. It was not
enough for them just to believe something to be true, one had to be able to
show that it was true, so that it could be openly verified. The processes of
articulation and demonstration became a focus of concern, and the idea of
'proof' was born. Mathematical principles, then, are truths, as we like to
think of them, namely open and secure knowledge. They don't go out of date,
they don 't d~pend on one's political party, they don't vary from country to
country, they are universal and they are 'pure' knowledge.
Of course it is important for this 'purity' that Mathematics is not about
concrete, tangible objects, as I said e~rlier. It is about abstractions which
concern those tangible objects. Drawn triangles may suffer from all sorts of
defects but the abstract triangle offers 'truths' about which one can feel
secure, and which anyone can verify over and over again not by drawing,
although that can help, but by proof. Moreover it is important for Mathematicians to depersonalise their inventions. Davies and Hersh say about the Ideal
Mathematician: "His writing follows an unbreakable convention: to conceal
any sign that the author or the intended reader is a human being. It gives the
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impression that, from the stated definitions, the desired results follow infallibly by a purely mechanical procedure. In fact, no computing machine has
ever been built that could accept his definitions as inputs."
The most important corollary of this idea for us is that Mathematical
knowledge is open to everybody and anybody to 'own'. You can convince
yourself that any Mathematical principle is true, nobody has to persuade you
- "the facts speak for themselves". Provided that you perform the correct
procedures, and keep to the rules, logic will do the rest. It is the logic of the
Mathematics itself that will persuade you that the conclusions are true. That is
why a good teacher 'will insist on the learner demonstrating and explaining
why a Mathematical truth is so, rather than merely accepting a reason such as
"It looks as if it is true". 4
How powerful that kind of knowledge can appear to be when placed next to
'other-people's' knowledge and authoritative opinion. It is difficult to imagine
a more individual 'charter' for cultural knowledge, except if we are so used to
it that we take it for granted. One is not a prisoner to tyrannical control, not
forever at the mercy of gods who must be appeased, nor is one bound to
certain people in authority. With rationalism as an ideology and progress as
the goal, individuals are liberated to question, to create alternatives and to
seek rational solutions to their life's problems.
Mathematical knowledge, being open and dehumanised, thus reinforces
and stimulates feelings of democracy and liberation within our societies and
our social institutions. Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) was a leading thinker in
this direction, as Kline documents "he boldly carried the banner of reason
into realms of thought previously ruled by authoritarian traditionalism, and
he sought a rationalistic approach to a system of ethics which served the
common man" (p. 370). John Locke was another political theorist who
pursued the logical basis for the existence of governments, and Kline shows us
convincingly just how strongly Thomas Jefferson's Declaration of Independence was influenced by the writings of Locke, to the extent that it actually
quotes some of Locke's phrases. It is no coincidence that these connections
are made. In the Age of Reason, Mathematics was the epitome of all that
could be rationalised, and ethics, human nature, government and economics
were obvious candidates for the application of Mathematical values.
Once again, though, it is the articulation and demonstration in the form of
a declaration which is of prime significance. Mathematics requires, invites and
encourages the value of openness and also makes (in this case) 'independence' an object by formalising it in a declaration. Similar reasons exist for
the production of the constitutions, agendas, manifestos, chapters and other
formal documents of democratic institutions. Formalising means giving something a form, be it a theorem, principle, algorithm or proof, in order that it
will not remain implicit and hidden, and perhaps therefore, not acceptable.
Formalising makes the idea explicit, makes it an object even, open to
criticism and objective analysis, and thereby shareable. This is clearly the
counterpart of 'objectism' as described earlier.
77
Perhaps one should say 'potentially shareable' above: firstly because one
needs to know the conventions of the symbols and of the logic being used, and
secondly because exposing arguments and propositions .doesn't necessarily
make the ideas or the conclusions appealing, which is also emotionally
necessary for sharing. In fact the opposite sentiment is often aroused. Frequently the exposition of principles and the opening up of arguments for
critical examination and analysis only points up deficiencies, weaknesses and
errors. As Fasheh points out: "Teaching people to question, to doubt, to
argue, to experiment, and to be critical, and teaching that increases the
awareness of students, constitute in my opinion, the real threat to existing and
established institutions, beliefs and authorities everywhere and of every kind"
(p.7).
So the view that Mathematics espouses, of an open and indeed a democratic perspective on knowledge, whilst being a very acceptable sentiment
from the individual's perspective, can create problems in a social context if
one is thereby either challenging the views of those in authority, for example,
or if one is thereby exposing traditional wisdoms to the harsh criticism of
rational analysis.
What needs to happen, it seems, is that just as rationalism helped societies
to progress to where they are today so it can be used as the guardian of
development in the future, particularly when allied with alternativism. What
is necessary, Habermas would argue, is that the ethic rationalism should
permeate throughout societal and institutional structures, thereby helping to
replace 'domination' as the primary motive. As he says: "The irrationality of
domination, which today has become a collective peril to life, could be
mastered only by the development of a political decision-making process tied
to the principle of general discussion free from domination. Our only hope for
the rationalisation of the power structure lies in conditions that favour
political power for thought developing through dialogue".
However, as many people have found throughout history, and others are
still finding today in many countries in all parts of the world, it is not always
socially acceptable to be logical, precise, critical and argumentative. However
attractive the rational, progressive, and open world-view may be as a charter
for an individual's life-style, there is much more to the reality of social
intercourse. Emotion, social mores, history, vested interests, politics, interpersonal attractions and repulsions, have powers of their own which rationalism and openness may not be able to challenge even within avowedly
democratic societies. Nevertheless, the educational imperative is clearly there
to demonstrate, and critically evaluate, the value of openness as represented
by Mathematical knowledge.
3.7. SOCIOLOGY - MYSTERY
The final significant value associated with Mathematics I have labelled 'mystery', because one of the paradoxes of Mathematics is that even though
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Mathematical culture brings with it the values of 'openness' and accessibility,

people still feel very mystified about just what Mathematics is.
Even though it is the most widely taught subject in the whole world, it is
still one of the most 'opaque' of subjects and one which most people worry
about and feel ignorant about. Moreover it is not just the people-in-the-street
who feel that Mathematics is a mystery; the Mathematician can also feel this
too. Bertrand Russell's profound yet 'flippant' remark is still very true:
"mathematics is the subject in which we never know what we are talking
about, nor whether what we are saying is true". Indeed it is at the highest
levels in a culture that the fragility of knowledge is perhaps best understood.
But how do the rest of us - the 'host culture' as Wilder calls it - relate to
Mathematicians? If Mathematics is a mystery to many, then, what can we say
of our relationship with Mathematicians?
Clearly they are just as mysterious, given that we know so little about them.
We can learn about the subject which is defined (by someone) as Mathematics, we know some elementary parts of it, we work with it at various levels
and we also think we understand some of it. We know that it was Mathematicians who generated this knowledge,or we assume we know - we actually
have to believe rather a lot sometimes. We have heard of various names:
al-Khowarizmi, Archimedes, Argand, Bolyai, Boole, Cantor, Cauchy, Dedekind, Descartes, Eratosthenes, Euclid, Euler, Fibonacci, Fourier, Galileo,
Galois, Gauss, Godel, Hilbert, Kronecker, Leibniz, Lobachevski, Napier,
Newton, Peano, Plato, Ptolemy, Pythagoras, Riemann, Russell, Thales,
Whitehead. We know some anecdotes about them, and we may have read
some stories about their lives. But we actually know some of their Mathematical products and 'objects' better - Archimedes' Principle, Cauchy Series,
Dedekind Cuts, Euclid's Elements, The Sieve of Eratosthenes, Fibonacci
Series, Fourier Analysis, Godel's Incompleteness Theorem, Napier's Bones,
Newtonian Mechanics, Peano's Postulates, Platonic Solids, Pythagoras'
Theorem, Russell's Paradox.
The 'openness' value described earlier requires that Mathematical knowledge be dehumanised in order to make it open, and it is therefore rather
difficult to think about a relationship with people who generated such 'dehumaniseable' knowledge. The fact that it is Pythagoras who is named with The
Theorem' about sides of right-angled triangles is irrelevant. In fact of course,
The Theorem was known well before his time. That is what we now know
about 'openness', and it can come as rather a shock. The mystery surrounding
Mathematicians as people therefore deepens.
Not only are those Mathematicians mysterious to us, from our perspective
on Mathematical history, they were mysterious and largely unknown to their
peers - just as present-day Mathematicians are largely unknown and mysterious to the rest of society now. Indeed one could say that Mathematicians have
often taken steps to preserve their mystery. This seems to have been achieved
by a combination of exclusiveness and detachment on the one hand, and of
79
association with others who shared their distaste of 'lesser mortals'! Ever
since the early Greeks began to give us not only Mathematics but also
Mathematicians, the cultivation of exclusivity seems to have been a concern.
'Abstraction' was necessary for the cultivation of Mathematics and the
Greeks were in a good position to do that - it also served to keep the
Mathematicians abstract, remote, and exclusive. There were strong similarities to the spirit of monasteries. Plato talked of 'philosopher-kings' as well, of
course, and Mathematics was to form a very large part of their training, as he
felt it should for anyone preparing to govern.
The later Pythagoreans also fused the Mathematical and the mystical and
were even more concerned with preserving their exclusiveness. Their members had to take a pledge of secrecy and were bound to the brotherhood for
life. Thomas Aquinas, much later on, worked closely with the Church and
according to Kline "undertook to provide a firm logical structure for theology
and to combine Catholic doctrine and Aristotelian philosophy in one rational
system". This "earned for his work the title of the 'spiritual Euclid' "
(p. 119).
Up to the sixteenth century, the Mathematician was not only an exclusive
being, but had also associated with other exclusive beings, mostly philosophers and religious leaders of all kinds. Exclusive by nature, and by association, the Mathematicians were indeed a formidable force in the later
developments which culminated in the Mathematising of all of nature. "God
the Mathematician" was no mere explanation - as a Mathematician yourself,
you were an associate of God!
Of course the events in the last two centuries have certainly continued the
tradition of the Mathematician's exclusivity and mysteriousness. Davis and
Hersh offer us the perfect picture of what they call the 'Ideal Mathematician'
and his exclusivity: "The ideal mathematician's work is intelligible only to a
small group of specialists, numbering a few dozen or at most a few hundred.
This group has existed only for a few decades, and there is every possibility
that it may become extinct in another few decades" (p. 34). "He is labelled by
his field, by how much he publishes, and especially by whose work he uses,
and by whose taste he follows in his choice of problems" (p. 35). "He studies
objects whose existence is unsuspected by all except a handful of his fellows.
Indeed, if one who is not an initiate asks him what he studies, he is incapable
of showing or telling what it is. It is necessary to go through an arduous
apprenticeship of several years to understand the theory to which he is
devoted. Only then would one's mind be prepared to receive his explanation
of what he is studying" (p. 35).
Moreover in the latter part of this present century we have to consider the
computer's role, and we can clearly see how the feeling of mystery is
developing with the increasing presence and influence of this technology.
Although its availability has also increased with miniaturisation, so that many
more people are now computer users, its speed, flexibility of use, and
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power-to-size ratio gives it a 'magic-box' aura. It is also difficult to understand, impossible to repair, and hard to modify unless one is 'an expert'. One
cannot properly use it unless and until one has learnt to communicate with it,
and the popular notion of 'the electronic brain' is a strongly held image. In
some way the computer seems not really to be understood as technology,
since looking at the actual hardware tells one nothing - it is therefore literally
as unknowable as another human being's brain. Despite a century or two of
research the functioning of the human brain is in itself a total mystery to most
people, so it is no surprise that an electronic brain is just as mysterious, if not
more so.
Mathematicians are now of course working with computers, and thus their
influence is certainly affecting the development of Mathematics itself. We can
for example find a movement from dialectical Mathematics to algorithmic
Mathematics, clearly brought about by the presence of the computer and by
developments in numerical analysis. So, in place of Philosopher-Kings and
Gods, Mathematicians now associate with the computer - perhaps the new
symbol of power, and certainly the new symbol of mystery. Mathematics, at
its research 'cutting' edge, thereby continues to foster feelings of mystery and
exclusivity.
The same aspect is familiar to all of us, since mystery in Mathematics is
related to the fact that one is dealing with abstractions. The more abstract the
ideas become, the less contextualised they will be and therefore the less
meaningful also. There seem to be few problems for anybody in understanding counting numbers, different geometric shapes and the other mathematical
ideas generated by the environmental activities of Chapter 2. But as soon as
one moves into different kinds of numbers, particularly irrationals and imaginary numbers (as their names suggest), or infinities, abstract algebras and
non-Euclidean geometries, one can have difficulties. This is where the environmentally-based and culturally-shaped intuitions of 'natural' perception
start to be of little value, and despite the fact that one can be trained to treat
these abstract entities as if they were objects (viz., the ideology of objectism)
they nevertheless have little meaning to most people. Even to Mathematicians they have presented many problems throughout history. 5
The word 'meaning' is of course not well defined here, but I am using it in
the sense that an idea is meaningful to someone to the extent that it makes
connections with other ideas known by that person. An idea such as 'symmetry' will probably make many connections with other Mathematical ideas
and with 'phenomena' which illustrate aspects of symmetry, in geometric
shapes, in numbers, in games, in words and letters, in people, in physical
properties, in human relationships, etc. For most people 'symmetry' is a very
rich concept. But a few steps down the Mathematical road one might meet
'groups, rings and fields' and although the actual words may conjure up
individual images, and perhaps even a fascinating composite image, these
'objects' will necessarily have less meaning. They may of course develop more
V ALVES OF MA THEMA TICAL CVL TURE
81
meaning within Mathematics, as more Mathematical connections are generated, and one can always retrace the abstracting steps to get back to, for
example, symmetry.
Professional Mathematicians who work with completely abstract phenomena as if they were objects will argue that these objects do have plenty of
meaning for them, and indeed their research is about establishing more
meanings about them. But that has not always been so and, for most people,
such abstract entities as groups, rings and fields are literally abstract and are
therefore essentially meaningless. Whether they will remain so is of course an
open question. It wasn't too many centuries ago that European Mathematicians overcame their prejudices and accepted the importance of negative
numbers, which had been developed by the Hindus many centuries previously
in order to help with their book-keeping procedures in business. Nowadays of
course negative numbers are familiar to most of us.
However, as Mathematics has grown, by the thrust and penetration of
rationalism and by its ability to objectivise both nature and other abstractions, so the real meaning of Mathematical objects has become more problematic. The mystery of Mathematics has grown, along with its power and
influence. 6
The irony, of course, is that it was, and still is, the power of Mathematically-based explanations of phenomena which pulled people away from other
kinds of explanation - magic, witchcraft, supernatural forces, gods, authorit(!.rian history or legend. So has one kind of mystery merely been substituted for
another? The short answer is 'yes', and indeed numerology and the general
fascination with number lore, geomancy and astrology certainly did much to
create a wide interest in Mathematical ideas. However a rather longer answer
must take account of the nature and tautology of 'explanation'.
As I said in Chapter 2, 'explaining' concerns making connections between
ideas - that is all - however profound these explanations might be. The
connections between phenomena are something else. If, as is often reported,
Newton, along with the other mathematicians of his era, believed that God
had designed the world according to Mathematical principles, this cannot be
dismissed as mere sophisticated idolatry. The status of this explanation is that
the idea of 'God the Mathematician' was a perfectly sensible connection
linking the idea of 'God' with the idea of the all-embracing Mathematical
explanations of natural phenomena. The problem begins if one thinks that
one has connected a real 'God' with real natural phenomena. There is nothing
wrong with believing that connection, don't misunderstand me. My point is
that an explanation is not a connection between real entities. And the biggest
mystery is "What is real?" which is destined to remain forever a mystery!
CHAPTER 4
MATHEMATICAL CULTURE AND THE CHILD
4.1. MATHEMATICAL CULTURE - SYMBOLIC TECHNOLOGY AND VALUES
I am now in a position to claim that Mathematics is that part of our culture

which has the specific symbolic technology described towards the end of
Chapter 2, underpinned by the values described in the last chapter.
That is, the activities of counting, locating, measuring, designing, playing
and explaining have, individually and in interaction, been instrumental in
developing the complex symbolisations and conceptualisations of Mathematics, as we know the internationalised discipline today. This particular symbolic technology, however, is only one kind, and is the result of a particular
set of cultural interactions and societal developments. Other cultures have
generated and will generate, I am sure, other symbolic technologies, and we
can now understand the existence of other mathematics.
The particular societal developments which have given rise to Mathematics
have also ensured that it is a product of various values; values which have
been recognised to be of significance in those societies. Mathematics, as a
cultural phenomenon, only makes sense if those values are also made explicit.
I have described them as complementary pairs, where rationalism and objectism are the twin ideologies of Mathematics, those of control and progress are
the attitudinal values which drive Mathematical development and, sociologically, the values of openness and mystery are those related to potential
ownership of, or distance from Mathematical knowledge and the relationship
between the people who generate that knowledge and others.
Note that I am not arguing that these are the values that are associated with
mathematics - the pan-cultural phenomenon. Just as we have seen in Chapter
2, differences exist in the way things are counted, locations are described etc.,
so one would expect to find differences in the values sustained by, and
themselves producing, the particular mathematics of any particular society.
We know that the Greek mathematics had a very different approach from
Roman mathematics (if I can use those rather global descriptors). Moreover
as Ronan says of Chinese mathematics: "There was an absence of the idea of
rigorous proof, possibly as a result of the mental outlook which avoided the
development of formal logic in China and which allowed associative or
organic thinking to dominate .... Mathematics in China was (therefore)
utilitarian, its social origins bound up with the problems the ruling officials
had to solve. . . . This does not mean that Chinese calculators were not
interested in truth, but it was not that abstract systematised academic truth
which the Greeks sought" (pp. 62-63).1
It would therefore seem to be possible to discuss the values of any society's
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mathematics under White's categories, if only the data existed in any substantial form. It is only comparatively recently that we have been gaining access to
anthropological data from around the world about such things as counting
and measuring, and it would require much more data to begin to discuss
values in any serious way. Moreover it is arguable whether a 'foreigner' like
me would be able to, or indeed should, attempt to discuss such deeply felt
aspects of other people's culture as their values. I may already have gone too
far in Chapters 2 and 3, and have shown myself to be guilty of the usual
offence of simplifying others' cultures in order to clarify points about my own.
If this is the case, then I apologise to people from those cultures.
We do have some suggestions about other values, of course, and I have
hinted at what some of these might be in comparison with those I have
described in detail. It is therefore not just the individual sets of values which
are significant, but also their interaction, and particularly their respective
balance within society. I have referred to the values of Mathematics as being
complementary pairs precisely in order that one can reflect on the aspects of
interaction and balance.
I do this not just to enable historical analysis to progress, though it is very
tempting to do that in the case of Mathematical development through the
different societies. I must leave that to others. My concern is rather that in
discussing education in relation to Mathematics, it is critical to consider
balances and interactions between values within society. Education, as an
intentional pursuit, must be concerned with choices. Mathematics education
is no different and the choices must therefore concern not just the various
symbolisations and conceptualisations of Mathematics, but the values also.
For example, in the first chapter of this book I characterised present
Mathematics teaching in practice in a certain way. It should be clear now that
behind that characterisation lies a certain balance of values.
That balance, in relation to ideology, seems to me to lean more towards
objectism than towards rationalism, in relation to the sentiment it leans more
towards control than towards progress, and in relation to the sociology it
leans more towards mystery than towards openness. Mathematics, as it is
perceived and presented through education in many countries today, is I
suggest characterisable as objective fact, supporting a feeling of control over
our environment through science and technology, but which remains largely a
mystery. Moreover, as I said earlier, the values are principally unknown they are developed unconsciously, implicitly and uncritically. In that sense
then, Mathematics teaching is reduced to being merely Mathematics training
- a pointless exercise if one is never going on to use the Mathematics.
As a result it is misunderstood by the vast majority of people. To try to
persuade the 'person in the street' that Mathematics is invented, not discovered, that hundreds of different counting system exist, that you can never
draw a triangle whose angle sum is precisely 180 or that we can never know
whether anything we prove is true, are formidable challenges indeed. But in
0
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my view, we who work in the area of Mathematics education have a duty to

meet challenges like those, for society's and for culture's sake.
I believe further that it is necessary in our education to redress the value
balances described above. In particular I personally seek a Mathematical
education which emphasises rationalism over objectism, which is concerned
more with progress than with control, and which develops in society more
openness and less mystery. 2 Let me then begin the consideration of how to
describe Mathematical education, in order that those balances might be
achieved.
4.2. THE CULTURE OF A PEOPLE
First of all we must become a little clearer about the people 'in' this culture.
As I said in Chapter 1 the people/ideas distinction in cultural discussions is a
complicated one, and it is particularly so for us here. Whereas anthropologists
usually define the group of people first, and then proceed to describe and
analyse specific aspects of their culture, rather as Wilder (1973) has done, I
have chosen to reverse the normal process in order not to be exclusive about
which people are, or can be, associated with the Mathematical culture. Also
what seemed to me important above all else was to clarify what the culture
was concerned with, first of all.
The danger with this approach, of course, is that the people then become
defined solely in terms of their culture - a potentially dehumanising approach.
It is also a greater problem from an educational perspective in that it would
become all too easy to consider children as generic, unenculturated learners. I
clearly must attend to this ideas/people issue, hence the title of this chapter.
It is important early on to be clear about what being associated with this
Mathematical culture is not determined by. In my view it is not restricted by
nationality, geography, race or creed. What sometimes is labelled as a part of
'Western' culture is understood in many areas of the world although it would
be the case that many more people feel sympathy with the Mathematical
culture in 'Western' industrialised societies than in other regions of the world.
Nevertheless it would be thoroughly wrong to call Mathematical culture
'Western' - that would give it certain other ideological overtones, and also it
would fail to give due recognition to the historical facts concerning the roles
of many nations and peoples in developing Mathematical culture, particularly
countries not now generally considered to be 'Western', e.g. predominantly
Muslim countries and India.
As I said in the first chapter the people in a cultural group are those for
whom the values of that culture act as a social 'glue', binding them together.
Kelly (1955) puts it this way: "Persons belong to the same cultural group not
merely because they behave alike nor because they expect the same thing of
others, but especially because they continue to construe their experience in
the same way" (p. 94). Similarly, anyone who shares in, adopts the values and
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characteristics of Mathematical culture, and "construes their experience" in

the ways described in the preceding sections, by definition belongs to that
cultural group. But it is important for considering cultural induction to
separate out different sub-groups in terms of their relationship with the
Mathematical culture.
Davies (1973) gives us a useful starting-point when he develops distinctions
between three levels of culture - the technical, the formal and the informal.
The technical culture of Mathematics, Davies says, includes the symbols and
arguments needed by Mathematicians in research, "then there is the formal
culture (concepts of number, symmetry and logic built into everyday life) and
informal culture (the ad hoc measurements to account for particular situations: 'it's not very far to town' " (p. 323). Let us extend these ideas further
by looking at the three levels in terms of their usage:
1. At the informal level we all use the symbolisations and conceptualisation of
Mathematics implicitly and imprecisely. The Mathematical ideas may be
largely submerged by the situational context, and the Mathematical values
may be overriden by different emotional or social considerations. For example, the social situation may be such that it would be considered impolite,
arrogant, offensive, or even dangerous to accuse the other person of being
illogical! Indeed even to analyse certain everyday informal interactions from
the perspective of rationalism would seem preposterous.
People would not be involved, at that time, in any formal or technical way
with Mathematical culture. To put it another way, some people may never be
involved with explaining phenomena Mathematically, and even those who are
won't be all the time, or won't in all their social interactions. Nevertheless
cultural involvement at this level is still significant even though it is largely
unconscious. It would be part of the implicit, taken-for-granted assumption
about shared values in society.
Cultural involvement at this level feeds off, and feeds into, the next level of
culture, the formal level, but itself has no independent cultural status. Nevertheless, because we all function at this level with our culture it is important to
recognise it, and to know how this level differs from the next. In 'ordinary
conversation' at the informal level, for example, words like 'always', 'never',
'equals' will be used, but will not usually have the precise meanings which
they have in Mathematics, and the short-cut arithmetical techniques of street
traders, for example, will derive from current technology or symbolism, but
have no power of generalisability beyond the specific context. 3
2. At the formal level, the use of the symbolisations and conceptualisations
would be deliberate, conscious and explicit and the values would be assumed
and supported. Many people operate at this level with their work, including
such disparate groups as engineers, architects, designers, economists and
map-makers. They are users of the Mathematical culture in their work as well
as contributors to it by their constant and conscious validation of it. Others
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who interact with them might well be more critical of their uses of particular
concepts and arguments in particular situations, e.g. those concerned with
economic predictions, environmental conflicts, and moral arguments of control and progress, especially if the Mathematical values are confronting other
societal values. Perhaps it is worth distinguishing between two sub-levels
here:
(a) the level where the Mathematical values are assumed and accepted
without question, and
(b) the level where other aspects of the situation impinge on these values and
make people question the validity of a purely Mathematical interpretation of the situation.
The distinction could be, for example, between a situation where a choice of
Mathematical approaches exists and is debated, and one where whether to
use Mathematical techniques at all is debated. The nuclear disarmament issue
is a good example, where many other values besides Mathematical will
influence debates and decisions.
Activity at this formal level therefore once again feeds off, and feeds into,
the next level, the technical, though the time-scale is rather different from
that at the formal/informal interface. That is, at the formal level, the Mathematics in use will probably be from former eras of technical activity, whereas
informal activity will be much closer (in time) to the ideas and techniques of
the formal level. But the formal level is the level at which ideas generated at
the technical level interact with other disciplines, other perspectives, other
values, and other technologies. The formal level of Mathematical culture is
the validating level of the culture.
3. At the technical level the whole symbolic system of Mathematics itself is
being developed and criticised - though this time not from outside the
Mathematical culture as in 2b above but criticised from within the culture.
This is not to say that questions of cultural interfaces and dominance would
not be debated, but here they would tend to be considered in the abstract, as
theoretical issues, as philosophical problems, rather than as affecting practical
problems and real situations, where a single action must be decided on. This is
the level at which researchers work on Mathematical problems - the level at
which is generated the multitude of specialist Mathematical concepts and
techniques which it is assumed represent a growth of knowledge. (This is not
to devalue this activity but merely to repeat the idea that at this level, the
'growth of knowledge' is felt to be self-justifying.)
It is often assumed, wrongly in my view, that this level is the dominant
level, because it is the generator of Mathematical knowledge. This is for
example the 'level' and the group which Wilder (1973) considers to be the
'bearers' of the Mathematical culture, namely the 'Mathematicians' who he
87
says are "the possessors of the cultural element known as mathematics" (p.
26). I would challenge the idea of this group being the dominant group
because of the 'validating' role I mentioned played by those operating mainly
at the formal level.
I would go further than that however. The significance of considering
Davies' levels of Mathematical culture, I claim, is that it makes us realise that
everyone operating at all three levels (technical, formal, informal) is contributing to the culture's store of knowledge, values and development by using
the symbolisations of Mathematics, by behaving in relation to certain ideologies and by expressing feelings and sentiments which are culturally specific.
Even Wilder recognises the importance of other people besides mathematicians in the development of Mathematics. He talks of the "needs of the host
culture" and says "By 'host culture' is meant the culture of which the
mathematics forms a sub-culture" (p. 201).
Mathematical culture,as with any kind of culture, is a living thing, known
in action and recognised in process. As we saw in the section on 'Openness',
Mathematical culture should not be 'possessed' exclusively by anyone subgroup of people. 4 However it is also clear now that it is the formal level of
Mathematical culture which is of prime significance to us in education. Both
the 'technical' and the 'informal' feed into it and influence it, but it also
sustains the others. It is the formal culture of Mathematics which is at the core
of our society's valuing of Mathematics, and it is that to which we must refer
in our consideration of Mathematics education from a cultural perspective.
4.3. THE CHILD IN RELATION TO THE CULTURAL GROUP
What, then, is the child in relation to this culture? Is it an empty vessel

waiting to be filled? A wild animal waiting to be tamed and domesticated? An
uncultured learner waiting to be enculturated?
Perhaps the first thing to be said is that no child seems to learn by waiting
for something to be done to it! Children have an active, not a passive,
approach to life. Of course the 'passive' construction is brought about here by
my approach to the whole problem. Having defined and characterised what I
think Mathematics-as-culture is, the next logical move is to consider 'how to
pass it on'. Anthropology certainly does talk of 'cultural transmission', which
may actually make sense as a global concept i.e. when one considers each
generation, but which is no help when dealing with education at an individual
lev'el. It may be useful to believe that cultural values and norms 'are transmitted' from one generation to the next but it is dangerous to assume also that
the next generation is merely a collection of passive recipients of that
transmission.
The second point to make is that the child does not 'receive' culture as an
abstract entity. Cultural norms and values are represented by people, either
in person or as personal products (writing, artifacts, institutions etc.). Culture
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is transmitted by a generation of people. Therefore the question at the start of

this section is inappropriate for us. What we need to consider is the child in
relation to the cultural group. Hence the heading of this section.
The third point is that we should not just consider the 'generic' child.
Culture is transmitted from one generation of people to the next generation of
people. For 'the child' read 'children'. This is one of the aspects of much
present-day mathematics teaching which I criticised in the first chapter - the
practice of 'impersonal learning' - and which I want to see changed. Children
are different persons and their contributions to cultural development do
differ. A cultural perspective on Mathematics education must surely recognise the existence of individual personalities. The child is not an 'it'. Children
are young people with many different attributes and I am therefore seeking an
approach to a Mathematical education which will accept, recognise and
develop all children as individual personalities.
These preliminary points imply that I must search for a formulation for a
Mathematical education which represents children as active learners, engaged
in developing their cultural knowledge through social interaction with other
people within the cultural group, who are the carriers and bearers of ideas,
norms and values of that culture.
Clearly these interactions can, and will, take many forms. Children may
initiate activities and behaviours, and receive feedback of different kinds.
They may respond to the activity of others and learn whether their responses
are appropriate. They will share in social activities, the 'joint accomplish
ments' to use Lancy's phrase again, imitating and replicating behaviour which
is itself rewarded by being copied and built on. Less behaviourally, and in
terms of norms and values, they will begin to mentally construct and anticipate events and activity, and have these anticipations realised. As Kelly
(1955) says, "Construing is a way of seeing events that makes them look
regular ... By construing events it becomes possible to anticipate them"
(p. 76). Shared constructions grow into the cultural norms, the child's constructions become developed, cultural learning progresses, and a 'world-view'
begins to grow. Cultural ideas and values are learned in the process of living
and interacting with other people.
The social interactions will also vary according to the different personality
and interests of the children. No two children are identical and therefore the
ways they interact will differ. As a result, no two people will develop an
identical conception of their shared culture.
Cultural learning is therefore a re-creative act on the part of every person.
Each young person and every new generation of young people re-creates the
cultural symbols and values of their culture, 'lives' and validates them within
their lifetime, and then engages with the next generation who in their turn
re-create, redefine, and therefore 're-live' them. 5
Cultural learning is thus no simple one-way process from teacher to
learner. Enculturation, as it is more formally called, is a creative, interactive
MA THEMA TICAL CULTURE AND THE CHILD
89
process engaging those living the culture with those born into it, which results
in ideas, norms and values which are similar from one generation to the next
but which inevitably must be different in some way due to the re-creation role
of the next generation. 6
4.4. MATHEMATICAL ENCULTURATION
In terms of the group levels described earlier it is now clear that all adults
sharing the symbolic ideas and values of Mathematical culture will playa role
in informal enculturation - by discourse, by example, by cooperative working, by social interactions, etc. This will be done predominantly by the family
and by the community, who may also be members of the culture who can
operate at the formal or the technical levels.
Enculturation at the formal level, however, seems to be more of my specific
concern in this book. Where education is aimed at the formal level, it can help
to explain and understand various aspects of informal Mathematical culture,
whereas an induction into these informal aspects won't educate about the
formal culture of Mathematics. The establishment of formal enculturation
enables the process to take place at the appropriate level- namely, the formal
- where enculturation can be intentional and explicit, at least for a short,
formative period in every child's life.
For all intents and purposes, formal enculturation has of course been taken
over by the schools, although it need not stop there. For 'formal enculturation' therefore I could substitute the words 'formal education'. Once again
though, my general argument is that formal Mathematics education is at
present not the enculturating experience that it should be, because of the
criticisms to which I referred in the first chapter. So, I shall retain, as far as I
can, the term 'formal enculturation', to express, and to help me analyse what
I feel formal 'education' in Mathematics should constitute.
Formal Mathematical Enculturation has as its goal the induction of children
into the symbolisations, conceptualisations and values of Mathematical culture. It clearly involves both 'process' and 'object', and we shall therefore
need to examine both, with the other in mind. It cannot be just processoriented because of the culture's frame of knowledge, but nor should it just
attend to that knowledge, since education is more than mere transmission.
Enculturation, equally, has a responsibility to both child and culture,
respecting the individuality and personality of children as well as the characteristics of the culture. To ignore the first would lead to indoctrination, while
to ignore the second would lead to anarchy. Mathematical enculturation
needs to be conceptualised as a social interactive process carried out within a
certain knowledge frame but with the goal of recreating and redefining that
frame.
There is of course, likely to be considerable interaction between informal
and formal enculturation. Increasingly, for example, in industrialised
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societies, informal enculturation is being taken over from the family and the
community by mass media. Also the various complex and important social
institutions in these societies, like political groups, clubs, community groups
and local Government institutions, playa strong role in informal enculturation through their workings, the values they exhibit and the publicity they
enjoy.
Whilst there will be broad areas of agreement between formal and informal
encuituration, we can also understand how the process of formal enculturation can indeed be undermined by the activities of others. To take two
examples of interest to us in Mathematics education, consider the persuasion
tactics used by some TV advertisements in contrast with the emphasis in
Mathematics education on proof, logic, the valid use of evidence, and the use
rather than abuse of statistics. Which criteria is the child to believe? Also
commercial products like calculators and microcomputers which have 'invaded' the informal Mathematical education of our children conflicted initially with some of the influences thought by the formal Mathematics educators
to be far more important for children's Mathematical development. That
conflict has now largely been resolved, of course.
The technical level of Mathematical culture presents us with a rather
different enculturation issue. The 'research' community, if I can use that term
for the group which operates at the technical level, exercises strong controls
over membership and over the behaviour of its members. This sub-group
demands a training that is not necessarily supplied by the formal enculturation process and it therefore supplies that training itself. However, the fact
that this group's special training (e.g. research activities of various kinds)
builds on the foundation offered by the formal enculturation process, means
that it too has an interest in its content and practice. So of course, do other
specialist groups in society who offer specific training to their entrants coming
from formal education (e.g. industrial and business organisations). But the
Mathematical research community appears to have a far greater voice than
these other groups, perhaps because, as Layton (1978) suggests, "their power
in relation to the definition of the subject is great".
However, I find that the cultural perspective offers a slightly different
interpretation. As Mathematical culture has developed in recent years it
seems that the range of Mathematical application in society has broadened,
and therefore many more people are now engaged in the growth and development of Mathematical culture. As technology has advanced, so more research
is driven by industrial, technological and societal requirements. As the
computer industry has developed, so other influences on the definition of
Mathematical cultural knowledge have increased. The knowledge-store of
Mathematical culture is no longer constituted entirely by the products of the
pure Mathematical research community.
This community is therefore likely to become less powerful than it once was
in helping to shape the formal enculturation process. Was indeed the peak of
91
its power reached with the "Modern Mathematics" movement? Subsequent

dissatisfactions from the industrial community, parents and the professional
Mathematics Education community (all for different reasons) certainly seem
to have combined to create an atmosphere in which the 'technical Mathematical 'sub-culture' will find it difficult to exercise the influence which it did in the
1950s and 60s.
In fact this group rarely plays any direct role in enculturating children, and
indeed by preserving its mystery and exclusivity it appears intentionally to
spurn any definite enculturating role. Far from being Wilder's 'bearers' of the
culture, this group operates independently from the rest of society, although
it is supported by society, and concerns itself with problems that have little to
do with the lives of the rest of society. If anyone group comprises the
'bearers' of Mathematical culture it is surely the group with specific responsibility for the formal enculturation of children - the Mathematical Enculturators, about whom more will be said in Chapter 7.
Formal Mathematical enculturation therefore needs to take account of
conflicts with the informal enculturation process, and to mediate the technical
level of mathematical culture. Its focus should be on all children however,
and it should be accountable to the formal cultural group described earlier.
There is clearly a large measure of responsibility carried by those charged
with the task of formal Mathematical Enculturation.
As I said earlier, formal Mathematical Enculturation is both 'object' and
'process'. In order for the enculturation to be done intentionally and explicitly
the phenomenon called culture has to be elaborated, and objectified. The
danger there is that the individual personality of children will be negated and
that the process will be conceptualised merely as transmission. Therefore in
considering the Mathematics curriculum, which is the 'object' of concern, I
must seek a way to define the knowledge frame which will allow personality to
flourish and social interaction to happen. This will be the focus of attention in
the next chapter.
The complementary aspect, that of the enculturation 'process', will be
considered in detail in Chapter 6. There the challenge will be to create a
conceptualisation of process which will operate within the knowledge frame
described in Chapter 5. The two chapters are strongly interconnected and
interdependent.
Finally in Chapter 7 I shall attend to the key people in the formal enculturation process, called the Mathematical Enculturators. As will be seen in the
next two chapters, much depends on the enculturators, the decisions they
take, the roles they play and the responsibility with which they approach their
tasks. It is the enculturators who must be accountable for the whole process,
not the education system.
CHAPTER 5
MATHEMATICAL ENCULTURATION - THE CURRICULUM
5.1 THE CURRICULUM PROJECT
In the nineteen-fifties and 'sixties a new phenomenon appeared in Mathematics education - the Mathematics curriculum project. This was an experimental 'vehicle' for deliberately changing the curriculum, and the phenomenon is
a well-known aspect of general educational activity nowadays. The curriculum project injected a very deliberate, interventionist, and indeed revolutionary idea into the education process. Educational change was no longer
something that just seemed to happen, or which was subject to unknown
external forces. It could be imagined, planned, experimented with and, if
successful on a 'pilot scale', deliberately put into operation on a large scale.
Before the days of the curriculum projects, the prime organising construct
for the Mathematics curriculum was the syllabus, which nowadays would
probably be called the 'examination syllabus'. This was, and still is in some
places, a listing of topics expected to be covered in the course of teaching.
Usually the lists were arranged either chronologically or logically (i.e. structured Mathematically in some way) and typical entries would be:
Multiplication of directed numbers
Mean, median and mode
The equation of a straight line.
These topics were not only in the printed syllabuses, they were often also
the chapter headings of the textbooks, or the section headings in those
chapters. They were, in addition, the topics for the lessons taught and
teachers would say, and still do say, "Today we are going to do 'the equation
of the straight line'." This syllabus approach was an excellent embodiment of
the atomism value of Mathematical culture - one taught small pieces of the
syllabus one after the other, and gradually they were built up into larger
pieces.
I have described the syllabus in these terms not to be critical, but to point
out the difficulty of representing the Mathematics curriculum. Even now we
can ask: how and in what form does the curriculum exist? How do we know
it? Is it the content of the text-books? Is it the content of the lessons? Or the
examinations? Is it the way the lessons are taught? How should one describe
the mathematics curriculum? In particular how can I best describe a curriculum which objectifies Mathematical culture, but which recognises the interactive nature of the enculturation process?
An important study by Howson, Keitel and Kilpatrick (1981) analysed the
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93
processes and contents of curriculum development in Mathematics through

the nineteen seventies, and in this study they identified five different approaches towards the Mathematics curriculum, which were represented by
various curriculum projects. Their analysis has been very helpful to me in my
search for an appropriate representation of the Mathematical enculturation
curriculum.
Here are their five approaches in outline:
1. The Behaviourist Approach
This approach was aimed at improving learning by a 'task analysis' of a
content area resulting in a detailed step-wise procedure for sequencing
learning. Gagne is quoted as being the principal 'theory' agent, with the IPI
and IMU projects being illustrative of this approach. 1 We shall not be
concerned further with this approach as it is only concerned with the mastery
of specific Mathematical content.
2. The New-Math Approach
This approach is characterised as: "a systematic description of mathematics
reorganised so as to emphasise structural considerations and presented in a
uniform language with great precision" (p. 1(0). Also "The basic principle of
Bourbaki, the deduction of content from axioms also became central to the
teaching of mathematics" (p. 101). Dieudonne's (1961) address to the OEEC
Seminar in Royaumont is cited as giving theoretical force to this approach,
and SMSG and SMP are offered as examples of projects which were allied to
this approach. 2 The emphasis on the preparation of future University Mathematicians, and the overt top-down approach, clearly renders this approach
inadequate for our purposes.
3. The Structuralist Approach
This approach is based on the theories of Bruner and Dienes as follows:
"From his (Bruner's) theory he derives the claim that the structures of the
sciences are suitable for promoting learning processes in an optimal way, thus
justifying a posteriori the efforts made to orientate curricular reform to the
structure of the scientific disciplines" (p. 108). One project is cited as an
example of this approach and that is the CSMP, although the work of Dienes
appeared in several different forms and indirectly in different projects.~ The
fact that Mathematics has certain structural forms is of interest to us but, as
with the previous approach, I feel that the 'internal' structure of Mathematics
alone should not determine the nature of the curriculum.
4. The Formative Approach
This approach, say Howson, Keitel and Kilpatrick "is formulated without
reference to particular school subjects. It proceeds on two assumptions: first,
that any school education aims at endowing the pupil with an optimal basic
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body of cognitive abilities and affective and motivational attitudes; second,

that these factors may be described in terms of personality traits" (p. 116).
The aim of this curriculum is to "initiate learning processes but not to
determine them". The principal guiding theorist is Piaget, and the Madison
Project and the Nuffield Maths Project are offered as examples of this
approach.4 We will find later some strong associations with this approach,
provided it is remembered that the context for the 'formation' is culturally
specific. However, the associations relate more to the next chapter's concerns
with the enculturation process than to the curriculum 'object'.
5. The Integrated-Teaching Approach

This approach "was developed at the same time and on the same cognitivetheoretical basis as the formative one; it seeks however, to go beyond mere
statements on methods and to consider also problems of content". "Problem
areas from reality willi determine the content of teaching" (p. 121) is how
Howson, Keitel and Kilpatrick describe the curriculum and they further point
out that "Curricular units have to be flexible enough to leave open the
greatest number of avenues to (and from) a problem so that the problemsolving process, and hence the progress of the learning process, can be
controlled by the students themselves". Of significance is the lack of distinction made between the different disciplines, and the two projects cited as
examples of this approach are the USMES project and the MMP (CP).5 We
will see a strong relationship with this approach emerge as we analyse the
cultural curriculum further.
A curriculum, for Howson, Keitel and Kilpatrick, is clearly much more
than a syllabus, and "must encompass aims, content, methods and assessment
procedures" (p. 2). However what emerges more significantly from analysing
the different approaches of projects is that there is also a strong unifying
feature, a certain theoretical strand. For example, if I were to identify a
curriculum project arising from this book's analyses, the theoretical underpinning should undoubtedly be classed as 'cultural' and so the approach which I
wish to develop in this chapter is the cultural approach to the Mathematics
curriculum. This can be considered as a sixth approach, following on the five
previous ones characterised by Howson, Keitel and Kilpatrick. I will be less
concerned with the assessment procedures but I will certainly consider the
aims, content and methods, or to be more precise (in my terms) I will firstly
analyse the principles to be followed in a 'cultural' approach to the curriculum, then I w:ll describe the components of the curriculum, and finally the
whole process will be analysed in the next chapter.
So what should this approach look like and what, firstly, are the principles
or aims to be pursued?
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95
5.2. THE CULTURAL APPROACH TO THE MATHEMATICS CURRICULUMFIVE PRINCIPLES
As I stated in the last chapter, Mathematical culture is the association of the

particular symbolic technology developed by the activities described in Chapter 2 with the values of the Mathematical culture described in Chapter 3. This
combination gives us the starting point for the analysis of the cultural
approach and the five principles which an enculturation curriculum should
follow.
5.2.1. Representativeness
First, of course, it should adequately represent the Mathematical culture.
That is, it must not just be concerned with the symbolic technology of
Mathematics, but must also attend explicitly and formally to values of the
Mathematical culture. It was, you will recall, my intention in Chapter 1 to get
clearer about the values of Mathematical culture precisely because they are
usually ignored in explicit formulations of curriculum content. There is little
overt reference to them in any of Howson, Keitel or Kilpatricks' analysis,
except in the 'integrated-teaching' approach.
Of course, as I said earlier, the fact that there has been no explicit
Mathematics education in relation to these values does not mean that no
values have been taught. The 'technique' curriculum which I characterised
and criticised in Chapter 1 develops a values balance which has in my view
over-emphasised objectism, control and mystery. The fact that proof is in
danger of disappearing from many Mathematics curricula indicates the lack of
attention to 'rationalism'. The general shortage of creative, innovative and
inventive possibilities in the Mathematics curriculum tells us that 'progress' is
relatively undervalued, and the meaninglessness and lack of comprehension
experienced by learners everywhere demonstrate that 'openness' is not a
significant value in current Mathematics curricula.
What then do I mean by 'adequately represent'? Clearly I must argue for
explicit attention to all the values described earlier but also I must reflect my
feelings that a redress of the balances must be undertaken. I therefore will
present a Mathematics curriculum structure which allows rationalism to be
stressed more than objectism, where progress can be emphasised more than
control and where openness can be more significant than mystery. Moreover
in formulating more detailed aspects of the Mathematics curriculum, these
emphases must be given special considerations in my opinion.
5.2.2. Formality
Second, it is important to reiterate the view that his curriculum should
objectify the formal level of the culture of Mathematics, showing the connections with the informal level and also offering an introduction to the technical
level. It should, for example, reflect the connections between Mathematics
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and present society, as well as Mathematics as a cultural phenomenon,

neither should the curriculum be narrowly conceived as just a preparation for
the technical level, as in the New Math approach. Nevertheless structuring, to
use the key notion in the 'structuralist' approach will be apparent, as I am
clearly recognising in the term 'Mathematical culture' something akin to a
Mathematical 'discipline', to follow Bruner's terminology, or core of concepts, as I prefer to think about it.
In fact the structure to be adopted for the symbolic technology will be
based on the six universal activities of Chapter 2. Since these are universal,
and since they developed the significant Mathematical concepts and ideas, it
will be sensible to use this structure to develop the ideas with the children. As
Mathematics is part of their culture it will be important to reflect that cultural
basis in the structure of their Mathematics curriculum.
Furthermore it is through this cultural structuring that reference can easily
and powerfully be made to the Mathematical ideas of other cultures. Part of
the difficulty at present experienced by various educators who are trying to
represent Mathematics as a 'multi-cultural' subject is that they do not in
general have a good structure for recognising similarities in mathematical
ideas. In order to multi-culturalise a curriculum, one must first culturalise it.
5.2.3. Accessibility
A third crucial principle to be adhered to is that an enculturation curriculum
should be accessible to all children. As I pointed out in the first chapter, the
'top-down' approach to content does very obviously disadvantage the vast
majority of children who either do not wish, or who are unable to go on to
further Mathematical study. Education may sadly be a process that fails in
practice for particular pupils but there is no logic behind planning an enculturating curriculum which is designed to fail them. Enculturation must be for all
- Mathematical education should be for all. Of course there will be a need to
create opportunities for individual children to pursue some ideas further than
other children according to their interests and backgrounds, but such provision does not negate the principle.
The other key idea in this principle is that the curriculum content must not
be beyond the intellectual capabilities of the children, nor must the material
examples, situations, and phenomena-to-be-explained, be exclusive to any
one group in society. The moral imperative is there, as it is in the 'formative'
approach, to find ways to reach all children. I am conscious of the difficulties
that this principle could cause for teachers of children with special needs,
especially those who are handicapped. But I still feel that the principle is an
important one even in those situations.
5.2.4. Explanatory Power

A fourth principle which has again appeared earlier in this book, is that the
enculturation curriculum should explain. Mathematics as a cultural phenome-
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97
non derives its power, as we have seen, from being a rich source of explanations, and that feature must shape the significant understandings to emerge
from the enculturation curriculum. It is not a 'technique' curriculum, as was
described in Chapter 1 although clearly the power to explain will be conveyed
only by the activity of explaining which will necessarily involve 'doing' various
Mathematical activities to a certain extent. The problem is that at present the
aims of most Mathematics curricula are entirely concerned with 'doing' and
little to do with explaining.
The corollary of this is that the power of explanation will only be conveyed
if the phenomena-to-be-explained are accessible to all children, are 'known'
by them, and as yet are unexplained. The environment, both physical (natural
and man-made) and social, is the source of such phenomena, and I share the
concerns of the 'integrated-teaching' approach in this. Thus the Mathematics
curriculum needs in some way to be based in the child's environment and in
the child's society. This implies moreover that in different countries and in
different societies one would expect to find different Mathematics curricula,
reflecting the differences in environmental and societal needs. There is no
reason, even with a cultural approach to the Mathematics curriculum, to
expect a universally applicable curriculum. Equally, one could expect that
any two children might well have experienced rather different curricula as a
result of their own choices and personalities. Because children differ we have
to be able to create curricula structures which allow individuality to be
experienced.
5.2.5. Broad and Elementary

The fifth principle is in essence a logical extension of the last. Rather than
being relatively narrow and 'technically demanding', the enculturation curriculum should be both relatively broad and elementary in its conception. A
variety of contexts should be offered, since the power of explanation, which
derives from Mathematics' ability to connect unlikely groups of phenomena,
needs to be fully revealed. To offer merely one example of a particular
algorithmic application, say, may preserve the Mathematical purity, but it
does not help to explain. It does not answer the question which children ask
frequently of Mathematics: "What is it for?" - they, too, want the Mathematics to do something for them. If its power is to explain, and to explain broad
ranges of phenomena, then that breadth has to be a significant principle for
any enculturating curriculum.
The constraint of a finite time for schooling means that, if breadth of
explanation and context is to be an important goal, then the Mathematical
content must be relatively elementary. I do not mean this to be merely simple
arithmetic, or Fun Maths or only childish games, I hasten to add. Elementary
Mathematics may not be an attractive proposition to those who want to see
Mathematics as difficult mental gymnastics, or who are solely concerned with
the development of future Mathematicians. But if 'enculturation' is the goal,
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and 'explanation' is the power of the symbolic technology of the culture, then
undue complexity in that technology will fail to explain, fail to convince and,
therefore ultimately, it will fail to enculturate. Moreover I would argue that
even the future Mathematician (perhaps indeed particularly the future Mathematician) needs a good enculturating grounding in the subject.
These then in summary are the five principles which I feel characterise the
enculturation curriculum, or the 'cultural' approach to the Mathematics
curriculum:
- it should represent the Mathematical culture, in terms of both symbolic
technology and values,
- it should objectify the formal level of that culture,
- it should be accessible to all children,
- it should emphasise Mathematics as explanation,
- it should be relatively broad and elementary rather than narrow and
demanding in its conception.
5.3. THE THREE COMPONENTS OF THE ENCULTURATION CURRICULUM
How, then, can I structure the knowledge frame of the enculturation curriculum? Clearly, having begun with those five general principles which the
cultural approach should follow, there is now no sense in prescribing long lists
of topics to be covered. It is, however, necessary to move to some finer level
of detail in order both to exemplify such an approach for the reader, and also
to structure the analysis further. Moreover, I do not want to suggest that the
cultural approach to the Mathematics curriculum is entirely process-oriented.
This is where this approach differs markedly from both the 'formative' and
the 'integrated-teaching' approaches. There are significant symbolisations,
conceptualisations and values which have been developed and I believe that it
is important to represent these in the curriculum. The contents of Chapters 2
and 3 do need to be specifically represented in some way in this curriculum.
I have therefore chosen, as a first level of structuring, three different
components which I shall argue are essential in an enculturation curriculum.
They offer a knowledge framework which will enable a curriculum to meet all
the principles described above. They cannot be defined in any mutually
exclusive way, and there will inevitably (and desirably) be overlap and
interactions between the three components. As 'labels' and descriptions of
the components I offer the following:
- The Symbolic Component - covering the significant explanatory conceptualisations in the symbolic technology of Mathematics, which allow principally the values of 'rationalism' and 'objectism' to be explicitly explored.
- The Societal Component - exemplifying society'S manifold uses of Mathematical explanations, and the principal values of 'control' and 'progress'
which have developed with these uses.
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99
The Cultural Component - exemplifying the meta-concept of mathematics

as a phenomenon existing in all cultures, and introducing the technical idea
of Mathematical culture, with its principal values of 'openness' and 'mystery'.
The perceptive reader will have noted that whereas the first component
uses the word "covering", the other two use "exemplifying". This is indeed
deliberate since I feel that not only is it not possible at this stage to describe
the Societal and Cultural components in such a way that 'coverage' would
make sense, but also that that is not a worthwhile aim. Moreover I feel that it
is necessary to make curricular provision for differences in preferences and
backgrounds among the learners, and that those differences should be catered
for overtly and explicitly within those two components rather than in the first,
although they are implicitly recognised there also. I am therefore in sympathy
with others who argue for a 'core' and 'options' approach to the curriculum provided that all children are allowed to experience the options as well as the
core. By this I mean that, for me, the core is not a minimum requirement the whole curriculum is.
Other aspects of the relationship between the three components will be
considered in a later section, but also the reader may find it profitable
occasionally to refer back to Chapters 2 and 3 while reading about these
activities, to recall where many of the ideas originated from.
5.4. THE SYMBOLIC COMPONENT: CONCEPT-BASED
This component is organised around the six 'universal' activities described in .

Chapter 2 and concerns the symbolic technology deriving from those activi.ties. I would argue that by structuring this component in this way we can
ensure a broad and elementary coverage of the significant Mathematical
ideas. The six activities have already been sketched in outline, but there are
various concepts which I feel need delineating and which should be met by all
children in their formal education. These concepts have been chosen to
illustrate all the principles of the Mathematics curriculum described earlier,
particularly principles 3, 4 and 5. There is no objective way to evaluate
'explanatory power', but adopting the spirit of the five principles it would
seem to me that, for example, 'Combinatorics' is a more significant idea for
children than Trigonometric Functions', in that there are many more situations understandable and accessible to children which the former idea 'explains' than does the latter.
The six-activity structuring also enables the contrasts and similarities with
other culture's mathematical ideas to be represented. Whether it is in relation
to number systems, geometrical language, orientations, patterns and designs,
games, measures or classifications of phenomena, the use of other cultures'
data is a powerful curriculum aid.
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I should also emphasise that I do not envisage these concepts as 'topics', as

in examination syllabuses. They are offered as organising concepts in the
curriculum which provide the knowledge frame. They should be the foci of
concern, approached through activities in rich environmental contexts, explored for their Mathematical meaning, logic and connectedness, and generalised to other contexts to exemplify and validate their explanatory power.
(We shall consider suitable activities in a few pages' time.)
The Symbolic component of the enculturation curriculum should therefore
be concept-based.
5.4.1. Counting: Quantifiers (each, some, many, none)

Adjectival number names Finger and body counting
Tallying Numbers
Place value Zero Base 10 Operations on numbers
Combinatorics
Accuracy Approximation Errors Fractions Decimals
Positives, Negatives Infinitely large, small Limit
Number patterns Powers Number relationships Arrow
diagrams
Algebraic representation Events Probabilities
Frequency representations.
To begin with I have indicated a partial ordering of these concepts although, of course, there can be no unique or necessary order. From my
anthropological and 'societal' analyses I do feel that relatively more work
should be done with whole numbers, in the sense of combinatorics and 'clever
counting', and relatively less work done with algorithmic operations on
integers and rationals. Also a fairly definite, yet cautious, conceptual approach to the infinite needs to be adopted, encompassing infinitely large and
small, exploiting the possibilities offered by fractions and decimals, and
relating to the idea of limit. Algebra as a representation of generalised
number relationships is of course nothing new, though I feel it needs to be
emphasised here in the context of ways of symbolising, along with numbernames, the base-ten system, and the various arrow-graphs, mapping diagrams, and number lines which are so important for further conceptual
development. These will emerge again in the specific section on 'explaining'.
The counting of events, in contrast to objects, underlies ~uch of the
understanding of prediction, probability and chance, and the representation
of large numbers of events stimulates the need for system, for symbols and for
representations such as frequency charts and graphs.
5.4.2. Locating: Prepositions Route descriptions

Environmentallocations N.S.E.W. Compass bearings
Up/down Left/right ForwardslBackwards
Journeys (distance) Straight and curved lines Angle as
turning Rotations
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Systems of location: Polar coordinates 20/30

coordinates Mapping
Latitude/longitude
Loci Linkages Circle Ellipse Vector Spiral
Locating emphasises the spatial geometry of position and controlled movement, and clearly should not be a mere pencil-on-paper exercise. The concepts here will derive from activities set within the child's immediate and
accessible environment, and from coding and symbolising the results of those
activities in various ways. As well as developing the child's language and
symbols for describing movements and locations, such activities also lead to
an understanding of procedures for scaling-down the environment (e.g. maps,
drawings, photographs). They can introduce the child to the rich vocabulary
of figural forms, particularly when taken in conjunction with the ideas of
'shape' which derive from the designing activities to be described later.
Some readers may be surprised to see polar coordinates in the list, but I
would argue that for the young child that system of locating is more natural
than the coordinate system. Experiences with the computer environment
offered by LOGO do seem to bear out this view. 6 Equally, geometric shapes
as loci may not be considered particularly useful by some, but I would point to
an understanding of mechanisms and linkages to argue for the explanatory
value of this approach in today's highly technological society.
5.4.3. Measuring: Comparative quantifiers (faster, thinner)

Ordering Qualities Development of units (heavyheaviest-weight)
Accuracy of units Estimation
Length Area Volume Time Temperature Weight
Conventional units Standard Units System of units
(metric) Money
Compound units
Measuring is concerned predominantly with comparing things according to
a shared quality, and develops through paired comparisons to many comparisons, through convenient units to standardised units and systems of units. The
notion of quality as a 'continuous' quantity is there (as opposed to the
discrete, in counting) and therefore the problems which measuring explains
are 'how much' problems, rather than the 'how many' problems which
provoke counting activities.
There could be some objection to my including as Mathematical concepts,
'length, area, volume ... weight' on the grounds that they are physical
qualities rather than Mathematical concepts. I don't accept this view for two
reasons: firstly, these concepts do play a strong role in our curriculum
generally and at the elementary levels we must accept overlap between
subjects; and, secondly, these concepts have played a fundamental part in the
development of our Mathematics throughout history. They are also the more
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obvious and significant concepts in the child's immediate environment - as is

'money', the system of units we use to measure the continuous quality called
'economic value'.
5.4.4. Designing: Design Abstraction Shape Form Aesthetics

Objects compared by properties of form
Large, small Similarity Congruence
Properties of shapes Common geometric shapes, figures and
solids
Nets Surfaces Tesselations
Symmetry Proportion Ratio Scale-model Enlargements
Rigidity of shapes
Designing is the activity which probably makes the most obvious and
immediate perceptual connections with the environment. One sees shapes ~l
around and it is very 'natural' to enquire about them particularly in the
increasingly manufactured world which uses many geometrically interesting
shapes. Similarities and differences are often very obvious, but even when
they aren't (as in the case of hexagonal honeycombs), the idea of a particular
design and shape gives rise to all kinds of explanations of structures in terms
of rigidity, for example. Properties of shapes are fascinating to children if they
are well located in their accessible environment.
Designing in Mathematics is also concerned with the scaling-down of the
environment, and that process itself has some important ideas for us models, ratios, proportions etc. Indeed the designing activity generally is
probably the most powerful one for conveying values concerned with the
Mathematical/environmental interaction.
5.4.5. Playing: Games Fun Puzzles Paradoxes

Modelling Imagined reality
Rule-bound activity Hypothetical reasoning
Procedures Plans Strategies
Cooperative games Competitive games Solitaire games
Chance, prediction
While it may seem strange to suggest that 'fun' is an important organising
construct for a Mathematics curriculum, I would argue that it is very important in the development of playing as a mathematically significant activity. The
progression is from 'games', to 'Mathematical games' to 'Mathematics as a
game' and the aesthetics of these are every bit as important in the child's
cultural development as are their cognitive significance.
The 'Mathematics is a game' metaphor is a very powerful idea to exploit in
this curriculum, and in this activity generally the attention needs to be
focussed on the serious side of play. The fact that games model reality, have a
structure, involve one, two or more players, and have logical rules, all need to
be dealt with explicitly. Prediction is an important component of playing too
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103
and, historically, had a great deal to do with the development of games like
chess. Puzzles, paradoxes, and other 'mental' games also playa strong role in
developing Mathematical thinking. Solitaire games and activities such as
'Magic Squares' have also a long history of connection with Mathematical
development, as we saw in Chapter 2.
As we move towards these 'meta' concerns, with their perspective on other
Mathematical concepts, so it perhaps becomes clearer why I am using these
concepts as organising constructs for the activities of the curriculum, rather
than as 'facts' to be defined, taught and applied.
5.4.6. Explaining: Similarities Classifications Conventions

Hierarchical classifying of objects
Story explanations Logical connectives
Linguistic explanations: Logical arguments Proofs
Symbolic explanations: Equation Inequality
Algorithm Function
Figural explanations: Graphs Diagrams Charts
Matrices
Mathematical modelling
Criteria: internal validity, external generalisability
The aim of including this set of concepts in the curriculum is to focus this
activity directly at what we can call the meta-conceptual level. To a certain
extent this is also the case with 'playing', as we saw, but here one can engage
the children directly in the way Mathematics explains, in the sort of 'answers'
one can obtain to Mathematical questions, in the kinds of questions themselves and in the power (and limitations) of Mathematical explaining. So, the
focus is on the different kinds of explanation, on the special nature of
Mathematical language, on symbols and figures, on the logical relationships
between them, and on their accuracy and generalisability. As the progression
develops so the explanations turn in more and more on Mathematics itself (as
with proof). What happens actually is of course that Mathematics, as an entity
itself, becomes more significant to the child and becomes thereby part of the
child's accessible environment, also to be explained and understood, with all
the tautologies and logical paradoxes which that situation ultimately provokes.
5.4.7. Concepts Through Activities

It is necessary once again to underline the fact that, in order to develop their
explanatory potential, these concepts should not be taught as topics. They
should be developed through suitable activities pitched at the children's level,
and set in accessible and interesting (for the child) environmental contexts.
The emphasis should be on the child doing the activities in a variety of
contexts and situations. The environment of the classroom and the school
can furnish sufficient situations for all of these activities although it would
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occasionally be of importance to carry out some of them in the community

context. I am also assuming, of course, that the classroom and the school will
be equipped with materials of all kinds - everyday objects, containers, toys,
models, construction material, moving linkages, etc. It would be difficult, if
not impossible, to carry out these activities fully and in the right spirit in a
bare classroom. In this respect I find myself in strong sympathy with several
aspects of curriculum projects such as USMES, the Nuffield Project and
MMP(CP).
Furthermore the activities would need to be stimulated by appropriately
challenging tasks or problems involving the different materials, and concerning the wider physical and social environment. However the focus is not on
the materials or the environment themselves, but on the concepts used for
explaining the environment. With this firmly in mind then, here are some
examples of the kinds of activities which we could expect to see being used to
develop the various concepts.
Counting activities abound in the child's environment and surveys of real
events, birthdays, family members, etc., within the classroom group, can
begin to show important regularities. More structured situations such as those
that occur in combinatorics problems are usually very successful in emphasising regularity, pattern and the need for 'clever' counting. Examples are the
"How many handshakes happen when six people meet?" type of problem
together with its relatives: "How many diagonals does a hexagon have?".
Devices like Braille, Morse Code and games such as dominoes and cards also
have a strong combinatoric component. Number patterns such as the Fibonnacci series not only relate, and explain, natural phenomena, they also, when
continued, give rise to ideas of infinitely large. 'Impossible' problems such as
"How many grains of sand are on the seashore?" or "How many stars are in
the sky?" can stimulate ideas of sampling as well as being relatable to
statistical surveys. Hand-held calculators offer many possibilities for discovering number relationships, through, for example, repeated operations like
doubling, or dividing by ten. Fractions and decimals can arise as representations of results of operations such as "ten objects need to be divided between
3 people" which gives 3 each with 1 left over, or 3 113, or 3.33, depending on
whether the 'object' is indivisible (a glass), realistically divisible (a bar of
chocolate), or 'infinitely' divisible! The fact that no real object can satisfy the
last demand gives much scope for discussions of 'limit' and 'infinitely small'.
Locating activities can involve real movement, journeys, navigation, paths,
etc., as well as how places and objects are described spatially in relation to
each other. Mapping and surveying activities can be very productive, particularly with known places like the school, the school grounds and the local
environment. More structure can be created with activities using mechanisms
and linkages, like this activity from Bolt (1982) called 'Turning Circles'
(Figure 6):
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105
Drlwing
pins
..
..
Fig. 6
Cars are designed to be manoeuvered in congested spaces.
Interestingly the mechanism to bring this about is the same trapezium linkage used in the
rocking horse design. Make up a model from card and pin to a drawing board as shown here.
Move CD to the left and observe that as the wheels A and B turn to the right they cease to be
parallel.
The lengths of AB and DC depend on the wheel base of the car. Investigate. The actual
mechanism is not so easy to observe on a car but take a look at a farm tractor next time you see
one. (p. 37)
The 'small' world of objects relative to each other can be productive

situations to analyse e.g. the Knight's move in chess, or traversibility problems, but just because much of Mathematics takes place on paper this does
not mean that we should ignore the larger world. The relative location of
places and objects on the surface of the Earth, in the sky and in space can be
approached through a variety of activities, and of course, these tasks gave
rise, in our history, to many important Mathematical ideas. A planetarium,
for example, is a fascinating mechanism to explore, and simple surveying
instruments can easily be made.
Measuring activities often commence with comparisons, and the use of
parts of the body for measuring in order to find, for example, the relative
dimensions of furniture, classroom and school. "How big should classrooms
be?" is a provocative problem for measuring activities. Length, area and
volume, are ot course all rich concepts to explore actively but one which is
sometimes rather neglected is 'time'. Historically the measurement of time
has been of great concern and activities with shadow sticks, pendula, candles,
sand and waterclocks, and sun-dials as well as mechanical clocks can generate
much interest. Indeed the whole 'world' of measuring instruments and devices has a great deal to offer us here.
Finding the areas of irregular shapes - such as comparing the sizes of
continents or seas, or countries, using a geographical globe, can also provoke
many ideas of Mathematical value. The sciences, geography included, have a
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CHAPTER 5
Fig. 7
great interest in this activity and although we must take care not just to be
focussing on the 'quality' per se, which is the scientist's interest, many of the
science education projects have interesting activities for our use as well. 7
Designing activities focus learners' attention on shapes, and indeed both
natural and man-made objects can be a rich source for matching and comparison tasks. Similarities, congruences and transformations reveal and 'explain'
many aspects of our environment. Bender and Schreiber (1980) illustrate this
perfectly by showing what can be done with the theme of 'the truncated cone'
in the man-made environment: see Figure 7.
With natural objects, interesting comparisons can be made of various
crystal shapes and structures, revealing intriguing aspects of 3D tesselations,
as well as leaves, birds, skeletons of mammals etc. Shells and flowers reveal
patterns and structures all of which concern constrained growth. Much beauty
accrues to such shapes as it does to 'perfectly' proportioned rectangles,
platonic solids and architectural design. The aesthetic side of Mathematical
activity is revealed through designing, as has happened throughout our
history.
Playing activities are easily understood whether they involve drawn games
such as noughts and crosses (tic-tac-toe), board games such as draughts
(checkers) or chess, or movement games like 'hop-scotch'. Indeed one way to
categorise games and playing activities generally is in terms of the medium
used, and as we saw in Chapter 2, string games offer a universality not found
with paper and pencil. Folk dancing often reveals interesting structural
regularities as do number games and puzzles, such as magic squares.
Chance and prediction were key ideas in developing the notion of serious
play, and predicting outcomes in relatively more or less structured situations
is an important Mathematical activity. The successes, or otherwise, in predicting events can be well explored through astrological charts, bingo games
(housey-housey), fruit machines and the like. Predicting generalisations can
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THE CURRICULUM
be significant also, whether in numerical situations (such as the 'grains of corn

on a chessboard' problem) or geometric (draw two points A, B and a third C,
such that the angle ACB is a right angle. Try to find more points C t , C2 , C3
etc.). One important area which is often neglected is the actual modelling
activity which is part of playing. So the making of models, using simple
materials, in itself teaches about simplifying, about modelling, and about
ignoring irrelevant details and focussing on the overall structure.
Explaining activities clearly build on the other areas and in some cases will
link them conceptually - graphical interpretation of essentially numerical
phenomena being a case in point. These activities usually involve the learner
in representing the outcomes of other activities by wall displays, write-ups,
solutions etc. But there are plenty of ways in which the explanatory concepts
themselves can be activated - for example, this tree diagram (Figure 8)
illustrates the available range of models of a particular car:
Ford OrIon
1.3 litre
1.4 litre
Model L
GL Ghia
1.6 litre
L GL Ghia
1.6 litre
(fuel-injected)
Ghia
1.6 diesel
GL
Fig. 8
Another good example is provided by the booklet 'Matrices' produced by

the OW & OC Project in Holland which focusses on the representational
power of the matrix. 'Justifying' and 'criticising' activities all help to develop
the idea of proof and the value of rationalism, and more recently the
calculator and the computer have made more accessible the 'connective' ideas
of flow-diagram and algorithm. Producing step-wise and 'always-true' algorithms is just as much of an explanatory activity as is that of proving, but often
it is ignored in the rush to master the technique. The function, or algorithm,
or rule, which explains for example a sequence of numbers such as the
Fibonnacci series is a powerful result, and an understanding of how that
algorithm works in nature to produce the observable results is very important.
More mechanistically, generating the sequence of steps necessary to program
a 'turtle' to execute a certain diagram is just as challenging an activity as
generalising a number pattern, and is arguably more important in helping to
'explain' today's computer-controlled environment to a young child.
The activities of applying Mathematics have also been developing in ways
which relate to this curriculum, and particularly in relations to 'Explaining',
the notion of Mathematical modelling has much significance. Books like
Burkhardt's The Real World and Mathematics, Lighthill's Newer Uses of
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CHAPTER 5
Mathematics, the books of the Mathematics Applicable Project (c.P. Ormell)

and articles like McLone's 'Teaching Mathematical Modelling' contain many
examples of appropriate activities which can develop the idea of the Mathematical Model.
5.4.8. Connections Between Concepts
Overlaps between concepts will inevitably, and naturally, occur and therefore
it is once again important to stress that the concepts above represent knowledge-organising constructs. For example, in considering the activity of Explaining, it will be the case that explaining and explanations will occur and be
the ultimate concern throughout the other activities. So all of the concepts
liste~ have a 'representation' role in the activity which then enables them to
explain the situations in which the activity was based. That explanation then
develops "logically and generalises to enable similar situations to be explained.
But in the section called 'Explaining' the focus is on the different kinds of
explanation themselves, on their qualities, and on the criteria for judging the
value and importance of the explanations. By 'internal' criteria I mean those
criteria of significance within Mathematics - logicality, conciseness and consistency with other Mathematical concepts. 'External' criteria relate to situational values of accuracy of prediction, societal relevance, and generalisability
to similar situational phenomena.
Overlaps will also occur between activities, as well as between concepts,
and indeed we can see strong similarities in this regard with the 'integratedteaching' approach to the curriculum. Provided that the conceptual structures
remain significant there is no problem with overlap - far from it, there is much
to be gained. I have already referred to the occasional science publication and
it will be the case that many Science Education projects will contain examples
of activities which could be powerful for Mathematics Education also. For
instance, the SCIS booklet on Relative Position and Motion contains some
excellent activities of value for the 'Locating' component, the USMES project
materials have many good situations relating to Measuring and Counting,
while in the UK the Science 5-13 project also has interesting activities in these
components.
But it would be wrong to see this integration and overlap as occurring only
with science. I have already indicated other connections, and we can find
useful activities in the materials available for teaching art. For example, the
works of Escher, Gombrich, Arnheim, and Bourgoin's Arabic Geometric
Pattern and Design, and interpretations like M. Holt's Mathematics in Art
help us to see what is possible.
In the area of design, I personally have found the following books very
stimulating: K. Rowland The Development of Shape, and G. Doczi The
Power of Limits - proportional harmonies in nature, art and architecture.
The teaching of Geography also makes many connections with our inter-
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109
ests, and books like the following contain ideas for useful activities:
R. Walford Games in Geography, E. Raisz General Cartography.
If 'games' does exist as a school subject, then it is usually only the physical,
and sporting, variety. This then should give us in Mathematics Education an
opportunity to encompass certain aspects of the 'games' subject, should we
wish to! Certainly there is plenty of material available on playing and plenty
of games activities and books which we can exploit. As an example I can cite
Falkener's Games Ancient and Oriental and How to Play Them.
Furthermore a book such as Ling's Mathematics Across the Curriculum
makes no apology for overlaps between Mathematics and other school
subjects and indicates well just how useful for Mathematics Education are the
connections with other areas.
By such a focus on the concepts of Mathematics through activities and by
reflecting on these activities we should be able to develop a good understanding in children of the values of rationalism and objectism. These are the
complementary ideologies behind Mathematical ideas, and a conceptual
curriculum is a good vehicle for exposing them fully. As is widely recognised,
for example, the present curricular focus on techniques means that proof has
all but disappeared from the Mathematics Education of most children.
Mathematics without proof is, in my opinion, no Mathematics at all, essentially because it cannot thereby reflect the 'rationalism' value adequately.
Another reason therefore why I have focussed on concepts developed
through activities is because this approach emphasises the meanings and
explanations offered by Mathematics, and de-emphasises the manipulative
skills and techniques which dominate our Mathematics curricula at present.
With the advent of calculators, tabular data of all kinds, and now with
microcomputers as well, we have no more reason to focus merely on manipulative techniques - they are in any case of little importance to the majority of
the adult population. If specific skills are needed for specific jobs then it is a
relatively easy matter to graft some specialised skill training onto a general
Mathematical conceptual foundation. As I argued in the first chapter, learning a collection of skills and techniques does not constitute an education.
This de-emphasis on techniques makes it possible also to approach concepts which might otherwise not be accessible to some children. For example,
as I said earlier, it may surprise some readers to see that I have included the
'concepts' of Limit, Infinitely divisible, Combinatorics, Ellipse, Vector, Proof,
Algorithm, Function, Matrices. My reasoning is first of all that these are
important ideas to know about, and secondly that I am not seeking competence at Mathematically manipulating and developing these ideas. The concept of Limit for example, is rationally powerful and widely explanatory, and
as we have seen, it is not necessary to go into the details of the Calculus to
appreciate and understand situations where the idea of Limit occurs. Likewise, to appreciate the idea of, and mode of generating, an Ellipse, does not
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necessitate understanding the Theory of Conic Sections nor does it demand

technical facility with coordinate geometry.
When techniques are de-emphasised, and mere performance of skills
becomes de-valued, then it becomes possible to spend far more time on
conceptual development, on the logical connections between ideas, on meanings both inside and outside Mathematics, and on the relationships between
different kinds of Mathematical explanations. An activity-based, conceptual,
and explanatory approach to the symbolic technology of Mathematics does
offer a genuinely educating foundation for Mathematical Enculturation.
5.5. THE SOCIETAL COMPONENT: PROJECT-BASED
In actual fact, I believe that if only the conceptual approach above were
adopted in more curricula Mathematics would be better understood than it
seems to be at present. However, I don't believe that that component alone
would constitute a good enculturation experience. Even assuming that the
conceptual curriculum is thoroughly developed through rich environmentally
based activities, it would not of itself generate a critical awareness of the
development of the values of Mathematics within society.
In particular I -believe that in order to develop this awareness, with
understanding, one needs to reflect on Mathematics as used by societies in the
past, as used by present society and as could be used by society in the future.
This societal component represents the full historical dimension of Mathematical development.
One principle which is appropriate for this component of the curriculum is
that of 'exemplification,' rather than 'coverage', which was important in the
previous component. There I argued for the importance of including activities
to develop all of those concepts. Here, it is necessary to adopt an exemplifying and paradigmatic approach to the historical and future development of
knowledge. We cannot offer our children a systematic course on the History
of Mathematics, for example, but we can, by a judicious choice of paradigmatic situations, make the Mathematics/society interface more overt, more
critically analysable and therefore better understood.
In my view, the most appropriate way to enable the children to become
suitably involved with these paradigmatic situations is through the use of
projects. I understand a project to be a piece of personal research undertaken
by the learner, using reference materials, and written up in the form of a
report. It will take a substantial amount of time, say one or two weeks, be
done individually or by small groups, be supervised by the teacher and will
differ in emphasis depending on the learner's interest and capabilities.
Project teaching is a very important mode of teaching, as witnessed by its
use in all higher degree work, and reported in dissertations, theses, books and
papers of all kinds. There is, in a sense, nothing really new about using
project-work in education, associated as it was with the ideas of John Dewey
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111
in the 1920s in America, but for some reason projects do not seem to be used
in any extensive way in present-day Mathematics education. 8 That seems to
me a great omission as they have so much to offer in a genuine Mathematical
education. In particular, three aspects of projects stand out as being of
particular value to us in considering this societal component.
1. First, a project allows for personal involvement to whatever depth is
wanted in a particular situation, and it therefore offers an individualising
and personal ising aspect of teaching so often missing from the usual
Mathematics curriculum.
2. Second, a project encourages the use of a variety of resource materials
which stimulate thinking about the importance of the Mathematical approach to interpreting and explaining reality. Just to come into contact
with the many books, films and video material available can enable
Mathematical ideas and values to be connected with other aspects of the
school curriculum.
3. Third, involvement with projects encourages activity at a reflective level.
Through researching and documenting a societal situation and by the
teacher's encouragement to analyse the relationship between the Mathematical ideas and the particular situation the learner can begin the process
of critical analysis which is so necessary if the values which Mathematics
offers to society are not merely to be just taken for granted.
Here then are some suggestions of possible topics for projects which I
would consider significant in this societal component.
5.5.1. Society in the Past

These first projects should seek to point the learner to historical situations of
significance to Mathematical development. All are sufficiently well documented to enable research to be done, and although some may be more
appropriate for older rather than younger learners they are nevertheless
accessible to learners at different levels and stages of development. The
critical focus should be particularly on the 'control' and 'progress' values
resulting from these particular topics.
Division of land following the Nile flooding
How long is a year?
Construction of the pyramids in Egypt
Water clocks and sand-timers
Early navigation techniques
Gold testing
Geomancy, and its evidence today
Planetary motions
The science of astrology
The improvement of artillery accuracy
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Perspective in painting
Numerology and the fascination of numbers
Codes and code-breaking
The golden ratio in architecture
Techniques of weighing
Musical harmonics and patterns
The changing relationship between Art and Mathematics
Automata and the spread of mathematical values
Astro-archaeological sites and their significance.
Another possibility for projects concerns the biographies of significant
Mathematicians. There are many sources for data about such people and it is
important to note that as well as a predominance of well established sources
like, for example, Men of Mathematics by E.T. Bell, we can now find other
examples like, Women Mathematicians by Dubreil-lacotin and Maths Equals
by Perl, The Muslim Contribution to Mathematics by AI-Daffa and Blacks in
Science: ancient and modem by van Sertima, which all help to destroy an earlier
myth that Mathematics was entirely the creation of white, Western males.
The field of History of Mathematics and Science is a very fertile one to
explore and we must find an opportunity in our Mathematics curricula to refer
learners to their cultural heritage. 9
5.5.2. Society at Present

The following project topics point to aspects of present societal life which
have been, and continue to be, strongly influenced by Mathematics. More
than those in the previous listing, these should be modified for use in different
societal contexts since not all would be relevant (e.g. coastal navigation).
Almost any aspect of society can be taken as a source for such a project, such
is the permeation of Mathematics throughout society, but once again it is
paradigmatic situations which should be sought. Mathematics serving the
'control' value should be the main critical focus.
Clocks and watches
Sports competitions
Buying a car
Life insurance
Building design
Gears and pulleys
Coastal navigation
Putting a man on the moon
Map-making
Casino gambling games
New town planning
Weather prediction
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113
Microscopes and telescopes

Packaged holidays
War games and simulations
Computer dating
Computer games
Opinion polls.
Once again it is clear that with projects like these, the need is for reference
materials which make strong connections with other fields. The Mathematical
literature will not in general help, which is not perhaps surprising, and it is
therefore necessary to turn to books, magazines and information leaflets
which concern such diverse areas as Insurance, Banking and Commerce,
Management, Architecture, Sailing, Transportation, Town Planning and
Computing. While it is possible to find some 'service' books for a few of the
subjects (e.g. A. Battersby's Mathematics in Management) generally this
particular project area seems not to be as well served with reference literature
as it should be, in my opinion, particularly if one is seeking to criticise
constructively the often implicit values which these ideas embody. This is
clearly indicative of the way values are assumed and implicit at present.
5.5.3. Society in the Future

The final topics illustrate the idea of projects which aim at 'progress' in
society, through various Mathematical applications. Once again, as in the
previous section, these projects will need to be altered to suit the particular
situations in different societies. Indeed this section offers tremendous creative
scope for both teachers and pupils. Also, and perhaps more importantly, the
value of Mathematically directed 'progress' can be confronted and discussed
in particular contexts. Alternative possibilities can be generated, not just
technological or product-oriented options, and hypothetical futures can be
compared, to reveal different criteria. Political and moral issues will undoubtedly arise, and should not be avoided.
The length of the school day
Improving traffic flow at intersections - what comes after traffic
lights?
Is there an ideal queue length?
International currency dealing
The logistics of interplanetary travel
World food availability in the future
The location of emergency services in town and country
Are the Olympics too big?
The implications of parental choice of their child's gender
The costs of peace
Robotics and the quality of life
Comparing standards of living.
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In case these ideas seem preposterous to the reader in the context of a

general Mathematical education, let me defend their presence by pointing out
that Mathematics has frequently 'opened up' and democratised ideas and
decision-making, and should continue to do so; that 'alternativism' is a
significant feature of progress; that the study of the future is arguably as
important as the study of the past; and that in a general education, all children
should have access to these issues. 10
Those, then, are some example topics for each of the three kinds of
projects which I feel would enable a teacher to develop in the pupil an
awareness of the power, but also the limitations, of Mathematical explanation
and representation, and the relative significance of the values of control and
progress. Note that I say 'would enable a teacher to develop'. Project
teaching does not imply that the pupil just copies what other people have
written, nor that the teacher merely sits back and allows the pupils to do what
ever they like. Projects do enable critical awareness to be developed and
significant values to be explored, but this all demands thoughtful and sensitive
teaching. I shall have more to say about this in the next chapter on the process
in the classroom, and in the final chapter on teacher preparation.
5.6. THE CULTURAL COMPONENT: INVESTIGATION-BASED
To complete the Mathematics Enculturation curriculum it is necessary to

include a third component. The symbolic and societal components will
certainly convey important messages about the power of Mathematical ideas
in a societal context, but the child will not necessarily learn a great deal about
the nature of activity within Mathematics nor about the genesis of Mathematical ideas. To a certain extent the symbolic component indicates to pupils
which Mathematical ideas we think are worth knowing about while the
societal component shows how the ideas are used. We need another component to indicate how, or perhaps why, these ideas were generated and to allow
reflection on what Mathematics is. Another way to see the need for this final
component is to realise that the heading "Mathematics and its uses" could be
used to characterise the first two components, and could perpetuate the myth
which many seem to believe that not only are Mathematical ideas discovered,
but also that they are discovered in relation to the need to solve practical
problems.
This component, therefore, aims to demonstrate the nature of Mathematics
as culture, the kind of engagement with abstractions which Mathematicians
have and the fact that Mathematical ideas have been invented. It is intended
as a vehicle for the exploration of the values of 'openness' , in order to combat
the negative feelings-generated by 'mystery'. It is therefore included partly to
introduce learners to the technical level of Mathematical culture insofar as it
is possible to do this with young learners in an accessible manner. There are in
fact two different aspects to this component, which I have characterised as
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115
'mathematics' and 'Mathematics' although as we shall see, the exact line

between them is rather difficult to draw. They both concern ideas, symbolism,
concepts and techniques, so the flavour of this component is rather different
from the previous one. Instead of seeking an 'external' perspective on
Mathematics, here one is very much concerned with internal criteria.
However, like the societal component, coverage of the cultural component
is not an appropriate aim - the 'paradigmatic example' is the basis of this
section also. To catch the sense of the activity within this component of the
curriculum I have chosen the label 'investigation', and my proposal here is
that the cultural component of the Mathematics curriculum should be investigation-based.
An investigation is, like a project, an extended piece of work, undertaken
individually (or in small groups, like projects). But this is an extended piece
of Mathematical work, intended to imitate some of the activities of the
Mathematician. With an investigation there are two distinct phases, firstly the
creative and inventive phase when the mathematical ideas are being explored,
analysed and developed. The second phase is one of writing a report on the
activity in the first phase. The first is the 'experiment', while the second is the
reflection on, and the write-up of, the experiment.
Various problems, puzzles, or situations can provoke an interesting investigation such as these:
Take any Pythagorean triple, multiply the three numbers together,
and the result will always be a multiple of 60. Is that true? Will it
always be true? Why?
What distinguishes a shape which will tesselate from one that will
not?
You are on a deserted island with no manufactured materials of
any kind. Could you construct a table of random numbers? If so,
how?
Sometimes investigations can arise from classroom situations. My favourite
example has been reported elsewhere (Bishop, 1976) and concerns a class I
was teaching on fractions, and which was being video-recorded. I asked for a
fraction between 112 and 3/4, and the class suggested 2/3. I asked how one
might know if that fraction did lie between the other two, and one boy replied
that "You can see that it does because on the top the numbers go 1, 2, 3 while
on the bottom they go 2, 3, 4". This is the point at which I stop the play-back
on the video recorder and say to my student teachers "Investigate". It
invariably produces much heated discussion, and some surprising results!
An investigation, then, catches the puzzles and the challenges of abstract
Mathematical ideas. One is not merely practising a technique, one is acting at
a much higher intellectual level and, I suggest, one is really doing some
creative Mathematics. Once again much of the success of investigation work
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depends on the teacher, firstly pitching the situation at an appropriate level

for the child and secondly working with the child to develop the investigation
fruitfully. Moreover the other important nature of investigations is that there
is no fixed end-point. One can always invent another direction to take, or
another assumption to start from, or another question to tackle. This means
that investigations, like projects, can be tailored to meet individual and
personal goals. Some pupils can go to greater depth than others in investigation work, and therefore as well as offering an introduction to 'being a
Mathematician', for some pupils this component might indicate a future
career specialism. They might indeed actually want to become Mathematicians.
The following lists, as with the previous component, are therefore merely
suggestions of areas of mathematical ideas which I feel it would be fruitful for
pupils to investigate. The first section is the mathematical one, where the
other-cultural sources will make the pupils aware of the pan-cultural nature of
mathematical thought. The second section contains ideas for investigations
from the Mathematical culture.
5.6.1.
Investigations in mathematical Culture

Body-counting methods
Finger-counting
Mixed base counting systems
Maps from other cultures
Circular calendars
Rug-weaving patterns
Basket weaving methods
The Quipu
The abacus and the soroban
Gnomons and sun-dials
String games
Body measures (cubits etc.)
Islamic tiling designs
Board game analyses.
A good example of an investigation in this section concerns The Quipu'.

This, as was described in Chapter 2, is a knotted-string system which was used
for recording numerical information about many aspects of life in the Inca
civilisation. In their book Code of the Quipu Marcia and Robert Ascher show
how quipus can be constructed and used to represent numerical information
such as that on a cash register tape (p. 24), or a car service station's opening
hours for the next four weeks. The book contains many other examples of
recording activities and it is clear that not only children, but adults also, can
learn a great deal about information coding from constructing and investigating quipus.
THE CURRICULUM
117
Other examples are offered by the information on basket-weaving methods

in Mozambique compiled by Gerdes (1985), on rug-weaving patterns in
Africa documented by Zaslavsky (1973), on the many counting systems of
Papua New Guinea collected by Lean (1986), and on Islamic designs compiled by Bourgoin (1973). There are many fascinating possibilities offered by
this kind of ethnographic data and the task, as Gerdes puts it, is "to defreeze"
the mathematical ideas which have been "frozen" into the many cultures
around the world. The aim is to open up the ideas and to make them
accessible to all. Mathematical thinking can then be shown to be the pancultural phenomenon that it truly is.
5.6.2. Investigations in Mathematical Culture

Figurate numbers (Triangular, square, etc.)
Different proofs of Pythagoras' theorem
Conic sections
Rational approximations to the value of l't
Fibonnacci numbers
The slide rule
Experimental probabilities
Pascal's triangle
Napier's bones
Odd and even numbers
Old measures within our present society
Magic squares.
It will of course be necessary for the teacher to narrow down any of those
ideas so that they can become appropriate vehicles for investigation at the
child's level. Also it will be important to have the appropriate source materials available. There are many books which can be used, including the
historical references, but I would particularly like to recommend Mottershead's Investigations in Mathematics, Bolt's Mathematical Activities, Mason's
Thinking Mathematically and Banwell, Saunders and Tahta's Starting Points,
all of which demonstrate and extol the investigatory approach. Note furthermore that several of the ideas above generate excellent investigations for
microcomputer work. 11
5.6.3. Investigations and Values

A further point is that it is only by engaging in the activity of a Mathematical
investigation that one begins to appreciate fully the values of 'openness' and
'mystery' of Mathematical ideas. In an investigation, at an appropriately
challenging level, you can never be sure just how much you are inventing or
how much you are discovering some results derived from your inventions,
how much you are in control of the investigation or how much the investigation is in control of you. You can start to find some glimmer of a pattern,
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some possible conjecture begins to emerge, and you begin to feel that it is
true! Take, for example, this well known situation involving the summation of
odd numbers:
1+3 ~ 4
1+3+5= 9
1 + 3 + 5 + 7 = 16
Those numbers on the right are very recognisable, and the amazing conjecture can be generated that 'the sum of the first n odd numbers is equal to n 2 '.
It seems to be true but you don't know yet if you'll find a counter example.
You recall that square numbers can be represented as squares:
and suddenly you can see how the conjecture must be true (Figure 9) .
Fig. 9
1+3
22
1+ 3+ 5
= 32
You have found the link" the connection, the representation which indicates to everybody how it is that 'the sum of the first n odd numbers' relates to
'square numbers', You have 'opened' the knowledge.
Of course, that reasoning does not yet give a result which can fully qualify
as a proof, in the strictest Mathematical sense, but it is proving. it does make
the appropriate connection overt and explicit. And, moreover, you did it.
You made the connection.
But wasn't the connection there all along? Isn't it just a 'built-in' property
of the numbers themselves? But how did 'odd' numbers or 'square numbers'
arise - are they just another property of the numbers themselves or did
someone invent those categories? What about sequences of odd numbers not
starting with one? What about adding even numbers? And what would
THE CURRICULUM
119
happen if you moved into different bases, or used a different symbol system?
Would you get the same result?
By this means the investigation progresses and the mysterious nature of
Mathematical activity begins to be revealed. Every professional Mathematician knows, and lives with, this balance of openness and mystery, and
investigations can help convey to pupils the mixed emotions of the fascination
of working within Mathematics. 12
One final point to make is about the report of the 'experiment'. This aspect
is of paramount importance in the enculturation process because of its role in
developing an understanding of the 'openness' value. The reported investigation needs to mak.e clear to any reader the situation investigated, the process
adopted and the results and conclusions found. Pupils will learn about the
precision and logicality of a Mathematical presentation as well as the fact that
this form of 'demonstration' of results never follows the sequence of activities
which produced the results!
Nor should this 'report' writing be thought of as an irrelevant or value-free
exercise. Several journals will now accept pupils' reports, and it is now
becoming recognised that classrom investigations can enable children to make
interesting contributions to general mathematical knowledge. More importantly children will begin to learn that openness is a necessary value in the
development of critical analysis. By contrasting arguments, reasons, explanations and proofs, children will learn the criteria of rational criticism. Rather
than remaining a within-Mathematics and introverted activity, investigating
will become generalisable to the whole of society and to any form of knowledge.
5.7. BALANCE IN THIS CURRICULUM
Those then are the three separate, yet overlapping and interacting, components of my enculturation curriculum, and my thesis in this chapter is that
these three components are not only necessary but also sufficient for creating
a curriculum capable of offering a Mathematical Enculturation for all children. As well as educating them, this curriculum will also preserve and
stimulate the Mathematical culture through their education. The historical
and developmental aspects, as offered in the societal and cultural components, will ensure the preservation of the cultural heritage of Mathematics.
The attention to environmental activities, to the societal uses in the present
and hypothetical future, and to the creative aspects of investigation, should
do much to stimulate Mathematical development in future generations. This
curriculum may also serve to reduce ultimately what Kline (1980) calls "the
isolation of Mathematics". As he says: "Mathematics is a marvellous invention but the marvel lies in the human mind's capacity to construct understandable models of complex and seemingly inscrutable natural phenomena and
120
CHAPTER 5
thereby give man some enlightenment and power" (p. 305). If I could
substitute the word 'environmental' for 'natural' I would subscribe wholeheartedly to that sentiment.
Two more issues need attention, before we move to consider the interpersonal enculturation process in the classroom in the next chapter. First what
balance between the three components should be sought? I have in general
tried to avoid detailed prescription in this book because of the societal
variations, both national and local, which abound, and because of the inevitable imprecision of description and overlaps between ideas. However, from
the enculturation perspective it would seem to be valuable to make the
'paradigmatic and exemplary' components at least as significant as the 'coverage' of the activity based component. I can see no value in having a curriculum which in its detail, is completely mandatory and compulsory. It is
necessary to offer teachers curricular opportunities to personalise the child's
learning, and to particularise the Mathematical activities in relation to learners' differing interests and backgrounds.
However, by the same token, I cannot accept that an enculturation curriculum should be entirely open to personal choice. A mandatory element must
surely be a strong part of an enculturation experience. Therefore my balance
between the three components should equalise the mandatory 'core', and the
paradigmatic options, in order that they have the chance to complement each
other.
This balance should also be reflected in any assessment procedure needing
to be adopted during the 'course' or at the end of it. This matter however, is
definitely one where the education/society interface is significant. From the
perspective of enculturation, assessment is unnecessary since enculturation is
not something you pass or fail, nor is it something you are better at than
someone else! The only assessment which can appropriately be made is of the
enculturation process itself. Thus judging by what little the average person
seems to understand about Mathematics nowadays, the Mathematics education offered at present is failing dismally as enculturation. The Mathematically enculturated person is a rare breed.
5.8. PROGRESS THROUGH THIS CURRICULUM
The second issue not yet touched on relates to the idea of progression through
this enculturation curriculum. Clearly any curriculum needs sequencing in
some way, so what criteria should govern the sequencing of an enculturation
curriculum?
Firstly the increasing complexity of the young child's environment should
be a major criterion. As a child grows from total dependence on the home
context, through an ever-widening and ever-more complex environment of
school and community, to the position of independent adult in the country
THE CURRICULUM
121
and world, so the curriculum should reflect that growing .environmental

complexity.
Thus 'the bicycle' would be a good source for activity of a Mathematical
nature long before 'the car' would, and the variety of escape routes from a fire
in a school might well provide a more motivating introduction to routing
problems, for a young child, than would the adoption of a one-way system in
the town. Equally, surveys within the school population could be undertaken
before issues of 'proportional representation' and 'single transferable votes'
are discussed in the context of national goverIHllent.
As I said earlier the power of explaining a situation will only be conveyed if
that situation is well-known but not necessarily well-understood. We should
not worry that the child has no immediate need to understand a bicycle in
Mathematical terms in order to ride it sensibly. The fact remains that the child
knows the bicycle sufficiently well to be motivated by the teacher to understand more about it, and the Mathematical ideas of rotation, revolutions,
angles, triangular rigidity, loci, centre of gravity, etc. can explain a variety of
phenomena associated with that familiar object.
The school environment not only offers a physical context for Mathematical
explanation, but it also offers, through other school subjects, a rich variety of
partially structured phenomena. Early in the child's school career the sensitive and aware teacher can make powerful Mathematical use of the physical
movements of games and play activities, the representational nature of
drawings and photographs, the making of models, the categorisations in
language, the measures in cooking and clothes making, and the maps of
school and community. Later on the science subjects, geography, technical
and social studies all offer many other structured possibilities for Mathematical explanation, as we have already noted.
Growing environmental complexity is therefore one significant criterion in
the sequencing of the curriculum. Another is the growth of Mathematical
complexity. Mathematics is a cumulative subject, certainly locally, i.e. within
each of the activities of the symbolic component. But calling it a cumulative
subject doesn't necessarily imply that it is a uniquely ordered subject. It
seems to be the case that in a heavily technique-oriented curriculum the
ordering is considered to be highly significant, "You can't run before you can
walk" seems to be the motto, and certainly the 'learning theory' approach to
the curriculum, as described by Howson, Keitel and Kilpatrick, and the 'New
Math' approach, emphasised the 'correct' sequences of mathematical skills
and principles.
However, with six 'parallel' activities in one component, and three different
yet complementary components, there is no unique basis for ordering the
ideas between them. Perhaps the only exception to that rule would be
'Explaining' because that activity to a certain extent builds on the explanations developed through the other five symbolic activities.
122
CHAPTER 5
18~------------~-----r--------------~
Fig. 10
The societal component can be ordered in terms of its three sections

although some of the historical projects might be more demanding Mathematically than some in the other sections. For the cultural component I don't
feel that there is any overall structure which is important. However a more
important criterion could be the relationships existing between the three
components. For example having dealt with time measures in the symbolic
component, it would be valuable for the child to engage in a project concerning 'Water-clocks, and sand-timers' or perhaps an investiation on 'Gnomons
and sun-dials'. A later example could be where, following some activities
concerning circles and ellipses, an investigation on 'Conic sections' or the
project on 'Planetary motions' would be valuable. Indeed further considerations of this type lead me to suggest the following diagram (Figure 10) of
development, in the balance of the Mathematical curriculum. The diagram
illustrates how I see the balance shifting as the child progresses through the
curriculum from when they enter at 5 years old and leave at 18 years old.
Even if the diagram is only indicative (and for example is not meant to
imply that the 'amount' of Mathematics curriculum a child of five receives
should be the same as an eighteen year old receives) it does reflect some
obvious points. For example, it is clear to me that investigations can't begin at
five years old, neither can projects, until the learner can at least read and
write. I see no reason however why limited project work cannot begin with
eight year olds, probably as class, or group activities rather than as individual
projects. However the content and style of investigations makes them, in my
view reflectively more significant for the rather older pupil although as we
have seen it is certainly possible to do investigative work with younger
children. Furthermore as the pupil matures through the Mathematics it would
be thoroughly appropriate to increase the time spent on projects and investigations in relation to that spent on concepts.
Finally the third criterion for progression through this curriculum must be
the development of the learners themselves. There is a tendency in the
THE CURRICULUM
123
enculturation literature for the individuality of the child to be ignored and

although the enculturation perspective does make clear the same intention
and goals for all children, the realisation and elaboration of those goals must
be dependent on the individuality of each child. Once again I must point out
that there is no 'bottom line' in enculturation, there is nothing to pass, no fear
of failure, no required criterion of achievement and no fixed time limit for it.
All children develop their own personalities, their own intellectual strengths,
their own interests and their own preferences. Enculturation is not something
one does to all children, it is a process of intentional engagement and
interaction between each individual person and others who 'represent' their
cultural heritage. Enculturation is therefore, at its heart, developmental.
Therefore a stated curriculum can only offer suggestions, criteria, a knowledge frame and ideas. It is impossible for any 'outsider' to specify precisely
what should be in the curriculum for each child at every stage of development
because the child's teacher is in the best position to be able to judge that.
Therefore it is crucial to build into a curriculum the possibility of, and
opportunity for, personal variation in interests, backgrounds and relative
intellectual strengths.
'
The curriculum which I have proposed, based as it is on three separate yet
complementary components, offers a balance of coverage and individual
opportunity which I feel is appropriate for a thorough enculturation curriculum. What now needs to be analysed and discussed is the actual process of
enculturation in the classroom and school. This is where the teacher, the
curriculum and the child come together, and this is where enculturation, as a
process, either succeeds or fails. It is to that interpersonal process that I now
turn.
CHAPTER 6
MATHEMATICAL ENCULTURA TION - THE PROCESS
6.1. CONCEPTUALISING THE ENCULTURATION PROCESS IN ACTION
6.1.1. What Should it Involve?

We come now to the second perspective on Mathematical Enculturation. The
first perspective was that of the curriculum, which is the 'objectified' representation of Mathematical culture for our education purposes. That perspective helped us to think about the kinds of selected activities to be used for
enculturating the young into that culture, and offered us a suitable structure
for organising those activities into a coherent whole.
In this chapter I propose consideration of the process of Mathematical
Enculturation within that knowledge frame, and how this should be put into
operation. The process essentially takes place between teacher and learners,
and in a formalised and institutionalised setting. Other people are therefore
also involved, but in order not to overparticularise the analysis, their roles
will not be scrutinised in any detail. Of essential concern in this chapter is the
interpersonal interaction between teacher and learners.
Already we have accumulated several ideas about how the process should,
and should not be realised. For example, it clearly should not be an accidental
or laissez-faire business, it should not be text-bound or impersonal, it should
not be merely technique-oriented, nor governed exclusively by University or
industrial requirements. Nor should it aim at selectivity or exclusivity. Rather,
the process of Mathematical Enculturation should:
-
be interpersonal and interactional

take significant account of its social context
be formal, institutionalised, intentional, accountable
be concerned with concepts, meanings, processes and values
be for all.
In addition, the data in Chapter 2 have demonstrated that mathematics

exists in every culture in some form and that what we are concerned with here
is a particular kind of mathematics - which I symbolised as Mathematics. In
essence then, the Mathematical Enculturation process is a shaping process - a
process whereby concepts, meanings, processes and values are shaped according to certain criteria. It is therefore an intentional process of shaping
ideas.
The goal of this process is the development in each individual child of a
modus sciendi - a way of knowing. As I said in Chapter 1, this idea symbolises
the most significant objective of this book - to promote the transformation
from 'technique', a way of doing, to 'meaning' a way of knowing.
124
THE PROCESS
125
How then should I approach the description, characterisation and analysis

of this process?
6.1.2. Towards a Humanistic Conception of the Process
As I argued atthe start of this book, I feel that it is necessary to move away
from the impersonal, instrumental and mechanistic ideas which dominate at
present (e.g. methods, instruction, textbooks), where Mathematics teaching
focusses on the efficient transmission of specified content from the teacher to
the learner. The choice of the 'enculturation' description was made not only
to focus more attention on values but also to move away from a 'transmission'
image of education. Enculturation isn't done by one person to another,
culture isn't a 'thing' which is transmitted from one person to another, nor is
the learner merely a passive recipient of culture from the enculturator.
Enculturation is an interpersonal process and therefore it is an interactive
process between people. Mathematical Enculturation is no different in that
respect from any other type of enculturation.
However, I believe we face a peculiar but very real obstacle in the field of
Mathematics education in relation to this issue. As I elaborated in Chapter 3,
one of the values associated with Mathematics concerns 'objectism', and the
mechanistic view of the world, and indeed our Mathematical culture could be
said to promote a Mathematico-technological world-view. We therefore, as a
result of our own Mathematical education, have a tendency to view any
phenomenon in this light. In particular we tend to apply this 'world- view' to
our own field, i.e. we try to describe and interpret the teachingllearning
process in Mathematics in mechanistic terms. The examples in the first
chapter illustrate this world-view perfectly. It can be argued of course that
this view has indeed brought its rewards - it has enabled many more people in
the world to know and to use Mathematical skills. That I am not denying.
What does concern me is the current failure of Mathematics teaching,
described in Chapter 1, and the continuing dominance and hegemony of the
Mathematico-technological world-view, in the present rapidly changing economic, social and political context of our 'global village'.
Learners and their teachers are human organisms and are not mechanisms.
Interactions, such as teaching and learning, can clearly be interpreted mechanistically, but the issue I wish to face here is, should they? Would it not be
more desirable to strive for descriptions, representations and interpretations
which do justice to the organismic nature of teachers and learners? Might we
not reflect better the essentially humanistic qualities of interpersonal interaction by trying to use organismic rather than mechanistic interpretations of
process? And might we not be encouraged to pursue humanist rather than
objectist goals by so doing?
The first task, then, as I see it, in describing the Mathematical enculturation
process is to begin to move away from mechanistic interpretations of process.
In these terms therefore I should already re-analyse the notion of 'shaping'
126
CHAPTER 6
which I suggested above, lest I run into the trap of implying mere mechanistic
'moulding' , of one person producing a shaped product in another. Shaping in
an interpersonal context should rather be understood as a joint enterprise
between the learner and teacher. At first sight it may appear that the teacher
is the one who does the shaping, but recall what is being shaped. It is no~ a
lump of clay nor is it a piece of material. Concepts, meanings, processes and
values are what are being shaped, and these belong to the learner. They are
developed by the learner, constructed by the learner, owned by the learner,
and therefore of course, shaped by the learner. Moreover they are shaped in
response to certain messages received not just from the teacher but from the
whole environment, both physical and social. The learner is a creative and
adaptive organism, as the following exchange illustrates:
K.H. is the teacher, and Martin is a bright secondary-school pupil.
K.H.
Some lad
K.H.
Louise
Martin
K.H.
Martin
K.H.
Martin
K.H.
Somebody
K.H.
"Give me two numbers (less than 6 and not 1, 2 or 4)"

"3 and 5"
"I am going to make up another number using multiples of 3 and 5, like:
17 = 4(3) + 1(5)
Now you make me 12"
"4(3) + 0(5)"
"14(3) - 6(5)"
"No, now you have made me tell you a rule, you can only add"
"- 6(5) + 14(3)"
"No negatives at all"
"Oh"
"Now make me 3"
"1(3) + 0(5)"
"Now 4"
There is a slight pause as young minds start to work.

Sarah
Martin
K.H.
Martin
K.H.
Martin
"You cannot do it"

"Can"
"How?"
"112(3) + 112(5)"
"Positive integer multiples only"
"You should have said."
(from Kent and Hedger, 1980, p. 167).
Encuituration, in humanistic terms, therefore demands that both learner

and social env:ronment playa strong role. On the learner's part there is the
creative, constructive, productive activity - without that nothing can happen.
If the child cannot or will not generate behaviour or symbol, for whatever
reasons, there is nothing to shape. No education can take place, no enculturation can happen. No adaptation can take place. Children suffering from
autism present some of the greatest problems for teachers and parents
precisely because of their non-productive and passive behaviour.
THE PROCESS
127
On the social environment's part there is the kind of activity which pressurises, encourages, restricts or frees - without that interaction, no shaping can
take place.
Enculturation, in these terms, is a certain kind of dynamic relationship
between the constructing, idea-providing, adaptive learner, and the pressurising, encouraging, restricting or freeing social environment, in which the
teacher plays a significant role. But I have described the social environment in
this general way because the teacher is not the only person in the learner's
social environment. In the particular situation of the Mathematics classroom,
there are the other people - the fellow-learners, the peers. They all play their
interactive role in helping other learners shape their ideas.
So the learner's role is to construct ideas, and the social (and physical)
environment's initial role is to allow ideas to be constructed. Furthermore the
environment must promote negotiation, while the learner must respond to
that kind of feedback and become more involved. These are the essential
features of learning in general and of the enculturation relationship in
particular.
Let us now narrow our focus a little and analyse more of the features of
interest to us as Mathematics educators. In particular three features of the
enculturation relationship seem to contain specific points to be discussed and
clarified. The first concerns the asymmetrical nature of the enculturation
relationship, which is what gives the process its dynamism. I call this aspect
asymmetrical because it describes the imbalance between teacher and learner's influence. It also reinforces the fact that it is the learners' ideas which are
intended to be shaped not the teacher's although, as we shall see, the
essentially negotiating characteristic of the process means that the teacher's
ideas cannot be unchanging - the teacher is also an adaptive organism.
The second, which I call the intentional aspect, is concerned with achieving
the particular goals of Mathematical Enculturation - the way of knowing, as I
have called it. What are the qualities and criteria which are to be striven for?
How do these direct the teacher's choices and decisions during the process?
To what ends are the learners adapting their ideas?
The third aspect of the enculturation relationship concerns its ideational
quality - the fact that we are concerned with Mathematical ideas. This fact
focusses our attention on the communicability and sharing of Mathematical
ideas, and requires us to examine the tension between individual and shared
meanings. Mathematics is, like any cultural knowledge, socially constructed
and we need to create ways of incorporating the social construction of
knowledge into the enculturation process.
These three foci will help us to clarify the nature of the Mathematical
Enculturation process and will offer us principles which should guide the
development of this process.
128
CHAPTER 6
6.2. AN ASYMMETRICAL PROCESS
6.2.1. The role of Power and Influence

The first aspect to be considered then is that which gives the enculturation
process its dynamic quality - it is an intentional, shaping process, driven by
the asymmetry between the participants in the process. Teacher and learner
do not have equal roles to play, nor do they meet on equal terms. It is the
teacher's task to create a particular kind of social environment for the learner.
It is the learner's task to construct ideas and modify them in interaction with
that environment. The roles are complementary and the relationship certainly
has an equilibrium about it, but it is a dynamic equilibrium.
The asymmetry though relates to more than the complementary roles. The
asymmetry is of power and influence, with the teacher being in the more
powerful, influential position. More than anything else it is the teacher's use
of that power which determines the quality of the enculturation process in the
classroom. It is therefore necessary to analyse the power relationship between
teacher and learner in order to understand more about how the enculturation
process can be successfully handled.
First of all, the basis for the teacher's power lies in the appointment by the
culture of the teacher as enculturator. The Mathematics culture requires the
teacher to act as the Mathematics enculturator, and it is to that culture that
the teacher is answerable and accountable. We can think of this as being the
basis of the formal power of the teacher. It gives the teacher the authority to
influence the learner, and it legitimises the teacher's various influential acts.
In general terms, while power is the pattern of influence which exists in
relationships between people, authority is the right to require certain action
of others. In the enculturation process, therefore, the formal power of the
teacher as enculturator gives her the authority to require certain actions of the
learners. The teacher has the right to determine, and demand, on behalf of
the Mathematical culture, that certain kinds of Mathematical activities be
undertaken. The teacher should consequently always be able to justify the
various learning activities, in terms of their enculturation potential.
Another kind of power is however also potentially the teacher's, and this is
due to her greater knowledge of the Mathematical culture. This is usually
referred to as sapiential power, the power of Mathematical knowledge. This
power clearly influences the learners in the Mathematics classroom, for good
but also for ill, the danger being that .the teacher can all too easily be felt by
the learners to be the Matb'~lO'atical authority.
Yates (1978) describes son ...: teaching in a way which illustrates this aspect:
I went to the lessons in September, David brought in a large cube made from Marley Tiles
and placed it on a table in the centre of the room. The lesson began - David asks: 'How would
you describe a cube for someone who hasn't seen one before'.
It is teacher-directed, David has made the opening move but it is different from what he did
in June. This is a question that allows for a variety of answers, there is not just one correct
answer. Where will he go from here?
THE PROCESS
129
In June I had felt that I knew what the end point would be, this time I was unsure.
The pupils responded - You can build things with them.
- 'Things'
David picked up this word, he seemed to be struggling to see the connection in the pupil's
mind with the question.
- Houses
SILENCE - David seemed to be trying to make a decision, he was using the silence for
himself. How should he respond to the pupil. He repeated the question,
You are trying to describe a cube.
A pupil responded.
You can only see three sides at a time.
Sides picks up David.
And so the relatively powerless pupils can only wait and see what else will
be revealed by this 'non-discovery' kind of teaching.
Lopez-Real (1985) also shows how teaching can be so organised by a
teacher as to convince the learner of the teacher's power.
"M:
p's:
M:
p's:
M:
p's:
M:
pI:
M:
p2:
Right, the one I want to do is 387 divided by 2. Don't do anything yet, just layout the
wood that you need. How many have we got?
3
How many tens?
8
And how many units?
7
7. Would you try to put your hundreds into two equal sets.
You can't. You've got one over.
Right. You've got 1 hundred in one set. 1 hundred in the other set. What's going to
happen to that?
Change it.
(Later, with the units).

M:
R:
M:
p3:
M:
p's
M:
Richard, are both sets the same? Are you sure? Are you absolutely sure? Exactly?
There's that other one.
Ah, there was one left over wasn't there? And that one you can't do anything with.
Tell me, what could you do with that one so that you could finish?
Cut it in half.
You could cut it in half couldn't you? So rather than say 193 remainder 1, you could
say ....
193 and a half.
193 112. That's right.
The context of the open question 'What could you do with that one?' suggests this has
previously been discussed and is thus, in effect, still a closed question. This is emphasised a
little later with another calculation:
pI:
I got 74 remainder 1.
(A number of other pupils give the same answer)

M:
p2:
M:
74 remainder 1. Or ... Who's going to be clever? Or?

74 and a half.
74 112. That's right.
130
CHAPTER 6
What is not discussed at any stage in this incident is the question of context. That is, when is it
appropriate to give 112 in an answer and when is it more reasonable to say 'remainder 1'.
(Lopez-Real, 1985, pp. 45-46.)
Nor were many other aspects discussed - for example, any reasons for the
problem, the pupils' guessed answers, or their strategies of solution. What
pupils learn from these kinds of exchanges is not just their teacher's mediated
view of Mathematics, but also the idea that their teacher somehow 'owns' the
Mathematical power. Mathematics will continue to be a mystery for them.
The warning is there, and we shall return to it in a moment, that the teacher
must use her Mathematical knowledge shrewdly in the enculturation process,
if values like 'openness' and 'rationalism' are to be properly fostered.
Both formal and sapiential power potentially exist for every Mathematics
teacher but only when they are demonstrated in the classroom context will
they achieve any real influence. Therefore it is necessary to consider achieved
power, being that which is negotiated between teacher and learners in the
classroom situation. Achieved power must be earned as any teacher knows
when she begins with a new class. It represents what of the potential formal
and sapiential power available to a Mathematics teacher is actually achieved
as a "pattern of influence" in the Mathematics classroom. It is dependent on
what kind of influence the teacher wishes to achieve and what kind the
learners will accede to. It is the product of the 'didactical contract' (Brousseau, 1981) which is negotiated between teacher and learner. It relates to the
patterns of authority in the school and in the wider societal context. What
would be acceptable teacher influence in one society might not be in another,
and therefore for the Mathematical enculturation process, the extent of
influence actually achieved by Mathematics teachers could vary significantly.
The enculturation process is always mediated by the particular societal
situation.
Is there then no particular kind of influence which should prevail if the
Mathematical enculturation process is to be successful? Whilst not perhaps
being able to answer that question directly, there are nevertheless some
important principles which follow on from the analyses so far.
6.2.2. Legitimate Use of Power

The first and most obvious principle is that the teacher's power and influence
must be legitimately used - perhaps we can say that it should be used and not
abused. Power has been known to corrupt of course and it is easily possible
for teachers to abuse their position of influence by seeking self-aggrandisement, or children's friendship etc. There are less blatant but perhaps just
as insidious abuses of power such as choosing only easy or 'nice' topics to
teach, or teaching in a style that benefits the teacher more than the learners,
or ignoring certain members in the class, or blaming the children for failing to
understand. There is no excuse for abusing the position of trust which one has
THE PROCESS
131
been given, as an enculturator, for all the learners in one's care. That moral
responsibility of the teacher is clear.
Regrettably the research evidence on teachers' role-stereotyping of children, and on pupils' attitudes, does suggest that this moral responsibility is
not as strongly accepted as it should be. The failures, in Chapter 1, can in
some aspects be understood as the results of abuses of their power by
teachers. One of Hoyles' (1982) interviewees describes this kind of abuse this
way:
Interview 5
P:
I:
P:
I:
P:
I:
P:
That was in the first year. I remember it well.

What happened then?
Well the teacher was always picking on me.
Picking on you?
Yes, and in one lesson she jumped on me; I wasn't doing anything but she said come to
the board and do this sum - fractions it was. My mind went blank. Couldn't do nothing,
couldn't even begin.
What did you feel then?
Awful, shown up. All my mates were laughing at me and calling out. I was stuck there.
They thought it was great fun. I felt so stupid I wanted the floor to open up and swallow
me. It was easy you know. The teacher kept me there and kept on asking me questions
in front of the rest. I just got worse. I can remember sweating all over.
There can be no excuse for that kind of immoral behaviour.
6.2.3. Constructive and Collaborative Engagement

The second important principle is that the teacher should use her influence to
achieve a constructive and collaborative engagement of the learners in the
enculturation process. As was said earlier, if the learners do not construct
then there is nothing to shape and the only way the teacher can tell if
construction is occuring is to seek contributions from the learners. Furthermore, contributions must be offered in a constructive and collaborative spirit,
not a destructive or confrontational one. Achieved power is not difficult to
attain but it is of no use by itself. Its only value is to help in nurturing the
relationship between the learner and the learning environment, and power
achieved confrontationally will not be productive in the enculturation process.
I have used the words'constructive' and 'collaborative' above, deliberately.
The relationship which is of concern is ultimately that between learner and
social environment, not just between learner and teacher. The learners and the
teacher between them create the learning environment and we are talking
therefore about a constructive and collaborative engagement involving all the
classroom group. It is this engagement which should be the focus of the
teacher's influence. This is the 'modus vivendi' which the teacher needs to
negotiate for in her classroom.
This should be the goal of the motivational strategies of the teacher - "how
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to motivate the learners" (as it is called in the mechanistic teaching literature). The aim of motivation strategies is the achievement of a constructive
and collaborative engagement. The teacher's task, though, is not "how to
motivate" but how to create, initiate and sustain the activities and the
environment which will engage the learners in meaningful Mathematical
endeavours.
.
Hoyles (1982) again shows us how significant this aspect can be for the
child:
P:
I:
P:
I:
P:
I:
P:
I:
P:
I:
P:
I:
Yes, once, in the second year (and) we had this teacher, she was a really good teacher,
maths it was, and I've never been any good at maths. She never pushed you or nothing
but let me get on with it at my own pace.
What do you mean exactly when you say she never pushed you?
Well, she was nice. I had tried and she realised it and didn't keep picking on me. I used
to really try hard in her lessons and just get on with it. As soon as she left it changed and
I went off and went back to my usual way.
Hang on a minute and !.!t's hear more about this good time. Supposing I was to make
this film of your story. What was happening? I can't quite see it?
During this term with this teacher I was just working away. She took time over every
person ... not just 'this is what you have to do and now go ahead and do it'. She
explained it over and over to me. She really cared if I could do it.
She cared, you say?
Yes, well I thought she did. She didn't just rattle on with lots more maths up there in
the front and leave me all behind.
Can you tell me how you felt during her lessons? What did you feel inside?
Well really good, it was really nice to be there.
What exactly does that mean, I'm not sure? What sort of expression must I have if I was
sitting in your place in that class, do you think? What sort of things might I say about it
all to the others?
I suppose really I just felt I was getting somewhere for a change. I'm not much good at
maths but I was plodding along well and, well, getting stuck into it. It just made a
difference that she knew where I was and I was keeping up; struggling along. It didn't
seem such a hopeless task as usual.
That was really interesting, thank you. It is nice to hear about when you were getting on
well.
6.2.4. Facilitative Influence

The third important principle is that the teacher should use her influence
facilitatively, and in particular that she should not impose her Mathematical
knowledge on the learners. We have already met some examples of teachers'
misuse of their sapiential power, and there is no reason to suspect that these
were isolated incidents.
Indeed the so-called Socratic method, so beloved by many educationalists
in the past is a classic example of teacher's use of power and the imposition of
knowledge. According to Pimm (1987) this view has led some people to
characterise this method as "proof by intimidation". It is certainly not a
teaching approach which meets my criteria.
Nor should one ever underestimate the strong emotions created by teachers
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133
who use their influence in this way. Buxton (1981) gives us an excellent
example of this emotional dimension. The following exchange is between
himself (Laurie) and an adult, who is perhaps more able to articulate these
emotions than a worried child:
Sarah:
Laurie:
Sarah:
Laurie:
Sarah:
Laurie:
Sarah:
I'm annoyed now because you're not going to tell me. You're going to go through
all the bloody . . .
What do you mean I'm not going to tell you?
You're keeping a knowledge to yourself until it suits you. That's the feeling I get
when you don't tell me what it is. You're presented with a problem. This bod
knows the answer, whoever he bloody is, and he's not going to tell you till he's
good and ready.
So if I tell you the answer is A + 3?
Then I can work. Then I can work and see. But you see, it's like any child, you see,
we've got to go through all the bloody rigmarole and then they are going to tell you
when it suits them.
The intention is to get you to see it.
I know. I know what the intention is and I'm telling you what the emotional feeling
is. And I think with children ... sod the explanation. Just tell me what it is. Don't
play games with me.
(I'm not sure now whether she knows that she has been told the answer - she obviously did
earlier.)
Moreover we should note that this reaction was to a teacher who was trying
to be helpful!
Clearly, the aim of the enculturation process of developing in each child 'a
way of knowing' demands that the teacher use her sapiential power to expose
ideas and values. But how can this be achieved without imposition and
without engendering those kinds of feelings.
Given the principles already stated, the teacher should perhaps first adopt
the general stance of the 'facilitative collaborator'. Farnham has a good
example of this (the teacher is OF) in the course of a group discussion:
DF:
Nicky:
Robin:
DF:
Robin:
David:
DF:
Robin:
David:
What do we mean by the word same?

WeIVexactly the same position/identical
It's notll didn't say identicaVI just said the same
What did you mean by the same Robin
Oh well you knowllook you've got like Hodgies
You put one on the other side
You were saying
Or if you turn it overlbut he's looking at it from his angle/just like that
It's not from any angle. Robin/they're just completely different.
(Farnham, 1975, p. 35)
The words from the teacher help to focus the discussion and sharpen up the
contrasts that are being pursued. They also help the learners to develop their
cooperative abilities. Additionally, unlike many teachers' questions, the
answers are not already known beforehand.
The direction though, and the security, comes from the Mathematical
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leadership offered by the teacher. That is, the teacher can now think of herself
as the Mathematical leader of the classroom group. The particular merit of
this view is that one can only be an effective leader if one is part of the group
one is trying to lead. This then emphasises the community of the group, and
requires the teacher to empathise, and identify herself, with the other members of the classroom group.
Yates (1978) reports another example of this kind of facilitative leadership
which develops a constructive learning environment:
In Brownoaks the School Mathematics Project Books are there. The words are there and
their ambiguities are recognised. The teacher acknowledges some of them:
- Be careful of the negative in the question where it says: not more than.
The pupils query others:
- What does a journey mean, there or there and back?
- Has to transport nine hundred parcels.
A pupil maintains that this latter statement need not necessarily mean more than, it might
mean exactly. Colin agrees.
It is all so different.
The atmosphere is different, Colin is relaxed, the pupils are relaxed. Colin does not mind
admitting when he is unsure, it does not make him feel insecure. The pupils accept their
teacher in this way. A mutual respect exists between teacher and pupils.
The teacher's knowledge can also be used to lead the learner (supportively)
into the difficult areas of experience, where accommodation, that most
painful aspect of learning, needs to happen:
How about if I did one like this?
6.23 x 0.48
What do you think the answer to this would be?
Urn. About twelve. Yes.
How did you get that?
It's about half of a whole number. Halfs into six equals twelve.
In this case the answer is twelve. You've divided, but the answer is bigger. What if you
multiply? Can you make the answer smaller? No it won't work out smaller.
Do you want to work it out? (hands him a calculator).
(laughs).
What's happened?
It's got smaller. It's 2.2904:
How do you explain that then?
I don't know. I thought maybe if you . .. Oh, is it one of those funny numbers? But
multiplication still makes it bigger.
(Pimm, 1987)
The teacher's influential role then is to lead the learners into the worthwhile Mathematical experiences. But this is still not enough, for, as I asked
earlier, how can the Mathematical leader avoid becoming THE Mathematical
authority? The danger is clear and the problem is also plain - the more one
emphasises (for all the best reasons) the interpersonal nature of Mathematical
education, the greater the risk that the teacher is perceived as being the
Mathematical authority figure in the classroom.
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135
Perhaps the only honest way for the teacher to unravel this knot for the
learners is by encouraging reflection on the Mathematical experiences which
they have engaged in. At present there is little reflection in classrooms about
Mathematical activity, so that even when genuine inductive discovery experiences are offered, for example, they operate within the narrow perspective of
the particular Mathematical topic being taught, rather than being considered
within the wider framework of Mathematical knowledge generally. Were the
teacher to bring to the overt attention of the learners the goals of Mathematical enculturation, and the fact that Mathematics is a kind of knowledge, this
would do much to create a collaborative engagement by the learners.
6.2.5. Metaknowledge and the Teacher

The frequently heard yet genuine question "why are we studying this topic?"
doesn't just need answering. It is a message from the frustrated and relatively
powerless learners that their metaknowledge needs developing, that the
'problematic' area is not just that topic but rather the whole issue of the
nature, status and value of Mathematical knowledge. With a shift to the
curriculum outlined in the previous chapter it will be possible for the teacher
to deal directly with the meta knowledge of Mathematics, and to use the
question above as an opportunity for perhaps developing a project or an
investigation. Certainly at the very least it will offer a chance to expose
criteria and values which in the existing curricula usually remain hidden.
More than that, however, an emphasis on the metaknowledge level enables
the teacher to distance herself from the Mathematics in order that the
learners can begin to see that the teacher is not the authority for the
Mathematics. Moreover the distance so created also means that a critical
stance can be encouraged towards those values and criteria associated with
Mathematics. This is the stance which enables Mathematics to be put into a
perspective which demonstrates that it is a way of knowing rather than the
way of knowing. In all our tireless efforts to make Mathematics truly accessible to all children we must never lose sight of the relativity of this knowledge.
This, for me, is one of the most pressing reasons for wanting to see a
development from 'the teaching of Mathematics' to 'a Mathematical Education'.
6.3. AN INTENTIONAL PROCESS
6.3.1. The Choice of Activities

The second aspect of the Mathematical enculturation process which it is
necessary to consider is that it is an intentional, purposeful, goal-directed
process. The goals relate both to the nature of the Mathematical (and of
course mathematical) activities discussed in Chapter 2 and to the particular
values and attitudes described in Chapter 3. Already we have seen how these
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can influence the components of the curriculum offered in the last chapter,
and in particular, how they help to emphasise the societal and cultural aspects
of a Mathematical education.
With regard to the process, then, the intentionality will first be experienced
by the learner in terms of the kinds of activities offered by the teacher. The
'image' of the Mathematics will be conveyed to the learners by the activities in
which they engage. An unremitting diet of technique and performance
activities cannot help but create an image of a subject which is solely
concerned with performance of techniques. A reflective, explanatory image
will therefore only be conveyed if activities of a reflective or explanatory
nature are also used. There is a process of 'narrowing down', from the
universe of possible activities, to those considered desirable for mathematics
enculturation, for Mathematics enculturation, for these children in this social
context, at this level of maturity and experience, and situated in this sequence
of activities. Already the first few stages of that process may well have been
established by the government, or the State, or the School and 'objectified' in
a curriculum before the teachers' decisions come into effect, but hopefully
there will be some room for manoevre for the teacher. 1
Ideally, in my view, the teacher is in the best position to judge the
micro-curricular situation and to decide on which particular activities will next
be appropriate for her children. As was suggested in Chapter 5 it is more
appropriate for the classroom teacher to make the micro-curricular decisions
and adaptations within a macro-curricular framework offered by others. The
teacher as an adaptive person needs to be able to respond creatively and
purposefully to the dynamic classroom environment created by herself and
the learners in her care. A framework and structure is necessary but it should
not be so restrictive as to prevent the teacher operating adaptively.
The teacher then should have responsibility for 'selecting the particular
Mathematical activities to be offered to the learners, and she must therefore
pay due regard to, and give due emphasis to, the different kinds of activities
called for in the three components of the Mathematics curriculum. The
over-arching principles are that all children should engage with these components, that as many as possible of the concepts in the Symbolic component
should be experienced, and that paradigmatic choices should be made within
the Societal and the Cultural components. The purpose of this enculturation
curriculum is to offer cohesive breadth of experience to the learner, which
means establishing connections between ideas (to develop cohesion) while
also emphasising the unique values of the different ideas (to develop breadth
of understanding).
Regardless therefore of the particular ideas to be developed through any
one activity, there need always to be provided opportunities for reflection
about that activity in order to allow for the connections to be made between
the ideas from one activity and those from another. This is important not just
to emphasise connectedness and cohesion, but because this is something
THE PROCESS
137
which the learners find difficult to do by themselves. It is most important

because, as we have seen in the previous section, in order to develop
meanings and "a way of knowing", and not just to teach techniques, the
teacher must encourage reflection about Mathematical ideas. The development, through discussing and teaching, of metaknowledge of Mathematical
ideas is central in the enculturation curriculum.
That this is missing from so much mathematics teaching was clearly exposed by Ruthven's (1980) study. Ruthven proposed a model of Mathematics
teaching which contained four elements:
Standard Articulation which consists of a "presentation of mathematical methods, concepts and
activity which is concerned solely with establishing, or laying down and acting in conformity with
a body of 'correct' or conventional systems, rules and relations" (p. 89).
Non-standard Articulation which goes beyond this "to examine other kinds of evaluations and
reasons underlying the structure of mathematical methods, concepts, arguments and activity".
While the first category "may be concerned with relations within the system, it does not examine
the basis of the system, or the intrusion of considerations logically external to it, in its use".
Non-standard Articulation does this.
Methodological Reflection involving "discussion of philosophical and psychological questions
about the nature of mathematical knowledge, argument, enquiry and thought, and the judgements underlying them".
Cultural Reflection involving "discussion of social and historical questions about the development
of mathematics, and its interaction with a wider society, in particular, its impact on man's world
and ideas" (p. 90).
In an analysis of transcripts from 38 lessons in Scottish secondary schools,

Standard Articulation accounted for the vast majority of classroom talk.
There was a very small amount of Non-standard Articulation but Cultural
Reflection only occurred in two lessons while no evidence of any Methodological Reflection was ever recorded.
As was stated earlier, a curriculum which is essentially technique-focussed,
as at present, does little to encourage reflection, or even the discussion of
aspects other than those concerned with the specific performance of the
techniques. Even a curriculum which allows for reflection, however, such as
that proposed in the last chapter, could still be taught non-reflectively. The
teacher therefore still has the responsibility not only to choose activities which
encourage comparison and reflection, but also to create reflective 'space'
around every activity. As I said in the last section this specific focus at the
metaknowledge level is necessary to distance the teacher from the Mathematics.
One study which demonstrates the possibilities well is that of Farnham
(1975) and we have already seen examples from his transcripts. The children
were 9-10 year olds and Farnham says
The starting points offered for discussion were:
- What is the biggest number?
- What do we mean by odd and even numbers?
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- What is the biggest number between 0 and I?

- What do we mean by one nought? (one zero)
- 0 x 0 = 2.
- What does 'straight' mean?
- What is a good way to decide who starts first in a game? (p. 5)
Clearly these Mathematical activities, set in the context of group work

(four children to a group), offer plenty of opportunity for reflective discussion. Furthermore the transcripts show us that, contrary to some people's
beliefs, children of 9-10 years old are well able to make progress with such
'reflective' topics. Moreover they did not always require a teacher to be
present in the discussion to make progress:
Stephen:
Alison:
Stephen:
Alison:
Stephen:
Christian:
Stephen:
Elizabeth:
Stephen:
Elizabeth:
Stephen:
eight ninths/no eight millionths

eight millionths (exclamatory)
what is after that/about a thousand thousandths and ninety nine?
could be nine nine nine nine
one from a million/millionths
a million millionth
that would be one
that's what we're trying to get
it's the highest number
yeah, between 0 and 1
well that's something like a million millionths/one from a million millionths
that's the highest you can get (p. 26)
And with respect to the question 'What do we mean by one nought?':

Robin:
Nicky:
David:
Nicky:
David:
Christopher:
Nicky:
Christopher:
Nicky:
But that is ten because you call it ten

Yeah
It's just a number/like my name's David
Is it
Just like my name's David the number's called ten/you have to have a name
Yes because your name can't be called ten
My name's Nicky/I suppose it's just the same
Your name could be ten (laughter)
Or eleven or twelve
And later in the same discussion:

Robin:
David:
Robin:
David:
Robin:
David:
Robin:
Nicky:
Robin:
David:
Christopher:
Robin:
One O/it's a symboVone 0 is a symbol isn't it/it's like having a different god
from God you know
It's not
It is/it's a symbol ...
What do you mean
It's like having a glo/d
It is ten it's a number not a god
I know it's not/it's just explaining it/isn't it
Yeah it must be
So ten is ten
I know
One is a number as well isn't it
All the numbers are symbols (p. 25)
THE PROCESS
139
The intentional nature of the enculturation process is therefore manifested

initially through the selection by the teacher of the particular activities to be
engaged in by the learners. What is equally important, however, is the
knowledge-frame or environment, created by the teacher in the classroom,
which encourages the intentional shaping of the ideas generated by the
learners through the activities. Let us therefore consider what knowledge
environments might be important for the three curricular components.
6.3.2. The Concept-Environment

As described in the previous chapter the Symbolic component is conceptbased and it would therefore be appropriate to analyse what I shall call the
concept-environment. Within this environment I would expect to see an
emphasis on
- the phenomena to be explained
- the derivation of models, concepts, explanations
- the search for similarity in disparate situations
the attention to structure, not detail
- the representations of similarity
- the generalisation and logical extension of concepts
- the objectification of abstractions
- the logical relationships between concepts and conceptual structures.
The concept-environment should be one where the focus is on the concepts
themselves, on the situations which they describe and on the connectedness of
concepts, together with the processes of relating and producing all these. The
language of discussion should be shaped accordingly, as should the questions
asked of the learners, and the answers offered to learners' questions. The
criteria for comparing the quality of contributions should relate to these foci,
as should the motivations and the challenges.
Take as an example the following situation (Figure 11), where a group of
post-16 students are working with a child's toy consisting of a track which is in
the shape of a vertical loop down which a model car can be released:
S 1:
S2:
T:
S1:
S2:
T:
S3:
S1:
(T is the teacher)
I t could reach the top and fall off. (The students are releasing cars down the track.)
It fell off there at one o'clock.
So if it's going to fall, it'll fall off around there, will it?
It might fall off anywhere in the top half.
No, between there and there.
... see where you can and where you can't get it to fall off.
About 2 and 3 ...
. . . again, around 3 o'clock.
If it doesn't fall off between 9 and 12 o'clock it won't fall off before 3 o'clock. If it's got
enough ...
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Fig. 11
[SI and S2 are viewing the loop from opposite sides.)

S2:
S1:
S2:
SI:
S3:
T:
SI:
S2:
S3:
S2:
SI:
S2:
SI:
S2:
SI:
T:
?:
SI:
S2:
SI:
S2:
I don't know ... it might be because of friction.

If it's got enough velocity here [at 12 o'cluck) then it won't.
But friction ... it might be losing energy along there.

It won't, it'll get faster.
... if there's enough energy to reach this point at the top then it won't fall off.
How fast must it be going at the top? You're saying if it just reaches the top with
enough energy? . . .
If it has enough potential energy to get to the top, surely that's it.
It needs to have enough KE (Kinetic Energy) here to do it.
Take it up the track to about the same height, so it starts at the same height as the top.
You lose energy from friction.
A bit higher to account for friction ... It comes off at about the top.
But it fell off.
That's friction.
But you allowed for friction.
Hm, not enough.
Can you say where it left the track?
About there. Couldn't really tell. If it comes off at that point? Can it corne off here?
If it comes off it's not going to just fall down. It's not going to reach there and drop.
Why?
Because urn, if it's in free fall then ... if it reached the top, it's not going to have
velocity that way (tangentially) and fall in a parabola. If there's no gravity acting it's
got to move that way, because there's gravity it'll fall in a parabola.
Yes, it can still have velocity ... that way.
(Williams, 1986, p. 59)
And so the discussion continues and the ideas of speed, friction, energy etc.
get analysed logically and rationally. Toys, particularly mechanical ones, do
lend themselves to interesting experiments with real phenomena.
In the next illustration of a concept-environment the teacher (T) is helping
the group of young children share their ideas about 'angle'.
THE PROCESS
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C
T
C
T
P
C
T
C
C
T
C
C
C
C
T
C
T
C
C
C
T
C
C
C
C
T
C
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141
What can you tell me about angles?

They're 90
You can have 112 turns and 114 turns
They're shapes, I think
What do you think, Linda?
Yes, I think it's a kind of shape
That's an angle - that sort of corner, there [Points to corner of her book]
What sort of angle is that
It's a corner
What do you think, Paul?
A shape
Your finger and thumb make an angle [Opening his finger and thumb]
Are they all the same size?
No, if they're different shapes, they've got to be different sizes
You can make angles with one of them round things that come of a genorite (sic) set
Is that the only way?
We could get one of these (protractor) and then turn it round like that ...
But there are only two angles on that, though
Maybe 3
No, 2
Could you show me the two angles?
There and there
I see
I don't think that are any - they aren't two lines coming down
If it was a whole circle you wouldn't have any angles
No. Not a single one.
What makes an angle, then?
90
A sharp point
A corner makes an angle
The handle on the door makes a 114 turn
Can you see other things that turn?
The door, when it opens
The clock hands
How far does the minute hand turn in a whole hour?
It goes all the way round
And how fa~ in a quarter of an hour?
That's 90
It depends on the clock
What do you mean?
Well, it's bigger on the class clock than my watch
Does that make it a bigger turn?
Oh yes. If it's a bigger shape it must be a bigger size ...
The teacher has created here an environment in which the children feel free to express the
ideas, and as a result the teacher had discovered a great deal about what the children know
about angles - right and wrong.
(Harvey, 1982, p. 69)
The next piece from a transcript illustrates the point that it is not just words
which help us to explain our environment, we also have figural concepts in
Mathematics - in this case, the graph. The teacher is M.
142
M:
pI:
M:
pI:
M:
p2:
M:
p2:
pI:
M:
CHAPTER 6
What did you think about which leg would be strongest?
What, what d'you mean?
With right-handed people which leg did you think would be the strongest?
The right.
Can you find out if that's true? In most cases? In every case? In some cases?
It isn't. Mr. L. ...
Yes, that's one. Can you look at all the results together?
And then see which one ... is the most. How may times it is and how many times it
isn't.
All we have to do is count it and if ... As long as ... We can do the same for the
left-handed.
Well, see if you can write about what you think. Write it at the top of your graph. As
long as somebody reading it can understand what you're talking about.
(Lopez-Real, 1985, p. 47)
Those three extracts show us some of the critical ingredients in the conceptenvironment: environmentally-related activity, conceptual clarification, reflection and logical analysis, Mathematics as explanation. The learners contribute most to the activity while the teacher leads, supports and encourages
the shaping.
6.3.3. The Project-Environment

Following the same pattern, then, what additionally would we expect to see in
an appropriate environment for the shaping of ideas within the Societal
component? Recall that this component was thought to be best conceived of
as project-based, so let us consider now a project-environment. We are
thinking particularly of projects which are concerned with the relationship
between Mathematics and society and of course if the concept-environment is
well provided for then this itself will have fostered some understanding of that
relationship. However, in this part of the curriculum the intention is to attend
more deliberately, and more problematically, to that relationship.
Within the project-environment therefore I would expect to see a particular
emphasis on:
- the variety of societal situations which have been and can be explained
the values of prediction and 'control' over the physical environment attained
the benefits and disadvantages to society of the increased control
the perceptions of 'progress' which such benefits bring
- the sources of information about societal situations
- critical analysis of the Mathematical explanatory process.
The project therefore is not merely a product - an essay, for example, with
illustrations. 2 A project, and the project-environment, is an activity and a
context in which many questions, problems and issues can be raised, though
slightly different emphases will be given according to the topic and also to the
time period of the project generally.
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143
That is, for "Society in the past", the significance relates to particular
situations which were important in the history of Mathematical development.
For "Society at present" the aim is to enable the learners to become more
aware of the societal context in which they live, and how Mathematically
controlled it has become. For "Society in the future" the hypothetical nature
of Mathematical reasoning can come to the fore together with considerations
of the kinds of society one might wish to work towards, and the strengths and
limitations offered by Mathematics in achieving that society.
The first problem facing the teacher, in creating' this environment, lies in
making satisfactory connections between the level of Mathematical conceptual knowledge possessed by the learners and the simplicity/complexity of the
societal/contextual situations to be explored. These problems are of course
greater with the historical project because one has little control over the level
of Mathematics involved. With the present and futture societies, on the other
hand, the level of situation can often be chosen to be appropriate to the
learners' level of conceptual knowledge.
But a prime aspect of the 'project' is that the learner should exercise as
much choice as is feasible over the topic to be pursued. In trying to personalise the learning through the project environment the teacher should try to
keep this point in mind. There is nothing more frustrating for learners than to
be forced to explore in great depth a topic which holds little interest for them.
It would be foolish to do this for a Ph.D student, and it is just as foolish to try
to do this for a young learner in school. It will be completely counterproductive.
One teacher describes her approach this way (ATM, 1987):
I have given the class a choice of problems. They have chosen their problem and are working with
friends in groups of 2 or 3, they have two weeks of maths lessons and homework. I have some
idea of what I would like to be happening. I would like them to be working actively and
independently, occasionally getting enthusiastic and generating ideas which surprise me and go
beyond the original plans. I do not want them bored and fed-up and continually saying "What do
I do now, Miss?"
WHAT DO I DO FOR THE NEXT TWO WEEKS??
I can say YES if what the students suggest is not actually illegal or likely to immediately lose me
my job!
"There's not enough room - can we use the corridor?"
"Can we borrow some plasticene from the art department?"
"We need to survey all the other fourth year classes."
I can PROVIDE MATERIALS - a curiously important part of the role. A willingness to find
very large, long or oddly patterned paper seems to convince the children that you really do want
them to follow their own ideas.
I can LISTEN to what they've done so far and what they plan (it will make working easier than
trying to follow what they have written down).
144
CHAPTER 6
I can try to devise TACTICS for dealing with a group that has become disheartened. They could
review what they have done so far - perhaps they need a reflective period writing up what they
have done. Do I need to suggest ideas myself or will they come up with something next lesson?
I can encourage groups to talk to each other and SHARE IDEAS that seem appropriate.
I can TALK ABOUT MATHEMATICS. (p. 51)
By helping the learner to choose an appropriate project topic, therefore,

the teacher is beginning to exercise the 'personal' mode of teaching, and this
will continue throughout the development and exploration of the project.
(Note that this approach doesn't rule out collaborative group work by the
learners on a project topic, as indicated by that teacher, though I would argue
that each child should prepare their own report.) This word 'personal" is
chosen, in preference to 'individual' to re-emphasise the interpersonal nature
of teaching and the way that this can be maximised within the project (and
investigation) environment. It offers the opportunity for the teacher to
support, encourage, challenge, and excite each learner at their personal level,
and to consider the personal development of each child.
The teacher needs to be even more of a facilitator here than in the
conceptual component. There it could be argued that the teacher already
knew more about the concepts than the learners did, or were likely to. Here,
where the aim is to give the child the opportunity to do personal research, just
as with the Ph.D thesis, the teacher will not know what the learner may
uncover. That consequence of course may extend well beyond aspects of
Mathematical knowledge into the areas of values concerning societal progress
and control.
Some may see that as a problem. I don't. If, as I argued earlier, the
teacher's ultimate task is to educate the learners to the meta-knowledge level
then suitable activities must be found to achieve this. It seems to me that
projects in the Societal component offer another opportunity for involvement
in activities at the meta-level, and a further chance to demonstrate and discuss
the values of Mathematics - in this case, those which relate to the wider
society.
Of course the 'feel' of the project environment will differ according to the
type of project undertaken. With the 'society in the past' aspect, it would be
unreasonable to expect the learner to develop my original ideas, whereas it
should be possible for any learner to gain access to a variety of historical
accounts which exist in both popular, and more academic, form.
The significant points relate to the gradual development of Mathematical
ideas and how these related to the society of the time. Whether, for example,
the topic is navigation, astrology, the calendar, or the role of automata, it is
important for the teacher to enable the child to 'feel' the significance and
impact of ideas on that society, even though for the child the ideas might
either seem 'obvious' or old-fashioned.
THE PROCESS
145
The 'facts' that the day has 24 hours, that the week has seven days, that the
year has 365 days, that the world is 'round' and revolves round the sun, that
our counting system is base 10, that there are 360 in a complete revolution,
are likely to be so obvious that they are not worth discussing. But the fact that
they were invented and argued about in society for centuries adds a very
different dimension to Mathematical Knowledge.
Similarly with 'old-fashioned' and slightly unusual ideas like astrology,
numerology and geomancy, a teacher can develop the connections between
Mathematical concepts and the ideas of prediction, supernatural control, and
mystery. Reading your 'star-predictions' in the daily newspaper may be a
source of amusement for many young people nowadays, but astrology and
numerology once held great importance for people centuries ago, and did
much to popularise Mathematical values.
Over and above these aspects, it would be important for the teacher to help
the child become aware that historical research is developing all the time (see
for example, Damerow, 1986, and Critchlow, 1979) as are the interpretations
of what we know. For example, van Sertima (1986) points out that a predominantly white, and European, version of Mathematical and scientific history
has obscured, and devalued, the contributions of black Africa to that history.
Thus, as well as referring learners to the historical literature as their source of
information, the teacher can also develop the idea that that literature was of
course, written by people, in a social and cultural context.
For 'society at present' the sources of information are not historical, but the
same point can be made. Whatever documents are used, they were written by
someone with a certain purpose in mind, and for a certain 'audience'. They
should not be taken as representing 'the truth'.
However the more significant purpose in exploring projects concerning
'society at present' is to enable the learner to understand more about how
society is 'controlled' by Mathematics. The technological environment offers
many ideas for such projects, as we saw in the last chapter, and from the
wheel to the computer, the societal implications can easily be identified and
analysed. Topics such as 'building design', 'map-making' and 'gears and
pulleys' are good examples of projects where different aspects of Mathematics
can be shown to have significant effects on the environment all over the
world.
More challenging, from the values perspective, can be topics like 'life
insurance', 'packaged holidays' and 'computer dating', where aspects of our
life-styles and interpersonal relationships can become highly controlled. At
one level it is necessary for children to have some understanding of how these
areas of societal activity function, but it is more important for the teacher to
cultivate the awareness of how, for example, numbers, measures and patterns
influence all our lives and of how values like logical consistency, predictability
and control are institutionalised in our society's very fabric. A project-
146
CHAPTER 6
environment for this area should be trying to help the learner to put Mathematics into a societal perspective.
This can become of even greater significance with the project-environment
for topics concerning 'society in the future'. As I said in the relevant section in
the last chapter, projects of this nature enable a teacher to develop in the
pupils an awareness of the power, and also the limitations of Mathematical
explanations. Some topics like those proposed e.g. 'improving traffic flow at
intersections' already appear in Mathematical curricula usually under a heading of 'Mathematical modelling'. The aim of such work is usually to improve
the application of Mathematical ideas within society - as one author says
"This book is about learning to use Mathematics" (Burkhardt, 1981). The
aim is dearly to both demonstrate the power of Mathematics in society, and
also by doing that, to increase that power. There is rarely any consideration of
whether the power of Mathematics should be increased, or whether it is
already too powerful. Such a learning environment will take for granted the
assumption that Mathematical power must increase.
By contrast, the project-environment which I have in mind will treat
Mathematical power and control as problematic. This is not to suggest that
the teacher should always adopt a negative stance towards any Mathematical
application but that the value of a Mathematical explanation, interpretation,
or 'solution' of a problem situation always needs to be judged by nonMathematical criteria. The criteria may be ethical, moral, social, or cultural
but they cannot by definition be Mathematical.
That is why I have deliberately included project topics like 'The length of
the school day', 'Are the Olympics too big?' and 'The costs of peace', in order
to promote the idea that criteria which are non-Mathematical should necessarily enter into the project-environment. The same motives apply here as
they did with the society-at-present projects, with one additional motive. Not
only will the teacher be helping the learner to understand, and to enquire,
about the environment and society generally, but also the awareness of choice
and decision about future life and society can be developed. The learner can
see that the power of Mathematical ideas carries with it values which may, or
may not, conflict with other values which have an equal, or more significant,
claim on our decisions at any time.
A thorough course of Mathematical modelling may be a very good Mathematical training, but it can never be a good basis for a Mathematical education. It is only by getting outside Mathematics itself and by critically
reflecting on its concepts, ideas, explanations and values and on their role
within society generally that we can begin to offer learners a genuine Mathematical education.
Creating a critically aware and sensitive project-environment is a challenging task for any teacher, but it is essential that Mathematics Educators
recognise the need to face that challenge. As Skovsmose (1985) puts it: "It is
necessary to increase the interaction between Mathematical Education and
THE PROCESS
147
Critical Education, if Mathematical Education is not to degenerate into one

of the most important ways of socialising students into the technological
society and at the same time destroying the possibilities for developing a
critical attitude towards precisely this technological society". That message is
as significant for all Mathematics Educators outside the classroom as it is for
those who work inside.
6.3.4. The Investigation-Environment

Finally we need to consider the Cultural component, where the intentional
nature of the enculturation process focusses our attention on the teacher's
creation of an investigation-environment. Once again, we have already seen in
the transcripts of the concept-environment the possibilities there for developing an understanding of the nature of Mathematical knowledge - the social
construction, the need for demonstration, the appeal to the rules of reason
etc. Now, in this environment the main aim for the teacher is to give the
learners opportunities specifically to shape their creative Mathematical behaviours in order for them to understand more about how Mathematical ideas
develop.
We have seen in the project-environment that the principal sources there
are likely to be references from 'experts' and other writers generally, and the
learner's task is to draw ideas, comparison and inspiration from those other
writers. In this environment, however, the main source is the learner's own
creative potential. This then is what the teacher must work with, and therefore the investigation-environment to be established by the teacher needs to
emphasise aspects such as:
-
the choosing of symbols

the exploration of possibilities
hypothetical thinking
the representation of relationships
the development of conjectures
conviction, argument and proof
precision, conciseness
logical consistency
reflection on all of these.
Of course, not all investigations need involve all of these aspects, except
perhaps the last, for once again it is the reflective engagement with these
creative endeavours which will help the learners appreciate the values and
mysteries of Mathematical activity. 3
Like the project-environment, the teacher should aim at the personal level
of teaching, for the reader will recall once again that this Cultural component
is not concerned with coverage, but with exemplification. Therefore choice
will enter in strongly at the phase of selecting appropriate investigation topics
as well as during the investigation itself. This does not mean that learners
148
CHAPTER 6
could not work in groups, or even as a class, on a particular investigation. But

the intention of personal endeavour should be made clear by the teacher in
creating and sustaining the investigation environment.
For example, in this extract from Lopez-Real (1985), the teacher is just
beginning to establish the appropriate environment with a class. We let
Lopez-Real introduce the scene:
The lessons observed with the 2nd year class centered around an investigation of patterns and
digit-sums in multiplication tables. The theme was introduced as a follow-up to a previous
incident where two of the boys had worked with Steve (the teacher) on the digit sum property of
the 9 times table. Throughout all the work Steve acts as if he is a genuine investigator himself not
knowing what will arise. He constantly emphasises the idea of hypothesis-making and testing.
For example, after the initial introduction and some work on the board with the digit-sums of the
18 times table and the 7 times table, we have the following extract:
S
(teacher)
D (pupil)
S:
D:
S:
D:
S:
Right, it's a different pattern to our 9 times table and

wonder what would happen if we tried other tables? And
see, because that's about as far as we got with Darren
thinking, how many different patterns could we get with
our 18 times table. I

it got me thinking you
and Mark. It got me
multiplication tables?
What I thought we could do is sort of experiment ourselves. It would help I

think if we worked together in small groups, say in two's and three's. Calculators are here to help you. If you want to try more complicated ones, by all means
do so.
If it, say you did the 3's then when you did the 30's
Well now, here's a theory Darren's got. Darren thinks that we might get the
same pattern for the 3 times and the 30 times table.
Or whatever 3 goes into.
O.K. He's saying whatever 3 divides into. So you think therefore the 3 will be
the same as the 6 times table?
Yes. Cos 9 was the same as 18.
Right, so there's a theory which Darren can test out and if you've got any
theories like that, write down your theory.
Say "I think this will happen" and then test it. Write down whether it actually
works or not. O.K.? Record everything." (pp. 38-9)
In this extract can be found some of the aspects of the investigation

environment - the exploration of possibilities, hypothetical thinking, the
development of conjectures (theories, as Steve calls them).
A different topic and a different phase to the investigation is illustrated
below, also from Lopez-Real (1985). The teacher M is working with a small
group investigating "the number of different shapes that could be formed by
placing two identical triangles together along their equal edges".
M:
p:
M:
p:
M:
p:
M:
See if you can name all the shapes. I think you're going to have to invent a name for
some of them.
This one looks like a kite, sort of.
Sort of? Why do you say that?
Doesn't have a sharp bottom.
So it's a sort of kite but doesn't have a sharp bottom.
It's sharpless.
Sharpless. Do you know what the opposite of sharp is?
149
THE PROCESS
p:
M:
Blunt. We could call it a blunt kite.

Call it a blunt kite then. Why not? (pp. 4&-7)
And so the investigation continues - perhaps the "blunt kite" is a significant

shape to pick out, perhaps not, but the children are engaging with the
processes of creating and exploring Mathematical structures, with choosing
symbols (here a name) and with representing relationships.
The individual and personal emphasis which this environment should
provide is well illustrated by the following transcript, which concerns a boy
following through on a 'snowflake' investigation which all the class participated in. The investigation 'task' states: "This pattern is formed by following
the rule, to colour in squares which touch previous squares along one side
(Figure 12):
r---:-
~'
"
~
:-::s
~'
:-.' ~ ~
~\
"-
I~
~'-
~.
,\\' %: ~\I
/- '~ ~
~
"""
~~'~'
,",
I~'
~'
/.- ~
I~ ~
'---
Fig. 12
Continue to colour new squares which obey the rule."

The teacher reports the follow-up discussion with Jonathan, aged 8 years 8
months:
T:
J:
T:
J:
T:
J:
T:
J:
T:
J:
T:
J:
Do you know what you're doing, Jonathan?

Yes, the same as the girls.
Why are you doing it?
I don't know.
Why are the girls doing it?
You told them to.
Don't they want to do it then?
Oh yes, they love doing it; it looks pretty.
Is that why you're doing it?
No.
Why then?
Well I want to see how it turns out if you do it properly ... They are not following the
rules and I can if I concentrate.
We'll take the hint and leave him. I return about 20 minutes later.
T:
Where's the pattern Jonathan?
150
J:
T:
J:
T:
J:
T:
J:
T:
J:
T:
J:
T:
J:
CHAPTER 6
Here, (he uncovers it), it makes a square. Can I take it home please?
Yes. Are you happy with the square shape?
Yes.
Did you add the same number of little squares every time?
No. (he thinks this is a silly question obviously from the look he gives me.)
Well how many little squares did you add each time?
I don't know now.
Shall we try it again and count?
If you like ... just use two colours, red and orange - I've got more of those ... see?
OK Jon.
You'll do it as well then?
Yes, how many do we add first time?
Four to the first one.
We discuss each of the first four rounds, then Jonathan, who is very sparing with his efforts,
has a suggestion.
J:
T:
J:
Let's just count what we put on one leg of the snowflake.

Why?
Well it will save time and I expect it will still give you one of your number patterns, you
know 2, 4, 6, 8 or something!!
(Jonathan seems to believe that the discovery of facts and answers to problems are purely a
source of joy to the teacher, who should be kept happy.)
We continue and get quite an interesting pattern. Jonathan finds that all the numbers of
squares added are 1 or multiples of 3 - and I am able to show him on a calculator that they are
powers of 3. (We find each number is 3 times the last.) Jonathan explains to me that is not 'all
the answers to a 3-times table' and I suggest they are in fact 'powers' of 3 and show him what I
mean on a calculator. He accepts this. I believe he will use this knowledge at some future time
when perhaps the concept will become clearer.
We are interrupted by an incident that I must sort out and I now leave Jonathan looking at
th.e long line of numbers we have made.
Returning, Jonathan tells me, 'Look Mrs. Bates, a number goes twice, then a new one,
then that number once, then the new one twice .. .' and he points out the pattern 2, 1, 1,2, I,
1,2,1,1.
I am over the moon, thankful for the interruption which meant Jonathan was left to make a
discovery which I would probably have overlooked.
(Plummer, 1986, p. 32)
(Perhaps the reader should stop here and check Jonathan's findings? And,
indeed think what you would now do with this contribution.) It is interesting
indeed to see the young learner so able to conjecture and to test possibilitiesthe 'clever counting' strategy of "Let's just count what we put on one leg of a
snowflake" is particularly remarkable for an 8 year old, in my view. This
investigation won't stop here, of course. There are always more questions to
answer, more possibilities to explore, and as the teacher-prepared card says
later "Start with a triangle. Try other shapes. Vary the rule." And eventually,
the learner should write-up what has been going on in the investigation. (An
THE PROCESS
151
outline of suggestions to pupils from another teacher is included in the

Appendix.) The 'openness' of Mathematics needs demonstrating.
The particular challenge for the teacher in creating this investigationenvironment lies with the fact that the Mathematical work may proceed in a
direction which the teacher has not investigated herself, and therefore that
the learner will know more about this work than the teacher. For some
teachers that situation may be difficult to come to terms with, and indeed it
could even be suggested by some people that the teacher should never allow
the learners to work on situations which the teacher herself doesn't know
thoroughly.
That is not my position, nor in my view could that be a tenable position
within the enculturation process generally. If my analyses in Chapters 2 and 3
have any validity then the education which seeks to enculturate learners into
those ideas and those values must include the possibility of the learners
developing their understanding above and beyond that of their teachers. The
investigation-environment, together with the project-environment, offers that
possibility which should therefore be intentionally exploited to its maximum
by teachers. To not do so is not only to abuse their sapiential power and
influence but also ultimately to fail in their accountability to the Mathematical
culture.
6.4. AN IDEATIONAL PROCESS
6.4.1. Social Construction of Meanings

The third aspect of the Mathematical enculturation process which it is
essential to analyse and clarify concerns the fact that it is an ideational
process. That is, what are being shaped are ideas and meanings, not behaviours or techniques. A 'way of knowing' is a different kind of phenomenon
from a 'way of doing', and although the two are inevitably and inextricably
interwoven, they are, as goals, significantly different. As I have argued in the
first chapter, an education focussed on techniques does not develop a rich
understanding of phenomena - neither of course does a 'way of knowing'
education guarantee masterly performance of skills and techniques. My
argument is that, for the future, we need far less technique and far more
understanding - hence I am seeking in this book an approach to a Mathematical education focussed on a 'way of knowing'.
Our process then is concerned with ideas and with Mathematical ideas in
particular, and with shaping them. At the heart of this aspect of the process is
a concern about the meaning of Mathematical ideas, and in some previous
writings (e.g. Bishop and Goffree, 1986) I have put forward my interpretation
of this concept: "mathematical meaning is achieved by establishing connections between the particular mathematical idea under discussion and the
152
CHAPTER 6
remainder of the individual's personal knowledge. A new idea is meaningful

to the extent to which individuals can connect it with their existing knowledge" (p. 346).
Meaning is thus personally achieved and is an 'integrating' response by the
pupil to a new and potentially disturbing phenomenon in her environment.
The learning human seeks to integrate, and if possible assimilate, the new
idea into her existing meaning structures or schemes. But this is dependent on
the extent of the contrast between the new and the already-learnt ideas. If the
contrast is not too great, then it will be relatively easily assimilated. If it is a
sufficiently large contrast, then the individual's knowledge structures themselves will need to accomodate in order to make sense of the new idea. If this
book has done its job then there should have been plenty of opportunity for
the reader to experience both assimilation and accomodation whilst reading
it! We all learn, we develop, we grow, by experiencing and making sense of
contrast, and the Mathematical enculturation process is a way of encouraging
individuals to experience and to reflect on certain kinds of ideational contrasts
in order to develop a particular way of knowing.
But how can that be achieved if meaning is a personally constructed state?
Can there ever be 'a way of knowing' if everyone is busy constructing their
own personal meanings?
Certainly, because the contrastive ideas do not appear magically, out of
thin air so to speak. Nor are they physically observable as objects in the
environment. They emanate from people - ideas are humanly constructed as
we have seen in all the preceding transcripts. Therefore ideas are contrasted
in interactive and interpersonal engagements. If those engagements are
entered into in a collaborative and constructive spirit, as opposed to a
confrontational and destructive one, then shared meanings will have to be
agreed to in order to make sense of the contrastive ideas.
Two individuals solving a problem can only collaborate if they take care
about sharing meanings and revealing contrasts, and clearly the shared
knowledge between two people, as in a marriage for example, can be
enormously extensive. However, unless and until that pair engage with others
to share their knowledge and meanings, it will remain 'private' and personal
to that pair. In the enculturation process we are concerned with many, many
people and with the shared meanings which have developed and are developing between them. The intriguing point about this is of course that anyone
person may only meet a relatively small number of others in their lifetime but
yet they can clearly be a part of the same culture. Such is the power of
education, literature, language, the family and the media.
The 'way of knowing' which we are interested in developing is thus a
socially constructed set of ideas and meanings. And each new generation of
children needs to be enculturated into this socially constructed set of ideas
and meanings. But not by merely being told them or by being given lists of
them. Each new generation reconstructs the meanings of the old, and thus
153
THE PROCESS
'culture' is no fixed collection of objects - no 'tablets of stone'. It is continually changing, and it is continually being changed by each new generation,
during the enculturation process.
Mathematical enculturation is no different. The meaning of a Mathematical
idea is, as I have already stated, established by the connections an individual
can make between it and the individual's existing meanings. A Mathematical
idea such as 'linear equations' links with many others in all sorts of ways
(Figure 13):
coordinate graphs
functions - - - -
continuity
prediction
formulae
Fig. 13
These connections can concern other Mathematical ideas as above, but

they can also concern other kinds of school knowledge and ideas from outside
school. They will relate to imagery, metaphor and analogy, and to the
individual's knowledge of 'real-world' situations and contexts.
Individuals will therefore reconstruct and recreate Mathematical culture in
relation to the other meanings and knowledge they possess, and to the extent
that individuals within a generation share these extra-Mathematical meanings, to that extent also will that generation reconstruct similar Mathematical
meanings and culture. The present generation in the 'Western' world, surrounded by an environment which takes computers, television, and information technology for granted, will most significantly reconstruct Mathematical
meanings. Indeed this book is a part of the significant reconstruction process,
trying to redefine and clarify the meanings of Mathematical culture in the
context of today's physical and ideational environment.
The ideational aspect of Mathematical enculturation therefore sensitises us
to the facts that:
- meanings are individual and personal
- they relate to other Mathematical ideas and to environmental (in its widest
sense) ideas
154
CHAPTER 6
- Mathematical meanings are socially constructed

- it is their social construction and reconstruction that renders them shareable
- development relates to the contrast of ideas between people.
At the level of the classroom there are two aspects which will be of
particular interest for the Mathematics teacher. First, the process of encouraging the sharing and contrasting of ideas, and second the issues associated
with shaping the understanding of Mathematics as a form of explanation,
which is the specific 'way of knowing' with which I am concerned in this book.
6.4.2. Sharing and Contrasting Mathematical Ideas

The genuine sharing and contrasting of ideas between people is not a simple
process to organise, particularly with young children. It requires first of all a
constructive atmosphere, but it also puts a responsibility on the learners to
make significant and shareable contributions. In particular in order to achieve
general understanding of the social construction of meaning, it is necessary
for all of them to participate in this construction. Were the teacher to be
responsible for only 2 or 3 learners, this would not create inordinate difficulties. As it is, with perhaps between 20-30 learners in one classroom the
teacher seems to face tremendous organisational difficulties, but is this in fact
the case?
What really is necessary? The need is for the exposition of meanings - that
is, for personal meanings to be exposed, to be made overt and therefore to
become potentially 'publicly' shareable. Meanings which remain hidden and
private are by definition not being shared. Therefore the teacher needs to
create activities for the children which enable them to expose their meanings
e.g. by writing, drawing, making wall charts, speaking etc. Equally the
teacher's meanings need to be exposed, for sharing or contrastive purposesbut of course exposition has never been a problem for teachers! The archetypal poor lesson has the teacher talking to (or even at) the learners all the
time - the lecture may have some merits but if it is the sole learning
experience, it has little value in the enculturation process. One does not shape
one's own ideas merely by listening.
Exposition therefore is essentially an interactive process, with listeners and
talkers, or writers and readers, interchanging roles and trying to make sense
of each others' contributions. The aim for the teacher is now clear - to
encourage collaborative learning by whatever kind of classroom organisation
seems most appropriate.
In particular it seems obvious to me from my analysis that Mathematics
teachers need to use small group activity for much of the time. But this
appears not to be so obvious to everyone else. Indeed this form of activity is
amazingly rare in most Mathematics classrooms, whereas it arguably should
be the most productive form of collaborative organisation in the Mathemati-
THE PROCESS
155
cal enculturation process. As we have seen with Farnham's (1975) work,

well-chosen group tasks engage the learners in sharing and contrasting their
ideas with far more frequency than is possible with a whole-class activity.
Moreover with the teacher creating the kinds of 'shaping' environments that
were described in the previous section, so the feedback can be provided for
the individual learners within their groups.
The whole rhythm of communication changes when one moves from
teacher-led whole class activity to collaborative small group activity. Typically
with a whole class, the teacher talks the longest, the learners contribute little,
and the kind of contributions which they make are largely determined by
questions which are of that type peculiar to traditional teaching, where the
teacher already knows the answer being sought and the learners have to try to
guess what is in the teacher's mind.
With small-group activity, the learners do the majority of the talking and
they must sort out their shared meanings and their disagreements. The task is
the group's task and they must find ways to collaborate. The teacher's task
becomes one of creating and sustaining the appropriate 'shaping' environment, and ensuring that the small groups are interacting and collaborating
effectively. It is also necessary for the teacher to realise when it is a good
moment to leave a group alone.
In this extract from a transcript (IOWa team, 1977), the group must
interpret a 'travel' graph. T is the teacher:
T:
F:
C:
M:
T:
F:
R:
M:
R:
M:
R:
M:
F:
R:
F:
Tog.:
M:
C:
M:
C:
Why do you think he's got into trouble?

Well, because he does not move on, because the graph is rising here, and there it is
not.
and then you can work out ... (Nobody pays attention to what C was going to say.
M. said while F was talking ah - ah ... )
Ah, but in 2 minutes he drives ... oh, well, in 1 minute he drives 2 km, eh?
Now that's a fat lot of good. (Leaves the group.)
Thank you so much. (Softly so that T. cannot hear it.)
Now "What can you say about this journey" (Reads the question aloud.) Well, he
drives in one minute ... He drives at 2 km per minute ... (all write down the
answer.)
And then .. .
Per hour .. .
This straight line means rest or ...
You must add 'an hour', boy.
He drives at 2 km a minute.
But so much 'an hour', that is what you usually find.
Yes, so much an hour, that's what we had to do before.
... and 120 km an hour. (Writing.)
That's what we had to do before, and then ...
Thi.s line means trouble ... rest or trouble. (They all talk at the same time.)
Rest or trouble.
Not rest.
Why not?
It is about trouble, isn't it, not about rest.
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M:
R:
M:
F:
F:
How can you tell?

Here is a picture of a patrol car, and that certainly means something. (Points to the
picture of a patrol car.)
But you are doing that question on Worksheet C4 (points to the first question on
Worksheet C4.) ... Write down ...
This ... straight ... line ... means trouble. (Writing.)
(A moment of silence.)
Because here he moves on in time, but not in km. (Points to the horizontal part of
the graph. The others are still writing.)
(A moment of silence.)
The arguments and their resolutions continued, with the occasional support
or intervention from the teacher. More than that, the language of small-group
discussion can clearly be seen, and felt, to be a socially-constructed language.
As Farnham (1975) puts it: "Discussions of this nature reveal quite clearly
that we cannot think of the language used in the classroom as being merely
the passing of information one to another for the performance of the mathematical task in hand. We have seen how language has been used to manoeuvre for position within the group and to keep interactions 'on the boil'. It has
been used to argue and explore, to explain to oneself and to the others:
language for learning and language for the negotiation of peer group relationships have gone hand in hand."
Another point relating to the rhythm of communication concerns the time
taken for new ideas to make sense i.e. to be incorporated into the learners'
meaning structures. Farnham again:
The transcripts are rich in examples of words such as add, take away, times, divide etc., which
have everyday meanings linked closely with actions children perform, yet in mathematics have
more particular meanings. We have seen how the discussions provided for considerable flexibility
in the use of words and the subsequent analysis has shown how agreement about more precise
meanings (i.e. 'same', 'straight') is not always easily achieved. Opportunities therefore for
children to explore this flexibility of use would seem to be crucial, for if we are inclined to say that
an agreed precise use of words in the mathematics of young children gives greater freedom in
thinking, that we must provide a correct vocabulary, then we must remember too that it might
take children a considerable time to accept certain word meanings and integrate them into their
thinking, before being able to make them part of their own natural mathematical functioning.
(p. 37)
By listening to such group discussions and by analysing the group's progress, the sensitive teacher can learn a great deal about the way Mathematical
meanings are made.
Of course small groups are not the only form of classroom organisation
which should be used - individuals need time and space to study, write,
experiment and read by themselves, and the teacher needs to be able to offer
the personal learning environment that only the one-one situation allows, as
we saw in the project and investigation environments. Also there is much
value in whole class activities, particularly for comparing and contrasting
ideas and 'results' from the groups, and for collaborating in larger ventures
such as complicated statistical and other data-gathering activities.
THE PROCESS
157
But the heart of collaborative, constructive learning in the classroom must

necessarily be small group activity, and one way to encourage the sharing of
ideas in the Mathematics classroom is to recognise that if. collaborative
small-group activities are established, then the sharing and contrasting of
Mathematical ideas will occur much more naturally than it does at present. 4
6.4.3. The Shaping of Explanations

The second 'ideational' aspect which has particular implications for the
teacher concerns the shaping of Mathematical explanations. This is the way of
knowing with which I am specifically concerned in this book and as I have
already pointed out, explaining is a particular kind of exposition, in that one
is exposing the relationships and connections between a new idea and others
which are already known, understood and assumed to have been accepted.
Explaining is connecting the unknown with the known, the unfamiliar with
the familiar, the "to be explained" phenomenon with the "already explained". It is our way of making conceptual progress, of making more sense
of an unknown world.
Now consider the following classroom explanations of Mathematical ideas:
(A) 2/3 lies between 112 and 3/4 because on top the numbers go 1,2,3 and
on the bottom 2, 3, 4.
(B) 114 is odd "because there are three of them" like on a clock - in a
quarter of an hour the numbers go 5, 10, 15 i.e. three of them
(Harvey, 1982).
(C) There are 360 degrees in the parallelogram because if you push it, it will
become a rectangle, and there are 360 degrees in a rectangle.
How can the teacher work with these? Already we can see that young
children have no difficulty in generating explanations, and presumably therefore they find them acceptable, or at least they find their own explanations
acceptable. However, we as educators do not, or at least we would feel that
they can be improved in various ways. For example, we might wish to see if
explanation A is more generally true, we can foresee problems of inconsistency in B, and we might prefer direct reference to particular angles in C.
Moreover, A, Band C all suffer from the fact that each explanation is (at
present) particular to that one situation and that generalisation therefore
needs exploring in each case.
But how should the teacher negotiate in order that those explanations
could be shaped better?
The teacher could try to 'correct' each explanation much in the way that
other procedures and techniques often get corrected, but the danger here is
two-fold - firstly, the learners will lose confidence in their ability to generate
ideas of worth, and secondly the criteria by which 'improvement' is recognised remain largely hidden and covert, whereas they are just what should be
exposed and clarified. They are seen to be a product of the teacher's author-
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ity, but therefore they remain private, hidden, and exclusively the teacher's.
Rather the negotiating aim of the teacher should be to encourage the
comparison of contrasting explanations for the same phenomenon - this can
happen in debate in the small group or the whole classroom group, or better
still the explanations should be written up publicly (on the board) and then
compared. The additional importance of this latter procedure is that each
explanation thereby becomes disengaged from its creator and thus comparison is eased - the explanations are then being compared, not their creators.
By such direct comparisons, the criteria for acceptability become exposed and
the idea of explaining becomes better understood and more richly developed.
We can also understand more about shaping explanations by considering
the two different kinds of explanation which we use in Mathematics - the
logical, rational, proof-like kind, and the analogical, metaphoric and imageryrich kind. In the first, the meaning of the language becomes controlled by the
logical connectives which were elaborated in Chapters 2 and 3. Explanation C
above is one example, another is the transcript on page (140) concerning the
child's 'loop-the-Ioop' toy. The investigation-environment will also be rich in
such language as we have also seen. For the teacher the aim is to demonstrate
that logical explanations can be tested by the 'rules' and criteria of logical
argument. Are the inferences correct? Does 'always' really mean 'always'? Is
the 'therefore' really a necessary corollary? Are the stated conditions sufficient to predict the known result? etc. etc. These all lead to the more
formalised notions of proof.
Analogical explaining works with other criteria. For example, we can see
that explanation B is rather different from the others in that the word 'like' is
used, which immediately suggests explanation by analogy. The transcript
from Farnham about 'one nought' on page 138 also shows the power of
analogy in explanation.
Analogical explaining relies on establishing a congruence or a similarity
between the unknown and a known phenomenon. "Economic activity is
cyclic", "These two triangles are similar because one is just a photographic
enlargement of the other", "Like houses on a street, odd and even numbers
alternate". Indeed the words fraction (fracture), division, natural numbers,
reflection, rotation, enlargement, simultaneous equations etc. all use words
which to some extent explain by analogy. (But analogy might also be confusing with words like irrational numbers, vulgar fractions, odd numbers, powers, rings, fields!)
From the teacher's perspective analogical explaining has a different character and must therefore be shaped differently from logical explaining. Where
logic runs in sequential chains, analogical explaining connects ideas 'in
parallel' so to speak (and using an analogy!). Evaluation and the shaping of
analogies must be in terms of that parallelism - how close an analogy is it? To
what extent does it fit? Where does it break down? And why?
More importantly, perhaps, from the point of view of collaborative engage-
THE PROCESS
159
ment, both kinds of explanation must be shaped with two kinds of criteria in
mind, the security of understanding and its extension 'beyond the information
given'. Logical explaining gives us a certain security of knowing based on our
desire for logical consistency and it also enables us to make predictive,
inferential statements. Analogical explaining satisfies by its intuitive appeal to
the 'familiar', and it can suggest, by extensions of the analogy, various ideas
and possibilities which had not previously been considered. The values of
'control' and 'progress' once again are revealed.
For the teacher therefore, with the benefit of more extensive Mathematical
knowledge, certain explanations will be obviously 'better' than others, in
terms of their predictive and progressive value. So, for example, explanation
C above is not as good as the explanation "360 degrees in a parallelogram,
because it is two triangles each of which have 180 degrees", when anticipating
the case of the general polygon. For the learner, who doesn't yet realise that
that case is a more important goal, explanation C can seem quite adequate,
quite convincing, and secure. The teacher then, needs to realise this emotional dimension of explaining and the cyclic nature of security and extension,
of control and progress, of 'knowing' and 'not-knowing'.
6.4.4. Explaining and Values

Talking about, and exemplifying, criteria such as these is the way in which
personal meanings and ideas can become both shareable and contrasted.
What is more important however is the fact that sharing and contrasting
personal meanings is the way to demonstrate that meanings, ideas and values
become shaped through social interaction. By encouraging learners to contrast their reasons the criteria of logic become public and the value of
rationalism is cultivated. By contrasting their analogies, learners realise the
importance and power of analogy and imagery. By overtly contrasting Mathematical explanations, they will come to understand more about Mathematical
explaining, and they will recognise the importance of the twin values of
control and progress. Moreover, the more subtle but perhaps ultimately the
more significant values, of openness and mystery, are also revealed by shared
reflections on the whole explaining process itself, of which Mathematical
explanations are but one example.
Into such an explanatory context and learning environment can be injected
debate about the relatively greater significance of rationalism over objectism,
of progress over control, of openness over mystery. It is only by creating a
learning environment in which the discussion of Mathematical criteria and
values is legitimate, that the teacher can begin to draw attention to the relative
importance of the different values themselves.
CHAPTER 7
THE MATHEMATICAL ENCUL TURA TORS
7.1. PEOPLE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PROCESS
We now come to the final chapter, where the spotlight falls on the people who
have the responsibility for the Mathematical enculturation process. It should
be clear by now that my overarching principle is that it is of no value
appealing to 'the education system' to take care of Mathematical enculturation, because the process is at heart an interpersonal one - we must reemphasise the role of people and particularly those who have special responsibilities for this process.
This principle is reinforced by the inability I felt, and which I have
exhibited, to prescribe any details of implementing the enculturation process.
The recognition of the need to re-establish people at the centre of our
concerns in education, implies that I should also reflect my own limitations
and the limits of my own expertise in this whole enterprise. In simple terms I
believe that it is just as critical for me, as a teacher educator, to create
negotiating space for teachers as it is for teachers themselves to create
negotiating space for their pupils.
I need also to recognise that many different roles are played in the
educational system by people who share the responsibility for the Mathematical enculturation process - teachers, teacher educators, advisers, inspectors,
curriculum developers, resource providers, researchers. It is impossible, as
well as unprofessional, for me to prescribe precisely how they should exercise
their roles in order to foster the enculturation process.!
It should also be clear by now that my analysis in the three previous
chapters implies a great deal about those who are responsible for the Mathematical enculturation process. Not the least is that a focus on these people
demands a high price from them in terms of knowledge, commitment,
expertise and professional responsibility. So be it. I never suggested that
Mathematical enculturation would be easy!
It also implies a great deal about the character of the people required to
become enculturators and about what the culture expects of them.
Any culture which has reached the level of formally employing enculturators must set strong criteria for them - criteria concerning who they are and
what they should do. This is true whether the enculturator is of the 'Religious'
or of the 'Mathematical' kind. It reflects the seriousness with which a culture
takes its own preservation, survival and growth. Just as there is a high
investment by a culture in the enculturation process, there needs to be an
equally high investment in the enculturators themselves. Indeed one of the
reasons for choosing, in this book, to view Mathematics education as an
160
THE MATHEMATICAL ENCULTURATORS
161
enculturation process is to increase the seriousness with which the ideas

about, and the people responsible for, a Mathematical education are treated.
Let me therefore begin to consider in more detail the preparation required
for the task of Mathematical enculturation and particularly the development
of the people with the formal responsibility for carrying out this task - the
teachers-as-enculturators.
7.2. THE PREPARATION OF MATHEMATICAL ENCULTURATORSPRELIMINARY THOUGHTS
First of all what should anyone in the Mathematical culture require of their
formal enculturators? Intuitively, they would surely expect that the teacheras-enculturator should be a thoroughly enculturated person, Mathematically.
I don't mean by that the commonly held, but rather old-fashioned view, that
the teacher should be a 'cultured' person, i.e. well-mannered and well-read. I
am seeking to stress the fact that it would not be sensible for any culture to
entrust the enculturation of its young to someone who is not seen to be
representative of the culture. In terms of the levels discussed in Chapter 4, the
teachers must therefore be enculturated at the formal level of culture, i.e.
they should at least be on a level with other groups who actively practise and
participate in the formal cultural pursuits.
But would it be valuable or indeed necessary, for a teacher to have engaged
with the culture at the 'technical' level? My initial answer would be 'no', but I
can recognise the potential value of that level of interaction for credibility
purposes within the cultural group. Recall that the difference between the
formal and the technical levels is essentially that, at the second, one needs to
'know' the culture in a way which allows one to question it from within, to
modify it and to develop it according to its internal criteria. It is thus the level
of engagement with the Mathematical culture that is different and that
engagement develops different kinds of knowledge. Research Mathematicians explore Mathematical ideas in a certain way which therefore develops
their knowledge of Mathematical culture in a certain way. Likewise a computer scientist, a social scientist, an engineer and an accountant have their
own context-specific knowledge of Mathematical culture because of their
different kinds of activities with respect to that culture.
A Mathematics teacher, similarly, in her role as Mathematical enculturator, interacts with and engages with Mathematical culture in a different way
from the others and therefore she needs to know Mathematical culture in a
different way. I would argue that she ideally needs to know it both globally
and locally; in other words she should have a global perspective on Mathematical culture as well as knowing the details of individual topics within the
subject area. She needs to know the relationships between different topics as
well as the various sequences of those relationships which allow the necessary
partial ordering of the curriculum for teaching purposes. She needs to be
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aware of the cultural values of Mathematics, to understand its actual and

potential contribution to society. She needs to know something substantial of
the cultural history of Mathematics.
She also needs to be thoroughly at ease with the symbolic technology of the
culture in a broad yet elementary way. I use the word 'elementary' to
reinforce the notion of an enculturator's role as being to provide an introduction, or an induction, into the culture. It means, as I said earlier, that it is not
essential for a teacher to know the culture at the technical level, (i.e. not
actually to be, or to have been, a research Mathematician). Preparation of the
teacher which emphasises that aspect only reinforces the notions that 'depth',
specialism, and the narrow internal criteria of Mathematical knowledge
achieve the same kind of understanding as 'breadth', global understanding
and the external criteria, and also implies that that kind of preparation is
somehow more valuable intrinsically.
Both reasons are questionable, and in my view the 'Ideal Mathematician' as
described by Davis and Hersh (1981) would not have the kind of understanding of Mathematics which an enculturator should have. Their Ideal Mathematician would not be my Ideal Mathematical Enculturator.
What seems to be implied by this argument is that the specific preparation
of the Mathematics teacher ideally needs to be different from that of other
people engaged with the formal Mathematical culture. Logistically, economically and socially (in terms of competing societal demands) that of course may
not appear to be feasible. But what do I mean by specific 'preparation'? I see
a dimension here. No specific preparation, would mean that at the end of
formal schooling certain people would simply be designated 'Mathematics
teachers'. At the other extreme a completely specific preparation would mean
having a planned preparation from the very beginning of the period of
compulsory schooling, much in the same way that some countries used to
develop their champion athletes, musicians, or gymnasts. Neither of these
extremes seems desirable or feasible, and every country adopts an approach
somewhere between them.
This approach usually involves the three key components of teacher preparation: selection, education and training. Selection can be a once-and-for-all
matter, where for example potential student teachers can be selected at a
relatively early age and placed in Colleges or 'Normal' schools, with the
expectation that all of them will become teachers on completion of their
training. Or it could become a gradual process involving attendance at a
particular kind of school, e.g. Gymnasium, or Grammar School, then selection for University, followed by selection for specialised training. Or it could
fall somewhere between those extremes.
Teacher education likewise can vary from the specialised to the general,
and bears a strong complementary relation to 'selection'. It may be advantageous to the society and to the culture for the selection of its future enculturators to be made early, though clearly it might well be in the person's own
163
interests to make the choice of career rather later. The balance usually
achieved in the different societies of the world is that the earlier the selection
the longer the specialised education, and conversely, the later the selection,
the more it is assumed that general education and/or experience has provided
all that is necessary for the future enculturator. Increasingly specialised
teacher education, which comes with earlier selection, seems to be developing
in several countries. The feeling seems to be growing that the task of
Education is a specialist professional concern which cannot rely on the
general preparation provided by others and therefore it must develop its own
specialist preparation. That development is one which I certainly would
support, from the enculturation perspective.
Teacher training seems in most countries to be a sub-set of teacher education and is prey to some of the same pressures, and issues, that teacher
education is. Nevertheless one does not tend to find marked differences in
training to teach specific academic subjects whereas one can often find
differences related to teaching different age groups. In particular, the training
of the elementary school teacher is usually rather different from that of the
secondary school teacher.
There are clearly many issues surrounding the relative importance of, and
relationships between, the components of teacher selection, specialised/nonspecialised teacher education, and teacher training, but from the point of
view of the role of the Mathematical enculturator certain issues seem more
significant than others. These are predominantly concerned with firstly, the
selection of Mathematics teachers, and secondly the specialised Mathematics
teacher education. This is not to suggest that training is unimportant, far from
it, as we shall see later. But having already narrowed this book to the idea of
Mathematical enculturation, the specific focus of training, in the sense of
ensuring that student teachers master the skills of organisation, voice control,
planning, classroom control, etc. which every teacher needs to be able to do,
is not of particular interest here. In contrast, both 'selection', and 'education'
are significant and in fact also have important implications for 'training'
generally. We will therefore deal in this chapter with each of these aspects in
more detail.
One more point of clarification needs to be made first though. The particular problem for this chapter, as the reader can see, is how to talk about 'the
teacher-as-enculturator', and I propose to make no overt distinction between
the elementary teacher and the secondary teacher. I know, of course, about
the kinds of differences which exist between their situations in most countries,
and I also realise that their training is usually markedly different. If I use the
words "Mathematics Teacher" many readers will assume that I am referring
to a secondary teacher - but I am not. I just do not wish to pursue the
elementary/secondary distinction at all in this book. In my view the elementary teacher is just as responsible for Mathematical enculturation as is the
secondary teacher.
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CHAPTER 7
So when I talk about 'the enculturator' or 'the teacher' in what follows, I

am happy for the reader to consider any teacher of children in the formal
educational age range, say from 5 years to 18 years.
7.3. THE CRITERIA FOR THE SELECTION OF MATHEMATICAL
ENCULTURATORS
A culture's expectations of its enculturators should be high, as I have said.

Not only do they need to be well enculturated themselves, but in a compulsory education system they must be capable of engaging all children in
society, including those who will eventually go on to be engaged at the
. technical level of the culture. From the perspective of enculturation, then, it
seems to me that the teacher of Mathematics needs to meet certain significant
criteria.
7.3.1. Ability to Personify Mathematical Culture

Firstly, she clearly should not just be someone who is proficient in the
symbolic component of Mathematical culture, as I have said before. On the
other hand, a high level of proficiency in its symbolic technology is a necessary quality, since an important feature of enculturation is the 'model'
provided by the enculturator. The transmission of Mathematical culture is not
achieved by merely talking about it, nor by merely making the learners do
some Mathematics.
The presence of ideological, sentimental and sociological values of a
culture actually demand of the enculturator that she should in some way
'represent' the culture in terms of techniques, feelings, ideologies and behaviour towards others. The teacher is a 'model' in that sense for the learners.
The enculturator is the personal mediator between the learner and the culture
and, because enculturation is an interpersonal process, the enculturator will
be required to 'personify' the culture as much as possible.
Note that this line of argument is nothing to do with the particular culture
of Mathematics but with the process of enculturation generally, and comes, in
fact, from a consideration of the process from the learner's perspective. It is
the learner who has the right to expect the Mathematics teacher to personify
the values in her culture, and to the extent that the teacher succeeds in
personifying and modelling them, to that extent also will the enculturation
process succeed. The phrase "Do what I say rather than what I do" is not
appropriate for an enculturator, and learners will have little confidence, for
example, in a teacher who cannot handle the Mathematical symbolisations.
Similarly, the teacher I once heard admonishing a child for 'arguing' with
her would have done well to reflect on the role of argument in Mathematics
classes! If you can't argue in a Mathematics class, where can you do it? Values
cannot be taught by talk alone, they must be demonstrated, exhibited,
experienced, discussed and lived, and if the teacher cannot model these
165
adequately, then formal enculturation will not be as successful as it might be.

The first important criterion that Mathematical enculturators should therefore meet is that they should personify the Mathematical culture, in terms of
representing both the symbolic technology and the values. The teachers in the
'positive' transcripts shown in the last chapter illustrate this aspect well.
This criterion also makes one aware that the assumption that for a teacher
we should have specific education and training following immediately after
their own formal schooling, may be worth questioning. It can be argued that
in order to be a Mathematically well-enculturated person one should have
had considerable experience of wider society, away from educational institutions. Certainly more mature entrants to teaching can bring with them many
useful Mathematical experiences and insights from society, from industry and
from everyday commerce, and in certain cases these entrants are clearly
better enculturated than are some of their younger and more 'protected'
colleagues. This suggests to me that ways need to be found to build this kind
of experience into the teacher's education at some stage, if they haven't
already acquired it by themselves. It does not suggest, however, that students
should not be allowed to prepare as Mathematics teachers without such prior
experience, since there is no guarantee that any particular industrial, commercial or other societal activity will of itself, assist in the enculturation
process. More of this aspect will appear in the section on 'education'.
7.3.2. Commitment to the Mathematical Enculturation Process

The second important criterion in lhe choice of Mathematical enculturators
must concern the person's commitment to the Mathematical enculturation
process itself, and this is clearly of significance for the self-selection of future
enculturators, if that is permitted by the society. The Mathematical enculturator's responsibilities are morally very demanding and only people committed
to the process will be able to handle those responsibilities successfully.
It is likely that many people would be able to satisfy the previous criterion
but only if they satisfy this second one as well will they have a chance of being
successful Mathematical enculturators. The reason for this is that the commitment to the enculturation process should modify, and to some extent, control
the personification of that culture. A committed enculturator has the learner
as her primary focus, with the learner's behaviours and feelings being those
that are to be shaped. The unenculturated learner is the starting point and the
enculturated person is the goal. The behaviour of the enculturator in personifying the culture must therefore be controlled by the demands of the
enculturation process.
To take a simple example, it would be thoroughly inappropriate for the
teacher of 6 year olds who have found that 5 + 6 gives the same result as 6 +
5, to launch into an exhaustive explanation in terms of the commutative
properties of certain binary operations. That explanation, and supporting
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CHAPTER 7
evidence and activity, would perhaps be appropriate at a later stage in the

process. Demonstration by the teacher of her knowledge of Mathematics
must therefore be controlled and used wisely. There is no room for the
exploitation, for personal gain, of the teacher's power associated with her
knowledge, as we saw in the last chapter.
The commitment to the Mathematical enculturation process is important in
the selection of teachers for yet another reason. The intention to enculturate,
which gives the impetus for the process, carries with it the responsibility for
negotiating the modifying and shaping of the knowledge, behaviours and
feelings of other people. For some people this is not an easy responsibility to
bear, nor is it something they enjoy doing. To a large extent one must take a
'controlling' stance, which demands confidence and also a certain kind of
interactive personality. But we can find tensions existing between the needs of
the enculturation process and the ideology of the particular culture, in this
case between the 'control' needed for enculturation, and the 'openness' of
Mathematical culture. We can see in Chapter 1 a characterisation of Mathematics teaching in which 'control' is given too much significance by the
education system, and 'openness' suffers.
The challenge of that kind of tension has to be faced by anyone engaged in
the task of enculturation, and a commitment to Mathematical enculturation
by the teacher ensures that the challenge will not be avoided. Those with no
real commitment could merely surrender to the conflict and allow the pupils
'freedom', or else they could over-react to the challenge, see it as a threat,
and adopt a totally domineering manner. Neither of those extremes would be
likely to lead to successful Mathematical enculturation. The goal is, as we saw
in the last chapter, to achieve through using one's influence facilitatively, a
constructive and collaborative engagement.
Equally the symbolic technology of Mathematics can be 'force-fed' to the
learners quickly and easily, but this will be ineffective for learning about the
development of symbolisation, and about the rationalism and progress which
can be achieved with appropriate symbols. The necessary control to be
exerted by the Mathematical enculturator can therefore reinforce certain
aspects of the culture but perhaps others will be ignored. unless the conflicts
inherent in Mathematical enculturation are known. understood, faced and
resolved.
7.3.3. Ability to Communicate Mathematical Ideas and Values
A third criterion for teacher selection is also demanded by the process.

Mathematical enculturation is a special kind of communication process and
therefore a potential enculturator needs to be a person who enjoys and is
successful at this communication. Whilst certain technical aspects of pedagogical communication can be developed through specific training, these rely
on already developed skills and sensitivities. A commitment to Mathematical
enculturation is admirable yet worthless if the basic 'feel' for Mathematical
THB MATHEMATICAL ENCUL TURATORS
167
communication is absent. Equally, a person can be an exemplary model of the

Mathematical culture and yet be unable to communicate this in the specific
and necessarily artificial context of the classroom.
This aspect relates again to the personal characteristics of the applicant some people enjoy, and are good at, communicating with other people.
Others prefer solitude, the world of books or objects, or indeed, in our
context here, the activities of technical Mathematics. There are indeed plenty
of examples of successful functional Mathematicians who are hopeless interpersonal communicators, as many Mathematics students at University can
testify! Perhaps the drive for ever-increasing abstraction in Mathematics is
opposed to the enjoyment of wide social contact and interaction as was
indicated in Chapter 3? Communication about Mathematical culture is therefore particularly complex, just because of the highly abstract nature of
Mathematics. It is a point which we have already seen exemplified in the last
chapter.
-In particular here we should note that Mathematical communication is not
just about words and language. Neither is it just a skill to be learnt on a
training course. Particularly for a Mathematical enculturator, it needs to
involve values, perceptions and beliefs of a personal nature, the communication of which is conveyed strongly by behaviour towards the Mathematical
cultural group itself and towards the people with whom one is communicating.
7.3.4. Acceptance of Accountability to the Mathematical Culture

The fourth important criterion is that the Mathematical enculturator must be
prepared to accept the role, and status, of 'agent' for the culture. Whilst the
teacher can play an equal role to anyone else at the formal level of cultural
interaction, 'enculturation' carries with it an obligation of accountability to
the Mathematical culture, and the enculturator must not abuse the position of
power and authority given to her by the culture. A teacher of Mathematics
has a responsibility to Mathematics therefore, and an enculturator into
Mathematical culture has the awesome responsibility for the transmission and
therefore ultimately the preservation and the growth of that culture. Whether
or not they also contribute significantly to the cultural store of knowledge,
their specific task and role is to preserve the culture - they are the only people
specifically designated to do that. No Mathematics teachers should therefore
feel themselves to be autonomous.
This criterion might well clash with teachers' equally legitimate demands to
be accorded 'professional' status in democratic societies, akin to doctors and
lawyers. That status is usually expected to imply self-governing, autonomous
decision-making about (potentially) any aspect of the profession - selection,
training, activity, conditions of work, etc. But this status can conflict with the
role of the teacher as the agent appointed by the culture to be responsible for
the formal enculturation of the young. The boundaries and constraints of any
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Association of Mathematics Teachers are partly determined by the word

"Mathematics". The autonomy is thus limited, and the accountability to the
cultural group is clear.
This criterion has, of course, important consequences for Mathematics
teacher education both in preparation and in continuing in-service education.
The Mathematical enculturator needs to have a strong and demonstrable
relationship with the Mathematical culture being preserved, and it is the
responsibility of all in that culture constantly to ensure that the enculturation
and preservation process is being handled responsibly, and (in that sense)
professionally.
7.3.5. Summary of Criteria

I propose, then, these four criteria for the selection of suitable Mathematical
enculturators:
-
ability to 'personify' the Mathematical culture

commitment to the Mathematical enculturation process
ability to communicate Mathematical ideas and values
acceptance of accountability to the Mathematical cultural group.
As we have seen, these criteria are either demanded by the culture, by the
learners, by the process itself, or by all three. They should enter into selection
and education at all levels, of course - which is why we should look for them
in future enculturators also. They should be used to help in selecting suitable
students to enter teacher preparation courses but equally they should also be
the criteria against which the products of those courses can partly be judged.
Moreover they should be a source of initiatives for in-service teacher counselling, advice and education. All four criteria are necessary, and together I would
argue that they would be sufficient requirements.
What then are the implications of these criteria for the specific teacher
education of our Mathematical enculturators? It is to that aspect that I now
turn.
7.4. THE PRINCIPLES OF THE EDUCATION OF MATHEMATICAL
ENCULTURATORS
At the start let it be clear that I shall not be thinking about courses on
'education' - psychology of education, sociology of education, etc. I am
considering here the specific Mathematical education which should be given
as preparation to the future Mathematical enculturators, and which builds on
the general aspects of formal education.
In most countries there is the general acceptance of the need during their
whole period of formal education for the future enculturators to be educated
with their peers. Indeed if the Mathematical enculturators are to be charged
with the duty of enculturating all children into Mathematical culture, then it
would seem to be a positive requirement that they should have received their
169
own formal education with as mixed a group of peers as possible. Assuming

therefore that we are considering students who have successfully passed
through that phase of non-selective formal schooling, what then would be the
principles which I would look for in the specialist education of the future
Mathematics enculturator?
7.4.1. Mathematics as a Cultural Phenomenon

My first principle is that this education should develop a broad understanding
of Mathematics as a cultural phenomenon. I put this principle first because it
is from this understanding that the need for enculturation and for enculturators develops. Moreover it is only by putting one's own culture into a broader
perspective that one can become aware of that culture. The most appropriate
sources for developing this understanding would thus come from the crosscultural and anthropological literature, and the contents of the second and
third chapters of this book would be important material for helping to foster
this first principle.
Breadth is the most important quality in this principle and although one
would like to see yet more evidence of 'other cultures' mathematical ideas
and values there is enough material available already to enable the breadth to
be partially conceptualised as I hope I have demonstrated. Certainly we have
data from all continents, and more is becoming available all the time as
research grows and as more educators realise the significance of this kind of
research. For example, d'Ambrosio (1985a) and Wilson (1981) show us just
such a breadth in their literature reviews.
This first principle is therefore aimed at ensuring an anthropological foundation for the future enculturator's work. The disciplines of history, philosophy, psychology and sociology have traditionally provided the principal
foundations for the education of future teachers, but my first requirement
from the point of view of Mathematical enculturation, is the recognition,
through essentially anthropological study, of Mathematics as a cultural phenomenon. Without that recognition, there is little reason for Mathematics to
be included in every child's education.
Another thrust to this principle is being given by the concerns over cultural
conflicts in education generally. In the UK, for example, the demands for
"multi-cultural education" are driving many educational developments, including a requirement from the Council for the Accreditation of Teacher
Education that "Students should be prepared for the diversity of ability,
behaviour, social background and ethnic and cultural origins encountered in
ordinary school; and in how to respond to that diversity and guard against
preconceptions based on race or sex" (C.A.T.E., 1983). In the context of this
book therefore the challenge is to develop teacher preparation which adequately conceptualises a "multi-cultural Mathematics education". 2
On the international scene, the growth and development of the
International Commission of Mathematics Instruction's activities bring more
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CHAPTER 7
and more mathematics educators together from different societies and cultures, see Howson and Wilson (1986), and specialist research groups like the
"International Study Group on Ethnomathematics" focus more people's
attention on these matters. There is therefore now no shortage of ideas,
evidence and writing generally for use within Mathematics teacher preparation programmes in order to develop the understanding of Mathematics as a
cultural phenomenon. 3
7.4.2. The Values of Mathematical Culture

The second principle is that their education must develop in the enculturators
a deep understanding of the values of Mathematical culture, and one way to
assist this development is through the analysis of society's present (and recent
past) uses of the symbolisations and conceptualisations of Mathematics, as in
the Societal component of the curriculum in Chapter 5. I feel particularly that
an emphasis on environmentally significant uses should be stressed as this is
the way that Mathematics has impinged on people in everyday life, and is thus
a vitally important influence in the development of values in the Mathematical enculturation process. The literature referred to in Chapter 3 would offer
valuable ideas but more important for the future Mathematical enculturator's
education would be the choice of particular examples from her present society
to illustrate the pervasiveness of Mathematical values in society. Where the
previous principle aims at breadth through the 'culture' concept, this principle
is more concerned with depth, with understanding the development in society
of a specific and ingrained set of values.
This is also the place where I would like to see the students gaining some
actual experience of Mathematics in society. As I said in the section on
Selection, those entrants into teaching who already have some experience of
the 'outside world' bring with them a depth of understanding of certain values
not achieved by the entrants who come straight from school. So, for all future
enculturators it would be important to spend a period of time, say 2-3 weeks
at least, working in situations (chosen by the teacher educator) which would
exemplify the presence of Mathematical values in society. This experience
should have the flavour of an individual research project, supervised, written
up in a report by the student teacher, and with the experiences of different
individuals finally compared, discussed and debated.
As we saw in Chapter 5, the development of courses with titles like 'Real
Mathematics', 'Mathematics in Society', 'Solving Real Problem5', and the
growing interest in modelling and applications, can provide .ample examples
of Mathematical advances in society. Only rarely however is there any explicit
or critical consideration of the values which are driving such advances.
However it is very possible for teacher educators to use such material for the
analysis of those values, not just for information purposes but also for
sensitisation and criticism, if desired. Value-clarification exercises should play
THE MA THEMA TICAL ENCUL TURATORS
171
a strong part in the enculturator's education.

Another aspect of this principle concerns the way Mathematical values
impinge on society through other subjects. It is therefore important for the
future Mathematical enculturator to have some understanding of how Mathematics relates to the sciences, to material technology, to computing, and to
other school subjects such as geography, technical drawing, art and economics. It is certainly the case that "every teacher of a subject which involves
Mathematics is also necessarily a teacher of Mathematics" and it is therefore
important for the future geography teacher, for example, to be made aware of
this situation also, and to realise the responsibility they share for the Mathematical enculturation of society.
7.4.3. The Symbolic Technology of Mathematics

The third important principle is that the education of the Mathematical
enculturators should improve their competence in, and understanding of, the
symbolic technology of Mathematics. This is of course a well recognised
principle at present and in fact it appears to be a dominant principle in many
Mathematics teacher education courses. This principle is realised at present
however through an emphasis on learning Mathematics to ever higher and
more abstract levels, which in my view is a totally inappropriate preparation
for the future enculturator. The rationale for this appears to be that the more
complex the Mathematics one knows the better and it is clear that Mathematical 'respectability' is felt to be an important criterion of such courses.
My enculturation perspective suggests however that it is not the respectability, the rigour or the abstractness of the Mathematical knowledge which is
important. What is needed is a broad understanding of, and broad competence in, the different ways of working with this symbolic technology. There is
not one way to do addition, for example, just as there is not one way to solve
linear equations. The individual techniques are many and varied, some are
more efficient in the short-term while others have more of a long-term
pay-off. Some are universally applicable while others have specific applications. Once again the literature and evidence is growing, from studies of
children's procedures, methods and meanings, to more adult methods in
non-standard situations. One can cite the work .of researchers like Booth
(1981), Hart (1981), Bell (1976), Sewell (1981), Cobb (1986), Steffe (1983),
Berry (1976), and Carraher (1985), as examples which c~.n furnish very useful
evidence for student teachers to argue about, to compare and ultimately to
make sense of, in the context of their own Mathematical knowledge. The
cross-cultural literature of Chapter ,2 once again can also help by showing
important similarities and differences.
An important additional experience for the student teachers is to observe
real children, in real classrooms, for the purposes of beginning to develop
'observation' as a significant part of their teaching strategy (see Davis et aI.,
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CHAPTER 7
1986). It is only by seeing and understanding a variety of Mathematical

meanings and procedures in use that the future teacher will become aware of
the problems which learners can experience, and 'real' evidence of these
meanings and procedures is vital. There is always a tendency for individuals
to think that their way is the correct (and sometimes the only) way to solve a
problem. Whilst that may not be an important point for other people, for the
future enculturator it is disastrous. In Mathematical enculturation there is no
legitimate reason for a teacher to say or to imply "You do it this way because
this is the way I use and I am the teacher". Valid differences, as both
Hadamard (1945) and Krutetskii (1976) demonstrate, exist even at the level
of giftedness and highest achievements in pupils, and such differences of
course are well known at the technical level of Mathematical culture.
Having said that, however, it is obviously the case that some methods are
considered to be Mathematically 'better' in some situations than others - once
again Kiutetskii's work can be cited as giving us clear evidence of that fact.
Traditionally, of course, it was only ever the 'better' methods which were
taught. What is therefore important for the student teacher to realise is that it
is only by comparing and contrasting methods and procedures that what is
'better' gets revealed. This is how the criteria of Mathematics should become
overt and objectivised. One of the challenges of teaching for enculturation is
that of how to expose and explain those Mathematical criteria which can often
remain hidden. A first prerequisite is of course to be aware of them oneself,
whilst a second is to be prepared by appropriate procedures, as described
above. 4
7.4.4. The Technical Level of Mathematical Culture

My fourth principle is that her education should develop the Mathematical
enculturator's knowledge and understanding of the technical level of Mathematical culture. This needs developing in two principal ways - through actual
engagement in typical Mathematical research activity and through the historical and sociological analyses of Mathematical developments.
The first should aim at conveying the flavour of the actual development of
the symbolic technology of Mathematics through such methods as Investigations and creative work. Investigation work at the school level has already
been well described in the two previous chapters but I quote here one
example of such an activity described by Hirst (1981), which was actually
done with first year university undergraduates:
It is always diffiCUlt to start students on a new way of working. The strategy adopted is to begin
the whole class on the same problem, taking in fact the one at the beginning of Starting Points.
(Banwell et al., 1986).
This concerns a rectangular grid of squares, and an investigation of the number of squares
crossed by a diagonal. A written response is asked for within a few days, and it is with this that
the work begins. One thing which invariably surprises the students is the variety of responses
which come from their fellows, all equally acceptable. Symptomatic of this is a matter which
173
always causes discussion, what to do when a diagonal passes through a vertex, for this case upsets
the first simple pattern observed. Some respond by saying that they will count this as an "extra
square". Others then attack this quite vigorously, saying that that is "not allowed". This is for
many of them the first occasion in a long time when a real decision has to be made in their
mathematics. It worries some of them that they have an apparently free choice over whether or
not to count a vertex as an extra square. This is an important aspect at this early stage, for in
order to make progress in the later investigations they have to realise that they must make
choices, and then work with the consequences of them. They also do not like the fact that I will
not arbitrate, and tell them which is the "correct" choice, since there isn't one. For of course to
count them as extra squares or not, both leave open !he question as to how many vertices are in
fact met by the diagonal as a further problem to be looked at.
Hirst goes on to describe more elaborate Investigations undertaken individually by the students which, while not necessarily developing any original
Mathematics, certainly enable the students to research and explore Mathematical ideas which were original to them.
Nowadays the availability of microcomputers makes investigation work in
Mathematics very accessible to students and is very important also in helping
them to face the enculturation challenges of the man-machine interaction.
Mathematics is now no longer entirely a pencil and paper activity and many
powerful advances in Mathematical research are being, and will increasingly
be, made with the help of computers.
The other approach to this principle looks backwards rather than forwards,
and should aim to develop the Mathematical enculturator's understanding of
the influences which helped to generate the symbolic technology which we
have at present. There has been a growing interest world-wide in the history
of Mathematical ideass but it is only comparatively recently that the sociological perspective on this history has been understood to be what is really
important for the Mathematical educator. It is clearly necessary to understand human and social influences on the development of Mathematical ideas
and I would argue that these are better understood through the analyses of
societal and cultural situations than through rigorous Mathematical analysis.
Of course it is important to understand the Mathematical ideas themselves
but I would argue that the perspective of analysts and writers like Kline,
Wilder, and Bos and Mehrtens (1977) is the significant one for this aspect of
the education of the enculturator. Mathematical development in its human
context is surely the most appropriate framework for understanding the
interrelationship between Mathematical research and the rest of Mathematical culture.
7.4.5. The Meta-Concept of Mathematical Enculturation
My fifth, and final principle, is that the education of the future Mathematical
enculturator should develop a strong metaconcept of the Mathematical Enculturation process generally. The particular problems and issues of Mathematical enculturation need to be raised - the aims of Mathematical enculturation, the difficulties and misconceptions of the learners, the influencing of
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Mathematical meanings, the awareness of the pedagogical problems faced by

teachers of children from other cultures, the requirements placed on enculturation by the Mathematical culture and the criteria to be met by the Mathematical encuIturators themselves - all need raising in order that the actual
process of Mathematical encuIturation, in practice, can be meaningfully
understood in its wider perspective. The tensions between, for example, the
control (of the enculturation stance) and the accountability (to the culture)
need to be recognised, reflected on and resolved by each enculturator for
themselves.
The particular significance of this final principle is that it should serve as the
over-arching principle for all the others, and is there to remind us that
pursuing the four previous principles separately makes no sense unless at the
same time the fifth principle is also pursued. It is there to ensure that the
knowledge developed through the other principles does not become compartmentalised, or disconnected, in the students' mind. Integration of these ideas
is critical during the teacher education period, as McQualter (1986) indicates.
Knowledge comes from activity and the activity to be associated with this
knowledge is that of enculturation.
Therefore early on in the Mathematical enculturator's education the process of becoming an enculturator needs to start. The central problem of
helping another person to shape their Mathematical ideas needs to be faced as
soon as possible because the activity of shaping, together with reflection on
that activity, is the cognitive context into which can be introduced theoretical
reflections, and interpretations concerning Mathematical education and enculturation.
The main challenge to the Mathematics teacher educator is that of how to
encourage the integration of the different principles in the student teacher's
mind, and that integration needs to happen at different levels and through
different kinds of activity. At the level of the individual child there is, for
example, the activity of tutoring, of helping one child to develop some
broadening of Mathematical meaning and understanding. The ideas from
psychologically-based research such as Booth (1981) and Bell (1976) can be of
value here, and the central concern of personalising teaching gives rise to the
need for a good understanding of personal constructs by the enculturator.
Then at the level of the small group one can introduce the student teacher
to the task of facilitating the contrasting, comparing and perhaps reconciling
of different views, to enable a group of children to share and develop their
Mathematical understanding together. This is still an area of basic research
weakness in our field. Small-group activity, and the social psychology of
Mathematics education, are both relative newcomers to the research scene,
so that the integrating constructs are relatively undeveloped at yet. 6
At the level of the whole class the selection and development of appropriate units of Mathematical activity becomes more important and Wittmann's
THE MATHEMATICAL ENCUL TURA TORS
175
idea of the Teaching Unit (1984) is a very useful integrating concept for this
level. As Wittman says" Appropriate teaching units provide opportunities for
doing mathematics, for studying one's own learning processes and those of
students, for evaluating different forms of social organisation, and for planning, performing and analysing practical teaching" (p. 30).
Finally, at the more global level of the curriculum, the kind of didactical
analysis offered by Freudenthal (1983) offers an excellent structural framework for integrating different principles. Another approach to this level of
analysis is provided of course by the Enculturation Curriculum structure in
Chapter 5.
What this final principle also points out is that the most important task of
teacher education is to initiate the entrant into the role of being a Mathematical enculturator. Traditionally, perhaps, this task has been seen to be less
significant than that of the development of the student teacher's Mathematical knowledge. What the enculturation perspective provokes is the idea that
that knowledge is likely to be irrelevant if it is not contextualised in the
metaconcept of 'Mathematical enculturation'.
7.4.6. Summary of Principles

These then are the five principles which I would look for in the education of
Mathematical enculturators:
- it should develop a broad understanding of Mathematics as a cultural
phenomenon,
- it should develop a deep understanding of the values of Mathematical
culture,
- it should improve their competence in, and und~rstanding of, the symbolic
technology of Mathematics,
- it should develop their knowledge and understanding of the technical level
of Mathematical culture,
- it should develop a strong metaconcept of the Mathematical enculturation
process generally.
We have seen how some of these principles are already being operationalised, but we can also recognise that there are many areas of weakness in our
current practices.
The difficulty of writing about this preparation is that one is essentially
thinking about a person while describing an appropriate 'curriculum' for
preparation. What I must do now therefore is to re-emphasise the interpersonal and social nature of that preparation. Indeed the whole analysis of
selection and preparation needs to be embedded in the social perspective of
initiating and inducting the future enculturator into the wider Mathematical
enculturation 'community'. Let us therefore now consider the roles of this
community.
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7.5. SOCIALISING THE FUTURE ENCULTURATOR INTO THE MATHEMATICS

EDUCATION COMMUNITY
7.5.1. The Developing Mathematics Education Community

The approach recommended in the previous sections is one of an initial phase
of formal, non-selective schooling followed by a substantial phase of specialist
education for the intending teacher, the future enculturator. This implies that
someone is responsible for providing this specialist education. In most countries, this has been, and still is, the task of educators in tertiary institutions
such as Universities or teacher-training institutes.
As befits its name, 'teacher-training' used to be conceptualised relatively
simplistically, as training. Df course that is not to suggest that complexity did
not exist, as it still does with different aspects of specific training, e.g ..
motivating learners, sequencing learning activities, controlling a classroom
effectively etc. However, because of the growing complexity and general
development of Mathematical culture, and the wider societal implications of
Mathematics, increasing numbers of groups now have a vested interest in
Mathematical enculturation, and the process of educating the future enculturator has taken on a deeper significance. Those responsible for the education
of Mathematics teachers have had to develop new courses and new techniques to educate teachers for the complex task of Mathematical education,
in addition to continuing the provision of training.
As these new courses have been developed, so new knowledge has been
created, new analyses undertaken and the people responsible for them have
grown closer together. Mathematics Teacher Educators are now a recognisable group in many countries and their developmental role is a very significant
one. They are usually not just involved with teacHer preparation but they will
also contribute substantially to the in-service education of the teachers. The
group can include not only educators at tertiary institutions, but also inspectors and advisers, materials developers, curriculum developers, and examiners. Some countries seem to have a strong hierarchical relationship between
teachers and teacher educators, while in others a more collaborative and
therefore 'equal' relationship pertains, where, for example, experienced
teachers are also engaged to help with the education of beginning teachers, to
run in-service courses for other teachers, and to work as curriculum developers and as examiners.
Whatever the nature of the relationship, the fact is that Mathematics
teachers and Mathematics teacher educators together have developed into an
important professional community, which I shall refer to as Mathematics
Educators (or Mathematical Enculturators) and what is particularly interesting is that this community has really only formally existed within the last two
decades. It is a relatively recent phenomenon brought on, I would argue, by
the increasing complexity, and importance, of Mathematics education in
many countries. 7
THE MATHEMATICAL ENCUL TURATORS
177
Local, national and international networks and associations of Mathematics Educators have developed apace, together with journals, books, meetings
and conferences which aid communication. As this (now) international community has developed so it has begun to exercise influence in ways which go
beyond what one might think of an initial and in-service teacher education.
Most significantly, Mathematics Educators are now the mediators of the
potential influences towards the curriculum, the textbooks and the examinations which previously were influenced more directly by those who were not
school teachers. In some countries it is now increasingly difficult for anyone
without Mathematics Education 'credentials' to influence directly any of
those areas. Even with an innovation such as the micro-computer, the
influence of manufacturing companies and 'user' businesses is mediated by
Mathematics Educators, who have taken over the hardware and are also
developing what they consider to be worthwhile Mathematical educational
software for schools.
Within this new Mathematics Education community there are of course
many intellectual and political currents but all recognise that despite titles and
status, the classroom teacher performs the most critical function in the whole
enculturation process. No matter how detailed the curriculum is nor how
prescriptive the textbook, the teacher has it within her power to facilitate
education or to inhibit it. Successful Mathematical enculturation therefore
can only happen if the teacher makes it happen. This is not to suggest,
though, that the teachers can successfully enculturate through any kind of
syllabus or aid provision. Clearly that makes the other partners in the
Mathematics Education community shoulder equally the responsibility and
the accountability for the enculturation process.
As partners in the Mathematical enculturation process we cannot hold
teachers alone accountable for the success or failure of enculturation. This
means that whatever else happens the rest of the Mathematics Education
community has a responsibility, need, and indeed a duty, to support the
Mathematics teachers in their work since it is in everyone's interest that the
teachers should be successful. It also means that it is Mathematics Educators
as a whole who are accountable to the culture and to the wider society. We who
are part of that Mathematics Education community are all in some way
responsible for the Mathematical enculturation process. We can take pleasure
from its successes and we must carry the blame when it is not so successful.
One of the reasons for my writing this book is that I am concerned at the
moment that the process is not being successfully carried out. I feel it
necessary to accept my share of the responsibility for that situation.
Furthermore, recognising that the teacher's primary responsibility is for the
enculturation of the pupils in her care, the rest of the Mathematics Education
community must help to create the favourable climate and context within
which that formal enculturation can happen. For example, we should be
aware of political and ideological developments in education and society, and
must challenge them should they be detrimental to the interests of
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CHAPTER 7
Mathematical enculturation. We should continue to mediate the influences of

all interested parties which means that we need to be in a position to receive
and understand the messages of the different pressure groups. Moreover we
should strive within our own cultural community to demonstrate as much as
possible the values of Mathematical culture. By constantly validating and
rehearsing these values within our community, the understanding and awareness of its role as the preserver of Mathematical culture will become fully
developed. Only by this means will the Mathematics Education community
be able to truly enculturate and to protect our societies from the ideosyncratic
and limited caricatures of Mathematical enculturation which can (and do)
pass as Mathematics education.
7.5.2. The Critical Mathematics Education Community

The other important role of Mathematics Educators is to provide the social
context for reflection about Mathematical enculturation, and for stimulating
criticism, research, analysis and development. The tremendous growth in
research and development in Mathematics Education in recent years can be
attributed to the increasing recognition of the importance of this questioning,
and to the desire to seek better ways to educate our children:
Criticism, analysis, reflection, argument on all aspects of Mathematical
enculturation should be welcomed and encouraged within the Mathematics
Education community, as a celebration of 'openness'. By its role as 'analyst'
and 'preserver' of the culture this community is helping to stimulate ideas
about the Mathematical culture itself and is therefore helping to develop the
culture. This book is an example of what I mean here, and it is thus no
coincidence that it is being written by someone who is deeply embedded in
the Mathematics Education community, and by someone who feels that the
values of Mathematical culture are being lost sight of in meeting the other
educational demands of present day society.8
This then is the present social context into which the new Mathematics
teacher is to be socialised. As with any occupational group the older and
experienced members will play a strong role in socialising the newcomer.
Experienced teachers have always socialised new teachers into their roles,
and that will not stop. What the enculturation perspective indicates is that the
socialisation of the newcomer into the role of Mathematical Enculturator is
now the responsibility of a much wider group than just experienced Mathematics teachers. Moreover, because of the growth of complexity in the
enculturation 'profession' it is now no longer appropriate to think of the new
teacher as becoming merely socialised into the role of 'classroom teacher'.
The new Mathematical Enculturator is being socialised into a far wider
group than that, anq can therefore develop professional influence which goes
way beyond the confines of her classroom and her school. (For example, the
highly influential Cockcroft Committee, reviewing the whole state of Mathematics Education in the UK, contained several Mathematics teachers, and
179
submissions to the committee were made by several teachers' groups. Other

examples exist in other countries as well.) Thus the present Mathematics
Education community offers a social context for inducting the newcomer into
a role whole influence reaches far wider than was possible, or even imagined,
fifty years ago. Can we accept also the responsibility to use that influence
wisely?
NOTES
CHAPTER 1
1 The conceptual shift is documented also in 'Mathematics for all' by P. Damerow and others
(1984).
2 I should like here to mention several writings which I found were very provocative and helpful
to me at an early stage of my analysis. I later chose not to refer to them specifically in the text in
order that I could control more tightly the direction of my writing. The full references are in the
bibliography.
P.L. Berger and T. Luckman: The social construction of reality.
1.W. Berry: Human ecology and cognitive style.
D. Bloor: Knowledge and Social Imagery.
D. Bloor: Mathematics: An Anthropological Phenomenon (Chapter 5 of Wittegenstein: A Social
Theory of Knowledge).
M. Cole and S. Scribner: Culture and thought.
H. Freudenthal: Weeding and Sowing.
P.M. Greenfield and 1.S. Bruner: Culture and Cognitive growth.
F. Musgrove: Education and Anthropology.
B.L. Whorf: Language, Thought and Reality.
R. Wuthnow: Cultural Analysis.
3 This problem, with its variety of 'answers', is quoted in Schminke and Arnold (1971).
4 The controls exerted by textbooks are well described by Hardy (1976) in his article 'Textbooks
and classroom knowledge: the politics of explanation and description'.
S This view is presented most clearly in Merill and Wood (1974).
CHAPTER 2
1 Of course I recognise the circularity in this situation, but nevertheless I feel it is sensible to
retain the idea of mathematics as a cultural product - a symbolised kind of knowledge resulting
from certain activities.
2 See Lean, G.A.: Counting Systems of Papua New Guinea in the references. Lancy's original
typology of counting systems is now no longer adequate for classifying purposes, according to
Lean.
3 It should perhaps be said here that the reader may like to be mentally prepared to accept
'string' as the universal medium for mathematics - it will appear in most sections of this chapter!
4 'Calculi' were, of course, the Roman stone, glass or metal counters used on counting boards.
S See, for example, Kozminsky, 1985, for an introduction to various numerological ideas.
6 See for example.Michell, 1977, Pennick (1979) and Critchlow, 1979, for some ofthe documentation.
7 Note once again the development of the symbolic ideas being provoked by the absence of the
physical object:
counting - the taboos leading to indirect counting,

- when one can't 'know' the objects individually,
locating - when one can't see the island, or the place one is searching for,
measuring - when one can't physically juxtapose the two objects which one is comparing,
designing - when it is too expensive, or too large to have a 'copy'.
180
NOTES
181
So, mathematics seems to develop when imagined, or hypothetical activity is provoked.

It is no accident that another profound book about shape by Doczi (1981) is called The Power
of Limits and is written by an architect.
9 See, for example, Falkener (1961) for an excellent coverage of games and magic squares.
10 This, of course, is similar to the notion of Yin and Yang in ancient Chinese writing. See Ronan
(1981) for more details.
11 A similar kind of analysis has been undertaken by Saunders MacLane in his 1981 paper in the
American Mathematical Monthly.
12 Freudenthal has reminded me, however, that the 'quadrivium of the mathematical arts' in the
ancient Pythagorean tradition was composed of arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy
(Freudenthal, 1973, p. 80). They were the 'original' four mathematics, in the plural. The more
relevant construct for the ideas in this chapter is 'ethnomathematics' (d'Ambrosio, 1985b).
CHAPTER 3
1 Sydenham (1979) says this: "Today's society still requires numerous routine measurements to
regulate its function ... A great deal of modern instrumentation is used to control, rather than
gain, new knowledge in the scientific sense" (p. 30).
2 Khader (1984) comments, along with others: "Technology, in itself, is neither good nor evil, it
is the use that it is put to that makes it so" (p. 38).
3 Kothari (1978) takes up this theme: "Should the emphasis of science and mathematics teaching
lie in bettering, in strengthening, links between Science, Technology and Productivity, which is
relatively easy to do, or to link S.T.P. with Wisdom, which is far more necessary but terribly
difficult?" (p. 17). Kothari characterises modern society as knowledge-based, and acknowledges
its virtues but reminds us also of its faults. What he seeks is a society that is 'Knowledge-andwisdom-based' and he personally looks to Ghandi as his image of wisdom.
4 Gordon (1978) in his paper 'Conflict and Liberation: Personal Aspects of the Mathematical
Experience' suggests that the teacher should replace phrases such as "What if', "suppose" and
"let", with "what if I", "suppose I" and "if I let" or "if we let". He says "It is we who create the
world, school, and mathematics. But the person is never alluded to in mathematics textbooks,
except for those famous individuals whose efforts have been singular" (p. 267).
5 Crowe (1975) presents us with 'Ten "Laws" concerning patterns of change in the History of
Mathematics' provoked by Wilder's (1%8) collection of ten laws. Crowe's First Law states "New
mathematical concepts frequently come forth not at the bidding, but against the efforts, at times
strenuous efforts, of the mathematicians who create them". His Second Law is "Many new
mathematical concepts, even though logic~lly acceptable, meet forceful resistance after their
appearance and achieve acceptance only after an extended period of time" (p. 162).
6 An interesting discussion of this point, in relation to mathematics, is undertaken by White
(1947) in his article 'The Locus of Mathematical Reality'.
CHAPTER 4
1 There are equally interesting aspects of Islamic values in mathematics and science referred to in
Nasr (1976), Harrow and Wilson (1976) and Savory (1976). Another excellent article on this
whole area is Joseph (1987) 'Foundations of Eurocentrism in Mathematics'.
2 To put it another way, I am interested in approaches to Mathematics education which would
help to de-objectify, de-control and de-mystify Mathematical ideas.
3 This is another aspect which falls into the area of 'ethnomathematics' (see d'Ambrosio, 1985)
although to me it has a totally different status from the indigenous mathematical ideas referred to
in Chapter 2. See Carraher et al. (1985).
4 Indeed the whole area of 'sociology of knowledge' is very relevant to our discussion here.
However there have been few attempts to make sense of the area from the perspective of
182
NOTES
Mathematics. One of the rare relevant books is by Mellin-Olsen (1987) called The Politics of
Mathematics Education which is centrally concerned with the 'ownership' of Mathematical
knowledge and with the importance of this issue from the perspective of the pupil.
5 The idea of recreation or re-invention is not new, see for example, Freudenthal (1973, p. 120)
on ore-invention and discovery'. I am here however referring to its importance for a culture, and a
people, and not just for one child.
6 Note that I do not intend to analyse the educational experience of children from one culture
who are required to learn the values and symbols of another cultural group. They would clearly
not be in an encl!ituration situation. See Herskovits (1938) and Taft (1977) for aspects of the
complexity of that situation.
CHAPTER 5
1 IPI stands for Individually Prescribed Instruction Project, and see Lindvall and Cox for a good
analysis. IMU stands for (in English) Individualised Mathematics Instruction Project, see
Larsson (1973).
2 SMSG stands for School Mathematics Study Group, see Wooton (1965). SMP stands for
School Mathematics Project, see Howson (1987).
3 CSMP stands for Comprehensive School Mathematics Project, see Herbert (1974).
4 For information on the Madison Project, see Davis (1965). For information on the Nuffield
project see Hewton (1975).
5 USMES stands for Unified Science and Mathematics for Elementary Schools, Shann et al.
(1975). MMP (CP) stands for Mathematics for the Majority Project (Continuation Project), see
Kaner (1973).
6 See, for example, Hoyles and Sutherland (1985).
7 See, for example, the unit on 'Time' in the Science 5/13 Series (MacDonald Educational, 1969)
8 See, for example, J. Dewey (1916) which is where he puts forward his philosophy of education.
9 See Swetz (1982) and Burgess (1986) for some examples of how to introduce students and
pupils to historical ideas through projects. Also Osen (1974) gives more biographical information
in Women in Mathematics, as does Fox et al. (1980).
10 A recent and promising approach to this area is described by Hudson (1987) using a database
of statistics on 127 different countries.
11 See, for example, Some Lessons in Mathematics with a Microcomputer (SLIMWAM 1 and 2)
published by the Association of Teachers of Mathematics, Queen Street, Derby, U.K.
12 Some examples of pupils' investigations are given in Banwell, Saunders and Tahta (1986).
CHAPTER 6
1 An excellent discussion of goals and different ways to conceptualise them is given in Treffers
(1987).
2 The range of possible projects and various teaching points concerning project-work are well
illustrated by the Mathematical Association's booklet Pupils Projects: Their Use in Secondary
School Mathematics. See also ATM (1987), Isaacson (1987) and Mellin-Olsen (1987).
3 Useful discussions about Investigation work are to be found in ATM (1980) Mathematical
Investigations in the Classroom, in ATM (1987), and in Isaacson (1987).
4 Other useful writing about group work is in Hoyles (1985), in Slavin et al. (1985), in Bishop and
Goffree (1986) and in Barnes and Todd (1977).
CHAPTER 7
1 For 'they' read 'we', and for 'them' read 'us', because I am in the rather awkward position of
trying to locate my own role as Mathematics teacher educator within the whole process. I use the
word 'them' to help my analysis, not to imply that the process is someone else's responsibility.
NOTES
183
This situation is also recognised and discussed in, for example, Australia (see Dawe, 1988).
Moreover culture conflict lies behind the educational concerns of Pinxten (1983), d'Ambrosio
(1985a), Gerdes (1985) Harris (1980) and many other Mathematics educators.
3 This group now publishes a newsletter. Also M. Ascher's College course on 'Mathematical
Ideas in.Non-Western Societies' described in Historia Mathematica (1984) is an excellent example
of the kind of teaching required at this level.
4 The course described by Goffree (1981) in his article 'Primary Teacher Training: A Reflective
Approach' is a good example of what I have in mind. See, also Bishop (1982) for another
example.
S See, for example, the newsletter of the International Study Group on the relationship between
History and Pedagogy of Mathematics.
6 See, however, Bishop (1985) for an attempt to structure some ideas relevant to this area.
7 See, for example, Shuard and Quadling (1980), Bishop and Nickson, (1983) and Christiansen,
Howson and Otte (1986), for introductions to this area.
8 The other books in this Kluwer series, whilst pursuing other specific goals, are similarly
contributing to the development of Mathematical culture.
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Resnikoff, H.L. and Wells, RO.: 1984, Mathematics in Civilization, Dover, New York.
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Ronan, c.A.: 1983, The Cambridge Illustrated History of the World's Science, Cambridge
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Sagasti, F.R.: 1980, 'The Two Civilizations and the Process of Development', Prospects, X,
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Savory, E.M. (ed.): 1976, Introduction to Islamic Civilisation, Cambridge University Press.
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INDEX OF NAMES
dAmbrosio. U. 169. 181. 182. 184

AI-DalIa. A.A. 112. 184
AI-Faruqi. I.R. 184. 189
Arnold. W.R. 180. 190
Ascher. M. 26. 116. 183. 184
Ascher. R. 26. 116. 183. 184
Dahrendorf. R. 74. 185

Damerow. P. 145.180. 185
Davies. I. 75. 85. 87. 185
Davis. P.J. 66. 79. 185
Davis. R.B. 162. 171. 182. 185
Dawe. L.C.S. 182. 185
Debus. A.G. 187
Denny. J.P. 25.55.185
Dewey. J. 110. 182. 185
Dienes Z.P. 93
Dieudonne. J. 93. 185
Doczi. G. 108. 181. 185
Dole. G. 191
van Dooren 28. 189
Dubreil-Jacotin. M.L. 112. 186
Durban. P.T. 186
Baker. R.R. 184

Banwell. c.. 117. 172. 182. 184
Barnes. D. 182. 184
Bateson. G. 48. 184
Battersby. A. 113. 184
Bell. A.W. 171. 174. 184
Bell. E.T. 112. 184
Bender. P. 106. 184
Berger. P.L. 180. 184
Bergman. H.G. 186
Bernstein. B. 184
Berry. J.W. 171. 180. 184
Biersack. A. 38. 184
Bishop, A.J. 35. 115. 151. 182. 183. 184
Bloor, D. 180,184
Bolt. B. 104.117. 184
Booth. L.R. 171.174. 185
Bos, H.J.M. 173. 185
Bourdieu. P. 185
Bourgoin. J. 108. 117. 185
Bridgman. P.W. 51. 185
Brody. L. 186
Brousseau. G. 130. 185
Brown. R. 185
Bruner. J.S. 17. 18. 40. 60. 93. 96. 180.
185. 186
Burgess. B. 182. 185
Burkhardt. H. 107. 146. 185
Burton. L. 185. 188
Buxton. L. 133. 185
Ellul. J. 71. 186

Ellert. H. 186
Entwistle. H. 4. 5. 186
Eshiwani. G. 37. 186
Faegre. T. 186
Falkener. E. 109. 181. 186
Farnham. D. 133. 137. 155. 158. 186
Fasheh. M. 73.77. 186
Fischbein. E. 66. 186
Fitzgerald. A. 8. 186
Fox. L.H. 182. 186
Freudenthal. H. 28. 175. 180. 181. 182. 186
Gardner. P.L. 51.58. 186
Gay. J. 20. 21. 27. 33. 35. 36. 37. 38. 41.
51. 52. 53. 63. 186
Gerdes. P. 41.117.182.186
Gilbert. P.G.S. 186
GolIree. F. 151. 182. 183. 184. 186
Gordon, M. 181. 186
Greenfield. P.M. 60. 180. 186
Goslin, D.A. 186
Griffiths. H.B. 186
Carneiro. R.L. 191

Carraher. D.W. 185
Carraher. T.N . 171. 181. 185
Christiansen 183. 184. 185
Closs. M.P. (ed.) 21. 185
Cobb. P. 171. 185
Cole. M. 18.20.21.27.33.35.36.37.38.
41. 51. 52. 53. 63. 180. 185
Cox R.C. 182. 188
Critchlow. K. 41. 42. 53. 56. 145. 180. 185
Crowe. M.J. 181. 185
Habermas. J. 74. 77.186

Hadamard. J. 172. 186
Hallpike. C.R. 186
Halsey. A.H. 185
Hardy. J. 180. 186
Harris. P. 21.24.30.34,36.48. 182. 186
Harrow. L. 181. 186
192
INDEX OF NAMES
Hart, K.M. 171, 187
Harvey, F. 28, 189
Harvey, R.D. 141, 157, 187
Heath, T.L. 56, 187
Hedger, K. 126, 187
Herbert, M. 182, 187
Hersh, R. 66, 75, 79, 162, 185
Herskovits, M.J. 182, 187
Hewton, E. 182, 187
Hirst, K.E. 172, 173, 187
Holt, M. 108, 187
Hopkins, B. 48, 187
Horton, R. 48, 65, 70, 73, 74, 187
Howson, A.G. 92,93, 94, 95, 121, 170,
182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 189
Hoyles, C. 131, 132, 182, 187
Hudson, B. 182, 187
Huizinga, J. 43, 44, 45, 187, 189
Isaacson, Z. 182, 187
Jayne, C.F. 44, 187
Jones, J. 34, 35, 187
Joseph, G.G. 181, 187
Kaner, P. 182, 187
Karabel, J. 185
Keddie, N. I, 187
Keitel, C. 92, 93, 94, 95, 121, 187
Keller, A. 69, 187
Kelly, G.A. 21, 50, 84, 85, 88, 187
Kent, D. 126, 187
Kerslake, D. 187
Khader, B. 181, 187
Kilpatrick, J. 92, 93, 94, 95, 121, 187
Kline, M. 5,6, 16, 19,57,63,64,76,79,
119, 173, 187
Kluckhohn, D. 4,61, 188
Kothari, D.S. 74, 181, 187
Kozminsky, I. 180, 188
Kroeber, A.L. 4, 61, 188
Krutetskii, V.A. 172, 188
Lancy, D.F. 21, 25, 26, 27, 45, 49, 50, 52,
60,61,63,73,88, 180, 188, 189
Larsson, I. 182, 188
Laszlo, E. 188
Layton, D. 90, 188
Leach, E. 37, 188
Lean, G .A. 21, 25, 56, 117, 180, 188
LeLionnais, E. 186
Lewis, D. 30, 188
Lighthill, J. 107, 188
193
Lindvall, C.M. 182, 188

Ling, J. 109, 188
Linton R. 189
Littlejohn, J. 33, 36, 188
Lopez-Real, F. 129, 130, 142, 148, 188
Lovegrove, M.N. 186
Luckman, T. 180, 184
Lundgren, U.P. 188
Lynch, J. 188
MacLane, S. 181, 188
Marks, J. 188
Mason, J. 117,188
McLone, R.R. 108, 188
McOualter, J.W. 174, 188
Mehrtens, H. 173, 185
Mellin-Olsen, S. 181, 182, 188
Menninger, K. 23,24,26, 188
Merrill, M.D. 180, 188
Michell, J. 180, 188
Moore, e.G. 188
Morton, L. 188
Mottershead, L. 117, 184
Murdoch, G.P. 55, 189
Musgrove, F. 180, 189
Nasseef, A.D. 184, 189
Nasr, S.H. 56, 181, 189
Needham, J. 32,46
Newman, M.H.A. 66, 189
Nickson, M. 183, 184
Norbeck, E. 43, 189
Ormell, C.P. 108, 189
Osen, L.M. 182, 189
Oswalt, W.H. 40, 189
Otte, M. 183, 184, 185, 189
Pennick, N. 180, 189
Perl, T. 112, 189
Philp, H. 50, 189
Pimm, D. 132, 134, 189
Pinxten, R. 21, 28, 29, 30, 41, 50, 61, 65,
182, 189
Plummer, G. 150, 189
Plunkett, H.D. 188
Purce, J. 42, 189
Ouadling, D.A. 183, 190
Rahman, A.U. 53, 189
Raisz, E. 109, 189
Rapp, F. 186
194
INDEX OF NAMES
Resnikoff, H.L. 189

Rochlin, G.F. 190
Ronan, C.A. 26, 32, 41, 46, 53, 56, 65, 82,
189
Roth, W.E. 43, 44, 45, 189
Rowland, K. 108, 189
Ruthven, K. 137, 189
Thwaites, B. 190
Tindall, B.A. 45, 188, 189
Tobin, D. 186
Todd, F. 182, 184
Torbe, M. 187
Treffers, A. 182, 190
Tylor, E.B. 4, 190
Sagasti, F.R. 189

Saunders, K. 117,182,184
Savory, E.M. 181, 190
Schaaf, W.L. 70, 190
Schliemann, A.D. 185
Schminke, C.W. ISO, 190
Schreiber, A. 106, 184
Vansina, 1.51,53,54, 190

Vygotsky, L.S. 43, 190
Scribner S. ISO, 185

van Sertima, I. 112, 145, 190
Sewell, B. 171, 190
Shann, M.H. 182, 190
Shuard, H.B. 183, 187, 190
Silvert, K.H. 188, 190
Skovsmose, O. 146, 190
Slavin, R. 182, 190
Stacey, K. 188
Steffe, L.P. 171, 190
Stenhouse, L. 5, 17,58, 190
Stokes, 1. 24, 25, 190
Stone, M.H. 58, 190
Strauss, S. 185
Streeftand, L. 184, 187
Strevens, P. 51, 190
Struik, D.l. 59, 190
Sutherland, R. 182, 187
Swetz, F.l. 14, 182, 190
Sydenham, P.H. 181, 190
Taft, R. 182, 190
Tahta, D. 117, 182, 184
Waddington, C.H. 65, 190

Wain, G.T. 188
Walford, R. 109, 190
Warren, N. 190
Washburn, S.L. 17, 190
Weizenbaum, J. 59, 62, 191
Wells, R.O. 189
Werner, T. 185
White, L.A. 16, 17, 18,23,58,59,61,62
69,83, 181, 191
Whitty, G. 186
Whorf, B.L. 180, 191
Wilder, R.L. 6, 16, 18,57,67,78,84,86,
87,91, 173, 181, 191
Williams, J. 140, 191
Williams, T.R. 191
Wilson, B. 169, 170, 187, 191
Wilson, P.L. 181, 186
Wittmann, E. 174, 175, 191
Wober, M. 48, 187
Wood, N.D. 180, 188
Wooton, W. 182, 191
Wuthnow, R. 180, 191
Yates, 1. 128, 134, 191
Young, M.F.D. 186, 187
Zaslavsky, C. 24, 27, 36, 38, 41, 46, 56,
117, 191
APPENDIX: MATHEMATICAL INVESTIGATIONS

Some notes to help you with this type of work.
(1) Introduce the problem in your own words.
(2) State how you are going to try and solve the problem, or how you are
going to investigate the situation.
(3) Try this method. Show all your working.
(4) Collect any results that your work has produced. Always tabulate results
if you can (i.e. put the results in a table in a logical way.)
(5) Look at your results and see if you can find any rules or any patterns. If
you think you have spotted a rule or a pattern, say what it is. Then check
it, by trying out your rule on some new data and seeing if it still works or
by seeing if the pattern continues.
(6) State any conclusions that you think your work entitles you to make.
(7) If your method doesn't work, try and find another method and start
again. Mathematicians often have to do this!
Do ask for help if you need it.
(8) Try and add something of your own, something original to the problem.
e.g. extend the problem, do a little research about the topic, change the
problem slightly, make up new rules, write something about your investigation, read about the work any mathematicians have done on this topic
etc.
When you produce the final version of your work bear these things in
mind:
(a) choose the right sort of paper for the job, (lined, plain, squared,
isometric, dotty, graph, etc.)
(b) illustrate your work with diagrams, sketches, graphs, charts etc. if it
helps to make things clearer.
(c) use coloured pens/pencils only if it really helps; sometimes colour
confuses.
(d) don't write 'essays', use note form (this sheet is in note form). Be
precise; write in short sentences as far as possible.
(e) don't make statements or draw conclusions that you haven't checked
out, or that your work doesn't entitle you to do.
From A. T.M. (1980).
195
Mathematical Education Library

Managing Editor: A.J. Bishop, Cambridge, U.K.
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ISBN 90-277-1535-1; Ph 90-277-2261-7
2. B. Christiansen, A. G. Howson and M. Otte (eds.): Perspectives on Mathematics Education. Papers submitted by Members of the Bacomet Group.
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ISBN 90-277-1929-1; Ph 90-277-2118-1
3. A. Treffers: Three Dimensions. A Model of Goal and Theory Description in
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CHAPTER 11 Towards a Way of Knowing

CHAPTER 21 Environmental Activities and Mathematical Culture

Perspectives from cross-cultural studies

CHAPTER 31 The Values of Mathematical Culture

Values, ideals and theories of knowledge

Culture and the Child

Mathematical culture - symbolic technology and values

The curriculum project

Enculturation - The Curriculum

Enculturation - The Process

Conceptualising the enculturation process in action

6.2.1. The role of power and influence

7/ The Mathematical Enculturators

People are responsible for the process

Mathematics is in the unenviable position of being simultaneously one of the

D. Farnham's Language and Mathematical Understanding, D. Lingard's

Finally I thank Marie Collins, my long-suffering secretary, without

TOWARDS A WAY OF KNOWING

1.1. THE CONFLICT

TOW ARDS A WAY OF KNOWING

What I am searching for, through writing this book, is an elaboration of what

Anthropological - 'whole way of life'

Totality (Cl) minus its dysfunctional

TOWARDS A WAY OF KNOWING

regarded as 'popular culture'. C4n then excludes those aspects of popular

civilization' then I want this book to be about the kind of mathematical

TOWARDS A WAY OF KNOWING

maticians, though of course they are of rather more interest. My concern is

The first major area of concern to me is the mathematics curriculum which

My concern is that it is in essence a 'user's' curriculum, which purports to

TOW ARDS A WAY OF KNOWING

provided that it is successful, but however successfully it does those things it

TOWARDS A WAY OF KNOWING

It is of course no accident that we have the technique curriculum, impersonal

TOWARDS A WAY OF KNOWING

1.8. MATHEMATICAL EDUCATION, A SOCIAL PROCESS

It should be clear by now that, fundamentally, education for me must be

recognised as being a social process, and therefore a mathematical education

the acquisition of mathematical techniques and in the desire for so-called

TOWARDS A WAY OF KNOWING

civics, or national history, or even perhaps language is. Mathematics is a

TOWARDS A WAY OF KNOWING

Moreover whilst showing that these four components are interrelated he

In the next chapter I propose to explore in more detail the technological

TOWARDS A WAY OF KNOWING

tics is a pan-cultural phenomenon: i.e. it exists in all cultures. The second

ENVIRONMENTAL ACTIVITIES AND MA THEMA TICAL

2.1. PERSPECTIVES FROM CROSS-CULTURAL STUDIES

We begin with perhaps the most obvious activity suggesting mathematical

The more recent anthropological and cultural studies, however, sensitise us to

activity relating firmly to environmental needs, and is subject to various social