!

1A Courts Notes

REVISED 2017

http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/photography-the-first-amendment
O'Grady v. Superior Court
139 Cal. App. 4th 1423, 2006 WL 1452685 (Cal. App. , 6th Dist., May 26, 2006)
Apple Barred From Obtaining Source Of Blog's Article
-

Electronic Communications Privacy Act - Wiretap and Stored Communications Acts

Email, Right of Privacy and Internet Use
First Amendment
Internet Service Provider
Reporter's Privilege - Confidentiality of Sources

SEE page 36 keyword "embroil"

... "We decline the implicit invitation to embroil ourselves in questions of wha
t constitutes legitimate journalis[m]. The shield law is intended to protect the g
athering and dissemination of news, and that is what petitioners did here. We ca
n think of no workable test or principle that would distinguish legitimate from ill
egitimate news.
Any attempt by courts to draw such a distinction would imperil a fundamental pur
pose of the First Amendment, which is to identify the best, most important, and
most valuable ideas not by any sociological or economic formula, rule of law, or
process of government, but through the rough and tumble competition of the meme
tic marketplace." ...
SEE page 36 keyword "embroil" in the CA O'Grady v. Superior Court (2006),

---------------2006 O'Grady v Superior Court of Santa Clara County

2011 Glik v Cuniffe 1CA Opinion 2011-08-26
2011 Rodriguez v Winski
=======================
(2011 Rodriguez v Winski 12CV3389 NRB) US DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT NEW Y
ORK 12CV3389 (NRB)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
No. 12CV3389 (NRB)
==========================
The story is in a gun rights group, but it is about 1st Amendment Freedom of Ex
pressive Speech; the Gathering of News for a Free Press; and the Gathering of Ev
idence of Government Wrongdoing for Redress of Grievances.

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
!1st A Cases
Take to court and use the following court decisions and collect.
Marbury vs Madison (1803),
http://www.lawnix.com/cases/marbury-madison.html

Application for writ of mandamus denied. Marbury doesn t get the commission.
See Ex Parte McCardle for a constitutional law case brief holding that that the
Constitution gives Congress the express power to make exceptions to the Supreme
Court s appellate jurisdiction.
Bryer s v United States 273 U.S. 28.,
--0r-Byars v. United States - 273 U.S. 28 (1927)
Dejammer v hoskill of Albany, ??? (UNKN)
Erie Railroad v Thompkins,
7A Trial by jury.
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (Supreme Court trumps everything el
se) ,
Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 262,
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Al.: 373 US 262 (1962):
If the state does convert your right into a privilege and issue a license and a f
ee for it, you can ignore the license and a fee and engage the right with impuni
ty.
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
was a Supreme Court decision that helped to establish a fundamental "right to tr
avel" in U.S. law. Although the Constitution does not mention the right to trave
l, it is implied by the other rights given in the Constitution. (Although the ri
ght was recognized under the Equal Protection clause in this case, pre-Fourteent
h Amendment, the right to travel was understood as protected by the Privileges a
nd Immunities Clause (Article IV), as a privilege of citizenship, and therefore
might have been applied to the states under the Privileges or Immunities Clause
of Amendment XIV, as J. Stewart wanted.)
COURT CASES:
1876 SCOTUS - United States v. Cruikshank (1876);
was an important United States Supreme Court decision in United States constitut
ional law, one of the earliest to deal with the application of the Bill of Right
s to state governments following the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.
1937 SCOTUS - De Jonge v. Oregon (1937);
Holding
-- The Oregon statute as applied to the particular charge as defined by the stat
e court is repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
judgment of conviction is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceed
ings not inconsistent with this opinion.
-- held that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause applies to freedom of
assembly.
The Court found that Dirk De Jonge had the right to organize a Communist Party
and to speak at its meetings, even though the party advocated industrial or poli
tical change in revolution. However, in the 1950s with the fear of communism on
the rise the Court ruled in Dennis v. United States (1951) that Eugene Dennis, w
ho was the leader of the Communist Party, violated the Smith Act by advocating t
he forcible overthrow of the
United States government.
1939 SCOTUS - HAGUE V CIO 1939;
Holding
-- The Court held that Hague's ban on political meetings violated the First Amen

dment right to freedom of assembly, and so the ordinances were void.

1940 SCOTUS - Thornhill v. Alabama (1940);
Holding
The free speech clause protects speech about the facts and circumstances of a la
bor dispute.
1941 SCOTUS - Cox v. New Hampshire (1941);
(keywords: sidewalk,
although the government cannot regulate the contents of speech,
it can place reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on
speech for the public safety.
Also, that every parade or procession on public streets
had to have a license and organizers had to pay a fee.
1963 SCOTUS - Edwards v. South Carolina (1963);
Holding
State governments must protect First Amendment rights through the Fourteenth Ame
ndment.
-That the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution forbade stat
e government officials to force a crowd to disperse when they are otherwise lega
lly marching in front of a state house.
1965 SCOTUS - Cox v. Louisiana (1965);
case based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. It held that a state
government cannot employ "breach of the peace" statutes against protesters enga
ging in peaceable demonstrations that may potentially incite violence.
1969 SCOTUS - Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham (1969);
... it applied to the enforcement of an officer's order in directing vehicular
traffic.
-- HOLDING -The Court held that
(1) even though the actual construction of 1142 of the Birmingham General City
Code was unconstitutional, the judicial construction of the ordinance prohibited
only standing or loitering on public property that obstructed free passage, but
it was unclear from the record, whether the literal or judicial construction wa
s applied; and (2) the literal construction of 1132 of the Birmingham General Ci
ty Code was unconstitutional, and the statutory application revealed that it app
lied to the enforcement of an officer's order in directing vehicular traffic.
If you get arrested at an overpass rally, and they hold you overnight, then abs
olutely DO NOT go out and do another rally. You should be intimidated and fear b
eing arrested, then you have a grounds to sue.
1970 SCOTUS - Bachellar v. Maryland (1970);
(keywords: sidewalk,
Petitioners' convictions for violating Maryland's disorderly conduct statute ste
mming from a demonstration protesting the Vietnam conflict must be set aside, as
the jury's general verdict, in light of the trial judge's instructions, could h
ave rested on several grounds, including "the doing or saying . . . of that whic
h offends, disturbs, incites, or tends to incite a number of people gathered in
the same area," and a
conviction on that ground would violate the constitutional protection for the a

dvocacy of unpopular ideas.

Stromberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359. Pp. 397 U. S. 565-571.
1971 SCOTUS - Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971)
(keywords: sidewalk,
Holding
A Cincinnati ordinance which made it a criminal offense for three or more person
s to assemble on a sidewalk and annoy passersby violated the rights of free asse
mbly and association.
Additionally, the vagueness of the law violated due process.
1972 SCOTUS - Flower v. United States (1972);
(keywords: sidewalk,
-- Application of 18 U.S.C. 1382, proscribing the re-entry onto a military post
of a person who has been removed therefrom or ordered by an officer not to re-en
ter, held violative of First Amendment rights as applied when petitioner, a civi
lian who had previously been barred from the post was arrested after re-entry wh
ile quietly distributing leaflets on a public street extensively used by civilia
ns as well as military personnel that runs through Fort Sam Houston, an open mil
itary post.
1972 SCOTUS - Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB (1972);
1972 SCOTUS Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner (1972);
(keywords: sidewalk, shopping mall,
-- The District Court s opinion on Lloyd showed that Logan Valley [7] were both ve
ry similar cases. Both were distinguished as having narrow grounds also limited
to a labor dispute involving one of that shopping center's tenants occurred unde
r any conditions where no realistic alternative for expression existed. Noting t
hat the Lloyd Corp. respondent's message was directed to all members of the publ
ic, the
Court concluded that the respondents could have distributed their handbills on
"any public street, on any public sidewalk, in any public park, or in any public
building."
Therefore, respondents were not entitled to exercise their free-speech rights o
n the privately owned shopping-center property.
-- The Lloyd Shopping Center invites schools to hold football rallies, president
ial candidates to give speeches, and service organizations to hold Veterans Day
ceremonies on its grounds. The court also observed that the Center permits the S
alvation Army, the Volunteers of America, and the American Legion to solicit fun
ds in the Mall. Thus, the court concluded that the Center was already open to Fi
rst Amendment activities, and that respondents could not constitutionally be exc
luded from distributing leaflets solely because Lloyd Center was not bewitched o
f the form or substance of their speech. The Court of Appeals affirmed, taking t
he position that it was not extending either Logan Valley or Marsh.[7] In other
words, the District Court found that Lloyd Center had deliberately chosen to ope
n its private property to their own broad range of rules and expressions and tha
t having done so it could not constitutionally exclude respondents in America, t
he writer for the dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall, agreed with Donald Tanner.
[8]
1972 7TH CIRCUIT - Police Department of Chicago v. Mosely (1972);
(keywords: sidewalk,
-- City ordinance prohibiting all picketing within 150 feet of a school, except

peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute, found by the Court
of Appeals to be unconstitutional because overbroad, held violative of the Equa
l Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since it makes an impermissible
distinction between peaceful labor picketing and other peaceful picketing.
Pp. 94-102.
1972 SCOTUS - Grayned v. Rockford (1972);
- When is picketing constitutionally protected?
Picketing is normally a peaceful carrying of signs and banners clearly
advertising a grievance or the purpose of a demonstration. It is a
recognized means of communication.
-- That the anti-picketing ordinance was overbroad and was therefore invalid; th
at the antinoise ordinance, which prohibited only noise that took place near a p
ublic school and might disrupt school activity, was valid; and that therefore Gr
ayned's conviction under the anti-picketing ordinance was reversed while his con
viction under the antinoise ordinance was upheld.
-- RELATED CASES:
- - Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
- - Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
- - Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).
- - Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
- - Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
1984 SCOTUS - Clark v. Community for Creative Nonviolence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984);
-- Holding
A rule against camping or overnight sleeping in public parks is not beyond the c
onstitutional power of the Government to enforce
2000 SCOTUS - Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000);
-- police interactions based on anonymous tip, absent observing a crime.
-- Holding
A police officer may not legally stop and frisk anyone based solely on an
anonymous tip that simply described that person's location and appearance witho
ut information as to any illegal conduct that the person might be planning.
2003 CA 3RD APPEALS COURT - Sanctity of Human Life v. CHP (2003);
(keywords: overpass, impede, )
(Vehicle Code sections 2410, 21465 and 21467)
-- We find that the statutes, Vehicle Code sections 21465 and 21467, under which
the CHP claimed the power to terminate plaintiffs' activities, do not apply to
plaintiffs' activities. However, we also conclude the CHP, under the facts prese
nted at trial, acted appropriately pursuant to its authority to direct traffic.(
See Veh.Code, 2410.) We further conclude that the CHP's actions in this case did
not violate plaintiffs' free speech rights. Accordingly, we modify the trial cou
rt's judgment to grant to plaintiffs declaratory relief only to the extent of de
claring that the CHP may not interfere with plaintiffs' activities under the aut
hority of Vehicle Code sections 21465 and 21467 and otherwise affirm the judgmen
t. (Hereafter, unspecified code citations are to the Vehicle Code.)
-- Plaintiffs' signs cannot be characterized as traffic signs subject to
prohibition under section 21465.
--- They did not purport to be traffic signs.
--- They did not imitate or resemble traffic signs.
--- The signs did not attempt to direct the movement of traffic or hide from vie
w any traffic sign.
--- The CHP, relying only on sections 21465 and 21467, cannot prevent plaintiffs
from displaying the signs.
-- Plaintiffs have presented an actual controversy concerning whether the CHP ma

y interfere with plaintiffs' activities under the authority of

sections 21465 and 21467.
--- We conclude the CHP may not do so.
-- Members of the California Highway Patrol are authorized to direct traffic acco
rding to law, and, in the event of a fire or other emergency, or to expedite tra
ffic or insure safety, may direct traffic as conditions may require notwithstand
ing the provisions of this code. (2410.) Traffic
includes pedestrians. (620.) The record shows that the CHP acted to
terminate plaintiffs' activities on freeway overpasses only when those
activities were causing freeway congestion.
--- Thus, under the authority of section 2410 allowing the CHP to direct
traffic to expedite traffic as conditions may require , the actions taken by the
CHP conformed to their statutory authority.
2011 - Occupy Nashville et al v. Haslam et al(2011);
2011 9th Circuit - Comit de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach,
California (2011)
2012 - Stahl v. City of St. Louis, Mo. (2012);
-- The fact that a person only violates the ordinance if his or her action evoke
s a particular response from a third party is especially problematic because of
the ordinance's resulting chilling effect on core First Amendment speech.
==========
to act outside that authority is an abuse of power.
620. The term traffic includes pedestrians, ridden animals, vehicles, street cars,
and other conveyances, either singly or together, while using any highway for p
urposes of travel.
=======
====
2410. Members of the California Highway Patrol are authorized to direct traffic
according to law, and, in the event of a fire or other emergency, or to expedite
traffic or insure safety, may direct traffic as conditions may require notwiths
tanding the provisions of this code.
2800. (a) It is unlawful to willfully fail or refuse to comply with a lawful ord
er, signal, or direction of a peace officer, as defined in Chapter 4.5 (commenci
ng with Section 830) of Title 3 of Part 2 of the Penal Code, when that peace off
icer is in uniform and is performing duties pursuant to any of the provisions of
this code, or to refuse to submit to a lawful inspection pursuant to this code.
--------1972 SCOTUS - Grayned v. Rockford (1972);
- When is picketing constitutionally protected?
Picketing is normally a peaceful carrying of signs and banners clearly advertis
ing a grievance or the purpose of a demonstration. It is a recognized means of c
ommunication.
-- That the anti-picketing ordinance was overbroad and was therefore invalid;
that the anti-noise ordinance, which prohibited only noise that took place near
a public school and might disrupt school activity, was valid; and that therefor
e Grayned's conviction under the anti-picketing ordinance was reversed while his
conviction under the anti-noise ordinance was upheld.
-- RELATED CASES:
- - Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
- - Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).

- - Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966).

- - Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
- - Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
2000 SCOTUS - Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000);
-- police interactions based on anonymous tip, absent observing a crime.
-- Holding
A police officer may not legally stop and frisk anyone based solely on an
anonymous tip that simply described that person's location and appearance witho
ut information as to any illegal conduct that the person might be planning.
2011 9th Circuit - Comit de Jornaleros de Redondo Beach v. City of Redondo Beach,
California (2011)http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2011/09/16/06-5
5750.pdf
2012 - Stahl v. City of St. Louis, Mo. (2012);
-- The fact that a person only violates the ordinance if his or her action evoke
s a particular response from a third party is especially problematic because of
the ordinance's resulting chilling effect on core First Amendment speech.
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/12/08/103761P.pdf

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
1995 Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F. 3d 436 - Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit 19
95
This case arises from the alleged interference by police officers of the City of
Seattle with Jerry Edmon Fordyce's attempt on August 5, 1990 to videotape a publ
ic protest march. ? Fordyce, who apparently considered himself part of the prote
st, had volunteered to videotape the demonstration for local television productio
n, presumably for broadcast on a public access channel. ? Among his subjects were
the activities of the police officers assigned to work the event. ? Not surpris
ingly, the police themselves became targets of the protest and were subjected to
rude and profane insults. ? Generally, the police reacted to this treatment in
a calm and professional manner, but the record suggests that some of these offic
ers were not pleased with Fordyce's actions, and that one officer in particular
attempted physically to dissuade Fordyce from his mission. ? At the end of the d
ay, in a separate incident, a different officer arrested Fordyce when he attempt
ed to videotape some sidewalk bystanders against their wishes. ? Fordyce was cha
rged with violating a Washington State privacy statute, Wash.Rev.Code ?9.73.030,
which forbids the recording of private conversations without the consent of all
participants.1?Fordyce spent the night in jail. ? On October 1, 1990, the charges
against Fordyce were dismissed on motion of the prosecuting attorney.
http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-9th-circuit/1054985.html
2005 Porat v. LINCOLN TOWERS COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION, Dist. Court, SD New York 200
5
In his ten-count Complaint, Plaintiff advances four federal claims. Pursuant to 4
2 U.S.C. 1983, Plaintiff alleges: (1) malicious prosecution in violation of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) false arrest and false imprisonment in viol
ation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments; (3) retaliation in response to a p
rotected exercise of First Amendment rights; and (4) conspiracy to violate the F
irst, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.[1]The Private Defendants presently move t
o dismiss the first four claims, the purported federal claims, and Plaintiff's t
enth claim, the declaratory judgment claim.
2006 Pomykacz v. Borough of West Wildwood, 438 F. Supp. 2d 504 - Dist. Court, D.

New Jersey 2006

http://www.leagle.com/decision/2006942438FSupp2d504_1893/POMYKACZ%20v.%20BOROUGH
%20OF%20WEST%20WILDWOOD
2008 Levitt v. NYPD (Seeking access to NYPD policy for issuing press passes) N
ew York Civil Liberties Union NYCLU - American Civil Liberties Union of New
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
1. This Article 78 proceeding seeks to vindicate the right of petitioners the Ne
w York Civil Liberties Union ( NYCLU ) and journalist Leonard Levitt to access docum
ents related to New York City Police Department ( NYPD ) policies and procedures gov
erning the issuance and denial of NYPD press passes.
2. For over twenty years prior to January of 2007, Len Levitt held an NYPD press
pass in his capacity as a reporter for New York Newsday and as an independent j
ournalist covering stories related to the NYPD. On January 10, 2007, Mr. Levitt
was notified that his press pass would not be renewed by the NYPD.
3. On May 14, the NYCLU and Mr. Levitt filed a Freedom of Information Law ( FOIL ) r
equest seeking the documents related to NYPD policies and procedures 2 governing
the issuance and denial of press passes, as well as documents related to the NY
PD s denial of Mr. Levitt s application to renew his press pass. The NYPD has constr
uctively denied this request by failing to produce responsive documents and by d
enying a timely administrative appeal, necessitating this Article 78 petition.
4. The NYPD s refusal to produce the requested information violates the Freedom of
Information Law. Petitioners now seek an order from this Court, pursuant to Art
icle 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, directing the NYPD to prod
uce the documents as requested by the NYCLU and Mr. Levitt. http://www.nyclu.org/
files/levitt_petition_022008.pdf
2009 Chavez v. City of Oakland, Dist. Court, ND California 2009 - Google Scholar
Defendants' motion for summary judgment on the federal claims is GRANTED. At a mi
nimum, the law was not clearly established that an officer could not arrest some
one for exiting his car in the lane of a freeway to take photographs of an accid
ent scene. The law was also not clearly established that an officer could not ar
rest someone for refusing to comply with an order from the officer when, rather
than immediately complying, the person asserts that he has the right to stand in
the freeway and take photographs. Finally, the law was not clearly established
that members of the press have a federal First Amendment right to leave a vehicl
e unattended in a lane of a freeway in order to photograph an accident.
2011 Belsito Communications, Inc. v. Decker
Plaintiffs, Brian Blackden and Belsito Communications (doing
business as 1st Responder Newspaper), bring suit under 42 U.S.C.
1983 alleging violations of their First, Fourth, and Fourteenth
Amendment rights. Defendants are Robert Quinn, Director of the
Division of State Police, New Hampshire Department of Safety, and
New Hampshire State Trooper James Decker. The defendants
motions to dismiss, doc. nos. 17 and 18, are pending before the
court.
As alleged in the first amended complaint, doc. no. 16,
Blackden is a freelance reporter and photographer for various
news agencies, including plaintiff Belsito Communications. On
August 25, 2010, Blackden heard a radio transmission calling the
Belsito Communications, Inc. v. Decker Doc. 32
Dockets.Justia.com
Penacook Rescue Squad to the scene of a serious traffic accident.
Blackden went to the scene and donned a protective coat and a
helmet marked Photographer. After taking photographs of the
accident and rescue efforts, Blackden was approached by state
trooper James Decker, who asked Blackden to identify himself and
to produce some form of identification. Blackden complied with
Decker s request. Shortly after questioning him, Decker seized

Blackden s camera, which contained a digital photo card

containing the photographic files Blackden had taken at the
scene.
2011 1CA-GLIK-V-CUNNIFFE-10-1764P-01A
Simon Glik was arrested for using
his cell phone's digital video camera to film several police
officers arresting a young man on the Boston Common. The charges
against Glik, which included violation of Massachusetts's wiretap statute and tw
o other state-law offenses, were subsequently judged baseless and were dismissed
. Glik then brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that his arrest for
filming the officers constituted a violation of his rights under the First and
Fourth Amendments.
In this interlocutory appeal, the defendant police
officers challenge an order of the district court denying them
qualified immunity on Glik's constitutional claims. We conclude,
based on the facts alleged, that Glik was exercising clearly established First A
mendment rights in filming the officers in a
public space, and that his clearly-established Fourth Amendment
rights were violated by his arrest without probable cause. We
therefore affirm.
2012 Rodriguez-et-al-v.-Winski-et-al.-First-Amended-Complaint
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
1. This is a civil rights action in which Plaintiffs seek relief for the violati
on of their
rights secured by 42 USC 1983 and the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments t
o
the United States Constitution, and the laws and Constitution of the State of Ne
w York
and rules and regulations of the City of New York.
2. The claims arise from a series of incidents in connection with Occupy Wall St
reet
protests beginning in and around September 17, 2011 and continuing to the presen
t day in
which the City of New York in concert with various private and public entities h
ave
employed Officers of the New York City Police Department ("NYPD") and others act
ing
under color of state law, to intentionally and willfully subject Plaintiffs and
the public to,
among other things, violations of rights to free speech, assembly, freedom of th
e press,
false arrest, excessive force, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution and
,
furthermore, purposefully obstructing Plaintiffs carrying out their duties as el
ected
officials and members of the press, including oversight of the New York City Pol
ice
Department.
3. This unlawful conduct has been undertaken with the intention of obstructing,
chilling, deterring and retaliating against Plaintiffs for engaging in Constitut
ionally protected
protest activities.
4. Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief as well as special, compensatory and puniti
ve
monetary damages against Defendants, as well as an award of costs and attorneys'
fees,
and such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

2012 Sharp v. Baltimore City Police Dept., et al., No. 1:11-cv-02888 (D. Md.)
The lawsuit details how Sharp was detained and harangued by police officers afte
r he recorded the police incident, with the officers demanding that he surrender
his cellphone as "evidence". Sharp politely declined, but police continued to d
emand that he give up his phone. Fearing arrest, he finally handed over the phon
e to an officer. The police then destroyed the beating videos and all other vide
os it contained - about two dozen in all - before returning the phone to Sharp.
http://www.aclu-md.org/our_work/legal_cases/1
2013 GARCIA V. MONTGOMERY COUNTY 8:12-cv-03592-JFM
In 2011, photojournalist Mannie Garcia witnessed an excessive force arrest by tw
o officers and began photographing the scene. Mr. Garcia did not interfere with
police activity and even identified himself as a member of the press to one of t
he on scene officers. After Mr. Garcia identified himself and his belongings, Off
icer Malouf arrested Mr. Garcia and placed him in a chokehold, forcibly dragging
him along the ground to the police cruiser. Officer Malouf handcuffed Mr. Garci
a, confiscated his camera, and kicked Mr. Garcia to the ground. Officer Malouf al
so threatened Mr. Garcia s wife with arrest if she approached. After his arrest, Of
ficer Malouf failed to inform Mr. Garcia of his Miranda rights or his charged of
fense. Further, Officer Malouf confiscated physical evidence of his abuse and boo
ked Mr. Garcia for disorderly conduct. When the police released Mr. Garcia from
booking, he did not receive his video card back. At his subsequent trial, a jury
acquitted Mr. Garcia of the disorderly conduct charge.
After being acquitted, Mr. Garcia initiated a civil suit against the police depa
rtment and city alleging that Officer Malouf fabricated the disorderly conduct c
harge and that the officers onsite failed to follow police policy on media relat
ions. Mr. Garcia s complaint sought relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of h
is First and Fourth Amendment Rights. https://ducrimlawrev.wordpress.com/2014/09
/03/garcia_v-_montcty/
2014 gericke v weare 12-2326P-01A
Gericke was not brought to trial. She subsequently sued the Town of Weare, its p
olice department, and the officers who arrested and charged her, alleging in per
tinent part that the wiretapping charge constituted retaliatory prosecution in v
iolation of her First Amendment rights.