G.R. No.

87059 June 22, 1992

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS, accused-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
Accused-appellant Rogelio Mengote was convicted of illegal possession of firearms on the strength mainly of the stolen
pistol found on his person at the moment of his warrantless arrest. In this appeal, he pleads that the weapon was not
admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and was therefore the fruit of the poisonous tree.
The Government disagrees. It insists that the revolver was validly received in evidence by the trial judge because its seizure
was incidental to an arrest that was doubtless lawful even if admittedly without warrant.
The incident occurred shortly before noon of August 8, 1987, after the Western Police District received a telephone call from
an informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo,
Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. As later narrated at the trial by
Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan, 1 they there saw two men "looking from side to side," one of whom was

holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two
tried to run away but were unable to escape because the other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were then
searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused-appellant, was found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson
revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His companion, later identified as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife
secreted in his front right pants pocket. The weapons were taken from them. Mengote and Morellos were then turned
over to police headquarters for investigation by the Intelligence Division.
On August 11, 1987, the following information was filed against the accused-appellant before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila:
The undersigned accuses ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS of a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866,
committed as follows:
That on or about August 8, 1987, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control a firearm, to wit:
one (1) cal. 38 "S & W" bearing
Serial No. 8720-T
without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the proper authorities.
Besides the police officers, one other witness presented by the prosecution was Rigoberto Danganan, who identified the
subject weapon as among the articles stolen from him during the robbery in his house in Malabon on June 13, 1987. He
pointed to Mengote as one of the robbers. He had duly reported the robbery to the police, indicating the articles stolen from
him, including the revolver. 2 For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the firearm or that he was

licensed to possess it and claimed instead that the weapon had been "Planted" on him at the time of his arrest.

The gun, together with the live bullets and its holster, were offered as Exhibits A, B, and C and admitted over the objection of
the defense. As previously stated, the weapon was the principal evidence that led to Mengote's conviction for violation of
P.D.
1866.
He
was
sentenced
to
reclusion
perpetua. 4
It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have been admitted in evidence because of its illegal
seizure. no warrant therefor having been previously obtained. Neither could it have been seized as an incident of a lawful
arrest because the arrest of Mengote was itself unlawful, having been also effected without a warrant. The defense also
contends that the testimony regarding the alleged robbery in Danganan's house was irrelevant and should also have been
disregarded by the trial court.
The following are the pertinent provision of the Bill of Rights:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3 (1). The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order
of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose
in any proceeding.
There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible in any proceeding for
any purpose. That is the absolute prohibition of Article III, Section 3(2), of the Constitution. This is the celebrated
exclusionary rule based on the justification given by Judge Learned Hand that "only in case the prosecution, which itself
controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will the wrong be repressed." The Solicitor General,
while conceding the rule, maintains that it is not applicable in the case at bar. His reason is that the arrest and search of
Mengote and the seizure of the revolver from him were lawful under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court reading as
follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. A peace officer or private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person;
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases failing under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Rule 112, Section 7.
We have carefully examined the wording of this Rule and cannot see how we can agree with the prosecution.
Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an escapee from a penal institution when he was
arrested. We therefore confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness of his arrest under either Par. (a) or Par. (b) of this
section.
Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least
attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting officer.
These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the accusedappellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the arresting officers themselves.
There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted
by Mengote in their presence.
The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was not necessary as long as Mengote's acts "created
a reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an offense had been
committed and that the accused-appellant had committed it." The question is, What offense? What offense could possibly
have been suggested by a person "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen" and in a place not exactly
forsaken?
These are certainly not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made them less so, if at all. It might have been different if
Mengote bad been apprehended at an ungodly hour and in a place where he had no reason to be, like a darkened alley at 3

o'clock in the morning. But he was arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in a crowded street shortly after alighting from a
passenger jeep with I his companion. He was not skulking in the shadows but walking in the clear light of day. There was
nothing clandestine about his being on that street at that busy hour in the blaze of the noonday sun.
On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of them innocent, why his eyes were darting from side to
side and be was holding his abdomen. If they excited suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers, as the prosecution
suggests, it has nevertheless not been shown what their suspicion was all about. In fact, the policemen themselves testified
that they were dispatched to that place only because of the telephone call from the informer that there were "suspiciouslooking" persons in that vicinity who were about to commit a robbery at North Bay Boulevard. The caller did not explain why
he thought the men looked suspicious nor did he elaborate on the impending crime.

the Court sustained the warrantless arrest of the accused because there
was a bulge in his waist that excited the suspicion of the arresting officer and, upon inspection, turned out to be a
pouch containing hashish. In People v. Claudio, 6 the accused boarded a bus and placed the buri bag she was
carrying behind the seat of the arresting officer while she herself sat in the seat before him. His suspicion aroused, be
surreptitiously examined the bag, which he found to contain marijuana. He then and there made the warrantless arrest
and seizure that we subsequently upheld on the ground that probable cause had been sufficiently established.
In the recent case of People v. Malmstedt,

The case before us is different because there was nothing to support the arresting officers' suspicion other than Mengote's
darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that
an offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in their presence.

where the Court held that the warrantless arrest of the accused was
unconstitutional. This was effected while be was coming down a vessel, to all appearances no less innocent than the
other disembarking passengers. He had not committed nor was be actually committing or attempting to commit an
offense in the presence of the arresting officers. He was not even acting suspiciously. In short, there was no probable
cause that, as the prosecution incorrectly suggested, dispensed with the constitutional requirement of a warrant.
This case is similar to People v. Aminnudin,

Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not been satisfied. The prosecution has
not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and that the arresting officers had
personal knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the
telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be committed.
The truth is that they did not know then what offense, if at all, had been committed and neither were they aware of the
participation therein of the accused-appellant. It was only later, after Danganan had appeared at the Police headquarters,
that they learned of the robbery in his house and of Mengote's supposed involvement therein. 8 As for the illegal possession of the
firearm found on Mengote's person, the policemen discovered this only after he had been searched and the investigation conducted later revealed that he
was not its owners nor was he licensed to possess it.

Before these events, the Peace officers had no knowledge even of Mengote' identity, let alone the fact (or suspicion) that he
was unlawfully carrying a firearm or that he was involved in the robbery of Danganan's house.
In the landmark case of People v. Burgos, 9 this Court declared:
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is
about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of the fact. The offense must also be
committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859). (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to
believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been
committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to
suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be
undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. (Emphasis
supplied)
This doctrine was affirmed in Alih v. Castro, 10 thus:

If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in connection with a crime about to
be committed, being committed, or just committed, what was that crime? There is no allegation in the
record of such a falsification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that under the Revised Rule 113, Section
5(b), the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the ground therefor as stressed in the
recent case of People v. Burgos. (Emphasis supplied)
It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and searched just because he is holding his
abdomen, even if it be possibly because of a stomach-ache, or if a peace officer could clamp handcuffs on any person with a
shifty look on suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act or is actually committing or attempting it. This simply
cannot be done in a free society. This is not a police state where order is exalted over liberty or, worse, personal malice on
the part of the arresting officer may be justified in the name of security.
There is no need to discuss the other issues raised by the accused-appellant as the ruling we here make is sufficient to
sustain his exoneration. Without the evidence of the firearm taken from him at the time of his illegal arrest, the prosecution
has lost its most important exhibit and must therefore fail. The testimonial evidence against Mengote (which is based on the
said firearm) is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime imputed to him.
We commend Atty. Violeta Calvo-Drilon for her able and spirited defense of the accused-appellant not only in the brief but
also in the reply brief, which she did not have to file but did so just the same to stress the constitutional rights of her client.
The fact that she was acting only as a counsel de oficio with no expectation of material reward makes her representation
even more commendable.
The Court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, the prosecution of the
accused-appellant might have succeeded. As it happened, they allowed their over-zealousness to get the better of them,
resulting in their disregard of the requirements of a valid search and seizure that rendered inadmissible the vital evidence
they had invalidly seized.
This should be a lesson to other peace officers. Their impulsiveness may be the very cause of the acquittal of persons who
deserve to be convicted, escaping the clutches of the law because, ironically enough, it has not been observed by those
who are supposed to enforce it.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant is ACQUITTED and ordered
released immediately unless he is validly detained for other offenses. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant.
CRUZ, J.:
The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless arrested, tried and found guilty of
illegally transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving him, held it was high time to put him away and sentenced him to
life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00. 1
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the
evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding
what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were
confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an
information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. 2 Later, the information was amended to

include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. 3 Both
were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali on the
basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." 5 The motion was
granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted . 6
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers that the accused-appellant
was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. 7 He was Identified by name. 8 Acting on this tip,

they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him as he descended from the gangplank after
the informer had pointed to him. 9 They detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain
three kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner, 10 who testified that she
conducted microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding, the corresponding
charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing consisting of a
jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. 11 He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His

bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled to force him to admit he
was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried
the blows while he was still handcuffed. 12 He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his
business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have
been carrying was not properly Identified and could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock room of the
PC headquarters. 14
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed to have come to Iloilo City
to sell watches but carried only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo for that purpose and spending P107.00 for fare,
not to mention his other expenses. 15 Aminnudin testified that he kept the two watches in a secret pocket below his belt

but, strangely, they were not discovered when he was bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they
damaged as a result of his manhandling. 16 He also said he sold one of the watches for P400.00 and gave away the
other, although the watches belonged not to him but to his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full name he said did not even
know. 18 The trial court also rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not sufficiently proved the
injuries sustained by him. 19
There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the trial judge who had immediate access to
the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh their credibility on the stand. Nuances of tone or voice,
meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face and dart of eyes, which may reveal the truth or expose the lie, are not
described in the impersonal record. But the trial judge sees all of this, discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the
falsities.
The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the accused-appellant was not really beaten
up because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a medical examination. That is hardly fair or realistic. It is
possible Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he was at that time under detention by the PC authorities and in fact has
never been set free since he was arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No bail has been allowed for his release.
There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that he was arrested and
searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession inadmissible in evidence against him
under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not even discuss this point. For his part, the Solicitor General dismissed this after
an all-too-short argument that the arrest of Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules
of Court on warrantless arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that they had no warrant when
they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only justification was the tip they had earlier received
from a reliable and regular informer who reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their
testimony varies as to the time they received the tip, one saying it was two days before the arrest, 20 another two weeks 21

and a third "weeks before June 25." 22 On this matter, we may prefer the declaration of the chief of the arresting team,
Lt. Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as follows:
Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the coming of Idel
Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?
A Yes, sir.

Q When did you receive this intelligence report?

A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable sources.
Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible trafficking of
marijuana leaves on that date?
A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this information from that
particular informer, prior to June 25, 1984 we have already reports of the particular
operation which was being participated by Idel Aminnudin.
Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June 25, 1984 with respect
to the coming of Wilcon 9?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?
A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the coming of Wilcon 9. For
instance, report of illegal gambling operation.
COURT:
Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days before June 25, 1984,
did you also receive daily report regarding the activities of Idel Aminnudin
A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of Idel Aminnudin.
Q What were those activities?
A Purely marijuana trafficking.
Q From whom did you get that information?
A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of information, maybe for
security reason and we cannot Identify the person.
Q But you received it from your regular informer?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. LLARIZA:
Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel Aminnudin is coming
with drugs?
A Marijuana, sir.
Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo with marijuana was
received by you many days before you received the intelligence report in writing?
A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.
Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984 two days before?
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that minnudin was coming?

A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was coming but on June
23, 1984 that was the time when I received the information that he was coming.
Regarding the reports on his activities, we have reports that he was already consummated
the act of selling and shipping marijuana stuff.
COURT:
Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?
A Yes, sir.
Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was mentioned?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are you sure of that?
A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.
Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23, 1984, you had already
gathered information to the effect that Idel Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on June 25,
1984?
A Only on the 23rd of June.
Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search of the subject
mentioned in your intelligence report?
A No, more.
Q Why not?
A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield positive result.
Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you do not need a
search warrant anymore?
A Search warrant is not necessary. 23
That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of the PC. The Supreme Court
cannot countenance such a statement. This is still a government of laws and not of men.
The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination by him of
the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government, the accused-appellant was not caught in
flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under
Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as in the
case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches

and seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.

The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had
at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo
on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the
information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the
issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored
altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a
"search warrant was not necessary."
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act, it has
always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the
narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of

selling the prohibited drug.

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he
was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and
there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers
innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he
suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification
by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the despised dictatorship, when
any one could be picked up at will, detained without charges and punished without trial, we will have only ourselves to blame
if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to return, to once more flaunt its disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties
its Bill of Rights guarantees.
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words suggest that he is lying, that
fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional presumption is that he is innocent, and he will be so
declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to convict him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution must fall. That evidence
cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the trial court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was
seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident
of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions
allowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was
inadmissible.
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our lawenforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But
as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of
the liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its
protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high- handedness from the authorities, however
praiseworthy their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of order.
Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, "I think it a less evil that some criminals
should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is simply not allowed in the free society to violate a
law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself.
We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accused-appellant, his guilt has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.
Narvasa, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 72564 April 15, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANITA CLAUDIO Y BAGTANG, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Romeo C. Alinea for accused-appellant.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch 73 finding the accused Anita
Claudio y Bagtang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 4, Rep. Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as
amended) and sentencing her to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of P 20,000.00, and to pay the costs.
The information filed against the accused alleged:
That on or about the 21st day of July 1981, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named ACCUSED without being lawfully authorized, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly transport 1.1 kilos of Marijuana dried leaves, which are prohibited drugs
for the purpose of selling the same from Baguio City to Olongapo City. (Rollo, p. 13)
The lower court established her guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the basis of the prosecution's evidence as follows:
To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution offered the following document and testimonial evidence
as follows: Exhibit "A" Letter request for Examination of suspected marijuana dried leaves weighing
approximately 1.1 kilos dated July 25, 1981; "B" plastic container; "B- 1"-marijuana contained in the plastic
container; "B-1-a"another plastic container; "C"Chemistry Report No. D-668-81;"C-1" Findings: Positive
for marijuana; "D,","D-1," "D-2"and "D-3; "E" and "E-1" photographs of accused with Pat. Daniel Obia and
Pauline Tiongco showing the marijuana, "F"Victory Liner Ticket No. 84977;"G"Sworn Statement of Pat.
Daniel Obia, "H" Request for Field Test on suspected marijuana from accused by P/Lt. Antonio V.
Galindo;"H-1"date of of the request; "L"Certificate of Field Test dated July 22, 1981; "B-2" and "B-2a"
additional Wrapping paper; and the testimonies of witnesses of the prosecution, Theresa Ann Bugayong;
Pat. Daniel Obio, Cpl. Paulino Tiongco, Cpl. Ernesto Abello and Sgt. Leoncio Bagang.
Theresa Ann Bugayong22 years old, single, Forensic Chemist and a resident of 1150 Sampaloc, Metro
Manila testified that she received a request from the Task Force Bagong Buhay, Olongapo City, dated July
25, 1981, on specimen marijuana submitted for examination. The specimen consisted of 900 grams of
suspected dried marijuana flowering tops wrapped in a newspaper placed in a plastic bag with a marking
"MB Store" (Exh. "B").
The examination conducted by her proved to be positive for marijuana. After her examination, she prepared
Chemistry Report No. D-668-81 dated July 29,1981 (Exhs. "C" and "C-l"). She conducted three
eliminations; microscopic examination, the duguenoi levine test and thirdly, the confirmatory examination of
thin layer chromatographic test. The said specimen was submitted to them by OIC Danilo Santiago, a
representative of the CANU, Olongapo City.
The second witness for the prosecution was Daniel Obia, 37 years old, married, policeman and residing at
34 Corpuz St., East Tapinac, Olongapo City. Obia testified that he has been a member of the INP, since
1970 up to the present. He was assigned in June, 1972 at the Investigation Division as operative. His job
then was among other things to follow up reports in their office, recover stolen items and apprehend
suspects. On July 21,1981, he was on Detached Service with the ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit; and that on that
date, he came from Baguio City and arrived in Olongapo City at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon having
left Baguio at about 8:30 o'clock in the morning. He took the Victory Liner in going back to Olongapo City.
His family lives in Baguio City. On board the Victory Liner, he was seated on the second seat at the back.
While he was thus seated, suspect Anita Claudio boarded the same bus and took the seat in front of him
after putting a bag which she was carrying at the back of the seat of Obia. The bag placed by suspect
behind his seat was a wooven buri bag made of plastic containing some vegetables. The act of the
accused putting her bag behind Pat. Obia's seat aroused his suspicion and made him felt (sic) nervous.
With the feeling that there was some unusual, he had the urge to search the woven plastic bag. But it was
only at San Fernando, Pampanga when he was able to go to the bag. He inserted one of his fingers in a
plastic bag located at the bottom of the woven bag and smelt marijuana. The plastic woven bag appearing
to contain camote tops on the top has a big bundle of plastic of marijuana at the bottom. He could

recognize the smell of marijuana because he was assigned at that time at the ANTI-NARCOTICS Unit. He
did not, however, do anything after he discovered that there was marijuana inside the plastic bag of the
accused until they reached Olongapo City and the accused alighted from the bus in front of the Caltex
Gasoline Station in Sta. Rita. Right after the accused alighted from the bus, policeman Obina intercepted
her and showed her his Id Identifying himself as a policeman and told her he will search her bag because
of the suspicion that she was carrying marijuana inside said bag. In reply, accused told him, "Please go
with me, let us settle this at home." However, the witness did not heed her plea and instead handcuffed her
right hand and with her, boarded a tricycle right away and brought the suspect to the police headquarters
with her bag appearing to contain vegetables.
At the police headquarters Investigation Section, the bag was searched in the presence of Investigator Cpl.
Tiongco; Pat. Obia, the accused and Sgt. Leoncio Bagang. Inside the plastic bag was found a big bundle
of plastic containing marijuana weighing about one kilo. Witness stated that he could detect marijuana even
before the application of chemicals because of one year and a half assignment with the CANU. After the
marijuana was taken from the bag of the accused, photographs were taken of the accused and the
marijuana confiscated from her possession with Pat. Obia and that of Investigator Tiongco, accused and
himself Identified photographs shown to him in open Court. (Exhs. "D," "D-l," "D-2" and "D-3"). Witness was
likewise shown a plastic bag of marijuana contained in a plastic container (Exhs. "B," "B-1" and "B-1 -a")
and Identified it as the one confiscated from the accused and pointed to his initials on the newspaper
wrapping which also shows the date and time, although the wrapper at the time he testified appeared to be
soiled already. The marijuana was allegedly still fresh when confiscated.
To prove further that the accused transported the confiscated marijuana from Baguio City to Olongapo City,
witness Identified Victory Liner Ticket No. 684977 which was confiscated from the accused and for
Identification purposes, the witness presented the body number of the bus he wrote at the back of the ticket
which is "309" (Exhs. "F" and "F-l"). Regarding himself, he did not pay his fare from Baguio City because as
a policeman, he used his badge and a free ride.
On cross-examination, witness stated that he went to Baguio City on July 15,1981 and underwent
treatment of his heart while he was there. He was given a furlough for medical treatment. He stayed in
Baguio City for about five days and returned to Olongapo City on July 21, 1981. Prior to July 21, 1981,
witness never knew the accused, and the first time he saw her was in Baguio when she boarded the same
Victory Liner he took. When the accused who was bringing with her a woven plastic bag placed the bag
right behind his seat instead of placing it in front of her or beside her seat. Witness Obia became
suspicious and his suspicion was confirmed when they reached San Fernando, Pampanga, after he
checked the buri bag. The bus stopped at said town to load some gasoline. Witness inserted one of his
fingers inside the buri bag and thereafter smelt marijuana. He confirmed his testimony on direct that when
witness confronted accused he was invited to go with her in order to settle the matter to which he refused.
Accused further testified that from the time the accused placed her bag behind his seat from Baguio City,
he felt so nervous and had to take his medicine at the Tarlac Station. It was only after having taken his
medicine that his apprehension was contained and thus was able to insert his right hand inside the buri bag
in San Fernando, Pampanga. His fingers reached the very bottom of the bag. He Identified his sworn
statement regarding this incident given on July 21, 1981 which is Exhibit "G." Witness likewise Identified
accused Anita Claudio in open court.
Paulino Tiongco, 52 years old, married and resident of 31 Canada St., East Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City,
testified that as a policeman on the afternoon of July 21, 1981, he was inside the Investigation Division of
the Police Station, Olongapo City. As Duty Investigator, between 1:45 and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
the same day, Pat. Daniel Obia arrived at the Police Station with a woman and Identified her in the
courtroom as Anita Claudio. Pat. Obia reported to him that he apprehended Anita Claudio inside the
Victory Liner bus for possession of marijuana dried leaves. The marijuana leaves were contained in a buri
bag with some vegetables such as camote tops, bananas and some other vegetables. The marijuana was
placed in a plastic wrapper with the name National Book Store colored black and white. Witness Identified
the wrapper (Exh. "B-2"). The bag contained the markings of Pat. Obia which are his initials, (Exhs. "B-2a"), and numbers 210781 representing the date which was placed by Pat. Obia after Cpl. Tiongco
examined the suspected marijuana.
After examining and seeing the marijuana together with the vegetables, he interviewed apprehending
officer Obia and reduced his statements in writing. Cpl. Tiongco Identifled the sworn statement of Obia
(Exh. "G"). He also interviewed accused Anita Claudio who was all the while inside the Investigation room

seated on a chair. After appraising her of her constitutional rights, he asked the accused whether she was
willing to give her written statements to which the accused refused. Hence, no statements were taken of
her. However, pictures were taken inside the investigation room. Exhs. "D" and "E," series which were
already previously Identified by Pat. Obia, Witness Identified the persons appearing in the pictures as that
of Pat. Obia and the accused and also of himself. Thereafter, the marijuana contained in the plastic bag
were turned over to Lt. Galindo and Anita Claudio was detained.
Ernesto Abello, 41 years old, married and residing at No. 29 Alba Street, East Tapinac, Olongapo City,
testified he was since March 1972 a policeman and was stationed at Police Station 21, Olongapo City,
Metrodiscom. However, in 1981, he was already assigned to the CANU General Anti-NARCOTICS Unit. On
July 22, 1981, he reported for work at the CANU and received from Lt. Galindo more than a kilo of
suspected marijuana dried leaves. As requested by Lt. Galindo he conducted a field test on this marijuana
which he received from Lt. Galindo, as evidenced by a request signed by him dated July 22,1981 (Exh.
"H").
In connection with the field test conducted by him on the specimen, he prepared a Certificate of Fleld Test
dated July 22,1981 (Exhs. "I"). The Certificate of Field Test indicated the presence of tetra-hydrocannabinol
(THC), an active substance that can be only be found in marijuana, a prohibited drug. Cpl. Abello Identified
a plastic bag of marijuana received from Lt. Galindo which he later give to CIC Danilo Santiago, the
Evidence Custodian, for the latter to bring the specimen to the PC Crime Laboratory.
The last witness for the prosecution was Leoncio Bagang, 40 years old, married, residing at No. 27 Jones
St., East Tapinac, Olongapo City, a policeman of Olongapo City, assigned with Police Station "21." He has
been a policeman since 1966 up to the present. In July, 1981, he was then assigned at the Patrol Division
and his duty was to patrol the city proper from Magsaysay Drive up to east Bajac Bajac.
He narrated that on July 21,1981, between the hours of 1:00 and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, he was at
the Caltex Gasoline Station, East Bajac Bajac, Olongapo City along Rizal Avenue. He was then on duty
patrol using a motorcycle. While he was at the said place, he saw Pat. Obia alighted from the Victory Liner
bus ordering somebody to alight from the same bus. When he heard Pat. Obia he approached him and
asked him what was happening. Pat. Obia told him he apprehended a certain woman possessing dried
marijuana. The woman was still then inside the bus. Pat. Obia then brought the woman to the police
department who was bringing with her a buri bag. They boarded a tricycle, the woman riding inside the
tricycle while Pat. Obia sat behind the driver. He then followed in his motorcycle the said tricycle to police
station. He went inside the Investigation Section of the Police Station and he was there when Pat. Obia
reported to Cpl. Tiongco his apprehension of the woman possessing marijuana. He saw the marijuana for
the first time inside the Investigation Section placed in a buri bag covered with newspaper. He witnessed
the taking out of the marijuana from inside the bag by Pat. Obia in the presence of Cpl. Tiongco and the
woman or the accused in this case, and himself. Policeman Bagang Identified the accused in open Court.
When asked about the nature of the marijuana when it was brought out from the bag, he said that the
marijuana was dried but not well dried. Aside from the marijuana inside the buri bag, there were vegetables
and bananas, Witness Identified in open Court, the marijuana he saw found in the buri bag of the accused.
His means of Identification was the signature of Pat. Obia, (Exh. "B-1"). He likewise Identified a
newspaper wrapping which was already torn.
While in the Investigation Division, witness Bagang heard the accused's answer to Cpl. Tiongco's questions
that she was going to deliver the marijuana to Sta. Rita. He, however, did not linger long at the investigation
Division. After he saw the marijuana and heard the answer of the accused to Cpl. Tiongcos question the
place of delivery of the marijuana, he left the police station. Witness likewise Identified an initial DO-21-0781 already marked as Exhibit "B-2." DO which is an initial, and not a signature, stands for Daniel Obia.
After the testimony of Leoncio Bagang, the prosecution rested its case. (Rollo, pp. 42-47)
Accused Claudio raised the following assignments of errors in this appeal:
I
CONVICTION UNDER SECTION 4, ART. II OF R.A. 6425 IS IMPROPER IF ONE OR SOME OF THE
ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE IS OR ARE ABSENT.
II

CONVICTION CAN NOT BE HAD UNDER SECTION 4, ART. II OF R.A. 6425 IF THE ALLEGED BUYMAN
WAS NOT PRESENTED TO TESTIFY.
III
APPELLANTS CONVICTION FOR DELIVERY (SEC. 4, ART II, OF R.A. 6424) IS WRONG BECAUSE
SOME MATERIAL FACTS WERE OVERLOOKED AND NOT CONSIDERED IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT.
(Rollo, p. 91)
The accused alleges that she is only liable, at the most, for possession under Sec. 8, Art. II of Rep. Act No. 6425 and not for
violating Sec. 4 of the same Act.
The latter section, Sec. 4 provides:
Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs.The penalty of
life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from twenty thousand to thirty thousand pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to
another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of
such transactions. If the victim of the offense is a minor, or should a prohibited drug involved in any offense
under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein
provided shall be imposed.
Claudio contends that there was no delivery as there was no recipient of the prohibited drugs. Therefore, she may not be
convicted under Sec. 4 of Rep. Act No. 6425.
The contention is without merit. A closer perusal of the subject provision shows that it is not only delivery which is penalized
but also the sale, administration, distribution and transportation of probihited drugs. Claudio was caught transporting 1.1
kilos of marijuana, thus the lower court did not err in finding her guilty of violating Sec. 4.
The accused also alleges that before the completion of delivery, the intention of the possessor is unknown.
This allegation is also unavailing. It is undisputed that Claudio had in her possession 1.1 kilos of marijuana. This is a
considerable quantity. As held in the case of People v. Toledo, (140 SCRA 259, 267) "the possession of such considerable
quantity as three plastic bags of marijuana leaves and seeds coupled with the fact that he is not a user of prohibited drugs
cannot indicate anything except the intention of the accused to sell, distribute and deliver said marijuana.
The accused next contends the warrantless search, seizure and apprehension as unlawful.
The applicable provisions on this issue are found in the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) of the said Rules provides:
.. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense.
xxx xxx xxx
Meanwhile, its Rule 126, Sec. 12 provides:
Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant. (12a)
Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel Obia did not need a warrant to arrest Claudio as
the latter was caught in flagrante delicto. The warrantless search being an incident to a lawful arrest is in itself lawful.
(Nolasco v. Pano, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there was no infirmity in the seizure of the 1.1 kilos of marijuana.

The accused takes inconsistent positions in her appellant's brief. At first, she does not deny having had with her marijuana at
the time of her arrest. Instead, she claims that she should just be guilty of possession. In a complete turnabout, in the latter
portion of said brief, she claims that the evidence against her were mere fabrications and the marijuana allegedly found in
her possession was only planted.
We have carefully examined the records of the case and we find no ground to alter the trial court's findings and appreciation
of the evidence presented.
Credence is accorded to the prosecution's evidence, more so as it consisted mainly of testimonies of policemen. Law
enforcers are presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of proof to the contrary (People v. De Jesus,
145 SCRA 521). We also find no reason from the records why the prosecution witnesses should fabricate their testimonies
and implicate appellant in such a serious crime (See People v. Bautista, 147 SCRA 500).
The accused testified that she was not on that bus that came from Baguio City but rather she was in Olongapo City all that
time. She alleged that she was arrested by Pat. Obia for no reason at all.
In the case at bar, alibi does not deserve much credit as it was established only by the accused herself (People v. De la
Cruz, 148 SCRA 582).
Moreover, it is a well-established rule that alibi cannot prevail over positive testimony (People v. De La Cruz, supra).
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-63630

April 6, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MEDEL TANGLIBEN Y BERNARDINO, defendant-appellant.
The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.Katz N. Tierra for defendant-appellant.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Third Judicial Region at San Fernando,
Pampanga, Branch 41, finding appellant Medel Tangliben y Bernardino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section
4, Article II of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and sentencing him to life imprisonment, to
pay a fine of P20,000 and to pay the costs.
The information filed against the appellant alleged:
That on or about the 2nd day of March, 1982, in the municipality of San Fernando, Province of Pampanga,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused MEDEL
TANGLIBEN y BERNARDINO, knowing fully well that Marijuana is a prohibited drug, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have his possession, control and custody one (1) bag of dried marijuana
leaves with an approximate weight of one (1) kilo and to transport (sic) the same to Olongapo City, without
authority of law to do so. (At p. 6, Rollo)
The prosecution's evidence upon which the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt was based is narrated by the trial court
as follows:
It appears from the evidence presented by the prosecution that in the late evening of March 2, 1982,
Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and Romeo L. Punzalan of the San Fernando Police Station, together with
Barangay Tanod Macario Sacdalan, were conducting surveillance mission at the Victory Liner Terminal
compound located at Barangay San Nicolas, San Fernando, Pampanga; that the surveillance was aimed
not only against persons who may commit misdemeanors at the said place but also on persons who may
be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs based on informations supplied by informers; that it was

around 9:30 in the evening that said Patrolmen noticed a person caring a traveling bag (Exhibit G) who was
acting suspiciously and they confronted him; that the person was requested by Patrolmen Quevedo and
Punzalan to open the red traveling bag but the person refused, only to accede later on when the patrolmen
identified themselves; that found inside the bag were marijuana leaves (Exhibit B) wrapped in a plastic
wrapper and weighing one kilo, more or less; that the person was asked of his name and the reason why
he was at the said place and he gave his name as Medel Tangliben and explained that he was waiting for a
ride to Olongapo City to deliver the marijuana leaves; that the accused was taken to the police
headquarters at San Fernando, Pampanga, for further investigation; and that Pat. Silverio Quevedo
submitted to his Station Commander his Investigator's Report (Exhibit F).
It appears also from the prosecution's evidence that in the following morning or on March 3, 1982, Pat.
Silverio Quevedo asked his co-policeman Pat. Roberto Quevedo, who happens to be his brother and who
has had special training on narcotics, to conduct a field test on a little portion of the marijuana leaves and to
have the remaining portion examined by the PCCL at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga; that Pat.
Roberto Quevedo conducted a field test (Exhibit H) on the marijuana leaves and found positive result for
marijuana (Exhibit E); that the remaining bigger quantity of the marijuana leaves were taken to the PCCL at
Camp Olivas by Pat. Roberto Quevedo that same day of March 3, 1982 (Exhibit A and A-1) and when
examined, the same were also found to be marijuana (Exhibit C and C-1). (At pp. 9-10, Rollo)
Only the accused testified in his defense. His testimony is narrated by the trial court as follows:
The accused declared that he got married on October 25, 1981 and his wife begot a child on June 10,
1982; that he was formerly employed in the poultry farm of his uncle Alejandro Caluma in Antipolo, Rizal;
that he is engaged in the business of selling poultry medicine and feeds, including chicks, and used to
conduct his business at Taytay, Rizal; that he goes to Subic at times in connection with his business and
whenever he is in Subic, he used to buy C-rations from one Nena Ballon and dispose the same in Manila;
that he never left his residence at Antipolo, Rizal, on March 2, 1982; that on March 3, 1982, he went to
Subic to collect a balance of P100.00 from a customer thereat and to buy C-rations; that he was able to
meet Nena Ballon at 6:00 o'clock in the evening and he stayed in Nena's house up to 8:00 o'clock because
he had a drinking spree with Nena's son; that he tried to catch the 8:00 o'clock trip to Manila from Olongapo
City but he failed and was able to take the bus only by 9:00 o'clock that evening that it was a Victory Liner
Bus that he rode and because he was tipsy, he did not notice that the bus was only bound for San
Fernando, Pampanga; that upon alighting at the Victory Liner Compound at San Fernando, Pampanga he
crossed the street to wait for a bus going to Manila; that while thus waiting for a bus, a man whom he came
to know later as Pat. Punzalan, approached him and asked him if he has any residence certificate; that
when he took out his wallet, Pat. Punzalan got the wallet and took all the money inside the wallet
amounting to P545.00; that Pat. Punzalan told him that he'll be taken to the municipal building for
verification as he may be an NPA member; that at the municipal building, he saw a policeman, identified by
him later as Pat. Silverio Quevedo, sleeping but was awakened when he arrived that Pat. Quevedo took
him upstairs and told him to take out everything from his pocket saying that the prisoners inside the jail may
get the same from him; that inside his pocket was a fifty-peso bill and Pat. Quevedo took the same, telling
him that it shall be returned to him but that it was never returned to him; that he was thereafter placed
under detention and somebody told him that he is being charged with possession of marijuana and if he
would like to be bailed out, somebody is willing to help him; and, that when he was visited by his wife, he
told his wife that Patrolman Silverio Quevedo took away all his money but he told his wife not to complain
anymore as it would be useless. (Rollo, pp. 10-11)
Appellant, through counsel de oficio Atty. Enrique Chan, raised the lone assignment of error in his appeal:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND FINDING HIM GUILTY
OF THE CRIME CHARGED ON INSUFFICIENT AND DOUBTFUL EVIDENCE. (At p. 48, Rollo)
The Solicitor-General likewise filed his brief, basically reiterating ating the lower court's findings.
However, before this Court had the chance to act on appeal, counsel de oficio Atty. Enrique Chan died. Thereafter, this court
appointed a new counsel de oficio, Atty. Katz Tierra and pursuant thereto, the Deputy Clerk of Court, in behalf of the Clerk of
Court, required the new counsel to file her appellant's brief. The latter complied and, in her brief, raised the following
assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE PACKAGE OF MARIJUANA
ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM DEFENDANT-APPELLANT AS IT WAS A PRODUCT OF AN UNLAWFUL
SEARCH WITHOUT A WARRANT.
II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE ALLEGED PACKAGE OF MARIJUANA
LEAVES AS THE LEAVES SUPPOSEDLY SEIZED FROM ACCUSED WHEN IT WAS NEVER
AUTHENTICATED.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THE
GUILT OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. (At pp. 92-93, Rollo)
It is contended that the marijuana allegedly seized from the accused was a product of an unlawful search without a warrant
and is therefore inadmissible in evidence.
This contention is devoid of merit.
One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 12
of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant.
Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides:
. . . A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit an offense.
Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. This case therefore falls squarely
within the exception. The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently valid.
In the case of People v. Claudia, 160 SCRA 646, [1988] this Court, confronted with the same issue, held that:
Appellant Claudio was caught transporting prohibited drugs. Pat. Daniel did not need a warrant to arrest
Claudio as the latter was caught in flagrante delicto. The warrantless search being an incident to a lawful
arrest is in itself lawful. (Nolasco V. Pao, 147 SCRA 509). Therefore, there was no infirmity in the seizure
of the 1.1 kilos of marijuana.
We are not unmindful of the decision of this Court in People v. Amininudin, 163 SCRA 402 [1988]. In that case the PC
officers had earlier received a tip from an informer that accused-appellant. was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and
was carrying marijuana. Acting on this tip, they waited for him one evening, approached him as he descended from the
gangplank, detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. Said bag contained marijuana leaves. The Court held that
the marijuana could not be admitted in evidence since it was seized illegally. The records show, however, that there were
certain facts, not sing in the case before us, which led the Court to declare the seizure as invalid. As stated therein:
The present case presented no such urgency From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is
clear that they had at react two days within which they could have obtained a warrant of arrest and search
Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified.
The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded
a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No
effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC
lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search
warrant was not necessary."
In contrast, the case before us presented urgency. Although the trial court's decision did not mention it, the transcript of
stenographic notes reveals that there was an informer who pointed to the accused-appellant as carrying marijuana. (TSN,
pp. 52-53) Faced with such on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act quickly. There was not enough time to
secure a search warrant. We cannot therefore apply the ruling in Aminnudin to the case at bar. To require search warrants
during on-the-spot apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of
contraband goods, robbers, etc. would make it extremely difficult, if not impossible to contain the crimes with which these
persons are associated.
Accused-appellant likewise asserts that the package of marijuana leaves supposedly seized from him was never
authenticated and therefore should not have been admitted as evidence. He capitalizes on the fact that the marijuana
package brought by patrolman Roberto Quevedo to the PC Crime Laboratory for examination did not contain a tag bearing

the name of the accused. We rule, however, that since Patrolman Quevedo testified that he gave the marijuana package
together with a letter-request for examination, and the forensic chemist Marilene Salangad likewise testified that she
received the marijuana together with the letter-request and said letter-request bore the name of the accused, then the
requirements of proper authentication of evidence were sufficiently complied with. The marijuana package examined by the
forensic checklist was satisfactorily identified as the one seized from accused.
Even assuming arguendo that the marijuana sent to the PC Crime Laboratory was not properly authenticated, still, we
cannot discount the separate field test conducted by witness Roberto Quevedo which yielded positive results for marijuana.
Lastly, the appellant claims that the evidence upon which he was convicted was insufficient and doubtful and that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt.
In attacking the sufficiency of evidence, the appellant avers that the informer should have been presented before the lower
court. We discard this argument as a futile attempt to revive an already settled issue. This Court has ruled in several cases
that non-presentation of the informer, where his testimony would be merely corroborative or cumulative, is not fatal to the
prosecution's case. (People v. Asio, G.R. No. 84960, September 1, 1989; (People v. Viola, G.R. No. 64262, March 16, 1989;
People v. Capulong, 160 SCRA 533 [1988]; People v. Cerelegia, 147 SCRA 538).
As to doubtfulness of evidence, well-settled is the rule that findings of the trial court on the issue of credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and accorded the highest consideration by the appellate court. Since
credibility is a matter that is peculiarly within the province of the trial judge, who had first hand opportunity to watch and
observe the demeanor and behavior of witnesses both for the prosecution and the defense at the time of their testimony
(People v. Tejada, G.R. No. 81520, February 21, 1989; People v. Turla, 167 SCRA 278), we find no reason to disturb the
following findings:
The testimony of prosecution witnesses Patrolmen Silverio Quevedo and Romeo Punzalan are positive and
sufficiently clean to show the commission by the accused of the offense herein chatted. These prosecution
witnesses have no motive to fabricate the facts and to foist a very serious offense against the accused. The
knowledge on what these witnesses testified to were (sic) acquired by them in the official performance of
their duties and then, (sic) being no showing that they are prejudiced against the accused, their testimonies
deserve full credit.
The testimonies of the afore-mentioned petitioner that what they found in the possession of the accused
were marijuana leaves were corroborated by the examination findings conducted by Pat. October to
Salangad of the PCCL, with station at camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga (Exhibits C and C-1). (Rollo,
p. 11)
Moreover, if there is truth in the testimony of the accused to the effect that Pat. Punzalan got all the money
from his wallet when he was accosted at the Victory Liner Terminal and was told just to keep quiet
otherwise he will be "salvaged" why will Pat. Punzalan still bring the accused to the municipal Building for
interrogation and/or verification? Would not Pat. Punzalan be exposing his identity to the accused? This is
unnatural. And this is also true on the testimony to the accused that Pat. Silverio Quevedo got his fifty-peso
bill arid never returned the same to him. If the policemen really got any money from the accused and that
the marijuana leaves do not belong to the accused, why will the two policemen still produce in Court as
evidence that expensive-looking traveling red bag (Exhibit G) taken from the accused and which contained
the marijuana in question if the instant case is a mere fabrication?
As already stated, all the evidence, oral and documentary, presented by the prosecution in this case were
all based on personal knowledge acquired by the prosecution witnesses in the regular performance of their
official duties and there is nothing in their testimonies to show that they are bias ( sic) or that they have any
prejudice against the herein accused. Between the testimonies of these prosecution witnesses and that of
the uncorroborated and self-serving testimony of the accused, the former should prevail. (Rollo, p. 13)
Likewise, the appellant chose to limit his defense to his own testimony. He could have availed himself through compulsory
court processes of several witnesses to buttress his defense. Since not one other witness was presented nor was any
justification for the non-appearance given, the inadequacy of his lone and uncorroborated testimony remains. It cannot
prevail vis-a-vis the positive testimonies given by the prosecution witnesses.
Moreover, the appellant's having jumped bail is akin to flight which, as correctly observed by the lower court, is an added
circumstance tending to establish his guilt.
We take exception, however, to the trial court's finding that:
The dried marijuana leaves found in the possession of the accused weighs one (1) kilo, more or less. The
intent to transport the same is clear from the testimony of Pat. Silverio Quevedo who declared, among
other things, that when he confronted the accused that night, the latter told him that he (accused) is

bringing the marijuana leaves to Olongapo City. Moreover, considering the quantity of the marijuana leaves
found in the possession of the accused and the place he was arrested which is at San Fernando,
Pampanga, a place where the accused is not residing, it can be said that the intent to transport the
marijuana leaves has been clearly established. (Rollo, pp. 13-14)
The alleged extrajudicial confession of the accused which, on the other hand, he categorically denied in court, that he is
transporting the marijuana leaves to Olongapo City cannot be relied upon. Even assuming it to be true, the extrajudicial
confession cannot be admitted because it does not appear in the records that the accused, during custodial investigation,
was apprised of his rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights. In People v. Duero 104 SCRA
379 [1981], the Court pronounced that "inasmuch as the prosecution failed to prove that before Duero made his alleged oral
confession he was informed of his rights to remain silent and to have counsel and because there is no proof that he
knowingly and intelligently waived those rights, his confession is inadmissible in evidence. This ruling was reiterated in
People v. Tolentino, 145 SCRA 597 [1986], where the Court added that:
In effect, the Court not only abrogated the rule on presumption of regularity of official acts relative to
admissibility of statements taken during in-custody interrogation but likewise dispelled any doubt as to the
full adoption of the Miranda doctrine in this jurisdiction. It is now incumbent upon the prosecution to prove
during a trial that prior to questioning, the confessant was warned of his constitutionally protected rights.
The trial judge likewise found the marijuana to weigh one kilo, more or less, and from this finding extracted a clear intent to
transport the marijuana leaves. It may be pointed out, however, that although the information stated the weight to be
approximately one kilo, the forensic chemist who examined the marijuana leaves testified that the marijuana weighed only
600 grams Such amount is not a considerable quantity as to conclusively confer upon the accused an intent to transport the
marijuana leaves.
Nor can it be said that the intent to transport is clearly established from the fact that the accused was arrested at San
Fernando, Pampanga, a place which is not his residence. Conviction of a crime with an extremely severe penalty must be
based on evidence which is clearer and more convincing than the inferences in this case.
What was therefore proved beyond reasonable doubt is not his intent to transport the marijuana leaves but his actual
session.
The offense committed by the appellant is possession of marijuana under Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 as amended).
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED but MODIFIED. The appellant is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and fine of Six
Thousand (P6,000.00) Pesos.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 95847-48. March 10, 1993.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GABRIEL GERENTE y BULLO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; ARREST WITHOUT WARRANT; LAWFUL WHEN ARRESTING OFFICER
HAS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE THAT THE PERSON TO BE ARRESTED HAS COMMITTED THE CRIME; CASE AT BAR.
The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They saw
Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece of
wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina
Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those
circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that
Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest
until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did.

2. ID.; ID.; SEARCH AND SEIZURE; VALID EVEN WITHOUT A WARRANT WHEN MADE AS AN INCIDENT TO LAWFUL
ARREST; RATIONALE. The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an
incident to a valid arrest. This is in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:
"Section 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant." The frisk and search of
appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for
the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them unless he is first disarmed. In Adams vs.
Williams, 47 U.S. 143, cited in Justice Isagani A. Cruz's Constitutional Law, 1991 Edition, p. 150, it was ruled that "the
individual being arrested may be frisked for concealed weapons that may be used against the arresting officer and all
unlawful articles found his person, or within his immediate control may be seized."
3. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; LIABILITY OF CONSPIRATORS; RULE; CASE AT BAR. There is no merit in
appellant's allegation that the trial court erred in convicting him of having conspired and cooperated with Fredo and Totoy
Echigoren to kill Blace despite the testimony of Dr. Valentin Bernales that the fracture on the back of the victim's skull could
have been inflicted by one person only. what Dr. Bernales stated was a mere possibility that only one person dropped the
concrete hollow block on the head of the victim, smashing it. That circumstance, even if true, does not absolve the other two
co-conspirators in the murder of Blace for when there is a conspiracy to commit a crime, the act of one conspirator is the act
of all. The conspiracy was proven by the eyewitness-testimony of Edna Edwina Reyes, that she overheard the appellant and
his companions conspire to kill Blace, that acting in concert, they attacked their victim with a piece of wood and a hollow
block and caused his death. "When there is no evidence indicating that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved
by improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so moved and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit" (People
vs. Belibet, 199 SCRA 587, 588). Hence, the trial court did not err in giving full credit to Edna Reyes' testimony.
4. ID.; CIVIL INDEMNITY FOR DEATH; INCREASED TO P50,000.00. The Solicitor General correctly pointed out in the
appellee's brief that the award of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Clarito Blace should be increased to
P50,000.00 in accordance with our ruling in People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643.
DECISION
GRIO-AQUINO, J p:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, which found the
appellant guilty of Violation of Section 8 of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) and sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of imprisonment for a term of twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to twenty (20) years, as maximum;
and also found him guilty of Murder for which crime he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The
dispositive portion of the appealed decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing the Court finds the accused Gabriel Gerente in Criminal Case No. 10255-V-90 guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of twelve years and one day as minimum to twenty years as maximum, and a fine of twelve thousand, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
"In Criminal Case No. 10256-V-90, the Court finds the accused Gabriel Gerente guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Murder, and there by (sic) no aggravating circumstances nor mitigating circumstances, is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P30,000.00, and in the amount of P17,609.00
as funeral expenses, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The accused Gabriel
Gerente shall be credited with the full term of his preventive imprisonment." (p. 25, Rollo.)
Appellant Gabriel Gerente y Bullo was charged with Violation of Section 8, Art. II of R.A. 6425, which was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 10255-V-90 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila. The Information reads:
"That on or about the 30th day of April, 1990, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without justification, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have in his possession and control dried flowering tops wrapped in foil with markings and place in a
transparent plastic bag which are considered prohibited drugs." (p. 2, Rollo.)
The same accused, together with Totoy and Fredo Echigoren who are both at large, was charged with Murder in Criminal
Case No. 10256-V-90 in an information of the same date and signed by the same Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, as
follows:
"That on or about the 30th day of April, 1990, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused together with two (2) others who are still at large and against
whom the preliminary investigation has not yet been terminated by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan,
conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, armed with a piece of wood and hallow (sic) block and
with intent to kill one Clarito B. Blace, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident premeditation and
treachery, attack, assault and hit with the said piece of wood and hollow block the said Clarito B. Blace, hitting the latter on

the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting serious physical injuries which directly caused the death of the said victim."
(p. 3, Rollo.)
Edna Edwina Reyes testified that at about 7:00 a.m. of April 30, 1990, appellant Gabriel Gerente, together with Fredo
Echigoren and Totoy Echigoren, started drinking liquor and smoking marijuana in the house of the appellant which is about
six (6) meters away from the house of the prosecution witness who was in her house on that day. She overheard the three
men talking about their intention to kill Clarito Blace. She testified that she heard Fredo Echigoren saying, "Gabriel,
papatayin natin si Clarito Blace," and Totoy Echigoren allegedly seconded Fredo's suggestion saying: "Papatayin natin 'yan
mamaya." Appellant allegedly agreed: "Sigue, papatayin natin mamaya." (pp. 3-4, tsn, August 24, 1990.)
Fredo and Totoy Echigoren and Gerente carried out their plan to kill Clarito Blace at about 2:00 p.m. of the same day. The
prosecution witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, testified that she witnessed the killing. Fredo Echigoren struck the first blow
against Clarito Blace, followed by Totoy Echigoren and Gabriel Gerente who hit him twice with a piece of wood in the head
and when he fell, Totoy Echigoren dropped a hollow block on the victim's head. Thereafter, the three men dragged Blace to a
place behind the house of Gerente.
At about 4:00 p.m. of the same day, Patrolman Jaime Urrutia of the Valenzuela Police Station received a report from the
Palo Police Detachment about a mauling incident. He went to the Valenzuela District Hospital where the victim was brought.
He was informed by the hospital officials that the victim died on arrival. The cause of death was massive fracture of the skull
caused by a hard and heavy object. Right away, Patrolman Urrutia, together with Police Corporal Romeo Lima and
Patrolman Alex Umali, proceeded to Paseo de Blas where the mauling incident took place. There they found a piece of wood
with blood stains, a hollow block and two roaches of marijuana. They were informed by the prosecution witness, Edna
Edwina Reyes, that she saw the killing and she pointed to Gabriel Gerente as one of the three men who killed Clarito.
The policemen proceeded to the house of the appellant who was then sleeping. They told him to come out of the house and
they introduced themselves as policemen. Patrolman Urrutia frisked appellant and found a coin purse in his pocket which
contained dried leaves wrapped in cigarette foil. The dried leaves were sent to the National Bureau of Investigation for
examination. The Forensic Chemist found them to be marijuana.
Only the appellant, Gabriel Gerente, was apprehended by the police. The other suspects, Fredo and Totoy Echigoren, are
still at large.
On May 2, 1990, two separate informations were filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Benjamin Caraig against him for
Violation of Section 8, Art. II, of R.A. 6425, and for Murder.
When arraigned on May 16, 1990, the appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. A joint trial of the two cases was held.
On September 24, 1990, the trial court rendered a decision convicting him of Violation of Section 8 of R.A. 6425 and of
Murder.
In this appeal of the appellant, the following errors are ascribed to the trial court:
1. the court a quo gravely erred in admitting the marijuana leaves adduced in evidence by the prosecution; and
2. the court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crimes charged despite the absence of evidence
required to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The appellant contends that the trial court erred in admitting the marijuana leaves as evidence in violation of his
constitutional right not to be subjected to illegal search and seizure, for the dried marijuana leaves were seized from him in
the course of a warrantless arrest by the police officers. We do not agree.
The search of appellant's person and the seizure of the marijuana leaves in his possession were valid because they were
incident to a lawful warrantless arrest.
Paragraphs (a) and (b), Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:
'SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
"(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;"
"(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it; . . .'

The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They saw
Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of death: a piece of
wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina
Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those
circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that
Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest
until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did.
In Umil vs. Ramos, 187 SCRA 311, the arrest of the accused without a warrant was effected one (1) day after he had shot to
death two Capcom soldiers. The arrest was held lawful by this Court upon the rationale stated by us in People vs.
Malasugui, 63 Phil. 221, 228, thus:
"To hold that no criminal can, in any case, be arrested and searched for the evidence and tokens of his crime without a
warrant, would be to leave society, to a large extent, at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most expert, and the most depraved
of criminals, facilitating their escape in many instances."
The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest. This is
in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides:
"SECTION 12. Search incident to lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant."
The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers to
protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them unless he is first
disarmed. In Adams vs. Williams, 47 U.S. 143, cited in Justice Isagani A. Cruz's Constitutional Law, 1991 Edition, p. 150, it
was ruled that "the individual being arrested may be frisked for concealed weapons that may be used against the arresting
officer and all unlawful articles found in his person, or within his immediate control may be seized."
There is no merit in appellant's allegation that the trial court erred in convicting him of having conspired and cooperated with
Fredo and Totoy Echigoren to kill Blace despite the testimony of Dr. Valentin Bernales that the fracture on the back of the
victim's skull could have been inflicted by one person only.
What Dr. Bernales stated was a mere possibility that only one person dropped the concrete hollow block on the head of the
victim, smashing it. That circumstance, even if true, does not absolve the other two co-conspirators in the murder of Blace
for when there is a conspiracy to commit a crime, the act of one conspirator is the act of all. The conspiracy was proven by
the eyewitness-testimony of Edna Edwina Reyes, that she overheard the appellant and his companions conspire to kill
Blace, that acting in concert, they attacked their victim with a piece of wood and a hollow block and caused his death. "When
there is no evidence indicating that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by improper motive, the
presumption is that he was not so moved and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit" (People vs. Belibet, 199 SCRA
587, 588). Hence, the trial court did not err in giving full credit to Edna Reyes' testimony.
Appellant's failure to escape (because he was very drunk) is no indicium of his innocence.
The Solicitor General correctly pointed out in the appellee's brief that the award of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity for the
death of Clarito Blace should be increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with our ruling in People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with modification of the civil indemnity awarded to the heirs of
the victim, Clarito Blace, which is hereby increased to P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ ., concur.
G.R. No. 85401-02 June 4, 1990
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROSALINDA RAMOS y DAVID, defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Romeo C. Alinea for defendant-appellant.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Appellant Rosalinda Ramos seeks the reversal of the decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Third Judicial Region
at Olongapo City, finding her guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 5990 for violating Section 8 of Republic
Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and in Criminal Case No. 5991 for violating Section 4 of the same
Act and sentencing her to:
1) Imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day and a fine of P6,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 5990; and
2) Life imprisonment and a fine of P20,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 5991.
The two informations filed against the appellant respectively alleged:
Criminal Case No. 5990
That on or about the 29th day of November, 1982 in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused without being lawfully authorized, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her/their person, possession and control twenty (20)
sticks of marijuana cigarettes.
Criminal Case No. 5991
That on or about the 29th day of November, 1982 in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being lawfully authorized, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly engage in selling, delivering, giving away to another and
distributing four (4) sticks of marijuana cigarettes which is/are prohibited drug(s). (Rollo, p. 68)
The prosecution's version of the facts, as summarized by the Solicitor-General, is as follows:
On November 29,1982, at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening, a civilian informer came to the Narcotics
Command Office in Olongapo City and reported that a cigarette vendor by the name of 'Mama Rose' was
selling marijuana at the comer of 3rd Street and Rizal Avenue in Olongapo City (TSN, pp. 4-5, 13, May 4,
1984; pp. 3-4, 11, April 9, 1986). Captain Castillo instructed the informant to conduct a test buy. He gave to
the informant two (2) five-peso bills, noting first the serial numbers in his pocket note (TSN, pp. 5,14-15,
May 4, 1984; p. 4, April 9, 1986). The informer left and after thirty (30) minutes came back and gave to
Captain Castillo two (2) sticks of marijuana cigarettes (Exhibit 'C-2') which he bought from appellant.
Captain Castillo again instructed the informer to make another test buy from the suspect. From his wallet,
Captain Castillo extracted another two (2) five-peso bills and before handing the same to the informer,
recorded the serial numbers in his pocket note (TSN, pp. 19-21, May 4, 1984).
A team composed of Captain Castillo, Sgt. Tahil Ahamad, CIC Danilo Santiago and Angel Sudiacal left with
the informer. The informer proceeded to where appellant was selling cigarettes to conduct the next test buy
while the NARCOM agents waited at the Black and White Open Bar located at 7th Street, Rizal Avenue,
Olongapo City (TSN, pp. 6-7, April 9, 1986). The bar was about three (3) blocks away from the place where
appellant was selling cigarettes (TSN, pp. 19, 8, Id.). After forty-five (45) minutes more or less, the informer
arrived at the Black and White Bar and again gave to Captain Castillo two (2) sticks of marijuana (Exhibit
'C-l'; TSN, p. 23, May 4, 1984; p. 6, April 9,1986).
The team then proceeded to the place where appellant was selling cigarettes. After Identifying themselves
as NARCOM agents, Capt. Castillo told appellant that she was being placed under arrest for illegal
peddling of marijuana. Appellant was requested to take out the contents of her wallet (TSN, pp. 6-7, April 9,
1986, The four marked five- peso bills were found among her possessions and were confiscated after the
serial numbers were confirmed by Captain Castillo from his record (TSN, pp. 23-25, May 4, 1984). The
initial of Sgt. Tahil Ahamad was also found from the confiscated five- peso bills (TSN, p. 9, April 9, 1986).
Sgt. Ahamad searched the stall of appellant and found twenty (20) sticks of marijuana cigarettes in a trash
can placed under the small table where appellant displayed the wares she was selling (TSN, p. 7, April 9,
1986). Appellant was thereafter brought to the station (TSN, p. 23, May 4, 1984).
At the station, appellant executed a statement confessing to her crimes which she swore to before
Assistant City Fiscal Domingo Cabali, Jr. (TSN, pp. 5-6. June 20,1984; Exhibit 'G').

The marijuana sticks confiscated were sent to the Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory (PCCL) for
analysis. These were confirmed to be marijuana as evidenced by the Chemistry Report No. MD-363-82 of
Marlene Salangad, a Forensic Chemist of the PCCL (See Exhibit 'B'; TSN, p. 3, Jan. 13, 1986). (Rollo, pp.
92-94)
On the other hand, the version of the appellant as summarized by the trial court, is as follows:
... [O]n November 29, 1982, between 9:00 and 10:00 o'clock in the evening she was at the corner of 3rd
St., and Rizal Avenue, West Tapinac, Olongapo City, selling cigarettes and fruits; that she does not have
any table, all she had was a small wooden 'papag' to show her wares and sell them; that she was sitting on
the small 'papag' when Capt. Castillo came and introduced himself followed by three or four others who
were more or less 6 to 8 meters away. She was surprised why they were there, and that she was invited by
Capt. Castillo to the NARCOM office for investigation to which invitation she said 'yes' after which she was
taken to the NARCOM office. Before she was taken thereto, the other men searched the buri bags where
she used to place her fruits (records does (sic) not show what fruits she was selling) and also her small
cigarettes (sic) stand; that they did not find anything under the 'papag; that when she was ordered to board
the car, Castillo told her 'sakay na ho, Mama Rose' (please board now, Mama Rose'); that she was told to
bring along her cigarette stand; that inside her brown wallet, she has fifty (P 50.00) pesos consisting of five
pesos and ten pesos; that it was Sudiacal who took her wallet and Sudiacal took five (5) peso bills and told
her that four (4) five peso bills are the same money which was used to buy marijuana from her; that she
told the officer that the money was hers as she has been saving some for the rentals. She claimed that she
affixed her signatures on the four (4) five peso bills because she was forced by Tahil Ahamad by saying
'Mama Rose', you sign this, if you are not going to sign this, something will happen to you, you will get hurt';
that because she is an old woman, she got scared so she signed. When Tahil Ahamad told her to sign,
Ahamad was tailing to her in a normal manner and seated in front of her; that she cannot remember having
signed anything because she was nervous, Capt. Castillo investigated her and thereafter was brought to
the Fiscal's Office. She signed a document at the Fiscal's Office; that she was asked if the contents of the
document is (sic) true to which she answered 'No, sir; that she was not assisted by a counsel while being
investigated. She also testified that she stayed at Narcom for five (5) days; that Capt. Castillo alone
investigated her for four (4) hours and that she likewise was not assisted by counsel at the Fiscal's Office.
She claimed that when she was told by the Fiscal to just sign the document, Fiscal Cabali did not say
anything when she said that the contents of the document are not true. (Rollo, pp. 72)
Appellant raises the following assignment of errors:
I THE FINDINGS OF FACTS ARE SO UNCLEAR AND DOUBTFUL, MAKING THE CONCLUSIONS OF
THE TRIAL COURT WITHOUT FACTUAL AND LEGAL LEG TO STAND ON.
II THE EVIDENCE OBTAINED AND THE PERSON ARRESTED WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF A
WARRANT OF ARREST AND SEIZURE MAY NOT BE USED AGAINST THE ACCUSED AND ANY
CONVICTION FROM SUCH EVIDENCE IS NOT VALID AND A GROUND FOR REVERSAL.
III THE TRIAL COURT RELIED HEAVILY ON THE CONFESSION OF THE APPELLANT AND THE
CONFESSION WAS EXTRACTED IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 'TO
REMAIN SILENT AND TO COUNSEL'.
IV WHEN NOT ALL THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE ARE PRESENT AND PROVEN, CONVICTION
IS NOT PROPER.
V THE REQUISITES IN ORDER TO CONVICT ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ARE NOT PRESENT
AND NOT COMPLIED WITH. (Rollo, p. 59)
At the outset, it may be observed that two informations were filed against the appellant and the lower court imposed two
sentences on appellant, one for sale and the other for possession of marijuana. This Court must emphasize that, assuming
arguendo, the findings of guilt for both offenses are correct, the trial judge nevertheless erred in imposing a separate
sentence for possession because possession of marijuana is inherent in the crime of selling them. (People v. de Jesus, 145
SCRA 521 [1986]; People v. Andiza, 164 SCRA 642 [1988])
After a careful scrutiny of the records, this Court holds that appellant's guilt in Criminal Case No. 5991 (sale of marijuana)
has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

First, the extrajudicial confession extracted from the accused on November 29, 1982 is inadmissible in evidence for being
violative of the Constitutional mandate that any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the
right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. (Art. III, Section 12(l), Constitution)
The preliminary statement read to the appellant when her sworn statement was executed appears as follows:
SALAYSAY NA KUSANG LOOB NA IBINIBIGAY NI ROSALINDA RAMOS Y DAVID KAY CAPTAIN
ARTURO M. CASTILLO PC SA HARAP NI SGT. TAHIL AHAMAD DITO SA HIMPILAN NG CANU,
OLONGAPO CITY, NGAYON 29 NG BUWAN NG NOBYEMBRE 1982.
TAGASIYASAT: Gng. Rosalinda Ramos, ikaw ay nasa ilalim ng isang pagsisiyasat ukol sa paglabag sa
ipinagbabawal na gamot. Bago kita tanungin ay nais kong malaman mo ang iyong mga karapatan sa ating
bagong saligang batas at ito ay ang mga sumusunod:
1 Ikaw ay may karapatan na huwag sumagot sa aking mga itatanong sa iyo sa pagsisiyasat na ito,
2. Ikaw ay may karapatan na kumuha ng isang abogado upang makatulong sa iyo sa pagsisiyasat na ito at
3. Ano man ang iyong sasabihin sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay maaaring gamitin laban or pabor sa iyo saan
mang hukuman dito sa ating bansa.
TANONG: Ngayon alam no na ang iyong mga karapatan sa ating bagong saligang batas ikaw ba ay
kusang loob na magbibigay ng isang salaysay na pawang katotohanan at pawang katotohanan lamang sa
pagsisiyasat na ito?;
SAGOT: Opo. (Exhibit G)
This Court finds that such recital of rights falls short of the requirement on proper apprisal of constitutional rights. We quote
the ruling in People v. Nicandro (141 SCRA 289 [1986]):
When the Constitution requires a person under investigation 'to be informed' of his right to remain silent
and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the transmission of meaningful information rather than
just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract constitutional principle. As a rule, therefore, it
would not be sufficient for a police officer just to repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of
Section 20, Article IV of the Constitution. He is not only duty- bound to tell the person the rights to which the
latter is entitled; he must also explain their effects in practical terms, e.g., what the person under
interrogation may or may not do, and in a language the subject fairly understands. In other words, the right
of a person under interrogation 'to be informed implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police
investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in understanding what is
conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right , as it cannot truly be said that the person has been
'informed' of his rights. Now, since the right 'to be informed implies comprehension, the degree of
explanation required will necessary vary, depending upon the education, intelligence and other relevant
personal circumstances of the person under investigation. Suffice it to say that a simpler and more lucid
explanation is needed where the subject is unlettered.
Although the right to counsel is a right that may be waived, such waiver must be voluntary, knowing and intelligent (People v.
Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2 [1980]).
To insure that a waiver is voluntary and intelligent, the Constitution now requires; that for the right to counsel to be waived,
the waiver must be in writing and in the presence of the counsel of the accused. (Art. III, Section 12(l), Constitution) There is
no such written waiver in this case, much less was any waiver made in the presence of counsel.
Fiscal Cabali, who administered the oath on the appellant's extrajudicial confession, and the police officers who took it down
should know by now that the procedure they followed results in incompetent evidence. If the purpose is to get proof which
can stand up in court, they should follow the requirements of the Constitution.
Second, the alleged poseur-buyer, who also happens to be the alleged informant, was never presented during trial. The
presence and Identity of the poseur-buyer is vital to the case as his very existence is being disputed by the accused-

appellant who denies having sold marijuana cigarettes to anyone. (People v. Ale, 145 SCRA 50 [1986]) Without the
testimony of the poseur-buyer, there is no convincing evidence pointing to the accused as having sold marijuana. (People v.
Fernando, 145 SCRA 151 [1986]) In this case, the alleged informant and the alleged poseur-buyer are one and the same
person. We realize that narcotics agents often have to keep their Identities and those of their informants confidential. For a
prosecution involving the sale or distribution of drugs to prosper in this particular case, however, the informant has to testify.
The testimony of the poseur-buyer is rendered compelling by the fact that the police officers were situated three blocks away
from where the alleged sale took place. They did not see the actual sale of marijuana. Thus, Sit. Sudiacal testified:
Q Before you arrested the accused, where did you position yourselves?
A We were at the Black and White Open Bar, sir.
Q How far is that from the place where the accused was selling cigarettes?
A It is about three blocks, sir.
Q You did not actually see the accused selling marijuana?
A Yes, Sir ...," (TSN, May 4, 1984, p. 8)
xxx xxx xxx
Q Did you actually see the buying of the marijuana?
A No, Mam.
Q So, you did not see anything?
A Yes, Mam.
Q None of the three of you, Sgt. Sudiacal and Captain Castillo witnessed the actual buy of the three sticks
of marijuana?
A Yes, Mam.
Q Your basis of the alleged buy by the informant is his word that he bought it from the suspect?
A Yes, Mam. (TSN, April 9, 1986, pp. 125-126)
It is a known fact that drug dealings are hard to prove in court. Precisely because of this difficulty, buy-bust operations have
to be conducted and every effort is taken such that the suspected pusher is caught in flagrante selling prohibited drugs. For
the culprit to be convicted, the element of sale must be unequivocally established. In this case, the alleged poseur-buyer
who could have categorically asserted that she bought marijuana from the appellant was not presented by the prosecution.
And Sgts. Ahamad and Sudiacal could not attest to the fact of sale because they were three blocks away. The sale of
marijuana was therefore not positively proven.
Despite the absence of the testimony of the poseur-buyer, the court a quo, however, relied on circumstantial evidence in
concluding that there was indeed a sale:
In this case, the accused admitted that she was the only one selling cigarettes at the corner of 3rd Street;
the informant told the NARCOM Officers that their 'suspect' is a cigarette vendor positioned thereat. The
two (2) 'test buy' yielded positive results as the informant was able to buy four (4) handrolled sticks of
marijuana cigarettes from her, two at a time. The accused did not ask the reason why when she was invited
for investigation. This act negates innocence and against human nature, especially after having introduced
themselves as NARCOM agents. In her control and possession, twenty (20) sticks of similar handrolled
marijuana cigarettes were recovered from a trash can under her small table. Her counsel on crossexamination asked Sgt. Tahil Ahamad the following (TSN, April 9, 1986, p. 14) 'and in order to search that
trash can under the table, you have to ask or request 'Mama Rose' to get out of the way in order to check

the contents of the waste can?' The question was answered, 'We asked permission from her to stand up so
we can look into the contents of her small table, sir.
When investigated, the accused gave her statement which in fact was a confession where she admitted
having sold marijuana cigarettes. She was taken before the Fiscal to subscribe the same. While she
alleged that she told the Fiscal (Fiscal Cabali) that the contents of her statement are not true, why then did
she sign it before the said Fiscal? Why did she not insist that her denial be registered on the document so
as to repudiate it? Fear could not be a valid reason as she has already boldly spoken out when she said
the contents were not true. The 'marked money' were recovered from her possession. She did not deny
that the four (4) five peso bills were taken from her wallet. She was addressed as 'Mama Rose' not once
but twice by the apprehending officers. Her counsel during the cross-examination of the prosecution
witnesses and direct examination of the accused called and addressed her as 'Mama Rose', and the
informant Identified her not only as Rosalinda Ramos but also as 'Mama Rose'. (At pp. 73-74, Rollo)
This Court finds that the cited circumstantial evidence do not establish beyond reasonable doubt that there was a sale of
marijuana. Considering the severe penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed on those who sell or distribute drugs, we have to
insure that evidence of culpability must pass the test of the strictest scrutiny. We also have to take into account the
oftrepeated defense in violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act that the drugs or the marked money were planted by police
officers. More direct and positive evidence is essential.
The failure of the appellant to ask why she was being invited for investigation by the NARCOM officers does not ipso facto
indicate her guilt. Fear could have, prevented her from propounding inquiries to the officers.
Nor does the fact that' marked money was found in her possession show incontrovertibly that she is the seller of marijuana.
The appellant is a cigarette vendor. By the nature of her job, there is a constant exchange of goods for money. It may be farfetched but it is possible that she came into possession of the marked money because she accepted it in the course of
legitimate sales of cigarettes. Again, it is only the poseur-buyer who could testify that she gave marked money to the
appellant in exchange for marijuana sticks.
The fact that the appellant signed the extrajudicial confession despite her insistence that its contents were not true does not
necessarily signify guilt. As earlier stated the extra-judicial confession cannot be accepted as evidence. It is useless for
purposes of proof of sale of prohibited drugs.
Lastly, this Court fails to see how, from her being addressed as Mama Rose by the witnesses and appellant's counsel and
the alleged informant poseur-buyer, the sale of marijuana can be inferred.
Rule 133, Section 6 of the Rules of Court provides:
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inference are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond a reasonable
doubt.
For not successfully meeting the above requirements, the enumerated circumstantial evidence cannot be a ground for
conviction for the sale of marijuana.
With respect to Criminal Case No., 5990, however, this Court upholds the lower court's finding that the appellant is guilty of
possession of marijuana.
Rule 113 Section 6 (b) of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
SEC. 6. Arrest without warrant. when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating
that the person to be arrested has committed it.
Meanwhile, Section 12 of Rule 126 states:
SEC. 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant.
Sgts. Sudiacal and Ahamad testified that there was an informant who apprised them of the presence of a drug pusher at the
comer of 3rd Street and Rizal Avenue, Olongapo City. Acting on such information and in their presence, their superior,
Captain Castillo, gave the informant marked money to buy marijuana. The informant, now turned poseur-buyer, returned with
two sticks of marijuana. Captain Castillo again gave said informant marked money to purchase :marijuana. The informantposeur buyer thereafter returned with another two sticks of marijuana. The police officers then proceeded to the corner of
3rd Street and Rizal Avenue and effected the arrest of appellant.
From the above facts, it may be concluded that the arresting police officers had personal knowledge of facts implicating the
appellant with the sale of marijuana to the informant-poseur buyer. We hold therefore that the arrest was legal and the
consequent search which yielded 20 sticks of marijuana was lawful for being incident to a valid arrest.
The fact that the prosecution failed to prove the sale of marijuana beyond reasonable doubt does not undermine the legality
of the appellant's arrest.
It is not necessary that the crime should have been established as a fact in order to regard the detention as legal. The
legality of detention does not depend upon the actual commission of the crime, but upon the nature of the deed when such
characterization may reasonably be inferred by the officer or functionary to who in the law at the moment leaves the decision
for the urgent purpose of suspending the liberty of the citizen (People v. Molleda, 86 SCRA 667 [1978]).
The obligation to make an arrest by reason of a crime does not presuppose as a necessary requisite for the fulfillment
thereof the indubitable existence of a crime (People v. Ancheta, 68 Phil. 415 [1939]).
The appellant argues that if the twenty sticks of marijuana were in a trash can and it was not shown by clear and convincing
evidence that the said trash can belongs to the appellant, then she cannot be considered as being in possession of
marijuana.
In disposing of this contention, this Court quotes with approval the following arguments of the Solicitor-General:
Appellant's defense falls against the categorical testimony of the NARCOM agents that the trash can was
found under the table where her legitimate wares were being sold. This fact was not denied by appellant.
Therefore, she was the only person who had access to the trash can. The same was under her immediate
physical control. She had complete charge of the contents of the trash can under the table to the exclusion
of all other persons. In law, actual possession exists when the thing is in the immediate occupancy and
control of the party. But this is not to say that the law requires actual possession. In criminal law,
possession necessary for conviction of the offense of possession of controlled substances with intent to
distribute may be constructive as well as actual (Black's Law Dictionary, Abridge, 5th Edition, pp. 606-607).
It is only necessary that the defendant must have dominion and control over the contraband. These
requirements are present in the situation described, where the prohibited drugs were found inside the trash
can placed under the stall owned by appellant. In fact, the NARCOM agents who conducted the search
testified that they had to ask appellant to stand so that they could look inside the trash can under the
'papag' of the appellant. Hence the trash can was positioned in such a way that it was difficult for another
person to use the trash can. The trash can was obviously not for use by her customers.
Appellant's arguments are inherently weak and improbable and cannot stand against the clear evidence
pointing to her actual possession of the prohibited drug. The raw facts testified to by the NARCOM agents
were corroborated by appellant and their conclusion-that she had possession of the marijuana sticks found
in the trash can- is consistent with law and reason.
Appellant further contends that it is hard to believe that she would keep the marijuana sticks in a trash can
since it is a precious commodity to pushers and users thereof.

The above argument is misleading. The value of the marijuana is not the primary consideration in the
concealment of the contraband. The primary consideration is escaping detection and arrest. Obviously, the
modus operandi was to dissimulate the act of selling and possession of marijuana sticks which carries the
capital penalty (sic). Appellant could not display it among her regular wares of cigarettes and fruits for sale.
She had to hide them from public view, but near enough to have access to them. The trash can, to her
thinking, would be the last place to look for the precious commodity. Unfortunately, she was found out. The
argument that it was an 'unlikely place' to hide the precious contraband is in fact the very consideration in
choosing it as the hiding place for the contraband. (At pp. 97-100, Rollo)
We rule, therefore, that the twenty sticks of marijuana are admissible in evidence and the trial court's finding that the
appellant is guilty of possession is correct.
The lower court, however, erred in imposing a fixed penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day for possession of marijuana.
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Republic Act 4103 as amended) provides that in imposing a prison sentence
for an offense punished by a law other than the Revised Penal Code, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum
which shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. The penalty prescribed by the Dangerous Drugs Act
for possession of marijuana is imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine
ranging from P6,000 to P12,000.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision in Criminal Case No. 5990 is AFFIRMED but MODIFIED. The appellant is sentenced
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to nine (9) years and to pay a fine of six
thousand (P 6,000) pesos. The appealed decision in Criminal Case No. 5991 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
appellant is acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J. (Chairman), Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Cortes, J., took no part.