1. MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS [177 SCRA 668; G.R. NO.

88211; 15 SEPT 1989]

This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the
respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos
and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's
decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to
return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They
contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses
because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their
right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is
guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President
(Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the
Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would
normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's
country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right
to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of
a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and
distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and
residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the
right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to
leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the
national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However,
right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to
construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those
pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered
view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International
Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land.
The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by
the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after
the Marcos regime.
The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the
Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

2. Villavicencio vs Lukban L-14639

Facts:
Justo Lukban as Manila Mayor together with the police officer, took custody of 170 women at the
night of October 25 beyond the latter's consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to
Davao City where they were signed as laborers.

A writ of habeas corpus was filed against the mayor on behalf of those women. The court granted
the writ, but the mayor was not able to bring any of the women before the court on the
stipulated date.

Issue:
Whether or not the act of mayor has a legal basis.
Held:
The supreme court said that the mayor's acts were not legal. His intent of exterminating vice was
commendable, but there was no law saying that he could force filipino women to change their
domicile from manila to nother place. The women, said the court, although in a sense "lepers of
society" were still filipino citizens and such they were entitled to the constitutional enjoyed by all
other filipino citizens. The right to freedom of domicile was such a fundamental right that its
suppression could considered tantamount to slavery.
The supreme court upheld the right of filipino citizens to freedom of domicile or the Liberty of
abode. "Ours is a government of laws and not of men."

3. Garcia vs. J. Drilon and Garcia, G. R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013

Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262
Facts:
Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a
Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled An Act
Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for
Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes. She claimed to be a victim of
physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of
custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part
of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by
the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The
trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on
why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the petitioner no
longer submitted the required comment as it would be an axercise in futility.
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on,
questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal
protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being an unwanted product of an
invalid law.
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure
to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for
prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral attack on
said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of
constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a
collateral attack on the validity of the law.

WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust
and violative of the equal protection clause.
WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due
process clause of the Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to protect
the family as a basic social institution
WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it allows
an undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.

Decision:
1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction,
inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in
the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.

2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers Union, the
Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means
that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions
only; and apply equally to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid
classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring women over men as
victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.

3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due
process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of ones defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the
right to due process.

4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioners contention that by not
allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family
as a basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it
ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so because
violence is not a subject for compromise.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power includes
the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the
Government while executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws. The
preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function.

The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law
enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.

The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.

4. MEJOFF VS. DIRECTOR OF PRISONS (90 PHIL 70)

FACTS:
Petitioner: Boris Mejoff, a Russian national brought to the Philippines as a secret operative by the
Japanese during the Japanese Occupation
Yet another petition for habeas corpus (i.e. this was not the first case filed by Mejoff)
First petition denied by SC on July 30, 1949
[Now that were done with that, lets go back to the story]
Upon the liberation of the Philippines, Mejoff was arrested as a spy by the US Army CounterIntelligence Corps
The Peoples Court ordered Mejoffs release, but the Deportation Board then found out that he
had no travel documents and referred the matter to the immigration authorities
The Immigration Board declared Mejoff an illegal alien, having illegally entered the Philippines in
1944, without inspection or admission by immigration officials, and ordered that he be deported
to Russia come the first available transport
Mejoff was then under custody, having been arrested on March 18, 1948
Repeated failures to ship Mejoff to Russia
Mejoff was moved to Bilibid where he has been confined for give or take two years; no ship or
country would take him, says the decision

ISSUE:
WON Mejoff should be released from prison pending his deportation

RULING:
The protection against deprivation of liberty without due process of law, and except for crimes
committed against the laws of the land, is not limited to Philippine citizens but extends to all
residents, except enemy aliens, regardless of nationality
Sec. 3, Art. II of the 1935 Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of international
law as part of the law of the Nation, which means that the incorporation doctrine holds sway
here
The Universal Declaration Of Human Rights proclaims the right to life and liberty and all other
fundamental rights as applied to all human beings, stating that all human beings are born free
and equal in degree and rights (Art. 1); that everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedom

set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status
(Art. 2); that every one has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals
for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law (Art. 8); that
no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile (Art. 9 ), etc.
The writ of habeas corpus will issue commanding the respondents to release the petitioner from
custody upon these terms: that the petitioner shall be placed under reasonable surveillance c/o
the immigration authorities or their agents in such form and manner as may be deemed
adequate to insure that he keep peace and be available when the Government is ready to deport
him.

5. International School Manila Alliance of Educators vs. Quisumbing (G.R.

No. 128845)
Facts:
The International School Manila (ISM), under Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational
institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other
temporary residents. To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational program and
improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes the School to
employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from
Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws
and regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for
the protection of employees.

The local-hires union of the ISM were crying foul over the disparity in wages that they got
compared to that of their foreign teaching counterparts.
These questions are asked to qualify a teacher into a local or foreign hire.
a.....What is one's domicile?
b.....Where is one's home economy?
c.....To which country does one owe economic allegiance?
d.....Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School
responsible for bringing that individual to the Philippines?

Should any answer point to Philippines, the person is a local hire. The School grants foreign-hires
certain benefits to the foreign hires such as housing, transportation, and 25% more pay than
locals under the theory of (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The first was
grounded on leaving his home country, the second was on the lack of tenure when he returns
home.

The negotiations between the school and the union caused a deadlock between the parties. The
DOLE resolved in favor of the school, while Dole Secretary Quisumbing denied the unions motion
for reconsideration He said, The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify
its claim of parity. It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal
protection of the laws is not violated by legislation or private covenants based on reasonable
classification. A classification is reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions and apply to

all members of the same class. Verily, there is a substantial distinction between foreign hires and
local hires, the former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no amenities of their own in the
Philippines and have to be given a good compensation package in order to attract them to join
the teaching faculty of the School.

The union appealed to the Supreme Court. The petitioner called the hiring system discriminatory
and racist. The school alleged that some local hires were in fact of foreign origin. They were paid
local salaries.

Issue:
Whether or not the hiring system is violative of the equal protection clause.

Held:
The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all."
Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities
regardless of sex, race or creed. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization.

In this jurisdiction, there is the term equal pay for equal work, pertaining to persons being paid
with equal salaries and have similar skills and similar conditions. There was no evidence here
that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires.

The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital.
These relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor
contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good.

For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot
serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The dislocation factor and limited tenure
affecting foreign-hires are adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are
not enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave
travel allowances.

In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the
distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There
is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires

The order of the Secretary of DOLE was reversed in sofar as giving foreign-hires higher salary.

6. Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, Major General Josephus Q. Ramas,

Elizabeth Dimaano G.R. No. 104768
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No.
0037.
The first Resolution dismissed petitioners (Republic of the Philippines) Amended Complaint and
ordered the return of the confiscated items to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second
Resolution denied petitioners (Republic of the Philippines) Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner prays for the grant of the reliefs sought in its Amended Complaint, or in the alternative,
for the remand of this case to the Sandiganbayan (First Division) for further proceedings allowing
petitioner to complete the presentation of its evidence.
Statement of Facts
Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG)
President Corazon C. Aquino, immediately upon assuming Malacaang, enacts Executive Order 1
(EO No. 1) or the Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG). It is mandated to
recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates.
EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power:
(a) to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the
purposes of this order and the power
(h) to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of
this order.
Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft
Board (AFP Board) tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by
AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired.
AFP Board
The AFP Board, in line with its mandate, investigates Major General Q. Josephus Ramas.
On July 1987, the AFP Board issues a resolution and findings on Ramas alleged ill gotten wealth.
It submits the following findings:
Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot located at 15Yakan St., La Vista, Quezon City. The aforementioned property in Quezon City may be estimated
modestly at P700,000.00.
He is also the owner of a house and lot located in Cebu City. The lot has an area of 3,327 square
meters.
Communication equipment and facilities are found in the premises of Elizabeth Dimaano, a
Confidential Agent of the Military Security Unit, and are confiscated by elements of the PC
Command of Batangas.
These items could not have been in the possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use
by respondent Commanding General of the Philippine Army.

Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the raiding team was
also able to confiscate money in the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the
house of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.
Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the raiding team was
also able to confiscate money in the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the
house of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.
Elizabeth Dimaano is allegedly Major General Q. Josephus Ramas mistress. She does not have
any means to acquire the communications equipment as well as the aforementioned money.
The AFP Board finds a prima facie case against Major General Josephus Ramas for ill gotten
wealth and unexplained wealth in the amount of P2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars.
Decision: It is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for
violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and
RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known as The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired
Property.
On 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 (RA No.
1379) against Ramas.
Amended Complaint: Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas acquired funds, assets and
properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other income from
legitimately acquired property by taking undue advantage of his public office and/or using his
power, authority and influence as such officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a
subordinate and close associate of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos.
The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after a previous inquiry, found
reasonable ground to believe that respondents have violated RA No. 1379. The Amended
Complaint prayed for, among others, the forfeiture of respondents properties, funds and
equipment in favor of the State.
Ramas Answer:
Ramas contends that his property consisted only of a residential house at La Vista Subdivision,
Quezon City, valued at P700,000, which was not out of proportion to his salary and other
legitimate income.
He denies ownership of any mansion in Cebu City and the cash, communications equipment and
other items confiscated from the house of Dimaano.
Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint. Admitting her employment as a clerktypist in the office of Ramas from January-November 1978 only, Dimaano claimed ownership of
the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles taken from her house by the
Philippine Constabulary raiding team.
The Sandiganbayan
On 13 April 1989, petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint in order to charge
the delinquent properties with being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by
defendant Dimaano alone x x x.
Petitioner fails to present witnesses and delays the court for over a year.
on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its inability to proceed to trial because it had no
further evidence to present. Again, in the interest of justice, the Sandiganbayan granted

petitioner 60 days within which to file an appropriate pleading. The Sandiganbayan, however,
warned petitioner that failure to act would constrain the court to take drastic action.
Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic v. Migrino.The Court
held in Migrino that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military
officers by reason of mere position held without a showing that they are subordinates of former
President Marcos.
Dispositive: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the Amended Complaint,
without pronouncement as to costs. The counterclaims are likewise dismissed for lack of merit,
but the confiscated sum of money, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles are
ordered returned to Elizabeth Dimaano.
The records of this case are hereby remanded and referred to the Hon. Ombudsman, who has
primary jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases under R.A. No. 1379, for such appropriate action as
the evidence warrants. This case is also referred to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano in connection
herewith.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
(1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court
in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan[10] and Republic v. Migrino[11] which involve the same issues.
(2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases was conducted
against Ramas and Dimaano.
(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima facie case against him.
(4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.
Issues
PCGGs Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents
Propriety of Dismissal of Case Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence Petitioner also
contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case before completion of the
presentation of petitioners evidence.
Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred
in declaring the properties confiscated from Dimaanos house as illegally seized and therefore
inadmissible in evidence. This issue bears a significant effect on petitioners case since these
properties comprise most of petitioners evidence against private respondents. Petitioner will not
have much evidence to support its case against private respondents if these properties are
inadmissible in evidence.Ruling
First issue:
The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt
practices of AFP personnel who fall under either of the two categories mentioned in Section 2 of
EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the
administration of former President Marcos by being the latters immediate family, relative,
subordinate or close associate, taking undue advantage of their public office or using their
powers, influence x x x; or (2) AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft and corruption
provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG.
Ramas case should fall under the first category of AFP personnel before the PCGG could exercise
its jurisdiction over him. Petitioner argues that Ramas was undoubtedly a subordinate of former

President Marcos because of his position as the Commanding General of the Philippine Army.
Petitioner claims that Ramas position enabled him to receive orders directly from his
commander-in-chief, undeniably making him a subordinate of former President Marcos.
We hold that Ramas was not a subordinate of former President Marcos in the sense contemplated
under EO No. 1 and its amendments.
Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a subordinate as this
term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association
with former President Marcos.
Second issue:
Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of this case, we find that petitioner
has only itself to blame for non-completion of the presentation of its evidence. First, this case has
been pending for four years before the Sandiganbayan dismissed it.
Third issue:
On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaanos residence a search warrant
captioned Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. Dimaano was not present during the
raid but Dimaanos cousins witnessed the raid. The raiding team seized the items detailed in the
seizure receipt together with other items not included in the search warrant. The raiding team
seized these items: one baby armalite rifle with two magazines; 40 rounds of 5.56 ammunition;
one pistol, caliber .45; communications equipment, cash consisting of P2,870,000 and
US$50,000, jewelry, and land titles.
Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the search and
seizure on March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSA revolution. Petitioner argues that
a revolutionary government was operative at that time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1
announcing that President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were taking power in the name and
by the will of the Filipino people. Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government effectively
withheld the operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents
exclusionary right.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only
beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends
that all rights under the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of
the search. Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies and items taken from
Dimaano and use the same in evidence against her since at the time of their seizure, private
respondents did not enjoy any constitutional right.
Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.
The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights
of the 1973 Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over
of power by the revolutionary government following the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces
up to 24 March 1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and (2)
whether the protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (Covenant) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration) remained
in effect during the interregnum.
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the
interregnum. However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant
and the Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum.

During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the
supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders.
With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no
municipal law higher than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus,
during the interregnum, a person could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights
because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum.
As the Court explained in Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno:A revolution has been
defined as the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or state by
those who were previously subject to it or as a sudden, radical and fundamental change in the
government or political system, usually effected with violence or at least some acts of violence.
In Kelsens book, General Theory of Law and State, it is defined as that which occurs whenever
the legal order of a community is nullified and replaced by a new order . . . a way not prescribed
by the first order itself.
During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government
bound by no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of
the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the
adoption of the Freedom Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the sequestration
orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.
The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the
interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations
under the Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to
say that the Court considers the Declaration as part of customary international law, and that
Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the
Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the
Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the
revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the States good faith compliance
with its treaty obligations under international law.
During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders
issued by government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority
granted them by the revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have also
violated the Covenant or the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government
presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the revolutionary government did not repudiate it.
The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application, specified the items to be searched and
seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items specifically described in the warrant.
It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the
monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated.
The search warrant did not particularly describe these items and the raiding team confiscated
them on its own authority. The raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items without
showing that these items could be the subject of warrantless search and seizure. Clearly, the
raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized these items.The seizure of these items was
therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se, and they are not, they must be
returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not declare that
such person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and seizure warrant could
not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the possessor. We thus hold that
these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.
The Dispositive
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding

the records of this case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence may
warrant, and referring this case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a
determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.

7. Central Bank Employees Association v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas

Published by Paul Nikko Degollado on January 3, 2014 | Leave a response
GR No 148208
Puno, J.
Facts:
RA 7653 otherwise known as the New Central Bank Act took effect July 3 1993, effectively
replacing the earlier Central Bank of the Philippines (established 1949) by the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas. On June 8 2001, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association Inc. filed a
petition against the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President to restrain BSP from
implementing the last proviso in Section 15 (i), Article II of RA 7653 which pertains to
establishment of a Human resource management system and a compensation structure as part
of the authority of the Monetary Board. Employees whose positions fall under SG 19 and below
shall be in accordance with the rates in the salary standardization act. Petitioner contends that
the classifications is not reasonable, arbitrary and violates the equal protection clause. The said
proviso has been prejudicial to some 2994 rank- and file BSP employees. Respondent on the
other hand contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause, provided
that it is construed together with other provisions of the same law such as the fiscal and
administrative autonomy of the Bangko Sentral and the mandate of its monetary board. The
Solicitor General, as counsel of the Executive Secretary defends the provision, that the
classification of employees is based on real and actual differentiation and it adheres to the policy
of RA 7653 to establish professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws
and policies of the government.
Issue: Whether or not the contended proviso if RA 7653 violates the equal protection of laws,
hence unconstitutional.
Held: Yes the proviso is unconstitutional as it operate on the salary grade or the officer
employee status, it distinguishes between economic class and status with the higher salary
grade recipients are of greater benefit above the law than those of mandated by the Salary
Standardization Act. Officers of the BSP receive higher wages that those of rank-and-file
employees because the former are not covered by the salary standardization act as provided by
the proviso.

8. Ocampo v. Enriquez
Facts: During 2016 presidential campaign, Duterte publicly announced he would allow the burial
of Marcos in LNMB. After winning the elections, through Sec. of National Defense Lorenzana, a
Memorandum was issued to Chief of Staff of AFP, Gen. Visaya, for the interment of Marcos, in
compliance with the verbal order of the President to implement his election campaign promise.
AFP rear Admiral Enriquez issued directives to the Philippine Army Commanding General to
provide services, honors, and other courtesies for the late Former President Marcos. Dissatisfied
with the issuances and directives, various petitioners filed petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.

Saturnino Ocampo, et. al., in their capacity as human rights advocates and human rights
violations victims
-

Rene Saguisag and his son, as members of the Bar and human rights lawyers

Edcel Lagman, as member of Congress

-Loretta Pargas-Rosales, former Chairperson of CHr, as victims of State-sanctioned human rights

violations during martial law
-

Heherson Alvarez, former Senator, as concerned citizens and taxpayers

Zaira Baniaga, as concerned citizens and taxpayers

Algamar Latiph, former chairperson of regional human rights commission ARMM, on behalf
of Moros who are victims during martial law
-

Leila De Lima, as Senator

Issues:
PROCEDURAL
1.
Whether Pres. Dutertes determination to have the remains of Marcos interred at LNMB
poses a justiciable controversy
NO. The Court agrees with the OSG that Pres. Dutertes decision to have the remains of Marcos
interred at the LNMB involves a political question that is not a justiciable controversy. It is also
under the Constitution and EO 292 (Admin Code of 1987) to allow the interment in LNMB which is
a land of public domain devoted for national military cemetery and military shrine purposes. It is
based on his wisdom that it shall promote national healing and forgiveness. It is outside the
ambit of judicial review.
2.

Whether petitioners have locus standi to file the instant petitions

NO. Petitioners failed to show that they have suffered or will suffer direct or personal injury as a
result of the interment of Marcos at the LNMB. The interment of Marcos would have no profound
effect on the political, economic, and other aspects of our national life considering that more
than 27 years since his death and 30 years after his ouster have already passed. Petitioners
failed to demonstrate a clear and imminent threat to their fundamental constitutional rights
3.
Whether petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and
hierarchy of courts
YES. Petitioners violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of
courts. They should seek reconsideration of the assailed memorandum and directive before the
Secretary of National Defense and give them the opportunity to correct themselves, if warranted.
If petitioners are still dissatisfied with the Secretarys decision they could have elevated it before
the Office of the President which has control and supervision of the DND.
Even though there are exceptions that would warrant a direct resort to the Supreme Court under
exceptional cases, the petitioners cannot brush aside the doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts that
requires such petitions to be filed first with the proper RTC which are not only trier of facts but
can also resolve questions of law in the exercise of its original and concurrent jurisdiction over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and has the power to issue restraining order
and injunction when proven necessary.
In fine, the petitions at bar should be dismissed on procedural grounds alone.

SUBSTANTIVE
1.
Whether the issuance and implementation of the memorandum violates the Constitution,
domestic and international law
NO. The Presidents decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution,
the law or jurisprudence.
Laws and Constitutional provisions cited by petitioner:
Art. II: Sec. 2, 11, 13, 23, 26, 27, and 28 not self-executory
Art. VII: Sec. 17 Faithful execution clause, it is consistent with President Dutertes mandate, the
burial does not contravene RA 289, RA 10368, and the international human rights laws cited by
petitioner
Art. XIV: Sec. 3(2) reliance in this provision is misplaced it refers to duty of educ institutions to
teach values of nationalism and patriotism and respect for human rights
Art. XI: Sec. 1 not self-executory but RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees), RA 7080 (Penalizing Plunder), RA 9485 (Anti-red Tape Act) was enacted
pursuant to this
Art. XVIII: Sec. 26 transitory provision and freeze order to recover ill-gotten wealth
RA 289 authorized the construction of a National Pantheon as a burial place for Presidents,
National Heroes, and Patriots for the perpetuation of the memory and for the inspiration and
emulation of this generation and of generations still unborn.
Petitioners failed to provide legal and historical bases that LNMB and National Pantheon is one
and the same. LNMB is distinct from the burial place envisioned in rA 289. The National Pantheon
does not exist at present. Also to apply the standard that LNMB is reserved only for the decent
and brave or hero, it will put into question all the mortal remains therein. The name of LNMB is a
misnomer, interment of Marcos remain does not confer upon him the status of a hero.
RA 10368 (compensation for Human rights violations victims during Marcos regime) recognizes
the human rights violations committed and gives them reparation. However, the court cannot
subscribe to petitioners logic that the reparation includes the prohibition of Marcos interment
when it is not provided. It is undue to extend the law beyond what it contemplates. Legislators
could have easily inserted a provision prohibiting Marcos internment as reparation but they did
not. The law is silent and should remain to be so. We cannot read into law what is simply not
there. That would be tantamount to judicial legislation.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights these are principles that call for an
enactment of legislative measures. The PH is compliant with its international obligations evident
by the various RAs, exec issuances, and even in the Constitution
Our nations history will not be instantly revised by a single resolve of President Duterte to bury
Marcos at the LNMB. Whether petititoners admit it or not, the lessons of Martial Law are already
engraved, albeit in varying degrees, in the hearts and minds of the present generation of
Filipinos.
2.
Whether the Sec. of National Defense and AFP rear admiral commited grave abuse of
discretion when they issued the memorandum and directive in compliance with the verbal order
of Pres. Duterte to implement his election campaign promise of Marcos interment in LNMB
The Presidents decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is not done whimsically, capriciously or
arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias. Presumption of regularity in the performance of

official duty prevails over the petitioners allegation of Dutertes utang na loob or bayad utang to
the Marcoses. Petitioners should establish such claims but failed to do so. Then again, the court
is not a trier of facts.
3.
Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth of Marcos and his
cronies, and pronouncement of SC, nullifies his entitlement as a soldier and former President to
interment at the LNMB
National Shrines are governed by NHCP, military shrines are not. They are governed by PVAO of
DND. LNMB is a military shrine.
Magsaysay issued EO 77 orders remains of war dead interred at Bataan to be reinterred in
McKinley to minimize expenses and accessibility to widows.
Magsaysay issued Proc. 86 changing the name to LNMB
Garcia issued Proc. 423, Marcos issued Proc and General Orders, Cory issued EOs too. The point
is the PVAO manages military shrines which is under DND which is under the Office of the
President
AFP Regulations G 161-375 who may be interred
a.)

Medal of Valor awardee

b.)

Presidents or Commander-in-Chief, AFP

c.)

Sec. of National Defense

d.)

Chief of Staff, AFP

e.)

General/Flag Officers, AFP

f.)

Active and retired military personnel

g.)
Gov dignitaries, statesman,national artists and others as long as approved by the C-i-C,
Congress or Sec. of National defense
h.)

Widows of former presidents

Petitioners did not dispute that Marcos was a former President and C-i-C, legislator, Sec. of
National Defense, veteran, medal of valor awardee.
Marcos does not have any disqualification. He was not convicted of moral turpitude nor
dishonourably discharged.
Marcos rendered significant active military service and military-related activities.
THOSE WHO Are NOT QUALIFIED:
a.)

Personnel who are dishonorably discharged

b.)

Convicted of final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude

Moral Turpitude conduct that is contrary to community standards of justice, honesty, or good
morals.
4.
Whether the Marcos family waived the burial of remains of Marcos in LNMB when they
entered into agreement with Gov. of PH as to the condition and procedures by which his remains
shall be brought back to and interred in the PH.

The presidential power of control over the Executive Branch of Government is a self-executing
provision of the Constitution nor its exercise be limted by legislature. As the incumbent President,
Duterte is not bound by the 1992 Agreement between ramos and the Marcos family to have the
remains of Marcos interred in Ilocos Norte, he is free to amend, revoke or rescind political
agreements entered into by his predecessors, and to determine policies which he considers,
based on informed judgment and presumed wisdom, will be most effective in carrying out his
mandate.

In sum, there is no clear constitutional or legal basis to hold that there was grave abuse of
discretion which would justify the Court to interpose its authority to check and override an act
entrusted to the judgment of another branch. The President through respondents acted within
the bounds of law and jurisprudence. The Court must uphold what is legal and just and that is not
to deny Marcos of his rightful place in LNMB
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petitions are DISMISSED. Necessarily, the Status Quo
Ante Order is hereby LIFTED.

9. Grace Poe vs COMELEC

Facts:

In her COC for presidency for the May 2016 elections, Grace Poe declared that she is a naturalborn citizen and that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be
10 years and 11 months counted from 24 May 2005.
May 24, 2005 was the day she came to the Philippines after deciding to stay in the PH for good.
Before that however, and even afterwards, she has been going to and fro between US and
Philippines. She was born in 1968, found as newborn infant in Iloilo, and was legally adopted.
She immigrated to the US in 1991 and was naturalized as American citizen in 2001. On July 18,
2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship under
RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a new Philippine passport. In 2010, before
assuming her post as an appointed chairperson of the MTRCB, she renounced her American
citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirement . From then on, she stopped using her American
passport.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the ground
particularly, among others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino citizen since she
cannot prove that her biological parents or either of them were Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc
cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she is in want of citizenship and residence
requirements, and that she committed material misrepresentations in her COC.

On certiorari, the SC reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is qualified as a candidate
for Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote on the natural-born citizenship issue.

Issue 1: W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction to rule on the issue of qualifications of candidates
(Read Dissent)

Held:

No. Article IX-C, Sec 2 of the Constitution provides for the powers and functions of the COMELEC,
and deciding on the qualifications or lack thereof of a candidate is not one among them.

In contrast, the Constitution provides that only the SET and HRET tribunals have sole jurisdiction
over the election contests, returns, and qualifications of their respective members, whereas over
the President and Vice President, only the SC en banc has sole jurisdiction. As for the
qualifications of candidates for such positions, the Constitution is silent. There is simply no
authorized proceeding in determining the ineligibility of candidates before elections. Such lack
of provision cannot be supplied by a mere rule, and for the COMELEC to assimilate grounds for
ineligibility into grounds for disqualification in Rule 25 in its rules of procedures would be contrary
to the intent of the Constitution.

Hence, the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it decided on the qualification
issue of Grace as a candidate in the same case for cancellation of her COC.

Issue 2: W/N Grace Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino citizen (Read Dissent)

Held:

Yes, Grace Poe might be and is considerably a natural-born Filipino. For that, she satisfies one of
the constitutional requirements that only natural-born Filipinos may run for presidency.

First, there is a high probability that Grace Poes parents are Filipinos. Her physical features are
typical of Filipinos. The fact that she was abandoned as an infant in a municipality where the
population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than 99%
chance that a child born in such province is a Filipino is also a circumstantial evidence of her
parents nationality. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under
Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept the
absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the norm.

Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced that foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.
This is based on the finding that the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention show
that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. While the 1935
Constitutions enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would
definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with
respect to foundlings, the SC felt the need to examine the intent of the framers.

Third, that foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born citizenship is supported by
treaties and the general principles of international law. Although the Philippines is not a
signatory to some of these treaties, it adheres to the customary rule to presume foundlings as
having born of the country in which the foundling is found.

Issue 3: W/N Grace Poe satisfies the 10-year residency requirement

Held:
Yes. Grace Poe satisfied the requirements of animus manendi coupled with animus revertendi in
acquiring a new domicile.
Grace Poes domicile had been timely changed as of May 24, 2005, and not on July 18, 2006
when her application under RA 9225 was approved by the BI. COMELECs reliance on cases
which decree that an aliens stay in the country cannot be counted unless she acquires a
permanent resident visa or reacquires her Filipino citizenship is without merit. Such cases are
different from the circumstances in this case, in which Grace Poe presented an overwhelming
evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US. Coupled
with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her familys actual
continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when Grace Poe returned on May
24, 2005, it was for good.

Issue 4: W/N the Grace Poes candidacy should be denied or cancelled for committing material
misrepresentations in her COC
Held:
No. The COMELEC cannot cancel her COC on the ground that she misrepresented facts as to her
citizenship and residency because such facts refer to grounds for ineligibility in which the
COMELEC has no jurisdiction to decide upon. Only when there is a prior authority finding that a
candidate is suffering from a disqualification provided by law or the Constitution that the
COMELEC may deny due course or cancel her candidacy on ground of false representations
regarding her qualifications.

In this case, by authority of the Supreme Court Grace Poe is now pronounced qualified as a
candidate for the presidency. Hence, there cannot be any false representations in her COC
regarding her citizenship and residency.

10.
Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo G.R. No. 180906, October
7, 2008

Facts: The brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo, farmers from Bulacan who were suspected
of being members of the New Peoples Army, were forcibly taken from their home, detained in
various locations, and tortured by CAFGU and military units. After several days in captivity, the
brothers Raymond and Reynaldo recognized their abductors as members of the armed forces led
by General Jovito Palparan. They also learned that they were being held in place for their brother,

Bestre, a suspected leader of the communist insurgents. While in captivity, they met other
desaperacidos (including the still-missing University of the Philippines students Karen Empeno
and Sherlyn Cadapan) who were also suspected of being communist insurgents and members of
the NPA. After eighteen months of restrained liberty, torture and other dehumanizing acts, the
brothers were able to escape and file a petition for the writ of amparo.

Issue: Whether or not the right to freedom from fear is or can be protected by existing laws.

Held: Yes. The right to the security of person is not merely a textual hook in Article III, Section 2
of the Constitution. At its core is the immunity of ones person against government intrusion. The
right to security of person is freedom from fear, a guarantee of bodily and psychological
integrity and security.
To whom may the oppressed, the little ones, the desaperacidos, run to, if the Orwellian sword of
the State, wielded recklessly by the military or under the guise of police power, is directed
against them? The law thus gives the remedy of the writ of amparo, in addition to the rights and
liberties already protected by the Bill of Rights. Amparo, literally meaning to protect, is borne
out of the long history of Latin American and Philippine human rights abusesoften perpetrated
by the armed forces against farmers thought to be communist insurgents, anarchists or brigands.
The writ serves to both prevent and cure extralegal killings, enforced disappearances, and
threats thereof, giving the powerless a powerful remedy to ensure their rights, liberties, and
dignity. Amparo, a triumph of natural law that has been embodied in positive law, gives voice to
the preys of silent guns and prisoners behind secret walls.

11. FR. REYES V. GONZALES (2009)

G.R. No. 182161 December 3, 2009

FACTS:
Fr. Reyes was among of those who were arrested during the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege,
30th of November, 2007 and they were temporarily held at Camp Crame. A Hold Departure Order
(HDO) for the petitioner and to the other accused was issued by the DOJ upon the request of the
Department of Interior and Local Government. Probable cause was found during investigation
and petitioner was charged with rebellion. The RTC however dismissed the charge against him
but the HDO was still in effect. Petitioner requested that HDO should be lifted in view of the
dismissal of the criminal case. Petitioner argued that a writ of amparo should be issued against
the respondents, violating the whole breadth of rights enshrined in the Constitution, specifically,
his right to travel.

ISSUE: Whether the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.

RULING:
No. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to
life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of

a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal
killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
The restriction on petitioners right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the
criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has failed to establish that his right to
travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his
right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or
remedy.
A persons right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very
necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused should be
permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the courts sound
discretion.

12.Rubrico vs. Arroyo

FACTS:
Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3, 2007 by armed men belonging to the
301st Air Intelligence and Security Squadron, based at the Philippine Air Force Field Station at
Fernando Air Base in Lipa City, Batangas. During her detention, the petitioner added, her
daughters Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel and Jean Rubrico Apruebo were harassed by Senior Insp.
Arsenio Gomez and that there were also armed men following them. The petitioners prayed that
a writ of amparo be issued, ordering the individual respondents to desist from performing any
threatening act against the security of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman
(OMB) to immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating
circumstance of gender of the offended party. It also prayed for damages and for respondents to
produce documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.

The respondents then filed a joint return on the writ specifically denying the material inculpatory
averments against them. Respondents interposed the defense that the President may not be
sued during her incumbency.

Petitioners pleaded back to be allowed to present evidence ex parte against the President, et al.

By a separate resolution, the CA dropped the President as respondent in the case .

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT the [CA] committed reversible error in dismissing [their] Petition and dropping
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.

HELD:
The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved under our system of government, albeit
not expressly reserved in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-members in
the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr.
Joaquin Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in jurisprudence that the President
may not be sued during his or her tenure.

Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may
not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution
or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can
be dragged into court litigations while serving as such.

The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the amparo case against other respondents for failure of
the petition to allege ultimate facts as to make out a case against that body for the enforced
disappearance of Lourdes and the threats and harassment that followed.

13. G.R. Nos. 184461-62 BOAC v. CADAPAN

FACTS

At 2:00 a.m. of June 26, 2006, armed men abducted Sherlyn Cadapan (Sherlyn),Karen Empeo
(Karen) and Manuel Merino (Merino) from a house in San Miguel,Hagonoy, Bulacan. The three
were herded onto a jeep bearing license plate RTF 597that sped towards an undisclosed
location.Having thereafter heard nothing from Sherlyn, Karen and Merino, their respectivefamilies
scoured nearby police precincts and military camps in the hope of findingthem but the same
yielded nothing.During the pendency of the motion for reconsideration of the Petition for
HabeasCorpus, Erlinda Cadapan and Concepcion Empeo filed before this Court a Petitionfor Writ
of Amparo With Prayers for Inspection of Place and Production of Documents.By Decision of
September 17, 2008,23 the appellate court granted the Motion forReconsideration in CA-G.R. SP
No. 95303 (the habeas corpus case) and ordered theimmediate release of Sherlyn, Karen and
Merino in CA-G.R. SP No. 00002 (theamparo case).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Petition for the issuance of the Writ of Amparo withPrayers for Inspection of
Place and Production of Documents was proper
HELD/RATIO
In the Amparo case, the appellate court deemed it a superfluity to issue any inspectionorder or
production order in light of the release order. As it earlier ruled in the habeascorpus case, it
found that the three detainees right to life, liberty and security wasbeing violated, hence, the
need to immediately release them, or cause their release.Indeed, the parents of Sherlyn and
Karen failed to allege that there were no knownmembers of the immediate family or relatives of
Merino. The exclusive and successiveorder mandated by Section 2 must be followed. The order of
priority is not withoutreason"to prevent the indiscriminate and groundless filing of petitions for
amparowhich may even prejudice the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party."With

respect to the amparo petition, the parents of Sherlyn and Karen are precludedfrom filing the
application on Merinos behalf as they are not authorized parties underthe Rule.

14. BIRAOGAO VS TRUTH COMMISION

FACTS:

Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July
30, 2010.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to
investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration,
and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot
adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between contending parties.
All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt,
much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such
facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.

Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing
its functions. They argued that:

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a
public office and appropriate funds for its operation.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot
legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize
the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the
power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth
Commission.

(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the Truth
Commission with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the
Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative
Code of 1987.

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar
species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be
indictable.

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the Presidents executive power
and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations to ensure
that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled jurisprudence, authorize
the President to create or form such bodies.

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no
appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and
the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do not
duplicate, supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly
created for laudable purposes.

ISSUES:

1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of
Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.

RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must
have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota
of the case.

1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which they
belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each
member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of
that institution.

Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested
by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity
of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.

With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any
personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question. In private suits,
standing is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule. It provides that every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest. Real-party-in interest is the
party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit.

Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a
public right in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the
general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make out
a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a citizen
or taxpayer.

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The Court,
however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of transcendental
importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional issues in
the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents

The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The powers
of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One of the
recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is
the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and
determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating
bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled to know so that
he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative to the execution
and enforcement of the laws of the land.

2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation of
the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the
President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be
allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no
impropriety in the funding.

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all, the
investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The function
of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts
remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is limited to
obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties
relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.

4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its
apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of
Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and institutions
to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection
clause is to secure every person within a states jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution
through the states duly constituted authorities.

There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the
test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.

The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly
treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The
clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to
single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.

Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is
not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and
selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.

The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the
authority to investigate all past administrations.

The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws
must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public authority
administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.