Unethical conduct of lawyer results in disbarment

A.C. NO.
10525, September 01, 2015

INTESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE UY, HEREIN REPRESENTED
BY ITS ADMINISTRATOR WILSON
UY, Complainant, v. ATTY. PACIFICO M. MAGHARI
III, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
This resolves a Complaint1 for disbarment directly filed before
this court by complainant Wilson Uy, the designated
administrator of the estate of Jose Uy. This Complaint charges
respondent Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari, III (Maghari) with
engaging in deceitful conduct and violating the Lawyer's Oath.
Specifically, Maghari is charged with the use of information
that is false and/or appropriated from other lawyers in signing
certain pleadings.2
On February 18, 1997, Lilia Hofilea (Hofilea) filed a Petition
before the Bacolod City Regional Trial Court praying that she
be designated administratrix of the estate of her common-law
partner, the deceased Jose Uy. This was docketed as Spec.
Proc. No. 97-241.3
Hofilea was initially designated administratrix. 4 However, a
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order designating Hofilea
as administratix was filed by Wilson Uy, one of Jose Uy's
children, on behalf of Jose Uy's spouse and other children. 5 In
its Order6 dated June 9, 1998, the Regional Trial Court
designated Wilson Uy as administrator of Jose Uy's estate.
Subsequently, Hofilea's claims in the settlement of Jose Uy's
estate were granted.7 Hence, she filed a Motion for
Execution8 dated September 14, 2007.
In Spec. Proc No. 97-241 and in other proceedings arising from
the conflicting claims to Jose Uy's estate, Hofilea was
represented by her counsel, Atty. Mariano L. Natu-El (Atty.
Natu-el). In a pleading filed in the course of these proceedings
(i.e., in the Comment dated May 27, 2009 filed before the
Court of Appeals9), Atty. Natu-El indicated the following
details:
MARIANO L. NATU-EL
Counsel for Private-Respondent
Rm. 14, J.S. Building
Lacson-Galo Sts., Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 731938 11/24/08
PTR NO. 0223568 1/5/09
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLENO. 001597010 (Emphasis supplied)
There appears to have been conflicts between Wilson Uy and
the other heirs of Jose Uy.11 In the course of the proceedings,
Wilson Uy prayed that a subpoena ad testificandum be issued
to Magdalena Uy as she was alleged to have been the
treasurer of several businesses owned by Jose Uy. 12 In its
Order13 dated April 20, 2010, the Regional Trial Court granted
Wilson Uy's Motion that a Subpoena ad Testificandum be
issued to Magdalena Uy.
Thereafter, Magdalena Uy, through Maghari, her counsel, filed
a Motion to Quash Subpoena ad Testificandum with
Alternative Motion to Cite the Appearance of Johnny K.H.
Uy.14 In signing this Motion, Maghari indicated the following
details:
PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III
Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 731938 11/24/08 B.C.
PTR NO. 0223568 1/5/09 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLECompl. 0015970 1/14/0915 (Emphasis supplied)
On November 9, 2010, Wilson Uy filed his Opposition to
Magdalena Uy's Motion to Quash.16
Magdalena Uy, through Maghari, filed her Reply17 to Wilson

Uy's Opposition. This Reply was dated December 8, 2010. In
signing this Reply, Maghari indicated the following details:
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 766304 11/27/09 B.C.
PTR NO. 3793872 1/4/10 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLE Compl. 0015970 1/14/0918 (Emphasis supplied)
The Regional Trial Court subsequently denied Magdalena Uy's
Motion to Quash.19 Thereafter, Maghari filed for Magdalena Uy
a Motion for Reconsideration20 dated July 15, 2011. In signing
this Motion, Maghari indicated the following details:
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 815530 1/4/11 B.C.
PTR NO. 4190929 1/4/11 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLE Compl. IH-0000762 1/14/0921(Emphasis supplied)
As the Motion for Reconsideration was denied, 22 Maghari filed
for Magdalena Uy a Motion to Recall Subpoena ad
Testificandum23 dated March 8, 2012. In signing this Motion,
Maghari indicated the following details:
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 848630 12/27/11 B.C.
PTR NO. 4631737 1/2/12 B.C.
ROLL NO. 44869
MCLE Compl. III-0000762 1/14/0924 (Emphasis supplied)
At this point, Wilson Uy's counsel noticed that based on the
details indicated in the March 8, 2012 Motion, Maghari
appeared to have only recently passed the bar examinations.
This prompted Wilson Uy to check the records of Spec. Proc
No. 97-241. Upon doing so, he learned that since 2010,
Maghari had been changing the professional details indicated
in the pleadings he has signed and has been copying the
professional details of Atty. Natu-El.25cralawred
Wilson Uy then filed a Motion26 to declare Magdalena Uy in
indirect contempt (as by then she had still not complied with
the Subpoena ad Testificandum) and to require Maghari to
explain why he had been usurping the professional details of
another lawyer.
In its Order27 dated February 16, 2012, the Regional Trial Court
declined from citing Magdalena Uy in contempt as no verified
petition asking that she be so cited had been filed. 28
On July 31, 2014, Wilson Uy filed before this court the present
Complaint for disbarment. 29 Pointing to Maghari's act of
repeatedly a changing and using another lawyer's professional
details, Wilson Uy asserts that Maghari violated the Lawyer's
Oath and acted in a deceitful manner.
In the Resolution30 dated November 12, 2014, this court
directed Maghari to file his Comment on Wilson Uy's
Complaint.
This court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, received
Maghari's Comment31 on March 2, 2015.
For resolution are the issues of whether respondent Atty.
Pacifico M. Maghari, III engaged in unethical conduct and of
what proper penalty may be meted on him.
I
Respondent does not deny the existence of the errant entries

indicated by complainant. However, he insists that he did not
incur disciplinary liability. He claims that these entries were
mere overlooked errors:
For true indeed that after the draft of a particular motion or
pleading had been printed and ready for signature, all what
[sic] he did after cursorily going over it was to affix his
signature thereon, specifically, atop his printed name, without
giving any special or particular attention to details as the "IBP,
PTR, and MCLE Numbers", considering that these are matters
of record and are easily verifiable, thus he gains nothing by
"the usurpation of professional details of another lawyer" and
has no sinister motive or ill-purpose in so doing[.] 32
He attempts to diminish the significance of the dubious
entries and instead ascribes ill motive to complainant. He
faults complainant for "nitpicking"33 and calls him a "sore
loser"34 and a "disgruntled litigant"35 who is merely "making a
mountain out of a molehill"36 and is predisposed to "faultfinding."
He adds that "for the satisfaction of complainant," 37 he has
provided what are supposedly his correct professional details:
2009
IBP OR No. 765868 - Dec. 22, 2008 - Bacolod City
PTR No. 3408746 - Jan. 5, 2009 -Bacolod City
MCLE Compl. II-0012507 - Jan. 14, 2009 and
III-0000762-Jan. 14, 2009
2010
IBP OR No. 766304 - Dec. 9, 2009 - Bacolod City
MCLE Compl. II-0012507 - Jan. 14, 2009 and
III-0000762 - Jan. 14, 2009
2011
IBP OR No. 815530 -Jan. 4, 2011 -Bacolod City
PTRNo. 4190929 - Jan. 4, 2011 - Bacolod City
MCLE Compl. III-0000762 - Jan. 14, 2009
2012
IBP OR No. 848630-Dec. 27, 2011 - Bacolod City
MCLE Compl. III-0000762 - Jan. 14,
200938ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
II
Respondent's avowals, protestations, and ad hominem attacks
on complainant fail to impress.
The duplicitous entries speak for themselves. The errors are
manifest and respondent admits their existence. This court
would perhaps be well counseled to absolve respondent of
liability or let him get away with a proverbial slap on the wrist
if all that was involved were a typographical error, or
otherwise, an error or a handful of errors made in an isolated
instance or a few isolated instances. So too, if the error
pertained to only ' one of the several pieces of information
that lawyers are required to indicate when signing pleadings.
None of these can be said of this case. Respondent did not
merely commit errors in good faith. The truth is far from it.
First, respondent violated clear legal requirements, and
indicated patently false information. Second, the way he did
so demonstrates that he did so knowingly. Third, he did so
repeatedly. Before our eyes is a pattern of deceit. Fourth, the
information he used was shown to have been appropriated
from another lawyer. Not only was he deceitful; he was also
larcenous. Fifth, his act not only of usurping another lawyer's
details but also of his repeatedly changing information from

one pleading to another demonstrates the intent to mock and
ridicule courts and legal processes. Respondent toyed with
the standards of legal practice.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court provides for deceit
as a ground for disbarment. The Lawyer's Oath entails
commitment to, among others, obeying laws and legal orders,
doing no falsehood, conducting one's self as a lawyer to the
best of one's capacity, and acting with fidelity to both court
and client:
I, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, I will support the Constitution and
obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or
willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit,
or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for
money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I
impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
No amount of feigned ignorance and ad hominem attacks on
complainant can negate the gravity of respondent's actions.
His insolent and mocking violation of statutory and regulatory
requirements is a violation of his duties to society and to
courts. His swiping of another lawyer's information is a
violation of his duties to the legal profession. The unnecessary
risks that he foiled on his client as a possible result of
deficiently signed pleadings violate his duties to his client.
Thus, respondent did not only act in a deceitful manner and
violate the solemn oath he took to be admitted into the legal
profession; he also violated every single chapter of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
It is as clear as the entries themselves that respondent acted
in a manner that is woefully unworthy of an officer of the
court. He was not even a good citizen. As respondent has
fallen short of the ethical standards apropos to members of
the legal profession, we find it proper to suspend respondent
from the practice of law for two (2) years.
III
The requirement of a counsel's signature in pleadings, the
significance of this requirement, and the consequences of
non-compliance are spelled out in Rule 7, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court:
Section 3. Signature and address. Every pleading must be
signed by the party or counsel representing him, stating in
either case his address which should not be a post office box.
The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that
he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and
that it is not interposed for delay.
An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the
court may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be
remedied if it shall appear that the same was due to mere
inadvertence and not intended for delay. Counsel who
deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading in
violation of this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent matter
therein, or fails promptly report to the court a change of his
address, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action.
(Emphasis supplied)
A counsel's signature on a pleading is neither an empty
formality nor even a mere means for identification. Through
his or her signature, a party's counsel makes a positive
declaration. In certifying through his or her signature that he
or she has read the pleading, that there is ground to support
it, and that it is not interposed for delay, a lawyer asserts his
or her competence, credibility, and ethics. Signing a pleading
is such a solemn component of legal practice that this court

has taken occasion to decry the delegation of this task to nonlawyers as a violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that
he has read the pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge,
information and belief, there is a good ground to support it;
and that it is not interposed for delay. Under the Rules of
Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his signature, who can
certify to these matters.
mechanism that has been statutorily devolved to local

government units.
The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal

work involving practice of law which is reserved exclusively
for the members of the legal profession. Counsel may
delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer but
cannot do so in favor of one who is not. The Code of
Professional Responsibility
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified
person the performance of any task which by law may only be
performed by a member of the Bar in good
standing.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to
signing by unqualified persons, something the law strongly
proscribes.39 (Citations omitted)
Lastly, the inclusion of a counsel's address and contact details

is designed to facilitate the dispensation of justice. These
pieces of information aid in the service of court processes,
enhance compliance with the requisites of due process, and
facilitate better representation of a client's cause. In Juane v.
Garcia,48 this court took occasion to expound on the
significance of putting on record a counsel's address:
A counsel's signature is such an integral part of a pleading

that failure to comply with this requirement reduces a
pleading to a mere scrap of paper totally bereft of legal effect.
Thus, faithful compliance with this requirement is not only a
matter of satisfying a duty to a court but is as much a matter
of fidelity to one's client. A deficiency in this respect can be
fatal to a client's cause.
Apart from the signature itself, additional information is
required to be indicated as part of a counsel's signature:
(1) Per Rule 7, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, a counsel's
address must be stated;
(2) In Bar Matter No. 1132,40 this court required all lawyers to
indicate their Roll of Attorneys number;
(3) In Bar Matter No. 287,41 this court required the inclusion of
the "number and date of their official receipt indicating
payment of their annual membership dues to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the current year"; in
lieu of this, a lawyer may indicate his or her lifetime
membership number;
(4) In accordance with Section 139 of the Local Government
Code,42 a lawyer must indicate his professional tax receipt
number;
(5) Bar Matter No. 192243 required the inclusion of a counsel's
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of
Compliance or Certificate of Exemption; and
(6) This court's Resolution in A.M. No. 07-6-5-SC44 required the
inclusion of a counsel's contact details.
The inclusion of information regarding compliance with (or

exemption from) Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) seeks to ensure that legal practice is reserved only for
those who have complied with the recognized mechanism for
"keep[ing] abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintaining]
the ethics of the profession[,] and enhancing] the standards of
the practice of law."47
The time has come, we believe, for this Court to remind the
members of the Bar that it is their inescapable duty to make
of record their correct address in all cases in which they are
counsel for a suitor. For, instances there have been in the past
when, because of failure to inform the court of the change of
address, litigations were delayed. And this, not to speak of
inconvenience caused the other parties and the court. Worse
still, litigants have lost their cases in court because of such
negligence on the part of their counsel. It is painful enough for
a litigant to surfer a setback in a legal battle. It is doubly
painful if defeat is occasioned by his attorney's failure to
receive notice because the latter has changed the place of his
law office without giving the proper notice therefor. It is only
when some such situation comes about that the negligent
lawyer comes to realize the grave responsibility that he has
incurred both to his client and to the cause of justice. It is then
that the lawyer is reminded that in his oath of office he
solemnly declared that he "will conduct" himself "as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion." Too
late. Experience indeed is a good teacher. To a lawyer,
though, it could prove very expensive. 49
These requirements are not mere frivolities. They are not
mere markings on a piece of paper. To willfully disregard them
is, thus, to willfully disregard mechanisms put in place to
facilitate integrity, competence, and credibility in legal
practice; it is to betray apathy for the ideals of the legal
profession and demonstrates how one is wanting of the
standards for admission to and continuing inclusion in the bar.
Worse, to not only willfully disregard them but to feign
compliance only, in truth, to make a mockery of them reveals
a dire, wretched, and utter lack of respect for the profession
that one brandishes.
IV
As with the signature itself, these requirements are not vain

formalities.
We underscore several facts. These demonstrate that

respondent acted in manifest bad faith, thereby exhibiting a
pattern of insubordination, dishonesty, deceit, and intent to
make a mockery of courts and legal processes.
The inclusion of a counsel's Roll of Attorneys number,

professional tax receipt number, and Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) receipt (or lifetime membership) number is
intended to preserve and protect the integrity of legal
practice. They seek to ensure that only those who have
satisfied the requisites for legal practice are able to engage in
it. With the Roll of Attorneys number, parties can readily verify
if a person purporting to be a lawyer has, in fact, been
admitted to the Philippine bar.45With the professional tax
receipt number, they can verify if the same person is qualified
to engage in a profession in the place where he or she
principally discharges his or her functions. With the IBP receipt
number, they can ascertain if the same person remains in
good standing as a lawyer. These pieces of information, in the
words of Galicto v. Aquino III, "protect the public from bogus
lawyers."46Paying professional taxes (and the receipt that
proves this payment) is likewise compliance with a revenue
In signing the Motion to Quash Subpoena ad Testificandum

with Altenative Motion to Cite the Appearance of Johnny K.H.
Uy, respondent appropriated four of the five details (i.e., IBP
official receipt number, professional tax receipt number, Roll
of Attorneys number, and MCLE compliance number) that Atty.
Natu-el indicated in the Comment dated May 27, 2009, which
the latter signed and filed before the Court of Appeals. Atty.
Natu-el's details are reproduced as follows:
MARIANO L. NATU-EL
Counsel for Private-Respondent
Rm. 14, J.S. Building
Lacson-Galo Sts., Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 731938 11/24/08
PTR NO. 0223568 1/5/09
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLENO. 001597050 [Emphasis

supplied]ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The details that respondent indicated are reproduced as
follows:
Bacolod City
IBPO.R. No. 731938 11/24/08 B.C.
PTR NO. 0223568 1/5/09 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLE Compl. 00159701/14/0951 (Emphasis supplied)
In signing the Reply dated December 8, 2010, respondent
used what was supposedly his correct IBP official receipt
number and professional tax receipt number:
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 766304 11/27/09 B.C.
PTR NO. 3793872 1/4/10 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLE Compl. 00159701/14/0952 (Emphasis supplied)
The same pleading, however, still bore Atty. Natu-el's Roll of
Attorneys number and MCLE compliance number, which
respondent previously appropriated for himself.
In signing the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 15, 2011,
respondent used what was supposedly his correct IBP official
receipt number and professional tax receipt number. However,
he still used Atty. Natu-el's Roll of Attorneys number:
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 815530 1/4/11 B.C.
PTR NO. 4190929 1/4/11 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLE Compl. III-0000762 1/14/09 53(Emphasis supplied)
It was only in signing the Motion to Recall Subpoena ad
Testificandum54 dated March 8, 2012, that all the professional
details that respondent indicated are supposedly his own:
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 848630 12/27/11 B.C.
PTR NO. 4631737 1/2/12 B. C.
ROLL NO. 44869
MCLE Compl. 111-0000762 1/14/09 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent acted deliberately. It is impossible that the
erroneous details he indicated on his pleadings are products
of mere inadvertence.
To begin with, details were copied from a pleading submitted
by another lawyer. These details somehow found their way
into respondent's own pleadings. Certainly, these details could
not have written themselves, let alone transfer themselves
from a pleading prepared by one lawyer to those prepared by
another. Someone must have actually performed the act of
copying and transferring; that is, someone must
have intended to copy and transfer them. Moreover, the
person responsible for this could have only been respondent
or someone acting under his instructions; the pleadings on
which they were transferred are, after all, respondent's
pleadings.
Second, these details were not merely copied, they were
modified. "B.C." was added to the IBP official receipt and
professional tax receipt numbers copied from Atty. Natu-el.
The facts of modification and addition show active human

intervention to make something more out of markings that
could otherwise have simply been reproduced.
Third, in subsequent pleadings, some details copied from Atty.
Natu-el were discarded while some were retained. The
December 8, 2010 Reply still bore Atty. Natu-el's Roll of
Attorneys number and MCLE compliance number, but no
longer his IBP official receipt number and professional tax
receipt number. The July 15, 2011 Motion for Reconsideration
only bore Atty. Natu-el's MCLE compliance number.
This gradual act of segregating informationdiscarding some
while retaining others, and retaining less over timereveals
that the author of these markings must have engaged in a
willful exercise that filtered those that were to be discarded
from those that were to be retained.
Respondent is rightly considered the author of these acts. Any
claim that the error was committed by a secretary is
inconsequential. As this court has stated in Gutierrez v.
Zulueta:55
The explanation given by the respondent lawyer to the effect
that the failure is attributable to the negligence of his
secretary is devoid of merit. A responsible lawyer is expected
to supervise the work in his office with respect to all the
pleadings to be filed in court and he should not delegate this
responsibility, lock, stock and barrel, to his office secretary. If
it were otherwise, irresponsible members of the legal
profession can avoid appropriate disciplinary action by simply
disavowing liability and attributing the problem to the fault or
negligence of the office secretary. Such situation will not be
countenanced by this Court.56
V
In the first place, it is doubtful that respondent has complied
with the requirements of paying his dues to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, paying his annual professional tax, and
completing the necessary units for Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education in the periods concerned. To put it plainly,
there would be no need for him to use incorrect information if
he had complied with all pertinent regulations.
In his Comment, respondent provided what are supposedly his
correct professional details. We emphasize, however, that he
failed to attach to his Comment copies of the pertinent official
receipts, certifications, and other supporting documents. All
that he relies on is a self-serving recital of numbers and dates.
None but respondent, himself, was in a better position to
produce the documents that could prove his claims. His failure
to do so is, at the very least, suspicious. It can very well mean
that they do not exist, or that he willfully desisted from
producing them. The latter would be more damaging to
respondent, as it calls into operation the basic presumption
"[t]hat evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced."57
Even assuming that the details provided by respondent in his
Comment are correct, it still remains that he (1) used a false
IBP official receipt number, professional tax receipt number,
Roll of Attorneys number, and MCLE compliance number a
total of seven (7) times; and (2) used another lawyer's details
seven (7) times.
In failing to accurately state his professional details,
respondent already committed punishable violations. An
isolated inaccuracy, regardless of the concerned lawyer's lack
of bad faith, already merits a penalty of relative severity.
In Bumactao v. Fano,58 respondent Atty. Restito F. Fano was
suspended from the practice of law for the singular violation
of indicating wrong MCLE compliance details:
Here, it is established that respondent Atty. Restito F. Fano
falsely indicated "MCLE Compliance No. III-0018308". . . . . The
admitted falsity notwithstanding, respondent endeavors to
douse his culpability by shifting the blame to the MCLE
providers - PLM and IBP Quezon City Chapter and insisting

that he acted in good faith. He likewise attributes the
indication of "MCLE Compliance No. III-0018308" to his
secretary / liaison, an "honest mistake . . . because of the
pressure of his many duties."
We are not impressed.
Bar Matter No. 1922, dated June 3, 2008, requires "practicing
members of the bar to indicate in all pleadings filed before the
courts or quasi-judicial bodies, the number and date of issue
of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of
Exemption, as may be applicable. . . ." It further provides that
"[f]ailure to disclose the required information would cause the
dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings
from the records."
At the very least, respondent was negligent in failing to
monitor his own MCLE compliance. This is a sort of negligence
that is hardly excusable. As a member of the legal profession,
respondent ought to have known that non-compliance would
have resulted in the rendering inutile of any pleading he may
file before any tribunal. The grave consequence of noncompliance notwithstanding, respondent (by his own account)
admits to having complacently relied on the statements of
MCLE providers. His negligence, therefore risked harm not
only upon himself - he being now burdened with the present
complaint as a direct consequence - but worse, upon his
clients, the reliefs they seek through their pleadings being
possibly rendered inoperative.59
This court has never shied away from disciplining lawyers who
have willfully engaged in acts of deceit and falsehood.
In Flores v. Chua,60 respondent Atty. Enrique S. Chua was
disbarred on this court's finding of "a habit, attitude, and
mindset not only to abuse one's legal knowledge or training,
but also to deliberately defy or ignore known virtues and
values which the legal profession demands from its
members."61 Atty. Enrique S. Chua was found to have
notarized a document that he knew to have been falsified so
as to make it appear that a person had personally appeared
before him; this was part of a bigger design to defraud
another.
In Nunga v. Viray,62 respondent Atty. Venancio Viray was
suspended from the practice of law for three (3) years after
having been found to have notarized a document despite the
lapse of his commission as a notary public.
In Benguet Electric Cooperative v. Flores,63 respondent Atty.
Ernesto B. Flores was suspended from the practice of law for
two (2) years after being found to have falsely stated that he
did not pursue an appeal so as to absolve himself of the
charge of forum shopping when, in fact, he had perfected an
appeal.
Here, respondent violated Bar Matter No. 287, Section 139(e)
of the Local Government Code, Bar Matter No. 1132, and Bar
Matter No. 1922, a total of seven (7) times. The sheer
multiplicity of instances belies any claim that we are only
dealing with isolated errors. Regardless whether isolated or
manifold, these inaccuracies alone already warrant
disciplinary sanctions. However, as shall be discussed,
respondent also acted with dishonest, deceitful, and even
larcenous intent.
Respondent is not only accountable for inaccuracies. This case
is far from being a matter of clerical errors. He willfully used
false information. In so doing, he misled courts, litigantshis
own client included professional colleagues, and all others
who may have relied on the records and documents on which
these false details appear.
Respondent's act of filing pleadings that he fully knew to
contain false information is a mockery of courts, chief of which

is this court, considering that this court is the author of all but
one of the regulations that respondent violated. It is this court
that requires respondent to indicate his Roll of Attorneys
number, IBP official receipt number, and MCLE compliance
number.
Having also violated a requirement spelled out in the Local
Government Code, respondent similarly made a mockery of
an act of the legislature.
Respondent's profligacy does not stop here. He also
appropriated for himself another lawyer's professional details
in seven (7) separate instances.
In seven distinct instances, respondent is accountable for
three constituent acts of larceny, taking, use, and profiting.
Seven times, respondent took for himself professional details
that belonged to another. In these seven instances, he used
the same swiped details in his own pleadings. So too, in these
seven instances he personally benefited. In these instances,
respondent succeeded in making it appear that he filed valid
pleadings and avoided the fatal consequences of a deficiently
signed pleading. He was able to pursue reliefs in court and
carry on litigation that could have been terminated as soon as
his deficient pleadings were recognized.
All these instances of falsity, dishonesty, and professional
larceny are similarly acts of deceit. In using false information
taken from another, respondent misled courts, parties, and
colleagues into believing that he was faithfully, truthfully, and
decently discharging his functions.
Respondent's acts reek of malicious intent to deceive courts.
He was not only insubordinate and disobedient of regulations;
he was also dishonest, deceitful and duplicitous. Worse, he
was mocking and contemptuous.
VI
The totality of respondent's actions demonstrates a degree of
gravity that warrants suspension from the practice of law for
an extended period.
This case involves anything but trivial non-compliance. It is
much graver. The confluence of: (1) respondent's many
violations; (2) the sheer multiplicity of rules violated; (3) the
frequencynay, patternof falsity and deceit; and (4) his
manifest intent to bring courts, legal processes, and
professional standards to disrepute brings to light a degree of
depravity that proves respondent worthy of being sanctioned.
Having flagrantly disobeyed, deceived, and ridiculed courts,
respondent rightly stands to be at the receiving end of
disciplinary action.
Respondent's circumstances are well within the grounds for
disciplining lawyers as specified by Rule 138, Section 27 of the
Rules of Court. His deception is well demonstrated. He ran
afoul of every single word, save perhaps his name, in the
Lawyer's Oath. Then again, it was his own signature, his own
name, that respondent Pacifico M. Maghari, III had disgraced.
Respondent's acts also demonstrate a violation of every single
chapter of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility pronounces
a lawyer's foremost duty "to uphold the constitution, obey the
laws of the land V and promote respect for law and legal
processes" Rule 1.01 of the same Code requires lawyers to
"not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct."
Per Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, "[a]
lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" Rule
10.01 requires lawyers to "not do any falsehood . . . or allow
the court to be misled by any artifice." Rule 10.03 imposes

upon lawyers the duty of faithfully "observ[ing] the rules of
procedure [and] not misusing] them to defeat the ends of
justice." Canon 11 exhorts lawyers to "observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts."
Respondent did not merely violate a statute and the many
issuances of this court as regards the information that
members of the bar must indicate when they sign pleadings.
He did so in a manner that betrays intent to make a mockery
of courts, legal processes, and professional standards. By his
actions, respondent ridiculed and toyed with the requirements
imposed by statute and by this court. He trampled upon
professional standards established not only by this court, in its
capacity as overseer of the legal profession, but by the
Republic itself, through a duly enacted statute. In so doing, he
violated his duty to society and to the courts.
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires a
lawyer to "conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward his professional colleagues."
In appropriating information pertaining to his opposing
counsel, respondent did not only fail to observe common
courtesy. He encroached upon matters that, ultimately, are
personal to another. This encroachment is, therefore, not only
an act of trickery; it is also act of larceny. In so doing, he
violated his duty to the legal profession.
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility imposes
upon a lawyer "fidelity to the cause of his client," while Canon
18 requires a lawyer to "serve his client with competence and
diligence."
In using false information in his pleadings, respondent
unnecessarily put his own client at risk. Deficiencies in how
pleadings are signed can be fatal to a party's cause as
unsigned pleadings produce no legal effect. In so doing,
respondent violated his duty to his clients.
It is tempting to think that the only thing respondent did was
to deviate from required formalities. Respondent was, himself,
quite dismissive, stating that he did nothing more than
"cursorily [go] over . . . without giving any ... attention to
details . . . that. . . are matters of record and are easily
verifiable."64 It is equally tempting to think it would be
excessive of this court to engage in an overly rigid, pedantic
emphasis on formalistic niceties.
However, we have demonstrated that what can otherwise be
dismissed as empty formalities are, in fact, necessary
solemnities. They are not ends in themselves but crucial
means to enhance the integrity, competence and credibility of
the legal profession. They are vital to the dispensation of
justice. The significance of these solemnities, along with the
legal profession's "high standard of legal proficiency, . . .
morality, honesty, integrity[,] and fair dealing[,]"65 put in
contrast with how respondent has fallen dismally and
disturbingly short of the high standards that his profession
demands, demonstrates the propriety of momentarily
suspending respondent from engaging in legal practice.
It is unsettling that respondent engaged in the mockery and
ridicule that he did of the very same badgeshis place in the
Roll of Attorneys, his membership in the Integrated Bar, his
recognition as a practicing professional, his continuing
training and competencethat are emblematic of his being a
lawyer. Seeing as how he manifested such contempt for these
badges, we find that there is every reason for preventing him,
at least temporarily, from engaging in the profession these
badges signify.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari, III, having
clearly violated his Lawyer's Oath and the Canons of the Code
of Professional Responsibility through his unlawful, dishonest,
and deceitful conduct, is SUSPENDED from the practice of

law for two (2) years, effective upon receipt of a copy of this
Resolution.
Let copies of this Resolution be served on the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts
in the country for their information and guidance. Let a copy
of this Resolution be attached to respondent Atty. Pacifico M.
Maghari, III's personal record as attorney.
SO ORDERED.chanro
CONRADO N. QUE, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
For the Court's consideration is the Profound Appeal for
Judicial Clemency1 filed by Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr.
(respondent), who seeks to be reinstated as a member of the
Philippine Bar.
Factual Background
In a Decision2 dated December 4, 2009, this Court disbarred
the respondent from the practice of law on the following
grounds: abuse of court procedures and processes; filing of
multiple actions and forum-shopping; willful, intentional and
deliberate resort to falsehood and deception before the
courts; maligning the name of his fellow lawyer; and
fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in court.
The material portions of the subject Decision provide:
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent
committed various acts of professional misconduct and
thereby failed to live up to the exacting ethical standards
imposed on members of the Bar. We cannot, agree, however,
that only a penalty of one-year suspension from the practice
of law should be imposed. Neither should we limit ourselves to
the originally recommendedpenalty of suspension for two (2)
years.
Given the respondents multiple violations, his past record as
previously discussed, and the nature of these violations which
shows the readiness to disregard court rules and to gloss over
concerns for the orderly administration of justice,we believe
and so hold that the appropriate action of this Court is to
disbar the respondent to keep him away from the law
profession and from any significant role in the administration
of justice which he has disgraced. He is a continuing risk, too,
to the public that the legal profession serves. Not even his
ardor and overzealousness in defending the interests of his
client can save him. Such traits at the expense of everything
else, particularly the integrity of the profession and the
orderly administration of justice, this Court cannot accept nor
tolerate.
Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the
respondents first ethical infraction of the same nature. We
penalized him in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia versus
Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla for his willful and intentional
falsehood before the court; for misuse of court procedures and
processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and for
collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of law.
We showed leniency then by reducing his penalty to
suspension for six (6) months. We cannot similarly treat the
respondent this time; it is clear that he did not learn any
lesson from his past experience and since then has exhibited
traits of incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis to the
respondents professional legal career for the sake of the
public, the profession and the interest of justice.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM
Resolution No. XVII-2005-164 dated December 17, 2005 and
Resolution No. XVII-2008-657 dated December 11, 2008 of the
Board of Governors of the IBP Committee on Bar Discipline
insofar as respondent Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. is found liable
for professional misconduct for violations of the Lawyers
Oath; Canon 8; Rules 10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02
and 12.04, Canon 12; and Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility;and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. However, we modify the
penalty the IBP imposed, and hold that the respondent should
be DISBARREDfrom the practice of law.
SO ORDERED.
On July 8, 2010, the respondent filed a Petition for Judicial
Clemency and Compassion3 praying that his license to
practice
law
be
restored
based
on
humanitarian
considerations, but the Court En Bancresolved to deny the
petition for lack of merit.
The respondent subsequently filed on January 11, 2011, an
Appeal for Grace, Succor, and Mercy 4 asking the Court to take
a second look at the penalty imposed upon him. He
maintained that Conrado N. Que (complainant) failed to
establish by clear and convincing evidence that he committed
grossly immoral conduct meriting the severe penalty of
disbarment. He also attempted to pass the blame on another
individual (a certain Gerolin Piedad, General Manager of
Kalayaan Development Corporation) to free himself from
liability by claiming that one of the charges leading to his
disbarment was not of his own doing.
In a Resolution5 dated February 8, 2011, the Court denied the
appeal.
The respondent again wrote the Court on July 13, 2011,
reiterating his pleas for the Courts compassion and
mercy.6 He sought the Courts forgiveness stating that he has
learned his lesson; but at the same time, questioning the
Courts finding for lackof factual support. He appended to his
appeal proofs of his updated payment of IBP membership
dues,7 MCLE compliance,8 and a letter from the Bishop of
Marinduque.9 His appeal, however, was denied by a
Resolution10 dated August 2, 2011.
On May 17, 2012, the respondent sent a letter 11 addressed to
the Members of the Court En Banc once again reiterating his
prayer to lift the order of disbarment. He alleged among
others that for more than three years that he has been
disbarred in the practice of law, he has never been involved in
any immoral or illegal activities, has devoted himself in the
services of St. Peter Parish and Shrine, CommonwealthAvenue
as Eucharistic Minister leader, has conducted regular monthly
lectures on the subject of marriage at the Diocese of
Novaliches, and has participated as monthly financial
contributor to Mr. Carmel Church, Lucena City. He also begged
the Court to no longer prolong his penalty since it had already
served its purpose. The plea was also denied on July 3, 2012.12
On August 30, 2012, the respondent once more prayed for his
reinstatement professing repentance and remorse for what he
did.13 He pleaded for the Courts consideration, and vowed
that he will no longer misuse the rules of procedure but
instead, devote his time and energy for its proper observance
and implementation. He also stated that for almost three
years of being disbarred from the practice of law, he has

never been involved in any unlawful, dishonest, and immoral
activities. He promised to maintain at all times a high degree
of legal proficiency, morality, integrity, and fair dealings to the
courts, clients, and the legal profession in accordance with the
values and morals embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In a Resolution14 dated October 9, 2012, the Court denied his
petition for lack of merit. Aggrieved, the respondent filed on
March 27, 2013 a letter15 pleading the Court to revisit his
previousrequests for reinstatement.
Treating his letter as a motion for the reconsideration of the
resolutions dated August 2, 2011, July3, 2012, and October 9,
2012, the Court, on June 4, 2013 deniedthe motion with
finality.16 On July 18, 2014, the respondent filed a Profound
Appeal for Judicial Clemency17 reiterating his apologies to the
Court. He stressed that the penalty of disbarment has already
taken its toll on his health; he has now become most frail and
weak; and he had been diagnosed with chronic kidney disease
at stage five (5) and undergoing dialysis thrice weekly. He also
stressed that in the years that he had been excluded from the
practice of law, he devoted his time to Christian and charity
pursuits serving with all humility as a Lay Minister and a
regular lecturer on Legal Aspect of Marriage at St. Peter
Church, Quezon City.
The respondent also pleads for clemency, not because he
intends to practice law again, but to be made whole, to
recover from being shattered, and to finally have peace of
mind. Heexpressed his sincere repentance and deep remorse
by taking full responsibility for his misdemeanor. He also
prayed that his disbarment be lifted and that he be reinstated
as a member of the Philippine bar. As part of his petition, he
submitted a Medical Abstract18evidencing his diagnosis for
chronic kidney disease, and a certification 19 from St. Peter
Parish, Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City, proving that he
and his family are dedicated parishioners.
The Court's Ruling
We deny the present appeal.
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions.20 It is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right
granted to everyone who demands it, but rather, a special
privilege granted and continued only to those who
demonstrate special fitness inintellectual attainment and in
moral
character.21 The
same
reasoning
applies
to
reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. When exercising its
inherent power to grant reinstatement, the Court should see
to it that only those who establish their present moral fitness
and knowledge of the law will be readmitted to the Bar. Thus,
though the doors to the practice of law are never permanently
closed on a disbarred attorney, the Court owes a duty to the
legal profession as well as to the general public to ensure that
if the doors are opened,it is done so only as a matter of
justice.22
The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatementto the practice
of law is whether the lawyer has sufficiently rehabilitated
himself or herself in conduct and character. 23 Whether the
applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a
great extent on the sound discretion of the Court. 24 The lawyer
has to demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing
evidence that he or she is again worthy of membership in the
Bar. The Court will take into consideration his or her character
and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and
character of the charge/s for which he or she was disbarred,
his or her conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the
time that has elapsed in between the disbarment and the

application for reinstatement. 25
In the present case, we note that before his admission to the
Bar, the respondent had demonstrated an active involvement
and participation in community and church activities by
joining Youth For Christ, Catechism, and Bible Study and
Sharing. Likewise, upon admission to the Bar, the respondent
worked as Municipal Attorney in Sta. Cruz, Marinduque
rendering free legal assistance to his townmates who were
inneed of legal service. Thereafter, the respondentwas
appointed as a Municipal Administrator and had continued
extending assistance to the indigent residents.
The respondent also actively engaged and participated in
various community projects, through the Marinduque Jaycees,
where he served as President from 1980 to 1981, and the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Marinduque Chapter, where
he served as a member, Director, and President from 1982 to
1987.
In his present appeal for judicial clemency, the respondent
acknowledged his indiscretions and claimed to have taken full
responsibility for his misdemeanor. Unlike in his previous
petitions/appeal for judicial clemency, the respondent no
longerquestioned the Courts decision. According to him, he
has long expressed deep remorse and genuine repentance.
The respondent also claimed that the long period of his
disbarment gave him sufficient time to reflect on his
professional conduct, to show remorse and repentance, and to
realize the gravity of his mistakes. After his disbarment, the
respondent continued lending assistance, and deviated his
time and effort in pursuing civic and religious work that
significantly contributed to his character reformation.He
professed that during his almost five (5) years of disbarment,
he has been an active member of the Couples for Christ,
Marriage Encounter, and Knights of Columbus; and through
his affiliations with these groups, he had served in the
ecclesial affairs in his parish as an Extraordinary Minister for
Holy Communion and a lecturer on Legal Aspect of Marriage
Pre-Cana and Marriage Preparation Seminar at the Parish
Church of St. Peter in Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City.
Although the Court believes that the respondent is not
inherently lacking in moral fiber as shown by his conduct prior
to his disbarment, we are not convinced that he had
sufficiently achieved moral reformation.
26
In Rodolfo M. Bernardo v. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia, the Court, in

deciding whether or not to reinstate Atty. Mejia, considered
that 15 years had already elapsed from the time hewas
disbarred, which gave him sufficient time to acknowledge his
infractions and to repent. The Court also took into account the
fact that Atty. Mejiais already of advanced years, has long
repented, and suffered enough. The Court also notedthat he
had made a significant contribution by putting up the Mejia
Law Journal containing his religious and social writings; and
the religious organization named "El Cristo Movement and
Crusade on Miracle of the Heart and Mind." Furthermore, the
Court considered that Atty. Mejia committed no other
transgressions since he was disbarred.
Similarly in Adez Realty, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 27 the Court
granted the reinstatement of the disbarred lawyer (found to
be guilty of intercalating a material fact in a CA decision) and
considered the period of three (3) years as sufficient time to
do soul-searching and to prove that he is worthy to practice
law. In that case, the Court took into consideration the
disbarred lawyers sincere admission of guilt and repeated
pleas for compassion.
Also in Valencia v. Antiniw, 28 the Court reinstated Atty. Antiniw

(who was found guilty of malpractice in falsifying a notarized
deed of sale and subsequently introducing the document in
court) after considering the long period of his disbarment
(almost 15 years). The Court considered that during Atty.
Antiniws disbarment, he has been persistent in reiterating his
apologies to the Court, has engaged inhumanitarian and civic
services, and retained an unblemished record as an elected
public servant, as shown by the testimonials of the numerous
civic and professional organizations, government institutions,
and members of the judiciary.
In all these cases, the Court considered the conduct of the
disbarred attorney before and after his disbarment, the time
that had elapsed from the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement, and more importantly, the disbarred attorneys
sincere realization and acknowledgement of guilt.
In the present case, we are not fully convinced that the
passage of more than four (4) years is sufficient to enable the
respondent to reflect and to realize his professional
transgressions.
We emphasize that this is the second timethat the respondent
was
accused
and
was
found
guilty
of
gross
misconduct.1wphi1 The respondent, in an earlier case of Plus
Builders, Inc. v. Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla,Jr., 29 was likewise
found guilty of gross misconduct for committing willful and
intentional falsehood before the court; misusing court
procedure and processes to delay the execution of a
judgment; and collaborating with nonlawyers in the illegal
practice of law mostly the same grounds on which the
Decision dated December 4, 2009 (2nd disbarment) was
based. In Plus Builders, we granted the respondents motion
for reconsideration and reduced the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law from two (2) years to six (6) months
out of compassion to the respondent.
Considering the respondents earlier disbarment case(and
subsequent reduction of the penalty imposed as an act of
clemency), and another disbarment case against him still
pending review by the Court, we are not fully and convincingly
satisfied that the respondent has already reformed. The
period of five (5) years is likewise not considerably long
considering the nature and perversityof the respondents
misdeeds. We believe that it is still early for the Court to
consider the respondents reinstatement.
Furthermore, we are not persuaded by the respondent's
sincerity in acknowledging his guilt.1wphi1 While he
expressly stated in his appeal that he had taken full
responsibility of his misdemeanor, his previous inclination to
pass the blame to other individuals, to invoke self-denial, and
to make alibis for his wrongdoings, contradicted his assertion.
The respondent also failed to submit proof satisfactorily
showing his contrition. He failed to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that he is again worthy of membership in
the legal profession. We thus entertain serious doubts that the
respondent had completely reformed.
As a final word, while the Court sympathizes with the
respondent's unfortunate physical condition, we stress that in
considering his application for reinstatement to the practice of
law, the duty of the Court is to determine whether he has
established moral reformation and rehabilitation, disregarding
its feeling of sympathy or pity. Surely at this point, this
requirement was not met. Until such time when the
respondent can demonstrate to the Court that he has
completely rehabilitated himself and deserves to resume his
membership in the Bar, Our decision to disbar him from the
practice of law stands.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Profound Appeal for

Judicial Clemency filed by Atty. Anastacio E. Revilla, Jr. is
hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Transcript of Conrado Que vs Atty. Revilla Jr

Conrado Que filed a disbarment case for Atty. Anastacio
Revilla Jr. before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) of
committing various violations on the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138 of the Rules of Court as stated in
the following
ISSUE
Monday, February 28, 2014
Vol XCIII, No. 311
The respondents abuse courts remedies and processes by
filing petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA),
two petitions for annulment of title at the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), a petition for annulment of judgment in the RTC and
lastly, a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC
(collectively, subject cases)to assail and overturn the final
judgments of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) and RTC in
the unlawful detainer case rendered against the respondent
clients.
Facts
The respondent also committed forum shopping by filing the
subject cases in order to obstruct, impede, and frustrate the
efficient administration of justice for his own personal gain
and to defeat the right of the complainant and his siblings to
execute the MeTC and RTC judgments in the unlawful detainer
case.
RULING
The respondents willful and revolting falsehood is also alleged
by the complainant that unjustly maligned and defamed the
good name and reputation of the late Atty. Alfredo Catolico
(Atty. Catolico) who is the previous counsel of the
respondents clients.
Atty. Revilla fabricated an imaginary order issued by the
presiding judge in open court which allegedly denied the
motion to dismiss filed by the respondents in the said case
where the respondent asserted the falsehood.
The complainant alleged that the respondent did this to cover
up his lack of preparation. Thus, the respondent also deceived
his clients (who were all squatters) in supporting the above
falsehood.
Under the circumstances of abuse of court and processes, the
respondents repeated attempts go beyond the legitimate
means allowed by professional ethical rules in defending the
interests of his client. The respondent violated Rule 10.03,
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
makes it obligatory for a lawyer to observe the rules of
procedure and. . . not [to] misuse them to defeat the ends of
justice.
The respondent also violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04,
Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility as well as
the rule against forum shopping, both of which are directed
against the filing of multiple actions to attain the same
objective. Both violations constitute abuse of court processes;
they tend to degrade the administration of justice; wreak
havoc on orderly judicial procedure and add to the congestion
of the heavily burdened dockets of the courts.
The respondent continually argued and challenged the court
for lack of jurisdiction by the MeTC and RTC even knowing
fully well that the competent courts have jurisdiction over the
unlawful detainer case.
Yes. The respondent committed violations in the code of
Professional Responsility and the Rules of Court
The respondents also deliberate, fraudulent and unauthorized
appeared in court in the petition for annulment of judgment
for 15 litigants, three of whom are already deceased
Conrado Que vs Atty. Anastacio Revilla Jr
Likewise, the respondent violated his duty as an attorney and
his oath as a lawyer never to mislead the judge or any

judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law.
In defending his clients interest, the respondent also failed to
observe Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which reads:
CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH
ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF LAW
Rule 19.01 A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means
to attain the lawful objectives of his clients x x x
Furthermore, the respondent also repeatedly attacked the
complainants and his siblings titles over the property subject
of the unlawful detainer case.
The respondent willfully and fraudulently appeared in the
second petition for annulment of title as counsel for the
Republic of the Philippines without being authorized to do so.
Atty. Revilla was accused of representing fifty-two (52)
litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762 when no such authority
was ever given to him.
The respondent answered the complaint and mostly denied all
the allegations.
Whether or not the respondent can be held liable for the
imputed unethical infractions and professional misconduct,
and the penalty these transgressions should carry.
The respondent violated Sections 21 and 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court when he undertook the unauthorized
appearances. The settled rule is that a lawyer may not
represent a litigant without authority from the latter or from
the latters representative or, in the absence thereof, without
leave of court.
Due to Atty. Revilla's multiple violations on the Conduct of
Professional Responsibility, and is found liable for professional
misconduct for violations of the Lawyers Oath; Canon 8; Rules
10.01 and 10.03, Canon 10; Rules 12.02 and 12.04, Canon 12;
Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and Sections 20(d), 21 and 27 of Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court. However, we modify the penalty the IBP
imposed, and hold that the respondent should beDISBARRED
from the practice of law.
A.C. No. 10628, July 01, 2015

MAXIMINO NOBLE III, Complainant, v. ATTY. ORLANDO O.
AILES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
vexation13 and, on June 19, 2012, after voluntarily entering a

plea of guilty, Orlando was convicted of the crime of unjust
vexation, consisting in his act of vexing or annoying Marcelo
by "texting insulting, threatening and persuading words to
drop his lawyer over a case x x
x."14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
IBP Report and Recommendation
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This instant administrative case arose from a verified
Complaint1 for disbarment dated April 16, 2012 filed by
complainant Maximino Noble III (Maximino) against
respondent Atty. Orlando O. Ailes (Orlando) before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
The Facts
Maximino alleged that on August 18, 2010, Orlando, a lawyer,
filed a complaint2 for damages against his own brother,
Marcelo O. Ailes, Jr. (Marcelo), whom Maximino represented,
together with other defendants, therein. In the said complaint,
Orlando stated the following data: "IBP-774058-12/07/09-QC
x x x MCLE Compliance No. II-00086893/Issued on March 10,
2008."4 Maximino claimed that at the time of the filing of the
said complaint, Orlando's IBP O.R. number should have
already reflected payment of his IBP annual dues for the year
2010, not 2009, and that he should have finished his third
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Compliance,
not just the second.
Sometime in December 2011, Maximino learned from Marcelo
that the latter had filed a separate case for grave threats
and estafa5 against Orlando. When Maximino was furnished a
copy of the complaint, he discovered that, through text
messages, Orlando had been maligning him and dissuading
Marcelo from retaining his services as counsel, claiming that
he was incompetent and that he charged exorbitant fees,
saying, among others: "x x x Better dismiss [your] hi-track
lawyer who will impoverish [you] with his unconscionable
[professional] fee. Max Noble, as shown in court records,
never appeared even once, that's why you lost in the pre-trial
stage, x x x get rid of [Noble] as [your] lawyer. He is out to
squeeze a lot of money from [you], x x x daig mo nga
mismong abogado mong polpol."6 Records show that Orlando
even prepared a Notice to Terminate Services of Counsel 7 in
the complaint for damages, which stated that Maximino "x x x
has never done anything to protect the interests of the
defendants in a manner not befitting his representation as a
seasoned law practitioner and, aside from charging enormous
amount of professional fees and questionable expenses, said
counsel's contracted services reached as far only in preparing
and filing uncalled for motions to dismiss x x x" as well as a
Compromise Agreement,8 both of which he sent to Marcelo for
his signature. Affronted, Maximino filed the instant complaint
charging Orlando with violation of Rule 7.03 of Canon 7, the
entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
(CPR), Bar Matter (BM) Nos. 8509 and 192210, and prayed for
the disbarment of respondent as well as the award of
damages.
In his defense,11 Orlando denied the charges against him and
claimed that his late submission of the third MCLE compliance
is not a ground for disbarment and that the Notice to
Terminate Services of Counsel and Compromise Agreement
were all made upon the request of Marcelo when the latter
was declared in default in the aforementioned civil case.
Moreover, he insisted that the allegedly offensive language in
his text messages sent to Marcelo was used in a "brother-tobrother communication" and were uttered in good
faith.12ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Meanwhile, the criminal case for grave threats and estafa filed
by Marcelo against Orlando was downgraded to unjust
In a Report and Recommendation15 dated April 30, 2013, the

IBP Commissioner recommended the dismissal of the case
against Orlando, finding that a transgression of the MCLE
compliance requirement is not a ground for disbarment as in
fact, failure to disclose the required information would merely
cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the
pleadings from the records. Neither did the IBP Commissioner
find any violation of the CPR so gross or grave as to warrant
any administrative liability on the part of Orlando, considering
that the communication between Orlando and Marcelo, who
are brothers, was done privately and not directly addressed to
Maximino nor intended to be published and known by third
persons.
In a Resolution16 dated May 11, 2013, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the IBP Commissioner's
Report and Recommendation and dismissed the case against
Orlando, warning him to be more circumspect in his dealings.
Maximino moved for reconsideration17 which was however
denied in a Resolution18 dated May 3, 2014 with modification
deleting the warning.
Aggrieved, Maximino filed the present petition for review
on certioranri.19ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Issue Before the Court
The issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the IBP
correctly dismissed the complaint against Orlando.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
The practice of law is a privilege bestowed on lawyers who
meet high standards of legal proficiency and morality. 20 It is a
special privilege burdened with conditions before the legal
profession, the courts, their clients and the society such that a
lawyer has the duty to comport himself in a manner as to
uphold integrity and promote the public's faith in the
profession.21 Consequently, a lawyer must at all times,
whether in public or private life, act in a manner beyond
reproach especially when dealing with fellow
lawyers.22ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In this relation, Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as Canon 8 of the
CPR provides:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he,
whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy,
fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and
shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach
upon the professional employment of another lawyer;
however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to
give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief
against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it

should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity
of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and
unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of the judicial
forum.23 In Buatis Jr. v. People,24 the Court treated a lawyer's
use of the words "lousy," "inutile," "carabao English,"
"stupidity," and "satan" in a letter addressed to another
colleague as defamatory and injurious which effectively
maligned his integrity. Similarly, the hurling of insulting
language to describe the opposing counsel is considered
conduct unbecoming of the legal
profession.25ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In this case, the IBP found the text messages that Orlando
sent to his brother Marcelo as casual communications
considering that they were conveyed privately. To the Court's
mind, however, the tenor of the messages cannot be treated
lightly. The text messages were clearly intended to malign and
annoy Maximino, as evident from the use of the word "polpol"
(stupid). Likewise, Orlando's insistence that Marcelo
immediately terminate the services of Maximino indicates
Orlando's offensive conduct against his colleague, in violation
of the above-quoted rules. Moreover, Orlando's voluntary plea
of guilty to the crime of unjust vexation in the criminal case
filed against him by Marcelo was, for all intents and purposes,
an admission that he spoke ill, insulted, and disrespected
Maximino - a departure from the judicial decorum which
exposes the lawyer to administrative liability.
On this score, it must be emphasized that membership in the
bar is a privilege burdened with conditions such that a
lawyer's words and actions directly affect the public's opinion
of the legal profession. Lawyers are expected to observe such
conduct of nobility and uprightness which should remain with
them, whether in their public or private lives, and may be
disciplined in the event their conduct falls short of the
standards imposed upon them.26 Thus, in this case, it is
inconsequential that the statements were merely relayed to
Orlando's brother in private. As a member of the bar, Orlando
should have been more circumspect in his words, being fully
aware that they pertain to another lawyer to whom fairness as
well as candor is owed. It was highly improper for Orlando to
interfere and insult Maximino to his client.
Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial
proceedings, as in this case, constitutes unprofessional
conduct which subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.27 While
a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and
courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive
and abusive language.28 The Court has consistently reminded
the members of the bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor
and reputation of a party. Considering the circumstances, it is
glaringly clear how Orlando transgressed the CPR when he
maligned Maximino to his client.29ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
With regard to Orlando's alleged violation of BM No. 1922, the
Court agrees with the IBP that his failure to disclose the
required information for MCLE compliance in the complaint for
damages he had filed against his brother Marcelo is not a
ground for disbarment. At most, his violation shall only be
cause for the dismissal of the complaint as well as the
expunction thereof from the
records.30ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Orlando O.
Ailes GUILTY of violating Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 as well as the
entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
hereby ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in dealing with
his professional colleagues and STERNLY WARNED that a
commission of the same or similar acts in the future shall be
dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.cralawlaw
Whether or not Atty. Adaza should be held administratively liable for failure
to comply with MCLE requirements.
The Ruling:
Bar Matter No. 850 requires members of the IBP to undergo continuing legal
education to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law
and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the
standards of the practice of law. 1 The First Compliance Period was from 15
April 2001 to 14 April 2004; the Second Compliance Period was from 15
April 2004 to 14 April 2007; and the Third Compliance Period was from 15
April 2007 to 14 April 2010. Complainants letter covered respondents
pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 which means respondent also
failed to comply with the MCLE requirements for the Fourth Compliance
Period from 15 April 2010 to 14 April 2013.
A Lawyers Failure To Comply With The MCLE Requirements And Disregard

Of The Directives Of The MCLE Office Warrant His Declaration As A
Delinquent Member Of The IBP
OCTOBER 7, 2015 BY THE LAWYER'S POST
The Case:
Atty. Samuel Arnado called the attention of the Court to the practice of Atty.
Homobono Adaza (respondent) of indicating MCLE application for
exemption under process in his pleadings filed in 2009, 2010, 2011 and 201,
and MCLE Application for Exemption for Reconsideration in a pleading
filed in 2012. When he inquired from the MCLE office, he learned that
respondent did not comply with the requirements of Bar Matter No. 850 for
the First (2001-2004), Second (2004-2007), and Third (2007-2010)
Compliance Periods. When the case was referred to the MCLE Committee
for evaluation, report and recommendation, the Committee came out with its
findings: respondent applied for exemption for the First and Second
Compliance Periods, on the ground of expertise in law.
The MCLE Governing Board denied the request on January 14, 2009. He also
did not apply for exemption nor complied with the Third Compliance Period.
The Court then required the respondent to file his comment. In his comment,
he alleged that he did not receive a copy of the letter of the complainant, who
belongs to the Romualdo and Arnaldo Law Office, the law office of his
political opponent, the Romualdo family. He then enumerated his
achievements as a lawyer and claimed that he had been practicing law for
about 50 years. His achievements ranged from appearing as counsels to
several poetical personalities, writing books, becoming a public servant, and
even refusing to be appointed a Supreme Court justice.
In its report and recommendation, the Office of the Bar Confidant found that
respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities as a lawyer. The OBC
stated that respondents failure to comply with the MCLE requirements
jeopardized the causes of his clients because the pleadings he filed could be
stricken off from the records and considered invalid.
The OBC recommended that respondent be declared a delinquent member of
the Bar and guilty of non-compliance with the MCLE requirements. The OBC
further recommended respondents suspension from the practice of law for six
months with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the
future will be dealt with more severely. The OBC also recommended that
respondent be directed to comply with the requirements set forth by the
MCLE Governing Board.
The Issue:
The records of the MCLE Office showed that respondent failed to comply
with the four compliance periods. The records also showed that respondent
filed an application for exemption only on 5 January 2009. According to the
MCLE Governing Board, respondents application for exemption covered the
First and Second Compliance Periods. Respondent did not apply for
exemption for the Third Compliance Period. The MCLE Governing Board
denied respondents application for exemption on 14 January 2009 on the
ground that the application did not meet the requirements of expertise in law
under Section 3, Rule 7 of Bar Matter No. 850. However, the MCLE Office
failed to convey the denial of the application for exemption to respondent. The
MCLE Office only informed respondent, through its letter dated 1 October
2012 signed by Prof. Feliciano, when it received inquiries from complainant,
Judge Sinfroso Tabamo, and Camiguin Deputy Provincial Prosecutor Renato
A. Abbu on the status of respondents MCLE compliance. Respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration after one year, or on 23 October 2013, which the
MCLE Governing Board denied with finality on 28 November 2013. The
denial of the motion for reconsideration was sent to respondent in a
letter2 dated 29 November 2013, signed by Justice Pardo.
Clearly, respondent had been remiss in his responsibilities by failing to
comply with Bar Matter No. 850. His application for exemption for the First
and Second Compliance Periods was filed after the compliance periods had
ended. He did not follow-up the status of his application for exemption. He
furnished the Court with his letter dated 7 February 20123 to the MCLE
Office asking the office to act on his application for exemption but alleged
that his secretary failed to send it to the MCLE Office.4 He did not comply
with the Fourth Compliance Period.
In its 1 October 2012 letter to respondent, the MCLE Office enjoined him to
comply with the requirements for the First to Third Compliance periods. It
was reiterated in the 29 November 2013 letter denying respondents motion
for reconsideration of his application for exemption. The OBC also reported
that a Notice of Non-Compliance was sent to respondent on 13 August 2013.
Under Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations, respondent has
60 days from receipt of the notification to comply. However, in his
Compliance and Comment before this Court, respondent stated that because of
his involvement in public interest issues in the country, the earliest that he
could comply with Bar Matter No. 850 would be on 10-14 February 2014 and
that he already registered with the MCLE Program of the University of the
Philippines (UP) Diliman on those dates.
Section 12(5) of the MCLE Implementing Regulations provides:
Section 12. Compliance Procedures
xxxx
(5) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to
circumvent or evade compliance with the MCLE requirements.
A member failing to comply with the continuing legal education requirement
will receive a Non-Compliance Notice stating his specific deficiency and will
be given sixty (60) days from the receipt of the notification to explain the
deficiency or otherwise show compliance with the requirements. Such notice
shall be written in capital letters as follows:
YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION FOR NONCOMPLIANCE OR PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE
REQUIREMENT WITHIN 60 DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF THIS NOTICE
SHALL BE A CAUSE FOR LISTING YOU AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER
AND SHALL NOT BE PERMITTED TO PRACTICE LAW UNTIL SUCH
TIME AS ADEQUATE PROOF OF COMPLIANCE IS RECEIVED BY THE
MCLE COMMITTEE.
The Member may use the 60-day period to complete his compliance with the
MCLE requirement. Credit units earned during this period may only be
counted toward compliance with the prior period requirement unless units in
excess of the requirement are earned in which case the excess may be counted
toward meeting the current compliance period requirement.
A member who is in non-compliance at the end of the compliance period shall
pay a non-compliance fee of PI,000.00 and shall be listed as a delinquent
member of the IBP by the IBP Board of Governors upon the recommendation
of the MCLE Committee, in which case Rule 13 9-A of the Rules of Court
shall apply.
Even if respondent attended the 10-14 February 2014 MCLE Program of UP
Diliman, it would only cover his deficiencies for the First Compliance Period.
He is still delinquent for the Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods.
The Court has not been furnished proof of compliance for the First
Compliance Period.
The Court notes the lackadaisical attitude of respondent towards Complying
with the requirements of Bar Matter No. 850. He assumed that his application
for exemption, filed after the compliance periods, would be granted. He
purportedly wrote the MCLE Office to follow-up the status of his application
but claimed that his secretary forgot to send the letter. He now wants the Court
to again reconsider the MCLE Offices denial of his application for exemption
when his motion for reconsideration was already denied with finality by the
MCLE Governing Board on 28 November 2013. He had the temerity to
inform the Court that the earliest that he could comply was on 10-14 February
2014, which was beyond the 60-day period required under Section 12(5) of
the MCLE Implementing Regulations, and without even indicating when he
intended to comply with his deficiencies br the Second, Third, and Fourth
Compliance Periods. Instead, he asked the Court to allow him to continue
practicing law while complying with the MCLE requirements.
The MCLE Office is not without fault in this case. While it acted on
respondents application for exemption on 14 January 2009, it took the office
three years to inform respondent of the denial of his application. The MCLE
Office only informed respondent on 1 October 2012 and after it received
inquiries regarding the status of respondents compliance. Hence, during the
period when respondent indicated MCLE application for exemption under
process in his pleadings, he was not aware of the action of the MCLE
Governing Board on his application for exemption. However, after he had
been informed of the denial of his application for exemption, it still took
respondent one year to file a motion for reconsideration. After the denial of his
motion for reconsideration, respondent still took, and is still aking, his time to
satisfy the requirements of the MCLE. In addition, when respondent indicated
MCLE Application for Exemption for Reconsideration in a pleading, he had
not filed any motion for reconsideration before the MCLE Office.
Respondents failure to comply with the MCLE requirements and disregard of
the directives of the MCLE Office warrant his declaration as a delinquent
member of the IBP. While the MCLE Implementing Regulations state that the
MCLE Committee should recommend to the IBP Board of Governors the
listing of a lawyer as a delinquent member, there is nothing that prevents the
Court from using its administrative power and supervision to discipline erring
lawyers and from directing the IBP Board of Governors o declare such
lawyers as delinquent members of the IBP.
The OBC recommended respondents suspension from the practice of aw for
six months. We agree. In addition, his listing as a delinquent member of the
IBP is also akin to suspension because he shall not be permitted to practice
law until such time as he submits proof of full compliance to the IBP Board of
Governors, and the IBP Board of Governors has notified the MCLE
Committee of his reinstatement, under Section 14 of the MCLE Implementing
Regulations. Hence, we deem it proper to declare respondent as a delinquent
member of the IBP and to suspend him from the practice of law for six months
or until he has fully complied with the requirements of the MCLE for the
First, Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods, whichever is later, and
he has fully paid the required non-compliance and reinstatement fees.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:
(1) REMIND the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Office to promptly
act on matters that require its immediate attention, such as but not limited to
applications for exemptions, and to communicate its action to the interested
parties within a reasonable period;
(2) DENY the prayer of Atty. Homobono A. Adaza to be exempted from
MCLE compliance as the matter had already been denied with finality by the
MCLE Governing Board on 28 November 2013;
(3) DECLARE Atty. Homobono A. Adaza as a delinquent member of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and SUSPEND him from the practice of law
for SIX MONTHS, or until he has fully complied with the MCLE
requirements for the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Compliance Periods,
whichever is later, and he has fully paid the required non-compliance and
reinstatement fees.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Homobono A. Adazas
personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to
all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts in the
land. Let copies be also furnished the MCLE Office and the IBP Governing
Board for their appropriate actions.
SO ORDERED.
MCLE Certification"; stating her belief that she was exempted

from completing the MCLE; and explaining why she could not
submit any Certificate of Exemption within the period given by
respondent judge, that is due to the MCLE Board meeting held
only once a month delaying the release of the Certificate of
Exemption. The Clerk of Court returned the letter to
complainant reasoning that it concerned a court
matter.10chanrobleslaw
On 20 April 2011, respondent judge issued an Order (1)
expunging the Compliance and Manifestation, (2) citing
complainant in contempt for failing to comply with the show
cause order dated 21 January 2011, and (3) imposing a fine of
P2,000.11 The Order stated that more than a month after the
18 February 2011 Order directing complainant to submit her
certificate of exemption, no such certificate has been filed.
ATTY. LUCITA E. MARCELO, Complainant, v. JUDGE

PELAGIA J. DALMACIO-JOAQUIN, PRESIDING JUDGE,
The Case
This involves an administrative complaint1 filed by Atty. Lucita
E. Marcelo against Judge Pelagia J. Dalmacio-Joaquin,
Presiding Judge of Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan (MTCC-San Jose del
Monte), for grave abuse of authority, grave misconduct, and
violation of Section 4(a), (b), and (c) of Republic Act No. 6713
(RA 6713).2chanrobleslaw
The Facts
Complainant, as counsel for accused in three criminal cases
raffled off to respondent judge's sala, failed to appear during
the hearing on 21 January 2011 in Criminal Case No. 10-0090.
She reasoned that she was indisposed, and conveyed her
condition through a phone call to Randy Sarmiento, Clerk of
the Office of City Prosecutor of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan to
inform the assigned prosecutor and the trial court. She also
instructed her client, Manolito Capingol, through his sister, to
inform the trial court of her predicament.
Respondent judge issued an Order directing complainant to
show cause "why she should not be cited in contempt of court
for not appearing in court despite notice and causing delay in
the proceedings."3The hearing was reset to 18 February 2011.
On 1 February 2011, complainant filed a "Compliance and
Manifestation"4 explaining the reason for her absence during
the hearing, attaching thereto a medical
certificate.5chanrobleslaw
During the scheduled hearing on 18 February 2011,
complainant verbally objected to the show cause order for
lack of basis, to which respondent judge allegedly countered
that "the issue was not [her] absence but the failure to
indicate in [her] 'Compliance and Manifestation' the details
regarding [her] third [Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE)] compliance."6 Complainant stated that she had the
honest belief that as a retired prosecutor she was exempt
from the MCLE requirement in accordance with Department of
Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 50 dated 25 June 2010. 7 In an
Order8 of even date, respondent judge directed complainant
to submit her exemption certificate within 10 days, which was
extended to 15 days upon complainant's motion.
Since she failed to obtain immediately a copy of the
exemption certificate, complainant wrote a letter 9 addressed
to the Clerk of Court of the MTCC-San Jose del Monte,
protesting about respondent judge's "sudden shift of focus
from [her] absence [on the 21 January 2011 hearing] to [her]
On 18 May 2011, complainant, through counsel, filed a motion

for reconsideration,12 which was denied in an Order dated 17
June 2011.13chanrobleslaw
On 31 August 2011, respondent judge issued an
Order14 directing complainant to show cause why she should
not be ordered arrested for her failure to pay the fine imposed
on her.
Thereafter, complainant filed with the trial court a
Compliance, dated 17 September 2011,15maintaining that she
"[had] not the slightest intention to defy lawful court
orders."16 Complainant reiterated the reason for her absence
during the 21 January 2011 hearing and her honest belief that
she was exempted from the MCLE requirement as a retired
city prosecutor pursuant to DOJ Circular No. 50. Complainant
claimed that "her absence in court on January 21, 2011 and/or
her failure to timely submit the Certificate of MCLE Exemption
does not fall within the ambit of the enumerated acts in
Section 3, Rule 71 which constitutes indirect
contempt."17chanrobleslaw
Complainant also filed a Letter Explanation, addressed to
respondent judge thru the Clerk of Court, dated 19 September
2011,18 raising her continuing objection to the contempt order.
On 8 November 2011, respondent judge issued an Order 19 for
the arrest of complainant for non-payment of the fine. On 24
November 2011, complainant paid the P2,000 fine, thereby
lifting the warrant of arrest.
Respondent judge also issued a show cause order in the other
two criminal cases for complainant's failure to appear during
the hearing. Complainant filed an Explanation20 for her
absence on 18 August 2011 in Criminal Case Nos. 09-0138
and 09-0398, which was due to the sudden change of trial
date which conflicted with complainant's pre-scheduled
appointments. In its 12 October 2011 Order, respondent judge
ordered the Explanation expunged for non-indication of
complainant's MCLE mformation, cited complainant in
contempt, and fined her P2,000 for failing to show cause why
she should not be cited in contempt for not appearing in court
despite notice.
In her Complaint, complainant alleged that respondent judge
issued the contempt orders "out of her whims and caprices
and without any legal basis therefor." 21 Complainant further
alleged that respondent judge "deprived her of the
opportunity to defend herself against her unjust orders by
refusing to consider all the explanation, compliance, and/or
correspondence she filed as expunged pleadings under the
cloak of non-compliance with the MCLE
requirements."22chanrobleslaw
Complainant alleged that her non-appearance in just one
hearing due to a justifiable reason or her failure to indicate
the details of her third MCLE Compliance does not fall under
any of the particular acts which constitute indirect contempt
under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

In her Comment,23 respondent judge explained that she cites
in contempt only those lawyers or litigants who fail to submit
satisfactory explanations to show cause orders and only after
giving them sufficient time to submit explanations or
compliances. She admitted citing complainant in contempt
since complainant submitted an explanation or compliance
which the trial court did not consider filed or was ordered
expunged from the records for not being compliant with the
MCLE requirement.
Respondent judge claimed that it was complainant who had
the propensity to do improper acts as a legal practitioner such
as sending a letter 24 to the Clerk of Court asking her to
reschedule a hearing, when what should have been done was
to submit a timely motion for cancellation or postponement of
hearing. In another instance, complainant, instead of
submitting a compliance to the trial court's show cause order
by way of pleading, sent a letter-explanation 25 which was not
considered at all, since the show cause order called for a
formal pleading that conforms with the prescribed rules.
Respondent judge further pointed out that complainant filed a
petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 7, challenging the show cause and
contempt orders and the P2,000 fine imposed by respondent
judge for being issued with grave abuse of authority.
Respondent judge stressed that the petition for certiorari was
dismissed for being moot since complainant already paid the
fine.
Respondent judge alleged that complainant was impelled by
revenge in filing the administrative case because it was
respondent judge who initiated a financial audit in the MTCCSan Jose del Monte, which resulted in the dismissal of
complainant's son, then acting clerk of court, who was found
guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and gross neglect of
duty.
The OCA's Report and Recommedations
In its Report of 22 November 2013, the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) found respondent judge liable for grave
abuse of authority, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
This Office cannot pass upon the wisdom of respondent Judge
Dalmacio-Joaquin in citing complainant Atty. Marcelo in
contempt for simply failing to appear during the hearing. It is
noteworthy, however, that the records reveal that
complainant Atty. Marcelo made an effort to notify the adverse
party and the court that she could not appear on the
scheduled hearing due to illness. A medical certificate issued
by Meonardo A. Reyes, M.D., substantiates this.
Be that as it may, even if it is conceded that complainant Atty.
Marcelo committed indirect contempt of court, she is
nevertheless entitled to due process.
xxxx
Respondent Judge Dalmacio-Joaquin's act of expunging from
the case records complainant Atty. Marcelo's explanation of
her failure to indicate the requisite third (3rd) MCLE
Compliance effectively deprived the latter of the procedural
requisite that before citing a person in contempt, said person
must be given the opportunity to appear and explain her
conduct. Moreover, the non-inclusion by complainant Atty.
Marcelo of her MCLE Compliance is not without valid reason.
Complainant cited Section 607 of Department of Justice
Circular No. 50 dated 25 June 2010 as her basis of exemption.
Yet, despite the aforecited circular, respondent Judge
Dalmacio-Joaquin required complainant Atty. Marcelo to
submit a Certificate of Exemption, which the latter willingly
complied with by applying for the same. The MCLE Board's
action on the matter is beyond complainant Atty. Marcelo's
control and, therefore, the MCLE Board's failure to

immediately act on the application should not be taken
against her.
x x x Respondent judge's act of unceremoniously citing
complainant in contempt is a clear evidence of [her]
unjustified use of the authority vested upon [her] by law. 26
The OCA recommended that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. x x x x
2. respondent Judge Dalmacio-Joaquin be found LIABLE for
grave abuse of authority; and
3. respondent Judge Dalmacio-Joaquin be meted a FINE of
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (Php5,000.00), with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same, or any similar
infraction in the future, shall be dealt with more severely. 27
The Issue
Since the OCA no longer discussed the charges of grave
misconduct and violation of Section 4(a), (b) and (c) of RA
6713, without any question from complainant, the issue boils
down to whether respondent judge is guilty of grave abuse of
authority.
The Ruling of the Court
We adopt the findings of the OCA, but modify the penalty
imposed on respondent judge.
The records show that respondent judge directed complainant
to show cause why she should not be cited in contempt for
not appearing during the hearing of 21 January 2011 in
Criminal Case No. 10-0090. In her Compliance and
Manifestation, complainant explained that she was unable to
attend the scheduled hearing because she was unwell, which
condition was relayed to her client and the office of the
prosecutor for the information of the trial court. Complainant
attached a medical certificate to support her explanation.
However, complainant's Compliance and Manifestation lacked
the number and date of issue of her MCLE Certificate of
Compliance or Exemption. For this reason alone, respondent
judge admits expunging the Compliance and Manifestation
and eventually citing complainant in contempt for failure to
file a satisfactory explanation for her non-appearance.
Respondent judge did not review or consider complainant's
explanation for her absence during the hearing of 21 January
2011.
In the interest of substantial justice, respondent judge should
have relaxed the application of Bar Matter No.
1922;28 accepted complainant's Compliance and
Manifestation; and should not have expunged the same from
the records. Besides, complainant was not without reason for
not indicating the MCLE information, that is, her honest belief
of her exemption from such requirement. At any rate,
complainant applied for a Certificate of Exemption 29 and
completed the units for her third MCLE Compliance period.
Yet, her application for exemption remained pending when the
contempt order was issued.30 As noted by the OCA, the delay
in the issuance of the Certificate of Exemption should not be
taken against her.
Reviewing the records, we find that complainant exhibited
respect and obedience to the trial court's orders. There is
clearly no disobedience, much less defiance, on the part of
complainant against respondent judge's authority. In other
words, there is no contempt of court to speak of, which has
been defined as "a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity
of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and
administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or
prejudice parties litigant or their witnesses during
litigation." 31chanrobleslaw
While respondent judge has inherent contempt powers,32 the

same should be exercised judiciously, sparingly, and with
utmost restraint.33 Respondent judge miserably failed to
exercise restraint. She cited complainant in contempt on the
sole ground that complainant failed to file a satisfactory
explanation for her non-appearance before the court. Yet, the
records clearly show that complainant filed a satisfactory
explanation, albeit lacking the required MCLE information.
Indeed, respondent judge demonstrated grave abuse of
authority, which has been defined as "a misdemeanor
committed by a public officer, who under color of his office,
wrongfully inflicts upon any person any bodily harm,
imprisonment or other injury; it is an act of cruelty, severity,
or excessive use of authority."34 To repeat, respondent judge
strictly, albeit unreasonably, applied the provisions of Bar
Matter No. 1922 in expunging the Compliance and
Manifestation. Respondent judge equated the expunged
explanation to non-filing of a satisfactory explanation when in
fact complainant filed a sufficient explanation for her nonappearance.
However, we modify the penalty imposed by the OCA. Instead
of fine, we find the penalty of reprimand appropriate under
the circumstances in this case.35 As stated, respondent judge
invoked and applied, though strictly, Bar Matter No. 1922 in
expunging complainant's Compliance and Manifestation,
which ultimately resulted in the contempt order.
We find unsubstantiated respondent judge's accusation of illwill or revenge as motive for the filing of this administrative
complaint. Respondent judge did not adduce any evidence to
prove such allegation.
On complainant's sending of letters addressed to the Clerk of
the trial court concerning court matters, we remind
complainant to file the appropriate pleadings or motions
directly with the trial court.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Pelagia J. DalmacioJoaquin, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch
1, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, GUILTY of grave abuse of
authority and accordingly REPRIMAND her, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same, or any similar
infraction in the future, shall be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.crala
just compensation. They also stipulated that their lawyers fees shall be in
proportion to the cash/bonds ratio of the just compensation.
A Compromise Agreement was executed between the Zuzuarreguis and the
NHA. The Compromise Agreement, stipulated among other things, that the
just compensation of the Zuzuarregui properties would be at P19.50 per
square meter payable in NHA Bonds. In a Decision dated 20 December 1985,
the RTC, approved the Compromise Agreement submitted by the parties.
The total amount in NHA bonds released to Atty. Romeo G. Roxas in behalf
of the Zuzuarreguis amounted to P54,500,000.00. Out of this amount, the
records show that the amount turned over to the Zuzuarreguis by Atty. Roxas
amounted to P30,520,000.00 (representing the actual just compensation,
although this amount is bigger) in NHA bonds.
Computed at P19.50 per square meter, the 1,790,570.36 square meters
property of the Zuzuarreguis was expropriated at a total price of
P34,916,122.00. The total amount released by the NHA was P54,500,000.00.
The difference of P19,583,878.00 is, undoubtedly, the yield on the bonds.
On 25 August 1987, a letter was sent by the Zuzuarreguis new counsel, Jose
F. Gonzalez, to Attys. Roxas and Pastor, demanding that the latter deliver to
the Zuzuarreguis the yield corresponding to bonds paid by the NHA within a
period of 10 days from receipt, under pain of administrative, civil and/or
criminal action.
Issue:
The honorable court of appeals gravely erred on a question of law in holding
that the letter-agreement re: contingent fees cannot be allowed to stand as the
law between the parties
Held:
A contract is a meeting of the minds between two persons whereby one binds
himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some service.
Contracts shall be obligatory, in whatever form they may have been entered
into, provided all the essential requisites for their validity are present. The
Zuzuarreguis, in entering into the Letter-Agreement, fully gave their consent
thereto. In fact, it was them (the Zuzuarreguis) who sent the said letter to
Attys. Roxas and Pastor, for the purpose of confirming all the matters which
they had agreed upon previously. There is absolutely no evidence to show that
anybody was forced into entering into the Letter-Agreement. Verily, its
existence, due execution and contents were admitted by the Zuzuarreguis
themselves.
In the presence of a contract for professional services duly executed by the
parties thereto, the same becomes the law between the said parties is not
absolute but admits an exception that the stipulations therein are not
contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy or public order.
Under the contract in question, Attys. Roxas and Pastor are to receive
contingent fees for their professional services. It is a deeply-rooted rule that
contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law. They are sanctioned by
Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics.
ROXAS V. DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR
Facts:
The Zuzuarreguis engaged the legal services of Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and
Santiago N. Pastor, to represent them in the case. This was sealed by a LetterAgreement, wherein it was contained that the attorneys would endeavor to
secure just compensation with the NHA and other government agencies at a
price of 11pesos or more per square meter, and that any lower amount shall
not entitle them to any attys fees. They also stipulated that in the event they
get it for 11pesos per square meter, their contingent fee shall be 30% of the
A contract for contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable

under all the circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of
the compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court,
as to its reasonableness.
Indubitably entwined with the lawyers duty to charge only reasonable fees is
the power of this Court to reduce the amount of attorneys fees if the same is
excessive and unconscionable.
Attorneys fees are unconscionable if they affront ones sense of justice,
decency or reasonableness. It becomes axiomatic therefore, that power to
determine the reasonableness or the, unconscionable character of attorney's
fees stipulated by the parties is a matter falling within the regulatory

prerogative of the courts.
In the instant case, Attys. Roxas and Pastor received an amount which was
equal to forty-four percent (44%) of the just compensation paid (including the
yield on the bonds) by the NHA to the Zuzuarreguis, or an amount equivalent
to P23,980,000.00 of the P54,500,000.00. Considering that there was no full
blown hearing in the expropriation case, ending as it did in a Compromise
Agreement, the 44% is, undeniably, unconscionable and excessive under the
circumstances. Its reduction is, therefore, in order.
It is imperative that the contingent fees received by Attys. Roxas and Pastor
must be equitably reduced. In the opinion of this Court, the yield that
corresponds to the percentage share of the Zuzuarreguis in the P19.50 per
square meter just compensation paid by the NHA must be returned by Attys.
Roxas and Pastor.
The yield on the NHA bonds amounted to P19,583,878.00. This amount must
therefore be divided between the Zuzuarreguis, on the one hand, and Attys.
Roxas and Pastor, on the other. The division must be pro rata. Attys. Roxas
and Pastor, in the opinion of this Court, were not shortchanged for their efforts
for they would still be earning or actually earned attorneys fees in the amount
of P6,987,078.75
On the issue of moral and exemplary damages, we cannot award the same for
there was no direct showing of bad faith on the part of Attys. Roxas and
Pastor, for as we said earlier, contingency fees are not per se prohibited by
law. It is only necessary that it be reduced when excessive and
unconscionable, which we have already done.

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Unethical conduct of lawyer results in disbarment

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A.C. NO.

10525, September 01, 2015

Magdalena Uy, through Maghari, filed her Reply17 to Wilson

Respondent does not deny the existence of the errant entries

details but also of his repeatedly changing information from

is such a solemn component of legal practice that this court

mechanism that has been statutorily devolved to local

The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal

Lastly, the inclusion of a counsel's address and contact details

A counsel's signature is such an integral part of a pleading

The inclusion of information regarding compliance with (or

As with the signature itself, these requirements are not vain

We underscore several facts. These demonstrate that

The inclusion of a counsel's Roll of Attorneys number,

In signing the Motion to Quash Subpoena ad Testificandum

MCLENO. 001597050 [Emphasis

The facts of modification and addition show active human

providers - PLM and IBP Quezon City Chapter and insisting

contain false information is a mockery of courts, chief of which

the court to be misled by any artifice." Rule 10.03 imposes

and deceitful conduct, is SUSPENDED from the practice of

years of being disbarred from the practice of law, he has

time that has elapsed in between the disbarment and the

In Rodolfo M. Bernardo v. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia, the Court, in

Also in Valencia v. Antiniw, 28 the Court reinstated Atty. Antiniw

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Profound Appeal for

Transcript of Conrado Que vs Atty. Revilla Jr

his oath as a lawyer never to mislead the judge or any

A.C. No. 10628, July 01, 2015

vexation13 and, on June 19, 2012, after voluntarily entering a

In a Report and Recommendation15 dated April 30, 2013, the

Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it

A Lawyers Failure To Comply With The MCLE Requirements And Disregard

MCLE Certification"; stating her belief that she was exempted

ATTY. LUCITA E. MARCELO, Complainant, v. JUDGE

On 18 May 2011, complainant, through counsel, filed a motion

under Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.

control and, therefore, the MCLE Board's failure to

While respondent judge has inherent contempt powers,32 the

A contract for contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable

fees stipulated by the parties is a matter falling within the regulatory

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