Zwicky on Heads

Author(s): Richard A. Hudson

Source: Journal of Linguistics, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Mar., 1987), pp. 109-132
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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J. Linguistics 23 (I987),

109-I32.

Printed in Great Britain

Zwicky on heads'
RICHARD A. HUDSON
Department of Phonetics and Linguistics, University College London

(Received22 July I986)

I.

INTRODUCTION

An interestingdevelopmentin the last decadeor so has been the increasing

use that theoreticallinguistshave made of the notion 'head' - or rather,in
ordernot to beg the question,of notions to whichthey have giventhe name
'head'. Thetermhasbeenaroundfora long timein linguistics,of course- for
exampleBloomfielduses it in relationto endocentricconstructions(I933:
I95), where the head is the daughter constituent which has the same
distributionas the mother.Beforethat, Sweethad used 'head-word'to refer
to any word to which another is subordinate (I89I: I6, quoted in Matthews,
I98I: I65). However,theoreticallinguistsmadeverylittleuse of the term,or
of the constellationof associatedconcepts,until quite recently.Its present
statusis due largelyto work on X-bar syntaxdatingfrom Chomsky(1970),
and especiallyto its recentmanifestationin GeneralisedPhrase Structure
Grammar(Gazdar& Pullum,I98I; Gazdaret al., I985)-and even more so
in the 'head-driven'variantof this (Pollard,i985). But the improvedstatus
of 'head' is also due to some extent to the renewedinterestin dependency
grammar(Anderson, 1971, I977; Matthews, I98I; Atkinson, et al, I982;

Hudson, I984; Nichols, I986). All these treatments agree not only in using

the term 'head', but also in using it to refer to the element in some
constructionto which all the other parts of that constructionare (in some
sense)subordinate.
It is reasonableto be suspiciousof notionswith as chequereda historyas
'head' on the groundsthat it developedin the days beforeformaltheories
of syntacticstructurewereavailable,as a rathermetaphoricalandvagueway
of referringto notionswhichwe maynow be ableto definemoreeconomically
and insightfullyin termsof other, more primitivenotions. It is sometimes
temptingin such cases to reintroducethe traditionaltermjust becauseit is
traditional.Thereis then a dangerof multiplyingentitiesunnecessarily- as
if one were to try to find a place for notions like 'guttural' or 'lilting' in
modernphonetics.Worsestill, a traditionaltermmay be used to referto a
multiplicityof notions whichare more or less closely relatedto the (vague)
traditionalconcept,but whichare in fact independentof each other.Arnold
[i]

Arnold Zwicky gave me most valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper, for
which I should like to thank him. I am also grateful to Nigel Vincent for his help with the
present version.
IO9

RICHARD

A. HUDSON

Zwickyhas recentlyargued(I985a) that this is in fact what has happened

with the term 'head'. He starts with the observationthat after its short
(recent)life in syntax,the termhas now startedto be appliedin morphology
as well, in orderto allow the verygeneralprincipleof 'percolation'to apply
at both levels. This principleis generallyformulatedin termsof a mother
constituentandits 'head', and requiresthe categorymembershipof the latter
to 'percolateup' to the former.Thus, if we know that the head is a noun,
we can deducethatthemotheris also a noun(perhapswitha differentnumber
of bars); and this is true whetherthe head is a singleword or a suffix(e.g.
-ness). However,after surveyinga varietyof head-likeconceptsin syntax,
Zwickyconcludesthatpercolationappliesto only one of them- whathe calls
the 'morphosyntacticlocus' (the constituenton whichinflexionsrelevantto
the motherare located, or would be if therewere any such inflexions).He
considerssevenotherhead-likenotions,but they all seemto be independent
of the morphosyntacticlocus, so the notions 'syntactichead' and 'morphosyntacticlocus' appearto be one and the same. Moreover,when possible
uses in morphologyare considered,he shows that 'morphosyntacticlocus'
is not the conceptthat is neededfor categorypercolation- whichof course
means that the apparent generalizationsand insights to be gained by
extendingthe category'head' into morphologyare spurious.
Apart from the consequencesfor morphology,the generalconclusionis
that 'head' is muchless importantin syntaxthanmanyof us havesupposed;
indeed,if we havesomeway to characterizemorphosyntacticloci, 'head' can
be droppedentirelyfrom our theoreticalvocabulary.The logic of Zwicky's
argumentis impeccable,and thereis no doubt that this paperis a valuable
contributionto the developmentof grammaticaltheory- as so many of his
otherpapershave been, suchas those on clitics(I985b) and on constituents
(1978). However,thereare seriousreasonsto doubt his conclusionsabout
the role of 'head' in syntax-and presumablyalso for questioninghis
pessimismregardingits role in morphology,thoughI shall have nothingto
say about this. The doubtsarisenot fromhis logic, but fromhis assumptions
about how varioustypes of structureshouldbe analysed.
2. ZWICKYxS

ANALYSIS

He considers the following syntactic notions as possible candidatesfor

'head' - i.e. for the categoryto whichpercolationapplies.
A. The SEMANTIC ARGUMENT-the constituentwhose meaning has the
status of 'argument'in relationto some 'functor'. This categorywill be
explainedanddiscussedin thenextsection,butZwickyassumes,for example,
that a determiner'smeaningis a functorwhose argumentis the meaningof
the followingcommonnoun.
B. The DETERMINANTOF CONCORD -the constituentwith whichsomeother
fellow-constituent must agree.
IIO

ZWICKY

ON HEADS

C. The MORPHOSYNTACTICLOCUS - as explainedearlier,this is the constituent on which any inflexionswhich are relevantto the motherare located
(or on which they would have been located had the languageincludedany
such inflexions).
D. The SUBCATEGORIZAND- the constituentwhich is subcategorizedwith
respectto its sisters,in the familiarsense.
E. The GOVERNOR- the constituentwhichdeterminesthe morphosyntactic
form of some sister.
F. The DISTRIBUTIONALLYEQUIVALENTconstituent- the constituentwhose
distributionis similarto that of the mother.
G. The OBLIGATORYconstituent- the one which has to be presentif the
motheris to be categorizedas it is.
analysis,the
H. The RULER of dependencytheory- in a dependency-based
'ruler' (Zwicky'stermfor what is often called 'head' in actualdependency
analyses)is the word on whichother wordsdepend.
Zwickydiscussesthesecategoriesin relationto six Englishconstructions:
e.g. control those penguins
(i) V + NP
towardthose penguins
(ii) P + NP
we control those penguins
(iii) NP + VP
those penguins
(iv) Det + N
must control those penguins
(v) Aux+ VP
that we control those penguins
(vi) Comp+ S
Given the analysesthat Zwicky assumesfor these constructions,his eight
categoriesapply to them as shownin Table I. The rows show the head-like
notions listed above (A to H), and the columns show the six English
constructions.Eachentryin the tableshowswhichof theconstituentsin these
constructionsis taken,in Zwicky'sanalysis,to be the head-likeconstituent,
but theseentriesare givenin termsof the correspondingentriesfor an extra
row whichI havesuppliedat the top of the table,for 'semanticfunctor'.This
is of coursejust the converseof the row for 'semanticargument',as can be
seen from the row of stars in the latter, but it will be helpfulfor the later
discussionto take the semanticfunctorentriesas a standardagainstwhich
we can measureotherentries.
If all the entriesin Table I had been either'=' or blank then we could
have claimedthat all of the eight head-likecategorieswerein fact the same
category,presentedwith respectto differentproperties.A naturalname for
this super-categorywould have been 'head', and the value- indeed,
indispensability- of 'head' would have been established.The big attraction
of the notion 'head', for those of us who believein it, is preciselythat it
integratesa wide rangeof differentphenomenasuchas the eight 'head-like'
concepts.(It goes withoutsayingthat it is immaterialwhat we actuallycall
thissuper-concept;if one linguistcallsit 'head' andanothercallsit something
else the disputeis about nothingbut terminology.)But of course the main
III

RICHARD

A. HUDSON

thrust of Zwicky'spaper is that this is NOT how things are- the various
concepts in fact pick out different ranges of items across the various
constructions,as shown by the distributionof = and * in Table i.

Semantic functor...
(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)
(E)
(F)
(G)
(H)

Semantic argument
Determinant of concord
Morphosyntactic locus
Subcategorizand
Governor
Distributional equivalent
Obligatory
Ruler

V+NP
(V)

P+NP
(P)

NP+VP
(VP)

Det+N
(Det)

*
*

*
*
*

=
=

=
*

(*)

Aux+VPComp+S
(Aux) (Comp)

=
=

Key: = same as entry for 'Semantic functor'

* different from entry for 'Semantic functor'
Table i
Zwicky's analysis of six constructions in terms of eight head-like categories

One advantageof presentingthe informationas I have done in this table

is thatit allowsus to pinpointthe sourcesof discrepancyby isolatingthe rows
and columnsin which * appears.These are as follows:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

the row for '(A) Semanticargument',

the row for '(B) Determinantof concord',
the columnfor 'Det + N',
the columnfor 'Aux+ VP'
the columnfor 'Comp+ S'.

In the followingdiscussionI shalltryto showthatthe analyseswhichZwicky

assumes,and on whichtheseentriesare based,are eitherirrelevantor open
to improvement.The outcomeof the discussionwill be a revisedversionof
the tablein whichthe discrepanciesare removed,and whichcan be takenas
evidencefor the positionwhichZwickyrejects,namelythat thereis a general
categorywhichsubsumesmany- thoughnot all - of the'head-like'concepts.
NaturallyI shallsuggestthatthissupercategory
is whathas traditionallybeen
called 'head'.
Beforeembarkingon this exerciseit is perhapsworth repeatingthat the
scope of the discussionis extremelylimited- just six constructions,and all
in relationto English.All that is at issuefor presentpurposesis whetherthe
varioushead-likecategoriesarein conflictas far as thisparticularset of data
is concerned.At the end of the discussionit will still be an importantmatter
I12

ZWICKY

ON HEADS

of debateto what extentthe conclusionsreachedherecan be generalizedto

other constructions,or to other languages.
3.

ARGUMENTS

AND BEING 'A KIND OF'

I startwith Zwicky'sintroductionto his discussionof semanticarguments:

We could take the head/modifierdistinctionto be at root semantic:in a
combinationX + Y, X is the 'semantichead' if, speakingvery crudely,
X + Y describesa kind of the thing describedby X. (p. 4)
Howevercrudeit may be, I find this descriptionveryinsightful,and I think
it correspondscloselyto the intuitionthat underliesmanyof the dependency
analyseswith which I am familiar.For example,in controlthosepenguins
(and other V+NP patterns),the whole refersto a kind of controlling,and
not to a kind of penguins,so controlis the head;and similarlyin Wecontrol
those penguins, in which both we and those penguins are subordinate to

control.This interpretationof 'head' applieseven more obviouslyto compoundslikejam sandwich,whose head is sandwichbecausethe wholedefines
a kind of sandwich,and not a kind of jam. Thus the head'ssistershave the
functionof modifyingthemeaningof thehead,in theeveryday,non-technical
meaningof 'modify'.
Having given this excellentintroduction,however,Zwicky immediately
suggests 'a sharpening(and extension)' of it in terms of the semantic
distinction between functors and arguments.The train of thought is as
follows:let us assumethat in Det + N the semanticheadis N because'those
penguinsdescribesa kind of penguin[sic]'. Now in standardfunctor/argument analysesit is the N which is taken as the argument,so let us assume
that the notion 'argument'is just a sharpened-upequivalentof the element
of which the whole defines 'a kind'. I shall suggest in Section 6 that the
standardanalysisof Det+N on which this conclusionrestsis faulty,but it
is surelyeasy to see that the analysisdoes not in fact generalizeto the other
constructions.
Takethe V + NP construction,to whichwe havealreadyreferred.According to the standardanalysesthe semanticargumentis clearlythe NP, but
we have seen that controlthosepenguinsrefersto a kind of controlling,and
not to a kind of penguins.Similarremarksapply to NP +VP examples:as
I suggestedabove, Wecontrolthosepenguinsrefersto a kind of controlling,
namelyone in whichwe and the penguinsare involved.Of course,thereis
a long traditionof takingNP + VP as a semanticallyexocentricconstruction,
in which neitherconstituenthas a uniquelyprivilegedstatus. This seems,
however,to confuse two questions.One is about the relationof the NP to
the VP - does the wholereferto an instanceof whateveris referredto by the
VP? Consider the well-establishedlogical tradition of representingthe
meaningof John loves Mary as 'Loves (John, Mary); here the respective
II3

RICHARD

A. HUDSON

relationsof subjectand object to the predicate(providedby the verb) are

clearlyverysimilar,and it wouldbe correctto say that 'Loves (John,Mary)'
is an instanceof 'Loves (x, y)'. So, in V + NP and in NP + VP, the NPs both
have the samerelationto the otherconstituent.A similarassumptionabout
the equalstatusesof subjectsand objectsis madeby all the familiarsemantic
analyseswhichuse semanticrelations.
Both typesof semanticanalysisreflectthe intuitionthat a sentenceand its
verbboth referto somekindof predicate,withthe differencethatfor the verb
variousargument'slots' are filledby variables(or indefinitedefaultvalues),
whereasfor the sentencethey have valuesdefinedby the subjectand object.
Take the verb controlfor instance;in the lexiconit might be representedas
'Control(x, y)' (I am not advocatingsuchstructures,just assumingthemfor
simplicity),and this structurewould be used as the basis for the semantic
structureof a sentencelike We controlthosepenguins,with the variables
replacedby 'we' and 'those penguins' (or their equivalents).All this is
presumablyveryfamiliarand ratheruncontroversial;but it all indicatesthat
NP +VP refersto a kind of the thing referredto by VP.
This questionabout the semanticrelationof NP to VP is separatefrom
the other one, which is about the relationsbetween the whole structure
NP + VP (i.e. sentences)and the structureV + NP. Sentencesseem to have
somethingwhichnone of theirpartshave, namelythe semanticbasis for an
illocutionaryforce;so in thatrespectthemeaningof a sentenceis indeedmore
than a modifiedversionof the meaningof its VP. However,this additionof
illocutionaryforce is not due to the additionof the subject,becauseit also
happensin the case of imperatives,whereno subjectis added(comparethe
infinitive (to) control those penguins with the imperative Control those

penguins!). Moreover no illocutionaryforce is added when NP+VP is

embedded in sentences like I know we control those penguins, so the

illocutionary force must be due to the linguistic context- i.e. lack of

dominatingconstituents-rather than to the NP+VP structureitself. I
conclude,then, that we arejustifiedin takingNP + VP as referringto a kind
of what is referredto by VP.
How about P + NP, in whichonce againit is the NP that is the argument?
Surelyit is nonsenseto say that towardthosepenguinsrefersto a kind of
penguins- as it shoulddo if the whole referredto a 'kind of' the semantic
argument?On the contrary,towardthosepenguinsrefersto a kind of place
or direction,which is definedin relationto the penguins.Similarly,behind
the tablerefersto a place, and not to any kind of table; and becauseof the
penguinsrefersto a kind of reason, not to the penguins.In case it is not
obviousthat this is so, let mejust point out that if towardthosepenguinsdid
referto a kindof penguinsit shouldcorrespondto pronounslike what,which
and them or it, but it does not (compare for example * Whathe saw was toward
those penguins). Instead it corresponds to where, there and so on (compare
Where he pointed his camera was toward the penguins).
II4

ZWICKY

ON HEADS

The less straightforward

constructionsare similarin theirinterpretation:
thewholerefersto somethingwhichis a particularcaseof (' kindof') thething
referredto not by the argument,but by the functor. Take the Comp+ S
construction, as in because we control those penguins. (In case it is objected

that becauseis betteranalysedas a preposition,I shouldexplainthat I shall

be introducing an analysis in which prepositions and subordinating
aremembersof the sameclass.)Accordingto
conjunctions/complementizers
Zwickythe S is the argument,so the whole constructionshould referto a
kind of controlling(by us) of those penguins,but it could be taken at least
equallyconvincinglyas referringto a kind of reason- namelythe kind of
reasonin which the cause is our controllingof those penguins(notice that
it could be paraphrased by for a certain reason, namely that we control those
penguins). Similarly, when we control those penguins refers to a kind of time,
and so that we can control those penguins to a kind of purpose. Admittedly

the semanticanalyseswhichI am invokingare veryroughand ready,but at

least they are nearerto the markthan analysesin whichComp+we control
thosepenguinsrefersjust to some instanceof us controllingthose penguins
(as if Comp werea modifierlike yesterdayorfirmly).
Another constructionto be tested is Aux+VP, as in may controlthose
penguins.Here Zwickytakes VP as the argument,so it ought to referto a
kind of controllingof those penguins.This might seem fairly reasonable,
especially in vew of sentences like Maybe they control those penguins, which
means much the same as Theymay control thosepenguins, but where the effect

is achievedby meansof an adverb.If an adverb+ verbcombinationgenerally

definesa kind of the event to whichthe verbrefers(as in e.g. oftencontrol),
then perhaps the same should be true of cases like maybe control and
thereforealso of may control.However,it could also be arguedthat maybe
controlis a kind of possibilityratherthan a kind of controllingand that in
this case the syntax and semanticsare out of step; a more transparent
rendering of the same meaning would be It is possible that they control those

penguins,in whichit is mucheasierto see that the whole refersto a kind of

possibility,ratherthan to a kind of controllingof penguins.
In conclusion,then, the notion of 'semanticargument'seemsparticularly
badly suitedas a basis for formalizingthe 'kind of' notion- I have shown
thatin fiveout of the sixconstructionsit is the functor,andnot the argument,
that definesthe thing of which the whole structuredefines'a kind'; and I
have promiseda discussionof the sixthcase (Det+ N) whichwill lead to the
same conclusion.Indeed, it would have been very odd had it turned out
otherwise,becauseI take it that in a functor-argumentstructureit is the
arguments,not the functor,which would be representedin the lexicon by
means of variables.Thus the functorstays constantas the argumentsvary,
andeachnewcombinationof argumentsdefinesa different'kindof' the thing
definedby the functor.
It is becauseof the speciallyclose relationbetween'kind of' and functors
I 15

RICHARD

A. HUDSON

that I included the notion 'semantic functor' as a 'head-like' notion in

additionto those whichZwickygives. In Table I I even go so far as to take
this extra notion as the standard against which other notions can be
measured,becauseof the verygreatvalueof Zwicky'soriginalinsightabout
the whole defininga kind of the thing denotedby the 'semantichead' - i.e.
by the functor.Thismeansin effectthat we can now ignorethe whole of the
' semanticargument'line of entriesin Table i, on the groundsthat starsthere
are irrelevant.
4. CONCORD

The line for '(B) controllerof concord' containsonly threeentriesbecause

thereis no concordat all in most of the constructions- concordappliesonly
to Det + N and to NP + VP. Thereis also a bracketedentryfor V + NP on
the basis of Zwicky's observationthat some languages- Hungarianfor
example- haveconcordbetweenverband object.However,the threeentries
whichare suppliedagreewiththose for the semanticargument,whichwe are
now ignoringas irrelevantto headship.Zwicky'sentriesfor concordare of
courseentirelyin conformitywiththe widelyheldview,whichhe quotes,that
concordis determinedby the semanticargument,but we mustnow look for
a way to reconcilethe entriesfor concordwith those for semanticfunctors.
An alternativeview of concordis as follows. Let us assumetwo elements
X and Y and a rulewhichrequiresthemto agreewitheachotherwithrespect
to some featureor set of featuresF. The questionis what else needs to be
specifiedabout X and Y in orderfor this rule to operatecorrectly,and the
simplestassumptionis clearlythat NOTHING
else need be specified.We must
presumablyaccept this assumptionunless some good reason is found for
rejectingit. Now there are two obvious essentialsfor any concordpattern
betweentwo elements,whichwe maycallthe 'concordants'.Onerequirement
is that one of the concordantsshould be fixed, with respectto F, by some
rule other than the concordrule. For example,if one of the concordantsis
a noun and the other an adjective,the numberof the noun is fixed by its
meaning(or by the lexicon,if its numberis arbitrary).The otherrequirement
is that the remainingconcordantshould NOTbe fixed in this way, because
otherwiseits value for F will not be free to be fixedby the concordrule.
Of courseit is logicallypossiblefor a concordruleto applyto concordants
which both have their values for F fixed independently.In that case the
concordrulewouldact as well-formedness
constraint,rulingout caseswhere
the valuesfor X andY differ.However,so faras I knowthisis not in facthow
concordrulesgenerally,or even ever,work.A candidatein Englishfor such
a rule would be the one whichis often said to apply betweena predicative
noun and its subject,givingriseto pairslike He is myfriendversusTheyare
myfriends.Sinceeithernoun could in principlehave its numbervaluefixed
lexically,irreconcilableconflictscould arise betweenthem; but when such
i i6

ZWICKY

ON HEADS

situationsarise,the resultmaybe eitherimpeccable(as in Theyarea nuisance)

or slightly problematic (as in ?My main problem is these scissors) - but not

ungrammatical,as one would expect if therewere a concordrule that had

been infringed.The conclusionto whichI come on this matter,then, is that
thereis no such rule (in Englishat any rate),and that the predicativenoun
selectsits value for the numberfeatureindependentlyof that of its subject,
takingaccountonly of the sentence'smeaning.

Semantic functor...
(C) Morphosyntactic

locus

V+NP
(V)

P+NP
(P)

NP+VP
(VP)

(D) Subcategorizand

(E) Governor

(F) Distributional equivalent

(G) Obligatory
(H) Ruler

Det+N
(Det)

Aux+VPComp+S
(Aux) (Comp)

Table2
Zwicky's analysis of six constructioas in terms of the six genuinely head-like categories

It seems reasonableto supposethat all concordrules will take the form

describedearlier,withonly one concordantfixedexternally.If thatis so, there
is no reasonfor specifyingwhich of the concordantsis the 'determinantof
concord',becausethis will be shownindependentlyby whateverrulesapply
to one of them.Typicallyone of themis a noun and the otheris not, so the
ruleswhichfixfeatureson the nounwillnaturallyapplyto this,andthevalues
of the correspondingfeatureson the other concordantwill be left to the
concord rule. If this is so, it can be seen that the directionof concord
determinationhas nothingat all to do with the notion 'head', pace Zwicky.
Puttingit somewhatcrudely,the determinantof concordis the noun, and
whetherthis is head or not is immaterial.We can now removethe line for
'(B) Determinantof concord' from Table I, therebyfurtherreducingthe
numberof deviationsfrom the standard.Table 2 shows the effectsof this
reduction.
5.

AUXILIARIES

AND COMPLEMENTIZERS

Accordingto Zwicky'sanalysisthe Aux+VP and Comp+S constructions

each contributethree discrepanciesrelativeto the standard.We shall now
considerwhetherthesejudgmentsare correct.We startwith the analysisof
auxiliaries.Here is what Zwicky says about them in connexion with the
categoryof 'distributionalequivalents':
I 17

RICHARD

A. HUDSON

VP is the distributionalequivalentof Aux+ VP, since the distributionof

Aux+ VP is roughlythe same as the distributionof VPs like controlthose
penguins and go to Fresno. (p.

I2)

This claim is hard to assessbecauseof the word 'roughly'. For example,

VP clearlycannot substitutefor Aux+ VP in sentenceslike He will control
thosepenguins (compare *He control thosepenguins) or He is controllingthose
penguins (compare *He controlling those penguins). Indeed, in order to take

VP as interchangeablewith Aux+ VP we have to ingorethe morphosyntax

of the verb in VP entirely.Moreover,Aux+ VP cannot be replacedby VP
in exampleslike Whyare you worrying?,even if we ignore questions of
morphosyntaxand pretendthat the differencebetweenworryingand worry
does not matter compare *Why you worrying/worry?). It would be at least

as persuasiveto say that the distributionalequivalentof Aux+ VP is Aux.

So faras I knowthereareno contextsin whicha sequenceof Aux+ VPcannot
be replacedby the Aux on its own, becauseof the effectsof VP ellipsis.For
example, He will control thosepenguinsis matched by He will; He is controlling
those penguins by He is; and Why are you worrying? by Why are you?

Admittedlythese cases are all elliptical,but this fact is irrelevantas far as

the principleswhichZwickygives for identi"yingdistributionalequivalance
are concerned.
Similarconclusionsapply to the relatedquestionof whichconstituentis
obligatoryin Aux+ VP. Accordingto Zwicky,VP is the obligatoryelement,
in spite of the well-knownfacts mentioned above, because he excludes
elliptical constructionsby fiat as irrelevantto the head-like notion of
'obligatoryconstituent'.He mentionstwo kinds of ellipsisin this context.
One is gapping (e.g. I ate sushi, and Kiyoko a hamburger),where I sympathize

with his decision- so muchcan be elidedin gappingthat if we took account

of gapping we should surely have to say that everythingis optional.
Moreover,thereis no specialconnexionbetweenthe rule for gappingand
the Aux+ VP construction- all thatis neededis for the gap to containa verb
of somekind,whetherauxiliaryor not. Butthe situationis verydifferentwith
the ellipsis of VP (e.g. I can swallow goldfish, but you can't). Here the ellipsis

is made possibleby the specificsubcategorizationpropertiesof auxiliaries,

accordingto whichthe complementof any auxiliary(i.e. the VP) is optional,
so there is a special connexion between the ellipsis and the Aux+ VP
construction(namely,that the VP is alwayssubjectto ellipsis).Moreoverin
this respectauxiliariesarejust like some kindsof non-auxiliaryverbsuchas
watch,contribute(Fillmore, I986) and know,whose complementsare also
optionaland, if absent,areto be recoveredanaphorically(compareFredwas
watching, Fred contributed a pound and I know). Zwicky accepts the

optionalityof the NP in V + NP as relevant,so it is hardto see whywe should

excludethat of VP in Aux+ VP. If this is so, it is clearlyAux, and not VP,
whichis the obligatoryelement.Theconclusionof the discussion,then,is that
i i8

ZWICKY

ON HEADS

Aux is both the distributionalequivalentof Aux+ VP and also its obligatory

constituent,contraryto Zwicky'sanalysis.
We now turn to Comp+S, whereof course we have to take account of
examples like since he left and what he did as well as of those like that we

controlthosepenguinswhich Zwickycites. Once again the questionsabout

whichpartis thedistributionalequivalentof thewholeandaboutwhichpartis
obligatoryare closely interconnected.It is true that if we concentrateon
clausesintroducedby that,it is easy to believethat the obligatorypart, and
thereforethe partwhichis distributionallyequivalentto Comp+ S, is S. For
example, in He thinks that we control those penguins, it is possible to omit
that but not to omit the following clause, we control thosepenguins. However,

in thisrespect.Takea complementizer
thatis a veryuntypicalcomplementizer
like since,whichis muchmore typical.Hereit is possibleto omit the clause,
by anaphoric ellipsis similar to the process responsiblefor VP ellipsis
(compare I haven'tseen him since we had that argumentand I haven'tseen him

since);but it is not possibleto omit the complementizer(compare*I haven't

seen him we had that argument).Similarlyfor interrogative pronouns like what
(e.g. I don't know what he did, I don't know what, and *I don't know he did),

and for a numberof othercomplementizers.

Not all complementizersare like since and what in this respect, of
course- withmanyof themtheclauseis obligatory(e.g. if, as in *I won'tcome
if). But this is preciselylike the relationin V+NP, in whichZwickyaccepts
that the distributionalequivalentand the obligatoryelementis V, in spiteof
the fact that someverbshaveto be followedby a NP, othersmay, and others
like
againmustnot be. WhatI am suggesting,then,is that a complementizer
since may be treatedas a kind of adverbwhich occurs in three different
structures: as sister of S (e.g. I've not seen him since he left), as sister of NP
(e.g. I've not seen him since the party), or without a sister (e.g. I've not seen
him since). Matthews(I 98 I : 150) seemsto favoura similaranalysisandtraces

it back to Jespersenand Strang;and of courseit is similarto the view that

prepositionsmay be eithertransitiveor intransitive- Jackendoff(I983: 49),
referringto earlierwork by Klimaand Emonds.
Thisanalysishas a welcomeconsequence,namelythat it fits preciselywith
Zwicky'sview that Compis the subcategorizand
in Comp+ S. He basesthis
view on the observationthat differentcomplementizers
allow differentkinds
of S - finite,non-finite,withor withoutgaps,and so on - so ourobservations
aboutoptionalitycan be takenas furtherevidencefor his analysis.Moreover,
we canevenusethe abovediscussionas a basisforfillingin someof theentries
for 'subcategorizand'whichZwickyleft blank(for perfectlygood reasonsbecausetheypresupposedtoo muchdiscussionof theory-particular
analyses).
Even without enteringinto theory-particular
issues, it is clear that thereis
at least a close connexionamongadverbs,prepositionsand non-pronominal
to the extentthat therearesinglewordswhichmay be used
complementizers,
in all threeways(e.g. since,discussedabove;otherexamplesarebefore,after
II9

RICHARD

A. HUDSON

and maybeexcept). It seemsat least worthexploringthe possibility,in any

theory,thatprepositionsareadverbswhichhavean NP as theircomplement,
thatcomplementizers
areadverbswhichhaveS as theircomplement,andthat
traditionaladverbsaresimplyadverbs(nowtakenmorebroadly)whichhave
no complement.But if this is so we can clearlyidentifyP as subcategorizand
in P+NP, therebyfillingone of the boxes whichZwickyleft empty.

Semanticfunctor...
(C) Morphosyntactic

locus

(D) Subcategorizand
(E) Governor
(F) Distributional equivalent
(G) Obligatory
(H) Ruler

V+NP
(V)

P+NP
(P)

NP+VP Det+N Aux+VPComp+S

(VP)
(Det)
(Aux) (Comp)

=
=

Table3
Zwicky'sanalysisof six constructionsin termsof the six genuinelyhead-likecategories,
showingfirstrevisions

The conclusionso far reachedin this section,then,is that Aux and Comp
are the distributionalequivalents and the obligatory elements in their
in P + NP. Table3
respectiveconstructions,andthatP is the subcategorizand
is a revisedversionof Table 2, in whichthesechangesare included.
Two otherquestionsarisein connexionwithAux+ VP and Comp+ S. The
firstis about the morphosyntacticlocus in Comp+ S. Accordingto Zwicky
it is the S, and the reasonfor this choiceis that S is wherethe morphological
markersof tense are. I take it that he accordsthis criterialstatus to tense
becausehe believesthat tense should percolateup from S on to the node
dominatingComp+ S, so presumablyhe has reasonsfor believingthat this
node shouldcarrya tense feature- perhapssomethingto do with subcategorizationof matrixverbs. However,since he does not explainhis reasons
it is hardto commenton the choice. What is clear,however,is that at least
as good a case can be made for takingComp as morphosyntacticlocus, on
preciselythe samegroundsas he offersfor takingP as morphosyntacticlocus
in P+NP: that the selectionof particularprepositionsis analogousto case
features(a verytheory-particular
decisionassociatedwithGeneralisedPhrase
Structure Grammar (Gazdar et al., 1985: 23) and Lexical-Functional
Grammar(Kaplan& Bresnan,1982: 197)). Sincethereare verbsin English
which select particular prepositions (e.g. informof, tell to), we must show this

prepositionas a propertyof theverb'ssister,althoughit is actuallymanifested

on the verb's'niece'. Whateverthe meritsand demeritsof this assumption,
much the sameis true, though on a smallerscale, of complementizers.
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ZWICKY

ON HEADS

For example,the verbdoubtallowseitherwhetheror if as complementizer

in its complement(e.g. I doubtwhether/ifit's true).Thisfactcannotbe stated
in semanticterms, by allowing an interrogativestructureas complement,
becausemost kinds of interrogativestructureare not in fact allowedafter
doubt - compare *I doubt why he did it - and in any case, whetherand if are

hereinterchangeablewith that (e.g. I doubtthat it's true)withoutchangeof

meaning.Similarlyverbsseemto differas to whetherthey accepteitherif or
whether- so discuss, for example, seems to prefer whetherstrongly to if (e.g.
We were discussing whether/?if we had enough money). In other words, the

subcategorizationfor verbs must be able to distinguishbetween clausal

complementswhich are introducedby differentcomplementizers
just as it
mustbe ableto be sensitiveto the prepositionsin prepositionalcomplements.
In short,Comphasat leastas good a claimto be takenas themorphosyntactic
locus in Comp+ S as S does.
The otherquestionrelatesto Zwicky'sviewaboutthe dependencyanalysis
of Aux+ VP, whichleads him to take VP as what he calls the 'ruler'- alias
the 're'gissant'or 'Regens' of some dependencyscholars,and the 'head' of
others.AdmittedlyZwickyis presentingwhat he takes to be the consensus
of opinion among dependencygrammarians,and he may well be right in
suggesting that most would take the VP as 'ruler'. This is certainly a
traditionalview, which is firmlyentrenchedin the term 'auxiliary' verb,
suggesting subordinationin relation to the 'main' verb inside the VP.
However,manylinguistsnow questionthis traditionalview,and it is at least
reasonableto suggestthatall the argumentswhichareusedto showthatAux
is a sisterof VP, in a constituency-based
analysis,carryoverto a dependencybased one. (This is certainly the view that I have taken in my own
dependency-basedwork- cf. Hudson, I984: 9I.) I think, then, that if the
entriesfor the 'ruler'of dependencygrammarare to be takenseriouslythey
must be updatedfor Aux+VP; so I shall assumethat in this construction
it is Aux, not VP, that is the ruler.This revision,togetherwith the analysis
of Comp as morphosyntacticlocus of Comp+ S, will be incorporatedinto
the next versionof our table.
6.

DETERMINERS

All the remainingstarsin Table 3 are in the columnfor Det+N. However,

let us startwith the one entrywhichagreeswith the standard.Accordingto
Zwicky, Det is the subcategorizand,on the groundsthat 'determinersare
lexicallysubcategorizedaccordingto whethertheycan combinewithsingular
count nouns (each penguin/*penguins/*sand), plural count nouns (many
*penguin/penguins/*sand) or mass nouns (much *penguin/*penguins/sand)'.

This judgmentis again supportedby other distributionalfacts about the

commonnoun, namelythat the possibilityof ellipsisvariesfromdeterminer
to determiner.For example, it is possible after each, but not after every
(compare The winnerslined up and each/*every was given a standing ovation);
121

RICHARD

A. HUDSON

afterthisbut not afterthe;aftersomebut not aftera(n); and so on. All these

facts can be dealt with very easily if the determineris analysed as the
subcategorizand,with lexicaldifferencesamongdeterminers.
Zwicky'sotherclaimsabout Det + N are open to seriousdoubt. Consider
firsthis viewthatN is the morphosyntacticlocus.Hejustifiesthisby pointing
to the distinction between singular and plural which is marked on the
commonnoun, and whichis relevantto distinctionsin the VP. Thereare a
numberof other facts, however,which he does not mentionalthoughthey
are highlypertinent.
(a) Severaldeterminersalso mark the distinctionbetween singularand
plural - this/these, that/those, much, many, few, little, both, either, neither

a(n)and all the numbers.And somecommonnounsdo not showthe number

contrastmorphologically- sheep,fish, etc. Notice too that in some varieties
of Englishmeasurenounsaresingularwhentheyfollowa number-five mile,
threepound,etc. So it is at least debatablewhethernumberis indicatedby
the noun ratherthan by the determiner.
(b) Two determinersare of particularinterest:you and we (e.g. you
Americans,welinguists).It seemsclearthat thesewordsaredeterminerswhen
combinedwitha commonnoun(Postal,I966; Sommerstein,1972), as witness
for examplethe fact that theycannotcombinewith otherdeterminers(in the
absenceof an intonationbreakto marknon-definingapposition)- e.g. *we
the linguists, *you those students. One relevant fact about these determiners

is thattheyhavesole responsibilityformarkingperson(relevant,for instance,

to choice of reflexive pronouns: You childrenmust behaveyourselves/*them-

selves). Likewisethey alone mark 'case' -the differencebetween subject

andobjectforms.For example,westudentscontrastswithusstudents(at least
in some varieties): We/*us students work hard, vs. The governmentis against

us/*we students.In contrast,common nouns indicatenothingabout either

personor case.
The few morphosyntacticmarkersthat thereare in the EnglishNP, then,
seem to be distributedfairlyequallybetweenDet and N, so I shall reverse
Zwicky'sdecisionby takingDet as the morphosyntacticlocus. It shouldbe
clearthatwe couldextendthe discussioninterestinglyto otherlanguages,and
in at least some languageswe shouldfind even clearerevidencethat Det is
the morphosyntacticlocus,ratherthanN - e.g. caseis moreclearlyindicated
on Det in German,and numberis more clearlymarkedon Det in spoken
French.However,for the presentI shall restrictmy discussionto English,
followingZwicky'slead.
What about the relatedconcepts'distributionalequivalent'and 'obligatoryelement'?Regardingdistributionalequivalence,Zwickywrites:'N is the
distributionalequivalentof Det + N, since the distributionof Det + N is
roughly the same as the distributionof Ns like penguinsand Kim' (I2).
However,as Zwickyhimselfnotes, it is by no meanseasy to decidewhether
Det + N is endocentric,so it is also hard to decide whetherit has any
I22

ZWICKY

ON HEADS

distributionalequivalentat all. If you take exampleslike the boys,it is clear

that boysis distributionally(moreor less) equivalent,and that theis not (e.g.
I knowthe boys/boys/*the);on the other hand, this boy points in precisely
the opposite directionbecauseboy on its own cannot be used as an NP,
whereas this can (e.g. I know this boy/this/*boy). To quote Zwicky: 'the
criterion[of distributionalequivalence]can be used to argue that N is the
head, that neitherconstituentis, or that Det is, dependingon which set of
facts you look at' (12 n. 8).
Part of the problemwith thinkingthroughthis area of grammaris that
we are constrainedby a ratherunsatisfactoryset of terminology.In this
respectthe situation is rather similarto the one we consideredearlierin
relation to the terms 'preposition', 'adverb' and 'complementizer'.The
terminologyin the presentcase consistsof 'noun', 'pronoun' and 'determiner'. The traditionalassumptionis that 'determiner'is a basic word class
whichcannot be subsumedunderother classes,but thereare good reasons
for thinkingthat determinersare in fact a subset of pronouns,which are
generallyagreedto be a subsetof nouns(or moreprecisely,a subsetof nouns
which are distributionallyequivalentto NPs). Some of these argumentsare
alreadywell known(e.g. Postal, I966; Sommerstein,I972), but othershave
been pointed out more recently(Hudson, I984: 90 f.). The most striking
connexion between 'determiner'and 'pronoun' is the large overlap of
membership,if we follow the traditionin sayingthat any determinerwhich
occurswithout a followingnoun is a pronoun.In fact all but a handfulof
the determinersare also pronounsin this sense.But thereare other striking
similaritiesbetweendeterminersandpronouns,suchas the fact thatthe same
range of grammaticalfeaturesare relevantin both cases (e.g. possessive,
relative,interrogative,demonstrative,definite,indefinite,negative).In view
of similariesas great as this it seems at least reasonableto assume that
determinersare pronouns,and thereforenouns.
If we now returnto the questionof thedistributionalequivalentin Det+ N,
the situationlooks ratherdifferentif we updatethe notationby writing'N'
insteadof Det: N+ N. In otherwords,we are now assumingthat the words
in thisboy are BOTH nouns.Thusif the distributionalequivalentof NP must
be an N, then this could be the determineras easily as the common noun.
And if we apply the test of distributionalequivalencein some other way,
whichresultsin the determinerbeingselectedas the distributionalequivalent
of the NP, then this result should now be more acceptableto those who
believe,with X-bar theory,that the head of a phraseshould have the same
categoryfeaturesas the phrase.
I recognizethatmanyreaderswillwantmuchmoredetailedargumentation
before they accept that determinersare just 'transitivenouns', as it were
(parallelwith prepositionsas 'transitiveadverbs').However,I submitthat
the case for choosing the commonnoun as the distributionalequivalentof
the NP is at least less clear than Zwickyassumes.Similarremarksapply to
123

RICHARD

A. HUDSON

the choice of the obligatoryelement,but they follow in a fairlyobviousway

from what I havejust said, so thereis no need to make them in detail.The
main point is that it is at least as easy to omit a common noun as it is to
omit a determiner(e.g. I didn'treadeitherbook/either/*book).Admittedly
the formeromissionis an exampleof ellipsis,whichZwickyexcludesa priori;
but as I have alreadyexplained,we need not follow Zwickyin this respect.
I assume,then, that it is Det, ratherthanN, whichis the obligatoryelement
in Det +N.
Finallywe come to whatZwickytakesas the consensusof opinionamong
dependencygrammariansregardingthe status of Det and N. The situation
here is much the same as it was in the case of Aux+ VP: he reports a
traditionalview againstwhicha numberof argumentscan be musteredeven
within the dependencyframework.I shall present one such argumentin
Section8. For the presentI shall simplynote that many of the thingsI have
saidaboveaboutDet + N arerelevantto a dependencyanalysis,andindicate
that Det, not N, shouldbe taken as 'ruler'.
7. A

HARMONIOUS

ANALYSIS

Table 4 presentsthe resultsof the discussion.Zwicky'smain themeis that

the varioushead-likenotions which he identifiesin fact representdifferent,
andcompeting,analysesof sentencestructure.My contentionis that exactly
the contraryis the case: there is a quite remarkabledegree of agreement
among those of them that are genuinelyrelevantto headship,to the extent
that thereis NO CONFLICTWHATSOEVERamongthem.This is not of courseto
saythatno conflictwilleverarise,if we applythe samecategoriesto a different
set of constructionsfrom the six that Zwickychose. All it shows is that a
harmoniousanalysisof theseparticularconstructionsis possible.It is natural
to drawthe conclusionthat the notion 'head' does indeedcontributea great
deal to linguistictheory, because it - and it alone- is suited to bringing
togetherthe six distinctnotions, which we can now take as (more or less)
independentpropertiesof the head of a construction:it is the semantic
functor,the morphosyntacticlocus, the subcategorizand,the governor,the
distributionalequivalent,and the obligatoryelement.
It is worthremindingourselvesthat this list of head-likenotions includes
the semanticnotion 'semanticfunctor', as well as the five strictlysyntactic
ones.Thisshowsthat'head' is an importantpointof contactandcongruence
betweenthe syntacticandsemanticstructuresof a sentence,thepointat which
the semanticcategory'functor' is mappedon to syntacticcategories.If the
congruencedoes indeedgeneralizebeyondthe six structuresconsideredhere,
then clearlyit limitsvery strictlythe extentto whichsyntacticstructuresare
arbitraryvis-'a-vissemantic ones, and allows us to identify all sorts of
mappingsbetweensyntacticand semanticstructureswhich should not be
found in naturallanguages.Furtherresearchwill have to developsome of
124

ZWICKY

ON HEADS

theseconsequencesfor typology,childlanguageacquisitionand otherfields.

An excellentstarthas alreadybeen madein the typologicalfieldby Nichols
(I986), in whichit is shownthat the morphologicalmarkerof a dependency
need not be located on the dependent(as in the prepositions,case-markers
and so on of familiarWesternEuropeanlanguages)but may also be located
on the head.

Semantic functor...
(C)
(D)
(E)
(F)
(G)
(H)

Morphosyntactic locus
Subcategorizand
Governor
Distributional equivalent
Obligatory
Ruler

V+NP
(V)

P+NP
(P)

=
=

NP+VP
(VP)

Det+N
(Det)

Aux+VPComp+S
(Aux) (Comp)

=
-

=
-

Table 4
Final revised version of Zwicky's analysis of six constructions in terms of the six genuinely
head-like categories

A methodologicalproblemarisesin using generalizationsbased on categorieswhich,like 'head', unify a rangeof differentproperties.The problem

is that whatunifiesthesepropertiesis only a verystrongtendency,so deviant
cases can arise. We have alreadyseen one such case in our discussionof
English,when we noted that the semanticstructurefor maybecontrolis not
as expected,with the head (control)providingthe functor.If Theymaybe
control the penguins has the same semantic structure as It is possible that they

controlthepenguins,it is clearthat the syntacticrelationsmustbe out of step

with the semanticones in at least one of the sentencesbecausein one maybe
is subordinateto control,and in the other the syntacticrelationis reversed.
Suchcases are easy to accommodatein WordGrammar- indeedthe theory
leadsus to expectthem- butmethodologicallytheymakeit somewhatharder
to be sure in particularcases which elementis the head, becausedifferent
propertiesmay point in differentdirections.The problemis not peculiarto
the concept'head', however- otherimportantcategorieslike 'subject'raise
preciselyanalogous problems- so I see no reason to take it as evidence
againstthe generalclaimsI havejust made.
I shouldalso like to point out that theseconnexionsbetweensemanticand
syntacticstructuredo not dependon acceptanceof the distinctionbetween
'argument'and 'functor'- a distinctionwhichZwickyhimselfnotes is itself
ratheruncertain.Insteadof referringto functorswe could referto Zwicky's
originalidea about the 'kind of' relationbetweenthe referentsof the head
125

RICHARD

A. HUDSON

and of the whole construction(i.e. the constructionrefersto a kind of X,

whereX is whatits headrefersto). Thisis a muchmoregeneralnotionwhich
can be formulatedin termsof a varietyof theoriesof semanticand cognitive
structure.The generalpictureof how syntax and semanticsrelate to one
anotheris thena verysimpleone, in whichtheheadof a constructionprovides
a general semanticnotion which is narroweddown by the various other
elementsin the construction.
A furtherconsequenceof our discussionis that the notions of 'head' as
this termhas beenappliedin a varietyof theoriesarenot, in fact,as disparate
as Zwickysuggests.In particular,he is wrongin suggestingthat'the notionof
head that Andersonand Hudson [two advocatesof dependencytheory]are
usingis... probablynot the samenotion as the headin syntacticpercolation
( II n. 7). Differentlinguistsmayusethenotion'head' fordifferentpurposesone for percolation,anotherfor government,and so on - but this is to be
expectedin viewof themultiplicityof propertiesthatwehavefoundforheads.
In the same way, one might referto the notion 'subject'in rules for word
order, for agreement,and so on, but it is the same concept that is being
referredto in each case. One could thus see the increaseduse of the term
'head' as a genuine case of convergenceamong theories, a particularly
encouragingdevelopmentconsideringhow differentin other respectssome
of the theoriesconcernedare.
I shallfinishthepaperby discussingtwo furtherusesof theterm'head' - in
otherwords,two more'head-likeconcepts'- whicharenot on Zwicky'slist.
8.

ADJACENCY

Zwickyrefersratherbriefly(and somewhatsceptically)to the possibilityof

formulatingword-orderrulesin relationto 'head'. The ruleshe has in mind
are those for linearorderingof sistersin a construction,suchas the rulefor
Japanese:heads follow non-heads.This possibilityhas been recognizedfor
a long time in the dependencyliterature,and is alreadyquitewell developed
in Tesniere(I959). Unfortunatelythe generalizationsthat can be made on
this basis for Englishare not particularlyimpressive,becausesome heads
follow and othersprecede.For some other languagesthe benefitsof being
ableto referto headsaremuchmoreobvious,but I shallnot pursuethispoint
here.InsteadI shalltakeup anotheraspectof word-ordering
to whichZwicky
does not refer, namely the question of adjacency. Recent versions of
dependencytheoryhaveuseda principlecalledthe AdjacencyPrinciple(and
firstformulated)by Robinson(1970). Thisprinciplehas a crucialpartto play
in dependencytheorieswhicheschewconstituentstructure,becauseit is solely
responsiblefor keeping phrases continuous. (A phrase can be defined,
derivatively,as a wordplus all the wordswhichare subordinateto it, in the
sense of subordinateto be definedbelow.) Roughlyspeakingit says that a
word must be as close as possible to its head-i.e. to the head of the
I26

ZWICKY

ON HEADS

constructioncontainingit. (Fromnow on I shallassumethat in 'head of X'

X is a word dependingon the head, ratherthan a phrasecontainingit; the
two terminologiesare largely interchangeable,but only the former is
appropriateto dependencytheory.)
In my own theory, Word Grammar,the AdjacencyPrinciplecan be
expressedas follows (similarformulationshave been given by others, e.g.
Robinson, 1970; Anderson,1976).
ADJACENCY

PRINCIPLE

If A is the head of B, and some word C separatesthem, then it must be

the case either(i) that C is subordinateto A, or (ii) that C is (subordinate
to) the head of both A and B.
The term'subordinateto' is usedin the senseof Anderson& Durand(I986)
to referto an extensionof the dependencyrelation.If X dependson Y and
Y on Z, then X is subordinateto Z, althoughit does not 'depend' on it in
the strictsenseof havingit as its head.(Thisdistinctionbetween'dependent'
and 'subordinate'is intendedto replacethe distinctionI made in previous
work between'direct' and 'indirect'dependency.)Formallyspeaking:
- A depends(or is dependent)on B if B is the head of A;
- A is subordinateto B if A is dependenton B, or if A dependson C and
C is subordinateto B.
To makethe discussionmoreconcrete,imaginethreewords,with,difficulty
and great, and assume that difficultydepends on with, and great on difficulty.

We can indicatethese dependenciesin the traditionalway by meansof the

with
verticaldimension:
difficulty
great
Let us also assume two rules for the orderingof heads relativeto their
dependents,whose effectsguaranteethe followingorderings:
with difficulty
great difficulty
The questionis, what determinesthe orderingof within relationto great?
The rules given so far permit either of with great difficulty and *great with

difficulty,so how do we excludethe secondof these?This is the functionof

the AdjacencyPrinciple.(Sincethis is a universalprinciple,specialdispensations will be neededfor cases in other languageswhich seem to infringeit,
such as Latin summa cum laude, 'highest with praise' - i.e. 'with the highest

praise'.)
To see how the principleworks let us look at the dependencystructures,
using the Word Grammarnotation in which arrowspoint from the head
towardsits dependents:
I27

RICHARD

(a)

A. HUDSON

'
(b)
with greatdifficulty
greatwith difficulty

Structure(a) is permittedby the AdjacencyPrinciplebecause difficultyis

separated from its head, with, by a word - great - which is subordinate to

with,therebysatisfyingclause(i). It will be seen thatgreat is subordinateto

withbecausethe formerdependson difficulty,whichin turndependson with.
In contrast,structure(b) does not satisfyclause(i) becausegreatis separated
from its head, difficulty,by with,whichis not subordinateto difficulty.Nor
does it satisfyclause (ii), becausewithis not the head of both great and of
difficulty.Consequently(b) is ill formed.
I should explainwhy clause (ii) is needed.It is meant to cover a variety
of constructionsin whichan elementis displaced- so-calledsubject-raising,
subject-control,tough-movement,extraposition, long extraction (alias
unbounded dependencies- e.g. wh-movement),and a number of other
possibilities.In each of thesecasesa specialruleassignssomeworda second
head, so one of its heads is allowed(by clause (ii)) to intervenebetweenit
and its other head. Explainingand justifyingthese analyseswould take us
muchtoo farafieldfor presentpurposes,so I shalljust illustratethe operation
of clause (ii) in relationto subject-raisingverbs,as in Fredkeeps talking.I
assume that Fred is subjectnot only of keeps, but also - and in the same
structure- of talking. (Similar structuresare also assumed in LexicalFunctionalGrammar- see Bresnan,I982 a.) If X is subjectof Y, then Y is
the head of X, so Fred has two heads; the two verbs, one of which - keeps - is

also head of the other.The structureis as follows:

Fred

keeps

talking

It can be seenthatFredis separatedfromone of its heads,talking,by a word

which is not subordinateto the latter, so it is not permittedby clause (i).
However,this wordis also the headof both of them,so clause(ii) coversthe
structureand it is well formed.
The point of this discussionis to show the importantpart playedby the
Adjacency Principle in dependency theory, which in turn shows how
important the notion of 'head' is in specifying adjacency,because the
principlereferscruciallyto the asymmetricalrelationbetween'head' and
'dependent'.Let us takejust one particularlysimpleinstantiationof clause
(i), expressedas follows.If A is headof B, and somewordC separatesthem,
thenC maydependon B. Thiscoverscaseslike ourearlierexamplewithgreat
dificulty, where great depends on dfficulty; and it excludes cases like *great

withdifficultybecausetheinterveningwordwithis headratherthandependent
of difficulty.If thedirectionof dependency- i.e. thedifferencebetween'head'
and 'dependent'- had been irrelevant,therewould have been no difference
in statusbetweenthesetwo examples,becausein both cases the dependency
I28

ZWICKY

ON HEADS

relations are in other respects the same (each of great and with has a
dependencyrelationto difficulty).
As I promisedin the discussionof determiners,the AdjacencyPrinciple
throwsextra light on the relationbetweenDet and N in Det+N. Imagine
a sequenceof determiner+adjective+common noun, such as the big book.
Now if the common noun were the head of the determiner,as in the
traditionalanalysis,thedependencyrelationbetweenthemwouldbe precisely
the same as that betweenbig and book,wherebookis clearlythe head. But
if that were the case, there would be no explanationfor the fact that the
determineralways precedesthe adjective;why should it not be allowedto
follow, possiblysubjectto some pragmaticconstraintssuch as those on the
relativeorderof adjectives?E.g. why should*bigthebookbe so muchworse
thana phraselikeredbigbooks(comparedwithbigredbooks)?If on the other
hand we adopt the analysis which I assumed in the earlier discussion,
accordingto whichit is the determinerwhichis head of the commonnoun,
then the word-orderrestrictionsfollows absolutelyautomaticallyfrom the
AdjacencyPrinciple.Thatis, *bigthebookis bad for exactlythe samereason
as *great with difficulty.

The discussionin this section has shown the crucial importanceof the
notion'head' in dealingwiththe continuityof phrasesin a dependency-based
analysis.A good deal of researchis neededbeforewe can be sure that the
AdjacencyPrincipleis compatiblewith all we know about English,not to
mention other languages,and of course even more researchis needed to
evaluate the general principlesof dependencygrammar,but so long as
dependencytheoriesinvoke the AdjacencyPrinciple,they must also invoke
the notion 'head'.
9.

GRAMMATICAL

RELATIONS

One furtherpoint is worthmakingin connexionwith the notion of 'head'.

Let us consider again Zwicky's list of constructions,together with the
constituentin each whichwe have now decidedis its head:
(i) V+NP
(ii) P+NP
(iii) NP+VP
(iv) Det + N
(v) Aux+ VP
(vi) Comp+ S

head: V
P
VP
Det
Aux
Comp

This list suggestsa generalizationabout grammaticalrelations,namelythat

any constituent to which an establishedgrammaticalrelation category
(GRC) appliesis NOT the head. Thus in V+NP, the only relevantGRC is
'object' - i.e. the NP, not the head V; and similarlyfor P+NP. In the case
of NP + VP, the headis VP, and the relevantGRC is 'subject',whichapplies
5

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A. HUDSON

to the NP. So far so good. When we come to the last threeconstructions,

it is less obvious how to apply this generalization,becauseGRCs are not
usuallyappliedat all to these constructions,partlybecauseof the analyses
that have traditionallybeen assumed.We have consideredthe analysisof
Co-word

Head

Dependent

Pre-dependent
Subject

Visitor

Post-dependent
Pre-adjunct

Object

Complement

Incomplement

Free

Post-adjunct

Oblique

Figure i

thesethreeconstructions,and havedecidedthatin eachcase the head- Det,

Aux or Comp- is the subcategorizand,
whichmeansthat we can now apply
at leastone establishedGRC, namely'complement'.Thisis afterall the term
that is now widelyused to referto any elementwith respectto whichsome
wordor classof wordsis subcategorized.
Butof courseit is againthenon-head
in each case which is classified as complement, as predicted by our
generalization.
Theseremarksare meantto be only suggestive,but theycan be developed
in termsof the currentWord Grammartreatmentof grammaticalrelations
(seeHudson, I985a,b, I986). In this theoryGRCs areassumedto be distinct
fromnon-relationalcategoriessuchas 'noun' or 'auxiliaryverb',but similar
to them in being organizedin an 'isa' hierarchy.In this hierarchythe first
contrastis that between'head' and 'dependent',and then 'dependent'is
subdividedinto GRCs, some familiarand othersunfamiliar.The hierarchy
for Englishmay includethe one shown in Figure I.
If this hierarchicalview of GRCs is in fact correct,at leastin outline,then
once again we find that 'head' is a crucialcategoryin grammaticaltheory,
becauseit is at the very top of the hierarchy.Moreover,every other GRC
is definedin relationto 'head', becausewhereverX is the R of Y (whereR
standsfor a GRC otherthan'head'), Y is the headof X. (It shouldof course
be rememberedthat in dependencytheory a GRC, like the more general
dependencyrelation,is definedin relationto singlewords,anddoes not define
the relation between a construction and its constituent parts as in
constituency-basedtheories.)For example,if X is the objectof Y, then Y is
the head of X; if X is the complementof Y, Y is the head of X; if X is the
subject of Y, Y is the head of X; and so on.
130

ZWICKY

ON HEADS

In conclusion,then,'head' is the nameof a grammaticalrelationcategory,

on a par with categorieslike 'subject'and 'object', but on a higherlevel of
generalitythan these. Like them it servesthe essentialfunctionof allowing
generalizations
acrossruleswhichcouldnot otherwisebe made- forexample,
a categorywhichis referredto in a word-orderrulecan be identified,by name,
with a category referred to in a rule concerned with agreement, or
subcategorization,or whatever.It is possibleto justifythe categoryin terms
of the kind of analysis that Zwicky himself assumes- one based on
constituentstructure- and I tried in the first six sections of this paper to
present my argumentsin such terms. However, if we adopt instead a
dependency-basedtheory we can go further,and integrate'head' into a
comprehensivesystemof grammaticalrelationcategories- somethingwhich
I doubt that one could do in a constituent-structure
theory.

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