OPERATION No.
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HEIADQUARTERS EIGHtH AIR FOHOE
APO 634
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HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORGE
APO 634
19 May 1945
1* lIMSSiMiSJL
a. Operation No. j^U
b. Targets.
•
2.
(4) Toulouse Airfield, France, 12 August, 1944.
PlJib^kiMM™.
a. At a conference on 2 August held at USSTAF Eastern Command
Headquarters, Russian representatives requested assistance against G.A.F,
units based on the Eastern Front which, were hampering movements of troops
and supplies by attacks on lines of communications. It was suggested that
the American forcer-3 concentrate their efforts against enemy airfields
located immediately south of the lasi-Akkerman front in Rumania and also
oil targets in Krakow and Upper Silesia (the nature of the latter targets
necessitated use of heavy bombers) and due to the advances it was considered
imperative that the air attacks be conducted before 5 August, While this
date was indicated as a deadline, it was understood that progress might
slacken so that the targets in upper Silesia would be available for attack
over a longer period.
•
b. On the basis of these requirements, Headquarters USSTAF ' made
the decision to operate against as many of the targets as possible, Cir
cumstances permitted only one operation (the Fifteenth Air Force dis*
patched /$ P-33's and 36 P-^l!s against the airfield at Foesani, Rumania,
on 4 August) before the indicated deadline bub decision was made to dis
patch as many missions as possible during the month of August against
targets in support of the Russian;*. The Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces
were to be used alternately. The Eighth Air Force was thereupon instructed
to conduct its second heavy bomber mission to Russia as soon after 5 August
as weather conditions permitted rather than 12 August as originally scheduled.
32ES^JiaSBSLLIP-^lssi^.i i^^
1. TARGET.
a, Aircraft Components Factory at Rahmel, near Gdynia, Poland.
2, JMS3M»
a. The 3rd Bomb Division had been previously designated to pro
vide the necessary forces to carry out such shuttle -bombing operations to
Russia as might be required. The tank force for this particular mission
was to consist of tvo B-17 Combat Wings (three 13-aircraft Groups) and a
P-51 Group (four Squadrons), the latter to operate as fighter-bombers when
not required to support the 8~17 f s, The task force commander, 3rd Bomb
Division Headquarters and Eighth Air Force Headquarters, participated in the
numerous preliminery plans and preparations necessary to permit the execu
tion of the mission on the first day for which a satisfactory weather
forecast was made.
.
of 2-4Ao cumulus over the target indicated good visual conditions and
favorable weather was expected en route Overcast, patchy fog and some
haze was forecast in base areas but it was expected that they would be
operational.
•
that of a larger formation of 3-17*3 at a point approximately midway of the
North Sea crossing. From there to Heligoland the Russia-bound bombers
were to fly below and slightly behind the lead of the other force. At a
point near the coast the large formation was to turn on a southeasterly
heading towards its targets in the Berlin area leaving the two Rahmel
Combat Wings to continue their easterly course across the Jutland Peninsula
and over the Baltic Sea. After turning inland at a point approximately
4.0 miles northwest of Latienburg, their Initial Point, the bombers were to
make their bombing runs on duo easterly headings. After bombing, the
Combat Wings, in order to avoid the Gdynia and Danzig anti-aircraft defenses,
were to turn sharply to the north and then due" east for approximately 25
-
miles before taking up a southeasterly heading to the USSTAF Eastern
-
Command bases at Mirgorod and Poltava. The aircraft were to arrive at the
bases one Combat Wing at each as early in the day as practicable
(about 1700 hours) to. facilitate dispersals and maintenance. Plans were
then to be made for one or more operations from the Russian bases and for
return via Italy. The bombers were scheduled to attack their primary
3. SffiGUTION.
a. Target Bombed ,
(l) Aircraft Components Factory at Rahmel, near Gdynia, Poland.
b. Take-Off and Assembly.
(l) Low ceiling and somewhat limited visibility on the
ground prevailed at the time of take-off for the two B-17 Combat Wings
of 3rd Bomb Division but the bombers ascended without incident. No
difficulties were experienced in completing Group and "Wing assemblies
although the force formed at 8,000 feet instead of the briefed altitude
of 4,000 feet due to a layer of stratus cloud. As the first control
point was approached in England, the task force commander contacted the
second Combat Wing and it was determined that it would be 10 minutes late.
Accordingly, a 360° turn was made at Southwold by the lead Combat Wing
to enable the other Wing to join the formation. At the completion of the
turn, the second Wing was in trail by approximately two minutes (briefed
three mnutos). The formation departed the English coast at 0355 hours,
10 minutes behind schedule. A total of 75 B-17's were dispatched on this
operation.
c. Penetration,
(l) During the briefed flight across the North Sea, the
• formation was able to regain the lost time and cross the enemy coast at
the Jutland Peninsula approximately five minutes earlier than scheduled.
The planned course was followed to the Initial Point, with the bombers
achieving bombing altitude before reaching that point.
(2) The first P-51 Group, detailed to join the bombers
northwest of Heligoland, failed to make rendezvous and it was subse
quently determined that it escorted another force, in all probability
Ist Bomb Division, towards Berlin. As a result, the shuttle force flew
unescorted to a point approximately 60 miles east of Jutland, where the
second P-51 Group made rendezvous approximately eight minutes early.
The third P~5l Group, scheduled to make rendezvous 40 miles northwest of
the Initial Point, was late and did not meet the bombers until they
began withdrawal.
(3) No enemy aircraft were observed by the bombers or
escorting fighters, nor was any anti-aircraft fire re ported. en route.
d. Target Area.
(l) Excellent weather conditions for visual bombing
% generally prevailed in the target area but sighting operations of one
Group were slightly hindered by a low cloud. All units attacked the
assigned objective approximately 10 minutes earlier than scheduled, at
1251-1254 hours (briefed 1301 hours), from an altitude of 22,735-24,791
feet (brief od 25, 000 feet). Soferty-five 8~17 T s released 109.2 tons of
HE,
(2) Striko and reconnaissance photographs indicated the
following results*
-
\u2666Aircraft Components Factory at Rahroel, near Gdynia, Poland (75
B~l7's dropped 437x500 HE) Bombs hit the target in a north
west-southeast direction. Two main assembly or repair shops
and a hangar in the southwest area were damaged slightly and
two stores and dismantling shops in the south, previously
damaged, were hit again, one being almost completely destroyed.
At least 15 store-type buildings, some of which had been
previously damaged, were entirely demolished 'and nine or 10
others, including a hoadquarters-type building, wore hit for
the first time. Over 50 craters were visible in a small area
of the factory 'airfield in the southeast corner, where over
20 hits were on tarmacs and taxi tracks. The road passing
through the factory from east to west was cut by at least 10
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craters. Approximately seven small and two large aircraft
were damaged and three small aircraft were destroyed.
* See "Bombing" .Annex for photographs.
(3) The P-51 Group which had rendezvoused on the penetra
tion continued to provide close escort through the target area* No enemy
aircraft v/ere reported by either bombers or fighters and the anti-aircraft
fire encountered at the target was meager to moderate and very inaccurate,
c , Withdrawal •
•
Wing assigned to the base at Mirgorod required a longer time to land as
rainstorms were encountered and identification of base was difficult.
(2) The P-51 Group detailed to meet the bomber force prior
to the -Initial Point and escort it to Russia., rendezvoused at the Rally
Point as fighters were approximately 10 minutes late and the Combat Wings
were a few minutes oar^Ly, The P-51 !s covered the bombers as far as their
base at Piryatin, breaking escort there at approximately 1630 hours.
(3) The bombers encountered approximately 20 enemy aircraft,
FW-190's and l?s~lo9 T s, at 1325 hours in the vicinity of Allenstein, Germany
(about 60 miles southeast of the Gulf of Danzig). Four I'fo-109 f s attacked
the high Group of the leading Combat Wing from 12 o T clock high and nine
FW~I90 f s and six MXLO9's attacked the low Group of the second Combat Wing
from 2 olclocko 1clock high with the combats taking place over a period of three
minutes. The P~sl's dispersed the enemy aircraft before they could press
home their attack. After the engagements, the enemy aircraft remained
• around the formation, well out of range, for 15 minutes but made no
further attempt to intercept the bombers «
(4.) No anti-aircraft fire was reported on the flight to
Russia after leaving the target area.
f. Fighter Support.
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which supported the bombers on this mission nor was there any battle damage
reported. Claims from aerial combat, all made by the Group protecting the
final phase 5 were 2 destroyed and 2 damaged.
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i. !HlT§.
a. Oil Refinery at Trzebinia, Poland.
p PLANNING
•
teenth Air Force.
3. BXSCpTION.
a. Take-Off and Assembly,
(l) The Combat Wing from Poltava completed its assembly hj
0915 hours at 7000 feet and proceeded to Mirgorod, whore the other Combat
Wing was to join the formation. Duo to the required dispersal of aircraft
on the field and heavy rains of the preceding day, many of the B-17's were
mired in the -iuc! and difficulties were encountered in extricating them in
• time for scheduled take-offs. A 20-minute dolay in leaving the field was
requested by the second Combat Wing, and it was granted. The lead Wing
had to make two 360° turns before Division assembly was achieved at 0952
hours. A total of 57 B*-17 f s wore dispatched.
b. Penetration.
(l) The climb to bombing altitude was started at 1000 hours
and reached by the time the battle lino was crossed at 1252 hours. The
briefed westerly course to the Initial Point was followed, the second
Combat Wing following the first at tho specified threc~minute interval.
The 37 P-51's rendezvoused north of Lwow, Poland, as briefed.
(,?)
No enemy aircraft were reported by bombers or fighters
but ground dofonses were in action on the flight to the target. At
Sandomierz, Poland, tho anti-aircraft fire was inaccurate, meager and heavy
and at Katowice, Poland, it was moderate, fairly accurate and heavy.
c# Target Area.
(l) T-.io leading Combat Wing made visual bomb runs without
incident but the 6/10 scattered cloud arid heavy smoko caused some difficulty
for the following Combat Wing. By maneuvering around the clouds, two of
its Groups raanaged to synchronize their bombsights for good runs but the
remaining Group ,yjhich made a second run because smoke in the target inter
fered with sighting on the initial approach, dropped its bombs short and to
the risrht. The assigned objective was attacked at 1324.-1335 hours (briefed
1254. hours) from an altitude of 19,576-21,600 feet (briefed 21,000 feet)
by 55 3-17 f s releasing 109 tons of HE.
(3) The P-51 !s escorted the bombers through the target. One
FW-190 made one fast head-on attack against the low Group of the leading
• Combat Wing and the fighters reported engagements with six to eight enemy
aircraft, destroying three of them. The anti-aircraft fire was moderate
and fairly accurate but slightly low.
d. Withdrawal.
(l) The Combat Wings reformed at the Rally Point and the
briefad return route to Russia was flown as planned. The P-51 T s furnished
close oscort to a point approximately 40 miles 'southeast of Krako?/, Poland,
The bombers let down after crossing the battle line, and reached their
bases at 1730 hours.
(2) No enemy aircraft were encountered during the withdrawal
nor was any anti-aircraft fire reported.
g. Fighter Support.
(l) The briefed route was followed to the target and the
escorting fighters rendezvoused as scheduled.
•
(l) Tho weathsr encountered in the target area enabled all
units to attack visually tho resigned objective's. Seventy- three B~r7 !s
released 144.7 tons of HE at 1115-1121 hours (briefed 1110 hours) from an
altitude of 20,300-24,694 foot (briefed 21,000 foet).
(2) Bombing: results bc.ced on strike photographs, as no
reconnaissance photographs arc available, are siMmariaed as follows 1
*Buzau Airfield, Rumania (37 B-17's released 140x250 K.B, Russian
F.A.3. bombs (7716], lbs.) and 280x250 and 5x500 HE) Approxi
mately 150 bursts blanketed at loast half the barracks area
and one, possibly two, of the three hangars. At least 20
scattered bursts woro seen on the landing ground. Of the 74
aircraft visible at the time of attack ,
two were probably
damaged.
-
*ZilistoT. Airfield, Rumania (36 B-17's dropped 536x250 and 12x500
Ik) Two concentrations of bursts were seen in the target area,
one on tho southwest hangar aro?. and the other on the landing
ground near the. barraclrs area in the center of the airfield.
Of B2 aircraft visible at the time of tho attack, three were
probably damaged or destroyed.
* Sco "Bombing" Annox for photographs .
(3) There wore no enomy aircraft encounters by either
bombers or fi-htoro. Anti-aircraft firo at thy target was moderate and
inaccurate.
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d. Withdrawal.
(l) The Combat Wing rally v/as effected as planned and the
force withdrew in good formation. On the flight to the bases in Italy it
became necessary to climb to ?M> ooo feet and to alter the course to the
loft in order to avoid built-up altostratus cloud. The fighters broke off
approximately midway between the target and Italy. The enemy coast was
crowed at 13A3 hours and the Italian bases were reached at.- 1500 hours.
g. Fijhter Summary.
• f. Losses
(l) Bombers.
Incomplete battle damage reports indicated that only three aircraft stis
tainod -major damage. There were no claims.
(a)
The P-51 T s landed in Italy without loss or battle
damage. There was a single claim, 1 enemy aircraft destroyed.
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Airfield Toulonno/EY-incaSalj Franco,
2. ?!UMIM
a. On tho basis of a favorable weather forecast for the Mcdi
terranean and Franco, plane were completed to have the two Combat Wings
?.roa
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• enemy
b. Penetration.
(l) The briefed course v/as followed to the target. The
coast ?ia« crossed at 1114 hours at the bombing altitude of 21,000
foot. Rendezvous by the P-51 Group was made essentially as planned prior
to the time the force reached the French coast.
(2) Noithor the bombers nor the fighters encountered any
enemy aircraft and no ground defenses were reported as being in action.
c. Target Area.
(l) The weather prevailing in the target areas was l-2/lO
cumulus below 5000 foot and all units attacked the assigned primary target
visually. Ground haae interfered slightly with sighting operations. Sixt;
;T
•
nine B~l7's released 171 tons of KB at 1147-11 53 hours (briefed 114-4 hours
from altitudes of 21,100-22,700 feot (briefed 21,000 feet). Bombing re
sults are summarised as followc:
d. Withdrawal,
9
the withdrawal. The two P-51
Groups from England rendezvoused at 1212 and
1230 hours and remained with the bombers ar» far as Cherbourg.
(l) Bombers.
(a) All bombers returned to their bases in England and
available battle damage reports indicate that only 1 bomber sustained
minor battle damage from anti-aircraft fire. There were no claims.
(2) Fighters.
> (a) All the escorting fighters returned but there was
1 instance of Category 'W (salvage) damage. Claims included 1 enemy air
craft destroyed in aerial combat.
CTOc^LLJUMM^Y
i
1. BOTERS.
a, Sevanty- sight B-17 !s were dispatched from England on the
first phase of the operation on the 6th of August and 75 aircraft landed
at Russian bases. Throe aircraft abandoned the mission and returned to
England as a result of mechanical failures. No bombers were lost. On the
7th of August, due to battle damage of the previous day, only 57 B-17 fs
were dispatched on the mission to Poland, Two aircraft abandoned the
mission and 55 returned to Russia, No aircraft wore lost, On the Bth of
> August, 1L B-17's wore dispatched and 73 landed at Fifteenth Air Force
bases in Italy. One aircraft returned to Russia and another was left for
repairs. Ho bombers were lost* On the 12th of August, 73 B-17*s were
dispatched from Italy for the return trip to England and 70 aircraft
reached their home basas. No bombers were lost. Five of the other air
craft, part of this task force, returned to England at a later date.
2, FIGHTERS.
a. The fighter Group participating in the shuttle operation
dispatched 65 P-51 'si as bomber escort on 6 August $ 64- of these aircraft
reached the Russian base and one returned to England, On 7 August f 37
Prsl !s were dispatched in support of the bombers on the mission to
Poland 1 35 sorties were made, all aircraft returning to Russia. On
8 August, 63 P-51 f s were dispatched with the bombers from Russia to Italy,
55 P-51 t s comrloted the mission, the roiaaining aircraft returning to
Russia, On 10 August, 4,5 P-.sl*s operated in conjunction with the Fif
teenth Air Force in support of a troop carrier evacuation missions 38
sorties wore made. On this same date, the 8 P-51 !s arrived in Italy
from Russia, On 12 August, 5B P«sl !s accompanied the bombers from
10
the remaining 6 P-51 f s made a safe return.
Italy to England ji subsequently
No fighters wore lost during tho entire shuttle operation.
ROBERT H. TBRRILL'
Colonel AC
Deputy C/S for Operations
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S^ 3RD BOMB DIVISION
TARCET FORCE DATE TOT ALT.
I- RAHMEL.POLAND I3thACBCWi 6th Auq 1301 23000
2- TRZEBINIA,POLAND '• 7th Aug. 1254 23000
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FRANCE 13th AC B Au» 1144 2 1000
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280x250 H.E.
5x500 H.E#
•
previous bursts, also new bursts in the vicinity of
two hangars and numerous other buildings at the north
Fide of the airfield as well as scattered bursts in
the wooded area and fields northwest of the airfield.
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1. Strike photograph showing all bursts on airfield and
its facilities.
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3 AUG 44 ZILISTEA A/F
SAY 390/842-7 (ROUMANIA)
aojs.20. ptSoii^-o annotated print
HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
APO 634
»
1. Strike photograph showing bursts on the north and north
west hangars late in the attack.
•
14 August, 1944 \u26 6
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12 AUG 1944 S.A. 2542
SAY 390C/828-9 TOUIX)USE/FRAKCAZAL k/l
Nee. Jilo.FTJot/o? ANNOTATED PRINT
HI
BOMBING DATA
390 C 046
Trzebina
- 7 August
Mitt, 22,735 1254 X X 73x500 HE 13
•
958
95C 233 4 Mm. 20,076 1335 X r 160x250 HE 10
GBOUP OF RUN OF RIB ALTITUDE RELEASE AFCE MANUAL BOMBS & DEFL. ON LDR.
Toulouse Airfield 12
•*\u25a0\u25a0 August
118*500 HE 1 11
120x500 HE 12
•
HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AJR FORCE
APO 634
BOMBER SIHMAR:
Combat Damage 23 22 1
Cat* "A11 21 18 0
Oat. »B" 2 4 1
Cause* of Damage 23 22 1
AA 23 22 1
Casualties
Killed. 0 1 0
• Wounded 1 1 0
- !\u25a0
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BOMBER SUMMARY
232
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•
fiir'fiia fiiiiP'if^i
65 64 i0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2
U3 112 i0 0 0 0 0 2 0 t
RUSS JIAi TO POLA] 7 AlEEIGUS5T
IGUS 5T
35 35 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0
55 55 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
• Total 71
8
63
8
63
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
Tgt. W/b
3578 P-51 Pen* 29 27 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tgt. W/D
Total U5 38 38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ITALY TO E3SfiGJ
E3SfiGJ <ASD 12 AUGUST
lllf^I V- .
main operation of the daau data is included in the Report of
. Operations, 6 August, -^
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DECLASSIFIED