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Us

EIGHTH AIR FORCE

TACTICAL MISSION REPORT


i

OPERATION No.

REPORT OF SHUTTLE BOMBING MISSION

6-12 AUGUST 1944

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HEIADQUARTERS EIGHtH AIR FOHOE
APO 634
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REPORT OF SHUTTLE BOMBING MISSION .0s


• 6*0.2 AUGUST, 1944

MISSION TARGET DATE


1. UNITED nNC3D(M TO RUSSIA RAMEL, Pa&AMD 6 AUGUST, 19U
o RUSSIA TO POUND TO RUSSIA TRZEBINIA, FOI^AND 7 AUGUST, 1944

3. RUSSIA TO ITALI BUZAU AND 25ILISTEA, 8 AUGUST, 1944


RUMANIA

• 4. ITALITO UNITED KINCDQM TOULOUSE, FRANCE 12 AUGUST, 1944

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HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORGE
APO 634

19 May 1945

SUBJECTS Report of Shuttle Bombing Mission, 6-12 August, 1944.

TO Commanding General, Array Air Forces, Washington 25, D.C.


(Through Channels)*

1* lIMSSiMiSJL
a. Operation No. j^U

b. Targets.

(l) Aircraft Components Factory, Rahrael, near Gdynia,


Poland, 6 August, 1944*
(2) Oil Refinery at Trzebinia, Poland, 7 August, 1944.
(3) Buzau and Zilistea, Rumania, $ August, 1944.


2.
(4) Toulouse Airfield, France, 12 August, 1944.
PlJib^kiMM™.
a. At a conference on 2 August held at USSTAF Eastern Command
Headquarters, Russian representatives requested assistance against G.A.F,
units based on the Eastern Front which, were hampering movements of troops
and supplies by attacks on lines of communications. It was suggested that
the American forcer-3 concentrate their efforts against enemy airfields
located immediately south of the lasi-Akkerman front in Rumania and also
oil targets in Krakow and Upper Silesia (the nature of the latter targets
necessitated use of heavy bombers) and due to the advances it was considered
imperative that the air attacks be conducted before 5 August, While this
date was indicated as a deadline, it was understood that progress might
slacken so that the targets in upper Silesia would be available for attack
over a longer period.


b. On the basis of these requirements, Headquarters USSTAF ' made
the decision to operate against as many of the targets as possible, Cir­
cumstances permitted only one operation (the Fifteenth Air Force dis*­
patched /$ P-33's and 36 P-^l!s against the airfield at Foesani, Rumania,
on 4 August) before the indicated deadline bub decision was made to dis­
patch as many missions as possible during the month of August against
targets in support of the Russian;*. The Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces
were to be used alternately. The Eighth Air Force was thereupon instructed
to conduct its second heavy bomber mission to Russia as soon after 5 August
as weather conditions permitted rather than 12 August as originally scheduled.

32ES^JiaSBSLLIP-^lssi^.i i^^
1. TARGET.
a, Aircraft Components Factory at Rahmel, near Gdynia, Poland.
2, JMS3M»
a. The 3rd Bomb Division had been previously designated to pro­
vide the necessary forces to carry out such shuttle -bombing operations to
Russia as might be required. The tank force for this particular mission
was to consist of tvo B-17 Combat Wings (three 13-aircraft Groups) and a
P-51 Group (four Squadrons), the latter to operate as fighter-bombers when
not required to support the 8~17 f s, The task force commander, 3rd Bomb
Division Headquarters and Eighth Air Force Headquarters, participated in the
numerous preliminery plans and preparations necessary to permit the execu­
tion of the mission on the first day for which a satisfactory weather
forecast was made.

b. On 5 August favorable weather was predicted not only for the


shuttle mission but for large-scale operations to northern and central
Germany such as it was highly desirable to perform in conjunction with
the United Kingdom to Russia phase of the shuttle missions. The prediction

.
of 2-4Ao cumulus over the target indicated good visual conditions and
favorable weather was expected en route Overcast, patchy fog and some
haze was forecast in base areas but it was expected that they would be
operational.

c. Hans were made to carry out the shuttle bombing mission in


conjunction with a large-scale effort against targets in Hamburg, Kiel and
Berlin areas. (See Report of Operation, No. 524., 6 August.) The objec­
tive of the Russian task force was the aircraft components factory at
Rahmel, near Gdynia, Poland. This force, after departing the English coast
at O&4-5 hours, was scheduled to follow a northeasterly route converging with


that of a larger formation of 3-17*3 at a point approximately midway of the
North Sea crossing. From there to Heligoland the Russia-bound bombers
were to fly below and slightly behind the lead of the other force. At a
point near the coast the large formation was to turn on a southeasterly
heading towards its targets in the Berlin area leaving the two Rahmel
Combat Wings to continue their easterly course across the Jutland Peninsula
and over the Baltic Sea. After turning inland at a point approximately
4.0 miles northwest of Latienburg, their Initial Point, the bombers were to
make their bombing runs on duo easterly headings. After bombing, the
Combat Wings, in order to avoid the Gdynia and Danzig anti-aircraft defenses,
were to turn sharply to the north and then due" east for approximately 25

-
miles before taking up a southeasterly heading to the USSTAF Eastern
-

Command bases at Mirgorod and Poltava. The aircraft were to arrive at the
bases one Combat Wing at each as early in the day as practicable
(about 1700 hours) to. facilitate dispersals and maintenance. Plans were
then to be made for one or more operations from the Russian bases and for
return via Italy. The bombers were scheduled to attack their primary

• targets at 1301 hours on upwind runs from an altitude of 23*000 feet.

d. It was not believed that this force would experience any


attack before reaching the Gdynia area, the likelihood being that such
enemy aircraft as might be in a position to intercept would be drawn in­
land towards Hamburg and Berlin by the major operation against targets in
those areas. Three P-51 filter Groups were detailed to furnish close
support for this force. One Group was to rendezvous northwest of Heligo­
land and a second Group at a point approximately 100 miles east of the
Jutland coast # These two Groups were to provide cover, if endurance per­
mitted, as far as the target but not beyond as they were to return to home
bases. The third Group of four Squadrons (72 aircraft) was to rendezvous
approximately 4-0 miles northwest of the Initial Point and fly 2000 feet
above the bombers unless enemy aircraft attempted attacks. The distance
over which this Group could be expected to furnish escort would depend on
the extent and duration of enemy fighter opposition, but in any event it
was anticipated that support would be rendered for a good portion of the
flight across Russia. The fighter Group was scheduled to land at the

Notes See "Routes" Annex


-
Eastern Command bade at Piryatin.

Over- All Plan for bomber routes, timings and


fighter rendezvous points.

3. SffiGUTION.

a. Target Bombed ,
(l) Aircraft Components Factory at Rahmel, near Gdynia, Poland.
b. Take-Off and Assembly.
(l) Low ceiling and somewhat limited visibility on the
ground prevailed at the time of take-off for the two B-17 Combat Wings
of 3rd Bomb Division but the bombers ascended without incident. No
difficulties were experienced in completing Group and "Wing assemblies
although the force formed at 8,000 feet instead of the briefed altitude
of 4,000 feet due to a layer of stratus cloud. As the first control
point was approached in England, the task force commander contacted the
second Combat Wing and it was determined that it would be 10 minutes late.
Accordingly, a 360° turn was made at Southwold by the lead Combat Wing
to enable the other Wing to join the formation. At the completion of the
turn, the second Wing was in trail by approximately two minutes (briefed
three mnutos). The formation departed the English coast at 0355 hours,
10 minutes behind schedule. A total of 75 B-17's were dispatched on this
operation.

c. Penetration,
(l) During the briefed flight across the North Sea, the

• formation was able to regain the lost time and cross the enemy coast at
the Jutland Peninsula approximately five minutes earlier than scheduled.
The planned course was followed to the Initial Point, with the bombers
achieving bombing altitude before reaching that point.
(2) The first P-51 Group, detailed to join the bombers
northwest of Heligoland, failed to make rendezvous and it was subse­
quently determined that it escorted another force, in all probability
Ist Bomb Division, towards Berlin. As a result, the shuttle force flew
unescorted to a point approximately 60 miles east of Jutland, where the
second P-51 Group made rendezvous approximately eight minutes early.
The third P~5l Group, scheduled to make rendezvous 40 miles northwest of
the Initial Point, was late and did not meet the bombers until they
began withdrawal.
(3) No enemy aircraft were observed by the bombers or
escorting fighters, nor was any anti-aircraft fire re ported. en route.

d. Target Area.
(l) Excellent weather conditions for visual bombing
% generally prevailed in the target area but sighting operations of one
Group were slightly hindered by a low cloud. All units attacked the
assigned objective approximately 10 minutes earlier than scheduled, at
1251-1254 hours (briefed 1301 hours), from an altitude of 22,735-24,791
feet (brief od 25, 000 feet). Soferty-five 8~17 T s released 109.2 tons of
HE,
(2) Striko and reconnaissance photographs indicated the
following results*

-
\u2666Aircraft Components Factory at Rahroel, near Gdynia, Poland (75
B~l7's dropped 437x500 HE) Bombs hit the target in a north­
west-southeast direction. Two main assembly or repair shops
and a hangar in the southwest area were damaged slightly and
two stores and dismantling shops in the south, previously
damaged, were hit again, one being almost completely destroyed.
At least 15 store-type buildings, some of which had been
previously damaged, were entirely demolished 'and nine or 10
others, including a hoadquarters-type building, wore hit for
the first time. Over 50 craters were visible in a small area
of the factory 'airfield in the southeast corner, where over
20 hits were on tarmacs and taxi tracks. The road passing
through the factory from east to west was cut by at least 10

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craters. Approximately seven small and two large aircraft
were damaged and three small aircraft were destroyed.
* See "Bombing" .Annex for photographs.
(3) The P-51 Group which had rendezvoused on the penetra­
tion continued to provide close escort through the target area* No enemy
aircraft v/ere reported by either bombers or fighters and the anti-aircraft
fire encountered at the target was meager to moderate and very inaccurate,

c , Withdrawal •

(l) The Combat Wings rallied as planned over the Gulf of


Danzig, the lead Wing l!S !t -ing in order that the following Combat Wing
could close up the formation, A let-down to 17,000 feet was started by the
bombers and, after crossing the Russian battle line, the Groups descended
to 4,000 feet and flew the remainder of the trip below the cloud bases •
The briefed routo was followed and the Eastern Command bases were reached
at 1700 hours, approximately one-half earlier than briefed. The Combat


Wing assigned to the base at Mirgorod required a longer time to land as
rainstorms were encountered and identification of base was difficult.
(2) The P-51 Group detailed to meet the bomber force prior
to the -Initial Point and escort it to Russia., rendezvoused at the Rally
Point as fighters were approximately 10 minutes late and the Combat Wings
were a few minutes oar^Ly, The P-51 !s covered the bombers as far as their
base at Piryatin, breaking escort there at approximately 1630 hours.
(3) The bombers encountered approximately 20 enemy aircraft,
FW-190's and l?s~lo9 T s, at 1325 hours in the vicinity of Allenstein, Germany
(about 60 miles southeast of the Gulf of Danzig). Four I'fo-109 f s attacked
the high Group of the leading Combat Wing from 12 o T clock high and nine
FW~I90 f s and six MXLO9's attacked the low Group of the second Combat Wing
from 2 olclocko 1clock high with the combats taking place over a period of three
minutes. The P~sl's dispersed the enemy aircraft before they could press
home their attack. After the engagements, the enemy aircraft remained

• around the formation, well out of range, for 15 minutes but made no
further attempt to intercept the bombers «
(4.) No anti-aircraft fire was reported on the flight to
Russia after leaving the target area.
f. Fighter Support.

(l) Two of the throe assigned P-51 Groups operated in


support o.f the shuttle bombing force, the third having inadvertently
joined another formation operating against targets in the Berlin area.
The Group which rendezvoused near the Jutland Peninsula returned to its
baso in England! the other Group continued to Russia. Those two Groups
dispatched 116 aircraft, of which number 113 completed sorties. (See
Report on Operation No, 52/,., 6 August, 1944, for data concerning third
P-51 Group -A3 aircraft dispatched, 39 aircraft sortied. )
£. Losses, Battle Damage and Claims.
(l) Bombers
(a) All the bombers reached their destination but
Eastern Command reported 2 instances of major and 21 instances of limited
battle damage. One eneny aircraft was claimed as damaged.
(2) Fighters
(a) No fighters were lost from the two P-51 Groups

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which supported the bombers on this mission nor was there any battle damage
reported. Claims from aerial combat, all made by the Group protecting the
final phase 5 were 2 destroyed and 2 damaged.

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i. !HlT§.
a. Oil Refinery at Trzebinia, Poland.
p PLANNING

a. Planning for the mission from Russia to Poland was completed


by the tasl : force commander, operations and intelligence officers, who
1

accompanied the force, and the commander of the fighter Group. In


accordance -with a Russian request, the oil refinery at Trzebinia, Poland
(in vicinity of Krakow) was selected as the objective. The plans for this
operation, vjero fully coordinated with Eastern Command, USSTAF and Fif­


teenth Air Force.

b. The two B-17 Combat Wings, consisting of 60 operational


bombers, and approximately 37 P-51's were scheduled to participate in the
day T s effort, A substantially direct route was proposed for the flight
to the target and back to the Eastern Command bases in Russia, The assigned
objective was to be attacked at 1254- hours from 21,000 foot.

3. BXSCpTION.
a. Take-Off and Assembly,
(l) The Combat Wing from Poltava completed its assembly hj
0915 hours at 7000 feet and proceeded to Mirgorod, whore the other Combat
Wing was to join the formation. Duo to the required dispersal of aircraft
on the field and heavy rains of the preceding day, many of the B-17's were
mired in the -iuc! and difficulties were encountered in extricating them in

• time for scheduled take-offs. A 20-minute dolay in leaving the field was
requested by the second Combat Wing, and it was granted. The lead Wing
had to make two 360° turns before Division assembly was achieved at 0952
hours. A total of 57 B*-17 f s wore dispatched.
b. Penetration.
(l) The climb to bombing altitude was started at 1000 hours
and reached by the time the battle lino was crossed at 1252 hours. The
briefed westerly course to the Initial Point was followed, the second
Combat Wing following the first at tho specified threc~minute interval.
The 37 P-51's rendezvoused north of Lwow, Poland, as briefed.
(,?)
No enemy aircraft were reported by bombers or fighters
but ground dofonses were in action on the flight to the target. At
Sandomierz, Poland, tho anti-aircraft fire was inaccurate, meager and heavy
and at Katowice, Poland, it was moderate, fairly accurate and heavy.

c# Target Area.

(l) T-.io leading Combat Wing made visual bomb runs without
incident but the 6/10 scattered cloud arid heavy smoko caused some difficulty
for the following Combat Wing. By maneuvering around the clouds, two of
its Groups raanaged to synchronize their bombsights for good runs but the
remaining Group ,yjhich made a second run because smoke in the target inter­
fered with sighting on the initial approach, dropped its bombs short and to

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the risrht. The assigned objective was attacked at 1324.-1335 hours (briefed
1254. hours) from an altitude of 19,576-21,600 feet (briefed 21,000 feet)
by 55 3-17 f s releasing 109 tons of HE.

(2) Bomb damage assessed from strike photographs «- no recon­


naissance cover was obtained *• is summarized as follows­
Oil Refinery, Tr?,ebinia, Poland (55 B-17's released 872x250 HE)
-
Eastern Command Headquarters reported that three large and
10 medium storage tanks were destroyed and severe damage was
caused to the wax extraction, oil compounding, oil purifi­
cation and dispatch buildings and slight damage was done to
the petrol treatment building and one distillation unit.
Storage facilities were also hit. The coke plant in the mar­
shalling yard to the south was blanketed with craters and two
long trains were hit.

(3) The P-51 !s escorted the bombers through the target. One
FW-190 made one fast head-on attack against the low Group of the leading

• Combat Wing and the fighters reported engagements with six to eight enemy
aircraft, destroying three of them. The anti-aircraft fire was moderate
and fairly accurate but slightly low.

d. Withdrawal.
(l) The Combat Wings reformed at the Rally Point and the
briefad return route to Russia was flown as planned. The P-51 T s furnished
close oscort to a point approximately 40 miles 'southeast of Krako?/, Poland,
The bombers let down after crossing the battle line, and reached their
bases at 1730 hours.
(2) No enemy aircraft were encountered during the withdrawal
nor was any anti-aircraft fire reported.
g. Fighter Support.

• (l) The fighter Group supporting this operation dispatched


37 P-51 !s and sorties wero completed by 35*
f. Losses, Battle Damage and CD-aims.
(l) Bombers.
(a) All bombers returned but there were 4- instances
of major (Category H AGI! or "15")and 18 instances of minor (Category "A")
battle damage. Tho 1 enemy aircraft encountered was claimed destroyed.
(2) Fighters.
(a) All the fighters returned safely, sustaining no
battle damage. Claims were 3 enemy aircraft destroyed.

RUMpI4 TO ITALICS August 1944


ITi> tJPTPrnc!
1

a. Airfield at Biiziltt, Rumania,


b. Airfield, at Ziitotea, Rumania.
2. PLANNING.
a. In compliance with a Russian request through Eastern Command
Headquarters ,the task for.cc commander and operational staff made plans to
attack the important airfields at Busau and Zilistea, Rumania, and then
proceed to bases in Italy. The weather forecast for ft August indicated good
visual conditions and final details for execution of the mission were com­
pleted after full coordination with Headquarters Fifteenth Air Force.
Bombing was to be at 1110 hours from 21,000 feet. All of the 74- operational
B-17's and 63 P*-51's were to participate in this operation, one Combat Wing
being assigned to each airfield. The flight to the target was to be direct
on a southwesterly heading and, after attacking the airfields, the force
was to continue on a southwesterly heading as far as the northeast coast
of Albania and then turn due west across the Adriatic Sea to the east
coast of Italy.
3. EXECUTION.

a. Take-off and Assembly,


(l) Take-off and Group and Combat Wing assemblies were com'
pleted without difficulty. The lead Combat Wing was five minutes late
at the assembly point and as a consequence the force made its departure
a few minutes late. A total of 74- B-17 f s were dispatched in the two
Combat Wings which wore separated by the gpocifiod three -minute interval.

# b, Jfonet rat ion.

(l) The briefed route was followed to the target and the
escorting fighters rendezvoused as scheduled.

(2) No enemy aircraft were observed by the bombers but the


fighters ro^ortod approximately 35 enemy aircraft at 1009 hours southwest
of Nikolaev, Only eight were engaged as the rest evaded and one enemy
fighter was destroyed. No ground defenses were seen in action along the
route.
c. Target i^rea.


(l) Tho weathsr encountered in the target area enabled all
units to attack visually tho resigned objective's. Seventy- three B~r7 !s
released 144.7 tons of HE at 1115-1121 hours (briefed 1110 hours) from an
altitude of 20,300-24,694 foot (briefed 21,000 foet).
(2) Bombing: results bc.ced on strike photographs, as no
reconnaissance photographs arc available, are siMmariaed as follows 1

­
*Buzau Airfield, Rumania (37 B-17's released 140x250 K.B, Russian
F.A.3. bombs (7716], lbs.) and 280x250 and 5x500 HE) Approxi­
mately 150 bursts blanketed at loast half the barracks area
and one, possibly two, of the three hangars. At least 20
scattered bursts woro seen on the landing ground. Of the 74
aircraft visible at the time of attack ,
two were probably
damaged.

-
*ZilistoT. Airfield, Rumania (36 B-17's dropped 536x250 and 12x500
Ik) Two concentrations of bursts were seen in the target area,
one on tho southwest hangar aro?. and the other on the landing
ground near the. barraclrs area in the center of the airfield.
Of B2 aircraft visible at the time of tho attack, three were
probably damaged or destroyed.
* Sco "Bombing" Annox for photographs .
(3) There wore no enomy aircraft encounters by either
bombers or fi-htoro. Anti-aircraft firo at thy target was moderate and
inaccurate.
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d. Withdrawal.
(l) The Combat Wing rally v/as effected as planned and the
force withdrew in good formation. On the flight to the bases in Italy it
became necessary to climb to ?M> ooo feet and to alter the course to the
loft in order to avoid built-up altostratus cloud. The fighters broke off
approximately midway between the target and Italy. The enemy coast was
crowed at 13A3 hours and the Italian bases were reached at.- 1500 hours.

(2) No enemy aircraft were encountered but ground defenses


were in action at Ploesti and Bucharest.

g. Fijhter Summary.

(l) Sixty- three ?-51 f s were dispatched to provide close


escort on this mission and 55 were credited with sorties. Eight P-51's had
to return to Eus?.:ia for various reasons but they rejoined the' task force
in Italy on the 9th of August.

• f. Losses
(l) Bombers.

5 Battle Damage and Claims.

(a) illbombers reached the designated Italian bases.

Incomplete battle damage reports indicated that only three aircraft stis­
tainod -major damage. There were no claims.

(a)
The P-51 T s landed in Italy without loss or battle
damage. There was a single claim, 1 enemy aircraft destroyed.

ITALY. 5-11 August. I%L


1, The entire task force was stood down on 9 August to rest the
combat and provide ,-/.i opportunity for a thorough chock "-up of the
crow?
aircraft in preparation for return to England, thoro having been 31

» operational hours in the throe consocutiva drys.


2, leather conditions prevented bomber missions on 10 and 11 August.
On the earlier date tho fighters, operating as two Groups of 17 and 28
aircraft ? in conjunction with tho Fifteenth Air Force provided escort
on a troop carrier evacuation, mission. Thoro wore A5 P*-51's dispatched
and 38 completed uneventful sorties.

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a. ,
Airfield Toulonno/EY-incaSalj Franco,

2. ?!UMIM
a. On tho basis of a favorable weather forecast for the Mcdi­
terranean and Franco, plane were completed to have the two Combat Wings
?.roa
f

of B-17 !s attack the Toulouse (Franoazal) airfield in southern France and


roti'im to their Eighth Air Forco bases in Bnf-land. Time over target was
set at 1144 hourrj, bombing altitude at 21,000 feet. Fifteenth Air Force
unit3wore to attack targets in tho same area while other Eighth Air Force
units were scheduled against airfields around Reims. Paris and Metz between
1000 and 1100 hours.

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b. The route wa.i to be essentially direct. The shuttle force,


upon leaving the Italian bases, was to fly duo west across Italy, norths
west over the Mediterranean Sea to the French coast at Narbonne. The
bombing run was to be made on a westerly heading. Withdrawing from the
target area, the bombers were to, proceed directly north to Selsey Billon
the 'southern coast of England. The returning' P- 51 Group was scheduled to
rendezvous with' the bombers in the Golfe dv Lion, between Corsica and the
French coast, and escort to the limit of endurance. Two other P-51 Groups
from England were scheduled to cover the withdrawal of the bombers from
the target area.
3, SICUTION.
a. Take -Off and Assembly.
(l) The bombers took off between 0610 and 0630 hours and
Combat Wing and Division assemblies were completed without incident by
0800 hours. The formation departed as two Combat Wings flying in trail
with a two-minute interval. Seventy-three B-17 !s were dispatched.

• enemy
b. Penetration.
(l) The briefed course v/as followed to the target. The
coast ?ia« crossed at 1114 hours at the bombing altitude of 21,000
foot. Rendezvous by the P-51 Group was made essentially as planned prior
to the time the force reached the French coast.
(2) Noithor the bombers nor the fighters encountered any
enemy aircraft and no ground defenses were reported as being in action.

c. Target Area.
(l) The weather prevailing in the target areas was l-2/lO
cumulus below 5000 foot and all units attacked the assigned primary target
visually. Ground haae interfered slightly with sighting operations. Sixt;
;T

nine B~l7's released 171 tons of KB at 1147-11 53 hours (briefed 114-4 hours
from altitudes of 21,100-22,700 feot (briefed 21,000 feet). Bombing re­
sults are summarised as followc:

*Toulouso Airfiold, Franco (69 B-17's released 634x500 HS)


­
Strike
and reconnaissancG photographs showed damage was inflicted
upon the three hangar areas of the airfield, with the most
concentrated attack on the south and northwest hangar areas.
Fourteen hangars were damaged, administrative buildings and
workshops were seriously affected and fuel areas were hit.
The landing ground showed craters only about the edges near the
hangars to tho south and northwest.
* See '^Bombing" Annex for photographs.
(2) lh enemy aircraft were reported by the bombers but es­
corting fighters sighted one aircraft, believed to be a Ju-I#3, at 1145
in tho vicinity of Toulouse and claim to havo destroyed it, Tho anti­
aircraft fire in the target area was moderate and inaccurate.

d. Withdrawal,

(l) There wore no important deviations from the planned


coiirso. The', bombers crossed the English coast at 1424 hours as scheduled.
(2) Fighter cover to England was executed generally as
planned. The shuttle fighter Group broke escort approximately midway on
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9
the withdrawal. The two P-51
Groups from England rendezvoused at 1212 and
1230 hours and remained with the bombers ar» far as Cherbourg.

(3) No enemy aircraft were reported by either bombers or


fighters nor was any anti-aircraft fire encountered.
c. Fighter Support,
(l)
Fighter escort for the bombers returning from the
shuttle mission to Russia was provided by three P-51 Groups. There were
112 fighters, including 62 returning from Italy, and 105 aircraft com­
pleted mission*

f, Losseo, Battle Damage and Claims,

(l) Bombers.
(a) All bombers returned to their bases in England and
available battle damage reports indicate that only 1 bomber sustained
minor battle damage from anti-aircraft fire. There were no claims.
(2) Fighters.
> (a) All the escorting fighters returned but there was
1 instance of Category 'W (salvage) damage. Claims included 1 enemy air­
craft destroyed in aerial combat.

CTOc^LLJUMM^Y
i

1. BOTERS.
a, Sevanty- sight B-17 !s were dispatched from England on the
first phase of the operation on the 6th of August and 75 aircraft landed
at Russian bases. Throe aircraft abandoned the mission and returned to
England as a result of mechanical failures. No bombers were lost. On the
7th of August, due to battle damage of the previous day, only 57 B-17 fs
were dispatched on the mission to Poland, Two aircraft abandoned the
mission and 55 returned to Russia, No aircraft wore lost, On the Bth of
> August, 1L B-17's wore dispatched and 73 landed at Fifteenth Air Force
bases in Italy. One aircraft returned to Russia and another was left for
repairs. Ho bombers were lost* On the 12th of August, 73 B-17*s were
dispatched from Italy for the return trip to England and 70 aircraft
reached their home basas. No bombers were lost. Five of the other air­
craft, part of this task force, returned to England at a later date.
2, FIGHTERS.
a. The fighter Group participating in the shuttle operation
dispatched 65 P-51 'si as bomber escort on 6 August $ 64- of these aircraft
reached the Russian base and one returned to England, On 7 August f 37
Prsl !s were dispatched in support of the bombers on the mission to
Poland 1 35 sorties were made, all aircraft returning to Russia. On
8 August, 63 P-51 f s were dispatched with the bombers from Russia to Italy,
55 P-51 t s comrloted the mission, the roiaaining aircraft returning to
Russia, On 10 August, 4,5 P-.sl*s operated in conjunction with the Fif­
teenth Air Force in support of a troop carrier evacuation missions 38
sorties wore made. On this same date, the 8 P-51 !s arrived in Italy
from Russia, On 12 August, 5B P«sl !s accompanied the bombers from

10
the remaining 6 P-51 f s made a safe return.
Italy to England ji subsequently
No fighters wore lost during tho entire shuttle operation.

FOR THE COMMA?©! M} GENERAL:

ROBERT H. TBRRILL'
Colonel AC
Deputy C/S for Operations

11

I
,112 in 1424
424 1 6
6 Auq oul
oul OB4J
•845 0954 1012 lO3S-339 Cp P-sl'» " I138-55 Cp P-S
P-S
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S^ 3RD BOMB DIVISION
TARCET FORCE DATE TOT ALT.
I- RAHMEL.POLAND I3thACBCWi 6th Auq 1301 23000
2- TRZEBINIA,POLAND '• 7th Aug. 1254 23000
tma 'CSrr !SiS3«.«n ..» ..«»
TOULOUSE
4- C.K'i 12th
FRANCE 13th AC B Au» 1144 2 1000

• 46*

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t
1236

<•• \_ Jf~
k 1144 \
i\V>®~*ol37j 357 Cpi P-SI-i HOP to 1250 (
0845
0845
5939 V ;O842)
O842)

42» \ Alien-
Alien­

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—- 1135 1126 ,yv/
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'o^-Bcrctlono "\u25a0%T^~^~^» *\
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55 Ci t 339 Cp (P-SI'OIISO
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40-
40­

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2» 4* 6° 8" lO° 12°
r- ""-S S IT*

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE


APO 634

TARGET: RAHMEL AIRCRAFT FACTORY AND AIRFIEID.


DATE; 6 AUGUST, 1944*

» NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT ATTACKING:

NUMBER OF BOMB{3 DROPPED:


75*
437x500 H.E.

1. Strike photograph showing smoke rising from bursts


which heavily blanketed the hangar and workshop area
early in the attack and also new bursts at the west
edge of this ares ,

2. Reconnaissance photograph obtained at 1320 hours

* on 7 August, 1944 c

*
<* i i* fc**\

lILib&*v *~^ ' * y4y 4 ~*


HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
APO 634

TARGET; BUZAU AIRFIELD, RUMANIA.


DATE: 8 AUGUST, 1944.

• NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT ATTACKING: 37.

NUMBER OF BOMBS DROPPED: 14-0x250 K.B. Russian F,A,B*

280x250 H.E.
5x500 H.E#

1, Strike photograph showing smoke from the areas of


previous bursts, also new bursts in the vicinity of
two hangars and numerous other buildings at the north
Fide of the airfield as well as scattered bursts in
the wooded area and fields northwest of the airfield.

lji
n^ j \u25a0*\u25a0
tf* T3^ fr *f T*t *^k /'"N *# ?J ?"<iii »*V*

HEIi^QUARTEES EIGHTH AIR FOPCE


APO 634.

TARGET; ZILISTEA AIRFIELD, RUMANIA.

DATE; 8 AUGUST, 19U*

NUMBER OF AIRCR^,FT ATTACKING; 36 •

NUMBER OF BOMBS DROPPED; 536x250 H.E.

#
1. Strike photograph showing all bursts on airfield and
its facilities.

>>
rat! Sn k>^ Cj tJ L\i \
J
tf^ \% s^ L-^ i^S £iij
3 AUG 44 ZILISTEA A/F
SAY 390/842-7 (ROUMANIA)
aojs.20. ptSoii^-o annotated print
HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
APO 634

TARGET} TOULOUSE/JBANCAZAL AIRFIEID, FRANCE.

DATE: 12 AUGUST, 1944.

NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT ATTACKING: 69

NUMBER OF BOMBS DROPPED: 684*500 H.E,

»
1. Strike photograph showing bursts on the north and north
west hangars late in the attack.

2. Approximate Bomb Plot,

3» Reconnaissance photograph obtained ft 1300 hours on


14 August, 1944 \u26 6

Hr% WW'*
u "'• r
' *''*"** "' if^**%
12 AUG 1944 S.A. 2542
SAY 390C/828-9 TOUIX)USE/FRAKCAZAL k/l
Nee. Jilo.FTJot/o? ANNOTATED PRINT
HI

Photographic Background SAY 390 A/3806


Neg. Noe /°T3O///O
HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE
APO 634

BOMBING DATA

6-12 August, 1944

DIRECT. LENGTH TIME OF NTBUBER OF RANGE DROPPED


GROUP OF RUN OF RUN ALTITUDE RELEASE AFCE MANUAL BOMBS & DEFL. ON LDR.

BOMB DIVISION 13A & B


<• 6 August
Rabmel
95A 059 Mm. 23,800 1251 X X 77x500 m 1 12

958 065 Miiw 24,790 1252 X X 75x500 HE 1 12

# 95C 046 Mm. 22,700 1253 X X 66x500 HE 1 11

390 A. 08? Mm, 23,750 1253 X X 71x500 HE 1 11


3908 057 Mm. 24,791 1254 X X 70x500 HE 1 11

390 C 046
Trzebina
- 7 August
Mitt, 22,735 1254 X X 73x500 HE 13

95A 233 1Mm. 20,576 1324 X X 170x250 HE 1 10

233 6 Min> 21,076 1325 X 127x250 HE 8


958
95C 233 4 Mm. 20,076 1335 X r 160x250 HE 10

390 A 221 13 Mm. 20,586 1326 X X 159x250 HE 10

3908 191 2 Mm, 21,600 1329 X X 96x250 HE 6


390 C 130 4 Mm. 19,576 1330 X X 160x250 HE 10
Buaau Kaux «\u25a0 8 August
95A 327 3 Mm. 24,186 1115 X X 184x250 HE 2 11
958 310 3 Mm. 24,654 1116 X X 136x250 HE 11
95C
Zilistea
306
- 8 August
4 Mm. 20,300 1116 X 105x250 HE 1 12

390 A 326 10 Mm. 24,186 1120 X X 176x250 HE 11

39G8 320 5 Mm«


MilW 23,000 1121 X 174x250 HE 1 11
390 C 320 5 Mm. 23,673 1121 X X 198x250 HE 1 12

gr^ « fi- X ft f&iL*' *~.


' ":
; tL1
Sai' i^K^BL j&3 ajjig***
1
*
M
- ji'i
"
wf

BOMBING DATA (Continued) 6-12 August, 1944


DIRECT. LENGTH TIME OP NUMBER OF RANGE DROPPED

GBOUP OF RUN OF RIB ALTITUDE RELEASE AFCE MANUAL BOMBS & DEFL. ON LDR.

Toulouse Airfield 12
•*\u25a0\u25a0 August

95A 326 2 Mm. 22,X55 1147 X X 118x500 HE 2 10


\
90x^00 HE 9
129x500 HE 1 12
109x500 HE 1 10

118*500 HE 1 11

120x500 HE 12


HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AJR FORCE
APO 634

BOMBER SIHMAR:

6r12 August, 1944

EN ROUTE TO RUSSIA Bombed from Russia en route to Italy


6 AUGUST, 1944 7 august, 1944 8 august,
AUGUST, 1944
(IOTA/RAHMBL TRZEBINA, POLAND ZIJJSTEA, RUMANIA
A/c assembly plant OIL REFINERY AIRFIEIP

Number a/d pispstohed 78 57 36


Number Sorties 75 55 36
Attack. Pri* 75 55 36
Bombs on Target
70,0
109.0

\u2666 Pri< (HE) 109.2


Number A/C Lost t 0 0 0

Combat Damage 23 22 1
Cat* "A11 21 18 0
Oat. »B" 2 4 1

Cause* of Damage 23 22 1
AA 23 22 1

Casualties
Killed. 0 1 0

• Wounded 1 1 0

- !\u25a0­
/

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE


APO 634

BOMBER SUMMARY

6*12 August, 1944­

EN ROUTE TO ITALY EN ROUTE TO U.K.


8 AUGUST, 1944 12 AUQUST, 1944
BUZAU KAUX, RUMANIA TOULOUSE, PRANCE OPERATION
AIRFIELD rfx: TOTAL

232

<#


fiir'fiia fiiiiP'if^i

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE


APO 634
FIGHTER SUMMARY

6r12 August, 1944­


A/C TYPE A/C SOR- EXEC* A/G CAT. DAM. KJA CLAIMS
GROUP TYPE SUPPORT DISP. TIES ASSGN, LOST %« OTH. MIA WD* DES. PROB, DAM.
OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF SHUTTLE MISSION TO RUSSIA

ENGLAND TO RUSSIA 6 AUGUI


48 AS i0 0 0 000 0 0

65 64 i0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2

U3 112 i0 0 0 0 0 2 0 t
RUSS JIAi TO POLA] 7 AlEEIGUS5T
IGUS 5T

35 35 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0

RUSSIA TO ITALY 8 & ? AUGUST

55 55 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0

• Total 71
8

63
8

63
0

SPECIAL ESCORT IN ITALY


ITALY

0
0

0
0

0
0

0
0

1
0

0
0

357 A P-.51 Pen, 17 11 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Tgt. W/b
3578 P-51 Pen* 29 27 27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Tgt. W/D
Total U5 38 38 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

ITALY TO E3SfiGJ
E3SfiGJ <ASD 12 AUGUST

357 P-51 Pen, 62 53 58 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0


Tgt. w/d
55 P-51 Wyb 25 25 23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

339 F-51 W/D 25 H 2U 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Total 112 107 105 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0

OPERATION TOT/iL 331 356 353 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 2


NOTE; This t*Toup failed to rendezvous with the Shuttle Bomberß but supported the

lllf^I V- .
main operation of the daau data is included in the Report of
. Operations, 6 August, -^
j|jP1^ |.IMOHH^^L§§\u25a0 fm f
DECLASSiEi
-\u25a0 \u25a0
.\u25a0;* '\u25a0,\u25a0'-' \u25a0\u25a0 ; *j''A \u25a0.
\u25a0
£

DECLASSIFIED