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UNDER C:

Rule 130, Documentary Evidence, Electronic Evidence, Case No. 1


HEIRS OF SABANPAN v. COMORPOSA
G.R. No. 152807 | August 12, 2003
FACTS:
This case arose from a complaint for unlawful detainer filed in the MTC by
petitioners against respondents involving possession of a parcel of petitioners land
by respondents. Respondents argue that they have acquired just and valid
ownership of the premises and that the Regional Director of the DENR has already
upheld their possession over the land in question when it ruled that they were the
rightful claimants and possessors. MTC ruled in favour of petitioners which was
reversed by the RTC. On appeal, CA affirmed RTC ruling that although not yet final,
the Order issued by the DENR Regional Director remained in full force and effect.
The certification that the DENR's community environment and natural resources
(CENR) officer issued was proof that when the cadastral survey was conducted, the
land was still alienable and was not yet allocated to any person. Respondents had
the better right to possess alienable and disposable land of the public domain,
because they have sufficiently proven their actual, physical, open, notorious,
exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof since 1960. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Is the CENR Officer's Certification, which only bears the facsimile of the alleged
signature of a certain Jose F. Tagorda admissible as evidence?
HELD:
In the case of Garvida, the Court held that: "A facsimile or fax transmission is a
process involving the transmission and reproduction of printed and graphic matter
by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and representing the
shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current."
Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best exact
copies. As such, they are not admissible in evidence, as there is no way of
determining whether they are genuine or authentic.
The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a facsimile of
the signature of CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda. The facsimile referred to is not the
same as that which is alluded to in Garvida. The one mentioned here refers to a
facsimile signature, which is defined as a signature produced by mechanical means
but recognized as valid in banking, financial, and business transactions. Note that
the CENR officer has not disclaimed the Certification. In fact, the DENR regional
director has acknowledged and used it as reference in his Order. If the Certification
were a sham as petitioner claims, then the regional director would not have used it
as reference. He would have either verified it or directed the CENR officer to take
the appropriate action, as the latter was under the former's direct control and
supervision.

As for the new matter raised for the first time on appeal, the court ruled that neither
the rules of procedure nor jurisprudence would sanction the admission of evidence
that has not been formally offered during the trial. But this evidentiary rule is
applicable only to ordinary trials, not to cases covered by the rule on summary
procedure -- cases in which no full-blown trial is held.
The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value.
Admissibility refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be
considered at all, while probative value refers to the question of whether the
admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be
admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the
guidelines provided by the rules of evidence

UNDER C:
Rule 130, Documentary Evidence, Electronic Evidence, Case No. 2
TORRES vs. PAGCOR
G.R. No. 193531 | December 14, 2011
FACTS:
Petitioner was a Slot Machine Operations Supervisor (SMOS) of respondent
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). On the basis of an
alleged intelligence report of padding of the Credit Meter Readings (CMR) of the slot
machines at PAGCOR-Hyatt Manila, then Casino Filipino-Hyatt (CF Hyatt), which
involved the slot machine and internal security personnel of respondent PAGCOR,
and in connivance with slot machine customers, respondent PAGCOR's Corporate
Investigation Unit (CIU) allegedly conducted an investigation to verify the veracity of
such report. The CIU discovered the scheme of CMR padding which was committed
by adding zero after the first digit of the actual CMR of a slot machine or adding a
digit before the first digit of the actual CMR, e.g., a slot machine with an actual CMR
of P5,000.00 will be issued a CMR receipt with the amount of eitherP50,000.00
or P35,000.00. Based on the CIU's investigation of all the CMR receipts and slot
machine jackpot slips issued by CF Hyatt for the months of February and March
2007, the CIU identified the members of the syndicate who were responsible for
such CMR padding, which included herein petitioner.
On the same day, another Memorandum of Charges signed by Rogelio Y. Bangsil, Jr.,
Senior Branch Manager, CF Hyatt Manila, was issued to petitioner informing him of
the charge of dishonesty (padding of anomalous SM jackpot receipts). Petitioner was
then required to explain in writing why he should not be sanctioned or dismissed.
Petitioner was placed under preventive suspension effective immediately until
further orders.
Petitioner wrote Manager Bangsil a letter explanation/refutation of the charges
against him. He denied any involvement or participation in any fraudulent
manipulation of the CMR or padding of the slot machine receipts, and he asked for a
formal investigation of the accusations against him.
On August 4, 2007, petitioner received a letter dated August 2, 2007 from Atty.
Lizette F. Mortel, Managing Head of PAGCOR's Human Resource and Development
Department, dismissing him from the service.
On September 14, 2007, petitioner filed with the CSC a Complaint against PAGCOR
and its Chairman Efraim Genuino for illegal dismissal, non-payment of backwages
and other benefits. The complaint alleged among other things, that he tried to
persuade respondent PAGCOR to review and reverse its decision in a letter of
reconsideration dated August 13, 2007 addressed to the Chairman, the members of
the Board of Directors and the Merit Systems Protection Board and that no
resolution was issued on his letter reconsideration.
Thereafter, the CSC dismissed the complaint on the ground that the same has
already prescribed.

After the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, Torres elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals, which likewise dismissed his petition on the same ground. Hence,
this appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the sending of his letter of reconsideration by means of a fax
machine is a valid mode of filing a letter of reconsideration?
HELD:
A motion for reconsideration may either be filed by mail or personal delivery. When
a motion for reconsideration was sent by mail, the same shall be deemed filed on
the date shown by the postmark on the envelope which shall be attached to the
records of the case. On the other hand, in case of personal delivery, the motion is
deemed filed on the date stamped thereon by the proper office. And the movant
has 15 days from receipt of the decision within which to file a motion for
reconsideration or an appeal therefrom.
The mode used by petitioner in filing his reconsideration which was sent through a
facsimile transmission is not sanctioned by the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service.
In Garvida v. Sales, Jr., we found inadmissible in evidence the filing of pleadings
through fax machines and ruled that:
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and
reproduction of printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one
elemental area at a time, and representing the shade or tone of each area by a
specified amount of electric current. The current is transmitted as a signal over
regular telephone lines or via microwave relay and is used by the receiver to
reproduce an image of the elemental area in the proper position and the correct
shade. The receiver is equipped with a stylus or other device that produces a
printed record on paper referred to as a facsimile.
xxx A facsimile is not a genuine and authentic pleading. It is, at best, an exact copy
preserving all the marks of an original. Without the original, there is no way of
determining on its face whether the facsimile pleading is genuine and authentic and
was originally signed by the party and his counsel. It may, in fact, be a sham
pleading.xxx
Moreover, a facsimile transmission is not considered as an electronic evidence
under the Electronic Commerce Act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v.
Ssangyong Corporation, We determined the question of whether the original
facsimile transmissions are "electronic data messages" or "electronic documents"
within the context of the Electronic Commerce Act.
We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic
document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a
facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered
as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the
Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.

UNDER C:
Rule 130, Documentary Evidence, Electronic Evidence, Case No. 3
ANG V. REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 182835 | April 20, 2010
FACTS:
This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime of violence against women
when a former boyfriend sent to the girl the picture of a naked woman, not her, but
with her face on it. The herein petitioner, Rustan Ang and the private respondent,
Irish Sagud were lovers during their college days in Wesleyan University in Maria
Aurora Province of Aurora. Eventually, Irish heard that Rustan has a live-in-partner
whom Rustan got pregnant. Because of this, Irish decided to broke up with Rustan.
The latter asked Irish to elope with him, since he does not love the other girl, to
which Irish refused. To pressure Irish to get back with him he send multimedia
messages to Irish, bearing a picture of a naked woman, who spread her legs with a
face of Irish superimposed on it. After she got the obscene picture, she received text
messages from Rustan threatening her that he will spread the picture he sent
through the Internet.
Because of this scenario, Irish, asked help from the Vic-Mayor of the municipality, to
which coordination with the local police was made. Under police supervision, Irish
contacted Rustan through the cellphone number he used in sending the picture and
text message. She asked him to meet her at a resort and he did. Upon parking his
motorcycle and walking towards Irish, the police intercepted and arrested him. The
police seized his cellphone and several SIM cards.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Rustans contention that the multimedia messages should not be
made admissible for the basic reason that such was not properly authenticated as
provided by the Rules on Electronic Documents?
HELD:
Rustan claims that the
constitutes an electronic
an electronic signature,
Electronic Evidence (A.M.

obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message


document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of
as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on
01-7-01-SC).

But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene
picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before this Court. The objection is too late since
he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at the time
it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such
ground for objection.
Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on
Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and
administrative proceedings.

UNDER C:
Rule 130, Documentary Evidence, Electronic Evidence, Case No. 4
RAMON A. SYHUNLIONG V. TERESITA D. RIVERA
G.R. No. 200148 | June 4, 2014
FACTS:
Syhunliong and Rivera are respectively the private complainant and defendant in
the instant case. Syhunliong is the President of BANFF Realty and Development
Corporation (BANFF) while Rivera used to be the Accounting Manager of BANFF.
About three years after she was hired, Rivera, citing personal and family matters,
tendered her resignation and continued working for BANFF until March of the same
year to complete the turn-over of papers under her custody to Jennifer Lumapas
(Lumapas). Sometime in April of 2006, Rivera called Lumapas to request for the
payment of her remaining salaries, benefits and incentives. Lumapas informed
Rivera that her benefits would be paid, but the check representing her salaries was
still unsigned, and her incentives were put on hold by Syhunliong.
On April 6, 2006, Rivera sent the following text message to one of BANFFs official
cellular phones held by Lumapas:
I am expecting that. grabe talaga sufferings ko dyan hanggang
pagkuha ng last pay ko. I dont deserve this because I did my job when I
was still there. God bless. Sana yung pagsimba niya, alam niya real
meaning.
Minutes later, Rivera once again texted another message, which reads:
Kailangan release niya lahat [nang] makukuha ko diyan including
incentive up to the last datena nandyan ako para di na kami abot sa labor.
Subsequently, on December of 2006, Rivera filed before the National Labor
Relations Commission a complaint against Syhunliong for underpaid salaries, 13th
to 16th month and incentive pay, gratuities and tax refund.
On April 16, 2007 pending the resolution of the aforecited labor case, Syhunliong
instituted against Rivera a complaint for libel, and the public prosecutor finds
probable cause to indict Rivera the crime of libel.
Rivera filed a Motion to Quash. She argued that the text message, which was the
subject of the libel complaint, merely reflected the undue stress she had suffered
due to the delay in the release of her unpaid salaries, benefits and incentives.

Further, the facts charged in the information did not constitute the crime of libel as
the elements of malice and the making of defamatory imputation for public
consumption were wanting. Her text message was not prompted by ill will or spite,
but was merely sent as part of her duty to defend her own interests.
During the arraignment on October 11, 2007, Rivera entered a plea of not guilty.
The lower court concurred with the Public Prosecutors finding that there was
probable cause to indict Rivera for having ascribed to Syhunliong the possession of
a vice or defect, or for having committed an act, tending to cause dishonor or
discredit to the latters name. As a defense, Rivera said her text message falls
squarely within the parameters of "Privileged Communication" or the elements
of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code are not fully established by the
Prosecutions evidence. Thereafter, the lower court issued an Order denying
Riveras motion for reconsideration.
The Appellate Court rendered their decision directing the dismissal of the
information for libel filed against Rivera. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA committed reversible error in ordering the outright dismissal
of the complaint of Syhunliong on the putative ground that the allegedly libelous
text messages were privileged communication?
HELD:
The Court still stresses that the text message which Rivera sent to Lumapas falls
within the purview of a qualified privileged communication.
The rule on privileged communication means that a communication made in good
faith on any subject matter in which the communicator has an interest, or
concerning which he has a duty, is privileged if made to a person having a
corresponding duty.
In order to prove that a statement falls within the purview of a qualified
privileged communication under Article 354, No. 1, the following requisites must
concur:
(1) the person who made the communication had a legal, moral, or social
duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect, which
interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is made;
(2) the communication is addressed to an officer or a board, or superior,
having some interest or duty in the matter, and who has the power to furnish the
protection sought; and
(3) the statements in the communication are made in good faith and without
malice
In the case at bar, it was Lumapas who informed Rivera of either the delay or denial
of the latters claims for payment of salaries, benefits and incentives by Syhunliong.
Rivera expressed through the subject text message her grievances to Lumapas. At
that time, Lumapas was the best person, who could help expedite the release of
Riveras claims.

Presiding from the above, the Court thus finds no error in the CAs declaration that
Riveras text message falls within the ambit of a qualified privileged communication
since she was speaking in response to duty [to protect her own interest] and not
out of an intent to injure the reputation of Syhunliong. Besides, [t]here was no
unnecessary publicity of the message beyond [that] of conveying it to the party
concerned.

UNDER C:
Rule 130, Testimonial Evidence, Disqualifications
MARCOS V. HEIRS OF ANDRES NAVARRO
G.R. No. 198240 |

July 03, 2013

FACTS:
Spouses Navarro died in 1958 and 1993, respectively. They left behind several
parcels of land including a 108.3997-hectare lot located in Cayabon, Milagros,
Masbate. The spouses were survived by their daughters Luisa Navarro Marcos,
herein petitioner, and Lydia Navarro Grageda, and the heirs of their only son Andres
Navarro, Jr. The heirs of Andres, Jr. are the respondents herein.
Petitioner and her sister Lydia discovered that respondents are claiming exclusive
ownership of the subject lot. Respondents based their claim on the Affidavit of
Transfer of Real Property where Andres, Sr. donated the subject lot to Andres, Jr.
Believing that the affidavit is a forgery, the sisters, through Assistant Fiscal Andres
Marcos, requested a handwriting examination of the affidavit. The PNP handwriting
expert PO2 Mary Grace Alvarez found that Andres, Sr.s signature on the affidavit
and the submitted standard signatures of Andres, Sr. were not written by one and
the same person. Thus, the sisters sued the respondents for annulment of the deed
of donation before the RTC of Masbate.
Respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness. The RTC granted
respondents motion and disqualified PO2 Alvarez as a witness. The RTC ruled that
PO2 Alvarezs supposed testimony would be hearsay as she has no personal
knowledge of the alleged handwriting of Andres, Sr.
The sisters sought reconsideration of the order but the RTC denied their motion.
Aggrieved, the sisters filed a petition for certiorari before the CA, which however,
dismissed their petition. The CA likewise denied their motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PO2 Alvarez should be disqualified as a witness.
HELD:
No. In Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System v.
Republic of the Philippines, we said that a witness must only possess all the

qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in the Rules of Court.


Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence provides:
SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications.Except as provided in the next
succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can
make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or
conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a
ground for disqualification.
Specific rules of witness disqualification are provided under Sections 21 to 24, Rule
130 of the Rules on Evidence. Section 21 disqualifies a witness by reason of mental
incapacity or immaturity. Section 22 disqualifies a witness by reason of marriage.
Section 23 disqualifies a witness by reason of death or insanity of the adverse
party. Section 24 disqualifies a witness by reason of privileged communication.
As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and make
known her perception to others. We have no doubt that she is qualified as a
witness. She cannot be disqualified as a witness since she possesses none of the
disqualifications specified under the Rules. Respondents motion to disqualify her
should have been denied by the RTC for it was not based on any of these grounds
for disqualification. The RTC rather confused the qualification of the witness with
the credibility and weight of her testimony.
Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear that the opinion of
an expert witness may be received in evidence, to wit:
SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness.The opinion of a witness on a
matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which
he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence.
For instance, in Tamani v. Salvador, we were inclined to believe that Tamanis
signature was forged after considering the testimony of the PNP document
examiner that the case involved simulated or copied forgery, such that the
similarities will be superficial. We said that the value of the opinion of a handwriting
expert depends not upon his mere statements of whether a writing is genuine or
false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks,
characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of
writing which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed
observer.
Thus, we disagree with the RTC that PO2 Alvarezs testimony would be hearsay.
Under Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, PO2 Alvarez is allowed to
render an expert opinion, as the PNP document examiner was allowed in Tamani.
But the RTC already ruled at the outset that PO2 Alvarezs testimony is hearsay
even before her testimony is offered and she is called to the witness stand. Under
the circumstances, the CA should have issued a corrective writ of certiorari and
annulled the RTC ruling.

UNDER C:
Rule 130, Testimonial Evidence, Disqualifications, Mental Incapacity or Immaturity
PEOPLE V. GOLIMLIM
G.R. No. 145225
|
April 2, 2004
FACTS:
Private complainant Evelyn G. Canchela (Evelyn), is a mental retardate. When her
mother, Amparo Hachero, left for Singapore on May 2, 1996 to work as a domestic
helper, she entrusted Evelyn to the care and custody of her (Amparos) sister Jovita
Guban and her husband Salvador Golimlim, herein appellant, at Barangay Bical,
Bulan, Sorsogon.
Sometime in August 1996, Jovita left the conjugal residence to meet a certain
Rosing, leaving Evelyn with appellant. Taking advantage of the situation, appellant
instructed private complainant to sleep, and soon after she had laid down, he kissed
her and took off her clothes. As he poked at her an object which to Evelyn felt like a
knife, he proceeded to insert his penis into her vagina. His lust satisfied, appellant
fell asleep.
When Jovita arrived, Evelyn told her about what appellant did to her. Jovita,
however, did not believe her and in fact she scolded her.
Sometime in December of the same year, Lorna Hachero, Evelyns half-sister,
received a letter from their mother Amparo instructing her to fetch Evelyn from
Sorsogon and allow her to stay in Novaliches, Quezon City where she (Lorna)
resided. Dutifully, Lorna immediately repaired to appellants home in Bical, and
brought Evelyn with her to Manila.
A week after she brought Evelyn to stay with her, Lorna suspected that her sister
was pregnant as she noticed her growing belly. She thereupon brought her to a
doctor at the Pascual General Hospital at Novaliches, Quezon City for check-up and
ultrasound examination.

Lornas suspicions were confirmed as the examinations revealed that Evelyn was
indeed pregnant. She thus asked her sister how she became pregnant, to which
Evelyn replied that appellant had sexual intercourse with her while holding a knife.
On February 27, 1997, Evelyn, assisted by Lorna, filed a criminal complaint for rape
against appellant before the Municipal Trial Court of Bulan, Sorsogon.
Finding for the prosecution, the trial court, by the present appealed Decision,
convicted appellant as charged. Hence, the accused appealed, he argues that the
mind of the victim is not normal. He further alleged that Evelyns testimony is not
categorical and is replete with contradictions, thus engendering grave doubts as to
his criminal culpability.
ISSUE:
Whether Evelyn, a mental retardate is disqualified as a witness.
HELD:
No. Sections 20 and 21 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:
SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in the
next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving,
can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
xxx
SEC. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity
immaturity. The following persons cannot be witnesses:

or

(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for
examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making
known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them
incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined
and of relating them truthfully.
In People v. Trelles, where the trial court relied heavily on the therein mentally
retarded private complainants testimony irregardless of her "monosyllabic
responses and vacillations between lucidity and ambiguity," this Court held:
A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se, disqualified from being
a witness, her mental condition not being a vitiation of her credibility. It is now
universally accepted that intellectual weakness, no matter what form it assumes, is
not a valid objection to the competency of a witness so long as the latter can still
give a fairly intelligent and reasonable narrative of the matter testified to.
It cannot then be gainsaid that a mental retardate can be a witness, depending on
his or her ability to relate what he or she knows. If his or her testimony is coherent,
the same is admissible in court.
To be sure, modern rules on evidence have downgraded mental incapacity as a
ground to disqualify a witness. As observed by McCormick, the remedy of excluding

such a witness who may be the only person available who knows the facts, seems
inept and primitive. Our rules follow the modern trend of evidence.
Thus, in a long line of cases, this Court has upheld the conviction of the accused
based mainly on statements given in court by the victim who was a mental
retardate

UNDER C:
Rule 130, Testimonial Evidence, Disqualifications, Marital DQ, Case No. 2
PEOPLE V. CASTANEDA
G.R. No. L-46306 | February 27, 1979
FACTS:
Benjamin Manaloto was charged with the crime of Falsification of Public Document.
The complaint was filed by his wife, Victoria Manaloto.
That on or about the 19th day of May, 1975, in the Municipality of San Fernando,
province of Pampanga, Philippines, Benjamin falsified in a deed of sale the house
and lot belonging to the conjugal partnership in favor of Ponciano Lacsamana,
making it appear that his spouse gave her marital consent to said sale.
At the trial, the prosecution called the wife to the witness stand but the defense
moved to disqualify her as a witness, invoking Sec. 20, Rule 130. The prosecution
stated that it is acriminal case for a crime committed by one against the other.
Notwithstanding such opposition, respondent Judge granted the motion,
disqualifying Victoria.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public Document may be
considered as a criminal case for a crime committed by a husband against his wife
and, therefore, an exception to the rule on marital disqualification.
HELD:
No. The case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule. WHEN AN OFFENSE
DIRECTLY ATTACKS, OR DIRECTLY AND VITALLY IMPAIRS, THE CONJUGAL RELATION,
IT COMES WITHIN THE EXCEPTION to the statute that one shall not be a witness

against the other except in a criminal prosecution for a crime committed (by) one
against the other.
In the case, it must be noted that had the sale of the said house and lot, and the
signing of the wifes name by her husband in the deed of sale, been made with the
consent of the wife, no crime could have been charged against said husband. It is
the husbands breach of his wifes confidence which gave rise to the offense
charged. And it is this same breach of trust which prompted the wife to make the
necessary complaint.
With more reason must the exception apply to the instant case where the victim of
the crime and the person who stands to be directly prejudiced by the falsification is
not a third person but the wife herself. And it is undeniable that the act had the
effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. This is apparent not only
in the act of the wife in personally lodging her complaint with the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent efforts in connection with the instant
petition, which seeks to set aside the order disqualifying her from testifying against
her husband.
Taken collectively, the actuations of the witness-wife underscore the fact that the
martial and domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have become
so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved said nor peace and
tranquility which may be disturbed. In such a case, identity of interests disappears
and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is nonexistent.
Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidence of private life which the
law aims at protecting will be nothing but ideals which, through their absence,
merely leave a void in the unhappy home.

UNDER C:
Rule 130, Testimonial Evidence, Disqualifications, Death or Insanity, Case No. 1
RAZON V. IAC
G.R. No. 74306 | March 16, 1992

FACTS:
Vicente Chuidian, the administrator of Juan Chuidians estate asked Enrique Razon
et.al, to deliver to him the certificate of stocks in E. Razon, Inc. registered in the
name of Juan Chuidian. Juan Chuidian was the father of Vicente. Razon, et.al
however alleged that all the stocks of the corporation were fully paid by defendant
Razon, and by agreement, that the all stocks were owned by Razon, and in his
possession. Razon also alleged that neither Juan nor Vicente had paid any amount
for the said stocks.
On the basis of the 1,500 shares of stock, the late Juan T. Chuidian and after him,
Enrique R., were elected as directors of E. Razon, Inc. Both of them actually served
and were paid compensation as directors of E. Razon, Inc.
From the time the certificate of stock was issued on April 1966 up to April 1971,
Enrique Razon had not questioned the ownership by Juan T. Chuidian of the shares
of stock in question and had not brought any action to have the certificate of stock
over the said shares cancelled
The certificate of stock was in the possession of defendant Razon who refused to
deliver said shares to the plaintiff, until the same was surrendered by defendant
Razon and deposited in a safety box in Philippine Bank of Commerce

Based on the facts, the subject shares of stocks were delivered by the late Chuidian
to Enrique because it was the latter who paid for all the subscription on the shares
of stock in the defendant corporation and the understanding was that he (defendant
Razon) was the owner of the said shares of stock and was to have possession
thereof until such time as he was paid therefor by the other nominal
incorporators/stockholders.
According to Enrique R., the "dead man's statute" rule is not applicable to the
instant case. Moreover, the private respondent, as plaintiff in the case did not object
to his oral testimony regarding the oral agreement between him and the deceased
Juan T. Chuidian that the ownership of the shares of stock was actually vested in the
petitioner unless the deceased opted to pay the same; and that the petitioner was
subjected to a rigid cross examination regarding such testimony. RTC held that
Razon was the owner, but it was overturned by CA. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:

Whether or not the dead mans statute applies in this case.


Whether or not the testimony of Enrique R. should be excluded from

evidence.
HELD:
NO. The dead mans statute only applies when it is filed against the administrator
or its representative upon a claim against the estate of the deceased person. It is
clear, therefore, that the testimony of the petitioner is not within the prohibition of
the rule. The case was not filed against the administrator of the estate, nor was it
filed upon claims against the estate.
Furthermore, the records show that the private respondent never objected to the
testimony of the petitioner as regards the true nature of his transaction with the
late elder Chuidian. The petitioner's testimony was subject to cross-examination by
the private respondents' counsel. Hence, granting that the petitioner's testimony is
within the prohibition of Section 20 (a), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the private
respondent is deemed to have waived the rule. We ruled in the case of Cruz v. Court
of Appeals (192 SCRA 209 [1990]):
"It is also settled that the court cannot disregard evidence which would
ordinarily be incompetent under the rules but has been rendered admissible by the
failure of a party to object thereto
However, the court ruled ultimately that the testimony of Enrique R. based on their
oral agreement was not sufficient to prove his ownership over the said shares of
stocks. Under the Corporation Code, for there to be an effective transfer of the
shares of stocks, there must be delivery of the duly indorsed certificate of stock. In
the instant case, there is no dispute the questioned 1,5000 shares of stock of E.
Razon, Inc. are in the name of the late Juan Chuidian in the books of the
corporation. Moreover, the records show that during his lifetime Chuidian was
elected member of the Board of Directors of the corporation which clearly shows
that he was a stockholder of the corporation. From the point of view of the
corporation, therefore, Chuidian was the owner of the 1,500 shares of stock. In such
a case, the petitioner who claims ownership over the questioned shares of stock
must show that the same were transferred to him by proving that all the

requirements for the effective transfer of shares of stock in accordance with the
corporation's by laws, if any, were followed.
The petitioner failed in both instances. The petitioner did not present any by-laws
which could show that the 1,500 shares of stock were effectively transferred to him.
In the absence of the corporation's bylaws or rules governing effective transfer of
shares of stock, the provisions of the Corporation Law are made applicable to the
instant case.
The law is clear that in order for a transfer of stock certificate to be effective, the
certificate must be properly indorsed and that title to such certificate of stock is
vested in the transferee by the delivery of the duly indorsed certificate of stock.
(Section 35, Corporation Code) Since the certificate of stock covering the
questioned 1,5000 shares of stock registered in the name of the late Juan Chuidian
was never indorsed to the petitioner, the inevitable conclusion is that the
questioned shares of stock belong to Chuidian. The petitioner's asseveration that he
did not require an indorsement of the certificate of stock in view of his intimate
friendship with the late Juan Chuidian can not overcome the failure to follow the
procedure required by law or the proper conduct of business even among friends.
Moreover, the preponderance of evidence supports the appellate court's factual
findings that the shares of stock were given to Juan T. Chuidian for value. Juan T.
Chuidian was the legal counsel who handled the legal affairs of the corporation. We
give credence to the testimony of the private respondent that the shares of stock
were given to Juan T. Chuidian in payment of his legal services to the corporation.
Petitioner Razon failed to overcome this testimony.
UNDER C:
Rule 130, Testimonial Evidence, Disqualifications, Death or Insanity, Case No. 2
SUNGA-CHAN V. CHUA
G.R. No. 143340 | August 15, 2001
FACTS:
Respondent alleged that, he verbally entered into a business partnership with
Jacinto. Respondent and Jacinto allegedly agreed to register the business name of
their partnership, under the name of Jacinto as a sole proprietorship. The
partnership allegedly had Jacinto as manager, assisted by Josephine Sy, a sister of
the wife respondent, Erlinda Sy.
Upon Jacinto's death, his surviving wife, petitioner Cecilia and particularly his
daughter, petitioner Lilibeth, took over the operations, control, custody, disposition
and management of Shellite without respondent's consent. Despite respondent's
repeated demands upon petitioners for accounting, inventory, appraisal, winding up
and restitution of his net shares in the partnership, petitioners failed to comply.
Petitioners filed their Answer with Compulsory Counter-claims, contending that they
are not liable for partnership shares, unreceived income/profits, interests, damages
and attorney's fees, that respondent does not have a cause of action against them,

and that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action, the SEC
being the agency that has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case. As
counterclaim, petitioner sought attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
The trial court rendered its Decision ruling for respondent. Petitioners filed a Notice
of Appeal with the trial court, the CA dismissed the appeal. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners question the correctness of the finding of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals that a partnership existed between respondent and Jacinto from 1977 until
Jacinto's death. In the absence of any written document to show such partnership
between respondent and Jacinto, petitioners argues that these courts were
proscribes from hearing the testimonies of respondent and his witness, Josephine, to
prove the alleged partnership three years after Jacinto's death. To support this
argument, petitioners invoke the "Dead Man's Statute' or "Survivorship Rule" under
Section 23, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioners thus implore this Court to rule that the testimonies of respondent and his
alter ego, Josephine, should not have been admitted to prove certain claims against
a deceased person (Jacinto), now represented by petitioners.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the "Dead Man's Statute" applies to this case so as to render
respondent's testimony and that of Josephine inadmissible.
HELD:
The "Dead Man's Statute" provides that if one party to the alleged transaction is
precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disabilities, the
surviving party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own
uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction. But before this rule can
be successfully invoked to bar the introduction of testimonial evidence, it is
necessary that:
"1. The witness is a party or assignor of a party to case or persons in whose behalf a
case in prosecuted.
2. The action is against an executor or administrator or other representative of a
deceased person or a person of unsound mind;
3. The subject-matter of the action is a claim or demand against the estate of such
deceased person or against person of unsound mind;
4. His testimony refers to any matter of fact of which occurred before the death of
such deceased person or before such person became of unsound mind."
Two reasons forestall the application of the "Dead Man's Statute" to this case. First,
petitioners filed a compulsory counterclaim against respondents in their answer
before the trial court, and with the filing of their counterclaim, petitioners
themselves effectively removed this case from the ambit of the "Dead Man's
Statute". Well entrenched is the rule that when it is the executor or administrator or
representatives of the estates that sets up the counterclaim, the plaintiff, herein
respondent, may testify to occurrences before the death of the deceased to defeat
the counterclaim. Moreover, as defendant in the counterclaim, respondent is not
disqualified from testifying as to matters of facts occurring before the death of the

deceased, said action not having been brought against but by the estate or
representatives of the deceased.
Second, the testimony of Josephine is not covered by the "Dead Man's Statute" for
the simple reason that she is not "a party or assignor of a party to a case or persons
in whose behalf a case is prosecuted." Records show that respondent offered the
testimony of Josephine to establish the existence of the partnership between
respondent and Jacinto. Petitioners' insistence that Josephine is the alter ego of
respondent does not make her an assignor because the term "assignor" of a party
means "assignor of a cause of action which has arisen, and not the assignor of a
right assigned before any cause of action has arisen." Plainly then, Josephine is
merely a witness of respondent, the latter being the party plaintiff.

UNDER C:
Rule 130, Testimonial Evidence, Disqualifications, Death or Insanity, Case No. 3
BORDALBA V. CA
G.R. No. 112443 | January 25, 2002
FACTS:
In 1980, herein petitioner was granted a Free Patent and was issued an Original
Certificate of Title over the herein subject lot. She caused the subdivision and titling
of the said lot into 6 parcels, as well as the conveyance of the two parcels thereof.
Private respondents, however, claimed ownership over the same lot by virtue of an
extrajudicial partition made as early as 1947. Hence, they filed a complaint to
declare void the Free Patent as well as the cancellation of the titles issued.
The trial court, finding that fraud was employed by petitioner in obtaining the Free
Patent, declared said free patent and title void and ordered its cancellation.
However, the purchaser and mortgagee of the two parcels conveyed were declared
in good faith, hence, upheld their rights over the property. Both petitioner and
private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with

modification the decision of the trial court. It ruled that private respondents are
entitled only to 1/3 portion of the lot and petitioner should be ordered to reconvey
only 1/3 of the lot to the private respondents. Petitioner contends that the
testimonies given by the witnesses for private respondents which touched on
matters occurring prior to the death of her mother should not have been admitted
by the trial court, as the same violated the dead man's statute. Likewise, petitioner
questions the right of private respondents to inherit from the late Nicanor Jayme
and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay, as well as the identity between the disputed lot and the
parcel of land adjudicated in the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a violation of dead mans statute?
HELD:
No. The dead man's statute does not operate to close the mouth of a witness as to
any matter of fact coming to his knowledge in any other way than through personal
dealings with the deceased person, or communication made by the deceased to the
witness.
Since the claim of private respondents and the testimony of their witnesses in the
present case is based, inter alia, on the 1947 Deed of Extra-judicial Partition and
other documents, and not on dealings and communications with the deceased, the
questioned testimonies were properly admitted by the trial court.
Likewise untenable is the claim of petitioner that private respondents are not legal
heirs of Nicanor Jayme and Asuncion Jayme-Baclay. Other than their bare allegations
to dispute their heirship, no hard evidence was presented by them to substantiate
their allegations. Besides, in order that an heir may assert his right to the property
of a deceased, no previous judicial declaration of heirship is necessary.

UNDER C:
Rule 130, Testimonial Evidence, Hearsay Evidence Rule, Case No. 1
PATULA V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 164457 |

April 11, 2012

| 699 SCRA 135

FACTS:
Patula was a saleswoman of Footluckers Chain of Stores, Inc. and was accused of
Estafa for allegedly failing to turn over the collected sum of P131,286.97 from
several customers of said company under the express obligation to account for the
proceeds of the sales and deliver the collection to the said company. The
prosecution presented two witnesses, the manager of the store who testified on the
duties and responsibilities of Patula and auditor Guivencan of the company who
testified on her findings. Guivencan testified that she conducted her audit by going
to the customers in places from Mabinay to Zamboanga and Negros Oriental, and
then in Siquijor; that she discovered in the course of her audit that the amounts
appearing on the original copies of receipts in the possession of around 50
customers varied from the amounts written on the duplicate copies of the receipts

petitioner submitted to the office. The difference was stipulated in her written report
to the manager. The prosecution offered various documents consisting of: (a) the
receipts allegedly issued by petitioner to each of her customers upon their
payment, (b) the ledgers listing the accounts pertaining to each customer with the
corresponding notations of the receipt numbers for each of the payments, and (c)
the confirmation sheets accomplished by Guivencan herself. The ledgers and
receipts were marked and formally offered as Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives.
In the course of Guivencans direct-examination, Patulas counsel interposed a
continuing objection on the ground that the figures entered in the exhibit and their
derivatives, were hearsay because the persons who had made the entries were not
themselves presented in court. RTC, stating that inasmuch as Patula had opted not
to present evidence for her defense the Prosecutions evidence remained
unrefuted and uncontroverted, found Patula guilty of estafa. Patula went straight
to the Supreme Court via Petition for review on Certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in ruling that the list of customers covered by
Patula with difference in record is not hearsay.
HELD:
Yes, the trial court erred in not finding the list hearsay hence inadmissible.
Guivencan conceded having no personal knowledge of the amounts actually
received by petitioner from the customersor remitted by petitioner to Footluckers.
This means that persons other than Guivencan prepared Exhibits B to YY and their
derivatives, and that Guivencan based her testimony on the entries found in the
receipts supposedly issued by petitioner and in the ledgers held by Footluckers
corresponding to each customer, as well as on the unsworn statements of some of
the customers. Accordingly, her being the only witness who testified on the entries
effectively deprived the RTC of the reasonable opportunity to validate and test the
veracity and reliability of the entries as evidence of petitioners misappropriation or
conversion through cross-examination by petitioner. The denial of that opportunity
rendered the entire proof of misappropriation or conversion hearsay, and thus
unreliable and untrustworthy for purposes of determining the guilt or innocence of
the accused.
To elucidate why the Prosecutions hearsay evidence was unreliable and
untrustworthy, and thus devoid of probative value, reference is made to Section 36
of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that a witness can testify only to those
facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from her
own perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court. The personal
knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for accepting testimonial
evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A witness bereft of personal
knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon for that purpose because her
testimony derives its value not from the credit accorded to her as a witness
presently testifying but from the veracity and competency of the extrajudicial
source of her information.
In case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard another
person say about the facts in dispute, the person from whom the witness derived

the information on the facts in dispute is not in court and under oath to be
examined and cross-examined. The weight of such testimony then depends not
upon the veracity of the witness but upon the veracity of the other person giving
the information to the witness without oath. The information cannot be tested
because the declarant is not standing in court as a witness and cannot, therefore,
be cross-examined.

Under D:
Rule 131, Burden of Proof and Presumptions, Burden of Proof vs. Burden of Evidence
GR 170598

FEBTC V. CHANTE
October 9, 2013 |

707 SCRA 149

FACTS:
Robert Mar Chante (Chan), was a depositor of FEBTC. FEBTC issued him an ATM
Card. The card, known as a "Do-It-All" card to handle credit card and ATM
transactions, was tagged in his current account.
As a security feature, a PIN, known only to the depositor, was required in order to
gain access to the account. With the use of the PIN, Chan could then deposit and
withdraw funds from his current account from any FEBTC ATM facility, including the

MEGALINK facilities of other member banks that included the Philippine National
Bank (PNB).
FEBTC alleged that on May 4 and 5, 1992, Chan had used his card to withdraw funds
totaling P967k from the PNB-MEGALINK ATM at the Manila Pavilion Hotel in Manila.
Such amount withdrawn was more than the outstanding balance of Chans current
account. FEBTC added that at the time of the ATM withdrawal transactions, there
was an error in its computer system known as "system bug" whose nature had
allowed Chan to successfully withdraw funds in excess of his current credit balance
of P198k; and that Chan had taken advantage of the system bug to do the
withdrawal transactions.
FEBTC filed a complaint to recover the over withdrawn amount (P770k). It alleged
that the ATM transactions in question would not be processed unless the PIN, which
was known only to Chan as the cardholder, had been correctly entered, an
indication both that it was his ATM card that had been used, and that all the
transactions had been processed successfully by the PNB-MEGALINK ATM facility at
the Manila Pavilion Hotel with the use of the correct PIN.
Chan denied the liability and claims that he did not make such withdrawals and
further claims that it could possibly an inside job.
RTC ruled in favor of FEBTC and held Chan liable for P770k based on the acts of the
latter of issuing a check amounting to his available balance in the current account.
On appeal, CA reversed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not FEBTC was able to discharge the burden of proof.
HELD:
No, the fact that Chans account number and ATM card number were the ones used
for the withdrawals, by itself, is not sufficient to support the conclusion that he
should be deemed to have made the withdrawals.
Burden of proof is a term that refers to two separate and quite different concepts,
namely: (a) the risk of non-persuasion; and (b) the duty of producing evidence, In its
first concept, it is the duty to establish the truth of a given proposition or issue by
such a quantum of evidence as the law demands in the case at which the issue
arises. In its other concept, it is the duty of producing evidence at the beginning or
at any subsequent stage of trial in order to make or meet a prima facie case.
Generally speaking, burden of proof in its second concept passes from party to
party as the case progresses, while in its first concept it rests throughout upon the
party asserting the affirmative of the issue.
The party who alleges an affirmative fact has the burden of proving it because mere
allegation of the fact is not evidence of it.13 Verily, the party who asserts, not he
who denies, must prove.

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