CLT Realty v Hi-Grade Feeds Corporation, G .R. No. 160684, Sept.

2, 2015
A title can only have one date of registration, as there can only be one title covering the same
property. The date of registration is reckoned from the time of the title's transcription in the
record book of the Registry of Deeds. Therefore, the date appearing on the face of a title refers to
the date of issuance of the decree of registration, as provided in Sections 41 and 42 of the Land
Registration Act or Section 40 of the P.D. 1529. Based on Decree No. 36455 in Land Registration
Case No. 4429, the decree registering OCT No. 994, the date of the issuance is 19 April 1917
while on the other hand, OCT No. 994 was received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on
3 May 1917. In this case, the date which should be reckoned as the date of registration of the
title is the date when the mother title was received for transcription, 3 May 1917. As correctly
found by the Court of Appeals: For sure, the very copy of OCT No. 994, presented by Appellee CLT
no less and marked as its Exhibit "D", shows on its face that the date April 19, 1917 refers to the
issuance of the decree of registration by the Honorable Norberto Romualdez, while May 3, 1917
pertains to the date when the same decree was Received for transcription in the Office of the
Register of Deeds. Therefore, as the date of transcription in the record book of the Registry of
Deeds is 3 May 1917, we rule that the genuine title is the title of Hi-Grade

PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE:

The term prima facie evidence denotes evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is
sufficient to sustain the proposition it supports or to establish the facts. Prima facie means it is
sufficient to establish a fact or raise a presumption unless disproved or rebutted. (Republic of
the Philippines, vs. Sandiganbayan Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., et al., April 12, 2011, G.R. No.
166859, Carpio Morales, J.).
G.R. NO. 152375, DECEMBER 13, 2011.
FACTS:
A case was filed against the respondents for before the Sandiganbayan (SB) for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages in relation to the allegation that respondents
illegally manipulated the purchase of the major shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited in
Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI). This case docketed as Civil Case No. 0009
spawned numerous incidental cases, among them, Civil Case No. 0130, a petition instituted by
Victor Africa (Son of the late Jose Africa) which sought to nullify the orders of the PCGG directing
him to account for the alleged sequestered shares in ETPI and to cease and desist from
exercising voting rights. The present respondents were not made parties either in Civil Case No.
0130. In the former case, Victor Africa (Africa) was not impleaded in and so is plainly not a party
thereto.
In the proceedings for Civil Case No. 0130, testimony of Mr. Maurice V. Bane (former director
and treasurer-in-trust of ETPI) was taken by way of deposition upon oral examination (Bane
deposition) before Consul General Ernesto Castro of the Philippine Embassy in London, England.
The purpose was for Bane to identify and testify on the facts set forth in his affidavit so as to
prove the ownership issue in favor of the petitioner and/or establish the prima facie factual
foundation for sequestration of ETPIs Class A stock.
As to Civil Case No. 009, the petitioner filed a motion (1 st Motion) to adopt the testimonies of
the witnesses in Civil Case No. 0130, including the deposition of Mr. Maurice Bane which was
denied by SB in its April 1998 Resolution because he was not available for cross-examination.
The petitioners did not in any way question the 1998 resolution, and instead made its Formal
Offer of Evidence on December 14, 1999. Significantly, the Bane deposition was not included as
part of its offered exhibits. In rectifying this, they filed a second motion with prayer for reopening of the case for the purpose of introducing additional evidence and requested the court
to take judicial notice of the facts established by the Bane deposition. This was however
denied by the SB in its November 6, 2000 resolution (2000 resolution). A third motion was filed
by the petitioners on November 16, 2001 seeking once more to admit the Bane deposition which
the SB denied for the reason that the 1998 resolution has become final in view of the petitioners
failure to file a motion for reconsideration or appeal within the 15-day reglementary period.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the SB committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the 1998 resolution has
already attained finality and in refusing to re-open the case.

2. Whether the Bane deposition is admissible under the rules of court and under the principle of
judicial notice.
RULING:
1. The court ruled that the SBs ruling on the finality of its 1998 resolution was legally
erroneous but did not constitute grave abuse of discretion due to the absence of a clear
showing that its action was a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment affecting its exercise
of jurisdiction. The SBs ruling, although an erroneous legal conclusion was only an error of
judgment, or, at best, an abuse of discretion but not a grave one.
The 1998 resolution is an interlocutory decision, thus petition for certiorari is still premature
since the rules of court provides that certiorari should be availed in a situation where neither an
appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is available to
the aggrieved party except if such remedy is inadequate or insufficient in relieving the aggrieved
party of the injurious effects of the order complained of. At the time of the 1 st motion, the
presentation of evidence has not yet concluded. The remedy after the denial of the 1 st motion
should have been for the petitioner to move for a reconsideration to assert and even clarify its
position on the admission of the Bane deposition. But upon denial of the 2nd motion, petitioners
should have already questioned it by way of certiorari since it effectively foreclosed all avenues
available to it for the consideration of the Bane deposition. Instead of doing so, however, the
petitioner allowed the 60-day reglementary period, under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, to lapse, and proceeded to file its 3rd motion.
However, the court ruled that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
ultimately refusing to reopen the case for the purpose of introducing and admitting in
evidence the Bane deposition. The Rules of Court does not prohibit a party from requesting
the court to allow it to present additional evidence even after it has rested its case provided that
the evidence is rebuttal in character, whose necessity, for instance, arose from the shifting of the
burden of evidence from one party to the other; or where the evidence sought to be presented is
in the nature of newly discovered evidence. At the time the petitioner moved to re-open its case,
the respondents had not yet even presented their evidence in chief. The respondents, therefore,
would not have been prejudiced by allowing the petitioners introduction of the Bane deposition,
which was concededly omitted through oversight.
2. Despite the cases being closely related, admissibility of the Bane deposition still
needs to comply with the rules of court on the admissibility of testimonies or
deposition taken in a different proceeding. Depositions are not meant as substitute for the
actual testimony in open court of a party or witness. Generally, the deponent must be presented
for oral examination in open court at the trial or hearing otherwise, the adverse party may
oppose it as mere hearsay. Cross-examination will test the truthfulness of the statements of the
witness; it is an essential safeguard of the accuracy and completeness of a testimony.
Depositions from the former trial may be introduced as evidence provided that the parties to the
first proceeding must be the same as the parties to the later proceeding. In the present case, the
petitioner failed to establish the identity of interest or privity between the opponents of the two
cases. While Victor Africa is the son of the late respondent Jose Africa, the deposition is
admissible only against him as an ETPI stockholder who filed Civil Case No. 0130.
Further, the rule of judicial notice is not applicable in this case as it would create confusion
between the two cases. It is the duty of the petitioner, as a party-litigant, to properly lay before
the court the evidence it relies upon in support of the relief it seeks, instead of imposing that
same duty on the court.
The petition was DISMISSED for lack of merit.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION),
JOSE L. AFRICA (SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS), MANUEL H. NIETO, JR., FERDINAND E.
MARCOS (SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS), IMELDA R. MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS,
JR., JUAN PONCE ENRILE, AND POTENCIANO ILUSORIO (SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS),
RESPONDENTS.
FACTS: On July 22, 1987, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed a complaint against Jose L. Africa, Manuel H.
Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr., Juan Ponce Enrile, and
Potenciano Ilusorio (collectively, the respondents) for reconveyance, reversion, accounting,
restitution,and damages before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner alleged that the respondents
illegally manipulated the purchase of the major shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited in

Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), which shareholdings respondents Jose Africa
and Manuel Nieto, Jr. held for themselves and, through their holdings and the corporations they
organized, beneficially for respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos. This case
docketed as Civil Case No. 0009. Victor Africa (Africa), son of the late Jose L. Africa, was not
impleaded in and so is plainly not a party to Civil Case No. 0009. Civil Case No. 0009 spawned
numerous incidental cases, among them, Civil Case No. 0130. The present respondents were not
made parties in Civil Case No. 0130.
Africa, as an ETPI stockholder, filed a petition for certiorari, with prayer for a temporary
restraining order/preliminary injunction with the Sandiganbayan (docketed as Civil Case No.
0130), seeking to nullify the order of the Sandiganbayan for the former to account for his
sequestered shares in ETPI and to cease and desist from exercising voting rights. During the
pendency of Africas petition, Civil Case No. 0130, Africa filed a motion with the Sandiganbayan,
alleging that the PCGG had been illegally exercising the rights of stockholders of ETPI,
especially in the election of the members of the board of directors and prayed for the issuance of
an order for the calling and holding of [ETPI] annual stockholders meeting under the courts
control and supervision. Sandiganbayan favored Africas motion.
The PCGG assailed this resolution before this Court via a petition for certiorari docketed
as G.R. No. 107789 (PCGGs petition), imputing grave abuse of discretion on the
Sandiganbayan for holding, inter alia, that the registered stockholders of ETPI had the right to
vote.[14] In our November 26, 1992 Resolution, we enjoined the Sandiganbayan from
implementing its assailed resolution.
The Sandiganbayan ordered for the consolidation of Civil Cases Nos. 0009 and 0130, with
the former as the main case and the latter as an incident.
During the pendency of PCGGs petition (G.R. No. 107789), A Very Urgent Petition for
Authority to Hold Special Stockholders Meeting for the Sole Purpose of Increasing [ETPIs]
Authorized Capital Stock (Urgent Petition) was filed by PCGG. In our May 7, 1996 Resolution, we
referred
this
Urgent
Petition
to
the
Sandiganbayan for
reception
of
evidence
and immediate resolution which will be in Civil Case No. 0130.
To resolve the Urgent Petition, the testimony of Mr. Maurice V. Bane (former director and
treasurer-in-trust of ETPI) was taken at the petitioners instance for the purpose for Bane to
identify and testify on the facts in his affidavit so as to prove the ownership issue in favor of the
petitioner and/or establish the prima facie factual foundation for sequestration of ETPIs Class A
stock in support of the Urgent Petition. The notice also states that the petitioner shall use the
Bane deposition in evidence in the main case of Civil Case No. 0009. On the scheduled
deposition date, only Africa was present and he cross-examined Bane.
The Sandiganbayan granted the Urgent Petition hence, Africa went to this Court via a
petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 147214 (Africas petition). The court resolved the
PCGG and Africas petition and were REFERRED to the Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence
and to decide it within 60 days from receipt of this resolution.
In Civil case 0009, the pre trial conference was scheduled and concluded only on
November 29, 1996 and March 17, 1997. Among the witnesses offered was Maurice V. Bane
representative of Cable and Wireless Limited (C & W) at the time ETPI was organized. After the
trial of Civil Case No. 009, the petitioner filed a motion to adopt the testimonies of the witnesses
in Civil Case No. 0130, including Bane. The Sandiganbayan promulgated the 1998 Resolution
which denied the adoption of oral deposition of Bane because he was not available for crossexamination.
The petitioners did not question the 1998 resolution, and instead they made its Formal Offer of
Evidence. Significantly, the Bane deposition was not included as part of its offered exhibits. In
order to correct this, they filed a second motion with prayer for re-opening of the case for the
purpose of introducing additional evidence and requested the court to take judicial notice of the
facts established by the Bane deposition. This was denied by the Sandiganbayan in its
November 6, 2000 resolution. A third motion was filed by the petitioners on November 16, 2001
seeking once more to admit the Bane deposition which the Sandiganbayan for the reason that
without plaintiff having moved for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the
resolution has attained finality and its effect cannot be undone by the simple expedient of
filing a motion.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of jurisdiction on holding
that the 1998 resolution already attained finality and that the 3 rd motion for reconsideration of
the petitioner is prohibited.
HELD:

A judgment or order is considered final if the order disposes of the action or

proceeding completely, or terminates a particular stage of the same action; in such case, the
remedy available to an aggrieved party is appeal. If the order or resolution, however, merely
resolves incidental matters and leaves something more to be done to resolve the merits of the
case, the order is interlocutory and the aggrieved partys remedy is a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65. Therefore, the 1998 resolution is interlocutory. The Sandiganbayans denial of the
petitioners 1st motion through the 1998 Resolution came at a time when the petitioner had not
even concluded the presentation of its evidence. Plainly, the denial of the motion did not resolve
the merits of the case, as something still had to be done to achieve this end.
the Sandiganbayans 1998 resolution which merely denied the adoption of the Bane deposition
as part of the evidence in Civil Case No. 0009 could not have attained finality.
The Sandiganbayan undoubtedly erred on a question of law in its ruling, but this legal
error did not necessarily amount to a grave abuse of discretion in the absence of a clear showing
that its action was a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment affecting its exercise of
jurisdiction.[62] Without this showing, the Sandiganbayans erroneous legal conclusion was only
an error of judgment, or, at best, an abuse of discretion but not a grave one.
The 3rd motion could not also be considered as a prohibited motion because Section 5,
Rule 37 of the Rules of Court clearly provides, the proscription against a second motion for
reconsideration is directed against a judgment or final order. But a second motion for
reconsideration of an interlocutory order can be denied on the ground that it is discusses again
the arguments already passed upon and resolved by the court. In this case, the latter is the
reason cited by the respondents for the denial of the motion

CAMITAN V. FIDELITY INVESTMENT (REMEDIAL)

The records show that counsel for petitioners made a judicial admission and failed to refute that
admission during the said proceedings despite the opportunity to do so. A JUDICIAL
ADMISSION is an admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, which dispenses with the need for proof with respect to the
matter or fact admitted. It may be contradicted only by a showing that it was made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
Petitioners explicate that the wrong admission was an honest mistake and negligence
attributable to the counsel's nervousness and excitement in appearing for the first time before
the CA. However, as correctly pointed out by the CA, such an admission may only be refuted
upon a proper showing of palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. Thus, the claim
of honest mistake and negligence on the part of the counsel did not suffice.
There was ample opportunity for petitioners; counsel to examine the document, retract his
admission, and point out the alleged discrepancies. But he chose not to contest the document.
Thus, it cannot be said that the admission of the counsel was made through palpable mistake.
Every counsel has the implied authority to do all acts which are necessary or incidental to the
prosecution and management of the suit in behalf on his client Any act performed by counsel
within the scope of his general and implied authority is, in the eyes of law, regarded as the act of
the client himself.
Consequently, the mistake or negligence of the counsel, which may result in the rendition of an
unfavorable judgment, generally binds the client. To rule otherwise would encourage every
defeated party, in order to salvage his case, to claim neglect or mistake on the part of his
counsel. Then, there would be no end to litigation, as every shortcoming of counsel could be the
subject of challenge by his client through another counsel who, is he is also found wanting,
would likewise be disowned by the same client through another counsel ans so on, as infinitum.
This rule admits of exceptions, i.e., where the counsel's mistake is so great and serious that the
client is deprived of his day in court or of his property without due process of law. In these
cases, the client is not bound by his counsel's mistakes and the case may even be reopened in
order to give the client another chance to present his case. In the case at bar, however, these
exceptional circumstances do not obtain.

People vs. Ejandra

G.R. No. 134203. May 27, 2004.*

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ELVIE EJANDRA @ ELVIES EJANDRA @ BEBOT EJANDRA
@ ALEJANDRO EJANDRA @ BEBOT OCAY SUANGCO, MAGDALENA CALUNOD y MAGANOY @
MAGDALENA SALIOT-SUANGCO, ROEL REVILLA CERON and EDWIN TAMPOS y AMPARO (All
detained at the Quezon City Jail, Quezon City), appellants.
Criminal Law; Kidnapping for Ransom; Witnesses; Child Witnesses; The testimony of children of
sound mind is more correct and truthful than that of older persons.It bears stressing that Ed
Henderson was only nine years old and in Grade III when he was kidnapped. In People vs. Bisda,
et al. the kidnap victim Angela was barely six years old when she testified. We held that,
considering her tender years, innocent and guileless, it is incredible that she would testify falsely
that the appellants took her from the school through threats and detained her in the dirty
house for five days. Thus, testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit. The
testimony of children of sound mind is likewise to be more correct and truthful than that of older
persons. In People vs. Alba, this Court ruled that children of sound mind are likely to be more
observant of incidents

People vs. Ejandra

which take place within their view than older persons, and their testimonies are likely more
correct in detail than that of older persons.
Same; Same; Alibi; For alibi to merit approbation, the accused must adduce clear and convincing
evidence that he was in a place other than the situs criminis at the time the crime was
committed, such that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime
when it was committed.The appellants denials and alibi, which are merely selfserving
evidence cannot prevail over the positive, consistent and straightforward testimony of Ed
Henderson. Alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly
unreliable. To merit approbation, the accused must adduce clear and convincing evidence that he
was in a place other than the situs criminis at the time the crime was committed, such that it
was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime when it was committed.
Appellants Revilla and Tampos failed to prove their alibi. They relied merely and solely on their
bare and dubious testimonies to prove their defense. Appellant Revilla, likewise, failed to adduce
any documentary evidence to prove exactly when he left Sogus, Southern Leyte, via a domestic
vessel and the time and date of his arrival in Manila.

Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; The accused waives any irregularities relating to his
warrantless arrest if he fails to file a motion to quash the Information on that ground, or to object
to any irregularity in his arrest before he is arraigned.We agree with the Office of the Solicitor
General that the appellants Ejandra and Calunod waived any irregularities relating to their
warrantless arrest when they failed to file a motion to quash the Information on that ground, or
to object to any irregularity in their arrest before they were arraigned. They are now estopped
from questioning the legality of their arrest.

Same; Same; If the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting
ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial. For the accused to be convicted of
kidnapping or serious illegal detention, the prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable
doubt all the elements of the crime, namely, (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he
kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of
detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the
following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three
days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) any serious physical injuries are
inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person
kidnapped and detained is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the
victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his
detention is immaterial.

People vs. Ejandra

Same; Same; Elements; Words and Phrases; The purpose of the offender in extorting ransom is a
qualifying circumstance which may be proven by his words and overt acts before, during and
after the kidnapping and detention of the victim; Ransom, as employed in the law, is so used in
its common or ordinary sense, meaning, a sum of money or other thing of value, price, or
consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a kidnapped or detained person, a payment
that releases from captivity.To warrant an imposition of the death penalty for the crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom, the prosecution must prove the following
beyond reasonable doubt: (a) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his
liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the victim of his liberty; and, (c) motive of the accused, which is
ransom for the victim or other person for the release of the victim. The purpose of the offender in
extorting ransom is a qualifying circumstance which may be proven by his words and overt acts
before, during and after the kidnapping and detention of the victim. Neither actual demand for
nor actual payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be committed. Ransom, as employed
in the law, is so used in its common or ordinary sense; meaning, a sum of money or other thing
of value, price, or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a kidnapped or detained
person, a payment that releases from captivity. It may include benefits not necessarily pecuniary
which may accrue to the kidnapper as a condition for the victims release.