TERESITA B. ENRIQUEZ, Complainant, v. ATTY.

TRINA
DE VERA, Respondent.
(Canons: 1, 1.01; 7, 7.03)
Whether Atty. Trina De Vera committed serious
misconduct and should be held administrative liable for
the issuance and dishonor of several post-dated checks.
FACTS: The complainant Teresita, a businesswoman
involved in building cell site towers. She is acquainted with
Atty. De Vera through business by subcontracting the cell
site acquisition to Atty. De Vera. In April 2006, Atty De
Vera borrowed P500,000.00 from Teresita with interest of
20,000.00 per month. Atty. De Vera issued post-dated
check for P500,000.00 and also issued to more checks to
cover the interest. Atty. De Vera obtained another loan
from Teresitas sister in the amount of P100,000.00. Atty.
De vera issued another post-dated check inconsideration
thereof. Upon maturity of the checks Teresita present the
checks for payment. However, the checks bounced for
being drawn against insufficient funds. She attempted to
encash the checks but the checks were dishonored
because the account was closed. Teresita demanded
payment from Atty. De Vera however she failed to settle
her obligations, prompting Teresita to file complaints
against Atty. DV for violation of BP 22 and estafa under
Art. 315 (2) of the RPC.
Contention of the accused: Atty. DV tries to free herself
from liability by arguing that she did not incur the loans
alleged by Teresita, and the checks were issued merely as
a guarantee and not as payment for the loan. She also
raises the prematurity of the administrative complaint in
view of the pendency of the criminal proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether Atty. De Vera committed serious
misconduct and should be held administratively liable for
the issuance and dishonor of worthless checks in violation
of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD: Yes. This court has ruled that the Lawyers act of
issuing worthless checks, punishable under BP 22
constitutes serious misconduct. The Supreme court cited
the case De Jesus v. Callado wherein it state that We do
not, believe that conviction of the criminal charges raised
against her is essential, so far as either administrative or
civl service case or the disbarment charges against her is
concerned. We consider that the issuance of checks in
violation of the provisions of BP 22 constitutes serious
misconduct on the part of the member of the Bar.
Misconduct involves wrongful intention and
not mere error of judgment; it is serious or gross
when it is flagrant.
Membership in the bar requires a high degree of
fidelity to the laws whether in a private or professional
capacity. "Any transgression of this duty on his part would
not only diminish his reputation as a lawyer but would also
erode the public's faith in the Legal Profession as a
whole."56 A lawyer "may be removed or otherwise
disciplined 'not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his
profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected
with his professional duties, which showed him to be unfit

for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his

license and the law confer to him.'"
BP 22 has been enacted inorder to safeguard the
interest of the banking system and the legitimate public
checking account users. The gravamen of the offense is
tha act of making and issuing worthless check, or any
check that is dishonored upon its presentment for
payment and putting in circulation. Being a lawyer
respondent was well aware of the objetives and coverage
of BP 22. If he did not, he was nonetheless presumed to
know them, for the law is penal in character and
application. His issuance of unfunded check exihibited his
indifference towards the pernicious effect of his illegal act
to public interest and public order. He thereby swept aside
his lawyers oath and enjoined them to support the
constitution and obey the laws.
A lawyer is required to observe the law and be
mindful of his or her actions whether acting in a public or
private
capacity.50
The
Code
of
Professional
Responsibility provides:
CANON A
LAWYER
SHALL
UPHOLD
THE
1CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW
AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule
A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
1.01 - immoral or deceitful conduct.
....
CANON A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD
7THE INTEGRITY- AND DIGNITY OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE
ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
....
Rule
A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that
7.03 - adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,
nor shall he, whether in public or private life,
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.

ATTY.
EDITA
NOE-LACSAMANA, Complainant, vs.
ATTY. YOLANDO F. BUSMENTE, Respondent.
(Canon 9)
A complaint for disbarment filed by Atty.
Lacsamana against Atty. Bustamante before the IBP for
directly or indirectly assisting Dela Rossa in her illegal
practice of law.

FACTS: Complainant Lacsamana alleged in her complaint

that she was a counsel for Irene Bides, the plaintiff in Civil
case before the RTC while Bustamante was the counsel
for the defendant Imelda Ulaso. Lacsamana allleged that
one Atty. Dela Rosa would accompany Ulaso in court
projecting herself as Bustamantes collaborating counsel
and upon verification, she discovered that Dela Rosa was
not a lawyer.

Contention of the Accused: Busmente alleged that Dela

Rosa was a law graduate and was his paralegal assistant
for a few years. Busmente alleged that Dela Rosas
employment with him ended in 2000 but Dela Rosa was
able to continue misrepresenting herself as a lawyer with
the help of Regine Macasieb (Macasieb), Busmentes
former secretary. Busmente alleged that he did not
represent Ulaso in Civil Case No. 9284 and that his
signature in the Answer1 presented as proof by NoeLacsamana was forged. Busmente claimed that he was
totally unaware of Civil Case No. 9284 and he only came
to know about the case when Ulaso went to his office to
inquire about its status. Busmentes allegation
contradicted the Joint Counter-Affidavit 9 submitted by
Ulaso and Eddie B. Bides

ISSUE: whether Busmente is guilty of directly or indirectly

assisting Dela Rosa in her illegal practice of law that
warrants his suspension from the practice of law.

RULING: The Court affirmed the decision of the IBP

recommending Bustamantes suspension from the
practice of law.
Canon 9 of the CPR states that, a lawyer shall not,
directly or indirectly, assist in the unathourized practice of
law.
The Court ruled that the term practice of law
implies customarily or habitually holding oneself out to the
public as a lawyer for compensation as a source of
livelihood or in consideration of his services. The court
further ruled that holding oneself as atty. Appearing in
court in representation of a client, or associating oneself
as a partnes of a law office for the general practie of law.
The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the very least
not to assist in the unathorized practice of law is founded
on public interest and policy. Public policy requires that
the practice of law be limited to those individuals found
duly qualified in education and character. The permissive
right conferred ont the lawyer is an individual and limited
privelege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain
proper standards of moral and professional conduct. The
purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client, and
the bar from the incompetence or dishonesty of those
unlicensed to practice law and not to subject to the
disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer
to see that this purpose is attained.
The canons and ethics of the profession enjoin
him not to permit his professional services or his name to
be used in aid of, or to make possible the unauathorized
practice of law by any agency, personal or corporate. And,
the law makes it a misbehaviour on his part, subject to
disciplinary action, to aid a layman in unauthorized
practice of law.

Hence, we agree with the findings of the IBP-CBD

that there was sufficient evidence to prove that Busmente
was guilty of violation of Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. We agree with the
recommendation
of
the
IBP,
modifying
the
recommendation of the IBP-CBD, that Busmente should
be suspended from the practice of law for six months.

ENGR. GILBERT TUMBOKON, Complainant, vs. ATTY.

MARIANO R. PEFIANCO, Respondent.
An administrative complaint for disbarment filed by
complainant Engr. Tumbokon against respondent Atty.
Mariano R. Pefianco for grave dishonesty, gross
misconduct constituting deceit and grossly immoral
conduct.

FACTS: Complainant narrated that the respondent Atty.

Pefianco undertook to give him commission of atty. Fees
the latter would receive in representing spouses Yap,
whom he referred. Their agreement was reflected in a
letter dated August 11, 1995. However the respondent
failed to pay him the agreed commission notwithstanding
the receipt of attorneys fees. Instead he was informed
through a letter that the spouses Yap assumed to pay the
same amount after the respondent had agreed to reduce
his attorneys fees from 25% to 17%. Complainant then
demanded the payment of his commission which
respondent ignored.
Complainant further alleged that respondent has
not lived up to high moral standards required of his
profession for having abandoned his legal wife and
cohabited with his mistress. He also accused respondent
of engaging in money lending business without the
required authorization from the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas.

Contention of the Accused: In his defense, respondent

explained that he accepted Spouses Yaps case on a 25%
contingent fee basis and advanced all expenses. He
disputed the August 11, 1995 letter for being a forgery and
claimed that spouses Yap assumed to pay complainants
commission.

HELD: The practice of law is considered a privilege

bestowed by the state on those who show that they
possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications
for the profession.. As such lawyers, are expected to
maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency,
morality, honesty and integrity and fair dealing and must
perform their four-fold duty to society and legal profession,
the courts and their clients in accordance with the values
and norms embodied in the Code. Lawyers may, thus, be
disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of the above
standards whether in their professional or in their private
capacity.
Respondents defense that forgery had attended
the execution of the August 11, 1995 letter was belied by
his July 16, 1997 letter admitting to have undertaken the
payment of complainants commission but passing on the
responsibility to spouses Yap. Clearly, respondent has
violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code which prohibits a
lawyer from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal
services with persons not licensed to practice law, except
in certain cases which do not obtain in the case at bar.
Furthermore, respondent did not deny the
accusation that he abandoned his legal family and cohabit
with his mistress. The settled rule is that betrayal of the
marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations outside marriage
is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests
deliberate disregard of sanctity of marriage and the marital
vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our
laws.
Respondent violated the Lawyers Oath and Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the code, which proscribes a lawyer from
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
However, we find the charge of engaging in illegal
money lending not to have been sufficiently established.
The lending of money to a single person without showing
that such service is made available to other persons on a
consistent basis cannot be construed asindicia that
respondent engaged in the business of lending.
Nonetheless, we find that respondent should be
sanctioned for his actions.

RODRIGO
E.
TAPAY
RUSTIA, Complainants, vs.

and

ANTHONY

J.

ATTY. CHARLIE L. BANCOLO and ATTY. JANUS T.,

Respondents

The administrative case arose from a complaint filed by

Rodrigo E. Tapay and Anthony Rustia, both employees of
the Sugar Regulatory Administration, against Atty.
Bancolo and Atty. Jarder for violation of the Canons of
Ethics and Professionalism, Falsification of Public
Document, Gross dishonesty, and harassment.
FACTS: Sometime in October 2004, Tapay and Rustia,
complainants received an order from the office of the
Ombudsman requiring them to file a counter affidavit to a
complaint for usurpation of authority, falsification of public
document and graft and corruption practices filed against
them by Nehimias Divinagracia. The complaint was
allegedly signed on behalf of Divinagracia by one Atty.
Bancolo of the Jarder Bancolo law office. When Atty.
Bancolo and Atty. Rustia chanced upon each other, the
latter informed Atty. Bancolo of the case filed against
them. Atty. Bancolo denied that he represented
Divinagracia. Atty. Bancolo declared that the signature
appearing in the complaint above his name as counsel for
Divinagracia was not his. Thus, Rustia convicnced Atty.
Bancolo to sign an affidavit denying his supposed
signature appearing on the Complaint filed with the Office
of the Ombudsman. Using the affidavit, Tapay and Rustia
filed a counter-affidavit accusing Divinagracia of falsifying
the signature of his alleged counsel Atty. Bancolo.
Thereafter, Divinagracia filed his counter affidavit
denying that he falsified the signature of his former lawyer
Atty. Bancolo. Divinagracia presented as evidence an
affidavit by an assistant of Atty. Bancolo, that the Jarder
Bancolo Law Office accepted Divinagracias case and that
the complaint filed with the Office of the Ombudsman was
signed by the office Secretary per Atty. Bancolos
instructions.
Contention of the Accused: Respondents admitted that the
criminal and administrative case before the Ombudsman
were accepted by the Jarder Bancolo Law Office. The
cases were assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Atty. Bancolo
alleged that after being informed of the assignment of the
cases, he ordered his staff to prepare and draft all the
necessary pleadings and documents. However, due to
some minor lapses, Atty. Bancolo permitted that the
pleadings and communications be signed in his name by
the secretary of the law office. Respondents added that
complainants filed the disbarment complaint to retaliate
against them since the cases filed before the Office of the
Ombudsman were meritorious and strongly supported by
testimonial and documentary evidence.
Held: The court agree with the findings of the IBP Board
and found reasonable grounds to hold respondent Atty.
Bancolo administratively liable.

Atty Bancolo admitted that the complaint he filed

was signed in his name by a secretary of his law office.
Clearly this is a violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the
CPR which provides:
A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY,
ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF
LAW.
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any
unqualified person the performance of any task which
by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar
in good standing.
This rule was explained in the case of Cambaliza
vs. Cristal-Tenorio, The lawyers duty to prevent, or at the
very least not to assisst in unauthorized practice of law is
founded on public interest and policy. Public policy
requires that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in eduction and character.
The permissive right conferred on the lawyer is an
individual and limited privilege subject to withdrawal if he
fails to maintain proper standards of moral and
professional conduct.
In Republic v. Kenrick Development Corporation, we held
that the preparation and signing of a pleading constitute
legal work involving the practice of law which is reserved
exclusively for members of the legal profession. Atty.
Bancolos authority and duty to sign a pleading are
personal to him. Although he may delegate the signing of
a pleading to another lawyer, he may not delegate it to a
non-lawyer.
Further, under the Rules of Court, counsels
signature serves as a certification that:
(1) he has read the pleading;
(2) to the best of his knowledge, information and
belief there is good ground to support it; and
(3) it is not interposed for delay.
Thus, by affixing ones signature to a pleading, it
is counsel alone who has the responsibility to certify to
these matters and give legal effect to the document.
The complainants did not present any evidence
that Atty. Jarder was directly involved, had knowledge of,
or even participated in the wrongful practice of Atty.
Bancolo in allowing or tolerating his secretary to sign
pleadings for him. Thus, we agree with the finding of the
IBP Board that Atty. Jarder is not administratively liable.
In sum, we find that the suspension of Atty.
Bancolo from the practice of law for one year is warranted.
We also find proper the dismissal of the case against Atty.
larder.