18.

MAYNILAD WATERS SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION vs MAYNILAD

COLA is part of salary in computing for 13th month pay.
FACTS:

Petitioner Maynilad Water Supervisors Association(MWSA) is an

association composed of former supervisory employees of Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS). These employees claim
that during their employment with MWSS, they were receiving a
monthly cost of living allowance (COLA) equivalent to 40% of their
basic pay.

The payment of these allowances and other additional compensation,

including the COLA were, however, discontinued without
qualification effective 1 November 1989 when the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) issued Corporate Compensation
Circular No. 10 (CCC No. 10).

In 1997, MWSS was privatized and part of it, MWSS West, was
acquired by Maynilad Water Services, Inc. (Maynilad). Some of the
employees of MWSS, which included members of MWSA, were
absorbed by Maynilad subject to the terms and conditions of a
Concession Agreement.

In 2002, MWSA filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter praying for
the payment of their COLA from the year 1997, the time its
members were absorbed by Maynilad, up to the present. MWSA
argued that since DBM CCC No. 10 was rendered ineffective, the COLA
should be paid as part of the benefits enjoyed by their members at the
time of their separation from MWSS, and which should form part of their
salaries and benefits with Maynilad.
ISSUE:
Whether Maynilad bound itself under the Concessionaire
Agreement to pay the COLA of the employees it absorbed from MWSS.
HELD: NO, after a careful review of the Concession Agreement, SC
concluded that both MWSS and Maynilad never intended to include COLA
as one of the benefits to be granted to the absorbed employees.
1 As far as their employment relationship with Maynilad is concerned, the
same is not affected by the De Jesusruling because it is governed by a
separate compensation package provided for under the Concession
Agreement. (We note that the Courts ruling in the De Jesus case applies

only to government-owned and controlled corporations and not to private

entities.)
2. From the aforesaid provision, we note that all allowances were deemed
integrated into the standardized salary rates except:
(1) representation and transportation allowances;
(2)
clothing
and
laundry
allowances;
(3) subsistence allowances of marine officers and crew on
board
government
vessels;
(4) subsistence allowances of hospital personnel; (5) hazard pay;
(6) allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad; and
(7) such other additional compensation not otherwise specified in
Section 12 as may be determined by the DBM.
Jurisprudental basis:
In Gutierrez v. DBM,which is a consolidated case involving over 20
government-owned and controlled corporations, the Court found proper the
inclusion of COLA in the standardized salary rates. It settled that COLA, not
being an enumerated exclusion, was deemed already incorporated in the
standardized salary rates of government employees under the general rule
of integration. In explaining its inclusion in the standardized salary rates, the
Court cited its ruling in National COA Tobacco Administration v. COA in that
the enumerated fringe benefits in items (1) to (6) have one thing in common
they belong to one category of privilege called allowances which are
usually granted to officials and employees of the government to defray or
reimburse the expenses incurred in the performance of their official
functions. Consequently, if these allowances are consolidated with the
standardized salary rates, then the government official or employee will be
compelled to spend his personal funds in attending to his duties. On the
other hand, item (7) is a catch-all proviso for benefits in the nature of
allowances similar to those enumerated.
3. Clearly, COLA is not in the nature of an allowance intended to
reimburse expenses incurred by officials and employees of the government
in the performance of their official functions. It is not payment in
consideration of the fulfillment of official duty.

As defined, cost of living refers to the level of prices relating to a

range of everyday items[17] or the cost of purchasing those goods
and services which are included in an accepted standard level of
consumption.

Based on this premise, COLA is a benefit intended to cover

increases in the cost of living. Thus, it is and should be
integrated into the standardized salary rates.

4. From the aforesaid discussion, it is evident therefore, that at the time the
MWSS employees were absorbed by Maynilad in 1997, the COLA was
already part and parcel of their monthly salary. The non-publication of DBM
CCC No. 10 in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation did
not nullify the integration of COLA into the standardized
5. The ruling of the Labor Arbiter which MWSA insists on is also erroneous in
that it seeks to have the COLA incorporated in the monthly compensation to
be received by the absorbed employees. It failed to consider that the
employment contracts of the MWSA members with MWSS were terminated
prior to their employment with MAYNILAD. Although they may have
continued performing the same function, their employment is already
covered by an entirely new employment contract.

This Court has ruled that unless expressly assumed, labor

contracts such as employment contracts and collective bargaining
agreements are not enforceable against a transferee of an
enterprise, labor contracts beingin personam, thus binding only
between the parties.[21]
6. No ambiguity in the Concession Agreement nothing to construe
7. Insufficiency of appeal bond: We agree with the NLRC that there was
merit in the arguments forwarded in support of the prayer for the reduction of
the appeal bond.
19. LOON vs POWER MASTER
FACTS:

Respondents Power Master, Inc. and Tri-C General Services

employed and assigned the petitioners as janitors and
leadsmen in various Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company (PLDT) offices in Metro Manila area.

Subsequently, the petitioners filed a complaint for money claims

against Power Master, Inc., Tri-C General Services and their
officers, the spouses Homer and Carina Alumisin (collectively, the
respondents).
o The petitioners alleged in their complaint that they were
not paid minimum wages, overrtime, holiday, premium,
service incentive leave, and thirteenth month pays.

They further averred that the respondents made them sign

blank payroll sheets. On June 11, 2001, the petitioners
amended their complaint and included illegal dismissal as
their cause of action. They claimed that the respondents
relieved them from service in retaliation for the filing of
their original complaint.
Notably, the respondents did not participate in the proceedings
before the Labor Arbiter except on April 19, 2001 and May 21,
2001 when Mr. Romulo Pacia, Jr. appeared on the respondents
5
behalf. The respondents counsel also appeared in a
6
preliminary mandatory conference on July 5, 2001. However,
the respondents neither filed any position paper nor proffered
pieces of evidence in their defense despite their knowledge of the
pendency of the case.
LA ruled for petitioners.
16
NLRC: Partially ruled in favor of the respondents.
The NLRC
affirmed the LAs awards of holiday pay and attorneys fees. It
also maintained that the LA acquired jurisdiction over the persons of
the respondents through their voluntary appearance. However, it
allowed the respondents to submit pieces of evidence for the
first time on appeal on the ground that they had been deprived
of due process.
CA: Affirmed NLRC.
o

ISSUE: W/N NLRC and CA committed GAD.

1) Whether the CA erred when it did not find that the NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion in giving due course to the respondents appeal;
a) Whether the respondents perfected their appeal before the NLRC; and
b) Whether the NLRC properly allowed the respondents supplemental
appeal
2) Whether the respondents were estopped from submitting pieces of
evidence for the first time on appeal; YES, the CA grossly erred in ruling that
the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in arbitrarily admitting
and giving weight to the respondents pieces of evidence for the first time on
appeal.
3) Whether the petitioners were illegally dismissed and are thus
entitled to backwages;

4) Whether the petitioners are entitled to salary differential, overtime,

holiday, premium, service incentive leave, and thirteenth month pays;
and
5) Whether the petitioners are entitled to attorneys fees.
HELD: YES, we find that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in
admitting and giving probative value to the respondents' evidence on appeal,
which errors the CA replicated when it upheld the NLRC rulings.
(As a final note, we observe that Rodelito Ayala, Winelito Ojel, Renato
Rodrego and Welito Loon are also named as petitioners in this case.
However, we deny their petition for the reason that they were not part of the
proceedings before the CA. Their failure to timely seek redress before the
CA precludes this Court from awarding them monetary claims.)
1. Procedural:
a) CA grossly erred in ruling that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in arbitrarily admitting and giving weight to the respondents pieces
of evidence for the first time on appeal.
b) We cannot accept the respondents cavalier attitude in blatantly
disregarding the NLRC Rules of Procedure. The CA gravely erred when it
overlooked that the NLRC blindly admitted and arbitrarily gave probative
value to the respondents evidence despite their failure to adequately explain
their delay in the submission of evidence.
c) Respondents failed to sufficiently prove the allegations sought to be
proven. Why the respondents photocopied and computerized copies of
documentary evidence were not presented at the earliest opportunity is a
serious question that lends credence to the petitioners claim that the
respondents fabricated the evidence for purposes of appeal.
d) Viewed in these lights, the scales of justice must tilt in favor of the
employees. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that the employers
cause can only succeed on the strength of its own evidence and not on the
39
weakness of the employees evidence.
2. Substantive:
a) The petitioners are entitled to backwages

Based on the above considerations, we reverse the NLRC and the

CAs finding that the petitioners were terminated for just cause and
were afforded procedural due process.

In termination cases, the burden of proving just and valid cause for
dismissing an employee from his employment rests upon the

employer. The employers failure to discharge this burden

results in the finding that the dismissal is unjustified. This is
exactly what happened in the present case.
b) The petitioners are entitled to salary differential, service incentive,
holiday, and thirteenth month pays

We also reverse the NLRC and the CAs finding that the petitioners
are not entitled to salary differential, service incentive, holiday, and
thirteenth month pays.

As in illegal dismissal cases, the general rule is that the

burden rests on the defendant to prove payment rather than on
the plaintiff to prove non-payment of these money claims.
o The rationale for this rule is that the pertinent personnel
files, payrolls, records, remittances and other similar
documents which will show that differentials, service
incentive leave and other claims of workers have been
paid are not in the possession of the worker but are in
42
the custody and control of the employer.
c) The petitioners are not entitled to overtime and premium pays

However, the CA was correct in its finding that the petitioners failed
to provide sufficient factual basis for the award of overtime, and
premium pays for holidays and rest days.

The burden of proving entitlement to overtime pay and premium

pay for holidays and rest days rests on the employee because
43
these are not incurred in the normal course of business.

In the present case, the petitioners failed to adduce any evidence

that would show that they actually rendered service in excess of the
regular eight working hours a day, and that they in fact worked on
holidays and rest days.
d) The petitioners are entitled to attorneys fees

The award of attorneys fees is also warranted under the

circumstances of this case.1awphi1 An employee is entitled to an
award of attorneys fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the
amount of the wages in actions for unlawful withholding of
44
wages.
RULING: LC SET ASIDE.

20. DAVID VS MACASIO

Employees engaged on a task/pakyaw basis are NOT entitled to 13 th
month pay.
FACTS:

In January 2009, Macasio filed before the LA a complaint7 against

petitioner Ariel L. David, doing business under the name and style
Yiels Hog Dealer, for nonpayment of overtime pay, holiday pay
and 13thmonth pay. He also claimed payment for moral and
exemplary damages and attorneys fees. Macasio also claimed
payment for service incentive leave (SIL).8

Macasio alleged9 before the LA that he had been working as a

butcher for David since January 6, 1995. Macasio claimed that
David exercised effective control and supervision over his work.

On the other hand, David alleged that he hired Macasio as a

butcher or chopper on pakyaw or task basis who is, therefore, not
entitled to overtime pay, holiday pay and 13th month pay pursuant
to the provisions of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR)
of the Labor Code.
ISSUE: W/N Macasio is entitled to holiday, SIL, and 13 th month pay (Whether
Macasio falls within the rule on entitled to these claims or within the
exception.)
1. We reject this assertion of the petitioner. Engagement on pakyaw or task
basis does not characterize the relationship that may exist between the
parties, i.e., whether one of employment or independent contractorship.
Article 97(6) of the Labor Code defines wages as x x x the remuneration or
earnings, however designated, capable of being expressed in terms of
money,whether fixed or ascertained on a time, task, piece, or
commission basis, or other method of calculating the same, which is
payable by an employer to an employee under a written or unwritten
contract of employment for work done or to be done, or for services
rendered or to be rendered[.]35In relation to Article 97(6), Article 10136 of
the Labor Code speaks of workers paid by results or those whose pay is
calculated in terms of the quantity or quality of their work output which
includes pakyaw work and other non-time work.

2. The existence of employment relationship between the parties is

determined by applying the four-fold test; engagement on pakyaw or task
basis does not determine the parties relationship as it is simply a method of
pay computation. Accordingly, Macasio is Davids employee, albeit engaged
on pakyaw or task basis.
a) Employer-Employee relationship exists between David and Macasio.
1. David engaged the services of Macasio, thus satisfying the element
of selection and engagement of the employee.
2. David paid Macasios wages. Both David and Macasio categorically
stated in their respective pleadings before the lower tribunals and
even before this Court that the former had been paying the latter
P700.00 each day after the latter had finished the days task.
Solano and Antonio also confirmed this fact of wage payment in
their Pinagsamang Sinumpaang Salaysay.
3. David had been setting the day and time when Macasio should
report for work. This power to determine the work schedule
obviously implies power of control.
4. David had the right and power to control and supervise Macasios
work as to the means and methods of performing it.
b) Macasio is engaged on pakyaw-or task basis

A distinguishing characteristic of pakyaw or task basis

engagement, as opposed to straight-hour wage payment, is the
non-consideration of the time spent in working. In a task-basis
work, the emphasis is on the task itself, in the sense that payment
is reckoned in terms of completion of the work, not in terms of the
number of time spent in the completion of work. Once the work or
task is completed, the worker receives a fixed amount as wage,
without regard to the standard measurements of time generally
used in pay computation.

In Macasios case, the established facts show that he would usually

start his work at 10:00 p.m. Thereafter, regardless of the total hours
that he spent at the workplace or of the total number of the hogs
assigned to him for chopping, Macasio would receive the fixed
amount of P700.00 once he had completed his task. Clearly, these
circumstances show a pakyaw or task basis engagement that all
three tribunals uniformly found.
3. In contrast and in clear departure from settled case law, the LA and the
NLRC still interpreted the Labor Code provisions and the IRR as exempting

an employee from the coverage of Title I of the Labor Code based simply
and solely on the mode of payment of an employee. The NLRCs utter
disregard of this consistent jurisprudential ruling is a
clear act of grave abuse of discretion.51 In other words, by dismissing
Macasios complaint without considering whether Macasio was a field
personnel or not, the NLRC proceeded based on a significantly
incomplete consideration of the case. This action clearly smacks of grave
abuse of discretion.
Under the Laboe Code provisions

General Rule: Holiday and SIL pay provisions cover all employees.

To be excluded from their coverage, an employee must be one of

those that these provisions expressly exempt, strictly in accordance
with the exemption.
o Under the IRR, exemption from the coverage of holiday
and SIL pay refer to field personnel and other employees
whose time and performance is unsupervised by the
employer including those who are engaged on task or
contract basis[.]
o Note that unlike Article 82 of the Labor Code, the IRR
on holiday and SIL pay do not exclude employees
engaged on task basis as a separate and distinct
category from employees classified as field personnel.
Rather, these employees are altogether merged into one
classification of exempted employees.

Cebu Institute vs Ople: those who are engaged

on task or contract basis related dapat with
field personnel (here, teching personnel not
deemed field personnel)

Autobus Tranpsort vs Bautista: According to the

Implementing Rules, Service Incentive Leave
shall not apply to employees classified as field
personnel.The phrase other employees whose
performance is unsupervised by the employer
must not be understood as a separate
classification of employees to which service
incentive leave shall not be granted. Rather, it
serves as an amplification of the interpretation of
the definition of field personnel under the Labor
Code as those whose actual hours of work in the

field cannot be determined with reasonable

certainty. The same is true with respect to the
phrase those who are engaged on task or
contract basis, purely commission basis. Said
phrase should be related with field personnel,
applying the rule on ejusdem generis that general
and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by
the particular terms that they follow.
Serrano vs Court: applying the rule on ejusdem
generis49 declared that employees engaged
on task or contract basis x x x are not
automatically exempted from the grant of
service incentive leave, unless, they fall under
the classification of field personnel.5

4. Entitlement to holiday pay

In short, in determining whether workers engaged on pakyaw or
task basis is entitled to holiday and SIL pay, the presence (or
absence) of employer supervision as regards the workers time and
performance is the key: if the worker is simply engaged on pakyaw
or task basis, then the general rule is that he is entitled to a holiday
pay and SIL pay unless exempted from the exceptions specifically
provided under Article 94 (holiday pay) and Article 95 (SIL pay) of
the Labor Code. However, if the worker engaged onpakyaw or task
basis also falls within the meaning of field personnel under the
law, then he is not entitled to these monetary benefits.
5. Macasio does not fall under the classification of field personnel

Based on the definition of field personnel under Article 82, we agree

The CAs finding in this regard is supported by the established facts

of this case:first, Macasio regularly performed his duties at Davids
principal place of business; second, his actual hours of work could
be determined with reasonable certainty; and third, David
supervised his time and performance of duties.

Since Macasio cannot be considered a field personnel, then he is

not exempted from the grant of holiday, SIL pay even as he was
engaged on pakyaw or task basis.

Not being a field personnel, we find the CA to be legally correct

when it reversed the NLRCs ruling dismissing Macasios complaint

for holiday and SIL pay for having been rendered with grave abuse
of discretion.
6. Entitlement to 13th month pay

With respect to the payment of 13th month pay however, we

find that the CA legally erred in finding that the NLRC gravely
abused its discretion in denying this benefit to Macasio.

The governing law on 13th month pay is PD No. 851. 52As with
holiday and SIL pay, 13th month pay benefits generally cover
all employees; an employee must be one of those expressly
enumerated to be exempted. Section 3 of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing P.D. No. 85153enumerates the
exemptions from the coverage of 13thmonth pay benefits.
o
Under Section 3(e), employers of those who arepaid
onxxxtask basis, and those who are paid a fixed
amount for performing a specific work,
irrespective of the time consumed in the
performance thereof54 are exempted.

Note that unlike the IRR of the Labor Code on holiday and SIL
pay, Section 3(e) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
PD No. 851 exempts employees paid on task basis without
any reference to field personnel. This could only mean that
insofar as payment of the 13th month pay is concerned, the
law did not intend to qualify the exemption from its coverage
with the requirement that the task worker be a field personnel
at the same time.
21. LETRAN CALAMBa vs NLRC
Overload pay is NOT part of salary in computing 13th month pay
FACTS:
Petitioner
alleged
in
its
Position
Paper
that:
xxx x
1. 2)[It] has filed this complaint in behalf of its members whose names
and positions appear in the list hereto attached as Annex A.
2. 3)In the computation of the thirteenth month pay of its academic
personnel, respondent does not include as basis therefor their
compensation for overloads. It only takes into account the pay the
faculty members receive for their teaching loads not exceeding

eighteen (18) units. The teaching overloads are rendered within

eight (8) hours a day.
3.4)Respondent has not paid the wage increases required by Wage Order
No. 5 to its employees who qualify thereunder.
4. 5)Respondent has not followed the formula prescribed by DECS
Memorandum Circular No. 2 dated March 10, 1989 in the
computation of the compensation per unit of excess load or
overload of faculty members. This has resulted in the diminution of
the compensation of faculty members.
5. 6)The salary increases due the non-academic personnel as a result
of job grading has not been given. Job grading has been an annual
practice of the school since 1980; the same is done for the purpose
of increasing the salaries of non-academic personnel and as the
counterpart of the ranking systems of faculty members.
6. 7)Respondent has not paid to its employees the balances of seventy
(70%) percent of the tuition fee increases for the years 1990, 1991 and
1992.
7. 8)Respondent has not also paid its employees the holiday pay for the
ten (10) regular holidays as provided for in Article 94 of the Labor Code.
8. 9)Respondent has refused without justifiable reasons and despite
repeated demands to pay its obligations mentioned in paragraphs 3 to 7
hereof.
ISSUE: Whether or not a teachers overload pay should be considered in the
computation of his or her 13th-month pay.
HELD: NO.
1. In resolving this issue, the Court is confronted with conflicting
interpretations by different government agencies.
a) Opinion of the Bureau of Working Conditions of the DOLE O.P. forms
part of basic wage
b) Affirmed by Explanatory Bulletin
c) Legal Service Dept of DOLE and DOLE Order (cited by LA) Not part
2. In the present case, while the DOLE Order may not be applicable, the
Court finds that overload pay should be excluded from the computation of
the 13th-month pay of petitioners members.
a) It is a settled rule that when an administrative or executive agency
renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets

a preexisting law and the administrative interpretation is at best

advisory for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means.
b) What basic salary includes and excludes:

Includes: Basic salary of an employee is used as the basis in the

determination of his13month pay. Any compensations or
remunerations which are deemed not part of the basic pay is
excluded as basis in the computation of the mandatory bonus.

Not part of basic salary:

a)Cost-of-living allowances granted pursuant to Presidential Decree
525 and Letter of Instruction No. 174;
b)Profit sharing payments;
c)All allowances and monetary benefits which are not
considered or integrated as part of the regular basic salary of the
employee at the time of the promulgation of the Decree on
December 16, 1975.
Under a later set of Supplementary Rules and Regulations
Implementing Presidential Decree 851 issued by the then Labor
Secretary Blas Ople, overtime pay, earnings and other
remunerations are excluded as part of the basic salary and in the
computation of the 13th-month pay.
*Intention: strip basic salary of other payments which are properly
considered as fringe benefits
** The all-embracing phrase earnings and other remunerations which are
deemed not part of the basic salary includes within its meaning payments for
sick, vacation, or maternity leaves, premium for works performed on rest
days and special holidays, pay for regular holidays and night differentials. As
such they are deemed not part of the basic salary and shall not be
considered in the computation of the 13th-month pay. If they were not so
excluded, it is hard to find any earnings and other remunerations expressly
excluded in the computation of the 13th-month pay. Then the exclusionary
provision would prove to be idle and with no purpose.
2. The peculiarity of an overload lies in the fact that it may be performed
within the normal eight-hour working day. This is the only reason why the
DOLE, in its explanatory bulletin, finds it proper to include a teachers
overload pay in the determination of his or her 13th-month pay. However,
the DOLE loses sight of the fact that even if it is performed within the
normal eight-hour working day, an overload is still an additional or
extra teaching work which is performed after the regular teaching load
has been completed. Hence, any pay given as compensation for such

additional work should be considered as extra and not deemed as part

of the regular or basic salary.
3. Moreover, petitioner failed to refute private respondents contention that
excess teaching load is paid by the hour, while the regular teaching load is
being paid on a monthly basis; and that the assignment of overload is
subject to the availability of teaching loads. This only goes to show that
overload pay is not integrated with a teachers basic salary for his or her
regular teaching load. In addition, overload varies from one semester to
another, as it is dependent upon the availability of extra teaching loads. As
such, it is not legally feasible to consider payments for such overload as part
of a teachers regular or basic salary. Verily, overload pay may not be
included as basis for determining a teachers 13th-month pay.
22. ODANGCO vs NLRC
FACTS:

Petitioners are monthly-paid employees of ANTECO whose

workdays are from Monday to Friday and half of Saturday.

After a routine inspection, the Regional Branch of the Department

of Labor and Employment (DOLE) found ANTECO liable for
underpayment of the monthly salaries of its employees. On 10
September 1989, the DOLE directed ANTECO to pay its employees
wage differentials amounting to P1,427,412.75. ANTECO failed
to pay.

Thus, on various dates in 1995, thirty-three (33) monthly-paid

employees filed complaints with the NLRC Sub-Regional Branch
VI, Iloilo City, praying for payment of wage differentials, damages
and attorneys fees.

The Labor Arbiter gave credence to petitioners arguments on the

computation of their wages based on the 304 divisor used by
ANTECO in converting the leave credits of its employees. The
Labor Arbiter agreed with petitioners that ANTECOs use of 304 as
divisor is an admission that it is paying its employees for only 304
days a year instead of the 365 days as specified in Section 2. The
Labor Arbiter concluded that ANTECO owed its employees the
wages for 61 days, the difference between 365 and 304, for every
year.

NLRC: Reversed.

CA: Dismissed.

ISSUE:
1. W/N CA is correct in dismissing the case.
2. W/N petitioners are entitled to their money claim.
HELD:
1. YES, we find that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the
petition outright. Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court requires that a
petition for certiorari must state the grounds relied on for the relief sought. A
simple perusal of the petition readily shows that petitioners failed to meet this
requirement.
2. NO, they are not entitled.
a) We have long ago declared void Section 2, Rule IV of Book III of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code (Insular Bank vs Inciong).
Thus, Section 2 cannot serve as basis of any right or claim. Absent any other
legal basis, petitioners claim for wage differentials must fail.
b) Even assuming that Section 2, Rule IV of Book III is valid, petitioners
claim will still fail.

The basic rule in this jurisdiction is no work, no pay. The right to

be paid for un-worked days is generally limited to the ten legal
holidays in a year.15 Petitioners claim is based on a mistaken
notion that Section 2, Rule IV of Book III gave rise to a right to be
paid for un-worked days beyond the ten legal holidays. In effect,
petitioners demand that ANTECO should pay them on Sundays, the
un-worked half of Saturdays and other days that they do not work at
all. Petitioners line of reasoning is not only a violation of the no
work, no pay principle, it also gives rise to an invidious
classification, a violation of the equal protection clause. Sustaining

petitioners argument will make monthly-paid employees a

privileged class who are paid even if they do not work.

The use of a divisor less than 365 days cannot make ANTECO
automatically liable for underpayment. The facts show that
petitioners are required to work only from Monday to Friday and
halfof Saturday. Thus, the minimum allowable divisor is 287, which
is the result of 365 days, less 52 Sundays and less 26 Saturdays
(or 52 half Saturdays). Any divisor below 287 days means that
ANTECOs workers are deprived of their holiday pay for some or all
of the ten legal holidays. The 304 days divisor used by ANTECO is
clearly above the minimum of 287 days.
c) Petitioners cite Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople16 as an
analogous situation. Petitioners have misread this case.

In Chartered Bank, the workers sought payment for un-worked

legal holidays as a right guaranteed by a valid law. In this case,
petitioners seek payment of wages for un-worked non-legal
holidays citing as basis a void implementing rule. The
circumstances are also markedly different. InChartered Bank,there
was a collective bargaining agreement that prescribed the divisor.
No CBA exists in this case. InChartered Bank, the employer was
liable for underpayment because the divisor it used was 251 days,
a figure that clearly fails to account for the ten legal holidays the law
requires to be paid. Here, the divisor ANTECO uses is 304 days.
This figure does not deprive petitioners of their right to be paid on
legal holidays.
d) As a final note, this controversy should have ended long ago had either
counsel first checked the validity of the implementing rule on which they
based their contentions.