ki

Relations among Turkey, Iraq, Kurdistan-Iraq, the Wider Middle East, and Iran
Robert Olson (2006)
In this essay, I address cooperative economic, trade, and political relations among Turkey,
Iraq, Kurdistan-Iraq, the Wider Middle East, and Iran, some of which were imposed and
expedited by the US invasion and occupation of Iraq in March 2003. I also address the
relations in the broader context of the US-initiated and European-supported Wider Middle
East Initiative (WMEI). The WMEI is interpreted here as a policy to support privatization and
capital markets in the Middle East, and not just as a fund-raising instrument to support
1
democratization.
In my view, it is essential to consider Turkey's relations with Iraq, Kurdistan-Iraq, and Iran
within the context of the objectives of the WMEI, especially with respect to Turkey's
relations with the United States, Israel, the American Jewish community, Jordan, the
2
Palestinians and the Arab Gulf countries (the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf area).
As a theoretical construct to support my arguments, I use Anoushiravan Ehteshami and
3
Raymond Hinnebusch's "middle level powers" and omnibalancing [End Page 13] theories.
I argue that international relations theories dealing with middle-level powers implementing
omnibalancing, especially non-European powers, are not usually equipped to deal with
authoritarian, hegemonicly driven countries. The United States is a prime example of such a
country, bent on the domination of a vital region of the world whose control and occupation
of resources it seeks to use to project its geopolitical and geostrategic power in order to
dissuade any other power or combination of powers from challenging its global hegemony.
This is especially true since many of the international relations theories from realism to
constructivism have been conceived and propagated by Americans who were unable to think
or conceptualize that their own country would break the boundaries of even what they
describe as a superpower. American international relations theorists were simply unable to
conceive that the United States would pursue policies akin to those of authoritarian states of
early twentieth-century Europe. Their theories of hegemony somehow conceptualized that
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American hegemony would be democratic or "soft." They could not think in such a manner,
and I knowingly use the word could and not did, because I think and argue that it was
culturally impossible for them to conceive of an authoritarian America. In this study I argue
that the leadership of other countries, in this case Turkey, could perceive of an authoritarian
America, unwillingly to be sure, but believing in realpolitik, it adapted their policies
accordingly.
Omnibalancing postulates that Third World countries reproduce, rather than provide havens
from, the anarchy of international politics, i.e., Third World politics are a microcosm of
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international politics. Balancing is as critical for groups within states as it is between states.
Unlike balance-of-power theories, omnibalancing suggests that Third World states construct
their alignments on their perceptions of how to best protect themselves from [End Page
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14] threats they face, whether internal or external. Omnibalancing is relevant to this study
in another sense; it can also be construed to include three international relations
theoriesthe rational actor, the irrational actor, and the capital accumulatorin that they
represent three implicit survival requisites that potentially shape policy: geopolitically
shaped national interests and external threats, domestic politics and internal ideological
legitimization needs, and economic needs. Ehteshami and Hinnebusch state, "In a given
regime and at any given time, threats to one or the other may be dominant in decisionmakers' calculations, although in the long run if any are neglected, regime stability is put to
risk. The notion of omnibalancing could also be extended by taking rationality [of the
neorealist school] to mean attending not only to security threats [both internal and
external] but also to capital accumulation and rent acquisition requisites. Since these
various requisites of state formation may conflict in any given situation, and no policy is

therefore likely to appear fully rational from all points of view, the highest rationality may
7
be the ability to make a reasonable series of trade-offs." In the remainder of this text, I
make the argument that this is the policy that Turkey has pursued from mid-2003 to the
present.
Turkey's Involvement in the WMEI
While attending the G-8 summit at Sea Island, Georgia, on 89 June 2004, Turkish prime
minister Recep Tayyib Erdogan committed his government to participate in the US WMEI.
This was a project intended to democratize the Arab countries of the Middle East and Iran
through regime change, if necessary, and, as the events in Iraq have indicated, through
war. Democratization was to result in pro-American, pro-Israeli, market-oriented
governments or regimes. The first substantial implementation of the WMEI project was the
invasion and occupation of Iraq. It must be noted that even as the war in Iraq raged during
the Sea Island summit, the European countries as well as [End Page 15] Canada and
Russia concurred with the objectives of the WMEI. The process was to continue bringing
Syria and eventually Iran online, so to speak. However, the strong resistance in Iraq
delayed the implementation of the WMEI, especially with regard to what the US role would
8
be in that country.
In spite of setbacks to its pacification and control of Iraq, as of mid-2006 the United States
was still vigorously pursing the WMEI. One aspect of the WMEI was to strengthen the
economic and trade relations by the establishment of Qualifying Industrial Zones (QIZs)
between Turkey and Israel, between Israel and Jordan, between Israel and the Palestinians,
and between Jordan and the Palestinians, as well as among all of these groups and Turkey.
In exchange for Israeli participation or Israeli goods (usually 8 to 10 percent), the goods
manufactured by these Middle Eastern countries in the QIZs could be exported to the United
States and the countries of the North American Free Trade Agreement via Israel tariff free,
9
as Israel was a favored-nation trading partner of the United States.
Ankara understood the WMEI as a crucial aspect of US Middle East policy. In April and July
2004, Turkey and Israel had signed several economic and trade agreements. During the
visit of Israel's deputy prime minister Ehud Olmert to Turkey in mid-July 2004, the two
countries completed negotiations regarding Israel's purchase of water from Turkey. This
negotiation had been in the works, if not including the pipeline, for some time but was
delayed due to differences over pricing and transportation. Most notably among the
agreements signed was one for having Israeli companies bid on the privatization of Turkish
companiesTekel, Petkim, Turkish Air Lines, and Turkcell. The latter two companies
operated the major airlines and communication systems of Turkey. Agriculture Minister
Sami Guclu and Olmert also signed the Joint Economic Commission (Karma Ekonomik
Komisyon) agreement, which called for the participation of Israeli companies in the South
Anatolian Project, a large hydroelectric and irrigation project in southeastern Turkey, as well
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as in the Konya Yaylak Ovas Project, another irrigation and agriculture project. [End
Page 16]
Officials in Ankara were concerned that it would be difficult for Turkey to counter US policies
attempting to tie Turkey's economy as tightly as possible to that of Israel. This could create
a situation in the future in which any unhappiness of Turkey with Israel's larger geopolitical
strategy in the wider Middle East, such as Israel's polices toward the Kurds of Iraq and the
transnational aspects of the Kurdish question, including the challenge of Kurdish nationalism
in Turkey, would be undertaken at some risk of damage to its military, economic, and trade
relationship with Israel and, hence, with American Jews and, consequently, to its
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relationship with the United States.
This is exactly what happened as a result of Turkey's unhappiness with Israeli operations in
Kurdistan-Iraq, resulting in Erdogan's subsequent criticism of Israeli actions against the

Palestinians. It was Washington's hope that if the military, economic, and trade
relationships between Israel and Turkey grew strong enough, it would be a factor in
compelling Turkey to acquiesce to US policies in Iraq, whether by design or default. Such a
scenario raised the possibility in return that these policies would facilitate the movement of
the Kurds of Iraq to independence. The main foreign policy of Turkey since the creation of
the republic in 1923 has been to prevent this. It was Ankara's larger geopolitical concerns
regarding Israel and aggressive US policies in the wider Middle East that impelled Turkey to
reach out to Syria, Jordan, and Iran as well as to increase its participation in the economic
rehabilitation of Gaza and the West Bank, the rebuilding of Iraq, and the supplying of the
US and coalition occupation forces in that country. While visiting Toronto on 15 May 2006,
Shimon Peres, the former prime minister of Israel and a member of now Prime Minister
Olmert's newly elected government, emphasized again the important aspects of the WMEI.
Peres stated that he, and others, "wanted to convert Israel's eastern border into an
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economic corridor run jointly by Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians."
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization summit held in Istanbul in June 2004 confirmed
Turkey's acceptance of and eagerness to participate in the WMEI. The negotiations carried
on at the summit confirmed to the Turks that NATO countries agreed to extend their
responsibilities and obligations into the Arab world by approving and participating in the USled WMEI. This [End Page 17] was affirmed in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI,
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Istanbul Isbirligi Girisimi) declaration issued at the conclusion of the summit. The
declaration suggested that NATO would cooperate with the United States in the WMEI, the
fight against terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as well as
border security, civil defense, natural disasters, NATO maneuvers, and military reform. It
would also provide assistance in the area of civil-military relations. The ICI was an
extension of the WMEI announced at Sea Island some three weeks earlier.
During the NATO summit, in a 27 June meeting consisting of President Bush, Secretary of
State Colin Powell, and National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, Bush had asked for a
one-year extension on the US use of Incirlik airbase in order to supply food, fuel, military
supplies, and equipment to the US and coalition forces in Iraq and to the Interim Iraqi
Government (IIG). The Turks agreed after extensive negotiations. One of the reasons for
the Turks' cooperation was that by June 2004 Turkey's exports to Iraq had reached $800
million, which suggested that for the entire year exports might well reach $1.6 billion
whether or not the United States was able to squash the resistance. Indeed, the stronger
the resistance, the more supplies the US, coalition, and Iraqi forces would need. The $1.6
billion sum would be only $400 million short of the $2 billion figure that the Turks had
hoped to have access to from the $18.6 billion allocated by Congress for rebuilding
purposes in Iraq. The Turks might well have increased the $1.6 billion figure, but by midJune 2005, US occupational forces had spent and assigned only $7 billion of the $18.6
billion allocated by Congress.
Another reason that Ankara favored increasing trade with Iraq was that much of it took
place and emanated from southeastern Turkey, an area heavily populated with Kurds and
one of the most economically depressed regions of Turkey. An increase in economic
activities in the southeast could lessen the support of the Kurds in the region for militant
Kurdish nationalist groups. Ilnur Cevik, the editor of the Turkish Daily News, resigned from
that position in order to pursue a policy of strengthening economic relations between Turkey
and Kurdistan-Iraq by overseeing his family's construction firm's engagement in building
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projects in Sulaymaniya, Arbil (Hewler), and elsewhere. [End Page 18] Cevik's action
indicated the strong hand held by those Turks (and Kurds) who advocated an economic
solution to facets of the multifarious Kurdish question and the attempts to circumscribe the
wider Kurdish nationalist movements within the WMEI. The effect of the success of such
economic policies would be to have a narrow Kurdish nationalism within a wider Middle East,
hence, Turkey's adhesion to the WMEI.
By July 2004, two hundred to three hundred trucks owned by a dozen or more companies,
many of them Kurdish, were leaving the southeastern region of Mardin in Turkey every day,

hauling food, fuel, cooking fuel, varieties of electronic goods, military equipment, and
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myriad other products to the US and coalition forces in Iraq. All together, around four
thousand trucks per day, owned by Turks and Kurds, were supplying up to 60 percent of the
total goods being used and consumed by the US and coalition forces. Despite the high
number of drivers taken hostage and killed by resistance forces, Minister of State for Trade
Kursad Tuzmen made it clear that hostage taking and the killing of drivers would not affect
Turkey's policy of increasing its trade with Iraq: "We are a country that wants to
demonstrate greater capabilities in strong markets. As a result we will continue our trade
with Iraq. We stood beside the Iraqi people before the war and we tried to meet their needs
during the war. After the war, we continued to meet the needs of the Iraqi people for goods
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and services." Tuzmen said that before the hostage-taking crisis four thousand vehicles a
day crossed the border into Iraq, and as of 8 August 2004, thirty-nine-hundred vehicles
were passing daily. He was confident that Turkey would meet its objective of exporting $1.6
17
billion to $1.8 billion of goods to Iraq by the end of 2004. Tuzmen's remarks indicate that
Ankara was implementing the decision of the Istanbul June G-8 summit and NATO meeting.
By 1 May 2006, 314 Turkish companies had signed contracts for projects in Iraq valued at
more than $1 billion; trade between Turkey and Iraq, much of it with Kurdistan-Iraq, had
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reached $2.6 billion by the end of 2005.
By October 2004, there was more evidence that Turkey was acquiescing [End Page 19] to
the US and IIG's policies of allowing and encouraging Turkey's trade with Iraq. On 24
October Turkey's Union of Chambers and Commodities Exchanges (TOBB) declared that the
projected $1.8 billion trade between the two countries was a "vital artery" (hayati
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dammar). The TOBB also increased its economic and political relations with KurdistanIraq. In October it was announced that the Justice and Development (AKP) government had
agreed with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) to begin air flights between Istanbul and
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Arbil for "humanitarian" reasons. This suggested that some groups in Turkey, including
Cevik and colleagues, believed that "a Kurdish state umbilical bound to Turkey would be in
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Turkey's interest." Dogu Ergil, a prominent Turkish political scientist and an expert on the
Kurdish nationalist movements in Turkey, wrote that based on interviews that he conducted
in the fall of 2004 the ethnic and religious groups of the region of southeastern Turkeynot
with just Kurds but with Arabs, Yezidis, Assyrians, Sunnis, Alevis, and othersno longer
perceived the world from the perspective of their region or country: "Even the most
problematic parts of Turkey have become so much integrated into the European vision [bold
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letters Ergil's] and [thus] cease to be a liability for the stability of the country."
Turkish companies would also be able to invest in international oil and gas companies that
operated in Kurdistan-Iraq. In December 2004, Michael Gulbenkian, the grandson of the
notorious Calouste Gulbenkian, a late nineteenth and early twentieth century oil
entrepreneur, also known as "5 percent Gulbenkian," as it was his wont to take a 5 percent
commission from all of the oil deals in which he was involved, announced that Heritage Oil
Corporation, of which he was chairman and chief executive officer, had formed a joint
adventure with the Eagle Group of Iraq, which, in turn, created K Petroleum Company. He
further indicated that K Petroleum would also have a 45 percent interest in the Eagle
Groups of Iraq; Turkish investors would hold the remaining 15 percent. Heritage Oil
Corporation was to be responsible for the [End Page 20] overall operation and
management of Heritage Arbil and of K Petroleum. The latter two companies would work
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with the Iraqi oil ministry.
It is notable that Turkish interest and participation in K Petroleum Company could have
occurred only with the approval of the KDP, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the
Interim Iraq Government (IIG), and Washington. Since Turkish investors' participation in
the Gulbenkian oil deal could have been achieved only with the approval of Ankara and the
Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), it also demonstrated that both thought, at least for the time
being, that the strengthening of economic ties among Kurdistan-Iraq, Iraq, and Turkey
could act as a restraint on the Kurds achieving greater independence in Iraq. Turkish
participation in the Gulbenkian oil deal also showed that the Kurdistan-Iraq leadership

hoped that Turkey's participation in the oil and gas industries in Kurdistan-Iraq and,
potentially, in Arab Iraq would soften Ankara's attitudes toward Kurdistan-Iraq's
strengthening autonomy. More confirmation of such a policy came on 19 December when
the IIG announced that it had awarded its first postwar oil field contracts to Turkish and
Canadian firms. Turkey's Avrasya Company won the contract to develop the Khurmala
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Dome field in Kurdistan-Iraq.
Turkey had more good news regarding its oil and gas interests in Iraq when it was
announced on 5 July 2005 that Pet-Oil, a Turkish company in partnership with an American
company, was drilling and soon expected to lift oil from fields in the Kifri region of northern
Iraq that remained under the control of the PUK. Guntekin Koksal, the owner of Pet-Oil, said
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that the two companies expected to find "billions of barrels of oil here." Pet-Oil was to
start production in the Pulkhana region of Kifri with a $10 million investment. Koksal stated
that Pet-Oil would complete the geological surveys being conducted in the region and that
private companies would dig the wells. He claimed that reserves containing billions of
barrels of oil had been discovered. Within a one-hundred-kilometer-long and fifteenkilometer-wide zone, oil was expected to be extracted at depths of two thousand to twentyfour hundred meters. Oil was found in three out of the seven wells that already existed
[End Page 21] but had been abandoned because they could not be operated profitably.
Koksal said that a different oil reserve had been found in each underground layer. He said
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that oil was "flowing like a stream." He declined to identify the American company with
whom Pet-Oil partnered: "Even if we make use of all our opportunities, we cannot meet the
costs. So, we discovered a US company and proposed a fifty-fifty partnership and now we
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will continue with this project along with this US company." As early as 15 May 2003, the
New York Times reported that two Turkish-controlled companies, Pet-Oil and General
Energy, both owned by Koksal, were drilling and producing oil (some three thousand barrels
per day) from an oil field known as Taqtaq in an area located twenty-nine kilometers
northeast of the rich Kirkuk fields in a region known as Chuya Surk (Ciya Surk), which was
located close to the Iranian border and in the Kurdish-controlled area of Jalal Talabani's
PUK. The Turkish Daily News reported that a "strategic deal" had been struck between
Koksal and Talabani two years previously. The "strategic" part of the deal obviously referred
to Talabani's desire to involve Turkish companies in the exploitation of northern Iraq's oil,
gas, and mineral resources in efforts to reduce Ankara's hostility to the burgeoning Kurdish
autonomous entity in northern Iraq. The Turkish government and the TAF obviously also
approved of the deal. The Turkish Daily News reported that it had been told "by
independent oil industry sources that the Americans were aware of the General Energy and
the Pet-Oil contract and gave their tacit approval even before the war started [19 March
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2003]."
A PUK official in Sulaymaniya contacted by the Turkish Daily News said, "The deals with the
Turkish companies should not be seen as an effort by the Kurds to set a precedent to run
the Kirkuk and Mosul fields. The PUK had agreed with other Iraqi opposition groups before
the fall of Saddam Husayn that the energy resources of Iraq would be run by the central
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government in Baghdad and not by individual groups." He said the deals with Turkish
companies were reached "long before the agreement by the opposition groups and [End
Page 22] were simply production-sharing deals and did not provide any concessions to
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foreign companies." The same PUK official said that the PUK leadership had taken the
decision to preserve strong relations with Ankara and thus maintained the view that Turkish
oil and gas companies as well as other Turkish firms would remain active in northern Iraq.
The permission of the United States to allow Turkish oil and gas companies to operate in the
Kurdish-controlled regions of northern Iraq was obviously an effort on the part of
Washington to allay Turkey's opposition to its policies in Iraqone of which was to
strengthen Kurdish autonomy. Thus, elements of the WMEI seem to have been put in place
before it was officially announced at the June G-8 summit in Sea Island.
During Erdogan's 711 June 2005 visit to Washington and New York, he had many meetings
and discussions emphasizing that, if Turkey wanted fuller participation in the WMEI, it

should (1) continue to strengthen its economic ties with Iraq and Kurdistan-Iraq; (2)
expand further its already manifold defensive, security, trade, and economic relations with
Israel; and (3) reduce its relations with Syria and Iran and to do so despite its reservations
regarding US policies in Iraq, which most likely would lead to an eventual Kurdish state.
In Washington at a 7 June meeting of the American-Turkish Council, one of the keynote
speakers, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick, a former US trade representative, told
the Turks that they should "look beyond accession to the European Union and adopt a more
global perspective. Now, the EU is clearly important for Turkey's future, but so are countries
of the broader Middle East." It was particularly important for Turkey "to recognize that it
should be operating in a global environment. So, at least my suggestion is that as Turkey
moves forward, obviously it wants to have good relations with Europe and the United
31
States, but it needs to have a 360 degree perspective." Zoellick listed three sets of shared
interests in which Turkey and the United States could cooperate: democratization in the
broader Middle East, reconstruction in Iraq, and the development of the broader Middle
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East. [End Page 23] "So," continued Zoellick, "my hope is that as Turkey looks to its own
future, the connections that it has with Europe, which are implemented, need to be
complemented by a global perspective. That's where the partnership with the United States
becomes particularly valuable. The United States is a unique country in terms of its global
reach and the insights and relationships one builds, I hope, can be relevant to our interests
33
as well." While Zoellick was US trade representative (2001 to 2005), he strongly
34
supported views pursued in the WMEI.
Turkey's policies toward Iraq and Kurdistan-Iraq, from the 30 January 2005 national
assembly elections in Iraq through the repeated national assembly elections on 15
December, continued the pattern that Turkey had been compelled to establish after the 1
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March 2003 resolution and the 4 July 2003 "bag affair." But there were three significant
differences between the two periods: (1) in the latter period Turkey was further compelled
to improve relations with Israel despite Turkey's activities in Iraq; (2) Turkey was also
encouraged to improve relations with Israel if it wanted the continued support of the major
American Jewish organizations, neoconservatives, and especially Jewish neoconservatives;
and (3) it needed warmer relations with American Jews if it expected its voice, especially
36
that of its prime minister, to be heard in the White House. Unless Turkey did these things,
it was clear there would be no US, KDP, PUK, or Iraqi government attacks or attempts to
disband the PKK (Partiya Kakeren Kurdiasan)/Kongra-Gel forces remaining in [End Page
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24] Iraq. As of 1 April 2006, such attempts had not taken place. There would also be less
sympathy from the United States and the EU regarding Ankara's policies toward the Kurds,
especially in Turkey's southeast.
The degree of Turkey's participation in the WMEI would also be geared to Ankara's lessening
its relations with Syria and Iran. Ankara had not substantially distanced itself from Syria by
mid-2006. It considered its relations with Damascus within the confines of the principles of
the WMEI, although there were indications by the end of 2005, under pressure from the
United States, that it might be reconsidering its policies toward Damascus and Tehran. The
implementation of such policies by Turkey would, of course, diminish the thrust of the AKP's
multilateral foreign policies, especially toward Middle Eastern countries, that it had adopted
after coming to power in November 2002. Most importantly, the policies that Zoellick
recommended Turkey pursue in his 7 June talk in Washington would result in Turkey
acquiescing to policies that eventually would lead to the further strengthening of the Kurds'
autonomy in Iraq and their potential independence. Even without the declaration of
independence by the Kurds of Iraq, the developments in Kurdistan-Iraq were already having
repercussions on the strengthening of Kurdish nationalism in Turkey as well as in Syria and
Iran. The Turks felt deep resentment, as I have indicated, by the predicament that the
Americans had placed them in by their invasion and occupation of Iraq. The Turkish
dilemma also demonstrated the historical struggle between capitalism and nationalism (in
the latter case, Kurdish, Turkish, and Arab nationalism) with the additional irony in this case
that capitalism also furthered the strengthening of Kurdish nationalism, and in response to

it, a strengthening of both Turkish and Arab nationalism, which, in turn, exacerbated the
policies of the AKP government to extend its multilateral economic and trade policies to its
Middle East neighbors.
Turkey's decision to participate in the WMEI and, especially in its Palestine and Israel
aspects, was the emphasis of James Wolfensohn's visit to Turkey on the same day as the
conclusion of the G-8 summit in Gleneagles, [End Page 25] Scotland, on 89 July 2005.
Wolfensohn, the recently retired president of the World Bank (he was replaced by Paul
Wolfowitz, the former US deputy secretary of defense and ardent advocate of the war
against Iraq) and now special envoy for Gaza disengagement, arrived in Ankara on 10 July
to confer with Rifat Hisarc koglu, president of Turkey's TOBB, to discuss Turkey's
participation in the building of several construction projects in Gaza, especially in the Israelowned Erez Industrial Zone.
The member countries of the G-8 had allocated $3 billion (out of a total pledge of $9 billion)
for the Erez projects. Starting in late 2004, Turkish, Israeli, and Palestinian businessmen
had joined in the Ankara Forum to cooperate on business projects and enterprises in Gaza
and eventually in the West Bank. All wished to take advantage of the monies made available
for Gaza after the Israelis pulled out and for the West Bank, if and when a negotiated
political agreement was reached between Israel and the Palestinians. Wolfensohn declared
38
that he was eager to have Turkish businessmen participate in the Gaza project. Turkey
continued to display a strong interest in the Erez Industrial Zone. On 45 January 2006,
Turkish foreign minister Abdullah Gul visited Gaza to sign a memorandum of understanding
(MoU) with Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) regarding Turkey's construction and
management of the Erez project. His eagerness to sign the MoU was interpreted as a
gesture to help PA president Mahmud Abbas against his Hamas opposition in the scheduled
39
25 January 2006 elections. TOBB executive Mustafa Bayburtlu said that the Erez project
would provide some five thousand jobs to Palestinians: "The zone will be open to all
investors from all countries, including Israel, of course." With PA foreign minister Nasir alQidwa standing at his side, Gul stated, "While supporting Palestinian efforts to establish
their independent state, we also place great importance on them being able to stand on
their feet economically. This is the first concrete international project to address these
issues. I believe it will be followed up and that new job opportunities and sources of income
will emerge for the Palestinians. We will invite not only investors from Turkey, Palestine,
and Israel but also from the EU and the United States, Japan, and the Arab [End Page 26]
40
world." Al-Qidwa said much hard work lay ahead to make the Erez project a success: "It's
not going to be easy, but with determination and with enough support from the political
authorities of all sides, we will be able to make it. The project will encourage the average
Palestinian and the average person of the region to feel the fruits of economic cooperation
41
and of living in peace in the region."
Five days after the Palestinian national assembly election, in which Hamas won a significant
victory, PA ambassador to Turkey, Nabil Maruf, stated in a press interview that enhancing
relations between Turkey and the Palestinian people was a major goal of the PA: "I don't
42
think that there is another regional ally who can put pressure on Israel as Turkey can do."
At the same interview, Turkish justice minister Cemil Cicek did not exclude the possibility
that Turkey would mediate disputes between Israel and the PA, even a Hamas-dominated
43
PA. But he said that no decisions could be made until after the March elections in Israel.
Two days after Gul left Israel, it was announced that during President Sezer's visit to Egypt
on 2526 December, in addition to the signing of a free trade agreement, the two countries
also discussed the construction of a gas pipeline from Egypt to Turkey. Turkey was eager to
44
diversify its gas sources and have other alternatives to its dependence on Russian gas.
45
Significantly, the pipeline would traverse Israel. Whether the pipeline would ever
materialize or not, the raising of its possible construction strongly indicated that both
countries basically accepted Israel's strong presence in the West Bank, the settlement of
Jews there, and the cantonization of the West Bank. Turkey's policies, and those of Egypt as
well, suggested that they would merely try to ease the pain of Israel's occupation by

providing jobs to the Palestinians. On [End Page 27] the same day that the possibility of
construction of the pipeline occurred, it was also announced that Turkey and Israel would
cooperate more extensively in a variety of fields of technology and science, including space
46
technology. Whether the two countries would cooperate or are also collaborating on
47
technologies that contribute to nuclear weaponization remains unclear. While it was not
announced, it seemed probable that the two countries would also cooperate in nuclear
technology, probably including nuclear weaponization, despite Turkey's adherence to a
policy of not developing nuclear weapons. Notably, this announcement was made just as the
furor over Iran's decision to go ahead with its uranium enrichment program escalated,
especially in the United States and Israel. Perhaps Ankara, Jerusalem, and Washington were
sending a message to Tehran.
On 13 September, a TOBB delegation headed by TOBB president Hisarc koglu arrived in
Washington, DC, where they again met with Wolfensohn and later with Paul Wolfowitz and
Kemal Dervis, the latter a former member of the Turkish parliament and an official at the
World Bank who now served as head of economic development for the lesser developed
countries. Dervis strongly favored Turkey's participation in the WMEI. Wolfowitz declared
that he was pleased by TOBB's decision to fully participate in the Erez projects. He also
advised the Turkish businessmen to develop partnerships with Palestinian businessmen:
"Hence, you would contribute to the creation of employment in addition to providing support
48
to Palestine." He added that the World Bank "was taking the lead in securing $100 to
$250 million in loans for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) which are vital, and the
49
World Bank is ready to provide support in that regard," noted Wolfowitz. He stressed to
the TOBB businessmen that the World Bank was also prepared to collaborate with Turkey in
developing relations with Iraqi businessmen. [End Page 28]
Wolfensohn told the Turks that he would be unable to attend the scheduled 21 September
meeting of the Ankara Forum to be held in Ankara but that he would send one of his four
50
assistants. He assured the Turks that PA president Abbas approved of the Ankara Forum
members' participation in the Erez industrial projects. He stressed that he was doing his
best to persuade the EU member countries to invest and participate in the Gaza projects. He
thought that the projects could begin at once and that he saw "no obstacles for the
51
commencement of construction." His major concern was Israel's demand that
comprehensive security measures be taken before the start of construction. Turkey's
editorial writers opined that Turkey's participation and management of the Erez zone would
give Turkey recognition for entering into the global economy by participating in the
52
economic development of other countries. At the 21 September meeting in Ankara,
Hisarc koglu stressed that Turkey's participation in the Erez project was important:
"Stability in the area is significant for the integration of the Turkish economy with the rest of
the region. As businessmen, our mission is to secure integration, and trade will further
53
strengthen stability and build new bridges in the region."
Nigel Roberts, the World Bank's director for the West Bank and Gaza, working closely with
Wolfensohn, stated on 13 October that the World Bank already had $750 million in hand for
implementing construction projects, largely in Gaza, but also planned a few for the West
Bank. With the latest pledges, it was expected that aid to the Palestinians would rise to
about $1.2 billion for 2005. Roberts stated that the countries of the G-8 had pledged a total
of $9 billion, much of it in the form of private investments, over the next three years. The
$9 billion figure suggested that Turkish companies might gain an even larger share of the
54
pledged G-8 countries' funds than previously anticipated. [End Page 29]
Alon Ben-Meir, an Israeli diplomat, analyzed Turkey's growing economic and political role in
the Middle East, especially regarding Israeli and Palestinian issues in a wider context. He
noted that Turkey in recent years had accepted Israel's centrality in Middle East affairs. He
opined that Ankara's increased dialogue with its own Kurds had solidified its creditability
with and, in turn, strengthened its relations with the EU. He anticipated that Turkey would
undertake even larger projects in Gaza than the ones currently in progress, such as the
building of power plants as well as desalination plants, houses for Palestinian refugees,

roads, and schools. In addition, Ben-Meir suggested that Turkey could assume the
responsibility for the training of Palestinian security forces and in the streamlining of these
55
forces into the interior ministry of the PA. Interesting enough, the Israeli official
advocated this policy even as Israeli military and intelligence forces were training military
and security personnel in Kurdistan-Iraq.
Ben-Meir noted Turkey's increasing role in international diplomacy was also evident in the
September announcement by Israel and Pakistan that they would be resuming diplomatic
relations in the near future. The Israeli diplomat went so far as to say that Turkey might be
able to play a role, and a more effective one than Egypt, in trying to persuade Hamas that
"it is fighting a lost, even a suicidal battle. Turkey, too, could be a major player in
monitoring the Palestinian national elections and assume some security role in facilitating
relations between Israel and the Palestinians before and during the upcoming elections in
56
the occupied territories."
Ben-Meir's predictions seemed right on target. On 11 October it was announced that a
Turkish company, Zorlu Energy Group, had signed an agreement with Israel's Solbar
Industries to build a $360-million power plant in southern Israel. "To try and tie the
relations [between Turkey and Israel] with economic products is very, very important," said
57
Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, Israel's minister of national infrastructure. The power plant deal
was expected to raise the trade between the two countries to $2.5 billion by the end of
2005, excluding the military sales and refurbishing of military equipment, which would add
around another $1 billion to the $2.5 figure [End Page 30] .
There was more evidence in September 2005 that Turkey was to play a larger role in Middle
East politics, not only in developing projects in Gaza, the West Bank, and Iraq, but in
providing a market for Israeli and Jewish investments. In September it was announced that
Sam Ofer, president of the Ofer Group of companies and investments and a well-known
Israeli and international billionaire, in partnership with a Turkish company, Global Transport
(Global Menkul Degerler), headed by Mehmet Kutman, a cousin of former prime minister
Mesut Y lmaz, had won a $4.3 billion (3.5 billion euros) contract to design, renovate, build,
and operate Galataport, a project to redo the port of Galata at the juncture of the Golden
58
Horn and Bosporus, where many tourist boats and ships dock upon entering Istanbul.
Ofer was most well known as being the major shareholder in Royal Caribbean Cruises.
The winning of the Galataport contract came on the heels of the announcement that Ofer
and Kutman had also purchased 14.75 percent of the shares of the newly privatized Turkish
Oil and Gas Company (TUPRAS-Turk Petrol ve Refine Anonim Sirketi). It was also reported
that Ofer and Kutman were part of a consortium that won the contract to operate the
harbor at Kusadas , one of the most well-known and frequented ship tourist ports on the
Aegean Sea south of Izmir. Due to complaints of corruption in the Galataport tender, it was
rescinded on 3 February 2006 by Finance Minister Kemal Unak tan, one of the ministers
charged with corruption. It was reported that a new tender would be submitted after a new
plan for the rebuilding of the area was completed. The new tender process made it unclear
59
if the Ofer Group would be one of the principal bidders on the new tender. The Republican
Peoples Party also accused Unak tan of profiting from the 14.76 percent of the TUPRAS
60
tender purchased by the Ofer Group and Kutman's company. Whatever disappointment
the Ofer Group or Israel may have had due to the [End Page 31] rescinding of the
Galataport project, Israel must have been delighted when Turkey and Russia announced on
3 February that the two countries and Israel would cooperate in building a gas pipeline from
Turkey's Ceyhan oil terminal on the Mediterranean to Israel and Lebanon. The pipeline
61
would be laid under the Mediterranean.
More deals involving Israeli-Jewish companies occurred in September. The ubiquitous
Kutman in partnership with the Canadian CanWest Company paid more than $33 million for
the Super FM radio station of the Star Media Group that had been part of the media empire
created and managed by the Uzun family before they were indicted on multiple charges of
corruption and fraud and their assets sold. CanWest was a company begun by Israel Asper
62
(of Israeli origin) and consisted of many television and radio companies. In September it

was also officially announced that Turkey would permit air flights from Istanbul to Arbil in
63
Kurdistan-Iraq. In December, Ankara did give permission for flights from Istanbul to Arbil.
64
It seemed likely that there would soon be flights to Sulaymaniya as well. Wolfowitz's
declaration to the TOBB businessmen in Washington on 13 September that his efforts as
president of the World Bank to get Turkey to collaborate with the World Bank to develop
relations with Iraqi businessmen was bearing fruit. The fruit kept ripening. In October it was
estimated that Kurdistan-Iraq had granted some $800 million in contracts to Turkish
65
companies of one kind of another.
By the time of the 15 December 2005 national assembly elections in Iraq, Turkish
participation in oil and gas exploration in Kurdistan-Iraq and in regions of Iraq not controlled
by the Kurds was well known. There [End Page 32] was hardly an eyebrow raised when an
announcement in early December revealed that the Norwegian DNO oil company, with a
contract from the KDP, began to drill for oil near Zakho in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq
66
only fifteen miles from the Turkish border. Although there were a few eyebrows raised
upon learning that a thirty-ton made-in-China oil rig had been transported to Kurdistan-Iraq
through Turkey with the approval and cooperation of the Turks, most observers simply
shrugged. In mid-April 2006, Kurdistan Regional Government officials estimated their
67
unexplored oil reserves at about 45 billion barrels.

Turkey, the Arab Gulf Countries, and the

WMEI
Turkey's participation in the WMEI gathered steam in late 2005 with the commitment of
Arab Gulf countries to invest in the Turkish economy. Turkey made great efforts to attract
investments from the Arab Gulf countries flush with windfall profits from the unexpectedly
68
high price of oil from 2004 to 2006. In November, Prince Muhammed bin Rashid alMakhtum, with eighty Dubai and United Arab Emirates (UAE) businessmen in tow,
descended upon Istanbul to sign an already negotiated deal to invest $300 million in an
office and business complex consisting of two, three-hundred-meter-high buildings to be
called the Dubai Towers. Kadir Topbas, the mayor of Istanbul, announced that Dubai
International Properties had also committed to invest $5 billion in an array of real estate
developments both in Istanbul and elsewhere in Turkey. Dubai officials also announced that
they would invest in tourist facilities throughout Turkey as well as bid on government-owned
companies that were to be privatized, including various sea ports. They also said they would
like to bid on the privatization tender of Telsim, the second largest mobile telephone
69
company in Turkey. Telsim was subsequently purchased by Vodafone, a British-managed
company, for $4.5 billion. [End Page 33]
In January 2006, Dubai Islamic Bank bought Turkish-owned MNG Bank for $160 million.
MNG Bank owned ten branches in Turkey. Dubai Islamic Bank began operations in 1997. In
70
2005 its net profit was $288.7 million, and it financed some $680 million in loans. In early
March 2006, it was announced that a Turkish brick and roof-tile company, based in the
western Turkish city of Eskisehir, agreed with one of the companies directed by Shaykh
Muhammad bin Rashid al-Maktum, the ruler of Dubai, to supply $4 million worth of bricks
and roof tiles for the complex of hotels, office buildings, residences, and sports arenas being
built as part of the Palmiye City project. There was the promise that the contract would be
71
greatly expanded in the future.
In the early months of 2006 Turkey looked increasingly profitable for Dubai investors. In
mid-March 2006 Salma Harib, the CEO of Dubai Jabal Ali Free Trade Corporation (JAFTC),
along with the company's international director, Charles Heath, arrived in Istanbul to
investigate the possibilities of establishing free-trade zones for its operations in Turkey
similar to the ones that it operated in Jordan. JAFTC operated or participated in some five

thousand companies in 120 countries. According to Harib, Jabal Ali already worked with fifty
Turkish companies. JAFTC was so successful, said Harib, that it was planning to build its
own airport in Dubai by 2007. She said that her company's goal was to make Dubai the
principal business center of the Middle East, with the goal of creating one thousand
72
companies by 2007. "We believe," said Harib, "that our relationship with Turks will be one
73
of 'win-win' for both of us."
Three days after Harib and her entourage left Istanbul, another Dubai businessman and
investor, Umar Ayish, director of the Tamir Group, announced at an international real estate
fair in Cannes that his group would invest $8 billion in the construction of a satellite city that
would accommodate 500,000 people on the outskirts of Istanbul. His group hoped to secure
suitable locations for the proposed city by cooperating with the Turkish government.
"However," said Tamir, "if we cannot agree with the government [End Page 34] we are
ready to work with the private sector. And, if the proposed satellite city is not realized, we
74
will consider building 'towers' [kuleler] within the city [Istanbul]." Tamir anticipated that
the proposed satellite city could be built within two years.
An Arab company, Saudi-owned and Beirut-based Oger Telecom, did manage to buy
Turkcell, the largest Turkish mobile telephone company, for $6.6 billion. Paul Doany, the
Lebanese head of the newly created company, stated that the new company intended to
75
invest another $3.5 billion in Turkcell within the next five or six years. Muhammad Hariri,
the deputy president of Oger Telecom, said that his company was also interested in
76
investing in Turkey's banking sector.
Less than two weeks before the announcement that Oger Telecom had purchased Turkcell,
Abu Dhabi also indicated its intention to enter the investment fray in Turkey. On 78
November Abu Dhabi's planning and economic minister as well as the finance minister for
the UAE, Shaykh Hamid bin Zayid al-Nahyan, with another large contingent of businessmen,
arrived in Turkey. Al-Nahyan said that he expected large participation of Turkish
construction companies in the planned $30-billion project to build three artificial islands on
77
the Abu Dhabi waterfront, with the construction of several hotels and other complexes. AlNahyan said it was still too early to say to what extent that Abu Dhabi companies would
invest in Turkey, but he indicated that talks were going forward on several fronts, including
talks with the Army Mutual Assistance Association (Ordu Yard mlasma Kurumu), created by
78
army officers in 1961. The consummation of such a deal would mean that the
commanders of the TAF would seem to be willing to go into partnership with an Arab
country. Turkish state minister for trade Kursad Tuzmen stated that he expected trade
between Turkey and the UAE to reach $1.8 billion by the end of 2005; in 2000 it had been
79
$354 million. [End Page 35]
One week after al-Nahyan left Turkey, Prime Minister Erdogan left for Qatar with the
message that Turkey was ready for more investment from the Arab Gulf countries. On 14
November, Erdogan held talks with Qatar Amir Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani and with
Shaykh Hamid bin Qasim bin Jabr al-Thani, Qatar's deputy president and foreign minister,
respectively. The al-Thanis told Erdogan that they expected Qatar would invest some $2
billion to $4 billion in Turkey's communication, transportation, and technology industries.
They also expected that Turkish companies would be major participants in the $100 billion
80
worth of construction projects that the UAE was planning for the next decade. After
leaving Qatar, Erdogan and his contingent headed to Bahrayn for talks with Amir Halifa bin
Salman al-Khalifa. Erdogan immediately presented al-Khalifa with an invitation from Turkish
president Ahmet Necdet Sezer to visit Turkey, which the amir promised to do in the near
future. Al-Khalifa said that Bahrayn was very interested in investing in newly privatized
81
Turkish companies, especially in the Retirement Pension Fundowned hotels. Al-Khalifa
also said that Bahrayn investors were also interested in Turkish banks that were scheduled
for privatization. With 340 banks in Bahrayn, 25 of them Islamic banks, Bahraynis had
much experience in this sector, said the amir. He added that in the first quarter of 2005, the
82
banking and investment sector alone had a profit of $6.1 billion.

In late December, Istanbul Chamber of Commerce (ICC) president Murat Yalc ntas paid a
several-day visit to Dubai and to Qatar. In Dubai he was assured by Farhan Feridun, the
CEO of Dubai International Properties, one of the major investment companies of Dubai,
that by all means Dubai would continue to invest in other projects in Turkey besides the
already committed $5 billion. Feridun reiterated that in the view of Dubai and UAE
businessmen Istanbul was considered a valuable place in which to invest, and he anticipated
that it would be even more "sparkling" in the future. Yalcintas also invited Dubai
83
businessmen to invest in a huge industrial park that ICC was planning to build. [End Page
36]
In late December, Mehmet Seref Cosar, the general manager of Baytur, the biggest Turkish
construction company in Qatar, announced that the Qatar Oil Company had signed a
contract worth $124 million with his company to build the Qatar Islamic Art Museum and a
$245 million contract to build the Qatar National Library. In addition, Baytur was to build
the al-Handsa and al-Rim towers to be used for office, commercial, and residential use. He
said that in Qatar alone his company had the potential for $440 million of business and that
84
current projects would keep Baytur's three thousand Turkish workers busy until 2008. He
added that in Dubai alone his company was already engaged for a contracted $150 million
in the construction of the Palmiye Island project. Alkas Bekisoglu, the project manager for
another Turkish company, Tekfen, announced that his company was engaged in
constructing a 158-kilometer natural gas pipeline for $115 million. Yet another Turkish
company, Gama, had $100 million worth of construction projectsone of which was an
electrical-engineering contract to build a large cement factory. In the Ras Laffan region,
Gama was also slated to build a workers' camp. It was estimated that by the end of 2005
85
Gama was engaged in $150 million to $200 million worth of construction in Qatar.
Qatar-Turkey relations continued to grow. In March 2006 Doha announced that the TurkishAustrian company Tepe, Akfen, Vie (TAV), which specializes in building and operating
airports, had been awarded a $869 million contract to participate in building one of the
terminals and managing the $5 billion international airport being constructed outside of
86
Doha. TAV already managed Istanbul International Airport and was awarded the contract
to manage Cairo International Airport in 2005. TAV had also been slated to take over the
management of the Imam Khomeini International Airport near Tehran, but its contract was
cancelled in May 2004 when Iranian security forces closed the airport. It was subsequently
87
reopened under different, largely Iranian management.
By the end of 2005, economic and trade relations between Turkey and [End Page 37] the
Arab Gulf countries were prospering. Turkey's largest food and beverage company, Ulker,
had investments in Saudi Arabia. There were also several Saudi-funded banks in Turkey. In
addition, there were an estimated 100,000 Turks working in the country; some 200,000 or
more Turks went on haj every year. Saudi and Kuwaiti citizens have also bought property in
88
Yalova and Bursa in western Turkey.
By the end of 2005, there were seventeen Kuwaiti
companies operating in various fields in Turkey, and it was expected that Turkish exports to
the UAE would approach $1 billion. One of Turkey's largest banks, Yap Kredi, had a branch
in Kuwait. By the middle of 2004, the UAE was already the thirteenth-ranked export market
89
for Turkey.
The increased importance of Arab Gulf resources to fund QIZs in the West Bank and Gaza
was not lost on Wolfensohn. In mid-February 2006 after the G-8 summit, he left for a tour
of the Arab Gulf countries to solicit funds for the restructuring of the West Bank and Gaza
and, hopefully, to use the economic development provided by the funds, if secured, as a
counterpoise to militant Palestinian nationalism. This was, of course, an objective made
more difficult by the Hamas victory in the 25 January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary
90
elections.
By the end of 2005, Turkey's multipronged economic and trade policies were humming
along, especially with regard to its neighbors. One of the driving forces behind this
expansion is the Trade Development Strategy of Turkey with its neighboring and
surrounding fifty countries. In 2005 trade with those countries rose to $45 billion, up from

91

$19.9 billion in 2000. The increase in projected trade with countries adjoining Turkey was
especially noticeable. In 2006, trade and economic engagement with Syria was expected to
reach $2 billion; with Iran, $4 billion; with Kurdistan-Iraq, $3 billion; and with Iraq (Arab),
92
$2 billion to $2.3 billion. It is estimated that Turkey's gross national product could well
reach $1 trillion by 2015. [End Page 38]
Turkey's increased economic involvement in Kurdistan-Iraq continued apace in early 2006.
It was announced in January 2006 that two of Turkey's largest banks, Vakifbank and
Akbank, would open branches in Kurdistan-Iraq and conduct business in Arbil, Dohuq,
93
Sulaymaniya, and Kirkuk.
In May 2006 there were more indications of closer ties between Turkey and Bahrayn. In
mid-May Amir Shaykh Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa visited Ankara, where he finalized plans for
a spacious new Bahrayn embassy. The amir declared that Bahrayn intended to make
substantial investments in Turkey, including in the Turkish-held sector of northern Cyprus.
He stated, "If possible we will open an office in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. We
94
are researching all of the possibilities of doing so." Shaykh Hamad confirmed what
Bahrayni prime minister Shaykh Khalifa bin Salman al-Khalifa had said during his February
visit to Ankara when he reiterated his country's support for Turkey's efforts to find a
comprehensive deal to the Cyprus problem. On 23 May during Speaker of the Parliament
Bulent Ar nc's visit to Bahrayn, Prime Minister Salman al-Khalifa repeated his country's
95
support: "We have not given up on our commitments to Turkey on Cyprus." The prime
minister said that he had also expressed Bahrayn's support for Turkey's Cyprus policy
during a recent meeting with Greek president Karolas Papoulias when the latter was visiting
Bahrayn. The prime minister reiterated that Bahrayn was interested in investing in the
tourism sector of northern Cyprus.
Also on 25 May, during a visit to Ankara, Kuwaiti foreign minister Shaykh Muhammad Sabah
al-Salim al-Sabah also stressed his country's support for Turkey's position regarding Cyprus.
He extended Kuwait's support to Turkey's efforts for a solution to the decades-old Cyprus
dispute and Ankara's aspirations to get a temporary seat on the UN Security Council. The
96
prime minister stressed that Kuwait wanted "a friendly solution to the Cyprus dispute." He
also told the Turks that Kuwait was highly interested in Halkbank's privatization, the Cevahir
shopping center in Istanbul, and Istanbul's gas distributing company, IGDAs. He also said
that Kuwait Investment Authority was interested [End Page 39] in constructing houses for
low-income families in Istanbul. The prime minister and Turkish foreign minister Gul also
discussed in depth strengthening cooperation between NATO and the Gulf Cooperation
Council as part of the ICI agreed upon at the June 2004 NATO summit held in Istanbul. By
early 2006, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrayn, and the UAE, but not Saudi Arabia, had adopted the
security provisions of the ICI discussed earlier. The ICI was designed to accommodate the
security concerns of the Arab Gulf countries with regard to Iran and the consequences of
the possible break-up of Iraq. The United States and EU initiated the ICI with the idea that
97
NATO would be more palatable to the Arab Gulf countries' publics than the United States.
The leaders of the Arab Gulf countries may think that increased security ties with NATO
countries might contribute to their regimes' stability.
What is important for my analysis in this article is that Bahrayn, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE,
and possibly down the line Saudi Arabia consider Turkey as an important part of the ICI, as
well as being the only Muslim country that is a member of NATO. In effect, by adopting the
security provisions of the ICI, Bahrayn, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE become associated with
NATO. In this light, Turkey has become more of an important player in the security of the
Arab Gulf countries and, hence, more of a trustworthy country in which to invest. Of course,
all of these countries are looking for secure opportunities to invest the surplus of oil
revenues resulting from high oil pricesprices that may well continue for some time.
Turkey, with a population of some 73 million and a young and dynamic population, offers
lucrative investment opportunities. It is notable, however, that the implementation of the
ICI and its adoption by Bahrayn, Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE, and the increased investment
interest of these countries in Turkey, have occurred at the same time. It is these policies

that help explain the change of position of these countries in support of Turkey's position
regarding Cyprus. [End Page 40]

Turkey, Iran, and the Struggle for Iraq

Turkey's decision to cooperate with the sponsors of the WMEI with regard to its policies
toward Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan marked a significant and dramatic departure from its
policies prior to March 2003. Ankara's policies also were a sharp divergence from those of
Iran and the policies that the two countries pursued prior to the US invasion and occupation
of Iraq.
From the Iranian revolution in 1979 to 1991, Turkey's policy toward Iran was based on two
principal factors: first, containing the Iranian revolution and its potential impact in Turkey,
98
and second, resolving the PKK issue. These tensions were lessened by the increased trade
between the two countries as a result of the Iraq-Iran War, but these same two issues
remained prominent from 1991 to 1997. Even the assassination of prominent Turks, which
Ankara thought Tehran supported, did not supercede them. Indeed, these tensions came to
a head in the Sinjan affair, in which Turkey determined that the Iranian ambassador,
Mohammad Reza Baqeri, was interfering directly in Turkey's domestic politics. As a result,
99
he and several of his colleagues were expelled.
Other developments that directly affected each country's policies toward the other, and
Iraq, also exacerbated tensions. Among these were the increasing closeness of Turkey and
Israel and their stronger ties with Azerbaijan. This relationship was established parallel to
Tehran's suspicions that the United States, Israel, and perhaps Turkey were supporting
Mahmud Ali Johragani's National Liberation Movement of South Azerbaijan (NLMSA) and the
United Azerbaijan Movement (UAM). When Turkish president Ahmed Necdet Sezer visited
Tehran on 1718 June 2002, he stressed that his country's main problem with Iran was its
support of the PKK, including its presence in Iran and in Iraq. President Khatami responded
that Iran's principal concerns were Turkey's support for the Mojahedin-e Khalq, the UAM,
100
and the NLMSA.
More unrest in Iran, among ethnic Arabs in Khuzetan in [End Page 41]
2005 and especially in Azerbaijan in May and June 2006, furthered Tehran's suspicions that
the United States, Britain, Israel, and others were supporting the ethnic unrest.

Turkey's and Iran's Relations toward Iraq

after March 2003
Turkey's and Iran's respective relations toward Iraq changed dramatically after the US
invasion and occupation of Iraq. I argue that it represents a paradigmatic shift. Both Turkish
and Iranian officials have emphasized from the establishment of their modern states in
1923 and 1925 that the two countries have had good and cooperative relations since the
Treaty of Qasr-i Shirin (a city located near the present Iran-Iraq boundary) in 1639, which
basically established the current border between Iraq (then under Ottoman control) and
101
Iran. These statements have political and diplomatic merit.
But the US occupation of Iraq
and the dramatic shifts in power among the peoples of Iraq place the paradigm of 1639 in
jeopardy. The principal reason for this is that prior to 2003 the two countries jockeyed
largely for geopolitical position in Iraq, which in turn mitigated their geopolitical competition
in Central Asia and the Caucasus. But after 2003, when Turkey was excluded from a
meaningful military and political presence in Iraq, it had no choice but to try to manage its
relations with Iraq, and especially Iraqi Kurdistan, by becoming as fully engaged as possible
in the "rebuilding." By participating in the economic development of Kurdistan as well as
other aspects of the WMEI, Ankara contributed to the stated US policy of support for a

unified Iraq and, at the same time, attempted to circumscribe the consolidation of Kurdish
nationalism and Kurdistan control of northern Iraq. Turkey, then, opted for as large as
possible an economic presence in Iraq, the Arab countries of the Middle East, and Israel. It
aligned with the United States, the EU, and Israel as the most reasonable trade-off among
the options it determined available.
Iran was aligned with no one, and it did not have the political stability or [End Page 42]
depth of Turkey. It was antagonistic to the United States, Britain, and the EU. As a result it
became a target of regime change as soon as, and probably before, the United States
invaded Iraq. It also became an object of subversion by the United States, Britain, and
others, maybe including Turkey. In addition, unlike Turkey's policy of economic engagement
in Iraq, Iran had a policy of political engagement. Whatever happens in Iraq, Turkey will
maintain its economic engagement, but if Iran were to be attacked by the United States
and/or Israel and the regime changed, it is likely that its strong political position in Iraq
would be greatly diminished.
The dramatic shift in the policies of Turkey and Iran with reference to Iraq can be
understood by posing the question: What would Ankara's position be toward the UN
Security Council's imposition of sanctions on Iran? This is an important question. The logic
of the argument presented in this essay is that Turkey might well adhere to such sanctions
in some measure. Another question to pose: What would be Turkey's position if the United
States and/or Israel were to attack Iran's nuclear and other industrial infrastructure? I have
argued here that Turkey might well agree to US and/or Israeli use of its airspace and even
bases in Turkey, although the latter probably would not be used, and if they were, their use
would be denied.
In May 2006 there was more evidence that this might well be the case. Erdogan met with
President Mahmud Ahmadinejad on 5 May in Baku, Azerbaijan, and again on 13 May, in Bali,
102
Indonesia, while both were attending the D-8 developing countries' summit.
The main
topic discussed was reportedly Iran's nuclear-enrichment policy. Even while Erdogan and
Ahmadinejad held talks in Baku, the general secretary of Iran's High Security Council, Ali
Larijani, one of the most powerful officials in Iran's government, visited Ankara on 89 May
to discuss Iran's position vis--vis the E-3, UN, and US stance toward its nucleardevelopment program. According to the Turkish press, Ankara took a strong stance toward
Iran's diplomacy and laid out several objections and offered advice to Larijani, including,
first, that Turkey did not want nuclear weapons in the Middle East, although it was not
opposed to Iran's development of nuclear energy and the processes needed to secure it,
and second, Iran should implement the policies necessary to ensure [End Page 43] the
world that this, indeed, was its policy. "It's not me, but the world that you have to
103
convince," Erdogan told Ahmadinejad.
Ankara also informed Larijani that if Iran did not
cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency and did not abandon its policy of
enriching uranium, Turkey would support and implement sanctions against Iran if the UN
104
voted for them.
As if to emphasize its points, Turkey announced that along with the
United States, France, and Portugal, it would stage air and sea maneuvers in the eastern
Mediterranean from 24 to 26 May. The maneuvers were to be conducted in the framework
of the Proliferation Security Initiative against Weapons of Mass Destruction. Thirty-one
105
countries were to send observers.
It must be noted that even as the discussions between Ankara and Tehran were taking
place in Baku, Bali, and Ankara, Turkey's and Iran's highest national security officials were
meeting to discuss mutual policies, including joint operations against PKK guerrillas in Iraq.
Gokan Ayd ner, Turkey's general director of security, also spoke with Iraqi government
officials and noted that it was necessary to capture or kill PKK leaders Murat Karay lan and
Cemil Bay k, ensconced in the Kandil Mountains, in order to prevent the ideological
strengthening of the PKK, especially in Turkey. Iran's national security director, General
Ismail Ahmedi Mogaddam, told his Turkish counterpart that Iran was building twenty-seven
police stations along its border with Turkey. He also said that his forces had recently
captured 248 members of the PKK guerrillas (it was unclear whether they were captured in

106

Iran or Iraq) and had arrested 54 PKK members and turned them over to Turkey.
Turkey
and Iran's cooperation against the PKK in Iraq occurred when US, Iraqi government, KDP,
and PUK forces did little to remove the PKK from its camps in Iraq. It seems that the KDP
and PUK did not want to fight with the PKK and the United States did not want to move
against the PKK guerrillas in Iraq if their Kurdish allies did not want to do so. This is an
example of how Turkish and Iranian cooperation contributes to stability in Iraq. The
principal reason for their cooperation in this regard was/is to increase stability and better
manage Kurdish nationalism and Kurdish resistance in their own countries. [End Page 44]
The logic of my argument here suggests that even if the Iraqi Kurds were to declare
independence at some time in the future, and even if the Kurds were to take strong control
over Kirkuk (both city and province), assuming that is was done incrementally, both before
and after the scheduled 2007 plebiscite, Turkey would be constrained militarily to intervene
in Iraq. Of course, if Iraq were to fall into full-scale civil war and fragment into full sectarian
and ethnic conflict, Turkey might well intervene. But in this case, its economic participation
107
in Iraq would no longer be guaranteed by the United States.
In spite of mutual Turkish and Iranian interests in managing the forces of Kurdish
nationalism, given the differing alignments and strategies of Turkey, both domestically and
internationally, it seems possible that the position of the two countries with regard to Iraq
has the potential for creating more conflict between the two countries in the next five to ten
years. If Iran's power is weakened and its regime changed, then Turkey will become a
stronger presence in northern Iraq and perhaps in all of Iraq, and Iran's presence in the
politics of Arab Iraq will diminishthe paradigm of 1639 will no longer have salience.
Many analysts have argued of late that the Arab neighbors of Iran and especially the nonArab neighbors of IraqTurkey and Iranshould be brought into the negotiations to secure
more stability in Iraq. What I argue in this article is that the people, diplomats, groups,
organizations, and countries involved earnestly in the negotiations over the future political
and geographical configuration of Iraq must not just involve Turkey and Iran in such
negotiations but must recognize Ankara's and Tehran's determined national security
interests in Iraq. Unlike the paradigm of Qasr-i Shirin, the new paradigm will have to
consider Turkey's needs to project its geopolitical power into Kurdistan-Iraq and portions of
the Sunni regions of Iraq and Iran's needs to be a dominant geopolitical force in the largely
Shiite regions. This might well result in more stability in Iraq than obtained in mid-2006.
Robert Olson is professor of Middle East Politics at the University of Kentucky.

Footnotes
1. A short version of this essay was presented as a paper at the international conference,
"Iraq: Preventing Another Generation of Conflict," sponsored by Foreign Affairs Canada and
the International Peace Academy, Ottawa, Canada, 1112 May 2006. I wish to thank the
participants and organizers for their comments on the paper.
2. For the reasons why I use the term Kurdistan-Iraq, with hyphen, see Robert Olson,
Turkey-Iran Relations, 19792004: Revolution, Ideology, War, Coups and Geopolitics (Costa
Mesa, Calif.: Mazda, 2004), 20713; and "Turkey and Kurdistan-Iraq, 2003," Middle East
Policy 11 (winter 2004): 1159.
3. See Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran: Middle Level
Powers in a Penetrated Region (New York: Routledge, 1997); Tom Nairn, The Break-Up of
Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism (London: NLB, 1977); and Steven R. David, "Explaining
Third World Alignment," World Politics 43, no. 2 (1991): 23356.
4. One might well speculate how such a cultural perception affects other aspects of their
theories.
5. Steven R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," World Politics 43, no. 2 (1991):
23356. For a review of some international relations theories, see Robert O. Keohane, ed.,

Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). For a brief and
relevant review of the literature, see Stephen M. Walt, "International Relations: One World,
Many Theories," Foreign Policy, no. 111 (spring 1998): 2946.
6. In a previous study, Robert Olson, Turkey's Relations with Iran, Syria, Israel, and Russia,
19912000: The Kurdish and Islamist Questions (Costa Mesa, Calif.: Mazda, 2001), I
argued that Turkey and Iran used omnibalancing vis--vis Kurdish nationalist challenges
during the 1980s and 1990s and, indeed, have used elements of omnibalancing right up to
the present.
7. Ehteshami and Hinnebusch, 57 and 198.
8. For Turkey's reaction to the WMEI, proposed officially at the 89 June G-8 summit in Sea
Island, Georgia, see Robert Olson, The Goat and the Butcher: Nationalism and State
Formation in Kurdistan-Iraq since the Iraqi War (Costa Mesa, Calif.: Mazda, 2005), 55, 65,
70, and 8088.
9. The origin of the QIZs is much too complicated to be discussed here. For more details,
see Olson, Turkey-Iran Relations, 1669.
10. For background on the relationship of Turkey with the American Jewish community, see
Olson, Turkey's Relations with Iran, Syria, Israel, and Russia, 12565.
11. For more detail on this topic see ibid.
12. Globe and Mail, 16 May 2006.
13. Hurriyet, 28 June 2004.
14. Turkish Daily News (TDN), 19 July 2004.
15. Ibid., 9 August 2004.
16. Hurriyet, 6 August 2004.
17. Ibid.
18. See www.kurdishmedia.com, 2 May 2006.
19. Hurriyet, 24 October 2004.
20. TDN, 11 November 2004.
21. See www.kurdishmedia.com, 11 November 2004. By 2005, Turkey had already agreed
to allow flights from Europe to Kurdistan-Iraq to fly through Turkish air space.
22. TDN, 29 November 2004.
23. See www.kurdishmedia.com, 17 December 2004.
24. Ibid.
25. Zaman, 5 July 2005.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. TDN, 20 May 2003; New York Times, 15 May 2005. For more context of the Pet-Oil deal
and the politics surrounding it, see Olson, Turkey-Iran Relations, 1602.
29. TDN, 20 May 2003.
30. Ibid.
31. TDN, 12 June 2005.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid. Zoellick, as a former US trade representative, was deeply familiar with the Turkish
economy. He was also a strong advocate of the QIZs. In 2002, during then Turkish prime
minister Bulent Ecevit's 1419 January visit to the United States, Zoellick told a large
contingent of Turkish businessmen accompanying Ecevit that the United States encouraged
the "diversification of the Turkish economy and particularly the export of hi-tech products."
He also advocated Turkish businessmen's participation in QIZs, especially if they were tied
to Israel. For a more detailed discussion of Zoellick's view on Turkey and QIZs, see Olson,
Turkey-Iran Relations, 1668.
34. Tom Barry, the policy director of the International Relations Center, categorizes Zoellick
as more of a committed nationalist than that of a free trader.
35. The "bag affair" refers to the incident of 4 July 2003 when US military forces placed
bags over the heads of eleven Turkish Special Forces and nineteen members of the Iraq

Turkoman Front (ITF) in the headquarters of the ITF in Sulaymaniya. For more details on
the bag affair, see Olson, The Goat and the Butcher, 279.
36. For the latest commentary on Jewish influence on the making of US foreign policy,
especially with regard to the Middle East, see John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, "The
Israel Lobby," London Review of Books, 11 May 2006; and Michael Massing, "The Storm
over the Israel Lobby," New York Review of Books, 8 June 2006.
37. There was a flurry of activity between Ankara and Washington in December 2005,
including visits to Ankara by Robert Mueller, director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
and Porter J. Goss, director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
38. Hurriyet, 11 July 2005.
39. TDN, 3 January 2006.
40. TDN, 5 January 2006.
41. Ibid.
42. TDN, 31 January 2006.
43. Ibid.
44. Turkey receives an estimated 70 to 80 percent of its gas from Russia.
45. While unconfirmed, there were reports in early June that Turkey, Israel, and Russia
would cooperate to build a network of four pipelines under the Mediterranean for
transporting Russian gas and oil to Israel, with feeder lines to the PA, Jordan, and Lebanon.
Interestingly, the feasibility study for the project was funded by the Luxembourg-based
European Investment Bank. See Washington Times, 30 April 2006.
46. TDN, 7 January 2006.
47. In a recent article, a Turkish scholar specializing in Turkey's and Iran's nuclear policies
suggests that Turkey still follows the policy of not pursuing nuclear weapons. See Mustafa
Kibaroglu, "Good for the Shah, Banned for the Mullahs: The West and Iran's Quest for
Nuclear Power," Middle East Journal 60, no. 2 (2006): 20734.
48. TDN, 29 September 2005.
49. Ibid. The funds were to come from the World Bank's Multilateral Investment Guarantee
Agency.
50. The Ankara Forum was established in 2004 by Turkey's prime minister Recep Tayyib
Erdogan, Israel's prime minister Ariel Sharon, and the Palestinian Authority's president
Mahmud Abbas. In addition to the Erez IQZ projects, the Ankara Forum also hoped to invest
in tourist trade for Palestine.
51. Hurriyet, 15 September 2005.
52. Ibid.
53. TDN, 29 September 2005.
54. Daily Star, 13 October 2005.
55. TDN, 10 October 2005.
56. Ibid.
57. TDN, 13 October 2005; Hurriyet, 17 September 2005.
58. There were many charges of corruption regarding the awarding of the Galataport
contract. There were accusations that Prime Minister Erdogan had spoken with Ofer some
days before the awarding of the contract.
59. TDN, 4 February 2006. It was reported that the tender was rescinded after Deputy
Prime Minister Abdulatif Sener objected to the manner in which the first tender was
submitted and concluded. Among his and other politicians' objections were the criticisms
that the AKP, including Prime Minister Erdogan himself, had consulted and, perhaps,
reached certain understandings with the Ofer Group prior to the bidding process.
60. TDN, 7 February 2006.
61. TDN, 5 February 2006. The gas for Israel and Lebanon was to come from the Blue
Stream (Mavi Ak m) pipeline that brings gas from Russia to the Turkish port of Samsun.
The Blue Stream pipeline pumps about 3 billion cubic meters of gas a year, but Turkish
authorities stated that the volume could easily be quadrupled. Since Ceyhan is also the
terminal for the Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline as well as two oil pipelines originating

from the Kirkuk region oil fields in Iraq (Kurdistan-Iraq), there seems a good possibility that
an oil pipeline would be laid alongside the gas pipeline at some point. Indeed, Vladimir Putin
mentioned on several occasions that an oil pipeline should be built alongside the Blue
Stream gas pipeline.
62. Hurriyet, 22 September 2005.
63. As mentioned earlier, by September 2005 there were already flights from Dubai and
Frankfurt, Germany, to Arbil.
64. TDN, 5 January 2005. In mid-December, Fly Air, a low-budget private airline, became
the first Turkish commercial service to Kurdistan-Iraq.
65. Newsweek, 17 October 2005.
66. The Daily Star, 2 December 2005. The story first broke in the Los Angeles Times.
67. See www.kurdmedia.com, 17 April 2006. The seismic company Terra Seis, working for
DNO, was headed and owned by Kevin Plintz, a Canadian geophysicist.
68. Saudi Arabia was reported to have profits of $160 billion in 2005 alone.
69. Hurriyet, 78 November 2005.
70. TDN, 2006. MNG Bank was owned by Naz f Gunal, who bought the bank from the
Dogus Group in 1997. MNG was the thirty-second largest bank in Turkey.
71. Hurriyet, 6 March 2006.
72. Hurriyet, 13 March 2006.
73. Ibid.
74. Hurriyet, 18 March 2005.
75. Hurriyet, 15 and 16 November 2005. As in the case of the Ofer purchase of the
Glassport tender, when there were statements that the Jews were buying up Turkey, now
the cry from some in Turkey was that the Arabs were buying up Turkey.
76. Ibid.
77. Hurriyet, 7 November 2005.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. Hurriyet, 22 November 2005.
81. Hurriyet, 15 November 2005.
82. Ibid.
83. Hurriyet, 26 December 2005.
84. Hurriyet, 26 December 2006.
85. Ibid.
86. Sabah, 15 March 2006.
87. TAV had already invested $15 million for the official opening of the airport. The
cancellation of the contract remained a sore point with many Turkish investors.
88. Bulent Aras, "Turkey and the GCC," Middle East Policy 12, no. 4 (2005): 96.
89. Ibid.
90. For the details of Wolfensohn's involvement in these efforts, as the head of the
international Quartet for Palestine, see Nigel Roberts, "International Aid, Diplomacy and the
Palestine Reality," remarks at the Palestine Center, Washington, DC, 13 February 2006.
Roberts is the former World Bank Country director for the Occupied Territories.
91. TDN, 23 January 2006.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid. Ziraat Bank obtained permission to operate in Iraq in 2005, but it was not able to
operate because it is a public bank and for security reasons.
94. Hurriyet, 4 May 2006.
95. TDN, 24 May 2006.
96. TDN, 26 May 2006.
97. For a detailed analysis of the ICI see Ellen Laipson, Emile El-Hokayem, Amy Buenning
Sturm, and Wael Alzayat, eds., Security Reform in the Gulf (Washington, DC: Henry L.
Stimson Center, 2006), available at www.stimson.org. This study was a joint project of the
Henry L. Stimson Center and the US Army's Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Series.

98. For details of Turkey-Iran relations during this period see Olson, Turkey-Iran Relations.
99. This was only the second time in the history between the two countries that Turkey had
expelled Iran's ambassador. Turkey expelled Iran's ambassador in 1927 due to differences
with Iran over the activities of the Kurdish leader in Iran, Simko Agha. For details of the
expulsion see, Robert Olson, The Kurdish Question and Turkish-Iranian Relations: from
World War I to 1998 (Costa Mesa, Calif.: Mazda, 1998), 22.
100. Olson, Turkey-Iran Relations, 148.
101. I am aware, of course, that the Treaty of Qasr-i Shirin did not end war or conflict
between the Ottoman and Safavid, Nasirid, and Qajar dynasties, as most textbooks on the
Middle East make clear. What I stress here is that Qasr-i Shirin continued to have diplomatic
and political relevancy by providing a commonly understood diplomatic discourse with which
both parties could refer in commencing diplomatic negotiations over disputed issues.
102. Hurriyet, 14 May 2006, 6, 12.
103. Hurriyet, 14 May 2006.
104. Hurriyet, 8 May 2006.
105. Hurriyet, 23 May 2006.
106. Hurriyet, 16 May 2006.
107. In this matter I differ from the International Crisis Group's analysis that a Kurdish
declaration of independence or a direct takeover of the oil fields of Kirkuk (at-Tamim)
province would necessarily lead to a full-scale invasion of Iraq by Turkey. See Joost R.
Hiltermann, "How to Tackle the Kirkuk Question," in the forthcoming proceedings of the
conference, "Iraq: Preventing Another Generation of Conflict."