Evidence Midterm Cases

Evidence Midterm Cases
September 2,2015
G.R. No. 160684
CLT
REALTY
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
HI-GRADE FEEDS CORPORATION, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (through the
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL), REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF METRO MANILA,
DISTRICT III, CALOOCAN CITY , and the COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
Tracing the line of transfer that preceded the title of Hi-Grade, it is averred that TCT No. 4211
was registered under the names of Ruiz and Leuterio on 9 September 1918. Later, Lot 26 was
sold to Francisco Gonzalez (Gonzalez), which resulted in the cancellation of TCT No. 4211
and its replacement by TCT No. 5261, registered under the name of Gonzalez. 5
Upon Gonzalez's death, TCT No. 5261 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 35486,
registered under the name of his surviving spouse Rufina Narciso Vda. De Gonzalez. The
land covered by TCT No. 35486 was subdivided into seven (7) lots under subdivision plan
Psd-21154. By virtue of Psd-21154, TCT No. 35486 was cancelled and seven (7) new titles
were issued, TCTs No. 1368 to No. 1374, registered under the children of Gonzalez.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The properties in dispute were formerly part of the notorious Maysilo Estate left by Gonzalo
Tuason, the vastness of which measures 1,660.26 hectares, stretching across Caloocan City,
Valenzuela, and Malabon, covered by five (5) mother titles or Original Certificate of Title
(OCT). One of the mother titles is OCT No. 994, the mother title in dispute. Later on, smaller
lots forming part of the Maysilo Estate were sold to different persons. Several subsequent
subdivisions, consolidations, and one expropriation of the Estate, spawned numerous legal
disputes, living-up to the name "Land of caveat Emptor" 1 one of these disputed lots was lot 26,
the property subject of this litigation.
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari are the Decision 2 and Resolution3 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 53770 dated 18 June 2003 and 28 October 2003, respectively,
which annulled petitioner CLT Realty Development Corporation's (CLT) TCT No. T-177013 and
affirmed Hi-Grade Feeds Corporation's (Hi-Grade) TCTs No. 237450 and No. T-146941.
The conflict arose due to an overlapping of the properties of CL T and Hi-Grade, which
prompted CL T to file a case for Annulment of Transfer Certificates of Title, Recovery of
Possession, and Damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch
121, docketed as Civil Case No. C-15463 against Hi-Grade.
Version of Hi-Grade
Respondent Hi-Grade is the registered owner of two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos.
237450 and T-146941, derived from TCT No. 4211 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of
Rizal, registered under the names of Alejandro Ruiz (Ruiz) and Mariano Leuterio (Leuterio ),
which is a derivative title of OCT No. 994, the mother title. 4
Page 1 of 75
In 194 7, the Government expropriated the seven lots. 6 By virtue of the expropriation, TCTs
No. 1368 to No. 1374 were cancelled and replaced by TCTs No. 12836 to No. 12842.
Afterwards, by virtue of Consolidated Subdivision Plan Psd (LRC) Pcd-1828, the Government
consolidated the titles and then further subdivided the property into 77 lots.
One of the 77 lots was registered in the name of Benito Villanueva under TCTs No. 23027 to
No. 23028, which was further subdivided into Lot-A and 17-B, pursuant to subdivision plan
Psd-276839. One of the properties in dispute is Lot 17-B, which was later on registered in the
name of Jose Madulid, Sr. (Madulid, Sr.), under TCT No. C-32979, which was later on sold to
Hi-Grade.
Another lot resulting from the Government's consolidation and subdivision of the Maysilo
Estate into 77 lots, is Lot No. 52, which was registered in the name of Inocencio Alvarez
(Alvarez) under TCT No. 7363. Soon after, Alvarez sold Lot No. 52 to Madulid, Sr. TCT No.
7363 was cancelled and TCT No. 7364 was issued to Madulid, Sr. Afterwards, Madulid, Sr.
sold the lot to Hi-Grade. This is another one of the properties in dispute.
As a review, first, Hi-Grade traces its title to TCTs No. 7364 and No. C-32979, which were
registered in the name Madulid, Sr., which in tum stemmed from TCT Nos. 36557-63/T-460.
TCT Nos. 36557-63/T-460 were derived from TCTs No. 1368 to No. 1374.
TCTs No. 1368 to No. 1374 stemmed from TCT No. 35486, which was subdivided into
smaller lots.
TCT No. 35486 was derived from TCT No. 5261.
TCT No. 5261 stemmed from TCT No. 4211.

Finally, TCT No. 4211 was derived from OCT No. 994, the mother title.
Version of CLT
CLT is the registered owner of TCT No. T-177013, by virtue ofa Deed of Absolute Sale with
Real Estate Mortgage dated 10 December 1988, executed by the former registered owner,
Estelita I. Hipolito.
CLT argued that Hi-Grade's title is null and void for being fake and spurious based on the
following:
1. As shown in the face of TCT No. 4211, it purports to have been derived from OCT
No. 994;
2. The original copy of OCT No. 994, which is existing and in due form, on file with the
Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City, contains dilapidated pages and no longer
contains the pages where Lot No. 26 and some other lots are supposedly inscribed.
3. Upon examination of the original copy of OCT No. 994, it can be seen that the
technical descriptions of the lots and the certificate itself are entirely written in the
English language. On the other hand, the technical descriptions on the alleged TCTs
No. 4211, No. 5261, and No. 35486 are still inscribed in the Spanish language.
4. The dates of the original survey of OCT No. 994, the mother title of TCT No. 4211,
i.e., 8-27 September, 4-21 October and 17-18 November 1911, are not indicated on
TCTs No. 4211, No. 5261, and No. 35486. Rather, an entirely different date, 22
December 1917, is indicated at the end of the Spanish technical descriptions on the
alleged TCTs No. 4211, No. 5261, and No. 35486.
Plan Psd-21154. Said EDPS listings indicate those records which were surveyed after
the Second World War. It appears, from TCTs No. 1368 to No. 1374, plan PSD-21154
was done after the war on 15, 21, 29 September and 5-6 October 1946.
8. The technical descriptions inscribed on TCTs No. 1368 to No. 1374 show that the
tie points deviated from the mother lot's tie point, which is the Bureau of Lands
Location Monument ("BLLM") No. 1, Caloocan. Instead, different location monuments
of the adjoining Piedad Estate were used. The tie point used in TCT No. 1368 is B.M.
10, Piedad Estate; while TCTs No. 1369 and No. 1470 used B.M. No. 8, Piedad
Estate; and TCTs No. 1371, No. 1372, No. 1373, and No. 1374 used B.M. No. 7,
Piedad Estate. The changing tie points resulted in the shifting of the position of the
seven lots in relation to the mother lot, using their technical descriptions inscribed on
the face of the titles. Thus, when plotted, the seven lots do not fall exactly inside the
boundary of the mother lot. The same is true when the lots described on the titles of
Hi-Grade are plotted on the basis of their technical descriptions inscribed on the titles.
9. TCT No. 4211 contains patent infirmities, inconsistencies, and irregularities
indicating that it is a falsified document representing a fictitious title and is, therefore,
null and void. The fact was confirmed by an examination by the Forensic Chemistry
Division of the National Bureau of Investigation, which concluded that TCT No. 4211
was prepared only sometime in the 1940s and not in 1918, as it is made to appear on
the face of the document. Thus, the series of titles from where Hi-Grade's titles were
derived, starting from TCTs No. 4211, No. 5261, and No. 35486, and up to and
including the titles of HiGrade, are also necessarily null and void.
6. There is no subdivision survey plan number indicated on TCTs No. 4211, No. 5261,
and No. 35486 covering the subdivision of Lot No. 26 of the Maysilo Estate.
During trial, CL T presented the following witnesses: (1) Ramon Velazquez (Velazquez),
Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Records Section, Records Management Division of the LMB,
who testified that the LMB does not have a copy of Psd 21154; (2) Norberto Vasquez, Jr.
(Vasquez), Deputy Register of Deeds of Caloocan City, who identified the various titles
relevant to the case; (3) Juanita Bustalino (Bustalino), a licensed Geodetic Engineer, who
testified that CL T engaged his services to survey the subject property and discovered that
there was an overlap between CLT's and HiGrade's titles; (4) Atty. Rafael Antonio M. Santos,
one of the counsel of CLT; and (5) Aida R. Villora-Magsipoc, a Forensic Chemist of the
Forensic Division, National Bureau of Investigation, who examined the titles as an expert
witness.
7. The plan Psd-21154 which subdivided the lot covered by TCT No. 35486 (formerly
covered by TCT No. 4211, then TCT No. 5261), could not be traced at the official
depository of plans, which is the Lands Management Bureau (LMB). According to the
EDPS Listings of the Records Management Division of the LMB, there is no record of
On the other hand, Hi-Grade presented its sole witness, Atty. Jose Madulid, counsel for and
stockholder of Hi-Grade, and son of Hi-Grade's predecessor, Jose Madulid, Sr., who testified
that his family has been occupying the subject properties under the concept of an owner for
more than twenty-seven (27) years, until the properties were transferred to HiGrade.
5. The parcel of land covered successively by TCTs No. 4211, No. 5261, and No.
35486 is not identified by a lot number and there is no reference or mention of Lot No.
26 of the Maysilo Estate in the technical description of said titles.
Page 2 of 75

The Ruling of the RTC
After trial, the RTC7 ruled in favor of CLT. According to the RTC, Hi-Grade's title, the older title,
cannot prevail over CLT's title because it suffers from patent defects and infirmities. Although
Hi-Grade paid realty taxes on the subject properties, it is not considered as a conclusive proof
of ownership. The dispositive portion of the Decision of the RTC dated 27 December 1995
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and by preponderance of evidence, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiff CL T REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP. and against
defendants HI-GRADE FEEDS CORP. et. al., ordering
1. TCT Nos. 237450 and 146941 in the name of the defendant null and void and
accordingly ordering their cancellation;
2. defendant to vacate the portion of Lot No. 26 presently occupied by it and turn over
possession of the same to the plaintiff; and
3. defendant to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.8
Aggrieved, Hi-Grade filed a Motion for New Trial and/or Reconsideration on the grounds of
newly discovered evidence and serious and patent errors in the court's appreciation of
evidence and factual findings based on the decision of the court in Civil Case No. C-15491,
entitled "CLT v. Sta. Nino Kapitbahayan Association. " The R TC denied the motion for utter
lack of merit. According to the RTC, the ruling in favor of Hi-Grade in Sta. Nino is not a newlydiscovered evidence, as Hi-Grade could not have failed to produce such evidence if it
exercised reasonable diligence. HiGrade' s reliance in the aforesaid case is already moot and
academic as the court in Sta. Nino already reconsidered its decision and upheld the validity of
CL T's title.
Appeals granted the motion in a Resolution 9 dated 31 August 1998. Included in the
Resolution, however, is a statement that although the Court of Appeals takes judicial notice of
the Senate Report, the Court of Appeals is not bound by the findings and Conclusions
therein. .10
In the meantime, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the Republic and in
representation of the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority, filed a Petition for
Intervention dated 25 August 1998. The OSG averred that its intervention is indispensable as
it is pursuant to its duty to preserve the integrity of the Torrens system of registration and to
protect the Assurance Fund, in connection with which it can initiate necessary actions for the
annulment of titles irregularly and fraudulently issued. The Court of Appeals granted the OSG
motion. The Court of Appeals resolved the issue on intervention in the appealed Decision
dated 18 June 2003. According to the Court of Appeals, due to the magnitude and significance
that will affect the stability and integrity of the Torrens system, the State has sufficient interest
in the case.
Departing from the trial court's findings of fact, the Court of Appeals ruled as baseless the trial
court's reliance on the testimonies of CL T's witnesses, Vasquez and Bustalino, on the alleged
patent infirmities and defects in TCT No. 4211. According to the Court of Appeals, Vasquez
and Bustalino never testified that the issuance of TCT No. 4211 failed to conform to the
registration procedures in 1917, the year it was issued. Also, Vasquez and Bustalino are
incompetent to testify on the customary practices in land registration at that time. Reversing
the Decision of the RTC, the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new
one entered DISMISSING CLT's complaint a quo and upholding the validity of TCT Nos.
237450 and T-146941 of appellant Hi-Grade Feeds Corporation.
Appellant CL T is further ordered to surrender its owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. T-177013
to the Registrar of Deeds of Caloocan City who is hereby directed to effect its cancellation.
The other incidents are resolved as above indicated.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

No pronouncements as to costs.
Impelled by the adverse ruling of the RTC, Hi-Grade elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals. During the pendency of the appeal, Hi-Grade filed a Motion to Admit and Take
Judicial Notice of Committee Report on Senate
Inquiry into Maysilo Estate Submitted by the Committees on Justice and Human Rights and on
Urban Planning, Housing and Resettlement (Senate Report) on 1 July 1998. The Court of
Page 3 of 75
SO ORDERED.11
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari. In addition to the factual issues raised in
the trial court, the Petition raised the following arguments:

I. The Court of Appeals went beyond the issues resolved by the trial court and
formulated its own issue regarding the date when OCT No. 994 was originally
registered which it resolved on the basis of extraneous purported evidence not
presented before the trial court in the instant case, in violation of petitioner CLT Realty'
process of law.
II. The Court of Appeals perfunctorily, arbitrarily and blindly disregarded the findings of
fact and conclusions of the trial court arrived at after a careful evaluation of the
evidence presented by the parties and established on record and substituted and
supplanted the same with its own conclusions based on extraneous evidence not
presented and admitted in evidence before the trial court.
Issues
I.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it took judicial notice of
the Senate Report
II.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it admitted the Office
of the Solicitor General's Petition for Intervention
III. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court despite the fact that
respondent Hi-Grade has failed to present evidence to refute the established fact that
the alleged titles from where its alleged titles are derived from, i.e., the alleged TCT
Nos. 4211, 5261, 35486 and 1368 to 1374, contain patent and inherent technical
defects and infirmities which render them spurious, void and ineffective.
III.
IV. The Court of Appeals unjustly made a wholesale rendition in its questioned
decision despite the pendency of important prejudicial motions or incidents which it
thereby either peremptorily resolved or rendered moot and academic, thus, violating
petitioner CL T Realty's right to due process of law.
First, the incidental matters.
V. The Court of Appeals totally disregarded the rules on evidence and surrendered the
independence of the judiciary by giving full faith and credence to the findings and
conclusions contained in the Senate Committee Report No. 1031 by taking judicial
notice of the same, which report was rendered pursuant to proceedings initia
conducted without notice to petitioner CL T Realty and thus in gross violation of its
right to due process, and was based on documents that were never authenticated.
VI. The Court of Appeals erroneously relied on the allegation raised in the Republic's
petitioner for intervention although the State has no legal interest in the subject matter
of the litigation of the instant case and may not validly intervene in the instant case
since the matter in litigation are admittedly privately owned lands which will not revert
to the Republic.
VII. The Court of Appeals blindly ignored the fact and worse, failed and refused to rule
on the issue that respondent Hi-Grade is guilty of forum-shopping for which reason
the latter's appeal before the Court of Appeals should have been dismissed. 12
Page 4 of 75
Which of the OCTs 994, that dated 19 April 1917 or that dated 3 May 191 7, is the valid title?
Our Ruling
I.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it took judicial notice of
the Senate Report CL T avers that taking judicial notice of the Senate Report is a violation of
the Rules of Court and CLT's right to due process. First, the Senate Report is inadmissible and
should not be given any probative value because it was obtained in violation of Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court, considering that the Senate Report is unauthenticated and is thus deemed
hearsay evidence. Contrary to the mandatory procedure under Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
which requires examination of documentary and testimonial evidence, the Senate Report was
not put to proof and CL T was deprived of the opportunity to conduct a cross-examination on
the Senate Report. And it is also contended that the right of CL T to due process was violated
because the proceedings in the Senate were conducted without notice to CLT. Finally, the
admission in evidence of the Senate Report violated the time-honored principle of separation
of powers as it is an encroachment into the jurisdiction exclusive to the courts.
CL T misses the point. Taking judicial notice of acts of the Senate is well within the ambit of the
law. Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides:
SECTION 1 . Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice, without the
introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history,

forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime
courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the
official acts of legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of
nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions. (la) (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on
without proof because these facts are already known to them; 13 it is the duty of the court to
assume something as a matter of fact without need of further evidentiary support. 14 Otherwise
stated, by the taking of judicial notice, the court dispenses with the traditional form of
presentation of evidence, i.e. the rigorous rules of evidence and court procee dm. gs sue h as
cross-exami.n ati.o n.15
However, the question of the binding effect of that Report upon this Court is altogether a
different matter. Certainly, a determination by any branch of government on a justiciable matter
which is properly before this Court for adjudication does not bind the latter. The finding of the
Senate committees may be the appropriate basis for remedial legislation but when the issue of
the validity of a Torrens title is submitted to a court for resolution, only the latter has the
competence to make such a determination and once final, the same binds not only the parties
but all agencies of government.18
That there is such a document as the Senate Report was all that was conceded by the Court
of Appeals. It did not allow the Senate Report to determine the decision on the case.
II.
The Senate Report, an official act of the legislative department, may be taken judicial notice
of.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it admitted the Office
of the Solicitor General's Petition for Intervention
CL T posits that the Court of Appeals violated the time-honored principle of separation of
powers when it took judicial notice of the Senate Report. This contention is baseless. We adoft
the pronouncements of this Court in Angeles v. The Secretary of Justice:16
The Republic maintains that the proliferation of spurious or fake titles covering the infamous
Maysilo Estate poses a serious threat to the integrity of the Torrens system and the Assurance
Fund. The Republic asserts that because it is bound to safeguard and protect the integrity of
the Torrens system and Assurance Fund, it is duty-bound to intervene in the present case. In
granting the intervention, the Court of Appeals ruled that considering the magnitude and
significance of the issues spawned by the Maysilo Estate, enough to affect the stability and
integrity of the Torrens system, the Republic is allowed to intervene.
To be sure, this Court did not merely rely on the DOJ and Senate reports regarding OCT No.
994. In the 2007 Manotok case, this Court constituted a Special Division of the Court of
Appeals to hear the cases on remand, declaring as follows:
Since this Court is not a trier of fact[s], we are not prepared to adopt the findings made by the
DOJ and the Senate, or even consider whether these are admissible as evidence, though
such questions may be considered by the Court of Appeals upon the initiative of the parties. x
x x The reports cannot conclusively supersede or overturn judicial decisions, but if admissible
they may be taken into account as evidence on the same level as the other pieces of evidence
submitted by the parties. The fact that they were rendered by the DOJ and the Senate should
not, in itself, persuade the courts to accept them without inquiry. The facts and arguments
presented in the reports must still undergo judicial scrutiny and analysis, and certainly the
courts will have the discretion to accept or reject them. 17 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
CLT, on the other hand, contends that the Republic's intervention is baseless. According to CL
T, the Republic has no legal interest in the properties as the subject properties are not public
lands and as such, will not revert to the Republic. Further, there is no threat or claim against
the Assurance Fund. Anchoring on Presidential Decree No. 478 and Administrative Code of
1987, CL T claims that the only action which the Office of the Solicitor General may file on
behalf of the Republic in connection with registered lands is an action for the reversion to the
Government of lands of the public domain and improvements thereon, as well as lands held in
violation of the Constitution.19
Thus, the Senate Report shall not be conclusive upon the courts, but will be examined and
evaluated based on its probative value. The Court of Appeals explained quite pointedly why
the taking of judicial notice of the Senate Report does not violate the republican principle.
Thus:
Intervention is only allowed before or during trial. Citing Sps. Oliva v. CA, 20 CLT argues that
the Petition for Intervention was time-barred for having been filed beyond the period
prescribed in Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, i.e., before rendition of judgment. In
Oliva, the Court clarified that intervention is unallowable when the case has already been
submitted for decision, when judgment has been rendered, or when judgment has already
Page 5 of 75
This time, we agree with CLT.

became final and executory. And, intervention is only allowed when the intervenors are
indispensable parties.
Although we are cognizant of the exception that the Court may wield its power to suspend its
own rules and procedure in lieu of substantial justice and for compelling reasons, 21 the
attendant circumstances are not availing in the present case.
Parenthetically, although the general rule is that the factual findings of the trial court are
accorded respect and are not generally disturbed on appeal, the aforesaid rule does not apply
in the case at bar, as the findings of the trial court and the appellate court are contradictory.24
We shall now discuss the bottom issues.
III.
The Republic is not an indispensable party in the instant litigation. An indispensable party is a
party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action, and who shall
be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. 22 Here, even without the Republic as participant, a
final determination of the issues can be attained.
Anent the opportuness of intervention, the Court held in Carino v. Ofilada 23 that it may be
allowed only before or during trial. The term trial is used in its restricted sense, i.e., the period
for the introduction of evidence by both parties. The period of trial terminates when the
judgment begins. As this case was already in its appeal stage when intervention was sought, it
could no longer be allowed.
CL T further avers that because there was no claim against the Assurance Fund, intervention
is improper. Section 95 of P.D. 1529 provides for the grounds when a party can claim against
the Assurance Fund:
Section 95. Action for compensation from funds. A person who, without negligence on his part,
sustains loss or damage, or is deprived of land or any estate or interest therein in
consequence of the bringing of the land under the operation of the Torrens system of arising
after original registration of land, through fraud or in consequence of any error, omission,
mistake or misdescription in any certificate of title or in any entry or memorandum in the
registration book, and who by the provisions of this Decree is barred or otherwise precluded
under the provision of any law from bringing an action for the recovery of such land or the
estate or interest therein, may bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction for the
recovery of damages to be paid out of the Assurance Fund.
Indeed, whatever party is favored in this case, the losing party may file a claim against the
Assurance Fund as the present case involves the operation of the Torrens system. However,
the action to claim against the Assurance Fund may be dealt with in a separate proceeding.
Now, the merits of this case.
Page 6 of 75
Which of the OCTs 994, that dated 19 April 1917 or that dated 3 May 1917, is the valid title?
The mother title, OCT 994
The arguments of the parties come from apparently the same document. Notably, however,
the parties' OCTs No. 994 contain different dates of registration, namely:
CLT's OCT No. 994 is dated 19 April 1917
Hi-Grade's OCT No. 994 is dated 3 May 1917
A title can only have one date of registration, as there can only be one title covering the same
property. The date of registration is reckoned from the time of the title's transcription in the
record book of the Registry of Deeds.25Therefore, the date appearing on the face of a title
refers to the date of issuance of the decree of registration, as provided in Sections 41and42 of
the Land Registration Act or Section 40 of the P.D. 1529:
Section 41. Immediately upon the entry of the decree of registration the clerk shall send a
certified copy thereof, under the seal of the court to the register of deeds for the province, or
provinces or city in which the land lies, and the register of deeds shall transcribe the decree in
a book to be called the "Registration Book," in which a leaf, or leaves, in consecutive order,
shall be devoted exclusively to each title. The entry made by the register of deeds in this book
in each case shall be the original certificate of title, and shall be signed by him and sealed with
the seal of the court. x x x
Section 42. The certificate first registered in pursuance of the decree of registration in regard
to any parcel of land shall be entitled in the registration book, "original certificate of title,
entered pursuant to decree of the Court of Land Registration, dated at" (stating the time and
place of entry of decree and the number of case). This certificate shall take effect upon the
date of the transcription of the decree. Subsequent certificates relating to the same land shall
be in like form, but shall be entitled "Transfer from number" (the number of the next previous

certificate relating to the same land), and also the words "Originally registered" (date, volume,
and page of registration). (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Based on Decree No. 36455 in Land Registration Case No. 4429, the decree registering OCT
No. 994, the date of the issuance is 19 April 1917 while on the other hand, OCT No. 994 was
received for transcription by the Register of Deeds on 3 May 1917. In this case, the date which
should be reckoned as the date of registration of the title is the date when the mother title was
received for transcription, 3 May 1917. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals:
For sure, the very copy of OCT No. 994, presented by Appellee CL T no less and marked as
its Exhibit "D'', shows on its face that the date April 19, 191 7 refers to the issuance of the
decree of registration by the Honorable Norberto Romualdez, while May 3, 191 7 pertains to
the date when the same decree was "Received for transcription in the Office of the Register of
Deeds.26
Therefore, as the date of transcription in the record book of the Registry of Deeds is 3 May
1917, we rule that the genuine title is the title of Hi-Grade.
The derivative title, TCT No. 4211
As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, CL T failed to prove by preponderance of evidence,
the alleged defects and infirmities in TCT No. 4211, the title from whence Hi-Grade's titles
were derived.
CLT failed to prove that TCT No. 4211 did not conform to the registration procedures at the
time it was prepared. Contrary to the findings of the trial court, the Court cannot give credence
to the testimony of CL T's witnesses, Vasquez 27 and Bustalino.28 Vasquez is the Deputy
Register of Deeds of Caloocan City, while Bustalino is a Geodetic Engineer. For their
testimonies to matter, CL T must first establish their competence as regards the registration
rules in land registration in 1918, at the time TCT No. 4211 was prepared. CL T failed to
discharge such burden.
On CLT's allegation that the Lands Management Bureau (LMB) has no records of Psd 21154,
we note that CL T did not prove that the LMB indeed has no such records. CL T's witness,
Velasquez, merely testified that
he cannot ascertain whether or not Psd 21154 was burned or lost during the world war. 29 Just
as important, while Psd 21154 could not be located, it was not only testified to that it may have
been lost or burned during the world war; a blue print copy of the same is being kept in the
vault of the Register of Deeds of Pasig City.
Page 7 of 75
As regards the findings of the NBI Forensic Chemist on the age of TCT No. 4211, the Court of
Appeals correctly found that such findings are inconclusive because the Chemist did not
conclusively state that TCT No. 4211 could not have been prepared in 1918. 30 Also, the
Chemist, in her cross-examination, admitted that she did not know who supplied her copies of
the TCTs and that she has not seen any standard document dated 1918. 31
On the matter regarding the discrepancy between the dates of survey and issuance, tie points,
and language used in TCT No. 4211 and OCT No. 994, CL T's contention must fail for the
obvious reason that the basis of CLT's allegation is the non-existent mother title, OCT No. 994
dated 19 April 1917. Thus, as OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 has been established as null
and void, it cannot serve as precedent for ascertaining the genuineness ofTCT No. 4211.
What matters most in this case is that CL T questioned the title of HiGrade for the purpose of
having CL T's own title upheld. Instead of establishing the genuineness of its own title, CLT
attacked Hi-Grade's titles.
However, CL T failed to establish the chain of titles linking its TCT No. T- 177013 to the mother
title, OCT No. 994. It failed to prove the "circumstances under which its predecessor-ininterest acquired the whole of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate. Ironically, it is even by CL T's
presentation of OCT No. 994 and of the succession of titles previous to those held by
appellant Hi-Grade that the latter's titles [was] established as genuine derivative titles of OCT
No. 994."32
Indeed, CL T's evidence must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw
strength from the alleged weakness of the evidence of Hi-Grade.1avvphi1 As already shown,
such allegation was proven wrong by documents on records.
As opposed to CLT's evidence on the alleged infirmities in HiGrade's titles, Hi-Grade
presented muniments of title, tax declarations or realty tax payments, on the subject
properties.33 While tax declarations and receipts are inconclusive evidence of ownership or of
the right to possess land, they are prima facie proof of ownership or possession and may
become the basis of a claim for ownership when it is coupled with proof of actual possession
of the property.34 In the case at bar, Hi-Grade is the actual possessor of the subject property.35
To sum up, Hi-Grade was able to establish the chain of titles linking its titles, TCTs No. 237450
and T-14691, to the derivative title, TCT No. 4211, to the mother title, OCT No. 994. 36 As borne
by the records, TCT No. 4211 was registered as a derivative title of OCT No. 994 on 9
September 1918.37 On the other hand, CLT's title, TCT No. R-17994, 38 was registered also as
a derivative title of OCT No. 994 only on 12 September 1978. Thus, the reference of both

parties is OCT No. 994, but with different dates: CLT's OCT No. 994 is dated 19 April 1917,
while Hi-Grade's OCT No. 994 is dated 3 May 1917.
This factual issue of which OCT No. 994 is genuine is not a novel matter. This Court, in
Angeles v. The Secretary of Justice, 39 citing Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development
Corporation,40 exhaustively passed upon and ruled that the true and valid OCT No. 994 was
dated 3 May 1917, not 19 April 1917.
In the recent case of Syjuco v. Republic of the Philippines, 41 this Court, reiterated the rulings in
Angeles v. The Secretary of Justice 42 and Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development
Corporation, that the true and valid OCT No. 994 was registered on 3 May 1917, not on 19
April 1917, and that any title that traces its source from OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 191 7, is
deemed void and inexistent.43
As we have priorly pronounced, any title that traces its source to a void title, is also void. The
spring cannot rise higher than its source. Nemo potest plus Juris ad alium transferre quam
ipse habet. All titles that trace its source to OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917, are therefore
void, for such mother title is inexistent. 44 CLT so traces its title to OCT No. 994 dated 19 April
191 7, the title of CL T is void.45
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 53770, entitled "CLT Realty Development Corporation v. HiGrade Feeds Corporation, Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District III " dated 18 June 2003
and 28 October 2003, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE
Associate Justice
Page 8 of 75
PORTUGAL
PEREZ
G.R. No. 152375
December 16, 2011
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (FOURTH DIVISION), JOSE L. AFRICA (substituted by his heirs),
MANUEL H. NIETO, JR., FERDINAND E. MARCOS (substituted by his heirs), IMELDA R.
MARCOS, FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., JUAN PONCE ENRILE, and POTENCIANO
ILUSORIO (substituted by his heirs), Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is the petition for certiorari1 filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner) to set
aside the February 7, 2002 resolution (2002 resolution) 2 of the Sandiganbayan3 denying the
petitioners Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice V.
Bane) (3rd motion).
THE ANTECEDENTS
On July 22, 1987, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed a complaint (docketed as Civil Case No.
0009) against Jose L. Africa, Manuel H. Nieto, Jr., Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos,
Ferdinand
R.
Marcos,
Jr.,
Juan
Ponce
Enrile,
and
Potenciano
Ilusorio
(collectively, the respondents) for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and
damages before the Sandiganbayan. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the respondents
illegally manipulated the purchase of the major shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited in
Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), which shareholdings respondents Jose
Africa and Manuel Nieto, Jr. held for themselves and, through their holdings and the
corporations they organized, beneficially for respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R.
Marcos.4
Civil Case No. 0009 is the main case subject of the present petition. Victor Africa (Africa), son
of the late Jose L. Africa, was not impleaded in and so is plainly not a party to Civil Case No.
0009.5
Civil Case No. 0009 spawned numerous incidental cases, 6 among them, Civil Case No.
0130.7 The present respondents were not made parties either in Civil Case No. 0130.
I. Civil Case No. 0130
In the August 7, 1991 PCGG-conducted ETPI stockholders meeting, a PCGG-controlled board
of directors was elected. Later, the registered ETPI stockholders convened a special
stockholders meeting wherein another set of board of directors was elected. As a result, two
sets of ETPI board and officers were elected.8
Page 9 of 75
Thereafter, Africa, as an ETPI stockholder, filed a petition for certiorari, with prayer for a
temporary restraining order/preliminary injunction with the Sandiganbayan (docketed as Civil
Case No. 0130), seeking to nullify the August 5, 1991 and August 9, 1991 Orders of the
PCGG. These Orders directed Africa:
[T]o account for his sequestered shares in ETPI and to cease and desist from exercising
voting rights on the sequestered shares in the special stockholders meeting to be held on
August 12, 1991, from representing himself as a director, officer, employee or agent of ETPI,
and from participating, directly or indirectly[,] in the management of ETPI. 9
During the pendency of Africas petition, Civil Case No. 0130, Africa filed a motion with the
Sandiganbayan, alleging that since January 29, 1988 the PCGG had been "illegally
exercising the rights of stockholders of ETPI," 10 especially in the election of the members of
the board of directors. Africa prayed for the issuance of an order for the "calling and holding of
[ETPI] annual stockholders meeting for 1992 under the [c]ourts control and supervision and
prescribed guidelines."11
In its November 13, 1992 resolution, the Sandiganbayan favored Africas motion in this wise:
WHEREFORE, it is ordered that an annual stockholders meeting of the [ETPI], for 1992 be
held on Friday, November 27, 1992, at 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, at the ETPI Board Room,
Telecoms Plaza, 7th Floor, 316 Gil J. Puyat Avenue, Makati, Metro Manila. x x x The
stockholders meeting shall be conducted under the supervision and control of this Court,
through Mr. Justice Sabino R. de Leon, Jr. [O]nly the registered owners, their duly authorized
representatives or their proxies may vote their corresponding shares.
The following minimum safeguards must be set in place and carefully maintained until final
judicial resolution of the question of whether or not the sequestered shares of stock (or in a
proper case the underlying assets of the corporation concerned) constitute ill-gotten wealth[.] 12
The PCGG assailed this resolution before this Court via a petition for certiorari docketed as
G.R. No. 10778913(PCGGs petition), imputing grave abuse of discretion on the
Sandiganbayan for holding, inter alia, that the registered stockholders of ETPI had the right to
vote.14 In our November 26, 1992 Resolution, we enjoined the Sandiganbayan from
implementing its assailed resolution.
In the meantime, in an April 12, 1993 resolution, the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation
of Civil Case No. 0130, among others, with Civil Case No. 0009, with the latter as the main
case and the former merely an incident.15
During the pendency of PCGGs petition (G.R. No. 107789), the PCGG filed with this Court a
"Very Urgent Petition for Authority to Hold Special Stockholders Meeting for [the] Sole
Purpose of Increasing [ETPIs] Authorized Capital Stock" (Urgent Petition). In our May 7, 1996
Resolution, we referred this Urgent Petition to the Sandiganbayan for reception of evidence
and immediate resolution.16 The Sandiganbayan included the Urgent Petition in Civil Case No.
0130.17

In the proceedings to resolve the Urgent Petition, the testimony of Mr. Maurice V. Bane (former
director and treasurer-in-trust of ETPI) was taken at the petitioners instance and after
serving notice of the deposition-taking on the respondents 18 on October 23 and 24, 1996 by
way of deposition upon oral examination (Bane deposition) before Consul General Ernesto
Castro of the Philippine Embassy in London, England.
Invoking Section 1, Rule 24 (of the old Rules of Court), purportedly allowing the petitioner to
depose Bane without leave of court, i.e., as a matter of right after the defendants have filed
their answer, the notice stated that "[t]he purpose of the deposition is for [Bane] to identify and
testify on the facts set forth in his affidavit 19 x x x so as to prove the ownership issue in favor of
[the petitioner] and/or establish the prima facie factual foundation for sequestration of [ETPIs]
Class A stock in support of the [Urgent Petition]." 20 The notice also states that the petitioner
shall use the Bane deposition "in evidence in the main case of Civil Case No. 0009." 21 On
the scheduled deposition date, only Africa was present and he cross-examined Bane.
On December 13, 1996, the Sandiganbayan resolved the Urgent Petition by granting authority
to the PCGG (i) "to cause the holding of a special stockholders meeting of ETPI for the sole
purpose of increasing ETPIs authorized capital stock" and (ii) "to vote therein the sequestered
Class A shares of stock."22 Thus, a special stockholders meeting was held, as previously
scheduled, on March 17, 1997 and the increase in ETPIs authorized capital stock was
"unanimously approved."23 From this ruling, Africa went to this Court via a petition
for certiorari24docketed as G.R. No. 147214 (Africas petition).
We jointly resolved the PCGGs and Africas petitions, and ruled:
This Court notes that, like in Africas motion to hold a stockholders meeting (to elect a board of
directors), the Sandiganbayan, in the PCGGs petition to hold a stockholders meeting (to
amend the articles of incorporation to increase the authorized capital stock), again failed to
apply the two-tiered test. On such determination hinges the validity of the votes cast by the
PCGG in the stockholders meeting of March 17, 1997. This lapse by the Sandiganbayan
leaves this Court with no other choice but to remand these questions to it for proper
determination.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, this Court Resolved to REFER the petitions at bar to the Sandiganbayan for
reception of evidence to determine whether there is a prima facie evidence showing that the
sequestered shares in question are ill-gotten and there is an imminent danger of dissipation to
entitle the PCGG to vote them in a stockholders meeting to elect the ETPI Board of Directors
and to amend the ETPI Articles of Incorporation for the sole purpose of increasing the
authorized capital stock of ETPI.
The Sandiganbayan shall render a decision thereon within sixty (60) days from receipt of this
Resolution and in conformity herewith.
II. Civil Case No. 0009
Page 10 of 75
Although Civil Case No. 0009 was filed on July 22, 1987, it was only on November 29, 1996
and March 17, 1997 that the first pre-trial conference was scheduled and concluded. 25
In its Pre-Trial Brief26 dated August 30, 1996, the petitioner offered to present the following
witnesses:
WITNESSES TO BE PRESENTED AND A BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THEIR TESTIMONIES
(1) Maurice V. Bane representative of Cable and Wireless Limited (C & W) at the time ETPI
was organized.
xxxx
(2) Mr. Manuel H. Nieto x x x
(3) Ms. Evelyn Singson x x x
(4) Mr. Severino P. Buan, Jr. x x x
(5) Mr. Apolinario K. Medina - x x x
(6) Mr. Potenciano A. Roque x x x
(7) Caesar Parlade - x x x
IIa. Motion to Admit the Bane Deposition
At the trial of Civil Case No. 0009, the petitioner filed a Motion27 (1st motion), stating that
1. In the hearings of the incidents of [Civil Case No. 0009], i.e., Civil Case Nos. 0048, 0050,
0130, 014628the following witnesses were presented therein:
a. Cesar O.V. Parlade
b. Maurice Bane
c. Evelyn Singson
d. Leonorio Martinez
e. Ricardo Castro; and
f. Rolando Gapud
2. [The petitioner] wishes to adopt in [Civil Case No. 0009] their testimonies and the
documentary exhibits presented and identified by them, since their testimonies and the said
documentary exhibits are very relevant to prove the case of the [petitioner] in [Civil Case No.
0009].
3. The adverse parties in the aforementioned incidents had the opportunity to cross-examine
them.
The respondents filed their respective Oppositions to the 1st motion; 29 in turn, the petitioner
filed a Common Reply30 to these Oppositions.
On April 1, 1998, the Sandiganbayan 31 promulgated a resolution32 (1998 resolution) denying
the petitioners 1st motion, as follows:
Wherefore, the [petitioners] Motion x x x is

1. partly denied insofar as [the petitioner] prays therein to adopt the testimonies on oral
deposition of Maurice V. Bane and Rolando Gapud as part of its evidence in Civil Case No.
0009 for the reason that said deponents according to the [petitioner] are not available
for cross-examination in this Court by the [respondents]. (emphasis added)
On November 6, 2000 and on several dates thereafter, the respondents separately filed their
respective demurrers to evidence. 36 On the other hand, the petitioner moved for the
reconsideration of the 2000 resolution, but was rebuffed by the Sandiganbayan in its April 3,
2001 resolution37 (2001 resolution).
2. partly Granted, in the interest of speedy disposition of this long pending case, insofar as
plaintiff prays therein to adopt certain/particular testimonies of Cesar O. Parlade, Evelyn
Singson, Leoncio Martinez, and Ricardo Castro and documentary exhibits which said
witnesses have identified in incident Civil Case Nos. xxx 0130 xxx, subject to the following
conditions :
IIc. Motion
to
Admit
Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice Bane)
1. xxx
2. xxx
3. That the said witnesses be presented in this Court so that they can be cross-examined on
their particular testimonies in incident Civil Cases xxx [by the respondents].
IIb. Urgent Motion and/or Request for Judicial Notice
The petitioner did not in any way question the 1998 resolution, and instead made its Formal
Offer of Evidence on December 14, 1999. 33 Significantly, the Bane deposition was not included
as part of its offered exhibits. Rectifying the omission, the petitioner filed an Urgent Motion
and/or Request for Judicial Notice 34 (2nd motion) dated February 21, 2000, with the alternative
prayer that:
1. An order forthwith be issued re-opening the plaintiffs case and setting the same for trial
any day in April 2000 for the sole purpose of introducing additional evidence and limited only
to the marking and offering of the [Bane deposition] which already forms part of the records
and used in Civil Case No. 0130 x x x;
2. In the alternative, x x x the [Sandiganbayan] to take judicial notice of the facts established
by the [Bane deposition], together with the marked exhibits appended thereto. [emphasis ours]
On August 21, 2000, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution 35 (2000 resolution) denying
the petitioners 2nd motion:
Judicial notice is found under Rule 129 which is titled "What Need Not Be Proved." Apparently,
this provision refers to the Courts duty to consider admissions made by the parties in the
pleadings, or in the course of the trial or other proceedings in resolving cases before it. The
duty of the Court is mandatory and in those cases where it is discretionary, the initiative is
upon the Court. Such being the case, the Court finds the Urgent Motion and/or Request for
Judicial Notice as something which need not be acted upon as the same is considered
redundant.
On the matter of the [Bane deposition], [its] admission is done through the ordinary formal
offer of exhibits wherein the defendant is given ample opportunity to raise objection on
grounds provided by law. Definitely, it is not under Article (sic) 129 on judicial notice.
[Emphasis ours]
Page 11 of 75
Supplemental
Offer
of
On November 16, 2001, the petitioner filed its 3rd Motion, seeking once more the admission of
the Bane deposition.38 On February 7, 2002 (pending resolution of the respondents demurrers
to evidence),39 the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed 2002 resolution, 40 denying the
petitioners 3rd motion. The Sandiganbayan ruled:
But in the courts view, it is not really a question of whether or not plaintiff has already rested
its case as to obviate the further presentation of evidence. It is not even a question of whether
the non-appearing defendants are deemed to have waived their right to cross-examine Bane
as to qualify the admission of the deposition sans such cross-examination. Indeed, We do not
see any need to dwell on these matters in view of this Courts Resolution rendered on April 1,
1998 which already denied the introduction in evidence of Banes deposition and which has
become final in view of plaintiffs failure to file any motion for reconsideration or appeal
within the 15-day reglementary period. Rightly or wrongly, the resolution stands and for this
court to grant plaintiffs motion at this point in time would in effect sanction plaintiffs disregard
for the rules of procedure. Plaintiff has slept on its rights for almost two years and it was only
in February of 2000 that it sought to rectify its ineptitude by filing a motion to reopen its case
as to enable it to introduce and offer Banes deposition as additional evidence, or in the
alternative for the court to take judicial notice of the allegations of the deposition. But how can
such a motion be granted when it has been resolved as early as 1998 that the deposition is
inadmissible. Without plaintiff having moved for reconsideration within the reglementary
period, the resolution has attained finality and its effect cannot be undone by the simple
expedient of filing a motion, which though purporting to be a novel motion, is in reality a
motion for reconsideration of this courts 1998 ruling. [emphases ours]
The resolution triggered the filing of the present petition.
THE PETITION
The petitioner filed the present petition claiming that the Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion:
I.
x x x IN HOLDING THAT ITS INTERLOCUTORY ORDER IN 1998 HAD BECOME FINAL.
II.
x x x IN x x x REFUSING TO ADMIT THE BANE DEPOSITION WHICH WAS ALREADY
ADMITTED AS EVIDENCE IN AN INCIDENT CASE (CIVIL CASE NO. 0130) AS PART OF
PETITIONERS EVIDENCE IN THE MAIN x x x CASE (CIVIL CASE NO. 0009).

III.
x x x IN REFUSING TO ADMIT A HIGHLY RELEVANT AND IMPORTANT PIECE OF
EVIDENCE FOR THE PETITIONER ON THE BASIS OF FLIMSY AND TENUOUS
TECHNICAL GROUNDS.
The petitioner41 argues that the 1998 resolution of the Sandiganbayan is merely an
interlocutory order; thus, the petitioners failure to question this 1998 resolution could not have
given it a character of "finality" so long as the main case remains pending. 42 On this basis, the
petitioner concludes that the Sandiganbayans denial of its 3rd motion was plainly tainted with
grave abuse of discretion.
On the issue of the Sandiganbayans refusal (in its 2002 resolution) either to take judicial
notice of or to admit the Bane deposition as part of its evidence, the petitioner asserts that
Civil Case No. 0130 (where the Bane deposition was originally taken, introduced and admitted
in evidence) is but a "child" of the "parent" case, Civil Case No. 0009; under this relationship,
evidence offered and admitted in any of the "children" cases should be considered as
evidence in the "parent" case.
Lastly, the petitioner claims that given the crucial importance of the Bane deposition, the
Sandiganbayan should not have denied its admission on "flimsy grounds," considering that:
1. It was also already stated in the notice (of the taking of the Bane deposition) that it would be
used as evidence in Civil Case No. 0009. Notices having been duly served on all the parties
concerned, they must accordingly be deemed to have waived their right to cross-examine the
witness when they failed to show up.
2. The Bane deposition was a very vital cog in the case of the petitioner relative to its
allegation that the respondents interest in ETPI and related firms properly belongs to the
government.
3. The non-inclusion of the Bane deposition in the petitioners formal offer of evidence was
obviously excusable considering the period that had lapsed from the time the case was filed
and the voluminous records that the present case has generated. 43
THE
RESPONDENTS
and THE PETITIONERS REPLY
COMMENTS
In the respondents Comments44 (filed in compliance with our Resolution of April 10, 2002 45 ),
they claim that the present petition was filed out of time - i.e., beyond the 60-day reglementary
period prescribed under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 46 This assertion proceeds
from the view that the petitioners 3rd motion, being a mere rehash of similar motions earlier
filed by the petitioner, likewise simply assails the Sandiganbayans 1998 resolution. Along the
same line, they posit that the petitioners 3rd motion actually partakes of a proscribed third
motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayans 1998 resolution. 47 They likewise assert, on
the assumption that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory in character, that the petitioners failure
to contest the resolution by way of certiorari within the proper period gave the 1998 resolution
a character of "finality."
The respondents further claim that after a party has rested its case, the admission of a
supplemental offer of evidence requires the reopening of the case at the discretion of the trial
court; the Sandiganbayan simply exercised its sound discretion in refusing to reopen the case
since the evidence sought to be admitted was "within the knowledge of the [petitioner] and
available to [it] before [it] rested its case." 48 The respondents also advert to the belated filing of
the petitioners 3rd motion i.e., after the respondents had filed their respective demurrers to
evidence.
On the petitioners claim of waiver, the respondents assert that they have not waived their right
to cross-examine the deponent; the Sandiganbayan recognized this right in its 1998 resolution
and the petitioner never questioned this recognition. They also assert that the allegations in
the Bane deposition cannot be a proper subject of judicial notice under Rule 129 of the Rules
of Court. The respondents lastly submit that the Bane deposition is inadmissible in evidence
because the petitioner failed to comply with the requisites for admission under Section 47,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
In its Reply,49 the petitioner defends the timeliness of the present petition by arguing that a
party may opt to wait out and collect a pattern of questionable acts before resorting to the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari. The petitioner stresses that it filed the 3rd motion precisely
because of the Sandiganbayans 2000 resolution, which held that the admission of the Bane
deposition should be done through the ordinary formal offer of evidence. Thus, the
Sandiganbayan seriously erred in considering the petitioners 3rd motion as a proscribed
motion for reconsideration. The petitioner generally submits that the dictates of substantial
justice should have guided the Sandiganbayan to rule otherwise.
The petitioner also clarifies that it has not yet rested its case although it has filed a formal offer
of evidence. A party normally rests his case only after the admission of the pieces of evidence
he formally offered; before then, he still has the opportunity to present further evidence to
substantiate his theory of the case should the court reject any piece of the offered evidence. 50
The petitioner further maintains that the mere reasonable opportunity to cross-examine the
deponent is sufficient for the admission of the Bane deposition considering that the deponent
is not an ordinary witness who can be easily summoned by our courts in light of his foreign
residence, his citizenship, and his advanced age. The petitioner asserts that Rule 24 (now
Rule 23), and not Section 47, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court should apply to the present
case, as explicitly stated in the notice of the deposition-taking.
To date, respondents Imelda Marcos and the heirs of Potenciano Ilusorio have yet to file their
respective comments on the petition. Given the time that had lapsed since we required their
comments, we resolve to dispense with the filing of these comments and to consider this
petition submitted for decision.
THE ISSUES
Page 12 of 75

On the basis of the pleadings, we summarize the pivotal issues for our resolution, as follows:
1. Whether the petition was filed within the required period.
2. Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion
i. In holding that the 1998 resolution has already attained finality;
ii. In holding that the petitioners 3rd motion partakes of a prohibited motion for
reconsideration;
iii. In refusing to re-open the case given the critical importance of the Bane deposition to the
petitioners cause; and
iv. In refusing to admit the Bane deposition notwithstanding the prior consolidation of Civil
Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130.
On the other hand, a court order is merely interlocutory in character if it leaves substantial
proceedings yet to be had in connection with the controversy. It does not end the task of the
court in adjudicating the parties contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as
against each other. In this sense, it is basically provisional in its application.54 (emphasis
supplied)
Under these guidelines, we agree with the petitioner that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory.
The Sandiganbayans denial of the petitioners 1st motion through the 1998 Resolution came
at a time when the petitioner had not even concluded the presentation of its evidence. Plainly,
the denial of the motion did not resolve the merits of the case, as something still had to be
done to achieve this end.
THE COURTS RULING
We clarify, too, that an interlocutory order remains under the control of the court until the case
is finally resolved on the merits. The court may therefore modify or rescind the order upon
sufficient grounds shown at any time before final judgment. 55 In this light, the Sandiganbayans
1998 resolution which merely denied the adoption of the Bane deposition as part of the
evidence in Civil Case No. 0009 could not have attained finality (in the manner that a
decision or final order resolving the case on the merits does) despite the petitioners failure to
move for its reconsideration or to appeal.56
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
I (b). The 3rd motion was not prohibited by the Rules.
I. Preliminary Considerations
We also agree with the petitioner that its 3rd motion cannot be considered as a proscribed
third (actually second) motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayans 1998 resolution. As
Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court clearly provides, the proscription against a second
motion for reconsideration is directed against "a judgment or final order." Although a second
motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order can be denied on the ground that it is a
mere "rehash" of the arguments already passed upon and resolved by the court, it cannot be
rejected on the ground that it is forbidden by the law or by the rules as a prohibited motion. 57
3. Whether the Bane deposition is admissible under i. Rule 23, Section 4, par. (c) alone or in relation to Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court;
and
ii. The principle of judicial notice.
I (a). The interlocutory nature of the Sandiganbayans 1998 resolution.

In determining the appropriate remedy or remedies available, a party aggrieved by a court
order, resolution or decision must first correctly identify the nature of the order, resolution or
decision he intends to assail.51 In this case, we must preliminarily determine whether the 1998
resolution is "final" or "interlocutory" in nature.
Case law has conveniently demarcated the line between a final judgment or order and an
interlocutory one on the basis of the disposition made. 52 A judgment or order is considered
final if the order disposes of the action or proceeding completely, or terminates a particular
stage of the same action; in such case, the remedy available to an aggrieved party is appeal.
If the order or resolution, however, merely resolves incidental matters and leaves something
more to be done to resolve the merits of the case, the order is interlocutory 53 and the
aggrieved partys remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Jurisprudence pointedly
holds that:
As distinguished from a final order which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by
execution what has been determined by the court, an interlocutory order does not dispose of a
case completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated upon. The term "final"
judgment or order signifies a judgment or an order which disposes of the case as to all the
parties, reserving no further questions or directions for future determination.
Page 13 of 75
I (c). The 1998 resolution was not ripe for a petition for certiorari.
Under Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, an aggrieved party may appeal from a
judgment or final order which completely disposes of a case or from an order that the Rules of
Court declares to be appealable. While this provision prohibits an appeal from an interlocutory
order, the aggrieved party is afforded the chance to question an interlocutory order through a
special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65; the petition must be filed within sixty days from
notice of the assailed judgment, order, resolution, or denial of a motion for reconsideration.
On the premise that the 1998 resolution is interlocutory in nature, the respondents insist that
the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari should be reckoned from the petitioners
notice of the Sandiganbayans 1998 resolution. They argue that since this ruling had long
been rendered by the court, the petitioners subsequent filing of similar motions was actually a
devious attempt to resuscitate the long-denied admission of the Bane deposition.
We do not find the respondents submission meritorious. While the 1998 resolution is an
interlocutory order, as correctly argued by the petitioner and impliedly conceded by the

respondents, the claim that the 1998 resolution should have been immediately questioned by
the petitioner on certiorari is not totally correct as a petition for certiorari is not grounded solely
on the issuance of a disputed interlocutory ruling. 58 For a petition for certiorari to prosper,
Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires, among others, that neither an appeal nor
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is available to the
aggrieved party. As a matter of exception, the writ of certiorari may issue notwithstanding the
existence of an available alternative remedy, if such remedy is inadequate or insufficient in
relieving the aggrieved party of the injurious effects of the order complained of. 59
We note that at the time of its 1st motion in Civil Case No. 0009, the petitioner had not yet
concluded the presentation of its evidence, much less made any formal offer of evidence. At
this stage of the case, the prematurity of using the extraordinary remedy of certiorari to
question the admission of the Bane deposition is obvious. After the denial of the 1st motion,
the plain remedy available to the petitioner was to move for a reconsideration to assert and
even clarify its position on the admission of the Bane deposition. The petitioner could
introduce60 anew the Bane deposition and include this as evidence in its formal offer 61 as the
petitioner presumably did in Civil Case No. 0130.
Thus, at that point, the case was not yet ripe for the filing of a petition for certiorari, and the
denial of the 1st motion could not have been the reckoning point for the period of filing such a
petition.
II. The Sandiganbayans ruling on the finality of its 1998 resolution was legally
erroneous but did not constitute grave abuse of discretion
In light of the above discussions and conclusions, the Sandiganbayan undoubtedly erred on a
question of law in its ruling, but this legal error did not necessarily amount to a grave abuse
of discretion in the absence of a clear showing that its action was a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment affecting its exercise of jurisdiction. 62Without this showing, the
Sandiganbayans erroneous legal conclusion was only an error of judgment, or, at best,
an abuse of discretion but not a grave one. For this reason alone, the petition should be
dismissed.
Despite this conclusion, however, we opt not to immediately dismiss the petition in light of the
unique circumstances of this case where the petitioner cannot entirely be faulted for not
availing of the remedy at the opportune time, and where the case, by its nature, is
undoubtedly endowed with public interest and has become a matter of public concern. 63 In
other words, we opt to resolve the petition on the merits to lay the issues raised to rest and to
avoid their recurrence in the course of completely resolving the merits of Civil Case No. 0009.
Although the word "rested" nowhere appears in the Rules of Court, ordinary court procedure
has inferred it from an overview of trial sequence under Section 5, Rule 30 (which capsulizes
the order of presentation of a
partys evidence during trial), read in relation to Rule 18 on Pre-Trial, 64 both of the Rules of
Court. Under Section 5, Rule 30, after a party has adduced his direct evidence in the course of
Page 14 of 75
discharging the burden of proof, 65 he is considered to have rested his case, and is thereafter
allowed to offer rebutting evidence only.66 Whether a party has rested his case in some
measure depends on his manifestation in court on whether he has concluded his presentation
of evidence.67
In its second and third motions, respectively, the petitioner expressly admitted that "due to
oversight, [the petitioner] closed and rested its case";68 and that it "had terminated the
presentation of its evidence in x x x Civil Case No. 0009." 69 In the face of these
categorical judicial admissions,70 the petitioner cannot suddenly make an about-face and
insist on the introduction of evidence out of the usual order. Contrary to the petitioners
assertion, the resting of its case could not have been conditioned on the admission of the
evidence it formally offered. To begin with, the Bane deposition, which is the lone piece of
evidence subject of this present petition, was not among the pieces of evidence included in its
formal offer of evidence and thus could not have been admitted or rejected by the trial court.
The Court observes with interest that it was only in this present petition for certiorari that the
petitioner had firmly denied having rested its case. 71 Before then, the petitioner never found it
appropriate to question on certiorari the Sandiganbayans denial of its 2nd motion which
prayed, inter alia, for the reopening of the case. This is a fatal defect in the petitioners case.
Although the denial of the petitioners first motion did not necessitate an immediate recourse
to the corrective writ of certiorari, the denial of the 2nd motion dictated a different course of
action. The petitioners non-observance of the proper procedure for the admission of the Bane
deposition, while seemingly innocuous, carried fatal implications for its case. Having been
rebuffed on its first attempt to have the Bane deposition adopted in Civil Case No. 0009, and
without seeking reconsideration of the denial, the petitioner presented its other pieces of
evidence and eventually rested its case. This time, the petitioner forgot about the Bane
deposition and so failed to include that piece of evidence in its formal offer of evidence.
More than two years later, the petitioner again tried to squeeze in the Bane deposition into its
case. In resolving the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayans 2000
resolution, the Sandiganbayan held that the Bane deposition has "become part and parcel" of
Civil Case No. 0009. This pronouncement has obscured the real status of the Bane deposition
as evidence (considering that, earlier, the Sandiganbayan already denied the petitioners
attempt to adopt the Bane deposition as evidence in Civil Case No. 0009 for the deponent
cannot be cross-examined in court). Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan ultimately denied the
petitioners motion to reopen the case. Having judicially admitted the resting of its case, the
petitioner should have already questioned the denial of its 2nd motion by way of certiorari,
since the denial of its attempt to reopen the case effectively foreclosed all avenues available
to it for the consideration of the Bane deposition. Instead of doing so, however, the petitioner
allowed the 60-day reglementary period, under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
to lapse, and proceeded to file its 3rd motion.

Significantly, the petitioner changed its legal position in its 3rd motion by denying having
rested its case and insisting on the introduction of the Bane deposition. Rebuffed once more,
the petitioner filed the present petition, inviting our attention to the Sandiganbayans
resolutions,72 which allegedly gave it "mixed signals." 73 By pointing to these resolutions,
ironically, even the petitioner impliedly recognized that they were then already ripe for review
on certiorari. What the petitioner should have realized was that its 2nd motion unequivocally
aimed to reopen the case for the introduction of further evidence consisting of the Bane
deposition. Having been ultimately denied by the court, the petitioner could not have been
prevented from taking the proper remedy notwithstanding any perceived ambiguity in the
resolutions.
On the other end, though, there was nothing intrinsically objectionable in the petitioners
motion to reopen its case before the court ruled on its formal offer of evidence. The Rules of
Court does not prohibit a party from requesting the court to allow it to present additional
evidence even after it has rested its case. Any such opportunity, however, for the ultimate
purpose of the admission of additional evidence is already addressed to the sound discretion
of the court. It is from the prism of the exercise of this discretion that the Sandiganbayans
refusal to reopen the case (for the purpose of introducing, "marking and offering" additional
evidence) should be viewed. We can declare this Sandiganbayan action invalid if it had acted
with grave abuse of discretion.
III. The Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ultimately refusing to reopen
the case for the purpose of introducing and admitting in evidence the Bane deposition
The basis for a motion to reopen a case to introduce further evidence is Section 5, Rule 30 of
the Rules of Court, which reads:
Sec. 5. Order of trial. Subject to the provisions of section 2 of Rule 31, and unless the court
for special reasons otherwise directs, the trial shall be limited to the issues stated in the pretrial order and shall proceed as follows:
xxxx
(f) The parties may then respectively adduce rebutting evidence only, unless the court,
for good reasons and in the furtherance of justice, permits them to adduce evidence
upon their original case[.] [emphases ours]
Under this rule, a party who has the burden of proof must introduce, at the first instance, all
the evidence he relies upon74 and such evidence cannot be given piecemeal. 75 The obvious
rationale of the requirement is to avoid injurious surprises to the other party and the
consequent delay in the administration of justice.76
A partys declaration of the completion of the presentation of his evidence prevents him from
introducing further evidence;77 but where the evidence is rebuttal in character, whose
necessity, for instance, arose from the shifting of the burden of evidence from one party to the
other;78 or where the evidence sought to be presented is in the nature of newly
Page 15 of 75
discovered evidence,79 the partys right to introduce further evidence must be recognized.
Otherwise, the aggrieved party may avail of the remedy of certiorari.
Largely, the exercise of the courts discretion 80 under the exception of Section 5(f), Rule 30 of
the Rules of Court depends on the attendant facts i.e., on whether the evidence would
qualify as a "good reason" and be in furtherance of "the interest of justice." For a reviewing
court to properly interfere with the lower courts exercise of discretion, the petitioner must
show that the lower courts action was attended by grave abuse of discretion. Settled
jurisprudence has defined this term as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment,
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or, the exercise of power in an arbitrary manner by reason of
passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, so patent or so gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty, to a virtual refusal to perform the mandated duty, or to act at all in contemplation
of the law.81 Grave abuse of discretion goes beyond the bare and unsupported imputation of
caprice, whimsicality or arbitrariness, and beyond allegations that merely constitute errors of
judgment82 or mere abuse of discretion.83
In Lopez v. Liboro,84 we had occasion to make the following pronouncement:
After the parties have produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer
rebutting evidence only, but, it has been held, the court, for good reasons, in the furtherance of
justice, may permit them to offer evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be
disturbed in the appellate court where no abuse of discretion appears. So, generally,
additional evidence is allowed when it is newly discovered, or where it has been omitted
through inadvertence or mistake, or where the purpose of the evidence is to correct
evidence previously offered. The omission to present evidence on the testator's knowledge of
Spanish had not been deliberate. It was due to a misapprehension or oversight. (citations
omitted; emphases ours)
Likewise, in Director of Lands v. Roman Archbishop of Manila,85 we ruled:
The strict rule is that the plaintiff must try his case out when he commences. Nevertheless, a
relaxation of the rule is permitted in the sound discretion of the court. "The proper rule for the
exercise of this discretion," it has been said by an eminent author, "is, that material testimony
should not be excluded because offered by the plaintiff after the defendant has rested,
although not in rebuttal, unless it has been kept back by a trick, and for the purpose of
deceiving the defendant and affecting his case injuriously."
These principles find their echo in Philippine remedial law. While the general rule is rightly
recognized, the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the judge "for special reasons," to change
the order of the trial, and "for good reason, in the furtherance of justice," to permit the parties
"to offer evidence upon their original case." These exceptions are made stronger when one
considers the character of registration proceedings and the fact that where so many parties
are involved, and action is taken quickly and abruptly, conformity with precise legal rules
should not always be expected. Even at the risk of violating legal formul, an opportunity

should be given to parties to submit additional corroborative evidence in support of
their claims of title, if the ends of justice so require. (emphases ours)
Rule 31 of the old Rules of Court 93 the rule in effect at the time Civil Case Nos. 0009 and
0130 were consolidated provided that:
In his commentaries, Chief Justice Moran had this to say:
Rule
Consolidation or Severance
However, the court for good reasons, may, in the furtherance of justice, permit the parties to
offer evidence upon their original case, and its ruling will not be disturbed where no abuse of
discretion appears, Generally, additional evidence is allowed when x x x; but it may be
properly disallowed where it was withheld deliberately and without justification.86
The weight of the exception is also recognized in foreign jurisprudence. 87
Under these guidelines, we hold that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
refusing to reopen the case. Instead of squarely ruling on the petitioners 2nd motion to avoid
any uncertainty on the evidentiary status of the Bane deposition, the Sandiganbayans action
actually left the petitioners concern in limbo by considering the petitioners motion
"redundant." This is tantamount to a refusal to undertake a positive duty as mandated by the
circumstances and is equivalent to an act outside the contemplation of law.
It has not escaped our notice that at the time the petitioner moved to re-open its case, the
respondents had not yet even presented their evidence in chief. The respondents, therefore,
would not have been prejudiced by allowing the petitioners introduction of the Bane
deposition, which was concededly omitted "through oversight." 88The higher interest of
substantial justice, of course, is another consideration that cannot be taken lightly.89
In light of these circumstances, the Sandiganbayan should not have perfunctorily applied
Section 5, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court on the petitioners request to reopen the case for the
submission of the Bane deposition.
On the basis of this conclusion, a remand of this case should follow as a matter of course. The
state of the parties submissions and the delay that has already attended this aspect of Civil
Case No. 0009, however, dictate against this obvious course of action. At this point, the
parties have more than extensively argued for or against the admission of the Bane
deposition. Civil Case No. 0009 is a 25-year old sequestration case that is now crying out for
complete resolution. Admissibility, too, is an issue that would have again been raised on
remand and would surely stare us in the face after remand. 90 We are thus left with no choice
but to resolve the issue of admissibility of the Bane deposition here and now.
IV. The admissibility of the Bane deposition
IV (a). The consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case No. 0130 did not
dispense with the usual requisites of admissibility
In support of its 3rd motion, the petitioner argues that the Bane deposition can be admitted in
evidence without observing the provisions of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 91 The
petitioner claims that in light of the prior consolidation of Civil Case No. 0009 and Civil Case
No. 0130, among others, 92 the "former case or proceeding" that Section 47, Rule 130 speaks
of no longer exists.
Page 16 of 75
31
Section 1. Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or fact are
pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in
the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning
proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.94 (emphases ours)
Consolidation is a procedural device granted to the court as an aid in deciding how cases in its
docket are to be tried so that the business of the court may be dispatched expeditiously and
with economy while providing justice to the parties. To promote this end, the rule permits the
consolidation and a single trial of several cases in the courts docket, or the consolidation of
issues within those cases.95
A reading of Rule 31 of the Rules of Court easily lends itself to two observations. First, Rule 31
is completely silent on the effect/s of consolidation on the cases consolidated; on the parties
and the causes of action involved; and on the evidence presented in the consolidated cases.
Second, while Rule 31 gives the court the discretion either to order a joint hearing or trial, or to
order the actions consolidated, jurisprudence will show that the term "consolidation" is used
generically and even synonymously with joint hearing or trial of several causes. 96 In fact, the
title "consolidation" of Rule 31 covers all the different senses of consolidation, as discussed
below.
These observations are not without practical reason. Considering that consolidation is
basically a function given to the court, the latter is in the best position to determine for itself
(given the nature of the cases, the complexity of the issues involved, the parties affected, and
the courts capability and resources vis--vis all the official business pending before it, among
other things) what "consolidation" will bring, bearing in mind the rights of the parties appearing
before it.
To disregard the kind of consolidation effected by the Sandiganbayan on the simple and
convenient premise that the deposition-taking took place after the Sandiganbayan ordered the
consolidation is to beg the question. It is precisely the silence of our Rules of Procedure and
the dearth of applicable case law on the effect of "consolidation" that strongly compel this
Court to determine the kind of "consolidation" effected to directly resolve the very issue of
admissibility in this case.
In the context of legal procedure, the term "consolidation" is used in three different senses: 97
(1) Where all except one of several actions are stayed until one is tried, in which case the
judgment in the one trial is conclusive as to the others. This is not actually consolidation but is
referred to as such. (quasi-consolidation)98

(2) Where several actions are combined into one, lose their separate identity, and become a
single action in which a single judgment is rendered. This is illustrated by a situation where
several actions are pending between the same parties stating claims which might have been
set out originally in one complaint. (actual consolidation)99
(3) Where several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate
character and requires the entry of a separate judgment. This type of consolidation does not
merge the suits into a single action, or cause the parties to one action to be parties to the
other. (consolidation for trial)100
Considering that the Sandiganbayans order 101 to consolidate several incident cases does not
at all provide a hint on the extent of the courts exercise of its discretion as to the effects of the
consolidation it ordered in view of the function of this procedural device to principally aid the
court itself in dealing with its official business we are compelled to look deeper into the
voluminous records of the proceedings conducted below. We note that there is nothing that
would even suggest that the Sandiganbayan in fact intended a merger of causes of action,
parties and evidence.102 To be sure, there would have been no need for a motion to adopt
(which did not remain unopposed) the testimonies in the incident cases had a merger actually
resulted from the order of consolidation, for in that case, the Sandiganbayan can already take
judicial notice of the same.
Significantly, even the petitioner itself viewed consolidation, at most, to be merely a
consolidation for trial.103Accordingly, despite the consolidation in 1993, the petitioner acceded
to the Sandiganbayans 1998 Resolution (which denied the petitioners 1st Motion on the
ground that the witnesses, whose testimony in the incident cases is sought to be adopted, "are
not available for cross-examination in" the Sandiganbayan) by presenting these other
witnesses again in the main case, so that the respondents can cross-examine them.
These considerations run counter to the conclusion that the Sandiganbayans order of
consolidation had actually resulted in the complete merger of the incident cases with the main
case, in the sense of actual consolidation, and that the parties in these consolidated cases
had (at least constructively) been aware of and had allowed actual consolidation without
objection.104
Considering, too, that the consolidated actions were originally independent of one another and
the fact that in the present case the party respondents to Civil Case No. 0009 (an action for
reconveyance, accounting, restitution and damages) are not parties to Civil Case No. 0130 (a
special civil action filed by an ETPI stockholder involving a corporate squabble within ETPI),
the conclusion that the Sandiganbayan in fact intended an actual consolidationand, together
with the parties affected,105 acted towards that end - where the actions become fused and
unidentifiable from one another and where the evidence appreciated in one action is also
appreciated in another action must find support in the proceedings held below. This is
particularly true in a case with the magnitude and complexity of the present case. Otherwise,
to impose upon the respondents the effects of an actual consolidation (which find no clear
Page 17 of 75
support in the provisions of the Rules of Court, jurisprudence, 106 and even in the proceedings
before the Sandiganbayan itself and despite the aforementioned considerations) results in an
outright deprivation of the petitioners right to due process. We reach this conclusion
especially where the evidence sought to be admitted is not simply a testimony taken in one of
the several cases, but a deposition upon oral examination taken in another jurisdiction and
whose admission is governed by specific provisions on our rules on evidence.
We stress on this point, too, that while the Sandiganbayan ordered the consolidation in 1993
(that is, before the deposition was taken), neither does the Pre-Trial Order 107 issued by the
Sandiganbayan in 1997 in Civil Case No. 0009 contain any reference, formal or substantive,
to Civil Case No. 0130.108 Interestingly, in its Pre-Trial Brief dated August 30, 1996, 109 the
petitioner even made a representation to present Bane as one of its witnesses.
IV (b). Use of deposition under Section 4, Rule 23 and as a former testimony under
Section 47, Rule 130
Since the present consolidation did not affect Civil Case No. 0130 as an original, albeit
incidental, case, the admissibility of the Bane deposition cannot avoid being measured against
the requirements of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court the rule on the admissibility
of testimonies or deposition taken in a different proceeding. In this regard, the petitioner
argues that Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court (then Rule 24) 110must, at any rate, prevail
over Section 47, Rule 130111 of the same Rules.
At the outset, we note that when the petitioners motion to adopt the testimonies taken in the
incident cases drew individual oppositions from the respondents, the petitioner represented to
the Sandiganbayan its willingness to comply with the provisions of Section 47, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court,112 and, in fact, again presented some of the witnesses. The petitioners aboutface two years thereafter even contributed to the Sandiganbayans own inconsistency on how
to treat the Bane deposition, in particular, as evidence.
Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court on "Deposition Pending Action" (deposition de bene
esse) provides for the circumstances when depositions may be used in the trial, or at the
hearing of a motion or an interlocutory proceeding.
SEC. 4. Use of depositions. At the trial or upon the hearing of a motion or an interlocutory
proceeding, any part or all of a deposition, so far as admissible under the rules of
evidence, may be used against any party who was present or represented at the taking of the
deposition or who had due notice thereof, in accordance with any one of the following
provisions:
xxxx
(c) The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any
purpose if the court finds: (1) that the witness is dead; or (2) that the witness resides at a
distance more than one hundred (100) kilometers from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of
the Philippines, unless it appears that his absence was procured by the party offering the
deposition; or (3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness,

infirmity, or imprisonment; or (4) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to
procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (5) upon application and notice, that
such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with
due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to
allow the deposition to be used[.] [emphasis ours]
On the other hand, Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. The testimony or deposition of
a witness deceased or unable to testify, given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or
administrative, involving the same parties and subject matter, may be given in
evidence against the adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him.
A plain reading of Rule 23 of the Rules of Court readily rejects the petitioners position that the
Bane deposition can be admitted into evidence without observing the requirements of Section
47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Before a party can make use of the deposition taken at the trial of a pending action, Section 4,
Rule 23 of the Rules of Court does not only require due observance of its sub-paragraphs (a)
to (d); it also requires, as a condition for admissibility, compliance with "the rules on evidence."
Thus, even Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court makes an implied reference to Section
47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court before the deposition may be used in evidence. By reading
Rule 23 in isolation, the petitioner failed to recognize that the principle conceding admissibility
to a deposition under Rule 23 should be consistent with the rules on evidence under Section
47, Rule 130.113 In determining the admissibility of the Bane deposition, therefore, reliance
cannot be given on one provision to the exclusion of the other; both provisions must be
considered. This is particularly true in this case where the evidence in the prior proceeding
does not simply refer to a witness testimony in open court but to a deposition taken under
another and farther jurisdiction.
A common thread that runs from Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court and Section 47, Rule
130 of the same Rules is their mutual reference to depositions.
A deposition is chiefly a mode of discovery whose primary function is to supplement the
pleadings for the purpose of disclosing the real points of dispute between the parties and
affording an adequate factual basis during the preparation for trial. 114 Since depositions are
principally made available to the parties as a means of informing themselves of all the relevant
facts, depositions are not meant as substitute for the actual testimony in open court of a party
or witness. Generally, the deponent must be presented for oral examination in open court at
the trial or hearing. This is a requirement of the rules on evidence under Section 1, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court.115
Examination to be done in open court. The examination of witnesses presented in a trial
or hearing shall be done in open court, and under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is
incapacitated to speak, or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the
witness shall be given orally.
Page 18 of 75
Indeed, any deposition offered to prove the facts set forth therein, in lieu of the actual oral
testimony of the deponent in open court, may be opposed by the adverse party and excluded
under the hearsay rule i.e., that the adverse party had or has no opportunity to crossexamine the deponent at the time that his testimony is offered. That opportunity for crossexamination was afforded during the taking of the deposition alone is no argument, as the
opportunity for cross-examination must normally be accorded a party at the time that the
testimonial evidence is actually presented against him during the trial or hearing of a
case.116 However, under certain conditions and for certain limited purposes laid down in
Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, the deposition may be used without the deponent
being actually called to the witness stand.117
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is an entirely different provision. While a former
testimony or depositionappears under the Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, the classification
of former testimony or deposition as an admissible hearsay is not universally conceded. 118 A
fundamental characteristic of hearsay evidence is the adverse partys lack of opportunity to
cross-examine the out-of-court declarant. However, Section 47, Rule 130 explicitly
requires, inter alia, for the admissibility of a former testimony or deposition that the adverse
party must have had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness or the deponent in the prior
proceeding.
This opportunity to cross-examine though is not the ordinary cross-examination 119 afforded an
adverse party in usual trials regarding "matters stated in the direct examination or connected
therewith." Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court contemplates a different kind of crossexamination, whether actual or a mere opportunity, whose adequacy depends on the requisite
identity of issues in the former case or proceeding and in the present case where the former
testimony or deposition is sought to be introduced.
Section 47, Rule 130 requires that the issues involved in both cases must, at least, be
substantially the same; otherwise, there is no basis in saying that the former statement was or would have been - sufficiently tested by cross-examination or by an opportunity to do
so.120 (The requirement of similarity though does not mean that all the issues in the two
proceedings should be the same.121 Although some issues may not be the same in the two
actions, the admissibility of a former testimony on an issue which is similar in both actions
cannot be questioned.122 )
These considerations, among others, make Section 47, Rule 130 a distinct rule on evidence
and therefore should not be confused with the general provisions on deposition under Rule 23
of the Rules of Court. In other words, even if the petitioner complies with Rule 23 of the Rules
of Court on the use of depositions, the observance of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court cannot simply be avoided or disregarded.
Undisputably, the Sandiganbayan relied on the Bane deposition, taken in Civil Case No. 0130,
for purposes of this very same case. Thus, what the petitioner established and what the
Sandiganbayan found, for purposes of using the Bane deposition, refer only to the

circumstances laid down under Section 4(c), Rule 23 of the Rules of Court, not necessarily to
those of Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as a distinct rule on evidence that
imposes further requirements in the use of depositions in a different case or proceeding. In
other words, the prior use of the deposition under Section 4(c), Rule 23 cannot be taken as
compliance with Section 47, Rule 130 which considers the same deposition as hearsay,
unless the requisites for its admission under this rule are observed. The aching question is
whether the petitioner complied with the latter rule.
Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court lays down the following requisites for
the admission of a testimony or deposition given at a former case or proceeding.
1. The testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or otherwise unable to testify;
2. The testimony was given in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative;
3. Involving the same parties;
4. Relating to the same matter;
5. The adverse party having had the opportunity to cross-examine him. 123
The reasons for the admissibility of testimony or deposition taken at a former trial or
proceeding are the necessity for the testimony and its trustworthiness. 124 However, before
the former testimony or deposition can be introduced in evidence, the proponent must first lay
the proper predicate therefor,125 i.e., the party must establish the basis for the admission of the
Bane deposition in the realm of admissible evidence. This basis is the prior issue that we must
now examine and resolve.
IV (c). Unavailability of witness
For the admission of a former testimony or deposition, Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court simply requires, inter alia, that the witness or deponent be "deceased or unable to
testify." On the other hand, in using a deposition that was taken during the pendency of an
action, Section 4, Rule 23 of the Rules of Court provides several grounds that will justify
dispensing with the actual testimony of the deponent in open court and specifies, inter alia, the
circumstances of the deponents inability to attend or testify, as follows:
(3) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, sickness, infirmity, or
imprisonment[.] [emphases ours]126
The phrase "unable to testify" appearing in both Rule 23 and Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
refers to a physical inability to appear at the witness stand and to give a testimony. 127 Hence
notwithstanding the deletion of the phrase "out of the Philippines," which previously appeared
in Section 47, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, absence from jurisdiction128 - the petitioners
excuse for the non-presentation of Bane in open court - may still constitute inability to testify
under the same rule. This is not to say, however, that resort to deposition on this instance of
unavailability will always be upheld. Where the deposition is taken not for discovery purposes,
but to accommodate the deponent, then the deposition should be rejected in evidence. 129
Page 19 of 75
Although the testimony of a witness has been given in the course of a former proceeding
between the parties to a case on trial, this testimony alone is not a ground for its admission in
evidence. The witness himself, if available, must be produced in court as if he were
testifying de novo since his testimony given at the former trial is mere hearsay.130 The
deposition of a witness, otherwise available, is also inadmissible for the same reason.
Indeed, the Sandiganbayans reliance on the Bane deposition in the other case (Civil Case
No. 0130) is an argument in favor of the requisite unavailability of the witness. For purposes of
the present case (Civil Case No. 0009), however, the Sandiganbayan would have no basis to
presume, and neither can or should we, that the previous condition, which previously allowed
the use of the deposition, remains and would thereby justify the use of the same deposition
in another case or proceeding, even if the other case or proceeding is before the same court.
Since the basis for the admission of the Bane deposition, in principle, being necessity,131 the
burden of establishing its existence rests on the party who seeks the admission of the
evidence. This burden cannot be supplanted by assuming the continuity of the previous
condition or conditions in light of the general rule against the non-presentation of the deponent
in court.132
IV (d). The requirement of opportunity of the adverse party to cross-examine; identity of
parties; and identity of subject matter
The function of cross-examination is to test the truthfulness of the statements of a witness
made on direct examination.133 The opportunity of cross-examination has been regarded as an
essential safeguard of the accuracy and completeness of a testimony. In civil cases, the right
of cross-examination is absolute, and is not a mere privilege of the party against whom a
witness may be called.134 This right is available, of course, at the taking of depositions, as well
as on the examination of witnesses at the trial. The principal justification for the general
exclusion of hearsay statements and for the admission, as an exception to the hearsay rule, of
reported testimony taken at a former hearing where the present adversary was afforded the
opportunity to cross-examine, is based on the premise that the opportunity of crossexamination is an essential safeguard135 against falsehoods and frauds.
In resolving the question of whether the requirement of opportunity to cross-examine has been
satisfied, we have to consider first the required identity of parties as the present opponent to
the admission of the Bane deposition to whom the opportunity to cross-examine the deponent
is imputed may not after all be the same "adverse party" who actually had such opportunity.
To render the testimony of a witness admissible at a later trial or action, the parties to the first
proceeding must be the same as the parties to the later proceeding. Physical identity,
however, is not required; substantial identity136or identity of interests137 suffices, as where the
subsequent proceeding is between persons who represent the parties to the prior proceeding
by privity in law, in blood, or in estate. The term "privity" denotes mutual or successive
relationships to the same rights of property.138

In the present case, the petitioner failed to impute, much less establish, the identity of interest
or privity between the then opponent, Africa, and the present opponents, the respondents.
While Africa is the son of the late respondent Jose Africa, at most, the deposition should be
admissible only against him as an ETPI stockholder who filed the certiorari petition docketed
as Civil Case No. 0130 (and, unavoidably, as successor-in-interest of the late respondent Jose
Africa). While Africa and the respondents are all ETPI stockholders, this commonality does not
establish at all any privity between them for purposes of binding the latter to the acts or
omissions of the former respecting the cross-examination of the deponent. The sequestration
of their shares does not result in the integration of their rights and obligations as stockholders
which remain distinct and personal to them, vis-a-visother stockholders.139
intended not as an aid to litigation, but merely to annoy, embarrass or oppress either the
deponent or the adverse party, or both. (emphasis ours)
IV (d1). The respondents notice of taking of Bane deposition is insufficient evidence of waiver
In conjunction with the order of consolidation, the petitioners reliance on the prior notice on
the respondents, as adequate opportunity for cross-examination, cannot override the nonparty status of the respondents in Civil Case No. 0130 the effect of consolidation being
merely for trial. As non-parties, they cannot be bound by proceedings in that case. Specifically,
they cannot be bound by the taking of the Bane deposition without the consequent impairment
of their right of cross-examination.148 Opportunity for cross-examination, too, even assuming
its presence, cannot be singled out as basis for the admissibility of a former testimony or
deposition since such admissibility is also anchored on the requisite identity of parties. To
reiterate, although the Sandiganbayan considered the Bane deposition in resolving Civil Case
No. 0130, its action was premised on Africas status as a party in that case where the Bane
deposition was taken.
The petitioner staunchly asserts that the respondents have waived their right to cross-examine
the deponent for their failure to appear at the deposition-taking despite individual notices
previously sent to them.140
In its first Notice to Take Oral Deposition of Mr. Maurice V. Bane dated August 30, 1996, 141 the
petitioner originally intended to depose Mr. Bane on September 25-26 1996. Because it failed
to specify in the notice the purpose for taking Mr. Banes deposition, the petitioner sent a
Second Amended Notice to Take Deposition of Mr. Maurice V. Bane Upon Oral Examination
where it likewise moved the scheduled deposition-taking to October 23-26, 1996.
The records show that Africa moved several times for protective orders against the intended
deposition of Maurice Bane.142 On the other hand, among the respondents, only respondent
Enrile appears to have filed an Opposition 143 to the petitioners first notice, where he squarely
raised the issue of reasonability of the petitioners nineteen-day first notice. While the
Sandiganbayan denied Africas motion for protective orders, 144 it strikes us that no ruling was
ever handed down on respondent Enriles Opposition.145
It must be emphasized that even under Rule 23, the admission of the deposition upon oral
examination is not simply based on the fact of prior notice on the individual sought to be
bound thereby. In Northwest Airlines v. Cruz, 146 we ruled that The provision explicitly vesting in the court the power to order that the deposition shall not be
taken connotes the authority to exercise discretion on the matter. However, the discretion
conferred by law is not unlimited. It must be exercised, not arbitrarily or oppressively, but in a
reasonable manner and in consonance with the spirit of he law. The courts should always see
to it that the safeguards for the protection of the parties and deponents are firmly maintained.
As aptly stated by Chief Justice Moran:
. . . . (T)his provision affords the adverse party, as well as the deponent, sufficient protection
against abuses that may be committed by a party in the exercise of his unlimited right to
discovery. As a writer said: "Any discovery involves a prying into another person's affairs
prying that is quite justified if it is to be a legitimate aid to litigation, but not justified if it is not to
be such an aid." For this reason, courts are given ample powers to forbid discovery which is
Page 20 of 75
In the present case, not only did the Sandiganbayan fail to rule on respondent Enriles
Opposition (which is equally applicable to his co-respondents), it also failed to provide even
the bare minimum "safeguards for the protection of," (more so) non-parties, 147 and to ensure
that these safeguards are firmly maintained. Instead, the Sandiganbayan simply bought the
petitioners assertion (that the taking of Bane deposition is a matter of right) and treated the
lingering concerns e.g., reasonability of the notice; and the non-party status of the
respondents in Civil Case No. 0130 - at whose incident (docketed as G.R. No. 107789) the
Bane deposition was taken - rather perfunctorily to the prejudice of the respondents.
Corollarily, the idea of privity also permeates Rule 23 of the Rules of Court through its Section
5 which provides:
Effect of substitution of parties. Substitution of parties does not affect the right to use
depositions previously taken; and, when an action has been dismissed and another action
involving the same subject is afterward brought between the same parties or their
representatives or successors in interest, all depositions lawfully taken and duly filed in the
former action may be used in the latter as if originally taken therefor. [italics and underscoring
ours]
In light of these considerations, we reject the petitioners claim that the respondents waived
their right to cross-examination when they failed to attend the taking of the Bane deposition.
Incidentally, the respondents vigorous insistence on their right to cross-examine the deponent
speaks loudly that they never intended any waiver of this right.
Interestingly, the petitioners notice of the deposition-taking relied on Rule 23 of the Rules of
Court. Section 15 of this rule reads:
Deposition upon oral examination; notice; time and place. A party desiring to take the
deposition of any person upon oral examination shall give reasonable notice in writing to
every other party to the action. The notice shall state the time and place for taking the
deposition and the name and address of each person to be examined, if known, and if the

name is not known, a general description sufficient to identify him or the particular class or
group to which he belongs. On motion of any party upon whom the notice is served, the court
may for cause shown enlarge or shorten the time.
Under this provision, we do not believe that the petitioner could reasonably expect that the
individual notices it sent to the respondents would be sufficient to bind them to the conduct of
the then opponents (Africas) cross-examination since, to begin with, they were not even
parties to the action. Additionally, we observe that in the notice of the deposition taking,
conspicuously absent was any indication sufficient to forewarn the notified persons that their
inexcusable failure to appear at the deposition taking would amount to a waiver of their right of
cross-examination, without prejudice to the right of the respondents to raise their objections at
the appropriate time.149We would be treading on dangerous grounds indeed were we to hold
that one not a party to an action, and neither in privity nor in substantial identity of
interest with any of the parties in the same action, can be bound by the action or
omission of the latter, by the mere expedient of a notice. Thus, we cannot simply deduce
a resultant waiver from the respondents mere failure to attend the deposition-taking despite
notice sent by the petitioner.
Lastly, we see no reason why the Bane deposition could not have been taken earlier in Civil
Case No. 0009 the principal action where it was sought to be introduced while Bane was
still here in the Philippines. We note in this regard that the Philippines was no longer under the
Marcos administration and had returned to normal democratic processes when Civil Case No.
0009 was filed. In fact, the petitioners notice itself states that the "purpose of the deposition is
for Mr. Maurice Bane to identify and testify on the facts set forth in his Affidavit," which Mr.
Bane had long executed in 1991 in Makati, Metro Manila. 150 Clearly, a deposition could then
have been taken - without compromising the respondents right to cross-examine a witness
against them - considering that the principal purpose of the deposition is chiefly a mode of
discovery. These, to our mind, are avoidable omissions that, when added to the deficient
handling of the present matter, add up to the gross deficiencies of the petitioner in the
handling of Civil Case No. 0009.
After failing to take Banes deposition in 1991 and in view of the peculiar circumstances of this
case, the least that the petitioner could have done was to move for the taking of the Bane
deposition and proceed with the deposition immediately upon securing a favorable ruling
thereon. On that occasion, where the respondents would have a chance to be heard, the
respondents cannot avoid a resultant waiver of their right of cross-examination if they still fail
to appear at the deposition-taking. Fundamental fairness dictates this course of action. It must
be stressed that not only were the respondents non-parties to Civil Case No. 0130, they
likewise have no interest in Africas certiorari petition asserting his right as an ETPI
stockholder.
Setting aside the petitioners flip-flopping on its own representations, 151 this Court can only
express dismay on why the petitioner had to let Bane leave the Philippines before taking his
deposition despite having knowledge already of the substance of what he would testify on.
Page 21 of 75
Considering that the testimony of Bane is allegedly a "vital cog" in the petitioners case against
the respondents, the Court is left to wonder why the petitioner had to take the deposition in an
incident case (instead of the main case) at a time when it became the technical right of the
petitioner to do so.
V. The petitioner cannot rely on principle of judicial notice
The petitioner also claims that since the Bane deposition had already been previously
introduced and admitted in Civil Case No. 0130, then the Sandiganbayan should have taken
judicial notice of the Bane deposition as part of its evidence.
Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and act on
without proof because these facts are already known to them. 152 Put differently, it is the
assumption by a court of a fact without need of further traditional evidentiary support. The
principle is based on convenience and expediency in securing and introducing evidence on
matters which are not ordinarily capable of dispute and are not bona fide disputed.153
The foundation for judicial notice may be traced to the civil and canon law
maxim, manifesta (or notoria) non indigent probatione.154 The taking of judicial notice means
that the court will dispense with the traditional form of presentation of evidence. In so doing,
the court assumes that the matter is so notorious that it would not be disputed.
The concept of judicial notice is embodied in Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
Rule 129 either requires the court to take judicial notice, inter alia, of "the official acts of the x x
x judicial departments of the Philippines,"155 or gives the court the discretion to take judicial
notice of matters "ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions." 156 On the
other hand, a party-litigant may ask the court to take judicial notice of any matter and the court
may allow the parties to be heard on the propriety of taking judicial notice of the matter
involved.157 In the present case, after the petitioner filed its Urgent Motion and/or Request for
Judicial Notice, the respondents were also heard through their corresponding oppositions.
In adjudicating a case on trial, generally, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the
contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending
in the same court, and notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried or are actually
pending before the same judge.158 This rule though admits of exceptions.
As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the
original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it,
when, with the knowledge of, andabsent an objection from, the adverse party, reference
is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is
sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is
actually withdrawn from the archives at the court's direction, at the request or with the consent
of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case then pending.159
Courts must also take judicial notice of the records of another case or cases, where sufficient
basis exists in the records of the case before it, warranting the dismissal of the latter case. 160

The issue before us does not involve the applicability of the rule on mandatory taking of
judicial notice; neither is the applicability of the rule on discretionary taking of judicial notice
seriously pursued. Rather, the petitioner approaches the concept of judicial notice from a
genealogical perspective of treating whatever evidence offered in any of the "children" cases
Civil Case 0130 as evidence in the "parent" case Civil Case 0009 - or "of the whole family
of cases."161 To the petitioner, the supposed relationship of these cases warrants the taking of
judicial notice.
We strongly disagree. First, the supporting cases162 the petitioner cited are inapplicable either
because these cases involve only a single proceeding or an exception to the rule, which
proscribes the courts from taking judicial notice of the contents of the records of other
cases.163 Second, the petitioners proposition is obviously obnoxious to a system of orderly
procedure. The petitioner itself admits that the present case has generated a lot of cases,
which, in all likelihood, involve issues of varying complexity. If we follow the logic of the
petitioners argument, we would be espousing judicial confusion by indiscriminately allowing
the admission of evidence in one case, which was presumably found competent and relevant
in another case, simply based on the supposed lineage of the cases. It is the duty of the
petitioner, as a party-litigant, to properly lay before the court the evidence it relies upon in
support of the relief it seeks, instead of imposing that same duty on the court. We invite the
petitioners attention to our prefatory pronouncement in Lopez v. Sandiganbayan:164
Down the oft-trodden path in our judicial system, by common sense, tradition and the law, the
Judge in trying a case sees only with judicial eyes as he ought to know nothing about the facts
of the case, except those which have been adduced judicially in evidence. Thus, when the
case is up for trial, the judicial head is empty as to facts involved and it is incumbent upon the
litigants to the action to establish by evidence the facts upon which they rely. (emphasis ours)
We therefore refuse, in the strongest terms, to entertain the petitioners argument that we
should take judicial notice of the Bane deposition.
VI. Summation
To recapitulate, we hold that: (1) the Sandiganbayans denial of the petitioners 3rd motion
the Motion to Admit Supplemental Offer of Evidence (Re: Deposition of Maurice Bane) was a
legal error that did not amount to grave abuse of discretion; (2) the Sandiganbayans refusal to
reopen the case at the petitioners instance was tainted with grave abuse of discretion; and (3)
notwithstanding the grave abuse of discretion, the petition must ultimately fail as the Bane
deposition is not admissible under the rules of evidence. 165
VII. Refutation of Justice Carpios Last Minute Modified Dissent
At the last minute, Justice Carpio circulated a modified dissent, quoting the Bane deposition.
His covering note states:
I have revised my dissenting opinion to include the Bane deposition so that the Court and the
public will understand what the Bane deposition is all about. (underlining added)
Page 22 of 75
In light of this thrust, a discussion refuting the modified dissent is in order.

First: Contents of the Bane deposition not an Issue. The dissent perfectly identified what is at
issue in this case i.e., the admissibility of the Bane deposition. Admissibility is concerned
with the competence and relevance166 of the evidence, whose admission is sought. While the
dissent quoted at length the Bane deposition, it may not be amiss to point out that the
relevance of the Bane deposition (or, to adopt the dissents characterization, whether "Maurice
V. Bane is a vital witness") is not an issue here unless it can be established first that the Bane
deposition is a competent evidence.
Second: Misrepresentation of Cited Authority. The dissent insists that "in Philippine
Jurisprudence, the consolidation of cases merges the different actions into one and the rights
of the parties are adjudicated in a single judgment," citing Vicente J. Francisco. In our
discussion on consolidation, we footnoted the following in response to the dissents position,
which we will restate here for emphasis:
In the 1966 edition of Vicente J. Franciscos Revised Rules of Court, Francisco wrote:
The effect of consolidation of actions is to unite and merge all of the different actions
consolidated into a single action, in the same manner as if the different causes of actions
involved had originally been joined in a single action, and the order of consolidation, if made
by a court of competent jurisdiction, is binding upon all the parties to the different actions until
it is vacated or set aside. After the consolidation there can be no further proceedings in the
separate actions, which are by virtue of the consolidation discontinued and superseded by a
single action, which should be entitled in such manner as the court may direct, and all
subsequent proceedings therein be conducted and the rights of the parties adjudicated in a
single action (1 C.J.S., 113, pp. 1371-1372).
At the very beginning of the discussion on consolidation of actions in the Corpus Juris
Secundum, the following caveat appears:
The term consolidation is used in three different senses. First, where several actions are
combined into one and lose their separate identity and become a single action in which a
single judgment is rendered; second, where all except one of several actions are stayed until
one is tried, in which case the judgment in the one is conclusive as to the others; third, where
several actions are ordered to be tried together but each retains its separate character and
requires the entry of a separate judgment. The failure to distinguish between these methods of
procedure, which are entirely distinct, the two latter, strictly speaking, not being consolidation,
a fact which has not always been noted, has caused some confusion and conflict in the cases.
(1 C.J.S., 107, pp. 1341-1342) (Emphasis added).
In defining the term "consolidation of actions," Francisco provided a colatilla that the term
"consolidation" is used in three different senses, citing 1 C.J.S. 1341 and 1 Am. Jur. 477
(Francisco, Revised Rules of Court, p. 348).
From the foregoing, it is clear that the dissent appears to have quoted Franciscos statement
out of context. As it is, the issue of the effect of consolidation on evidence is at most an

unsettled matter that requires the approach we did in the majoritys discussion on
consolidation.167
Third: Misappreciation of the Purpose of Consolidation. The dissent then turns to the purpose
of consolidation to "expeditiously settle the interwoven issues involved in the consolidated
cases" and "the simplification of the proceedings." It argues that this can only be achieved if
the repetition of the same evidence is dispensed with.
It is unfortunate that the dissent refuses to recognize the fact that since consolidation is
primarily addressed to the court concerned to aid it in dispatching its official business, it would
be in keeping with the orderly trial procedure if the court should have a say on what
consolidation would actually bring168 (especially where several cases are involved which have
become relatively complex). In the present case, there is nothing in the proceedings below
that would suggest that the Sandiganbayan or the parties themselves (the petitioner and the
respondents) had in mind a consolidation beyond joint hearing or trial. Why should this Court
which is not a trial court impose a purported effect that has no factual or legal grounds?
Fourth: The Due Process Consideration. The dissent argues that even if the consolidation only
resulted in a joint hearing or trial, the "respondents are still bound by the Bane deposition
considering that they were given notice of the deposition-taking." The issue here boils down to
one of due process the fundamental reason why a hearsay statement (not subjected to the
rigor of cross-examination) is generally excluded in the realm of admissible evidence
especially when read in light of the general rule that depositions are not meant as substitute
for the actual testimony, in open court, of a party or witness.
Respondent Enrile had a pending Opposition to the notice of deposition-taking (questioning
the reasonableness thereof an issue applicable to the rest of the respondents) which the
Sandiganbayan failed to rule on. To make the Sandiganbayans omission worse, the
Sandiganbayan blindly relied on the petitioners assertion that the deposition-taking was a
matter of right and, thus, failed to address the consequences and/or issues that may arise
from the apparently innocuous statement of the petitioner (that it intends to use the Bane
deposition in Civil Case No. 0009, where only the respondents, and not Africa, are the
parties).169 There is simply the absence of "due" in due process.
Fifth: Misstatement of the Sandiganbayans Action. The dissent repeatedly misstates that the
Sandiganbayan "granted" the request for the deposition-taking. For emphasis, the
Sandiganbayan did not "grant" the request since the petitioner staunchly asserted that the
deposition-taking was a matter of right. No one can deny the complexity of the issues that
these consolidated cases have reached. Considering the consolidation of cases of this nature,
the most minimum of fairness demands upon the petitioner to move for the taking of the Bane
deposition and for the Sandiganbayan to make a ruling thereon (including the opposition filed
by respondent Enrile which equally applies to his co-respondents). The burgeoning omission
and failures that have prevailed in this case cannot be cured by this Court without itself being
guilty of violating the constitutional guarantee of due process.
Page 23 of 75
Sixth: Issues Posed and Resolved Go Beyond Technicalities. The above conclusions, contrary
to the petitioners claim, are not only matters of technicality. Admittedly, rules of procedure
involve technicality, to which we have applied the liberality that technical rules deserve. But the
resolution of the issues raised goes beyond pure or mere technicalities as the preceding
discussions show. They involve issues of due process and basic unfairness to the
respondents, particularly to respondent Enrile, who is portrayed in the Bane deposition to be
acting in behalf of the Marcoses so that these shares should be deemed to be those of the
Marcoses. They involved, too, principles upon which our rules of procedure are founded and
which we cannot disregard without flirting with the violation of guaranteed substantive rights
and without risking the disorder that these rules have sought to avert in the course of their
evolution.
In the Court En Banc deliberations of December 6, 2011, the Court failed to arrive at a
conclusive decision because of a tie vote (7-7, with one Justice taking no part). The same vote
resulted in the re-voting of December 13, 2011. In this light, the ponencia is deemed
sustained.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the petition for lack of merit. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO
Associate Justice
D.
BRION

G.R. No. 134203
May 27, 2004
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ELVIE EJANDRA @ ELVIES EJANDRA @ BEBOT EJANDRA @ ALEJANDRO EJANDRA
@ BEBOT OCAY SUANGCO, MAGDALENA CALUNOD y MAGANOY @ MAGDALENA
SALIOT-SUANGCO, ANTONIO HUERA y RANDA, ROEL REVILLA CERON, and EDWIN
TAMPOS y AMPARO (All detained at Quezon City Jail, Quezon City), appellants.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a review on automatic appeal of the Decision 1 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court,
Branch 219, convicting appellants Elvie Ejandra, Magdalena Calunod, Edwin Tampos and
Roel Revilla of kidnapping for ransom, and sentencing them to suffer the death penalty.
The Indictment
The accused were charged of kidnapping for ransom in an Information filed in the Regional
Trial Court which reads:
That on or about July 2, 1997, in Quezon City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, above-named accused, while confederating, conniving, conspiring, and helping each
and one another, did then and there with the use of force, threat and intimidation, take and
carry away, a nine-year-old minor child, Ed Henderson Tan, against the will and consent of the
latter nor any of his natural and legal parents or guardian, to an unknown destination, detain,
hold and control Ed Henderson Tan depriving him of his liberty, and during their control and
custody of Ed Henderson Tan, call, demand and negotiate the payment of ransom money from
Eddie Tan, the father of Ed Henderson Tan, for the safe release and return of the victim Ed
Henderson, otherwise, the victim would be harmed or killed, the victims father Eddie Tan
actually paid the accused the amount of P548,000.00 as ransom money, for the safe release
of the victim to the damage and prejudice of the victim Ed Henderson Tan and his father Eddie
Tan.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
The accused, assisted by counsel, were arraigned for the crime charged on November 11,
1997, and entered their respective pleas of not guilty.
The Evidence for the Prosecution
Ed Henderson Tan, the nine-year old son of the spouses Eddie and Marileen Tan, was a
Grade III student at the Philippine Institute of Quezon City, located at Kitanlad, Quezon
City.3 At about 4:00 p.m. on July 2, 1997, Ed Henderson was dismissed from his classes and
proceeded to the nearby house of his tutor in Chinese language, Huang Lao Shih. 4 Ed
Henderson and his father, Eddie Tan, had earlier agreed that after the tutorial classes ended
at 7:00 p.m., Ed Henderson would phone his father, who would then fetch him from his
mentors house.5The tutorial classes ended at 7:00 p.m., as scheduled, and Ed Henderson
Page 24 of 75
then proceeded to the store near the gate of the school to have his periodic test papers
photocopied.6 He left the store and was on his way back to the house of his tutor to wait for his
father.
Suddenly, Ed Tampos, armed with a revolver (de bola),7 chased and overtook Ed Henderson
at the Royalty canteen near the school.8 Tampos ordered the boy to proceed to a motorcyle
parked nearby and warned the latter that if he refused, he would be shot. Petrified, Ed
Henderson approached the motorcycle where appellants Elvie Ejandra and Roel Revilla were
waiting. Ejandra had no legs (pilay), while Revilla had curly hair. There was no lamp post
outside the school premises but the lights inside the school were still on. 9 Ejandra covered Ed
Hendersons mouth with his hand, pointed his gun at the boy 10 and warned the latter not to
shout.11 Revilla boarded the motorcycle and took the drivers seat. Ejandra sat behind him,
and Tampos sat behind Ejandra. Tampos ordered Ed Henderson to board the motorcyle, or
else, he would be shot.12 The boy was then ordered to sit behind Tampos.13
Ed was brought to a one-storey house with cemented flooring and white-colored walls. 14 Once
inside, he saw a man who was drinking, who turned out to be Antonio Huera, and a female,
who turned out to be Magdalena Calunod. 15 Ed Henderson also saw a cell phone. 16 The was
ordered to write down his fathers telephone number, as well as that of their house and their
store.17 Ed Henderson did as he was told, and wrote down the number 737-61-77 the
telephone number of his father, Eddie Tan. It appeared to the boy that Ejandra was the leader
of his abductors because it was he who gave orders to the others.
In the meantime, Eddie went to fetch his son at 7:00 p.m. at his tutors house, but the boy was
nowhere to be found.18 Frantic, Eddie contacted his friends and relatives and asked if they
knew where his son was, to no avail. He even called up hospitals, inquiring if a boy named Ed
Henderson had been admitted as a patient. 19 Shortly after midnight, Eddie received a call from
his house that someone had called earlier up his mother, Benita Tan, with the information that
his son had been kidnapped20 and that the kidnappers wanted to talk to the parents. 21Eddie
rushed back home.
At 12:30 a.m., Eddie received a call through his home phone, informing him that his son had
been kidnapped. The caller demanded P10,000,000 for the safe release of his son. 22 When
Eddie informed the caller that he did not have P10,000,000, the latter hung up the phone.23
In the meantime, as ordered by Ejandra, Ed Henderson called up his father, through the
kidnappers cell phone, to urge his father to pay the ransom money.24
Thereafter, Eddie received several calls threatening him that if he refused to pay the ransom
they demanded, the kidnappers would cut Ed Hendersons ear and finger, and thereafter kill
the boy and dump his body in an isolated place. Eddie pleaded for mercy but the caller would
simply hang up the telephone.25
Eddie and his family were terrified of the callers threats that they could hardly sleep. They lost
their appetite just thinking of what Ed Henderson would suffer in the hands of his
kidnappers.26 At 6:00 p.m. on July 3, 1997, a Sunday, Eddie received another call informing

him that the kidnappers had agreed to reduce the ransom to P5,000,000.27 Eddie told the
caller that he did not have P5,000,000 and pleaded that the ransom be reduced. However, the
caller merely repeated his threat that the kidnappers would cut Ed Hendersons fingers and
ears, and dump the boy in an isolated place.28
Meanwhile, Eddie began borrowing money from his relatives and friends. He received another
call reiterating the demand for ransom. He told the caller that he would try to raise P585,000
but the caller told Eddie to raise P600,000. Eddie was finally able to borrow P548,000 from his
relatives and friends. When the caller called anew, Eddie revealed that he was able to raise
only P548,000 and reiterated that he could no longer borrow any additional amount. 29
At 10:00 a.m. the next day, July 4, 1997, another call from the kidnappers came through, and
Eddie reiterated that he could no longer raise any additional amount. The caller hung up, but
called again and informed Eddie that the kidnappers had agreed to accept a ransom
of P548,000.00.30 At about noon, the caller contacted Eddie and instructed him to place the
money in a newspaper and to bring the money to the parking lot in front of the Sto. Domingo
Church in Quezon City within ten minutes. The caller further instructed Eddie to open the
doors and windows of his car upon arriving at the designated spot. Eddie was also told that a
man would approach him and call him "Eddie."
Eddie did as he was told.31 He placed the money in a newspaper and placed it in a Shoe Mart
(SM) plastic bag.32He then proceeded to the designated place on board his Besta van. He
parked the van in the parking lot in front of the convent adjacent to the Sto. Domingo
Church.33 He opened the doors and windows, then alighted from the car. Momentarily,
appellant Calunod approached Eddie and called out, "EddieaEddie." Eddie noted that
Calunod had a scar on her right temple. Eddie was taken aback because he was expecting a
man to approach him. Nevertheless, when he heard Calunod say "Eddie," he handed over the
plastic bag which contained the money.34 He asked her how his son was,35 she told him not to
worry because she would bring the boy home. Calunod then walked to the gate of the Santo
Domingo Church.36 Eddie went home to wait for his sons return. Shortly after his arrival at
their house, Eddie received two telephone calls from a male and a female, respectively, who
informed him of his sons impending release.
Between 3:20 to 3:30 p.m. of July 4, 1997, Ed Henderson was told that he would be brought
back home.37 The boy then called up his mother and told her that he would be back soon.
Tampos and Calunod boarded Ed Henderson in a taxi. Calunod ordered the boy to pretend
that she was his aunt.38 Ed recalled that it was also Calunod who took care of him and gave
him food in the house where he was detained. 39 The taxi stopped near the Imperial Drugstore
at E. Rodriguez Avenue, where Calunod instructed Ed Henderson to get down. She gave the
boy P50.00 for his fare back home. The boy took a taxi and was soon reunited with his waiting
family.
On July 7, 1997, Ed Henderson gave a sworn statement to PO3 Terencio Claudio of the
Criminal Investigation Division in Camp Crame, Quezon City.40 He was shown photographs of
Page 25 of 75
suspects of kidnappings and he identified, from the pictures shown to him, Elvie Ejandra alias
Alejandro Ejandra and Magdalena Calunod41 as two of his kidnappers.
The Case for the Accused
Edwin Tampos denied any involvement in the kidnapping of Ed Henderson, and invoked alibi
as an additional defense. He claimed that the first time he met Elvie Ejandra and Magdalena
Calunod was in Camp Crame, Quezon City, after he was arrested, with Roel Revilla, on board
the latters tricycle at 10:00 p.m. on August 13, 1997. He knew Antonio Huera, who lived in the
same place and solicited bets for "ending." He also knew Roel Revilla, who was a tricycle
driver. Tampos claimed that he was arrested without any warrant therefor, and that he was
handcuffed, mauled and blindfolded. He was asked if he was a kidnapper, denied that he was
one and was forced to sign a piece of paper. He testified that he eked out a living as a butcher
of pigs at Villa Beatriz, Old Balara, Quezon City. He sold the butchered pigs three times a
week within the neighborhood. His aunt, Biba Oray, financed his business. 42 Tampos also
averred that he owned three fighting cocks.43
Tampos claimed that on July 2, 1997, he was so tired of butchering pigs and opted to stay
home the whole day and night. At 10:00 p.m., he went out of his house and bought
cigarettes.44 He returned home immediately thereafter and slept.45 He and his aunt made plans
to buy pigs to be butchered. He was also at home the following day, July 4, 1997, tending to
his three fighting cocks.46
Roel Revilla, likewise, denied any involvement in the kidnapping of Ed Henderson and also
interposed an alibi. He testified that he arrived from Sogus, Southern Leyte on August 5, 1997
and stayed in the house of Antonio Huera, his brothers friend at Villa Beatriz, Old Balara,
Quezon City. Huera worked at the Tarpark and promised that he would help Revilla get a job
there.47 He was arrested on August 13, 1998 by the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission
(PACC) agents, along with Huera and Tampos. They were brought to Camp Crame, Quezon
City, where they were blindfolded, mauled and tortured. He was asked if he was a kidnapper,
but he denied any involvement in the incident. He averred that he did not know of any reason
why Ed Henderson would implicate him in the kidnapping.
Magdalena Calunod denied any involvement in the crime charged. She testified that she was
thirty-five-year-old businesswoman from Iligan City. She had a stall in Manggahan in 1994, but
the same was demolished in 1995. She returned to Iligan City and tended fighting cocks from
1995 to 1997.48 In August 1997, she was residing in a rented house at Bidasari, Lagro
Subdivision, Quezon City. Sometime on August 14, 1998, she and Ejandra were on their way
to Nueva Ecija when policemen blocked their vehicle. She, at first, thought that the men were
hold-uppers because they were divested of their money, pieces of jewelry and clothes. The
policemen were not armed with any warrant of arrest. She admitted that she had been
charged of kidnapping in another case in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City on August
10, 1997.

Elvie Ejandra also denied any involvement in the kidnapping of Henderson. Like the other
accused, he interposed the defense of alibi. He testified that he and Magdalena Calunod were
married.49 Since 1994, he had been engaged in the business of onions and ready-to-wear
clothes which they sold in Baclaran and Divisoria. They also had a stall in Manggahan where
they sold onions.50 When their stall was demolished in 1994, they went back to Iligan
City.51 On July 2, 1993, he and Calunod were in Iligan City tending fighting cocks. They
returned to Quezon City from Iligan City only on July 9 or July 10, 1997. 52 They were arrested
on August 14, 1997 by policemen while they were on their way to Sicsican, Nueva Ecija.
When he was arrested, he had a drivers license in the name of Bebot Suangco. 53 He averred
that he did not have any cell phone, but had a car with plate no. 413. 54
Antonio Huera also denied the charge and interposed the defense of alibi. He testified that he
was employed by the Car Parts Manufacturing as a power press operator. 55 However, when
his employment was terminated on June 25, 1997, he became a collector of bets for
"ending."56 On July 27, 1997, he was in the house of his uncle, which was a stones throw
away from his own house at No. 7, Don Fabian Street, Villa Beatriz Subdivision, Old Balara,
Quezon City.57 His grandfather died that day in Southern Leyte 58 and was later buried on July
3, 1997.59Roel Revilla spent the night in his house when he arrived from Southern
Leyte.60 Huera also admitted that Elvie Ejandra was his classmate in high school, who visited
him on August 5, 1997.61 He was arrested at 5:30 a.m. of August 14, 1997 at his house, on the
mere suspicion that he was a kidnapper. He and two others were brought to Camp Crame,
Quezon City, where he was beaten and maltreated.
On June 4, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment convicting the accused of kidnapping for
ransom defined and penalized in Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentenced each
of them to suffer the death penalty. Antonio Huera, was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence,
The decretal portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Edwin Tampos, Elvie Ejandra, Magdalena Calunod, and Roel
Revilla GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for ransom, the court
hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of DEATH; to pay the victim, Ed
Henderson Tan and his family, the amount of P548,000.00 as actual damages with legal
interest until fully paid, and P1,000,000.00 as moral damages; and to pay the costs.
Accused Antonio Huera is hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence. The Warden of
Quezon City Jail is hereby ordered to release him from custody unless he is being detained for
another charge or unlawful case.
SO ORDERED.62
The Present Appeal
Appellants Ejandra and Calunod do not dispute that they kidnapped Ed Henderson. They
merely assert that the prosecution failed to prove that they had a cellular phone, implying that
they could not have used it to demand ransom for the victims release. It was their daughter,
Sherry Mae Saliot who was the subscriber to telephone number 490-55-95. They also assert
that they were arrested without any warrant therefor.63
For their part, appellants Tampos and Revilla contend that the trial court erred in not acquitting
them of the crime charged on reasonable doubt. 64 They aver that Ed Henderson could not
have recognized them as two of those who kidnapped him at 7:00 p.m. on July 2, 1997 in the
vicinity of the Philippine Institute of Quezon City, because the place was dark. They assert that
it was physically impossible for four people to ride on a motorcycle. The appellants aver that
Ed Hendersons testimony is unreliable, as police officers coached him and taught him what to
say during a confrontation between him and the suspects in Camp Crame, Quezon City.
Appellant Revilla posits that the boy could have mistaken him for Tito Lozada with whom the
appellants were when they were arrested. He argues that he merely stayed in the house of
Huera and since the latter was acquitted, he should also be acquitted. Appellant Revilla insists
that his extrajudicial confession is not admissible in evidence against him because he was
forced by policemen into signing the same. He argues that the trial court erred in not
considering his alibi, that on July 7, 1997 he was in Sogus, Southern Leyte. Appellant Tampos
further alleges that it was unlikely that he would be involved in the kidnapping because he was
engaged in the lucrative business of being a butcher and meat vendor. He asserted that he
was forced into signing a piece of paper in Camp Crame; hence, the said paper is
inadmissible in evidence against him.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General submits that in failing to assail any irregularity in
their arrest before they were arraigned for the crime charged on November 11, 1993, the
appellants thereby waived their right to do so. The appellants even failed to file their
respective counter-affidavits during the preliminary investigation of the charge against them at
the Department of Justice. Moreover, the prosecution adduced overwhelming evidence to
prove the crime charged that the appellants were the perpetrators of the said crime.
The contentions of the appellants do not persuade. Ed Henderson positively and in a
straightforward manner testified that appellant Tampos was the one who chased and grabbed
him near his school, and that it was appellant Revilla who drove the motorcycle from the
school to the house where he was detained. Ed Henderson was able to recognize the two
appellants because the lights inside the Philippine Institute illuminated the place where he was
chased and grabbed by appellant Tampos. The victim even noticed that appellant Revilla, who
drove the motorcycle, had curly hair. Appellant Tampos was so close to Ed Henderson, as it
was he who poked the gun at the boy, and even warned the latter that he would be shot if he
refused to board the motorcycle. The testimony of Ed Henderson pointing to appellants
Tampos and Revilla as two of his kidnappers near the Philippine Institute of Quezon City,
reads:
ATTY. CHUA:
Q What were you doing when you were kidnapped?
A I have something xeroxed, sir.
Page 26 of 75

Q Can you tell this court how you were "nahuli"?
A Red, sir.66
A When I finished xeroxing something, I was running and then
A Yes, sir.
Moreover, Ed Henderson was with appellants Revilla and Tampos when they reached the
house where the boy was detained. The lights inside the house were on and Ed Henderson,
saw the appellants Revilla and Tampos at close range. The victim, likewise, identified
appellant Tampos when the latter and Calunod boarded him in a motorcycle in broad daylight
in the afternoon of July 4, 1997. Tampos and Calunod brought the boy to the Imperial
Drugstore at E. Rodriguez Avenue where he boarded a taxicab that brought him home. Ed
Hendersons testimony on this matter is quoted, viz:
INTERPRETER:
Q You said you were able to go home. Do you recall what date they released you?
Witness stepping down from the witness stand and proceed to a man wearing yellow T-shirt
who when asked to identify himself he gave his name as Edwin Tampos.
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. CHUA:
A July 4, 1997, sir.
Q After this man whom you pointed to, caught you, what did you do?
Q Around what time were you released?
A He showed me a gun, sir.
A In the afternoon, sir.
Q After he showed you a gun, what did you do?
Q How were you able to go home?
A He told me "sakay."
A At first they load me in a motorcycle and they hailed me a taxicab, sir.
Q Where?
Q Who were with you in the motorcycle?
somebody chased me, sir.

Q Who was the one chasing you?
A "Yung humuli sa akin."
Q If he is in court, will you please step down from the witness stand and point him to us?
65
Q What date was that?
A In a motorcycle, sir.
A Edwin Tampos and the female, sir.
Q What happened after the female called the taxicab?
ATTY. ROUS:
A She told me to pretend that she is my aunt and afterwards, she gave me P50.00.67
Q Mr. Witness, who was the one driving the motorcycle?
Finally, appellants Revilla and Tampos were identified by Ed Henderson in open court, pointing
to both of them as two of his kidnappers.
A The person with curly hair, sir.

Q Where were you seated when you were boarded
ATTY. CHUA:
At what point in time because he rode the motorcycle twice, Your Honor.
ATTY. ROUS:
Q When you were taken from your school, who was the person driving?
A The person with curly hair, sir.
Q When you were taken from your school, where were you seated in the motorcycle?
A I was positioned "sa pangatlo" sir.
Q What do you mean by "pangatlo"?
A The first one in the motorcycle was the driver, the curly hair, the second one is Edwin
Tampos and I was on the third part.
Q What was the color of this motorcycle?
Page 27 of 75
It bears stressing that Ed Henderson was only nine years old and in Grade III when he was
kidnapped. In People vs. Bisda, et al.,68 the kidnap victim Angela was barely six years old
when she testified. We held that, considering her tender years, innocent and guileless, it is
incredible that she would testify falsely that the appellants took her from the school through
threats and detained her in the "dirty house" for five days. Thus, testimonies of child victims
are given full weight and credit.
The testimony of children of sound mind is likewise to be more correct and truthful than that of
older persons.69 In People vs. Alba,70 this Court ruled that children of sound mind are likely to
be more observant of incidents which take place within their view than older persons, and their
testimonies are likely more correct in detail than that of older persons.
In the case at bar, the trial court found the testimony of Ed Henderson credible and entitled to
full probative weight. Well settled is the rule that the findings of facts of the trial court, its
calibration of the testimonies of witnesses, its assessment of the credibility of the said
witnesses and its evidence based on the said findings are given high respect if not conclusive
effect by the appellate court, unless the trial court overlooked, misconstrued or misinterpreted

facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, will alter the outcome of the
case.71We have meticulously reviewed the records and find no justification to deviate from the
findings of facts of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of Ed Henderson and the
veracity and probative weight of his testimony.
The appellants denials and alibi, which are merely self-serving evidence cannot prevail over
the positive, consistent and straightforward testimony of Ed Henderson. 72 Alibi is an inherently
weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable. 73 To merit approbation, the
accused must adduce clear and convincing evidence that he was in a place other than the
situs criminis at the time the crime was committed, such that it was physically impossible for
him to have been at the scene of the crime when it was committed. 74 Appellants Revilla and
Tampos failed to prove their alibi. They relied merely and solely on their bare and dubious
testimonies to prove their defense. Appellant Revilla, likewise, failed to adduce any
documentary evidence to prove exactly when he left Sogus, Southern Leyte, via a domestic
vessel and the time and date of his arrival in Manila.
The acquittal of Huera on reasonable doubt is not a ground for the acquittal of appellant
Revilla. As gleaned from the trial courts decision, Huera was acquitted on reasonable doubt
because the only evidence against him was the testimony of Ed Henderson, that when he and
his kidnappers arrived in the house where the latter was thereafter detained, he saw Huera
drinking. There is no evidence against Huera relating to the boys detention and his release on
July 4, 1997. There is even no evidence that Huera was in the house when Ed Henderson
was detained on July 3 and 4, 1997.
Contrary to the assertion of the appellants, it is not physically impossible for four people to ride
on a motorcycle, taking into account the sizes and weights of the riders. Ed Henderson was,
after all, only nine years old at that time.
The Court also rejects appellant Tampos plea that the Court take discretionary judicial notice
that the business of butchering pigs and selling their meat is, by nature, a lucrative business.
The appellant was burdened to prove his claim that he was so affluent that it was incredible for
him to indulge in kidnapping for ransom. The appellant failed to do so, and merely relied on his
bare testimony. There is no evidence how much the appellant earned from the business he
was allegedly engaged in. In contrast, the appellants collected P548,000.00 by way of ransom
from Eddie Tan for the kidnapping of his son.
The fact that the cell phone used by the kidnappers to demand ransom was owned by Sherry
Mae Saliot, the daughter of appellants Ejandra and Calunod, does not constitute evidence that
the said appellants could not have used the said cell phone to demand ransom from Eddie
Tan. Sherry Mae Saliot could have just given the cell phone to her parents for their use, while
she paid for the charges thereon.
We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General that the appellants Ejandra and Calunod
waived any irregularities relating to their warrantless arrest when they failed to file a motion to
Page 28 of 75
quash the Information on that ground, or to object to any irregularity in their arrest before they
were arraigned. They are now estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest. 75
In People vs. Bisda,76 we had the occasion to state:
In People v. Pagalasan, this Court held that conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence.
It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of
the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design. Conspiracy may
be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the
accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts,
though apparently independent of each other were, in fact, connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. Conspiracy
once found, continues until the object of it has been accomplished unless abandoned or
broken up. To hold accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be
shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There
must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the
common design and purpose.
Conspirators are held to have intended the consequences of their acts and by purposely
engaging in conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces a prohibited result, they are,
in contemplation of law, chargeable with intending that result. Conspirators are necessarily
liable for the acts of another conspirator unless such act differs radically and substantively
from that which they intended to commit. As Judge Learned Hand put it in United States v.
Andolscheck, "when a conspirator embarks upon a criminal venture of indefinite outline, he
takes his chances as to its content and membership, so be it that they fall within the common
purposes as he understands them.
In the case at bar, the overt acts of the appellants were so coordinated to attain a common
purpose: that of kidnapping and detaining Ed Henderson for ransom. Appellants Ejandra,
Tampos and Revilla abducted the victim. Appellant Revilla drove the motorcycle from the place
of abduction to the house where the victim was detained. Appellant Calunod guarded the
victim during the latters detention, and later brought the victim to E. Rodriguez Avenue in
Quezon City prior to his release, along with appellant Tampos. Appellant Calunod also
collected the ransom from the victims father. All the foregoing facts indubitably show that the
appellants conspired to kidnap the victim for ransom.
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 reads:
ART. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention.Any private individual who shall kidnap
or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death.
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made.
majority that the law is constitutional, and that the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the
case at bar.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female or a public officer.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 219, convicting appellants Elvie Ejandra alias Elvies Ejandra alias Bebot
Ejandra alias Bebot Ocay Suangco, Magdalena Calunod y Maganoy alias Magdalena SaliotSuangco, Roel Ceron Revilla and Edwin Tampos y Amparo of kidnapping for ransom under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, sentencing each of them to suffer the
death penalty is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The aforementioned appellants
are ORDERED to pay, jointly and severally, to the victim Ed Henderson Tan and his
parents P350,000 as moral damages, and to pay, jointly and severally, to the Spouses Eddie
and Marileen Tan, the amount of P485,000 as actual damages.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose
of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances
above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected
to torture dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. 77
For the accused to be convicted of kidnapping or serious illegal detention, the prosecution is
burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime, namely, (1) the
offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives
the latter of h is liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the
commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or
detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c)
any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to
kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped and serious illegal detention is a minor, the
duration of his detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally
detained for the purpose of extorting ransom, the duration of his detention is immaterial. 78
To warrant an imposition of the death penalty for the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention for ransom, the prosecution must prove the following beyond reasonable doubt: (a)
intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his liberty; (b) actual deprivation of the
victim of his liberty; and, (c) motive of the accused, which is ransom for the victim or other
person for the release of the victim. The purpose of the offender in extorting ransom is a
qualifying circumstance which may be proven by his words and overt acts before, during and
after the kidnapping and detention of the victim. 79 Neither actual demand for nor actual
payment of ransom is necessary for the crime to be committed. 80 Ransom as employed in the
law is so used in its common or ordinary sense; meaning, a sum of money or other thing of
value, price, or consideration paid or demanded for redemption of a kidnapped or detained
person, a payment that releases from captivity.81 It may include benefits not necessarily
pecuniary which may accrue to the kidnapper as a condition for the victims release. 82
In this case, the appellants not only demanded but also received ransom for the release of the
victim. The trial court correctly sentenced the appellants to death. However, the trial court
erred in failing to order the appellants to pay, jointly and severally, to Ed Henderson, his
parents Eddie and Marileen Tan the amount of P485,000.00 as actual damages and the
amount of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages. Under Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code,
the principals are jointly and severally liable for the civil liabilities arising from the delict.
Three Justices of the Court maintain their position that Rep. Act No. 7659 is unconstitutional
insofar as it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the
Page 29 of 75
In accordance with Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 7659 amending Section 83 of the Revised
Penal Code, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded, upon finality of this Decision,
to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 163684
April 16, 2008
FAUSTINA
CAMITAN
and
DAMASO
vs.
FIDELITY INVESTMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
LOPEZ, petitioners,
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the
Decision1 dated November 28, 2003 and of the Resolution 2 dated May 12, 2004, both of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 37291 entitled Fidelity Investment Corporation v.
Alipio Camitan, Faustina Camitan, Damaso Lopez, the Regional Trial Court of Calamba,
Laguna (Branch 37) and the Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna.
The case arose from the Petition 3 for the issuance of another duplicate copy of Certificate of
Title No. T-(12110) T-4342 (TCT) filed in 1993 by herein petitioners, together with Alipio
Camitan, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Calamba, Laguna. The case was raffled to
Branch 37 of the said court and was docketed as SLRC Case No. 1198-93-C.
The petition contained, among others, the allegations that: (1) the petitioners are the true and
lawful registered co-owners of a parcel of land located at Maunong, Calamba, Laguna,
consisting of 30,000 square meters covered by the TCT; (2) the lot is declared for tax
purposes under Tax Declaration No. 14187; (3) petitioners paid the realty taxes on the said
property until 1993; (4) the owners duplicate copy was lost and could not be found despite
diligent efforts to locate it; (5) per Certification 4 dated June 21, 1993 of the Register of Deeds
of Calamba, Laguna, there were no legal claims annotated at the back of the TCT filed with
that office; (6) petitioners filed with the Register of Deeds an affidavit of loss of the said
owners duplicate copy; (7) they secured a certified true copy of the original TCT from the
Register of Deeds with the affidavit of loss annotated at the back thereof; (8) at the last page
of the original certificate of title, a mortgage was annotated, which upon verification was found
to have already been paid; (9) the Register of Deeds of Calamba could not cancel the
mortgage from the original copy of the title until presentation of the owners duplicate copy to
the bank; and (10) petitioners were in possession of the subject property.
After due proceedings, the RTC, in its Order 5 dated April 8, 1994, granted the petition, directed
the Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna to issue a second owners duplicate copy of the
TCT, and declared void the first owners duplicate copy thereof.
Later, on May 25, 1995, herein respondent Fidelity Investment Corporation (Fidelity) filed a
Petition6 for annulment of judgment and cancellation of title before the CA. According to
Fidelity, on December 16, 1967, it purchased the property covered by the subject certificate of
title from the registered owners thereof pursuant to a Deed of Absolute Sale 7 of the same date.
It said that upon execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale and the payment in full of the
purchase price, the vendors delivered to Fidelity their owners duplicate copy of the TCT,
which has been in its possession since. It also alleged that it had been in actual physical
Page 30 of 75
possession and continuous occupation of the subject property and that it had been paying the
real estate taxes due thereon.
It further said that, sometime in March 1995, upon verification with the Register of Deeds of
Calamba, Laguna, it learned for the first time of the issuance of a second owners duplicate
copy as recorded under Entry No. 357701 dated May 26, 1994 and annotated on the TCT.
Thus, it caused the sale of the property in its favor to be annotated on the TCT. The notice of
the sale was annotated on March 28, 1995 as Entry No. 384954. Fidelity then filed, on April
26, 1995, a Notice of Adverse Claim with the concerned Register of Deeds, which was
annotated on the TCT as Entry No. 387483.
In fine, Fidelity argued that the Order dated April 18, 1994 is null and void, the RTC having no
jurisdiction to issue the same as the owners duplicate copy of the TCT was in its possession
all along and the respondents therein had no standing to file the petition on account of the
Deed of Absolute Sale they executed in its favor. It claimed that the petitioners perjured
themselves before the RTC when they stated that the duplicate copy of the TCT was lost and
that they gave notice to all who had interest in the property, because they failed to notify
Fidelity despite knowledge of the latters possession of the property.
In their Comment,8 private respondents [herein petitioners] Faustina Camitan, Damaso Lopez,
and the surviving heirs of deceased Alipio Camitan, denied having committed falsehoods in
their petition before the trial court, which they claimed had jurisdiction over the case. They
submitted that the long, unexplained, and questionable silence of Fidelity on its alleged
possession of the owners duplicate copy of the TCT and the Deed of Absolute Sale over the
property and the non-registration and titling thereof in its name for about 27 years since the
purported sale, was tainted with malice and bad faith, thus, subjecting it to estoppel and
laches.
By its Resolution dated May 27, 1997, the CA gave due course to the petition for annulment of
judgment, and a preliminary conference was set, directing Fidelity to bring the owners
duplicate copy of the TCT. At the preliminary conference, Fidelitys counsel presented what
was claimed to be the owners duplicate copy of the TCT. Counsel for private respondents
examined the certificate of title and admitted that it is the genuine owners copy thereof.
Thereafter, counsel for Fidelity manifested that they were no longer presenting other evidence.
On the other hand, counsel for private respondents prayed that an additional issue, the
question of the validity of the deed of sale in favor of Fidelity, be likewise resolved. Fidelitys
counsel objected on the ground of irrelevancy. However, in order to expedite the proceedings,
he agreed to have private respondents amplify their position in their memorandum.
In their Memorandum, private respondents retracted their counsels admission on the
genuineness of the owners duplicate copy of the TCT presented by Fidelity, citing honest
mistake and negligence owing to his excitement and nervousness in appearing before the CA.
They pointed to some allegedly irreconcilable discrepancies between the copy annexed to the
petition and the exhibit presented by Fidelity during the preliminary conference. They also

reiterated the issue on the validity of the purported deed of sale of the property in favor of
Fidelity.
In its Comment to the Memorandum, Fidelity countered that there were no discrepancies
between the owners duplicate copy it presented and the original copy on file with the Registry
of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna. It argued that private respondents are bound by the judicial
admission made by their counsel during the preliminary conference. It, likewise, objected to
the inclusion of the issue on the validity of the deed of sale over the property.
In the Decision dated November 28, 2003, the CA ruled in favor of Fidelity. It declared that the
RTC was without jurisdiction to issue a second owners duplicate copy of the title in light of the
existence of the genuine owners duplicate copy in the possession of petitioner, as admitted by
private respondents through counsel. According to the CA, a judicial admission is conclusive
upon the party making it and cannot be contradicted unless previously shown to have been
made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. It said that honest
mistake and negligence, as raised by private respondents in retracting their counsels
admission, are not sufficient grounds to invalidate the admission.
Hence, this petition, raising the sole issue of
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT CONSIDER
THAT THE JUDICIAL ADMISSION OF THE COUNSEL OF THE PETITIONERS DURING THE
HEARING IN C.A.-G.R. SP. NO. 37291 WAS A PALPABLE MISTAKE.
Herein petitioners argue that despite the existence of a judicial admission, there is still some
leeway for the court to consider other evidence presented. They point out that, even as early
as in their Memorandum before the CA, they had already retracted their counsels admission
on the genuineness of the owners duplicate copy of the TCT presented by Fidelity, and claim
that their counsel was honestly mistaken and negligent in his admission owing to his
excitement and nervousness in appearing before the CA. Petitioners likewise cite, in support
of their position, the circumstances they alleged in their petition before the RTC which
convinced the latter to issue them a new owners duplicate copy of the TCT. Further,
petitioners raise in issue the discrepancies between the certificate of title on file with the
Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna and that submitted by Fidelity during the preliminary
conference before the CA.
someone in his behalf to the Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies as
soon as the loss or theft is discovered. If a duplicate certificate is lost or destroyed, or cannot
be produced by a person applying for the entry of a new certificate to him or for the
registration of any instrument, a sworn statement of the fact of such loss or destruction may be
filed by the registered owner or other person in interest and registered.
Upon the petition of the registered owner or other person in interest, the court may, after
notice and due hearing, direct the issuance of a new duplicate certificate, which shall contain a
memorandum of the fact that it is issued in place of the lost duplicate certificate, but shall in all
respects be entitled to like faith and credit as the original duplicate, and shall thereafter be
regarded as such for all purposes of this decree.
Petitioners were able to convince the RTC that their owners duplicate copy had indeed been
lost. They appeared to have complied with the requirements of the law. This led the RTC to
grant their petition.
Upon discovery of the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of the TCT, Fidelity went to
the CA seeking to annul the judgment of the RTC. Unfortunately for petitioners, their counsel
admitted the genuineness of the owners duplicate copy of the TCT presented by Fidelity
during the preliminary conference at the CA. The following exchange is revealing:
J. MARTIN:
Counsel for the private respondent, will you go over the owners copy and manifest to
the court whether that is a genuine owners copy?
ATTY. MENDOZA:
Yes, Your Honor.
J. MARTIN:
Alright. Make it of record that after examining the owners copy of TCT NO. (T-12110) T4342, counsel for the private respondent admitted that the same appears to be a
genuine owners copy of the transfer certificate of title. Do you have a certified true copy
of this or any machine copy that you can compare?
ATTY. QUINTOS:
Yes, Your Honor.
In its Comment,9 Fidelity reiterate the arguments it presented before the CA.
J. REYES:
We find for the respondent.
Including all the entries at the back page.
At the outset, we emphasize that the core issue in this case is the validity of the issuance by
the RTC of a new owners duplicate copy of the TCT in favor of petitioners. The applicable law
is Section 109 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), which
states:
ATTY. QUINTOS:
SEC. 109. Notice and replacement of lost duplicate certificate. In case of loss or theft of an
owners duplicate certificate of title, due notice under oath shall be sent by the owner or by
Does it include all the list of the encumbrances?
Page 31 of 75
Yes, Your Honor.

J. MARTIN:
ATTY. QUINTOS:

Yes, Your Honor.
ATTY. MENDOZA:
We do not admit, Your Honor this being only a xerox copy and not certified . . .
J. MARTIN:
It is only for purposes of substitution. Will you compare that with the other copy which you
already admitted to be a genuine owners copy.
ATTY. MENDOZA:
Yes, Your Honor.
J. MARTIN:
Alright. Counsel, are you marking that?
ATTY. QUINTOS:
Your Honor, we request that this copy of the transfer certificate of title No. T-12110, T-4342 be
marked as Exhibit A to A-3 for the petitioner?
J. MARTIN:
Preliminary conference.
Alright, after examining the machine copy consisting of three pages and comparing the
same with the admittedly genuine owners copy of the transfer certificate of title,
counsel prayed for the substitution of the machine copy after marking them as
Exhibits A-A-3 inclusive. We will return the owners copy to you so that you can submit this
already in lieu thereof.
This is a preliminary conference. Unless you have other incidents to thresh out, I think that we
can terminate the conference this morning. Counsel for the private respondents? 10
Petitioners now claim that the "honest mistake and negligence" of their counsel amount to
palpable mistake. They also enumerate observed discrepancies between the original TCT on
file with the Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna and the owners duplicate copy presented
by Fidelity, to wit:
1. On the above left margin of the xerox copy of the ORIGINAL COPY of TCT No. (T-12110) T4342 on file with the Register of Deeds, Calamba, Laguna in question, (Annex A,
Respondents Petition in question before the Court of Appeals) Annex C, supra, the PRINTED
WORDS were:
"(JUDICIAL
(Revised September, 1954.)
FORM
NO.
109)
However, in the belated submission of the alleged xerox copy of the alleged duplicate copy of
the title in question by the respondent to the Court of Appeals (Exh. A; Annex "H", supra,) the
following PRINTED WORDS appeared:
"(JUDICIAL
FORM
(Revised September, 1954.)" (Emphasis supplied)
NO.
109-D)
xxxx
[2.] The Serial Number of the Xerox copy of the original copy of the title in question on file with
the Register of Deeds of Calamba City was written in handwriting as "158640".
However, the Serial Number of the purported duplicate copy of the original title in question of
the respondent was PRINTED in letters and in figures: "No. 158640".
3. The typewritten words "PROVINCE OF LAGUNA" on the heading of the xerox copy of the
original copy of the said title on file with the said Register of Deeds were written in big type of
letters.
The foregoing transcript of the preliminary conference indubitably shows that counsel for
petitioners made a judicial admission and failed to refute that admission during the said
proceedings despite the opportunity to do so. A judicial admission is an admission, verbal or
written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, which dispenses
with the need for proof with respect to the matter or fact admitted. It may be contradicted only
by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
made.11
However, in Exh. "A", Annex H, supra, of the respondent, it was typewritten with small type of
letters.
Petitioners, in their Memorandum before the CA, attempted to retract their counsels judicial
admission on the authenticity of the owners duplicate copy of TCT in the possession of
Fidelity. Petitioners explicate that the wrong admission was an honest mistake and negligence
attributable to the counsels nervousness and excitement in appearing for the first time before
the CA. However, as correctly pointed out by the CA, such an admission may only be refuted
upon a proper showing of palpable mistake or that no such admission was made. Thus, the
claim of "honest mistake and negligence" on the part of the counsel due to his excitement and
nervousness in appearing before the CA did not suffice.
5. In the xerox copy of the original copy of title of the property in question covered by TCT No.
(T-12110) T-4342, which cancelled TCT No. T-10700, the type of letter "T", figures, 10700 and
dash thereof were in big letters.
Page 32 of 75
4. In the FIGURES of the xerox copy of the original copy of the said title: NO. (T-12110) T4342 in question, they were written in a big type of letters. The same is true in the letters "T"
and DASH after the letter "T". The figures "4342" were printed in big letters.
However, the printed and handwritten figures and words in Exh. A, Annex C, supra, were
small. The figures 4342 were in handwriting.
However, the purported duplicate copy of the original copy of the title in question submitted to
the Court of Appeals by the respondent, the type of the letter, dash and figures thereof were in
small letters.

6. The type of the printed words, dashes, and figures in the body of the Xerox copy of the
original title in question, it was typewritten with big letters and figures.
The purported duplicate copy of the original title of the property in question submitted to the
Court of Appeals by the respondent, the letters, dashes and figures there of were typewritten
in small letters.
7. The letters, dashes, and figures of the xerox copy of the original title in question
were typewritten in a manual typewriter with big letters.
In Exh. "A", Annex H, supra, the purported duplicate copy of the original title in question
submitted to the Court of Appeals by the respondent, they were typewritten in a manual
typewriter with small letters and figures.
8. The signatures of the Registrar of Deeds in the xerox of the original copy of the title in
question; had loop in small letter "d" and the rest had no loops.
In Exh. A, Annex H, supra, of the purported duplicate copy of the title in question submitted by
the respondent to the Court of Appeals, there was no loop, except there were two (2) open
vertical lines below thereof after four letters.
9. The xerox copy of the original copy of the title in question after TCT No. T-10700 was
cancelled, it was entered in the Register of Deeds of Sta. Cruz, Laguna since September 24,
1957 at 9:10 a.m.
10. In view thereof, it is but NATURAL that the judicial forms and descriptions of letters and
figures of the original copy of title in question and file with the Register of Deeds its duplicate
copy since September 24, 1954, were the SAME and already OLD.
11. However, in Exh. "A", Annex H, supra, the purported duplicate copy of the title in question
submitted by the respondent to the Court of Appeals, the judicial form thereof was already
small and it clearly appeared that it might have been NEWLY ISSUED NEW COPY OF TITLE.
It might be the revised new form in 1988 that is presently used in the Register of Deeds. 12
Upon examination of the said exhibits on record, it appears that the alleged discrepancies are
more imagined than real. Had these purported discrepancies been that evident during the
preliminary conference, it would have been easy for petitioners counsel to object to the
authenticity of the owners duplicate copy of the TCT presented by Fidelity. As shown in the
transcript of the proceedings, there was ample opportunity for petitioners counsel to examine
the document, retract his admission, and point out the alleged discrepancies. But he chose not
to contest the document. Thus, it cannot be said that the admission of the petitioners counsel
was made through palpable mistake.
Every counsel has the implied authority to do all acts which are necessary or incidental to the
prosecution and management of the suit in behalf of his client. Any act performed by counsel
within the scope of his general and implied authority is, in the eyes of the law, regarded as the
act of the client himself. Consequently, the mistake or negligence of the clients counsel, which
may result in the rendition of an unfavorable judgment, generally binds the client. To rule
Page 33 of 75
otherwise would encourage every defeated party, in order to salvage his case, to claim neglect
or mistake on the part of his counsel. Then, there would be no end to litigation, as every
shortcoming of counsel could be the subject of challenge by his client through another counsel
who, if he is also found wanting, would likewise be disowned by the same client through
another counsel, and so on, ad infinitum.
This rule admits of exceptions, i.e., where the counsels mistake is so great and serious that
the client is deprived of his day in court or of his property without due process of law. In these
cases, the client is not bound by his counsels mistakes and the case may even be reopened
in order to give the client another chance to present his case. 13 In the case at bar, however,
these exceptional circumstances do not obtain.
With proof that the owners duplicate copy of the TCT was in the possession of Fidelity, the
RTC Decision dated April 8, 1994 was properly annulled. In a catena of cases, we have
consistently ruled that if an owners duplicate copy of a certificate of title has not been lost but
is in fact in the possession of another person, the reconstituted title is void, as the court
rendering the decision never acquires jurisdiction. Consequently, the decision may be
attacked at any time.14
The circumstances cited by petitioners in support of their petition, i.e., the TCT is still in their
names; the property in question is declared for tax purposes in their names; they were the
persons informed by the Municipal Treasurer of Calamba, Laguna for the non-payment of real
estate taxes for the years 1990-1993; they paid the real estate taxes due on the property; no
one was claiming the property per the certification of the
Register of Deeds of Calamba, Laguna; the questionable delay of Fidelity in registering its
claim over the property under the purported sale of December 13, 1967; and the validity of the
Absolute Deed of Sale, all pertain to the issue of ownership over the property covered by the
TCT.
In a petition for the issuance of a new owners duplicate copy of a certificate of title in lieu of
one allegedly lost, on which this case is rooted, the RTC, acting only as a land registration
court with limited jurisdiction, has no jurisdiction to pass upon the question of actual ownership
of the land covered by the lost owners duplicate copy of the certificate of title. 15 Consequently,
any question involving the issue of ownership must be threshed out in a separate suit where
the trial court will conduct a full-blown hearing with the parties presenting their respective
evidence to prove ownership over the subject realty.16
At this point, we reiterate the principle that possession of a lost owners duplicate copy of a
certificate of title is not necessarily equivalent to ownership of the land covered by it.
Registration of real property under the Torrens System does not create or vest title because it
is not a mode of acquiring ownership. The certificate of title, by itself, does not vest ownership;
it is merely an evidence of title over the particular property described therein. 17
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 28, 2003 and the Resolution dated May 12,
2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37291 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 128114
October 25, 2000
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGER CANDO Y PAGDANGANAN, ARNEL VARGAS Y MAGTANGOB, AND WILBERTO
RAPCING Y BROOLA, accused-appellants.
QUISUMBING, J.:
On automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, in
Criminal Case No. 95-142748, convicting appellants of the crime of robbery with homicide,
sentencing them to death, ordering them solidarily to indemnify the heirs of the victim the
amount of P50,000.00, and to return the personal belongings taken from the victim and other
offended parties. In a related case, Criminal Case No. 95-142749, appellants were acquitted
of the charge of carnapping.
Appellants Cando and Rapcing, aged 40 and 28 respectively, were employed as
candlemakers at the Rosarian Candle Factory located in Paco, Manila. Appellant Vargas,
aged 20, was employed as a delivery boy. The victim, Luis D. Remoriata, was the caretaker
("katiwala") in said factory.
The facts based on the records are as follows:
In the afternoon of May 13, 1995, Vargas, Rapcing and one Nonoy Sayson were having a
drinking session at a canteen in front of the factory. At around 9:30 P.M., Cando joined the
group. Upon the prompting of Vargas, Cando went to the factory to get his salary. Cando came
back angry because he was unable to get his salary from the secretary, nor was he able to get
a loan of P100.00 from the caretaker. Apparently, Cando already had previous
misunderstandings with the caretaker, so this time, he threatened to kill the caretaker. The
group continued their drinking session.1
At around 11:00 P.M., Vargas, Rapcing, and Cando, armed with two knives and carrying a
shoulder bag, climbed the fence of the factory. They walked on the galvanized iron roof
towards the other building. One by one, they slipped through a narrow window at the side of
the building. The trio proceeded to the victim's room, which was lighted by a fluorescent lamp.
Cando picked a piece of lead pipe and told Vargas to pull open the door where the victim's
mosquito net was attached. When Vargas pulled open the door, the mosquito net snapped
and Cando struck the victim on the head with the lead pipe. The victim awakened and Cando
demanded money from him. When the victim replied that he had no money, Cando struck him
again with the lead pipe. Blood oozed from the victim's head. Cando asked the victim if he
recognized him. The victim weakly replied "Yes, You are Roger (Cando)." Thereafter, Cando
repeatedly hit him with the lead pipe until he became unconscious. Cando placed the victim's
radio cassette in his bag. He went upstairs to get more items and the keys of the Cimarron
van. Thereafter, the trio went downstairs to where the van was parked. Vargas, the only one
who knew how to drive, sat on the driver's seat. Cando and Rapcing opened the gate, then
pushed the van outside. Once they were out of hearing range, Vargas gunned the motor and
Page 34 of 75
the two clambered into the van. Cando sat on the passenger side while Rapcing sat at the
back. Cando prevailed upon the group to proceed to Quiapo to visit his girlfriend, but they
could not locate her so they just drove around until daybreak. When they reached Hemady
Street in Quezon City, they abandoned the van. The trio boarded a jeep going to Taft Avenue
and went their separate ways.2 It was then already early morning of May 14, 1995.
At around 6:00 A.M., Mrs. Norma Chu, the factory owner, discovered the dead body of Luis
Remoriata. The factory van was also missing. A hysterical Mrs. Chu called the Barangay
Captain, who in turn reported the incident to the police. Upon investigation, the police found a
bakawan firewood stained with blood some ten meters away from the victim's body. The police
also called a funeral parlor to get the body of the victim. 3
In the meantime, the van was discovered by Barangay Kagawad Mejia, who called up the
telephone number posted at the side of the van. The owner, Mrs. Chu, arrived with three NBI
Agents who took pictures of the van and lifted fingerprints from it. 4
The very next day, May 15, 1995, Mrs. Chu lodged a complaint 5 with the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). Based on her complaint, the NBI dispatched a team of agents to the crime
scene. The NBI recovered a bloodstained steel pipe behind the door of the room. Upon
learning from Mrs. Chu that appellants Cando and Vargas had previous skirmishes with the
victim, on May 16, 1995, the NBI agents picked up Vargas from the factory and brought him to
their office for questioning.6
Vargas readily admitted his participation and pinpointed appellants Cando and Rapcing as his
co-perpetrators. He likewise executed an extrajudicial admission 7 and waiver of his rights
under Articles 124 and 125 of the Revised Penal Code.8
Acting on the lead, the NBI agents picked appellant Cando at his house in Libis St., Caloocan
City. Appellant Cando invoked his right to remain silent. 9 He executed a waiver of rights under
Articles 124 and 125 of the Revised Penal Code.10
Thereafter, appellant Rapcing was also arrested at his house in Cristobal St., Looban, Paco,
Manila.11 Rapcing admitted complicity in the crime, and executed an extrajudicial
admission12 corroborating the story of Vargas. He also executed a waiver of his rights under
Articles 124 and 125 of the Revised Penal Code.13
During custodial investigation, the three were assisted by Atty. Isidro T. Gamutan, a lawyer
who happened to be at the NBI because he was following up a case.
On May 17, 1995, appellant Vargas executed a second extrajudicial admission 14 stating that
Cando gave him the bag containing the stolen items for safekeeping and that he brought the
bag to his sister-in-law's house in Kahilum, San Andres Bukid, Manila. He accompanied the
NBI agents to the house and gave them the bag which bore Cando's name. 15
On May 23, 1995, appellants were charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide under the
following Information:16

"The undersigned accuses ROGER CANDO y PAGDANGANAN, ARNEL VARGAS y
MAGTANGOB and WILFREDO RAPCING y BROOLA of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, committed as follows;
That on or about May 13, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring
and confederating together and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with intent of gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: by
hitting one LUIS D. REMORIATA with steel pipe and wood on the head several times and at
the same time forcibly taking away from him the following, to wit:
Mrs. Norma Chu testified that when she discovered the body of the victim, the quarters was in
disarray, and the victim's clothes and radio were missing. Later, her husband and son
informed her that their wallets which they placed on top of the TV in the sala upstairs, and two
other wristwatches were missing. She also identified the van which was recovered from
Hemady St. in Quezon City as the one belonging to the factory.18
One (1) Brown wallet valued at
P 120.00
containing cash money of
1,000.00
Cash money in the amount of
10,000.00
Three (3) wrist watches, all valued
1,000.00
Serafin Gil testified that he took down the statement of Mrs. Chu and supervised the custodial
investigation of appellants.19 Mario Garcia took down the statements of Vargas and
Rapcing.20 Gregorio Tomagan testified that he was present during the taking of the two
statements of appellant Vargas dated May 16 and 17, 1995. 21 Cecilio Datinguinoo testified that
he took pictures of the van while the NBI agents were lifting fingerprints from the van. 22Elter
Yano testified that he managed to lift six (6) fingerprints from the cimarron van, tagged as "Q1" to "Q-6". He testified that "Q-1" which was lifted from the air freshener found in the van was
identical to the left index fingerprint of appellant Vargas (Exh. "DD"). Likewise, "Q-2" which
was lifted from the victim's stereo cassette was identical to the right ring fingerprint of Cando
(Exh. "EE"). The other prints were unidentifiable.23
One (1) Radio cassette (STD)
1,200.00
Dr. Manuel Lagonera testified that the cause of death was "blunt head injuries" and that the
victim sustained the following injuries:24
Assorted clothing, not less than
500.00
"1. Triangular lacerated wound, with contusions at the periphery, measuring 3x2. 8x2.5 cms,
right forehead.
2. Deep lacerated wound, right forehead, above the right eyebrow, measuring 7x1.9 cms.
or in the total amount of P13,820.00 belonging to said Luis D. Remoriata and under his
personal care, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid amount of
P13,820.00, Philippine Currency; that on the occasion of the said robbery and by reason
thereof, the herein accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal violence upon
the said LUIS D. REMORIATA, and as a result thereof, he sustained physical injuries which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death.
3. Lacerated wound, right zygomatic region, measuring 4.2x1.5 cms.
Contrary to law.
9. Lacerated wound, left occipital region, measuring 7x3 cms.
ALEJANDRO G. BIJASA
10. V-shaped lacerated wound, right external ear, measuring 3x2.5 cms.
Asst. City Prosecutor"
11. Abrasion, right anterior shoulder, measuring 4x1.8 cms.
On August 29, 1995, upon arraignment, appellants entered their respective pleas of not
guilty.17 Joint trial ensued.
12. Semi-circular contusion, right supra-clavicular region, measuring 3.5x3.2 cms.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Norma C. Chu, the factory owner; (2)
NBI Agents Serafin Gil, Mario Garcia, Gregorio Tomagan; (3) NBI Photographer Cecilio
Datinguinoo; (4) NBI Fingerprint Examiner Elter Yano; (5) Dr. Manuel Lagonera, medico-legal
officer; (6) Atty. Isidro Gamutan, counsel of appellants during custodial investigation; (7)
Barangay Kagawad Alejandro Mejia.
4. Deep lacerated wound, left frontal region, measuring 7x2.5cms.

5. Lacerated wound, left fronto-temporal region, measuring 2.5x2 cms.
6. Deep lacerated wound, angle of the mouth, right, measuring 4.5x2 cms.
7. Hematoma, both upper eyelids.
8. Deep lacerated wound, vertex, measuring 9x3 cms.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. There was extensive sub-aponeurotic hematoma with multiple fractures of the cranial vault.
Epidural hematoma over the left parietal lobe of the brain with massive sub-arachnoid
hemorrhage.
2. Right anterior and middle cranial fossae were fractured.
3. The stomach was empty."
Page 35 of 75

Atty. Isidro T. Gamutan testified that he happened to be at the NBI when the three accused
were scheduled for custodial investigation. The Chief of the Anti-Carnapping Unit requested
him to give legal assistance to the three accused. He asked the accused why they were being
investigated, and explained to them their rights. When he was satisfied that the accused
understood their rights, he assisted them in executing their extrajudicial statements. 25
Alejandro Mejia, Barangay Kagawad at Barangay Kristong Hari, Quezon City testified that he
found the abandoned van with a flat tire. He contacted the owner through the telephone
number printed on the side of the van. The owner arrived with three NBI agents who examined
the van.26
For the defense, appellants testified. Appellant Cando stated that he finished Grade III, cannot
read, but can write his name. He denied any participation in the killing, but claimed that Vargas
and Rapcing knew about the incident. He said that on May 13, 1995, he reported for work at
the factory at 2:00 P.M. until 10:00 P.M. He went home in Libis St. Caloocan City, where he
slept until around 11:00 A.M. the following day. He denied joining the drinking session. On May
14, 1995, he reported for work at around 12:00 NN until 2:00 P.M.. He identified as his the bag
containing the stolen items. He further identified the contents of the bags, the air freshener
which was taken from the van, the two wristwatches belonging to the son and daughter of Mrs.
Chu. He admitted that he and the other two appellants offered to pay to the widow of the victim
damages for his death.27
Appellant Vargas, for his part, admitted participation in the killing, but claimed that he was
forced by Cando at knife point to participate. He further claimed that it was only Cando who
killed the victim by hitting him with an iron bar. He admitted, however, that he agreed to drive
the Cimarron because he wanted to practice driving. 28
Appellant Rapcing recanted his extrajudicial admission. He denied any knowledge or
participation in the killing since he was stone drunk ("lasing na lasing"). He claimed that he just
slept inside a Tamaraw pick-up parked outside the factory. Further, he claimed that the finding
of guilt is inconsistent with the fact that he never went into hiding after the alleged incident. 29
30
On December 27, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision convicting the three (3)
appellants of Robbery with Homicide with the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and treachery, and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of death. Appellants
were acquitted of the charge of carnapping.
Hence, the present automatic review. In their consolidated brief, 31 appellants raise the lone
assignment of error that
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF
EVIDENT PREMEDITATION AND TREACHERY ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE
CRIME CHARGED.
In praying for the reduction of the sentence from death to reclusion perpetua, appellants
contend that the prosecution failed to prove evident premeditation, as there was no time for
cool reflection since their minds were hazy with the influence of liquor. Appellants further
Page 36 of 75
dispute the existence of treachery since the killing of Remoriata was merely "on the spur of the
moment."
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that evident premeditation clearly attended
the commission of the crime but said aggravating circumstance, being inherent in the crime of
robbery with homicide, should not be appreciated separately.32 Treachery qualified the killing
since the victim was sleeping at the time he was attacked. In addition, the generic aggravating
circumstances of nighttime and dwelling should be appreciated.
The principal issue for resolution is whether the aggravating circumstances of treachery and
evident premeditation attended the commission of the offense? Secondarily, we must also
determine whether all the elements of robbery with homicide were proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially
to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended
party might make.33 The conditions which must concur before treachery can be appreciated
are: (a) the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity
to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) that said means of execution be deliberately and
consciously adopted.34 The essence of treachery lies in the adoption of ways that minimize or
neutralize any resistance which may be put up by the offended party. 35 The killing of the
sleeping victim herein was attended by treachery since he was in no position to flee or defend
himself.36
The presence of treachery, though, should not result in qualifying the offense to murder, for the
correct rule is that when it obtains in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, such
treachery is to be regarded as a generic aggravating circumstance, robbery with homicide
being a case of a composite crime with its own definition and special penalty in the Revised
Penal Code.37
For evident premeditation to exist, the prosecution must prove with clear and convincing
evidence the following elements: (1) the time when the offenders decided to commit the crime;
(2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient
lapse of time between the determination and execution to allow them to reflect upon the
consequences of their act and allow their conscience to overcome the resolution of their
will.38 Evident premeditation is inherent in crimes against property, but it may be considered in
robbery with homicide if there is premeditation to kill besides stealing. 39 The prosecution
clearly proved the intention to rob and to disable the victim, but not the intention to kill him. As
Vargas testified, the victim was still alive when they left him rolling on the floor. 40 Thus, evident
premeditation can not be appreciated where the prosecution failed to establish that the
accused killed the victim pursuant to a preconceived plan. 41
The alternative circumstance of intoxication, however, should be considered as mitigating, it
having been sufficiently shown that (1) at the time of the commission of the criminal act, they

have taken such quantity of alcoholic drinks as to blur their reason and deprive them of certain
degree of control, and (b) that such intoxication is not habitual, or subsequent to the plan to
commit the felony.42
As to the crime committed, the prosecution amply established the following elements of
robbery with homicide: (a) the taking of personal property is perpetrated by means of violence
or intimidation against a person, (b) the property taken belongs to another, (c) the taking is
characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi, and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by
reason thereof, the crime of homicide, in its generic sense, is committed. 43 It matters not that
the victim was killed prior to the taking of the personal properties of the victim and the other
occupants of the house. What is essential in robbery with homicide is that there be a "direct
relation, and intimate connection between robbery and the killing, whether the latter be prior or
subsequent to the former or whether both crimes be committed at the same time. 44 The rule
is well-established that whenever homicide has been committed as a consequence of or on
the occasion of the robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be
held guilty as principals of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide although they
did not actually take part in the homicide, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to
prevent the homicide. 45 While Cando was bashing the head of the victim, and placing the
personal items in his bag, nary a peep could be heard from Vargas and Rapcing. Their act of
simply watching Cando shows their moral assent and complete acquiescence to the
commission of the crime.
Appellant Vargas claims that he was threatened at knife point to join appellant Cando in the
commission of the crime. He is in effect invoking the exempting circumstance of compulsion of
an irresistible force under Article 12, par. 5 of the Revised Penal Code. We have held that the
compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape
or self-defense. 46 Vargas had several opportunities to prevent the killing and to escape, but
he chose to remain with his co-conspirators, and even willingly drove the get-away vehicle.
As to appellant Rapcing, the fact that he did not go into hiding after the alleged incident does
not make him an innocent man. We have long ruled that flight is an indicium of guilt, but nonflight is not necessarily an indicium of innocence.47
Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 9 of R.A. No. 7659, the
penalty for robbery with homicide is reclusion perpetua to death. There being one mitigating
circumstance of intoxication, and one aggravating circumstance of treachery, the penalty to be
imposed is reclusion perpetua.48 The existence of one aggravating circumstance merits the
award of exemplary damages under Art. 2230 of the New Civil Code.
We likewise order that the personal properties which are in custodia legis be returned to the
offended parties.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, in Criminal Case
No. 95-142748 is hereby MODIFIED as follows: appellants ROGER CANDO Y
PAGDANGANAN, ARNEL VARGAS Y MAGTANGOB, and WILBERTO RAPCING Y
Page 37 of 75
BROOLA are hereby found guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, and sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered solidarily to pay the heirs of the victim
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to return to the
owners thereof the cash and the vehicle and other effects taken by the appellants, as well as
to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 183830
October 19, 2011
PEOPLE
OF
vs.
DELFIN CALISO, Accused-Appellant.
THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The decisive question that seeks an answer is whether the identification of the perpetrator of
the crime by an eyewitness who did not get a look at the face of the perpetrator was reliable
and positive enough to support the conviction of appellant Delfin Caliso (Caliso).
Caliso was arraigned and tried for rape with homicide, but the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 21, in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte found him guilty of murder for the killing of AAA, 1 a
mentally-retarded 16-year old girl, and sentenced him to death in its decision dated August 19,
2002.2 The appeal of the conviction was brought automatically to the Court. On June 28,
2005,3 the Court transferred the records to the Court of Appeals (CA) for intermediate review
pursuant to the ruling in People v. Mateo. 4 On October 26, 2007,5 the CA, although affirming
the conviction, reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua and modified the civil awards. Now,
Caliso is before us in a final bid to overturn his conviction.
Antecedents
The information dated August 5, 1997 charged Caliso with rape with homicide perpetrated in
the following manner:
That on or about the 5th day of June, 1997, at Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force,
violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge upon one AAA, who is a minor of 16 years old and a mentally retarded girl, against
her will and consent; that on the occasion of said rape and in furtherance of the accuseds
criminal designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, and
taking advantage of superior strength, attack, assault and use personal violence upon said
AAA by mauling her, pulling her towards a muddy water and submerging her underneath,
which caused the death of said AAA soon thereafter.
CONTRARY to and in VIOLATION of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A.
7659, otherwise known as the "Heinous Crimes Law".6
that Amegable subsequently heard sounds of beating and mauling that soon ended the girls
cries; that Amegable then proceeded to get a better glimpse of what was happening, hiding
behind a cluster of banana trees in order not to be seen, and from there she saw a man
wearing gray short pants bearing the number "11" mark, who dragged a girls limp body into
the river, where he submerged the girl into the knee-high muddy water and stood over her
body; that he later lifted the limp body and tossed it to deeper water; that he next jumped into
the other side of the river; that in that whole time, Amegable could not have a look at his face
because he always had his back turned towards her; 9 that she nonetheless insisted that the
man was Caliso, whose physical features she was familiar with due to having seen him pass
by their barangay several times prior to the incident; 10 that after the man fled the crime scene,
Amegable went straight to her house and told her husband what she had witnessed; and that
her husband instantly reported the incident to the barangay chairman.
It appears that one SPO3 Romulo R. Pancipanci declared in an affidavit 11 that upon his station
receiving the incident report on AAAs death at about 12:45 pm of June 5, 1997, he and two
other officers proceeded to the crime scene to investigate; that he interviewed Amegable who
identified the killer by his physical features and clothing (short pants); that based on such
information, he traced Caliso as AAAs killer; and that Caliso gave an extrajudicial admission of
the killing of AAA. However, the declarations in the affidavit remained worthless because the
Prosecution did not present SPO3 Pancipanci as its witness.
Leo Bering, the barangay chairman of San Vicente, Kapatagan, Lanao Del Norte, attested that
on the occasion of Calisos arrest and his custodial interrogation, he heard Caliso admit to the
investigating police officer the ownership of the short pants recovered from the crime scene;
that the admission was the reason why SPO3 Pancipanci arrested Caliso from among the
curious onlookers that had gathered in the area; that Amegable, who saw SPO3 Pancipancis
arrest of Caliso at the crime scene, surmised that Caliso had gone home and returned to the
crime scene thereafter.12
Municipal Health Officer Dr. Joseph G.B. Fuentecilla conducted the post-mortem examination
on the body of AAA on June 6, 1997, and found the following injuries, to wit:
EXTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. The dead body was generally pale wearing a heavily soiled old sleeveless shirt and garter
skirts.
2. The body was wet and heavily soiled with mud both nostrils and mouth was filled with mud.
At his arraignment on November 12, 1997,7 Caliso pleaded not guilty to the charge.
3. The skin of hands and feet is bleached and corrugated in appearance.
The records show that AAA died on June 5, 1997 at around 11:00 am in the river located in
Barangay Tiacongan, Kapatagan, Lanao Del Norte; that the immediate cause of her death
was asphyxia, secondary to drowning due to smothering; that the lone eyewitness, 34-year old
Soledad Amegable (Amegable), had been clearing her farm when she heard the anguished
cries of a girl pleading for mercy: Please stop noy, it is painful noy!; 8 that the cries came from
an area with lush bamboo growth that made it difficult for Amegable to see what was going on;
4. 2 cm. linear lacerated wound on the left cheek (sic).
Page 38 of 75
5. Multiple small (sic) reddish contusions on anterior neck area.

6. Circular hematoma formation 3 inches in diameter epigastric area of abdomen.
7. Four erythematus linear abrasion of the left cheek (sic).

8. Presence of a 6x8 inches bulge on the back just below the inferior angle of both scapula
extending downwards.
9. The body was wearing an improperly placed underwear with the garter vertically oriented to
the right stained with moderate amount of yellowish fecal material.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, accused DELFIN CALISO is hereby

sentenced to death and to indemnify the heirs of AAA in the amount of P50,000.00. The
accused is also hereby ordered to pay the said heirs the amount of P50, 000.00 as exemplary
damages.
10. Minimal amount of pubic hair in the lower pubis with labia majora contracted and retracted.
SO ORDERED.15
11. Theres no swelling abrasion, laceration, blood hematoma formation in the vulva. There
were old healed hymenal lacerations at 5 and 9 oclock position.
The RTC found that rape could not be complexed with the killing of AAA because the oldhealed hymenal lacerations of AAA and the fact that the victims underwear had been
irregularly placed could not establish the commission of carnal knowledge; that the examining
physician also found no physical signs of rape on the body of AAA; and that as to the killing of
AAA, the identification by Amegable that the man she had seen submerging AAA in the murky
river was no other than Caliso himself was reliable.
12. Vaginal canal admits one finger with no foreign body recovered (sic).
13. Oval shaped contusion/hematoma 6 cm at its greatest diameter anterior surface middle
3rd left thigh.
14. Presence of 2 contusion laceration 1x0.5 cm in size medial aspect left knee. 13
Dr. Fuentecilla also conducted a physical examination on the body of Caliso and summed up
his findings thusly:
P.E. FINDINGS:
1. Presence of a 7x0.1 cm. horizontally averted linear erythematus contusion left side of neck
(Post ).
2. 8x0.2 cm. reddish linear abrasion (probably a scratch mark) from the left midclavicular line
extending to the left anterioraxillary line.
3. Presence of 2 erythematus abrasion 3 cmx0.1 cm in average size dorsal surface (probably
a scratch mark) middle 3rd left arm.
Nevertheless, the RTC did not take into consideration the testimony of Bering on Calisos
extrajudicial admission of the ownership of the short pants because the pants were not
presented as evidence and because the police officers involved did not testify about the pants
in court.16 The RTC cited the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength to raise the
crime from homicide to murder, regarding the word homicide in the information to be used in
its generic sense as to include all types of killing.
Ruling of the CA
On intermediate review, the following errors were raised in the brief for the accusedappellant,17 namely:
4. 2.5 cm. abrasion dorsal surface middle and right forearm.
i. The court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of murder
despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt;
5. Presence of a linear erythematus contusion (probably a scratch mark) 2x7 cm. in average
size lateral boarder of scapula extending to left posterior axillary line.
ii. The court a quo gravely erred in giving weight and credence to the incredible and
inconsistent testimony of the prosecution witnesses.
6. Presence of 2 oblique oriented erythematus contusion (probably a scratch mark) 14x022

cm. and 5x0.2 cm. in size respectively at the upper left flank of the lower back extending
downward to the midline.
iii. The court a quo gravely erred in appreciating the qualifying aggravating circumstance of
taking advantage of superior strength and the generic aggravating circumstance of disregard
of sex[; and]
7. Presence of 5 linear reddish pressure contusion parallel to each other with an average 5 cm
left flank area.14
iv. The court a quo gravely erred in imposing the death penalty.
In his defense, Caliso denied the accusation and interposed an alibi, insisting that on the day
of the killing, he plowed the rice field of Alac Yangyang from 7:00 am until 4:00 pm.
Yangyang corroborated Calisos alibi, recalling that Caliso had plowed his rice field from 8 am
to 4 pm of June 5, 1997. He further recalled that Caliso was in his farm around 12:00 noon
because he brought lunch to Caliso. He conceded, however, that he was not aware where
Caliso was at the time of the killing.
Ruling of the RTC
After trial, the RTC rendered its judgment on August 19, 2002, viz:
Page 39 of 75
As stated, the CA affirmed Calisos conviction for murder based on the same ratiocinations the
RTC had rendered. The CA also relied on the identification by Amegable of Caliso, despite his
back being turned towards her during the commission of the crime. The CA ruled that she
made a positive identification of Caliso as the perpetrator of the killing, observing that the
incident happened at noon when the sun had been at its brightest, coupled with the fact that
Amegables view had not been obstructed by any object at the time that AAAs body had been
submerged in the water; that the RTC expressly found her testimony as clear and
straightforward and worthy of credence; that no reason existed why Amegable would falsely
testify against Caliso; that Caliso did not prove the physical impossibility for him to be at the
crime scene or at its immediate vicinity at the time of the incident, for both Barangay San

Vicente, where AAAs body was found, and Barangay Tiacongan, where the rice field of
Yangyang was located, were contiguous; that the attendant circumstance of abuse of superior
strength qualified the killing of AAA to murder; that disregard of sex should not have been
appreciated as an aggravating circumstance due to its not being alleged in the information and
its not being proven during trial; and that the death penalty could not be imposed because of
the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, prohibiting its imposition in the Philippines.
Q: Mrs. Amegable, you said during your direct examination that you saw Delfin Caliso, the
accused in this case, several times passed by your barangay, am I correct?
The CA decreed in its judgment, viz:
Q: Are you acquainted with him?
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated August 19, 2002, finding
appellant guilty of Murder, is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant Delfin
Caliso is sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and is directed to pay the victims heirs the amount
of P50,000.00 as moral damages, as well as the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages, in addition to the civil indemnity of P50,000.00 he had been adjudged to pay by the
trial court.
A: Yes, sir.
SO ORDERED.18
The inconsistencies as alleged by appellant, between Soledad Amegables declaration in court

and her affidavit, such as the tree or plant from where she was hiding behind at the time of the
incident, are insignificant and cannot negate appellants criminal liability. Her whole attention
was riveted to the incident that was unfolding before her. Besides, any such inconsistencies
are minor. Slight contradictions are indicative of an unrehearsed testimony and could even
serve to strengthen the witness credibility. A witness who is telling the truth is not always
expected to give a perfectly concise testimony, considering the lapse of time and the treachery
of human memory.
Issue
The primordial issue is whether Amegables identification of Caliso as the man who killed AAA
at noon of July 5, 1997 was positive and reliable.
Ruling
The appeal is meritorious.
In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be
established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, the first duty of the Prosecution is not
to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the commission of the
crime can be established, there can be no conviction without proof of identity of the criminal
beyond reasonable doubt.19
The CA rejected the challenge Caliso mounted against the reliability of his identification as the
culprit by Amegable in the following manner:20
As to the first two errors raised, appellant contends that the testimony of Soledad Amegable
was replete with discrepancies. Appellant avers, for instance, that Soledad failed to see the
assailants face. Moreover, considering the distance between where Soledad was supposedly
hiding and where the incident transpired, appellant states that it was inconceivable for her to
have heard and seen the incident. According to appellant, witness Soledad could not even
remember if at that time, she hid behind a banana plant, or a coconut tree.
At bench, the incident happened at noon, when the sun was at its brightest. Soledad could
very well recognize appellant. Furthermore, notwithstanding the fact that it was his back that
was facing her, she asserted being familiar with the physical features of appellant, considering
that he frequented their barangay. Even during her cross-examination by the defense counsel,
Soledad remained steadfast in categorically stating that she recognized appellant:
Page 40 of 75
A: Several times.
Q: By any chance prior to the incident, did you talk to him?
A: No, sir.
Q: Even if he is in his back position?

A: Yes, sir. (Emphasis Supplied)
Given the circumstances as stated above, it was even probable that Soledad caught glimpses
of the profile of the appellant at the time of the incident. She related, in addition, that when the
victim was being submerged in the water, there was no object obstructing her view.
In fact, the testimony of a single eye-witness is sufficient to support a conviction, so long as

such testimony is found to be clear and straightforward and worthy of credence by the trial
court. Furthermore, over here, witness Soledad had no reason to testify falsely against
appellant.
Besides, the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the
trial court, because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note
their demeanor, conduct and attitude.lawphi1Findings of the trial court on such matters are
binding and conclusive on the appellate court.
Contrary to the CAs holding that the identification of Caliso based on Amegables recognition
of him was reliable, the Court considers the identification not reliable and beyond doubt as to
meet the requirement of moral certainty.
When is identification of the perpetrator of a crime positive and reliable enough for
establishing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt?
The identification of a malefactor, to be positive and sufficient for conviction, does not always
require direct evidence from an eyewitness; otherwise, no conviction will be possible in crimes
where there are no eyewitnesses. Indeed, trustworthy circumstantial evidence can equally
confirm the identification and overcome the constitutionally presumed innocence of the

accused. Thus, the Court has distinguished two types of positive identification in People v.
Gallarde,21 to wit: (a) that by direct evidence, through an eyewitness to the very commission of
the act; and (b) that by circumstantial evidence, such as where the accused is last seen with
the victim immediately before or after the crime. The Court said:
xxx Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that
of being an eyewitness to the very act of commission of the crime. There are two types of
positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal case as the
perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This
constitutes direct evidence. There may, however, be instances where, although a witness
may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he may still be able
to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance
when the latter is the person or one of the persons last seen with the victim
immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is the second type
of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken
together with other pieces of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and
reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the crime to the exclusion of
all others. If the actual eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify a
suspect or accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless
there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary that there can be no conviction
until and unless an accused is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd,
because it is settled that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix
wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. If resort to circumstantial
evidence would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of direct
evidence, then felons would go free and the community would be denied proper protection. 22
Amegable asserted that she was familiar with Caliso because she had seen him pass by in
her barangay several times prior to the killing. Such assertion indicates that she was obviously
assuming that the killer was no other than Caliso. As matters stand, therefore, Calisos
conviction hangs by a single thread of evidence, the direct evidence of Amegables
identification of him as the perpetrator of the killing. But that single thread was thin, and cannot
stand sincere scrutiny. In every criminal prosecution, no less than moral certainty is required in
establishing the identity of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. Her identification of
Caliso as the perpetrator did not have unassailable reliability, the only means by which it might
be said to be positive and sufficient. The test to determine the moral certainty of an
identification is its imperviousness to skepticism on account of its distinctiveness. To achieve
such distinctiveness, the identification evidence should encompass unique physical features
or characteristics, like the face, the voice, the dentures, the distinguishing marks or tattoos on
the body, fingerprints, DNA, or any other physical facts that set the individual apart from the
rest of humanity.
A witness familiarity with the accused, although accepted as basis for a positive identification,
does not always pass the test of moral certainty due to the possibility of mistake.
Page 41 of 75
No matter how honest Amegables testimony might have been, her identification of Caliso by a
sheer look at his back for a few minutes could not be regarded as positive enough to generate
that moral certainty about Caliso being the perpetrator of the killing, absent other reliable
circumstances showing him to be AAAs killer. Her identification of him in that manner lacked
the qualities of exclusivity and uniqueness, even as it did not rule out her being mistaken.
Indeed, there could be so many other individuals in the community where the crime was
committed whose backs might have looked like Calisos back. Moreover, many factors could
have influenced her perception, including her lack of keenness of observation, her emotional
stress of the moment, her proneness to suggestion from others, her excitement, and her
tendency to assume. The extent of such factors are not part of the records; hence, the trial
court and the CA could not have taken them into consideration. But the influence of such
varied factors could not simply be ignored or taken for granted, for it is even a well-known
phenomenon that the members of the same family, whose familiarity with one another could
be easily granted, often inaccurately identify one another through a sheer view of anothers
back. Certainly, an identification that does not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake
cannot be accorded any evidentiary force.23
Amegables recollection of the perpetrator wearing short pants bearing the number "11" did not
enhance the reliability of her identification of Caliso. For one, such pants were not one-of-akind apparel, but generic. Also, they were not offered in evidence. Yet, even if they had been
admitted in evidence, it remained doubtful that they could have been linked to Caliso without
proof of his ownership or possession of them in the moments before the crime was
perpetrated.
Nor did the lack of bad faith or ill motive on the part of Amegable to impute the killing to Caliso
guarantee the reliability and accuracy of her identification of him. The dearth of competent
additional evidence that eliminated the possibility of any human error in Amegables
identification of Caliso rendered her lack of bad faith or ill motive irrelevant and immaterial, for
even the most sincere person could easily be mistaken about her impressions of persons
involved in startling occurrences such as the crime committed against AAA. It is neither fair
nor judicious, therefore, to have the lack of bad faith or ill motive on the part of Amegable raise
her identification to the level of moral certainty.
The injuries found on the person of Caliso by Dr. Fuentecilla, as borne out by the medical
certificate dated June 9, 1997, 24 did not support the culpability of Caliso. The injuries, which
were mostly mere scratch marks, 25 were not even linked by the examining physician to the
crime charged. Inasmuch as the injuries of Caliso might also have been due to other causes,
including one related to his doing menial labor most of the time, their significance as evidence
of guilt is nil.
In the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt as to the identity of the culprit, the accuseds
constitutional right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved is not overcome, and
he is entitled to an acquittal, 26 though his innocence may be doubted. 27 The constitutional
presumption of innocence guaranteed to every individual is of primary importance, and the

conviction of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense he put up but on the
strength of the evidence for the Prosecution.28
WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated on October 26, 2007 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE for insufficiency of evidence, and accused-appellant Delfin Caliso is ACQUITTED of
the crime of murder.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City is directed to forthwith release
Delfin Caliso from confinement, unless there is another lawful cause warranting his further
detention.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
LUCAS
Associate Justice
Page 42 of 75
P.
BERSAMIN

G.R. No. 201725
July 18, 2014
PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
JOY ALCALA y NOVILLA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
white crystalline substance from the right front pocket of her pants and then asked for
payment. PO2 Bautista handed her the marked money and then took the plastic sachet from
appellant. Thereafter, PO2 Bautista lighted a cigarette, the pre-arranged signal that the sale
was consummated. The other members of the team converged on the scene and arrested
appellant. Appellant was asked to empty her pockets, after which, the buy bust money was
recovered.
Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CRHC Noj 04053 affirming the Decision 2 in Criminal Case No. Q-04-129946 rendered by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 82 of Quezon City. Th~ RTC Decision found Joy Alcala y
Novilla (accuseq) guilty beyond reasonaple doubt for violation of Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 (Rj.A. No. 9165), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.
Appellant was brought to the police station. Thereat, the confiscated plastic sachet was
markedby PO2 Bautista with the letters "EB-JA". He then and turned it over to the duty desk
officer, PO3 Castuciano, who prepared the standard request for laboratory examination. The
specimen and the request were brought by PO2 Pamiliar to the PNP Crime Laboratory. After a
qualitative examination conducted by forensic chemist, Victor Calub Drapete, it was reported
that the contents of the plastic sachet EB-JA proved positive for the presence of
methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.
The Facts
The Defense Version
The accused was charged under the Information 3 docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04129946 for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which reads as follows:
On September 30, 2003,6 appellant accompanied her friend, alias Baba, to Police Station 11,
purportedly, totalk to a very important person there. However, while they were in the station,
she was arrested and ordered detained by the woman whom alias Baba talked to. She kept
crying inside the detention cell but nobody helped her. She did not see her friend nor the
woman anymore. Appellant vehemently denies the accusation against her and claims thatshe
does not know the cause of her detention.7
That on or about the 30th day of September, 2004, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said
accused, not being authorized by law to sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any
dangerous drug, did, then and there, willfully (sic) and unlawfully sell, dispense, deliver,
transport, distribute or act as broker in the said transaction, zero point zero two (0.02) gram of
white crystalline substance containing methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous
drug.4 Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty to said charge. 5 Trial thereafter
ensued. The factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, are stated as
follows: The Version of the Prosecution
Around 5 oclock in the afternoon of September 30, 2004, a female informant came to the AntiIllegal DrugsSpecial Operation Task Force of the Central Police District, Station 11, Quezon
City, to report the illegal drug activities of a certain alias Joy in the vicinity of Lantana St.,
Barangay Immaculate Conception, Cubao, Quezon City. Thereupon, P/Insp. Erwin Guevarra
formed a buy-bust team composed of SPO1 Mario Abong, PO2 Anthony Pamiliar, PO3 Jose
Castuciano, PO2 Jonathan Caranza and PO2 Erwin Bautista, who was designated as poseur
buyer. The team was briefed on the details of the buy-bust operation against alias Joy and
PO2 Bautista was given buy-bust money, a one hundred peso bill, which he marked with his
initials "EB". Thereafter, a pre-operation report was prepared.
Past 6:00 p.m. of the same day, the team arrived at the target area. The informant and
Bautista sought alias Joy, who was later identified as appellant, Joy Alcala. The rest of the
operatives followed at a distance and positioned themselves according to their plan. Along
Lantana St., the informant saw and approached appellant. He introduced PO2 Bautista as a
buyer of shabu. Then, appellant asked him, "Iiskor kayo, magkano?" PO2 Bautista replied
"piso lang", meaning P100.00 worth of shabu. Appellant took a small plastic sachet containing
Page 43 of 75
The Ruling of the RTC

After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered a Decision 8 finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. The dispositive portion
of which is hereunder quoted as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused JOY
ALCALA y NOVILLA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of Section 5, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165. Accordingly, she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00)
PESOS.
The Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to transmit to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency the dangerous drugs subject hereof for proper disposition and final disposal. 9
The trial court concluded that the evidence presented by the prosecution sufficiently satisfied
the quantum required for accuseds conviction. It found the testimonies of the police officers
who participated in the buy-bust operation credible and reliable since absence of any showing
of ill-motive on their part to concoct trumped-up charges, they enjoy the presumption of
regularity in the performance of their duties. 10 On the other hand, the denial of the accused
was found to be unsubstantiated by any convincing and credible evidence. Hence, being
considered as a negative, weak, and self-serving evidence, accuseds bare denial cannot

prevail over the positive testimony of the prosecutions witnesses and the physical evidence
which supported said judgment of conviction.11
The Ruling of the CA
On intermediate appellate review, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision convicting the accused.
It ruled that the prosecution was able to sufficiently bear out the statutory elementsof the
crime. The elements of the sale of illegal drugs between accused and PO2 Erwin Bautista
(PO2 Bautista), as poseur-buyer, have beenduly established by the prosecution, considering
that there was actual delivery of the prohibited drug to the poseur-buyer and actual receipt by
the seller of the marked money. These established factual findings consummated the buy-bust
transaction between the entrapping police officers and the drug dealer. 12 Moreover, the
appellate court held that failure to comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 will not render the
arrest of the accused illegal, nor will it result to the inadmissibility in evidence of the illegal
drugs seizedin the course of the entrapment operation. What is of utmost relevance is the
preservation of the integrity and maintenance of the evidentiary value of the confiscated illegal
drugs, for in the end, the same shall necessarily be the thrust that shall determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused. The prosecution, therefore, must simply show that the seized item
recovered from accused was the same item presented in court and found to be an
illegal/prohibited drug. These were all established and proven beyond reasonable doubt in the
instant case.13
In addition, the CA gave no credence to the defense of the accused of denial. It ruled that a
denial is a weak defense which cannot prevail against the positive testimony of the police
officers acting in the performance of their official duty, which appeared more credible and
adequately supported by evidence on record. Thus, a denialwhich is unsubstantiated by clear
and convincing evidence is not worthy of credence. 14 Lastly, it pointed out that any allegation
of a violation of fundamental rights during custodial investigation is relevant and material only
in cases where extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the
basis of their conviction. Since no such extrajudicial admission or confession was extracted
from appellant during her custodial investigation in the present case, such argument was
therefore unmeritorious.15
Upon elevation of this case before this Court, the Office of the Solicitor General manifested
that it will no longer file its supplemental brief and, instead, will adopt all the arguments in its
brief filed before the CA.16 While in the Supplemental Brief 17 filed by accused through the
Public Attorneys Office, she raisesthe issue that the court a quo gravely erred in convicting
the accused notwithstanding the prosecutions failure to establish the chain of custody and
integrity ofthe alleged seized illegal drugs for failure to comply with the mandatoryprocedures
under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. Accordingly, it is her contention that the court a quo
gravely erred in convicting the accused despite the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The Issue
Page 44 of 75
Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in finding that the evidence of the prosecution was
sufficient to convictthe accused of the alleged sale of methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, in violation of Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165.
Our Ruling
The Court finds no merit in the appeal.
We find no valid reason to depart from the time-honored doctrine that where the issue is one
of credibility ofwitnesses, and in this case their testimonies as well, the findings of the trial
court are not to be disturbed unless the consideration of certain facts of substance and value,
which have been plainly overlooked, might affect the result of the case. 18
Upon perusal of the records of the case, we see no reason to reverse or modify the findings of
the RTC on the credibility of the testimony of the prosecutions witnesses, less so in the
present case, in which its findings were affirmed by the CA. It is worthyto mention that, in
addition to the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duty, the court
a quowas in the best position to weigh the evidence presented during trial and ascertain the
credibility of the police officers who testified as to the conduct of the buy-bust operation and
inpreserving the integrity of the seized illegal drug.
Nonetheless, for academic discussion,it has been consistently ruled that for the successful
prosecution of offenses involving the illegal sale of drugs under Article II, Section 5 ofR.A. No.
9165, the following elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, object
and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. 19 In other
words, there is a need to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused actually sold
and delivered a prohibited drug to another, and that the former indeedknew that what she had
sold and delivered to the latter was a prohibited drug. 20 To reiterate, what is material to the
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually
took place, plus the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. 21
Certainly, based on the evidence in record, the prosecution had indeed established that there
was a buy-bust operation 22 conducted, showing that accused-appellant sold and delivered the
shabufor P100.00 to PO2 Bautista, the poseur-buyer. PO2 Bautista himself testified that there
was an actual exchange of the marked-money and the prohibited drug. Likewise, accused was
fully aware that what she was selling was illegal and prohibited when she asked PO2 Bautista
"iiskor kayo, magkano?" Thereafter, the corpus delicti or the subject drug was seized, marked,
and subsequently identified as a prohibited drug. Taken collectively, the illegal sale of
dangerous drugs by accused-appellant was indeed established beyond reasonable doubt.
It cannot be overemphasized that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, as amended, credenceshould be given to the narration of the incident by the
prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed tohave
performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence tothe contrary. In this
regard, the defense failed to show any ill motive orodious intent on the part of the police
operatives to impute such a serious crime that would put in jeopardy the life and liberty of an

innocent person,such as in the case of accused. Incidentally, if these were simply trumped-up
charges against her, there remains a question of why no administrative charges were brought
against the police officers. Moreover, in weighing the testimonies of the prosecutions
witnesses vis--visthat of the defense, it is a well-settled rule that in the absence of palpable
error or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge, the trial courts evaluation of
the credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal. 23
Again, in the absence of any showing that substantial or relevant facts bearing on the
elements of the crime have been misapplied or overlooked, this Court can only accord full
credence to such factual assessment of the trial court which had the distinct advantage of
observing the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses during the trial. Absent any proof of
motive to falsely charge an accused of such a grave offense, the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty and the findings of the trial court with respect to the credibility
ofwitnesses shall prevail over his/her bare allegation. 24
Furthermore, this Court has timeand again adopted the chain of custody rule, 25 a method of
authenticating evidence which requires that the admission of an exhibit be precededby
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent
claims it to be. This would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment
the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person
who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and
what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was received
and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would
then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition
of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. 26
of the items seized had been preserved.To reiterate what we have held in past cases, we are
not always looking for the strict step-by-step adherence to the procedural requirements; what
is important is to ensure the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items, as these would determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. We succinctly
explained this in People v. Del Montewhen we held:
We would like to add that non-compliance with Section 21 of said law, particularly the making
of the inventory and the photographing of the drugs confiscated and/or seized, will not render
the drugs inadmissible in evidence. Under Section 3 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court,
evidence is admissible when it is relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these
rules. For evidence to be inadmissible, there should be a law or rule which forbids its
reception. If there is no such law or rule, the evidence must be admitted subject only to the
evidentiary weight that will [be] accorded it by the courts. x x x
We do not find any provision or statement in said law or in any rule that will bring about the
nonadmissibility of the confiscated and/or seized drugs due to non-compliance with Section 21
of Republic Act No. 9165. The issue therefore, if there is non-compliance with said section, is
not of admissibility, but of weight evidentiary merit or probative value to be given the
evidence. The weight to be given by the courts on said evidence depends on the
circumstances obtaining in each case.29 (Emphasis supplied and citations omitted)
However, as correctly pointed out by the RTC and the CA, failure to strictly comply with the
prescribed procedures in the inventory of seized drugs does not render an arrest ofthe
accused illegal or the items seized/confiscated from her inadmissible. What is essential is "the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would
be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused." 28 Thus:
From the testimonies of the police officers in the case at bench, the prosecution established
that they had custody of the drug seized from the accused from the moment she was arrested,
during the time she was transported to the police station, and up to the time the drug was
submitted to the crime laboratory for examination.The same witnesses also identified the
seized drug with certaintywhen this was presented in court. With regard to the handling of the
seized drugs, there are no conflicting testimonies or glaring inconsistencies that would cast
doubt on the integrity thereof as evidence presented and scrutinized in court. It is therefore
safe to conclude that, to the unprejudiced mind, the testimonies show without a doubt that the
evidence seized from the accused at the time of the buy-bust operation was the same one
tested, introduced, and testified to in court. This fact was further bolstered by the stipulations
entered into between the parties as to the testimony of forensic chemist, P/Insp. Victor
Drapete.30 In other words, there is no question as to the integrityof the evidence against
accused.
From the point of view of jurisprudence, we are not beating any new path by holding that the
failure to undertake the required photography and immediate marking of seized items may be
excused by the unique circumstances of a case. In People v. Resurreccion, we already stated
that "marking upon immediate confiscation"does not exclude the possibility that marking can
be at the police station or office of the apprehending team. In the cases of People v. Rusiana,
People v. Hernandez, and People v. Gum-Oyen, the apprehending team marked the
confiscated items at the police station and not at the place of seizure. Nevertheless, we
sustained the conviction because the evidence showed that the integrity and evidentiary value
To reiterate, although this Court finds that the police officers did not strictly comply with the
requirements of Article II, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, such nonC'.ompliance did not affect the
evidentiary weight of the drug seized from the accused, because the chain of custody of the
evidence was shown to be unbroken under the circmpstances of the case. As correctly found
by the appellate court, the drug confiscated from the accused was properly accounted for and
forthrightly submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for its extensive examination. The CA
further ruled that nothing invited the suspicion that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized articles were jeopardized.
It is essential for the prosecution to prove that the prohibited drug confiscated or recovered
from the suspect is the verysame substance offered in court as exhibit. Its identity must be
established with unwavering exactitude for it to lead to a finding of guilt. 27
Page 45 of 75

In fine, considering the pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution, the denial of the
accused fails. Courts generally view the defense of denial with disfavor due to thr facility with
which an accused can concoct it to suit his or her defense. As evidence that is both negative
and self-serving, this defense cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses who testify clearly, providing thereby positive evidence on the various
aspects of the crime committed.31
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 04053 dated 13 June 2011, is AFFIRMED in all respects.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
Page 46 of 75

G.R. No. 200081, June 08, 2016
PEOPLE OF THE
Appellant.
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDGARDO
T. CRUZ, Accused-
Thus, on 18 July 2002, Carlos filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft against Cruz.
The Information
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before us is an appeal from the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 29 April 2011 in
CA-G.R. CR No. 32134 affirming the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City,
Branch 262 of Pateros, Metro Manila dated 27 May 2008 in Criminal Case No. 123851,
entitled People v. Cruz, which found accused-appellant Edgardo T. Cruz guilty of the crime of
Qualified Theft punishable under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code and sentenced him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Facts
Sometime in November 2000, private complainant Eduardo S. Carlos (Carlos) put up a
business engaged in the sale of tires, batteries, and services for wheel alignment, wheel
balancing and vulcanizing under the name and style of Chromax Marketing (Chromax).
During the infancy of Chromax, Carlos sought the help of accused-appellant Edgardo T. Cruz
(Cruz) to register and manage the business, i.e., attend to the needs of the customers, receive
orders, issue receipts and accept payments, and to prepare daily sales report for Carlos to be
able to monitor the number of sales made, credits given, and total amount collected.
When Chromax began to gain recognition, Carlos employed several other employees.
However, despite the rise of number of clients they were servicing, Chromax's financial capital
remained unimpressive. Thus, upon inquiry prompted by suspicion, Carlos discovered through
his
sister,
Eliza
Cruz,
that
Cruz
was
stealing
from
Chromax.
On 19 February 2002, Carlos, as part of his routine, checked the daily sales report containing
the list of payments and balances of customers. Upon examination, he discovered that the
remaining balance of their customers and Cruz's advances (vale) totaled to P97,984.00.3 At
the bottom of the balance sheet 4 was an acknowledgment that the amount stated as lost was
actually used by Cruz, which reads, "Mr. Eddie Carlos (sic) Amount stated lost was actually
used by me for my personal use and (sic) which I promise to pay you back." 5
Upon further investigation, Carlos also discovered an irregularity in the receipts issued to
services rendered to Miescor covering the same transaction with an invoice number 0287. The
discrepancies were between the amounts as indicated in the receipt issued to Miescor and the
receipt shown to him by Cruz. The receipt issued to Miescor indicated the amount of
P1,259.006 while the receipt shown to him by Cruz contained the amount of P579.00. 7
Page 47 of 75
That, on or about the 19th day of February, 2002, or prior thereto, in the Municipality of
Pateros, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being then an employee of Chromax Marketing, enjoying the trust and
confidence reposed upon him by his employer, with intent to gain, grave abuse of confidence
and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away cash money amounting to Php97,984.00
representing sales proceeds of Chromax Marketing products and services, belonging to said
Chromax Marketing owned by herein complainant Edgardo Carlos y Santos, to the damage
and
prejudice
of
the
owner
thereof
in
the
aforesaid
amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
During arraignment, Cruz pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued. The prosecution presented two witnesses, namely: (1) Carlos, who testified
that he knew Cruz two years before they set up Chromax and denied that he knew nothing
about granting commissions to Miescor drivers; and (2) Keithly Cruz, who testified that as a
cashier at Chromax, she saw Cruz hand a yellow piece of paper 9 to Carlos, which she also
saw was personally prepared by Cruz contrary to Cruz's allegation that the balance sheet as
written
in
the
yellow
piece
of
paper
was
forged. 10
On the other hand, the defense presented its sole witness, Cruz, who denied liability for
qualified theft. He insinuated that Chromax started losing money from the time another
employee, Jeffrey Albaitar (Albaitar), was employed. Moreover, with only few months since
Albaitar was employed, Albaitar was already able to buy a brand new cellphone valued at
P11,000.00. Finally, Cruz averred that his purported signature and declaration in the balance
sheet that the missing collectible sum of money was allegedly used by him for personal use
were forged.
Ruling of the RTC
On 27 May 2008, the RTC convicted Cruz finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime
of
Qualified
Theft
in
Criminal
Case
No.
123851.
The RTC opined that Cruz's admission of taking the amount stated as loss for his personal
use is enough to sustain his conviction. The RTC, citing People v. Mercado,11 held that "the
declaration of the accused expressly acknowledging his guilt to the offense may be given in
evidence against him, and any person otherwise competent to testify as a witness, who heard

the confession, is competent to testify as to the substance of what he heard, if he understood
it."
The RTC went on further stating that even without Cruz's extrajudicial admission, there is
enough circumstantial evidence to uphold his conviction. The RTC ruled that the following
circumstances were established by the prosecution which prove that it was only Cruz who had
sales control and supervision of Chromax from receipt of payment, issuance of receipts, and
credit
collections:
[Cruz] is the manager and in-charge of cash purchase and sales of merchandise of Chromax
Marketing.
1. Being the manager, he receives payments, issues receipts and handles credit
collections of the company.
2. He likewise prepares daily sales reports.
3. Aside from [Cruz], who goes to work daily, Carlos and his immediate family have
access to the cash register. However, they seldom go to Chromax Marketing except
Carlos who visits 2 to 3 times a week.
4. [Cruz] cannot validly explain the shortages when confronted by Carlos. He just
blamed Albaitar for a missing P100.00.12
Therefore, based on the pieces of evidence presented, the prosecution established "an
unbroken chain leading to fair and reasonable conclusion that [Cruz] took the subject amount
loss."13
The RTC rejected Cruz's allegation that Carlos authorized Cruz to grant commissions to
Miescor's drivers. The RTC stated that assuming Carlos indeed authorized Cruz to give
commissions, such authority is not a license to steal. The dispositive portion of the Decision of
the
RTC
reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered,
judgment
is
hereby
rendered
finding
accused EDGARDO T. CRUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified
Theft and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Further, accused is
ordered to pay the private complainant in the amount of Php97,984.00 as actual
damages.14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
aspects pertaining to cash purchases and sale of merchandise of the business. By taking
advantage of and gravely abusing the trust and confidence of Carlos, Cruz was able to
appropriate the proceeds of the missing amounts for his personal benefit.
What is glaring is Cruz failed to provide any justifiable reason as to why the collectible balance
in the balance sheet could not be accounted for in spite of the undisputed fact that he was
personally responsible for the accounting and safekeeping of the same.
The CA also took note that Cruz's categorical acknowledgment in the balance sheet that he
used the amount of money for his personal benefit with a promise that the same will be paid,
plus the fact that Cruz in open court, testified that aside from having personally prepared the
balance sheet, he also acknowledged his personal responsibility therefor.
As regards the defense's contention that his conviction was merely based on circumstantial
evidence, the CA ruled that, "[d]irect evidence is not the sole means of establishing guilt
beyond reasonable doubt since circumstantial evidence, if sufficient, can supplant its absence.
The crime charged may also be proved by circumstantial evidence. xxx." 15
It is this submission that forms the basis of the present appeal the argument being that the CA
erred in convicting Cruz on the basis of insufficient circumstantial evidence.
Our Ruling
The
appeal
Theft,
as
defined
in Article
is
308
bereft
of
the
Revised
of
Penal
Code
merit.
(RPC)
provides:
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain
but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take
personal
property
of
another
without
the
latter's
consent.
Theft
is
likewise
committed
by:
Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local
authorities or to its owner;
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
1. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall
remove or make use of the fruits or object of the damage caused by him; and
The CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC and found that all the elements of theft, together with
the circumstances that led to the appreciation of the crime as qualified theft, were sufficiently
established
by
the
prosecution.
2. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden
or which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish
upon the same or shall gather cereals, or other forest or farm products. 16
In the case at bar, Cruz was entrusted to receive payments, issue receipts, and oversee all
Page 48 of 75

Based on the foregoing, the elements of the crime of theft are: (1) there was taking of personal
property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking was without the consent of the
owner; (4) the taking was done with intent to gain; and (5) the taking was accomplished
without violence or intimidation against the person or force upon things. 17
However, when theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence, the crime appreciates into
qualified
theft
punishable
under
Article
310
of
the
RPC,
to
wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 310. Qualified Theft. The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher
by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by
a domestic servant, or with grave abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor
vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts taken from the premises of the
plantation or fish taken from a fishpond or fishery, or if property is taken on the occasion of
fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil
disturbance.18ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Therefore, the elements of Qualified Theft committed with grave abuse of confidence are as
follows:
1.
Taking
of
personal
property;
2.
That
the
said
property
belongs
to
another;
3.
That
the
said
taking
be
done
with
intent
to
gain;
4.
That
it
be
done
without
the
owners
consent;
5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of
force
upon
things;
[and]
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.19 (Emphasis omitted)
All
the
elements
of
Qualified
Theft
are
present
in
this
case.
First. The defense contends that the prosecution was not able to prove Cruz's guilt by direct
evidence. The defense's contention is incorrect. The records reveal that it is by Cruz's own
admission why a conviction can be sustained. As already stated, Cruz declared that he took
the money for his personal use, "Mr. Eddie Carlos (sic) Amount stated lost was actually used
by me for my personal use and (sic) which 1 promise to pay you back." 20
order for circumstantial evidence can sustain conviction: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.22 Contrary to the defense's allegation that the pieces of circumstantial evidence
presented were insufficient, a perusal of the records reveal otherwise. Based on the evidence,
there is more than one circumstance which can prove Cruz's guilt. 23
As sufficiently discussed by the trial court, besides Cruz's own admission that he took the
unaccounted money without Carlos' knowledge and authority, Cruz's guilt was also proven
through the following circumstantial evidence: Cruz, as the manager of Chromax, had sole
access to the money and other collectibles of Chromax; he had sole authority to issue
receipts; he gave commissions without Carlos' authority; he forged the amount in the sales
report and receipts; and finally, insinuated that it was Albaitar who misappropriated the money
without
providing
any
scintilla
of
proof
to
support
his
accusations.
Contrary to the defense's allegation that due to lack of direct evidence the Court cannot
uphold Cruz's conviction, circumstantial evidence is not a "weaker" form of evidence. The
Rules of Court does not distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence insofar as their
probative value is concerned. In the case at bar, the combination of the circumstantial
evidence draws no other logical conclusion, but that Cruz stole the money with grave abuse of
confidence.
Second. It is undisputed that the money unaccounted for was owned by Carlos. While Cruz is
the manager of Chromax, whose authority is limited to receiving payments, issuing receipts,
and overseeing all aspects pertaining to cash purchases and sale of merchandise of the
business, he has no right to dispose of the same, and Carlos, as the owner of Chromax, has
sole
power
of
dominion
over
the
proceeds
therefrom.
Third. Cruz himself admitted that he took the money for his benefit. During his direct
examination, Cruz admitted it was an advance or vale which he used for his mother's
hospitalization:
Nevertheless, even without Cruz's own admission and direct evidence proving Cruz's guilt, a
conviction can still be sustained. As correctly held by the CA, direct evidence is not the sole
means to establish guilt because the accused's guilt can be proven by circumstantial
evidence.
Q:
Now, there is an entry here, this one named vale, what is this vale all about?
A:
Yun po yung cash advance ko kay Mr. Carlos.
Circumstantial evidence is defined as that which "goes to prove a fact or series of facts other
than the facts in issue, which, if proved, may tend by inference to establish a fact in
issue."21 Rule 133, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the requirements in
Q:
And when did you incur this vale of P12,000.00?
A:
I cannot remember. That's the time my mother was hospitalized. 24
Page 49 of 75

Fourth. Contrary to Cruz's allegation that the unaccounted money he gave as commission to
Miescor drivers was authorized by Carlos, the records reveal otherwise. As clearly established
by
the
prosecution,
Cruz's
act
of
giving
commissions
were
baseless:
portion and from this Exhibit "A", "A-1", "A-2", "A-4", "A-5". From Exhibit "A-3" and "A1".
A:
At first[,] I only gave him this paper.
Q:
When was that?
A:
I only wrote this on the 19th of February.
Q:
This portion? Exhibit "A-3" and "A-1"?
A:
Yes, sir.
Q:
And this portion Exhibit "A"[,] "A-2" up to "A-5"?
Therefore, Cruz misappropriated the unaccounted money without Carlos' knowledge or

consent.
A:
I prepared that on the 10th of February.
Fifth. It is indisputable that the act was accomplished without the use of violence or
intimidation against persons, or of force upon things as Cruz had free access to the cashier of
Chromax.
Q:
Now, what was the reason why you wrote this portion marked as Exhibit "A-3" and "A1"?
A:
He asked me to sign this paper proving that I prepared this and I knew that I was
supposed to pay all this because I'm responsible. "So in good faith, tsaka medyo ano
na rin po ako nun, parang iba na ang naramdaman ko, dahil yung responsibility ko
parang inalis na nya dun na lang ako sa labas kaya sabi ko baka hindi ako magtagal.
So in good faith ko po naisulat ito." (Witness pointing to "A-3" and "A-1"). 26
Q:
A:
Also in relation to the invoice receipt wherein you said you discovered that he
overpriced the transaction, can you remember that? The sales invoice issued to
Miescor?
"Ang ibig ko pong sabihin dun, iba yung report n'ya sa [akin. Iba] yung resibong inerereport n'ya para magawa n'ya yung instruction ko na daily sales report, iba naman
ang ini-issue n'ya sa customer."
Q:
Are you not [a]ware of the fact that he did this because he wants the drivers of the
Miescor to have a commission on this overpricing?
A:
No, sir.25
Sixth. As Chromax's manager, Cruz had access to Chromax's cashier. He was entrusted to
receive payments, issue receipts, and oversee all aspects pertaining to cash purchases and
sale of merchandise of the business. Indeed, his position entails a high degree of confidence
as he had access to the lists of sales report and the cash of the daily sales. However, Cruz
took advantage of this trust and confidence. He exploited his position to take the money and
was
able
to
accomplish
the
crime
with
grave
abuse
of
confidence.
As regards the defense's insinuation that it was Albaitar who misappropriated the money, such
bare allegations must fail. It cannot prevail over the overwhelming evidence proving his guilt.
Cruz averred that his purported signature and declaration in the balance sheet that the
missing collectible sum of money which he supposedly used for personal purpose were
forged.
His
testimony
belies
any
allegation
of
forgery:
Q:
Now, you said earlier that when you gave this one to Mr. Carlos, he did not execute this
Page 50 of 75
Premises considered, we find no cogent reason to reverse the conviction of Cruz, who was
able to perpetrate the crime of qualified theft through grave abuse of confidence.
Imposable
Penalty
The penalty for qualified theft is based on the value of the property stolen, which in this case is
P97,984.00. To compute for the imposable penalty, we must first take the basic penalty for
theft, which is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods to be imposed in the
maximum period, that is, eight (8) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to ten (10) years
of prision mayor. To determine the additional years of imprisonment to be added to the basic
penalty, the amount of P22,000.00 is deducted from P97,984.00, which leaves a difference of

P75,984.00. This amount is then divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount less than
P10,000.00. The resulting quotient of 7 is equivalent to 7 years, which is added to the basic
penalty.27cralawred
In this case, because Cruz committed qualified theft, his penalty is two degrees higher than
the penalty for simple theft, which is reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods to
be imposed in its maximum period or eighteen (18) years, two (2) months, and twenty-one
(21) days to twenty (20) years, which shall be added to the resulting quotient of 7 years. The
resulting sum shall then be the imposable penalty. Thus, the range of the imposable penalty is
twenty-five (25) years, two (2) months, and twenty-one (21) days to twenty-seven (27) years.
Moreover, as the crime committed is qualified theft, we do not apply the rule in simple theft
that the maximum penalty cannot exceed twenty (20) years. The penalty for qualified theft has
no such limitation. His penalty exceeds twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, the penalty
that
should
be
imposed,
therefore,
is reclusion
perpetua.28
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated 27 May 2008 of the Regional
Trial Court in Criminal Case No. 123851 is AFFIRMED, sentencing accused-appellant to serve
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay private complainant in the amount of
P97,984.00 as actual damages, which shall earn legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum
from date of finality of this Court's Decision until full payment as per BSP Circular No. 799,
Series
of
2013.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184704
Page 51 of 75
June 30, 2009

PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
LEODEGARIO BASCUGIN1 y AGQUIZ Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is an appeal from the January 16, 2008 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CR-H.C. No. 01855 which affirmed the August 15, 2005 Decision 3 in Criminal Case No.
4371 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10 in Balayan, Batangas. The RTC found
accused-appellant Leodegario Bascugin guilty of rape with homicide.
The Facts
In an information dated June 21, 1999, Bascugin was charged with rape with homicide
committed as follows:
That on or about the 4th day of June, 1999 at about 7:45 oclock in the evening, at Barangay
[XXX], Municipality of Balayan, Province of Batangas, Philippines and within the Jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a bladed instrument and a hard
object, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of [AAA],4 against her will and consent and by reason or on
the occasion of the said rape, accused with intent to kill, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
stabbed and hit the said AAA, thereby inflicting upon the latter multiple stab wounds and other
injuries on the different parts of her body, which caused her instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
With the assistance of his counsel de oficio, Bascugin pleaded guilty upon arraignment on
August 5, 1999. Since he was facing a charge for a capital offense, the trial court asked him if
his plea was voluntarily given and whether he understood the consequences of his plea. The
case then proceeded to trial. The prosecution presented testimonial, object, and documentary
evidence, while the defense offered no contest. On June 15, 2000, the trial court adjudged him
guilty of the charge beyond reasonable doubt and sentenced him to death.
In the automatic review by the Supreme Court, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and
Bascugin challenged the proceedings in the trial court, specifically the invalid arraignment of
Bascugin. They contended that the consultation made by the counsel de oficio was hasty; and
Bascugin was not sufficiently apprised of the nature of his case and the consequences of his
plea. We found merit in appeal; hence, we annulled the trial courts judgment and remanded
the case to the court a quo for appropriate proceedings.6
On May 6, 2002, Bascugin was once again arraigned. With assistance from his counsel de
oficio, he pleaded not guilty. The prosecution asked the court to adopt the testimonies
previously given in the first trial by some witnesses, namely: PO3 Menandro de Castro, Pet
Byron T. Buan, Dr. Antonio Vertido, Rolando de Mesa, Domingo Liwanag, and BBB, AAAs
father. The defense did not object to said motion; thus, it was granted by the trial court. The
Page 52 of 75
prosecution additionally presented the testimonies of CCC, mother of AAA; Aida R. VilloriaMagsipok, NBI forensic chemist; and further direct examination of Dr. Vertido. 7
According to the prosecution, AAA was last seen on June 4, 1999 around 7:00 p.m. by de
Mesa, a tricycle driver. AAA was on board the tricycle driven by Bascugin. De Mesa saw
Bascugin again at around 8:30 p.m. going towards Balayan town proper, but de Mesa did not
notice if Bascugin had a passenger on board. On the same night, Liwanag, an employee of
Steel Corporation located in Balayan, was on his way home from work via his motorcycle
when he passed by Bascugins tricycle parked near a waiting shed in Brgy. XXX, Balayan.
Liwanag testified that he heard a girl shout but he ignored the same because the area was
allegedly haunted.8
Around 11:50 p.m., AAA was reported missing. The police officers in Balayan conducted an
investigation. PO3 de Castro received information that a patient was being treated at the Don
Manuel Lopez Memorial District Hospital for tongue injury. Police officers rushed to the
hospital and found the patient to be Bascugin. Bascugin told the police that AAA was his
passenger that night but as he was about to leave the tricycle terminal, a man and a woman
boarded. The man sat behind him while the woman sad beside AAA. While Bascugin was
driving, he was hit by a hard object on his nape causing him to lose consciousness. When he
woke up, his tongue was already injured and his three passengers were gone. Bascugin was
then invited to the police station for further investigation. 9
Around 1:30 a.m. of June 5, 1999, based on the information from Liwanag, police officers and
AAAs relatives went to the waiting shed where Bascugins tricycle was parked. They found a
muddled portion of the sugarcane plantation with visible tricycle marks, and a hairclip
belonging to AAA. Police officers returned to the site at around 6 a.m. to further investigate.
On the way back to the police station, they discovered AAAs body in the canal along the
national road, naked from the waist down and with 13 stab wounds. 10 They also recovered a
pair of maong pants and two panties both belonging to the victim. 11
On September 8, 2003, before the prosecution could rest its case, the defense manifested
that Bascugin wishes to change his plea of "not guilty" to "guilty." The trial court set his rearraignment to September 29, 2003 to allow him more time to consider his plea. He was then
arraigned on September 29, 2003, and he pleaded guilty to the charge. Upon motion of the
prosecution, Bascugin was placed on the witness stand. He affirmed that he understood the
consequences of his voluntary plea, and admitted that AAA rode his tricycle on June 4, 1999
and that he brought AAA to Brgy. XXX where he raped and killed her.12
On November 12, 2003, Bascugin moved to withdraw his plea of guilty. This was granted by
the trial court in an order dated November 17, 2003. He was re-arraigned on December 1,
2003 and he pleaded "not guilty."13
Bascugin testified that on June 4, 1999, around 5:00 p.m., he and AAAs cousin, DDD, had
three bottles of gin to celebrate the latters birthday. Around 7:00 p.m., Bascugins cousin,
Christopher de Mesa, requested Bascugin to wait for AAA and bring her home because

Christopher had to be with his wife who was about to give birth. AAA arrived around 7:30 p.m.;
Bascugin told her that Christopher asked him to bring her home. AAA then rode Bascugins
tricycle. Due to the heavy rain, they stopped at a waiting shed in a barangay for a long time.
Bascugin stated that something happened which he could not tell but after that incident, he
started the engine of his tricycle to bring AAA home but AAA ran away. He said that he
pursued her but he could only remember that he drove the lifeless body of AAA to Bagong
Daan. Assuming responsibility for his passenger, he went to the house of AAAs parents.
Thereafter, he went home; his father saw his bloodied shirt so he was brought to Don Manuel
Lopez Memorial District Hospital. Police officers arrived at the hospital and invited him to the
police station. He voluntarily went with the investigators. On cross-examination, Bascugin
admitted that he raped and killed AAA.14
aggravating circumstances, hereby imposes upon him the supreme penalty of DEATH. He is
further ordered to indemnify the heirs of [AAA] the sum of P100,000.00, to pay the same heirs
the amount of P50,000.00 by way of moral damages and to pay the costs.
The trial court appreciated the following circumstantial evidence as incriminatory:
The CA upheld Bascugins conviction. The appellate court concurred with the trial courts
finding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence pointing to him as the culprit.
Moreover, he admitted in open court that he raped and killed AAA. This judicial admission
constitutes evidence of high order, not only because it is presumed that a deliberate
confession to a crime is prompted by truth, but also because such admission was supported
by medical findings of sexual intercourse between the accused and the victim, and resistance
by the victim.16
1. the victim boarded the tricycle being driven by the accused at around 7:00 oclock in the
evening of June 4, 1999;
2. at about 8:30 oclock of the same night, the accused was seen driving his tricycle without
any person on board going towards the direction of Balayan town proper from Brgy. [XXX];
3. the tricycle then being driven by the accused was seen parked near the waiting shed at
Brgy. [XXX] which was the place discovered by the police officers where the incident took
place and the hairclip belonging to the victim was found;
4. the abaca rope found by the police inside the tricycle of the accused, the pair of maong
pants belonging to the victim was found near the body of the latter, a white panty and yellow
panty also belonging to the victim, a Hanford brief, a sleeveless undershirt, a blue T-shirt and
a pair of corduroy pants, all belonging to the accused were all found to be positive for human
blood reactions of Group A which was the same grouping as that of fresh blood taken from
the victim;
5. the yellow panty belonging to the victim was found to be positive to seminal stains;
6. the findings of the medico-legal officer who examined the body of the victim which shows
that the latter bore multiple stab wounds and complete fresh hymenal lacerations;
7. the complete matching of the bucal swab taken from the accused with the vaginal smear
sample taken from the victim which sufficiently established that the accused had sexual
intercourse with the victim before killing her; and
8. the admission of the accused that he raped and killed AAA when asked by the Court and
the prosecutor.15
On August 15, 2005, the trial court found Bascugin guilty. The fallo of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Leodagario Bascugin y [Agquiz]
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, defined and penalized
under Art. 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
8353, in relation to Republic Act No. 7659 and without considering any mitigating and/or
Page 53 of 75
In view of the imposition of the death penalty, the case was forwarded to the CA for review.
The Ruling of the CA
On appeal, Bascugin argued that there was no evidence of force, threat, or intimidation during
sexual intercourse; thus, there was no rape. The human blood from his clothes which matched
the blood type of AAA does not prove that he killed the latter. Also, he asserted that his
confession when he pleaded guilty should have been expunged from the records since he
withdrew said plea and substituted it with a plea of "not guilty."
The appellate court, however, modified the ruling by ordering imprisonment and adding
temperate damages and increasing the amount of moral damages, as follows:
It having been established beyond any shadow of a doubt that appellant raped [AAA] and
killed her on the occasion thereof, the mandatory penalty of death is inescapable. However,
with the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9346 which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty,
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole, should instead be imposed on
accused-appellant.
The trial court correctly awarded P100,000.00 as civil indemnity to the heirs of [AAA]
commensurate with the seriousness of the said complex crime. Likewise, the heirs of [AAA]
are entitled to temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00, despite the paucity of
evidence as to actual damages, inasmuch as it is reasonable to expect that they incurred
expenses for the coffin, burial and food during the wake. Moreover, in line with prevailing
jurisprudence, the award of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 should be increased
to P75,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION by imposing
on accused-appellant Leodegario Bascuguin y Agquiz the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and ORDERINGhim to further indemnify the heirs of
[AAA] in the increased amount of P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as
temperate damages.
Assignment of Error

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
OF THE CRIME OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO
PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
The Courts Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The decisive factor in Bascugins conviction was his admission to the crime when he was
examined by his lawyer in court. He testified as follows:
Q: At that point, did you come to know the cause of your physical injury?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What may be the reason?
A: According to the doctor, the injury I sustained was a result of a persons bite, sir.
Q: For how long did you stay at that hospital?
A: Less than an hour, sir.
Q: After one (1) hour of staying in that hospital, what happened next?
A: While on our way out at the hospital, I was invited by police investigators to go with them to
the police station and I voluntarily went with them to face the consequences of what I did, sir.
Q: Could you tell to this Honorable Court what do you mean by the consequences of what you
did?
A: That if I did something wrong on that time, I should pay for it, sir.
Q: So you mean to say that you have this thinking that you have committed something wrong?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you are willing to confront the same, freely, voluntarily and without offering any
resistance?
A: Yes, sir.
COURT:
Q: Are you thinking of this case against you?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: Meaning to say you might have committed the same?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
ATTY. CHAVEZ:
Q: You said that you were being brought to the police station. What happened there, Mr.
Witness?
A: The investigator incarcerated me, sir.
Q: And at that time, do you know the reason why you were incarcerated by the police?
A: No, sir.
Q: What was the date when you were being detained at the police station?
A: June 4 already, sir.
Q: Are you sure of that, Mr. Witness?
A: Yes, sir, because it was already early morning.
Q: At the police station, Mr. Witness, what happened?
A: At around 7:00 oclock in the morning, [AAA] arrived, sir.
Q: Who were with [AAA]?
A: [Her] parents and the police officers, sir.
Q: Was she still alive during that time?
A: No longer, sir.
Q: What was your reaction upon seeing [AAA]?
A: During that moment I was so sorry and I cannot explain and I cannot understand what
happened, sir.
Q: Do you mean to tell us that you have this feeling at that time that you were responsible for
the killing and raping of this [AAA]?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you feel any remorse or resentment to what happened with you and [AAA]?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: I noticed also, Mr. Witness, that at the course of the proceedings of this case you are
always changing your plea of not guilty/to guilty. Why is it so, Mr. Witness?
A: Because I am bothered by my conscience and I was always changing my plea but I feel
responsible for what I did, sir.
Q: Do you know fully the consequences of your testimony, Mr. Witness?
A: Yes, sir.
ATTY. CHAVEZ: I have no more questions, Your Honor.
COURT: Cross?
PROS. ALIX: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: By your own testimony you are not admitting that you are responsible for the death of
[AAA] and that you did have carnal knowledge of that? Before you do that, may the Court
remind this witness that he has the right to answer or not the question.
COURT: The Court would like to remind you that you have the right to choose whether to
answer or not to answer the question. You can remain silent so before you answer the
question, think of the question carefully.
WITNESS:
Page 54 of 75

A: Yes, sir.
COURT:
Q: Meaning to say that you not only admit that you killed her but you also raped her?
A: Yes, Your Honor.17
Bascugins confession was freely, intelligently, and deliberately given. Judicial confession
constitutes evidence of a high order. The presumption is that no sane person would
deliberately confess to the commission of a crime unless prompted to do so by truth and
conscience.18 Admission of guilt constitutes evidence against the accused pursuant to the
following provisions of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 4. Judicial admissions.An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course
of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made. [Rule 129]
SEC. 26. Admissions of a party.The act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant
fact may be given in evidence against him. [Rule 130]
SEC. 33. Confession.The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him.
[Rule 130]
Furthermore, Bascugins confession is consistent with the evidence.1 a vv p h i 1 We agree
with the trial and appellate courts finding that the chain of events constitutes circumstantial
evidence that is sufficient to support a conviction. From the testimonies of witnesses and the
physical evidence gathered, it was established that the victim was last seen with Bascugin in
his tricycle; his tricycle was seen parked near a waiting shed in the premises of which the
victims personal belongings were later found; his pieces of clothing were found positive for
human blood that matches the victims; and the medico-legal report states that Bascugin had
sexual intercourse with the victim.
Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the
facts in issue may be established by inference. 19 According to Rule 133, Section 4 of the
Rules, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2) the inference is based on proven facts; and (3) the combination of all
circumstances produces a conviction beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. In
the case at bar, the circumstantial pieces of evidence enumerated by the trial court all point to
Bascugin as the perpetrator beyond reasonable doubt.
As regards damages, we agree with the appellate courts award of PhP 100,000 as civil
indemnity; PhP 75,000 as moral damages; and temperate damages amounting to PhP 25,000
in lieu of actual damages, all consistent with prevailing jurisprudence for rape with
homicide.20 The Court also awards exemplary damages in the amount of PhP 50,000. Article
2229 of the Civil Code grants the award of exemplary or correction damages in order to deter
Page 55 of 75
the commission of similar acts in the future and to allow the courts to mould behaviour that
can have grave and deleterious consequences to society.21
WHEREFORE, the CA Decision dated January 16, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01855
is AFFIRMED withMODIFICATION that accused-appellant is ordered to pay additional
exemplary damages of PhP 50,000 to the heirs of the victim. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO
Associate Justice
J.
VELASCO,
JR.

G.R. No. 128466
May 31, 2001
REMEGIO P. YU, MICHAEL S. COSUE and JULIETA M. FERNANDEZ, petitioners,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, JUSTICES FRANCIS E. GARCHITORENA, MINITA V. CRICONAZARIO and EDILBERTO G. SANDOVAL (SB 1ST Division), RON. ANIANO DESIERTO,
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR LEONARDO P. TAMAYO, DEPUTY SPECIAL PROSECUTOR
ROBERT E. KALLOS, PROSECUTOR HENEDINA A. PULGAR, EDDIE PATAWARAN,
SUSAN P. CASARENO, LEON LICUDO, JR. AND CRIS COLOMA, respondents.
PARDO, J.:
What is before the Court is a petition1 for certiorari with prohibition and an application for
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.1wphi1.nt
Petitioners alleged that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding that there was probable cause to indict them for
violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act particularly Section 3 (e) thereof. And that
the Sandiganbayan also committed grave abuse of discretion in sustaining such finding and
persisting to try the case in SB Case No. 23454.2
On March 23, 1994, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon received a Joint Affidavit and Criminal
Complaint from the members of the Sangguniang Bayan, Rosales, Pangasinan namely, Eddie
Patawaran, Leon Lucido, Susan P. Casareno and Cris Coloma charging Municipal Mayor
Remegio P. Yu, Municipal Vice-Mayor Michael S. Cosue and Municipal Treasurer Julieta M.
Fernandez and Rodolfo Macabunga, the proprietor of Rosales Lumber and Hardware with
violation of R. A. No.3019, Section 3 (e).3
Acting on the complaint, the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon required the respondents to file
their corresponding counter affidavits.
4
On May 23, 1994, complainants submitted an amended, criminal complaint dropping Rodolfo
Macabunga from the charge attaching the affidavit 5 of Macabunga to the effect that he did not
make any delivery of gravel and sand to the Rosales, Public Market; that the delivery receipt
was not signed by an employee of the Municipal Government of Rosales, Pangasinan, that he
was not aware how the Municipal Government came into possession of a delivery receipt and
the voucher amounting to P20,000.00 for the gravel and sand.
In time, respondents filed their counter affidavits and supporting evidences.
Petitioners Yu, Cosue and Femandez claimed that there was indeed delivery of the subject
materials by Rosales Lumber and Hardware which submitted the lowest bid price quotation
through its representative Mr. Virgillo "Gil" Aguilar. It was also Mr. Aguilar who received the
purchase order dated September 29, 1993, in behalf of Rosales Lumber and Hardware. The
delivery was attested to by the affidavits of sixteen (16) market vendors of Rosales Public
Market, plus the joint-affidavit of Municipal Engineers Camillo S. Olegario and, Danilo E.
Nacion, attesting to the complete delivery of the materials. 7
Page 56 of 75
On March 18, 1996, OMB investigator Perfecto Lawrence D. Chua Cheng V after evaluation of
the evidence for both parties recommended the dismissal of the case. 8 However, the
Ombudsman disapproved the recommendation for dismissal. 9 And relying on the
Memorandum of an OMB special assistant which gave credence to the affidavit of Rodolfo
Macabunga, owner of the Rosales Lumber and Hardware, that he had not entered into any
contract with the municipality of Rosales for the delivery of the subject materials, the
Ombudsman proceeded to charge petitioners with violation of R. A. No. 3019, Section 3 (e). 10
Hence, on September 11, 1996, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan an Information
11 for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3 (e) against petitioners and one Rodolfo
Macabunga, for acting in conspiracy and making it appear that 100 cu. m. of mixed gravel and
sand valued at P20,000.00, for use in the gravelling of the Rosales Public Market was
delivered by Rosales Lumber and Hardware on October 1, 1993, when in fact no delivery was
ever made.
Upon previous leave of court, on November 11, 1996, petitioner Yu and Femandez filed a
Motion for Reconsideration12 of the indictment based on the following grounds:
"1. There was indeed delivery of the subject materials;
"2. The check in payment thereof was received and endorsed/encashed by Rodolfo
Macabunga (proprietor of Rosales Lumber and Hardware ); and that
"3. There was no damage or prejudice caused to the municipality of Rosales."
Previously, on November 4, 1996, accused Cosue filed a separate Motion for
Reconsideration13 based on the same grounds that Yu and Fernandez raised. In a
memoranduml4 the Ombudsman denied the motion for reconsideration. In the same manner,
the Sandiganbayan denied the motion for reconsideration petitioners filed. 15
Hence, this petition.16
Petitioners raise the following issues:
1. Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in ruling that there was probable cause against petitioners
2. Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in sustaining the finding of probable cause of the Ombudsman. 17
According to petitioners, there was an abundance of evidence showing that there was delivery
of the gravel and sand for the public market of Rosales, such as the affidavits of sixteen
market vendors some of whom physically helped in the spreading of the mixed gravel and
sand; the affidavits of two of the Municipal Engineers, Camilo Olegario and Danilo Nacion,
attesting to actually seeing the delivery and several business operators in the public market
who personally helped either as hired labor or volunteers in the laying of the gravel and
sand.18

Also worthy of note is the recommendation for the dismissal of the case by OMB Investigator
Perfecto Lawrence D. Chua Cheng V, concurred into by OMB Director Ernesto M. Marcos and
recommended for approval by Ombudsman for Luzon Jesus F. Guerrero, to wit:
"The issues to be resolved in this case hinges on whether or not deliveries of the aggregates
were actually made for the regravelling of the Rosales Public Market, and whether or not
payment of P20,000.00 was received by Rodolfo Macabunga.
"The Answer to both questions it is respectfully submitted must be in the affirmative. While Mr.
Macabunga denied that his hardware made a delivery of the ordered aggregates, the same
cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the respondents as well as their witnesses
confirming the delivery of the mixed gravel and sand at the public market in the months of
September and October 1993. This finding is all the more bolstered by the evidence of receipt
of the Land Bank of the Philippines Check No. 6099256 in the amount of P19,400.00 by
Virgillo "Gil" Aguilar whose signature appears on the claimants box of disbursement voucher
No. 101-93-50-1479 as determined by the National Bureau of Investigation per Bureau's
questioned document report no. 574- 794-A dated August 8, 1994. Noteworthy mentioning at
this point is the failure on the part of the complainants as well as their witness Rodolfo
Macabunga to refute the respondent's claim that Virgillo "Gil" Aguilar is the latter's authorized
representative respecting the subject transaction. Evidence on record belie Mr. Rodolfo
Macabunga's claim of non-receipt of the above-mentioned check no. 6099256 which was
either deposited or encashed at the Traders Royal Bank, carmen, Pangasinan Branch by its
endorser whose signature appearing on the dorsal portion thereof was determined by the NBI
to be that of Mr. Rodolfo Macabunga.
"Finally refutation of the complainants claim that the three truck loads of aggregates were not
delivered by the Rosales Hardware but by the DPWH, respondent Vice-Mayor Cosue
submitted the joint-affidavit dated July 27, 1994 of the three named DPWH truck drivers
denying making any delivery of the gravel and sand at the public market. Despite being
furnished copies of the evidence the complainant failed to controvert the same leading more
credence to respondent's position.
"WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, finding that no evidence exist to indict the
respondent for violating Sec. 3 (e) of Republic Act 3019, let this case be DISMISSED for lack
of merit and/or evidence."19
Petitioners further alleged that there is a complete absence of evidence to prove the nondelivery of the subject materials. The statement of accused Macabunga that he did not make
deliveries of the subject materials is inadmissible under the rule of "res inter alios acta, alteri
nocere non debit" Petitioners alleged that under Rule 130, Section 28 of the Revised Rules of
Court, which provides that "the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or
omission of another, except as hereinafter provided" that the relationship between Macabunga
and the petitioners does not make out an exception under Rule 130, Section 30 (admission by
co-conspirator) for the simple reason that they were not co-conspirators.
Page 57 of 75
Respondent Ombudsman stressed that the issues raised are matters of defense that could be
submitted before the Sandiganbayan at the trial. The affidavits of the sixteen market vendors
and the municipal engineers Villanueva, Olegario and Nacion are questionable since the
affidavits were similarly worded. To further emphasize the point, the Ombudsman alleged that
Municipal Engineers Olegario and Nacion, who both claimed to be at the site when the gravel
and sand were delivered were unable to present any delivery receipts to prove the quantity of
the gravel and sand that Rosales Lumber and Hardware actually delivered. 20
We find the petition without merit.
The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested in the Office of the
Ombudsman. The Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the Ombudsman in
the exercise of its powers, and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the
Ombudsman who, "beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver
of the integrity of public service."21
The rule is based not only upon constitutional considerations but upon practical ones as well.
If it were otherwise, the courts would be gravely hampered by innumerable petitions
questioning the dismissal of investigatory proceedings before the Ombudsman, in much the
same way that the courts would be swamped if they would be compelled to review the
exercise of discretion on the part of our prosecutors each time they decide to file an
information in court or throw out a complaint.22
The main function of the government prosecutor during preliminary investigation is merely to
determine the existence of probable cause, and to file the corresponding information if he
finds it to be so. "And, probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of crime for which he was
prosecuted."23
To repeat, it is well settled that in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion, courts will not
interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman, who, depending on his finding and considered
evaluation of the case, either dismisses a complaint or proceeds with it. 24
In the same manner, we can not say that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion in finding the existence of probable cause and continuing with the trial of SB Case
No. 23454.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 185522
June 13, 2012
SAN
MIGUEL
vs.
HELEN T. KALALO, Respondent.
CORPORATION, Petitioner,
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
This Rule 45 Petition assails the Decision 1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR No. 30473. The CA affirmed the Decision 3 and Order4 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 45, Manila, in Crim. Cases Nos. 04-230278-84, which had in turn affirmed the
Decision5 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 11, Manila, in Crim. Case No.
372535-41. The MeTC acquitted respondent Helen T. Kalalo ("Kalalo") of a violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22, or the Bouncing Checks Law, but ruled that she was civilly liable to
petitioner San Miguel Corporation (SMC) for the amount of P 71,009 representing the value of
unpaid goods.6
As culled from the records, it appears that respondent Kalalo had been a dealer of beer
products since 1998. She had a credit overdraft arrangement with petitioner SMC whereby,
prior to the delivery of beer products, she would be required to issue two checks to petitioner:
a blank check and a check to be filled up with an amount corresponding to the gross value of
the goods delivered. At the end of the week, Kalalo and an agent of SMC would compute the
actual amount due to the latter by deducting the value of the returned empty beer bottles and
cases from the gross value of the goods delivered. Once they succeeded in determining the
actual amount owed to SMC, that amount would be written on the blank check, and
respondent would fund her account accordingly.7
In time, respondents business grew and the number of beer products delivered to her by SMC
increased from 200 to 4,000 cases a week. Because of the increased volume of deliveries, it
became very difficult for her to follow and keep track of the transactions. Thus, she requested
regular statements of account from petitioner, but it failed to comply.8
In 2000, SMCs agent required Kalalo to issue several postdated checks to cope with the
probable increase in orders during the busy Christmas season, without informing her of the
breakdown of the balance. She complied with the request; but after making several cash
payments and returning a number of empty beer bottles and cases, she noticed that she still
owed petitioner a substantial amount. She then insisted that it provide her with a detailed
statement of account, but it failed to do so. In order to protect her rights and to compel SMC to
update her account, she ordered her bank to stop payment on the last seven checks she had
issued to petitioner,9 the details of which are as follows:10
Bank
of
Check No.
the
0012825
Page 58 of 75
Philippine
Islands
(BPI) Date
Sept. 16, 2000
Amount
P 62,200.00
0008250
Sept. 18, 2000
190,000.00
0012801
Sept. 25, 2000
190,000.00
0012802
Sept. 30, 2000
208,162.00
0012826
Sept. 30, 2000
62,200.00
0012823
Sept. 30, 2000
104,327.00
0012824
Oct. 14, 2000
104,326.00
TOTAL
P 921,215.00
On 19 October 2000, instead of updating the account of respondent Kalalo, petitioner SMC
sent her a demand letter for the value of the seven dishonored checks. 11
On 5 December 2000, and in the face of constant threats made by the agents of
SMC,12 respondents counsel wrote a letter (the "Offer of Compromise") wherein Kalalo
"acknowledge[d] the receipt of the statement of account demanding the payment of the sum
of P 816,689.00" and "submitt[ed] a proposal by way of Compromise Agreement to settle the
said obligation."13
It appears, however, that SMC did not accept the proposal. On 9 March 2001, it filed a
Complaint against respondent for violating the Bouncing Checks Law.14
In the meantime, Kalalo kept reiterating her demands that SMC update her account. During
trial, and after the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner finally complied. After tallying all
cash payments and funded checks and crediting all returned empty bottles and cases, the
Statement of Account showed that the net balance of the amount owed to petitioner
was P 71,009.15 Respondent thereafter recanted her Offer of Compromise and stated that, at
the time she had the letter prepared, she was being threatened by SMC agents with
imprisonment, and that she did not know how much she actually owed petitioner.16
After trial on the merits, the MeTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, these cases are hereby dismissed and the accused is hereby acquitted of all
the charges against her. However, it appearing that she still owes the private complainant, the
accused is hereby ordered to pay the amount of P 71,009.00 to private complainant.17
As the right against double jeopardy prevented an appeal of the criminal aspect of the case,
SMC appealed only the civil aspect of the MeTCs Decision to the RTC. Petitioner claimed that
it was entitled to the larger amount of P921,215.18 After the parties submitted their respective
Memoranda, the RTC found no reversible error in the MeTCs Decision, dismissed the appeal
of petitioner,19 and denied the latters Motion for Reconsideration. 20
Dissatisfied with the RTCs Decision, SMC filed with the CA a Rule 42 Petition for Review,
which was eventually dismissed by the appellate court. 21 Petitioner moved for reconsideration,
to no avail.22
SMC thereafter filed this Rule 45 Petition before this Court. 23
The Courts Ruling

We deny the instant Petition and uphold the assailed Decision and Resolution of the appellate
court.
I
The Offer of Compromise may not be considered as evidence against respondent Kalalo.
Petitioner argues that, in her Offer of Compromise, respondent "unequivocally admitted her
liability to private complainant-appellant duly assisted by her counsel." 24
We quote in full Kalalos Offer of Compromise addressed to petitioner:
December 5, 2000
Mr.
GENERAL
San
Biglang
Caloocan City
JOSELITO
Miguel
Awa
MANALO
MANAGER
Corporation
Street
Dear Sir:
My client, Ms. HELEN T. KALALO of No. 1055-A Dagupan Street, Tondo, Manila, hereby
acknowledges the receipt of the Statement of Account demanding the payment of the sum
of P816,689.00 representing her unpaid accounts.
The reason why she was not able to pay her accounts on time is because she had great
difficulty in collecting from the following wholesalers:
1. MRS.
EVELYN
R.
MONTILLA/MINES
&
LYN
General
Merchandise
624
Chacon
St.,
Tondo,
Manila
P 413,444.50 amount of Pilsen, Red Horse and Grande Beers (full goods)
P 115,500.00 amount of empties.
2. Mr.
DANIEL
TOMAS/
MRS.
FORTUNE
Ladies
and
Rum
Gen.
Merchandizing
1501
N.
Zamora
St.,
Tondo,
P 150,000.00 amount of full goods, Pilsen and Red Horse beers.
TOMAS
(sic)
Manila
She is respectfully submitting her proposal by way of "Compromise Agreement" to settle the
said obligation:
Advance payment for the empties: P 11,500.00
Installment of P 10,000.00 per month for the principal, then later on for the interest due.
Considering the economic crisis, she is hoping that her proposal merits your kind
consideration and approval.
Very respectfully yours,
SGD
Vicente
Counsel for Helen T. Kalalo25
Page 59 of 75
G.
Villamil
Contrary to petitioners contention, the aforequoted letter does not contain an express
acknowledgment of liability. At most, what respondent acknowledged was the receipt of the
statement of account, not the existence of her liability to petitioner.
Furthermore, the fact that respondent made a compromise offer to petitioner SMC cannot be
considered as an admission of liability. In Pentagon Steel Corporation v. Court of
Appeals,26 we examined the reasons why compromise offers must not be considered as
evidence against the offeror:
First, since the law favors the settlement of controversies out of court, a person is entitled to
"buy his or her peace" without danger of being prejudiced in case his or her efforts fail; hence,
any communication made toward that end will be regarded as privileged. Indeed, if every offer
to buy peace could be used as evidence against a person who presents it, many settlements
would be prevented and unnecessary litigation would result, since no prudent person would
dare offer or entertain a compromise if his or her compromise position could be exploited as a
confession of weakness.
Second, offers for compromise are irrelevant because they are not intended as admissions by
the parties making them. A true offer of compromise does not, in legal contemplation, involve
an admission on the part of a defendant that he or she is legally liable, or on the part of a
plaintiff, that his or her claim is groundless or even doubtful, since it is made with a view to
avoid controversy and save the expense of litigation. It is the distinguishing mark of an offer of
compromise that it is made tentatively, hypothetically, and in contemplation of mutual
concessions. 27 (citations omitted)
Petitioner further argues that respondents Offer of Compromise may be received in evidence
as an implied admission of guilt. 28 It quotes Rule 130, Section 27 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence, which states:
Sec. 27. Offer of compromise not admissible. In civil cases, an offer of compromise is not an
admission of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the offeror.
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed
by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in
evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
We do not agree. As correctly pointed out by respondent, the Offer of Compromise dated 5
December 2000 was made prior to the filing of the criminal complaint against her on 9 March
2001 for a violation of the Bouncing Checks Law.29 The Offer of Compromise was clearly not
made in the context of a criminal proceeding and, therefore, cannot be considered as an
implied admission of guilt.
Finally, during the testimony of respondent and after her receipt of the Statement of Account
from SMC, she recanted the contents of the Offer of Compromise. She explained that, at the
time she had the letter prepared, the final amount owed to petitioner SMC was yet
undetermined; and that she was constantly facing threats of imprisonment from petitioners
agents. 30 The trial courts and the CA gave weight to her justification, 31 and we find no cogent

reason to disturb their findings. We rule, therefore, that the Offer of Compromise may not be
considered as evidence against respondent Kalalo, nor can it be the basis of her liability to
petitioner in the amount of P 921,215.
II
SMC failed to prove that Kalalo is indebted to it in the amount of P 921,215.
SMC claims that it is entitled to collect the amount of P 921,215 representing the value of
unpaid goods from respondent Kalalo. It argues that the MeTC erred in ruling that respondent
was liable to it to the extent of only P71,009, because the Statement of Account does not
reflect the transactions covered by the dishonored checks, as it only covers cash
transactions.32
We find, however, that aside from its bare assertions on appeal, SMC failed to present any
evidence to prove that cash transactions were treated differently from check transactions.
Respondent correctly argues that if the check transactions were covered by other statements
of account, petitioner should have presented evidence of those transactions during the
proceedings before the lower court.33
In any event, we cannot allow SMC to recover the amount of P 921,215 from respondent, as it
failed to prove the existence of the purported indebtedness. The records are bereft of any
evidence, other than the dishonored checks, establishing the existence of that obligation.
Checks, however, are not issued merely for the payment of a preexisting obligation. They may
likewise be issued as a guarantee for the performance of a future obligation. In this case, it
was sufficiently established that the dishonored checks were issued merely to guarantee the
performance of a future obligation; that is, the payment of the net value of the goods after the
value of the empty bottles and beer cases returned to petitioner were deducted from the gross
value of the goods delivered to respondent.1wphi1
As to the amount of P 71,009, both parties admit that the Statement of Account provided by
SMC to respondent showed a liability of only P 71,009. Respondent presented in evidence the
Statement of Account, which petitioners witness confirmed to have come from SMCs
accounting department.34
We therefore rule that SMC failed to present enough evidence to prove Kalalos indebtedness
to it in the amount of P 921,215, but that respondents obligation to petitioner in the amount
of P 71,009 is unrebutted and supported by sufficient evidence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no reversible error committed by the
appellate court, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30473 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA
Associate Justice
Page 60 of 75
LOURDES
P.
A.
SERENO
G.R. No. 168071
December 18, 2006
LUCIANO
vs.
RODIL ENTERPRISES, respondent.
TAN, petitioner,
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 dated 21 October 2002 and
the Resolution2dated 12 May 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67201, which
set aside the 18 June 2001 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 26
in Civil Case No. 01-99797. The RTC reversed the 6 October 2000 Decision 4 of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 13 in Civil Case No. 166584, and dismissed
the Complaint filed by respondent Rodil Enterprises against petitioner Luciano Tan for utter
lack of merit.
This case has its origin from the Complaint 5 for Unlawful Detainer filed on 13 March 2000 by
Rodil Enterprises against Luciano Tan with the MeTC of Manila, Branch 13, docketed as Civil
Case No. 166584.
The factual antecedents to the filing of the Complaint show that Rodil Enterprises is a lessee
of the subject premises, the Ides ORacca Building since 1959. The Ides ORacca Building,
located at the corner of M. de Santos and Folgueras Streets in Binondo, Manila, is owned by
the Republic of the Philippines. On 18 May 1992, Rodil Enterprises and the Republic, through
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), entered into a Renewal of a
Contract of Lease over the Ides ORacca Building. A subsequent Supplementary Contract
dated 25 May 1992 was similarly entered into, thus, extending the lease agreement until 1
September 1997.
The validity of the 18 May 1992 and the 25 May 1992 contracts was placed in question in
several actions involving Rodil Enterprises, the Ides ORacca Building Tenants Association,
Inc., and other tenants. This Court upheld the validity of the aforesaid contracts in a Decision
rendered on 29 November 2001, in the consolidated cases of Rodil Enterprises, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, Carmen Bondoc, Teresita Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear and Chua Huay
Soon (G.R. No. 129609) and Rodil Enterprises, Inc. v. Ides ORacca Building Tenants
Association, Inc. (G.R. No. 135537).6
Prior thereto, the Office of the President in OP Case No. 4968 entitled, Spouses Saturnino B.
Alvarez and Epifania Binay Alvarez v. Rodil Enterprises Company, Inc. rendered a
Decision7 dated 8 February 1994, declaring the Renewal of Contract of Lease and the
Supplementary Contract, dated 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992, respectively, of no force and
effect.
It appears that Rodil Enterprises appealed the 8 February 1994 Decision to the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 34586 which was dismissed by the appellate court for
Page 61 of 75
non-compliance with procedural requirements. The dismissal was appealed by Rodil

Enterprises to the Supreme Court, docketed as G.R. No. 119711 which was also dismissed.
Subsequently, the Office of the President issued an Order of Execution of its 8 February 1994
Decision in OP Case No. 4968. Thereafter, Rodil Enterprises filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari with the Court of Appeals on the Order of Execution, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No
79157. The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision therein dated 28 March 2005 which
annulled the Order of Execution, and enjoined the Office of the President from enforcing its 8
February 1994 Decision in OP Case No. 4968. Likewise, the Court of Appeals ordered the
Office of the President to abide by the 29 November 2001 Decision of the Supreme Court in
the consolidated cases of G.R. No. 129609 and G.R. No. 135537, upholding the validity of the
Renewal of Contract of Lease and the Supplemental Contract, dated 18 May 1992 and the 25
May 1992, respectively. Finally, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79157
was brought on certiorari by the Ides ORacca Building Tenants Association, Inc. to the
Supreme Court, and docketed as G.R. No. 169892. On 25 January 2006, the Court, in G.R.
No. 169892, issued a Resolution denying the Petition. On 20 March 2006, a Resolution was
rendered in the same case denying with finality the amended Motion for Reconsideration.
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the preceding cases, on 18 October 1999, a subsequent
Contract of Lease was drawn between Rodil Enterprises and the Republic, the same to be
effective retroactively from 1 September 1997 to 21 August 2012 at a monthly rental
of P65,206.67, subject to adjustment upon the approval of a new appraisal covering the Ides
ORacca Building. Rodil Enterprises subleased various units of the property to members of the
Ides ORacca Building Tenants Association, Inc. A space thereof, known as Botica Divisoria
was subleased to herein petitioner, Luciano Tan.
In Rodil Enterprises Complaint for Unlawful Detainer filed against Luciano Tan, the former
alleged that Luciano Tan bound himself to pay under a Contract of Sublease, the amount
of P13,750.00 as monthly rentals, representing the reasonable use and occupancy of the said
premises. However, Luciano Tan unjustifiably and unreasonably refused to pay the rentals
from September 1997 up to the time of the filing of the Complaint, and despite repeated oral
and written demands, refused to vacate the premises and to pay the rents due. Rodil
Enterprises prayed that Luciano Tan and those claiming rights under him be ordered to vacate
the leased premises. A payment of rentals in arrears, amounting to P385,000.00 was similarly
sought, including attorneys fees and litigation costs, as well as, subsequent monthly rentals in
the amount of P13,750.00 until Luciano Tan vacates Botica Divisoria.
In his Answer, Luciano Tan insists that he is a legitimate tenant of the government who owns
the Ides ORacca Building and not of Rodil Enterprises. As such, he has the right to lease the
said premises pending the disposition and sale of the building. He based his claim on the fact
that on 8 February 1994, the Office of the President in OP Case No. 4968, had declared the
Renewal of Contract of Lease dated 18 May 1992 and the Supplemental Contract dated 25
May 1992 between Rodil Enterprises and the Republic to be without force and effect.
Accordingly, the DENR was directed to award the lease contract in favor of the Ides ORacca

Building Tenants Association, Inc. of which Luciano Tan is a member. He, thus, prayed for the
dismissal of the Complaint, and for the return of whatever amount Rodil Enterprises had
collected from 1987 to 1997, or during such time when he was still paying rentals to the latter.
1.) That [Luciano Tan] will pay P440,000.00 representing rentals from September 1997 up to
the present, which is the outstanding obligation of the defendant as of June, 2000, on or
before June 30, 2000; and
On 27 June 2000, the MeTC issued an Order, recognizing an agreement entered into in open
court by Luciano Tan and Rodil Enterprises. The Order, inter alia, declared, thus:
2) [[Luciano Tan] will pay the monthly rentals computed at P13,750.00, on or before the 5th day
of each month after June 30, 2000.
On second call, the parties and counsel agreed in principle in open court to the following terms
to put an end to this civil case for ejectment between them:
(Order dated June 27, 2000)12
1.) that [Luciano Tan] will pay P440,000.00 representing rentals from September, 1997 up to
the present, which is the outstanding obligation of [Luciano Tan] as of June, 2000, on or before
June 30, 2000; and
2.) [Luciano Tan] will pay the monthly rentals computed at P13,750.00 on or before the 5 th day
of each month after June 30, 2000.8
On 14 August 2000, Luciano Tan filed a Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit
Rentals,9 averring therein that he had agreed to pay all the rentals due on the subject
premises and to pay the subsequent monthly rentals as they fall due; that the rentals in
arrears from September 1997 amounted to P467,500.00; and in line with his good faith in
dealing with Rodil Enterprises, he would like to deposit the aforesaid amount, and the
subsequent monthly rentals as they fall due. He prayed that he be allowed to deposit the
Managers Check for the amount of P467,500.00, made payable to the City Treasurer of
Manila. However, on 15 August 2000, the MeTC denied the Motion on the rationalization that
Luciano Tans prayer to deposit the specified sum with the City Treasurer of Manila
contravenes Section 19,10 Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Subsequently, the issues for the resolution of the MeTC were synthesized by the court in its
Order, dated 25 July 2000, to wit:
[T]he issue insofar as [Rodil Enterprises], revolved on:
"Whether [Rodil Enterprises] is legally entitled to collect from [Luciano Tan] the amount of
rentals and interest thereon as prayed for in the complaint and to ask for the ejectment of the
defendant from the leased premises."
On the other hand, [Luciano Tan]s counsel formulated the issues of the case in the following
manner[,] to wit:
1) Whether or not under the circumstances[,][Luciano Tan] could be ejected from the premises
in question;
2) Whether or not under the circumstances[,] [Rodil Enterprises] should be made to return the
amounts collected from [Luciano Tan] from 1987 to 1997 amounting to P988,650.00.11
On 6 October 2000, the MeTC rendered a Decision in favor of Rodil Enterprises. The court
said that Luciano Tan did not contest the sublease on a monthly basis, and in fact admitted in
judicio, viz:
Page 62 of 75
According to the MeTC, notwithstanding the evidentiary norm in civil cases that an offer of
compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible in evidence against the
offeror, the court cannot overlook the frank representations by Luciano Tans counsel of the
formers liability in the form of rentals, coupled with a proposal to liquidate. 13 The foregoing
gestures, as appreciated by the MeTC, were akin to an admission of a fact, like the existence
of a debt which can serve as proof of the loan, and was thus, admissible. 14 The court
pronounced that Luciano Tan had explicitly acknowledged his liability for the periodic
consideration for the use of the subleased property. Estoppel, thus, precludes him from
disavowing the fact of lease implied from the tender of payment for the rentals in
arrears.15 The MeTC, explained further:
Prescinding from the foregoing discourse, it ineluctably follows that [Luciano Tan]s
indifference to heed the two demand letters, the cognition of which were recognized
(paragraphs VII and IX, Complaint; paragraph 2, Answer), rendered him a deforciant
(1 Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 6th Revised Edition, 1997, page 770, citing Dikit vs.
Ycasiano, 89 Phil. 44), and was thus vulnerable to the special civil action under Section 1,
Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, especially so when non-payment of rentals is an
accepted prelude to, and a secondary matrix for, a tenants eviction ( Article 1673 (2), New
Civil Code).
From a different plane, [Luciano Tan]s quest at this juncture for recovery of the rentals he paid
to the plaintiff from 1987 to 1997 will not merit the desired result since, in a manner of
speaking, it will place the cart ahead of the horse, when juxtaposed with another pending
controversy between the parties before the Supreme Court (Annex "1," Position Paper for the
Defendant; Annex "B," Answer to Counterclaim).
The decretal portion of the Decision, states, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
[Rodil Enterprises], ordering:
1. Defendant Luciano Tan, and all persons claiming rights under him, to vacate the subject
realty, and to peacefully deliver possession to the plaintiffs representative;
2. Defendant [Luciano Tan] to pay the sum of FOUR HUNDRED FORTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P440,000.00) as recognized unpaid rentals from September, 1997 up to June 30, 2000;

3. Defendant [Luciano Tan] to pay the sum of THIRTEEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
FIFTY PESOS (P13,750.00) as agreed rental per month, starting July, 2000, and every month
thereafter, until possession is delivered to the plaintiffs representative;
4. Defendant [Luciano Tan] to pay the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as
reasonable attorneys fees; and
5. Defendant [Luciano Tan] to pay the cost of suit.
For want of merit, defendants counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.16
Aggrieved thereby, Luciano Tan appealed the Decision to the RTC. Meanwhile, Rodil
Enterprises filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, 17 which was subsequently denied
by the MeTC in the Order18 of 15 December 2000.
On 18 June 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision reversing the judgment appealed from and
dismissing the Complaint. It found that the MeTC erred in holding that the offer to compromise
by Luciano Tans counsel was akin to an admission of fact, the same being contrary to Section
27,19 Rule 130 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As reasoned by the RTC:
During the pre-trial conference held in the lower court, proposals and counter-proposals
emanated from the parties counsels, which was normally inspired by the desire to "buy
peace", nay, to put an end to the troubles of litigation, and to promote settlement of disputes
as a matter of public policy. The act of defendant/appellants (sic) in the midst of pre-trial is not
an admission of any liability and therefore, should not be considered admissible evidence
against him.20
Proceeding to the issue of the right of Rodil Enterprises to collect rentals and eject Luciano
Tan based on the contracts, dated 18 May 1992 and 25 May 1992, the RTC ruled that the
controversy is still pending before the Supreme Court. It, thus, held that the prayer for
recovery of rentals from 1987 to 1997 is premature.
The RTC, disposed, as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby REVERSED, and a
new judgment is hereby entered DISMISSING the complaint in Civil Case No. 166584 for utter
lack of merit.21
Subsequently, Rodil Enterprises filed a Petition for Review with the appellate court, which, in a
Decision dated 21 October 2002 set aside the judgment of the RTC, and affirmed and
reinstated the 6 October 2000 Decision of the MeTC.
According to the appellate court, there is, between Rodil Enterprises and the Republic of the
Philippines, a valid and subsisting Contract of Lease executed on 18 October 1999, the same
for a period of fifteen (15) years. 22 The period of the lease, under the 18 October 1999 contract
is from 1 September 1997 to 31 August 2012. The Court of Appeals gave credence to the fact
that the existence of the aforesaid contract was not denied nor controverted by Luciano Tan.
What Luciano Tan, instead, impugned was the validity of the contracts dated 18 and 25 May
Page 63 of 75
1992, which was upheld by this Court in the consolidated cases of Rodil Enterprises, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, Carmen Bondoc, Teresita Bondoc-Esto, Divisoria Footwear and Chua Huay
Soon (G.R. No. 129609) and Rodil Enterprises, Inc. v. Ides ORacca Building Tenants
Association, Inc. (G.R. No. 135537).23
Ruling on the more important question of whether Luciano Tan made a judicial admission
anent his liability as a sublessee of Rodil Enterprises, the Court of Appeals held that the
former made an implied admission of the existence of a contract of sublease between him and
Rodil Enterprises on the subject premises; and that he had reneged in the payment of rentals
since 1 September 1997. Moreover, it deemed Luciano Tans Motion to Allow Defendant to
Deposit Rentals as another admission in favor of Rodil Enterprises. The appellate court
elucidated, thus:
The evidence on record indubitably shows that respondent [Luciano Tan] is a sublessee of
petitioner [Rodil Enterprises] who failed to pay rentals from 01 September 1997 and even until
the case was filed before the [M]etropolitan [T]rial [C]ourt, when respondent [Luciano Tan]
"agreed in principle in open court" to the following terms:
1) that the defendant [Luciano Tan] will pay P440,000.00 representing rentals from September,
1997 up to the present, which is the outstanding obligation of the defendant as of June, 2000,
on or before June 30, 2000; and
2) defendant [Luciano Tan] will pay the monthly rentals computed at P13,750.00 on or before
the 5thday of each month after June 30, 2000.
at the hearing on 27 June 2000 though no settlement was eventually reached between the
parties, respondent [Luciano Tan] in effect made an implied judicial admission that there was a
subsisting contract of sublease between him and petitioner, and that he was remiss in the
payment of rentals from 01 September 1997 up to that day (Rollo, Annex "9" of petition).
Respondent [Luciano Tan]s admission was further bolstered by the fact that he filed a "Motion
to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals" (Rollo, p. 3 of Annex "15" of petition). By such acts,
respondent [Luciano Tan] accepted the truth of petitioner [Rodil Enterprises] allegation of the
existence of a contract of sublease between them and of his non-payment of the rentals from
01 September 1997. A judicial admission is an admission made in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, verbal or written, by a party accepting for the purposes of the
suit the truth of some alleged fact, which said party cannot thereafter disprove (Remedial Law
by Herrera, Oscar M. citing Section 4, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence and
Evidence by Salonga).24
The decretal portion of the 21 October 2002 Court of Appeals Decision, states, thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the petition for review is GIVEN DUE COURSE.
The Decision dated 18 June 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 26 is hereby
SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 06 October 2000 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 13 is AFFIRMED and REINSTATED.25

The appellate court denied Luciano Tans Motion for Reconsideration thereon, in a
Resolution,26 dated 12 May 2005.
Thus, petitioner comes before us, raising the following grounds, to wit:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT ISSUED ITS RESOLUTION DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF ITS DECISION BY RELYING SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY ON
THE MARCH 28, 2005 DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AND DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THE SAID DECISION HAS NOT YET BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
II
RESPONDENT RODIL ENTERPRISES IS GUILTY OF FORUM SHOPPING WHEN IT FILED
THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WITH THE COURT OF APPEALS DOCKETED AS CAG.R. SP. NO. 79517 SEEKING TO NULLIFY THE ORDER OF EXECUTION BY THE OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT OF ITS 8 FEBRUARY 1994 DECISION IN OP CASE NO. 4968,
DESPITE THE FACT THAT ITS PREVIOUS PETITION FOR REVIEW FILED WITH THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF THE SAME DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
DATED 8 FEBRUARY 1994 HAD BEEN DISMISSED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IN ITS
RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 17, 1994 DUE TO NON-COMPLIANCE WITH
PROCEDURAL RULES.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR
AND A GRAVE MISAPPREHENSION OF THE FACTS AND MISAPPRECIATION OF THE
EVIDENCE WHEN IT RULED THAT PETITIONER IS A SUBLESSEE OF RESPONDENT
AND THAT PETITIONER WAS REMISS IN THE PAYMENT OF HIS RENTALS OVER THE
PREMISES.27
The Petition is without merit.
We shall address the first ground raised by petitioner with regard to the alleged reliance of the
Court of Appeals on the Decision of the Tenth Division of the same court, dated 28 March
2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 79157, entitled, Rodil Enterprises, Inc. v. The Office of the President
and Ides ORacca Building Tenants Association, Inc.28
Contrary to petitioners contention, we do not find that the Court of Appeals was in error when
it took notice of the ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 79157 in resolving petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. As respondent Rodil Enterprises asseverated, for the appellate court to
ignore a decision rendered by a division thereof would be to turn a blind eye on a valid
judgment rendered by the same appellate body. Neither can we give merit to petitioners
submission that the reliance by the Court of Appeals on its Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 79517
is premature and misplaced. More significantly, the contention of the petitioner that the
Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 79517 has not attained finality has become mute when viewed
Page 64 of 75
within recent factual developments. The ruling in CA-G.R. SP No. 79517 has long reached
finality. This Court in a Resolution 29 dated 25 January 2006 denied the Petition for Review on
Certiorari filed by the Ides ORacca Building Tenants Association, Inc. thereon. On 20 March
2006, this Court denied with finality the Motion for Reconsideration of the 25 January 2006
Resolution for lack of compelling reason or substantial argument. 30
Moreover, on 12 April 2004, the appellate court issued a Resolution, 31 granting petitioner a
hearing on its Motion for Reconsideration as the grounds cited therein needed further
clarification. This belies petitioners claim that the resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration
was based solely on the ruling of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79517.
We come to the second ground raised by the petitioner. Petitioner argues that Rodil
Enterprises is guilty of forum shopping when it filed the Petition for Certiorari with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79157, 32after it filed an Appeal with the appellate court
in CA-G.R. SP No. 34586.33 Forum shopping is the act of a party against whom an adverse
judgment has been rendered in one forum, seeking another and possibly favorable opinion in
another forum other than by appeal or special civil action of certiorari.34
The question of forum shopping is not even material to the instant petition.
It must be emphasized that neither CA-G.R. SP No. 79157 nor CA-G.R. SP No. 34586 is
before this Court for consideration. These cases are separate and distinct from CA-G.R. SP
No. 67201 now before us.
What are assailed in the instant Petition are the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 21
October 2002 and the Resolution, dated 12 May 2005 in CA G.R. SP No. 67201, which
reversed the ruling of the RTC, and affirmed the MeTC, ordering Luciano Tan to vacate the
premises and peacefully deliver possession to Rodil Enterprises. The matter in controversy is
the refusal of Luciano Tan to pay the monthly rentals over Botica Divisoria under the contract
of sublease between the parties.
On the other hand, CA-G.R. SP No. 79157 was a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to
nullify the Order of Execution of the Office of the President of its 8 February 1994 Decision in
OP Case No. 4968 finding the Renewal of Contract of Lease, and the Supplemental Contract
of no force and effect. CA-G.R. SP No. 34586 was an appeal on the Decision in O.P. Case No.
4968, which was the basis of the Order of Execution. If there has indeed been forum shopping
when CA-G.R. SP No. 79517 was instituted during the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 34586,
such question should have been raised by petitioner, at first instance, before the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79517. It should be noted that the petition in CA-G.R. SP No.
79517 was already given due course by the Court of Appeals and its ruling therein has long
attained finality when, on appeal to this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 169892, we denied the
said appeal with finality in our Resolutions dated 25 January 2000 and dated 20 March 2006.
Whatever matters concerning the said case is now beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to
resolve.

We proceed to the final ground raised by the petitioner for the allowance of the instant
Petition. Petitioner assails the factual findings of the Court of Appeals when it ruled that there
was a judicial admission as to petitioners liability under a contract of sublease between him
and Rodil Enterprises.
To resolve this issue, a reading of the significant orders of the MeTC and the pleadings filed by
petitioner is warranted.
The MeTC issued an Order, dated 27 June 2000 of the following import, to wit:
On second call, the parties and counsel agreed in principle in open court to the following terms
to put an end to this civil case for ejectment between them:
1.) that the defendant [Luciano Tan] will pay P440,000.00 representing rentals from
September, 1997 up to the present, which is the outstanding obligation of the defendant as of
June, 2000 on or before June 30, 2000; and
2.) the defendant [Luciano Tan] will pay the monthly rentals computed at P13,750.00 on or
before the 5th day of each month after June 30, 2000.35
On 14 August 2000, petitioner filed a Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals with the
MeTC, praying that he be allowed to deposit the rentals due as of August 2000, in the amount
of P467,500.00, and the subsequent monthly rentals as it falls due.
Petitioner posits that the aforesaid admission, made in open court, and then, reiterated in his
Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals, cannot be taken as an admission of his liability,
citing Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, 36 which states, inter alia, that an offer of
compromise in a civil case is not a tacit admission of liability.
The general rule is an offer of compromise in a civil case is not an admission of liability. It is
not admissible in evidence against the offeror.
The rule, however, is not iron-clad. This much was elucidated by this Court in Trans-Pacific
Industrial Supplies, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,37 to wit:
To determine the admissibility or non-admissibility of an offer to compromise, the
circumstances of the case and the intent of the party making the offer should be considered.
Thus, if a party denies the existence of a debt but offers to pay the same for the purpose of
buying peace and avoiding litigation, the offer of settlement is inadmissible. If in the course
thereof, the party making the offer admits the existence of an indebtedness combined with a
proposal to settle the claim amicably, then, the admission is admissible to prove such
indebtedness (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 5, p. 233 [1980 ed.]); Francisco,
Rules of Court, Vol. VII, p. 325 [1973 ed.] citing McNiel v. Holbrook, 12 Pac. (US) 84, 9 L. ed.,
1009). Indeed, an offer of settlement is an effective admission of a borrowers loan balance
(L.M. Handicraft Manufacturing Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 640 [1990]. x x x. 38
Similarly, in the case of Varadero de Manila v. Insular Lumber Co.39 the Court applied the
exception to the general rule. In Varadero there was neither an expressed nor implied denial
of liability, but during the course of the abortive negotiations therein, the defendant expressed
Page 65 of 75
a willingness to pay the plaintiff. Finding that there was no denial of liability, and considering
that the only question discussed was the amount to be paid, the Court did not apply the rule of
exclusion of compromise negotiations.
In the case at bar, the MeTC and the Court of Appeals properly appreciated petitioners
admission as an exception to the general rule of inadmissibility. The MeTC found that
petitioner did not contest the existence of the sublease, and his counsel made frank
representations anent the formers liability in the form of rentals. This expressed admission
was coupled with a proposal to liquidate. The Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals
was deemed by the MeTC as an explicit acknowledgment of petitioners liability on the
subleased premises. The Court of Appeals agreed with the MeTC. Indeed, the existence of
the Contract of Lease, dated 18 October 1999 was not denied by petitioner. The contracts that
were assailed by petitioner are the contracts dated 18 and 25 May 1992, the validity of which
has been upheld by this Court in the consolidated cases of G.R. No. 129609 and G.R. No.
135537.
Finally, we find a categorical admission on the part of petitioner, not only as to his liability, but
also, as to the amount of indebtedness in the form of rentals due. The Order of the MeTC
dated 27 June 2000 was clear that the petitioner agreed in open court to pay the amount
of P440,000.00, representing petitioners unpaid rentals from September 1997 to June 2000;
and that petitioner will pay the monthly rentals computed at P13,750.00 on or before the
5th day of each month after 30 June 2000. The petitioners judicial admission in open court, as
found by the MeTC, and affirmed by the Court of Appeals finds particular significance when
viewed together with his Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals, wherein petitioner
stated that the rentals due on the premises in question from September 1997 up to the
present amounted to P467,500.00, as of the date of filing the Motion. Petitioner cannot now be
allowed to reject the same. An admission made in the pleading cannot be controverted by the
party making such admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted by
him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should be ignored whether objection is
interposed by a party or not.40 A judicial admission is an admission made by a party in the
course of the proceedings in the same case, for purposes of the truth of some alleged fact,
which said party cannot thereafter disprove.41
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 21 October 2002 and the
Resolution dated 12 May 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 67201, affirming and reinstating the 6
October 2000 Decision of the MeTC in Civil Case No. 166584 are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175085, June 01, 2016
TAN SIOK1 KUAN AND PUTE CHING, Petitioners, v. FELICISIMO "BOY" HO, RODOLFO C.
RETURTA,2 VICENTE M. SALAS, AND LOLITA MALONZO, Respondents.

DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari3 assailing the Decision4 dated June 29,
2006 and the Resolution5 dated October 17, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 92107, which rulings reversed the Consolidated Decision 6 dated May 6, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Civil Case Nos. Q-04-53505 to Q-04-53511 and the Joint
Decision7 dated July 8, 2004 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in Civil Case Nos. 30272
to 30278 and, in effect, dismissed for lack of merit the complaints for unlawful detainer filed by
herein petitioners.
Antecedent Facts
The case at bar stems from seven (7) separate complaints for unlawful detainer filed by
petitioners Tan Siu Kuan and Pute Ching against defendants Avelino Bombita (Bombita), Felix
Gagarin (Gagarin), Bernardo Napolitano (Napolitano), Felicisimo "Boy" Ho (Ho), Rodolfo
Returta
(Returta),
Vicente
Salas
(Salas),
and
Lolita
Malonzo
(Malonzo).
In their Complaints,8 petitioners averred that they are the owners of a parcel of land, along
with the improvements therein, located at Apollo Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon
City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 279014 and 279015; that they
have been leasing portions of said property to the defendants since 1972; and that on
February 7, 2003 they notified defendants in writing of their failure to pay rentals, as follows:
-
defendant AVELINO BOMBITA that his rentals from March 1997 to the present have not
been paid in the total sum of Php17,500.00 as of December, 2002;
defendant FELIX GAGARIN that his rentals from September 1997 to the present have
not been paid in the total sum of Php16,000.00 as of December, 2002;
defendant FELICISIMO "BOY" HO that his rentals from December 1996 to the present
have not been paid in the total sum of Php28,700.00 as of December, 2002;
defendant LOLITA MALONZO that her rentals from January, 1997 to the present have
not been paid in the total sum of Php21,600.00 as of December, 2002;
defendant BERNARDO NAPOLITANO that his rentals from September, 1997 to the
present have not been paid in the total sum of Php16,000.00 as of December, 2002;
defendant RODOLFO RETURTA that his rentals from July, 1996 to the present have [not]
been [paid in] the total sum of Php23,700.00 as of December, 2002; and
defendant VICENTE SALAS [that] his rentals from August, 1997 to the [present have] not
been paid in the total sum of Php22,750.00 as of December, 2002. 9
Page 66 of 75
Defendants were given ten (10) days to pay the rentals due or else to vacate the premises
and turn over the possession thereof to petitioners, but defendants allegedly ignored
petitioners' demand, warranting the filing of the complaints for unlawful detainer. 10
For their part, Bombita, Gagarin, and Napolitano (defendants) argued that the lease
agreements they have executed with petitioners are void ab initio, petitioners being Chinese
nationals who are not entitled to own real property in the Philippines. Moreover, they claimed
to have been in possession of the subject premises since 1968 or some 35 years ago, thus
plaintiffs action cannot be one for ejectment or unlawful detainer, but accion publiciana which
must
be
filed
before
the
RTC.11
On the other hand, Ho, Returta, Salas, and Malonzo, herein respondents, maintained that they
have been in possession of the subject premises for 37 years without any rentals being paid to
any landlord or his agents, and that there are no existing lease contracts between
respondents and petitioners. In fact, in separate letters to petitioners, in response to the
latter's demand letters, respondents categorically denied renting the subject
premises.12 Respondents also asserted that they have started possessing said property in
1966 by building residential houses, and that they have been in continuous possession since
then. Additionally, respondents claimed that petitioners presented only photocopies of the
subject TCTs and that when they presented such to the Register of Deeds of Quezon City for
verification as to how such were transferred from the mother titles TCT Nos. 12505 and
12506, said office informed them that there is no single transaction recorded in the aforesaid
mother titles.13 Lastly, respondents argued that even assuming that petitioners' titles are
authentic, their cause of action should have been accion publiciana considering that
respondents are in possession and that no lease contract exists between the parties.
After trial, the MeTC-Branch 40, Quezon City ruled in favor of petitioners. As regards
defendants, the MeTC held that they impliedly admitted the existence of lease contracts
between them and petitioners and, as such, they cannot deny the consequent lessor-lessee
relationship following the rule that a tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord. As
regards respondents, on the other hand, the MeTC ruled that since petitioners were able to
show that the property in question was registered under their name, and since respondents
merely denied the existence of a lessor-lessee relationship between them and petitioners,
petitioners' averments must prevail following the tenet that in weighing contradictory
declarations and statements, greater weight must generally be given to positive testimony.
Thus, the MeTC disposed of the case in this manner: 14
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the herein
plaintiffs TAN S1U KUAN & PUTE CHING as against all the above named defendants over

that certain property located at Apollo Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City covered
by TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NOS. 270014 and 279015, both of the Registry of
Deeds
for
Quezon
City,
as
follows:
IN CIVIL CASE NO. 30272:
a. ordering the defendant AVELINO BOMBITA and any and all persons' claiming rights
under him [to] vacate the premises in question, and to peacefully surrender and turn
over the possession of the same unto plaintiffs;
b. ordering said defendant to pay unto plaintiff the sum of Php250.00 per month starting
from February 7, 2003 until they have completely vacated the premises;
c.
ordering said [defendant to] pay unto plaintiff the sum of Php 10,000.00 pesos as and
by way of attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.

a. ordering the defendant FELIX GAGARIN and any and all persons claiming rights
under him to vacate the premises in question, and to peacefully surrender and turn
c.
ordering said defendant to pay unto plaintiff the sum of Php10,000.00 pesos as and by
way of attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.

a. ordering the defendant FELIC1SIMO "[BOY]" HO and any and all persons [claiming]
rights under him to vacate the premises in question, and to peacefully surrender and
turn over the possession of the same unto plaintiffs;
c.
ordering said defendant to pay unto plaintiff the sum of Phpl0,000.00 pesos as and by
way of attorney's fees, plus costs of suit.

a. ordering the defendant LOLITA MALONZO and any and all persons claiming rights
under her to vacate the premises in question, and to peacefully surrender and turn
b. ordering said defendant to pay unto plaintiffs the sum of Php300.00 per month starting
Page 67 of 75
c.
ordering said defendant to pay unto plaintiffs the sum of Php 10,000.00 pesos as and

a. ordering the defendant BERNARDO NAPOLITANO and any [and all] persons claiming
rights under him to vacate the premises in question, and to peacefully surrender and
turn over the possession of the same unto plaintiffs;
c.
ordering said defendant to pay unto plaintiffs the sum of Phpl0,000.00 pesos as and
by way of attorney's fee[s], plus costs of suit.
IN CIVIL CASE NO, 30277:

a. ordering the defendant RODOLFO RETURTA and any and all persons claiming rights
c.
ordering said defendant to pay unto plaintiffs the sum of Phpl0,000.00 pesos as and
-andIN CIVIL CASE NO. 30278:

a. ordering the defendant VICENTE SALAS and any and all persons claiming rights
from February 7, 2003 until they have completely vacated the premises; and
c.
ordering said defendant to pay unto plaintiffs the sum of Phpl 0,000.00 pesos as and
by
way
of
attorney's
fees,
plus
costs
of
suit.
SO ORDERED.
Upon appeal, the RTC-Branch 87, Quezon City affirmed the MeTC. According to the RTC, the
"defendant's common defense is that the complaint states no cause of action against them on
the grounds that plaintiffs are [C]hinese nationals, hence, not entitled to own real properties in

the Philippines; occupancy since 1968, hence, the action should have been accion publiciana;
and absence of lessor/lessee relationship." 15 Said court then went on to address these issues,
as follows: "Relative to the first three assigned errors, the Court finds that the matters have
been thoroughly and judiciously passed upon by the court a quo in arriving at the subject
decision, hence, this Court finds no compelling reason to disturb the same." 16
Thus, the RTC ruled:17
In sum, the Court finds no reversible error in the decision of the court a quo and hereby affirms
the
same en
toto.
SO ORDERED.23 (Citation omitted.)

The Present Petition
Petitioners filed the present petition for review on certiorari, raising the following issues:
I.
THE CONSOLIDATED DECISION DATED 6 MAY 2005 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL

COURT OF QUEZON CITY BRANCH 87 IN CIVIL CASE NOS. 04-53507, 53508, 0453510 and 04-53511, WHICH AFFIRMED IN TOTO THE EARLIER JOINT DECISION
DATED 8 JULY 2004 OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT, QUEZON CITY IN
CIVIL CASE NOS. 30272 TO 30278 HAD BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY FOR
FAILURE OF RESPONDENTS TO FILE THEIR JOINT MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD OF FIFTEEN (15)
DAYS FROM RECEIPT OF THE DECISION.24
II.
THE TENANCY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PETITIONERS AND RESPONDENTS

WAS PROPERLY ESTABLISHED.25
Costs against the defendant. SO ORDERED.

On motion, the RTC issued a Writ of Execution dated January 16, 2006. 18 On February 24,
2006,
the
subject
premises
were
turned
over
to
petitioners. 19
In the meantime, on November 18, 2005, respondents timely filed their appeal before the CA,
questioning the jurisdiction of the MeTC over the consolidated cases, the finding of a lessorlessee relationship between petitioners and respondents in. violation of the principle of res
inter alios acta,and the non-dismissal of the case despite the failure of petitioners and their
counsel
to
attend
the
pre-trial
conference. 20
Petitioners, on the other hand, averred that the assailed decision has already become final
and executory for failure to file the Joint Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Decision within
the prescribed period and, in fact, a writ of execution has already been issued. Alternatively,
they argued that since respondents refused to pay their rentals from 1997 to present, and
since non-payment of rent is a valid ground for ejectment, then the lower courts were correct
in
ruling
in
their
favor.21
After evaluating the merits of the case, the CA reversed the RTC. Although the CA upheld the
jurisdiction of the MeTC, saying that the allegations in the complaints make a case for unlawful
detainer and that the complaints were filed within one year from respondents' receipt of the
demand letters, it nevertheless agreed with respondents that petitioners have materially failed
to prove their right to eject respondents on the strength of being lessors. Moreover, the CA
sustained respondents' invocation of the principle of res inter alios acta.
Thus, the CA held:22
WHEREFORE, the Consolidated Decision dated May 6, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 87, Quezon City is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In its stead, a new one is
entered dismissing
the
actions
for
unlawful
detainer
for
lack
of
merit.
The Ruling of the Court
Petitioners'
arguments
do
not
persuade.
Anent the first issue of whether the Joint Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Decision was
timely filed, a close review of the records yields the finding that it was.
Indeed, as capitalized on by petitioners, respondents stated in their Joint Motion for
Reconsideration that they received the Decision dated May 6, 2005 on May 15, 2005, and that
they filed the Joint Motion for Reconsideration only on June 29, 2005. 26 However, as explained
by respondents, the statement that they received the RTC Decision on May 15, 2005 was
inadvertent and erroneous.27The records, particularly the certified true copies of the registry
return slips from the RTC, 28 show that the RTC Decision was simultaneously mailed by the
RTC to the parties only on June 7, 2005. Thus, as correctly maintained by respondents, they
could not have received the RTC Decision on May 15, 2005 or before the said decision was
mailed to them. Respondents then clarified that they received the RTC Decision on June 15,
2005.29 As such, the filing of the Joint Motion for Reconsideration on June 29, 2005 was timely
and
the
RTC
Decision
was
not
yet
final
and
executory.
As to the second issue of whether a lessor-lessee relationship between the parties was
Page 68 of 75

properly
established,
the
evidence
on
record
generates
negative
conclusion.
Velasco,
Jr.,
(Chairperson),
Peralta, and Reyes,
Jardeleza, J., on wellness leave.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
JJ., concur.
Except for petitioners' bare claims, they have not shown any evidence of a lease between
them and respondents, be it express or implied. As keenly observed by the CA, there was no
mention of how and when the alleged contract of lease started, there was no proof of prior
payment of rentals or any prior demand for such payment considering petitioners' allegation
that respondents failed to pay rentals since 1997 and that the case was instituted only in 2003.
Moreover, there is merit in respondents' invocation of the principle of res inter alios acta or that
principle which states that "the right of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration or
omission of another, except as hereinafter provided, among which are: (1) admission by third
party, (2) admission by co-partner or agent, (3) admission by conspirator, and (4) admission by
privies."30
In the case of Tamargo v. Awingan,31 the Court expounded on the rationale behind the
principle of res inter alios acta. Citing People v. vda. De Ramos, the Court held that:
(O)n a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding upon
himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not
only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the
acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of
strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.
In the present case, petitioners failed to establish that the defendants' 32 alleged implied
admission of a lessor-lessee relationship falls under the exceptions to the principle of res inter
alios acta as to make such admission binding upon respondents. Although defendants and
respondents were all defendants in the complaints for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners, it
is very clear that defendants and respondents espoused different defenses. Contrary to
defendants' position, respondents, as early as the filing of their response to petitioners'
demand letter, firmly and consistently denied the existence of any lease contract between
them
and
petitioners
over
the
subject
land.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the assailed rulings, the Court resolves
to DENY the present petition. Accordingly, the Decision dated June 29, 2006 and the
Resolution dated October 17, 2006 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED and the
complaints for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners Tan Siu Kuan and Pute Ching against
respondents Felicisimo "Boy" Ho, Rodolfo Returta, Vicente Salas, and Lolita Malonzo
are DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 177727
HAROLD
V.
TAMARGO, Petitioner,
vs.
ROMULO AWINGAN, LLOYD ANTIPORDA and LICERIO ANTIPORDA, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
SO
Page 69 of 75
ORDERED.
January 19, 2010
CORONA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 of the November 10, 2006 decision 2 and May 18,
2007 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 93610.
Atty. Franklin V. Tamargo and his eight-year-old daughter, Gail Franzielle, were shot and killed
at around 5:15 p.m. of August 15, 2003 along Nueva Street corner Escolta Street, Binondo,
Manila. The police had no leads on the perpetrators of the crime until a certain Reynaldo
Geron surfaced and executed an affidavit dated September 12, 2003. He stated that a certain
Lucio Columna told him during a drinking spree that Atty. Tamargo was ordered killed by
respondent Lloyd Antiporda and that he (Columna) was one of those who killed Atty. Tamargo.
He added that he told the Tamargo family what he knew and that the sketch of the suspect
closely resembled Columna.4
After conducting a preliminary investigation and on the strength of Gerons affidavit, the
investigating prosecutor5issued a resolution dated December 5, 2003 finding probable cause
against Columna and three John Does. 6 On February 2, 2004, the corresponding Informations
for murder were filed against them in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, one assigned
to Branch 27 for the death of Atty. Franklin Tamargo, and the other to Branch 29 for the death
of the minor Gail Franzielle.7 Columna was arrested in the province of Cagayan on February
17, 2004 and brought to Manila for detention and trial. 8
On March 8, 2004, Columna (whose real name was Manuel, Jr.) executed an affidavit wherein
he admitted his participation as "look out" during the shooting and implicated respondent
Romulo Awingan (alias "Mumoy") as the gunman and one Richard Mecate. He also tagged as
masterminds respondent Licerio Antiporda, Jr. and his son, respondent Lloyd Antiporda. 9 The
former was the ex-mayor and the latter the mayor of Buguey, Cagayan at that time. When the
killing took place, Licerio Antiporda was in detention for a kidnapping case in which Atty.
Tamargo was acting as private prosecutor.
Pursuant to this affidavit, petitioner Harold V. Tamargo (brother of Atty. Tamargo) filed a
complaint against those implicated by Columna in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila. 10
On April 19, 2004, Columna affirmed his affidavit before the investigating prosecutor 11 who
subjected him to clarificatory questions.12
Respondents denied any involvement in the killings. They alleged that Licerio was a candidate
for mayor in Buguey, Cagayan during the May 2004 elections and that the case was instituted
by his political opponents in order to derail his candidacy. The Antipordas admitted that Atty.
Tamargo was their political rival for the mayoralty post of Buguey. Atty. Tamargo had been
defeated twice by Lloyd and once by Licerio. Before the killing, Atty. Tamargo filed an election
case against Lloyd and a kidnapping case in the Sandiganbayan against Licerio. However,
they claimed that both cases were dismissed as Lloyd emerged as the winner in the elections
and Licerio was acquitted by the Sandiganbayan.13
During the preliminary investigation, respondent Licerio presented Columnas unsolicited
handwritten letter dated May 3, 2004 to respondent Lloyd, sent from Columnas jail cell in
Manila. In the letter, Columna disowned the contents of his March 8, 2004 affidavit and
Page 70 of 75
narrated how he had been tortured until he signed the extrajudicial confession. He stated that
those he implicated had no participation in the killings. 14 Respondent Licerio also submitted an
affidavit of Columna dated May 25, 2004 wherein the latter essentially repeated the
statements in his handwritten letter.
Due to the submission of Columnas letter and affidavit, the investigating prosecutor set a
clarificatory hearing, to enable Columna to clarify his contradictory affidavits and his
unsolicited letter. During the hearing held on October 22, 2004, Columna categorically
admitted the authorship and voluntariness of the unsolicited letter. He affirmed the May 25,
2004 affidavit and denied that any violence had been employed to obtain or extract the
affidavit from him.151avvphi1
Thus, on November 10, 2004, the investigating prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the
charges. This was approved by the city prosecutor.
Meanwhile, in another handwritten letter addressed to City Prosecutor Ramon Garcia dated
October 29, 2004, Columna said that he was only forced to withdraw all his statements
against respondents during the October 22, 2004 clarificatory hearing because of the threats
to his life inside the jail. He requested that he be transferred to another detention center.16
Aggrieved by the dismissal of the charges, petitioner filed an appeal to the Department of
Justice (DOJ).17 On May 30, 2005, the DOJ, through then Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez,
reversed the dismissal and ordered the filing of the Informations for murder. 18 He opined that
the March 8, 2004 extrajudicial confession was not effectively impeached by the subsequent
recantation and that there was enough evidence to prove the probable guilt of
respondents.19 Accordingly, the Informations were filed and the cases were consolidated and
assigned to the RTC of Manila, Branch 29.20
However, on August 12, 2005, Secretary Gonzales granted the Antipordas motion for
reconsideration (MR) and directed the withdrawal of the Informations. 21 This time, he declared
that the extrajudicial confession of Columna was inadmissible against respondents and that,
even if it was admissible, it was not corroborated by other evidence. 22 As a result, on August
22, 2005, the trial prosecutor filed a motion to withdraw the Informations. On October 4, 2005,
Secretary Gonzalez denied petitioners MR.
The RTC, through Judge Cielito Mindaro-Grulla, granted the motion to withdraw the
Informations in an order dated October 26, 2005. 23 Petitioner filed an MR but the judge
voluntarily inhibited herself without resolving the same. The cases were re-raffled to Branch
19, presided by Judge Zenaida R. Daguna. Judge Daguna granted the MR of petitioner in a
resolution dated December 9, 2005. She ruled that, based on Columnas March 8, 2004
affidavit which he affirmed before the investigating prosecutor, there was probable cause to
hold the accused for trial. She denied the MR of the Antipordas in an order dated February 6,
2006.

Consequently, respondent Awingan filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition in
the CA docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 93610. The Antipordas separately filed another certiorari
case docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 94188.
In a decision dated November 10, 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 93610, the CA ruled that the RTC
judge gravely abused her discretion because she arbitrarily left out of her assessment and
evaluation the substantial matters that the DOJ Secretary had fully taken into account in
concluding that there was no probable cause against all the accused. It also held that
Columnas extrajudicial confession was not admissible against the respondents because,
aside from the recanted confession, there was no other piece of evidence presented to
establish the existence of the conspiracy. Additionally, the confession was made only after
Columna was arrested and not while the conspirators were engaged in carrying out the
conspiracy.
After this decision was promulgated, CA-G.R. SP No. 93610 was consolidated with CA-G.R.
SP No. 94188. The CA denied reconsideration in a resolution dated May 18, 2007. In a
decision dated August 24, 2007, the CA likewise granted the petition for certiorari of
respondents Antiporda.24
Petitioner filed this petition assailing the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 93610. Later on, he filed
an amended petition impleading respondents Antiporda and likewise assailing the CA decision
in CA-G.R. SP No. 94188. The Court treated this as a supplemental petition.
The main issue for our resolution is whether or not the CA erred in finding that Judge Daguna
had committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the withdrawal of the Informations for
murder against respondents.
Petitioner argues that, based on the independent assessment of Judge Daguna, there was
probable cause based on the earlier affidavit of Columna. She considered all the pieces of
evidence but did not give credit to Columnas recantation.
Respondents counter that Judge Daguna committed grave abuse of discretion by limiting her
evaluation and assessment only to evidence that supported probable cause while completely
disregarding contradicting evidence. They also contend that Columnas extrajudicial
confession was inadmissible against respondents because of the rule on res inter alios acta.
We find no merit in the petition.
It is settled that, when confronted with a motion to withdraw an Information (on the ground of
lack of probable cause to hold the accused for trial based on a resolution of the DOJ
Secretary), the trial court has the duty to make an independent assessment of the merits of
the motion.25 It may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary.
Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary would be an abdication of the trial courts
duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case.26 The court must itself be convinced that
there is indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused. 27
Page 71 of 75
We agree with the CA that Judge Daguna limited herself only to the following: (1) Columnas
affidavit dated March 8, 2004 wherein he implicated the respondents in the murders; (2) his
affirmation of this affidavit during the April 19, 2004 clarificatory hearing; (3) his letter dated
October 29, 2004 and (4) the May 30, 2005 DOJ resolution upholding the prosecutors
recommendation to file the murder charges.28
She completely ignored other relevant pieces of evidence such as: (1) Columnas May 3, 2004
letter to respondent Lloyd Antiporda narrating the torture he suffered to force him to admit his
participation in the crimes and to implicate the respondents; (2) his May 25, 2004 affidavit
where he stated that neither he nor the respondents had any involvement in the murders and
(3) his testimony during the October 22, 2004 clarificatory hearing wherein he categorically
affirmed his May 3, 2004 letter and May 25, 2004 affidavit.
We declared in Jimenez v. Jimenez29 that
[although] there is no general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause
since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining in given situations and
its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting
the examination, such a finding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run
counter to the clear dictates of reason. The judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on
with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during
trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts are created to
uphold.30 (Emphasis supplied)
Had Judge Daguna reviewed the entire records of the investigation, she would have seen that,
aside from the pieces of evidence she relied on, there were others which cast doubt on them.
We quote with approval the reflections of the CA on this point:
The selectivity of respondent RTC Judge for purposes of resolving the motion to withdraw the
informationseffectively sidetracked the guidelines for an independent assessment and
evaluation of the merits of the case. Respondent RTC Judge thus impaired the substantial
rights of the accused. Instead, she should have made a circumspect evaluation by looking at
everything made available to her at that point of the cases. No less than that was expected
and required of her as a judicial officer. According to Santos v. Orda, Jr., the trial judge may
make an independent assessment of the merits of the case based on the affidavits and
counter-affidavits, documents, or evidence appended to the Information; the records of the
public prosecutor which the court may order the latter to produce before the court; or any
evidence already adduced before the court by the accused at the time the motion is filed by
the public prosecutor.31
Moreover, Judge Daguna failed to consider that Columnas extrajudicial confession in his
March 8, 2004 affidavit was not admissible as evidence against respondents in view of the
rule on res inter alios acta.
Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. The rule on res inter alios acta provides that the
rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of

another.32 Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant, is not
admissible against his or her co-accused33 and is considered as hearsay against them. 34 The
reason for this rule is that:
conspirators. Given that she had no sufficient basis for a finding of probable cause against
respondents, her orders denying the withdrawal of the Informations for murder against them
were issued with grave abuse of discretion.
on a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a mans own acts are binding upon
himself, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations. Yet it would not
only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the
acts of mere unauthorized strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of
strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him. 35
Hence, we hold that the CA committed no reversible error in granting the petitions for certiorari
of respondents.
An exception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made by a conspirator under
Section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy

and during its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.1avvphi1
This rule prescribes that the act or declaration of the conspirator relating to the conspiracy and
during its existence may be given in evidence against co-conspirators provided that the
conspiracy is shown by independent evidence aside from the extrajudicial confession. 36 Thus,
in order that the admission of a conspirator may be received against his or her coconspirators, it is necessary that (a) the conspiracy be first proved by evidence other than the
admission itself (b) the admission relates to the common object and (c) it has been made
while the declarant was engaged in carrying out the conspiracy.37 Otherwise, it cannot be used
against the alleged co-conspirators without violating their constitutional right to be confronted
with the witnesses against them and to cross-examine them. 38
Here, aside from the extrajudicial confession, which was later on recanted, no other piece of
evidence was presented to prove the alleged conspiracy. There was no other prosecution
evidence, direct or circumstantial, which the extrajudicial confession could corroborate.
Therefore, the recanted confession of Columna, which was the sole evidence against
respondents, had no probative value and was inadmissible as evidence against them.
Considering the paucity and inadmissibility of the evidence presented against the
respondents, it would be unfair to hold them for trial. Once it is ascertained that no probable
cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused, they should be relieved
from the pain of going through a full blown court case. 39 When, at the outset, the evidence
offered during the preliminary investigation is nothing more than an uncorroborated
extrajudicial confession of an alleged conspirator, the criminal complaint should not prosper so
that the system would be spared from the unnecessary expense of such useless and
expensive litigation.40 The rule is all the more significant here since respondent Licerio
Antiporda remains in detention for the murder charges pursuant to the warrant of arrest issued
by Judge Daguna.41
Indeed, at that stage of the proceedings, the duty of Judge Daguna was only to satisfy herself
whether there was probable cause or sufficient ground to hold respondents for trial as co-
Page 72 of 75
G.R. No. 149576 August 8, 2006

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by
Authority, Petitioner,
vs.
KENRICK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
the
Land
Registration

DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The Republic of the Philippines assails the May 31, 2001 decision 1 and August 20, 2001
resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948 in this petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
This case stemmed from the construction by respondent Kenrick Development Corporation of
a concrete perimeter fence around some parcels of land located behind the Civil Aviation
Training Center of the Air Transportation Office (ATO) in 1996. As a result, the ATO was
dispossessed of some 30,228 square meters of prime land. Respondent justified its action
with a claim of ownership over the property. It presented Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
Nos. 135604, 135605 and 135606 issued in its name and which allegedly originated from TCT
No. 17508 registered in the name of one Alfonso Concepcion.
ATO verified the authenticity of respondents titles with the Land Registration Authority (LRA).
On May 17, 1996, Atty. Jose Loriega, head of the Land Title Verification Task Force of the
LRA, submitted his report. The Registrar of Deeds of Pasay City had no record of TCT No.
17508 and its ascendant title, TCT No. 5450. The land allegedly covered by respondents titles
was also found to be within Villamor Air Base (headquarters of the Philippine Air Force) in
Pasay City.
By virtue of the report, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on September 3, 1996, filed a
complaint for revocation, annulment and cancellation of certificates of title in behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines (as represented by the LRA) against respondent and Alfonso
Concepcion. It was raffled to Branch 114 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City where it
was docketed as Civil Case No. 96-1144.
On December 5, 1996, respondent filed its answer which was purportedly signed by Atty.
Onofre Garlitos, Jr. as counsel for respondent.
Since Alfonso Concepcion could not be located and served with summons, the trial court
ordered the issuance of an alias summons by publication against him on February 19, 1997.
The case was thereafter punctuated by various incidents relative to modes of discovery, pretrial, postponements or continuances, motions to dismiss, motions to declare defendants in
default and other procedural matters.
During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and Committee on
Justice and Human Rights conducted a hearing in aid of legislation on the matter of land
registration and titling. In particular, the legislative investigation looked into the issuance of
fake titles and focused on how respondent was able to acquire TCT Nos. 135604, 135605 and
135606.
During the congressional hearing held on November 26, 1998, one of those summoned was
Atty. Garlitos, respondents former counsel. He testified that he prepared respondents answer
and transmitted an unsigned draft to respondents president, Mr. Victor Ong. The signature
Page 73 of 75
appearing above his name was not his. He authorized no one to sign in his behalf either. And
he did not know who finally signed it.
With Atty. Garlitos revelation, the Republic promptly filed an urgent motion on December 3,
1998 to declare respondent in default, 2 predicated on its failure to file a valid answer. The
Republic argued that, since the person who signed the answer was neither authorized by Atty.
Garlitos nor even known to him, the answer was effectively an unsigned pleading. Pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, 3 it was a mere scrap of paper and produced no legal
effect.
On February 19, 1999, the trial court issued a resolution granting the Republics motion. 4 It
found respondents answer to be sham and false and intended to defeat the purpose of the
rules. The trial court ordered the answer stricken from the records, declared respondent in
default and allowed the Republic to present its evidence ex parte.
The Republic presented its evidence ex parte, after which it rested its case and formally
offered its evidence.
Meanwhile, respondent sought reconsideration of the February 19, 1999 resolution but the
trial court denied it.
Aggrieved, respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for
certiorari 5 seeking to set aside the February 19, 1999 resolution of the trial court. Respondent
contended that the trial court erred in declaring it in default for failure to file a valid and timely
answer.
On May 31, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision. It found Atty. Garlitos
statements in the legislative hearing to be unreliable since they were not subjected to crossexamination. The appellate court also scrutinized Atty. Garlitos acts after the filing of the
answer 6 and concluded that he assented to the signing of the answer by somebody in his
stead. This supposedly cured whatever defect the answer may have had. Hence, the
appellate court granted respondents petition for certiorari. It directed the lifting of the order of
default against respondent and ordered the trial court to proceed to trial with dispatch. The
Republic moved for reconsideration but it was denied. Thus, this petition.
Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the trial courts order which declared respondent in
default for its failure to file a valid answer? Yes, it did.
A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt or ratify anothers statement. 7 Where it
appears that a party clearly and unambiguously assented to or adopted the statements of
another, evidence of those statements is admissible against him. 8 This is the essence of the
principle of adoptive admission.
An adoptive admission is a partys reaction to a statement or action by another person when it
is reasonable to treat the partys reaction as an admission of something stated or implied by
the other person. 9 By adoptive admission, a third persons statement becomes the admission
of the party embracing or espousing it. Adoptive admission may occur when a party:

(a) expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made by another;
(b) hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it;
10
11
(c) utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertion of another;
12
(d) replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised by another but ignores further
points which he or she has heard the other make 13 or
(e) reads and signs a written statement made by another. 14
Here, respondent accepted the pronouncements of Atty. Garlitos and built its case on them. At
no instance did it ever deny or contradict its former counsels statements. It went to great
lengths to explain Atty. Garlitos testimony as well as its implications, as follows:
1. While Atty. Garlitos denied signing the answer, the fact was that the answer was signed.
Hence, the pleading could not be considered invalid for being an unsigned pleading. The fact
that the person who signed it was neither known to Atty. Garlitos nor specifically authorized by
him was immaterial. The important thing was that the answer bore a signature.
2. While the Rules of Court requires that a pleading must be signed by the party or his
counsel, it does not prohibit a counsel from giving a general authority for any person to sign
the answer for him which was what Atty. Garlitos did. The person who actually signed the
pleading was of no moment as long as counsel knew that it would be signed by another. This
was similar to addressing an authorization letter "to whom it may concern" such that any
person could act on it even if he or she was not known beforehand.
The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has read the pleading; that,
to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is a good ground to support it; and
that it is not interposed for delay. 16Under the Rules of Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his
signature, who can certify to these matters.
The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving practice of law which
is reserved exclusively for the members of the legal profession. Counsel may delegate the
signing of a pleading to another lawyer 17 but cannot do so
in favor of one who is not. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 9.01 A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any
task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.
Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by unqualified
persons, 18 something the law strongly proscribes.
Therefore, the blanket authority respondent claims Atty. Garlitos entrusted to just anyone was
void. Any act taken pursuant to that authority was likewise void. There was no way it could
have been cured or ratified by Atty. Garlitos subsequent acts.
Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998 Senate hearing shows that Atty. Garlitos
consented to the signing of the answer by another "as long as it conformed to his draft." We
give no value whatsoever to such self-serving statement.
3. Atty. Garlitos testified that he prepared the answer; he never disowned its contents and he
resumed acting as counsel for respondent subsequent to its filing. These circumstances show
that Atty. Garlitos conformed to or ratified the signing of the answer by another.
No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanket authority for just anyone to sign
the answer. The trial court correctly ruled that respondents answer was invalid and of no legal
effect as it was an unsigned pleading. Respondent was properly declared in default and the
Republic was rightly allowed to present evidence ex parte.
Respondent repeated these statements of Atty. Garlitos in its motion for reconsideration of the
trial courts February 19, 1999 resolution. And again in the petition it filed in the Court of
Appeals as well as in the comment15 and memorandum it submitted to this Court.
Respondent insists on the liberal application of the rules. It maintains that even if it were true
that its answer was supposedly an unsigned pleading, the defect was a mere technicality that
could be set aside.
Evidently, respondent completely adopted Atty. Garlitos statements as its own. Respondents
adoptive admission constituted a judicial admission which was conclusive on it.
Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly labeled as mere technicalities
have their own valid raison d etre in the orderly administration of justice. To summarily brush
them aside may result in arbitrariness and injustice. 19
Contrary to respondents position, a signed pleading is one that is signed either by the party
himself or his counsel. Section 3, Rule 7 is clear on this matter. It requires that a pleading
must be signed by the party or counsel representing him.
Therefore, only the signature of either the party himself or his counsel operates to validly
convert a pleading from one that is unsigned to one that is signed.
Counsels authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. He may not delegate it to
just any person.
Page 74 of 75
The Courts pronouncement in Garbo v. Court of Appeals
20
is relevant:
Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants
alike are thus [enjoined] to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances,
allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge
a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation
and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and
circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true
that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an
orderly and speedy administration of justice.

Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, for the most persuasive
of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the
degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure. 21 In this case,
respondent failed to show any persuasive reason why it should be exempted from strictly
abiding by the rules.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for the commencement of disbarment proceedings against Atty. Onofre
Garlitos, Jr. for his possible unprofessional conduct not befitting his position as an officer of
the court.
As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to the acts committed by Atty. Garlitos in
violation of the ethics of the legal profession. Thus, he should be made to account for his
possible misconduct.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The May 31, 2001 decision and August 20,
2001 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the February 19, 1999 resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch
114 declaring respondent in default is hereby REINSTATED.
Page 75 of 75
SO ORDERED.

Evidence Midterm Cases

Diunggah oleh

Informasi Dokumen

Hak Cipta

Format Tersedia

Bagikan dokumen Ini

Bagikan atau Tanam Dokumen

Opsi Berbagi

Apakah menurut Anda dokumen ini bermanfaat?

Apakah konten ini tidak pantas?

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

Evidence Midterm Cases

Diunggah oleh

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

Evidence Midterm Cases