[G.R. No. 48006. July 8, 1942.

]
FAUSTO BARREDO, Petitioner, v. SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, Respondents.
Celedonio P. Gloria and Antonio Barredo for Petitioner.
Jose G. Advincula for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. DAMAGES; QUASI-DELICT OR "CULPA AQUILIANA" ; PRIMARY AND DIRECT
RESPONSIBILITY OF EMPLOYERS UNDER ARTICLES 1902-1910 OF THE CIVIL CODE. A
head-on collision between a taxi and a carretela resulted in the death of a 16-year-old boy, one of the
passengers of the carretela. A criminal action was filed against the taxi driver and he was convicted
and sentenced accordingly. The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a
separate civil action be reserved. Thereafter the parents of the deceased broughtSUIT for damages
against the proprietor of the taxi, the employer of the taxi driver, under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Defendant contended that his liability was governed by the Revised Penal Code, according to which
his responsibility was only secondary, but no civil action had been brought against the taxi driver.
Held: That this separate civil action lies, the employer being primarily and directly responsible in
damages under articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code.
2. ID.; ID.; ID. A quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana" is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code,
with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or
crime. Upon this principle, and on the wording and spirit of article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary
and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
3. ID.; ID.; ID. The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra- contractual looms clear and
unmistakable. This legal institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early ancestors being the Lex
Aquilia in the Roman Law. In fact, in Spanish legal terminology, this responsibility is often referred to
as culpa aquiliana. The Partidas also contributed to the genealogy of the present fault or negligence
under the Civil Code: for instance, Law 6, Title 15, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es de fazer emienda,
porque, como quier que el non fizo a sabiendas el dao al otro, pero acaescio por su culpa."cralaw
virtua1aw library
4. ID.; ID.; ID. The distinctiveNATURE of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to
article 1089, one of the five sources of obligations is this legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extracontractual: "los actos . . . en que intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia." Then article
1093 provides that this kind of obligation shall be governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of Book IV,
meaning articles 1902-1910. This portion of the Civil Code is exclusively devoted to the legal
institution of culpa aquiliana.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; DISTINCTION BETWEEN CRIMES UNDER THE PENAL CODE AND THE "CULPA
AQUILIANA" OR "CUASI-DELITO" UNDER THE CIVIL CODE. A distinction exists between the
civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The
same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under article 100
of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under
articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Plaintiffs were free to choose which remedy to enforce. Some of
the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under
the Civil Code are enumerated in the decision.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; OPINIONS OF JURISTS. The decision sets out extracts from opinions of jurists on
the separate existence of cuasi- delicts and the employers primary and direct liability under article
1903 of the Civil Code.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; SENTENCES OF THE SUPREME TRIBUNAL OF SPAIN. The decision cites
sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain upholding the principles above set forth: that a cuasi-

delict or culpa extra- contractual is a separate and distinct legal institution, independent from the civil
responsibility arising from criminal liability, and that an employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil
Code, primarily and directly responsible for the negligent acts of his employee.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; DECISIONS OF THIS COURT. Decisions of this Court are also cited holding that,
in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code
has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer
could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction,
he could have been sued for his civil liability arising from his crime.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; FOUNDATIONS OF DOCTRINES ABOVE SET FORTH; LITERAL MEANING OF THE
LAW. The Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence; if it should
be held that articles 1902-1910, Civil Code, apply only to negligence not punishable by law, culpa
aquiliana would have very little application in actual life. The literal meaning of the law will not be used
to smother a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DEGREE OF PROOF. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence
which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of
evidence. In such cases, defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under
articles 1902 to 1910, Civil Code. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXPEDITIOUS REMEDY. The primary and direct responsibility of employer
under article 1903, Civil Code, is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs. Such primary and
direct responsibility of employers is calculated to protect society.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRACTICE OF RELYING SOLELY ON CIVIL RESPONSIBILITY FOR A CRIME.
The harm done by such practice is pointed out, and the principle of responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 et seq., of the Civil Code is restored to its full vigor.

73 Phil 607
Torts and Damages Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from Crimes
At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanillas taxi collided with a kalesa thereby killing the 16 year
old Faustino Garcia. Faustinos parents filed a criminalSUIT against Fontanilla and reserved their
right to file a separate civil suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After the criminal suit, Garcia
filed a civil suit against Barredo the owner of the taxi (employer of Fontanilla). The suit was based
on Article 1903 of the civil code (negligence of employers in the selection of their employees).
Barredo assailed the suit arguing that his liability is only subsidiary and that the separate civil suit
should have been filed against Fontanilla primarily and not him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable.
HELD: No. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate civil action against negligent
employers. Garcia is well within his rights in suing Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate

civil action and this is more expeditious because by the time of the SC judgment Fontanilla is already
serving his sentence and has no property. It was also proven that Barredo is negligent in hiring his
employees because it was shown that Fontanilla had had multiple traffic infractions already before he
hired him something he failed to overcome during hearing. Had Garcia not reserved his right to file
a separate civil action, Barredo would have only been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not being
sued for damages arising from a criminal act (his drivers negligence) but rather for his own
negligence in selecting his employee (Article 1903).

[G.R. No. L-24803. May 26, 1977.]

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as Ascendants of Agapito Elcano,
deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father
andNATURAL Guardian of said minor, Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 1965 in Civil
Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano Et. Al. v. Reginald Hill Et. Al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of
defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor,
married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin Hill, with whom he was
living and getting subsistence, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito
Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his
act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."cralaw virtua1aw library
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. The present action is not only against but a violation ofSECTION
III, of the Revised Rules of Court;

1, Rule 107, which is now Rule

"2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now final and or in res-adjudicata;
"3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as
guardian of the other defendant through emancipation by marriage." (P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on
Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration of the defendants of
such denial, reiterating the above grounds that the following order was issued:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the defendants on January 14, 1965 and after
thoroughly examining the arguments therein contained, the Court finds the same to be meritorious
and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8, 1964 is hereby reconsidered by ordering the
dismissal of the above entitled case.
"SO ORDERED.
"Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965." (p. 40, Record [p. 21, Record on Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are presenting for Our resolution
the following assignment of errors:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE BY UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF
DEFENDANTS THAT
I

"THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT ALSO A VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE
107, NOW RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE
111, RULES OF COURT IS INAPPLICABLE;
II

"THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RESADJUDICATA;

III

"THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176 TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE
INAPPLICABLE IN THE INSTANT CASE; and
IV

"THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL
BECAUSE HE WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER DEFENDANT THROUGH
EMANCIPATION BY MARRIAGE." (page 4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant-appellee Reginald

Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City. After due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of
intent to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored Us with a copy of
the decision of acquittal, presumably because appellants do not dispute that such indeed was the
basis stated in the courts decision. And so, when appellants filed their complaint against appellees
Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees filed the
motion to dismiss above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues presented for Our
resolution are:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case
wherein the action for civil liability was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code be applied against Atty. Hill,
notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of, Reginald,
though a minor, living with and getting subsistence from his father, was already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and further clarification of the
dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly
established in this jurisdiction in Barredo v. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court postulated,
on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on theNATURE of culpa aquiliana in
relation to culpa criminal or delito and mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the
Supreme Court of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our own, that
the same given act can result in civil liability not only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil
Code. Thus, the opinion holds:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the Penal
Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and
therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper
subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the
employer and not the employee who was being sued." (pp. 615-616, 73 Phil.) 1
"It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case
because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is
therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject matter either of a
criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and
independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this
jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has
been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could
have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he
could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime." (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2
"It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil
Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or
simple negligence and not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal
negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for fault or
negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code." (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
"The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of
this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood, in the past,
it might not be inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
"Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple
negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or
negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literalIMPORT of article 1093 of the Civil Code,
the legal institution of culpa aquilina would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death

or injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence even the slightest
would have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such
a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to
impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation to absurd and anomalous. Nor are we,
in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that
giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a
principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito,
which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
"Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is
required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in
damages. There are numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond
reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant
can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code.
Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium." (p.
620, 73 Phil.)
"Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on
this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed,
and for lack of understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has
grown up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a
crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil
Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically
useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa
extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we
believe it is high time we pointed out to the harms done by such practice and to restore the principle
of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is
high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel,
so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is
believed, make for the better safeguarding or private rights because it re-establishes an ancient and
additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the
issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or
his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress." (p. 621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the foregoing excerpts from the
opinion in Garcia - that the concurrence of the Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to
contemplate only acts of negligence and not intentional voluntary acts deeper reflection would
reveal that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact it actually
extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made therein to the Sentence of the
Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919, supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a
negligent act. Indeed, Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia,
provided textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or
negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book
(which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And it is precisely the underline qualification, "not punishable by law",
that Justice Bocobo emphasized could lead to an undesirable construction or interpretation of the
letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth life" hence, the ruling that" (W)e will not
use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient
origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and
made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so, because Justice Bacobo
was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be
noted that the said Code, which was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, "not
punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts which are
criminal in character or in violation of the penal law, whether voluntary or negligent. Thus, the
corresponding provisions to said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says,
"Obligations derived from quasi-delicts shall be governed by the provisions of Chapter 2, Title XVII of
this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the
new code provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant."cralaw virtua1aw library
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177) through at first sight
startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature of criminal and civil
negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a culpa aquilian or quasidelict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal
negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and culpa extra-contractual or cuasidelito has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound
and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article
2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall
not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for
damages due to a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. But said article forestalls a double recovery."
(Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same
argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that upholds "the spirit that giveth life" rather than that
which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And
considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely
establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character
(under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule 111,
contemplate also the same separability, it is "more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice,
and more in harmony with modern progress", to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes v.
Atlantic. Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to
"fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character,
whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the
two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability
referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict
only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal
act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here
hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law. 4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his
liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginalds emancipation by marriage on the
possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our considered opinion that the conclusion of
appellees that Atty. Hill is already free from responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil
Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place "by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is,
however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really
full or absolute. Thus" (E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the childs person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he
were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent
of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his
father, mother or guardian."cralaw virtua1aw library
Now under Article 2180," (T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for ones

own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company." In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with
his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question. Factually,
therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not
unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the joint and solidary liability
of parents with their offending child under Article 2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to
supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. 5 On
the other hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor emancipated by marriage
may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the assistance of the parents, is that such
emancipation does not carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise
to judicial litigation. (See Manresa, id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing someone else
invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of
the duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of
money and alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor married
child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill notwithstanding the
emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However, inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of
age, as a matter of equity, the liability of Atty. Hill has become merely subsidiary to that of his son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in
accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against appellees.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio and Martin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J., is on leave.
Martin, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.
Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is blameworthy, when judged by
accepted legal standards. "The idea thus expressed is undoubtedly board enough to include any
rational conception of liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any society." (Street, J. in
Daywalt v. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, 600). See article 38, Civil Code
and the ruling that "the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil action to the injured person in the same
manner and to the same extent as an adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812 cited by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay v.
Tiangco, 74 Phil. 576, 579).

77 SCRA 100 May 26, 1977

Torts and Damages Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from Crimes
Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case
against Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for lack of intent coupled with mistake. Elcano then
filed a civil action against Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the
Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil action is barred by his sons acquittal in the criminal case; and
that if ever, his civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact that his son is already an
emancipated minor by reason of his marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180.
HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a separate civil
action. A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is
actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In
other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) ofSECTION 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability
for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which
may be punishable by law.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil
Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place by the marriage of the minor child, it is,
however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really
full or absolute. Thus Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the childs person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he
were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent
of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his
father, mother or guardian. Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill the SC however
ruled since at the time of the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvins liability should be
subsidiary only as a matter of equity.

[G.R. No. L-46179. January 31, 1978.]

CANDIDA VIRATA, TOMAS VIRATA, MANOLITO VIRATA, EDERLINDA VIRATA, NAPOLEON
VIRATA, ARACELY VIRATA, ZENAIDA VIRATA, LUZMINDA VIRATA, PACITA VIRATA, and
EVANGELINA VIRATA, Petitioners, v. VICTORIO OCHOA, MAXIMO BORILLA and THE COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, 7th JUDICIAL DISTRICT, BRANCH V, stationed at BACOOR,
CAVITE, Respondents.
Remulla, Estrella & Associates, for Petitioners.
Exequil C. Masangkay for Respondents.
SYNOPSIS
A criminal action for reckless imprudence was filed against a driver of a jeepney. Before the criminal
case could be decided, the heirs of the victim manifested that they were filing and they so did file a
separate civil action for damages against the owner and the driver of the jeepney based on quasidelict. The driver was subsequently acquitted of the crime charge. The defendants in the civil case
then moved to dismiss the same, which motion the trial court granted.
The principal issue before the Supreme Court is whether the heirs of the victim can prosecute an
action for damages based on quasi-delict against the driver and owner.
The Supreme Court held that the acquittal of the driver of the crime charged is not a bar to the
prosecution of a civil case for damages based on quasi-delict.
Order of dismissal set aside and case remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.
SYLLABUS
1. ACTIONS; CULPA AQUILIANA; AGGRIEVED PARTY MAY FILE SEPARATE ACTION BASED
ON CULPA AQUILIANA. In negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choose between an
action under the Revised Penal Code or for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code is to recover twice for the same
negligent act.
2. ID.; ID.; ACQUITTAL OF ACCUSED NOT A BAR TO PROSECUTION FOR DAMAGES BASED
ON QUASI-DELICT. The acquittal of the accused of the crime of homicide through reckless
imprudence is not a bar to the prosecution of a civil case for damages based on quasi-delict. The
source of obligation sought to be enforced in the civil action is quasi-delict, not an act or omission
punishable by law. Under Article 1157 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, quasi-delict and an act or
omission punishable by law are two different sources of obligation. Moreover, to prevail in the action
for damages, plaintiff have only be establish its cause of action by preponderance of evidence.

DECISION

FERNANDEZ, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari, from the order of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch V, in
Civil Case No. B-134 granting the motion of the defendants to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause 1
The record shows that on September 24, 1975 one Arsenio Virata died as a result of having been
bumped while walking along Taft Avenue, Pasay City by a passenger jeepney driven by Maximo
Borilla and registered in the name of Victorio Ochoa; that Borilla is the employee driver of Ochoa; that
for the death of Arsenio Virata, a criminal action for homicide through reckless imprudence was
instituted on September 25, 1975 against Maximo Borilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal at
Pasay City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 3162-P of said court; that at the hearing of the said
criminal case on December 12, 1975, Atty. Julio Francisco, the private prosecutor, made a
reservation to face a separate civil action for damages against the driver on his criminal liability; that
on February 19, 1976 Atty. Julio Francisco filed a motion in said criminal case to withdraw the
reservation to file a separate civil action; that thereafter, the private prosecutor actively participated in
the trial and presented evidence on the damages; that on June 29, 1976 the heirs of Arsenio Virata
again reserved their right to institute in separate civil action; that on July 29, 1977 the heirs of Arsenio
Virata, petitioners herein, commenced Civil No. B-134 in the Court of First Instance of Cavite at
Bacoor, Branch V, for damages based on quasi-delict against the driver Maximo Borilla and the
registered owner of the jeepney, Victorio Ochoa; that on August 13, 1976 the defendants, private
respondents herein, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that there is another action, Criminal
Case No. 3162-P, pending between the same parties for the same cause; that on September 8, 1976
the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Pasay City rendered in decision in Criminal Case No. 3612-P
acquitting the accused, Maximo Borilla, on the ground that he caused an injury by mere accident; and
that on January 31, 1977, the Court of First Instance of Cavite at Bacoor granted the motion to
dismiss Civil Case No. B-134 for damages 2
The principal issue is whether or not the petitioners, heirs of the deceased Arsenio Virata, can
prosecute an action for damages based on quasi-delict against Maximo Borilla and Victorio Ochoa,
driver and owner, respectively of the passenger jeepney that bumped Arsenio Virata.
It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choose between an action under the
Revised Penal Code or for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. What is
prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to recover twice for the same
negligent act.chanrobles law library : red
The Supreme Court has held that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"According to the Code Commission: The foregoing provision (Article 2177) though at first sight
startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exactNATURE of criminal and civil
negligence. The former is a violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a culpa aquiliana or quasidelict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality, separate from criminal
negligence. Such distinction between criminal negligence and culpa extra-contractual or quasidelito has been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound
and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the proposed Article
2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall
not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for
damages due to a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. But said article forestalls a double recovery."
(Report of the Code Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of negligence, the same
argument of Justice Bocobo about construction that upholds the spirit that giveth life rather than that
which is literal that killeth the intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And
considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil Code definitely
establishes the separability and independence of liability in a civil action for acts criminal in character
(under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, underSECTIONS 2 and 3(c), Rule 111,
contemplate also the same separability, it is more congruent with the spirit of law, equity and justice,

and more in harmony with modern progress, to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes v.
Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to
fault or negligence, covers not only acts not punishable by law but also acts criminal in character,
whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover
damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the
two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability
referred to in Par (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict
only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal
act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here
hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law. 3
The petitioners are not seeking to recover twice for the same negligent act. Before Criminal Case No.
3162-P was decided, they manifested in said criminal case that they were filing a separate civil action
for damages against the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney based on quasi-delict. This
acquittal of the driver, Maximo Borilla, of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 3162-P is not a bar
to the prosecution of Civil Case No. B-134 for damages based on quasi-delict. The source of the
obligation sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. B-134 is quasi-delict, not an act or omission
punishable by law. Under Article 1157 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, quasi-delict and an act or
omission punishable by law are two different sources of obligation.
Moreover, for the petitioners to prevail in the action for damages, Civil Case No. B-134, they have
only to establish their cause of action by preponderance of the evidence.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is hereby set aside and Civil Case No. B-134 is
reinstated and remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, with costs against the private
respondents.
SO ORDERED.

81 SCRA 472
Torts and Damages Double Recovery of Civil Liability

In September 1975, Borilla was driving a jeep when he hit Arsenio Virata thereby causing the latters
death. The heirs of Virata sued Borilla through an action for homicide through reckless imprudence in

the CFI of Rizal. Viratas lawyer reserved their right to file a separate civil action the he later withdrew
said motion. But in June 1976, pending the criminal case, the Viratas again reserved their right to file
a separate civil action. Borilla was eventually acquitted as it was ruled that what happened was a
mere accident. The heirs of Virata then sued Borilla and Ochoa (the owner of the jeep and employer
of Borilla) for damages based on quasi delict. Ochoa assailed the civilSUIT alleging that Borilla was
already acquitted and that the Viratas were merely trying to recover damages twice. The lower court
agreed with Ochoa and dismissed the civil suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs of Virata may file a separate civil suit.
HELD: Yes. It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties may choose between an
action under the Revised Penal Code or of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines is to recover twice
for the same negligent act. Therefore, under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation
of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil
action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or
culpa aquiliana. But said article forestalls a double recovery.

[G.R. No. L-78911-25. December 11, 1987.]

CHARMINA B. BANAL, Petitioner, v. THE HON. TOMAS V. TADEO, JR., Presiding Judge, RTCQuezon City, Branch 105 and Rosario Claudio, Respondents.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for Certiorari to review and set aside the orders of the respondent Regional Trial
Court, Branch 105, Quezon City dated (1) 8 January 1987 which rejected the appearance of Atty.
Nicolito L. Bustos as private prosecutor in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-40909 to Q-40913 where
respondent Rosario Claudio is the accused for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22; and (2) 31
March 1987 which denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the order dated 8 January
1987; and for mandamus to allow Atty. Bustos to enter his appearance as private prosecutor in the
aforestated criminal cases.
It appears that fifteen (15) separate informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 or the
Bouncing Checks Law, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 40909-40913, were filed against
respondent Claudio before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and originally assigned to Branch
84.
The presiding judge of Branch 84 inhibited himself when respondent Claudio, through counsel, filed a
petition for recuse dated May 19, 1986.
The cases were re-raffled and consequently assigned on June 25, 1986 to Branch 105 which was
then presided over by Judge Johnico G. Serquina.
During these proceedings, respondent Claudio was finally arraigned on November 20, 1986 where
she pleaded not guilty to the charges. Pre-trial was then set on January 8, 1987.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
In the meantime, Judge Tomas V. Tadeo, Jr. replaced Judge Serquina as presiding judge of Branch
105.
On January 8, 1987, the respondent court issued an order rejecting the appearance of Atty. Nicolito
L. Bustos as private prosecutor on the ground that the charge is for the violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 which does not provide for any civil liability or indemnity and hence, "it is not a crime against
property but public order."cralaw virtua1aw library
The petitioner, through counsel filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated 8 January 1987
on March 10, 1987.
Respondent Claudio filed her opposition to the motion for reconsideration on March 25, 1987.
In an order dated 31 March 1987, the respondent court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition questioning the orders of the respondent Court.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent Court acted with grave abuse of discretion
or in excess of its jurisdiction in rejecting the appearance of a private prosecutor.
The respondents make capital of the fact that Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 punishes the act of knowingly
issuing worthless checks as an offense against public order. As such, it is argued that it is the State
and the public that are the principal complainants and, therefore, no civil indemnity is provided for by
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for which a private party or prosecutor may intervene.
On the other hand, the petitioner, relying on the legal axiom that "Every man criminally liable is also
civilly liable," contends that indemnity may be recovered from the offender regardless of whether or
not Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 so provides.
A careful study of the concept of civil liability allows a solution to the issue in the case at
bar.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that
"Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable" (Art. 100, The Revised Penal Code). Underlying this
legal principle is the traditional theory that when a person commits a crime he offends two entities
namely (1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he had
violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property
was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission. However, this
rather broad and general provision is among the most complex and controversial topics in criminal
procedure. It can be misleading in its implications especially where the same act or omission may be
treated as a crime in one instance and as a tort in another or where the law allows a separate civil
action to proceed independently of the course of the criminal prosecution with which it is intimately
intertwined. Many legal scholars treat as a misconception or fallacy the generally accepted notion that
the civil liability actually arises from the crime when, in the ultimate analysis, it does not. While an act
or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much
because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can
readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation and the moral duty of
everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or
omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. In other
words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same felonious act or omission results in
damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Damage or injury to
another is evidently the foundation of the civil action. Such is not the case in criminal actions for, to be
criminally liable, it is enough that the act or omission complained of is punishable, regardless of
whether or not it also causes material damage to another. (See Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and
Damages, 1978, Revised Edition, pp. 246-247).
Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify
the latter for the same."cralaw virtua1aw library
Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of the offended
party may be had on account of the damage, loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the
wrongful act of another. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of
the penalty imposed by law for the commission of a crime (Quemel v. Court of Appeals, 22 SCRA 44,
citing Bagtas v. Director of Prisons, 84 Phil. 692). Every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action
for the punishment of the guilty party, and also to civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of
the damage, and indemnification for the losses. (United States v. Bernardo, 19 Phil. 265).
Indeed one cannot disregard the private party in the case at bar who suffered the offenses committed
against her. Not only the State but the petitioner too is entitled to relief as a member of the public
which the law seeks to protect. She was assured that the checks were good when she parted with
money, property or services. She suffered with the State when the checks bounced.cralawnad
In Lozano v. Hon. Martinez (G.R. No. 63419, December 18, 1986) and the cases consolidated
therewith, we held that "The effects of a worthless check transcend the private interests of the parties
directly involved in the transaction and touch the interests of the community at large." Yet, we too
recognized the wrong done to the private party defrauded when we stated therein that "The mischief it
creates is not only a wrong to the payee or the holder, but also an injury to the public."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Civil liability to the offended private party cannot thus be denied. The payee of the check is entitled to
receive the payment of money for which the worthless check was issued. Having been caused the
damage, she is entitled to recompense.
Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 to leave the
offended private party defrauded and empty-handed by excluding the civil liability of the offender,
giving her only the remedy, which in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a
separate civilSUIT . To do so, may leave the offended party unable to recover even the face value of

the check due her, thereby unjustly enriching the errant drawer at the expense of the payee. The
protection which the law seeks to provide would, therefore, be brought to naught.
The petitioners intervention in the prosecution of Criminal Cases 40909 to 40913 is justified not only
for the protection of her interests but also in the interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration
of justice mandated by the Constitution SECTION 16, Article III, Bill of Rights, Constitution of 1987).
A separate civil action for the purpose would only prove to be costly, burdensome, and timeconsuming for both parties and further delay the final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits
must be avoided. Where petitioners rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial
court, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted.chanrobles.com :
virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The respondent court is ordered to permit the
intervention of a private prosecutor in behalf of petitioner Charmina B. Banal, in the prosecution of the
civil aspect of Criminal Cases Nos. 40909 to 40913. The temporary restraining order issued by this
court on July 15, 1987 is lifted and the case is remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 82146. January 22, 1990.]

EULOGIO OCCENA, Petitioner, v. HON. PEDRO M. ICAMINA, Presiding Judge, Branch X of the
Regional Trial Court, Sixth Judicial Region, San Jose, Antique; THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by the Honorable Provincial Fiscal of Antique; and CRISTINA
VEGAFRIA, Respondents.
Comelec Legal Assistance Office for Petitioner.
Comelec Legal Assistance Officer for Private Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; APPEAL; ACCUSED MAY SEEK REVIEW OF JUDGMENT WITH RESPECT
TO BOTH CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ACTIONS. In the case of People v. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287, we
categorically stated that from a judgment convicting the accused, two (2) appeals may, accordingly,
be taken. The accused may seek a review of said judgment, as regards both civil and criminal
actions; while the complainant may appeal with respect only to the civil action, either because the
lower court has refused to award damages or because the award made is unsatisfactory to him. The
right of either to appeal or not to appeal in the event of conviction of the accused is not dependent
upon the other. Thus, private respondents theory that in actively intervening in the criminal action,
petitioner waived his right to appeal from the decision that may be rendered therein, is incorrect and
inaccurate. Petitioner may, as he did, appeal from the decision on the civil aspect which is deemed

instituted with the criminal action and such appeal, timely taken, prevents the decision on the civil
liability from attaining finality.
2. CRIMINAL LAW; PERSON CRIMINALLY LIABLE IS CIVILLY LIABLE; RATIONALE. Underlying
the legal principle that a person who is criminally liable is also civilly liable is the view that from the
standpoint of its effects, a crime has dual character: (1) as an offense against the state because of
the disturbance of the social order; and (2) as an offense against the private person injured by the
crime unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others wherein no
civil liability arises on the part of the offender either because there are no damages to be
compensated or there is no private person injured by the crime. In the ultimate analysis, what gives
rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the damage
caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and
whether or not punishable by law. In the case at bar, private respondent was found guilty of slight oral
defamation and sentenced to a fine of P50.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, but
no civil liability arising from the felonious act of the accused was adjudged. This is erroneous. As a
general rule, a person who is found to be criminally liable offends two (2) entities: the state or society
in which he lives and the individual member of the society or private person who was injured or
damaged by the punishable act or omission. The offense of which private respondent was found
guilty is not one of those felonies where no civil liability results because either there is no offended
party or no damage was caused to a private person. There is here an offended party, whose main
contention precisely is that he suffered damages in view of the defamatory words and statements
uttered by private respondent, in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as moral
damages and the further sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) as exemplary damages.
3. CIVIL LAW; MORAL DAMAGES; RECOVERABLE IN CASES OF LIBEL; SLANDER OR ANY
OTHER FORM OF DEFAMATION. Article 2219, par. (7) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of
moral damages in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation. This provision of law
establishes the right of an offended party in a case for oral defamation to recover from the guilty party
damages for injury to his feelings and reputation. The offended party is likewise allowed to recover
punitive or exemplary damages. It must be remembered that every defamatory imputation is
presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is
shown. And malice may be inferred from the style and tone of publication subject to certain
exceptions which are not present in the case at bar.

DECISION

FERNAN, C.J.:

On May 31, 1979, herein petitioner Eulogio Occena instituted before the Second Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Sibalom-San Remigio-Belison, Province of Antique, Criminal Case No. 1717, a criminal
complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against herein private respondent Cristina Vegafria for allegedly
openly, publicly and maliciously uttering the following insulting words and statements: "Gago ikaw nga
Barangay Captain, montisco, traidor, malugus, Hudas," which, freely translated, mean: "You are a
foolish Barangay Captain, ignoramus, traitor, tyrant, Judas" and other words and statements of
similarIMPORT which caused great and irreparable damage and injury to his person and honor.
Private respondent as accused therein entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued, at which
petitioner, without reserving his right to file a separate civil action for damages actively intervened thru
a private prosecutor.
After trial, private respondent was convicted of the offense of Slight Oral Defamation and was
sentenced to pay a fine of Fifty Pesos (P50.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency
and to pay the costs. No damages were awarded to petitioner in view of the trial courts opinion that
"the facts and circumstances of the case as adduced by the evidence do not warrant the awarding of

moral damages." 1
Disagreeing, petitioner sought relief from the Regional Trial Court, which in a decision dated March
16, 1987 disposed of petitioners appeal as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the civil aspect of the lower courts decision of April 20, 1981
subject of this appeal, for lack of merit, is hereby DENIED.
"After the decision shall have become final, remand the records of this case to the court of origin,
Second Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sibalom, San Remigio-Belison, Antique, for the execution of
its decision on the criminal aspect.
"SO ORDERED." 2
Petitioner is now before us by way of a petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul the RTC
decision for being contrary to Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code providing that every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable, and Article 2219 of the New Civil Code providing that
moral damages may be recovered in libel, slander or any other form of defamation. He submits that
public respondent RTC erred in relying on the cases of Roa v. de la Cruz, 107 Phil. 10 and Tan v.
Standard Vacuum Oil Co., Et Al., 91 Phil. 672 cited therein. He differentiates said cases from the
case at bar by saying that in the case of Roa, the decision of the trial court had become final before
Maria C. Roa instituted a civil action for damages; whereas in the instant case, the decision of the trial
court has not yet become final by reason of the timely appeal interposed by him and no civil action for
damages has been instituted by petitioner against private respondent for the same cause. Tan, on the
other hand, contemplates of two actions, one criminal and one civil, and the prosecution of the
criminal case had resulted in the acquittal of the accused, which is not the situation here where the
civil aspect was impliedly instituted with the criminal action in accordance withSECTION 1, Rule
111, of the Rules of Court.
Private respondent for her part argues that the decision of the trial court carries with it the final
adjudication of her civil liability. Since petitioner chose to actively intervene in the criminal action
without reserving his right to file a separate civil action for damages, he assumed the risk that in the
event he failed to recover damages he cannot appeal from the decision of the lower court.
We find merit in the petition.
The issues confronting us in the instant petition is whether or not the decision of the Second
Municipal Trial Court of Sibalom, San-Remigio-Belison, Province of Antique constitutes the final
adjudication on the merits of private respondents civil liability; and whether or not petitioner is entitled
to an award of damages arising from the remarks uttered by private respondent and found by the trial
court to be defamatory.
The decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court as affirmed by the Regional Trial Court in Criminal
Case No. 1709 cannot be considered as a final adjudication on the civil liability of private respondent
simply because said decision has not yet become final due to the timely appeal filed by petitioner with
respect to the civil liability of the accused in said case. It was only the unappealed criminal aspect of
the case which has become final.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In the case of People v. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287, we categorically stated that from a judgment
convicting the accused, two (2) appeals may, accordingly, be taken. The accused may seek a review
of said judgment, as regards both civil and criminal actions; while the complainant may appeal with
respect only to the civil action, either because the lower court has refused to award damages or
because the award made is unsatisfactory to him. The right of either to appeal or not to appeal in the
event of conviction of the accused is not dependent upon the other. Thus, private respondents theory
that in actively intervening in the criminal action, petitioner waived his right to appeal from the
decision that may be rendered therein, is incorrect and inaccurate. Petitioner may, as he did, appeal
from the decision on the civil aspect which is deemed instituted with the criminal action and such

appeal, timely taken, prevents the decision on the civil liability from attaining finality.
We tackle the second issue by determining the basis of civil liability arising from crime. Civil
obligations arising from criminal offenses are governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code
which provides that" (E)very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable," in relation to
Article 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delict, the provisions for independent civil actions in the
Chapter on Human Relations and the provisions regulating damages, also found in the Civil Code.
Underlying the legal principle that a person who is criminally liable is also civilly liable is the view that
from the standpoint of its effects, a crime has dual character: (1) as an offense against the state
because of the disturbance of the social order; and (2) as an offense against the private person
injured by the crime unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others
wherein no civil liability arises on the part of the offender either because there are no damages to be
compensated or there is no private person injured by the crime. 3 In the ultimate analysis, what gives
rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the damage
caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and
whether or not punishable by law. 4
In the case at bar, private respondent was found guilty of slight oral defamation and sentenced to a
fine of P50.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, but no civil liability arising from the
felonious act of the accused was adjudged. This is erroneous. As a general rule, a person who is
found to be criminally liable offends two (2) entities: the state or society in which he lives and the
individual member of the society or private person who was injured or damaged by the punishable act
or omission. The offense of which private respondent was found guilty is not one of those felonies
where no civil liability results because either there is no offended party or no damage was caused to a
private person. There is here an offended party, whose main contention precisely is that he suffered
damages in view of the defamatory words and statements uttered by private respondent, in the
amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as moral damages and the further sum of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000) as exemplary damages.
Article 2219, par. (7) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages in case of libel, slander
or any other form of defamation. This provision of law establishes the right of an offended party in a
case for oral defamation to recover from the guilty party damages for injury to his feelings and
reputation. The offended party is likewise allowed to recover punitive or exemplary
damages.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
It must be remembered that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be
true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown. And malice may be inferred
from the style and tone of publication 5 subject to certain exceptions which are not present in the
case at bar.
Calling petitioner who was a barangay captain an ignoramus, traitor, tyrant and Judas is clearly an
imputation of defects in petitioners character sufficient to cause him embarrassment and social
humiliation. Petitioner testified to the feelings of shame and anguish he suffered as a result of the
incident complained of. 6 It is patently error for the trial court to overlook this vital piece of evidence
and to conclude that the "facts and circumstances of the case as adduced by the evidence do not
warrant the awarding of moral damages." Having misapprehended the facts, the trial courts findings
with respect thereto is not conclusive upon us.
From the evidence presented, we rule that for the injury to his feelings and reputation, being a
barangay captain, petitioner is entitled to moral damages in the sum of P5,000.00 and a further sum
of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby
MODIFIED and private respondent is ordered to pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as moral
damages and another P5,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against
private Respondent.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

SO ORDERED.

EULOGIO OCCENA vs. HON. PEDRO M. ICAMINA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILS., & VEGAFRIA
G.R. NO. 82146 January 22, 1990. (Kinds of Damages)
PETITION for review on certiorari seeking to annul the decision of the RTC
FERNAN, C.J.:
Facts: Petitioner Occena filed a criminal complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against private
respondent Cristina Vegrafia for allegedly openly, publicly and maliciously uttering the following
insulting words and statements: "Gago ikaw nga Barangay Captain, montisco, traidor, malugus,
Hudas." Private respondent as accused therein entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, private
respondent was convicted of the offense of Slight Oral Defamation and was sentenced to pay a fine
of Fifty Pesos (P50.00) with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. No
damages were awarded to petitioner.
Issue: WON petitioner is entitled to an award of damages arising from the remarks uttered by private
respondent and found by the trial court to be defamatory.
Ruling: PETITION GRANTED. The decision of the RTC is MODIFIED and private respondent is
ordered to pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages and another P5,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the
damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently
and whether or not punishable by law. The offense of which private respondent was found guilty is
not one of those felonies where no civil liability results because either there is no offended party or no
damage was caused to a private person.
Article 2219, par. (7) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages in case of libel, slander
or any other form of defamation. This provision of law establishes the right of an offended party in a
case for oral defamation to recover from the guilty party damages for injury to his feelings and
reputation. The offended party is likewise allowed to recover punitive or exemplary damages.

[G.R. No. 169467 : February 25, 2010]

ALFREDO P. PACIS AND CLEOPATRA D. PACIS, PETITIONERS, VS. JEROME JOVANNE
MORALES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review[1] assails the 11 May 2005 Decision[2] and the 19 August 2005 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60669.
The Facts
On 17 January 1995, petitioners Alfredo P. Pacis and Cleopatra D. Pacis (petitioners) filed with the
trial court a civil case for damages against respondent Jerome Jovanne Morales (respondent).
Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Dennis Pacis, Jr. (Alfred), a 17-year old student who died in a
shooting incident inside theTOP Gun Firearms and Ammunitions Store (gun store) in Baguio City.
Respondent is the owner of the gun store.
The facts as found by the trial court are as follows:
On January 19, 1991, Alfred Dennis Pacis, then 17 years old and a first year student at the Baguio
Colleges Foundation taking up BSCOMPUTER Science, died due to a gunshot wound in the head
which he sustained while he was at the Top Gun Firearm[s] and Ammunition[s] Store located at
Upper Mabini Street, Baguio City. The gun store was owned and operated by defendant Jerome
Jovanne Morales.
With Alfred Pacis at the time of the shooting were Aristedes Matibag and Jason Herbolario. They
were sales agents of the defendant, and at that particular time, the caretakers of the gun store.
The bullet which killed Alfred Dennis Pacis was fired from a gun brought in by a customer of the gun
store for repair.
The gun, an AMT Automag II Cal. 22 Rimfire Magnum with Serial No. SN-H34194 (Exhibit "Q"), was
left by defendant Morales in a drawer of a table located inside the gun store.
Defendant Morales was in Manila at the time. His employee Armando Jarnague, who was the regular
caretaker of the gun store was also not around. He left earlier and requested sales agents Matibag
and Herbolario to look after the gun store while he and defendant Morales were away. Jarnague
entrusted to Matibag and Herbolario a bunch of keys used in the gun store which included the key to
the drawer where the fatal gun was kept.
It appears that Matibag and Herbolario later brought out the gun from the drawer and placed it on top

of theTABLE . Attracted by the sight of the gun, the young Alfred Dennis Pacis got hold of the same.
Matibag asked Alfred Dennis Pacis to return the gun. The latter followed and handed the gun to
Matibag. It went off, the bullet hitting the young Alfred in the head.
A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag before branch VII of this Court. Matibag,
however, was acquitted of the charge against him because of the exempting circumstance of
"accident" under Art. 12, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code.
By agreement of the parties, the evidence adduced in the criminal case for homicide against Matibag
was reproduced and adopted by them as part of their evidence in the instant case.[3]
On 8 April 1998, the trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs [Spouses
Alfredo P. Pacis and Cleopatra D. Pacis] and against the defendant [Jerome Jovanne Morales]
ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs -(1) P30,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Alfred Pacis;
(2) P29,437.65 as actual damages for the hospitalization and burial
expenses incurred by the plaintiffs;
(3) P100,000.00 as compensatory damages;
(4) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
(5) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its Decision [5] dated 11 May 2005, the Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court's Decision and absolved respondent from civil liability under Article
2180 of the Civil Code.[6]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution
dated 19 August 2005.
Hence, this petition.
The Trial Court's Ruling
The trial court held respondent civilly liable for the death of Alfred under Article 2180 in relation to
Article 2176 of the Civil Code.[7] The trial court held that the accidental shooting of Alfred which
caused his death was partly due to the negligence of respondent's employee Aristedes Matibag
(Matibag). Matibag and Jason Herbolario (Herbolario) were employees of respondent even if they
were only paid on a commission basis. Under the Civil Code, respondent is liable for the damages
caused by Matibag on the occasion of the performance of his duties, unless respondent proved that
he observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. The trial court held that
respondent failed to observe the required diligence when he left the key to the drawer containing the
loaded defective gun without instructing his employees to be careful in handling the loaded gun.
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
The Court of Appeals held that respondent cannot be held civilly liable since there was no employeremployee relationship between respondent and Matibag. The Court of Appeals found that Matibag
was not under the control of respondent with respect to the means and methods in the performance
of his work. There can be no employer-employee relationship where the element of control is absent.
Thus, Article 2180 of the Civil Code does not apply in this case and respondent cannot be held liable.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals ruled that even if respondent is considered an employer of

Matibag, still respondent cannot be held liable since no negligence can be attributed to him. As
explained by the Court of Appeals:
Granting arguendo that an employer-employee relationship existed between Aristedes Matibag and
the defendant-appellant, we find that no negligence can be attributed to him.
Negligence is best exemplified in the case of Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil. 809). The test of negligence is
this:
"x x x. Could a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee
harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so,
the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or take precaution against its
mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. x x x."
Defendant-appellant maintains that he is not guilty of negligence and lack of due care as he did not
fail to observe the diligence of a good father of a family. He submits that he kept the firearm in one of
hisTABLE drawers, which he locked and such is already an indication that he took the necessary
diligence and care that the said gun would not be accessible to anyone. He puts [sic] that his store is
engaged in selling firearms and ammunitions. Such items which are per se dangerous are kept in a
place which is properly secured in order that the persons coming into the gun store would not be able
to take hold of it unless it is done intentionally, such as when a customer is interested to purchase
any of the firearms, ammunitions and other related items, in which case, he may be allowed to handle
the same.
We agree. Much as We sympathize with the family of the deceased, defendant-appellant is not to be
blamed. He exercised due diligence in keeping his loaded gun while he was on a business trip in
Manila. He placed it inside the drawer and locked it. It was taken away without his knowledge and
authority. Whatever happened to the deceased was purely accidental.[8]
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:
I.

THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN RENDERING THE DECISION AND
RESOLUTION IN QUESTION IN DISREGARD OF LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE BY REVERSING
THE ORDER OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (BRANCH 59) OF BAGUIO CITY
NOTWITHSTANDING CLEAR, AUTHENTIC RECORDS AND TESTIMONIES PRESENTED
DURING THE TRIAL WHICH NEGATE AND CONTRADICT ITS FINDINGS.

II.

THE APPELLATE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE, REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RENDERING THE

DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN QUESTION BY DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED AND
USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS THEREBY IGNORING THE FACTUAL FINDINGS
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (BRANCH 59) OF BAGUIO CITY SHOWING PETITIONER'S
CLEAR RIGHTS TO THE AWARD OF DAMAGES.[9]

The Ruling of the Court

We find the petition meritorious.
This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of petitioners' son. Under Article
1161[10] of the Civil Code, petitioners may enforce their claim for damages based on the civil liability
arising from the crime under Article 100[11] of the Revised Penal Code or they may opt to file an
independent civil action for damages under the Civil Code. In this case, instead of enforcing their
claim for damages in the homicide case filed against Matibag, petitioners opted to file an independent
civil action for damages against respondent whom they alleged was Matibag's employer. Petitioners
based their claim for damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.

Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103[12] of the Revised Penal Code,[13] the
liability of the employer, or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary
and direct, based on a person's own negligence. Article 2176 states:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun store. Under PNP Circular No.
9, entitled the "Policy on Firearms and Ammunition Dealership/Repair," a person who is in the
business of purchasing and selling of firearms and ammunition must maintain basic security and
safety requirements of a gunDEALER , otherwise his License to Operate Dealership will be
suspended or canceled.[14]
Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or under his
control an instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or
substances. Such person in possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take
exceptional precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby. [15] Unlike the ordinary affairs of life
or business which involve little or no risk, a business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the
exercise of a higher degree of care.
As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and should
have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury
to others. Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms
should be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when the firearms are not needed for
ready-access defensive use.[16] With more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not
be loaded precisely because they are defective and may cause an accidental discharge such as what
happened in this case. Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and
placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first place, the defective
gun should have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the defective gun for repair, respondent
should have made sure that it was not loaded to prevent any untoward accident. Indeed, respondent
should never accept a firearm from another person, until the cylinder or action is open and he has
personally checked that the weapon is completely unloaded.[17] For failing to insure that the gun was
not loaded, respondent himself was negligent. Furthermore, it was not shown in this case whether
respondent had a License to Repair which authorizes him to repair defective firearms to restore its
original composition or enhance or upgrade firearms.[18]
Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a good father of a
family, much less the degree of care required of someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as would
exempt him from liability in this case.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 11 May 2005 Decision and the 19
August 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60669. We REINSTATE the trial
court's Decision dated 8 April 1998.
[G.R. No. 145391. August 26, 2002.]
AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, Petitioners, v. MARIO LLAVORE
LAROYA, Respondent.
DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Resolution 1 dated December 28, 1999
dismissing the petition for certiorari and the Resolution 2 dated August 24, 2000 denying the motion
for reconsideration, both issued by the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in Special
Civil Action No. 17-C (99).
The Facts

Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya ("Laroya" for brevity) and the other
owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo ("Capitulo" for brevity) and driven by petitioner Avelino
Casupanan ("Casupanan" for brevity), figured in an accident. As a result, two cases were filed with
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court ("MCTC" for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case
against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 002-99. On the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for
quasi-delict, docketed as Civil Case No. 2089.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage.
Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of forumshopping considering the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion in the Order
of March 26, 1999 and dismissed the civil case.
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate civil
action which can proceed independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied the motion for
reconsideration in the Order of May 7, 1999. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court ("Capas RTC" for brevity) of Capas,
Tarlac, Branch 66, 3 assailing the MCTCs Order of dismissal.
The Trial Courts Ruling
The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition for certiorari for
lack of merit. The Capas RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order
which disposes of the case and therefore the proper remedy should have been an appeal. The Capas
RTC further held that a special civil action for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. Finally, the
Capas RTC declared that even on the premise that the MCTC erred in dismissing the civil case, such
error is a pure error of judgment and not an abuse of discretion.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Capas RTC denied the same in
the Resolution of August 24, 2000.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue

The petition premises the legal issue in this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"In a certain vehicular accident involving two parties, each one of them may think and believe that the
accident was caused by the fault of the other. . . . [T]he first party, believing himself to be the
aggrieved party, opted to file a criminal case for reckless imprudence against the second party. On
the other hand, the second party, together with his operator, believing themselves to be the real
aggrieved parties, opted in turn to file a civil case for quasi-delict against the first party who is the very
private complainant in the criminal case." 4
Thus, the issue raised is whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can

validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the
private complainant in the criminal case.
The Courts Ruling

Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No. 2089, which the MCTC dismissed on the ground
of forum-shopping, constitutes a counterclaim in the criminal case. Casupanan and Capitulo argue
that if the accused in a criminal case has a counterclaim against the private complainant, he may file
the counterclaim in a separate civil action at the proper time. They contend that an action on quasidelict is different from an action resulting from the crime of reckless imprudence, and an accused in a
criminal case can be an aggrieved party in a civil case arising from the same incident. They maintain
that under Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case can proceed independently of the
criminal action. Finally, they point out that Casupanan was not the only one who filed the independent
civil action based on quasi-delict but also Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle, who was not a
party in the criminal case.
In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is fatally defective as it does not state the real
antecedents. Laroya further alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo forfeited their right to question the
order of dismissal when they failed to avail of the proper remedy of appeal. Laroya argues that there
is no question of law to be resolved as the order of dismissal is already final and a petition
for certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.
In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that the petition raises the legal question of whether
there is forum-shopping since they filed only one action the independent civil action for quasi-delict
against Laroya.
NATURE of the Order of Dismissal
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of forum-shopping under Supreme
Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC did not state in its order of dismissal 5 that the
dismissal was with prejudice. Under the Administrative Circular, the order of dismissal is without
prejudice toREFILING the complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly states it is with
prejudice. 6 Absent a declaration that the dismissal is with prejudice, the same is deemed without
prejudice. Thus, the MCTCs dismissal, being silent on the matter, is a dismissal without prejudice.
Section 1 of Rule 41 7 provides that an order dismissing an action without prejudice is not
appealable. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a special civil action under Rule 65. Section 1
of Rule 41 expressly states that "where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved
party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65." Clearly, the Capas RTCs order
dismissing the petition for certiorari, on the ground that the proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is
erroneous.
Forum-Shopping
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multipleSUITS involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. 8
Forum-shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights
of action and reliefs sought. 9 However, there is no forum-shopping in the instant case because the
law and the rules expressly allow the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed independently
of the criminal action.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property based on the
Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages based on Article
2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two actions arose from the same act or omission, they have
different causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable under the Revised
Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177

of the Civil Code. These articles on culpa aquiliana read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant."cralaw virtua1aw library
Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by preponderance of evidence,
that he has suffered damage because of the fault or negligence of another. Either the private
complainant or the accused can file a separate civil action under these articles. There is nothing in
the law or rules that state only the private complainant in a criminal case may invoke these articles.
Moreover, paragraph 6,SECTION 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure ("2000
Rules" for brevity) expressly requires the accused to litigate his counterclaim in a separate civil action,
to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) . . ..
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal
case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a
separate civil action." (Emphasis supplied)
Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his counterclaim in a separate
civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the accused files such separate civil action.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Filing of a separate civil action
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure ("1985 Rules" for brevity), as amended
in 1988, allowed the filing of a separate civil action independently of the criminal action provided the
offended party reserved the right to file such civil action. Unless the offended party reserved the civil
action before the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, all civil actions arising from the
same act or omission were deemed "impliedly instituted" in the criminal case. These civil actions
referred to the recovery of civil liability ex-delicto, the recovery of damages for quasi-delict, and the
recovery of damages for violation of Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on Human Relations.
Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict under the 1985 Rules, the
offended party had to reserve in the criminal action the right to bring such action. Otherwise, such civil
action was deemed "impliedly instituted" in the criminal action. Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules
provided as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission
of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the
right to file, any of said civil actions separately waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution

starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
accused.
x

x" (Emphasis supplied)

Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules was amended on December 1, 2000 and now provides as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute
it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution
starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation.
x

(b) . . .
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions." (Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is "deemed instituted" with the criminal action is only
the action to recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer "deemed instituted," and may be filed
separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. The
failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and
independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period on the civil
actions based on these articles of the Civil Code continues to run even with the filing of the criminal
action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code are separate, distinct and
independent of the civil action "deemed instituted" in the criminal action. 10
Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the option to file a separate civil action to
recover civil liability ex-delicto by reserving such right in the criminal action before the prosecution
presents its evidence. Also, the offended party is deemed to make such reservation if he files a
separate civil action before filing the criminal action. If the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto
is filed separately but its trial has not yet commenced, the civil action may be consolidated with the
criminal action. The consolidation under this Rule does not apply to separate civil actions arising from
the same act or omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. 11
Suspension of the Separate Civil Action
Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a separate civil action, if reserved in the
criminal action, could not be filed until after final judgment was rendered in the criminal action. If the
separate civil action was filed before the commencement of the criminal action, the civil action, if still
pending, was suspended upon the filing of the criminal action until final judgment was rendered in the
criminal action. This rule applied only to the separate civil action filed to recover liability ex-delicto.
The rule did not apply to independent civil actions based on Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code, which could proceed independently regardless of the filing of the criminal action.

The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules continues this procedure, to
wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. After the criminal action has been commenced,
the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in
the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has already been instituted, the latter shall be
suspended in whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits. The suspension shall
last until final judgment is rendered in the criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the
merits is rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of the offended party, be
consolidated with the criminal action in the court trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation,
the evidence already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the
criminal action without prejudice to the right of the prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses
presented by the offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present additional evidence.
The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall be tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period of prescription of the civil action
which cannot be instituted separately or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be
tolled.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw library
x

x." (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule that the separate civil action,
filed to recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended upon the filing of the criminal action. Section 2 of
the present Rule 111 also prohibits the filing, after commencement of the criminal action, of a
separate civil action to recover damages ex-delicto.
When civil action may proceed independently
The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and Capitulo, who are not the offended parties in the
criminal case, can file a separate civil action against the offended party in the criminal case. Section
3, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules provides as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34
and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by the
offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for
the same act or omission charged in the criminal action." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended 1985 Rules, expressly allows
the "offended party" to bring an independent civil action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code. As stated in Section 3 of the present Rule 111, this civil action shall proceed independently of
the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the
"offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action."cralaw virtua1aw library
There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an independent civil action
for quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the present Rule 111 expressly states that the
"offended party" may bring such an action but the "offended party" may not recover damages twice
for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to
the offended party in the criminal action, not to the accused.
Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling in Cabaero v. Cantos 12 where the Court held
that the accused therein could validly institute a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the
private complainant in the criminal case. In Cabaero, the accused in the criminal case filed his

Answer with Counterclaim for malicious prosecution. At that time the Court noted the "absence of
clear-cut rules governing the prosecution on impliedly instituted civil actions and the necessary
consequences and implications thereof." Thus, the Court ruled that the trial court should confine itself
to the criminal aspect of the case and disregard any counterclaim for civil liability. The Court further
ruled that the accused may file a separate civil case against the offended party "after the criminal
case is terminated and/or in accordance with the new Rules which may be promulgated." The Court
explained that a cross-claim, counterclaim or third-party complaint on the civil aspect will only
unnecessarily complicate the proceedings and delay the resolution of the criminal case.
Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was incorporated in the 2000 Rules precisely to
address the lacuna mentioned in Cabaero. Under this provision, the accused is barred from filing a
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint in the criminal case. However, the same provision
states that "any cause of action which could have been the subject (of the counterclaim, cross-claim
or third-party complaint) may be litigated in a separate civil action." The present Rule 111 mandates
the accused to file his counterclaim in a separate civil action which shall proceed independently of the
criminal action, even as the civil action of the offended party is litigated in the criminal action.
Conclusion
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the
offended party even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend
the prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension
in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil
action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.chanrob1es virtual law
library
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal
case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil
case for quasi-delict without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can proceed
simultaneously and independently of each other. The commencement or prosecution of the criminal
action will not suspend the civil action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended party
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In most cases, the
offended party will have no reason to file a second civil action since he cannot recover damages twice
for the same act or omission of the accused. In some instances, the accused may be insolvent,
necessitating the filing of another case against his employer or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused
of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111
which states that the counterclaim of the accused "may be litigated in a separate civil action." This is
only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil
aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate
separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not file a separate civil
action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run until the
civil action for quasi-delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code,
in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal
action. To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to
recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of law, access to the
courts, and equal protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is proper. The
order of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the ground of forum-shopping is
erroneous.
We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the decision of the trial court in the criminal case may

vary with the decision of the trial court in the independent civil action. This possibility has always been
recognized ever since the Civil Code introduced in 1950 the concept of an independent civil action
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Code. But the law itself, in Article 31 of the Code, expressly
provides that the independent civil action "may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings
and regardless of the result of the latter." In Azucena v. Potenciano, 13 the Court
declared:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . There can indeed be no other logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action
contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or
acquittal would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear
injunction in Article 31 that this action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter."
More than half a century has passed since the Civil Code introduced the concept of a civil action
separate and independent from the criminal action although arising from the same act or omission.
The Court, however, has yet to encounter a case of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions of trial
courts, one hearing the criminal case and the other the civil action for quasi-delict. The fear of
conflicting and irreconcilable decisions may be more apparent than real. In any event, there are
sufficient remedies under the Rules of Court to deal with such remote possibilities.
One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000 while the
MCTC issued the order of dismissal on December 28, 1999 or before the amendment of the rules.
The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given retroactive effect considering the wellsettled rule that
". . . statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to
that extent." 14
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated
December 28, 1999 and August 24, 2000 in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99) are ANNULLED and
Civil Case No. 2089 is REINSTATED.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
SO ORDERED.
Puno and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Casupanan v Laroya
Posted by ladymaridel on June 20, 2008

Two vehicles, one (Laroya)

other owned by (Capitulo )driven by (Casupanan)
Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict,
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage.
FORUM SHOPPING-dismisssed civil case
Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed
independently of the criminal case.
RTC>order of dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case and therefore
the proper remedy should have been an appeal.
The Capas RTC further held that a special civil action for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost
appeal. Finally, the Capas RTC declared that even on the premise that the MCTC erred in dismissing
the civil case, such error is a pure error of judgment and not an abuse of discretion.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Capas RTC denied the same in
the Resolution of August 24, 2000.
Issue raised is whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly
file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private
complainant in the criminal case.

aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
Clearly, the Capas RTCs order dismissing the petition for certiorari, on the ground that the
proper remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous.
Forum-Shopping
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multipleSUITS involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. Forumshopping is present when in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights of
action and reliefs sought.
However, there is no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law and the rules expressly
allow the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal action.
they have different causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal punishable
under the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana actionable under
Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code.

Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by preponderance of
evidence, that he has suffered damage because of the fault or negligence of another.
paragraph 6,SECTION 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure (2000 Rules for
brevity) expressly requires the accused to litigate his counterclaim in a separate civil action, to wit:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) x x x.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal
case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a
separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
Conclusion
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by
the offended party even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not
suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The
suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime, if
such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.
The two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil
Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of the
criminal action.
One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect on December 1, 2000 while
the MCTC issued the order of dismissal on December 28, 1999 or before the amendment of the rules.
The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure must be given retroactive effect
HELD > Petition for review is GRANTED.Civil Case No. 2089 is REINSTATED.

[G.R. No. L-34666. October 30, 1981.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, MERCEDES L. JAVELLANA, Petitioner,

v. ITONG AMISTAD, Respondent.
Yolanda Q. Javellana for Petitioner.
S. M. Fallarme for Respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Before the court a quo, the accused Itong Amistad was charged of the crime of estafa for conveying a
parcel of land by sale in favor of Ben Palispis and Teodoro Mat-an, effeccing the issuance of two
separate titles in favor of said vendees when he knew fully well he had previously entered into a
similar agreement with complainant Mercedes L. Javellana who had already paid him half of the
purchase price. A decision was rendered acquitting the accused, the trial court holding that "the case
of the prosecution is civil inNATURE " and that "the guilt of the accused has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt." From this judgment, the complainant appealed "insofar as the civil liability of the
accused is concerned." The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on the ground that an appeal
from a judgment of acquittal should be disallowed.
On review by certiorari, the Supreme Court, in sustaining the Court of Appeals, held that since the
civil liability recoverable in a criminal action is one arising from the crime charged, an acquittal
therefrom will not maintain a civil action to recover civil liability arising from the offense. Petitioner
may file a separate civil action if her cause of action could come under the category of quasi-delict or
one arising from law, contract or any other known source of civil liability.
Petition dismissed. Resolution appealed from affirmed.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION; ACTION FOR
THE RECOVERY OF CIVIL LIABILITY UNDER ART. 29 OF THE CIVIL CODE AND UNDER RULE
111; DISTINGUISHED. Article 29 of the Civil Code clearly requires the institution of a separate
action by the filing of the proper complaint. To such complaint, the accused as the defendant therein,
may file the appropriate responsive pleading, which may be an answer or a motion to dismiss. In a
criminal action, notwithstanding that the action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted
therewith, if not reserved or waived, the accused is not afforded the same remedy. Neither is the
mandatory pre-trial held as is required of all civil actions. The obvious reason is that the civil liability
recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent upon conviction, because said liability
arises from the offense, with respect to which pre-trial is never held to obtain admission as to the
commission thereof, except on the occasion of arraignment. This is the kind of civil liability involved in
the civil action deemed filed simultaneously wish the filing of criminal action, unless it is reserved or
waived, as so expressly provided inSECTION 1, Rule III of the Rules of Court and as held in People
v. Herrera, 74 Phil. 21 or if the ground of acquittal is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, a
separate civil action may be filed, the complainant alleging a cause of action independent of, and not
based on, the commission of an offense. Only preponderance of evidence would then be required.
2. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM LAW, CONTRACT OR QUASIDELICT; MERE PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE. If the civil liability arises from other sources
than the commission of the offense, such as from law or contract or quasi- delict, its enforcement has
to be an ordinary civil action, which, as expressly provided in Article 29 of the Civil Code may be
disposed of as a mere preponderance of evidence would warrant. Then, all the defenses available,
such as prescription, lack of jurisdiction, set-off, and the other grounds for a motion to dismiss may be
availed of, as maybe proper under the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, complete with
pre-trial after issues have been joined.

3. ID.; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; APPEAL; DISALLOWANCE OF APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF

ACQUITTAL TO REOPEN QUESTION OF DEFENDANTS CIVIL LIABILITY; A SETTLED RULE.
In People v. Herrera, 74 Phil. 21, the Court also held: "While the right of the offended party to
intervene in the criminal action (Section 15, Rule 110, Rules of Court) as well as to appeal from a final
judgment or ruling or from an order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the
appellant (Section 2, Rule 122, Rules) is recognized, the offended party however, cannot appeal if the
accused is acquitted. An appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance would perforce
require a new determination of defendants criminal liability. This cannot be done. Besides, the
offended party has the remedy of bringing a civil action independently of the criminal action.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT A DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS; REMEDY AVAILABLE TO OFFENDED
PARTY. Petitioner may not complain, as she does of being denied due process for disallowing her
appeal. She can institute a separate civil action if her cause of action could come under the category
of quasi-delict or one arising from law, contract or any other known sources of civil liablity, but
certainly not anymore from the offense of which petitioner had already been acquitted. It is but fair to
require petitioner to take this course of action, not only because she would have to pay the lawful
expenses for instituting the action to obtain the relief she seeks from respondent, from which she is
spared in the prosecution of a criminal case, but also for the respondent or defendant to avail of all
defenses and remedies as are open to him in a separate civil action not otherwise available in a
criminal action that carries with it the civil action when deemed simultaneously filed with it, to recover
civil liability arising from the crime charged.

DECISION

DE CASTRO, J.:

The legal question raised in this petition for certiorari is whether from a decision of acquittal, the
complainant in a criminal action for estafa, may appeal with respect to the civil aspect of the case.
The criminal action in this case was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Baguio and
Benguet, under an information which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"INFORMATION
"The undersigned Acting 1st Assistant City Fiscal accuses ITONG AMISTAD of the crime of Estafa
penalized under Article 316 Paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code, committed as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
`That on or about January 30, 1965, October 11, 1965, and December 23, 1965, in the City of
Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
(1) (January 30, 1965) sell, convey, transfer and deliver by way of a deed of sale in favor of Ben
Palispis an unsegregated portion of 42,326 square meters of that parcel of land described in
ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 0-105
`A parcel of land (Lot 1, plan Psu-203086 - Amd., Civil Reservation Case No. 1, L.R.C. Civil
Reservation Record No. 211), situated in the Res. Sec. `J, City of Baguio. Bounded on the NE., by
property of Honor Kingdome; on the SW., by Lot 2; on the W and NW., by Public Land . . . containing
an area of EIGHTY FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED AND FIFTY THREE (84,653) Square meters,
more or less, . . . in the names of spouses Itong Amistad and Luisa Tengdan;

(2) (October 11, 1965) sell, convey, transfer and deliver by way of a deed of sale in favor of Teodoro
Mat-an the remaining 42,326 square meters of the above-described parcel of land; and
(3) (December 23, 1965) execute a supplemental deed of sale over the entire area covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 0-105 in favor of vendees Ben Palispis and Teodoro Mat-an which
effected the issuance of two separate titles in favor of said vendees
knowing fully well and purposely withholding the information that on or about February 10, 1962, he
had previously entered into an agreement with one MERCEDES L. JAVELLANA to convey to her an
area of 10,000 square meters from the above-described parcel of land for the sum of TEN
THOUSAND (P10,000) PESOS and had already received from her the sum of FIVE THOUSAND
(P5,000.00) PESOS, thereby causing damage and prejudice to said Mercedes L. Javellana in the
amount of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency.
All contrary to law."cralaw virtua1aw library
After trial, decision was rendered dated February 8, 1971, and promulgated on March 18, 1971
acquitting the accused, respondent herein, the Court holding that "the case of the prosecution is civil
inNATURE " and that "the guilt of the accused has not been proven beyond reasonable
doubt." chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
From the judgment of acquittal, the complainant, the petitioner herein, appealed to the Court of
Appeals insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. Without awaiting the completion of
the transcript of the stenographic notes in the case, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal
merely on the legal proposition that an appeal by the complainant from a judgment of acquittal should
be disallowed.
The Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated December 1, 1971, is set forth in full as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"This refers to an appeal against the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Baguio, in Criminal
Case No. 4205, wherein the accused Itong Amistad who was prosecuted for the crime of estafa
(paragraph 2, Article 316 R.P.C.), was acquitted. The decision was promulgated on March 18, 1971
and on that same day, the complainant, through counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal from said judgment,
`insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned. Apparently the appeal was approved by the
trial court, the records of the case were elevated to this Court, and this Court required the completion
of the same.
"Now, while the right of the offended party to intervene in the criminal action SECTION 15, Rule
110, Rules) as well as to appeal from a final judgment or ruling or from an order made after judgment
affecting the substantial rights of the appellant (Section 2, Rule 122, Rules) is recognized, the
offended party however, cannot appeal if the accused is acquitted as matters are (People v. Herrera,
74 Phil. 21). Indeed, the trial court in acquitting the herein defendant stated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
`In the mind of the court, the case of the prosecution is civil in nature. In fact, the supervening acts of
the parties after the execution of Exhibit A until the execution of Exhibit D are clear and unequivocal
which ineluctably lead this court to believe that the guilt of the accused has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
"An appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance would perforce require a new
determination of defendants criminal liability. This cannot be done. Besides, the offended party has
the remedy of bringing a civil action independently of the criminal action.
"Indeed, this question is not new. It has already been so ruled by the Supreme Court in several cases
(People v. Flores, G.R. No. L-7523, December 18, 1957, citing People v. Velez, 77 Phil. 1026; People
v. Benjamin Liggayu, Et Al., No. 8224, October 31, 1955; People v. Joaquin Lipana, 72 Phil. 166;

People v. Florendo, 73 Phil. 679 [decided under the new Rules of Court]; Ricafort v. Fernan, 101 Phil.
575, 572).
"Considering that the complainant is appealing from a judgment acquitting the accused in a criminal
case, her appeal should be disallowed.
"WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby ordered dismissed. The stenographers who were required to
submit their respective transcripts of stenographic notes in this case are hereby excused therefrom
(pp. 6-7,BRIEF for the Respondent, p. 78, Rollo).
A motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals was filed but was denied on
January 4, 1972. From both aforesaid Resolutions dismissing the appeal and the order denying the
Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioner came to this Court on a petition for certiorari with prayer
that the Resolution of the Court of Appeals be reversed, and that judgment be rendered in favor of
petitioner and against respondent insofar as the latters liability is concerned
"(a). Ordering respondent to pay to petitioner such sum as this Court shall adjudge to rightfully
represent the value of the one-hectare portion of the land involved agreed to be conveyed to
petitioner by respondent in accordance with the Agreement to Convey Real Property (Exhibit `A),
"(b). Ordering respondent to pay to petitioner the expenses of litigation actually incurred by the latter;
and
"(c). Ordering respondent to pay the costs ofSUIT ." (p. 28, Brief for the Petitioner, p. 60, Rollo).
The sole legal question for determination as stated at the outset, is whether an appeal by the
complainant for estafa, may be allowed from a decision acquitting the accused of the crime charged,
only insofar as the latters civil liability is concerned.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
In support of her affirmative position on the issue above stated, petitioner cites Section 2, Rule 122 of
the Rules of Court which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 2. Who may appeal. The People of the Philippines can not appeal if the defendant would be
placed thereby in double jeopardy. In all other cases either party may appeal from a final judgment or
ruling or from an order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the appellant." (p. 12,
Brief for the Petitioner, p. 60, Rollo)
Additionally, she cites Section 3 of Rule 111, from which she quotes the
following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases not included in the preceding section
the following rules shall be observed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . .;
"(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the
manner provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the thing and
reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered." (Rule 111, Rules of Court in the Philippines.) (pp.
13-14, Id.)
Finally, she cites Article 29 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may
be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant,

the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should
be found to be malicious.
"If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so
declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the
decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground." (p. 14, Id.)
From the aforequoted provisions, petitioners contend that the remedy of appeal is expressly granted
to her inasmuch as the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the
criminal action, Criminal Case No. 4205 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet, there
having been no reservation to file a separate civil action or a waiver of the right to file one. She had in
fact hired a private prosecutor to handle, primarily the civil aspect of the case, the prosecution of the
crime remaining under the direction and control of the prosecuting Fiscal. The private prosecutor
presented evidence bearing on the civil liability of the accused. In a memorandum he filed, he also
discussed extensively the civil liability of the accused, despite which, the trial court failed to rule on
the latters civil liability to the complainant.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
It is this omission, as alleged by petitioner herein, that constitutes the thrust of her first assignment of
error, the only one We feel called upon to rule on, among her three assigned errors, the other two
having relation to how the trial court evaluated the evidence, and the extent of damages petitioner
alleges to be entitled to under such evidence, which evidently may not be passed upon in the instant
proceedings, the evidence presented during the trial not having been elevated to this Court, nor even
to the Court of Appeals, at least not fully or completely.
Confining ourselves, therefore, to the first assigned error, We find no ground to reverse the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals on the purely legal question of whether the petitioner, as
complainant in Criminal Case No. 4025 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet, for
estafa, can appeal from the judgment acquitting the accused, because the trial court failed to declare
the latters civil liability to the complainant, which was allegedly proven by the evidence.
The provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code relied upon by the petitioner clearly requires the
institution of a separate action by the filing of the proper complaint. To such complaint, the accused
as the defendant therein, may file the appropriate responsive pleading, which may be an answer or a
motion to dismiss. In a criminal action, notwithstanding that the action for the recovery of civil liability
is impliedly instituted therewith, if not reserved or waived, the accused is not afforded the same
remedy. Neither is the mandatory pre-trial held as is required of all civil actions. The obvious reason
is that the civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent upon conviction,
because said liability arises from the offense, with respect to which pre-trial is never held to obtain
admission as to the commission thereof, except on the occasion of arraignment. This is the kind of
civil liability involved in the civil action deemed filed simultaneously with the filing of criminal action,
unless it is reserved or waived, as so expressly provided in Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
and as held in People v. Herrera, 74 Phil. 21.
If the civil liability arises from other sources than the commission of the offense, such as from law or
contract or quasi-delict, its enforcement has to be by an ordinary civil action, which, as expressly
provided in Article 29 of the Civil Code may be disposed of as a mere preponderance of evidence
would warrant. Then, all the defenses available, such as prescription, lack of jurisdiction, set-off, and
the other grounds for a motion to dismiss may be availed of, as may be proper under the peculiar
facts and circumstances of the case, complete with pre-trial after issues have been joined. Upon
these considerations, it becomes clear that the argument of petitioner invoking the rule against
multiplicity of action may not forcefully or convincingly be put forth.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
In the Resolution of the Court of Appeals several cases have been cited which held that an appeal
from the dismissal of the criminal case on motion by the fiscal may not be taken by the offended party
(People v. Lipana, 72 Phil. 168; People v. Florendo, 73 Phil. 679). In the case of People v. Herrera, Et
Al., 74 Phil. 21, the accused was acquitted without the court making any pronouncement as to his civil
liability, in exactly the same manner that the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet in Criminal

Case No. 4025, was charged with a similar omission in the case at bar. The Supreme Court did not
permit an appeal by the offended party, the Court saying:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The decision of the justice of the peace court which acquitted the defendant of the charge and did
not make any pronouncement holding the defendant civilly liable put an end to the case, not only by
freeing the defendant from criminal responsibility but also by rejecting all liability for damages arising
from the alleged crime of malicious mischief. The offended parties not having reserved their right to
bring a separate civil action, the aforesaid decision of acquittal covered both the criminal and the civil
aspects of the case under Rule 107, Section 1(a) of the new Rules of Court. An appeal from that
decision to the Court of First Instance, as intended by the offended parties, would reopen the
question of defendants civil liability arising from the alleged crime. And considering that such civil
liability must be based on the criminal responsibility of the defendant (Art. 100, Revised Penal Code),
any review or re-examination of the question of civil liability would perforce require a new
determination of defendants criminal liability. But another trial upon defendants criminal responsibility
cannot be held, in view of his previous acquittal in the justice of the peace court. So the appeal from
the decision of the justice of the peace court is not authorized by law."cralaw virtua1aw library
Brought out in bold relief in the aforequoted ruling is that what is impliedly brought simultaneously
with the criminal action is the civil action to recover civil liability arising from the offense. Hence, the
two actions may rise or fall together. However, if the civil action is reserved, or if the ground of
acquittal is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, a separate civil action may be filed, the
complainant alleging a cause of action independent of, and not based on, the commission of an
offense. Only preponderance of evidence would then be required.
The futility of petitioners instant recourse becomes all too evident upon consideration of the principles
enunciated, particularly in the Herrera case, since if the civil liability recoverable in a criminal action is
one arising from the crime charged, no longer may the respondent be found criminally liable upon a
review of the evidence, after the verdict of acquittal has been handed down by the trial court. Again,
petitioner tries to show that the cases cited by the Court of Appeals are not in point. But she has not
cited one single case faintly supporting her position as she has tried to maintain in the instant case.
Nevertheless, petitioner may not complain, as she does of being denied due process for disallowing
her appeal. She can institute a separate civil action if her cause of action could come under the
category of quasi-delict or one arising from law, contract or any other known source of civil liability,
but certainly not anymore from the offense of which petitioner had already been acquitted. It is but fair
to require petitioner to take this course of action, not only because she would have to pay for the
lawful expenses for instituting the action to obtain the relief she seeks from respondent, from which
she is spared in the prosecution of a criminal case, but also for the respondent or defendant to avail
of all defenses and remedies as are open to him in a separate civil action not otherwise available in a
criminal action that carries with it the civil action when deemed simultaneously filed with it, to recover
civil liability arising from the crime charged.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
For all the foregoing, the Resolution appealed from is affirmed, and the instant petition is, accordingly,
dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 80194. March 21, 1989.]

EDGAR JARANTILLA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE KUAN
SING, Respondents.
Corazon Miraflores and Vicente P. Billena for Petitioner.
Manuel S. Gemarino for Private Respondent.

SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL PROCEDURE; "LAW OF THE CASE" ; CONCEPT. " Law of the case has been defined
as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it means that whatever is once
irrevocably established, as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same
case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the
facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court (21
C.J.S. 330)." (Emphasis supplied). "It need not be stated that the Supreme Court being the court of
last resort, is the final arbiter of all legal questions properly brought before it and that its decision in
any given case constitutes the law of that particular case. . ." (Emphasis supplied).
2. TORTS AND DAMAGES; CREATION OF DUAL LIABILITY FROM THE SAME ACT OR
OMISSION OF THE OFFENDER. The settled rule that the same act or omission (in this case, the
negligent sideswiping of private respondent) can create two kinds of liability on the part of the
offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto. Since the same negligence
can give rise either to a delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either of these two types of civil
liability may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code
that the offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability.
3. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; COURT OBLIGATED IN CASE OF ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED
ON REASONABLE DOUBT TO MAKE PRONOUNCEMENT ON THE CIVIL LIABILITY OF THE
ACCUSED. Under the present jurisprudential milieu, where the trial court acquits the accused on
reasonable doubt, it could very well make a pronouncement on the civil liability of the accused and
the complainant could file a petition for mandamus to compel the trial court to include such civil
liability in the judgment of acquittal.
4. ID.; ACQUITTAL OF ACCUSED ION REASONABLE DOUBT; INSTITUTION OF SEPARATE
CIVIL ACTION FOR THE SAME ACT OR OMISSION PROPER. We have ruled in the relatively
recent case of Lontoc v. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., Et. Al. "In view of the fact that the defendantappellee de la Cruz was acquitted on the ground that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt the plaintiff-appellant has the right to institute a separate civil action to recover damages from
the defendants-appellants (See Mendoza v. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113). The well-settled doctrine is that a

person, while not criminally liable may still be civilly liable.The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the
civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil
liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558 cited in People v.
Rogelio Ligon y Tria, Et Al., G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987; Filomeno Urbano v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72964, January 7, 1988).
5. ID.; ID.; FAILURE OF THE COURT TO MAKE ANY PRONOUNCEMENT AS TO CIVIL LIABILITY
OF THE ACCUSED; RESERVATION OF RIGHT TO INSTITUTE SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION
ACCORDED COMPLAINANT. Another consideration in favor of private respondent is the doctrine
that the failure of the court to make any pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil
liability of the accused amounts to a reservation of the right to have the civil liability litigated and
determined in a separate action. The rules nowhere provide that if the court fails to determine the civil
liability it becomes no longer enforceable.
6. ID.; ID.; FAILURE OF THE COMPLAINT TO RESERVE HIS RIGHT TO FILE SEPARATE CIVIL
ACTION, NOT A FORECLOSURE OF RIGHT TO FILE SEPARATE ACTION FOR DAMAGES.
Since this action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the respondent to reserve his right to file a
separate civil case and his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing such separate
civil action for damages. The Court has also heretofore ruled in Elcano v. Hill that the extinction of
civil liability referred to in Par. (c) of Sec. 3 Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a
quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that
the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. . . ."

DECISION

REGALADO, J.:

The records show that private respondent Jose Kuan Sing was "sideswiped by a vehicle in the
evening of July 7, 1971 in Iznart Street, Iloilo City." 1 The respondent Court of Appeals concurred in
the findings of the court a quo that the said vehicle which figured in the mishap, a Volkswagen (Beetle
type) car, was then driven by petitioner Edgar Jarantilla along said street toward the direction of the
provincial capitol, and that private respondent sustained physical injuries as a consequence. 2
Petitioner was accordingly charged before the then City Court of Iloilo for serious physical injuries thru
reckless imprudence in Criminal Case No. 47207 thereof. 3 Private respondent, as the complaining
witness therein, did not reserve his right to institute a separate civil action and he intervened in the
prosecution of said criminal case through a private prosecutor. 4 Petitioner was acquitted in said
criminal case "on reasonable doubt." 5
On October 30, 1974, private respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner in the former Court of
First Instance of Iloilo, Branch IV, 6 docketed therein as Civil Case No. 9976, and which civil action
involved the same subject matter and act complained of in Criminal Case No. 47027. 7 In his answer
filed therein, the petitioner alleged as special and affirmative defenses that the private respondent
had no cause of action and, additionally, that the latters cause of action, if any, is barred by the prior
judgment in Criminal Case No. 47207 inasmuch as when said criminal case was instituted the civil
liability was also deemed instituted since therein plaintiff failed to reserve the civil aspect and actively
participated in the criminal case. 8
Thereafter, acting on a motion to dismiss of therein defendant, the trial court issued on April 3, 1975
an order of denial, with the suggestion that" (t)o enrich our jurisprudence, it is suggested that the
defendant brings (sic) this ruling to the Supreme Court by certiorari or other appropriate remedy, to
review the ruling of the court." 9

On June 17, 1975, petitioner filed in this Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
which was docketed as G.R. No. L-40992, 10 assailing the aforesaid order of the trial court. Said
petition was dismissed for lack of merit in the Courts resolution of July 23, 1975, and a motion for
reconsideration thereof was denied for the same reason in a resolution of October 28, 1975. 11
After trial, the court below rendered judgment on May 23, 1977 in favor of the herein private
respondent and ordering herein petitioner to pay the former the sum of P6,920.00 for hospitalization,
medicines and so forth, P2,000.00 for other actual expenses, P25,000.00 for moral damages,
P5,000.00 for attorneys fees, and costs. 12
On July 29, 1987, the respondent Court of Appeals 13 affirmed the decision of the lower court except
as to the award for moral damages which it reduced from P25,000.00 to P18,000.00. A motion for
reconsideration was denied by respondent court on September 18, 1987. 14
The main issue for resolution by Us in the present recourse is whether the private respondent, who
was the complainant in the criminal action for physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and who
participated in the prosecution thereof without reserving the civil action arising from the act or
omission complained of, can file a separate action for civil liability arising from the same act or
omission where the herein petitioner was acquitted in the criminal action on reasonable doubt and no
civil liability was adjudicated or awarded in the judgment of acquittal.
Prefatorily, We note that petitioner raises a collateral issue by faulting the respondent court for
refusing to resolve an assignment of error in his appeal therein, said respondent court holding that the
main issue had been passed upon by this Court in G.R. No. L-40992 hereinbefore mentioned. It is
petitioners position that the aforesaid two resolutions of the Court in said case, the first dismissing
the petition and the second denying the motion for reconsideration, do not constitute the "law of the
cases which would control the subsequent proceedings in this controversy.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
1. We incline favorably to petitioners submission on this score.
The "doctrine of the law of the case" has no application at the aforesaid posture of the proceedings
when the two resolutions were handed down. While it may be true that G.R. No. L-40992 may have
involved some of the issues which were thereafter submitted for resolution on the merits by the two
lower courts, the proceedings involved there was one for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
assailing an interlocutory order of the court a quo, specifically, its order denying therein defendants
motion to dismiss. This Court, without rendering a specific opinion or explanation as to the legal and
factual bases on which its two resolutions were predicated, simply dismissed the special civil action
on that incident for lack of merit. It may very well be that such resolution was premised on the fact
that the Court, at that stage and on the basis of the facts then presented, did not consider that the
denial order of the court a quo was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 15 To repeat, no rationale
for such resolutions having been expounded on the merits of that action, no law of the case may be
said to have been laid down in G.R. No. L-40992 to justify the respondent courts refusal to consider
petitioners claim that his former acquittal barred the separate action.
"Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it
means that whatever is once irrevocably established, as the controlling legal rule of decision between
the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general
principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts
of the case before the court (21 C.J.S. 330)." (Emphasis supplied). 16
"It need not be stated that the Supreme Court being the court of last resort, is the final arbiter of all
legal questions properly brought before it and that its decision in any given case constitutes the law of
that particular case. . ." (Emphasis supplied). 17
"It is a rule of general application that the decision of an appellate court in a case is the law of the
case on the points presented throughout all the subsequent proceedings in the case in both the trial

and the appellate courts, and no question necessarily involved and decided on that appeal will be
considered on a second appeal or writ of error in the same case, provided the facts and issues are
substantially the same as those on which the first question rested and, according to some authorities,
provided the decision is on the merits. . . ." 18
2. With the foregoing ancillary issue out of the way, We now consider the principal plaint of petitioner.
Apropos to such resolution is the settled rule that the same act or omission (in this case, the negligent
sideswiping of private respondent) can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is,
civil liability ex delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto. Since the same negligence can give rise
either to a delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either of these two types of civil liability may be
enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the
offended party cannot recover damages under both types of liability." 19
We also note the reminder of petitioner that in Roa v. De la Cruz, Et Al., 20 it was held that where the
offended party elected to claim damages arising from the offense charged in the criminal case
through her intervention as a private prosecutor, the final judgment rendered therein constituted a bar
to the subsequent civil action based upon the same cause. It is meet, however, not to lose sight of the
fact that the criminal action involved therein was for serious oral defamation which, while within the
contemplation of an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code, constitutes only a
penal offense and cannot otherwise be considered as a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana under Articles
2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. And while petitioner draws attention to the supposed reiteration of
the Roa doctrine in the later case of Azucena v. Potenciano, Et Al., 21 this time involving damage to
property through negligence as to make out a case of quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and 2180 of
the Civil Code, such secondary reliance is misplaced since the therein plaintiff Azucena did not
intervene in the criminal action against defendant Potenciano. The citation of Roa in the later case of
Azucena was, therefore, clearly obiter and affords no comfort to petitioner.
These are aside from the fact that there have been doctrinal, and even statutory, 22 changes on the
matter of civil actions arising from criminal offenses and quasi-delicts. We will reserve our discussion
on the statutory aspects for another case and time and, for the nonce, We will consider the doctrinal
developments on this issue.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
In the case under consideration, private respondent participated and intervened in the prosecution of
the criminalSUIT against petitioner. Under the present jurisprudential milieu, where the trial court
acquits the accused on reasonable doubt, it could very well make a pronouncement on the civil
liability of the accused 23 and the complainant could file a petition for mandamus to compel the trial
court to include such civil liability in the judgment of acquittal. 24
Private respondent, as already stated, filed a separate civil action after such acquittal. This is allowed
under Article 29 of the Civil Code. We have ruled in the relatively recent case of Lontoc v. MD Transit
& Taxi Co., Inc., Et. Al. 25 that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In view of the fact that the defendant-appellee de la Cruz was acquitted on the ground that his guilt
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt the plaintiff-appellant has the right to institute a separate
civil action to recover damages from the defendants-appellants (See Mendoza v. Arrieta, 91 SCRA
113). The well-settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable may still be civilly liable.The
judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration
that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129
SCRA 558 cited in People v. Rogelio Ligon y Tria, Et Al., G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987; Filomeno
Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72964, January 7, 1988). The ruling is based on
Article 29 of the Civil Code which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be
instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. . . ." 26

Another consideration in favor of private respondent is the doctrine that the failure of the court to
make any pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as to the civil liability of the accused amounts to
a reservation of the right to have the civil liability litigated and determined in a separate action. The
rules nowhere provide that if the court fails to determine the civil liability it becomes no longer
enforceable. 27
Furthermore, in the present case the civil liability sought to be recovered through the application of
Article 29 is no longer that based on or arising from the criminal offense. There is persuasive logic in
the view that, under such circumstances, the acquittal of the accused foreclosed the civil liability
based on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which presupposes the existence of criminal liability
or requires a conviction of the offense charged. Divested of its penal element by such acquittal, the
causative act or omission becomes in effect a quasi-delict, hence only a civil action based thereon
may be instituted or prosecuted thereafter, which action can be proved by mere preponderance of
evidence. 28 Complementary to such considerations, Article 29 enunciates the rule, as already
stated, that a civil action for damages is not precluded by an acquittal on reasonable doubt for the
same criminal act or omission.
The allegations of the complaint filed by the private respondent supports and is constitutive of a case
for a quasi-delict committed by the petitioner, thus:chanrobles law library : red
"3. That in the evening of July 7, 1971 at about 7:00 oclock, the plaintiff crossed Iznart Street from his
restaurant situated at 220 Iznart St., Iloilo City, Philippines, on his way to a meeting of the Cantonese
Club at Aldeguer Street, Iloilo City and while he was standing on the middle of the street as there
were vehicles coming from the Provincial Building towards Plazoleta Gay, Iloilo City, he was bumped
and sideswiped by Volkswagen car with plate No. B-2508 W which was on its way from Plazoleta
Gay towards the Provincial Capitol, Iloilo City, which car was being driven by the defendant in a
reckless and negligent manner, at an excessive rate of speed and in violation of the provisions of the
Revised Motor Vehicle (sic) as amended, in relation to the Land Transportation and Traffic Code as
well as in violation of existing city ordinances, and by reason of his inexcusable lack of precaution and
failure to act with due negligence and by failing to take into consideration (sic) his degree of
intelligence, the atmospheric conditions of the place as well as the width, traffic, visibility and other
conditions of Iznart Street;" 29
Since this action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the respondent to reserve his right to file a
separate civil case and his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing such separate
civil action for damages. 30 The Court has also heretofore ruled in Elcano v. Hill 31 that
". . . a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is also
actually charged criminally, to recover damages on both scores; and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In
other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c) of Sec. 3 Rule 111, refers exclusively
to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; whereas the civil liability for the
same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
The aforecited case of Lontoc v. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., Et. Al. involved virtually the same factual
situation. The Court, in arriving at the conclusion hereinbefore quoted, expressly declared that the
failure of the therein plaintiff to reserve his right to file a separate civil case is not fatal; that his
intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing a separate civil action for damages,
especially considering that the accused therein was acquitted because his guilt was not proved
beyond reasonable doubt; that the two cases were anchored on two different causes of action, the
criminal case being on a violation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code while the subsequent
complaint for damages was based on a quasi-delict; and that in the judgment in the criminal case the
aspect of civil liability was not passed upon and resolved. Consequently, said civil case may proceed
as authorized by Article 29 of the Civil Code.

Our initial adverse observation on a portion of the decision of respondent court aside, We hold that on
the issues decisive of this case it did not err in sustaining the decision a quo.cralawnad
WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is hereby DENIED and the decision of the respondent Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED, without costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 165496

February 12, 2007

HUN HYUNG PARK, Petitioner,

vs.
EUNG WON CHOI, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner, Hun Hyung Park, assails the Court of Appeals (CA) Resolutions dated May 20, 2004 1 and
September 28, 20042 in CA G.R. CR No. 28344 dismissing his petition and denying reconsideration
thereof, respectively.
In an Information3 dated August 31, 2000, respondent, Eung Won Choi, was charged for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, for issuing on June 28,
1999 Philippine National Bank Check No. 0077133 postdated August 28, 1999 in the amount
of P1,875,000 which was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds.
Upon arraignment, respondent, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded "not guilty" to the offense
charged. Following the pre-trial conference, the prosecution presented its evidence-in-chief.

After the prosecution rested its case, respondent filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to
Evidence to which he attached his Demurrer, asserting that the prosecution failed to prove that he
received the notice of dishonor, hence, the presumption of the element of knowledge of insufficiency
of funds did not arise.4
By Order5 of February 27, 2003, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati, Branch 65 granted
the Demurrer and dismissed the case. The prosecutions Motion for Reconsideration was denied. 6
Petitioner appealed the civil aspect7 of the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati,
contending that the dismissal of the criminal case should not include its civil aspect.
By Decision of September 11, 2003, Branch 60 of the RTC held that while the evidence presented
was insufficient to prove respondents criminal liability, it did not altogether extinguish his civil liability.
It accordingly granted the appeal of petitioner and ordered respondent to pay him the amount
of P1,875,000 with legal interest.8
Upon respondents motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC set aside its decision and ordered
the remand of the case to the MeTC "for further proceedings, so that the defendant [-respondent
herein] may adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case."9 Petitioners motion for reconsideration
of the remand of the case having been denied, he elevated the case to the CA which, by the assailed
resolutions, dismissed his petition for the following reasons:
1. The verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached to the petition does not fully
comply withSECTION 4, as amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, Rule 7, 1997 Rules of Court,
because it does not give the assurance that the allegations of the petition are true and correct based
on authentic records.
2. The petition is not accompanied by copies of certain pleadings and other material portions of the
record, (i.e., motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence, demurrer to evidence and the opposition
thereto, and the Municipal [sic] Trial Courts Order dismissing Criminal Case No. 294690) as would
support the allegations of the petition (Sec. 2, Rule 42, ibid.).
3. The Decision dated September 11, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court attached to the petition is an
uncertified and illegible mere machine copy of the original (Sec. 2, Rule 42, ibid.).
4. Petitioners failed to implead the People of the Philippines as party-respondent in the petition.10
In his present petition, petitioner assails the above-stated reasons of the appellate court in dismissing
his petition.
The manner of verification for pleadings which are required to be verified, such as a petition for
review before the CA of an appellate judgment of the RTC,11 is prescribed by Section 4 of Rule 7 of
the Rules of Court:
Sec. 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically required by law or rule, pleadings need not be
under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations
therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on "information and belief," or
upon "knowledge, information and belief," or lacks a proper verification shall be treated as an
unsigned pleading.12(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioner argues that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence,
hence, he chose to affirm in his petition he filed before the court a quo that its contents are "true and
correct of my own personal knowledge,"13 and not on the basis of authentic documents.

On the other hand, respondent counters that the word "or" may be interpreted in a conjunctive sense
and construed to mean as "and," or vice versa, when the context of the law so warrants.
A reading of the above-quoted Section 4 of Rule 7 indicates that a pleading may be verified under
either of the two given modes or under both. The veracity of the allegations in a pleading may be
affirmed based on either ones own personal knowledge or on authentic records, or both, as
warranted. The use of the preposition "or" connotes that either source qualifies as a sufficient basis
for verification and, needless to state, the concurrence of both sources is more than
sufficient.14 Bearing both a disjunctive and conjunctive sense, this parallel legal signification avoids a
construction that will exclude the combination of the alternatives or bar the efficacy of any one of the
alternatives standing alone.15
Contrary to petitioners position, the range of permutation is not left to the pleaders liking, but is
dependent on the surroundingNATURE of the allegations which may warrant that a verification be
based either purely on personal knowledge, or entirely on authentic records, or on both sources.
As pointed out by respondent, "authentic records" as a basis for verification bear significance in
petitions wherein the greater portions of the allegations are based on the records of the proceedings
in the court of origin and/or the court a quo, and not solely on the personal knowledge of the
petitioner. To illustrate, petitioner himself could not have affirmed, based on his personal knowledge,
the truthfulness of the statement in his petition16 before the CA that at the pre-trial conference
respondent admitted having received the letter of demand, because he (petitioner) was not present
during the conference.17 Hence, petitioner needed to rely on the records to confirm its veracity.
Verification is not an empty ritual or a meaningless formality. ItsIMPORT must never be sacrificed in
the name of mere expedience or sheer caprice. For what is at stake is the matter of verity attested by
the sanctity of an oath18 to secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading have been made
in good faith, or are true and correct and not merely speculative.19
This Court has strictly been enforcing the requirement of verification and certification and enunciating
that obedience to the requirements of procedural rules is needed if fair results are to be expected
therefrom. Utter disregard of the rules cannot just be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal
construction.20 While the requirement is not jurisdictional in nature, it does not make it less a rule. A
relaxed application of the rule can only be justified by the attending circumstances of the case. 21
To sustain petitioners explanation that the basis of verification is a matter of simple preference would
trivialize the rationale and diminish the resoluteness of the rule. It would play on predilection and pay
no heed in providing enough assurance of the correctness of the allegations.
On the second reason of the CA in dismissing the petition that the petition was not accompanied by
copies of certain pleadings and other material portions of the record as would support the allegations
of the petition (i.e., Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence, Demurrer to Evidence and the
Opposition thereto, and the MeTC February 27, 2003 Order dismissing the case) petitioner
contends that these documents are immaterial to his appeal.
Contrary to petitioners contention, however, the materiality of those documents is very apparent
since the civil aspect of the case, from which he is appealing, was likewise dismissed by the trial court
on account of the same Demurrer.
Petitioner, nonetheless, posits that he subsequently submitted to the CA copies of the enumerated
documents, save for the MeTC February 27, 2003 Order, as attachments to his Motion for
Reconsideration.
The Rules, however, require that the petition must "be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate
original or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the
clerk of court."22

A perusal of the petition filed before the CA shows that the only duplicate original or certified true
copies attached as annexes thereto are the January 14, 2004 RTC Order granting respondents
Motion for Reconsideration and the March 29, 2004 RTC Order denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. The copy of the September 11, 2003 RTC Decision, which petitioner prayed to be
reinstated, is not a certified true copy and is not even legible. Petitioner later recompensed though by
appending to his Motion for Reconsideration a duplicate original copy.
While petitioner averred before the CA in his Motion for Reconsideration that the February 27, 2003
MeTC Order was already attached to his petition as Annex "G," Annex "G" bares a replicate copy of a
different order, however. It was to this Court that petitioner belatedly submitted an uncertified true
copy of the said MeTC Order as an annex to his Reply to respondents Comment.
This Court in fact observes that the copy of the other MeTC Order, that dated May 5, 2003, which
petitioner attached to his petition before the CA is similarly uncertified as true.
Since both Orders of the MeTC were adverse to him even with respect to the civil aspect of the case,
petitioner was mandated to submit them in the required form. 23
In fine, petitioner fell short in his compliance with Section 2 (d) of Rule 42, the mandatory tenor of
which is discernible thereunder and is well settled.24 He has not, however, advanced any strong
compelling reasons to warrant a relaxation of the Rules, hence, his petition before the CA was
correctly dismissed.
Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike
are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a
relaxation in the application of the rules, this we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for
erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of
the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true
that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of
justice.25 (Emphasis supplied)
As to the third reason for the appellate courts dismissal of his petition failure to implead the People
of the Philippines as a party in the petition indeed, as petitioner contends, the same is of no
moment, he having appealed only the civil aspect of the case. Passing on the dual purpose of a
criminal action, this Court ruled:
Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action, there are two actions involved in a criminal case.
The first is the criminal action for the punishment of the offender. The parties are the People of the
Philippines as the plaintiff and the accused. In a criminal action, the private complainant is merely a
witness for the State on the criminal aspect of the action. The second is the civil action arising from
the delict. The private complainant is the plaintiff and the accused is the defendant. There is a merger
of the trial of the two cases to avoid multiplicity of suits.26 (Underscoring supplied)
It bears recalling that the MeTC acquitted respondent.27 As a rule, a judgment of acquittal is
immediately final and executory and the prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal because of the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy.
Either the offended party or the accused may, however, appeal the civil aspect of the judgment
despite the acquittal of the accused. The public prosecutor has generally no interest in appealing the
civil aspect of a decision acquitting the accused. The acquittal ends his work. The case is terminated
as far as he is concerned. The real parties in interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the
offended party and the accused.28
Technicality aside, the petition is devoid of merit.

When a demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the whole case is submitted for judgment
on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution as the accused is deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence.29 At that juncture, the court is called upon to decide the case including its civil
aspect, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action has been waived or
reserved.30
If the filing of a separate civil action has not been reserved or priorly instituted or the enforcement of
civil liability is not waived, the trial court should, in case of conviction, state the civil liability or
damages caused by the wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the offended
party, if there is any.31
For, in case of acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly liable. The extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action where (a) the acquittal is based on
reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the
liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not
based upon the crime of which the accused was acquitted.32
The civil action based on delict may, however, be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the
final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did
not exist.33
In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce countervailing
evidence if the court denies the demurrer.34 Such denial bears no distinction as to the two aspects of
the case because there is a disparity of evidentiary value between the quanta of evidence in such
aspects of the case. In other words, a court may not deny the demurrer as to the criminal aspect and
at the same time grant the demurrer as to the civil aspect, for if the evidence so far presented is not
insufficient to prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt, then the same evidence is likewise not
insufficient to establish civil liability by mere preponderance of evidence.
On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt,
it does not follow that the same evidence is insufficient to establish a preponderance of evidence. For
if the court grants the demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of the case generally proceeds. The
only recognized instance when an acquittal on demurrer carries with it the dismissal of the civil aspect
is when there is a finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
Absent such determination, trial as to the civil aspect of the case must perforce continue. Thus this
Court, in Salazar v. People,35 held:
If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce
evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from
which the civil liability may arise did not exist.36
In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case without any finding that
the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
Respondent did not assail the RTC order of remand. He thereby recognized that there is basis for a
remand.
Indicatively, respondent stands by his defense that he merely borrowed P1,500,000 with the
remainder representing the interest, and that he already made a partial payment of P1,590,000.
Petitioner counters, however, that the payments made by respondent pertained to other
transactions.37 Given these conflicting claims which are factual, a remand of the case would afford the
fullest opportunity for the parties to ventilate, and for the trial court to resolve the same.
Petitioner finally posits that respondent waived his right to present evidence on the civil aspect of the
case (1) when the grant of the demurrer was reversed on appeal, citing Section 1 of Rule 33, 38 and
(2) when respondent orally opposed petitioners motion for reconsideration pleading that proceedings
with respect to the civil aspect of the case continue.

Petitioners position is tenuous.

Petitioners citation ofSECTION 1 of Rule 33 is incorrect.1awphi1.net Where a court has jurisdiction
over the subject matter and over the person of the accused, and the crime was committed within its
territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires it
to resolve.
One of the issues in a criminal case being the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime, the
governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the Rules of Civil Procedure which pertains to a
civil action arising from the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit. 39
As for petitioners attribution of waiver to respondent, it cannot be determined with certainty from the
records theNATURE of the alleged oral objections of respondent to petitioners motion for
reconsideration of the grant of the demurrer to evidence. Any waiver of the right to present evidence
must be positively demonstrated. Any ambiguity in the voluntariness of the waiver is frowned
upon,40 hence, courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against it.41
This Court therefore upholds respondents right to present evidence as reserved by his filing of leave
of court to file the demurrer.
WHEREFORE, the petition is, inLIGHT

of the foregoing discussions, DENIED.

The case is REMANDED to the court of origin, Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 65
which is DIRECTED to forthwith set Criminal Case No. 294690 for further proceedings only for the
purpose of receiving evidence on the civil aspect of the case.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 151931. September 23, 2003]

ANAMER SALAZAR, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and J.Y. BROTHERS
MARKETING CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure of
the Order[1] of the Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Legazpi City, Branch 5, [2] dated
November 19, 2001, and its Order[3] dated January 14, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration
of the decision of the said court on the civil aspect thereof and to allow her to present evidence
thereon.
On June 11, 1997, an Information for estafa was filed against herein petitioner Anamer D. Salazar
and co-accused Nena Jaucian Timario with the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 7474 which reads as follows:
That sometime in the month of October, 1996, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named-accused, conspiring and confederating with
each other, with intent to defraud by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, on the part of accused NENA JAUCIAN TIMARIO, drew and issue[d] PRUDENTIAL
BANK, LEGASPI CITY BRANCH CHECK NO. 067481, dated October 15, 1996, in the amount
of P214,000.00 in favor of J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING CORPORATION, represented by its
Branch Manager, JERSON O. YAO, and accused ANAMER D. SALAZAR endorsed and negotiated
said check as payment of 300 cavans of rice obtained from J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING
CORPORATION, knowing fully well that at that time said check was issued and endorsed, Nena
Jaucian Timario did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank to cover the amount
called for therein and without informing the payee of such circumstance; that when said check was
presented to the drawee bank for payment, the same was consequently dishonored and refused
payment for the reason of ACCOUNT CLOSED; that despite demands, accused failed and refused
and still fail and refuse to pay and/or make arrangement for the payment of the said check, to the
damage and prejudice of said J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING CORPORATION.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Upon arraignment, the petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter
ensued.

The Evidence of the Prosecution

On October 15, 1996, petitioner Anamer Salazar purchased 300 cavans of rice from J.Y. Brothers
Marketing Corporation, through Mr. Jerson Yao. As payment for these cavans of rice, the petitioner
gave the private complainant Check No. 067481 drawn against the Prudential Bank, Legazpi City
Branch, dated October 15, 1996, by one Nena Jaucian Timario in the amount of P214,000. Jerson
Yao accepted the check upon the petitioners assurance that it was a good check. The cavans of rice
were picked up the next day by the petitioner. Upon presentment, the check was dishonored because
it was drawn under a closed account (Account Closed). The petitioner was informed of such
dishonor. She replaced the Prudential Bank check with Check No. 365704 drawn against the Solid

Bank, Legazpi Branch, which, however, was returned with the word DAUD (Drawn Against
Uncollected Deposit).
After the prosecution rested its case, the petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of
Court[5] alleging that she could not be guilty of the crime as charged for the following reasons: (a) she
was merely an indorser of the check issued by Nena Timario, and Article 315, paragraph 2(d) on
estafa penalizes only the issuer of the check and not the indorser thereof; (b) there is no sufficient
evidence to prove that the petitioner conspired with the issuer of the check, Nena Jaucian Timario, in
order to defraud the private complainant; (c) after the first check was dishonored, the petitioner
replaced it with a second one. The first transaction had therefore been effectively novated by the
issuance of the second check.Unfortunately, her personal check was dishonored not for insufficiency
of funds, but for DAUD, which in banking parlance means drawn against uncollected
deposit. According to the petitioner, this means that the account had sufficient funds but was still
restricted because the deposit, usually a check, had not yet been cleared.
The prosecution filed its comment/opposition to the petitioners demurrer to evidence.
On November 19, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting the petitioner of the crime
charged but ordering her to remit to the private complainant the amount of the check as payment for
her purchase. The trial court ruled that the evidence for the prosecution did not establish the
existence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt between the petitioner and the issuer of the check,
her co-accused Nena Jaucian Timario, for the purpose of defrauding the private complainant. In fact,
the private complainant, Jerson Yao, admitted that he had never met Nena Jaucian Timario who
remained at large. As a mere indorser of the check, the petitioners breach of the warranty that the
check was a good one is not synonymous with the fraudulent act of falsely pretending to possess
credit under Article 315(2)(d). The decretal portion of the trial courts judgment reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Anamer D. Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime charged but is hereby held liable for the value of the 300 bags of rice. Accused Anamer D.
Salazar is therefore ordered to pay J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation the sum
of P214,000.00. Costs against the accused.[6]
Within the reglementary period therefor, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on the
civil aspect of the decision with a plea that he be allowed to present evidence pursuant to Rule 33 of
the Rules of Court. On January 14, 2002, the court issued an order denying the motion.
In her petition at bar, the petitioner assails the orders of the trial court claiming that after her
demurrer to evidence was granted by the trial court, she was denied due process as she was not
given the opportunity to adduce evidence to prove that she was not civilly liable to the private
respondent. The petitioner invokes the applicability of Rule 33 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in this
case, contending that before being adjudged liable to the private offended party, she should have
been first accorded the procedural relief granted in Rule 33.

The Petition Is Meritorious

According to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with
the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution
starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal,
temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the complaint or
information, the filing fees therefor shall constitute a first lien on the judgment awarding such
damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the criminal
case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a
separate civil action.
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full the filing
fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual damages
claimed.Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal,
temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees based on the
amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are
subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a
first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be
consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the
application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule
governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions.
The last paragraph of Section 2 of the said rule provides that the extinction of the penal action does
not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. Moreover, the civil action based on delict shall be
deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.[7]
The criminal action has a dual purpose, namely, the punishment of the offender and indemnity to
the offended party. The dominant and primordial objective of the criminal action is the punishment of
the offender. The civil action is merely incidental to and consequent to the conviction of the
accused. The reason for this is that criminal actions are primarily intended to vindicate an outrage
against the sovereignty of the state and to impose the appropriate penalty for the vindication of the
disturbance to the social order caused by the offender. On the other hand, the action between the
private complainant and the accused is intended solely to indemnify the former.[8]
Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action, there are two actions involved in a criminal
case. The first is the criminal action for the punishment of the offender. The parties are the People of
the Philippines as the plaintiff and the accused. In a criminal action, the private complainant is merely
a witness for the State on the criminal aspect of the action. The second is the civil action arising from
the delict. The private complainant is the plaintiff and the accused is the defendant. There is a merger
of the trial of the two cases to avoid multiplicity of suits.
The quantum of evidence on the criminal aspect of the case is proof beyond reasonable doubt,
while in the civil aspect of the action, the quantum of evidence is preponderance of evidence. [9] Under
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the said rules shall govern the procedure
to be observed in action, civil or criminal.
The prosecution presents its evidence not only to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt but also to prove the civil liability of the accused to the offended party.After the
prosecution has rested its case, the accused shall adduce its evidence not only on the criminal but

also on the civil aspect of the case. At the conclusion of the trial, the court should render judgment not
only on the criminal aspect of the case but also on the civil aspect thereof:
SEC. 2. Contents of the judgment. If the judgment is of conviction, it shall state (1) the legal
qualification of the offense constituted by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the participation of the accused in the
offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the penalty imposed upon
the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be
recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil
liability by a separate civil action has been reserved or waived.
In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely
failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In
either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist.[10]
The acquittal of the accused does not prevent a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the
case where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is
required; (b) where the court declared that the liability of the accused is only civil; (c) where the civil
liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was
acquitted. Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not
exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the civil aspect
of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it would place
the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party, the offended party or the accused or
both may appeal from the judgment on the civil aspect of the case within the period therefor.
After the prosecution has rested its case, the accused has the option either to (a) file a demurrer
to evidence with or without leave of court under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, or to (b) adduce his evidence unless he waives the same. The aforecited rule
reads:
Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the action
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the
opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or without leave of
court.
If the court denies the demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce
evidence in his defense. When the demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the accused
waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence
for the prosecution.
The motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state its grounds and shall
be filed within a non-extendible period of five (5) days after the prosecution rests its case. The
prosecution may oppose the motion within a non-extendible period of five (5) days from its receipt.
If leave of court is granted, the accused shall file the demurrer to evidence within a non-extendible
period of ten (10) days from notice. The prosecution may oppose the demurrer to evidence within a
similar period from its receipt.
The order denying the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence or the demurrer itself
shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before the judgment.
In criminal cases, the demurrer to evidence partakes of the nature of a motion to dismiss the case
for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In a case where the accused
files a demurrer to evidence without leave of court, he thereby waives his right to present evidence

and submits the case for decision on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution. On the other hand,
if the accused is granted leave to file a demurrer to evidence, he has the right to adduce evidence not
only on the criminal aspect but also on the civil aspect of the case if his demurrer is denied by the
court.
If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to
adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. If the trial court issues an order or
renders judgment not only granting the demurrer to evidence of the accused and acquitting him but
also on the civil liability of the accused to the private offended party, said judgment on the civil aspect
of the case would be a nullity for the reason that the constitutional right of the accused to due process
is thereby violated. As we held in Alonte v. Savellano, Jr.:[11]
Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution provides the fundamentals.
(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face
to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of
the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.
Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a) that
the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the
matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that
the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful
hearing.
The above constitutional and jurisprudentially postulates, by now elementary and deeply imbedded in
our own criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable. The principles find universal
acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that procedural due process
cannot possibly be met without a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry
and renders judgment only after trial.[12]
This is so because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, the accused has not yet
adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is
the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court should do is to issue an order or partial
judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused; and set the case for
continuation of trial for the petitioner to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case, and for the
private complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal after which the parties may adduce their
sur-rebuttal evidence as provided for in Section 11, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure:
Sec. 11. Order of trial. The trial shall proceed in the following order:
(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the proper case, the civil
liability.
(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense and damages, if any, arising from the
issuance of a provisional remedy in the case.
(c) The prosecution and the defense may, in that order, present rebuttal and sur-rebuttal evidence
unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permits them to present additional evidence bearing upon
the main issue.

(d) Upon admission of the evidence of the parties, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision
unless the court directs them to argue orally or to submit written memoranda.
(e) When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information but
interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified.
Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the case on the basis of the
evidence of the prosecution and the accused.
In this case, the petitioner was charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the
Revised Penal Code. The civil action arising from the delict was impliedly instituted since there was
no waiver by the private offended party of the civil liability nor a reservation of the civil action. Neither
did he file a civil action before the institution of the criminal action.
The petitioner was granted leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence. The court issued an
order granting the demurrer on its finding that the liability of the petitioner was not criminal but only
civil. However, the court rendered judgment on the civil aspect of the case and ordered the petitioner
to pay for her purchases from the private complainant even before the petitioner could adduce
evidence thereon. Patently, therefore, the petitioner was denied her right to due process.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated November
19, 2001 and January 14, 2002 are SET ASIDE AND NULLIFIED. The Regional Trial Court of
Legazpi City, Branch 5, is hereby DIRECTED to set Criminal Case No. 7474 for the continuation of
trial for the reception of the evidence-in-chief of the petitioner on the civil aspect of the case and for
the rebuttal evidence of the private complainant and the sur-rebuttal evidence of the parties if they opt
to adduce any.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 165732

December 14, 2006

SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY, INC., and ADMER PAJARILLO, petitioners,

vs.
LAURO TANGCO, VAL TANGCO, VERN LARRY TANGCO, VAN LAURO TANGCO, VON LARRIE
TANGCO, VIEN LARI TANGCO and VIVIEN LAURIZ TANGCO, respondent.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. (Safeguard)
and Admer Pajarillo (Pajarillo) assailing the Decision1 dated July 16, 2004 and the Resolution2 dated
October 20, 2004 issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 77462.
On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) went to Ecology Bank,
Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, toRENEW her time deposit per advise of the bank's cashier as she
would sign a specimen card. Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to
carry the same outside her residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside
the bank, and pulled out her firearm from her bag to deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly,
Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her
death.
Lauro Tangco, Evangeline's husband, together with his six minor children (respondents) filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo, docketed as
Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806 and assigned to Branch 78. Respondents reserved their right to file a
separate civil action in the said criminal case. The RTC of Quezon City subsequently convicted

Pajarillo of Homicide in its Decision dated January 19, 2000.3 On appeal to the CA, the RTC decision
was affirmed with modification as to the penalty in a Decision4dated July 31, 2000. Entry of Judgment
was made on August 25, 2001.
Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, a
complaint5 for damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard
for failing to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage committed by its
security guard. Respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
In their Answer,6 petitioners denied the material allegations in the complaint and alleged that
Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
Pajarillo; that Evangeline's death was not due to Pajarillo's negligence as the latter acted only in selfdefense. Petitioners set up a compulsory counterclaim for moral damages and attorney's fees.
Trial thereafter ensued. On January 10, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision, 7 the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, the heirs of Evangeline Tangco,
and against defendants Admer Pajarillo and Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. ordering said
defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the following:
1. ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS (P157,430.00),
as actual damages
2. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as death indemnity;
3. ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as moral damages;
4. THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00), as exemplary damages;
5. THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00), as attorney's fees; and
6. costs ofSUIT .
For lack of merit, defendants' counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 8
The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected Pajarillo's claim that he merely
acted in self-defense. It gave no credence to Pajarillo's bare claim that Evangeline was seen roaming
around the area prior to the shooting incident since Pajarillo had not made such report to the head
office and the police authorities. The RTC further ruled that being the guard on duty, the situation
demanded that he should have exercised proper prudence and necessary care by asking Evangeline
for him to ascertain the matter instead of shooting her instantly; that Pajarillo had already been
convicted of Homicide in Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806; and that he also failed to proffer proof
negating liability in the instant case.
The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and severally liable with Pajarillo.
It ruled that while it may be conceded that Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the selection of
its employees, particularly of Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the supervision of its employee; that
Safeguard's evidence simply showed that it required its guards to attend trainings and seminars
which is not the supervision contemplated under the law; that supervision includes not only the
issuance of regulations and instructions designed for the protection of persons and property, for the
guidance of their servants and employees, but also the duty to see to it that such regulations and
instructions are faithfully complied with.

Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On July 16, 2004, the CA issued its assailed
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the
modification that Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.'s civil liability in this case is only subsidiary under
Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code. No pronouncement as to costs. 9
In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held that the applicable provisions are not
Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, on quasi-delicts, but the provisions on civil
liability arising from felonies under the Revised Penal Code; that since Pajarillo had been found guilty
of Homicide in a final and executory judgment and is said to be serving sentence in Muntinlupa, he
must be adjudged civilly liable under the provisions of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code since
the civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent upon conviction, because
said liability arises from the offense charged and no other; that this is also the civil liability that is
deemed extinguished with the extinction of the penal liability with a pronouncement that the fact from
which the civil action might proceed does not exist; that unlike in civil liability arising from quasi-delict,
the defense of diligence of a good father of a family in the employment and supervision of employees
is inapplicable and irrelevant in civil liabilities based on crimes or ex-delicto; that Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that the liability of an employer for the civil liability of their employees is
only subsidiary, not joint or solidary.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied in a Resolution dated October
20, 2004.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari with the following assignment of errors, to wit:
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding petitioner Pajarillo liable to respondents for
the payment of damages and other money claims.
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred when it applied Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code
in holding petitioner Safeguard solidarily [sic] liable with petitioner Pajarillo for the payment of
damages and other money claims.
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing to find that petitioner Safeguard Security
Agency, Inc. exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, hence, should
be excused from any liability.10
The issues for resolution are whether (1) Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline; and
(2) Safeguard should be held solidarily liable for the damages awarded to respondents.
Safeguard insists that the claim for damages by respondents is based on culpa aquiliana under
Article 217611 of the Civil Code, in which case, its liability is jointly and severally with Pajarillo.
However, since it has established that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision
of Pajarillo, it should be exonerated from civil liability.
We will first resolve whether the CA correctly held that respondents, in filing a separate civil action
against petitioners are limited to the recovery of damages arising from a crime or delict, in which case
the liability of Safeguard as employer under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code 12 is
subsidiary and the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employee is not
available to it.
The CA erred in ruling that the liability of Safeguard is only subsidiary.
The law at the time the complaint for damages was filed is Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, to wit:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under
Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or
omission of the accused.
Respondents reserved the right to file a separate civil action and in fact filed the same on January 14,
1998.
The CA found that the source of damages in the instant case must be the crime of homicide, for
which he had already been found guilty of and serving sentence thereof, thus must be governed by
the Revised Penal Code.
We do not agree.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part
of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2)
independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a
felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code,
intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from
the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be enforced
against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes.13
It is important to determine the nature of respondents' cause of action. The nature of a cause of
action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action. 14 The
purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party
filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and
prayer for relief.15
The pertinent portions of the complaint read:
7. That Defendant Admer A. Pajarillo was the guard assigned and posted in the Ecology Bank
Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, who was employed and under employment of Safeguard Security
Agency, Inc. hence there is employer-employee relationship between co-defendants.
The Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. failed to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage to herein plaintiffs.
8. That defendant Admer Pajarillo upon seeing Evangeline Tangco, who brought her firearm out of
her bag, suddenly without exercising necessary caution/care, and in idiotic manner, with the use of
his shotgun, fired and burst bullets upon Evangeline M. Tangco, killing her instantly. x x x
xxxx
16. That defendants, being employer and the employee are jointly and severally liable for the death of
Evangeline M. Tangco.16
Thus, a reading of respondents' complaint shows that the latter are invoking their right to recover
damages against Safeguard for their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Pajarillo's act of
shooting and killing Evangeline under Article 2176, Civil Code which provides:

ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of
this Chapter.
The scope of Article 2176 is not limited to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. In Dulay v.
Court of Appeals,17 we held:
x x x Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not only acts committed with
negligence, but also acts which are voluntary and intentional. As far back as the definitive case of
Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held that:
"x x x Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not
punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or
not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be
entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two
cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111,
refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
liability for the same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even
by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana
includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law." (Emphasis supplied)
The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the criminal liability of Pajarillo in the
criminal case but one based on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict which is separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from crime.18 The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in the civil case is
a quasi-delict not an act or omission punishable by law.
In Bermudez v. Melencio-Herrera,19 where the issue involved was whether the civil action filed by
plaintiff-appellants is founded on crime or on quasi-delict, we held:
x x x The trial court treated the case as an action based on a crime in view of the reservation made by
the offended party in the criminal case (Criminal Case No. 92944), also pending before the court, to
file a separate civil action. Said the trial court:
It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this action on the assumption that defendant Pontino's
negligence in the accident of May 10, 1969 constituted a quasi-delict. The Court cannot accept the
validity of that assumption. In Criminal Case No. 92944 of this Court, plaintiffs had already appeared
as complainants. While that case was pending, the offended parties reserved the right to institute a
separate civil action. If, in a criminal case, the right to file a separate civil action for damages is
reserved, such civil action is to be based on crime and not on tort. That was the ruling in Joaquin vs.
Aniceto, L-18719, Oct. 31, 1964.
We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by the trial court is inapplicable to the instant case x x
x.
xxxx
In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action to enforce the
civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasidelict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may hold the
employer solidarily liable for the negligent act of his employee, subject to the employer's defense of
exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family.

In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action for damages based on quasi-delict. The
fact that appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to file an independent civil action
did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict.20 (Emphasis supplied)
Although the judgment in the criminal case finding Pajarillo guilty of Homicide is already final and
executory, such judgment has no relevance or importance to this case. 21 It would have been entirely
different if respondents' cause of action was for damages arising from a delict, in which case the CA
is correct in finding Safeguard to be only subsidiary liable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised
Penal Code.22
As clearly shown by the allegations in the complaint, respondents' cause of action is based on quasidelict. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, when the injury is caused by the negligence of the
employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the
master or the employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in the supervision over
him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate.
Therefore, it is incumbent upon petitioners to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
We must first resolve the issue of whether Pajarillo was negligent in shooting Evangeline.
The issue of negligence is factual in nature. Whether a person is negligent or not is a question of fact,
which, as a general rule, we cannot pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari, as our jurisdiction
is limited to reviewing errors of law.23 Generally, factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the CA,
are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. The established exceptions are: (1)
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse
of discretion; (3) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures;
(4) when the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact
are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of fact are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (8) when the CA manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would
justify a different conclusion; and (9) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence
of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. [24]
A thorough review of the records of the case fails to show any cogent reason for us to deviate from
the factual finding of the trial court and affirmed by the CA that petitioner Pajarillo was guilty of
negligence in shooting Evangeline.
Respondents' evidence established that Evangeline's purpose in going to the bank was to renew her
time deposit.25 On the other hand, Pajarillo claims that Evangeline drew a gun from her bag and
aimed the same at him, thus, acting instinctively, he shot her in self-defense.
Pajarillo testified that when Evangeline aimed the gun at him at a distance of about one meter or one
arm's length26 he stepped backward, loaded the chamber of his gun and shot her.27 It is however
unimaginable that petitioner Pajarillo could still make such movements if indeed the gun was already
pointed at him. Any movement could have prompted Evangeline to pull the trigger to shoot him.
Petitioner Pajarillo would like to justify his action in shooting Evangeline on his mere apprehension
that Evangeline will stage a bank robbery. However, such claim is befuddled by his own testimony.
Pajarillo testified that prior to the incident, he saw Evangeline roaming under the fly over which was
about 10 meters away from the bank28 and saw her talking to a man thereat;29 that she left the man
under the fly-over, crossed the street and approached the bank. However, except for the bare
testimony of Pajarillo, the records do not show that indeed Evangeline was seen roaming near the
vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously prior to the shooting incident. In fact, there is no evidence
that Pajarillo called the attention of his head guard or the bank's branch manager regarding his
concerns or that he reported the same to the police authorities whose outpost is just about 15 meters
from the bank.

Moreover, if Evangeline was already roaming the vicinity of the bank, she could have already
apprised herself that Pajarillo, who was posted outside the bank, was armed with a shotgun; that
there were two guards inside the bank30 manning the entrance door. Thus, it is quite incredible that if
she really had a companion, she would leave him under the fly-over which is 10 meters far from the
bank and stage a bank robbery all by herself without a back-up. In fact, she would have known, after
surveying the area, that aiming her gun at Pajarillo would not ensure entrance to the bank as there
were guards manning the entrance door.
Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be
credible in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its
conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to
the miraculous and is outside judicial cognizance.31
That Evangeline just wanted to deposit her gun before entering the bank and was actually in the act
of pulling her gun from her bag when petitioner Pajarillo recklessly shot her, finds support from the
contentions raised in petitioners' petition for review where they argued that when Evangeline
approached the bank, she was seen pulling a gun from inside her bag and petitioner Pajarillo who
was suddenly beset by fear and perceived the act as a dangerous threat, shot and killed the
deceased out of pure instinct;32 that the act of drawing a gun is a threatening act, regardless of
whether or not the gun was intended to be used against petitioner Pajarillo; 33 that the fear that was
created in the mind of petitioner Pajarillo as he saw Evangeline Tangco drawing a gun from her purse
was suddenly very real and the former merely reacted out of pure self-preservation.34
Considering that unlawful aggression on the part of Evangeline is absent, Pajarillo's claim of selfdefense cannot be accepted specially when such claim was uncorroborated by any separate
competent evidence other than his testimony which was even doubtful. Pajarillo's apprehension that
Evangeline will shoot him to stage a bank robbery has no basis at all. It is therefore clear that the
alleged threat of bank robbery was just a figment of Pajarillo's imagination which caused such
unfounded unlawful aggression on his part.
Petitioners argue that Evangeline was guilty of contributory negligence. Although she was a licensed
firearm holder, she had no business bringing the gun in such establishment where people would react
instinctively upon seeing the gun; that had Evangeline been prudent, she could have warned Pajarillo
before drawing the gun and did not conduct herself with suspicion by roaming outside the vicinity of
the bank; that she should not have held the gun with the nozzle pointed at Pajarillo who mistook the
act as hold up or robbery.
We are not persuaded.
As we have earlier held, Pajarillo failed to substantiate his claim that Evangeline was seen roaming
outside the vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously prior to the shooting incident. Evangeline's
death was merely due to Pajarillo's negligence in shooting her on his imagined threat that Evangeline
will rob the bank.
Safeguard contends that it cannot be jointly held liable since it had adequately shown that it had
exercised the diligence required in the selection and supervision of its employees. It claims that it had
required the guards to undergo the necessary training and to submit the requisite qualifications and
credentials which even the RTC found to have been complied with; that the RTC erroneously found
that it did not exercise the diligence required in the supervision of its employee. Safeguard further
claims that it conducts monitoring of the activities of its personnel, wherein supervisors are assigned
to routinely check the activities of the security guards which include among others, whether or not
they are in their proper post and with proper equipment, as well as regular evaluations of the
employees' performances; that the fact that Pajarillo loaded his firearm contrary to Safeguard's
operating procedure is not sufficient basis to say that Safeguard had failed its duty of proper
supervision; that it was likewise error to say that Safeguard was negligent in seeing to it that the
procedures and policies were not properly implemented by reason of one unfortunate event.

We are not convinced.

Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting
within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and solidarily liable for the quasi-delict committed
by the former. Safeguard is presumed to be negligent in the selection and supervision of his
employee by operation of law. This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that
the employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the
supervision of its employee.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their
qualifications, experience, and service records.35 On the other hand, due diligence in the supervision
of employees includes the formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees
and the issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and persons with
whom the employer has relations through his or its employees and the imposition of necessary
disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the
performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. To this, we add
that actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the
constant concern of the employer, acting through dependable supervisors who should regularly report
on their supervisory functions.36 To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious
liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
We agree with the RTC's finding that Safeguard had exercised the diligence in the selection of
Pajarillo since the record shows that Pajarillo underwent a psychological and neuro-psychiatric
evaluation conducted by the St. Martin de Porres Center where no psychoses ideations were noted,
submitted a certification on the Pre-licensing training course for security guards, as well as police and
NBI clearances.
The RTC did not err in ruling that Safeguard fell short of the diligence required in the supervision of its
employee, particularly Pajarillo. In this case, while Safeguard presented Capt. James Camero, its
Director for Operations, who testified on the issuance of company rules and regulations, such as the
Guidelines of Guards Who Will Be Assigned To Banks,37 Weapons Training,38 Safeguard Training
Center Marksmanship Training Lesson Plan,39Disciplinary/Corrective Sanctions,40 it had also been
established during Camero's cross-examination that Pajarillo was not aware of such rules and
regulations.41 Notwithstanding Camero's clarification on his re-direct examination that these company
rules and regulations are lesson plans as a basis of guidelines of the instructors during classroom
instructions and not necessary to give students copy of the same, 42 the records do not show that
Pajarillo had attended such classroom instructions.
The records also failed to show that there was adequate training and continuous evaluation of the
security guard's performance. Pajarillo had only attended an in-service training on March 1, 1997
conducted by Toyota Sta. Rosa, his first assignment as security guard of Safeguard, which was in

collaboration with Safeguard. It was established that the concept of such training was purely on
security of equipments to be guarded and protection of the life of the employees.43
It had not been established that after Pajarillo's training in Toyota, Safeguard had ever conducted
further training of Pajarillo when he was later assigned to guard a bank which has a different nature of
business with that of Toyota. In fact, Pajarillo testified that being on duty in a bank is different from
being on duty in a factory since a bank is a very sensitive area.44
Moreover, considering his reactions to Evangeline's act of just depositing her firearm for
safekeeping, i.e., of immediately shooting her, confirms that there was no training or seminar given on
how to handle bank clients and on human psychology.
Furthermore, while Safeguard would like to show that there were inspectors who go around the bank
two times a day to see the daily performance of the security guards assigned therein, there was no
record ever presented of such daily inspections. In fact, if there was really such inspection made, the
alleged suspicious act of Evangeline could have been taken noticed and reported.
Turning now to the award of damages, we find that the award of actual damages in the
amount P157,430.00 which were the expenses incurred by respondents in connection with the burial
of Evangeline were supported by receipts. The award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of
Evangeline is likewise in order.
As to the award of moral damages, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the spouse, legitimate
children and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages
for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased. Moral damages are awarded to enable
the injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral
suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable action. Its award is aimed at
restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; thus it must be proportionate to the
suffering inflicted.45 The intensity of the pain experienced by the relatives of the victim is proportionate
to the intensity of affection for him and bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the
offender.46
In this case, respondents testified as to their moral suffering caused by Evangeline's death was so
sudden causing respondent Lauro to lose a wife and a mother to six children who were all minors at
the time of her death. In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,47 we awarded one million pesos as moral
damages to the heirs of a seventeen-year-old girl who was murdered. In Metro Manila Transit
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,48 we likewise awarded the amount of one million pesos as moral
damages to the parents of a third year high school student and who was also their youngest child
who died in a vehicular accident since the girl's death left a void in their lives. Hence, we hold that the
respondents are also entitled to the amount of one million pesos as Evangeline's death left a void in
the lives of her husband and minor children as they were deprived of her love and care by her
untimely demise.
We likewise uphold the award of exemplary damages in the amount of P300,000.00. Under Article
2229 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. 49 It is awarded as
a deterrent to socially deleterious actions. In quasi-delict, exemplary damages may be granted if the
defendant acted with gross negligence.50
Pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney's fees may be recovered when, as in the instant
case, exemplary damages are awarded. Hence, we affirm the award of attorney's fees in the amount
of P30,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated July 16, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the civil liability of petitioner Safeguard Security
Agency, Inc. is SOLIDARY and PRIMARY under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. L-59551. August 19, 1986.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MANUEL NAVOA y MARTINEZ and
BERNARDO LIM y RAMIREZ alias "Jack Robertson," alias "Lim Ming Tak," alias "Christopher
Kelly," defendants-appellants.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Dakila F. Castro for defendant-appellant M. Navoa.
Divina S. Cuejillo for defendant-appellant B. Lim.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION; REQUISITE FOR ITS

VALIDITY; MUST PROCEED FROM THE FREE WILL OF THE PERSON CONFESSING. Even
before the adoption of the "right to counsel" rule for custodial interrogations in Article IV,SECTION
20 of the 1973 Constitution, this Court had already ruled that to be valid, a confession must be
shown to have proceeded from the free will of the person confessing. Thus, in People v. Bagasala (39
SCRA 236), we stated that "where the confession is involuntary, being due to maltreatment, or
induced by fear or intimidation, there is a violation of this constitutional provision. Any form of
coercion, whether physical, mental or emotional thus stamps it with inadmissibility. What is essential
for its validity is that is proceeds from the free will of the person confessing." The test of free will does
not require a showing of force or intimidation. On November 23, 1976, this Court ruled: "The
constitutional inquiry is not whether the conduct of the police officers in obtaining the confession was
shocking, but whether the confession was free and voluntary; that is, it must not be extracted by any
sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, nor by the exertion of
improper influence. (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 364). It has been recognized that `coercion can be
mental as well as physical, and that the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark on an
unconstitutional inquisition. (Blackburn v. Albama, 361 U.S. 199, 206, 4 L. Ed. 2d, 242)."cralaw
virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; PHYSICAL EXAMINATION OF DECLARANTS BY INDEPENDENT AND QUALIFIED

DOCTORS BEFORE ADMINISTERING OATH, NECESSARY. The trial court stated that no results
of medical examinations indicating torture were presented in evidence by the accused. Noteworthy is
our pronouncement in People v. Cabrera (134 SCRA 362) with respect to the taking of extra-judicial
confessions: `. . . [W]e reiterate the reminder to Judges and Fiscals before whom declarants are
brought for swearing to the truth of their statements to adopt the practice of having the confessants
physically and thoroughly examined by independent and qualified doctors before administering the
oath, even if it is not requested by the accused.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; IN THE ABSENCE OF PHYSICIANS, JUDGES OR FISCALS SHOULD EXAMINE
DECLARANTS THEMSELVES REASON FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION. People v. Cabrera,
supra: "If physicians are not available then they should themselves examine the bodies of the
declarants for signs of possible violence. This would not only deter attempts to secure confessions
through violence but would also preclude future controversies on whether the statements were
obtained through torture or not, which only delay criminal trials. (People v. Castro, 11 SCRA 699
[1964]; People v. Francisco, 74 SCRA 159 [1976])."cralaw virtua1aw library
4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; WAIVER OF RIGHT TO SILENCE AND TO
COUNSEL; REQUISITE. The written waiver of appellant Navoa purportedly waiving his
constitutional right to silence and to counsel should have been excluded by the trial court. In a case
decided last May 31, 1982, we stated that a defendant may waive effectuation of his right to remain
silent and to be assisted by counsel at a custodial police interrogation provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently (People v. Royo, 114 SCRA 304).
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; LACKING IN THE CASE AT BAR. In the case at bar, there was no such
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver. Exhibit "O" is so pat and aptly worded, so contrived as to
be exactlySUITED to meet legal objections that it could have been prepared only by a veteran
police investigator and not by an ordinary layman like appellant Manuel Navoa. Manuel Navoa is not
well versed in the niceties of the law and is without any experience whatsoever in criminal
investigations. Indeed there is persuasive merit in his submission that he only copied the waiver
under threat of a gun from a prepared text written by one of the police investigators. When Navoa
waived his right to counsel and executed the extra-judicial confession, he was alone in the company
of the police interrogators, deprived of outside support. This court is far from satisfied that the waiver
of counsel and the subsequent confession were indeed products of Navoas free will.
6. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY; PICTURES TAKEN DURING REENACTMENT; REQUISITES BEFORE BEING GIVEN EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT; IF ABSENT,
SHOULD BE EXCLUDED. Apart from the extra-judicial confessions, the trial court also relied on
the pictures taken during the re-enactment of the crime by appellant Navoa. In People v. Buscato (74
SCRA 30) this Court sustained the submission of the Acting Solicitor General that for a re-enactment
to be given evidentiary weight, the validity and efficacy of the confession must first be shown. Such a
showing is absent in this case. These pictures, therefore, should have been likewise excluded by the
trial court because they were based on the inadmissible extra-judicial confession of defendantappellant Navoa (People v. Alcaraz, 136 SCRA 74).
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROSECUTION MUST RELY ON THE STRENGTH OF ITS EVIDENCE AND NOT
ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE DEFENSE; PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT NOT
ESTABLISHED. With the exclusion of appellant Navoas written waiver of his constitutional rights
his extra-judicial confession and the pictures taken during the re-enactment of the crime the record is
bereft of any other evidence which could support a judgment of conviction. No eyewitnesses who saw
Navoa at the vicinity of the scene of the crime was ever presented. The prosecution failed to prove
the guilt of Navoa beyond reasonable doubt. While it is true that appellant Navoa put up only the
defense of denial, this defense went far enough to give rise to a reasonable doubt of his guilt.
Consequently, Navoa has to be acquitted if only to give meaning to the time honored principle that
the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of the
defense.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an automatic review of the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Sixth Judicial
District, Branch XXX convicting defendants-appellants Manuel Navoa and Bernardo Lim of the crime
of Arson. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds both accused Manuel Navoa y Martinez and Bernardo Lim y
Ramirez, also known as Jack Robertson, Lim Ming Tak and Christopher Kelly, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of arson, as charged in the information, and hereby sentences them to suffer the
penalty of death, to indemnify, jointly and severally, the building and theater owners, N. de la Merced
& Sons, Inc. and Universal Management Corporation, in the total amount of P774,550.29, and to pay
the costs."cralaw virtua1aw library
In an information dated June 29, 1979, defendants-appellants Manuel Navoa and Bernardo Lim were
charged with the crime of arson as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The undersigned accused MANUEL NAVOA y MARTINEZ and BERNARDO LIM y RAMIREZ, alias
`Jack Robertson alias `Lim Ming Tak, alias `Christopher Kelly of the offense of Violation of Article
320, paragraph 4, in relation to Article 326-A, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, (ARSON)
committed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about July 9, 1978, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating together with others whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still
unknown, and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
deliberately, with the use of gasoline, set fire to and burn the MANILA CINEMA BUILDING, a
commercial building where commodities of value were kept and which housed the Manila Cinema 1
and 2 Theatres, among others, located at the corner of Claro M. Recto Avenue and N. Reyes, Sr.,
St., this City, owned by the N. de la MERCED & SONS, INC., and which building was near and
adjacent to other commercial buildings thereat, and therefore was a populated place, thereby causing
as a consequence the said MANILA CINEMA BUILDING to be totally destroyed and burned, thus
inflicting damage and destructions to the said building and its contents amounting to six (6) million
pesos, to the damage and prejudice of the said owner thereof in the same sum of six (6) million
pesos, Philippine currency; that as a further result thereof, the hereunder named persons sustained
fatal injuries which were the direct cause of their death immediately thereafter:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Elmer Red Rebadavia, Lot 15, Blk. 86 Velvet St., SSS Village, Marikina, Rizal
"2. Remedios C. Gayo, 204 Manila Times Village, Pamplona, Rizal
"3. Gina Estela Montiel, 1709-B M. Hizon St., Sta. Cruz, Manila
"4. Ricardo Acordon, 142 Binangonan St., Maypajo, Caloocan City
"5. Alex Ibasco y Saldivar, 1659 Kundiman St., Sampaloc, Manila
"6. Elmer Guidilla, 19 Examiner St., Bo. West Triangle, Quezon City
"7. Magdalena Aparis Beares, 1444 4th St., Fabie Estate, Paco, Manila
"8. Nenita Cuyugan, 255-E dela Paz Sto. Nio, Marikina, Metro-Manila
"9. Leovegildo D. Vicedo, 1164 E. San Andres, Malate, Manila

"10. George M. Riego, Buenmar Subdivision, Mangahan, Pasig, Metro-Manila

"11. one (1) unidentified female of about 20 years old "12. and three (3) others unknown/unidentified
persons."cralaw virtua1aw library
On July 9, 1978, at about 2:30 and 3:30 oclock in the afternoon, the Manila Cinema Building housing
the Manila Cinema 1 and 2 theaters located at the corner of Claro M. Recto Avenue and Nicanor
Reyes, Sr., Streets, Manila was burned, causing damage and destruction to the said building. In
addition, fourteen (14) persons died in the fire, eleven of whom were identified. All died because of
asphyxia due to suffocation (Exhs. "B", "B-1," "B-2", "B-3", "C", "C-1," "C-2," "D," "D-1," "D-2," "E", "E1," "E-2," "F," "F-1," "F-2," "G," "G-1," "G-2," "H," "H-1," "H-2," "I," "I-1," "I-2," "J," "J-1," "J-2," "K," "K1," "K-2," "L," "L-1," "L-2," "M," "M-1" and "M-2").
N. de la Merced & Sons, the owner of the Manila Cinema Building, and Universal Management
Corporation, the owner of Manila Cinema 1 and 2 paid a total of P514,068.29 as indemnification to
heirs of the deceased to defray their funeral and hospitalization expenses and to those who survived
the fire, of which P244,541.80 was reimbursed by the insurer, Filipino Merchants Insurance Co.
(Exhs. "U-1" to "U-2"). Damage to the building was estimated at P4,160,750.00 of which only
P3,109,693,89 was paid by the insurer (Exhs. "S," "S-1" and "T").
On June 29, 1979, Defendant-Appellant Bernardo Lim alias "Jack Robertson," alias Christopher
Kelly," alias "Lim Ming Tak," acting as an alleged informer of Police Corporal Vicente Palmon and his
fellow arson operatives, informed the latter that it was Manuel Navoa who was responsible for the fire
that destroyed Manila Cinema 1 and 2.
Relying solely on the credibility of Bernardo Lim and without first securing a warrant of arrest,
Corporals Palmon and Harrison Tolosa arrested appellant Manuel Navoa. At the police headquarters,
appellant Navoa allegedly executed statements waiving his constitutional rights to silence and to
counsel (Exh. "O") and giving an extra-judicial confession (Exhs. "A," "A-1" to "A-9"). Both waiver and
extra-judicial confession were subscribed and sworn to before Inquest Fiscal Zeus Abrogas.
Earlier, on that same day, appellant Bernardo Lim likewise executed a waiver of his constitutional
rights to silence and to counsel (Exhs. "P" and "Q") and also gave an extra-judicial confession (Exhs.
"R," "R-1" to "R-10").
On June 24, 1979, appellant Manuel Navoa made a reenactment of how the theaters were set on fire
during which, pictures were taken at various stages (Exhs. "N," "N-1" to "N-14").
Both defendants-appellants pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.
The testimony of appellant Bernardo Lim was summarized by the trial court as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . It was at 8:45 oclock in the morning of June 22, 1979, that he was arrested by Corporal Palmon
and brought to the police headquarters where upon instruction by a police investigator whom he only
knew as Lito, he wrote in his own hand what purports to be a waiver of his constitutional rights
(Exhibit P) and affixed his signature to what appears to be his statement naming and identifying his
co-accused Navoa as the one who had set ablaze the two theaters in question and made the
corrections therein (Exhibits R, R-1 to R-10) after being maltreated, dealt countless fist blows on the
chest, tortured and threatened by said police investigator, which statement (Exhibits R, R-1 to R-10)
was but prepared by Corporal Palmon without his participation. Told earlier that it was his right to be
assisted by counsel, he said he needed none because anyway he was going to give his statement
voluntarily."cralaw virtua1aw library
On the other hand, appellant Manuel Navoas testimony is summarized as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . Between 7:00 and 7:15 oclock in the morning of June 22, 1979, at the junction of Jose Abad
Santos and Rizal Avenue Extension, as he was walking to take a ride to go to school, he was
accosted by three police officers. Corporal Palmon poking a gun at him and Corporal Tolosa twisting
his arm and handcuffing his two hands, they shoved him into a waiting jeep where a Chinese looking
man was riding in. Taken to the police headquarters at United Nations Avenue in Manila, upon arrival
he was first brought to the fingerprint section where after his handcuffs were removed he was made
to fill up a form containing his personal data. After being fingerprinted, Corporal Palmon brought him
to his office at the second floor of the building where upon being met by Corporal Tolosa he was
divested of his bag containing books, notebooks, pencils, ball pens, school identification card and
drivers license with P200 in cash kept inside his jacket. Except for the cash money, all were returned
to him. Told by Corporal Palmon that he was responsible for the burning of the two theaters, he
denied having anything to do with it, whereupon Corporal Tolosa told Corporal Palmon, `Just leave it
to me. It is not true that he was informed of his constitutional rights to silence and to counsel. In fact
they did not even allow him to get in touch with his relatives. For, when he tried to reach the
telephone, Corporal Tolosa told him, `Just try holding the phone and I will shoot you, as he pointed a
gun at him. Frightened, he did not attempt again to use the telephone. About the waiver, Exhibit 0,
Corporal Tolosas companion wrote it on a piece of paper. After giving to Corporal Tolosa, it was
given to him. With a ball pen handed to him, Corporal Tolosa told him to copy it on a typewriting
paper, a gun being pointed by Corporal Tolosa on his right cheek. Frightened, he did as ordered.
After that, Corporal Tolosa and his companion typed the statement (Exhibits A, A-1 to A-9). Except
the portion beginning from his name on the first page (Exhibit A) until question and answer No. 17 on
the third page (Exhibit A-2) everything on it is not true. After typing the statement, Corporal Tolosa
disapproved of some words used and ordered him to make the corrections. When he told him that he
needed the assistance of a lawyer, Corporal Tolosa ordered him to follow what he was told to do,
otherwise he would get hurt or killed. Because of that he obeyed and made the corrections appearing
on the fourth, seventh and tenth pages (Exhibits A-1, A-7 and A-9). Afterwards Corporal Tolosa
ordered him to sign the statement, otherwise he would be tortured. Frightened, he did as he was told.
Nothing was given him for lunch. And it was only in the morning of the next day, June 23, 1979, that
he was given food while at the Theft and Robbery Section. When told by him that it was Kelly
(accused Lim) alone who was responsible for having him arrested upon a false complaint, Corporal
Tolosa boxed him twice on the chest. He never admitted anything to Corporal Palmon. But aside from
what Corporal Tolosa did to him, Patrolman Julito Andales struck twice with his open palms his two
ears, boxed him thrice on the chest and several times on the stomach and tied a piece of wire around
his neck that he tightened and loosened slowly while he was at the Arson Section, being forced to
give answers to the questions that would tally with his police report, such as the fact that it was not
gasoline but a chemical that was used to burn the theaters, and that he was the one responsible for
the burning of Delta Theater and Roman Cinerama and the fire in Tambunting and other places in
Metro Manila. When first brought to the police headquarters, Corporal Palmon threatened to kill him,
asking Corporal Tolosa if they should kill him. Then Corporal Palmon warned him that if he would not
admit guilt to Corporal Tolosa he would return to kill him. Before being brought to the inquest fiscal,
Corporal Tolosa told him to answer that what appears in his statement is his signature and that he
was not tortured at all, if asked by the fiscal. About the alleged re-enactment in the pictures, Exhibits
N, N-1 to N-14, he was but ordered by Corporal Tolosa and Patrolman Andales to pose for them
while they were being taken. It was only in the morning of June 23, 1979, that his parents and
relatives came. To them he revealed the threat he received and the torture he suffered from the
police officers. A request was made by his mother to General James Barbers to have him undergo
psychiatric examination so that he could also be physically examined by a doctor (Exhibit 3). It was in
August 1976 at the Jai Alai that he came to know the accused Lim for the first time. Since then he
used to extort money from him, P20, P30, P50, while in the company of people carrying guns. In
March 1979, the accused Lim asked for P50,000 from him. Told that he could not give him that much,
the accused Lim threatened to kidnap his younger sister and report him to the Philippine
Constabulary as the one responsible for the murders, rapes, hold-ups and burnings in Metro Manila.
But because of the threat that his parents and the members of his family would be killed one by one,
his parents did not report it to the police authorities when he told them about it.
"Teresita Gutierrez, Edgardo Silva, Cristina de la Cruz and Glory Rabbon, Accused Navoas teachers
at Gregorio Araneta University in Malabon, Metro Manila, swore to his presence in his classes on

June 15, 16, 17 and 19 and July 8 and 10, 1978, as evidenced by their class records (Exhibits 1 & 2Navoa)."cralaw virtua1aw library
Solely on the basis of the extra-judicial confessions of both defendants-appellants (Exhibits "A," "A-1"
to "A-10," "R," "R-1" to "R-10"), the trial court rendered the appealed judgment of conviction.
Appellant Bernardo Lim now assigns the following errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The lower court erred in:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I

CONVICTING APPELLANT BERNARDO LIM y RAMIREZ ON THE BASIS MERELY OF THE

ALLEGED EXTRA-JUDICIAL CONFESSION (EXHIBITS "R" TO "R-10") OF THE SAME IN
VIOLATION OF SECTION 20 ARTICLE IV OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION.
II

CONVICTING APPELLANT BERNARDO LIM Y RAMIREZ WITH THE CAPITAL PUNISHMENT OF

DEATH WITHOUT PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III

NOT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE ARREST OF APPELLANT BERNARDO LIM y RAMIREZ
WITHOUT ANY WARRANT AFTER ONE YEAR FROM THE OCCURRENCE OF THE INCIDENT
SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS APPEAL.
IV

DISREGARDING THE ALIBI OF APPELLANT BERNARDO LIM y RAMIREZ EVEN IF THERE WAS
NO POSITIVE AND PROPER IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED BY WITNESSES OF THE
PROSECUTION.
V

FAILING TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE FIRE WAS THE RESULT OF AN ARSON OR
AN ACCIDENT.
On the other hand, appellant Manuel Navoa faults the trial court with the following errors:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT MANUEL NAVOA
WAS ILLEGALLY AND ARBITRARILY ARRESTED ON JUNE 22, 1979.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE ALLEGED WAIVER (EXH. "O") OF ACCUSEDAPPELLANT MANUEL NAVOA WHICH WAS TAKEN BY MEANS OF VIOLENCE, FORCE, THREAT
AND INTIMIDATION.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE ALLEGED EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION

(EXHS. "A," "A-1" TO "A-9") OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT MANUEL NAVOA WHICH WAS TAKEN IN
VIOLATION OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION.
FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE ALLEGED EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION
(EXHS. "A," "A-1" to "A-9") OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT MANUEL NAVOA WHICH WAS TAKEN BY
MEANS OF VIOLENCE, FORCE, THREAT AND INTIMIDATION.
FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ALIBI SET BY ACCUSED-APPELLANT
MANUEL NAVOA CANNOT STAND ON THE WAY OF CONVICTION FOR THE OFFENSE
CHARGED. SIXTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR.
SIXTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE TESTIMONIES OF THE WITNESSES FOR
ACCUSED-APPELLANT MANUEL NAVOA WHICH CONTRADICTED CERTAIN INCRIMINATORY
STATEMENTS IN THE ALLEGED EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION (EXHS. "A", "A-1" TO "A-9").
SEVENTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE POLICE
INVESTIGATORS DESPITE THEIR INHERENT INCREDIBILITIES, IRRECONCILABLE
INCONSISTENCIES AND PATENT PARTIALITY.
EIGHTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE ALLEGED EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION
(EXHS. "R," "R-1" to "R-10") OF CO-ACCUSED BERNARDO LIM AS EVIDENCE AGAINST
ACCUSED-APPELLANT MANUEL NAVOA.
NINTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT MANUEL NAVOA ON
THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.
The main thrust of the defendants-appellants arguments on appeal is that they were not afforded the
opportunity to avail of their rights under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution; that there was
no intelligent waiver of their rights, and as such, their extra-judicial confessions are inadmissible
against them.
The records show that the extra-judicial confessions of the accused formed the only basis for the
judgment of conviction. The confessions were taken without the assistance of any counsel for the
accused. The confessions were preceded by waivers of the right to counsel. Manuel Navoa stated
that he did not need the assistance of a lawyer or anybody else because he wanted to tell the truth
about his participation in the crime. To augment the waiver which formed the first part of his
typewritten confession, he also executed a short waiver in his own handwriting. Accused Bernardo
Lim did likewise.
During the trial, Accused Navoa repudiated the waivers and the confessions. He testified that the
police investigators employed force and intimidation, including outright torture to secure his
confession. However, the trial court did not believe that the accused were "forced, threatened,
intimidated, and tortured into executing their respective extra-judicial statements." It found no reason

why the police officers should resort to torture "if only to have them (the accused) falsely charged and
unjustly convicted of the serious crime of arson for which the penalty is death, fourteen people having
perished in the fire that had been set ablaze." The court found the confessions replete with details; no
complaints were filed against the police officers; and no doctors examined the accused for the alleged
injuries.
On the basis of the above findings, Accused Navoa and Lim were each sentenced to DEATH and
ordered to pay P774,550.29 in indemnifications.
We first pass upon the question of whether or not the extra-judicial confessions were voluntary.
Even before the adoption of the "right to counsel" rule for custodial interrogations in Article IV, Section
20 of the 1973 Constitution, this Court had already ruled that to be valid, a confession must be shown
to have proceeded from the free will of the person confessing.
Thus, in People v. Bagasala (39 SCRA 236), we stated that "where the confession is involuntary,
being due to maltreatment, or induced by fear or intimidation, there is a violation of this constitutional
provision. Any form of coercion, whether physical, mental or emotional thus stamps it with
inadmissibility. What is essential for its validity is that it proceeds from the free will of the person
confessing."cralaw virtua1aw library
The test of free will does not require a showing of force or intimidation. On November 23, 1976, this
Court ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The constitutional inquiry is not whether the conduct of the police officers in obtaining the confession
was shocking, but whether the confession was free and voluntary; that is, it must not be extracted by
any sort of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or implied promises, nor by the exertion of
improper influence. (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 364) It has been recognized that `coercion can be
mental as well as physical, and that the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an
unconstitutional inquisition. (Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206, 4 L. Ed. 2d. 242)."cralaw
virtua1aw library
In the light of the trial courts factual findings it is difficult for this Court to make a categorical finding
from the records that the police investigators resorted to cruel and reprehensible tactics to extort the
confessions. However, we can glean enough to rule that, under the standard of proof beyond
reasonable doubt, Navoas confession was far from being the product of his free will. Assuming there
was no torture, there was, at the very least, improper pressure and intimidation.
Appellant Navoas testimony during trial alleges that he was intimidated into signing the confession
(Exhibits "A," "A-1" to "A-9"). He states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q. After these personal items of yours were taken, what happened?
"A. Corporal Tolosa told that I was the one responsible for the burning of Cinema 1 and 2.
"Q. What did you answer?
"A. I told him I dont know anything about it.
"Q. What did he do afterwards?
"A. Corporal Palmon told Corporal Tolosa, `Shall we kill him? (t.s.n., December 9, 1980, p. 5)
x

"Q. At that time, did they allow you to get in touch with any of your relatives?

"A. They did not.

"Q. Did you attempt to inform them you wanted to get in touch with your relatives?
"A. Yes.
"Q. To whom did you make this request?
"A. To Tolosa.
"Q. What was his answer?
"A. When I tried to reach the telephone at the table of Tolosa, Tolosa suddenly pointed his gun at me
and told me, `Just try holding the telephone and I will shoot you.
"Q. What was your reactions?
"A. I became frightened after that." (t.s.n., December 9, 1980, p. 6).
More important than the intimidation is the maltreatment that appellant Manuel Navoa allegedly
suffered at the hands of the police investigators. He testified:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q. In what manner did he torture you?
"A. First, he tapped my ears two times very slowly.
"Q. With what hands?
"A. Two hands.
"Q. Afterwards?
"A. I became very dizzy after that. I did not say anything, some words, and suddenly he boxed me
three times in the chest and several times in the stomach and because of that I became weak and
frightened and after that I did not say again anything some words because if I will say something, it
will be against me. He suddenly tied with a wire again my neck. And slowly he untied and tied it again
and untied again." (t.s.n., December 9, 1980, p. 9).
x

"Q. Besides pointing his gun at you, what did Tolosa do to you?
"A. He boxed me two times in the chest and once in the stomach. When I told him that Kelly was the
one responsible for having jailed me when he complained to the police falsely." (t.s.n., December 9,
1980, p. 8).
x

"Q. What did Andales do to you?

"A. He tapped my two ears and because of what he had done, I became dizzy, and after that, he
boxed me three times in the chest, several times in the stomach and also he tied a wire around my
neck and tightened it slowly and very slowly he loosened and tightened again.

"Q. Where did this take place?

"A. In the room of the Arson Division." (t.s.n., December 9, 1980, p. 9).
Navoa stood firm in his testimony during the grueling cross-examination. Thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q. How were you harmed by Cpl. Tolosa?
"A. I was already at the headquarters, your Honor.
"Q. How were you harmed?
"A. He boxed me two times on the chest and once in the stomach, your Honor." (t.s.n., December 9,
1980, p. 30).
x

"Q. Now, after Cpl. Tolosa subjected you to bodily harm, do I get you correctly that Pat. Andales
subjected you also to bodily harm?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And this was tapping your ears two times, boxing you on your stomach three times?.
"WITNESS:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Yes, sir.
ATTY. BODEGON:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q. And not only that, Pat. Andales also tied a wire around your neck?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. And do I understand correctly that he would tighten this wire and then let it loose again and then
tighten it again?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. In such that you were subjected to excruciating pain?
"A. (witness nodding his head)." (t.s.n., March 3, 1981, pp. 34-35)
The trial court stated that no results of medical examinations indicating torture were presented in
evidence by the accused. Noteworthy is our pronouncement in People v. Cabrera (134 SCRA 362)
with respect to the taking of extrajudicial confessions:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . [W]e reiterate the reminder to Judges and Fiscals before whom declarants are brought for
swearing to the truth of their statements to adopt the practice of having the confessants physically
and thoroughly examined by independent and qualified doctors before administering the oath, even if
it is not requested by the accused. If physicians are not available then they should themselves
examine the bodies of the declarants for signs of possible violence. This would not only deter
attempts to secure confessions through violence but would also preclude future controversies on
whether the statements were obtained through torture or not, which only delay criminal trials. (People
v. Castro, 11 SCRA 699 [1964]; People v. Francisco, 74 SCRA 159 [1976])." (Emphasis supplied)

The written waiver (Exh. "O") of appellant Navoa purportedly waiving his constitutional rights to
silence and to counsel should have been excluded by the trial court.
In a case decided last May 31, 1982, we stated that a defendant may waive effectuation of his right to
remain silent and to be assisted by counsel at a custodial police interrogation provided the waiver is
made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently (People v. Royo, 114 SCRA 304).
In the case at bar, there was no such voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver. Exhibit "O" is so pat
and aptly worded, so contrived as to be exactly suited to meet legal objections that it could have been
prepared only by a veteran police investigator and not by an ordinary layman like appellant Manuel
Navoa. Exhibit "O" reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Ako Manuel Navoa y Martinez, 23 taon gulang, binata at kasalukuyang naninirahan sa 2975 Jose
Abad Santos, Tondo, Manila, pagkatapos kong malaman ang aking mga karapatan sang-ayon sa
ating Bagong Saligang Batas ay malaya at kusang loob na nagsasaad nitong mga
sumusunod:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1) Na ako ay pina-alala naman ng mga pulis ay aking karapatan sa ilalim ng ating Bagong Saligang
Batas tulad ng karapatan kong manatiling tahimik at huwag sumagot sa anumang itatanong sa akin,
karapatan ko ring magkaroon ng sariling abogado habang ako ay tinatanong ng pulis.
"2) Pagkatapos kong malaman ang aking mga karapatan na nabanggit sa itaas nito ako ay
magbibigay ng isang malaya at kusang loob na salaysay na ako ay hindi pinilit o kaya ay
pinangakuan ng anumang pabuya sa pagsisiyasat na ito.
"3) Na hindi ko na kailangan ang tulong ng isang abogado sapagkat pawang katotohanan lamang
ang sasabibin ko.
"4) Na ako ay pansamantalang nagpapadetine sa pulisya ng aking kagustuhan na ako ay hindi
tinakot, pinilit o kaya ay pinangakuan ng anumang pabuya.
"5) Na bilang patunay sa sinabi kong ito ay kusang-loob kong inilagda ang aking pangalan ngayong
ika-22 ng Hunyo, 1979, ganap na ika-12:20 ng hapon dito sa Lungsod ng Maynila."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Manuel Navoa is not well versed in the niceties of the law and is without any experience whatsoever
in criminal investigations. Indeed there is persuasive merit in his submission that he only copied the
waiver under threat of a gun from a prepared text written by one of the police investigators.
Thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q. Will you inform the Honorable Court how you signed, under what circumstances you signed Exh.
"O" ?
"A. The police companion of Tolosa wrote in a piece of paper a waiver and gave it to Tolosa who then
gave me a piece of typewriting paper and ball pen and told me to copy the waiver with his gun
pointed at my right cheek.
"Q. What did you do when he told you to copy the waiver?
"A. I became frightened and I copied it." (t.s.n., December 9, 1980, p. 6).
When Navoa waived his right to counsel and executed the extra-judicial confession, he was alone in
the company of the police interrogators, deprived of outside support. This Court is far from satisfied
that the waiver of counsel and the subsequent confession were indeed products of Navoas free will.
Moreover, the following material allegations in defendant-appellant Navoas alleged extrajudicial
confession, to wit: (1) That at about 5:00 oclock in the afternoon of June 15, 1978 at Mehan Garden,

a certain Jack Robertson asked defendant-appellant Navoa if he wanted to earn some fast money;
(2) That on June 16, 1978, Defendant-Appellant Navoa again met Jack Robertson, this time,
Robertson requested him to recruit several persons who also wanted to earn fast money, (3) That on
June 17 and 18, 1978, Jack Robertson requested defendant-appellant Navoa and his recruits to
watch a movie at the Manila Cinema 1 at the Manila Cinema Building along Claro M. Recto Avenue;
(4) That on July 8, 1978, Defendant-Appellant Manuel Navoa bought some gasoline; and (5) That on
July 9, 1978, Defendant-Appellant Manuel Navoa and his recruits again watched a movie at the
Manila Cinema 1 where they discreetly placed bags of gasoline at designated places - are all belied
by the collective testimonies of the teachers of defendant-appellant Navoa who categorically testified
that on those dates, he was present in their classes based on their recollections and evidenced by
their class records.
Cristina de la Cruz, a teacher of Animal Husbandry at the Gregorio Araneta University Foundation
testified:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ATTY. FERNANDEZ:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q. There has been presented in this court an alleged statement of Manuel Navoa which the
prosecution claimed to have been executed voluntarily. In that statement marked as Exhs. "A," "A-1"
to "A-9" inclusive, it was stated that at around 10:00 oclock of June 16, 1978 which is a Friday,
Manuel Navoa was with a certain Jack Robertson at Mehan Garden. Now do you know where Manuel
Navoa was at around 10:00 oclock in June 16, 1978 which was a Friday?
"A. Yes, he was in my class.
ATTY. FERNANDEZ:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q. Also in the same statement, Manuel Navoa was claimed to have voluntarily stated that on June
19, 1978 which is a Monday he was at Cinema 1 watching a movie with a certain Jack Robertson and
six recruits. Would you know where Manuel Navoa was in the morning of June 19, 1978?
"A. He was in my class also.
"Q. Likewise in the said statement, Manuel Navoa was alleged to have stated that on July 10, 1978
which is a Monday in the morning, he went to Mehan Garden for a meeting with Jack Robertson. Do
you know where Manuel Navoa was on July 10, 1978 in the morning.
"A. He was attending my class, sir.
"Q. Do you have the records of your class to show that on those particular dates and time, you
mentioned, Manuel Navoa attended your class?
"A. Yes, I have my record. It is here." (t.s.n., October 2, 1980, pp. 3-4).
x

ATTY. FERNANDEZ:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q. According to your record of attendance, how many times was Navoa absent during the first
semester of 1978?
"A. He was a regular student and he attended class. There was no absences at all. (t.s.n, October 2,
1980, p. 5).
Teresita Gutierrez, appellant Manuel Navoas teacher in Land Reform gave similar testimony. To the
same effect is the testimony of Edgardo Silva, Defendant-Appellant Manuel Navoas teacher in

Logic:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q. Well on your record, was Navoa present on June 15, and 17?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. All right, will you check your record and inform us whether the said accused Manuel Navoa was
present in your office during this date?
"A. He was present, sir." (t.s.n., November 7, 1980, p. 38)
The testimonies of the teachers are supported by the class records of attendance which were
submitted in evidence.
Apart from the extra-judicial confessions, the trial court also relied on the pictures (Exhs. "N," "N-1" to
"N-10") taken during the re-enactment of the crime by appellant Navoa.
In People v. Buscato (74 SCRA 30) this Court sustained the submission of the Acting Solicitor
General that for a re-enactment to be given evidentiary weight, the validity and efficacy of the
confession must first be shown. Such a showing is absent in this case.
These pictures, therefore, should have been likewise excluded by the trial court because they were
based on the inadmissible extra-judicial confession of defendant-appellant Navoa (People v. Alcaraz,
136 SCRA 74).
In addition, the prosecutions claim that the re-enactment was voluntarily done at the initiative of
appellant Navoa is belied by the direct testimony of the police photographer who took the pictures
during the alleged re-enactment. The police photographer categorically testified that it was indeed
Patrolman Palmon who directed the positioning of the people who took part in the re-enactment.
Thus,
"Q. And who instructed the positioning of these people in the pictures marked Exhibits "N-6" to "N-10"
?
"A. Corporal Palmon, sir.
"Q. In all these pictures marked Exhs. "N-6" to "N-10," it was Corporal Palmon who directed the
positioning of these persons?
WITNESS"
"A. Yes, sir." (t.s.n., November 9, 1979, pp. 53-54).
To the same effect is the testimony of appellant Navoa. He testified that it was Patrolman Andales
who instructed him what to do in the preparation of the materials to be used in the re-enactment and
that it was Patrolman Tolosa who directed the movements depicted in the
pictures:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q. Now, pictures marked Exhs. "N," "N-1" to "N-14" inclusive presented before this court and
pursuant to the testimony of Patrolman Palmon, said pictures were taken when you voluntarily
executed the preparation for the burning of Cinema 1 and 2 as depicted in the pictures, Exhs. "N," "N1" to "N-14." What can you say?
"A. In the making of the preparation to be used in the re-enactment, Andales told me what to do."
(t.s.n., December 9, 1980, p. 11)
x

"Q. Who directed the movements depicted in the pictures, Exhs. "N," "N-1" to "N-14" ?
"A. Tolosa supervised Andales who told me what to do." (t.s.n., December 9, 1980, p. 11)
The foregoing circumstances show that the re-enactment of the crime and the pictures taken during
such re-enactment were pursuant to a script made by police officers and directed by them. With more
reason, the pictures taken during the re-enactment should have been excluded.
With the exclusion of appellant Navoas written waiver of his constitutional rights (Exh. "O"), his extrajudicial confession (Exhs. "A," "A-1" to "A-9") and the pictures taken during the re-enactment of the
crime (Exhs. "N," "N-1" to "N-14"), the record is bereft of any other evidence which could support a
judgment of conviction. No eyewitness who saw Navoa at the vicinity of the scene of the crime was
ever presented. The prosecution failed to prove the guilt of Navoa beyond reasonable doubt.
While it is true that appellant Navoa put up only the defense of denial, this defense went far enough to
give rise to a reasonable doubt of his guilt. Consequently, Navoa has to be acquitted if only to give
meaning to the time honored principle that the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own
evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.
Like Manuel Navoa, appellant Bernardo Lim was convicted on the basis of his extra-judicial
confession (Exhs. "R," "R-1" to "R-10") alone. But unlike Navoa, Bernardo Lims later contention that
his extra-judicial confession was extorted in violation of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution
appears to be without merit. On the contrary, appellant Lim, who was a police informer, testified
during trial that he indeed voluntarily gave his statement to the police investigators.
Thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q. Were you informed of your right under our Constitution to remain silent or to call for an attorney,
to provide you with a lawyer in that investigation. Were you informed of that matter?
"A. No. I voluntarily gave statement to the police." (t.s.n., August 22, 1980, p. 5)
x

"Q. Were you told that you have the right to get a counsel?
"A. Yes.
"Q. What did you say?
"A. I said I dont have to get counsel because I am going to give voluntary statement." (t.s.n., August
22, 1980, p. 7)
However, Lims extra-judicial confession upon which the judgment was based is not adequate to
support conviction for the crime of arson warranting the extreme penalty of DEATH. Lims statement
limits his participation solely to the giving of information as to the exact location of the comfort rooms
of the theater and their distances to the screen.
The reliability of Lims confession is doubtful. He testified that his participation in the plotting took
place in December, 1977 and January 3, 1978. The building housing Cinemas 1 and 2 was burned on
July 9, 1978. The two appellants never saw each other again until January 26, 1979.
This fact was emphasized during the trial, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q. (89) Do I Understand that you never met again from January 3, 1978 up to January 26, 1979, a

period of more than a year?

"A. Yes."cralaw virtua1aw library
Being the police informer who fingered Manuel Navoa as the principal culprit, Lim appears to know
more about the crime than what appears in the records. In his confession and testimony, he limits
himself to the giving of information such as the layout of the movie houses which facilitated the
commission of the crime. Actually such information was unnecessary as Navoas alleged confession
shows he and six other men went to the theaters more than once to acquire full familiarity with the
place they were supposed to burn down. The culpability of appellant Lim is intimately tied up with the
truth of Navoas confession and the community of criminal design between the two. Since we find a
lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict Navoa, we are constrained to acquit Lim for the
same reason.
The intentional burning of two moviehouses which resulted in the death of fourteen (14) victims is
shocking in the perversity of the minds which conceived it, in their senseless lack of concern for the
sanctity of human life. By its very nature, the crime of arson is difficult to investigate. The crime itself
usually destroys the evidence which would incriminate the perpetrators. For that very reason,
however, the development of more sophisticated police techniques is imperative.
In this particular case, the police should have been more aware of the protections afforded by Article
IV, Section 20 of the Bill of Rights to persons undergoing custodial interrogation. In the belief that the
extrajudicial confession and the re-enactment, taken without the required constitutional safeguards,
were enough to sustain conviction, determined efforts to apprehend the six other arsonists or to get
admissible and more convincing evidence were no longer taken.
Section 20 of the Bill of Rights which provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of
such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall
be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in
evidence."cralaw virtua1aw library
governs the permissible procedures which the government may use in applying its power against
individuals suspected of complicity in the commission of a crime. Without in any way minimizing the
importance of giving police agencies ample latitude in the legitimate exercise of their duties, this
Court is bound to give full and effective meaning to the public policy enunciated in Section 20,
towards the creation of more effective safeguards against oppressive and arbitrary, albeit at times,
well-meaning state power.
Not even the most conservative elements of society can deny that accused persons suffer an
enormous disadvantage when confronted by the overwhelming interests of the State in public order,
public safety, or its own self-preservation. The accused is at a disadvantage when government power
and resources, coupled with the private motives of government officials are used against him.
The old argument that societys need for efficient law enforcement outweighs and, therefore,
condones small encroachments on individual liberties has no place in a democratic form of
government.
The continued acceptance of hitherto "valid" confessions to sustain judgments of conviction may lead
to sloppy police investigations, to a lack of initiative, industry and resourcefulness on the part of the
investigators, and to gross miscarriages of justice in many cases which must forever remain
unknown. **
In any balancing of interests, the scales will even out vis-a-vis government action only when there is
an improvement of police procedures, the development of anti-crime techniques, and the perfection of

law enforcement systems. And very often, such development of methods is possible only when the
traditional, authoritarian, and easier procedures are proscribed and no longer available.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellants
Manuel Navoa and Bernardo Lim are ACQUITTED of the crime charged on grounds of reasonable
doubt.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 72990. November 21, 1991.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MANUEL BADEO, ESPERIDION BADEO,
ROGELIO BADEO (at-large) and BONIFACIO TANGPUS (at-large), Defendants. MANUEL
BADEO and ESPERIDION BADEO, Defendants-Appellants.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Public Attorneys Office for Manuel Badeo.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; PLEA OF GUILTY FOR A LESSER OFFENSE;

DEMANDS THE CONFORMITY OF THE OFFENDED PARTY; CASE AT BAR. On arraignment,
Manuel pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide while Esperidion pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged. Manuel invoked the mitigating circumstances of voluntary plea of guilty and voluntary
surrender. However, the court ruled that a plea of guilty to a lesser offense demanded the conformity
of the offended party. Inasmuch as Catalina Germanes the mother of the victim, was not agreeable to
the plea entered by Manuel, the court considered the plea as one of not guilty.
2. ID.; EVIDENCE; BURDEN OF PROOF; LIES ON THE DEFENSE IN CASE ACCUSED ADMITS
HAVING AUTHORED THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM AND DEFENSE IS ANCHORED ON SELFDEFENSE. Well-settled is the rule that where the accused admits having authored the death of the
victim and his defense is anchored on self-defense, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence
and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution. Otherwise, his conviction is inescapable.
3. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF TRIAL COURT; RULE. On the
issue of credibility, we find no reason to depart from the settled rule that the findings of the trial court
on the credibility of witnesses should be accorded the highest respect because it had the advantage
of observing the demeanor of witnesses and to discern if a witness was telling the truth.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT AFFECTED BY THE RELUCTANCE TO DENOUNCE THE ACCUSED AS THE
KILLER IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME. The imputation of an illicit
relationship between the prosecution witness and the victim which was not shown other than by the
counter-affidavit of Manuel and which the investigating fiscal had even discredited, is not an
acceptable evidence insofar as proof of improper motive on the part of Eega is concerned. Neither
may Eegas initial reluctance to denounce Manuel and his other co-accused as the killers
immediately after the commission of the crime, affect the probative value of her testimony, specifically
her positive identification of Manuel as one of the perpetrators of the crime. Usually triggered by fear,
such reluctance is common and has been judicially declared not to affect credibility.
5. ID.; ID.; ALIBI; AS A GENERAL RULE, CONSIDERED A WEAK DEFENSE; EXCEPTION.
Anent Esperidion Badeos, we find that there is no basis for its imposition in view of the absence of a
clear showing that he committed the crime imputed to him. Esperidion could not have been at the
scene of the crime because the kaingin area where he had been staying since January 7, 1983 until

he was fetched by his wife on March 22, 1985 was a good five-hour hike away through a trail. Alibi is
generally considered a weak defense but it assumes importance where the evidence for the
prosecution is weak and betrays concreteness on the question of whether or not the accused
committed the crime.
6. CRIMINAL LAW; EXTINGUISHMENT OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY, DEATH OF THE ACCUSED
BEFORE FINAL JUDGMENT; EFFECT ON PECUNIARY PENALTIES. Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished "by the death of the convict, as to the
personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment." In People v. Alison (44 SCRA 523), the Court,
upon the recommendation of the then Solicitor General who was required to comment on the
information that appellant Alison had died at the prison hospital, resolved that, there being no final
judgment as yet, "the criminal and civil liability of Alison was extinguished by his death."cralaw
virtua1aw library
7. ID.; JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; SELF-DEFENSE; REQUISITES, UNLAWFUL
AGGRESSION; INDISPENSABLE. Of the three requisites of self-defense as stated in Article 11
(1) of the Revised Penal Code, namely: (a) unlawful aggression; (b) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it, and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself, the first requisite is indispensable for without it, there is nothing to prevent or repel.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; MAY BE BELIED BY THE LOCATION, NUMBER; SERIOUSNESS OF WOUNDS
SUSTAINED BY THE VICTIM. The location, number and seriousness of the wounds sustained by
Cresenciano belie the claim of self-defense. Of the nine wounds found on Cresencianos body,
Manuel admitted having inflicted the two wounds which the physician who performed the autopsy
considered as fatal: the hacking would on the skull and the stabbing wound on the stomach. As such,
even without the concerted assistance of the other accused, Manuel could have nonetheless
produced the lethal consequence: the death of Cresenciano.
9. ID.; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES; VOLUNTARY SURRENDER; APPRECIATED IN CASE AT
BAR. We agree with the Solicitor General that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
should be appreciated in favor of Manuel. Ordinarily, where there has been actual arrest, the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be invoked. While it is true that Manuel was
arrested with his father on December 4, 1981, the records show that Manuel did surrender: first, to
the barangay captain and, in the morning of March 22, 1981, to the police of Dagami. In fact, after his
surrender, Manuel was detained for twenty days.
10. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY; PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. The
killing of Cresenciano is qualified by treachery which is shown by the suddenness by which he was
attacked. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code the penalty for murder is reclusion temporal
maximum to death. There being one mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposable shall be the
minimum period. Applying the indeterminate sentence law, the proper penalty is ten (10) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor maximum as minimum to seventeen (17) years. four (4) months and one
(1) day of reclusion temporal maximum as maximum penalty.

DECISION

FERNAN, C.J.:

In this appeal, father and son Esperidion and Manuel Badeo, seek the reversal of the July 5, 1985
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Leyte, Branch XV at Palo, 1 the dispositive portion of which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the two accused Manuel Badeo and Esperidion

Badeo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and hereby sentences said two accused to the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, to indemnify the heirs of Cresenciano Germanes the sum of
P30,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay each half of the costs.
"It appearing that the two accused Manuel Badeo and Esperidion Badeo were detained since
December 4, 1984, when they were arrested by the police authorities of Tananan, Leyte, they should
be credited with the full time during which they have undergone preventive imprisonment, if they
agreed voluntarily in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted
prisoners; otherwise, they shall be credited with 4/5 only of the time during which they have
undergone preventive imprisonment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
"SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
According to the sole prosecution eyewitness Eega Abrio (Iega Abreo), at around six oclock in the
evening of March 21, 1981, she was walking on her way home. Cresenciano Germanes was walking
ahead of her. Near the house of Esperidion Badeo, four men attacked Cresenciano. Being about ten
arms length away, she saw Manuel Badeo hack Cresenciano at the back with a bolo measuring
around fifty-five centimeters in length. Rogelio Badeo then hacked Cresenciano with another long
bolo also at the back. Bonifacio Tangpus followed with a stab at the right portion of Cresencianos
stomach, after which Esperidion Badeo hacked Cresencianos back. Cresenciano fell down on his
back. 2
Cresenciano shouted after he had fallen. Noticing that Cresenciano was still alive, Rogelio came back
and "finished him off." 3 During the attack, Eega was as near to the group as seven arms length. 4
She did not go nearer because she was afraid. 5 Instead, she ran home taking a shortcut through the
property of a certain Adriano. She immediately informed her husband, Gregorio, about the incident.
She told him, however, not to go out anymore to inform Cresencianos relatives about the hacking
incident, as it was already dark. She eventually told Cresencianos relatives about his fate in the
morning of the following day, Sunday. 6
The body of Cresenciano, who was single and 42 years old when he died, was autopsied on March
23, 1981 by Dr. Lesmes C. Lumen, the municipal health officer of Dagami, Leyte. The following
findings appear on the medical certificate (Exh. A) issued by Dr. Lumen:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Hacking wound on the skull, from vertex to left temporal area, 10 inches long, 1 inch wide, 2
inches deep with exposure of brain substance
2. Hacking wound, left supraclavicular area, 2.5 inches long, .5 inch wide, .5 inch deep
3. Hacking wound, extending from left subcostal area to the level of the third rib, 9.5 inches long, 2
inches wide, 1 inch deep
4. Stab wounds at the infra mammary area, left
a) 2 inches long, .5 inch wide, 2 inches deep
b) .5 inch long, .5 inch wide, 2 inches deep
c) .5 inch long, .5 inch wide, 2 inches deep.
5. Stab wound, right iliac region, level of the umbilicus, 2.5 inches long, 2 inches wide, 1 inch deep
6. Longitudinal, oblique, abrasion at left iliac region, 2.5 inches long
7. Hacking wound, extending from right to left lumbar areas, crossing the vertebral column, 7 inches
long, 1 inch wide, 2 inches deep

8. Hacking wound, left supra scapular region, 5 inches long, 2 inches wide, 1.5 inches deep
9. Hacking wound, left shoulder area (deltoid portion), 7 inches long, 3 inches wide, 2 inches
deep." chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
Uldarico Germanes, a nephew of Cresenciano, believed that his uncle was killed by the four because
Cresenciano was instrumental in dividing the land being tenanted by Manuel into two portions. One
portion was to be retained by Manuel while the other half would be tenanted by him (Uldarico). He
accompanied Cresenciano when the latter told Manuel of the new arrangement. Manuel did not like
the arrangement because according to him, he could still work on the whole area. 7
Manuel Badeo admitted having hacked Cresenciano but averred that he did so in self-defense.
According to him, he was at home in the afternoon of March 21, 1981 as he was cutting the grass in
his home in barangay Katipunan. Later in the afternoon, he went to barangay Hilabago to ask for
kerosene from his mother arriving there at past six oclock in the evening.
While he was at his mothers house, his brother-in-law, Rosito Dumpang and the latters nephew
Gabriel, passed by. They invited him to go home with them. As they were walking, they met
Cresenciano Germanes behind the copra drier of Manuels mother. Cresenciano asked him where he
was going. When Manuel answered that he was going home, Cresenciano held him by his shirt and
pointed a gun at him. As Manuel was about an arms length away, he noticed that Cresenciano was
reeking with the smell of tuba.
While pointing the gun at him, Cresenciano threatened to kill Manuel. After telling Cresenciano that
they had nothing to fight about, Manuel retreated to a coconut tree, went around it, drew a bolo and
hacked Cresenciano hitting him on the head. Then he stabbed Cresencianos stomach. Manuel ran
towards Rosito and Gabriel Dumpang who, in turn, "castigated" Cresenciano. Manuel told them to
stop punishing Cresenciano but the two did not heed his advice.
Manuel did not see Eega Abreo when he hacked Cresenciano. Neither was his father, Esperidion,
around. But he noticed that when Rosito hacked Cresenciano, the latters pistol fell from his hand.
Manuel picked it up and later surrendered it to barangay captain Andrea Olimberio. When Manuel
surrendered to the police authorities, he did not implicate Rosito and Gabriel Dumpang because they
had threatened that should he mention their names, they would kill him. That threat was also the
reason why, together with Esperidion, he transferred his residence to Tanauan, Leyte.
Manuel stated in court that Eega Abreo testified against him because her husband, Sabino (sic),
was the first suspect in the killing of Cresenciano as there was "bad blood" between Sabino and
Cresenciano. 8
Andrea Olimberio, who was the barangay captain of barangay Katipunan when the incident occurred,
corroborated Manuels claim that he surrendered to her. According to Andrea, at about eleven oclock
in the evening of March 21, 1981, Manuel, accompanied by his wife and sister, came to her house
and told her that he had killed Cresenciano Germanes. Manuel surrendered to her a pistol which he
had taken from the victim. Andrea knew that the pistol belonged to Cresenciano because the latter
had shown it to her when he drank liquor at her store. 9
Esperidion Badeo, on the other hand, denied being at the scene when the killing occurred. He was
then in the mountain in Saransang making a kaingin on the land owned by Estelita Tangpus.
Saransang was more than seven kilometers away from barangay Hilabago and the distance could
only be negotiated by foot through a trail used by sled-drawing carabaos With him in the mountain
were Estelita, Rogelio Badeo and Bonifacio Tangpus. He left the place only on March 22, 1981 when
his wife fetched him because his son Manuel had wounded somebody. He went to Hilabago but he
immediately left for the mountain because he was afraid that revenge might be taken on him. 10
Estelita Rubo corroborated Esperidions alibi claiming that Esperidion did not leave the kaingin area
even after work. 11

Sometime in June, 1981, Esperidion and Rogelio Badeo executed a joint affidavit denying
participation in the killing of Cresenciano. They affirmed therein that they had been in the homestead
owned by Bonifacio Tangpus since March 14, 1981 when the crime transpired. 12 Bonifacio Tangpus
did not execute any affidavit nor surrender to the authorities. Neither was he apprehended.chanrobles
lawlibrary : rednad
For his part, Manuel executed a counter-affidavit dated June 1, 1981 stating that in the afternoon of
March 21, 1981, as he was cutting the grass in his lawn, Sagino Abrio (sic), the husband of Iiga
(Eega), approached him and intimated to him that he had a big problem because Iiga and
Cresenciano were having an illicit relationship. Sagino said that the relationship downgraded his
honor because it was known to everyone in their place. Sagino vowed that something would happen
to Cresenciano.
According to the same affidavit, when Manuel arrived at his mothers house to get kerosene, his
mother, Maria Badeo, Estelita Tangpuz (sic), Elena Borja, Cresencio (sic) Germanes and Sagino
Abrio were drinking liquor. As Manuel was about to leave, Germanes forced him to drink liquor. After
taking one glass, Manuel turned to leave but Germanes grabbed his shirt. Sagino then followed
Germanes, hacked him "many times" while telling Manuel that it was a problem he could handle.
Upon seeing that Germanes had a firearm tucked in his waist, Sagino ordered Manuel to get it
Manuel and Germanes grappled for possession of the firearm and as soon as Manuel took hold of it,
Sagino told him to surrender it to the police. 13
The contents of said counter-affidavit as well as Manuels insistence at the preliminary investigation
that it was Eega Abrios husband who was responsible for Cresenciano Germanes killing were
totally discredited by the investigating fiscal who noted that during Manuels 20-day detention, he
never mentioned to the police Saginos involvement in the crime. The investigating fiscal concluded
that the rather belated facts revealed by Manuel were designed "to coerce or force Eega Abrio from
becoming a witness for the complainant." 14
On February 8, 1982, an information for murder was filed against Manuel, Esperidion and Rogelio
Badeo and Bonifacio Tangpus. 15 They were charged with having conspired to kill and treacherously
killing Cresenciano.
On September 24, 1984, the assistant provincial fiscal filed a motion for the issuance of an alias
warrant of arrest. 16 Through the alias warrant of arrest issued by the court, on December 4, 1984,
Manuel Badeo and Esperidion Badeo were apprehended by the police. 17
On arraignment, Manuel pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide while Esperidion pleaded not
guilty to the crime charged. Manuel invoked the mitigating circumstances of voluntary plea of guilty 18
and voluntary surrender. However, the court ruled that a plea of guilty to a lesser offense demanded
the conformity of the offended party. 19 Inasmuch as Catalina Germanes, the mother of the victim,
was not agreeable to the plea entered by Manuel, the court considered the plea as one of not guilty.
After trial, the court rendered the aforementioned decision. Manuel and Esperidion appealed to this
Court contending that the trial court erred in not appreciating the justifying circumstance of selfdefense and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of Manuel, and in not giving
weight and credence to the alibi of Esperidion.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
On August 10, 1990, Esperidion died of cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to pulmonary tuberculosis
at the prison hospital in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. 20 Inasmuch as no final judgment had as yet been
rendered, in the resolution of August 21, 1991, the case against Esperidion was dismissed with costs
de oficio and entry of judgment was made on August 22, 1991. 21
On September 17, 1991, the Solicitor General filed a motion for the reconsideration of said resolution
alleging that while the criminal liability of appellant Esperidion Badeo had been extinguished by his
death pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, his civil liability arising from the criminal
offense subsisted in accordance with Articles 1231 and 1161 of the Civil Code in relation to Article

112 of the Revised Penal Code and the ruling in People v. Pancho, 145 SCRA 323. Hence, as
provided for in Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, upon proper notice, the legal representatives
of the deceased appellant should appear as substitute parties herein insofar as the deceaseds civil
liability for the crime is concerned. 22
We find merit in the motion for reconsideration. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
criminal liability is totally extinguished by the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as
to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs
before final judgment." In People v. Alison, 23 the Court, upon the recommendation of the then
Solicitor General who was required to comment on the information that appellant Alison had died at
the prison hospital, resolved that, there being no final judgment as yet, "the criminal and civil liability
(sic) of Alison was extinguished by his death."cralaw virtua1aw library
The Alison resolution was the basis of the resolution in People v. Satorre 24 similarly dismissing the
case against the deceased appellant. In a separate opinion in the resolution, then Associate Justice
Ramon C. Aquino stated that as to the personal penalties, criminal liability is totally extinguished by
the death of the convict but as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the
death of the offender occurs before final judgment. According to Justice Aquino, the term" pecuniary
penalties" (las pecuniarias) in Article 89 refers to fine and costs as distinguished from "pecuniary
liabilities" (responsabilidades pecuniarias) in Article 38 which include reparation and indemnity.
As every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party, and also
to a civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage and indemnification for the losses
25 whether the particular act or omission is done intentionally or negligently or whether or not
punishable by law, 26 subsequent decisions of the Court held that while the criminal liability of an
appellant is extinguished by his death, his civil liability subsists. 27 In such case, the heirs of the
deceased appellant are substituted as parties in the criminal case and his estate shall answer for his
civil liability. 28
In the light of the foregoing, we reconsider the resolution of August 21, 1991 insofar as it considers as
extinguished Esperidion Badeos civil liability, in order to determine whether or not such liability exist.
29
Well-settled is the rule that where the accused admits having authored the death of the victim and his
defense is anchored on self-defense, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of that of the prosecution. 30 Otherwise, his conviction is inescapable. 31
Of the three requisites of self-defense as stated in Article 11 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, namely:
(a) unlawful aggression; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and
(c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself, the first requisite is
indispensable 32 for without it, there is nothing to prevent or repel. After a close scrutiny of the
records, the Court finds that appellant Manuel Badeo failed to prove unlawful aggression.cralawnad
Manuel contends that he was the object of Cresencianos unlawful aggression because the latter held
his shirt and pointed a gun at him. His testimony, however, was completely uncorroborated. He failed
even to present Cresencianos gun in evidence notwithstanding his claim that he surrendered it to the
barangay captain and later, to the police. 33 Indeed, we agree with the trial court that if there really
was a gun, Cresenciano would have used it not only against Manuel but also against Rosito and
Gabriel Dumpang. 34
Moreover, the location, number and seriousness of the wounds sustained by Cresenciano belie the
claim of self-defense. 35 Of the nine wounds found on Cresencianos body, Manuel admitted having
inflicted the two wounds which the physician who performed the autopsy considered as fatal- the
hacking wound on the skull and the stabbing wound on the stomach. 36 As such, even without the
concerted assistance of the other accused, Manuel could have nonetheless produced the lethal
consequence: the death of Cresenciano.

Manuels assertion that the credibility of the sole prosecution eyewitness is questionable is belated if
not baseless. He insists that Eega had an illicit relationship with the victim and that if her testimony
were true, she would not have lost time in reporting the murder to Cresencianos relatives. On the
issue of credibility, we find no reason to depart from the settled rule that the findings of the trial court
on the credibility of witnesses should be accorded the highest respect because it had the advantage
of observing the demeanor of witnesses and to discern if a witness was telling the truth. 37 The
imputation of an illicit relationship between the prosecution witness and the victim which was not
shown other than by the counter-affidavit of Manuel and which the investigating fiscal had even
discredited, is not an acceptable evidence insofar as proof of improper motive on the part of Eega is
concerned. 38 Neither may Eegas initial reluctance to denounce Manuel and his other co-accused
as the killers immediately after the commission of the crime, affect the probative value of her
testimony, specifically her positive identification of Manuel as one of the perpetrators of the crime.
Usually triggered by fear, such reluctance is common and has been judicially declared not to affect
credibility. 39
However, we agree with the Solicitor General that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
should be appreciated in favor of Manuel. Ordinarily, where there has been actual arrest, the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be invoked. 40 While it is true that Manuel was
arrested with his father on December 4, 1981, the records show that Manuel did surrender: first, to
the barangay captain and, in the morning of March 22, 1981, to the police of Dagami. 41 In fact, after
his surrender, Manuel was detained for twenty days. 42
The killing of Cresenciano is qualified by treachery which is shown by the suddenness by which he
was attacked. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder is reclusion
temporal maximum to death. There being one mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposable shall be
the minimum period. 43 Applying the indeterminate sentence law, the proper penalty is ten (10) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) mouths and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum as maximum penalty.
Anent Esperidion Badeos civil liability, we find that there is no basis for its imposition in view of the
absence of a clear showing that he committed the crime imputed to him. 44 Esperidion could not
have been at the scene of the crime because the kaingin area where he had been staying since
January 7, 1983 until he was fetched by his wife on March 22, 1985 45 was a good five-hour hike
away through a trail. 46 Alibi is generally considered a weak defense but it assumes importance
where the evidence for the prosecution is weak and betrays concreteness on the question of whether
or not the accused committed the crime. 47
In this case, Esperidion was implicated by the uncorroborated testimony of sole prosecution
eyewitness Iega Abrio. Her identification of Esperidion as one of the perpetrators of the crime is,
however, short of the positiveness and reliability essential for conviction. 48 As several people
committed the crime, it is probable that Abrio mistook Esperidion for another person considering that
according to her, the attack was perpetrated when it was already getting dark. This does not however,
totally discredit her entire testimony especially the portion thereof which imputes on Manuel the
authorship of the fatal hacking blows on Cresenciano. Court may believe one part of a testimony and
disbelieve another part. 49
WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court is hereby affirmed insofar as appellant Manuel Badeo
is concerned subject to the modifications that he shall serve the penalty of ten (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor maximum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal maximum and indemnify the heirs of Cresenciano Germanes in the amount of fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000).
The resolution of August 21, 1991 is hereby reconsidered insofar as it considers as extinguished
Esperidion Badeos civil liability. However, finding that Esperidion Badeo should be acquitted as he
did not commit the crime imputed to him, no civil liability is hereby imposed on him. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 136818

December 19, 2000

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EDWIN BAYOTAS y IMPERIO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision,1 dated December 1, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
70, Malabon, Metro Manila, finding accused-appellant Edwin Bayotas y Imperio guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the murder of Ricardo Cao and sentencing him to pay the latters
heirs P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P60,000.00 as actual damages, and the costs.2
The information against accused-appellant charged
That on or about the 11th day of August, 1997, in the Municipality of Malabon, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, while armed
with a fan knife (balisong), with intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation, and with the use of
superior strength, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, hit/stab
RICARDO CAO hitting the latter on the left side of his body and right hand, thereby inflicting upon
the victim stab wounds, which caused his immediate death. 3
Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty, whereupon trial proceeded. 4
The stabbing of Ricardo Cao took place on August 11, 1997, at around 8:30 p.m. along M.H. Del
Pilar Street, Panghulo, Malabon, Metro Manila. It appears that the victim had an altercation with
accused-appellant. The victim fled to the barangay hall, but accused-appellant followed him and tried
to attack him. Barangay tanods who were present at that time intervened and tried to pacify the two.
Through their efforts, the victim and accused-appellant signed an amicable settlement.
After the two shook hands, accused-appellant departed, while the victim stayed behind. Jessie
Soriano, a barangay tanod, was asked by the barangay captain to accompany the victim until he
could find transportation. The victim boarded a jeepney. As the jeepney moved away, however,
accused-appellant, who emerged from a dark corner of the street, managed to board it and, once
inside, stabbed the victim with a fan knife (balisong). Upon seeing the incident, Jessie Soriano ran

after the jeepney. He pulled accused-appellant off the jeepney by grabbing the back of accusedappellantsPANTS and slammed him on the pavement. Accused-appellant fell on his back, still
clutching the fan knife. Upon seeing that accused-appellant was armed with a knife, Soriano backed
off. Then he heard the victim say, "Pare, may tama ako!" ("Pal, Ive been hit!") This made him turn to
the victim. On the other hand, accused-appellant took advantage of the momentary distraction of
Soriano and fled. When Soriano saw that accused-appellant was fleeing, Soriano shouted at the
policemen for help. As a result, accused-appellant was apprehended, although not before he had
thrown the fan knife away.
One of the policemen handcuffed accused-appellant, while Jessie Soriano searched the area for
accused-appellants fan knife. When Soriano found it, he turned it over to the policemen. The fan
knife was subsequently marked Exh. D5 for the prosecution.6
The postmortem examination of the victim shows that he sustained the following:
1) Stab wound, right infraclavicular region, measuring 1.8 x 0.8 cm., 6 cm. from the anterior midline,
132 cm. from theHEEL , 7 cm. deep, directed posteriorwards, upwards and medialwards, fracturing
the 2nd right thoracic rib, piercing the upper lobe of the right lung.
2) Stab wound, left mammary region, measuring 2 x 0.8 cm., 15 cm. from the anterior midline, 125
cm. from the heel.
3) Stab wound, left anterior axillary region, measuring 2.5 x 1.1 cm., 24 cm. from the anterior midline,
117 cm. from the heel, 8 cm. deep directed posteriorwards, upwards and medialwards, fracturing the
7th left thoracic rib, piercing the lower lobe of the left lung.
4) Incised wound, proximal phalanx, right thumb, measuring 1 x 0.3 cm.
5) Incised wound, right hand, measuring 2 x 0.5 cm., 3.5 cm. lateral to its posterior midline. 7
Dr. Maria Cristina B. Freyra, who conducted the postmortem examination, testified that stab wound
no. 3 was fatal, and that, like the other wounds sustained by the victim, it was caused by a singlebladed weapon.8
On the other hand, Pacita Samaniego, a representative of the victims parents, testified that the latter
spent P50,000.00 to P60,000.00 for the victims wake and burial.9
The defense presented accused-appellant as the sole witness. He admitted having stabbed the victim
but alleged he did so in a fit of anger. He claimed that his wife, Gina Aber, a beautician, and the victim
were having an affair. He said he knew the victim because of their common interest in cockfighting:
he (accused-appellant) maintained fighting cocks, while the victim sold taris (spurs attached to the
legs of fighting cocks so that they could maim each other during cockfights). They met at a place
where fighting cocks are unloaded from Cebu.
According to accused-appellant, on June 15, 1997, he went to the beauty parlor where his wife was
working without letting her know he was there. After the beauty parlor had closed, he saw his wife
going to the drugstore and making a telephone call. Later, the victim arrived and picked her up in a
taxi. Accused-appellant said he got a taxi and followed the pair. He saw the two check in aMOTEL
in Meycauayan, Bulacan. When she arrived home at 11:00 oclock that evening, however, she told
accused-appellant that she had come from a clients house for home service.
On another occasion, on June 18, 1997, accused-appellant claimed that he asked his wife, as the
latter was leaving the beauty parlor, where she was going because he suspected that she was going
to meet the victim. His wife replied that she was going to have her nipper sharpened, but when
accused-appellant offered to accompany her, she said she did not have the nipper with her after all.
Accused-appellant claimed he also noticed his wife was wearing jewelry which he had not bought for

her. When he confronted her about this, his wife replied she had bought them herself on credit. That
same day, accused-appellant said he told the victim to stay away from his wife.
Despite this incident, accused-appellant said he still offered to sell taris for the victim. Accusedappellant claimed that, as he was having drinks with friends on August 11, 1997, he saw the victim
pass by. He told the victim that he had sold two dozens of the latters taris to a certain Wilbur
for P7,000.00. The victim replied that accused-appellant should have sold them at P7,000.00 a
dozen, or P14,000.00 for two dozens. This led to a quarrel. The two were taken to the barangay hall
for reconciliation. Apparently, the two were able to patch up their differences although accusedappellant disputed that he left ahead of the victim, claiming that it was he who was told by the
barangay captain to stay behind. After five minutes, accused-appellant said he was allowed to leave.
He went back to have drinks with his friends. After a while, they decided to continue their drinking
session in Monumento. When they boarded a jeepney to go there, they saw the victim inside the
vehicle. Accused-appellant said the victim smiled at him and sarcastically told him that the P7,000.00
which he (accused-appellant) lost in the deal with Wilbur would be the payment for accusedappellants wife whom he (the victim) was going to see that night. Accused-appellant got angry, drew
his knife, and stabbed the victim. Afterwards, he alighted and surrendered to the police.10
On December 10, 1991, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Edwin Bayotas y Imperio guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER qualified by treachery and hereby sentences him to suffer
the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
Likewise, the accused is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of Ricardo Cao the amount of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity for the death of the said victim and P60,000.00 as actual damages plus cost of
theSUIT .
SO ORDERED.11
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that
I. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
TREACHERY IN THE CASE AT BAR.
II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF
PASSION AND OBFUSCATION AND VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.
III.ASSUMING THAT PASSION AND OBFUSCATION CANNOT BE APPRECIATED IN THE CASE
AT BAR, THE COURT A QUO SHOULD HAVE APPRECIATED THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE.12
From the foregoing, it appears that accused-appellant does not deny stabbing the victim. Be that as it
may, a resolution of his appeal turns on the determination of the circumstances surrounding the said
stabbing.
It must be noted that the prosecution and the defenses narration of events differ in several respects.
From the testimony of the prosecution eyewitness Jessie Soriano, it appears that despite the
apparent reconciliation of the victim and accused-appellant at the barangay hall, the latter still
harbored resentment against the former. Hence, after leaving the barangay hall ahead of the victim,
accused-appellant armed himself with a fan knife and waited for the victim to emerge. Upon seeing
the victim board a slow-moving jeepney, he attacked the victim.
Accused-appellant claims he could not have waylaid the victim because he (accused-appellant) left
the barangay hall later than the victim; that it was by mere chance that he boarded the jeepney which
the victim was also riding; and that he only stabbed the victim after the latter called his (accusedappellants) wife a prostitute.

Between the self-serving testimony of accused-appellant and that of Jessie Soriano, the trial court
correctly found the latter more credible. Soriano is a disinterested witness. He was, at the time of this
incident, a barangay tanod, and it was as such that he got involved in this case. No evidence has
been shown that he had any motive to testify falsely. We, therefore, give full credence to the following
findings of the trial court:
As borne by the record, [accused-appellant] left the barangay hall ahead of the victim. He then armed
himself with a fan knife before taking refuge at the dark portion of the street to await for the arrival of
the passenger jeepney where [the victim] was on board. And as soon as he caught glimpse of the
vehicle, the [accused-appellant] emerged from the dimly lit portion of the street, ran after passenger
jeepney, and lunged at the helpless victim.13
Indeed, it is well-established that findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to respect as the trial
court is in a better position to decide the question of credibility having heard the witnesses and
observed their deportment during the trial.14
In theLIGHT of the foregoing factual scenario, the Court now resolves the arguments raised by
accused-appellant in his appeal.
First. Accused-appellant claims he should have only been convicted of homicide, not murder,
because the prosecution failed to establish the qualifying circumstance of treachery. He contends that
the following circumstances negate the presence of treachery: (1) he stabbed the victim in a jeepney
in the presence of other passengers who could have rendered assistance to the victim or served as
eyewitnesses; (2) barangay tanod Jessie Soriano saw him stab the victim and even pulled him off the
jeepney and slammed him to the ground; and (3) the incident took place early in the evening (8:30
p.m.) on a busy street (M.H. Del Pilar, Panghulo, Malabon, Metro Manila).
This contention is without merit.
There is treachery when the following requisites are present: (1) the employment of means, method,
or manner of execution to ensure the safety of the malefactor from defensive or retaliatory action on
the part of the victim and (2) the deliberate or conscious adoption of such means, method, or manner
of execution.15
In this case, the very circumstances which accused-appellant claims negate treachery in fact prove
the same because the victim could not have expected that, despite his being in a jeepney that was
moving on a busy street with people around, accused-appellant would suddenly appear and stab
him.16 Indeed, the victim had reason to believe that he and accused-appellant had already settled
their differences at the barangay hall.
This case is similar to People v. De la Tongga.17 In that case, the accused suddenly appeared from
nowhere and then stabbed the victim while the latter and his companions were inside a tricycle. The
Court found treachery, explaining that
[the] essence of treachery is a swift and unexpected assault on an unarmed victim which renders him
unable to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the aggression. Here, the
weapon used, theNATURE of the injury inflicted, and the defenseless stance of the victim when
attacked confluently lead to the inevitable conclusion that appellant deliberately adopted the
murderous mode of commission to ensure the consummation of the offense with impunity.18
In this case, the manner of the attack, the number of the wounds sustained by the victim (five), and
the location of the fatal wound which indicates that accused-appellant deliberately and consciously
aimed at a vital spot of the victims body show treachery in the killing of the victim. 19
Treachery absorbs abuse of superior strength so that even if the same is present, there is no need to
appreciate it as an independent generic aggravating circumstance. 20 In this case, however, the trial
court correctly held that abuse of superior strength was absent. Not even the use of a

bladedINSTRUMENT would constitute abuse of superior strength if the prosecution failed, as in this
case, to demonstrate that there was a marked difference in the build of the victim and the accusedappellant which would have precluded an appropriate defense from the victim. 21 Anent the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, the trial court also correctly held that such
circumstance is absent in this case because the prosecution failed to establish (1) the time when
accused-appellant determined to commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that he had clung
to his determination, and (3) the lapse of an interval of time between the determination to commit the
crime and the execution thereof sufficient to allow accused-appellant to reflect upon the
consequences of his act.22
Second. As accused-appellant admits the commission of the crime, it is incumbent upon him to prove
by clear and convincing evidence the alleged mitigating circumstances of passion and obfuscation
and vindication of a grave offense, let alone sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the victim.23
We find none of these mitigating circumstances present in this case. To begin with, we find it strange
that accused-appellant would have any business relationship with the victim if he suspected the latter
of carrying on an affair with his wife.
Accused-appellants claim that he stabbed the victim because the latter practically called accusedappellants wife a prostitute is also belied by Jessie Sorianos testimony that accused-appellant
actually waylaid the victim by boarding the jeepney which the victim was riding with his fan knife
already drawn and then stabbing him inside the vehicle. It would thus appear that it was not any
remark made by the victim to accused-appellant in the jeepney which caused him to attack the former
but resentment which the accused-appellant still harbored despite their apparent reconciliation at the
barangay hall.1a\^/phi1
Nor can the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender be appreciated in favor of accusedappellant. For this circumstance to be taken into consideration, the following requisites must concur:
(1) the offender was not actually arrested, (2) he surrendered himself to a person in authority or to an
agent of a person in authority, and (3) his surrender was voluntary. 24 In this case, however, Jessie
Soriano testified that accused-appellant was fleeing when he was arrested by law enforcers who
heard his (Sorianos) cry for help.25 The police had to shout before accused-appellant stopped
running away. Had it been his intention to surrender, accused-appellant would not have thrown his
fan knife away.
Third. Accused-appellant contends that the trial court should not have given credence to Jessie
Sorianos affidavit (Exh. B) as a perusal of his testimony shows that he merely affirmed that he had
made the affidavit but did not confirm its truthfulness and veracity.26 This is mere hairsplitting. By
identifying his affidavit and affirming its contents,27 Jessie Soriano thereby attested to the veracity of
the contents therein.
Considering the facts of this case, we hold that accused-appellant is guilty of murder. Under Art. 248
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, the penalty for murder is reclusion
perpetua to death. In accordance with Art. 63(2), in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, the lesser penalty (reclusion perpetua) was correctly imposed by the trial court.
However, we find no basis for the trial courts award of P60,000.00 as actual damages for the
expenses of the victims wake and funeral considering that no receipts were presented to substantiate
the same.28 On the other hand, an award of P50,000.00 as moral damages should have been given
to the heirs of the victim in line with the recent rulings of this Court.29
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, Malabon, Metro Manila is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of actual damages in the amount of P60,000.00
is deleted but accused-appellant is ordered to pay P50,000.00 as moral damages to the heirs of the
victim Ricardo Cao, in addition to the amount of P50,000.00 awarded to them as civil indemnity.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 190696

August 3, 2010

ROLITO CALANG and PHILTRANCO SERVICE ENTERPRISES, INC., Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners, Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc.
(Philtranco) and Rolito Calang, to challenge our Resolution of February 17, 2010. Our assailed
Resolution denied the petition for review on certiorari for failure to show any reversible error sufficient
to warrant the exercise of this Courts discretionary appellate jurisdiction.
Antecedent Facts
At around 2:00 p.m. of April 22, 1989, Rolito Calang was driving Philtranco Bus No. 7001, owned by
Philtranco along Daang Maharlika Highway in Barangay Lambao, Sta. Margarita, Samar when its rear
left side hit the front left portion of a Sarao jeep coming from the opposite direction. As a result of the
collision, Cresencio Pinohermoso, the jeeps driver, lost control of the vehicle, and bumped and killed
Jose Mabansag, a bystander who was standing along the highways shoulder. The jeep turned turtle
three (3) times before finally stopping at about 25 meters from the point of impact. Two of the jeeps
passengers, Armando Nablo and an unidentified woman, were instantly killed, while the other
passengers sustained serious physical injuries.
The prosecution charged Calang with multiple homicide, multiple serious physical injuries and
damage to property thru reckless imprudence before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31,
Calbayog City. The RTC, in its decision dated May 21, 2001, found Calang guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of reckless imprudence resulting to multiple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to
property, and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of thirty days of arresto menor, as
minimum, to four years and two months of prision correccional, as maximum. The RTC ordered
Calang and Philtranco, jointly and severally, to pay P50,000.00 as death indemnity to the heirs of
Armando; P50,000.00 as death indemnity to the heirs of Mabansag; and P90,083.93 as actual
damages to the private complainants.
The petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals (CA), docketed as CA-G.R. CR
No. 25522. The CA, in its decision dated November 20, 2009, affirmed the RTC decision in toto. The
CA ruled that petitioner Calang failed to exercise due care and precaution in driving the Philtranco
bus. According to the CA, various eyewitnesses testified that the bus was traveling fast and
encroached into the opposite lane when it evaded a pushcart that was on the side of the road. In
addition, he failed to slacken his speed, despite admitting that he had already seen the jeep coming
from the opposite direction when it was still half a kilometer away. The CA further ruled that Calang
demonstrated a reckless attitude when he drove the bus, despite knowing that it was suffering from
loose compression, hence, not roadworthy.
The CA added that the RTC correctly held Philtranco jointly and severally liable with petitioner
Calang, for failing to prove that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent
the accident.
The petitioners filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari. In our Resolution dated
February 17, 2010, we denied the petition for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error in the
assailed decision to warrant the exercise of this Courts discretionary appellate jurisdiction.
The Motion for Reconsideration

In the present motion for reconsideration, the petitioners claim that there was no basis to hold
Philtranco jointly and severally liable with Calang because the former was not a party in the criminal
case (for multiple homicide with multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property thru
reckless imprudence) before the RTC.
The petitioners likewise maintain that the courts below overlooked several relevant facts, supported
by documentary exhibits, which, if considered, would have shown that Calang was not negligent,
such as the affidavit and testimony of witness Celestina Cabriga; the testimony of witness Rodrigo
Bocaycay; the traffic accident sketch and report; and the jeepneys registration receipt. The
petitioners also insist that the jeeps driver had the last clear chance to avoid the collision.
We partly grant the motion.
Liability of Calang
We see no reason to overturn the lower courts finding on Calangs culpability. The finding of
negligence on his part by the trial court, affirmed by the CA, is a question of fact that we cannot pass
upon without going into factual matters touching on the finding of negligence. In petitions for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, this Court is limited to reviewing only errors
of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on
record, or the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.
Liability of Philtranco
We, however, hold that the RTC and the CA both erred in holding Philtranco jointly and severally
liable with Calang. We emphasize that Calang was charged criminally before the RTC. Undisputedly,
Philtranco was not a direct party in this case. Since the cause of action against Calang was based on
delict, both the RTC and the CA erred in holding Philtranco jointly and severally liable with Calang,
based on quasi-delict under Articles 21761 and 21802 of the Civil Code. Articles 2176 and 2180 of the
Civil Code pertain to the vicarious liability of an employer for quasi-delicts that an employee has
committed. Such provision of law does not apply to civil liability arising from delict.
If at all, Philtrancos liability may only be subsidiary. Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the
subsidiary civil liabilities of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments, as follows:
In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or
corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a
violation of municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulations shall have been
committed by them or their employees.1avvphil
Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their
houses from guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such
guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the
deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such
innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to the care of and vigilance over
such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons
unless committed by the innkeepers employees.
The foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according to Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code, which reads:
The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers,
teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their
servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
The provisions of the Revised Penal Code on subsidiary liability Articles 102 and 103 are deemed
written into the judgments in cases to which they are applicable. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its

decision, the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the
employer.3 Nonetheless, before the employers subsidiary liability is enforced, adequate evidence
must exist establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted employees; (2) they
are engaged in some kind of industry; (3) the crime was committed by the employees in the discharge
of their duties; and (4) the execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency. The
determination of these conditions may be done in the same criminal action in which the employees
liability, criminal and civil, has been pronounced, in a hearing set for that precise purpose, with due
notice to the employer, as part of the proceedings for the execution of the judgment. 4
WHEREFORE, we PARTLY GRANT the present motion. The Court of Appeals decision that affirmed
in toto the RTC decision, finding Rolito Calang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless
imprudence resulting in multiple homicide, multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property,
is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that Philtrancos liability should only be subsidiary. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 12191. October 14, 1918. ]

JOSE CANGCO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MANILA RAILROAD CO., Defendant-Appellee.
Ramon Sotelo, for Appellant.
Kincaid & Hartigan, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. MASTER AND SERVANT; CONTRACT; NEGLIGENCE. Failure to perform a contract cannot be
excused upon the ground that the breach was due to the negligence of a servant of the obligor, and
that the latter exercised due diligence in the selection and control of the servant.
2. CONTRACTS; NEGLIGENCE:; CULPA AQUILIANA; CULPA CONTRACTUAL. The distinction
between negligence as the source of an obligation (culpa aquiliana) and negligence in the
performance of a contract (culpa contractual) pointed out.
3. CARRIERS; PASSENGERS; NEGLIGENCE; ALIGHTING FROM MOVING TRAIN. It is not
negligence per se for a traveler to alight from a slowly moving train.

DECISION

FISHER, J. :

At the time of the occurrence which gave rise to this litigation the plaintiff, Jose Cangco, was in the
employment of the Manila Railroad Company in the capacity of clerk, with a monthly wage of P25. He
lived in the pueblo of San Mateo, in the province of Rizal, which is located upon the line of the
defendant railroad company; and in coming daily by train to the companys office in the city of Manila
where he worked, he used a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him to ride upon the
companys trains free of charge. Upon the occasion in question, January 20, 1915, the plaintiff was
returning home by rail from his daily labors; and as the train drew up to the station in San Mateo the
plaintiff arose from his seat in the second class-car where he was riding and, making his exit through
the door, took his position upon the steps of the coach, seizing the upright guardrail with his right
hand for support.
On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is a cement platform
which begins to rise with a moderate gradient some distance away from the companys office and
extends along in front of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches. As
the train slowed down another passenger, named Emilio Zuniga, also an employee of the railroad
company, got off the same car, alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to rise from the
level of the ground. When the train had proceeded a little farther the plaintiff Jose Cangco stepped off
also, but one or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his
feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. His body at once rolled from the
platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated.
It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved forward possibly six meters
before it came to a full stop.
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 oclock on a dark night, and as the railroad station was
lighted dimly by a single light located some distance away, objects on the platform where the accident
occurred were difficult to discern, especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.
The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on the platform where the plaintiff alighted is

found in the fact that it was the customary season for harvesting these melons and a large lot had
been brought to the station for shipment to the market. They were contained in numerous tow sacks
which had been piled on the platform in a row one upon another. The testimony shows that this row of
sacks was so placed that there was a space of only about two feet between the sacks of melons and
the edge of the platform; and it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot
alighted upon one of these melons at the moment he stepped upon the platform. His statement that
he failed to see these objects in the darkness is readily to be credited.
The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and it appeared that the
injuries which he had received were very serious. He was therefore brought at once to a certain
hospital in the city of Manila where an examination was made and his arm was amputated. The result
of this operation was unsatisfactory, and the plaintiff was then carried to another hospital where a
second operation was performed and the member was again amputated higher up near the shoulder.
It appears in evidence that the plaintiff expended the sum of P790.25 in the form of medical and
surgical fees and for other expenses in connection with the process of his curation.
Upon August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila
to recover damages of the defendant company, founding his action upon the negligence of the
servants and employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and in
leaving them so placed as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the companys
trains. At the hearing in the Court of First Instance, his Honor, the trial judge, found the facts
substantially as above stated, and drew therefrom his conclusion to the effect that, although
negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of melons were so
placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had
failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded from recovering.
Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company, and the plaintiff appealed.
It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling
these sacks on the platform in the manner above stated; that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall
as he alighted from the train; and that they therefore constituted an effective legal cause of the
injuries sustained by the plaintiff. It necessarily follow s that the defendant company is liable for the
damage thereby occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiffs own contributory negligence.
In resolving this problem it is necessary that each of these conceptions of liability, to-wit, the primary
responsibility of the defendant company and the contributory negligence of the plaintiff should be
separately examined.
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of
carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all,
from the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its
performance. That is to say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially, in the legal
viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed by article
1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection
and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but
only to extra-contractual obligations or to use the technical form of expression, that article relates
only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual.
Manresa (vol. 8, p. 67) in his commentaries upon articles 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code, clearly
points out this distinction, which was also recognized by this Court in its decision in the case of Rakes
v. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Cc. (7 Phil. Rep., 359). In commenting upon article 1093 (vol. 8, p. 30)
Manresa clearly points out the difference between "culpa, substantive and independent, which of itself
constitutes the source of an obligation between persons not formerly connected by any legal tie" and
culpa considered as an "accident in the performance of an obligation already existing . . . ."cralaw
virtua1aw library
In the Rakes case (supra) the decision of this court was made to rest squarely upon the proposition
that article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to acts of negligence which constitute the breach
of a contract.

Upon this point the Court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The acts to which these articles [1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code] are applicable are understood to
be those not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another But where relations
already formed give rise to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi-contract, then breaches
of those duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103 and 1104 of the same code." (Rakes v. Atlantic, Gulf
and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359 at p. 365.)
This distinction is of the utmost importance. The liability, which, under the Spanish law, is, in certain
cases imposed upon employers with respect to damages occasioned by the negligence of their
employees to persons to whom they are not bound by contract, is not based, as in the English
Common Law, upon the principle of respondent superior if it were, the master would be liable in
every case and unconditionally but upon the principle announced in article 1902 of the Civil Code,
which imposes upon all persons who by their fault or negligence, do injury to another, the obligation
of making good the damage caused. One who places a powerful automobile in the hands of a servant
whom he knows to be ignorant of the method of managing such a vehicle, is himself guilty of an act of
negligence which makes him liable for all the consequences of his imprudence. The obligation to
make good the damage arises at the very instant that the unskillful servant, while acting within the
scope of his employment, causes the injury. The liability of the master is personal and direct. But, if
the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the selection and direction of the
servant, he is not liable for the acts of the latter, whether done within the scope of his employment or
not, if the damage done by the servant does not amount to a breach of the contract between the
master and the person injured.
It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in the selection and control of the servant
relieves the master from liability for the latters acts on the contrary, that proof shows that the
responsibility has never existed. As Manresa says (vol. 8, p. 68) the liability arising from extracontractual culpa is always based upon a voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent, but by
mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another. A master who exercises all possible
care in the selection of his servant, taking into consideration the qualifications they should possess for
the discharge of the duties which it is his purpose to confide to them, and directs them with equal
diligence, thereby performs his duty to third persons to whom he is bound by no contractual ties, and
he incurs no liability whatever if, by reason of the negligence of his servants, even within the scope of
their employment, such third persons suffer damage. True it is that under article 1903 of the Civil
Code the law creates a presumption that he has been negligent in the selection or direction of his
servant, but the presumption is rebuttable and yields to proof of due care and diligence in this
respect.
The supreme court of Porto Rico, in interpreting identical provisions, as found in the Porto Rican Civil
Code, has held that these articles are applicable to cases of extra-contractual culpa exclusively.
(Carmona v. Cuesta, 20 Porto Rico Reports, 215.)
This distinction was again made patent by this Court in its decision in the case of Bahia v. Litonjua
and Leynes, (30 Phil. Rep., 624), which was an action brought upon the theory of the extracontractual liability of the defendant to respond for the damage caused by the carelessness of his
employee while acting within the scope of his employment The Court, after citing the last paragraph
of article 1903 of the Civil Code, said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part
of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over
him after the selection, or both; and (2) that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and
consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of
the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of
a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.

"This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of
his servant. This is the notable peculiarity of the Spanish law of negligence. It is, of course, in striking
contrast to the American doctrine that, in relations with strangers, the negligence of the servant is
conclusively the negligence of the master."cralaw virtua1aw library
The opinion there expressed by this Court, to the effect that in case of extra-contractual culpa based
upon negligence, it is necessary that there shall have been some fault attributable to the defendant
personally, and that the last paragraph of article 1903 merely establishes a rebuttable presumption, is
in complete accord with the authoritative opinion of Manresa, who says (vol. 12, p. 611) that the
liability created by article 1903 is imposed by reason of the breach of the duties inherent in the special
relations of authority or superiority existing between the person called upon to repair the damage and
the one who, by his act or omission, was the cause of it.
On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or omissions of their
servants or agents, when such acts or omissions cause damages which amount to the breach of a
contract, is not based upon a mere presumption of the masters negligence in their selection or
control, and proof of exercise of the utmost diligence and care in this regard does not relieve the
master of his liability for the breach of his contract.
Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual. Extra-contractual
obligation has its source in the breach or omission of those mutual duties which civilized society
imposes upon its members, or which arise from these relations, other than contractual, of certain
members of society to others, generally embraced in the concept of status. The legal rights of each
member of society constitute the measure of the corresponding legal duties, mainly negative in
character, which the existence of those rights imposes upon all other members of society. The breach
of these general duties whether due to willful intent or to mere inattention, if productive of injury, gives
rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured party. The fundamental distinction between obligations of
this character and those which arise from contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of noncontractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum
juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary
duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation.
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or omission, it is
competent for the legislature to elect and our Legislature has so elected to limit such liability to
cases in which the person upon whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable or, on the
contrary, for reasons of public policy, to extend that liability, without regard to the lack of moral
culpability, so as to include responsibility for the negligence of those persons whose acts or
omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are in a position to exercise an absolute or
limited control over them. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra
contractual liability with certain well-defined exceptions to cases in which moral culpability can
be directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having
failed to exercise due care in ones own acts, or in having failed to exercise due care in the selection
and control of ones agents or servants, or in the control of persons who, by reason of their status,
occupy a position of dependency with respect to the person made liable for their conduct.
The position of a natural or juridical person who has undertaken by contract to render service to
another, is wholly different from that to which article 1903 relates. When the source of the obligation
upon which plaintiffs cause of action depends is a negligent act or omission, the burden of proof rests
upon plaintiff to prove the negligence if he does not his action fails. But when the facts averred
show a contractual undertaking by defendant for the benefit of plaintiff, and it is alleged that plaintiff
has failed or refused to perform the contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify in his pleadings
whether the breach of the contract is due to willful fault or to negligence on the part of the defendant,
or of his servants or agents. Proof of the contract and of its nonperformance is sufficient prima facie
to warrant a recovery.
"As a general rule . . . it is logical that in case of extra-contractual culpa, a suing creditor should
assume the burden of proof of its existence, as the only fact upon which his action is based; while on

the contrary, in a case of negligence which presupposes the existence of a contractual obligation, if
the creditor shows that it exists and that it has been broken, it is not necessary for him to prove the
negligence." (Manresa, vol. 8, p. 71 [1907 ed., p. 76].)
As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for the breach of a contract to show that the breach
was due to the negligent conduct of defendant or of his servants, even though such be in fact the
actual cause of the breach, it is obvious that proof on the part of defendant that the negligence or
omission of his servants or agents caused the breach of the contract would not constitute a defense
to the action. If the negligence of servants or agents could be invoked as a means of discharging the
liability arising from contract, the anomalous result would be that persons acting through the medium
of agents or servants in the performance of their contracts, would be in a better position than those
acting in person. If one delivers a valuable watch to a watchmaker who contracts to repair it, and the
bailee, by a personal negligent act causes its destruction, he is unquestionably liable. Would it be
logical to free him from his liability for the breach of his contract, which involves the duty to exercise
due care in the preservation of the watch, if he shows that it was his servant whose negligence
caused the injury? If such a theory could be accepted, juridical persons would enjoy practically
complete immunity from damages arising from the breach of their contracts if caused by negligent
acts of omission or commission on the part of their servants, as such juridical persons can of
necessity only act through agents or servants, and it would no doubt be true in most instances that
reasonable care had been taken in the selection and direction of such servants. If one delivers
securities to a banking corporation as collateral, and they are lost by reason of the negligence of
some clerk employed by the bank, would it be just and reasonable to permit the bank to relieve itself
of liability for the breach of its contract to return the collateral upon the payment of the debt by proving
that due care had been exercised in the selection and direction of the clerk?
This distinction between culpa aquiliana, as the source of an obligation, and culpa contractual as a
mere incident to the performance of a contract has frequently been recognized by the supreme court
of Spain. (Sentencias of June 27, 1894; November 20, 1896; and December 13 1896.) In the decision
of November 20, 1896, it appeared that plaintiff s action arose ex contractu, but that defendant sought
to avail himself of the provisions of article 1902 of the Civil Code as a defense. The Spanish Supreme
Court rejected defendants contention, saying:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"These are not cases of injury caused, without any pre-existing obligation, by fault or negligence,
such as those to which article 1902 of the Civil Code relates, but of damages caused by the
defendants failure to carry out the undertakings imposed by the contracts . . . ."cralaw virtua1aw
library
A brief review of the earlier decision of this court involving the liability of employers for damage done
by the negligent acts of their servants will show that in no case has the court ever decided that the
negligence of the defendants servants [has] been held to constitute a defense to an action for
damages for breach of contract.
In the case of Johnson v. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the court held that the owner of a carriage was
not liable for the damages caused by the negligence of his driver. In that case the court commented
on the fact that no evidence had been adduced in the trial court that the defendant had been
negligent in the employment of the driver, or that he had any knowledge of his lack of skill or
carefulness.
In the case of Baer Senior & Co.s Successors v. Compaia Maritima (6 Phil. Rep., 215), the plaintiff
sued the defendant for damages caused by the loss of a barge belonging to plaintiff which was
allowed to get adrift by the negligence of defendants servants in the course of the performance of a
contract of towage. The court held, citing Manresa (vol. 8, pp. 29, 69) that if the "obligation of the
defendant grew out of a contract made between it and the plaintiff . . . we do not think that the
provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 are applicable to the case."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the case of Chapman v. Underwood (27 Phil. Rep., 374), plaintiff sued the defendant to recover
damages for personal injuries caused by the negligence of defendants chauffeur while driving

defendants automobile in which defendant was riding at the time. The court found that the damages
were caused by the negligence of the driver of the automobile, but held that the master was not liable,
although he was present at the time, saying:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued for such a length of time as to give the
owner a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct the driver to desist therefrom. . . . The
act complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of time that the
owner by his acquiescence, makes the drivers acts his own."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the case of Yamada v. Manila Railroad Co. and Rachrach Garage & Taxicab Co. (33 Phil. Rep., 8),
it is true that the court rested its conclusion as to the liability of the defendant upon article 1903,
although the facts disclosed that the injury complained of by plaintiff constituted a breach of the duty
to him arising out of the contract of transportation. The express ground of the decision in this case
was that article 1903, in dealing with the liability of a master for the negligent acts of his servants
"makes the distinction between private individuals and public enterprise;" that as to the latter the law
creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence in the selection or direction of the servants; and that
in the particular case the presumption of negligence had not been overcome.
It is evident, therefore, that in its decision in the Yamada case, the court treated plaintiffs action as
though founded in tort rather than as based upon the breach of the contract of carriage, and an
examination of the pleadings and of the briefs shows that the questions of law were in fact discussed
upon this theory. Viewed from the standpoint of the defendant the practical result must have been the
same in any event. The proof disclosed beyond doubt that the defendants servant was grossly
negligent and that his negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury. It also affirmatively
appeared that defendant had been guilty of negligence in its failure to exercise proper discretion in
the direction of the servant. Defendant was therefore, liable for the injury suffered by plaintiff, whether
the breach of the duty were to be regarded as constituting culpa aquilina or culpa contractual. As
Manresa points out (vol. 8, pp. 29 and 69) whether negligence occurs as an incident in the course of
the performance of a contractual undertaking or is itself the source of an extra-contractual obligation,
its essential characteristics are identical. There is always an act or omission productive of damage
due to carelessness or inattention on the part of the defendant. Consequently, when the court holds
that a defendant is liable in damages for having failed to exercise due care, either directly, or in failing
to exercise proper care in the selection and direction of his servants, the practical result is identical in
either ease. Therefore, it follows that it is not to be inferred, because the court held in the Yamada
ease that the defendant was liable for the damages negligently caused by its servant to a person to
whom it was bound by contract, and made reference to the fact that the defendant was negligent in
the selection and control of its servants, that in such a case the court would have held that it would
have been a good defense to the action, if presented squarely upon the theory of the breach of the
contract, for defendant to have proved that it did in fact exercise care in the selection and control of
the servant.
The true explanation of such cases is to be found by directing the attention to the relative spheres of
contractual and extra-contractual obligations. The field of non-contractual obligation is much more
broader than that of contractual obligation, comprising, as it does, the whole extent of juridical human
relations. These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person
is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person.
When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that
the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of an
extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties.
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in
safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (Civil Code, article 1258). That
duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-performance could not be excused by
proof that the fault was morally imputable to defendants servants.
The railroad companys defense involves the assumption that even granting that the negligent
conduct of its servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractual

obligation to maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its trains, the direct and proximate
cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory negligence in failing to wait until the
train had come to a complete stop before alighting. Under the doctrine of comparative negligence
announced in the Rakes case (supra), if the accident was caused by plaintiffs own negligence, no
liability is imposed upon defendant, whereas if the accident was caused by defendants negligence
and plaintiffs negligence merely contributed to his injury, the damages should be apportioned. It is,
therefore, important to ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of negligence.
It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop before alighting, the
particular injury suffered by him could not have occurred. Defendant contends, and cites many
authorities in support of the contention, that it is negligence per se for a passenger to alight from a
moving train. We are not disposed to subscribe to this doctrine n its absolute form. We are of the
opinion that this proposition is too broadly stated and is at variance with the experience of every-day
life. In this particular instance, tat the train was barely moving when plaintiff alighted is shown
conclusively by the fact that it came to stop within six meters from the place where he stepped from it.
Thousands of persons alight from trains under these conditions every day of the year, and sustain no
injury where the company has kept its platform free from dangerous obstructions. There is no reason
to believe that plaintiff would have suffered any injury whatever in alighting as he did had it not been
for defendants negligent failure to perform its duty to provide a safe alighting place.
We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that expressed in Thompsons
work on Negligence (vol. 3, sec. 3010) as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting to
alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered
whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the passenger, would have
acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care has
been defined to be, not the care which may or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the
care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury."
(Thompson, Commentaries on Negligence, vol. 3, sec. 3010.)
Or, if we prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used by this court in Picart v. Snith (37 Phil. Rep.,
809), we may say that the test is this; Was there anything in the circumstances surrounding the
plaintiff at the time he alighted from the train which would have admonished a person of average
prudence that to get off the train under the conditions then existing was dangerous? If so, the plaintiff
should have desisted from alighting; and his failure so to desist was contributory negligence.
As the case now before us presents itself, the only fact from which a conclusion can be drawn to the
effect that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence is that he stepped off the car without being
able to discern clearly the condition of the platform and while the train was yet slowly moving. In
considering the situation thus presented, it should not be overlooked that the plaintiff was, as we find,
ignorant of the fact that the obstruction which was caused by the sacks of melons piled on the
platform existed; and as the defendant was bound by reason of its duty as a public carrier to afford to
its passengers facilities for safe egress from its trains, the plaintiff had a right to assume, in the
absence of some circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that the platform was clear. The place, as
we have already stated, was dark, or dimly lighted, and this also is proof of a failure upon the part of
the defendant in the performance of a duty owing by it to the plaintiff; for if it were by any possibility
conceded that it had a right to pile these sacks in the path of alighting passengers, the placing of
them in that position gave rise to the duty to light the premises adequately so that their presence
would be revealed.
As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this case the
following circumstances are to be noted: The companys platform was constructed upon a level
higher than that of the roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the steps of the car to
the spot where the alighting passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus reduced,
thereby decreasing the risk incident to stepping off. The nature of the platform, constructed as it was
of cement material, also assured to the passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight.

Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no
means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have been in
an aged or feeble person. In determining the question of contributory negligence in performing such
act that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly the age, sex, and
physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the
passenger, and should be considered. Women, it has been observed, as a general rule, are less
capable than men of alighting with safety under such conditions, as the nature of their wearing
apparel obstructs the free movement of the limbs. Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly
familiar to the plaintiff, as it was his daily custom to get on and off the train at this station. There could,
therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was
required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting. Our conclusion is that the
conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not
characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.
The evidence shows that the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was earning P25 a month as a
copyist clerk, and that the injuries he has suffered have permanently disabled him from continuing
that employment. Defendant has not shown that any other gainful occupation is open to plaintiff. His
expectancy of life, according to the standard mortality tables, is approximately thirty-three years. We
are of the opinion that a fair compensation for the damage suffered by him for his permanent disability
is the sum of P2,500, and that he is also entitled to recover of defendant the additional sum of
P790.25 for medical attention, hospital services, and other incidental expenditures connected with the
treatment of his injuries.
The decision of the lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of
P3,290.25, and for the costs of both instances. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Street and Avancea, JJ., concur.

0 Phil 768 Civil Law Torts and Damages Distinction of Liability of Employers Under Article 2180
and Their Liability for Breach of Contract
On January 20, 1915, Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Co (MRC). He was an
employee of the latter and he was given a pass so that he could ride the train for free. When he was
nearing his destination at about 7pm, he arose from his seat even though the train was not at full
stop. When he was about to alight from the train (which was still slightly moving) he accidentally
stepped on a sack of watermelons which he failed to notice due to the fact that it was dim. This
caused him to lose his balance at theDOOR and he fell and his arm was crushed by the train and
he suffered other serious injuries. He was dragged a few meters more as the train slowed down.
It was established that the employees of MRC were negligent in piling the sacks of watermelons.
MRC raised as a defense the fact that Cangco was also negligent as he failed to exercise diligence in
alighting from the train as he did not wait for it to stop.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Railroad Co is liable for damages.
HELD: Yes. Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a common practice and a lot of
people are doing so every day without suffering injury. Cangco has the vigor and agility of young
manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the
same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. He was also ignorant of the fact that sacks of
watermelons were there as there were no appropriate warnings and the place was dimly lit.
The Court also elucidated on the distinction between the liability of employers under Article 2180 and
their liability for breach of contract [of carriage]:

[G.R. No. L-21438. September 28, 1966.]

AIR FRANCE, Petitioner, v. RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, Respondents.
Lichauco, Picazo & Agcaoili for Petitioner.
Bengzon, Villegas & Zarraga for respondent R. Carrascoso.

SYLLABUS
1. JUDGMENT; FINDINGS OF FACT; REQUIREMENT OF LAW. Courts of justice are not
burdened with the obligation to specify in the sentence every bit and piece of evidence presented by
the parties upon the issues raised. The law solely insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate
facts" upon which the courts conclusion is drawn.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; APPEAL AND ERROR; FAILURE TO MAKE FINDINGS ON EVIDENCE AND
CONTENTIONS OF ONE PARTY, EFFECT OF; DECISION NOT TO BE CLOGGED WITH
DETAILS. The mere failure to make specific findings of fact on the evidence presented for the
defense or to specify in the decision the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing to
believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirement of the law and the
Constitution. There is no law that so requires. A decision is not to be clogged with details such that
prolixity, if not confusion, may result.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; FINDINGS OF FACT BY COURTS DEFINED. Findings of fact may be defined as
the written statement of the ultimate facts as found by the court and essential to support the decision
and judgment rendered thereon; they consist of the courts "conclusions with respect to the
determinative facts on issue."cralaw virtua1aw library
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; QUESTION OF LAW EXPLAINED. A question of law is "one which does not call for
an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties."cralaw virtua1aw
library
5. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; APPEAL; WHAT MAY BE RAISED ON APPEAL FROM COURT OF
APPEALS. It is not appropriately the business of the Supreme Court to alter the facts or to review
the questions of fact because, by statute, only questions of law may be raised in an appeal
by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of Appeals, which judgment is conclusive as to the facts.
6. ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF AFFIRMANCE BY COURT OF APPEALS OF TRIAL COURTS DECISION.
When the Court of Appeals affirms a judgment of the trial court, and the findings of fact of said
appellate court are not in any way at war with those of the trial court, nor is said affirmance upon a
ground or grounds different from those which were made the basis of the trial courts conclusions,
such judgment of affirmance is (1) a determination by the Court of Appeals that the proceeding in the
lower court was free from prejudicial error; (7) that all questions raised by the assignments of error
and all questions that might have been so raised have been finally adjudicated as free from all error.
7. ID.; COMPLAINT; SPECIFIC MENTION OF THE TERM "BAD FAITH" IN THE COMPLAINT NOT
REQUIRED. Although there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint, the
inference of bad faith may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. 8.
EVIDENCE; FINDING OF COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENT WAS ENTITLED TO A
FIRST CLASS SEAT. The Court of Appeals properly found that a first class-ticket holder is entitled
to first class seat, given the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed; otherwise,
an air passenger will be placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline, because it will always be easy
for an airline to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket and say that there was verbal agreement to
the contrary. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence

to the ticket so issued is desirable.

9. ID.; LACK OF SPECIFIC AVERMENT OF BAD FAITH CURED BY NOTICE TO DEFENDANT OF
WHAT PLAINTIFF INTENDS TO PROVE AND BY EVIDENCE PRESENTED WITHOUT
OBJECTION; AMENDMENT OF COMPLAINT TO CONFORM TO EVIDENCE UNNECESSARY. If
there was lack of specific averment of bad faith in the complaint, such deficiency was cured by notice,
right at the start of the trial, by plaintiffs counsel to defendant as to what plaintiff intended to prove:
while in the plane in Bangkok, plaintiff was ousted by defendants manager who gave his seat to a
white man; and by evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract presented without objection
on the part of the defendant. An amendment of the complaint to conform to the evidence is not even
required.
10. ID.; ADMISSIBILITY OF TESTIMONY ON AN ENTRY IN A NOTEBOOK; TESTIMONY NOT
COVERED BY BEST EVIDENCE RULE. The testimony of a witness that the purser made an entry
in his notebook reading "First Class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will
and that the captain refused to intervene," is competent and admissible because the subject of the
inquiry is not the entry but the ouster incident. It does not come within the prescription of the best
evidence rule.
11. CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE; QUASI-DELICT; LIABILITY OF COMMON CARRIERS; CASE AT
BAR. Neglect or malfeasance of the carriers employees could give ground for an action for
damages. Damages here are proper because the stress of respondents action is placed upon his
wrongful expulsion, which is a violation of a public duty by petitioner- aircarrier a case of quasidelict.
12. ID.; ID.; ID.; AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT. Award of moral
damages is proper, despite petitioners argument that respondents action is planted upon breach of
contract, where the stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion, the contract having been averred
only to establish the relation between the parties.
13. ID.; ID.; ID.; EMPLOYER IS RESPONSIBLE FOR TORTIOUS ACTS OF HIS EMPLOYEE; CASE
AT BAR. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of his employees is well settled in
law. (Art. 2130, Civil Code). Petitioner-aircarrier must answer for the willful, malevolent act of its
manager.
14. ID.; ID.; ID.; LIABILITY FOR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES; POWER OF COURTS TO GRANT;
CASE AT BAR. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant exemplary damages, the only
condition being that defendant should have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or
malevolent manner." As the manner of ejectment of plaintiff from his first class seat fits into this legal
precept, exemplary damages are well awarded, in addition to moral damages.
15. ID.; ID.; LIABILITY FOR ATTORNEYS FEES; COURT DISCRETION WELL EXERCISED
SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment for
attorneys fees. The court below felt that it is but just and equitable that attorneys fees be given and
the Supreme Court does not intend to break faith with the tradition that discretion well-exercised as
it is here should not be disturbed.
16. ID.; RIGHTS OF PASSENGERS. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They
have a right to be treated by the carriers employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language,
indignities and abuses from such employees. So, any rude or discourteous conduct on the part of
employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier. (4 R. C. L1174-1175).
17. ID.; BREACH OF CONTRACT MAY BE A TORT. Although the relation of passenger and
carrier is contractual both in origin and nature, nevertheless, the act that breaks the contract may also
be a tort.

18. WORDS AND PHRASES; BAD FAITH DEFINED. "Bad faith", as understood in law,
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of selfinterest or ill will or for ulterior purpose

DECISION

SANCHEZ, J.:

The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso
P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the
difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome, these
various amounts with interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid;
plus P3,000.00 for attorneys fees; and the costs of suit.
On appeal, 2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascosos plane ticket
from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs
against petitioner.
The case is now before us for review on certiorari.
The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as "fully supported by the evidence of record",
are:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for Lourdes
on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc.,
issued to plaintiff a first class round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to
Bangkok, plaintiff traveled in first class, but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced
plaintiff to vacate the first class seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness
Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a white man, who, the Manager alleged, had a better right to the seat.
When asked to vacate his first class seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told
defendants Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and,
according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class;
when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager],
they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white
man (Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of May 26, 1959); and plaintiff reluctantly gave his first class seat in
the plane." 3
1. The thrust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review "all the findings" 4 of respondent
Court of Appeals. Petitioner charges that respondent court failed to make complete findings of fact on
all the issues properly laid before it. We are asked to consider facts favorable to petitioner, and then,
to overturn the appellate courts decision.
Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision shall be rendered by any court of
record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based." 5
This is echoed in the statutory demand that a judgment determining the merits of the case shall state
"clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based", 6 and that "Every decision of the
Court of Appeals shall contain complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised before it." 7
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open to direct attack. 8 The law,
however, solely insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the courts
conclusion is drawn. 9 A court of justice is not hidebound to write in its decision every bit and piece of

evidence 10 presented by one party and the other upon the issues raised. Neither is it to be burdened
with the obligation "to specify in the sentence the facts" which a party "considered as proved." 11 This
is but a part of the mental process from which the Court draws the essential ultimate facts. A decision
is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So long as the
decision of the Court of Appeals contains the necessary facts to warrant its conclusions, it is no error
for said court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect to the evidence for the
defense." Because, as this Court well observed, "There is no law that so requires." 12 Indeed, "the
mere failure to specify (in the decision) the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusing
to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the provisions of law
and the Constitution." It is in this setting that in Manigque, it was held that the mere fact that the
findings "were based entirely on the evidence for the prosecution without taking into consideration or
even mentioning the appellants side in the controversy as shown by his own testimony", would not
vitiate the judgment. 13 If the court did not recite in the decision the testimony of each witness for, or
each item of evidence presented by, the defeated party, it does not mean that the court has
overlooked such testimony or such item of evidence. 14 At any rate, the legal presumptions are that
official duty has been regularly performed, and that all the matters within an issue in a case were laid
before the court and passed upon by it. 15
Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, may be defined as "the written
statement of the ultimate facts as found by the court . . . and essential to support the decision and
judgment rendered thereon." 16 They consist of the courts "conclusions with respect to the
determinative facts in issue" 17 A question of law, upon the other hand, has been declared as "one
which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
parties." 18
2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the
Court of Appeals 19 That judgment is conclusive as to the facts. It is not appropriately the business of
this Court to alter the facts or to review the questions of fact. 20
With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals support its judgment.
3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?
It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner a first
class ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and
agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for
first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the
issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such
would depend upon the availability of first class seats.
These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and discussed in its brief before the
Court of Appeals under its third assignment of error, which reads: "The trial court erred in finding that
plaintiff had confirmed reservations for, and a right to, first class seats on the definite segments of
his journey, particularly that from Saigon to Beirut." 21
And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a first-class ticket was no
guarantee that the passenger to whom the same had been issued, would be accommodated in the
first-class compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff he had yet to make arrangements upon arrival at
every station for the necessary first class reservation. We are not impressed by such a reasoning. We
cannot understand how a reputable firm like defendant airplane company could have the indiscretion
to give out ticket it never meant to honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of
first-class tickets end yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in
keeping with the ordinary course of business that the company should know whether or not the tickets
it issues are to be honored or not." 22

Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly disposed of petitioners contention,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a First class ticket, there can be no question. Apart
from his testimony, see plaintiffs Exhibits A, A-1 B, B-1, B-2, C and C-1, and defendants own
witness, Rafael Altonaga, confirmed plaintiffs testimony and testified as follows:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
Q. In these tickets there are marks O.K. From what you know, what does this O.K. mean?
A. That the space is confirmed.
Q. Confirmed for first class?
A. Yes, first class. (Transcript, p. 169)
x

"Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that
although plaintiff paid for, and was issued a first class airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to
confirmation in Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the testimony of said witnesses. Oral
evidence cannot prevail over written evidence, and plaintiffs Exhibits A, A1, B, B-1, C and C- 1
belie the testimony of said witnesses, and clearly show that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a
first class ticket without any reservation whatever.
Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendants own witness Rafael Altonaga testified that the
reservation for a first class accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. The court cannot believe
that after such confirmation ,defendant had a verbal understanding with plaintiff that the first class
ticket issued to him by defendant would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong." 23
We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight difference of a few pesos in the
amount refunded on Carrascosos ticket, the decision of the Court of First Instance was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals in all other respects. We hold the view that such a judgment of affirmance has
merged the judgment of the lower court. 24 Implicit in that affirmance is a determination by the Court
of Appeals that the proceeding in the Court of First Instance was free from prejudicial error and that
all questions raised by the assignments of error and all questions that might have been so raised are
to be regarded as finally adjudicated against the appellant." So also, the judgment affirmed "must be
regarded as free from all error" 25 We reached this policy construction because nothing in the
decision of the Court of Appeals on this point would suggest that its findings of fact are in any way at
war with those of the trial court. Nor was said affirmance by the Court of Appeals upon a ground or
grounds different from those which were made the basis of the conclusions of the trial court. 26
If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat,
notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air
passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. What security then can a passenger
have? It will always be an easy matter for an airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very
stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the
passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a rule, a written document speaks
a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the
relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such is
the case here. The lower courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants
in the ticket.
The foregoing are the considerations which point to the conclusion that there are facts upon which the
Court of Appeals predicated the finding that respondent Carrascoso had a first class ticket and was

entitled to a first class seat at Bangkok, which is a stopover in the Saigon to Beirut leg of the flight, 27
We perceive no "welter of distortions by the Court of Appeals of petitioners statement of its position",
as charged by petitioner. 28 Nor do we subscribe to petitioners accusation that respondent
Carrascoso "surreptitiously took a first class seat to provoke an issue." 29 And this because, as
petitioner states, Carrascoso went to see the Manager at his office in Bangkok "to confirm my seat
and because from Saigon I was told again to see the Manager. 30 Why, then, was he allowed to take
a first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat? Or, if another had a better right to the
seat?
4. Petitioner assails respondent courts award of moral damages. Petitioners trenchant claim is that
Carrascosos action is planted upon breach of contract; that to authorize an award for moral damages
there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith; 31 and that the decision of the Court of Appeals fails
to make a finding of bad faith. The pivotal allegations in the complaint bearing on this issue
are:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"3. That . . . plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with the Philippine Air Lines for a valuable
consideration, the latter acting as general agents for and in behalf of the defendant, under which aid
contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as defendant agreed to furnish plaintiff, First Class passage on
defendants plane during the entire duration of plaintiffs tour of Europe with Hongkong as starting
point up to and until plaintiffs return trip to Manila, . . .
4. That during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to Saigon and from Saigon to Bangkok,
defendant furnished to the plaintiff First Class accommodation but only after protestations, arguments
and/or insistence were made by the plaintiff with defendants employees.
5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passage, but instead furnished plaintiff only
Tourist Class accommodations from Bangkok to Teheran and/or Casablanca, . . . the plaintiff has
been compelled by defendants employees to leave the First Class accommodation berths at
Bangkok after he was already seated.
6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the inconvenience and embarrassments
brought by defendants breach of contract was forced to take a Pan American World Airways plane
on his return trip from Madrid to Manila. 32
x

2. That likewise, as a result of defendants failure to furnish First Class accommodations aforesaid,
plaintiff suffered inconveniences, embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby causing plaintiff mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the like injury, resulting in moral
damages in the amount of P30,000.00." 33
x

The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a
first class passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said contract
was breached when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, That
there was bad faith when petitioners employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class
accommodation berth "after he was already seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason
of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental
anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is
true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad
faith is there; it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. 34 The contract was
averred to establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of the action is put on wrongful
expulsion.

Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right at the start of the trial, respondents counsel placed
petitioner on guard on what Carrascoso intended to prove: That while sitting in the plane in Bangkok,
Carrascoso was ousted by petitioners manager who gave his seat to a white man; 35 and (b)
evidence of bad faith in the fulfillment of the contract was presented without objection on the part of
the petitioner. It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment
in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured
by the evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even required. 36 On the
question of bad faith, the Court of Appeals declared:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the plane belonging to
the defendant Air France while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist class not only without
his consent but against his will, has been sufficiently established by plaintiff in his testimony before
the court, corroborated by the corresponding entry made by the purser of the plane in his notebook
which notation reads as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will and that the captain
refused to intervene,
and by the testimony of an eye-witness Ernesto G. Cuento, who was a co-passenger. The captain of
the plane who was asked by the manager of defendant company at Bangkok to intervene even
refused to do so. It is noteworthy that no one on behalf of defendant ever contradicted or denied this
evidence for the plaintiff. It could have been easy for defendant to present its manager at Bangkok to
testify at the trial of the case, or yet to secure his deposition; but defendant did neither. 37
The Court of Appeals further stated
"Neither is there evidence as to whether or ,not a prior reservation was made by the white man.
Hence, if the employees of the defendant at Bangkok sold a first-class ticket to him when all the seats
had already been taken, surely the plaintiff should not have been picked out as the one to suffer the
consequences and to be subjected to the humiliation and indignity of being ejected from his seat in
the presence of others. Instead of explaining to the white man the improvidence committed by
defendants employees, the manager adopted the more drastic step of ousting the plaintiff who was
then safely ensconced in his rightful seat. We are strengthened in our belief that this probably was
what happened there, by the testimony of defendants witness Rafael Altonaga who, when asked to
explain the meaning of the letters O.K., appearing on the tickets of plaintiff, said that the space is
confirmed for first class. Likewise, Zenaida Faustino, another witness for defendant, who was the
chief of the Reservation Office of defendant, testified as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q. How does the person in the ticket-issuing office know what reservation the passenger has
arranged with you?
A. They call us up by phone and ask for the confirmation. (t.s.n., p. 247, June 19, 1959)
In this connection, we quote with approval what the trial Judge has said on this point:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
Why did the, using the words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, white man have a better right to the
seat occupied by Mr. Carrascoso? The record is silent. The defendant airline did not prove any
better, nay, any right on the part of the white man to the First class seat that the plaintiff was
occupying and for which he paid and was issued a corresponding first class ticket.
If there was a justified reason for the action of the defendants Manager in Bangkok, the defendant
could have easily proven it by having taken the testimony of the said Manager by deposition, but
defendant did not do so; the presumption is that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if
produced [Sec. 69, par. (e) Rules of Court]; and, under the circumstances, the Court is constrained to
find, as it does find, that the Manager of the defendant airline in Bangkok not merely asked but
threatened the plaintiff to throw him out of the plane if he did not give up his first class seat because

the said Manager wanted to accommodate using the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, the
white man." 38
It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted portion first transcribed did not use
the term "bad faith." But can it be doubted that the recital of facts therein points to bad faith? The
manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he
imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of
having to go to the tourist class compartment just to give way to another passenger whose right
thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has
assumed a meaning different from what is understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of
mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for
ulterior purposes." 39
And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express finding of bad faith in the judgment of
the Court of First Instance, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The evidence shows that defendant violated its contract of transportation with plaintiff in bad faith,
with the aggravating circumstances that defendants Manager in Bangkok went to the extent of
threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many passengers to have him thrown out of the airplane to
give the first class seat that he was occupying to, again using the words of witness Ernesto G.
Cuento, a white man whom he (defendants Manager) wished to accommodate, and the defendant
has not proven that this white man had any better right to occupy the first class seat that the
plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for, and for which the corresponding first class ticket was issued by
the defendant to him." 40
5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortuous act of its employees-need not be essayed. It is
well settled in law. 41 For the willful malevolent act of petitioners manager, petitioners his employer,
must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."cralaw virtua1aw
library
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the
provisions of Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable. 42
6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual
relation. 43 And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business
is mainly with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers.
The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or
malfeasance of the carriers employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a light to be treated by the carriers
employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected
against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it
is, that any rude or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the
latter an action for damages against the carrier. 44
Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a passengers check, it was a breach of
contract and a tort, giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to falsely
notify her that the check was worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection, though the
language used was not insulting and she was not ejected. 46 And this, because, altho the relation of
passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the
contract may be also a tort." 47 And in another case, "Where a passenger on a railroad train, when
the conductor came to collect his fare, tendered him the cash fare to a point where the train was
scheduled not to stop, and told him that as soon as the train reached such point he would pay the
cash fare from that point to destination, there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger which

justified the conductor in using insulting language to him, as by calling him a lunatic," 48 and the
Supreme Court of South Carolina there held the carrier liable for the mental suffering of said
passenger.
Petitioners contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascosos
action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the
petitioner-air carrier a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascosos testimony, thus
"Q. You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant and purser?
A. When we left already that was already in the trip I could not help it. So one of the flight
attendants approached me and requested from me my ticket and I said, What for? and she said, We
will note that you were transferred to the tourist class. I said, Nothing of that kind. That is tantamount
to accepting my transfer. And I also said, You are not going to note anything there because I am
protesting to this transfer.
Q. Was she able to note it?
A. No, because I did not give my ticket.
Q. About that purser?
A. Well, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable and you dont have enough leg
room, I stood up and I went to the pantry that was next to me and the purser was there. He told me, I
have recorded the incident in my notebook. He read it and translated it to me because it was
recorded in French First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and
that the captain refused to intervene.
MR. VALTE
I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness because the best evidence would be
the notes. Your Honor.
COURT
I will allow that as part of his testimony." 49
Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry in his
notebooks reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and
that the captain refused to intervene" is predicated upon evidence [Carrascosos testimony above]
which is incompetent. We do not think so. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster
incident. Testimony of the entry does not come within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such
testimony is admissible. 49
Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the impact of the
startling occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down.
Statements then, in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. 50 For, they grow "out
of the nervous excitement and mental and physical condition of the declarant." 51 The utterance of
the purser regarding his entry in the notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of
the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been guaranteed. 52 It thus escapes the operation of the
hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of petitioner. It would
have been an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted Carrascosos testimony. If it were really
true that no such entry was made, the deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter.

We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in evidence.
8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the Court ample power to grant
exemplary damages in contracts and quasi-contracts. The only condition is that defendant should
have "acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." 53 The manner of
ejectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept. And this, in
addition to moral damages. 54
9. The right to attorneys fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar
judgment for attorneys fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just
and equitable that attorneys fees be given. 55 We do not intend to break faith with the tradition that
discretion well exercised as it was here should not be disturbed.
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, thus: P25,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages, and
P3,000.00 as attorneys fees. The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial-court. 56 The
Court of Appeals did not interfere with the same. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give our
imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof. 57
On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from reversible error.
We accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, J.P., J., did not take part.

[G.R. No. L-24837. June 27, 1968.]

JULIAN C. SINGSON and RAMONA DEL CASTILLO, Plaintiffs, v. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS and SANTIAGO FREIXAS, in his capacity as President of the said Bank, Defendants.
Gil B. Galang for plaintiff-appellants.
Aviado & Aranda, for Defendant-Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; TORTS; CONTRACTUAL RELATION DOES NOT BAR RECOVERY OF
DAMAGES. The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort
by the one against the other and the consequent recovery of damages. Where the act that breaks the
contract may also be a tort, the contractual relation of the parties does not bar the recovery of
damages. (Air France v. Carrascoso, L-21438, September 28, 1966).

DECISION

CONCEPCION, J.:

Appeal by plaintiffs, Julian Singson and his wife, Ramona del Castillo, from a decision of the Court of
First Instance of Manila dismissing their complaint against defendants herein, the Bank of the
Philippine Islands and Santiago Freixas.
It appears that Singson, was one of the defendants in civil case No. 23906 of the Court of First
Instance, Manila, in which judgment had been rendered sentencing him and his codefendants therein,
namely, Celso Lobregat and Villa-Abrille & Co., to pay the sum of P105,539.56 to the plaintiff therein,
Philippine Milling Co. Singson and Lobregat had seasonably appealed from said judgment, but not
Villa-Abrille & Co., as against which said judgment, accordingly, became final and executory. In due
course, a writ of garnishment was subsequently served upon the Bank of the Philippine Islands in
which the Singsons had a current account insofar as Villa-Abrilles credits against the Bank were
concerned. What happened thereafter is set forth in the decision appealed from, from which we
quote:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment, a clerk of the bank in charge of all matters of execution
and garnishment, upon reading the name of the plaintiff herein in the title of the Writ of Garnishment
as a party defendant, without further reading the body of the said garnishment and informing himself
that said garnishment was merely intented for the deposits of defendant Villa-Abrille & Co., Valentin
Teus, Fernando F. de Villa-Abrille and Joaquin Bona, prepared a letter for the signature of the
President of the Bank informing the plaintiff Julian C. Singson of the garnishment of his deposits by
the plaintiff in that case. Another letter was also prepared and signed by the said President of the

Bank for the Special Sheriff dated April 17, 1963.

"Subsequently, two checks issued by the plaintiff Julian C. Singson, one for the amount of P383 in
favor of B.M. Glass Service dated April 16, 1963 and bearing No. C-424852, and check No. C394996 for the amount of P100 in favor of the Lega Corporation, and drawn against the said Bank,
were deposited by the said drawees with the said bank. Believing that the plaintiff Singson, the
drawer of the check, had no more control over the balance of his deposits in the said bank, the
checks were dishonored and were refused payment by the said bank. After the first check was
returned by the bank to the B.M. Glass Service, the latter wrote plaintiff Julian C. Singson a letter,
dated April 19, 1963, advising him that his check for P383.00 bearing No. C-424852 was not honored
by the bank for the reason that his account therein had already been garnished. The said B.M. Glass
Service further stated in the said letter that they were constrained to close his credit account with
them. In view thereof, plaintiff Julian C. Singson wrote the defendant bank a letter on April 19, 1963,
claiming that his name was not included in the Writ of Execution and Notice of Garnishment, which
was served upon the bank. The defendant President Santiago Freixas of the said bank took steps to
verify this information and after having confirmed the same, apologized to the plaintiff Julian C.
Singson and wrote him a letter dated April 22, 1963, requesting him to disregard their letter of April
17, 1963, and that the action of garnishment from his account had already been removed. A similar
letter was written by the said official of the bank on April 22, 1963 to the Special Sheriff informing him
that his letter dated April 17, 1963 to the said Special Sheriff was considered cancelled and that they
had already removed that the Notice of Garnishment from plaintiff Singsons account. Thus, the
defendants lost no time to rectify the mistake that had been inadvertently committed, resulting in the
temporary freezing of the account of the plaintiff with the said bank for a short time.
x

x"

On May 8, 1963, the Singsons commenced the present action against the Bank and its president,
Santiago Freixas, for damages 1 in consequence of said illegal freezing of plaintiffs account.
After appropriate proceedings, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment dismissing the
complaint upon the ground that plaintiffs cannot recover from the defendants upon the basis of a
quasi-delict, because the relation between the parties is contractual in nature; because this case does
not fall under Article 2219 of our Civil Code, upon which plaintiffs rely; and because plaintiffs have not
established the amount of damages allegedly sustained by them.
The lower court held that plaintiffs claim for damages cannot be based upon a tort or quasi-delict,
their relation with the defendants being contractual in nature. We have repeatedly held, however, that
the existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one
against the order and the consequent recovery of damages therefor. 2 Indeed, this view has been in
effect, reiterated in a comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France v. Carrascoso, 3 involving an
airplane passenger who, despite his first- class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his first-class
accommodation, and compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was held entitled to recover
damages from the air- carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latters part, for, although the relation
between a passenger and the carrier is "contractual both in origin and nature . . . the act that breaks
the contract may also be a tort."
In view, however, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering, particularly, the
circumstance that the wrong done to the plaintiffs was remedied as soon as the President of the bank
realized the mistake he and his subordinate employee had committed, the Court finds that an award
of nominal damages the amount of which need not be proven 4 in the sum of P1,000, in
addition to attorneys fees in the sum of P500.00, would, suffice to vindicate plaintiffs rights. 5
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed and another one shall be entered
sentencing the defendant Bank of the Philippine Islands to pay to the plaintiffs said sums of P1,000,
as nominal damages, and P500.00, as attorneys fees, apart from the costs. It is so ordered.

FACTS: Singson, was one of the defendants in a civil case, in which judgment had been rendered
sentencing him and his co-defendants therein Lobregat and Villa-Abrille & Co., to pay a sum of
money to the plaintiff therein. Said judgment became final and executory as only against Ville-Abrille
for its failure to file an appeal. A writ of garnishment was subsequently served upon BPI in which
the Singsons had a current account insofar as Villa-Abrilles credits against the Bank were
concerned.
Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment, a clerk of the bank, upon reading the name of the
Singson in the title of the Writ of Garnishment as a party defendants, without further reading the body
and informing himself that said garnishment was merely intended for the deposits of defendant VillaAbrille & Co., et al, prepared a letter informing Singson of the garnishment of his deposits by the
plaintiff in that case.
Subsequently, two checks issued by the plaintiff Julian C. Singson, one in favor of B. M.GLASS
Service and another in favor of the Lega Corporation, were dishonored by the bank. B. M. Glass
Service then wrote to Singson that the check was not honored by BPI because his account therein
had already been garnished and that they are now constrained to close his credit account with them.
Singson wrote to BPI, claiming that his name was not included in the Writ of Execution and Notice of
Garnishment, which was served upon the bank. The defendants lost no time to rectify the mistake
that had been inadvertently committed.
Thus this action for damages.
ISSUE: WON the existence of a contract between the parties bars a plaintiffs claim for damages
based on torts?
HELD: NO. The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by
the one against the order and the consequent recovery of damages therefore. Indeed, this view has
been, in effect, reiterated in a comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascoso,
involving an airplane passenger who, despite his first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted from his
first-class accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist compartment, was held entitled
to recover damages from the air-carrier, upon the ground of tort on the latters part, for, although the
relation between a passenger and a carrier is contractual both in origin andNATURE the act that
breaks the contract may also be a tort.
In view, however, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering, particularly, the
circumstance, that the wrong done to the plaintiff was remedied as soon as the President of the bank
realized the mistake he and his subordinate employee had committed, the Court finds that an award
of nominal damages the amount of which need not be proven in the sum of P1,000, in addition
to attorneys fees in the sum of P500, would suffice to vindicate plaintiffs rights.

G.R. No. 145804

February 6, 2003

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, petitioners,

vs.
MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT SECURITY
AGENCY, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The case before the Court is an appeal from the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals,
promulgated on 27 April 2000 and 10 October 2000, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 60720, entitled
"Marjorie Navidad and Heirs of the Late Nicanor Navidad vs. Rodolfo Roman, et. al.," which has
modified the decision of 11 August 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 266, Pasig City,
exonerating Prudent Security Agency (Prudent) from liability and finding Light Rail Transit Authority
(LRTA) and Rodolfo Roman liable for damages on account of the death of Nicanor Navidad.
On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven oclock in the evening, Nicanor Navidad, then
drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token" (representing payment of the fare).
While Navidad was standing on the platform near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard
assigned to the area approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two
apparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the
fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT
tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman,
was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously.
On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad, along with her
children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the
Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband. LRTA and
Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent.
Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection
and supervision of its security guards.
The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin, instead of presenting
evidence, filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in
his assigned task. On 11 August 1998, the trial court rendered its decision; it adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants
Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordering the latter to pay jointly and severally the plaintiffs the
following:
"a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.00;
2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00;
3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00;
"b) Moral damages of P50,000.00;
"c) Attorneys fees of P20,000;
"d) Costs ofSUIT .
"The complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman are dismissed for lack of merit.
"The compulsory counterclaim of LRTA and Roman are likewise dismissed." 1

Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 August 2000, the appellate court promulgated its
now assailed decision exonerating Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and,
instead, holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable thusly:
"WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby MODIFIED, by exonerating the appellants from any
liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad, Jr. Instead, appellees Rodolfo Roman and theLIGHT Rail
Transit Authority (LRTA) are held liable for his death and are hereby directed to pay jointly and
severally to the plaintiffs-appellees, the following amounts:
a) P44,830.00 as actual damages;
b) P50,000.00 as nominal damages;
c) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased; and
e) P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees."2
The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet boarded the train,
a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim entered the place where
passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and getting the corresponding token therefor.
In exempting Prudent from liability, the court stressed that there was nothing to link the security
agency to the death of Navidad. It said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows
upon the victim and the evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his
having been hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman.
The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to establish the fact
that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the train.
The appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000.
In their present recourse, petitioners recite alleged errors on the part of the appellate court; viz:
"I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED BY DISREGARDING THE FINDINGS
OF FACTS BY THE TRIAL COURT
"II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS
ARE LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD, JR.
"III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT RODOLFO
ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA."3
Petitioners would contend that the appellate court ignored the evidence and the factual findings of the
trial court by holding them liable on the basis of a sweeping conclusion that the presumption of
negligence on the part of a common carrier was not overcome. Petitioners would insist that Escartins
assault upon Navidad, which caused the latter to fall on the tracks, was an act of a stranger that could
not have been foreseen or prevented. The LRTA would add that the appellate courts conclusion on
the existence of an employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA lacked basis
because Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA.

Respondents, supporting the decision of the appellate court, contended that a contract of carriage
was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT station and entered the
premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and protection under a contractual relation,
and that the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in
failing to exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a common carrier.
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from theNATURE of its business and for
reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring the
safety of passengers.4 The Civil Code, governing the liability of a common carrier for death of or injury
to its passengers, provides:
"Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and
foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for all
the circumstances.
"Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755."
"Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the
negligence or willful acts of the formers employees, although such employees may have acted
beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common carriers.
"This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees."
"Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on account of the
willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the common carriers employees
through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family could have prevented or stopped the
act or omission."
The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances.5 Such duty of a common carrier to provide
safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the course of the trip but for so long as the
passengers are within its premises and where they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of
carriage.6 The statutory provisions render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers
(a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts or negligence
of other passengers or of strangers if the common carriers employees through the exercise of due
diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. 7 In case of such death or injury, a
carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and8 by simple proof of injury, the
passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its
employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen
event or to force majeure.9 In the absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the
accident occurred, which petitioners, according to the appellate court, have failed to show, the
presumption would be that it has been at fault,10 an exception from the general rule that negligence
must be proved.11
The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim
arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required
of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a
carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an
independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its
responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for tort under the
provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180,13 of the Civil
Code. The premise, however, for the employers liability is negligence or fault on the part of the

employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the
presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the
selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by
showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not
been shown. Absent such a showing, one might ask further, how then must the liability of the
common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It
would be solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or
omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article
219414 of the Civil Code can well apply.15 In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract,
where tort is that which breaches the contract.16 Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a
breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract
existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing
the rules on tort to apply.17
Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of the late Nicanor Navidad,
this Court is concluded by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that "there is nothing to link
(Prudent) to the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason that the negligence of its employee,
Escartin, has not been duly proven x x x." This finding of the appellate court is not without substantial
justification in our own review of the records of the case.
There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any culpable act
or omission, he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to say, the contractual tie between the
LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be
made liable only for his own fault or negligence.
The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable. Nominal damages are
adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant,
may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss
suffered by him.18 It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory
damages.19
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the appellate court is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION but
only in that (a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner Rodolfo Roman is
absolved from liability. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 145804. February 6, 2003

FACTS:
Navidad was drunk when he entered the boarding platform of the LRT. He got into an altercation with
the SG Escartin. They had a fistfight and Navidad fell onto the tracks and was killed when a train
came and ran over him.
The Heirs of Navidad filed a complaint for damages against Escartin, the train driver, (Roman) the
LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization and Prudent Security Agency (Prudent). The trial court found
Prudent and Escartin jointly and severally liable for damages to the heirs. The CA exonerated
Prudent and instead held the LRTA and the train driver Romero jointly and severally liable as well as
removing the award for compensatory damages and replacing it with nominal damages.
The reasoning of the CA was that a contract of carriage already existed between Navidad and LRTA
(by virtue of his havA ing purchased train tickets and the liability was caused by the mere fact of
Navidad's death after being hit by the train being managed by the LRTA and operated by Roman. The
CA also blamed LRTA for not having presented expert evidence showing that the emergency brakes
could not have stopped the train on time.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not LRTA and/or Roman is liable for the death.
(2) Whether or not Escartin and/or Prudent are liable.
(3) Whether or not nominal damages may coexist with compensatory damages.
HELD:
(1) Yes. The foundation of LRTA's liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the
victim arising from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence
required of a common carrier.
(2) Fault was not established. Liability will be based on Tort under Art. 2176 of the New Civil Code.
(3) No. It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages.
RATIO:
Liability of LRTA Read Arts. 1755,1756, 1759 and 1763 of the New Civil Code
A common carrier is required by these above statutory provisions to use utmost diligence in carrying
passengers with due regard for all circumstances. This obligation exists not only during the course of
the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises where they ought to be in pursuance
to then contract of carriage.
Art. 1763 renders a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through
the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or (b) on account of willful acts or negligence of other
passengers or of strangers if the common carriers employees through theexercise of due diligence
could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. In case of such death or injury, a carrier is
presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the passenger is
relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the
burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force
majeure.
Liability of Security Agency If Prudent is to be held liable, it would be for a tort under Art. 2176 in
conjunction with Art. 2180. Once the fault of the employee Escartin is established, the employer,

Prudent, would be held liable on the presumption that it did not exercise the diligence of a good father
of the family in the selection and supervision of its employees.
Relationship between contractual and non-contractual breach How then must the liability of the
common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent contractor, on the other hand, be described? It
would be solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or
omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article
2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract,
where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a
breach of ontract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract
existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing
the rules on tort to apply.
Nominal Damages - The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable.
Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying
the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot coexist with compensatory damages. The award was deleted/\.

G.R. No. 138550 October 14, 2005

AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
NOEL CORDERO, Defendant.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 1999
in CA-G.R. CV No. 51671, entitled, "Noel Cordero, Plaintiff-Appellee versus American Express
International, Inc., Defendant-Appellant."
Petitioner is a foreign corporation that issues charge cards to its customers, which the latter then use
to purchase goods and services at accredited merchants worldwide. Sometime in 1988, Nilda
Cordero, wife of respondent Noel Cordero, applied for and was issued an American Express charge
card with No. 3769-895901-010020. The issuance of the charge card was covered by an Amex
Cardmember Agreement. As cardholder, Nilda, upon signing the back portion of the card, manifested
her acceptance of the terms of the Agreement.
An extension charge card, with No. 3769-895901-01010, was likewise issued to respondent Noel
Cordero which he also signed.2
On November 29, 1991, respondent, together with his wife, Nilda, daughter, sisters-in-law and unclein-law, went on a three-day holiday trip to Hong Kong. In the early evening of November 30, 1991, at
about 7:00 oclock, the group went to the Watsons Chemist Shop located at 277C Ocean Gallery,
Kowloon, Hong Kong. Noel picked up some chocolate candies and handed to the sales clerk his
American Express extension charge card to pay for his purchases. The sales clerk verified the card
by making a telephone call to the American Express Office in Hong Kong. Moments later, Susan
Chong, the store manager, emerged from behind the counter and informed respondent that she had
to confiscate the card. Thereupon, she cut respondents American Express card in half with a pair of
scissors. This, according to respondent, caused him embarrassment and humiliation considering that
it was done in front of his family and the other customers lined up at the check-out counter. Hence,
Nilda had to pay for the purchases using her own American Express charge card.3
When they returned to the ExcelsiorHOTEL , Nilda called up petitioners Office in Hong Kong. She
was able to talk to Senior Authorizer Johnny Chen, who informed her that on November 1, 1991, a
person in Hong Kong attempted to use a charge card with the same number as respondents card.
The Hong Kong American Express Office called up respondent and after determining that he was in
Manila and not in Hong Kong, placed his card in the "Inspect Airwarn Support System." This is the
system utilized by petitioner as a protection both for the company and the cardholders against the
fraudulent use of their charge cards. Once a card suspected of unauthorized use is placed in the
system, the person to whom the card is tendered must verify the identity of the holder. If the true
identity of the card owner is established, the card is honored and the charges are approved.
Otherwise, the card is revoked or confiscated.4
When the Watsons sales clerk called up petitioners Hong Kong Office, its representative said he
wants to talk to respondent in order to verify the latters identity, pursuant to the procedure observed
under the "Inspect Airwarn Support System." However, respondent refused. Consequently,
petitioners representative was unable to establish the identity of the cardholder.5 This led to the
confiscation of respondents card.
On March 31, 1992, respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch V, Manila, a complaint for
damages against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. 92-60807. He prayed for the award of moral
damages and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees as a result of the humiliation he
suffered.

The trial court found that "the inexcusable failure of defendant (petitioner herein) to inform plaintiff
(respondent herein) of the November 1, 1991 incident despite sufficient time was the proximate cause
of the confiscation and cutting of plaintiffs extension card which exposed the latter to public
humiliation for which defendant should be held liable." 6 On February 20, 1995, the trial court
promulgated its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant,
ordering the latter to pay the former the following amounts, namely:
a) The sum of P300,000.00 as and by way of moral damages;
b) The sum of P200,000.00 as exemplary damages;
c) The sum of P100,000.00 as and for reasonable attorneys fees; and
d) The costs of theSUIT .
SO ORDERED."7
Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision affirming the trial courts Decision
with modification in the sense that the amounts of damages awarded were reduced, thus:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision dated February 20, 1995 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch V, in Civil Case No. 92-60807 is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to
modifications with respect to the amount of damages awarded, which are reduced as follows:
(a) Moral damages from P300,000.00 to P150,000.00; and
(b) Exemplary damages from P200,000.00 to P100,000.00.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED."
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:
"A. Whether the lower courts gravely erred in attributing the public humiliation allegedly suffered by
Cordero to Amex.
B. Whether the lower courts gravely erred in holding Amex liable to Cordero for moral damages,
exemplary damages and attorneys fees."8
Respondent filed his comment contending in the main that the petition raises questions of fact beyond
this Courts domain.
While it is true that under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, this Court may
review only errors of law, however, this rule admits of well-known recognized exceptions, thus:
". . . (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) the Court of Appeals
went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties; (7)
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) said findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) the facts set
forth in the petition are not disputed by the respondents; and (10) the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record."9

In this case, the inference made by the courts below is manifestly mistaken. Therefore, we are
justified in reviewing the records of this case and rendering judgment based on our own findings.
In his complaint, respondent claimed that he suffered embarrassment and humiliation because his
card was unceremoniously confiscated and cut in half by Susan Chong of Watsons Chemist Shop.
Respondent anchors his cause of action on the following provision of the Civil Code:
"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter."10
In order that an obligation based on quasi-delict may arise, there must be no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties. But there are exceptions. There may be an action for quasi-delict
notwithstanding that there is a subsisting contract between the parties. A liability for tort may arise
even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act
which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual
liability, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to
apply.11
Furthermore, to constitute quasi-delict, the fault or negligence must be the proximate cause of the
damage or injury suffered by the plaintiff. Proximate cause is that cause which, inNATURAL and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without
which the result would not have occurred. Proximate cause is determined by the facts of each case
upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. 12
According to the trial court, petitioner should have informed respondent that on November 1, 1991, a
person in Hong Kong attempted to use a charge card bearing similar number to that of respondents
card; and that petitioners inexcusable failure to do so is the proximate cause of the "confiscation and
cutting of [respondents] extension card which exposed the latter to public humiliation for which
[petitioner] should be held liable."13
We cannot sustain the trial courts conclusion.
As explained by respondent himself, he could have used his card upon verification by the sales clerk
of Watson that indeed he is the authorized cardholder. This could have been accomplished had
respondent talked to petitioners representative, enabling the latter to determine that respondent is
indeed the true holder of the card. Clearly, no negligence which breaches the contract can be
attributed to petitioner. If at all, the cause of respondents humiliation and embarrassment was his
refusal to talk to petitioners representative.
That respondent refused to talk to petitioners representative can be gleaned from the testimony of
Mr. Chen Heng Kun a.k.a. Johnny Chen during the deposition in Hong Kong, 14 thus:
"Question No 9 : Was AEII required under its existing policies and/or membership agreement with its
cardholders to advise said cardholders of their card have been put under the support INSPECT
Strictly Question (for identification) cardmembers before approving any charge?
Mr. Johnny Chen : Under the existing policies of AEII, we dont have to inform the cardholders if they
have to pass the INSPECT Strictly Questions (for identification).
Question No 10 : If the answer to Q9 is in the negative, please explain why not?
Mr. Johnny Chen : The reason why we dont have to are because, first, we are not terminating the
service to the cardholder. Second, it doesnt mean that we are going to limit the service to the
cardholder. Third, as long as the cardholder can present an identification card of his membership, we

allow him to use the card. He can show this by telephoning the company or by presenting us his
passport or travel document. When Watson Company called AEII for authorization, AEII
representative requested that he talk to Mr. Cordero but he refused to talk to any
representative of AEII. AEII could not prove then that he is really the real card holder."
Mr. Chen Heng Kun was briefly cross-examined by respondents counsel, thus:
"Question No 10 : Question 9 is objected to since the best evidence would be the membership
agreement between plaintiffs and AEII."
Significantly, paragraph 16 of the Cardmember Agreement signed by respondent provides:
"16. THE CARD REMAINS OUR PROPERTY
"The Card remains our property and we can revoke your right and the right of ay Additional
Cardmember to use it at any time, we can do this with or without giving you notice. If we have
revoked the Card without cause, we will refund a proportion of your annual Card Account fee. We
may list revoked Cards in our "Cancellation Bulletin", or otherwise inform Establishments that the
Card issued to you and, if you are the basic Cardmember, any Additional Cards have been revoked
or cancelled.
"If we revoke the card or it expires, you must return it to us if we request. Also, if any Establishment
asks you to surrender an expired or revoked Card, you must do so. You may not use the Card after it
has expired or after it has been revoked.
"The revocation, repossession or request for the return of the Card is not, and shall not constitute any
reflection of your character or credit-worthiness and we shall not be liable in any way for any
statement made by any person requesting the return or surrender of the Card." 15
To be sure, pursuant to the above stipulation, petitioner can revoke respondents card without notice,
as was done here. It bears reiterating that the subject card would not have been confiscated and cut
had respondent talked to petitioners representative and identified himself as the genuine cardholder.
It is thus safe to conclude that there was no negligence on the part of petitioner and that, therefore, it
cannot be held liable to respondent for damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 51671 is REVERSED.
SO ORDERED.

Noel Cordero
G.R. No. 138550 [October 14, 2005]
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Factsof the Case:
American Express International was a foreign corporation that issued charge cards used to purchase
goods and services at accredited merchants worldwide to its customers. Nilda Cordero, wife of
respondent Noel Cordero, was issued an American Express charge card. An extension charge card,
was likewise issued to respondent Noel Cordero which he also signed. Respondent, together with his
family went on a three-day holiday trip to Hong Kong. The group went to the Watsons Chemist Shop.
While
there,
Noel
picked
up chocolate candies
and
handed
his
American Express extension charge card to the sales clerk to pay for his purchases. Susan Chong,
the store manager, informed respondent that she had to confiscate the card. Thereupon, she cut
respondents American Express card in half with a pair of scissors. This, according to respondent,
caused him embarrassment and humiliation. Hence, Nilda had to pay for the purchases using her
own American Express charge card.
The card was placed in the Inspect Airwarn Support System, asystem utilized by petitioner as a
protection both for the company and the cardholdersagainst the fraudulent use of their charge
cards. Once a card suspected of unauthorized use is placed in the system, the person to whom the
card is tendered must verify the identity of the holder. If the true identity of the card owner is
established, the card is honored and the charges are approved. Otherwise, the card is revoked or
confiscated.
Respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for damages against petitioner. He prayed
for the award of moral damages and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees as a result of the
humiliation he suffered. According to the trial court, petitioner should have informed respondent that
on November 1, 1991, a person in Hong Kong attempted to use a charge card bearing similar number
to that of respondents card and that petitioners inexcusable failure to do so is the proximate cause of
the confiscation and cutting of respondents extension card which exposed the latter to public
humiliation for which the petitioner should be held liable. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial courts decision.
Issue:
Whether the lower courts gravely erred in awarding moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorneys fees to Cordero.
Ruling of the Court:
YES. The Court ruled that petitioner can revoke respondents card without notice, as was done. The
subject card would not have been confiscated and cut had respondent talked to petitioners
representative and identified himself as the genuine cardholder. As explained by respondent himself,
he could have used his card upon verification by the sales clerk of Watson that indeed he is the
authorized cardholder. That could have been accomplished had respondent talked to petitioners
representative, enabling the latter to determine that respondent was indeed the true holder of the
card. Clearly, no negligence which breached the contract could have been attributed to petitioner. If at
all, the cause of respondents humiliation and embarrassment was his refusal to talk to petitioners
representative. It was thus safe to conclude that there was no negligence on the part of petitioner and
that, therefore, it cannot be held liable to respondent for damages.
The petition was granted.

[G.R. No. 120554. September 21, 1999.]

SO PING BUN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, TEK HUA ENTERPRISING CORP. and
MANUEL C. TIONG, Respondents.
DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for certiorari challenges the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated October 10, 1994,
and the Resolution 2 dated June 5, 1995, in CA-G.R. CV No. 38784. The appellate court affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 35, except for the award of attorneys fees, as
follows:chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
"WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appeal of respondent-appellant So Ping Bun for lack of
merit is DISMISSED. The appealed decision dated April 20, 1992 of the court a quo is modified by
reducing the attorneys fees awarded to plaintiff Tek Hua Enterprising Corporation from P500,000.00
to P200,000.00." 3
The facts are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In 1963, Tek Hua Trading Co, through its managing partner, So Pek Giok, entered into lease
agreements with lessor Dee C. Chuan & Sons Inc. (DCCSI). Subjects of four (4) lease contracts were
premises located at Nos. 930, 930-Int., 924-B and 924-C, Soler Street, Binondo, Manila. Tek Hua
used the areas to store its textiles. The contracts each had a one-year term. They provided that
should the lessee continue to occupy the premises after the term, the lease shall be on a month-tomonth basis.
When the contracts expired, the parties did not renew the contracts, but Tek Hua continued to occupy
the premises. In 1976, Tek Hua Trading Co. was dissolved. Later, the original members of Tek Hua
Trading Co. including Manuel C. Tiong, formed Tek Hua Enterprising Corp., herein respondent
corporation.
So Pek Giok, managing partner of Tek Hua Trading, died in 1986. So Pek Gioks grandson, petitioner
So Ping Bun, occupied the warehouse for his own textile business, Trendsetter Marketing.
On August 1, 1989, lessor DCCSI sent letters addressed to Tek Hua Enterprises, informing the latter
of the 25% increase in rent effective September 1, 1989. The rent increase was later on reduced to
20% effective January 1, 1990, upon other lessees demand. Again on December 1, 1990, the lessor
implemented a 30% rent increase. Enclosed in these letters were new lease contracts for signing.
DCCSI warned that failure of the lessee to accomplish the contracts shall be deemed as lack of
interest on the lessees part, and agreement to the termination of the lease. Private respondents did
not answer any of these letters. Still, the lease contracts were not rescinded.chanrobles
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
On March 1, 1991, private respondent Tiong sent a letter to petitioner, which reads as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
March 1, 1991
"Mr. So Ping Bun
930 Soler Street
Binondo, Manila

Dear Mr. So,

Due to my closed (sic) business associate (sic) for three decades with your late grandfather Mr. So
Pek Giok and late father, Mr. So Chong Bon, I allowed you temporarily to use the warehouse of Tek
Hua Enterprising Corp. for several years to generate your personal business.
Since I decided to go back into textile business, I need a warehouse immediately for my stocks.
Therefore, please be advised to vacate all your stocks in Tek Hua Enterprising Corp. Warehouse.
You are hereby given 14 days to vacate the premises unless you have good reasons that you have
the right to stay. Otherwise, I will be constrained to take measure to protect my interest.
Please give this urgent matter your preferential attention to avoid inconvenience on your
part.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Very truly yours,
(Sgd) Manuel C. Tiong
MANUEL C. TIONG
President" 4
Petitioner refused to vacate. On March 4, 1992, petitioner requested formal contracts of lease with
DCCSI in favor of Trendsetter Marketing. So Ping Bun claimed that after the death of his grandfather,
So Pek Giok, he had been occupying the premises for his textile business and religiously paid rent.
DCCSI acceded to petitioners request. The lease contracts in favor of Trendsetter were executed.
In the suit for injunction, private respondents pressed for the nullification of the lease contracts
between DCCSI and petitioner. They also claimed damages.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red
After trial, the trial court ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Annulling the four Contracts of Lease (Exhibits A, A-1 to A-3, inclusive) all dated March 11, 1991,
between defendant So Ping Bun, doing business under the name and style of Trendsetter
Marketing, and defendant Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. over the premises located at Nos. 924-B, 924C, 930 and 930, Int., respectively, Soler Street, Binondo Manila;
2. Making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court on June 21, 1991;
3. Ordering defendant So Ping Bun to pay the aggrieved party, plaintiff Tek Hua Enterprising
Corporation, the sum of P500,000.00, for attorneys fees;
4. Dismissing the complaint, insofar as plaintiff Manuel C. Tiong is concerned, and the respective
counterclaims of the defendant;
5. Ordering defendant So Ping Bun to pay the costs of this lawsuit;
This judgment is without prejudice to the rights of plaintiff Tek Hua Enterprising Corporation and
defendant Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. to negotiate for the renewal of their lease contracts over the
premises located at Nos. 930, 930-Int., 924-B and 924-C Soler Street, Binondo, Manila, under such
terms and conditions as they agree upon, provided they are not contrary to law, public policy, public
order, and morals.cralawnad
SO ORDERED." 5

Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the above decision was denied.

On appeal by So Ping Bun, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court. On motion for reconsideration,
the appellate court modified the decision by reducing the award of attorneys fees from five hundred
thousand (P500,000.00) pesos to two hundred thousand (P200,000.00)
Petitioner is now before the Court raising the following issues:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I. WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION
FINDING SO PING BUN GUILTY OF TORTUOUS INTERFERENCE OF CONTRACT?
II. WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEYS FEES OF
P200,000.00 IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.
The foregoing issues involve, essentially, the correct interpretation of the applicable law on tortuous
conduct, particularly unlawful interference with contract. We have to begin, obviously, with certain
fundamental principles on torts and damages.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. 6 One becomes liable in an action for damages for a
nontrespassory invasion of anothers interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if (a) the other
has property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with, (b) the
invasion is substantial, (c) the defendants conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, and (d) the
invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under general
negligence rules. 7
The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of
the third person of the existence of contract; and (3) interference of the third person is without legal
justification or excuse. 8
A duty which the law of torts is concerned with is respect for the property of others, and a cause of
action ex delicto may be predicated upon an unlawful interference by one person of the enjoyment by
the other of his private property. 9 This may pertain to a situation where a third person induces a
party to renege on or violate his undertaking under a contract. In the case before us, petitioners
Trendsetter Marketing asked DCCSI to execute lease contracts in its favor, and as a result petitioner
deprived respondent corporation of the latters property right. Clearly, and as correctly viewed by the
appellate court, the three elements of tort interference above-mentioned are present in the instant
case.cralawnad
Authorities debate on whether interference may be justified where the defendant acts for the sole
purpose of furthering his own financial or economic interest. 10 One view is that, as a general rule,
justification for interfering with the business relations of another exists where the actors motive is to
benefit himself. Such justification does not exist where his sole motive is to cause harm to the other.
Added to this, some authorities believe that it is not necessary that the interferers interest outweigh
that of the party whose rights are invaded, and that an individual acts under an economic interest that
is substantial, not merely de minimis, such that wrongful and malicious motives are negatived, for he
acts in self-protection. 11 Moreover, justification for protecting ones financial position should not be
made to depend on a comparison of his economic interest in the subject matter with that of others. 12
It is sufficient if the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful
motives. 13
As early as Gilchrist v. Cuddy, 14 we held that where there was no malice in the interference of a
contract, and the impulse behind ones conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in
wrongful motives, a party cannot be a malicious interferer. Where the alleged interferer is financially
interested, and such interest motivates his conduct, it cannot be said that he is an officious or
malicious intermeddler. 15

In the instant case, it is clear that petitioner So Ping Bun prevailed upon DCCSI to lease the
warehouse to his enterprise at the expense of respondent corporation. Though petitioner took interest
in the property of respondent corporation and benefited from it, nothing on record imputes deliberate
wrongful motives or malice on him.
Section 1314 of the Civil Code categorically provides also that, "Any third person who induces
another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other contracting party." Petitioner
argues that damage is an essential element of tort interference, and since the trial court and the
appellate court ruled that private respondents were not entitled to actual, moral or exemplary
damages, it follows that he ought to be absolved of any liability, including attorneys
fees.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
It is true that the lower courts did not award damages, but this was only because the extent of
damages was not quantifiable. We had a similar situation in Gilchrist, where it was difficult or
impossible to determine the extent of damage and there was nothing on record to serve as basis
thereof. In that case we refrained from awarding damages. We believe the same conclusion applies
in this case.
While we do not encourage tort interferers seeking their economic interest to intrude into existing
contracts at the expense of others, however, we find that the conduct herein complained of did not
transcend the limits forbidding an obligatory award for damages in the absence of any malice. The
business desire is there to make some gain to the detriment of the contracting parties. Lack of malice,
however, precludes damages. But it does not relieve petitioner of the legal liability for entering into
contracts and causing breach of existing ones. The respondent appellate court correctly confirmed
the permanent injunction and nullification of the lease contracts between DCCSI and Trendsetter
Marketing, without awarding damages. The injunction saved the respondents from further damage or
injury caused by petitioners interference.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Lastly, the recovery of attorneys fees in the concept of actual or compensatory damages, is allowed
under the circumstances provided for in Article 2208 of the Civil Code. 16 One such occasion is when
the defendants act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his interest. 17 But we have consistently held that the award of considerable
damages should have clear factual and legal bases. 18 In connection with attorneys fees, the award
should be commensurate to the benefits that would have been derived from a favorable judgment.
Settled is the rule that fairness of the award of damages by the trial court calls for appellate review
such that the award if far too excessive can be reduced. 19 This ruling applies with equal force on the
award of attorneys fees. In a long line of cases we said, "It is not sound policy to place a penalty on
the right to litigate. To compel the defeated party to pay the fees of counsel for his successful
opponent would throw wide open the door of temptation to the opposing party and his counsel to
swell the fees to undue proportions." 20
Considering that the respondent corporations lease contract, at the time when the cause of action
accrued, ran only on a month-to-month basis whence before it was on a yearly basis, we find even
the reduced amount of attorneys fees ordered by the Court of Appeals still exorbitant in the light of
prevailing jurisprudence. 21 Consequently, the amount of two hundred thousand (P200,000.00)
awarded by respondent appellate court should be reduced to one hundred thousand (P100,000.00)
pesos as the reasonable award for attorneys fees in favor of private respondent corporation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 3

G.R. No. 120554 September 21, 1999

Lessons Applicable: Interference with Contractual Relations (Torts and Damages)
Laws Applicable: Sec. 1314 of the Civil Code

FACTS:

1963: Tek Hua Trading Co, through its managing partner, So Pek Giok, entered into lease
agreements with lessor Dee C. Chuan & Sons Inc. (DCCSI)
Subjects of 4 lease contracts were premises located at Soler Street, Binondo, Manila
Tek Hua used the areas to store its textiles.
The contracts each had a one-year term. They provided that should the lessee continue to occupy the
premises after the term, the lease shall be on a month-to-month basis.
When the contracts expired, the parties did notRENEW the contracts, but Tek Hua continued to
occupy the premises
1976: Tek Hua Trading Co. was dissolved. Later, the original members of Tek Hua Trading Co.
including Manuel C. Tiong, formed Tek Hua Enterprising Corp.
1986: So Pek Giok died
So Ping Bun, occupied the warehouse for his own textile business, Trendsetter Marketing
August 1, 1989: lessor DCCSI sent letters addressed to Tek Hua Enterprises, informing the latter of
the 25% increase in rent effective September 1, 1989.
The rent increase was later on reduced to 20% effective January 1, 1990, upon other lessees'
demand.
December 1, 1990: the lessor implemented a 30% rent increase.
Enclosed in their letters were new lease contracts for signing which So Ping Bun did not answer. Still,
the lease contracts were not rescinded.
So Ping Bun refused to vacate
So Ping Bun requested formal contracts of lease with DCCSI in favor Trendsetter Marketing
ASUIT for injunction was filed
RTC: Granted annulling the four Contracts of Lease without awarding damages
CA upheld RTC
ISSUE: W/N the injunction should be upheld and

HELD: AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION that the award of attorney's fees is reduced from two
hundred thousand (P200,000.00) to one hundred thousand (P100,000.00) pesos

Damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from injury, and damages are the recompense or
compensation awarded for the damage suffered. One becomes liable in an action for damages for a
nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of asset if
(a) the other has property rights and privileges with respect to the use or enjoyment interfered with,
(b) the invasion is substantial,
(c) the defendant's conduct is a legal cause of the invasion, and
(d) the invasion is either intentional and unreasonable or unintentional and actionable under general
negligence rules
elements of tort interference are:
(1) existence of a valid contract;
(2) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of contract; and
(3) interference of the third person is without legal justification or excuse
Son Ping Bun asked DCCSI to execute lease contracts in its favor, and as a result deprived DCCSI's
property right
damage is NOT an essential element of tort interference

lower courts did not award damages, but this was only because the extent of damages was not
quantifiable
Lack of malice precludes damages. But it does not relieve petitioner of the legal liability for entering
into contracts and causing breach of existing ones.
The injunction saved the respondents from further damage or injury caused by petitioner's
interference.

[G.R. No. 138569. September 11, 2003]

THE CONSOLIDATED BANK and TRUST CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
L.C. DIAZ and COMPANY, CPAs, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:

The Case
Before us is a petition for review of the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals dated 27 October 1998
and its Resolution dated 11 May 1999. The assailed decision reversed the Decision[2] of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8, absolving petitioner Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation, now
known as Solidbank Corporation (Solidbank), of any liability. The questioned resolution of the
appellate court denied the motion for reconsideration of Solidbank but modified the decision by
deleting the award of exemplary damages, attorneys fees, expenses of litigation and cost of suit.

The Facts
Solidbank is a domestic banking corporation organized and existing under Philippine
laws. Private respondent L.C. Diaz and Company, CPAs (L.C. Diaz), is a professional partnership
engaged in the practice of accounting.
Sometime in March 1976, L.C. Diaz opened a savings account with Solidbank, designated as
Savings Account No. S/A 200-16872-6.
On 14 August 1991, L.C. Diaz through its cashier, Mercedes Macaraya (Macaraya), filled up a
savings (cash) deposit slip for P990 and a savings (checks) deposit slip for P50.Macaraya instructed
the messenger of L.C. Diaz, Ismael Calapre (Calapre), to deposit the money with Solidbank.
Macaraya also gave Calapre the Solidbank passbook.
Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the two deposit slips and the
passbook. The teller acknowledged receipt of the deposit by returning to Calapre the duplicate copies
of the two deposit slips. Teller No. 6 stamped the deposit slips with the words DUPLICATE and
SAVING TELLER 6 SOLIDBANK HEAD OFFICE. Since the transaction took time and Calapre had to
make another deposit for L.C. Diaz with Allied Bank, he left the passbook with Solidbank. Calapre
then went to Allied Bank. When Calapre returned to Solidbank to retrieve the passbook, Teller No. 6
informed him that somebody got the passbook.[3] Calapre went back to L.C. Diaz and reported the
incident to Macaraya.
Macaraya immediately prepared a deposit slip in duplicate copies with a check
of P200,000. Macaraya, together with Calapre, went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the
deposit slip and check. The teller stamped the words DUPLICATE and SAVING TELLER 6
SOLIDBANK HEAD OFFICE on the duplicate copy of the deposit slip. When Macaraya asked for the
passbook, Teller No. 6 told Macaraya that someone got the passbook but she could not remember to
whom she gave the passbook. When Macaraya asked Teller No. 6 if Calapre got the passbook, Teller
No. 6 answered that someone shorter than Calapre got the passbook. Calapre was then standing
beside Macaraya.
Teller No. 6 handed to Macaraya a deposit slip dated 14 August 1991 for the deposit of a check
for P90,000 drawn on Philippine Banking Corporation (PBC). This PBC check of L.C. Diaz was a
check that it had long closed.[4] PBC subsequently dishonored the check because of insufficient funds
and because the signature in the check differed from PBCs specimen signature. Failing to get back

the passbook, Macaraya went back to her office and reported the matter to the Personnel Manager of
L.C. Diaz, Emmanuel Alvarez.
The following day, 15 August 1991, L.C. Diaz through its Chief Executive Officer, Luis C. Diaz
(Diaz), called up Solidbank to stop any transaction using the same passbook until L.C. Diaz could
open a new account.[5] On the same day, Diaz formally wrote Solidbank to make the same request. It
was also on the same day that L.C. Diaz learned of the unauthorized withdrawal the day before, 14
August 1991, of P300,000 from its savings account. The withdrawal slip for the P300,000 bore the
signatures of the authorized signatories of L.C. Diaz, namely Diaz and Rustico L. Murillo. The
signatories, however, denied signing the withdrawal slip. A certain Noel Tamayo received
the P300,000.
In an Information[6] dated 5 September 1991, L.C. Diaz charged its messenger, Emerano Ilagan
(Ilagan) and one Roscon Verdazola with Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Document. The
Regional Trial Court of Manila dismissed the criminal case after the City Prosecutor filed a Motion to
Dismiss on 4 August 1992.
On 24 August 1992, L.C. Diaz through its counsel demanded from Solidbank the return of its
money. Solidbank refused.
On 25 August 1992, L.C. Diaz filed a Complaint [7] for Recovery of a Sum of Money against
Solidbank with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. After trial, the trial court rendered on 28
December 1994 a decision absolving Solidbank and dismissing the complaint.
L.C. Diaz then appealed[8] to the Court of Appeals. On 27 October 1998, the Court of Appeals
issued its Decision reversing the decision of the trial court.
On 11 May 1999, the Court of Appeals issued its Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration of Solidbank. The appellate court, however, modified its decision by deleting the
award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

The Ruling of the Trial Court

In absolving Solidbank, the trial court applied the rules on savings account written on the
passbook. The rules state that possession of this book shall raise the presumption of ownership and
any payment or payments made by the bank upon the production of the said book and entry therein
of the withdrawal shall have the same effect as if made to the depositor personally. [9]
At the time of the withdrawal, a certain Noel Tamayo was not only in possession of the passbook,
he also presented a withdrawal slip with the signatures of the authorized signatories of L.C. Diaz. The
specimen signatures of these persons were in the signature cards. The teller stamped the withdrawal
slip with the words Saving Teller No. 5. The teller then passed on the withdrawal slip to Genere
Manuel (Manuel) for authentication. Manuel verified the signatures on the withdrawal slip. The
withdrawal slip was then given to another officer who compared the signatures on the withdrawal slip
with the specimen on the signature cards. The trial court concluded that Solidbank acted with care
and observed the rules on savings account when it allowed the withdrawal of P300,000 from the
savings account of L.C. Diaz.
The trial court pointed out that the burden of proof now shifted to L.C. Diaz to prove that the
signatures on the withdrawal slip were forged. The trial court admonished L.C. Diaz for not offering in
evidence the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) report on the authenticity of the signatures on the
withdrawal slip for P300,000. The trial court believed that L.C. Diaz did not offer this evidence
because it is derogatory to its action.
Another provision of the rules on savings account states that the depositor must keep the
passbook under lock and key.[10] When another person presents the passbook for withdrawal prior to
Solidbanks receipt of the notice of loss of the passbook, that person is considered as the owner of the
passbook. The trial court ruled that the passbook presented during the questioned transaction was
now out of the lock and key and presumptively ready for a business transaction.[11]

Solidbank did not have any participation in the custody and care of the passbook. The trial court
believed that Solidbanks act of allowing the withdrawal of P300,000 was not the direct and proximate
cause of the loss. The trial court held that L.C. Diazs negligence caused the unauthorized
withdrawal. Three facts establish L.C. Diazs negligence: (1) the possession of the passbook by a
person other than the depositor L.C. Diaz; (2) the presentation of a signed withdrawal receipt by an
unauthorized person; and (3) the possession by an unauthorized person of a PBC check long closed
by L.C. Diaz, which check was deposited on the day of the fraudulent withdrawal.
The trial court debunked L.C. Diazs contention that Solidbank did not follow the precautionary
procedures observed by the two parties whenever L.C. Diaz withdrew significant amounts from its
account. L.C. Diaz claimed that a letter must accompany withdrawals of more than P20,000. The
letter must request Solidbank to allow the withdrawal and convert the amount to a managers
check. The bearer must also have a letter authorizing him to withdraw the same amount. Another
person driving a car must accompany the bearer so that he would not walk from Solidbank to the
office in making the withdrawal. The trial court pointed out that L.C. Diaz disregarded these
precautions in its past withdrawal. On 16 July 1991, L.C. Diaz withdrew P82,554 without any separate
letter of authorization or any communication with Solidbank that the money be converted into a
managers check.
The trial court further justified the dismissal of the complaint by holding that the case was a last
ditch effort of L.C. Diaz to recover P300,000 after the dismissal of the criminal case against Ilagan.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the trial court reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint.
The Court further renders judgment in favor of defendant bank pursuant to its counterclaim the
amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as attorneys fees.
With costs against plaintiff.
SO ORDERED.[12]

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals ruled that Solidbanks negligence was the proximate cause of the
unauthorized withdrawal of P300,000 from the savings account of L.C. Diaz. The appellate court
reached this conclusion after applying the provision of the Civil Code on quasi-delict, to wit:
Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this chapter.
The appellate court held that the three elements of a quasi-delict are present in this case, namely: (a)
damages suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for
whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or
negligence of the defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff.
The Court of Appeals pointed out that the teller of Solidbank who received the withdrawal slip
for P300,000 allowed the withdrawal without making the necessary inquiry. The appellate court stated
that the teller, who was not presented by Solidbank during trial, should have called up the depositor
because the money to be withdrawn was a significant amount. Had the teller called up L.C. Diaz,
Solidbank would have known that the withdrawal was unauthorized. The teller did not even verify the
identity of the impostor who made the withdrawal. Thus, the appellate court found Solidbank liable for
its negligence in the selection and supervision of its employees.
The appellate court ruled that while L.C. Diaz was also negligent in entrusting its deposits to its
messenger and its messenger in leaving the passbook with the teller, Solidbank could not escape

liability because of the doctrine of last clear chance. Solidbank could have averted the injury suffered
by L.C. Diaz had it called up L.C. Diaz to verify the withdrawal.
The appellate court ruled that the degree of diligence required from Solidbank is more than that of
a good father of a family. The business and functions of banks are affected with public interest. Banks
are obligated to treat the accounts of their depositors with meticulous care, always having in mind the
fiduciary nature of their relationship with their clients. The Court of Appeals found Solidbank remiss in
its duty, violating its fiduciary relationship with L.C. Diaz.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and a new
one entered.
1. Ordering defendant-appellee Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation to pay plaintiff-appellant the sum
of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00), with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per
annum from the date of filing of the complaint until paid, the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and P20,000.00 as attorneys fees and expenses of litigation as well as the cost of suit; and
2. Ordering the dismissal of defendant-appellees counterclaim in the amount of P30,000.00 as attorneys
fees.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Acting on the motion for reconsideration of Solidbank, the appellate court affirmed its decision but
modified the award of damages. The appellate court deleted the award of exemplary damages and
attorneys fees. Invoking Article 2231[14] of the Civil Code, the appellate court ruled that exemplary
damages could be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. Since Solidbank was guilty
of simple negligence only, the award of exemplary damages was not justified. Consequently, the
award of attorneys fees was also disallowed pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code. The expenses
of litigation and cost of suit were also not imposed on Solidbank.
The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, our decision dated October 27, 1998 is affirmed with
modification by deleting the award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees, expenses of litigation
and cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Hence, this petition.

The Issues
Solidbank seeks the review of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals on these
grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER BANK SHOULD SUFFER THE
LOSS BECAUSE ITS TELLER SHOULD HAVE FIRST CALLED PRIVATE RESPONDENT BY
TELEPHONE BEFORE IT ALLOWED THE WITHDRAWAL OF P300,000.00 TO RESPONDENTS
MESSENGER EMERANO ILAGAN, SINCE THERE IS NO AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES
IN THE OPERATION OF THE SAVINGS ACCOUNT, NOR IS THERE ANY BANKING LAW, WHICH
MANDATES THAT A BANK TELLER SHOULD FIRST CALL UP THE DEPOSITOR BEFORE
ALLOWING A WITHDRAWAL OF A BIG AMOUNT IN A SAVINGS ACCOUNT.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE AND
IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER BANKS TELLER HAD THE LAST OPPORTUNITY TO WITHHOLD

THE WITHDRAWAL WHEN IT IS UNDISPUTED THAT THE TWO SIGNATURES OF

RESPONDENT ON THE WITHDRAWAL SLIP ARE GENUINE AND PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
PASSBOOK WAS DULY PRESENTED, AND CONTRARIWISE RESPONDENT WAS NEGLIGENT
IN THE SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS MESSENGER EMERANO ILAGAN, AND IN THE
SAFEKEEPING OF ITS CHECKS AND OTHER FINANCIAL DOCUMENTS.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE INSTANT CASE IS A LAST DITCH
EFFORT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO RECOVER ITS P300,000.00 AFTER FAILING IN ITS
EFFORTS TO RECOVER THE SAME FROM ITS EMPLOYEE EMERANO ILAGAN.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT MITIGATING THE DAMAGES AWARDED AGAINST
PETITIONER UNDER ARTICLE 2197 OF THE CIVIL CODE, NOTWITHSTANDING ITS FINDING
THAT PETITIONER BANKS NEGLIGENCE WAS ONLY CONTRIBUTORY.[16]

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is partly meritorious.

Solidbanks Fiduciary Duty under the Law

The rulings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals conflict on the application of the law. The
trial court pinned the liability on L.C. Diaz based on the provisions of the rules on savings account, a
recognition of the contractual relationship between Solidbank and L.C. Diaz, the latter being a
depositor of the former. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals applied the law on quasi-delict to
determine who between the two parties was ultimately negligent. The law on quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana is generally applicable when there is no pre-existing contractual relationship between the
parties.
We hold that Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence, or culpa contractual.
The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code
on simple loan.[17] Article 1980 of the Civil Code expressly provides that x x x savings x x x deposits of
money in banks and similar institutions shall be governed by the provisions concerning simple
loan. There is a debtor-creditor relationship between the bank and its depositor. The bank is the
debtor and the depositor is the creditor. The depositor lends the bank money and the bank agrees to
pay the depositor on demand. The savings deposit agreement between the bank and the depositor is
the contract that determines the rights and obligations of the parties.
The law imposes on banks high standards in view of the fiduciary nature of banking. Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 8791 (RA 8791),[18] which took effect on 13 June 2000, declares that the State
recognizes the fiduciary nature of banking that requires high standards of integrity and
performance.[19] This new provision in the general banking law, introduced in 2000, is a statutory
affirmation of Supreme Court decisions, starting with the 1990 case of Simex International v. Court
of Appeals,[20] holding that the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors
with meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship.[21]
This fiduciary relationship means that the banks obligation to observe high standards of integrity
and performance is deemed written into every deposit agreement between a bank and its depositor.
The fiduciary nature of banking requires banks to assume a degree of diligence higher than that of a
good father of a family. Article 1172 of the Civil Code states that the degree of diligence required of
an obligor is that prescribed by law or contract, and absent such stipulation then the diligence of a
good father of a family.[22] Section 2 of RA 8791 prescribes the statutory diligence required from
banks that banks must observe high standards of integrity and performance in servicing their
depositors. Although RA 8791 took effect almost nine years after the unauthorized withdrawal of

the P300,000 from L.C. Diazs savings account, jurisprudence [23] at the time of the withdrawal already
imposed on banks the same high standard of diligence required under RA No. 8791.
However, the fiduciary nature of a bank-depositor relationship does not convert the contract
between the bank and its depositors from a simple loan to a trust agreement, whether express or
implied. Failure by the bank to pay the depositor is failure to pay a simple loan, and not a breach of
trust.[24] The law simply imposes on the bank a higher standard of integrity and performance in
complying with its obligations under the contract of simple loan, beyond those required of non-bank
debtors under a similar contract of simple loan.
The fiduciary nature of banking does not convert a simple loan into a trust agreement because
banks do not accept deposits to enrich depositors but to earn money for themselves.The law allows
banks to offer the lowest possible interest rate to depositors while charging the highest possible
interest rate on their own borrowers. The interest spread or differential belongs to the bank and not to
the depositors who are not cestui que trust of banks. If depositors are cestui que trust of banks, then
the interest spread or income belongs to the depositors, a situation that Congress certainly did not
intend in enacting Section 2 of RA 8791.

Solidbanks Breach of its Contractual Obligation

Article 1172 of the Civil Code provides that responsibility arising from negligence in the
performance of every kind of obligation is demandable. For breach of the savings deposit agreement
due to negligence, or culpa contractual, the bank is liable to its depositor.
Calapre left the passbook with Solidbank because the transaction took time and he had to go to
Allied Bank for another transaction. The passbook was still in the hands of the employees of
Solidbank for the processing of the deposit when Calapre left Solidbank. Solidbanks rules on savings
account require that the deposit book should be carefully guarded by the depositor and kept under
lock and key, if possible. When the passbook is in the possession of Solidbanks tellers during
withdrawals, the law imposes on Solidbank and its tellers an even higher degree of diligence in
safeguarding the passbook.
Likewise, Solidbanks tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring that they return
the passbook only to the depositor or his authorized representative. The tellers know, or should know,
that the rules on savings account provide that any person in possession of the passbook is
presumptively its owner. If the tellers give the passbook to the wrong person, they would be clothing
that person presumptive ownership of the passbook, facilitating unauthorized withdrawals by that
person. For failing to return the passbook to Calapre, the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz,
Solidbank and Teller No. 6 presumptively failed to observe such high degree of diligence in
safeguarding the passbook, and in insuring its return to the party authorized to receive the same.
In culpa contractual, once the plaintiff proves a breach of contract, there is a presumption that the
defendant was at fault or negligent. The burden is on the defendant to prove that he was not at fault
or negligent. In contrast, in culpa aquiliana the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant
was negligent. In the present case, L.C. Diaz has established that Solidbank breached its contractual
obligation to return the passbook only to the authorized representative of L.C. Diaz. There is thus a
presumption that Solidbank was at fault and its teller was negligent in not returning the passbook to
Calapre. The burden was on Solidbank to prove that there was no negligence on its part or its
employees.
Solidbank failed to discharge its burden. Solidbank did not present to the trial court Teller No. 6,
the teller with whom Calapre left the passbook and who was supposed to return the passbook to
him. The record does not indicate that Teller No. 6 verified the identity of the person who retrieved the
passbook. Solidbank also failed to adduce in evidence its standard procedure in verifying the identity
of the person retrieving the passbook, if there is such a procedure, and that Teller No. 6 implemented
this procedure in the present case.
Solidbank is bound by the negligence of its employees under the principle of respondeat
superior or command responsibility. The defense of exercising the required diligence in the selection

and supervision of employees is not a complete defense in culpa contractual, unlike in culpa
aquiliana.[25]
The bank must not only exercise high standards of integrity and performance, it must also insure
that its employees do likewise because this is the only way to insure that the bank will comply with its
fiduciary duty. Solidbank failed to present the teller who had the duty to return to Calapre the
passbook, and thus failed to prove that this teller exercised the high standards of integrity and
performance required of Solidbanks employees.

Proximate Cause of the Unauthorized Withdrawal

Another point of disagreement between the trial and appellate courts is the proximate cause of
the unauthorized withdrawal. The trial court believed that L.C. Diazs negligence in not securing its
passbook under lock and key was the proximate cause that allowed the impostor to withdraw
the P300,000. For the appellate court, the proximate cause was the tellers negligence in processing
the withdrawal without first verifying with L.C. Diaz. We do not agree with either court.
Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have
occurred.[26] Proximate cause is determined by the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of
logic, common sense, policy and precedent.[27]
L.C. Diaz was not at fault that the passbook landed in the hands of the impostor. Solidbank was
in possession of the passbook while it was processing the deposit. After completion of the
transaction, Solidbank had the contractual obligation to return the passbook only to Calapre, the
authorized representative of L.C. Diaz. Solidbank failed to fulfill its contractual obligation because it
gave the passbook to another person.
Solidbanks failure to return the passbook to Calapre made possible the withdrawal of
the P300,000 by the impostor who took possession of the passbook. Under Solidbanks rules on
savings account, mere possession of the passbook raises the presumption of ownership. It was the
negligent act of Solidbanks Teller No. 6 that gave the impostor presumptive ownership of the
passbook. Had the passbook not fallen into the hands of the impostor, the loss of P300,000 would not
have happened. Thus, the proximate cause of the unauthorized withdrawal was Solidbanks
negligence in not returning the passbook to Calapre.
We do not subscribe to the appellate courts theory that the proximate cause of the unauthorized
withdrawal was the tellers failure to call up L.C. Diaz to verify the withdrawal. Solidbank did not have
the duty to call up L.C. Diaz to confirm the withdrawal. There is no arrangement between Solidbank
and L.C. Diaz to this effect. Even the agreement between Solidbank and L.C. Diaz pertaining to
measures that the parties must observe whenever withdrawals of large amounts are made does not
direct Solidbank to call up L.C. Diaz.
There is no law mandating banks to call up their clients whenever their representatives withdraw
significant amounts from their accounts. L.C. Diaz therefore had the burden to prove that it is the
usual practice of Solidbank to call up its clients to verify a withdrawal of a large amount of
money. L.C. Diaz failed to do so.
Teller No. 5 who processed the withdrawal could not have been put on guard to verify the
withdrawal. Prior to the withdrawal of P300,000, the impostor deposited with Teller No. 6 the P90,000
PBC check, which later bounced. The impostor apparently deposited a large amount of money to
deflect suspicion from the withdrawal of a much bigger amount of money. The appellate court thus
erred when it imposed on Solidbank the duty to call up L.C. Diaz to confirm the withdrawal when no
law requires this from banks and when the teller had no reason to be suspicious of the transaction.
Solidbank continues to foist the defense that Ilagan made the withdrawal. Solidbank claims that
since Ilagan was also a messenger of L.C. Diaz, he was familiar with its teller so that there was no
more need for the teller to verify the withdrawal. Solidbank relies on the following statements in the
Booking and Information Sheet of Emerano Ilagan:

xxx Ilagan also had with him (before the withdrawal) a forged check of PBC and indicated the amount
of P90,000 which he deposited in favor of L.C. Diaz and Company. After successfully withdrawing this
large sum of money, accused Ilagan gave alias Rey (Noel Tamayo) his share of the loot. Ilagan then
hired a taxicab in the amount of P1,000 to transport him (Ilagan) to his home province at Bauan,
Batangas.Ilagan extravagantly and lavishly spent his money but a big part of his loot was wasted in
cockfight and horse racing. Ilagan was apprehended and meekly admitted his guilt.[28] (Emphasis
supplied.)
L.C. Diaz refutes Solidbanks contention by pointing out that the person who withdrew
the P300,000 was a certain Noel Tamayo. Both the trial and appellate courts stated that this Noel
Tamayo presented the passbook with the withdrawal slip.
We uphold the finding of the trial and appellate courts that a certain Noel Tamayo withdrew
the P300,000. The Court is not a trier of facts. We find no justifiable reason to reverse the factual
finding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. The tellers who processed the deposit of
the P90,000 check and the withdrawal of the P300,000 were not presented during trial to substantiate
Solidbanks claim that Ilagan deposited the check and made the questioned withdrawal. Moreover, the
entry quoted by Solidbank does not categorically state that Ilagan presented the withdrawal slip and
the passbook.

Doctrine of Last Clear Chance

The doctrine of last clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act
of one is appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but failed to
do so, is chargeable with the loss.[29] Stated differently, the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff does
not preclude him from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence of the defendant,
who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. [30]
We do not apply the doctrine of last clear chance to the present case. Solidbank is liable for
breach of contract due to negligence in the performance of its contractual obligation to L.C. Diaz. This
is a case of culpa contractual, where neither the contributory negligence of the plaintiff nor his last
clear chance to avoid the loss, would exonerate the defendant from liability. [31] Such contributory
negligence or last clear chance by the plaintiff merely serves to reduce the recovery of damages by
the plaintiff but does not exculpate the defendant from his breach of contract. [32]

Mitigated Damages
Under Article 1172, liability (for culpa contractual) may be regulated by the courts, according to
the circumstances. This means that if the defendant exercised the proper diligence in the selection
and supervision of its employee, or if the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, then the courts
may reduce the award of damages. In this case, L.C. Diaz was guilty of contributory negligence in
allowing a withdrawal slip signed by its authorized signatories to fall into the hands of an
impostor. Thus, the liability of Solidbank should be reduced.
In Philippine Bank of Commerce v. Court of Appeals,[33] where the Court held the depositor
guilty of contributory negligence, we allocated the damages between the depositor and the bank on a
40-60 ratio. Applying the same ruling to this case, we hold that L.C. Diaz must shoulder 40% of the
actual damages awarded by the appellate court. Solidbank must pay the other 60% of the actual
damages.
WHEREFORE,
the
decision
of
the
Court
of
Appeals
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner Solidbank Corporation shall pay private respondent
L.C. Diaz and Company, CPAs only 60% of the actual damages awarded by the Court of

Appeals. The remaining 40% of the actual damages shall be borne by private respondent L.C. Diaz
and Company, CPAs. Proportionate costs.
SO ORDERED.

Solidbanks tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring that they return the
passbook only to the depositor or his authorized representative. The tellers know, or should
know, that the rules on savings account provide that any person in possession of the
passbook is presumptively its owner.
Facts: Solidbank is a domestic banking corporation while private respondent L.C. Diaz and
Company, CPAs (L.C. Diaz), is a professional partnership engaged in the practice of accounting
and which opened a savings account with Solidbank. Diaz through its cashier, Mercedes Macaraya ,
filled up a savings cash deposit slip and a savings checks deposit slip. Macaraya instructed the
messenger of L.C. Diaz, Ismael Calapre, to deposit the money with Solidbank and give him the
Solidbank passbook. Calapre went to Solidbank and presented to Teller No. 6 the two deposit slips
and the passbook. The teller acknowledged receipt of the deposit by returning to Calapre the
duplicate copies of the two deposit slips. Since the transaction took time and Calapre had to make
another deposit for L.C. Diaz with Allied Bank, he left the passbook with Solidbank. When Calapre
returned to Solidbank to retrieve the passbook, Teller No. 6 informed him that somebody got the
passbook. Calapre went back to L.C. Diaz and reported the incident to Macaraya. The following day,,
L.C. Diaz through its Chief Executive Officer, Luis C. Diaz, called up Solidbank to stop any
transaction using the same passbook until L.C. Diaz could open a new account followed by a formal
written request later that day. It was also on the same day that L.C. Diaz learned of the unauthorized
withdrawal the day before of P300,000 from its savings account. The withdrawal slip bore the
signatures of the authorized signatories of L.C. Diaz, namely Diaz and Rustico L. Murillo. The
signatories, however, denied signing the withdrawal slip. A certain Noel Tamayo received
the P300,000.
L.C. Diaz demanded from Solidbank the return of its money but to no avail. Hence, L.C. Diaz filed a
Complaint for Recovery of a Sum of Money against Solidbank with the Regional Trial Court. After
trial, the trial court rendered a decision absolving Solidbank and dismissing the complaint. Court of
Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not Solidbank must be held liable for the fraudulent withdrawal on private
respondents account.
Held: Solidbanks tellers must exercise a high degree of diligence in insuring that they return the
passbook only to the depositor or his authorized representative. The tellers know, or should know,
that the rules on savings account provide that any person in possession of the passbook is
presumptively its owner. If the tellers give the passbook to the wrong person, they would
beCLOTHING that person presumptive ownership of the passbook, facilitating unauthorized
withdrawals by that person. For failing to return the passbook to Calapre, the authorized
representative of L.C. Diaz, Solidbank and Teller No. 6 presumptively failed to observe such high
degree of diligence in safeguarding the passbook, and in insuring its return to the party authorized to
receive the same. However, L.C. Diaz was guilty of contributory negligence in allowing a withdrawal
slip signed by its authorized signatories to fall into the hands of an impostor. Thus, the liability of
Solidbank should be reduced. Hence, the liability of Solidbank for actual damages was reduced to
only 60%, the remaining 40% was borne by private respondent.
The contract between the bank and its depositor is governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on
simple loan. There is a debtor-creditor relationship between the bank and its depositor. The bank is
the debtor and the depositor is the creditor. The law imposes on banks high standards in view of the
fiduciaryNATURE of banking. RA 8791 declares that the State recognizes the fiduciary nature of
banking that requires high standards of integrity and performance. This new provision in the general
banking law, introduced in 2000, is a statutory affirmation of Supreme Court decisions holding that
the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care, always
having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship.

[G.R. No. 138334. August 25, 2003]

ESTELA L. CRISOSTOMO, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS and CARAVAN TRAVEL &
TOURS INTERNATIONAL, INC., respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In May 1991, petitioner Estela L. Crisostomo contracted the services of respondent Caravan
Travel and Tours International, Inc. to arrange and facilitate her booking, ticketing and
accommodation in a tour dubbed Jewels of Europe. The package tour included the countries of
England, Holland, Germany, Austria, Liechstenstein, Switzerland and France at a total cost of
P74,322.70. Petitioner was given a 5% discount on the amount, which included airfare, and the
booking fee was also waived because petitioners niece, Meriam Menor, was respondent companys
ticketing manager.
Pursuant to said contract, Menor went to her aunts residence on June 12, 1991 a Wednesday to
deliver petitioners travel documents and plane tickets. Petitioner, in turn, gave Menor the full payment
for the package tour. Menor then told her to be at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA)
on Saturday, two hours before her flight on board British Airways.
Without checking her travel documents, petitioner went to NAIA on Saturday, June 15, 1991, to
take the flight for the first leg of her journey from Manila to Hongkong. To petitioners dismay, she
discovered that the flight she was supposed to take had already departed the previous day. She
learned that her plane ticket was for the flight scheduled on June 14, 1991. She thus called up Menor
to complain.
Subsequently, Menor prevailed upon petitioner to take another tour the British Pageant which
included England, Scotland and Wales in its itinerary. For this tour package, petitioner was asked
anew to pay US$785.00 or P20,881.00 (at the then prevailing exchange rate of P26.60). She gave
respondent US$300 or P7,980.00 as partial payment and commenced the trip in July 1991.
Upon petitioners return from Europe, she demanded from respondent the reimbursement of
P61,421.70, representing the difference between the sum she paid for Jewels of Europe and the
amount she owed respondent for the British Pageant tour. Despite several demands, respondent
company refused to reimburse the amount, contending that the same was nonrefundable.[1] Petitioner was thus constrained to file a complaint against respondent for breach of
contract of carriage and damages, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 92-133 and raffled to
Branch 59 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
In her complaint,[2] petitioner alleged that her failure to join Jewels of Europe was due to
respondents fault since it did not clearly indicate the departure date on the plane ticket.Respondent
was also negligent in informing her of the wrong flight schedule through its employee Menor. She
insisted that the British Pageant was merely a substitute for the Jewels of Europe tour, such that the
cost of the former should be properly set-off against the sum paid for the latter.
For its part, respondent company, through its Operations Manager, Concepcion Chipeco, denied
responsibility for petitioners failure to join the first tour. Chipeco insisted that petitioner was informed
of the correct departure date, which was clearly and legibly printed on the plane ticket. The travel
documents were given to petitioner two days ahead of the scheduled trip. Petitioner had only herself
to blame for missing the flight, as she did not bother to read or confirm her flight schedule as printed
on the ticket.
Respondent explained that it can no longer reimburse the amount paid for Jewels of Europe,
considering that the same had already been remitted to its principal in Singapore, Lotus Travel Ltd.,
which had already billed the same even if petitioner did not join the tour. Lotus European tour
organizer, Insight International Tours Ltd., determines the cost of a package tour based on a

minimum number of projected participants. For this reason, it is accepted industry practice to disallow
refund for individuals who failed to take a booked tour.[3]
Lastly, respondent maintained that the British Pageant was not a substitute for the package tour
that petitioner missed. This tour was independently procured by petitioner after realizing that she
made a mistake in missing her flight for Jewels of Europe. Petitioner was allowed to make a partial
payment of only US$300.00 for the second tour because her niece was then an employee of the
travel agency. Consequently, respondent prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay the balance of
P12,901.00 for the British Pageant package tour.
After due proceedings, the trial court rendered a decision,[4] the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant to return and/or refund to the plaintiff the amount of Fifty Three Thousand Nine
Hundred Eighty Nine Pesos and Forty Three Centavos (P53,989.43) with legal interest thereon at the
rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum starting January 16, 1992, the date when the complaint was
filed;
2. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos as and for
reasonable attorneys fees;
3. Dismissing the defendants counterclaim, for lack of merit; and
4. With costs against the defendant.
SO ORDERED.[5]
The trial court held that respondent was negligent in erroneously advising petitioner of her
departure date through its employee, Menor, who was not presented as witness to rebut petitioners
testimony. However, petitioner should have verified the exact date and time of departure by looking at
her ticket and should have simply not relied on Menors verbal representation. The trial court thus
declared that petitioner was guilty of contributory negligence and accordingly, deducted 10% from the
amount being claimed as refund.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which likewise found both parties to be at
fault. However, the appellate court held that petitioner is more negligent than respondent because as
a lawyer and well-traveled person, she should have known better than to simply rely on what was told
to her. This being so, she is not entitled to any form of damages. Petitioner also forfeited her right to
the Jewels of Europe tour and must therefore pay respondent the balance of the price for the British
Pageant tour. The dispositive portion of the judgment appealed from reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Regional Trial Court dated October 26, 1995
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby ENTERED requiring the plaintiffappellee to pay to the defendant-appellant the amount of P12,901.00, representing the balance of the
price of the British Pageant Package Tour, the same to earn legal interest at the rate of SIX
PERCENT (6%) per annum, to be computed from the time the counterclaim was filed until the finality
of this decision. After this decision becomes final and executory, the rate of TWELVE PERCENT
(12%) interest per annum shall be additionally imposed on the total obligation until payment thereof is
satisfied. The award of attorneys fees is DELETED. Costs against the plaintiff-appellee.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Upon denial of her motion for reconsideration,[7] petitioner filed the instant petition under Rule 45
on the following grounds:
I

It is respectfully submitted that the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in
reversing and setting aside the decision of the trial court by ruling that the petitioner is not entitled to a
refund of the cost of unavailed Jewels of Europe tour she being equally, if not more, negligent than
the private respondent, for in the contract of carriage the common carrier is obliged to observe utmost
care and extra-ordinary diligence which is higher in degree than the ordinary diligence required of the
passenger. Thus, even if the petitioner and private respondent were both negligent, the petitioner
cannot be considered to be equally, or worse, more guilty than the private respondent. At best,
petitioners negligence is only contributory while the private respondent [is guilty] of gross negligence
making the principle of pari delicto inapplicable in the case;
II
The Honorable Court of Appeals also erred in not ruling that the Jewels of Europe tour was not
indivisible and the amount paid therefor refundable;
III
The Honorable Court erred in not granting to the petitioner the consequential damages due her as a
result of breach of contract of carriage.[8]
Petitioner contends that respondent did not observe the standard of care required of a common
carrier when it informed her wrongly of the flight schedule. She could not be deemed more negligent
than respondent since the latter is required by law to exercise extraordinary diligence in the fulfillment
of its obligation. If she were negligent at all, the same is merely contributory and not the proximate
cause of the damage she suffered. Her loss could only be attributed to respondent as it was the direct
consequence of its employees gross negligence.
Petitioners contention has no merit.
By definition, a contract of carriage or transportation is one whereby a certain person or
association of persons obligate themselves to transport persons, things, or news from one place to
another for a fixed price.[9] Such person or association of persons are regarded as carriers and are
classified as private or special carriers and common or public carriers.[10] A common carrier is defined
under Article 1732 of the Civil Code as persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the
business of carrying or transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water or air, for
compensation, offering their services to the public.
It is obvious from the above definition that respondent is not an entity engaged in the business of
transporting either passengers or goods and is therefore, neither a private nor a common carrier.
Respondent did not undertake to transport petitioner from one place to another since its covenant
with its customers is simply to make travel arrangements in their behalf. Respondents services as a
travel agency include procuring tickets and facilitating travel permits or visas as well as booking
customers for tours.
While petitioner concededly bought her plane ticket through the efforts of respondent company,
this does not mean that the latter ipso facto is a common carrier. At most, respondent acted merely
as an agent of the airline, with whom petitioner ultimately contracted for her carriage to Europe.
Respondents obligation to petitioner in this regard was simply to see to it that petitioner was properly
booked with the airline for the appointed date and time. Her transport to the place of destination,
meanwhile, pertained directly to the airline.
The object of petitioners contractual relation with respondent is the latters service of arranging
and facilitating petitioners booking, ticketing and accommodation in the package tour. In contrast,
the object of a contract of carriage is the transportation of passengers or goods. It is in this sense
that the contract between the parties in this case was an ordinary one for services and not one of
carriage. Petitioners submission is premised on a wrong assumption.
The nature of the contractual relation between petitioner and respondent is determinative of the
degree of care required in the performance of the latters obligation under the contract. For reasons of
public policy, a common carrier in a contract of carriage is bound by law to carry passengers as far as

human care and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons and with
due regard for all the circumstances.[11] As earlier stated, however, respondent is not a common
carrier but a travel agency. It is thus not bound under the law to observe extraordinary diligence in the
performance of its obligation, as petitioner claims.
Since the contract between the parties is an ordinary one for services, the standard of care
required of respondent is that of a good father of a family under Article 1173 of the Civil Code. [12] This
connotes reasonable care consistent with that which an ordinarily prudent person would have
observed when confronted with a similar situation. The test to determine whether negligence attended
the performance of an obligation is: did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same
situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence.[13]
In the case at bar, the lower court found Menor negligent when she allegedly informed petitioner
of the wrong day of departure. Petitioners testimony was accepted as indubitable evidence of Menors
alleged negligent act since respondent did not call Menor to the witness stand to refute the allegation.
The lower court applied the presumption under Rule 131, Section 3 (e) [14] of the Rules of Court that
evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced and thus considered petitioners
uncontradicted testimony to be sufficient proof of her claim.
On the other hand, respondent has consistently denied that Menor was negligent and maintains
that petitioners assertion is belied by the evidence on record. The date and time of departure was
legibly written on the plane ticket and the travel papers were delivered two days in advance precisely
so that petitioner could prepare for the trip. It performed all its obligations to enable petitioner to join
the tour and exercised due diligence in its dealings with the latter.
We agree with respondent.
Respondents failure to present Menor as witness to rebut petitioners testimony could not give rise
to an inference unfavorable to the former. Menor was already working in France at the time of the
filing of the complaint,[15] thereby making it physically impossible for respondent to present her as a
witness. Then too, even if it were possible for respondent to secure Menors testimony, the
presumption under Rule 131, Section 3(e) would still not apply. The opportunity and possibility for
obtaining Menors testimony belonged to both parties, considering that Menor was not just
respondents employee, but also petitioners niece. It was thus error for the lower court to invoke the
presumption that respondent willfully suppressed evidence under Rule 131, Section 3(e). Said
presumption would logically be inoperative if the evidence is not intentionally omitted but is simply
unavailable, or when the same could have been obtained by both parties.[16]
In sum, we do not agree with the finding of the lower court that Menors negligence concurred with
the negligence of petitioner and resultantly caused damage to the latter. Menors negligence was not
sufficiently proved, considering that the only evidence presented on this score was petitioners
uncorroborated narration of the events. It is well-settled that the party alleging a fact has the burden
of proving it and a mere allegation cannot take the place of evidence. [17] If the plaintiff, upon whom
rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to show in a satisfactory manner facts upon
which he bases his claim, the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense. [18]
Contrary to petitioners claim, the evidence on record shows that respondent exercised due
diligence in performing its obligations under the contract and followed standard procedure in
rendering its services to petitioner. As correctly observed by the lower court, the plane ticket[19] issued
to petitioner clearly reflected the departure date and time, contrary to petitioners contention. The
travel documents, consisting of the tour itinerary, vouchers and instructions, were likewise delivered
to petitioner two days prior to the trip. Respondent also properly booked petitioner for the tour,
prepared the necessary documents and procured the plane tickets. It arranged petitioners hotel
accommodation as well as food, land transfers and sightseeing excursions, in accordance with its
avowed undertaking.
Therefore, it is clear that respondent performed its prestation under the contract as well as
everything else that was essential to book petitioner for the tour. Had petitioner exercised due
diligence in the conduct of her affairs, there would have been no reason for her to miss the flight.
Needless to say, after the travel papers were delivered to petitioner, it became incumbent upon her to

take ordinary care of her concerns. This undoubtedly would require that she at least read the
documents in order to assure herself of the important details regarding the trip.
The negligence of the obligor in the performance of the obligation renders him liable for damages
for the resulting loss suffered by the obligee. Fault or negligence of the obligor consists in his failure
to exercise due care and prudence in the performance of the obligation as the nature of the obligation
so demands.[20] There is no fixed standard of diligence applicable to each and every contractual
obligation and each case must be determined upon its particular facts. The degree of diligence
required depends on the circumstances of the specific obligation and whether one has been negligent
is a question of fact that is to be determined after taking into account the particulars of each case. [21]
The lower court declared that respondents employee was negligent. This factual finding,
however, is not supported by the evidence on record. While factual findings below are generally
conclusive upon this court, the rule is subject to certain exceptions, as when the trial court
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance
which will affect the result of the case.[22]
In the case at bar, the evidence on record shows that respondent company performed its duty
diligently and did not commit any contractual breach. Hence, petitioner cannot recover and must bear
her own damage.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51932 is AFFIRMED. Accordingly, petitioner is ordered to pay
respondent the amount of P12,901.00 representing the balance of the price of the British Pageant
Package Tour, with legal interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum, to be computed from the time
the counterclaim was filed until the finality of this Decision. After this Decision becomes final and
executory, the rate of 12% per annum shall be imposed until the obligation is fully settled, this interim
period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.[23]
SO ORDERED.

Crisostomo v. CA, 409 SCRA 528 (2003)

Problem:
Estela L. Crisostomo contracted the services of Caravan Travel and Tours International, Inc. to
arrange and facilitate her booking, ticketing and accommodation in a tour dubbed JEWELS of
Europe". The package tour cost her P74, 322.70. She was given a 5% discount on the amount, which
included airfare, and the booking fee was also waived because petitioners niece, Meriam Menor, was
formers companys ticketing manager.
Menor went to her aunts residence on a Wednesday to deliver petitioners travel documents and
plane tickets. Estela, in turn, gave Menor the full payment for the package tour. Menor then told her to
be at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) on Saturday, two hours before her flight on board
British Airways.
Without checking her travel documents, Estela went to NAIA on Saturday, to take the flight for the first
leg of her journey from Manila to Hongkong. She discovered that the flight she was supposed to take
had already departed the previous day. She learned that her plane ticket was for the flight scheduled
on June 14, 1991. She thus called up Menor to complain.
Subsequently, Menor prevailed upon Estela to take another tour the "British Pageant, which cost
P20, 881.00. She gave caravan travel and tours P7, 980.00 as partial payment and commenced the
trip in July 1991.
Upon petitioners return from Europe, she demanded from respondent the reimbursement of P61,
421.70, representing the difference between the sum she paid for "Jewels of Europe" and the amount
she owed respondent for the "British Pageant" tour. Despite several demands, respondent company
refused to reimburse the amount, contending that the same was non-refundable.

Estela filed a complaint against Caravan travel and Tours for breach of contract of carriage and
damages.

A) Will the action prosper?

B) Will she be entitled to damages?
Answer:

No, for there was no contract of carriage.

By definition, a contract of carriage or transportation is one whereby a certain person or association of

persons obligate themselves to transport persons, things, or news from one place to another for a
fixed price.

From the above definition, Caravan Travel and Tours is not an entity engaged in the business of
transporting either passengers or goods and is therefore, neither a private nor a common carrier.
Caravan Travel and Tours did not undertake to transport Estela from one place to another since its
covenant with its customers is simply to make travel arrangements in their behalf. Caravan travel and
tours services as a travel agency include procuring tickets and facilitating travel permits or visas as
well as booking customers for tours.

While Estela concededly bought her plane ticket through the efforts of respondent company, this does
not mean that the latter ipso facto is a common carrier. At most, Caravan Travel and Tours acted
merely as an agent of the airline, with whom the former ultimately contracted for her carriage to
Europe.

B) No.

The negligence of the obligor in the performance of the obligation renders him liable for damages for
the resulting loss suffered by the obligee. Fault or negligence of the obligor consists in his failure to
exercise due care and prudence in the performance of the obligation as theNATURE of the
obligation so demands.

In the case at bar, Caravan Travel and Tours exercised due diligence in performing its obligations
under the contract and followed standard procedure in rendering its services to Estela. The plane
ticket issued to petitioner clearly reflected the departure date and time, contrary to Estelas
contention. The travel documents, consisting of the tour itinerary, vouchers and instructions, were
likewise delivered to her two days prior to the trip. The Caravan Travel and Tours also properly
booked Estela for the tour, prepared the necessary documents and procured the plane tickets. It
arranged EstelasHOTEL ACCOMMODATION as well as food, land transfers and sightseeing
excursions, in accordance with its avowed undertaking.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the Caravan Travel and Tours performed its prestation under the
contract as well as everything else that was essential to book Estela for the tour.
Hence, Estela cannot recover and must bear her own damage.