FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 1170-CFI. September 30, 1978.]

NIEVES L. RITUAL, Complainant, v. JUDGE ERNESTO P. VALENCIA, Court of First
Instance, Baler, Quezon, Respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Complainants provisional appointment as court stenographer in respondents sala was
terminated because she did not possess the appropriate civil service eligibility. Although she
was a second grade civil service eligible and had rendered seven and a half years of
satisfactory service as court stenographer, respondent judge refused to recommend her for
reappointment while recommending two less qualified stenographers. Complainant charged
respondent with favoritism and partiality in dealing with his subordinates. Respondent, on the
other hand, claimed that complainant did not observe the usual and proper procedure for
recommendation for appointment to the position of stenographer, and did not accord due
respect and civility to him when she failed to voluntarily approach him to ask for a
recommendation.
The Supreme Court found respondent judge guilty of favoritism and partially for which he was
censured.
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGE; PARTIALITY AND FAVORITISM; RECOMMENDING
REAPPOINTMENT OF LESS QUALIFIED PERSONNEL. A judge displays his partiality in not
recommending the reappointment of a stenographer whose services were terminated pursuant
to Republic Act No. 6040 which terminated the services of those holding provisional
appointments without the appropriate civil service eligibility, while recommending for
reappointment two stenographers who were less qualified.
2. ID.; ID.; ASSIGNING FEMALE STENOGRAPHER IN JUDGES CHAMBER. A judge
shows partiality or favoritism in assigning a particular female stenographer most of the time in
his chamber instead of adopting the practice of assigning his three stenographers on rotation
basis to give them all equal exposure to the work in the courtroom and in the chamber.
Furthermore, he commits an indiscretion in assigning a female stenographer in his chamber. No
female stenographer should be assigned inside the chamber of the judge, who is not his close
relative to avoid suspicion or temptation. He should always bear in mind the injunction about
Caesars wife.
3. ID.; HUMILITY IS DEMANDED OF ABUSE IN AUTHORITY. A judges refusal to
recommend reappointment of a terminated employee merely because she did not approach him
voluntarily but only upon the advice of the Judicial Consultant smacks of arrogance of power as
well as pettiness. To further enhance the efficiency and loyalty to the service of his subordinates,
a superior should take the initiative in rewarding such efficiency and loyalty without imposing on
their self-respect. The respondent desired of complainant is conductive to promoting fawning
sycophancy or obsequiousness among subalterns, who will lose their self-respect and dignity by
flattering the vanity of egoistic superiors to curry favor with them. Humility is demanded of those
in authority.
4. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION OF COURTS; REAPPOINTMENT OF GOOD
PERSONNEL WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT. All inferior courts
and personnel are now within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (New Constitution, Section

6, Article X) including the appointments of subordinate court personnel, and therefore it was
proper for an applicant for reappointment as court stenographer to inquire about the status of
her application from the Judicial Consultant.
5. JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGE SHOULD BE PARTIAL (CANON NO. 4). A judge is duty
bound to be just and fair to his personnel as well as to observe the principles of judicial ethics.
Under Canon No. 4, he is expected to be: "temperate, attentive, patient, and
impartial . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
6. ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGES; PATENT PARTIALITY AND FAVORITISM HABITS
CENSURE. The patent partiality of favoritism committed by a district judge deserves
censure, not merely admonition.
DECISION
MAKASIAR, J.:
Respondent Ernesto P. Valencia is the District Judge of the Court of First Instance of Aurora
subprovince in Baler, Quezon. He is charged with "conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, abuse of authority, willful violation of the provisions of the Civil Service Rules, partiality
in dealing with subordinates, oppression and favoritism" by the complainant, Nieves L. Ritual,
his former court stenographer.
The instant case arose from the termination of the provisional appointment of the complainant
upon the recommendation of the respondent in accordance with Circular No. 2, issued on March
7, 1974 by the then Chief Justice Querube C. Makalintal pursuant to Republic Act 6040
terminating the services of those holding provisional appointments without the appropriate civil
service eligibility and the refusal of the respondent to recommend complainant for
reappointment, while recommending for reappointment two less qualified stenographers (p. 8,
Report).
It appears that complainant was extended a provisional appointment as court stenographer on
February 24, 1967. On September 13, 1974, she was advised by the then Judicial Consultant,
Honorable Manuel P. Barcelona, of the termination of her services as stenographer on
December 15, 1974.
Complainant filed an application for reappointment as stenographer on December 12, 1974 with
the Chief Justice, through the respondent Judge, stating that there were no civil service eligibles
who applied for the said position. Said application was not acted upon the respondent,
prompting her to inquire from the Judicial Consultant about the status of her application. She
found out that she did not have any recommendation for reappointment from
the Respondent.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
In a conference called by the Judicial Consultant on January 10, 1975, respondent informed him
that he did not recommend the complainant for reappointment because "She did not approach
him to recommend her and he would not be able to recommend her if she did not know how to
respect him" (p. 44, Report).
Upon the advice of the Judicial Consultant, complainant personally approached and asked the
respondent for recommendation. Notwithstanding this, however, respondent still refused to
recommend her. So, on April 10, 1975, she filed another application for reappointment. While
her application remained unacted upon, two other court stenographers, Isabel Ferreras and
Henry Gofredo, were reappointed and extended temporary appointments upon the
recommendation of theRespondent.
Thus, on July 15, 1975, complainant wrote the Judicial Consultant about the alleged
discrimination committed by the respondent against her. Required to comment on this letter,
respondent answered on August 21, 1975 giving his reasons for not recommending complainant
for reappointment, thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Mrs. Nieves L. Ritual does not possess the appropriate Civil Service Eligibility, she did not
observe the usual and proper procedure in applying for recommendation for appointment to the
position of stenographer, she did not accord due respect and civility to the recommending
authority, and she has demonstrated that she could not give the respect and civility required of
her to the Court" (p. 2 Report).
On October 9, 1975, complainant filed a letter-complaint against the respondent embodying the
aforementioned charges. In his answer dated March 10, 1976, herein respondent denied all the
charges against him (p. 11, Report).
In Our Resolution dated July 22, 1976, We referred this case to the Honorable Associate Justice
Mariano Serrano of the Court of Appeals, for investigation, report and recommendation.
On January 9, 1978, the Investigating Justice submitted his report finding the respondent guilty
of partiality or favoritism in dealing with his subordinates but exonerating him from other
charges, with the recommendation that he be admonished (p. 66, Report).
The charge of partiality or favoritism merits serious consideration.
Respondent displayed his partiality in not recommending the reappointment of the complainant
as temporary stenographer after the termination of her provisional appointment while
recommending for reappointment Isabel Ferreras and Henry Gofredo who were less qualified
than the complainant.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
The two favored stenographers do not possess a civil service eligibility as stenographer. While
complainant does not possess the appropriate civil service qualification, she, however, is a
second grade civil service eligible. Isabel Ferreras does not possess any civil service eligibility
whatsoever. Complainant has rendered seven and one-half (7 1/2) years of satisfactory service
as a court stenographer; while Henry Gofredo and Isabel Ferreras have rendered five years and
three years of service, respectively. Undoubtedly, complainant was better qualified than the
other two stenographers. Respondent himself even admitted that she was qualified to be a court
stenographer. Therefore, although she did not possess the appropriate civil service eligibility,
she should have been recommended for reappointment as temporary stenographer because of
her other qualifications.
Respondent likewise showed partiality or favoritism in assigning Isabel Ferreras most of the
time in his chamber. The records reveal that from July 1, 1971, when she first reported for work,
up to October 26, 1971 she attended only three court hearings. Whatever discretion respondent
has in the assignment of stenographers either in the chamber or in the courtroom; the better
practice, however, is to assign the three stenographer son rotation basis and thereby giving all
of them equal exposure to the work in the courtroom and in the chamber.
Furthermore, respondent committed an indiscretion in assigning a female stenographer in his
chamber. No female employee should be assigned inside the chamber of the judge, who is not
his close relative, to avoid suspicion or temptation. He should always bear in mind the injunction
about Caesars wife.
Respondent judge insists that complainant should approach him for recommendation. Yet he
recommended the reappointment of the two less qualified employees who did not approach him
for such recommendation. There was no need for complainant to approach respondent and
request him for a recommendation nor to approach him for interview, because she was an
incumbent stenographer who had been in the service for seven and one-half (7 1/2) years and
her qualifications were already known to respondent who considers her qualified for the
position.
Respondent, it seems, would want to make it appear to the complainant that it was a favor to be
recommended even if she is an incumbent stenographer and is fully qualified to be such.
Respondents refusal to recommend her merely because she did not approach him voluntarily
but only upon the advice of the Judicial Consultant, smacks of arrogance of power as well as
pettiness. To enhance further the efficiency and loyalty to the service of his subordinates, a

superior should take the initiative in rewarding such efficiency and loyalty without imposing on
their self-respect. What respondent desired of complainant is conducive to promoting fawning
sycophancy or obsequiousness among subalterns, who will lose their self-respect and dignity by
flattering the vanity of egoistic superiors to curry favor with them. Humility is demanded of those
in authority.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
We do not consider complainants refusal to approach the respondent for recommendation as
lack of respect for the respondent; because she had already followed the procedure of the
respondent by filling with him her application for reappointment. If at all, being an incumbent
stenographer with more years of satisfactory service than the favored ones, complainant
merited preferential consideration, without need of catering to the personal whim
of Respondent. Complainant had to inquire from the Judicial Consultant about the status of her
application because the same remained unacted upon by the Respondent. Such inaction on the
part of respondent accentuated his bias against complainant, doubly compounded by the fact
that he recommended for reappointment Isabel Ferreras and Henry Gofredo who did not
approach him therefor. In fact, respondent was the one who personally approached and
persuaded Isabel Ferreras to continue to work in his self and even admitted sending for her
from the public market where she was working after the lapse of her temporary appointment.
Moreover, all inferior courts and personnel thereof are now within the jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court (New Constitution, Section 6, Article X) including appointments of subordinate court
personnel, and therefore it was proper for the complainant to inquire about the status of her
application from the then Judicial Consultant.chanrobles law library : red
He maintained that it was not his duty to recommend complainant; yet he recommended two
less qualified stenographers. If it was not his duty, then he should not have insisted that she
should personally see him for such recommendation. He should have shown more concern
towards her knowing that she was going to be terminated after having rendered seven and onehalf (7 1/2) years of satisfactory service. And he should not have acted with partiality between
as a judge he is duty bound to be just and fair to his personnel as well as to observe the
principles of judicial ethics. And under Canon No. 4, he is expected to be: "temperate, attentive,
patient, and impartial . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
There is no need to consider the other four charges.
The patent partiality or favoritism committed by respondent deserves censure, not merely
admonition, considering his position as a District Judge.
WHEREFORE, THE RESPONDENT DISTRICT JUDGE ERNESTO P. VALENCIA IS HEREBY
CENSURED WITH THE WARNING THAT A REPETITION OF SAID ACT WILL BE DEALT
WITH MORE SEVERELY.
Muoz Palma, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-30324 November 29, 1973

RODULFO C. NIERE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH II, JOSE K.
QUIAMBAO, and JAIME PARROCO, City Treasurer of La Carlota City, respondents.
Medalla-Nava and Associates and Dominador Laberinto and Associates for petitioner.
Acting City Fiscal (La Carlota) Fortunato E. Singson, Jr. for respondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:
Petitioner Rodulfo C. Niere filed this petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the
decision dated December 28, 1968 of the respondent Court.
It is undisputed that La Carlota City was created by Republic Act No. 4585 enacted on June 19,
1965. Petitioner Rodulfo C. Niere is a Civil Service eligible, having passed the Board
Examinations for Civil Engineers in August, 1960 with a rating of 71.98%. He entered the
government service on October 3, 1960 as a civil engineer aide in the District Engineer's Office
at Bacolod City at P4.00 a day until he was given a permanent appointment as such on
December 1, 1961 at P2544.00 per annum. He was promoted on November 16, 1962 as junior
civil engineer; on September 9, 1963, as associate civil engineer; and on October 28, 1964 as
civil engineer. On January 3, 1966, he was appointed city engineer of La Carlota City by then
City Mayor Jaime Marino pursuant to the provisions of Section 21 of Republic Act No. 4585,
which appointment was endorsed to the Commissioner of Civil Service, who approved the same
on January 10, 1966. Petitioner thereafter assumed office as such city engineer of La Carlota
City.
After the enactment on July 17, 1967 of the Decentralization Act, otherwise known as Republic
Act No. 5185, private respondent Jose K. Quiambao was appointed on May 14, 1968 by the
President of the Philippines as city engineer of La Carlota City, upon recommendation of the
Commissioner of Public Highways, who, on June 17, 1968, officially informed herein petitioner
of said appointment of private respondent Quiambao, which appointment was duly confirmed by
the Commission on Appointments, and directed petitioner to turn over the office to respondent
Quiambao, who likewise on the same day June 17, 1968, advised petitioner that he was
assuming as city engineer of La Carlota City.
In reply to petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the confirmation of respondent Quiambao,
the Secretary of the Commission on Appointments, in a letter dated June 21, 1968, informed the
petitioner that his said motion was filed beyond the reglementary period and that his sole
remedy is to file quo warranto proceedings in court.
Private respondent Quiambao graduated cum laude from the Silliman University in 1957 with a
degree of Bachelor of Science in Civil Engineering and passed the Board Examinations the
same year with a rating of 82.4%. He entered the government service in 1957 while he was not
yet a registered engineer in the City Engineer's Office of Dumaguete City, then as associate
engineer in 1965 in the same office, from which he was promoted upon recommendation of the

Commissioner of Public Highways as heretofore intimated, to the position of City Engineer of La

Carlota City effective May 14, 1968.
Petitioner claims that he was legally appointed by the City Mayor of La Carlota City under
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 4585.
On the other hand, respondents maintain that the position of city engineer, created in the
Charter of La Carlota City (Secs. 19 & 29, R.A. No. 4585) which was enacted on June 19, 1965
and therefore already existing at the time of the appointment of petitioner on January 3, 1966,
can be filled up only by appointment of the President of the Philippines with the confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 5185, which expressly
excepts the city, engineer from the appointing authority of the city mayor.
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 4585 provides thus:
Appointment and removal of officials and employees. The mayor shall appoint the city
treasurer, the city health officer, the chief of police and fire department, and other heads and
other employees of such city department as may be created. Said office shall not be suspended
nor removed except in the manner and for causes provided by law: Provided, That
appointments of heads and other employees of the city shall be limited to civil service eligibles
as may from time to time be certified as such by the Commissioner of Civil Service.
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 5185 reads thus:
The City Assesssor, City Agriculturist, City Chief of Police and City Chief of Fire Department and
other heads of offices entirely paid out of city funds and their respective assistants or deputies
shall, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations, be appointed by the City Mayor;
Provided, however, that this section shall not apply to Judges, Auditors, Fiscals, City
Superintendents of Schools, Supervisors, Principals, City Treasurers, City Health officers and
City Engineers.
Section 10(3) of Article VII of the 1935 Constitution states:
The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, shall
appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank
of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain or commander, and all other
officers of the Government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and
those whom he maybe authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress may by law vest the
appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments.
The petition should be dismissed and the decision of the court a quo must be affirmed.
I
House Bill No. 9711, which became Republic Act No. 4585, originally expressly included the city
engineer as one of those whom the city mayor can appoint under Section 21 of Republic Act No.
4585, but during the period of amendment in the Senate, the position of said engineer was
deleted in the final draft of Section 21. This fact clearly indicates that the intention of the
Legislature was to exclude from the appointing power of the mayor the position of the city
engineer. This is not an amendment purely on a matter of form; because nothing could be more
substantial than the vesting of a power to appoint such an important city official as the city
engineer. Petitioner's assertion that Senator Tolentino stated that this amendment is merely one
of form is not accurate; because the records of the Senate session during the period of
amendments, as quoted by petitioner himself, show that:
THE PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE. We are in the period of amendments.

SENATOR TOLENTINO. There are committed amendments, Mr. President, embodied in the
committee Report. Some of them are matters of form. The other refers to the allotment of
collection of taxes. I move that these committee amendments be approved.
THE PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE. Is there any objection? (Silence) The Chair hears none.
The motion is approved. (P. 20 of Petition; p. 30, rec.; p. 42, petitioner's brief).
The Committee amendments included:
3. Page 33, line 6 .
Delete the following:
"the city engineer,
the city attorney.
"(P. 21 of Petition; p. 31, rec.; p. 43, petitioner's brief).
As aforequoted, Senator Tolentino was careful or deliberate in stating that some, not all, of the
amendments were matters of form. Neither did he refer expressly to the deletion of the
words city engineer from Section 21 of the Charter of La Carlota City as purely a formal
amendment. If Congress wanted to authorize the city mayor to appoint all heads and employees
of city department, it could have easily re-phrased Section 21 of the City Charter to that effect.
That this is a material modification is underscored by the fact that the City Charters of Toledo,
Cotabato, Kanlaon, Dapitan, San Carlos, Gingoog, Davao, Tacloban, Silahis, Bago, Bacolod,
Cebu, Legaspi and Roxas or Republic Acts Nos. 2688, 2364, 3445, 3811, 2643, 2668, 3028,
3068, 4382, 3857, 2234 and 603 expresslly vest the power to appoint the city department
heads, including the city engineer, in the President of the Philippines, who is the repository of
the appointing power by express constitutional conferment (Sec. 10(3), Art. VII, 1935
Constitution; see also Sec. 13, Art. IX, 1973 Constitution).
II
The clear legislative intendment in excepting the engineer from the appointing authority of the
city mayor under Section 21 of the Charter of La Carlota City is evident from the phraseology of
the same. Said section expressly limits the appointing authority of the mayor to "the city
treasurer, the city health officer, the chief of police and fire department, ..." among the heads of
the then duly created and existing departments, like the city engineer, of the city government of
La Carlota City. The following phrase in said Section 21 "and other heads and other employees
of the city departments as may be created," whom the mayor can appoint, refers to heads of city
departments that may be created after the enactment of Republic Act No. 4585. Otherwise, as
emphasized by respondents, the first conjunction "and" before "fire department" in the
preceding clause of that same sentence of Section 21 would be a superfluity, and would have
no meaning at all. As evident from the construction of the first sentence in said Section 21, the
terminal phrase "as may be created" modifies the last clause "and other heads and other
employees of such department," by all the principles of logic and syntax.
III
Since the city mayor under Section 21 is without authority to appoint the city engineer, this
prerogative can only be exercised by the President of the Philippines, who, under Section 10(3)
of Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, shall nominate with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments "all other officers of the government whose appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for"; because We ruled in Ramos vs. Alvarez (97 Phil. 844, 849) that when a
statute does not specify how an officer is to be appointed, the appointment must be made by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.
The appointing power is essentially the exclusive prerogative of the President. Consequently,
any diminution in its scope must be clear and unequivocal. This test is not met by Section 21 of

Republic Act No. 4585 so as to remove the power to appoint the city engineer of La Carlota City
from the residual power of appointment vested in the President by Section 10(3) of Article VII of
the 1935 Constitution.
Hence, the appointment of petitioner as city engineer by then city mayor of La Carlota City is
illegal and therefore null and void. However, as conceded by respondents, petitioner was a de
facto city engineer during the period of time that he performed the functions of the position until
he was displaced by respondent Quiambao who was validly nominated by the President of the
Philippines and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments (Cordilla vs. Martinez, 110 Phil.
24, 25; Rodriguez vs. Tan, 91 Phil. 724, 728; Luna vs. Rodriguez, 37 Phil. 866).
WHEREFORE, THE APPEALED DECISION IS HEREBY AFFIRMED, WITH COSTS AGAINST
PETITIONER.
Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Teehankee, Esguerra and Muoz Palma, JJ., concur.