Continuity in Leibniz's Mature Metaphysics

Author(s): Timothy Crockett

Source: Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic
Tradition, Vol. 94, No. 1/2, Selected Papers Presented at the American Philosophical
Association Pacific Division Meeting 1998 (May, 1999), pp. 119-138
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4320928 .
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TIMOTHYCROCKETT

CONTINUITYIN LEIBNIZ'SMATUREMETAPHYSICS*
(Receivedin revisedform20 November1998)

1. INTRODUCTION

Throughouthis philosophicalwritings, Leibniz attemptsto explain

fundamentalaspects of his metaphysics in terms of continuity.In
his early discussions of the structureof matter and motion, he
quite explicitly appeals to Aristotle's characterizationof continuity, and seems to adopt something like it as his own. There are, of
course, interpretativedifficulties in discerning what Leibniz takes
Aristotle's view to be and how Aristotle himself understandsthe
distinctionbetween a quantitythatis continuousand one thatis not.
But clearly Leibniz employs the Aristotelian distinction, in these
early texts, as a way of characterizingthe structureof an entity or
quantitywith respect to its elements or parts:if two things (or parts
of a thing) sharea boundary,they are continuous.
Commentatorsusually assume that Leibniz continues to understand the notion of continuity in this way for the rest of his life.
I think this interpretationof Leibniz is inadequate.To be sure, he
does continueto use somethinglike the Aristotelianconceptionwell
into the matureperiod of his thought.But I believe he articulatesa
second sense of continuityin his later writings that proves to be of
greaterimportanceto the exposition of his maturemetaphysics.
To supportthis interpretation,I shall first lay out a serious interpretativedifficulty about the continuity of change, a difficulty that
can be resolved only by reinterpretingwhat Leibniz says about
continuity,discontinuityand discreteness in the later metaphysics.
I shall then argue that careful considerationof key texts from this
period reveals that Leibniz did in fact have at least two notions of
continuityin mind, and that once these two senses are distinguished
we can reconcile some apparentlycontradictorytexts. In the course
La

PhilosophicalStudies 94: 119-138, 1999.

(C)1999 KluwerAcademicPublishers. Printedin the Netherlands.

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TIMOTHYCROCKETT

of this discussion, it will become evident that this distinction has

implicationsnot only for Leibniz's treatmentof change, but also for
otherfundamentalelements of the maturemetaphysics.

2. THE INTERPRETATIVE DIFFICULTY

One of Leibniz's most importantmetaphysicalprinciplesis the Law

of Continuity(lex continuitatis),accordingto which "naturenever
makes leaps" (G V, p. 49). He applies this principleat variousontological levels: at the level of ideal continua like space and time,
at the level of phenomena,and at the monadic level. As he states
in The Metaphysical Foundationsof Mathematics, "continuityis
found in time, extension, qualities, and movement - in fact, in all
naturalchanges, for these never take place by leaps" (after 1714;
L, p. 671). Leibniz is remarkablyconsistent in claiming that ideal
continuaobey the Law of Continuity.But there are apparenttextual
inconsistenciesin his treatmentof actualchange. In the passagejust
cited, Leibniz claims that all naturalchange is continuous. At the
very least, this amounts to the claim that all phenomenalchange
is continuous. And indeed there are several texts in which Leibniz
explicitly endorses such a view. For example, in a 1702 letter to
Varignon,Leibniz asks the following:
Continuitybeing thereforea necessary prerequisiteor a distinctive characterof
the true laws of the communicationof motion, can we doubt that all phenomena
are subject to it or become intelligible except by means of the true laws of the
communicationof motions?(W, p. 186).

Leibniz also says quite explicitly that perceptualchange, that is,

intra-monadicchange, is continuous as well. In the Monadology,
for example, he says
I take it as agreedthatevery createdbeing is subjectto change, and therefore,the
createdmonadalso, and furtherthatthis change is continuousin each one. (1714;
L, p. 643)

And in 1704 he writes to DeVolder,

For me nothing is permanentin things except the law itself which involves a
continuous succession and which corresponds,in individualthings, to that law
which determinesthe whole world. (L, p. 534)

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CONTINUITYIN LEIBNIZ'SMATUREMETAPHYSICS

Ideal
Phenomenal >
Most Real >

Spatial
Space
Matteror Body
Monads

121

Temporal
Time; MathematicalMotion
Changein Matter:motion
PerceptualChange

Figure 1.

So there is good reason to attributeto Leibniz the view that both

phenomenal change and intra-monadicor perceptual change are
continuous.I
Some of Leibniz'sletters,however,suggest a quitedifferentview.
For example, in a 1705 letter to DeVolder he states that "matter
is not continuous but discrete, and actually infinitely divided ....

(The same holds of changes, which are not really continuous)"(G

II, pp. 278-279). And in a 1705 letter to Princess Sophia he says
that "matterappearsto be a continuum,but it only appearsso, just
as does actual motion" (G VII, p. 564). So in the same period that
Leibniz claims change is continuous,he also apparentlydenies the
continuityof change.
How are we to interpretthese apparentlycontradictoryclaims?
In what follows I hope to show that we can provide a satisfactory
answer to this question only if we are careful to distinguish two
senses of continuityin the latermetaphysics,and if we are sensitive
to what Leibniz means when he claims that somethingis discrete.
3. ONTOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK

In laying out the interpretativedifficulty,I mentionedthat Leibniz

appliesthe Law of Continuityto threedistinctontologicallevels. Let
me begin explainingthe distinctionneeded to resolve thatdifficulty
by briefly sketching this three-tieredontology.2 In the monadological metaphysics,thereare threelevels of being and each level has
a spatialand a temporaldimension(see Figure 1).
At the ideal level of the spatialdimensionis space itself, which is
an idealizationor an abstractionfrom phenomena.At the phenomenal level are bodies or matter,which phenomenally 'result from',
but are not composed of, an infiniteaggregateof monads.Although

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TIMOTHYCROCKETT

phenomenaare not ultimateconstituentsof the world, they do have

some degree of realitythatis derivativefrom the monadsthat 'wellfound' them. Finally, at the ground-floormetaphysical level are
monads, or simple substances.These are the most real things that
exist. Each one is completely discerniblefrom any other substance
and is fully determinate.Though they get classified in this framework as falling under the spatial dimension, monads are really
non-spatial,unextendedsoul-like beings.
The temporaldimension is to be understoodanalogously.At the
purely ideal level are time and mathematicalmotion, which are
idealizationsthat are abstractedfrom the changing states of things.
At the phenomenal level is phenomenal change, that is, change,
like motion, that occurs in the phenomenal world. Finally, at the
most real level are the perceptualstates of monads.These states are
completely determinateand are discerniblefrom any other state.
There are three importantpoints to keep in mind about this
scheme. First,thereis a complicationat the ground-floorlevel of the
temporaldimension. Clearly, time is something ideal for Leibniz.
But it is not clear whethereach monad has its own privatetemporality that metaphysicallygrounds ideal, public time. If the monad
did have its own time, the analogy between the spatial dimension
and the temporaldimension would break down at the ground-floor
level. Monads would be neither in (Newtonian-like)space nor in
(Newtonian-like)time; but they would really have temporalproperties at the level of deepest metaphysicalrigor, even though they
would not really have spatial properties.3The motivationfor this
view is that it is hard to understandintra-monadicchange (or any
kind of change, for that matter) as something that does not take
place over time. Notwithstandingthis difficulty, I think that for
Leibniz the monad does not have a sort of private,intra-monadic
time, and that the analogy between the spatial and the temporal
dimensionsremainsintactat the level of deepest metaphysicalrigor.
On this view monads are neither in space nor in time, and at the
level of deepest metaphysical rigor, monads do not really have
temporalproperties,any more than they have spatialproperties.So,
the temporalorderingof states of a monad (and states of phenomena) is ultimatelygroundedin states thatare not temporallyordered
at all.4

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123

The second point about this frameworkis that the division of

each tier into two dimensions is somewhat artificialand may even
be misleading. For example, it would be wrong to assume that our
concept of space can be formedwithoutany experienceof phenomenal change,5 or that the division at the ground-floormetaphysical
level is meant to reflect a substantivedistinctionbetween a monad
and its series of states. Perhaps,then, it would be best to thinkof the
dimensionsmerely as ways of consideringthat which exists at each
ontological level. For example, at the phenomenallevel, we might
considera body at an instant,or we mightconsiderit as it undergoes
change. And we might consider space to be an abstractionfrom
phenomena considered in one way, and time an abstractionfrom
phenomenaconsideredin anotherway.
The thirdpoint is that Leibniz believes that the entities at these
various levels can be classified as either ideal, on the one hand, or
actualor real on the other.Obviously,entities at what we are calling
the 'ideal level' are taken by Leibniz to be ideal, while the monads
and its states are taken to be real. But what about entities at the
phenomenallevel? Leibniz fairly consistently classifies bodies and
their motions as real or actual, as opposed to ideal. For example,
in a letter to DeVolder from 1704 he says that ". . . in real things,
that is, bodies, the parts are not indefinite ..." (L, p. 536).6 And
he is also quite careful to distinguish, depending on the context,
between mathematicalmotion, or motion consideredabstractly,and
actual motion, or the motion of an actual body.7 This is not to say
that phenomena are as real as monads; Leibniz is clear that the
monads are the most genuinely real things that exist. Indeed, he
sometimes refers to phenomenaas 'semi-mentalentities', making
the point that phenomena are, in some sense, partially ideal. But
phenomenanonethelesshave reality because they are well-founded
in some set of monads. Their reality is, we might say, derivative
from the monadsthatwell-found them.

4. PRELIMINARY REMARKS ABOUT DISCRETENESS

As we have seen, Leibniz says that matterand change are discrete.

Some commentatorshave taken this to mean, or at least imply,
that matter comprises discrete bits or 'chunks' and similarly that

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TIMOTHYCROCKETT

phenomenalchange takes place in discrete slices.8 I think it is clear

this is not what Leibniz means. Let us look moreclosely at his claim
that matter is discrete. In some places, he says that it is discrete
insofar as it has a foundationin genuine unities or simples (e.g.,
L, p. 539). But there are no chunks of matterthat could be called
simples, since any chunk is itself composed of an infinite number
of other chunks. Mathematicalpoints are simple in the sense that
they are in no way divisible, but Leibniz is not referringto points
when he speaks of units or simples in these passages. He is trying
to provide an escape from the labyrinthof the continuum,and his
claim is thatconsiderationof the relationbetweenthese units andthe
continuumof matterwill providejust such an escape. But he is also
clear that thinking of the continuumas composed of unextended,
mathematicalpoints is, at least in part,what leads to the labyrinthin
the firstplace.9
The claim thatmatteris discrete should insteadbe understoodas
the claim thatthe simple substancesthatunderliematterarediscrete.
As he writes to DeVolder:
From the things I have said it is also obvious that in actualbodies there is only a
discrete quantity,that is, a multitudeof monads or of simple substances.... (L,
p. 539)

But the fact thatmatteris well-foundedin discretemonadsdoes not

imply that there are gaps in matter,or that matteris a composite of
discontinuous,though contiguous, parts. To be sure, Leibniz does
think that certainfacts aboutthe structureof matterfollow from its
being well-founded in discrete unities; but we cannot infer these
facts merely from the claim that matteris discrete. So, it is not yet
clear whether there is any contradictioninvolved in claiming both
that matteris discrete and that there are no discontinuitiesor gaps
among its parts.
The issues are a bit more complicated when we consider Leibniz's claim that phenomenal change is discrete. One tempting
interpretationis that just as matteris discrete insofar as it results
from simple substances that are perfectly unitary and indivisible,
so too phenomenal change is discrete insofar as it is founded in
monadic states that are perfectly unitary and indivisible. According to this view, althoughphenomenalchange, like matter,may be
continuousin structure,it results from discrete, unitarysubstances

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whose modes take the form of discrete,unitaryperceptualstates.As

some commentatorshaveput it, in perceptionwe smearthe divisions
that really exist between perceptualstates, making changes appear
continuouseven though strictlythey are not.10
Given the close analogy Leibniz draws between matter and
phenomenalchange, this might seem to be a naturalinterpretation
of Leibniz's comments about the discreteness of change.11But it
raises difficult questions. Is Leibniz really committed to the existence of these perceptualunities?How could the series of states of a
substancebe sliced up into perfectlyindividuatedandunifiedsimple
states?Whatcould providethe unityfor a complex perceptualstate?
Ratherthan discuss these difficulties here, I would like to present
an alternativeinterpretationthat allows Leibniz both to affirmthat
change is discrete and to deny that perceptualstates are metaphysically simple. So, while I will not directly rule out the possibility
that the series of states of a monad is an aggregate of perfectly
individuatedand unitary states, I do hope to show that Leibniz is
not committed to these sorts of discrete states by his claims that
change is not continuous.

5. CONTINUITY AND DISCONTINUITY

The idea of continuitythatis most often attributedto Leibniz has its

roots in Aristotle'sPhysics, and concernsthe structureof a quantity
with respectto its parts.Leibnizcharacterizesthis sortof continuity,
i.e., structuralcontinuity,in variousways, but two are centralto his
thought. First, he characterizesit in terms of what we might call
density or compactness,the propertya set or quantityhas if between
any two elements of the set or quantity,thereis at least one element
interposedbetween them. In a letter to DeBosses he writes: "... if
points are such that there are not two without an intermediate,then
a continuousextension is given" (1716; G II, p. 515). Here, Leibniz
is clear thathe thinksdensity is at least sufficientfor continuity.
It is importantto keep in mind thatLeibniz's settled view is that
points are not fundamentalconstituentsof extended things. Points,
as well as lines, surfacesand instantsare not partsof things, but are
ratherextrema, termini or limits of things (NE, p. 152). An early
(1676) text illustratesthis point nicely:

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TIMOTHYCROCKETT

[T]hereare no points before they are designated.If a spheretouches a plane, the

locus of contactis a point;if a body is intersectedby anotherbody, or a surfaceby
anothersurface, then the locus of intersectionis a surface or a line respectively.
But there are no points, lines or surfacesanywhereelse, and thereare no extrema
in the universeexcept those thataremade by a division. (A VI, iii, pp. 552-553)12

Points, instants,etc. are merely modes of mental and semi-mental

entities. But moreimportantly,they do not exist unless they are actually designated.13So althoughit mightsoundin the DesBosses letter
as if Leibniz thinks that points are discrete, fundamentalconstituents of extension, and althoughthis might soundperfectlynaturalto
us, he does not think that extension, either mathematicalor actual,
is an aggregate of points. If anything, the characterizationin the
DesBosses letteris meantto express the view thatbetween any two
designatedterminiof a continuousmagnitude,it is always possible
to designate a furthercut or termini. And this is just to say that a
continuousquantityis infinitelydivisible.
The second way that Leibniz characterizesstructuralcontinuity
is in terms similarto those employed by Aristotlein the Physics. In
the famous definition at the beginning of Book VI of the Physics,
continuitygets contrastedwith contiguityand successiveness:
Now if the terms 'continuous', 'in contact', and 'in succession' are understood
as defined above - things being continuousif their extremitiesone, in contact if
their extremities are together,and in succession if there is nothing of their own
kind intermediatebetween them - nothingthatis continuouscan be composed of
indivisibles .... (Physics, VI 1, p. 231a)'4

Leibniz endorses something like this definition in his early writings on motion and matter.In a 1670 discussion of the coherence
of body, for example, he suggests that his view is in accordance
with Aristotle's when he notes that "thingswhose extremaare one
... are continuousor cohering,by Aristotle'sdefinitionalso [i.e., as
they are by my definition]. . ." (emphasismine; A VI, 2, p. 266).15
Unfortunately,there are deep interpretativedifficulties concerning
how Aristotle's definition is to be understood.In particular,it is
difficult to know what the distinction between the continuous and
the contiguous is really supposedto amountto. But the centralidea
behind the definitionof 'continuity'is clear enough: the partsof a
quantityare continuousif theirboundariesor limits are one and the
same.

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In these early texts, Leibniz most often contrastscontinuitywith

discontinuity,ratherthan with contiguity or successiveness, though
the notion of contiguity is importantin these works. He characterizes contiguity in the following way: "Contiguousthings are those
between which thereis no distance"(A VI, iii, p. 94). The idea here
seems to be that contiguous things are those whose boundariesare
distinct, even though the distance between the things is zero, since
theirboundariesare in contact.16Assuming this is the correctinterpretation,we can inferthe relationbetween the notionsof contiguity
and discontinuityfrom a 1669 letterto Thomasius:
For by the very fact that the parts are discontinuous, each will have its own
separateboundaries[terminos](for Aristotle defines continuousthings as hon ta
eschata hen [i.e. those whose boundariesare one]). (A VI, ii, p. 435)17

Contiguousthings are those whose boundariesare not one butrather

two; and the idea in the passagejust quotedseems to be thatdiscontinuous things, as opposed to continuous things, are those whose
boundariesare not one but two. So for Leibniz, the contiguousis to
be understoodas a species of the discontinuous,where things are
discontinuousif theirlimits are not one.18'19
We are now in possession of two independentways of characterizing the distinctionbetween structuralcontinuityand structural
discontinuity.According to the firstway:
(1) A series or quantityis continuous if it is dense; a series or
quantityis discontinuousif it is not dense.
And accordingto the second way:
(2) Things are continuous if their limits are one; things are
discontinuousif their limits are not one.
It is difficult to say what Leibniz takes the relationshipbetween
these two characterizationsto be, since differententailmentrelations
among the definitionsare possible dependingupon how we define
the sets or quantitiesunder consideration.For now I am going to
leave this question open and simply assume that Leibniz takes (1)
and (2) to be differentways of characterizingthe same distinction.
That is, I will be assuming that a dense quantityjust is a quantity
whose parts share boundaries,and vice versa, and that this sort of
quantityis to be contrastedwith one that is not dense and whose
partsdo not sharea boundary.20

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TIMOTHYCROCKETT

Fortunately,nothing I say in this paperwill depend on whetherI

am right about this assumption.Indeed, my concern in this section
has not been to providean exhaustiveaccountof Leibniz's views on
structuralcontinuityand structuraldiscontinuity,butratherto establish thatLeibniz in fact has a sense of continuitythat is intendedas
a way to characterizethe structureof a quantitywith respect to its
parts.It is this sense of continuityand discontinuitythat is relevant
to questions about whethera quantityhas gaps, whethera quantity
is composed of parts that are in contact, and so on. And it is this
sense of continuitythat, I will argue, later becomes subsidiaryto a
second sense.
Assuming,then,thatLeibniz'stwo characterizationsof structural
continuity are meant to express the same idea, and that Leibniz's
matureview is that density is sufficientfor structuralcontinuity,let
us introducethe following definitions:
S-Continuity: An entityor quantityis S-continuous
if it is dense.
Discontinuity: An entityor quantityis discontinuous
if is it not S-

continuous.
Let me note two points about these definitions before we turn to
Leibniz's second sense of continuity.First,it is no mistakethat the
term 'discrete'has not been employedin the discussionof structural
continuity.It is my view that, at least in the maturemetaphysics,
Leibniz contrasts discreteness with a sense of continuity that is
different from S-continuity.This is not to say that Leibniz never
uses the term 'discrete' in a way that is meant to imply structural
discontinuity.But I think there is evidence that when he is being
careful he means something quite different by the term 'discrete'
than he does the by the term 'discontinuous'.As I shall argue, for
Leibniz, whether something is discrete is entirely independentof
whetherit is discontinuous.
The second point is that S-continuity is the sort of continuity
relevantto his lex continuitatis. Leibniz would consider any entity
or quantity that is discontinuous to be one in which the Law of
Continuityis violated, since it contains gaps or leaps of a sort. For
even if a quantityhas contiguouspartswhose boundariestouch one
another,there is still a sense in which it contains gaps since the
limits of those parts are two, ratherthan one, and those limits do

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not have any furtherlimits interposedbetween them.21 This point is

importantto keep in mind as I shall arguethatfor Leibniz a quantity
can be discrete and nonethelessobey the law of continuity.

6. CONTINUITY AND DISCRETENESS

The second sense of continuitythat Leibniz employs in the mature

metaphysics has its roots in a distinction between the continuous
and the discretethat was common in the 17th century.Considerthe
following idea, which is expressedin a Frenchdictionaryfrom 1690:
(3) A continuous quantity is the sort of quantity dealt with in
geometry,whereas a discretequantityis the sort dealt with in
mathematics.22

Leibniz never defines continuityin this way, but the idea expressed
here hints at a sense of continuitythat Leibniz does have in mind.
A discrete quantity,such as the number '2', is composed of units
or unities, whereas a continuous quantity, such as a line, is not
composed at all, thoughit is divisible into parts.This sortof distinction shows up often in the latermetaphysics,andLeibniz sometimes
explicitly links this idea to a distinctionbetween ideal wholes and
actualwholes. To DeVolder,for example, he says that
Actual things are compoundedas is a numberout of unities, ideals as is a number
out of fractions;the partsare actuallyin the real whole but not in the ideal whole.
(L, p. 539)23

Claims of this sort have led some commentatorsto think that Leibniz is committed to some version of physical atomism when he
says things such as "[m]atteris not continuous but discrete
(to DeVolder, G, II, pp. 278-279). But we need to be very careful in interpretingLeibniz when he speaks of parts and units. As I
argued earlier,the units Leibniz has in mind when he says things
such as "the unit is prior to the multitude" are the monads: ". . . it

is also obvious that in actual bodies there is only a discrete quantity, that is, is a multitudeof monads or of simple substances ..."
(emphasismine; to DeVolder,L., p. 539). So, a discrete quantityis
one that results from genuine unities, the simple substances.This
point, taken in conjunctionwith Leibniz's claim that anythingthat

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TIMOTHYCROCKETT

resultsfrom genuineunities is actualor real (as opposedto ideal), is

centralto the second sense of continuity,the one Leibniz contrasts
with the notion of discreteness:
M-Continuity:A quantityis M-continuous
continu(metaphysically
ous) just in case (1) it is S-continuousand (2) it is
ideal.
mathematically
is discrete
Discreteness: A quantity
justin caseit is notmathematideal
or
(whether notit is S-continuous).
ically
In order to understandthis distinction, we need some account of
what it is to be mathematicallyideal. Leibniz seems to have the
following in mind. A mathematicallyideal quantity(i) "pertainsto
possibles and actuals, insofar as they are possible" (G II, p. 282),
and (ii) has partsthatarecompletelyindeterminate,undifferentiated,
indiscernibleand uniform.Leibniz offers an excellent characterization of M-continuityin a 1706 letterto DesBosses:
A continuousquantityis something ideal which pertainsto possibles as well as
actuals,insofar as they are possible. A continuum,that is, involves indeterminate
parts,but on the otherhand, thereis nothingindefinitein actuals .... Meanwhile,
the knowledge of the continuous, that is of possibilities, contains knowledge of
eternaltruthsthatare neverviolated by actualphenomena.... (emphasismine; G
II, p. 282)

Commentatorsoften take this text as claiming thatonly ideal quantities are S-continuous, and so any actual quantity must have a
discontinuousstructure.But the last sentencemakesit clear thatthis
is not what Leibniz has in mind. Whatis trueof an ideal continuum
like space, with respect to whetherits partsare structurallycontinuous or discontinuous,is also true of actual phenomena, since the
law of continuityis violated neitherat the ideal level nor at the level
of phenomena.The difference is that while the parts of space are
completely indeterminate,the parts of matter,or the 'parts' of the
motion of a physical object, are completely determinateand differentiatedin virtue of their resultingfrom the only discreteunits that
exist in the world, the monads.
Further support for this interpretationis found in a letter to
DeVolderin which Leibniz suggests thatdiscretenessis to be understood in terms of substantialitywhile continuityis to be understood
in termsof ideality:

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131

Matter is not continuous but discrete, and actually infinitely divided, though
no assignable space is without matter. But space, like time, is something not
substantialbut ideal .... (G II,pp. 278-279)

This text too could be read as supportingthe claim that only ideal
quantities are continuous. But given the monadological metaphysics, a more plausible interpretationis that Leibniz is claiming that
a discrete quantityis a real or substantialquantity,that is, a quantity that is founded in simple substances,whereas an M-continuous
quantityis one that is not real but ideal. The reason that space and
time are not discreteis not thatthey do not have discontinuousstructures;it is thatthey arenot substantial,or foundedin genuineunities,
and so are not completely determinate.
It is importantto note that when Leibniz says that the parts are
determinatein an actual quantityhe does not mean that the quantity is 'carved up' in one way ratherthan another,resulting in an
aggregate of parts each of which have their own boundaries. If
the quantity were divided in this way, and the 'determinate'parts
had boundariesthat were in contact with boundariesof otherparts,
the result would be a contiguum, not a continuum, and the law
of continuity would be violated. So, the determinatenessand nonuniformitythat a quantitygets from being well-founded in simple
substancesmust be understoodin some otherway. Towardsthe end
of the next section, I will explain how determinatenessand nonuniformityshould be understoodif we are to preserveS-continuity
in nature.
7. INTERPRETATIVE DIFFICULTY REVISITED

A close look at the texts fromthe matureperiodrevealsthatthereare

in fact two senses of continuitythatcan be attributedto Leibniz. The
first, S-continuity,is to be contrastedwith discontinuityand is the
sense thatis relevantto whetherthereare gaps or leaps in a quantity.
A discontinuousquantityhas gaps whereas an S-continuousquantity does not. The second sense of continuity,M-continuity,is to
be contrastedwith discreteness.To attributeM-continuityto some
quantityis to say more than that it is dense: it is to say that it has a
particularontological status, viz., that it is mathematicallyideal. To
attributediscretenessto a quantity,on the other hand, is to say that

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TIMOTHYCROCKETT

it has some degree of reality,a realitythatcan only be derivedfrom

simple substance.
This interpretationof Leibniz's views on continuity derives
supportfrom the help it provides in resolving the textual difficulty
presentedin section 2. Recall thatthe interpretativetask is to explain
how it is that Leibniz can both affirmand deny that naturalchange
is continuous.Given the distinctionhe drawsbetween S-continuity
and M-continuity, we are now in a position to provide such an
explanation.When Leibniz says that motion and perceptualchange
are continuous,he means that they are S-continuous.So, there are
no discontinuitiesof any kind in motion or in the perceptualseries
of a monad.24Change, in both cases, is every bit as structurally
continuousas space or time. But when Leibniz says to DeVolder,for
example, that change, like matter,is discrete,he is making a different point. Namely, he is claiming that unlike Cartesianextended
substance, matter and change are completely determinate since
they are well-founded in completely determinateand discernible
substances.So althoughLeibniz thinks that all actual change is Scontinuous,he thinks that neither type of change is M-continuous,
since both involve complete determinatenessand discernibilityof
their 'parts'. He makes this point, at least for phenomenalchange,
quite explicitly in his reply to Bayle's Rorarius:
... perfectlyuniformchange is never found in nature... because the actualworld
does not remainin this indifferenceof possibilities but arisesfrom actualdivisions
or pluralitieswhose results are the phenomena.... (L, p. 583)

This lack of uniformityin phenomenalchange, in virtue of which

it is discrete rather than M-continuous, is a consequence of the
fact that change issues from the only genuinely discrete entities in
the world, entities that are themselves completely determinateand
discernible.But again, non-uniformitydoes not entail discontinuity.
Leibniz makes this clear in the very next sentence:
Yet the actualphenomenaof natureare arranged,and must be, in such a way that
nothing ever happenswhich violates the law of continuity,... or any other of the
most exact rules of mathematics.25

So, the claim that phenomenalchange is non-uniform,as well as

the claim that the actual world arises from actual divisions, must
be interpretedsuch that it does not underminethe S-continuityof

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motion.The key to such an interpretationis understandingthatwhen

Leibniz claims that the 'parts' of a quantity are non-uniformor
determinate,he does not mean that the quantityis an aggregateof
more fundamentalparts, each of which have their own boundaries
or limits. Rather,he simply means that any part that can be delimited is completely qualitativelydeterminateand discernible from
any other part that can be delimited. So when Leibniz speaks of
the parts of an actual motion, he means something like what he
means when he speaks of the parts of space or time. In both cases
the boundaries of those parts are completely ideal. This way of
understandingnon-uniformityand determinacyleaves the ontological status of boundariesof the parts within a quantityopen, and
so leaves open the possibility that a completely determinateand
non-uniformquantityis also S-continuous.
Something is discrete if it is real, as opposed to ideal, and this
realityis derivedfrom simple substances.So whetherwe areconsidering a collection of monads, the motion of a billiard ball, or the
billiardball itself, there is a sense in which the reality of the thing
is derived from monads. But this might seem a bit puzzling, given
the ontological frameworkdiscussed in section 3. ThereI suggested
thatmatteris foundedin monadsandphenomenalchangeis founded
in monadic change. So, one might wonder, is phenomenalchange
discretebecause it is founded in monadsor because it is foundedin
monadic change? Strictly speaking,phenomenalchange is discrete
because it is founded in monadic change, which is fully determinate. But to say that motion results from monadic change just
is to say that it results from monads conceived of as continually
enduringthings. According to the interpretationI am advocating,
the discreteness of motion does not entail anythingabout whether
motion is, or results from, an aggregate of discrete states. What
is doing the work in the account is the determinacy,discernibility
and non-uniformityof the parts, since having these propertiesare
sufficient for a quantity's failing to be mathematicallyideal. So,
Leibniz applies the term 'discrete' to motion because anything in
the createdworldthatis determinateis real, and anythingthatis real
owes its reality to the only genuinely discrete things that exist, the
monads.

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8. CONCLUSION

Let me conclude by statinghow I believe the distinctionsthat have

been drawnin this paperapplyat each of the threeontologicallevels.
Ideal Realm: Space, time and mathematicalmotion are each both
S-continuous and M-continuous. The law of continuity is never
violated with respectto these entities and they are each mathematically ideal. It should be noted, however,thatnot all ideal entities are
M-continuous.Leibniz is certainly committed to there being ideal
spaces that are not structurallycontinuous.For example, in a 1702
letterto Bayle he says that"spaceandtime ... relatenot only to what
actually is, but also to anythingthat could be put in its place, just
as numbersare indifferentto the things which can be enumerated"
(emphasismine; L, p. 583). The number'3' and the series of natural
numbersare examples of things that are not S-continuous,but are
nonetheless ideal. These entitles are not, however, discrete in the
sense definedsince they are not well-foundedin createdsubstances.
So there are some ideal entities that are neither M-continuousnor
discretein the sense defined.26
PhenomenalRealm:Matterand its changes are both S-continuous,
yet they are discrete. The Law of Continuityis never violated at
the phenomenallevel and neithermatternor its changes are mathematically ideal, since the parts of matter and the 'parts' of its
changes are completely determinateand discerniblein virtue their
resultingfrom completely determinatesimple substancesand their
states.27Importantly,this is not to say that all actual quantitiesare
divided into discrete parts; rather,it is to claim that any parts of
an actual quantitythat can be delimited will be completely qualitatively determinateand discerniblefrom one another.This is just as
we might expect, given Leibniz's claim that phenomenaare 'semimental'. Phenomena are real insofar as they are founded in real
entities, but they are ideal or mentalinsofaras we contributespatial
and temporalcontinuity to a world that is, at the level of deepest
metaphysicalrigor,a discretum.
Monadic Realm: The universe of created monads is certainly
discrete, as it is an aggregate of completely determinateand real

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135

things. But is it S-continuous?The answerhas to be 'no', since the

actualinfiniteis not a continuumat all. After all, Leibniz's solution
to the labyrinthinvolves arguingthat there really is no continuum
at the level of deepest metaphysicalrigor.There may be, however,
at least one sense in which monads are continuous, though not
S-continuous.Leibniz suggests that the series of monads is qualitatively dense; that is, for any two monads that differ qualitatively
from one another,there is anothermonad that lies between these
two with respect to qualitativedifference.28This would satisfy the
density requirementfor an S-continuousquantity,but it would be a
notion of continuitythatwould be difficultto understandin termsof
the Aristoteliandistinctionbetween a quantitywhose parts share a
boundaryand one whose partsdo not. Intra-monadicchange is also
certainlydiscrete as it is completely determinate.And on the interpretationthatI am advocatingthereis S-continuityin the unfolding
of monadic states.

NOTES
*

I am indebted to Janet Broughton,Hannah Ginsborg,Peter Hanks, Nicholas

Jolley, Alan Nelson, Larry Nolan, and Donald Rutherfordfor commenting on
earlier drafts of this paper.I have also benefited greatly from discussions with
Samuel Levey when this paper was delivered at the 1998 annualmeeting of the
Pacific APA, and from criticisms I received when a version of this paper was
presentedat the 1997 CaliforniaConferencein EarlyModernPhilosophy.
References to Leibniz's work are abbreviatedas follows: A = Samtliche
Shriftenund Briefe. Philosophische Schriften,(Berlin: Akademie-Verlag,1923).
AG = G.W Leibniz:Philosophical Essays, ed. and trans.R. Ariew and D. Garber
(Indianapolis:Hackett, 1989). G = Die philosophischenSchriftenvon Gotifried
WilhemLeibniz, ed. C.I. Gerhardt,7 vols. (Berlin: WeidmannscheBuchhandlung, 1875-90). GM = G.W Leibniz:MathematischeSchriften,ed. C.I. Gerhardt,
7 vols. (Berlin:A. Asher;Halle: H.W. Schmidt, 1849-63). L = GottfriedWilhelm
Leibniz:Philosophical Papers and Letters,ed. and trans.L.E. Loemker,2nd ed.
(Dordrecht:Reidel, 1969). LA = The Leibniz-ArnauldCorrespondence,ed. and
trans.H.T. Mason (Manchester:ManchesterU. Press, 1967; New York:Garland,
1985). NE = G.W. Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding,trans. and
ed. P. Remnantand J. Bennett (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity Press, 1981,
2d ed. 1996) - paginationfollows thatof A VI, 6. W = LeibnizSelections, ed. P.P.
Wiener(New York:CharlesScribner'sSons, 1951). Translationsare mine unless
otherwisenoted.

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There may be some difficulty in drawingthe distinctionbetween phenomenal

change andperceptualchangeat all. The distinctionis importantto note, however,
since it is drawnby othercommentatorswho have consideredthese issues. In this
paper,I will be using the term 'phenomenalchange' to refer to the sort of change
thatbodies undergo.
2 This conception of Leibniz's ontology has become standard.In large partthis
is due to two interestingand influentialpapers,the first by J.E. McGuire(1976),
and the second by Glenn Hartzand Jan Cover (1988).
3 If I understandthemcorrectly,this interpretationis advocatedby Russell (1900,
pp. 127-130), and Rescher (1979, p. 88).
4 Since this issue is peripheralto my discussion, I will not arguefor my interpretationhere.
5 In his Fifth Paperto Clarke(L, p. 703), Leibniz is clear thatour observationof
the change of place of a body, relative to surroundingbodies that do not change
theirrelationto one another,is necessaryfor the formationof our idea of space.
6 See also L, p. 539; and LA, p. 120.
7 See e.g. G VII, p. 564.
8 See McGuire(1976), and Hartzand Cover (1988).
9 See L, p. 456; and LA, p. 120.
10 Hartzand Cover (1988, p. 508).
11 For evidence that Leibniz thinks matter and motion are to be understood
analogously, see previously noted texts, G II, pp. 278-279; and G VII, p. 564;
see also L, pp. 535-536.
12
Translatedby Samuel Levey (1999, p. 63).
13
There are interestingquestions about what counts as a designationwhen we
areconsideringan actual(or, phenomenal)quantity.It could be that a designation
occurs with any division in, say, matter, independentlyof a designator.Or, it
could be that designations are conceptual and made only by beings capable of
designating.My view is that in a phenomenalquantity,designationof terminiof
the parts are only ideal, though I am not going to try to defend that view in this
paper.
14 From The Complete Works of Aristotle, Revised Oxford Translation,ed.
JonathanBarnes (PrincetonUniversityPress, 1984) pp. 390-391.
15 See also G VII, p. 573.
16

For a nice text illustratingthis point, see A VI, ii, pp. 435-436.
Sam Levey broughtthis, and the immediatelyprecedingtext to my attention
in his (1998). Both translationsare his.
18 Leibnizoffers a morerefineddefinitionof 'continuity',which seems to capture
the idea he takes over from Aristotle, in the SpecimenGeometriaeLuciferae:"A
continuouswhole is one such that its co-integratingparts(i.e., its partsthattaken
togethercoincide with the whole) have somethingin common,and moreoversuch
that if its partsare not redundant(i.e., they have no partin common, that is their
aggregateis equal to the whole) they have at least a limit [terminum]in common"
(GM VII, p. 284; see also GM V, p. 184).
17

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19 Just as it is difficult to discern how this distinction between continuity and

contiguity is understoodby Aristotle, it is similarly difficult to discern how this
distinctionis understoodby Leibniz. I have claimed in this paperthatfor Leibniz
the contiguous is a species of the discontinuous;but there are texts which might
cause problemsfor this reading.For example, in a 1670 letterto Hobbes, Leibniz
says that"Bodies whose boundariesare one ... are accordingto Aristotle'sdefinition not only contiguousbut continuous,and trulyone body . . . " (emphasismine;
G VII, p. 573). This suggests thatthings could be both continuousandcontiguous
at the same time.
20 This needs qualification.The assumptionI wish to make here is restrictedto a
domain of discourse aboutcontinua.Leibniz sometimes speaks of the continuity
of species or forms. In such contexts,understandingcontinuityin termsof density
might make some sense, whereas it is not clear that understandingcontinuityin
termsof the sameness of boundarieswould.
21 It is difficult to make this any more precise without running the risk of
anachronism.For an excellent discussion of how we might formulateLeibniz's
views about structuralcontinuityusing point-settopology, see Levey (1998). For
an interestingdiscussion of the relationbetween Leibnizianstructuralcontinuity
and combinatorialtopology, see Arthur(1986).
22 "On distingue en Philosophie la quantite continue de la quantite discrette.
La continue est celle lignes, des superficies& des solides, que est l'objet de la
Geometrie.La discretteest celle des nombres,qui est l'objet de 1'Arithmetique"
(Le Dictionnaire Universal,SNL-Le Robert(Paris, 1978)).
23 See also G
II, pp. 278-279, 336, and 379.
24 I
acknowledge that there are some texts that pose a problem for this interpretation.Most of these texts, however, seem to be expressions of an extremely
occasionalistic view of change. For example, Hartz and Cover (1988, pp. 500501) discuss a letterto Princess Sophia in which Leibniz says that actual motion
consists of a mass of momentaneousstates that are the result of a mass of divine
bursts of God ["l'amas d'une infinite d'eclats de la Divinite" (G VII, p. 564)].
Such texts are going to be difficultfor any interpreterto reconcile with the many
texts in which Leibniz arguesagainstoccasionalism.
25 See also Leibniz's Letterto Varignon:"Yetone can say in generalthat though
continuityis somethingideal and there is never anythingin naturewith perfectly
uniformparts,the real, in turn,neverceases to be governedperfectlyby the ideal
and the abstract... " (L, p. 544).
26 I am gratefulto Donald Rutherfordfor drawingmy attentionto some texts that
are relevantto this point.
27 Thereis a complicationthatarises for this interpretation
with respectto matter
that does not arise for phenomenalchange. Namely, Leibniz claims that matter
is actually infinitely divided. (It is worth noting that in several places, Leibniz
makes the weaker claim that matteris infinitely divisible. E.g. see AG, p. 103,
and L, p. 544.) On the view I am advocatingbeing infinitely divided is not what
it is to be discrete,nor does itfollow from a quantity'sbeing discrete.So we need
to either take this claim quite literally,in which case the Law of Continuityis

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TIMOTHYCROCKETT

violated throughoutnature,or provide a reinterpretationof Leibniz's claim that a

phenomenalquantityis actuallyinfinitely divided. Given thatLeibniz sometimes
does seem to confuse metaphysicallevels in his writings (for example, carelessly
referringto monads as 'parts' of bodies), I think there is hope for this kind of
interpretativemove. However,I shall not attemptto make that sortof move in this
paper.
28 Russell discusses, and cites texts relevant to, qualitative continuity among
substancesin his (1900, pp. 64-65).

REFERENCES
Arthur,R. (1986): 'Leibnizon Continuity',PSA 1, 107-115.
Hartz G. and Cover J. (1988): 'Space and Time in the Leibnizian Metaphysic',
Nous 22,493-519.
Levy S. (1998): 'Matterand Two Conceptsof Continuityin Leibniz', Philosophical Studies,this issue.
Levey S. (1999): 'Leibniz on Mathematicsand the Actually InfiniteDivision of
Matter',Philosophical Review 107(1), 49-96.
McGuire, J.E. (1976): ' 'Labyrinthuscontinui': Leibniz on Substance,Activity,
and Matter', in P. Machamerand R. Turnbull(eds.), Motion and Time,Space
and Matter,Columbus:Ohio State UniversityPress, pp. 290-326.
Rescher,N. (1979): Leibniz:An Introductionto His Philosophy,New Jersey:APQ
Libraryof Philosophy,RowmanandLittlefield.
Russell, B. (1900): A CriticalExpositionof thePhilosophyof Leibniz,Cambridge:
CambridgeUniversityPress.

Departmentof Philosophy
Universityof California,Berkeley
314 Moses Hall #2390
Berkeley,CA 94720-2390
USA

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