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XIII K.K. LUTHRA MEMORIAL MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2017

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CAMELOT

Criminal Appeal No. ______/2017

State of ErehwonPetitioner
Elizabeth Bennet..Respondent

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES........................................................................................................... 3
STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................................................. 5
ISSUES RAISED ............................................................................................................................ 6
WRITTEN PLEADINGS ............................................................................................................... 6
II.

This Court Should Affirm the High Courts Acquittal of Bennets Convictions. .............. 9
A.
In Sum, Bennets Actions Do Not Support a Conviction Under Section 351-A of the
Camelot Penal Code................................................................................................................ 9
1. Bennet lacked the mens rea necessary to support a conviction under Section 351-A.
11
a. The totality of Bennets rally speech demonstrates that she lacked an intent to
promote enmity or incite hatred under 351-A............................................................... 12
b.
Viewed in the broader context of Bennets political campaign, her statements
cannot be considered to promote enmity or incite hatred under Section 351-A. .......... 13
2. Bennets statements do not implicate any of the groups protected by the language in
Section 351-A. .................................................................................................................. 14
B. The Facts in the Record Are Insufficient to Convict Bennet of Sedition Under Section
421-A of the Camelot Penal Code. ....................................................................................... 14
1. Bennets actions do not support conviction under 421-A because they neither tended
to, nor succeeded in, inciting disaffection towards the government. ................................ 16
2. Bennets statements do not amount to sedition under 421-A because they were
aimed at another politician, not the Government itself. .................................................... 18
C. The State Lacks Sufficient Evidence to Convict Bennet of Criminal Conspiracy Under
Section 210-B of the Camelot Penal Code. .......................................................................... 19
1. No facts in the record indicate that Bennet knowingly made an agreement with other
individuals to further a criminal objective. ....................................................................... 21
2. Bennet lacked mens rea characterized by specific intent. ........................................ 21
3. Bennet never committed an actus reus to further a crime. ....................................... 22

III.
THE DEATH SENTENCE IS NOT AN APPROPRIATE PUNISHMENT FOR THE
OFFENSE OF SEDITION AND THE FACTS OF THIS CASE. ........................................... 22
PRAYER ....................................................................................................................................... 26

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CONSTITUTIONS
India Const. art. 19
U.S. Const. amend I
STATUTES
18 U.S.C. 2385 (2012)
Camelot Pen. Code 210-B
Camelot Pen. Code 241-A
Camelot Pen. Code 351-A
Coroners and Justice Act 2009
India Pen. Code 124A
India Pen. Code 153A
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES
Eur. Conv. on H.R. art. 10
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948)
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dec. 16, 1966)
CASES
American Tobacco Co. v. U.S., 328 U.S. 781 (1946) (USA)
Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam, Criminal Appeal No. 889 of 2007 (Supreme Court, 3/2/2011)
(India)
Asit Kumar Sen Gupta v. State of Chattisgarh, Criminal Appeal. No 86 of 2011 (India)
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 (India)
Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214: AIR 1995 SC 1785 (India)
Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of A.P., (1995) 3 SCC 214 (India)
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 44 (1969) (USA).
Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1075 (2011) (USA)
Cline v. State, 204 Tenn. 251 (Ten. 1958) (USA)
Debi Soren and others v. The State, AIR 1954 Pat 254 (India)
Dr. Vinayak Binayak Sen v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2011) 266 ELT 193 (India)
Ediga Anamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1974) 4 SCC 443 (India)
Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015) (USA)
Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973) (USA)
Iannelli v. U.S., 420 U.S. 770 (USA)
Ingram v. United States, 360 U.S. 672 (USA)
Joy Cherian v. Sub Inspector Of Police, Crl. MC. No. 4381 of 2010 (Kerala High Court,
26/3/2015) (India)
Kanhaiya Kumar v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 1362, 02 Mar. 2016 (India)
Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 (India)
Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State Of Maharashtra & Anr, (2007) 5 SCC 1 (India)
Mulcahy v. Regina, L. R. 3 Eng. & Ir. App. 306 (1868) (UK)

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New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (USA)
Northern Territory v. Collins, 235 CLR 619 (16 Oct 2008) (Australia)
P. Hemalatha v. The Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1976 AP 375 (India)
Pankaj Butalia v. Central Board Of Film, W.P. 675/2015 (Delhi High Court, 25/5/2015) (India)
Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v. Hart, [1992] UKHL 3 (UK)
Polester Electronics Co. v. Addl. Commr. Sales Tax, IR 1978 SC 897 (India)
R. v. Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary (Ex Parte Choudhury), [1991] 1 QB 429 (UK)
Ram Nadan v. State, AIR 1959 All 101 (India)
Ramesh Chotalal Dalal v. Union of India, 1988 AIR 775 (India)
Sri Indra Das v. State of Assam, (2011) 4 SCR 289 (India)
State of Maharashtra v. Abdul Hamid Haji Mohammed, 1994 SCC, Supl. (1) 579 (India)
State of W.B. v. Mohammed Khalid, 1995 AIR 785 (India)
The Oriental Ins. Co. v. Sardar Sadhu Singh & others, AIR 1994 Raj 44 (India)
The Sussex Peerage Case, (1844) 11 Cl & Fin 85, 8 ER 1034 (UK)
United States v. Alstotter, (1948) 3 TWC 1 (USA)
United States v. Berberian, 851 F.2d 236 (Cal. 1988) (USA)
United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975) (USA)
United States v. Jimenez Reico, 537 U.S. 270 (2003) (USA)
United States v. Licciardi, 30 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 1994) (USA)
Yakub Radul Azak Memon v. State of Masharashtra, (2013) 4 SCC 396 (India)
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957) (USA)
MISCELLANEOUS
Centre for the Study of Social Exclusion and Inclusive Policy, National Law School of India
University, Bangalore, Sedition Laws & The Death of Free Speech in India (Feb. 2011)
KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL
INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2001)
WILLIAM D. POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL
PROCESS 175 (2d ed. 1997)
NOLOS PLAIN-ENGLISH LAW DICTIONARY
Law Commission of India, Rep. No. 262, The Death Penalty (Aug. 2015)
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARVARD J.
L. PUBLIC POLICY 59, 65 (1988)
Amnesty International Global Report, Death Sentences and Executions (2015)
Telford Taylor, Brigadier General U.S.A., Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the
Nuremberg Trials Under Control Council Law No. 10, at 91 (Aug. 15, 1949)
(Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: the Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012)
K.D. GAUR, TEXTBOOK ON THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 4th ed. (New Delhi: Universal L. Pub.)
Nivedita Saksena & Siddhartha Srivastava, An Analysis of the Modern Offense of Sedition, 7
NUJS L. REV. 121, 132 (2014)
Albert J. Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, U. PENN. L. REV. 1941

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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Elizabeth Bennet (Bennet or Respondent), a leader of the largely student-dominated
Hogwarts Party, was elected to Parliament during Camelots general elections in March of 2015.
After the elections, Bennet started a new campaign to reach the young citizens of Camelot. To
benefit Camelot, Bennets campaign analyzed the good qualities of various countries to
encourage incorporation of these qualities into the Camelot way of life. Bennet included certain
good qualities of Genghiztan in this list, which upset many people in Camelot who felt
differently. Believing in her cause, however, Bennet continued her campaign and posted a
picture of herself with the Genghiztan flag on Twitter with a peaceful statement encouraging
people to treat other countries with respect and non-aggression.
Some citizens with different political views, however, were angered by Bennets post. In
response, Mr. K.F. Panda (Panda), the Chief Minister of Erehwon, demanded a public apology
in early May 2015. He also tweeted a message lashing out at Bennet and the Hogwarts Party
claiming that they had lost touch with reality. In response to Pandas reaction, Bennet and the
Hogwarts Party started a new campaign to express their discontent with the current government.
This campaign gained traction with many people and on June 1, 2015, Bennet gave a speech in
the famous Grounds of Erehwon, which was attended by 30,000 people. Her speech criticized
the current government and called for a fundamental overhaul. She praised Genghiztans good
qualities and spoke against the narrow parochial line of thought of the current government.
She also called for change and action to uphold Camelots Constitution.
After her speech, other members of the Hogwarts Party mobilized the public to protest
the current government, during which some people shouted slogans and burned public property.
Almost 200,000 people engaged in a peaceful protest, where they stood near the Camelot Gate
for two days in June 2015. Thousands of people also visited government officials and gave them
teddy bears to symbolize their childish support for the current government.
Shortly after these peaceful protests, a complaint was filed against Bennet under Sections
421-A, 351-A, and 210-B of the Penal Code of Camelot, and a First Information Report (FIR)
was registered on June 5, 2015. Though the Prime Minister of Camelot, Mr. Puddy Jedi, called
for restraint and asked the government officials not to stir tensions, Panda held a press
conference demanding justice and affirmative action to restore the nation. Prime Minister Jedi
condemned these illegal actions of the Crouching Tiger Party and Mr. K.F. Panda. He also

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noted, like Jawaharal Nehru, the former Prime Minister of India, that Section 124A of the Indian
Penal Code is objectionable and should be abolished.
Despite the Prime Ministers statements, the Final Report was filed against Bennet and
two other members of the Hogwarts Party, and the Magistrate took cognizance and issued
summons to the accused. At trial, Bennet was found guilty under all three offenses and the court
imposed the death sentence rather than life imprisonment. However, on appeal before the High
Court of Erewhon, she was acquitted of all charges. The State of Erewhon (the State or
Petitioner) preferred an appeal before this Court seeking reversal of the acquittal and
imposition of the death sentence. Leave was granted in the Petition by Special Leave.
ISSUES RAISED
I.

Whether Section 421-A is unconstitutional and should be struck down?

II.

Whether Petitioner has made out the offenses under Sections 421-A, 351-A, and 210-B of
the Camelot Penal Code against Elizabeth Bennet under the facts of this case?

III.

Whether the death sentence is an appropriate punishment for the offense of sedition and
should be imposed in this case?
WRITTEN PLEADINGS

It is humbly submitted that,

I.

THIS COURT SHOULD STRIKE DOWN SECTION 421-A AS

UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
This Court should affirm the High Courts reversal of Bennets sedition conviction and

strike down Section 421-A because it is an impermissible restriction on the freedom of speech, a
fundamental right of all peoples. The freedom of speech is a fundamental right of all people, and
is enshrined in democratic constitutions across the world.1 Everyone has the right to freedom of
opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to
seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontier.2
While some restrictions on speech are valid, they must be reasonable.3 In particular, laws
restricting speech against the government should be reviewed with extra scrutiny because it is
1

See, e.g., U.S. Const. amend I; Indian Const. art. 19, cl. 1 (All citizens shall have the right to the freedom of
speech and expression; to assemble peaceably and without arms.); see also Eur. Conv. on H.R. art. 10.
2
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 19 (Dec. 10, 1948).
3
See Indian Const. art. 19, cl 2.; Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 (India).

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hazardous to discourage thought and the people need to be protected against the occasional
tyrannies of governing majorities.4
In the context of sedition, many statutes of formerly colonized countries have either been
abolished, fallen into disuse, or restricted to much narrower interpretations than that of Section
421-A.5 For example, in the U.K., the last known conviction for sedition was in 1972.6 The
Coroners and Justice Act finally abolished the archaic common law offense of sedition in the
U.K. in 2009.7
Even countries that have retained sedition statutes have greatly restricted the statutes
applicability. The United States is one such example. Though the United States has a sedition
statute,8 its Supreme Court has dramatically restricted its application by affording broad
protection to political speech: Thus we consider this case against the background of a profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials.9 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has drawn a
distinction between the statement of an idea which may prompt its hearers to take unlawful
action, and advocacy that such action be taken.10 If the former, then it falls within protected
speech under the U.S. Constitution even if the hearers take unlawful action as a result.11
In interpreting its sedition statute that is strikingly similar to Camelots Section 421-A,
India has taken a similar position to that of the U.S. in restricting the application of Section
124A. The comments to Section 124A indicate that merely expressing disapprobation of the
Government, without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contempt, or disaffection does not
constitute sedition.12 Further, in reaction to overuse of the statute, the Indian Supreme Court
confirmed this interpretation in Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar by limiting the application of

See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964) (USA).
See Centre for the Study of Social Exclusion and Inclusive Policy, National Law School of India University,
Bangalore, Sedition Laws & The Death of Free Speech in India, at 39 (Feb. 2011),
https://www.nls.ac.in/resources/csseip/Files/SeditionLaws_cover_Final.pdf.
6
See id.
7
Coroners and Justice Act 2009, c.25, 73.
8
18 U.S.C. 2385 (2012).
9
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (USA).
10
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 322 (1957) (USA), overruled on other grounds by Burks v. United States,
437 U.S. 1 (1978).
11
Id.
12
Indian Pen. Code 124a, explanation 2.
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124A to words uttered with the intent or tendency to create public disorder or incite violence.13
Any broader interpretation of the statute is unconstitutional.14
Even with the curtailing of Section 124A, there have been numerous attempts in India to
declare the statute unconstitutional because of its effect of chilling political speech. The former
Prime Minister of India, Jewaharlal Nehru, declared Section 124A objectionable and
obnoxious and noted the sooner we get rid of Section 124A the better it will be.15 Mahatma
Gandhi called Section 124A the prince among political sections of the Indian Penal Code
designed to suppress the liberty of the citizens.16 Furthermore, in a recent case, the Indian
Supreme Court emphasized the importance of fundamental rights guaranteed in the Indian
Constitution. In doing so, the Court quoted several U.S. Supreme Court cases, including Yates,
stressing the importance of free political speech in a democracy.17
In light of these movements in other common law countries, this Court should strike
down Section 421-A because it imposes unconstitutional restrictions on the fundamental right of
free speech. Camelot, a democratic country, has a Constitution, which is supposed to protect the
fundamental rights of its citizens. Among the rights protected should be the freedom of speech.
There can be no democracy without freedom of speech.18 Section 421-A has a chilling effect on
this right because it attempts to punish anyone who tries to show that the Government has been
misled or mistaken in any of its measures.19 Being able to express dissatisfaction with the
government falls squarely within the right of freedom of expression, recognized by democracies
across the world.20 Camelots sedition statute impermissibly infringes on this right by going
beyond criminalizing words that incite violence and, instead, prohibiting mere criticism of the
government.

Camelots own Prime Minister has expressed this belief and called for its

abolishment.21 Thus, Camelot should follow in the U.K.s footsteps and abolish the archaic and
objectionable statute.
At the very least, the statute should be curtailed to punish only a very narrow category of
13

Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 (India).

Id.
15
Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 5.
16
Id.
17
Sri Indra Das v. State of Assam, (2011) 4 SCR 289 (India).
18
See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 297 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
19
Camelot Pen. Code 241-A(b).
20
See, e.g., G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 19 (Dec. 10, 1948); U.S. Const.
amend I; Indian Const. art. 19, cl. 1; Eur. Conv. on H.R. art. 10.
21
Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 5.
14

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speech, as reflected in the common law of countries such as India and the United States. Unlike
Indias sedition statute, Section 421-A prohibits a wide-range of speech against the government,
including statements that simply show that the government has been mistaken in its measures.
Without any limitation on the broad language of the statute, Section 421-A is in direct violation
of the right of free speech. Because Section 421-A on its face makes no attempt to confine the
applicability of the statute, it is not a reasonable restriction and must be struck down. The States
attempt to broadly apply Section 421-A here is unconstitutional.
In sum, Section 421-A of the Camelot Penal Code places unconstitutional and
unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental right to free speech and should be abolished or, at
the very least, restricted to circumstances that are not present in this case.
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE HIGH COURTS ACQUITTAL OF

BENNETS CONVICTIONS.
This Honble Court should affirm the High Courts acquittal of Bennet because the facts

in the record do not provide sufficient grounds to reinstate her convictions under Sections 351-A,
421-A, and 210-B of the Camelot Penal Code. Bennets actions neither promoted nor intended to
promote enmity between any groups of people, and at no point did her political discourse rise to
the level of sedition. Further, Bennet never conspired to commit any of the charged offenses.
A.

In Sum, Bennets Actions Do Not Support a Conviction Under Section 351-A

of the Camelot Penal Code.
The ability to engage in an open public dialogue and free flow of ideas is inextricably tied
to a flourishing society. While many democratic societies have historically imposed restrictions
to ensure that overreaching rhetoric, imbued with prejudice, vitriol, and malignant intent, does
not threaten the wellbeing of its members, the facts of this case do not rise to that level. Rather,
Bennets public comments and critiques fall squarely within the realm of political discourse,
exemplifying the spirit democracy. Her statements do not amount to the promotion of discord or
enmity between any groups of people first because they lack requisite mens rea, second because
they are not malicious when considered in the broader context of her campaign, and third
because the speech in question does not fall within the purview of Section 351-A.
Like Camelot, many common law countries have imposed restrictions on speech in an
attempt to maintain peace and harmony between different groups of people. India, for example,
has enacted a statute that bears striking resemblance to Section 351-A of the Camelot Penal

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Code.22 In interpreting this law, the Indian Supreme Court has repeatedly declared that it is
necessary to find mens rea,23 or intent to incite, when determining if an individual is guilty of
promoting enmity among different groups.24 The intention to cause disorder or incite people to
violence is the sine qua non of the offence under Section 153A IPC and the prosecution has to
prove the existence of mens rea in order to succeed.25 Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled in Brandenburg v. Ohio that the government may not punish or curtail public speech unless
the statements are intended to incite or produce imminent lawless action, and that such speech is
indeed likely to result in imminent lawless action.26
Global legal precedent has also firmly established that questionable speech must be
viewed in light of all surrounding circumstances before it can be considered offensive. The
Indian Supreme Court mandates a holistic approach to situations involving provocative or
offensive speech in order to assess the existence of mens rea.27 For example, in Balwant Singh v.
State of Punjab, the petitioner was accused of violating Section 153A of the IPC when he raised
controversial slogans at a rally shortly after the assassination of then-Prime Minister Indira
Gandhi.28 The Supreme Court viewed the circumstances surrounding Singhs speech, and ruled
that the mere casual raising of slogans a few times, without the intention to incite disorder among
others, did not constitute a threat to the Indian Government.29

Further, the Indian Supreme

Court declared in Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. that [t]he matter
complained of within the ambit of Section 153A must be read as a whole. One cannot rely on
strongly worded and isolated passages for proving the charge nor indeed can one take a sentence
here and a sentence there and connect them by a meticulous process of inferential reasoning.30
Courts have even noted that in controversial political speeches, the overall aim of the
22

See India Pen. Code 153A.

The Latin phrase mens rea is translated to mean guilty mind, or criminal intent in committing an act.
NOLOS PLAIN-ENGLISH LAW DICTIONARY.
24
See, e.g., Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of A.P., (1997) 7 SCC 431; Joy Cherian v. Sub Inspector Of Police, Crl. MC.
No. 4381 of 2010 (Kerala High Court, 26/3/2015) (India); Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214;
Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State Of Maharashtra & Anr, (2007) 5 SCC 1 (India).
25
Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State Of Maharashtra & Anr, (2007) 5 SCC 1 (India)
26
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 44 (1969) (USA).
27
See Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214; Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State Of Maharashtra & Anr,
(2007) 5 SCC 1 (India); Ramesh Chotalal Dalal v. Union of India, 1988 AIR 775 (India); Joy Cherian v. Sub
Inspector of Police, Crl. MC. No. 4381 of 2010 (Kerala High Court, 26/3/2015) (India).
28
Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214 (India).
29
Id.
30
Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State Of Maharashtra & Anr, (2007) 5 SCC 1 (India) (ruling that a few strongly worded,
isolated passages from a book could not justify conviction under 153A)
23

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statements should be considered before implicating 153A of the IPC.31 In Debi Soren and others
v. The State, the Patna High Court ruled that even though the accused used strong and
vituperative language in her speech, referred to the government as cowardly, and spoke of
spitting on the government, her actions were not be considered to promote enmity between
classes or groups.32
Finally, it is an established practice for courts in many common law jurisdictions to
employ a textualist, or literal interpretative approach when construing their respective
incitement and hate-speech laws.33 The philosophy suggests that the legal texts ordinary, plain
meaning should govern its interpretation, thus courts rely solely on the words as they appear in
the statute. 34 English courts in particular employ the Plain Meaning Rule, which requires that
laws be construed according to the literal, ordinary meaning of the text.35 This approach is not
limited to English courts: textualist interpretation is employed regularly throughout common law
jurisdictions.36 For example, in Polester Electronics Co. v. Addl. Commr. Sales Tax, the Indian
Supreme Court declared, [a] statutory enactment must ordinarily be construed according to
plain natural meaning of its language and no words should be added, altered or modified unless it
is plainly necessary to do so in order to prevent a provision from being unintelligible.37
Additionally, it is important to note that the concept of ejusdem generis38 is often employed in
conjunction with the plain meaning rule when interpreting written statutes: it mandates that
when a law first lists specific classes of people or things, and then refers to them generally, the
general statements apply only to the same kind of people or things specifically listed.
1.

Bennet lacked the mens rea necessary to support a conviction under

Section 351-A.

31

Debi Soren and others v. The State, AIR 1954 Pat 254 (India).
Id.
33
Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW &
PUBLIC POLICY 59, 65 (1988).
34
Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial Review (2001).
35
The Sussex Peerage Case, (1844) 11 Cl & Fin 85, 8 ER 1034; William Popkin, Materials on Legislation: Political
Language and the Political Process 175 (2d ed. 1997); Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v. Hart, [1992] UKHL 3 (UK).
36
See, e.g., The Oriental Insurance Company v. Sardar Sadhu Singh and others, 1994 ACJ 157 (India) (it is settled
that the law is the best expositor of itself); Northern Territory v Collins, 235 CLR 619, Case No. D2/2008
(Australia) (16 Oct 2008) ("[s]econdary material seeking to explain the words of a statute cannot displace the clear
meaning of the text of a provision) (footnotes omitted); Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1075 (2011) (USA)
(noting that the plain meaning rule is the most principled method of statutory interpretation); See also Antonin
Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: the Interpretation of Legal Texts (2012) (advocating for a textualist
method of interpretation).
37
Polester Electronics Co. v. Addl. Commr. Sales Tax, IR 1978 SC 897 (India).
38
Ejusdem generis, literally translated, means of the same kind. Nolos Plain-English Law Dictionary.
32

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Mens rea is a necessary element to support a conviction under section 351-A, and
although Bennets critiques deliberately drew the publics attention to political and social
concerns, her actions lacked any semblance of a plan to create discord or promote enmity
between different communities.

Under international precedents that interpret incitement and

hate-speech laws, the State invariably bears the burden of demonstrating that the accused had a
clear intent to inspire hate or enmity.39 Mens rea can be determined by viewing the questionable
actions within their broader context.40 Thus, by considering Bennets statements in light of her
entire speech, as well as the broader context of her political campaign, the Court should find that
she lacked the mens rea necessary to convict her under section 351-A.
a.

The totality of Bennets rally speech demonstrates that she lacked

an intent to promote enmity or incite hatred under 351-A.
Just as the Indian Supreme Court overturned Mr. Khans conviction under IPC 153A
after viewing offensive passages in context of his entire book,41 the Camelot Supreme Court
should view Bennets questionable statements in context of her entire speech. In doing so, it
becomes clear that Bennets intent was to instill change in the government through political
discourse, not to cause enmity between any groups of people.
Like the petitioners in Balwant Singh and Debi Soren, Bennets conviction under Section
351-A of the Camelot Peal Code stemmed from controversial public statements.42 Bennet was
charged under 351-A after openly supporting Genghiztan, denouncing Camelots style of
governing, and calling a public rally during which she advocated for a dramatic overhaul of the
government.43 Most notably, Bennet implored the attendees of her rally to strike at the very
root of [Camelots] evil and effectuate a fundamental overhaul, to rise in rebellion against
these dirty leeches on our mind and its thinking process, and to [b]reak the government to
pieces, if need be, to uphold the ideals contained in our beloved constitution.44
Viewed in isolation, Bennets statements are harsh critiques of the Camelot government;
39

See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 44 (1969) (USA); See Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC
214; Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State Of Maharashtra & Anr, (2007) 5 SCC 1 (India)
40
Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State Of Maharashtra & Anr, (2007) 5 SCC 1 (India)
41
Id.
42
Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 2-3.
43
Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 2 (Bennet publicly listed good qualities of Genghiztan at a press conference,
then posted a selfie with the Genghizstan flag on Twitter; she also started a political campaign entitled Mock and
Shame the Pseudo-Nationalist Government, and later issued support of a comment referring to the governments of
Erehwon and Camelot as a bunch of useless war-mongers).
44
Id.

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considered within the context of her entire rally speech, these statements indicate her ultimate
and sincere desire to improve her country and maintain the integrity of its constitution. For
example, Bennet begins her speech by referring to her audience, the citizens of Camelot, as
brothers and sisters. This simple word choice suggests her desire to unite the country, not
promote enmity within it. Further, Bennets suggestion to break the government to pieces
becomes far less sinister when viewed in tandem with her follow-up sentiment, if need be, to
uphold the ideals contained in our beloved constitution.45 And although she declares that [w]e
will be the divine destruction which shall vaporize the deep seated rot and ensure our beloved
country has a more refreshing start, a cursory examination of Bennets preceding comments
reveals that her frustration lies in intellectual narrow-mindedness of the government and the
corruption of constitutional ideals, not an intent to incite hatred between any groups of people.46
Further, as the Indian Supreme Court declared in Balwant Singh, the casual raising of
controversial slogans a few times does not amount to an intention to promote enmity.47
Therefore, just as the Indian Supreme Court overturned Mr. Singhs conviction under 153A after
making a series of objectionable public statements, the Camelot Supreme Court should also
uphold Bennets acquittal, as her statements were similarly casual and isolated.
b.

Viewed in the broader context of Bennets political campaign, her

statements cannot be considered to promote enmity or incite hatred
under Section 351-A.
Bennets conviction under 351-A is further unsupported when considering her comments
within the overall framework of her political campaign. In the case of Debi Soren, the petitioners
were originally convicted under IPC 153A after using strong and vituperative language in
political speeches that criticized the government and the people of Bihar while advocating for the
formation of a separate state.48

In viewing the ultimate political motivation behind the

petitioners statements, the High Court determined that the petitioners lacked an intent to
promote enmity between the groups of people mentioned in the speeches.49 Here, Bennets
statements, while also political in nature, were not as severe. On the contrary, Bennets speech
was aimed at improving Camelot and maintaining the integrity of its constitutional ideals for all.

45

Id.
See id.
47
Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214 (India).
48
Debi Soren and others v. The State, AIR 1954 Pat 254 (India).
49
See id.
46

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When Bennet praised Genghiztan on social media, she did so with the aim of imbibing
Genghiztans good qualities into the Camelot way of life, for the betterment of its citizens.50
Further, even after Bennet learned that she was being prosecuted under 351-A, she vowed that
her party would continue pursuing its goals so that Camelot wakes up to a new dawn.51 Thus,
a deeper examination of Bennets overall campaign reveals a clear desire to improve Camelot for
the benefit of all citizens, not a desire to incite. Her statements, when viewed both within the
contexts of the speech itself and the overall objectives of her political campaign, lack the mens
rea necessary to support a conviction under Section 351-A.
2.

Bennets statements do not implicate any of the groups protected by

the language in Section 351-A.
Bennets statements also do not support her conviction under 351-A because they do not
fall within the purview of the statutes plain language. Subsections 351-A(1)(a), (1)(b), and
(1)(c) of the statute enumerate different classifications of people sought to be protected within
the ambit of the law. Specifically, religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or
community52 However, there are no facts in the record to support the notion that Bennets
statements ever promoted (or intended to promote) enmity between religious, racial, regional,
residential, linguistic, or economic groups.

Rather, as discussed further below, Bennets

statements were directed towards certain corrupt members of the government. And, as the Indian
Supreme Court noted in Bilal Ahmed Kaloo, merely angering one community or group, without
any reference to any other community or group, cannot attract either of the two sections.53
Any reading of 351-A that seeks to protect the government would be improper under both
the Plain Language Rule and the ejusdem generis rule. Despite the statutes catchall phrase at
the end of 351-A, which seemingly encompasses any other group, the government and its
officials cannot reasonably be understood as the same kind of people in context of the other
groups listed in the statutes text. To interpret the statute otherwise would amount to the Court
impermissibly injecting its own legislative intent into the text of Section 153A.
B.

The Facts in the Record Are Insufficient to Convict Bennet of Sedition Under
Section 421-A of the Camelot Penal Code.
Freedom of speech is constitutionally guaranteed by many democracies across the world.
50

Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 2 (emphasis added).

Id. at 5.
52
Section 351A, Camelot Penal Code.
53
Bilal Ahmed Kaloo vs State of A.P. (1997) 7 SCC 431 (India).
51

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Central to this right is the ability to speak openly and critically about ones government without
fear of persecution. Absent hateful or violent intent, public criticism of the government falls
squarely within the realm of discourse that most constitutions seek to protect. In the present
case, Bennets sedition conviction should remain overturned first because her statements neither
incited nor had the tendency to incite violence, hostility, or disaffection towards the government,
second because Bennet wholly lacked the intent to promote hatred, violence, or disaffection
towards the government, and third, because the statements of Bennet, a politician, were directed
primarily to other politicians, not the government as a whole.
Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, outlining the offense of sedition, is nearly
identical to Section 421A in the Camelot Penal Code.54 In interpreting their respective statute,
the Indian Supreme Courts seminal decision in Kedar Nath limited convictions of sedition to
acts involving intention or tendency to create disorder or disturbance of law and order or
incitement to violence.55 Indeed, the section [on sedition] has taken care to indicate clearly that
strong words under lawful means used to express disapprobation of the measures of the
Government with the view to their improvement or alteration would not come within the
section.56 For example, in Balwant Singh, the petitioner made a number of controversial public
declarations shortly after Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated.57 Despite openly
undermining the Indian government and making objectionable speeches amidst a national
tragedy, the Supreme Court declared that raising of some lonesome slogans, a couple of
timeswithout anything more, did not constitute any threat to the Government of India.58
Additionally, in the case of Debi Soren, one of the petitioners declared, I spit on the
government, and others were heard calling the government cowardly.59 However, the Patna
High Court dismissed the sedition charges and noted: In a democratic country such criticisms
are to some extent unavoidable, they are made for the purpose of enlisting popular support, and
in considering the effect of such criticisms no serious notice ought to be taken of crude,

54

See India Pen. Code 124A.

Kedar Nath Singh v State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 (India). The Indian Supreme Court also confirmed this
requirement in Sri Indra Das v. State of Assam, Criminal Appeal No. 1383 of 2007; Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam,
Criminal Appeal No. 889 of 2007.
56
K.D. Gaur, Textbook on The Indian Penal Code, 4th ed. (New Delhi: Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd.
2011) at 234.
57
Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214 (India).
58
Id.
59
Debi Soren and others v. The State, AIR 1954 Pat 254 (India).
55

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blundering attempts or of rhetorical exaggeration by which nobody is likely to be impressed.60

Sedition laws have been interpreted to cover not only actions that result, or have a
tendency to result, in disaffection towards the governmentthey are also understood to cover
words or actions undertaken with the mens rea, or intent to create disaffection. Yet a
determination of seditious intent should be made only after considering all relevant
circumstances: the substratum of the offence of seditionis the intention with which the
language is used and, in judging the intention, the utterances or the speech made should be
looked at holistically and fairly without giving undue weight to isolated passages.61 Whether a
particular statement was made with the aim of inciting hatred towards the government is based
on the circumstances of each particular case and the manner and the occasion in which it is
mentioned.62 In England, for example, a summons was sought against author Salman Rushdie
for the crime of seditious libel.63 His book, The Satanic Verses, was accused of being a
scurrilous attack on the Muslim religion, resulting in violence in the U.K. and strained
diplomatic ties with Iran. Ultimately, the judges considered the book as a whole and found that
there was no seditious intent by Rushdie against the U.K. or its institutions.64
Criticism directed towards particular politicians is distinguishable from ire directed
towards the government generally. Indian courts have set aside sedition charges where inciting
statements were directed towards, for example, corrupt police officersnot police officers
generallybecause such speech does not amount to an attack against the State itself.

65

Moreover, in Ram Nandan vs State, the Allahabad High Court analogized a politician making a
speech that tended to excite bad feelings against the government while appealing to the
electorate to the act of a counsel in making an address tending to excite bad feelings against
the opposite party in a court of law or jury. 66
1.

Bennets actions do not support conviction under 421-A because they

neither tended to, nor succeeded in, inciting disaffection towards the
government.

60

Id.
Pankaj Butalia v. Central Board Of Film, W.P. 675/2015 (Delhi High Court, 25/5/2015) (India).
62
P. Hemalatha v. The Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1976 AP 375. (India).
63
See R. v. Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary (Ex Parte Choudhury), [1991] 1 QB 429.
64
See Id.
65
P. Hemalatha v. The Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1976 AP 375. (India).
66
Ram Nadan v. State, AIR 1959 All 101 (India).
61

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Incitement to violence has been read as an essential ingredient of sedition.67 Here, the
facts in the record do not support the contention that Bennets actions genuinely motivated, or
tended to motivate, violence or disaffection towards the government.

After Bennet made

supportive comments about Camelots neighbor Genghiztan, Chief Minister of Erehwon K.F.
Panda publicly admonished Bennet and her political party.68 In response, Bennet spoke at a
rally, where she expressed her frustration and disappointment.69 She denounced the corrupt
people who have sold our country [and] now want us to pawn our minds, as well as the myopia
of the current administration.70 Such statements are not only typical of political speeches; they
are often expected (particularly when a politician is addressing her electorate in response to
statements by another politician).71

It therefore cannot be said that a single political speech,

given at a rally of educated young adults,72 would have a general tendency to incite violence.
Even advocating for the division of the country, or overthrowing the government, does
not automatically attract sedition unless there is imminent incitement to violence.73 Although the
facts of this case indicate that certain individuals independently engaged in the destruction of
public property soon after the rally on the Grounds of Erehwon, there are no facts that specify
exactly how long after the rally they chose to commit these acts.74 Brandenberg, Kedar Nath,
and Balwant Singh all reinforce the necessity for violence to be imminent.75 The record also
does not indicate that it was indeed Bennet who incited these individuals actions.76 Without this
crucial information, a conviction under 421-A cannot be sustained.
In Balwant Singh, controversial slogans yelled after the Prime Ministers assassination
were not found to be seditious. Neither were the remarks about spitting on India in Debi
Soren. Under such a high bar for incitement, the gifting of teddy bears, as members of the
Hogwarts Party did, could never reasonably be considered violent towards the government.
67

Nivedita Saksena & Siddhartha Srivastava, An Analysis of the Modern Offense of Sedition, 7 NUJS L. REV. 121,
132 (2014); Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 (India).
68
Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 2.
69
Id. at 2-3.
70
See Id.
71
Ram Nadan v. State, AIR 1959 All 101 (India).
72
Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 2 (referring to Hogwarts Party members as largely student-dominated).
73
Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214 (India). Debi Soren and others v. The State, AIR 1954 Pat
254 (India); Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955; Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 44 (1969)
(USA).
74
See generally Statement of Facts, Moot Problem.
75
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 44 (1969) (USA); Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 (India);
Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214 (India).
76
See generally Statement of Facts, Moot Problem.

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On the contrary, these actions exemplify pacifistic demonstration. Further, the mere gathering of
people near the Parliament of Camelot and the Camelot Gate, without rioting or bloodshed, does
not fall within the ambit of disaffection towards the government.77 Considering the overall
respectful nature of the Hogwarts Partys dissent, Bennets actions did not effectuate, or tend to
effectuate, violence and disaffection towards the government.
Moreover, the facts of this case are void of any indication that Bennet so much as
intended to promote hatred or disaffection towards the government. Such intent would be
gleaned from the overall context of her speech, actions, and the campaign generally.78 Although
Bennet publicly praised Genghiztan, the record indicates that she did so with the aim of
imbibing [Genghiztans good qualities] into the Camelot way of life, for the betterment of its
citizens. Indeed, not as an insult to Camelot.79 Throughout her speech at the rally, Bennet
referred to Camelot as her beloved country, and declared that she would lay down her life for
her beloved fatherland.80 While, admittedly, Bennet eventually began referring simply to the
government, statements must be viewed within the larger context of her speech and campaign.
She further clarifies that any hypothetical rebellion would be against the dirty leeches on our
bind and its thinking process, and the corrupt people who have sold our country.81 These are
not the statements of someone who desires to incite violence against their government.
2.

Bennets statements do not amount to sedition under 421-A because

they were aimed at another politician, not the Government itself.
The expression the Government established by law has to be distinguished from the
persons for the time being engaged in carrying on the administration.82 Bennet is herself a
representative of the government, for which she has repeatedly pronounced her devotion.83 Not
only is it absurd to suggest that a politician cannot speak critically over the government in which
she works, but the record also indicates that her frustration lies in the statements of Panda and his
political party, not in the government itself. In fact, Bennets controversial speech was made in
response to being publicly castigated and embarrassed by Panda.84 The proposition that she
77

Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 3.

See Pankaj Butalia v. Central Board Of Film, W.P. 675/2015 (Delhi High Court, 25/5/2015) (India); P.
Hemalatha v. The Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1976 AP 375. (India).
79
Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 2.
80
Id. at 3.
81
Id.
82
Asit Kumar Sen Gupta v. State of Chattisgarh, Criminal Appeal. No 86 of 2011 (India).
83
See generally Statement of Facts, Moot Problem.
84
Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 2-3.
78

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would intend to cause disaffectiontowards the very institution she was elected to protectis
illogical. Ultimately, the very nature of Bennets career as a politician involves both making
critical public statements and engaging her electorates. It is imperative that the Camelot Supreme
Court takes this into account, and upholds her acquittal accordingly.
C.

The State Lacks Sufficient Evidence to Convict Bennet of Criminal

Conspiracy Under Section 210-B of the Camelot Penal Code.
The facts in the record are insufficient to sustain a conviction against Bennet for the
crime of conspiracy, first because she never knowingly agreed to commit a crime with another
individual, second because her actions do not indicate that she had mens rea characterized by
specific intent, and third because she never acted in furtherance of a purported criminal goal.
Most common law countries require prosecutors to prove a series of elements in order to
convict someone of criminal conspiracy.85 An act, speech, or slogan alone is not enough: there
must be proof that the accused made an agreement with another person to commit a crime, and
that the individual acted in some way to further or enable the conspiracy.86 It is commonly
understood that, at minimum, there must have been an agreement between parties in which all
parties are aware of the illegal objective of the conspiracy.87

Additionally, the accused

individual must have possessed a mens rea, characterized by specific intent, and must have
committed an actus reus88 in furtherance of the objective in order to sustain a conviction under a
criminal conspiracy statute.89 The Camelot Supreme Court would need to find that every one of
the above factors is satisfied in order to overturn Bennets acquittal under Section 210-B.
Invariably, common law precedent requires proof of an understanding between multiple
parties, with the aim of furthering an illegal act. The highest courts in the U.S. and U.K. have
continually held that the essence of a conspiracy is an agreement to commit an unlawful act.90
The agreement must be made with the knowledge that it will further a criminal objective.91
Further, given the inherent difficulty in finding concrete proof of an agreement, circumstantial

85

See Iannelli v. U.S., 420 U.S. 770 (USA); Mulcahy v. Regina, L. R. 3 Eng. & Ir. App. 306, 317 (1868) (UK).
See Iannelli v. U.S., 420 U.S. 770 (USA).
87
Ingram v. U.S., 360 U.S. 672 (1959) (USA).
88
Actus reus, translated from Latin, means guilty act. Nolos Plain-English Law Dictionary.
89
United States v. Jimenez Reico, 537 U.S. 270, 274-75 (2003) (USA).
90
United States v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671 (1975) (USA). See also Ingram v. U.S., 360 U.S. 672 (USA) (conviction
for conspiracy under federal conspiracy statute cannot be sustained unless there is proof of an agreement to commit
[the charged offense]); Mulcahy v. Regina, L. R. 3 Eng. & Ir. App. 306, 317 (1868) (UK).
91
United States v. Licciardi, 30 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1994) (USA) (holding that conspiracy should be found
only the agreement reflects a specific intent to commit a crime).
86

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evidence is considered sufficient proof.92 Thus, in order to prove the existence of a criminal
agreement, courts must examine all relevant facts and circumstances to draw an inference.93
The mens rea element of the crime of criminal conspiracy requires the prosecution to
prove that the accused had a specific intent to commit the charged offense.94 Conspiracy to
commit a particular substantive offense cannot exist without at least the degree of criminal intent
necessary for the substantive offense itself.95 The notion of specific intent, as mentioned in
the laws of various countries, is such that the accused cannot merely plan to engage in general
lawless action: they must have an intent to commit a specific crime.96

As discussed supra

(analyses of Camelot Penal Code Sections 421-A and 351-A), requisite mens rea may be
ascertained by examining the totality of circumstances surrounding the questionable conduct.97
No one is punished for the harboring merely of a criminal intent. There must be an act
giving adequate expression to the intent.98 Thus, the actus reus element, or the overt act,
requires proof of some deliberate act in furtherance of the conspiracys desired outcome. The
Indian Supreme Court has noted that, in order to determine whether an act was motivated by a
conspiracy, a court must take into consideration all relevant circumstances including the
presence of knowledge [of] the natural consequences of the action.99 To satisfy this element,
the overt act must be something more than just evidence of the intended crime;100 it must be an
action taken with the conscious, deliberate goal of effectuating the conspiracy.101 A qualifying
act may be something as brazen as attempting to execute the crime itself, or something less
obvious, like preemptively purchasing the materials needed to commit the offense.102
92

See American Tobacco Co. v. U.S., 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946) (USA); Dr Vinayak Binayak v. State of
Chattisgarsh, (2011 266 ELT 193 (India).
93
Id.
94
State of W.B. vs Mohammed Khalid, 1995 AIR 785, 1995 SCC (1) 684 (India); State of Maharashtra v. Abdul
Hamid Haji Mohammed, 1994 SCC Supl. (1) 579 (India).
95
Ingram v. U.S., 360 U.S. 672, 678 (1959) (USA); United States v. Licciardi, 30 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1994)
(USA) (explaining that it is insufficient to prove only dishonest means; specific intent must be shown; the mental
state requirement prevents ostensibly innocuous conduct from unwittingly being labeled as criminal).
96
See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107 (USA) (holding that speeches made at a protest that advocate rioting did
not amount to specific intent because they amounted to nothing more than advocacy of illegal action at some
indefinite future time).
97
See Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214 (India).
98
Albert J. Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, U. PENN. L. REV. 1941. 624, 628.
99
Mathuri and ors v. State of Punjab, 1964 AIR 986 (India) (assessing criminal intent behind an act by considering
unlawful conduct was the dominant intention which prompted the entry.).
100
See Cline v. State, 204 Tenn. 251 (Ten. 1958) (USA).
101
See id; Yates, 354 U.S. 254 (1957) (USA).
102
See United States v. Klein, 247 F.2d 908, 921 (2d Cir. 1957) (USA) (defendants convicted of criminal conspiracy
for tax evasion after they were found altering IRS statements); See United States v. Berberian, 851 F.2d 236 (Cal.

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1.

No facts in the record indicate that Bennet knowingly made an

agreement with other individuals to further a criminal objective.
To sustain a common law charge of conspiracy, there must be proof that multiple
individuals made a conscious agreement to engage in a criminal endeavor.103 Here, although two
additional members of the Hogwarts Party104 were convicted of conspiring to commit the
offenses outlined in 351-A and 421-A, there are no facts in the record to demonstrate that any of
them ever had ever even spoken to one another, let alone made an illicit agreement. Although a
court may consider circumstantial evidence as proof of an agreement, it cannot assume facts that
do not exist in the record; it must be able to point to discrete, articulable factors that together
support such an inference.105 In this case, Bennets actions amount to nothing more than making
statements, independently, on behalf of her political party.106 There is no indication anywhere in
the record that there was a meeting of the minds between Bennet and any other individual.
Moreover, an accused individual must plan to engage in a specific crime.107 Thus, in the total
absence of proof that Bennets made a conscious agreement with members of the Hogwarts party
to engage in criminal activity, the charge of conspiracy cannot be supported.
2.
Bennet lacked mens rea characterized by specific intent.
Even after a thorough examination of the factual record, there is no indication that Bennet
intended to engage in a specific, lawless endeavor. As the House of Lords ruled in Mulcahy v
Regina, conviction under a criminal conspiracy statute can only be supported where there is a
finding of mens rea characterized by specific intent (i.e., a plan to engage in a particular crime,
not merely a plan to engage in crime generally).108 Evidence of this mens rea may be inferred
after a review of all relevant and surrounding facts.109 In the present case, there are no such
facts. As mentioned in the preceding section, there is no mention anywhere of a specific crime,
let alone intent to further it. Indeed, Bennet gave an empowering speech to her fellow citizens,
but at no point did she allude to committing a particular criminal act. Rather, she speaks only

1988) (USA) (evidence that defendant purchased only nonexplosive components of bomb still resulted in conspiracy
conviction).
103
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 311 (1957) (USA).
104
Mr. Fun Toosh and Mr. Rebello Gonsalves were convicted, in addition to Bennet, under sections 421-A, 153-A,
and 210-B of the Camelot Penal Code. See Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 5.
105
See American Tobacco Co. v. U.S., 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946) (USA); Dr. Vinayak Binayak Sen v. State of
Chhattisgarh, (2011) 266 ELT 193 (India).
106
Statement of facts, Moot Problem at 2-3.
107
Mulcahy v. Regina, L. R. 3 Eng. & Ir. App. 306, 317 (1868) (UK).
108
Id.
109
Dr. Vinayak Binayak Sen v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2011) 266 ELT 193 (India).

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generally of a desire to eliminate the governments corruption and narrow-mindedness.110

Absent any additional facts, it cannot be reasonably inferred that Bennet intended to engage in a
specific criminal activity. Thus her conviction under Section 210-B is ill founded.
3.
Bennet never committed an actus reus to further a crime.
Finally, Bennets conviction under Camelot Penal Code Section 210-B is wholly
unsupportable because she never committed an actus reus. The actus reus element demands that
an overt act be performed with the aim of effectuating the criminal objective of the
conspiracy.111 Here, nothing that Bennet did could reasonably be construed as furthering a
criminal endeavor. Although the State may have taken issue with comments Bennet made
during the rally, statements advocating a governmental overhaul do not constitute an overt act:
existing precedent invariably states that for something to be considered an overt act, it must
further the illegal objective in some way.112 Bennets political speech does not suffice.
While a court may consider all relevant circumstances including the presence of
knowledge [of] the natural consequences of the action,113 the record of this case lacks any facts
whatsoever that could be viewed to facilitate such an examination. Absent just one of the
requirements for criminal conspiracy, the accused cannot be convicted.114 Here, none of the
requirements are met, and it is therefore imperative that this Court affirm Bennets acquittal
under Section 210-B.
III.

THE DEATH SENTENCE IS NOT AN APPROPRIATE PUNISHMENT FOR

THE OFFENSE OF SEDITION AND THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.
Even if this Court upholds Section 421-A as constitutional and re-instates Bennets

convictions, which as explained above it should not, the death sentence is not an appropriate
punishment for the offense of sedition because it is a cruel and unusual punishment, does not
serve any justifiable penological goals, and is not proportional to the crime charged. The current
trend in other countries indicates that the death sentence should be abolished for any crime, but
particularly for sedition. In a recent U.S. Supreme Court case, Justice Breyer in his dissent
argued: For it is those changes, taken together with my own 20 years of experience on this
Court, that lead me to believe that the death penalty, in and of itself, now likely constitutes a
110

Statement of Facts, Moot Problem at 3.

See Cline v. State, 204 Tenn. 251 (Ten. 1958)
112
Licciardi, 30 F.3d at 1131; Klein, 247 F.2d at 921.
113
Mathuri and ors vs State of Punjab, 1964 AIR 986 (India) (assessing criminal intent behind an act by considering
whether intimidation or insult and including also the probability of something else than the causing of such
annoyance etc. was the dominant intention which prompted the entry.)
114
See Ingram v. U.S., 360 U.S. 672 (1959) (USA).
111

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legally prohibited cruel and unusual punishmen[t].115 Further, in 2015 the Law Commission
of India concluded that the death penalty does not serve the penological goal of deterrence any
more than life imprisonment and that, in fact, it fails to achieve any constitutionally valid
penological goals.116 The Commission also reported that the death penalty is an excessive
punishment when used for incapacitation because this function can be achieved just as well by
life imprisonment.117 As of 2015, 102 countries have abolished the death penalty for all crimes,
including both the U.K. and Canada.118 These statistics and reports indicate that the trend is
moving towards abolishing the death sentence for any crime.
Moreover, even among the countries that retain the death penalty, most preserve it only
for severe crimes, such as terrorism or aggravated murder,119 because of the gravity of punishing
someone by taking his life.

The principle of proportionality between the crime and the

punishment is the principle of just deserts that serves as the foundation of every criminal
sentence that is justifiable.120 Thus, it is essential to criminal jurisprudence that the punishment
imposed be proportional to the crime. International law requires the death sentence be imposed
only for the most serious of crimes.121 The Nuremberg trials following World War II reflect
this cautious use of the death penalty. Of the 142 individuals convicted of heinous war crimes,
only 26 were sentenced to death.122 For example, in United States v. Alstotter, the court
sentenced a judicial officer who with evil intent, participated in the government-organized
system for racial persecution of the Poles of such a nature to shock the conscience of mankind
to life imprisonment, not death.123 The Nuremberg trials serve as a reminder that courts should
be hesitant to take a life as punishment even for the most egregious crimes.
Following this international trend, the Indian Supreme Court has reserved the death

115

Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2756 (2015) (USA) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Law Commission of India, Rep. No. 262, The Death Penalty at 213 (Aug. 2015),
http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/reports/report262.pdf (recommending abolition of the death penalty for all
offenses except terrorism offenses); Id.
117
Id. at 88.
118
Amnesty International Global Report, Death Sentences and Executions at 85 (2015).
119
Id. at 9-11.
120
Yakub Radul Azak Memon v. State of Masharashtra, (2013) 4 SCC 396 (India).
121
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 6 (Dec. 16, 1966).
122
Telford Taylor, Brigadier General U.S.A., Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuremberg Trials
Under Control Council Law No. 10, at 91 (Aug. 15, 1949), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_finalreport.pdf.
123
United States v. Alstotter, (1948) 3 TWC 1 (USA).
116

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sentence for only the rarest of the rare cases, emphasizing the dignity of human life.124 The
Bachan Singh court held that this extreme penalty can be imposed only in gravest cases of
extreme culpability after taking into account the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of
the crime.125 A few years later, the court in Ediga Anamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh reduced
a womans death sentence to life imprisonment even though she brutally murdered another
woman and her child.126 The court stated, We assume a better world is one without the legal
knifing of life.127 This is reflected in the number of executions in India in 2015; only 1
individual was executed for orchestrating the 1993 Mumbai bombings, which killed 257
people.128 In the Mumbai bombing case, even the individuals who parked the vehicles with the
bombs in the intended destinations did not receive the death sentence.129 Rather, the Supreme
Court reversed the death sentences of these ten contributors and affirmed only the death sentence
for the mastermind behind the bombings, Yakub Radul Azak Memon.130 In doing so, the Indian
Supreme Court noted mitigating factors highlighting that the other ten appellants were
subservient minions rather than the masterminds behind the attack.131 Memon, on the other
hand, diligently planned the attack and in affirming his death sentence, the court considered
aggravating factors including the dominant role he played in the crime, the vulnerability of the
victims, that this was a crime of terrorism, and that he deliberately chose crowded locations.132
These aggravating factors indicate that the death sentence is an exceptional punishment fitting
for only the most horrific crimes in which lives have actually been lost. And even when lives
have been lost, death is only imposed on the most culpable offenders.
Because punishment must be proportional to the crime and the death sentence is the
harshest punishment, other common law jurisdictions that retain sedition statutes do not impose
the death sentence as punishment for this offense.133 In fact, in India, individuals convicted
under Section 124A for inciting violence and disorder have received sentences of life

124

Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 (India).

Id.
126
Ediga Anamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1974) 4 SCC 443 (India).
127
Id.
128
Amnesty International Global Report, Death Sentences and Executions at 30 (2015).
129
Yakub Radul Azak Memon v. State of Masharashtra, (2013) 4 SCC 396 (India).
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 2385 (U.S. sedition statute with maximum sentence of twenty years); Indian Pen. Code
124A (imprisonment for life or up to 3 years).
125

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imprisonment at the most.134 Some individuals charged with sedition have even been released on
bail. For example, the student who was charged with sedition for anti-national activities and
slogans at JNU was released on interim bail for six months,135 suggesting he was not such a
danger to the state or society that he had to be kept in prison pending trial.
Here, the death sentence is not an appropriate punishment for the offense of sedition and
especially not under the facts of this case for several reasons. First, it does not serve any of the
penological goals intended by Section 421-A. Arguably, sedition statutes are meant to protect
democracies from offenses that threaten the state itself.136 Life imprisonment would serve the
same deterrence and incapacitation function as the death sentence in these cases. Bennet is not
such a danger to society that death is the only option. Additionally, the need for retribution is not
comparable to those cases in which hundreds of people were brutally murdered. The only
alleged victim here is the government because a government official, Panda, was offended by
Bennets political views. In contrast, for an offense that infringes on the fundamental right of
free speech, it seems especially repugnant to put someone to death for expressing her political
views.
Second, even if death was an appropriate sentencing option for sedition, Bennets case is
not the rarest of the rare nor does it contain any aggravating factors that would make the death
sentence suitable.

Unlike the defendant in Memon, who was the mastermind behind the

bombings that killed 257 people, Bennet merely gave a speech in which she expressed her
discontent with the current government officials during and after which no one died. Though she
expressed democratically overthrowing the government, this was not said with the intent to incite
violence but rather to encourage change and to uphold the ideals of the Camelot Constitution.
She did not premeditate a harmful attack or encourage people to harm government officials. In
fact, no one died as the result of her speech and the death sentence would not be a proportional
punishment here. If neither the ten individuals who killed hundreds of people in Mumbai nor a
Nazi whose war crimes shock the conscience were deserving of death, then certainly Bennet
134

See, e.g., Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 (India) (trial judge sentenced petitioner to one
year for speaking against the government including stating his belief in a revolution that would reduce Congress to
ashes); Dr. Vinayak Binayak Sen v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2011 (266) ELT 193 (Chhattisgarh High Court) (refusing
to grant bail for Sen who was found in possession and convicted of transporting Naxalite pamphlets and booklets to
a criminal organization in direct fight with the government and sentenced to life imprisonment). Sen was later
granted bail while pending appeal.
135
Kanhaiya Kumar v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 1362, 02 Mar. 2016.
136
See Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 (India).

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does not deserve to be sentenced to death for her peaceful opposition to the government, which
at most was a call for democratic change.
Instead, Bennets case, if she were to be found guilty, is more similar to convictions
under Indian Penal Code Section 124A, in which imprisonment is the punishment rather than
death. Her speech calling the people to uphold the Constitution was less inflammatory than
Singh, who wanted to reduce Congress to ashes,137 or Sen, who transported materials to a
criminal organization against the government.138 Rather, Bennet, the leader of a growing political
party, was advocating for electoral change and spreading her political beliefs of non-aggression
between Camelot and other countries. Moreover, if an offender can be released back into society
on bail pending trial for the offense of sedition,139 it is clearly not an offense that threatens the
nation so much that death is a proportional punishment.
For these reasons, sentencing Bennet to death would be cruel, would not further valid
penological goals, and would not be proportional to her alleged crime.
PRAYER
Wherefore in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is
humbly prayed that this Honble Court may be pleased to adjudge and declare that:
1.

Section 421-A of the Camelot Penal Code is unconstitutional and should be struck down;

2.

The High Court of Erehwons acquittals are affirmed as Petitioner has not made out the
offenses against Bennet under Sections 421-A, 351-A, and 210-B of the Camelot Penal
Code; and

3.

The death sentence is not an appropriate punishment for the facts of this case.

And pass any other order, direction, or relief that this Honble Court may deem fit in the interests
of justice, equity and good conscience.
All of which is humbly prayed,
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Counsels for the Respondent.

137

Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 (India).

Dr. Vinayak Binayak Sen v. State of Chhattisgarh, 2011 (266) ELT 193 (India).
139
Kanhaiya Kumar v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 1362, 02 Mar. 2016 (India).
138

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