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G.R.No.L25494

TodayisTuesday,July19,2016

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC

G.R.No.L25494June14,1972
NICOLASSANCHEZ,plaintiffappellee,
vs.
SEVERINARIGOS,defendantappellant.
SantiagoF.Bautistaforplaintiffappellee.
JesusG.Villamarfordefendantappellant.

CONCEPCION,C.J.:p
AppealfromadecisionoftheCourtofFirstInstanceofNuevaEcijatotheCourtofAppeals,whichcertifiedthe
casetoUs,uponthegroundthatitinvolvesaquestionpurelyoflaw.
The record shows that, onApril 3, 1961, plaintiff Nicolas Sanchez and defendant Severina Rigos executed an
instrument entitled "Option to Purchase," whereby Mrs. Rigos "agreed, promised and committed ... to sell" to
Sanchez the sum of P1,510.00, a parcel of land situated in the barrios ofAbar and Sibot, municipality of San
Jose, province of Nueva Ecija, and more particularly described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. NT12528 of
said province, within two (2) years from said date with the understanding that said option shall be deemed
"terminated and elapsed," if "Sanchez shall fail to exercise his right to buy the property" within the stipulated
period. Inasmuch as several tenders of payment of the sum of Pl,510.00, made by Sanchez within said period,
were rejected by Mrs. Rigos, on March 12, 1963, the former deposited said amount with the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija and commenced against the latter the present action, for specific performance and
damages.
After the filing of defendant's answer admitting some allegations of the complaint, denying other allegations
thereof,andalleging,asspecialdefense,thatthecontractbetweentheparties"isaunilateralpromisetosell,and
thesamebeingunsupportedbyanyvaluableconsideration,byforceoftheNewCivilCode,isnullandvoid"on
February 11, 1964, both parties, assisted by their respective counsel, jointly moved for a judgment on the
pleadings. Accordingly, on February 28, 1964, the lower court rendered judgment for Sanchez, ordering Mrs.
Rigos to accept the sum judicially consigned by him and to execute, in his favor, the requisite deed of
conveyance.Mrs.Rigoswas,likewise,sentencedtopayP200.00,asattorney'sfees,andothercosts.Hence,this
appealbyMrs.Rigos.
ThiscaseadmittedlyhingesontheproperapplicationofArticle1479ofourCivilCode,whichprovides:
ART. 1479. A promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a price certain is reciprocally
demandable.
Anacceptedunilateralpromisetobuyortoselladeterminatethingforapricecertainisbindingupon
thepromissorifthepromiseissupportedbyaconsiderationdistinctfromtheprice.
In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that, by virtue of the option under consideration, "defendant agreed and
committedtosell"and"theplaintiffagreedandcommittedtobuy"thelanddescribedintheoption,copyofwhich
wasannexedtosaidpleadingasAnnexAthereofandisquotedonthemargin. 1Hence, plaintiff maintains that the
promisecontainedinthecontractis"reciprocallydemandable,"pursuanttothefirstparagraphofsaidArticle1479.Although
defendant had really "agreed, promised and committed" herself to sell the land to the plaintiff, it is not true that the latter
had,inturn,"agreedandcommittedhimself"tobuysaidproperty.SaidAnnexAdoesnotbearoutplaintiff'sallegationto
this effect. What is more, since Annex A has been made "an integral part" of his complaint, the provisions of said
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instrumentformpart"andparcel"2ofsaidpleading.

The option did not impose upon plaintiff the obligation to purchase defendant's property. Annex A is not a
"contract to buy and sell." It merely granted plaintiff an "option" to buy. And both parties so understood it, as
indicatedbythecaption,"OptiontoPurchase,"givenbythemtosaidinstrument.Undertheprovisionsthereof,the
defendant "agreed, promised and committed" herself to sell the land therein described to the plaintiff for
P1,510.00, but there is nothing in the contract to indicate that her aforementioned agreement, promise and
undertakingissupportedbyaconsideration"distinctfromtheprice"stipulatedforthesaleoftheland.
Relying uponArticle 1354 of our Civil Code, the lower courtpresumed the existence of said consideration, and
thiswouldseemtobethemainfactorthatinfluenceditsdecisioninplaintiff'sfavor.Itshouldbenoted,however,
that:
(1)Article1354appliestocontractsingeneral,whereasthesecondparagraphofArticle1479refersto"sales"in
particular,and,morespecifically,to"anacceptedunilateralpromisetobuyortosell."Inotherwords,Article1479
iscontrollinginthecaseatbar.
(2)Inorderthatsaidunilateralpromisemaybe"bindinguponthepromisor,Article1479requirestheconcurrence
ofacondition,namely,thatthepromisebe"supportedbyaconsiderationdistinctfromtheprice."Accordingly,the
promiseecannotcompelthepromisortocomplywiththepromise,unlesstheformerestablishestheexistenceof
said distinct consideration. In other words, the promisee has the burden of proving such consideration. Plaintiff
hereinhasnotevenallegedtheexistencethereofinhiscomplaint.
(3) Upon the other hand, defendant explicitly averred in her answer, and pleaded as a special defense, the
absence of said consideration for her promise to sell and, by joining in the petition for a judgment on the
pleadings, plaintiff has impliedly admitted the truth of said averment in defendant's answer. Indeed as early as
March14,1908,ithadbeenheld,inBauermannv.Casas,3that:
One who prays for judgment on the pleadings without offering proof as to the truth of his own
allegations, and without giving the opposing party an opportunity to introduce evidence, must be
understoodtoadmitthetruthofallthematerialandrelevantallegationsoftheopposingparty,andto
resthismotionforjudgmentonthoseallegationstakentogetherwithsuchofhisownasareadmitted
inthepleadings.(LaYebanaCompanyvs.Sevilla,9Phil.210).(Emphasissupplied.)
ThisviewwasreiteratedinEvangelistav.DelaRosa4andMercy'sIncorporatedv.HerminiaVerde.5
SquarelyinpointisSouthwesternSugar&MolassesCo.v.AtlanticGulf&PacificCo.,6fromwhichWequote:
ThemaincontentionofappellantisthattheoptiongrantedtoappelleetoselltoitbargeNo.10for
thesumofP30,000underthetermsstatedabovehasnolegaleffectbecauseitisnotsupportedby
any consideration and in support thereof it invokes article 1479 of the new Civil Code. The article
provides:
"ART. 1479. A promise to buy and sell a determinate thing for a price certain is
reciprocallydemandable.
An accepted unilateral promise to buy or sell a determinate thing for a price certain is
binding upon the promisor if the promise is supported by a consideration distinct from
theprice."
Ontheotherhand,Appelleecontendsthat,evengrantingthatthe"offerofoption"isnotsupported
byanyconsideration,thatoptionbecamebindingonappellantwhentheappelleegavenoticetoitof
its acceptance, and that having accepted it within the period of option, the offer can no longer be
withdrawn and in any event such withdrawal is ineffective. In support this contention, appellee
invokesarticle1324oftheCivilCodewhichprovides:
"ART. 1324. When the offerer has allowed the offeree a certain period to accept, the
offermaybewithdrawnanytimebeforeacceptancebycommunicatingsuchwithdrawal,
exceptwhentheoptionisfoundeduponconsiderationassomethingpaidorpromised."
Thereisnoquestionthatunderarticle1479ofthenewCivilCode"anoptiontosell,"or"apromiseto
buyortosell,"asusedinsaidarticle,tobevalidmustbe"supportedbyaconsiderationdistinctfrom
theprice."Thisisclearlyinferredfromthecontextofsaidarticlethataunilateralpromisetobuyorto
sell, even if accepted, is only binding if supported by consideration. In other words, "an accepted
unilateral promise can only have a binding effect if supported by a consideration which means that
theoptioncanstillbewithdrawn,evenifaccepted,ifthesameisnotsupportedbyanyconsideration.
It is not disputed that the option is without consideration. It can therefore be withdrawn
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notwithstandingtheacceptanceofitbyappellee.
It is true that under article 1324 of the new Civil Code, the general rule regarding offer and
acceptanceisthat,whentheofferergivestotheoffereeacertainperiodtoaccept,"theoffermaybe
withdrawnatanytimebeforeacceptance"exceptwhentheoptionisfoundeduponconsideration,but
thisgeneralrulemustbeinterpretedasmodifiedbytheprovisionofarticle1479abovereferredto,
whichappliesto"apromisetobuyandsell"specifically.As already stated, this rule requires that a
promisetoselltobevalidmustbesupportedbyaconsiderationdistinctfromtheprice.
WearenotobliviousoftheexistenceofAmericanauthoritieswhichholdthatanoffer,onceaccepted,
cannot be withdrawn, regardless of whether it is supported or not by a consideration (12Am. Jur.
528). These authorities, we note, uphold the general rule applicable to offer and acceptance as
contained in our new Civil Code. But we are prevented from applying them in view of the specific
provision embodied in article 1479. While under the "offer of option" in question appellant has
assumed a clear obligation to sell its barge to appellee and the option has been exercised in
accordance with its terms, and there appears to be no valid or justifiable reason for appellant to
withdrawitsoffer,thisCourtcannotadoptadifferentattitudebecausethelawonthematterisclear.
OurimperativedutyistoapplyitunlessmodifiedbyCongress.
However,thisCourtitself,inthecaseofAtkins,KrollandCo.,Inc.v.CuaHianTek,8decidedlaterthatSouthwestern
Sugar&MolassesCo.v.AtlanticGulf&PacificCo.,9sawnodistinctionbetweenArticles1324and1479oftheCivilCode
and applied the former where a unilateral promise to sell similar to the one sued upon here was involved, treating such
promise as an option which, although not binding as a contract in itself for lack of a separate consideration, nevertheless
generated a bilateral contract of purchase and sale upon acceptance. Speaking through Associate Justice, later Chief
Justice,CesarBengzon,thisCourtsaid:

Furthermore,anoptionisunilateral:apromisetosellatthepricefixedwhenevertheoffereeshould
decide to exercise his option within the specified time.After accepting the promise and before he
exerciseshisoption,theholderoftheoptionisnotboundtobuy.Heisfreeeithertobuyornottobuy
later.Inthiscase,however,uponacceptinghereinpetitioner'sofferabilateralpromisetosellandto
buy ensued, and the respondent ipsofacto assumed the obligation of a purchaser. He did not just
get the right subsequently to buy or not to buy. It was not a mere option then it was a bilateral
contractofsale.
Lastly,evensupposingthatExh.Agrantedanoptionwhichisnotbindingforlackofconsideration,
theauthoritiesholdthat:
"If the option is given without a consideration, it is a mere offer of a contract of sale,
which is not binding until accepted. If, however, acceptance is made before a
withdrawal, it constitutes a binding contract of sale, even though the option was not
supported by a sufficient consideration. ... . (77 Corpus Juris Secundum, p. 652. See
also27RulingCaseLaw339andcasescited.)
"It can be taken for granted, as contended by the defendant, that the option contract
was not valid for lack of consideration. But it was, at least, an offer to sell, which was
accepted by letter, and of the acceptance the offerer had knowledge before said offer
waswithdrawn.Theconcurrenceofbothactstheofferandtheacceptancecould
atalleventshavegeneratedacontract,ifnonetherewasbefore(arts.1254and1262
oftheCivilCode)."(Zaycovs.Serra,44Phil.331.)
Inotherwords,sincetheremaybenovalidcontractwithoutacauseorconsideration,thepromisorisnotbound
byhispromiseandmay,accordingly,withdrawit.Pendingnoticeofitswithdrawal,hisacceptedpromisepartakes,
however,ofthenatureofanoffertosellwhich,ifaccepted,resultsinaperfectedcontractofsale.
ThisviewhastheadvantageofavoidingaconflictbetweenArticles1324onthegeneralprinciplesoncontracts
and 1479 on sales of the Civil Code, in line with the cardinal rule of statutory construction that, in
construing different provisions of one and the same law or code, such interpretation should be favored as will
reconcileorharmonizesaidprovisionsandavoidaconflictbetweenthesame.Indeed,thepresumptionisthat,in
the process of drafting the Code, its author has maintained a consistent philosophy or position. Moreover, the
decisioninSouthwesternSugar&MolassesCo.v.AtlanticGulf&PacificCo.,10holdingthatArt.1324is modified by
Art. 1479 of the Civil Code, in effect, considers the latter as an exception to the former, and exceptions are not favored,
unlesstheintentiontothecontraryisclear,anditisnotso,insofarassaidtwo(2)articlesareconcerned.Whatismore,the
reference,inboththesecondparagraphofArt.1479andArt.1324,toanoptionorpromisesupportedbyorfoundedupona
consideration,stronglysuggeststhatthetwo(2)provisionsintendedtoenforceorimplementthesameprinciple.

Uponmaturedeliberation,theCourtisoftheconsideredopinionthatitshould,asitherebyreiteratesthedoctrine
laiddownintheAtkins, Kroll & Co. case, and that, insofar as inconsistent therewith, the view adhered to in the
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SouthwesternSugar&MolassesCo.caseshouldbedeemedabandonedormodified.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against defendantappellant Severina
Rigos.Itissoordered.
Reyes,J.B.L.,Makalintal,Zaldivar,Teehankee,BarredoandMakasiar,JJ.,concur.
Castro,J.,tooknopart.

SeparateOpinions

ANTONIO,J.,concurring:
IconcurintheopinionoftheChiefJustice.
IfullyagreewiththeabandonmentoftheviewpreviouslyadheredtoinSouthwesternSugar&MolassesCo.vs.
AtlanticGulfandPacificCo.,1whichholdsthatanoptiontosellcanstillbewithdrawn,even if accepted, if the same is
not supported by any consideration, and the reaffirmance of the doctrine in Atkins, Kroll & Co., Inc. vs. Cua Hian Tek, 2
holdingthat"anoptionimplies...thelegalobligationtokeeptheoffer(tosell)openforthetimespecified"thatitcould be
withdrawnbeforeacceptance,iftherewasnoconsiderationfortheoption,butoncethe"offertosell"isaccepted,abilateral
promisetosellandtobuyensues,andtheoffereeipsofactoassumestheobligationsofapurchaser.Inotherwords,ifthe
optionisgivenwithoutaconsideration,itisamereoffertosell,whichisnotbindinguntilaccepted.If,however,acceptance
is made before a withdrawal, it constitutes a binding contract of sale. The concurrence of both acts the offer and the
acceptancecouldinsucheventgenerateacontract.

Whilethelawpermitstheofferortowithdrawtheofferatanytimebeforeacceptanceevenbeforetheperiodhas
expired, some writers hold the view, that the offeror can not exercise this right in an arbitrary or capricious
manner.Thisisupontheprinciplethatanofferimpliesanobligationonthepartoftheofferortomaintaininsuch
lengthoftimeastopermittheoffereetodecidewhethertoacceptornot,andthereforecannotarbitrarilyrevoke
theofferwithoutbeingliablefordamageswhichtheoffereemaysuffer.Acontraryviewwouldremovethestability
andsecurityofbusinesstransactions.3
In the present case the trial court found that the "Plaintiff (Nicolas Sanchez) had offered the sum of Pl,510.00
beforeanywithdrawalfromthecontracthasbeenmadebytheDefendant(SeverinaRigos)."SinceRigos'offer
sellwasacceptedbySanchez,beforeshecouldwithdrawheroffer,abilateralreciprocalcontracttosellandto
buywasgenerated.

SeparateOpinions
ANTONIO,J.,concurring:
IconcurintheopinionoftheChiefJustice.
IfullyagreewiththeabandonmentoftheviewpreviouslyadheredtoinSouthwesternSugar&MolassesCo.vs.
AtlanticGulfandPacificCo.,1whichholdsthatanoptiontosellcanstillbewithdrawn,evenifaccepted,ifthesameis
notsupportedbyanyconsideration,andthereaffirmanceofthedoctrineinAtkins,Kroll&Co.,Inc.vs.CuaHianTek,2
holdingthat"anoptionimplies...thelegalobligationtokeeptheoffer(tosell)openforthetimespecified"thatitcouldbe
withdrawnbeforeacceptance,iftherewasnoconsiderationfortheoption,butoncethe"offertosell"isaccepted,abilateral
promisetosellandtobuyensues,andtheoffereeipsofactoassumestheobligationsofapurchaser.Inotherwords,ifthe
optionisgivenwithoutaconsideration,itisamereoffertosell,whichisnotbindinguntilaccepted.If,however,acceptance
ismadebeforeawithdrawal,itconstitutesabindingcontractofsale.Theconcurrenceofbothactstheofferandthe
acceptancecouldinsucheventgenerateacontract.

Whilethelawpermitstheofferortowithdrawtheofferatanytimebeforeacceptanceevenbeforetheperiodhas
expired,somewritersholdtheview,thattheofferorcannotexercisethisrightinanarbitraryorcapricious
manner.Thisisupontheprinciplethatanofferimpliesanobligationonthepartoftheofferortomaintaininsuch
lengthoftimeastopermittheoffereetodecidewhethertoacceptornot,andthereforecannotarbitrarilyrevoke
theofferwithoutbeingliablefordamageswhichtheoffereemaysuffer.Acontraryviewwouldremovethestability
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andsecurityofbusinesstransactions.3
Inthepresentcasethetrialcourtfoundthatthe"Plaintiff(NicolasSanchez)hadofferedthesumofPl,510.00
beforeanywithdrawalfromthecontracthasbeenmadebytheDefendant(SeverinaRigos)."SinceRigos'offer
sellwasacceptedbySanchez,beforeshecouldwithdrawheroffer,abilateralreciprocalcontracttosellandto
buywasgenerated.

Footnotes
CONCEPCION,C.J.:
1OPTIONTOPURCHASE
KNOWALLMENBYTHESEPRESENTS:
I,SEVERINARIGOS,Filipino,oflegalage,widow,withresidenceatSanJose,NuevaEcijadoby
thesepresents
WITNESSETH:
ThatIamtheownerofthatpropertycoveredbyTransferCertificateofTitleNo.NT12528ofthe
LandRecordsofNuevaEcija,myownershipthereofisevidencedbyaDeedofAbsoluteSaleinmy
favorknownasDoc.No.47PageNo.12BookNo.1Seriesof1961ofNotaryPublic,A.Tomas
ThatIhaveagreed,promisedandcommittedanddoherebyagree,promiseandcommittosellthe
propertyconcernedbytheabovenumberedcertificateoftitletoNICOLASSANCHEZ,Filipino,of
legalage,marriedtoEngraciaBarrantes,withresidenceatSanJose,NuevaEcija,withinaperiodof
two(2)yearsfromtheexecutionofthisinstrumentfortheamountofOneThousandFiveHundred
TenPesos(Pl,510.00)PhilippineCurrency
Thatifwithintheperiodoftwo(2)yearsfromtheexecutionofthisinstrumentsaidNicolasSanchez
shallfailtoexercisehisrighttobuythepropertyunderthisoption,thenhisrightisdeemed
terminatedandelapsedandthatIshallnolongerbecompelledtoselltohimtheproperty
ThatI,NICOLASSANCHEZ,whosepersonalcircumstancesarementionedaboveherebyagreeand
conformwithalltheconditionssetforthinthisoptiontopurchaseexecutedinmyfavorthatIbind
myselfwithallthetermsandconditions.
INWITNESSWHEREOF,thepartieshavehereuntoaffixedtheirsignaturesbelowthis3rddayof
April,1961,atSanJose,NuevaEcija.
(Sgd.)NicolasSANCHEZ(Sgd.)SEVERINARIGOS
Res.Cert.No.A3914416Res.Cert.No.A2977240
IssuedatSanJose,N.E.IssuedatSanJose,N.E.
onApril3,1961onApril1,1961
SIGNEDINTHEPRESENCEOF:
(Sgd.)F.R.Bautista(Sgd.)HipolitoFrancisco
2Asallegedinparagraph5oftheComplaint.
310Phil.386,390.
476Phil.115.
5L21571,September29,1956.
697Phil.249,251252.
7Emphasisours.
8102Phil.948,951952.
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9Supra.
10Supra.
ANTONIO,J.,concurring:
197Phil.,249.
2102Phil.948.
3IGasperi302,6Planiol&Ripert180.
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation

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