(21)St. Martin Funeral Homes vs NLRC (1998) G.R.

130866
Facts: Private respondent alleges that he started working as Operations Manager of
petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6, 1995. However, there was no
contract of employment executed between him and petitioner nor was his name included
in the semi-monthly payroll. On January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment
for allegedly misappropriating P38,000.00. Petitioner on the other hand claims that private
respondent was not its employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of
petitioner St. Martins Funeral Home and in January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed
away, so the latter took over the management of the business. Amelita made some changes
in the business operation and private respondent and his wife were no longer allowed to
participate in the management thereof. As a consequence, the latter fi led a
complaint charging that petitioner had illegally terminated his employment. The
labor arbiter rendered a decision in favor of petitioner declaring that no employer-employee
relationship existed between the parties and therefore his office had no jurisdiction over the
case.
Issue:
Whether or not NLRC decisions are appealable to the CA?
Held:
Yes, In view of The increasing number of labor disputes that find their way to this Court and
the legislative changes introduced over the years into the provisions of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 442 (The Labor Code of the Philippines and Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.) 129
(The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) now stridently call for and warrant a
reassessment of that procedural aspect. The Court noted that there may have been an
oversight in the course of the deliberations on R.A. 7902, amending B.P. 129, or an
imprecision in the terminology used therein as from the records, Congress had intended to
provide for judicial review of the adjudication of the NLRC in labor cases by the Supreme
Court, but there was an inaccuracy in the term used for the intended mode of review.
The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals from the NLRC to
the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative intendment was that the special civil
action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the
NLRC. The use of the word appeal in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted
could have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by certiorari and the original action for
certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the appellate courts. The important
distinction between them, however, and with which the Court is particularly concerned here
is that the special civil action of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this
Court and the Court of Appeals; whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by
certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but would subvert, the
intention of Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on Senate Bill No. 1495.

(42)Azajar vs. Bureau of Lands

Facts: The plaintiff, Maria De Azajar filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Albay
seeking a declaratory judgment or relief pleading that she applied for the purchase of a
parcel of land belonging to the public domain located in the Province of Albay and that an
opposition to such application was filed by Francisco Ardales, one of the respondents herein.
The respondent contended that the applicant cannot be entitled to acquire said lands being
a Chinese Citizen. Such opposition, according to the plaintiff, raises uncertainty and
insecurity to her citizenship which is prejudicial to her. She contended that unless such
question of citizenship be judicially determined, the Bureau of Lands should not deny her
application. Moreover, she contended that her father is a Filipino Citizen. The petitioner
prayed that after due hearing, judgment be rendered declaring her to be a Filipino Citizen
and as such, entitled her to acquire lands of the public domain and that she possessed all
the rights and privileges accorded to the Filipino Citizens. After hearing, the court rendered a
decision stating that the plaintiff is a Chinese Citizen and being such, she is not entitled to
acquire lands of the public domain. The petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was
denied. The appeal was forwarded to the Court of Appeals. While it was pending, the First
Assistant Solicitor General filed a motion praying that the appeal be dismissed on the
grounds that an action for declaratory relief is not the proper proceedings for the purpose of
securing a judicial declaration of Filipino Citizenship and that the action brought by the
plaintiff was not the proper remedy because the trial court had no authority or jurisdiction to
decide on the merits but to dismiss it. The appellant objected to this motion and moved that
the appeal be forwarded to the Supreme Court because it involves pre questions of law.
However, the First Assistant Solicitor General objected and appealed for the case to be
dismissed on the ground that the case involved not only questions of law but also questions
of fact being such the court lacked jurisdiction to hear and render judgment therein.
Issue: Whether or not the plaintiffs citizenship can be determined in a complaint for
declaratory judgment or relief.
Held: From a decision of the Director of Lands, an appeal lies to the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources. Until all the administrative remedies had been exhausted, no court
may compel the Director of Lands or the Secretary of Agriculture to decide any sales
application as such is exclusively vested upon them. The Supreme Court held that the
appellants citizenship cannot be determined in the complaint for declaratory judgment/relief
as such is not proper remedy for determination of citizenship. The appellant may resort to
the courts if the exercise of her rights as citizens be prevented or denied. However, such
was not the action brought in the case at bar and the lower court should have dismissed it.

(63) Fortunato Ortua vs Singson Encarnacion

FACTS: The principal facts admitted by the pleadings may be stated as follows: In January,
1920, the petitioner Fortunato Ortua filed an application with the Bureau of Lands for the
purchase of a tract of public land situated in the municipality of San Jose, Province of
Camarines Sur. Following an investigation conducted by the Bureau of Lands, Ortuas
application was rejected, allowing him, however, to file a sale or lease application for the
portion of the land classified to be suitable for commercial purposes. Two motions for
reconsideration of the decision were filed and denied. On appeal to the then Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources (Agriculture and Commerce), the decision was affirmed.
It should be explained that one condition for the purchase of a tract of public agricultural
land, provided by the Public Land Law, Act No. 2874, in its sections 23 and 88, is that the
purchaser shall be a citizen of lawful age of the Philippine Islands or of the United States.
Fortunato Ortua in his application stated that he was a Filipino citizen, but the Director of
Lands held that on the contrary, Ortua was a Chinese citizen. The Dir of Land established the
ff facts: Fortunato Ortua was born in 1885 in Lagonoy, Camarines Sur, Philippine Islands,
being the natural son of Irene Demesa, a Filipina, and Joaquin Ortua, a Chinese. In 1896
Fortunato was sent to China to study. While he was in China his father and mother were
legally married. Fortunato returned to the Philippines in 1906, that is, when he was twentyone years of age. And that even if presumptively Fortunato Ortua was a Philippine citizen,
certain acts of Ortua were pointed to as demonstrating that he had forfeited his Philippine
citizenship.
ISSUE: WON the question of law arising from the undisputed evidence was correctly decided
by the Director of Lands.
HELD: NO.

ON QUESTION OF FACT. A decision rendered by the Director of Lands and approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, upon a question of fact is conclusive and not
subject to be reviewed by the courts, in the absence of a showing that such decision was
rendered in consequence of fraud, imposition, or mistake, other than error of judgment in
estimating the value or effect of evidence, regardless of whatever or not it is consistent with
the preponderance of the evidence, so long as there is some evidence upon which the
finding in question could be made.
There is, however, another side to the case. It certainly was not intended by the legislative
body to remove from the jurisdiction of courts all right to review decisions of the Bureau of
Lands, for to do so would be to attempt something which could not be done legally. Giving
force to all possible intendments regarding the facts as found by the Director of Lands

ON QUESTION OF LAW. The decision of the Director of Lands approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce on a question of law, is in no sense conclusive upon the courts,
but is subject to review. Any action of the Director of Lands which is based upon a
misconstruction of the law can be corrected by the courts.
The Director of Lands gave too much prominence, we think, to two minor facts, susceptible
of explanation. When Ortua returned from China at the age of twenty-one, it was the most
natural thing in the world for him to land as a Chinese, for this would facilitate entry and
obviate complications. Again, when Ortua applied for the registration of a boat, there may
have been any number of reasons why he did not care to appeal from the decision of the
Insular Collector of Customs. On the other hand, some consideration should be given to the
intention of the petitioner, and he vigorously insists that it is his desire to be considered a
Philippine citizen. He has taken a Filipino name. He has gone into business and has improved
the property here in question to a great extent. There has been no implied renunciation of
citizenship, because the petitioner has been domiciled in these Islands except for a short
period during his infancy when he temporarily sojourned in China for study. On the contrary,
he states that he has always considered himself to be a Filipino, and that he has elected to
remain as a Philippine citizen. Therefore, on the facts found by the Director of Lands, we
hold that clear error of law resulted in not considering petitioner a Philippine citizen and so
qualified under the Public Land Law to purchase public agricultural lands.
(83) Mison vs Coa
Facts:
The case is about customs case no. 813 where the commissioner of customs, MIson,
declaring illegal the seizure by elements of the Philippine Navy of the M/V "Hyojin Maru" a
vessel of Japanese registry, and ordered the release of the vessel and its cargo to the
claimants, Chan Chiu On and Cheung I.
However, the vessel was never released because it sank while in the custody of the
bureau of customs and it could not be salvaged. The claimants filed a claim with the
Commission on Audit for the payment of the vessel.
Acting thereon "(b)y authority of the Acting Chairman," Mr. Rogelio B. Espiritu,
Manager, Technical Service Office of the COA, denied the claim for the reasons set forth in
his registered letter to the claimant's lawyer dated November 3, 1977-captioned "Decision
No. 77-142."
In a letter dated May 10, 1978, claimants counsel, Mr. David replied that said
Decision No. 77-142-rendered only by the Manager, Technical Service Office of the COA, and
"not (by) the Acting Chairman, much less . . . the Commission on Audit" was void because
the matter could validly be acted upon only by "the Commission on Audit duly constituted,
by the appointment and qualification of its Chairman and two Commissioners," "as
specifically provided by Section 2, Article XII-D of the (1973) Constitution. In a 4th
Indorsement dated June 22, 1987 addressed "to the Auditor, Bureau of Customs," Chairman
Eufemio C. Domingo, acting "FOR THE COMMISSION," reconsidered Decision No. 77-142 of
Acting Commissioner of Audit Tantuico, supra.
He declared that the vessel sank while in illegal custody of the Bureau of Customs,
which "should have pre-eminently taken adequate measures to preserve" it but did not.;
hence, he declared that "this Commission will interpose no objection" to the instant claim,
subject to the usual auditing and accounting requirements." Petitioner seasonably filed with
this Court a petition for certiorari to nullify said COA Decisions pursuant to Section 7, Article
IX of the 1987 Constitution.

Issues:
Whether or not the decision to reverse the Espiritu Decision was proper?
Held:
In the first place the "Espiritu decision" was void ab initio. As manager of the COA
Technical Service Office, Mr. Espiritu obviously had no power whatever to render and
promulgate a decision of or for the Commission. Indeed, even the Chairman, alone, had not
that power. As clearly set out in the Constitution then in force, the power was lodged in the
Commission on Audit, "composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners." 20 It was the
Commission, as a collegial body, which then as now, had the jurisdiction to "(d)ecide any
case brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for resolution,"
subject to review by the Supreme Court on certiorari.
Hence, the adoption or ratification of the Espiritu decision by the Acting COA
Chairman was inconsequential. Ratification cannot validate an act void ab initio because
done absolutely without authority. The act has to be done anew by the person or entity duly
endowed with authority to do so.
Moreover, even conceding the contrary, no proper ratification or validation could
have been effected by the Acting Chairman since he was not the Commission, and he
himself had no power to decide any case brought before the Commission, that power, to
repeat, being lodged only in the Commission itself, as a collegial body. it must be made clear
that the Espiritu Decision was not merely "technically invalid," as the petitioner describes it.
It was substantively void ab initio, because rendered without jurisdiction. It had an essential
inherent defect that could not be cured or waived.

(105)Iron and Steel Authority vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS:
The Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) was created by PD No. 272, in order, generally, to
develop and promote the iron and steel industry in the Philippines. Initially, it was created
for a term of 5 years but when its original term expired, its term was extended for another
10 years by EO No. 555. The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly owned
subsidiary of the National Development Corporation which is an entity wholly owned by the
National Government embarked on an expansion program which includes the construction of
a steel mill in Iligan City. Proclamation No. 2239 was issued by the President withdrawing
from sale or settlement a tract of land in Iligan City to be used by the NSC. However, certain
portions of the public land under Proclamation 2239 were occupied by Maria Cristina
Fertilizer Co. (MCFC). LOI No. 1277 was issued directing NSC to negotiate with the owners of
MCFC for and on behalf of the Government for the compensation of MCFCs present
occupancy rights on the subject land. The LOI directed that ISA may exercise the power of
eminent domain should the negotiations fail. The negotiations failed and ISA commenced
expropriation proceedings against MCFC. While trial was on-going the statutory existence of
ISA had expired prompting MCFC to file the dismissal of the case since ISA has ceased to be
a juridical person. The trial court granted MCFCs motion to dismiss anchoring on the Rules
of Court that only natural or juridical persons or entities authorized by law may be parties
to a civil case. ISA moved for a reconsideration contending that despite the expiration of
its term, its juridicial existence continued until the winding up of its affairs could be
completed. In the alternative ISA urged that the Rep. of the Philippines should be allowed to
be substituted in its place. The RTC denied its motion for reconsideration. This was affirmed
by the CA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted for ISA in
view of the expiration of ISAs term.
HELD:

There is no provision in PD No. 272 recognizing ISA as possessing general or

comprehensive juridical personality separate and distinct from that of the Government. ISA
in fact appears to be a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines. It is common knowledge that other agencies or instrumentalities
of the Government of the Republic are case in corporate form, that is to say, are
incorporated agencies or instrumentalities, sometimes with and other times without capital
stock, and accordingly vested with a juridical personality distinct from the personality of the
Republic. The term Authority has been used to designate both incorporated and nonincorporated agencies or instrumentalities of the Government.
The Court considers that ISA is properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the
Republic of the Philippines. The Republic itself is a body corporate and juridical person
vested with full panoply of powers and attributes which are compendiously described as
legal personality.
When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers, duties
and functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and are reassumed by, the Republic of the Philippines, in the absence of special provisions of law
specifying some other disposition thereof such as e.g. devolution or transmission of such
powers, duties, functions, etc. to some other identified successor agency or instrumentality
of the Republic of the Philippines. When the expiring agency is an incorporated one, the
consequences of such expiry must be looked for, in the first instance, in the charter of that
agency and, by way of supplementation in the provisions of the Corporation Code. Since ISA
is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic, its powers, duties, functions,
assets and liabilities are properly regarded as folded back into the Government of the
Philippines and hence assumed once again by the Republic, no special statutory provision
having been shown to have mandated succession thereto by some other entity or agency of
the Republic.
It follows that the Republic of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted in the
expropriation proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA, the statutory term of ISA having
expired. The expiration of ISAs statutory did not by itself require or justify the dismissal of
the eminent domain proceedings. Further, no new legislative act is necessary should the
Republic decide, upon being substituted for ISA, in fact to continue to prosecute the
expropriation proceedings.