13.

Alexander L Kielland Accommodation Platform

13.1 Summary Details
Failed structure:
Pentagone type semi
submersible rig
Date:
27 March 1980
Place:
Ekofisk field, North Sea
Conditions:
Bad weather, ~60
75km/hr wind speeds, ~6
8mm wave height
Failure mode:
Fatigue failure followed by brittle fracture in one brace and ductile overload in remaining
adjacent braces
Cause:
Fatigue crack growth from a weld defect
Consequences:
Loss of 123 lives and platform
13.2 Background
On the evening of 27 March 1980, one of the five columns of the 'Alexander L Kielland'
accommodation platform anchored in the North Sea,
broke off (see Fig. 18). (The
five columns were the principal bu
oyancy elements
of the platform). The platform
immediately heeled over to an

angle of 30
35 and then continued to heel and sink slowly. Twenty minutes after the loss of column D, the
platform capsized. Of the
seven lifeboats on board, only two were launch
ed successfully albeit with great
difficulty in part due to bad weather conditions (one landed upside down in the water). Some
inflatable rafts launched themselves due to the listing of the platform. A massive international air
and sea rescue operation was undertaken. Of the 212 men on board the platform when it failed,
123 died.
The Alexander L Kielland was a semi
-submersible mobile rig of the Pentagone type, a design which had been developed in France.
The rig was built between 1973 and 1976
in France for an American operator. Although it was designed as a drilling rig, it was only ever
operated as an accommodation platform during its four years in service.
The platform had five columns, of overall height of 35.6m, mounted on 22m diameter pontoons.
The col
umns were positioned at the apexes of a pentagon with braces
running between adjacent columns and the deck or hull. Accommodation units and a drilling
tower were mounted on the deck.
Fig. 18
Alexander L Kielland accommodation platform

13.3 Causes of Failure

Following the accident, the platform and the separated column D remained afloat. Column D was
towed to Stavanger and divers removed all the fracture faces from the capsized platform for
investigation (see Fig.
19).

The Commission resp

onsible for the inquiry
into the disaster concluded that the structural failure had occurred in the following stages:
i.
Fatigue crack growth in brace D6 initiating from pre
existing cracks in the fillet welds between a hydrophone support and the brace ii
.
Final
, mainly ductile, fracture of brace D6
iii
.
Subsequent failure of five remaining braces joining the column to the structure by plastic
collapse Brace D6 and the hydrophone support were both made from a C
Mn structural steel (equivalent to a Lloyds' ship steel Grade EH) with a minimum specified yield
strength of 355N/mm
2
. The brace was 2.6m in diameter with a wall thickness of 26mm. The
hydrophone support was 20mm thick with a diameter of 325mm and was setthrough
the brace. It was attached to the brace by two
fillet welds, one on the outside of the brace and the other on the inside. Examination of these
fillet welds revealed poor penetration into the hydrophone tube material and an unsatisfactory
weld bead shape. Significant cracking was also found which was da
ted to the time of fabrication by the
presence of paint on the fracture surfaces.
Fatigue crack growth in brace D6 originated at the hydrophone support weld and extended, in the
latter stages partly by ductile tearing, around approximately 2/3 of the circumference of the brace
until final failure took place by brittle fracture.
The chemical compositions of the brace and hydrophone material were within
specification, as were the Charpy and in
plane tensile properties. The through
thickness ductility of the hydrophone material (which was not specified) was, however, poor.
This, combined with its through
thickness tensile strength being lower than the in
-

plane strength of the brace material and with sub

standard welding, led to partial cracking of the fillet we
ld during fabrication.
13.4 Lessons learnt
Although material properties and welding quality played a significant part in this
disaster, rig design was also a critical factor. Apart from the stability and buoyancy
aspects which were inadequate, the design did not consider attachments to highly
stressed braces such as D6 as important. The fatigue performance of the hydrophone attachment
and its effect on the fatigue life of the brace were tragically overlooked.
Fig. 19
Alexander L Kielland accommodation platform (fracture face)

13.5 References
Author
Title
Norges Offentlige
Utredninger
'Alexander L Keilland'
ulykken'. Report NOU
1981:11, 1981.
Moan T
'The progressive structural failure of the Alexander L
Kielland platform'. Case Histories in Offshore

Engineering, ed, G. Mauer, Springer

Verlag, 1985.
Almar
Naess A, Haagensen
P J, Lian B, Moan T and Simonsen T
'Investigation of the Alexander L Kielland failure
metallurgical and fracture analysis'. Proc. 14th Annual Offshore Technology Conference, Vol.2,
1982, p.79
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