Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 244

March 29, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF TELESFORO A. DIAO,

vs.
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.
BENGZON, C.J.:
After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953, Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar.
About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his application for such Bar examination,
that he had the requisite academic qualifications. The matter was in due course referred to the Solicitor General who caused the
charge to be investigated; and later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys,
because contrary to the allegations in his petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed, before taking up law
subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the Department of Private Education, specially, in the following particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained his A.A. diploma therefrom which contradicts the
credentials he had submitted in support of his application for examination, and of his allegation therein of successful
completion of the "required pre-legal education".
Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically admits the first charge: but he claims that although he had
left high school in his third year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which
(according to him) is equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered
his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and 4th year high school.
We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with respondent's failure to exhibit any certification to that effect (the
equivalence) by the proper school officials. However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly
meritorious. Diao never obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for examination represented him as an
A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April, 1949,
he says he was erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court,
without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or "confusion" was obviously of his own making. Had his
application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949,
thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before obtaining his Associate in Arts
degree. And then he would not have been permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the applicant for the Bar
examination must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the required
pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of Private Education," (emphasis on "previous").
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations; but due to his false representations, he was
allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such admission having been obtained under false
pretenses must be, and is hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is immaterial. Passing such examinations
is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the regular manner is
equally essential..
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the name of Telesforo A. Diao. And the latter is required to return
his lawyer's diploma within thirty days. So ordered.

[A.C. No. 1163. August 29, 1975.]

IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.

Topic: Requirements for application to the Bar no filed or pending case of moral turpitude
FACTS:
1. The case is one of the consolidated cases in In re Lanuevo.
2. Ramon E. Galang passed the 1971 bar examination but his exam papers were subjected to unauthorized re-correction and reevaluation by 5 examiners.

3. An investigation by the NBI revealed

that Ramon (Roman/Romy) was a student of School of Law of MLQU;

that in Sept 8, 1959, he was charged with the crime of slight physical injuries(SPI) of another student of the same
university;
that in a 1973 hearing, he was confronted with this information but declared he does not remember being charged with the
same.

4. Victim was summoned and narrated the case and identified Galang as the very same person charged with SPI in that case.

5. An administrative proceeding was filed for his disbarment along with Bar Confidant Lanuevo.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Galang must be stricken off in the roll of attorneys for concealing his case of SPI.

DECISION: YES
1. Under Rule 127, Sec 2 every applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his involvement in any criminal case, pending or
otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully ascertain or determine applicant's moral character.

2. As to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the Supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before or
informing the Court of one's personal record whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is
still pending becomes more compelling.

3. In 1963 and 1964, when Galang took the Bar for the second and third time, respectively, the application form provided by the
Court for use of applicants already required the applicant to declare under oath that "he has not been accused of, indicted for or
convicted by any court or tribunal of any offense involving moral turpitude; and that there is no pending case of that nature against
him."

4. By 1966, when Galang took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the application form prepared by the Court for use of
applicants required the applicant to reveal all his criminal cases whether involving moral turpitude or not. Yet, Galang continued to
intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court his criminal case of slight physical injuries which was then and until now is pending
in the City Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in his applications to take the Bar
examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.

5. That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or
indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law is well settled.

6. Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed to take the Bar
examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have no other alternative but to order the surrender of
his attorney's certificate and the striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 389

February 28, 1967

IN RE: DISBARMENT OF ARMANDO PUNO.

FLORA QUINGWA complainant,
vs.
ARMANDO PUNO, respondent.
Domingo T. Zavalla for complainant.
Armando Puno for and in his own behalf as respondent.
REGALA, J.:
On April 16, 1959, Flora Quingwa filed before this Court a verified complaint charging Armando Puno, a member of the Bar, with
gross immorality and misconduct. In his answer, the respondent denied all the material allegations of the complaint, and as a special
defense averred that the allegations therein do not constitute grounds for disbarment or suspension under section 25, Rule 127 of
the former Rules of Court.
The case was referred to the Solicitor General on June 3, 1958, for investigation, report and recommendation. Hearings were held
by the then Solicitor Roman Cancino, Jr., during which the complainant, assisted by her counsel, presented evidence both oral and
documentary. The respondent, as well as his counsel, cross-examined the complainant's witnesses. The respondent likewise
testified. He denied having sexual intercourse with complainant at the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, disclaimed the
handwriting "Mr. & Mrs. A. Puno" appearing in the hotel register, and disowned Armando Quingwa Puno, Jr. to be his child.
After the hearing, the Solicitor General filed a complaint, formally charging respondent with immorality. The complaint recites:
That on June 1, 1958, at a time when complainant Flora Quingwa and respondent Armando Puno were engaged to be
married, the said respondent invited the complainant to attend a movie but on their way the respondent told the
complainant that they take refreshment before going to the Lyric Theater; that they proceeded to the Silver Moon Hotel at
R. Hidalgo, Manila; that while at the restaurant on the first floor of the said Silver Moon Hotel, respondent proposed to
complainant that they go to one of the rooms upstairs assuring her that 'anyway we are getting married; that with
reluctance and a feeling of doubt engendered by love of respondent and the respondent's promise of marriage,
complainant acquiesced, and before they entered the hotel room respondent registered and signed the registry book as
'Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno; that after registering at the hotel, respondent shoved complainant inside the room; that as soon as
they were inside the room, someone locked the door from outside and respondent proceeded to the bed and undressed
himself; that complainant begged respondent not to molest her but respondent insisted, telling her: 'anyway I have
promised to marry you'; and respondent, still noticing the reluctance of complainant to his overtures of love, again assured
complainant that 'you better give up. Anyway I promised that I will marry you'; that thereupon respondent pulled
complainant to the bed, removed her panty, and then placed himself on top of her and held her hands to keep her flat on
the bed; that when respondent was already on top of complainant the latter had no other recourse but to submit to
respondent's demand and two (2) sexual intercourse took place from 3:00 o'clock until 7:00 o'clock that same evening
when they left the hotel and proceeded to a birthday party together; that after the sexual act with complainant on June 1,
1958, respondent repeatedly proposed to have some more but complainant refused telling that they had better wait until
they were married; that after their said sexual intimacy on June 1, 1958 and feeling that she was already on the family
way, complainant repeatedly implored respondent to comply with his promise of marriage but respondent refused to
comply; that on February 20, 1959, complainant gave birth to a child.

That the acts of the respondent in having carnal knowledge with the complainant through a promise of marriage which he
did not fulfill and has refused to fulfill up to the present constitute a conduct which shows that respondent is devoid of the
highest degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of and must be possessed by members of the
Philippine Bar.
The Solicitor General asked for the disbarment of the respondent.
A copy of this complaint was served on respondent on May 3, 1962. Thereupon, he answered the complaint on June 9, 1962, again
denying that he took complainant to the Silver Moon Hotel and that on the promise of marriage, succeeded twice in having sexual
intercourse with her. He, however, admitted that sometime in June, 1955, he and the complainant became sweethearts until
November, 1955, when they broke off, following a quarrel. He left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, to practice law. Without stating
in his answer that he had the intention of introducing additional evidence, respondent prayed that the complaint be dismissed.
This case was set for hearing in this Court on July 20, 1962. On the day of the hearing Solicitor Ceferino E. Gaddi who appeared for
the complainant submitted the case for decision without oral argument. There was no appearance for the respondents.
Since the failure of respondent to make known in his answer his intention to present additional evidence in his behalf is deemed a
waiver of the right to present such evidence (Toledo vs. Toledo, Adm. Case No. 266, April 27, 1963), the evidence produced before
the Solicitor General in his investigation, where respondent had an opportunity to object to the evidence and cross-examine the
witnesses, may now be considered by this Court, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 139 of the Rules of Court.
After reviewing the evidence, we are convinced that the facts are as stated in the complaint.
Complainant is an educated woman, having been a public school teacher for a number of years. She testified that respondent took
her to the Silver Moon Hotel on June 1, 1958, signing the hotel register as "Mr. and Mrs. A. Puno," and succeeded in having sexual
intercourse with her on the promise of marriage. The hotel register of the Silver Moon Hotel (Exh. B-1 and Exh. B-2) shows that "Mr.
and Mrs. A. Puno" arrived at that hotel on June 1, 1958 at 3:00 P.M. and departed at 7:00 P.M.
Complainant also testified that she last saw respondent on July 5, 1958, when the latter went to Zamboanga City. When she learned
that respondent had left for Zamboanga City, she sent him a telegram sometime in August of that year telling him that she was in
trouble. Again she wrote him a letter in September and another one in October of the same year, telling him that she was pregnant
and she requested him to come. Receiving no replies from respondent, she went to Zamboanga City in November, 1958, where she
met the respondent and asked him to comply with his promise to marry her.1wph1.t
Respondent admitted that he left for Zamboanga City in July, 1958, and that he and complainant met in Zamboanga City in
November, 1958. The fact that complainant sent him a telegram and letters was likewise admitted in respondent's letter to the
complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E), which was duly identified by the respondent to be his.
Complainant gave birth to a baby boy on February 20, 1959, at the Maternity and Children's Hospital. This is supported by a certified
true copy of a birth certificate issued by the Deputy Local Civil Registrar of Manila, and a certificate of admission of complainant to
the Maternity and Children's Hospital issued by the medical records clerk of the hospital.
To show how intimate the relationship between the respondent and the complainant was, the latter testified that she gave money to
the respondent whenever he asked from her. This was corroborated by the testimony of Maria Jaca a witness for the complainant.
Even respondent's letter dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E) shows that he used to ask for money from the complainant.
The lengthy cross-examination to which complainant was subjected by the respondent himself failed to discredit complainant's
testimony.
In his answer to the complaint of the Solicitor General, the respondent averred that he and complainant were sweethearts up to
November, 1955 only. The fact that they reconciled and were sweethearts in 1958 is established by the testimony of Fara Santos, a
witness of the complainant (pp. 12 & 17, t.s.n.); respondent's letter to the complainant dated November 3, 1958 (Exh. E); and
respondent's own testimony (pp. 249 & 255, t.s.n.)
Complainant submitted to respondent's plea for sexual intercourse because of respondent's promise of marriage and not because of
a desire for sexual gratification or of voluntariness and mutual passion. (Cf. Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-18630,
December 17, 1966) .
One of the requirements for all applicants for admission to the Bar is that the applicant must produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory evidence of good moral character (Section 2, Rule 127 of the old Rules of Court, now section 2, Rule 138). If that
qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of law, it is essential during the continuance
of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. (Royong vs. Oblena, Adm. Case No. 376, April 30, 1963, citing In re Pelaez, 44 Phil.
567). When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue

and overcome the evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p. 93) and show proofs that he still maintains the
highest degree of morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. Respondent denied that he took complainant to the
Silver Moon Hotel and had sexual intercourse with her on June 1, 1958, but he did not present evidence to show where he was on
that date. In the case of United States vs. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, said:
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not perform that duty he may not
always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is
the easiest of easy things, he is hardly indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide consideration which the
State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so when he not only
declines to help himself but actively conceals from the State the very means by which it may assist him.
With respect to the special defense raised by the respondent in his answer to the charges of the complainant that the allegations in
the complaint do not fall under any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar as enumerated in section
25 of Rule 127 of the (old) Rules of Court, it is already a settled rule that the statutory enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent powers of
the court over its officers can not be restricted. Times without number, our Supreme Court held that an attorney will be removed not
only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct, which shows him to be unfit for the office and
unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, citing In re Smith [1906] 73
Kan 743; Balinon vs. de Leon Adm. Case No. 104, January 28, 1954; 50 O.G. 583; Mortel vs. Aspiras, Adm. Case No. 145,
December 28, 1956, 53 O.G. 627). As a matter of fact, "grossly immoral conduct" is now one of the grounds for suspension or
disbarment. (Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).
Under the circumstances, we are convinced that the respondent has committed a grossly immoral act and has, thus disregarded
and violated the fundamental ethics of his profession. Indeed, it is important that members of this ancient and learned profession of
law must conform themselves in accordance with the highest standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics:
... The lawyer should aid in guarding the bar against the admission to the profession of candidates unfit or unqualified
because deficient in either moral character or education. He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain
the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but the administration of justice.
Wherefore, respondent Armando Puno is hereby disbarred and, as a consequence, his name is ordered stricken off from the Roll of
Attorneys.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A. M. No. 2104 August 24, 1989
NARCISO MELENDREZ and ERLINDA DALMAN, complainants,
vs.
ATTY. REYNERIO I. DECENA, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
In a sworn complaint 1 dated 25 September 1979, the spouses Erlinda Dalman and Narciso Melendrez charged Reynerio I. Decena,
a member of the Philippine Bar, with malpractice and breach of trust. The complainant spouses alleged, among others, that
respondent had, by means of fraud and deceit, taken advantage of their precarious financial situation and his knowledge of the law
to their prejudice, succeeded in divesting them of their only residential lot in Pagadian City; that respondent, who was their counsel
in an estafa case against one Reynaldo Pineda, had compromised that case without their authority.
In his answer dated 18 March 1980, respondent denied all the charges levelled against him and prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint.
By resolution dated 14 April 1980, the administrative complaint was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for investigation,
report and recommendation.
Accordingly, the Solicitor General forthwith deputized the City Fiscal of Pagadian City, Jorge T. Almonte, to conduct the necessary
investigation, with instructions to submit thereafter this report and recommendation thereon. Fiscal Almonte held several hearings on
the administrative case until 15 July 1982, when he requested the Solicitor General to release him from the duty of investigating the
case.
On 10 September 1982, the Solicitor General granted Fiscal Almonte's request and in his stead appointed the Provincial Fiscal of
Zamboanga del Sur, Pedro S. Jamero, who resumed hearings on 15 June 1983.
Respondent filed with this Court on 9 June 1987, a motion seeking to inhibit Fiscal Jamero from hearing the case followed by an
urgent motion for indefinite postponement of the investigation. Both motions were denied by the Court in a Resolution dated 21
September 1987 with instructions to the Solicitor General to complete the investigation of the administrative case and to render his
report and recommendation thereon within thirty (30) days from notice.

On 19 July 1988, the Solicitor General submitted his Report and Recommendation 2 dated 21 June 1988. In as Report, after setting
out the facts and proceedings held in the present case, the Solicitor General presented the following:
FINDINGS
Complainants allege that on August 5, 1975, they obtained from respondent a loan of P 4,000.00. This loan was
secured by a real estate mortgage (Annex C, Complainants' Complaint, p. 16, records).lwph1.t In the said
Real Estate Mortgage document, however, it was made to appear that the amount borrowed by complainants
was P5,000.00. Confronted by this discrepancy, respondent assured complainants that said document was a
mere formality, and upon such assurance, complainants signed the same. The document was brought by
complainant Narciso Melendres to a Notary Public for notarization. After the same was notarized, he gave the
document to respondent. Despite the assurance, respondent exacted from complainants P500.00 a month as
payment for what is beyond dispute usurious interest on the P5,000.00 loan. Complainants religiously paid the
obviously usurious interest for three months: September, October and November, 1975. Then they stopped
paying due to financial reverses. In view of their failure to pay said amounts as interest, respondent prepared a
new document on May 7, 1976, a Real Estate Mortgage (Annex D, Complaint, p. 18, records) over the same lot
3125-C, replacing the former real estate mortgage dated August 5, 1975, but this time the sum indicated in said
new contract of mortgage is P 10,000.00, purportedly with interest at 19% per annum. In this new Real Estate
Mortgage, a special power of attorney in favor of respondent was inserted, authorizing him to sell the
mortgaged property at public auction in the event complainants fail to pay their obligation on or before May 30,
1976. Without explaining the provisions of the new contract to complainants, respondent insisted that
complainants sign the same, again upon the assurance that the document was a mere formality. Unsuspecting
of the motive of respondent, complainants signed the document. Complainants Narciso Melendres again
brought the same document to a Notary Public for notarization. After the document was notarized, he brought
the same to respondent without getting a copy of it.
Complainants, relying on the assurance of the respondent that the second Real Estate Mortgage was but a
formality, neither bothered to ask from respondent the status of their lot nor tried to pay their obligation. For their
failure to pay the obligation, the respondent on October 12, 1976, applied for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
second real estate mortgage (Exhibit 16, Respondent's Position Paper). All the requirements of Act No. 3135,
as amended, re extrajudicial sale of mortgage were ostensibly complied with by respondent. Hence, finally, title
was transferred to him, and on June 20, 1979, respondent sold the involved property to Trinidad Ylanan for
P12,000.00.
When informed of the above by one Salud Australlado on the first week of March 1979 (see Sworn Statement of
complainant Narciso Melendres, p. 6, Folder No. 2 of case), and not having known the legal implications of the
provisions of the second Real Estate Mortgage which they had executed, complainants could not believe that
title to their lot had already been transferred to respondent and that respondent had already sold the same to a
third person.
Upon learning of the sale in March, 1979, complainants tried to raise the amount of P10,000.00 and went to
respondent's house on May 30, 1979 to pay their obligation, hoping that they could redeem their property,
although three years had already lapsed from the date of the mortgage.
Respondent did not accept the proffered P10,000.00, but instead gave complainants a sheet of paper (Annex B,
Complainants' Position Paper), which indicated that the total indebtedness had soared to P20,400.00. The
computation was made in respondent's own handwriting. Complainants went home with shattered hopes and
with grief in their hearts. Hence, the instant competent for disbarment against respondent filed on October 5,
1979.
Respondent DENIES all the allegations of complainants. He maintains that what appears on the two documents
allegedly executed by complainants, i.e., that they obtained a loan of P5,000.00 on August 5, 1975 and another
P10,000.00 on May 7,1976, is allegedly the truth, and claims that he in truth delivered the alleged amount of
P5,000.00 to complainants and not P4,000.00. With respect to the second loan, respondent claims that he
delivered to complainants P8,000.00, plus the P2,000.00 loan previously extended [to] complainants [by] one
Regino Villanueva, which loan had been indorsed to respondent for collection, thus making a total of
P10,000.00, as appearing on said document. Respondent denies that he exacted usurious interest of 10% a
month or P500.00 from complainants. He asserts that the fact that complainants were able to secure a loan
from the Insular Bank of Asia and America (IBAA) only proves the truth of his allegation that the title of the
property, at the time complainants obtained a loan from IBAA on April 1976, was clear of any encumbrance,
since complainants had already paid the original loan of P5,000.00 obtained from respondent; that
complainants knew fully well all the conditions of said mortgage; and that his acquisition of the property in
question was in accordance with their contract and the law on the matter. Thus, he denies that he has violated
any right of the complainants.
After weighing the evidence of both complainants and respondent, we find against respondent.

While complainants are correct in their claim that they actually obtained an actual cash of P4,000.00, they are
only partly correct in the claim that out of the P10,000.00 appearing in the second Real Estate Mortgage,
P6,000.00 was applied to interest considering that not all the P6,000.00 but only P4,000.00 was applied to
interest, computed as follows: the first loan of P5,000.00 was supposedly due on August 31, 1975.
Complainants paid 10% monthly interest or P500.00 on September 30, 1975, October 31, 1975 and November
30, 1975. Consequently, beginning December 31, 1975 up to May 31, 1976 (the date of the execution of the
second Real Estate Mortgage) a total of six (6) months lapsed. Six (6) months at P500.00 equals P 3,000.00,
which amount plus the P2,000.00 complainants' loan to one Engr. Villanueva (indorsed to respondent for
collection) totals P5,000.00. Adding this amount to the previous P5,000.00 indicated loan secured by the first
mortgage results in P10,000.00, the amount appearing in the second Real Estate Mortgage. Section 7, Rule
130 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 7. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is
to be considered as complaining all such terms, and, therefore, there can be, as between the parties and their
successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing, except
in the following cases:
(a) Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties, or the validity of the agreement is put in issue by the pleadings;
(b) Where there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the writing. The term "agreement" includes wills.
There is no dispute that the two documents denominated Real Estate Mortgages covering the supposed original
loan of P5,000.00 and the inflated P10,000.00, respectively, were voluntarily signed by the complainants. The
general rule is that when the parties have reduced their agreement to writing, it is presumed that they have
made the writing the only repository and memorial of the truth, and whatever is not found in the writing must be
understood to have been waived and abandoned.
However, the rule is not absolute as it admits of some exceptions, as aforequoted. One of the exceptions, that
is, failure to express the true intent and agreement of the parties, applies in this case. From the facts obtaining
in the case, it is clear that the complainants were induced to sign the Real Estate Mortgage documents by the
false and fraudulent representations of respondent that each of the successive documents was a are formality.
While it may be true that complainants are not at all illiterate, respondent, being a lawyer, should have at least
explained to complainants the legal implications of the provisions of the real estate mortgage, particularly the
provision appointing him as the complainants' attorney-in-fact in the event of default in payments on the part of
complainants. While it may be conceded that it is presumed that in practice the notary public apprises
complainants of the legal implications of the contract, it is of common knowledge that most notaries public do
not go through the desired practice. Respondent at least could have informed the complainants by sending a
demand letter to them to pay their obligation as otherwise he would proceed to sell the lot at public auction as
per their contract. This respondent failed to do, despite the fact that he knew fully wen that complainants were
trying their best to raise money to be able to pay their obligation to him, as shown by the loan obtained by
complainants from the IBAA on April 8, 1976. In this connection, it may be stated that complainants, per advice
of respondent himself, returned the proceeds of the IBAA loan to the bank immediately on April 30, 1976,
considering that the net proceeds of the loan from said bank was only P4,300.00 and not enough to pay the
indicated loan from respondent of P5,000.00, which per computation of respondent would already have earned
interest of P2,500.00 for five (5) months (December 1975 to April, 1976).
Respondent claims that complainants had paid him the original loan of P5,000.00, and that this was the reason
why complainants were able to mortgage the lot to the bank free from any encumbrance. This claim is incorrect.
The reason why the title (T-2684) was free from any encumbrance was simply because of the fact that the first
Real Estate Mortgage for the indicated loan of P5,000.00 (the actual amount was only P 4,000.00) had not been
annotated at the back of the title (see Annex B, p. 14, rec.).
Respondent also denies that complainants offered to him the amount of Pl0,000. 00 as payment of the loan,
alleging that if the offer were true, he could have readily accepted the same since he sold the lot for almost the
same amount, for only P12,000.00, a difference of a few thousand pesos. Respondent's denial is spacious.
Indeed, complainants made the offer, but respondent refused the same for the simple reason that the offer was
made on May 30,1979, three (3) years after the execution of the mortgage on May 31, 1976. With its lapse of
time, respondent demanded obviously the payment of the accumulated substantial interest for three years, as
shown by his own computation in as own handwriting on a sheet of paper (Annex C, Complainants' Position
Paper, Folder No. 2).lwph1.t
In view of all the foregoing, the observation made by the Hearing Officer is worth quoting:

In the humble opinion of the undersigned the pivotal question with respect to this particular charge is whose
version is to be believed. Is it the version of the complainants or the version of the respondent.
In resolving this issue the possible motive on the part of the complainants in filing the present complaint against
the respondent must be carefully examined and considered. At the beginning there was a harmonious
relationship between the complainants and the respondent so much so that respondent was even engaged as
counsel of the complainants and it is but human nature that when respondent extended a loan to the
complainants the latter would be grateful to the former. However, in the case at bar, complainants filed a
complaint against the respondent in spite of the great disparity between the status of the complainants and the
respondent. Admittedly, respondent is in a better position financially, socially and intellectually. To the mind of
the undersigned, complainants were only compelled to file the above entitled complaint against the respondent
because they felt that they are so aggrieved of what the respondent has done to them. It is for this reason
therefore that the undersigned is inclined to believe the version of the complainants rather than of the
respondent. In addition thereto, the respondent as a lawyer could really see to it that the transaction between
the complainants and himself on papers appear legal and in order. Besides, there is ample evidence in the
records of its case that respondent is actually engaged in lending money at least in a limited way and that the
interest at the rate of ten per cent a month is but common among money lenders during the time of the
transactions in question'
Going now into the second charge, complainants alleged that respondent, who was their counsel (private
prosecutor) in Criminal Case No. 734, for estafa, against accused Reynaldo Pineda, compromised the case
with the accused without their consent and received the amount of P500.00 as advance payment for the
amicable settlement, without however, giving to the complainants the Id amount nor informing them of said
settlement and payment.
Again, respondent denies the allegation and claims that the amicable settlement was with the consent of
complainant wife Erlinda Dalman Melendre[z].
We are inclined to believe the version of the complainants.
It is admitted that complainants were not interested in putting the accused Reynaldo Pineda to jail but rather in
merely recovering their money of P2,000.00. At this stage, relationship between complainants and respondent
was not yet strained, and respondent, as counsel of the complainants in this case, knew that complainants were
merely interested in said recovery. Knowing this, respondent on his own volition talked to accused and tried to
settle the case amicably for P2,000.00. He accepted the amount of P500.00 as advance payment, being then
the only amount carried by the accused Pineda. A receipt was signed by both respondent and accused Pineda
(Annex M, p. 34, record). However, respondent did not inform complainants about this advance payment,
perhaps because he was still waiting for the completion of the payment of P2,000.00 before turning over the
whole amount to complainants.
At any rate, complainants saw accused Pineda give the abovementioned P500.00 to respondent, but they were
ashamed then to ask directly of respondent what the money was all about.
On June 27, 1979, barely a month after May 30, 1979, when the complainants had already lost their trust and
respect and/or confidence in respondent upon knowing what happened to their lot and, more so, upon
respondent's refusal to accept the Pl0,000.00 offered by complainants to redeem the same, Narciso
Melendre[z] saw the accused Pineda on his way home and confronted him on the P500.00 that had been given
to respondent. Accused then showed complainant Melendres the receipt (Annex M, Id.) showing that the
P500.00 was an advance payment for the supposed settlement/dismissal of the case filed by complainants
against him.
Sensing or feeling that respondent was fooling them, complainants then filed a motion before the court which
was trying the criminal case and relieved respondent as their counsel.
The Investigating Fiscal, who heard the case and saw the demeanor of the witnesses in testifying, had this to
say:
With respect to the second charge, the fact that respondent received P500.00 from Reynaldo Pineda is duly
established. Both the complainants and the respondent agreed that the said amount was given to the
respondent in connection with a criminal case wherein the complainants were the private offended parties: that
Reynaldo Pineda is the accused and that the respondent is the private prosecutor of the said case. The pivotal
issue in this particular charge is whether the respondent received the amount of P500.00 from Reynaldo Pineda
as an advance payment of an amicable settlement entered into by the complainants and the accused or the
respondent received said amount from the accused without the knowledge and consent of the complainants. If it
is true as alleged by the respondent that he only received it for and in behalf of the complainants as advance

payment of an amicable settlement why is it that the same was questioned by the complainants? Why is it that it
was not the complainants who signed the receipt for the said amount? How come that as soon as complainants
knew that the said amount was given to the respondent, the former filed a motion in court to relieve respondent
as their counsel on the ground that they have lost faith and confidence on him? If it is really true that
complainants have knowledge and have consented to this amicable settlement they should be grateful to the
efforts of their private prosecutor yet the fact is that they resented the same and went to the extent of
disqualifying the respondent as their private prosecutor. Reynaldo Pineda himself executed an affidavit belying
the claim of the respondent.'
Clearly, the complained acts as described and levelled against respondent Decena are contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals for which he may be suspended. The moral turpitude for which an attorney
may be disbarred may consist of misconduct in either his professional or non- professional attitude (Royong v.
Oblena, 7 SCRA 859). The complained acts of respondent imply something immoral in themselves, regardless
of the fact whether they are punishable by law. The doing of the act itself, and not its prohibition by statute, fixes
the moral turpitude (Bartos vs. U.S. Dist. Court for District of Nebraska C.C.C. Neb] 19 F [2d] 722).
A parting comment.
All the above is not to say that complainants themselves are faultless.
Complainants should likewise be blamed for trusting the respondent too much. They did not bother to keep a
copy of the documents they executed and considering that they admitted they did not understand the contents
of the documents, they did not bother to have them explained by another lawyer or by any knowledgeable
person in their locality. Likewise, for a period of three years, they did not bother to ask for respondent the status
of their lot and/or their obligation to him. Their complacency or apathy amounting almost to negligence
contributed to the expedient loss of their property thru the legal manuevers employed by respondent. Hence,
respondent's liability merits mitigation. (Emphasis supplied)
and made the following recommendation:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Reynerio I. Decena be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of five (5) years. 3
The Office of the Solicitor General, through Fiscals Almonte and Jamero, held several hearings during the investigation of the
present administrative case: City Fiscal Jorge T. Almonte was able to hold six (6) actual hearings out of twenty-five (25)
resettings 4 While only five (5) actual hearings, out of forty (40) resettings 5 were held under Provincial Fiscal Pedro S. Jamero. In
those hearings, the complainants presented a number of witnesses who, after their direct testimony, were cross-examined by the
counsel for respondent; complainant Narciso Melendrez also testified and was accordingly cross-examined. Considering the long
delay incurred in the investigation of the administrative case and having been pressed by the Solicitor General immediately to
complete the investigation, Fiscal Jamero posed a change of procedure, from trial type proceedings to requiring the parties to
submit their respective position papers. The complainants immediately filed their position paper which consisted of their separate
sworn statements, (that of Narciso Melendrez was in a question and answer form), their documentary exhibits and an affidavit of
one Jeorge G. Santos. Respondent also filed his counter-affidavit and affidavits of his witnesses, with several annexes in support
thereof In the healing of 28 October 1987, which had been set for the cross examination of the complainants and their witnesses by
respondent, the complainants refused to submit themselves to cross-examination on the ground that the order of the hearing officer
dated 17 December 1986 declaring respondent's right of cross examination as having been waived, had become final and
executory. Respondent questions now the evidentiary value of the complainants' position paper, not having passed through any
cross-examination and argues that the non-submission of the complainants and their witnesses to cross-examination constitutes a
denial of his right to due process.
We do not think respondent's right to confront the complainants and their witnesses against him has been violated, Respondent in
fact cross-examined complainant Narciso Melendrez and some of the witnesses which complainants had presented earlier. As
pointed out by the Solicitor General, the record of the proceedings shows that respondent had all the opportunity to cross-examine
the other witnesses of the complainants (those whose affidavits were attached to complainants' position paper) had he wanted to,
but had forfeited such opportunity by asking for numerous continuances which indicated a clear attempt on his part to delay the
investigation proceedings. Respondent had in fact requested a total of twenty three (23) resettings during the investigation
proceedings: he had eight (8) under Fiscal Almonte and fifteen (15) under Fiscal Jamero. There were also instances where
respondent asked for postponement and at the same time reset the hearing to a specific date of his choice on which neither he nor
as counsel would appear. That attitude of respondent eventually led the hearing officer to declare his (respondent's) right to crossexamine the complainants and their witnesses as having been waived in his order of 17 December 1986. Respondent can not now
claim that he had been deprived below of the opportunity to confront the complainants and their witnesses.
After carefully going through the record of the proceedings as well as the evidence presented by both parties, we agree with the
findings and conclusions of the Solicitor General.

The following acts of respondent:

1. making it appear on the 5 August 1975 real estate mortgage that the amount loaned to complainants was
P5,000.00 instead of P4,000.00;
2. exacting grossly unreasonable and usurious interest;
3. making it appear in the second real estate mortgage of 7 May 1976 that the loan extended to complainants
had escalated to P10,000.00;
4. failing to inform complainants of the import of the real mortgage documents and inducing them to sign those
documents with assurances that they were merely for purposes of "formality";
5. failing to demand or refraining from demanding payment from complainants before effecting extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgaged property; and
6. failing to inform or refraining from informing complainants that the real estate mortgage had already been
foreclosed and that complainants had a right to redeem the foreclosed property within a certain period of time.
constitute deception and dishonesty and conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. We agree with the Solicitor General that the
acts of respondent "imply something immoral in themselves regardless of whether they are punishable by law" and that these acts
constitute moral turpitude, being "contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals." The standard required from members of the
Bar is not, of course, satisfied by conduct which merely avoids collision with our criminal law. Even so, respondent's conduct, in fact,
may be penalizable under at least one penal statute the anti-usury law.
The second charge against respondent relates to acts done in his professional capacity, that is, done at a time when he was counsel
for the complainants in a criminal case for estafa against accused Reynaldo Pineda. There are two (2) aspects to this charge: the
first is that respondent Decena effected a compromise agreement concerning the civil liability of accused Reynaldo Pineda without
the consent and approval of the complainants; the second is that, having received the amount of P500.00 as an advance payment
on this "settlement," he failed to inform complainants of that advance payment and moreover, did not turn over the P500.00 to the
complainants. The facts show that respondent "settled" the estafa case amicably for P2,000.00 without the knowledge and consent
of complainants. Respondent informed complainants of the amicable "settlement" and of the P500.00 advance payment only after
petitioner Narciso Melendrez had confronted him about these matters. And respondent never did turn over to complainants the
P500.00. Respondent is presumed to be aware of the rule that lawyers cannot "without special authority, compromise their clients'
litigation or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim, but the full amount in cash. 6 Respondent's failure to turn over to
complainants the amount given by accused Pineda as partial "settlement" of the estafa case underscores his lack of honesty and
candor in dealing with his clients.
Generally, a lawyer should not be suspended or disbarred for misconduct committed in his personal or non-professional capacity.
Where however, misconduct outside his professional dealings becomes so patent and so gross as to demonstrate moral unfitness to
remain in the legal profession, the Court must suspend or strike out the lawyer's name from the Rollo of Attorneys. 7 The nature of
the office of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law, in the
exercise of privileges of members of the Bar. Gross misconduct on the part of a lawyer, although not related to the discharge of
professional duties as a member of the Bar, which puts his moral character in serious doubt, renders him unfit to continue in the
practice of law. 8
In the instant case, the exploitative deception exercised by respondent attorney upon the complainants in his private transactions
with them, and the exacting of unconscionable rates of interest, considered together with the acts of professional misconduct
committed by respondent attorney, compel this Court to the conviction that he has lost that good moral character which is
indispensable for continued membership in the Bar.
WHEREFORE, respondent Reynerio I. Decena is hereby DISBARRED and his name shall be stricken from the Rollo of Attorneys.
Let a copy of this Resolution be FURNISHED each to the Bar Confidant and spread on the personal records of respondent attorney,
and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 376

April 30, 1963

JOSEFINA ROYONG, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ARISTON OBLENA, respondent.
BARRERA, J.:
In a verified complaint filed with this Court on January 14, 1959, complainant Josefina Royong charged the respondent Ariston J.
Oblena, a member of the Philippine Bar, with rape allegedly committed on her person in the manner described therein. Upon
requirement of this Court, the respondent filed his answer denying all the allegations in the complaint and praying that he be not
disbarred. On February 3, 1959, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation.
On July 10, 1961, the Solicitor General submitted his report on the case with the recommendation that the respondent "be
permanently removed from his office lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys". The pertinent part of the report
reads as follows:
The complainant testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, Cecilia Angeles, her foster mother, left her alone in their
house and went down to the pig sty to feed the pigs. At about 1:00 p.m., while she" (complainant) was ironing clothes on
the second floor of the house the respondent entered and read a newspaper at her back. Suddenly he covered her mouth
with one hand and with the other hand dragged her to one of the bedrooms of the house and forced her to lie down on the
floor. She did not shout for help because he threatened her and her family with death. He next undressed as she lay on
the floor, then had sexual intercourse with her after he removed her panties and gave her hard blows on the thigh with his
fist to subdue her resistance. After the sexual intercourse, he warned her not to report him to her foster parents,
otherwise, he would kill her and all the members of her family. She resumed ironing clothes after he left until 5:00 o'clock
that afternoon when she joined her foster mother on the first floor of the house. As a result of the sexual intercourse she
became pregnant and gave birth to a baby on June 2, 1959 (pp. 4-8, 21, 23, 26, 27, t.s.n., hearing of Aug. 5, 1959).
She admitted that had she shouted for help she would have been heard by the neighbors that she did not report the
outrage to anyone because of the threat made by the respondent; that she still frequented the respondent's house after
August 5, 1959, sometimes when he was alone, ran errands for him, cooked his coffee, and received his mail for him.
Once, on November 14, 1958, when respondent was sick of influenza, she was left alone with him in his house while her
aunt Briccia Angeles left for Manila to buy medicine (pp. 11, 14-18, 24, t.s.n., hearing of August 5, 1959).
The respondent on the witness stand denied that he raped the complainant (p. 3, t.s.n., hearing of March 25 1960). He
testified that after lunch on August 5, 1958, he went to the Commission Of Civil Service to follow up his appointment as
technical assistant in the office of the mayor of Makati, Rizal, and read the record of the administrative case against
Buenaventura Perez (pp. 23, 24, 34, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960, Exhs. 1 and 2).
The respondent, however, admitted that he had illicit relations with the complainant from January, 1957 to December,
1958, when their clandestine affair was discovered by the complainant's foster parents, but to avoid criminal liability for

seduction, according to him, he limited himself to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue before she
completed her eighteenth birthday. They had their first sexual intercourse on May 11, 1958, after she had reached
eighteen, and the second one week later, on May 18. The last intercourse took place before Christmas in December,
1958. In all, they had sexual intercourse about fifty times, mostly in her house and sometimes in his house whenever they
had the opportunity. He intended to marry her when she could legally contract marriage without her foster parents'
intervention, 'in case occasion will permit ... because we cannot ask permission to marry, for her foster parents will object
and even my common-law wife, will object.' After the discovery of their relationship by the complainant's foster parents, he
confessed the affair to Briccia, explaining that he wanted to have a child, something she (Briccia) could not give him. (pp.
14-16, 19-25, t.s.n., hearing of March 25, 1960).
xxx

xxx

xxx

FINDINGS AND COMMENT

There is no controversy that the respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant. The complainant claims she
surrendered to him under circumstances of violence and intimidation, but the undersigned are convinced that the sexual
intercourse was performed not once but repeatedly and with her consent. From her behaviour before and after the alleged
rape, she appears to have been more a sweetheart than of the victim of an outrage involving her honor ....
But the foregoing observations notwithstanding, the undersigned cannot in conscience recommend respondent's
exoneration. The respondent tempted Briccia Angeles to live maritally with him not long after she and her husband parted,
and it is not improbable that the spouses never reconciled because of him. His own evidence shows that, tiring of her after
more than fifteen years of adulterous relationship with her and on the convenient excuse that she, Briccia Angeles, could
not bear a child, he seduced Josefina Andalis, then 17 or 18 years of age, resulting in her pregnancy and the birth of a
child, on June 2, 1959. The seduction was accomplished with grave abuse of confidence and by means of promises of
marriage which he knew he could not fulfill without grievous injury to the woman who forsook her husband so that he,
respondent, could have all of her. He also took advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina
Andalis, treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata' (uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her
mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then), it is not difficult to see why she could not resist him.
The evidence further shows that on July 22, 1954, the respondent filed a sworn petition dated May 22, 1954 alleging "that
he is a person of good moral character" (Par. 3) and praying that the Supreme Court permit him "to take the bar
examinations to be given on the first Saturday of August, 1954, or at any time as the Court may fix.."
But he was not then the person of good moral character he represented himself to be. From 1942 to the present, he has
continuously lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles whose husband is still alive, knowing that his concubine is a
married woman and that her marriage still subsists. This fact permanently disqualified him from taking the bar
examinations, and had it been known to the Supreme Court in 1954, he would not have been permitted to take the bar
examinations that year or thereafter, or to take his oath of office as a lawyer. As he was then permanently disqualified from
admission to the Philippine Bar by reason of his adulterous relations with a married woman, it is submitted that the same
misconduct should be sufficient ground for his permanent disbarment, unless we recognize a double standard of morality,
one for membership to the Philippine Bar and another for disbarment from the office of a lawyer.
xxx

xxx

xxx

RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, the undersigned respectfully recommend that after due hearing, respondent Ariston J. Oblena be permanently
removed from his office as a lawyer and his name be stricken from the roll of attorneys.
In view of his own findings as a result of his investigation, that even if respondent did not commit the alleged rape nevertheless he
was guilty of other misconduct, the Solicitor General formulated another complaint which he appended to his report, charging the
respondent of falsely and deliberately alleging in his application for admission to the bar that he is a person of good moral character;
of living adulterously with Briccia Angeles at the same time maintaining illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong, niece
of Briccia, thus rendering him unworthy of public confidence and unfit and unsafe to manage the legal business of others, and
praying that this Court render judgment ordering "the permanent removal of the respondent ... from his office as a lawyer and the
cancellation of his name from the roll of attorneys."
In his answer to this formal complaint, respondent alleged the special defense that "the complaint does not merit action", since the
causes of action in the said complaint are different and foreign from the original cause of action for rape and that "the complaint
lacks the necessary formalities called for in Sec. 1, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court." Respondent prayed that after due notice and
hearing for additional evidence, the complaint be dismissed.

On September 13, 1961, this Court designated the Court Investigators to receive the additional evidence. Accordingly the case was
set for hearing of which the parties were duly notified. On September 29, 1961, respondent asked leave to submit a memorandum
which was granted, and on October 9, 1961 the same was filed, alleging the following: 1) That the charge of rape has not been
proven; 2) That no act of seduction was committed by the respondent; 3) That no act of perjury or fraudulent concealment was
committed by the respondent when he filed his petition for admission to the bar; and 4) That the respondent is not morally unfit to be
a member of the bar.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court,
without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
At the hearing on November 16, 1961, respondent presented his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, who testified as follows:
... Respondent is her common-law husband (t.s.n. 23). She first met respondent on December 16, 1941 at Cavinti,
Laguna (t.s.n. 23). She and her sister Cecilia Angeles-Royong were evacuated to Cavinti by the Red Cross (t.s.n. 23).
She was already married (to Teodoro Arines) at the time (t.s.n. 24). She and Arines are from Iriga, Camarines Sur (t.s.n.
24). Respondent and one Mr. Flores registered them (t.s.n. 24) as evacuees. When Mr. Flores asked her about her status
she told him she was 'single' (t.s.n. 25). She and her sister, Cecilia, were then told to stay at respondent's house,
respondent courted her (t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her if she was married and she told him 'we will talk about that later
on' (t.s.n. 26). She told respondent she was married (to Arines) when she and respondent were already living together as
'husband and wife', in 1942( t.s.n. 26). Respondent asked her to marry him, when they were living as husband and wife
(t.s.n. 27). Her sister Cecilia left Cavinti 2 months after their arrival thereat, but she did not go with her because she and
respondent 'had already a good understanding'(sexual relations) [t.s.n. 27]. Later, she left Cavinti and went to her
hometown in Iriga, Camarines Sur, because respondent was already reluctant to live with her and he told her it was better
for her to go home to Iriga (t.s.n. 25). Arriving at Iriga, she met her legitimate husband (Arines), who told her he had
already a wife, named Conching Guevara (t.s.n. 28-29). She then went back to Cavinti (in 1943), with her father, and lived
with respondent (t.s.n. 29). Respondent eventually agreed that she live with him (t.s.n. 35); in fact, she is still presently
living with respondent (t.s.n. 35) [Report of Court Investigators, March 6, 1962, pp. 5-6]."
Thereafter, respondent requested permission to submit an affidavit at a later date, which request was also granted. The affidavit was
filed on December 16, 1961, the respondent averring, among others, the following:.
... That he never committed any act or crime of seduction against the complainant, because the latter was born on
February 19, 1940, and his first sexual intercourse with her took place on May 11, 1958, when she was already above 18
years of age; that he had been living with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, for almost 20 years, but from the time he
began courting her, he 'had no intention to alienate' her love for her husband, Arines, or to commit the crime of adultery;
that he courted Briccia on October 16, 1941, and was shortly thereafter accepted by her; that on February 21, 1942, he
found Briccia alone in his house, who told him that her sister, Cecilia, had gone to Pagsanjan with the other evacuees;
that from said date (February 21), to the present, he and Briccia had been living together as common-law husband and
wife; that 2 or 3 weeks thereafter, he asked Briccia to marry him, but she confessed she was already married, and maybe
her husband (Arines) was still living in Iriga; that he could not then drive Briccia away, because she was a stranger in the
place, nor could he urge her to join her sister Cecilia, as the latter had left Pagsanjan; that in 1943 she told Briccia to
separate from him and to return to Iriga, and urged her never to see him again; that contrary to his expectations, Briccia
returned to Cavinti 3 months thereafter; that Briccia strongly insisted to live with him again, telling him that she cannot
separate from him anymore, as he was ashamed; that Briccia's father told him that Briccia's husband (Arines) had agreed
not to molest them as in fact he (Arines) was already living with another woman; that he had 'no choice but to live with her'
(Briccia) again; that when he filed his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954, he 'did not have the slightest intention
to hide' from this Court the fact of his 'open cohabitation with a married woman' (Briccia Angeles); that he did not state
said fact in his petition, because he did not see in the form of the petition being used in 1954 that the fact must be stated;
and that since his birth, he thought and believed he was a man of good moral character, and it was only from the Solicitor
General that he first learned he was not so; and that he did not commit perjury or fraudulent concealment when he filed
his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954." (Report of the Court Investigators, pp. 6-8, March 6, 1962).
After hearing, the investigators submitted a report with the finding that: 1) Respondent used his knowledge of the law to take
advantage by having illicit relations with complainant, knowing as he did, that by committing immoral acts on her, he was free from
any criminal liability; and 2) Respondent committed gross immorality by continuously cohabiting with a married woman even after he
became a lawyer in 1955 to the present; and 3) That respondent falsified the truth as to his moral character in his petition to take the
1954 bar examinations, being then immorally (adulterously) in cohabitation with his common-law wife, Briccia Angeles, a married
woman. The investigators also recommended that the respondent be disbarred or alternatively, be suspended from the practice of
law for a period of one year.
Upon the submission of this report, a copy of which was served on respondent, through his counsel of record, the case was set for
hearing before the Court on April 30, 1962. Respondent asked leave to file his memorandum in lieu of oral argument. This was
granted and the corresponding memorandum was duly filed.

It is an admitted and uncontroverted fact that the respondent had sexual relations with the complainant several times, and as a
consequence she bore him a child on June 2, 1959; and that he likewise continuously cohabited with Briccia Angeles, in an
adulterous manner, from 1942 up to the present.
The main point in issue is thus limited illicit relations with the complainant Josefina Royong the and the open cohabitation with
Briccia Angeles, a married woman, are sufficient grounds to cause the respondent's disbarment.
It is argued by the respondent that he is not liable for disbarment notwithstanding his illicit relations with the complainant and his
open cohabitation with Briccia Angeles, a married woman, because he has not been convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude. It is true that the respondent has not been convicted of rape, seduction, or adultery on this count, and that the grounds
upon which the disbarment proceedings is based are not among those enumerated by Section 25, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court
for which a lawyer may be disbarred. But it has already been held that this enumeration is not exclusive and that the power of the
courts to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is inherent; it is a necessary incident to the proper administration of
justice; it may be exercised without any special statutory authority, and in all proper cases unless positively prohibited by statute;
and the power may be exercised in any manner that will give the party be disbarred a fair trial and a fair opportunity to be heard. (1
Francisco, Rules of Court [1958 ed.] 698, citing In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). Although it is a well settled rule that the legislature (or
the Supreme Court by virtue of its rule-making power) may provide that certain acts or conduct shall require disbarment, the
accepted doctrine is that statutes and rules merely regulate the power to disbar instead of creating it, and that such statutes (or
rules) do not restrict the general powers of the court over attorneys, who are its officers, and that they may be removed for other
than statutory grounds (7 C.J.S. 734). In the United States, where from our system of legal ethics is derived, "the continued
possession of a fair private and professional character or a good moral character is a requisite condition for the rightful continuance
in the practice of law for one who has been admitted, and its loss requires suspension or disbarment even though the statutes do
not specify that as a ground of disbarment". The moral turpitude for which an attorney may be disbarred may consist of misconduct
in either his professional or non-professional activities (5 Am. Jur. 417). The tendency of the decisions of this Court has been toward
the conclusion that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from office as a lawyer for other than statutory grounds.
Indeed, the rule is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer (In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567). In
the case at bar, the moral depravity of the respondent is most apparent. His pretension that before complainant completed her
eighteenth birthday, he refrained from having sexual intercourse with her, so as not to incur criminal liability, as he himself declared
and that he limited himself merely to kissing and embracing her and sucking her tongue, indicates a scheming mind, which
together with his knowledge of the law, he took advantage of, for his lurid purpose.
Moreover, his act becomes more despicable considering that the complainant was the niece of his common-law wife and that he
enjoyed a moral ascendancy over her who looked up to him as her uncle. As the Solicitor General observed: "He also took
advantage of his moral influence over her. From childhood, Josefina Andalis (Royong), treated him as an uncle and called him 'tata'
(uncle), undoubtedly because he is the paramour of a sister of her mother. Considering her age (she was 17 or 18 years old then),
her inexperience and his moral ascendency over her, it is not difficult to see why she could not resist him." Furthermore, the blunt
admission of his illicit relations with the complainant reveals the respondent to be a person who would suffer no moral compunction
for his acts if the same could be done without fear of criminal liability. He has, by these acts, proven himself to be devoid of the
moral integrity expected of a member of the bar.
The respondent's misconduct, although unrelated to his office, may constitute sufficient grounds for disbarment. This is a principle
we have followed since the ruling in In Re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567, where this Court quoted with approval the following portion of the
decision of the Supreme Court of Kansas in the case of Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan. 398, 404), to wit:.
The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well as between court and attorney,
and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that an attorney be a person of good
moral character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law,
it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held
that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct
not connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which
his license and the law confer upon him. (Emphasis supplied).
Respondent's conduct though unrelated to his office and in no way directly bearing on his profession, has nevertheless rendered
him unfit and unworthy of the privileges of a lawyer. We cannot give sanction to his acts. For us to do so would be as the Solicitor
General puts it recognizing "a double standard of morality, one for membership to the Philippine Bar, and another for disbarment
from the office of the lawyer." If we concede that respondent's adulterous relations and his simultaneous seduction of his paramour's
niece did not and do not disqualify him from continuing with his office of lawyer, this Court would in effect be requiring moral integrity
as an essential prerequisite for admission to the bar, only to later on tolerate and close its eyes to the moral depravity and character
degeneration of the members of the bar.
The decisions relied upon by the respondent in justifying his stand that even if he admittedly committed fornication, this is no ground
for disbarment, are not controlling. Fornication, if committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as have proven in
this case, as to shock common sense of decency, certainly may justify positive action by the Court in protecting the prestige of the
noble profession of the law. The reasons advanced by the respondent why he continued his adulterous relations with Briccia
Angeles, in that she helped him in some way finish his law studies, and that his "sense of propriety and Christian charity" did not
allow him to abandon her after his admission to the bar after almost 13 years of cohabitation, are hardly an excuse for his moral

dereliction. The means he employed, as he stated, in order to extricate himself from the predicament he found himself in, by
courting the complainant and maintaining sexual relations with her makes his conduct more revolting. An immoral act cannot justify
another immoral act. The noblest means he could have employed was to have married the complainant as he was then free to do
so. But to continue maintaining adulterous relations with a married woman and simultaneously maintaining promiscuous relations
with the latter's niece is moral perversion that can not be condoned. Respondent's conduct therefore renders him unfit and unworthy
for the privileges of the legal profession. As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, he
may be removed therefrom whenever he ceases to possess such character (7 C.J.S. 735).
The respondent further maintains that the Solicitor General exceeded his authority in filing the present complaint against him for
seduction, adultery and perjury, as it charges an offense or offenses different from those originally charged in the complaint of
January 14, 1959 for rape, and cites as authority Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 128 of the Rules of Court, which state:.
SEC. 4. Report of the Solicitor General. Based upon the evidence adduced at the hearing, if the Solicitor General finds
no sufficient ground to proceed against the respondent, he shall submit a report to the Supreme Court containing his
findings of fact and conclusion, whereupon the respondent shall be exonerated unless the court orders differently.
SEC. 5. Complaint of the Solicitor General. Answer of the respondent. If the Solicitor General finds sufficient ground to
proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint, accompanied with all the evidence introduced
in his investigation, with the Supreme Court, and the respondent shall be served by the clerk of the Supreme Court with a
copy of the complaint with direction to answer the same within fifteen days.
The contention is devoid of merit. Nothing in the language of the foregoing rules requires the Solicitor General to charge in his
complaint the same offense charged in the complaint originally filed by the complainant for disbarment. Precisely, the law provides
that should the Solicitor General find sufficient grounds to proceed against the respondent, he shall file the corresponding complaint,
accompanied by the evidence introduced in his investigation. The Solicitor General therefore is at liberty to file any case against the
respondent he may be justified by the evidence adduced during the investigation..
The respondent also maintains that he did not falsify his petition to take the bar examinations in 1954 since according to his own
opinion and estimation of himself at that time, he was a person of good moral character. This contention is clearly erroneous. One's
own approximation of himself is not a gauge to his moral character. Moral character is not a subjective term, but one which
corresponds to objective reality. Moral character is what a person really is, and not what he or other people think he is. As former
Chief Justice Moran observed: An applicant for license to practice law is required to show good moral character, or what he really is,
as distinguished from good reputation, or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the
public in the place where he is known. As has been said, ante the standard of personal and professional integrity which should be
applied to persons admitted to practice law is not satisfied by such conduct as merely enables them to escape the penalties of
criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty (3 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, [1957 ed.] 626,
citing In Re Weinstein, 42 P. [2d] 744 B.L.D., Cooper v. Greeley. 1 Den. [N.Y.] 3447; In Re Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399; and People v.
Macauley, 82 N.E. 612). Respondent, therefore, did not possess a good moral character at the time he applied for admission to the
bar. He lived an adulterous life with Briccia Angeles, and the fact that people who knew him seemed to have acquiesced to his
status, did not render him a person of good moral character. It is of no moment that his immoral state was discovered then or now
as he is clearly not fit to remain a member of the bar.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered striking the name of herein respondent, Ariston J. Oblena, from the roll of attorneys.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
March 3, 1923
In re suspension of VICENTE PELAEZ, attorney,
Juan Sumulong for respondent.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for the Government.
MALCOLM, J.:
Following the suspension of Attorney Vicente Pelaez by Judge of First Instance Wislizenus for a period of one year, the case has
been elevated to this court as provided by law, for full investigation of the facts involved, and for the rendition of the appropriate
order.
The respondent Vicente Pelaez is a member of the Philippine Bar, residing at Cebu, Cebu. On March 20, 1918, he was appointed
guardian of the minor Gracia Cabrera. As such guardian, he came into possession of certain property, including twenty shares of the
E. Michael & Co., Inc., and ten shares of the Philippine Engineering Co. While Pelaez was still the guardian of the minor, he
borrowed P2,800 from the Cebu branch of the Philippine National bank. Shortly thereafter, to guarantee the loan, Pelaez, without
the knowledge or consent of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, deposited with the Cebu branch of the Philippine National Bank the
shares of stock corresponding to the guardianship. On April 13, 1921, Pelaez executed a written agreement in favor of the Cebu
branch of the Philippine National Bank, pledging, without the authority of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the shares of stock in
question, to guarantee the payment of the loan above referred to.
These are the facts, taken principally from the memorandum filed in this court on behalf of the respondent, which caused the judge
of First Instance to suspend him from the legal profession. To quote counsel for the respondent, "the misconduct of which the
respondent in this case is guilty consist of having pledged the shares belonging to his ward, to guarantee the payment of his
personal debt."
Two questions present themselves for the resolution. The first question is this: Are the courts in the Philippines authorized to
suspend or disbar a lawyer for causes other than those enumerated in the statute? The second questions is this: May a lawyer be
suspended or disbarred for non-professional misconduct?
Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from this office as
lawyer by the Supreme Court for any of the causes therein enumerated. It will be noticed that our statute merely provides that
certain cause shall be deemed sufficient for the revocation or suspension of an attorney's license. It does not provide that these
shall constitute the only causes for disbarment, or that an attorney may not be disbarred or suspended for other reasons.
It is a well-settled rule that a statutory enumeration of the grounds of disbarment is not to be taken as a limitation of the general
power of the court in this respect. Even where the Legislature has specified the grounds for disbarment, the inherent power of the
court over its officer is not restricted.

The prior tendency of the decisions of this court has been toward the conclusion that a member of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office as lawyer for other than statutory grounds. Indeed, the statute is so phrased as to be broad enough to
cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer.
Passing now to the second point as a general rule, a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for
misconduct alleged to have been committed in his private capacity. But this is a general rule with many exceptions. The courts
sometimes stress the point that the attorney has shown, through misconduct outside of his professional dealings, a want of such
professional honesty as render him unworthy of public confidence, and an unfit and unsafe person to manage the legal business of
others. The reason why such a distinction can be drawn is because it is the court which admits an attorney to the bar, and the court
requires for such admission the possession of good moral character.
The principal authority for the respondent is the case of People ex rel. vs. Appleton ([1883], 105 Ill., 474). Here it was held, by a
divided court, that where property is conveyed to an attorney in trust, without his professional advice, and he mortgages the same,
for the purpose of raising a sum of money which he claims is due him from the cestui que trust, and the trustee afterwards sells the
property and appropriates the proceeds of the sale to his own use, the relation of client and attorney not being created by such trust,
his conduct, however censurable as an individual occupying the position of a trustee, is not such as to warrant the summary
disbarring of him on motion to the court to strike his name from the roll of attorneys, but the injured party must be left to his proper
remedy by suit. The Illinois court, however, admits that although the general rule is, that an attorney-at-law will not be disbarred for
misconduct not in his professional capacity, but as an individual, there are cases forming an exception where his misconduct in his
private capacity may be of so gross a character as to require his disbarment.
The Attorney-General relies principally on the case of In re Smith ([1906], 73 Kan., 743). In the opinion written by Mr. Chief Justice
Johnston, it was said:
It is next contended that some of the charges against Smith do not fall within the cause for disbarment named in the
statute. As will be observed, the statute does not provide that the only cause for which the license of an attorney may be
revoked or suspended are those specified in it, nor does it undertake to limit the common-law power of the courts to
protect themselves and the public by excluding those who are unfit to assist in the administration of the law. It merely
provides that certain causes shall be deemed sufficient for the revocation or suspension of an attorney's license. (Gen.
Stat., 1901, sec. 398.) In the early case of Peyton's Appeal (12 Kan., 398, 404), it was held that this statute is not an
enabling act, but that the power of the court to exclude unfit and unworthy members of the profession is inherent; that "it is
a necessary incident to the proper administration of justice; that it may be exercised without any special statutory
authority, and in all proper cases, unless positively prohibited by statute; and that it may be exercised in any manner that
will give the party to be disbarred a fair trial and a full opportunity to be heard.' If there is authority in the Legislature to
restrict the discretion of the courts as to what shall constitute causes for disbarment, or to limit the inherent power which
they have exercised from time immemorial, it should not be deemed to have done so unless its purpose is clearly
expressed. It is generally held that the enumeration of the grounds for disbarment in the statute is not to be taken as a
limitation on the general power of the court, but that attorneys may be removed for common-law causes when the
exercise of the privileges and functions of their high office is inimical to the due administration of justice . . . .
The nature of the office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well as between court and attorney,
and the statutory rule prescribing the qualifications of attorney, uniformly require that an attorney shall be a person of good
moral character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon the practice of the law,
it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held
that an attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct
not connected with his professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which
his license and the law confer upon him.
We are of the opinion that the doctrines announced by the Supreme Court of Kansas are sound.
The relation of guardian and ward requires of the guardian the continual maintenance of the utmost good faith in his dealings with
the estate of the ward. The bond and the oath of the guardian require him to manage the estate of the ward according to law for the
best interests of the ward, and faithfully to discharge his trust in relation thereto. Moreover, it has not escaped our attention that in
the petition by Vicente Pelaez, asking the court to appoint him the guardian of Gracia Cabrera, he begins his petition in this manner:
"El abogado que subscribe, nombrado tutor testamentario, etc." (The undersigned attorney, appointed testamentary guardian, etc.)
which indicates that petitioner might not have been named the guardian in this particular case had he not at the same time been a
lawyer.
Counsel argues that the misconduct for which the respondent has been suspended by the lower court is single and isolated. "It
forms," he says, "the only blot upon the escutcheon." We feel, however, that the trial court has been extremely considerate of the
respondent, and that were we sitting in first instance, we would probably incline to a more severe sentence.
Judgment affirmed. So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
A.M. No. 2385 March 8, 1989
JOSE TOLOSA, complainant,
vs.
ALFREDO CARGO, respondent.
RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:
On 7 April 1982, complainant Jose Tolosa filed with the Court an Affidavit- Complaint dated 7 March 1982 seeking the disbarment of
respondent District Citizens' Attorney Alfredo Cargo for immorality. Complainant claimed that respondent had been seeing his
(complainant's) wife Priscilla M. Tolosa in his house and elsewhere. Complainant further alleged that in June 1981, his wife left his
conjugal home and went to live with respondent at No. 45 Sisa Street, Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila and that since then
has been living with respondent at that address.
Complying with an order of this Court, respondent filed a "Comment and/or Answer" dated 13 May 1982 denying the allegations of
complainant. Respondent acknowledged that complainant's wife had been seeing him but that she bad done so in the course of
seeking advice from respondent (in view of the continuous cruelty and unwarranted marital accusations of affiant [complainant]
against her), much as complainant's mother-in-law had also frequently sought the advice of respondent and of his wife and mother
as to what to do about the" continuous quarrels between affiant and his wife and the beatings and physical injuries (sometimes less
serious) that the latter sustained from the former." (Rollo, p. 8).
Complainant filed a Reply dated 16 June 1982 to respondent's "Comment and/or Answer" and made a number of further allegations,
to wit:
(a) That complainant's wife was not the only mistress that respondent had taken;
(b) That respondent had paid for the hospital and medical bills of complainant's wife last
May 1981, and visited her at the hospital everyday;
(c) That he had several times pressed his wife to stop seeing respondent but that she had
refused to do so;
(d) That she had acquired new household and electrical appliances where she was living
although she had no means of livelihood; and

(e) That respondent was paying for his wife's house rent.
Respondent filed a Rejoinder on 19 July 1982, denying the further allegations of complainant, and stating that he (respondent) had
merely given complainant's wife the amount of P35.00 by way of financial assistance during her confinement in the hospital.
By a Resolution dated 29 July 1982, the Court referred this case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation. The Solicitor General's office held a number of hearings which took place from 21 October 1982 until 1986, at
which hearings complainant and respondent presented evidence both testimonial and documentary.
The Solicitor General summed up what complainant sought to establish in the following terms:
1. That respondent had been courting his wife, Priscilla (tsn, May 12, 1982, p. 9).
2. That he actually saw them together holding hands in l980 in Cubao and Sto. Domingo,
Quezon City (tsn, pp. 13-15, May 12, 1983).
3. That sometime in June, 1982, his wife left their conjugal house at No. 1 Lopez Jaena
Street, Galas, Quezon City, to live with respondent at No. 45 Sisa Street, Barrio Tenejeros,
Malabon, Metro Manila (tsn, pp. 16- 17, May 12, 1983).
4. That while Priscilla was staying there, she acquired household appliances which she
could not afford to buy as she has no source of income (tsn, pp. 10-11, Sept. 10, 1985,
Exh. 'M', N' and 'Q').
5. That when Priscilla was hospitalized in May, 1982, at the FEU Hospital, respondent paid
for her expenses and took care of her (tsn, pp. 18-20, June 15, 1983). In fact, an incident
between respondent and complainant took place in said hospital (tsn, pp. 5-8, Sept. 20,
1983, Exhibits 'C' and 'C-l').
6. That an incident which was subject of a complaint took place involving respondent and
complainant at No. 45 Sisa Street, Barrio Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila (tsn, pp. 8- 10,
July 29, 1983; Exh. 'B', 'B-l' and 'K').
7. That again in Quezon City, incidents involving respondent and complainant were brought
to the attention of the police (Exhibits 'F' and 'G').
8. That Complainant filed an administrative case for immorality against respondent with the
CLAO and that respondent was suspended for one year (Exhibits 'D' and 'E'). (Rollo, pp.
33-35).
Respondent's defenses were summarized by the Solicitor General in the following manner:
a) That Priscilla used to see respondent for advice regarding her difficult relationship with
complainant; that Priscilla left complainant because she suffered maltreatment, physical
injuries and public humiliation inflicted or caused by complainant;
b) That respondent was not courting Priscilla, nor lived with her at No. 45 Sisa St.,
Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila; that the owner of the house where Priscilla lived in
Malabon was a friend and former client whom respondent visited now and then;
c) That respondent only gave P35.00 to Priscilla in the FEU Hospital, as assistance in her
medical expenses; that he reprimanded complainant for lying on the bed of Priscilla in the
hospital which led to their being investigated by the security guards of the hospital;
d) That it is not true that he was with Priscilla holding hands with her in Cubao or Sto.
Domingo Church in 1980;
e) That Priscilla bought all the appliances in her apartment at 45 Sisa Street, Tenejeros,
Malabon, Metro Manila from her earnings;

f) That it is not true that he ran after complainant and tried to stab him at No. 1 Galas St.,
Quezon City; that said incident was between Priscilla's brother and complainant;
g) That it is also not true that he is always in 45 Sisa St., Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila
and/or he had a quarrel with complainant at 45 Sisa St., Malabon; that the quarrel was
between Priscilla's brother, Edgardo Miclat, and complainant; that respondent went there
only to intervene upon request of complainant's wife (see tsn, June 21, 1984). (Rollo, pp.
35-37).
The Solicitor General then submitted the following
FINDINGS
1. That complainant and Priscilla are spouses residing at No.1 Lopez Jaena St., Galas,
Quezon City.
2. That respondent's wife was their 'ninang' at their marriage, and they (complainant and
Priscilla) considered respondent also their 'ninong'.
3. That respondent and complainant are neighbors, their residences being one house away
from each other.
4. That respondent admitted that Priscilla used to see him for advice, because of her
differences with complainant.
5. That Priscilla, in fact, left their conjugal house and lived at No. 45 Sisa St., Barrio
Tenejeros, Malabon, Metro Manila; that the owner of the house where Priscilla lived in
Malabon is a friend and former client of respondent.
6. That Priscilla indeed acquired appliances while she was staying in Malabon.
7. That incidents involving respondent and complainant had indeed happened.
8. That Priscilla returned to her mother's house later in 1983 at No. 1 Lopez Jaena St.,
Galas, Quezon City; but complainant was staying two or three houses away in his mother's
house.
9. That complainant filed an administrative case for immorality against respondent in
CLAO, where respondent was found guilty and suspended for one year. (Rollo, pp. 37-39).
In effect, the Solicitor General found that complainant's charges of immorality had not been sustained by sufficient evidence. At the
same time, however, the Solicitor General found that the respondent had not been able to explain satisfactorily the following:
1. Respondent's failure to avoid seeing Priscilla, in spite of complainant's suspicion and/or
jealousy that he was having an affair with his wife.
2. Priscilla's being able to rent an apartment in Malabon whose owner is admittedly a friend
and former client of respondent.
3. Respondent's failure to avoid going to Malabon to visit his friend, in spite of his
differences with complainant.
4. Respondent's failure to avoid getting involved invarious incidents involving complainant
and Priscilla's brothers (Exhs. 'B', B-1', 'F', 'G', ['G-1'] and ['I'])
5. Respondent's interest in seeing Priscilla in the evening when she was confined in the
FEU Hospital, in spite again of his differences with complainant. (Rollo, pp. 39-40).
Thus, the Solicitor General concluded that respondent had failed "to properly deport himself by avoiding any possible action or
behavior which may be misinterpreted by complainant, thereby causing possible trouble in the complainant's family," which behavior

was "unbecoming of a lawyer and an officer of the court." (Rollo, p. 40). The Solicitor General recommended that respondent Atty.
Alfredo Cargo be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) months and be severely reprimanded.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the record does not contain sufficient evidence to show that respondent had indeed been
cohabiting with complainant's wife or was otherwise guilty of acts of immorality. For this very reason, we do not believe that the
penalty of suspension from the practice of law may be properly imposed upon respondent.
At the same time, the Court agrees that respondent should be reprimanded for failure to comply with the rigorous standards of
conduct appropriately required from the members of the Bar and officers of the court. As officers of the court, lawyers must not only
in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the
highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to
refrain from adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses 1 but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the
public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to REPRIMAND respondent attorney for conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar and an
officer of the court, and to WARN him that continuation of the same or similar conduct will be dealt with more severely in the future.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 7136

August 1, 2007

JOSELANO GUEVARRA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for Disbarment1 before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for "grossly immoral
conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."
In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:
He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to him as
her friend who was married to Marianne (sometimes spelled "Mary Ann") Tantoco with whom he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from January to March 2001, Irene had been receiving from
respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read "I love you," "I miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall."
Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early in the morning of the following day, and
sometimes did not go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents' house in
Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.
In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On the second occasion, he
confronted them following which Irene abandoned the conjugal house.
On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday celebration at which he saw her and respondent celebrating with
her family and friends. Out of embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue immediately. Following that incident, Irene
went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household
appliances.
Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the words "I Love You" on its face, which card when
unfolded contained a handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene, reading:
My everdearest Irene,

By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I will say a prayer for you that you may
find meaning in what you're about to do.
Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness but experience eternal pain? Is it only for
us to find a true love but then lose it again? Or is it because there's a bigger plan for the two of us?
I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything humanly possible to love you. And
today, as you make your vows . . . I make my own vow to YOU!
I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on you, to the time we spent together, up to
the final moments of your single life. But more importantly, I will love you until the life in me is gone and until we are
together again.
Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last me a lifetime. Always remember
though that in my heart, in my mind and in my soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS
. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!
BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE!
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M LIVING MY TWEETIE YOU'LL BE!" 2

Eternally yours,
NOLI

Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly parked at No. 71-B 11th Street, New Manila where, as he was to
later learn sometime in April 2001, Irene was already residing. He also learned still later that when his friends saw Irene on or about
January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert, she was pregnant.
In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the above-quoted letter was handwritten.
On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading:
14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP as they attended social
functions together. For instance, in or about the third week of September 2001, the couple attended the launch of the
"Wine All You Can" promotion of French wines, held at the Mega Strip of SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong City. Their
attendance was reported in Section B of the Manila Standard issue of 24 September 2001, on page 21. Respondent and
Irene were photographed together; their picture was captioned: "Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala." A photocopy of the
report is attached as Annex C.4 (Italics and emphasis in the original; CAPITALIZATION of the phrase "flaunting their
adulterous relationship" supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph 14
of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being that their relationship was low profile and known only to the immediate
members of their respective families, and that Respondent, as far as the general public was concerned, was still known
to be legally married to Mary Anne Tantoco.5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading:
15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's wife and his apparent abandoning or neglecting of his own
family, demonstrate his gross moral depravity, making him morally unfit to keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted his
aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a "piece of paper." Morally reprehensible was his writing the love letter to
complainant's bride on the very day of her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her "until we are together again," as
now they are.6 (Underscoring supplied),
respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:

5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint regarding

his adulterousrelationship and that his acts demonstrate gross moral depravity thereby making him unfit to keep his
membership in the bar, the reason being that Respondent's relationship with Irene was not under scandalous
circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his own family:
5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with [his wife] Mary Anne as in fact they still
occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is aware of Respondent's special friendship with Irene.
xxxx
5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of marriage by calling the institution of
marriage a mere piece of paper because his reference [in his above-quoted handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage
between Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to the formality of the marriage
contract.7 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:
18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the laws. The Constitution regards marriage
as an inviolable social institution and is the foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec. 2). 9
And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:
19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the laws he, as a lawyer, has been
sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit love for the complainant's wife, he mocked the institution of
marriage, betrayed his own family, broke up the complainant's marriage, commits adultery with his wife, and degrades
the legal profession.10 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint, the reason being that under the
circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect to his purely personal and low profile special relationship with Irene
is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as would be a ground for
disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.11(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,12 alleging that Irene gave birth to a girl and Irene named respondent in the
Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father. Complainant attached to the Reply, as Annex "A," a copy of a Certificate of Live
Birth13 bearing Irene's signature and naming respondent as the father of her daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born
on February 14, 2002 at St. Luke's Hospital.
Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS 14 dated January 10, 2003 from respondent in which he
denied having "personal knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth attached to the complainant's Reply." 15 Respondent moved to
dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a civil case filed by complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a
criminal complaint for adultery against respondent and Irene which was pending before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office.
During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's Complaint-Affidavit and Reply to Answer were adopted as his testimony
on direct examination.16 Respondent's counsel did not cross-examine complainant.17
After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a 12-page REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION18 dated October 26, 2004, found the charge against respondent sufficiently proven.
The Commissioner thus recommended19 that respondent be disbarred for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility reading:
Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (Underscoring supplied),
and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading:
Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether
in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Underscoring supplied)

The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and
accordingly dismissed the case for lack of merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006 briefly reading:
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06
CBD Case No. 02-936
Joselano C. Guevarra vs.
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala
a.k.a. Noli Eala
RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit.20 (Italics and
emphasis in the original)
Hence, the present petition21 of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule 13922 of the Rules of Court.
The petition is impressed with merit.
Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and dismissing
the case for lack of merit, gave no reason therefor as its above-quoted 33-word Resolution shows.
Respondent contends, in his Comment23 on the present petition of complainant, that there is no evidence against him. 24 The
contention fails. As the IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner observed:
While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. "C") and the news item published in the Manila
Standard (Exh. "D"), even taken together do not sufficiently prove that respondent is carrying on an adulterous
relationship with complainant's wife, there are other pieces of evidence on record which support the accusation of
complainant against respondent.
It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent through counsel made the following
statements to wit: "Respondent specifically denies having [ever] flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged
in paragraph [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being [that] their relationship was low profile and known only to
immediate members of their respective families . . . , and Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19
of the complaint, the reason being that under the circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect to his purely
personal and low profile relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly
immoral conduct . . ."
These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there is indeed a "special" relationship
between him and complainant's wife, Irene, [which] taken together with the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha
Louise Irene Moje (Annex "H-1") sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit relationship between respondent
and Irene which resulted in the birth of the child "Samantha". In the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha it should be
noted that complainant's wife Irene supplied the information that respondent was the father of the child. Given the
fact that the respondent admitted his special relationship with Irene there is no reason to believe that Irene would lie or
make any misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the child. It should be underscored that respondent has not
categorically denied that he is the father of Samantha Louise Irene Moje.25 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous relationship with Irene, "adultery" being defined
under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal Code as that "committed by any married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man
not her husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently
declared void."26 (Italics supplied) What respondent denies is havingflaunted such relationship, he maintaining that it was "low profile
and known only to the immediate members of their respective families."
In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant,
a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading responded to which are not squarely denied.
It was in effect an admission of the averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of
negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or at least an implication of some kind favorable to the adverse
party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with
qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or modified are literally denied, it has been
held that the qualifying circumstances alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.27 (Citations omitted;
emphasis and underscoring supplied)

A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal knowledge" of Irene's daughter Samantha Louise Irene Moje's
Certificate of Live Birth. In said certificate, Irene named respondent a "lawyer," 38 years old as the child's father. And the phrase
"NOT MARRIED" is entered on the desired information on "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A comparison of the signature
attributed to Irene in the certificate28 with her signature on the Marriage Certificate29 shows that they were affixed by one and the
same person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being the father of the
child.
Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical Center, in his January 29, 2003 Affidavit 30 which he identified at the
witness stand, declared that Irene gave the information in the Certificate of Live Birth that the child's father is "Jose Emmanuel
Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years old and a lawyer.31
Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been sufficiently proven by more than
clearly preponderant evidence that evidence adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other
party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other32 which is the quantum of evidence needed in an administrative case
against a lawyer.
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of
civil and criminal cases.
. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an
administrative case for disbarment or suspension, "clearly preponderant evidence" is all that is required.33 (Emphasis
supplied)
Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship with Irene was not, under Section 27 of Rule 138
of the Revised Rules of Court, reading:
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinatory agency in a
foreign jurisdiction where he has also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the
basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground
for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
under scandalous circumstances.34
The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or suspension uses the phrase "grossly immoral
conduct," not "under scandalous circumstances." Sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances is, following Article 334 of
the Revised Penal Code reading:
ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or, shall have sexual
intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other
place, shall be punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
x x x x,
an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse with a woman elsewhere.
"Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be characterized as
'grossly immoral conduct' depends on the surrounding circumstances."35 The case at bar involves a relationship between a married
lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the
following pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:36
On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital affair with complainant, albeit brief
and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree" in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.

xxxx
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations between two unmarriedadults is not
sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital
vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual relations outside
marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and
the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:38
The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did contract a bigamous marriage . . . It is
enough that the records of this administrative case substantiate the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as well as
the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, a
grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession.
This detestable behavior renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges
which his license confers upon him.39 (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to practice law which goes:
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I
recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution andobey the laws as well
as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the
same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary
obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Underscoring supplied)
Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the Constitution reading:
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this constitutional provision, obligates the husband
and the wife "to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support." 40
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from
engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a
lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law."
Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the case before the IBP Commissioner, filed a
Manifestation41 on March 22, 2005 informing the IBP-CBD that complainant's petition for nullity of his (complainant's) marriage to
Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery
complainant filed against respondent and Irene "based on the same set of facts alleged in the instant case," which was pending
review before the Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of complainant, had been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn.
The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainant's Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review reads:
Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the petition for review, we are inclined to grant
the same pursuant to Section 10 of Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which provides that "notwithstanding
the perfection of the appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the same at any time before it is finally resolved, in which case
the appealed resolution shall stand as though no appeal has been taken."42 (Emphasis supplied by complainant)
That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is immaterial. The acts complained of
took place before the marriage was declared null and void.43 As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage.44 In carrying on an extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was
null and void, and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And he
betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.
As for complainant's withdrawal of his petition for review before the DOJ, respondent glaringly omitted to state that before
complainant filed his December 23, 2003 Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ had already promulgated a Resolution
on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office of complainant's complaint for adultery. In
reversing the City Prosecutor's Resolution, DOJ Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:

Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the fair estimation of the Department, sufficiently
establish all the elements of the offense of adultery on the part of both respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje
conceded to complainant that she was going out on dates with respondent Eala, and this she did when complainant
confronted her about Eala's frequent phone calls and text messages to her. Complainant also personally witnessed Moje
and Eala having a rendezvous on two occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew Moje to be married
to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was married to another woman. Moreover, Moje's eventual abandonment of
their conjugal home, after complainant had once more confronted her about Eala, only served to confirm the illicit
relationship involving both respondents. This becomes all the more apparent by Moje's subsequent relocation in No. 71-B,
11thStreet, New Manila, Quezon City, which was a few blocks away from the church where she had exchange marital
vows with complainant.
It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially since Eala's vehicle and that of Moje's were
always seen there. Moje herself admits that she came to live in the said address whereas Eala asserts that that was
where he held office. The happenstance that it was in that said address that Eala and Moje had decided to hold office for
the firm that both had formed smacks too much of a coincidence. For one, the said address appears to be a residential
house, for that was where Moje stayed all throughout after her separation from complainant. It was both respondent's love
nest, to put short; their illicit affair that was carried out there bore fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at
the nearby hospital of St. Luke's Medical Center. What finally militates against the respondents is the indubitable fact that
in the certificate of birth of the girl, Moje furnished the information that Eala was the father. This speaks all too
eloquently of the unlawful and damning nature of the adulterous acts of the respondents. Complainant's supposed
illegal procurement of the birth certificate is most certainly beside the point for both respondents Eala and Moje have
not denied, in any categorical manner, that Eala is the father of the child Samantha Irene Louise Moje.45(Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to
grant complainant's motion to withdraw his petition for review. But even if respondent and Irene were to be acquitted of adultery after
trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in court, the same would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint.
Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,46 viz:
x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these [administrative] proceedings. The
standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of x x x
criminal law. Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from that which
courts assume in trying criminal case47 (Italics in the original),
this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,48 held:
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed
independently of civil and criminal cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28, 2006 by the Board of Governors of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation
of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the records of respondent in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
circulated to all courts.
This Decision takes effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 October 7, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as TanodbayanOmbudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondents.
G.R. No. 80578 October 7, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman ombudsman under the 1987
Constitution, respondent.

PER CURIAM:
The following are the subjects of this Resolution:
1) a Motion, dated 9 February 1988, to Cite in Contempt filed by petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar against public respondent
Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzalez, in connection with G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578.
and 2) a Resolution of this Court dated 2 May 1988 requiring respondent Hon. Raul Gonzalez to show cause why he should
not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for making certain public statements.
I
The pertinent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Zaldivar is one of several defendants in Criminal Cases Nos.
12159-12161 and 12163-12177 (for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) pending before the
Sandiganbayan. The Office of the Tanodbayan conducted the preliminary investigation and filed the criminal informations
in those cases (originally TBP Case No. 86-00778).
On 10 September 1987, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus (G.R. Nos.
79690-707) naming as respondents both the Sandiganbayan and Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez. Among other things, petitioner
assailed: (1) the 5 February 1987 Resolution 1 of the "Tanodbayan" recommending the filing of criminal informations
against petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in TBP Case No. 86-00778; and (2) the 1 September 1987 Resolution 2 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 1216312177 denying his Motion to Quash the criminal

informations filed in those cases by the "Tanodbayan." In this respect, petitioner alleged that respondent Gonzalez, as
Tanodbayan and under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, was no longer vested with power and authority
independently to investigate and to institute criminal cases for graft and corruption against public officials and employees,
and hence that the informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 12163-12177 were all null and void.
On 11 September 1987, this Court issued a Resolution, which read:
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan and Honorable Raul M.
Gonzalez, Claiming To Be and Acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution ).
Acting on the special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, with urgent motion for preliminary elimination injunction, the Court Resolved, without giving due
course to the petition, to require the respondents to COMMENT thereon, within ten (10) days from
notice.
The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, effective immediately and
continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering respondent Sandiganbayan to CEASE and
DESIST from hearing and trying Criminal Cases Nos. 12159 to 12161 and 12163 to 12177 insofar as
petitioner Enrique Zaldivar is concerned and from hearing and resolving the Special Prosecutor's
motion to suspend dated September 3, 1987.
The parties later filed their respective pleadings.
Petitioner Zaldivar filed with this Court a second Petition for certiorari and Prohibition (G.R. No. 80578) on 19 November
1987, initially naming only Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez as respondent. That Petition assailed the 24 September 1987
Resolution 3 of the "Tanodbayan" in TBP Case No. 87- 01304 recommending that additional criminal charges for graft and
corruption be filed against petitioner Zaldivar and five (5) other individuals. Once again, petitioner raised the argument of
the Tanodbayan's lack of authority under the 1987 Constitution to file such criminal cases and to investigate the same.
Petitioner also moved for the consolidation of that petition with G.R. No. 79690-707.
In a Resolution dated 24 November 1987, 4 this Court, without giving due course to the second petition: (1) required
respondent Gonzalez to submit a comment thereon: and (2) issued a temporary restraining order "ordering respondent
Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-01394 ... and particularly, from filing
the criminal information consequent thereof and from conducting preliminary investigation therein." In a separate
resolution of the same date, 5 G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578 were ordered consolidated by the Court.
In the meantime, however, on 20 November 1987 or four (4) days prior to issuance by this Court of a temporary restraining
order in G.R. No. 80578, the Office of the Tanodbayan instituted Criminal Case No. 12570 6 with the Sandiganbayan which
issued on 23 November 1987 an Order of Arrest 7 for petitioner Zaldivar and his co-accused in Criminal Case No. 12570.
Upon Motion 8 of petitioner Zaldivar, this Court issued the following Resolution on 8 December 1987:
G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan). The motion filed by
the Solicitor General for respondents for an extension of thirty (30) days from the expiration of the
original period within which to file comment on the petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for
a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order is GRANTED.
Acting on the manifestation with motion to treat the Sandiganbayan as party-respondent, the Court
Resolved to (a) Consider IMPLEADED the Sandiganbayan as party respondent; and (b) In pursuance of
and supplementing the Temporary Restraining Order of November 24, 1987 "ordering respondent Hon.
Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-01304 entitled,
"Commission on Audit vs. Gov. Enrique Zaldivar, et al." and particularly, from filing the criminal
information consequent thereof and from conducting preliminary investigation therein" ISSUE a
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this
Court, ordering respondents Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from
further acting in Criminal Case No. 12570, entitled, "People of the Philippines vs. Enrique M. Zaldivar, et
al." and from enforcing the order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan in said case.
The Solicitor General filed a Comment 9 on the petition in G.R. No. 80578, and we required the petitioner to submit a
Reply 10 thereto.
On 9 February 1988, petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a Motion to Cite in Contempt 11 directed at respondent
Gonzalez. The Motion cited as bases the acts of respondent Gonzalez in: (1) having caused the filing of the information
against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 12570 before the Sandiganbayan; and (2) issuing certain allegedly contemptuous
statements to the media in relation to the proceedings in G.R. No. 80578. In respect of the latter, petitioner annexed to his

Motion a photocopy of a news article, reproduced here in toto, which appeared in the 30 November 1987 issue of the
"Philippine Daily Globe:"
Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case
TANODBAYAN Justice Raul M. Gonzalez said yesterday the Supreme Court order stopping him from
investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar can aggravate the thought that
affluent persons "an prevent the progress of a trial."
What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that while rich and influential
persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his
petition to be given due course. Gonzalez told the Daily Globe in an exclusive interview.
Gonzalez said the high tribunal's order '"eightens the people's apprehension over the justice system in
this country, especially because the people have been thinking that only the small fly can get it while
big fishes go scot-free."
Gonzalez was reacting to an order issued by the tribunal last week after Zaldivar petitioned the court to
stop the Tanodbayan from investigating graft cases filed against him.
Zaldivar had charged that Gonzalez was biased in his investigations because the latter wanted to help
promote the political fortunes of a friend from Antique, lawyer Bonifacio Alentajan.
Acting on Zaldivar's petition, the high court stopped Gonzalez from investigating a graft charge against
the governor, and from instituting any complaint with the Sandiganbayan.
While President Aquino had been prodding me to prosecute graft cases even if they involve the high
and mighty, the Supreme Court had been restraining me. Gonzalez said.
In accordance with the President's order, Gonzalez said he had filed graft cases against two "very
powerful" officials of the Aquino government-Commissioner Quintin Doromal of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government and Secretary Jiamil I.M. Dianlan of the Office of Muslim Affairs and
Cultural Communities.
While I don't wish to discuss the merits of the Zaldivar petition before the Supreme Court, I am a little
bit disturbed that (the order) can aggravate the thinking of some people that affluent persons can
prevent the progress of a trial, he said.
He disclosed that he had a talk with the Chief Executive over the weekend and that while she
symphatizes with local officials who are charged in court during election time, 'She said that it might be
a disservice to the people and the voters who are entitled to know their candidates.
Gonzalez said that while some cases filed against local officials during election time could be mere
harassment suits, the Constitution makes it a right of every citizen to be informed of the character of
tile candidate, who should be subject to scrutiny. (Emphasis supplied)
Acting on petitioner's Motion to Cite in Contempt, the Court on 16 February 1988 required respondent Gonzalez "to
COMMENT on aforesaid Motion within ten (10) days from notice." 12 On 27 April 1988, the Court rendered its
Decision 13 (per curiam) in the Consolidated Petitions. The dispositive portion thereof read:
WHEREFORE, We hereby:
(1) GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by petitioner Zaldivar and hereby NULLIFY the criminal
informations filed against him in the Sandiganbayan; and
(2) ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez to cease and desist from conducting investigations and filing
criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise exercising the powers and functions of the
Ombudsman.
SO ORDERED.

A Motion for Reconsideration 14 was filed by respondent Gonzalez the next day, 28 April 1988. In his Motion, respondent
Gonzalez, after having argued the legal merits of his position, made the following statements totally unrelated to any legal
issue raised either in the Court's Decision or in his own Motion:
1. That he "ha(d) been approached twice by a leading member of the court ... and he was asked to 'go
slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him;' "
2. That he "was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the COA report on illegal
disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will embarass the Court;" and
3. That "(i)n several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over the phone by a leading
member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the cases against (two Members of the Court)."
Respondent Gonzalez also attached three (3) handwritten notes 15 which he claimed were sent by "some members of this
Honorable Court, interceeding for cases pending before this office (i.e., the Tanodbayan)." He either released his Motion
for Reconsideration with facsimiles of said notes to the press or repeated to the press the above extraneous statements:
the metropolitan papers for the next several days carried long reports on those statements and variations and
embellishments thereof On 2 May 1988, the Court issued the following Resolution in the Consolidated Petitions:
G.R. No. 79690-707 (Enrique Zaldivar vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al. G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A.
Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, etc).
1. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Gonzalez under date of April 28, 1988,
the Court Resolved to REQUIRE the petitioner to COMMENT thereon within ten (10) days from notice
hereof.
2. It appearing that respondent Raul M. Gonzalez has made public statements to the media which not
only deal with matters subjudice but also appear offensive to and disrespectful of the Court and its
individual members and calculated, directly or indirectly, to bring the Court into disrepute, discredit and
ridicule and to denigrate and degrade the administration of justice, the Court Resolved to require
respondent Gonzalez to explain in writing within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why he should not be
punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for making such public
statements reported in the media, among others, in the issues of the "Daily Inquirer," the "Journal," the
"Manila Times," the "Philippine Star," the "Manila Chronicle" the "Daily Globe" and the "Manila
Standard" of April 29 and 30, and May 1, 1988, to wit:
(a) That the Court resolution in question is merely "an offshoot of the position he had taken that the SC
Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or investigation by government prosecutors or motivated by a
desire to stop him 'from investigating cases against some of their proteges or friends;"
(b) That no less than six of the members of the Court "interceded for and on behalf of persons with
pending cases before the Tanodbayan," or sought "to pressure him to render decisions favorable to
their colleagues and friends;"
(c) That attempts were made to influence him to go slow on Zaldivar and not to be too hard on him and
to refrain from investigating the Commission on Audit report on illegal disbursements in the Supreme
Court because it will embarass the Court;
(d) That there were also attempts to cause the dismissal of cases against two Associate Justices; and
(e) That the Court had dismissed judges' without rhyme or reason' and disbarred lawyers 'without due
process.
3. It further appearing that three (3) affidavits relative to the purpose of and circumstances attendant
upon the notes written to said public respondent by three (3) members of the Court have since been
submitted to the Court and now form part of its official records, the Court further Resolved to require
the Clerk of Court to ATTACH to this Resolution copies of said sworn statements and the annexes
thereto appended, and to DIRECT respondent Gonzalez also to comment thereon within the same
period of ten (10) days.
4. It finally appearing that notice of the Resolution of February 16, 1988 addressed to respondent
Gonzalez was misdelivered and therefore not served on him, the Court Resolved to require the Clerk of

Court to CAUSE SERVICE of said Resolution on the respondent and to REQUIRE the latter to comply
therewith.
Respondent Gonzalez subsequently filed with this Court on 9 May 1988 an Omnibus Motion for Extension and
Inhibition 16 alleging, among other things: that the above quoted 2 May 1988 Resolution of the Court "appears to have
overturned that presumption [of innocence] against him:" and that "he gravely doubts whether that 'cold neutrality [of an
impartial judge] is still available to him" there being allegedly "at least 4 members of this Tribunal who will not be able to
sit in judgment with substantial sobriety and neutrality." Respondent Gonzalez closed out his pleading with a prayer that
the four (4) Members of the Court Identified and referred to there by him inhibit themselves in the deliberation and
resolution of the Motion to Cite in Contempt.
On 19 May 1988 17 after receipt of respondent's Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. 18 this Court in an extended per
curiam Resolution 19 denied the Motion and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. That denial was made "final and
immediately executory.
Respondent Gonzalez has since then filed the following pleadings of record:
1. Manifestation with Supplemental Motion to Inhibition

20

dated 23 May 1988;

2. Motion to Transfer Administrative Proceedures to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines 21dated 20 May
1988
3. Urgent Motion for Additional Extension of Time to File Explanation Ex Abundante Cautelam, 22 dated
26 May 1988;
4. Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion
(a) For Extension of Time
(b) For Inhibition and
(c) For Transfer of Administrative Proceedings to the IBP, Under Rule 139-B 23 dated 4 June 1988 (with
Annex "A;" 24 an anonymous letter dated 27 May 1988 from the alleged Concerned Employees of the
Supreme Court and addressed to respondent):
5. Ex-Parte Manifestation 25 dated 7 June 1988;
6. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration 26 1988; and
7. Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with Motion 27 member 1988.
In compliance with the 2 May 1988 Resolution of this Court quoted earlier, respondent Gonzalez submitted on 17 June
1988 an Answer with Explanation and Comment 28 offering respondent's legal arguments and defenses against the
contempt and disciplinary charges presently pending before this Court. Attached to that pleading as Annex "A" thereof
was respondent's own personal Explanation/Compliance 29 second explanation called "Compliance," 30 with annexes, was
also submitted by respondent on 22 July 1988.
II
We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers of the court and members of the Bar. The
Supreme Court, as regulator and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary disciplinary authority over attorneys. The
authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Court's constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law,
which includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself of
law. 31 Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over members of the
Bar is an inherent power incidental to the proper administration of justice and essential to an orderly discharge of judicial
functions. 32 Moreover, the Supreme Court has inherent power to punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of
justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court including lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner
with a case before the Court. 33 The power to punish for contempt is "necessary for its own protection against an improper
interference with the due administration of justice," "(it) is not dependent upon the complaint of any of the parties
litigant. 34

There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases like that before us here; the Court's
inherent power to discipline attorneys and the contempt power. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of
the Bar is broader than the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be committee both by lawyers and nonlawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently, where the contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes
professional misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. 35 Where the respondent is a
lawyer, however, the Supreme Court's disciplinary authority over lawyers may come into play whether or not the
misconduct with which the respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of court. The power to punish for contempt of
court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers. 36 The disciplinary authority of the
Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not
merely a professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility
of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or
impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of
disciplinary action against him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt power.
It is sometimes asserted that in the exercise of the power to punish for contempt or of the disciplinary authority of the
Court over members of the Bar, the Court is acting as offended party, prosecutor and arbiter at one and the same time.
Thus, in the present case, respondent Gonzalez first sought to get some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the
resolution of this case for alleged bias and prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect asked the whole Court to inhibit
itself from passing upon the issues involved in this proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due process from this Court, that the
Court has become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly. Respondent Gonzalez misconceives the nature of the
proceeding at bar as well as the function of the members of the Court in such proceeding.
Respondent's contention is scarcely an original one. In In Re Almacen, 37 then Associate (later Chief) Justice Fred Fruiz
Castro had occasion to deal with this contention in the following lucid manner:
xxx xxx xxx
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in the premises, that, as
Atty. Almacen would have it appear, the members of the Court are the 'complainants, prosecutors and
judges' all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion,
not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is notand does not involvea trial of an action or a
suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to
inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective,
and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed
the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a
member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the property and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the
Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof But
in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the
individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the
individual members act not as such individuals but only as a duly constituted court. The distinct
individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. So that, in a very real sense, if there be any
complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereofas
well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed
at grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men
unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the power
to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this
Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally
invested upon it. So that even if it be conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the
aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of the power
because public policy demands that they, acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call
for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in
one entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.

xxx xxx xxx. 38

It should not be necessary for the members of this Court expressly to disclaim any bias or prejudice against the
respondent that would prevent them from acting in accordance with the exacting requirements of their oaths of office. It
also appears to the Court that for all the members to inhibit themselves from sitting on this case is to abdicate the
responsibility with which the Constitution has burdened them. Reference of complaints against attorneys either to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the Supreme Court; such reference to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is certainly not an exclusive procedure under the terms of
Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, especially where the charge consists of acts done before the Supreme Court.
There is no need for further investigation of facts in the present case for it is not substantially disputed by respondent
Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain statements attributed to him. In any case, respondent has had the amplest
opportunity to present his defense; his defense is not that he did not make the statements ascribed to him but that those
statements give rise to no liability on his part, having been made in the exercise of his freedom of speech. The issues
which thus need to be resolved here are issues of law and of basic policy and the Court, not any other agency, is
compelled to resolve such issues.
III
It is necessary to become very explicit as to what respondent Gonzalez was saying in his statements set out above.
Respondent has not denied making the above statements; indeed, he acknowledges that the newspaper reports of the
statements attributed to him are substantially correct. 39
Respondent Gonzalez was in effect saying, firstly, that the Supreme Court deliberately rendered an erroneous or wrong
decision when it rendered its per curiam Decision dated 27 April 1988 in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. That decision
according to respondent Gonzalez, was issued as an act of retaliation by the Court against him for the position he had
taken "that the (Supreme Court) Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or investigation by government prosecutors,"
and in order to stop respondent from investigating against "some of (the) proteges or friends (of some Supreme Court
Justices)." The Court cannot, of course, and will not debate the correctness of its Decision of 27 April 1988 and of its
Resolution dated 19 May 1988 (denying respondent Gonzalez Motion for Reconsideration) in the consolidated Zaldivar
cases. Respondent Gonzalez, and anyone else for that matter, is free intellectually to accept or not to accept the reasoning
of the Court set out in its per curiam Decision and Resolution in the consolidated Zaldivar cases. This should not,
however, obscure the seriousness of the assault thus undertaken by respondent against the Court and the appalling
implications of such assault for the integrity of the system of administration of justice in our country. Respondent has said
that the Court rendered its Decision and Resolution without regard to the legal merits of the Zaldivar cases and had used
the judicial process to impose private punishment upon respondent for positions he had taken (unrelated to the Zaldivar
cases) in carrying out his duties. It is very difficult to imagine a more serious affront to, or a greater outrage upon, the
honour and dignity of this Court than this. Respondent's statement is also totally baseless. Respondent's statements were
made in complete disregard of the fact that his continuing authority to act as Tanodbayan or Ombudsman after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, had been questioned before this Court as early as 10 September 1987 in the Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus filed against him in these consolidated Petitions 40 that is, more than seven (7)
months before the Court rendered its Decision. Respondent also ignores the fact that one day later, this Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order effective immediately ordering the Sandiganbayan to cease and desist from hearing the
criminal cases filed against petitioner Zaldivar by respondent Gonzalez. Respondent also disregards the fact that on 24
November 1987, upon the filing of a second Petition for certiorari for Prohibition by Mr. Zaldivar, the Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order this time requiring the respondent to cease and desist from further acting in TBP Case No.
87-0934. Thus, the decision finally reached by this Court in April 1988 on the constitutional law issue pending before the
Court for the preceding eight (8) months, could scarcely have been invented as a reprisal simply against respondent.
A second charge that respondent Gonzalez hurled against members of the Supreme Court is that they have improperly Id
pressured" him to render decisions favorable to their "colleagues and friends," including dismissal of "cases" against two
(2) members of the Court. This particularly deplorable charge too is entirely baseless, as even a cursory examination of the
contents of the handwritten notes of three (3) members of this Court addressed to respondent (which respondent attached
to his Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of this Court of 27 April 1988 in the consolidated Petitions) win show. It is
clear, and respondent Gonzalez does not pretend otherwise, that the subject matters of the said notes had no relation at all
to the issues in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. This charge appears to have been made in order to try to impart some
substance (at least in the mind of respondent) to the first accusation made by respondent that the Court had deliberately
rendered a wrong decision to get even with respondent who had, with great fortitude, resisted "pressure" from some
members of the Court. Once again, in total effect, the statements made by respondent appear designed to cast the Court
into gross disrepute, and to cause among the general public scorn for and distrust in the Supreme Court and, more
generally, the judicial institutions of the Republic.
Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was preventing him from prosecuting "rich and powerful persons,"
that the Court was in effect discrimination between the rich and powerful on the one hand and the poor and defenseless
upon the other, and allowing "rich and powerful" accused persons to go "scot-free" while presumably allowing or
affirming the conviction of poor and small offenders. This accusation can only be regarded as calculated to present the
Court in an extremely bad light. It may be seen as intended to foment hatred against the Supreme Court; it is also
suggestive of the divisive tactics of revolutionary class war.

Respondent, finally, assailed the Court for having allegedly "dismissed judges 'without rhyme or reason' and disbarred
lawyers 'without due process.'" The Court notes that this last attack is not without relation to the other statements made
by respondent against the Court. The total picture that respondent clearly was trying to paint of the Court is that of an
"unjudicial" institution able and willing to render "clearly erroneous" decisions by way of reprisal against its critics, as a
body that acts arbitrarily and capriciously denying judges and lawyers due process of law. Once again, the purport of
respondent's attack against the Court as an institution unworthy of the people's faith and trust, is unmistakable. Had
respondent undertaken to examine the records 'of the two (2) judges and the attorney he later Identified in one of his
Explanations, he would have discovered that the respondents in those administrative cases had ample opportunity to
explain their side and submit evidence in support thereof. 41 He would have also found that there were both strong reasons
for and an insistent rhyme in the disciplinary measures there administered by the Court in the continuing effort to
strengthen the judiciary and upgrade the membership of the Bar. It is appropriate to recall in this connection that due
process as a constitutional precept does not, always and in all situations, require the trial-type proceeding, 42 that the
essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one may have
in support of one's defense. 43 "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also
through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no
denial of procedural due process. 44
As noted earlier, respondent Gonzalez was required by the Court to explain why he should not be punished for contempt
and/or subjected to administrative discipline for making the statements adverted to above. In his subsequent pleadings
where he asked the full Court to inhibit itself and to transfer the administrative proceedings to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, respondent made, among others, the following allegations:
(a) That the Members of the Court "should inhibit [themselves] in the contempt and administrative
charges against the respondent, in the light of the manifest prejudice and anger they hold against
respondent as shown in the language of the resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration;"
(b) That "the entire membership of the court has already lost that 'cold neutrality of an impartial judge'
[to] be able to allow fairness and due process in the contempt citation as well as in the possible
administrative charge;
(c) That "respondent honestly feels that this court as angry and prejudiced as it is, respondent has no
china man's chance to get fair hearing in the contempt and possible administrative charges;"
(d) That one must consider "the milieu before this Tribunal with, perhaps passion and obfuscation
running riot;"
(e) That respondent, "after having been castigated with such venom by the entire Court in its decision
denying the Motion for Reconsideration, does not have confidence in the impartiality of the entire
Court" and that he "funds it extremely difficult to believe that the members of this Tribunal can still act
with unbiased demeanor towards him;" and
(f) That "the Tribunal is determined to disbar [respondent] without due process" and that a specified
Member of the Court "has been tasked to be the ponente, or at least prepare the decision."
(Underscoring in the original)
Thus, instead of explaining or seeking to mitigate his statements earlier made, respondent sought to heap still more
opprobrium upon the Court, accusing it of being incapable of judging his acts and statements justly and according to law.
Once again, he paints this Court as a body not only capable of acting without regard to due process but indeed determined
so to act. A grand design to hold up this Court to public scorn and disrespect as an unworthy tribunal, one obfuscated by
passion and anger at respondent, emerges once more. It is very difficult for members of this Court to understand how
respondent Gonzalez could suppose that judges on the highest tribunal of the land would be ready and willing to violate
their most solemn oath of office merely to gratify any imagined private feelings aroused by respondent. The universe of
the Court revolves around the daily demands of law and justice and duty, not around respondent nor any other person or
group of persons.
Whether or not the statements made by respondent Gonzalez may reasonably be regarded by this Court as contumacious
or as warranting exercise of the disciplinary authority of this Court over members of the Bar, may best be assayed by
examining samples of the kinds of statements which have been held in our jurisdiction as constituting contempt or
otherwise warranting the exercise of the Court's authority.
1. In Montecillo v. Gica, 45 Atty. Quirico del Mar as counsel for Montecillo, who was accused in a slander case, moved to
reconsider a decision of the Court of Appeals in favor of the complainant with a veiled threat that he should interpose his
next appeal to the President of the Philippines. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he referred to the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on "knowingly rendering an unjust judgment," and "judgment rendered through negligence" and
implied that the Court of Appeals had allowed itself to be deceived. Atty. del Mar was held guilty of contempt of court by

the Court of Appeals. He then sued the three (3) justices of the Court of Appeals for damages before the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, seeking to hold them liable for their decision in the appealed slander case. This suit was terminated,
however, by compromise agreement after Atty. del Mar apologized to the Court of Appeals and the justices concerned and
agreed to pay moral damages to the justices. Atty. del Mar some time later filed with this Court a Petition for Review on
certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals in a slander case. This Court denied the Petition for Review. Atty. del Mar
then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and addressed a letter to the Clerk of the Supreme Court asking for the names of
the justices of this Court who had voted in favor of and those who had voted against his Motion for Reconsideration. After
his Motion for Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit, Atty. del Mar filed a Manifestation in this Court saying:
I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished me with certified true copies of
the last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court confirming the decision of the Court of Appeals in the
case entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would have filed against the Justices supporting
the same, civil and criminal suits as I did to the Justices of the Court of Appeals who, rewarding the
abhorent falsification committed by Mr. Gica, reversed for him the decisions of the City Court and the
Court of First Instance of Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a favorable judgment therein but for the
purpose of exposing to the people the corroding evils extant in our Government, so that they may well
know them and work for their extermination. (60 SCRA at 240;emphasis supplied)
Counsel was asked to explain why he should not be administratively dealt with for making the above statements. In his
additional explanation, Atty. del Mar made the following statements:
... Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the Government. It is this state of things
that convinced me that all human efforts to correct and/or reform the said evils will be fruitless and, as
stated in my manifestation to you, I have already decided to retire from a life of militancy to a life of
seclusion, leaving to God the filling up deficiencies. (60 SCRA at 242)
The Court suspended Atty. del Mar, "until further orders," from the practice of law saying:
... Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft, corruption and injustice allegedly
rampant in and outside of the government as justification for his contemptuous statements. In other
words, he already assumed by his own contemptuous utterances that because there is an alleged
existence of rampant corruption, graft and injustice in and out of the government, We, by Our act in
G.R. No. L-36800, are among the corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly committing injustice. We are
at a complete loss to follow respondent del Mar's logic ...
xxx xxx xxx
To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only to the duty of
maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey the
laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to the
courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We do remind them of
said duty to emphasize to their younger brethren its paramount importance. A lawyer must always
remember that he is an officer of the court exercising a high privilege and serving in the noble mission
of administering justice.
xxx xxx xxx.
As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A G.R. No. 46504-R was based on its
evaluation of the evidence on only one specific issue. We in turn denied in G.R. No. L-36800 the petition
for review on certiorari of the decision because We found no reason for disturbing the appellate court's
finding and conclusion. In both instances, both the Court of Appeals and this Court exercised judicial
discretion in a case under their respective jurisdiction. The intemperate and imprudent act of
respondent del Mar in resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts reconsider their respective stand
in the decision and the resolution that spelled disaster for his client cannot be anything but pure
contumely for aid tribunals.
It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Court of the land when on
the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of both
Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they
acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his
client.
xxx xxx xxx

... To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will choose to enter this
profession, We wish to point to this case as a reminder for them to imprint in their hearts and minds
that an attorney owes it to himself to respect the courts of justice and its officers as a fealty for the
stability of our democratic institutions. (60 SCRA at 242-247: emphasis supplied)
2. In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 46 four (4) members of the bar, acting as counsel for MacArthur
International Minerals Company were required by this Court to explain certain statements made in MacArthur's third
Motion for Reconsideration:
d. ...; and I the Supreme Court I has overlooked the applicable law due to the mis-representation and
obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel. (Last sentence, par. 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated
Sept. 10, 1968).
e. ... Never has any civilized democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick (referring to the "right to
reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous executives to cover up and excuse losses to the
public, a government agency or just plain fraud ... and it is thus difficult, in the light of our upbringing
and schooling, even under many of the incumbent justices, that the Honorable Supreme Court intends
to create a decision that in effect does precisely that in a most absolute manner. (Second sentence, par.
7, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968). (31 SCRA at 6)
They were also asked to explain the statements made in their Motion to Inhibit filed on 21 September 1968 asking
Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves from
considering, judging and resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof retroactive to January 11,
1967. The motion charges "It that the brother of the Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vicepresident of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous and illegal decision
dated January 31, 1968" and the ex-parte preliminary injunction rendered in the above-entitled case, the
latter in effect prejudging and predetermining this case even before the joining of an issue. As to the
Chief Justice, the motion states [t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion was
given a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President a short time before the
decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered in this case. The appointment referred to was as secretary of the
newly-created Board of Investments. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on judicial ethics, and
makes a number of side comments projecting what is claimed to be the patent wrongfulness of the July
31, 1968 decision. It enumerates "incidents" which, according to the motion, brought about respondent
MacArthur's belief that unjudicial prejudice had been caused it and that there was 'unjudicial favoritism'
in favor of 'petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored party directly benefited by the said
decision
(31 SCRA at 6-7)
Another attorney entered his appearance as new counsel for MacArthur and filed a fourth Motion for Reconsideration
without leave of court, which Motion contained the following paragraphs:
4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders of the Republic of the Philippines at the time of the
Oral Argument of the above-entitled casewhich condition is prohibited by the New Rules of Court
Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote: "Justices; who may take part... . Only those members present when
any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and adjudication ... ." This
requirement is especially significant in the present instance because the member who penned the
decision was the very member who was absent for approximately four months or more. This provision
also applies to the Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio Barredo.
xxx xxx xxx
6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons its quest for justice in
the Judiciary of the Philippine Government, it will inevitably either raise the graft and corruption of
Philippine Government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965, required by the Nickel Law to determine
the operator of the Surigao nickel deposits, to the World Court on grounds of deprivation of justice and
confiscation of property and/or to the United States Government, either its executive or judicial
branches or both, on the grounds of confiscation of respondent's proprietary vested rights by the
Philippine Government without either compensation or due process of law and invoking the
Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine Government,
including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars annually, until
restitution or compensation is made.
(31 SCRA at 10-11)

Finding their explanations unsatisfactory, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sanchez, held three (3) attorneys guilty
of contempt:
1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for reconsideration, we, indeed,
find language that is not to be expected of an officer of the courts. He pictures petitioners as 'vulturous
executives.' He speaks of this Court as a 'civilized, democratic tribunal,' but by innuendo would suggest
that it is not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31, 1968 as 'false, erroneous
and illegal' in a presumptuous manner. He then charges that the ex parte preliminary injunction we
issued in this case prejudiced and predetermined the case even before the joining of an issue. He
accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this Court for being interested in the decision of this case:
Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because his brother is the vice president of the favored party who
is the chief beneficiary of the decision, and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son was
appointed secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments, 'a significant appointment in the
Philippine Government by the President, a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was
rendered.' In this backdrop, he proceeds to state that 'it would seem that the principles thus established
[the moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority by the Honorable Supreme Court
should first apply to itself.' He puts forth the claim that lesser and further removed conditions have
been known to create favoritism, only to conclude that there is no reason for a belief that the conditions
obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro would be less likely to engender favoritism
and prejudice for or against a particular cause or party.' Implicit in this at least is that the Chief Justice
and Justice Castro are insensible to delicadeza, which could make their actuation suspect. He makes it
plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were not free from the appearance
of impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect their judgment. He points out
that courts must be above suspicion at all times like Ceasar's wife, warns that loss of confidence for the
Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to happen in our country, 'although the process
has already begun.
xxx xxx xxx
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact and in law. The slur
made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the
whole court. For, inhibition is also asked if, we repeated any other justices who have received favors or
benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or any members of any board-petitioner or their
agents or principals, including the president.' The absurdity of this posture is at once apparent. For one
thing, the justices of this Court are appointed by the President and in that sense may be considered to
have each received a favor from the President. Should these justices inhibit themselves every time a
case involving the Administration crops up? Such a thought may not certainly be entertained. The
consequence thereof would be to paralyze the machinery of this Court. We would in fact, be wreaking
havoc on the tripartite system of government operating in this country. Counsel is presumed to know
this. But why the unfounded charge? There is the not too-well concealed effort on the part of a losing
litigant's attorney to downgrade this Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern. Such disrespect
detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's
words are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief.
xxx xxx xxx
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. and yet, this
Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and degrades the administration
of justice. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules against improper conduct tending to
degrade the administration of justice is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt of court.
xxx xxx xxx
Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World Court and/or the United
States government. It must be remembered that respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying to
overturn the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so, unnecessary statements were in
ejected. More specifically, the motion announced that McArthur 'will inevitably ... raise the graft and
corruption of the Philippine government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965 ... to the World Court'
and would invoke 'the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the
Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amount to more than fifty million dollars
annually ...

This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the blind of this Court to decide the case' in its favor. A
notice of appeal to the World Court has even been embodied in Meads return. There is a gross
inconsistency between the appeal and the move to reconsider the decision. An appeal from a decision
presupposes that a party has already abandoned any move to reconsider that decision. And yet, it
would appear that the appeal to the World Court is being dangled as a threat to effect a change of the
decision of this Court. Such act has no aboveboard explanation.
xxx xxx xxx
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected where infraction of ethics meets
with complacency rather than punishment. The people should not be given cause to break faith with the
belief that a judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court of justice
should not yield to the assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is a standard of
behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause before a court of justice. (31 SCRA at 13-23;
emphasis supplied)
3. In In re Almacen, supra, Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, in protest against what he asserted was "a great injustice
committed against his client by the Supreme Court," filed a Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title. He alleged
that his client was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," and had become "one of the sacrificial victims
before the altar of hypocrisy," saying that "justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court [was)
not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." Atty. Almacen vowed to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum" so
that "the people may know of this silent injustice committed by this Court' and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and
injustices that were committed [may] never be repeated." Atty. Almacen released to the press the contents of his Petition
and on 26 September 1967, the "Manila Times" published statements attributed to him as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did not expose the
tribunal's 'unconstitutional and obnoxious' practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without
any reason.
Because of the tribunal's 'short-cut justice.' Almacen deplored, his client was condemned to pay
P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, 'where our Supreme Court is
composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of justice, who ignore without reason their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.'
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living, the present
members of the Supreme Court 'will become responsible to all cases brought to its attention without
discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit' or "denied
resolutions. (31 SCRA at 565566; emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen was required by this Court to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him. His
explanation, which in part read:
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolized in paintings that can be found in all courts and government
offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no
members of this Court has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding,
sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense, that inspire of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings
to give us reasons why our appeals has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer to
no human defect or ailment in the above statement. We only described the impersonal state of Things
and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court and for which
reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost
today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we

alone may decide as to when we must end our self- sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing
ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and
to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members of this Court, there is no choice, we
must uphold the latter. (31 SCRA at 572; emphasis supplied)
was found by the Court to be "undignified and cynical" and rejected. The Court indefinitely suspended Almacen from the
practice of law holding, through Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, that Almacen had exceeded the boundaries of "fair
criticism."
4. In Paragas V. Cruz, 47 Counsel, whose Petition for Ceriorari ran was dismissed by this Court, made the following
statements in his Motion for Reconsideration:
The petitioner respectfully prays for a reconsideration of the resolution of this Honorable Court dated
April 20,1966 on the ground that it constitutes a violation of Section 14 of Rule 11 2 of the Rules of
Court promulgated by this very Hon. Supreme Court, and on the further ground that it is likewise a
violation of the most important right in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the Philippines, a
culpable violation which is a ground for impeachment.
... The rule of law in a democracy should always be upheld and protected by all means, because the rule
of law creates and preserves peace and order and gives satisfaction and contentment to all
concerned. But when the laws and the rules are violated, the victims resort, sometimes, to armed force
and to the ways of the cavemen We do not want Verzosa and Reyes repeated again and again, killed in
the premises of the Supreme Court and in those of the City Hall of Manila. Educated people should keep
their temper under control at all times! But justice should be done to all concerned to perpetuate the
very life of Democracy on the face of the earth. (14 SCRA at 810; emphasis supplied)
The Court considered the above statements as derogatory to the dignity of the Court and required counsel to show cause
why administrative action should not be taken against him. Counsel later explained that he had merely related factual
events (i.e., the killing of Verzosa and Reyes) and to express his desire to avoid repetition of such acts. The Court, through
Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, found these explanations unsatisfactory and the above statements contumacious.
... The expressions contained in the motion for reconsideration ... are plainly contemptuous and
disrespectful, and reference to the recent killing of two employees is but a covert threat upon the
members of the Court. ... That such threats and disrespectful language contained in a pleading filed in
courts are constitutive of direct contempt has been repeatedly decided (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil.
724; People vs. Venturanza, 52 Off. Gaz. 769; Medina vs. Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; De Joya vs. Court of First
Instance of Rizal, 1, 9785, September 19,1956; Sison vs. Sandejas L- 9270, April 29,1959; Lualhati vs.
Albert, 57 Phil. 86). What makes the present case more deplorable is that the guilty party is a member of
the bar; for, as remarked in People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 580Counsel should conduct himself towards the judges who try his cases with that courtesy all have a
right to expect. As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration
of justice.
It in light and plausible that an attorney in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do so
with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so, for him to
exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which
the dignity of the courts require. (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, [In re Francisco], 61 Phil. 729)' (1 4 SCRA at
811-812; emphasis supplied)
5. In In re Sotto, 48 a newspaper reporter, Mr. Angel Parazo, invoking the Press Freedom Law, refused to divulge the source
of the news item which carried his by-line and was sent to jail for so refusing. Atty. Vicente Sotto, a senator and author of
said law, caused the publication of the following item in a number of daily newspapers in Manila:
As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53), interpreted by the Supreme Court in the
case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his
refusal to divulge the source of a news published in his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal has
not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency
or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members. In the wake of so many blunders and injustices
deliberately committed during these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an end to so much
evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court. To this effect, I announce that one of the first
measures, which I will introduce in the coming congressional sessions, will have as its object the
complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, the Supreme Court of today
constitutes a constant peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even

the deaf may hear: The Supreme Court of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of
those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists
who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary. (82 Phil. at 597-598; emphasis supplied)
In finding Atty. Sotto in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the
constitutional guarantee of free speech and in requiring him to show cause why he should not be
disbarred, the Court, through Mr. Justice Feria, saidTo hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately so many
blunders and injustices that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the
law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was
rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the
coincidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently
to lower and degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines
is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for
their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their
confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot
expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their hands, and disorder and
perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente
Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he
owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which
without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation. (82 Phil. at 601-602; emphasis
supplied)
6. In Salcedo v. Hernandez, 49 Atty. Vicente Francisco filed a Motion before the Supreme Court which contained the
following paragraph (in translation):
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this court, denying our
motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the
petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality of
Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within our power in order that this error may be
corrected by the very court which has committed it, because we should not want that some citizen,
particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce,
as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the victim, and
because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court and of each and every
member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that
erroneous decisions like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will necessarily
consider unjust, increase the proselytes of sakdalism and make the public lose confidence in the
administration of justice. (61 Phil. at 726; emphasis supplied)
When required by the Court to show cause why he should not be declared in contempt, Atty. Francisco responded by
saying that it was not contempt to tell the truth. Examining the statements made above, the Court held:
... [they] disclose, in the opinion of this court, an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court
and an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than
having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights of the parties, and of the untoward
consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente
J. Francisco's client, because the acts of outraging and mocking from which the words 'outrage' and
mockery' used therein are derived, means exactly the same as all these, according to the Dictionary of
the Spanish Language published by the Spanish Academy (Dictionary of the Spanish Language, 15th
ed., pages 132-513).
The insertion of the phrases in question in said motion of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, for many years
a member of the Philippine bar, was neither justified nor in the least necessary, because in order to call
the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points relied upon in his argument and to
emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in his said motion were sufficient and the
phrases in question were superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it is highly improper
and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has done, because
both means are annoying and good practice can ever sanction them by reason of their natural tendency
to disturb and hinder the free exercise of a serene and impartial judgment, particularly in judicial
matters, in the consideration of questions submitted for resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion contains a more or
less veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated therein, after the author shows the course which
the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that they will resort to the press for the

purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage of which his client has been the victim;
and because he states in a threatening manner with the intention of predisposing the mind of the reader
against the court, thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices against it in order to make it odious in the
public eye, that decisions of the nature of that referred to in his motion to promote distrust in the
administration of justice and increase the proselytes of sakdalism a movement with seditious and
revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is of public knowledge, occurred in this country a
few days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt of the dignity of the court and disrespect of
the authority thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the court
is so devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error
notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with good reasons, that it has acted erroneously.
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any attorney, is in
duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not only because it had
conferred upon him the high privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he
now is: a priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St., Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing, he
neither creates nor promotes distrust in the administration of justice, and prevents anybody from
harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus
undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those who are
aggrieved turn for protection and relief (61 Phil. at 727-728; emphasis supplied)
It should not be supposed that the six (6) cases above discussed exhaust our case law on this matter. In the following
cases, among others, the Supreme Court punished for contempt or administratively disciplined lawyers who had made
statements not very different from those made in the cases discussed above:
1) In re Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987);
2) Borromeo v. Court of appeals, 87 SCRA 67 (1978);
3) Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441 (1967);
4) Malolos v. Reyes, 1 SCRA 559 (1961);
5) De Joya, et al. v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, 99 Phil. 907 (1956);
6) People v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil. 211 (1956);
7) In re Suzano A. Velasquez, per curiam Resolution (unreported), Promulgated 29 April 1955;
8) Cornejo v. Tan, 85 Phil. 772 (1950);
9) People v. Carillon, 77 Phil. 572 (1946);
10) Intestate Estate of Rosario 0lba; Contempt Proceedings against Antonio Franco, 67 Phil. 312 (1939);
and
11) Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 (1932).
Considering the kinds of statements of lawyers discussed above which the Court has in the past penalized as
contemptuous or as warranting application of disciplinary sanctions, this Court is compelled to hold that the statements
here made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the exercise of the disciplinary authority of the
Supreme Court. Respondent's statements, especially the charge that the Court deliberately rendered an erroneous and
unjust decision in the Consolidated Petitions, necessarily implying that the justices of this Court betrayed their oath of
office, merely to wreak vengeance upon the respondent here, constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Court.
Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system of
administration of justice in the country. That respondent's baseless charges have had some impact outside the internal
world of subjective intent, is clearly demonstrated by the filing of a complaint for impeachment of thirteen (13) out of the
then fourteen (14) incumbent members of this Court, a complaint the centerpiece of which is a repetition of the appalling
claim of respondent that this Court deliberately rendered a wrong decision as an act of reprisal against the respondent.
IV

The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was merely exercising his constitutional right of free speech. He
also invokes the related doctrines of qualified privileged communications and fair criticism in the public interest.
Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny him that right, least
of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional
freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with
the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the
integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the
integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be
secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other
words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which are accepted by the general community. As Mr.
Justice Frankfurter put it:
... A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent judiciary to a free
press. Neither has primacy over the other; both are indispensable to a free society. The freedom of the
press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary through which that freedom may, if necessary be
vindicated. And one of the potent means for assuring judges their independence is a free press. 50
Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the following terms:
The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This constitutional right must be
protected in its fullest extent. The Court has heretofore given evidence of its tolerant regard for charges
under the Libel Law which come dangerously close to its violation. We shall continue in this chosen
path. The liberty of the citizens must be preserved in all of its completeness. But license or abuse of
liberty of the press and of the citizens should not be confused with liberty ill its true sense. As
important as is the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the
citizens is the maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary cannot be
had if persons are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court adopted for good purposes, and if such
persons are to be permitted by subterranean means to diffuse inaccurate accounts of confidential
proceedings to the embarassment of the parties and the courts. 51 (Emphasis supplied)
Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest in the capacity of the Court effectively to prevent and control
professional misconduct on the part of lawyers who are, first and foremost, indispensable participants in the task of
rendering justice to every man. Some courts have held, persuasively it appears to us, that a lawyer's right of free
expression may have to be more limited than that of a layman. 52
It is well to recall that respondent Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special
Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to this Court as the embodiment and the repository
of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility of the respondent "to uphold the dignity and
authority of this Court' and "not to promote distrust in the administration of justice 53 is heavier than that of a private
practicing lawyer.
Respondent Gonzalez claims to be and he is, of course, entitled to criticize the rulings of this Court, to point out where he
feels the Court may have lapsed into error. Once more, however, the right of criticism is not unlimited. Its limits were
marked out by Mr. Justice Castro in In re Almacen which are worth noting
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bonafide and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse
and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary
action.
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even those gifted with
superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
xxx xxx xxx 54
(Emphasis supplied)
The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that respondent has criticized the Court; it is addressed rather to the
nature of that criticism or comment and the manner in which it was carried out.

Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the Court. The subjectivities of the respondent are
irrelevant so far as characterization of his conduct or misconduct is concerned. He will not, however, be allowed to
disclaim the natural and plain import of his words and acts. 55 It is upon the other hand, not irrelevant to point out that
respondent offered no apology in his two (2) explanations and exhibited no repentance. 56
Respondent Gonzalez also defends himself contending that no injury to the judiciary has been shown, and points to the
fact that this Court denied his Motion for Reconsideration of its per curiam Decision of 27 April 1988 and reiterated and
amplified that Decision in its Resolution of 19 May 1988. In the first place, proof of actual damage sustained by a court or
the judiciary in general is not essential for a finding of contempt or for the application of the disciplinary authority of the
Court. Insofar as the Consolidated Petitions are concerned, this Court after careful review of the bases of its 27 April 1988
Decision, denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration thereof and rejected the public pressures brought to bear upon
this Court by the respondent through his much publicized acts and statements for which he is here being required to
account. Obstructing the free and undisturbed resolution of a particular case is not the only species of injury that the
Court has a right and a duty to prevent and redress. What is at stake in cases of this kind is the integrity of the judicial
institutions of the country in general and of the Supreme Court in particular. Damage to such institutions might not be
quantifiable at a given moment in time but damage there will surely be if acts like those of respondent Gonzalez are not
effectively stopped and countered. The level of trust and confidence of the general public in the courts, including the court
of last resort, is not easily measured; but few will dispute that a high level of such trust and confidence is critical for the
stability of democratic government.
Respondent Gonzalez lastly suggests that punishment for contempt is not the proper remedy in this case and suggests
that the members of this Court have recourse to libel suits against him. While the remedy of libel suits by individual
members of this Court may well be available against respondent Gonzalez, such is by no means an exclusive remedy.
Moreover, where, as in the instant case, it is not only the individual members of the Court but the Court itself as an
institution that has been falsely attacked, libel suits cannot be an adequate remedy. 57
The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct
as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez from the practice of law indefinitely and until
further orders from this Court, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman, the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor
General and the Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654,
ANTONIO H. CALERO,
vs.
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
RESOLUTION

CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on September 25, 1967, in protest
against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his
own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply
aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same
breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by
the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client
"in the people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes,
wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney and
counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith
and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on September 26, 1967, the Manila
Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the tribunal's "unconstitutional and
obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without any reason.
Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was condemned to pay P120,000,
without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx

There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where our Supreme Court is
composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reason their own applicable
decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living, the present members of
the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will
purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of [sic] justice, who ignore their
own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of September 28, 1967. In connection therewith,
Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself," and that
"his charge is one of the constitutional bases for impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H. Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen
was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing, rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty.
Almacen received a copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the
adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on
July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To
prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a
second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card. This second motion for reconsideration,
however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier,
that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal
and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., L16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee praying that the appeal be
dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it
hereby dismisses, the appeal, for the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-113,
printed record on appeal) does not contain a notice of time and place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a
useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June
24, 1965), which did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was
perfected out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not decisive. At the same time he filed
a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the
Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of
Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the supplement thereto of the same date
filed by defendant- appellant, praying for reconsideration of the resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the
appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case and that of Manila Surety and
Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L- 16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by this Court in its
resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant further states that in the latest case, Republic vs. Venturanza, L-20417,
May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court concerning the question raised by appellant's motion, the ruling is
contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to dismiss the appeal, based on
grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on November 26, 1962, which was much earlier than the date
of promulgation of the decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, the resolution in
the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the Supreme Court issued it "without prejudice to appellee's
restoring the point in the brief." In the main decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court

passed upon the issue sub silencio presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to the resolution of
November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the Manila Surety and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs.
Venturanza is no authority on the matter in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by minute resolution denied the appeal.
Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for
reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was ordered expunged from the records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of
Title," already adverted to a pleading that is interspersed from beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that
is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his petition until he shall have actually
surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to make good his proffer. No word came from him. So he was reminded to
turn over his certificate, which he had earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. To said
reminder he manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said
case is now final and executory;" that this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive or
negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross misconduct, this Court on November
17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the
charges contained in the November 17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action
should be taken against him ... in an open and public hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to
state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and
incident submitted for decision." To this resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he
preferred to be heard and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could observe his
sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no time to hear him in person."
To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral
argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from being contrite Atty. Almacen
unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew:
"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you judge, you shall be
judged, and with what measure you measure, it shall be measured to you. But why dost
thou see the speck in thy brother's eye, and yet dost not consider the beam in thy own
eye? Or how can thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast out the speck from thy eye"; and
behold, there is a beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy
own eye, and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from thy brother's eyes."
"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to them: for this is the
Law and the Prophets."
xxx xxx xxx
Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his petition. On the contrary, he
refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with his lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court. But he vigorously DENY under oath that the underscored statements contained in the
CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory to the individual members of the
Court; that they tend to bring the entire Court, without justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct
unbecoming of a member of the noble profession of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has been asserted with NO MALICE
BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the highest interest of justice that in the particular
case of our client, the members have shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE, our pleadings will
bear us on this matter, ...

xxx xxx xxx

To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding,
sympathy and above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE, what did we get from this COURT? One word,
DENIED, with all its hardiness and insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court towards our pleas and
prayers, in simple word, it is plain callousness towards our particular case.
xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that notwithstanding the violation of the
Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of natural things, is now in the attempt to
inflict punishment on your respondent for acts he said in good faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY, GENEROSITY and
FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any semblance of reason, NEVER. Now
that your respondent is given the opportunity to face you, he reiterates the same statement with emphasis, DID
YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the Philippines today, that even our own President, said: "the story is
current, though nebulous ,is to its truth, it is still being circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not what
it is used to be before the war. There are those who have told me frankly and brutally that justice is a
commodity, a marketable commodity in the Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We attack the decision of this
Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. We were compelled by force of necessity. We were angry but
we waited for the finality of the decision. We waited until this Court has performed its duties. We never
interfered nor obstruct in the performance of their duties. But in the end, after seeing that the Constitution has
placed finality on your judgment against our client and sensing that you have not performed your duties with
"circumspection, carefulness, confidence and wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his God given right to
speak the truth and his Constitutional right of free speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we sought to be prevented is
impliedly shared by our President. ... .
xxx xxx xxx
What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us. Recalling Madam Roland's famous
apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what
technicalities are committed in thy name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in thy name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but who would correct such abuses
considering that yours is a court of last resort. A strong public opinion must be generated so as to curtail these
abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all courts and government offices. We
have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this
Court has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding sympathy and for justice; dumb in
the sense, that inspite of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us reasons why our appeal has
been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in the above
statement. We only describe the. impersonal state of things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court and for which reason we
offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be
regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide as to

when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing ourselves to have faith and
confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be
condemned by the members of this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a studied disrespect to this Court, let us
examine the grain of his grievances.
He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the criticisms 2 expressed against this
Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We have been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the law,
and to spell out the reasons for denial. We have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we know the abject frustration of a
lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to have his efforts
rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most petitions rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought
never to have been lodged at all.3 The rest do exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and large,
this Court has been generous in giving due course to petitions for certiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we reject, we would be unable to carry out
effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the
U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate
importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland
vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition different reasons may read
different justices to the same result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons for denying petitions
for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that the Court indicate its reasons for denial. Practical
considerations preclude. In order that the Court may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties, Congress
has placed the control of the Court's business, in effect, within the Court's discretion. During the last three terms
the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For the same three terms the Court
denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions calling for discretionary review. If the Court is to do its work it
would not be feasible to give reasons, however brief, for refusing to take these cases. The tune that would be
required is prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated different reasons not infrequently move
different members of the Court in concluding that a particular case at a particular time makes review
undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this Court, through the then
Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this matter. There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of
merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:
In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised before; and we held that these
"resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the petition
for review should not be entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and even
ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be remembered that a petition to review the
decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need
to fully explain the court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of
Appeals' opinion.
By the way, this mode of disposal has as intended helped the Court in alleviating its heavy docket; it was
patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein petitions for review are often merely ordered
"dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of Appeals have had the benefit of
appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting them.
For it is axiomatic that the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to give every
losing party another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.A review is not a matter of right but of sound judicial
discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor. The following, while
neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which will be
considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore determined by the
Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of
the Supreme Court;

(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings,
or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call for the exercise of the power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of the pleadings. and records, that the
Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of this
Court. Far from straying away from the "accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by
this Court in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its supervisory power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew or ought to have known that for a
motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the
adverse party (which he did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). This
rule was unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5
(formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall state the time, and place of hearing and shall be
served upon all the Parties concerned at least three days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the same
Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of such notice. Indeed it has been held that in
such a case the motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638,
Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41
Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is obvious: Unless the movant sets the time
and place of hearing the Court would have no way to determine whether that party agrees to or objects to the
motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the Rules themselves do not fix any period within
which he may file his reply or opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has only himself to blame. His own
negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift away from himself the
consequences of his carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr, and,
in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor on
the members thereof. It would thus appear that there is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect consideration. We know that it is natural for a
lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers
are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but, also the manner in which they
are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished by
the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority,4 or that it is articulated by a lawyer.5 Such right is especially recognized
where the criticism concerns a concluded litigation,6 because then the court's actuations are thrown open to public
consumption.7 "Our decisions and all our official actions," said the Supreme Court of Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the press
and the people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other
public servants, must answer for their official actions before the chancery of public opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity, competence and honesty, with "imminent
danger to the administration of justice," is the reason why courts have been loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their
actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in such a case as this where those who Sit as members of an entire Court are themselves
collectively the aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations. 10 For courageous and fearless
advocates are the strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is
expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and
judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. 13 For like the executive
and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the
citizens whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful
terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The reason is that
An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him in the administration of
justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the
independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6 F
Supp. 487) .

Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar. In the prosecution of appeals, he points
out the errors of lower courts. In written for law journals he dissects with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and
fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by
Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or publication of opinions as to the
capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best opportunities for
observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. ... To say that an
attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to account and to be deprived of his
profession and livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a
position too monstrous to be
entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to
avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the
judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).
Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become conversant with the character
and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to abuse the privilege, as no other class has as great an
interest in the preservation of an able and upright bench. (State Board of Examiners in Law v. Hart, 116 N.W.
212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of those in the best position to give
advice and who might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of
a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be profound silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on
the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a
lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and ferment. His investiture into
the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful
behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court
constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of legal
ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial
office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take upon themselves,
when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at
all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not discharged by merely
observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting
language and offensive conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d.
647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the
assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and it may tax his
patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as
necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The decisions of
the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and the bar should at all times be the
foremost in rendering respectful submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is his privilege. And he may suffer
frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however,
should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison
the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. (Per Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the
Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at
another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or communications 16 or in the course of a political,

campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the
attorney to disciplinary action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his conduct in office," the
Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which
brings into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice demands condemnation and the application of appropriate penalties,"
adding that:
It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is beyond bona fide comments
and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of decency and truth or which are not aimed at. the destruction
of public confidence in the judicial system as such. However, when the likely impairment of the administration of
justice the direct product of false and scandalous accusations then the rule is otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating a leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN
OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having committed judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair
trial on appeal and of being subject to the control of a group of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that
Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that
the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do.
The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle and besmirch the court and to
bring it into disrepute with the general public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year suspension of an attorney who published
a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The circular which referred to two
decisions of the judge concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial office to enable -said bank to keep that money."
Said the court:
We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism members of the bar may
make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even though it extends to the deliberate
publication by the attorney capable of correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against the intelligence and
integrity of the highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197
and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first case mentioned it was observed, for
instance:
"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication by an attorney,
directed against a judicial officer, could be so vile and of such a nature as to justify the
disbarment of its author."
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character than those made by the
respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that which requires of those who are permitted to enjoy the
privilege of practicing law the strictest observance at all times of the principles of truth, honesty and fairness,
especially in their criticism of the courts, to the end that the public confidence in the due administration of justice
be upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a woman who had been granted a divorce,
attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave the press the story of
a proposed libel suit against the judge and others. The letter began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is protected from the libel, lies,
and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall be compelled to resort to such drastic action as the law
allows and the case warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go unchallenged," and said that he was
engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's disbarment,
the Supreme Court of Illinois declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper ground for serious complaint against
a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper authorities, but the public
interest and the administration of the law demand that the courts should have the confidence and respect of the
people. Unjust criticism, insulting language, and offensive conduct toward the judges personally by attorneys,
who are officers of the court, which tend to bring the courts and the law into disrepute and to destroy public

confidence in their integrity, cannot be permitted. The letter written to the judge was plainly an attempt to
intimidate and influence him in the discharge of judicial functions, and the bringing of the unauthorized suit,
together with the write-up in the Sunday papers, was intended and calculated to bring the court into disrepute
with the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced by corruption and greed, saying that
the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not appear that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or decisions of
the Court. The lawyer was charged with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a period of two years. The Court
said:
A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of the court against whose
members it was made, bring its judgments into contempt, undermine its influence as an unbiased arbiter of the
people's right, and interfere with the administration of justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of disciplinary proceedings, deprive
him of any part of that freedom of speech which he possesses as a citizen. The acts and decisions of the courts
of this state, in cases that have reached final determination, are not exempt from fair and honest comment and
criticism. It is only when an attorney transcends the limits of legitimate criticism that he will be held responsible
for an abuse of his liberty of speech. We well understand that an independent bar, as well as independent court,
is always a vigilant defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting to an appellate court an affidavit
reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which the appeal was taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes
unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the statements, and
asserted that the affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession of criticising the motives and
integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their duties, and thereby reflecting on the administration of justice
and creating the impression that judicial action is influenced by corrupt or improper motives. Every attorney of
this court, as well as every other citizen, has the right and it is his duty, to submit charges to the authorities in
whom is vested the power to remove judicial officers for any conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to
show a violation of his duties, or would justify an inference that he is false to his trust, or has improperly
administered the duties devolved upon him; and such charges to the tribunal, if based upon reasonable
inferences, will be encouraged, and the person making them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case decided against him, or the right of
the Public generally, to criticise the decisions of the courts, or the reasons announced for them, the habit of
criticising the motives of judicial officers in the performance of their official duties, when the proceeding is not
against the officers whose acts or motives are criticised, tends to subvert the confidence of the community in
the courts of justice and in the administration of justice; and when such charges are made by officers of the
courts, who are bound by their duty to protect the administration of justice, the attorney making such charges is
guilty of professional misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:
I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible temporary observations more or
less vituperative and finally concluded, that, as my clients were foreigners, it might have been expecting too
much to look for a decision in their favor against a widow residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and privileged criticism, but are an
unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and innuendo, upon the motives and integrity of this court, and
make out a prima facie case of improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license from this court
and who is under oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to the court as well as to his client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper an article in which he impugned the
motives of the court and its members to try a case, charging the court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken to
suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying that:
The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive of the public good, if the
conduct of such members does not measure up to the requirements of the law itself, as well as to the ethics of
the profession. ...

The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of prime importance under our
system and ideals of government. No right thinking man would concede for a moment that the best interest to
private citizens, as well as to public officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise, would be
served by denying this right of free speech to any individual. But such right does not have as its corollary that
members of the bar who are sworn to act honestly and honorably both with their client and with the courts
where justice is administered, if administered at all, could ever properly serve their client or the public good by
designedly misstating facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth and honesty of purpose by members of the bar
in such discussion is necessary. The health of a municipality is none the less impaired by a polluted water
supply than is the health of the thought of a community toward the judiciary by the filthy wanton, and malignant
misuse of members of the bar of the confidence the public, through its duly established courts, has reposed in
them to deal with the affairs of the private individual, the protection of whose rights he lends his strength and
money to maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the members of the bar the law itself demands
retribution not the court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a pending action using in
respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt, and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and confident
insolence," "criminal prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered conduct
unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that greater latitude should be allowed in case of
criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of Minnesota impugning both the intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates in the decisions of
certain appeals in which he had been attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were published in a newspaper. One of the
letters contained this paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than the burglar to his plunder. It
seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful and vigilant
that the widow got no undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable, short of assigning to the court
emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals and faithlessness to duty? If the state bar association, or a
committee chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the University Law School, aided by the researches of its
hundreds of bright, active students, or if any member of the court, or any other person, can formulate a
statement of a correct motive for the decision, which shall not require fumigation before it is stated, and
quarantine after it is made, it will gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months, delivered its opinion as follows:
The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct in sending to the Chief
Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we have found, for the very purpose of insulting him and
the other justices of this court; and the insult was so directed to the Chief Justice personally because of acts
done by him and his associates in their official capacity. Such a communication, so made, could never subserve
any good purpose. Its only effect in any case would be to gratify the spite of an angry attorney and humiliate the
officers so assailed. It would not and could not ever enlighten the public in regard to their judicial capacity or
integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the accused of any constitutional right, or of any privilege which any
reputable attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could ever have any occasion or desire to assert. No judicial
officer, with due regard to his position, can resent such an insult otherwise than by methods sanctioned by law;
and for any words, oral or written, however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to the judge alone, he
can have no redress in any action triable by a jury. "The sending of a libelous communication or libelous matter
to the person defamed does not constitute an actionable publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017.
In these respects the sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly different from his
other acts charged in the accusation, and, as we have said, wholly different principles are applicable thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he exercised the rights of a citizen,
guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by considerations of public policy, to which reference has been
made, he was immune, as we hold, from the penalty here sought to be enforced. To that extent his rights as a
citizen were paramount to the obligation which he had assumed as an officer of this court. When, however he
proceeded and thus assailed the Chief Justice personally, he exercised no right which the court can recognize,
but, on the contrary, willfully violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to courts and judicial officers.
"This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but it
includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the judges personally
for their official acts." Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears to be no
distinction, as regards the principle involved, between the indignity of an assault by an attorney upon a judge,
induced by his official act, and a personal insult for like cause by written or spoken words addressed to the
judge in his chambers or at his home or elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct wholly different from
criticism of judicial acts addressed or spoken to others. The distinction made is, we think entirely logical and
well sustained by authority. It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra. While the court in that case, as has
been shown, fully sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings of the court in actions which are ended, it

held that one might be summarily punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a commissioner of the
court, for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the power of any person," said the court, "by insulting
or assaulting the judge because of official acts, if only the assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves
the building, to compel the judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the people by tame
submission to the indignity, or else set in his own person the evil example of punishing the insult by taking the
law in his own hands? ... No high-minded, manly man would hold judicial office under such conditions."
That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally, constitutes professional delinquency for
which a professional punishment may be imposed, has been directly decided. "An attorney who, after being
defeated in a case, wrote a personal letter to the trial justice, complaining of his conduct and reflecting upon his
integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct and will be disciplined by the court." Matter of Manheim 133 App.
Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In
the latter case it appeared that the accused attorney had addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City Court
of New York, in which it was stated, in reference to his decision: "It is not law; neither is it common sense. The
result is I have been robbed of 80." And it was decided that, while such conduct was not a contempt under the
state, the matter should be "called to the attention of the Supreme Court, which has power to discipline the
attorney." "If," says the court, "counsel learned in the law are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of
judges, to charge them with ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery, either as principals or accessories,
it will not be long before the general public may feel that they may redress their fancied grievances in like
manner, and thus the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy one, and the administration of justice will fall
into bad repute."
The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much the same as the case at bar.
The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit judge, which the latter received by due
course of mail, at his home, while not holding court, and which referred in insulting terms to the conduct of the
judge in a cause wherein the accused had been one of the attorneys. For this it was held that the attorney was
rightly disbarred in having "willfully failed to maintain respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer, and
thereby breached his oath as an attorney." As recognizing the same principle, and in support of its application to
the facts of this case, we cite the following: Ex parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State,
22 Ark. 149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374,
49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained as to make it our duty to
impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a suitable warning to others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for publishing a letter in a
newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the sinister influence of a gang that had paralyzed him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against the official acts and decisions of a
judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred for criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general
claiming that the judge was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of cases, criticising the court in
intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the
legal profession into disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer was disbarred.
14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared over a period of years vicious
attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as
a member of the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an intention to resign from the bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation
utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not,
which transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to
subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct
which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the exercise of the
prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts of counsel such as those catalogued
in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature have generally been disposed of under the power of courts to punish
for contempt which, although resting on different bases and calculated to attain a different end, nevertheless illustrates that universal
abhorrence of such condemnable practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.

1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for reconsideration as "absolutely
erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at
the polls," this Court, although conceding that
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do so with all the
fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to exercise said right by
resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts requires.
The reason for this is that respect for the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such
guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the
court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights to the
parties, and 'of the untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights
of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching to, the imprisonment for
contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law, refused to divulge the source of a news item carried in his paper, caused to
be published in i local newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said
law, but it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members," and his belief
that "In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, ... the only remedy to put an
end to go much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to liberty
and democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino
Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He there also announced
that one of the first measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session of Congress would have for its object the complete
reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the guarantee
of free speech, this Court declared:
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press, the respondent does
not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then and still is pending
consideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the members of this
Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is one of the members, reorganizing the
Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices from eleven, so as to change the members of this Court
which decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order
to influence the final decision of said case by this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of
justice. But the respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of
bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the administration. of justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately so many blunders
and injustices, that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of Que party knowing that the law and justice is
on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases
decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty
and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower ,or degrade the administration of justice
by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the
Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are
trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court
and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands,
and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts, Atty.
Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes
fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be
resting on a very shaky foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and
communication to the courts; he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty
of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra, where counsel charged this
Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of
the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating
the sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:

As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for reconsideration, implications
there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly
fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is the
tendency of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the law on jurisdiction. It makes a
sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings without as much as making
any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain
import of all these is that this Court is so patently inept that in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court,
it has committed error and continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court as
one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted
statements is that the pronouncements of this Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to
respect. Those statements detract much from the dignity of and respect due this Court. They bring into question
the capability of the members and some former members of this Court to render justice. The second
paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule against splitting of
jurisdiction."
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases 18 which, in the interest of brevity, need not now be reviewed in
detail.
Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases all of them involved contumacious statements made in
pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be
invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not after the
conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the
remarks for which he is now called upon to account were made only after this Court had written finis to his appeal. This is of no
moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its vitality. For sometime, this was the
prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof, however, came when, in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then
Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule
above-adverted to. A complete disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt
proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the
1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the validity of the said examinations had been
resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent
in Alarcon to the effect that them may still be contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice
Moran in Alarcon:
A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in administering justice in a
pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is 'summarily punishable by courts. A
publication which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends to
bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is equally punishable by
courts. What is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded against the influence of newspaper
comments, is the all-important duty of the courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the
second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the courts from any act or conduct
calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public confidence in them. In the first there is no contempt
where there is no action pending, as there is no decision which might in any way be influenced by the
newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as what is sought to
be protected is the court itself and its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them is
destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and actuations now under consideration
were made only after the judgment in his client's appeal had attained finality. He could as much be liable for contempt therefor as if it
had been perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for such post litigation utterances and
actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here
presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer
of this Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard and ethics of the
legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this
inquiry, the pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole objective of this proceeding is to
preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to
continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the solemn duty, amongst others, to
determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and
exclude from the practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Thus

The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and incidental power in courts of
record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. To deny its existence is
equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint.
Such a view is without support in any respectable authority, and cannot be tolerated. Any court having the right
to admit attorneys to practice and in this state that power is vested in this court-has the inherent right, in the
exercise of a sound judicial discretion to exclude them from practice. 23
This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is worthy of their confidence and
respect. So much so that
... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and confidence of
the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the right, but the duty, of the court which made him one of its
officers, and gave him the privilege of ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore it is almost
universally held that both the admission and disbarment of attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is admitted
to the bar and exercises his functions as an attorney, not as a matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on
his own behavior and the exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere inherent or incidental power. It has been
elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an assessment of whether or not the
utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's part. Unorthodox though it may
seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making the mere offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse
language, he actually availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated entirety of his
petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing
his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the justice administered by this Court to be not
only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its members with verbal talons,
imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its members as
"calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," he caused
the publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated effort ;to startle the public, stir up public indignation and
disrespect toward the Court. Called upon to make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with
characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually tarred and
feathered the Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary
sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks for itself. The vicious language
used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve
any purpose but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring ;this Court
and its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Odium
of this character and texture presents no redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the
truth. It is not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of
the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is
thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.
We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other Government entity in a viable
democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism. But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating,
fitting to its high function as the court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to
obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant striving to attain them.
Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and must be informed -by perspective and infused by
philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the premises, that, as Atty. Almacen would have
appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants, prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an
utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, this proceeding is not and does not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into
the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is
neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary objective, and
the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of
the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the

duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a
complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the Court as a body is
necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the
Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of
a collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but. only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct
individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. 30So that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it
can only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof as well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and
properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in
the Bar of men unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the power to admit persons to said
practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it
cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the members collectively are
in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that power because public
policy demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a
case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is
absolutely inexistent.
Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty. Almacen for his transgressions.
As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may range from mere suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32 The discretion to
assess under the circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court
which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be controlled by the
imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the
Court be zealously maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized. However, heeding the stern
injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it
may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive language never
fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it
is our view that suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his misconduct by neither
manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of determining how long that suspension should last and,
accordingly, we are impelled to decree that the same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because
jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the comforting support of precedent, it is obvious
that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension,
which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is
best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall
last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the
practice of law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby, suspended from the practice of
law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for their
information and guidance.