ControlSystemsbySupervisoryAuthorities

dealswithgeneralstandardsthatapplytoalltypesofaudits.Theyrelatetotheindependenceofaudit
staffand
theOffice,thecompetenceoftheauditteam,theexerciseofdueprofessionalcareinconductingand
reportingtheaudit,and
thepresenceofqualitycontrols.Thesestandardsaredistinctfromstandardsthatrelatetofieldwork
(planningand
conductingtheaudit)andstandardsthatrelatetopreparingauditreports.
2.1Independence
Inallmattersrelatingtotheauditwork,theauditorandtheOfficeshouldbefreefrompersonal
and
externalimpairmentsandbeorganizationallyindependent.
2.1.1ThisstandardplacesresponsibilityoneachauditorandtheOfficetomaintainindependenceso
thatopinions,
conclusions,judgementsandrecommendationswillbeimpartialandbeviewedtobeimpartialby
knowledgeable
thirdparties.
2.1.2Auditorsshouldnotifytheirsupervisorofanypersonalimpairmentstotheirindependencethat
couldaffecttheir
objectivityinconductingtheaudit.Suchimpairmentscouldinclude:
official,personalorfinancialrelationshipswiththestaffortheentitybeingaudited;
previousresponsibilityfordecisionmakingormanaginganentitybeingaudited;and

previousresponsibilityformaintainingtheaccountingrecordsofanentitybeingaudited.
2.1.3Insuchsituations,theOfficeshouldreassigntheauditstafftootherduties.
2.1.4TheOfficeshouldbeindependentfromboththeexecutiveandthelegislatureandshallnotbe
subjecttoany
directionfromthemintheprogramming,planningandconductofaudits.Itmusthavefreedomtoset
prioritiesand
programmeitsworkinaccordancewithitsmandateandadoptmethodologiesappropriatetothe
auditstobe
undertaken.
2.1.5TheOfficemaygivemembersofthelegislaturefactualbriefingsonauditreports,butitis
importantthattheOffice
maintainsitsindependencefrompoliticalinfluence.ThisimpliesthattheOfficeshouldnotbe
responsive,norgive
theappearanceofbeingresponsive,tothewishesofparticularpoliticalinterests.
2.].6AttherequestofParliamentortheexecutive,theOfficemayundertakespecificissuesfor
audit.However,the
Officemustbefreetodeclineanysuchrequestand,ifitdoesaccepttherequest,itmustremainfree
todetermine
themannerinwhichitconductstheauditwork.
2.1.7TheOfficemustnotbesubjecttodirectionbytheexecutiveinrelationtotheperformanceofits
mandate.Itshould
notbeobligedtothegovernmenttocarryout,modifyorrefrainfromcarryingout,anauditor
suppressormodify

auditfindings,conclusionsandrecommendations.
2.1.8TheOfficeshouldtakecareinavoidingparticipationintheexecutivesfunctionsofthekind
thatwouldmilitate
againstitsindependenceandobjectivityinthedischargeofitsmandate.TheOfficeshouldbeready
toadvisethe
executiveinsuchmattersasaccountingstandardsandpoliciesandtheformoffinancialstatements.
TheOffice
mustensurethatingivingsuchadviceitavoids ion.