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Arquero v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.

168053, September 21, 2011


FACTS: Congress approved Republic Act (RA) No. 6765, wherein several were
converted into national schools and integrated with the Palawan National School
(PNS) in the City of Puerto Princesa, Province of Palawan, as branches thereof. The
law also provides that the Palawan Integrated National Schools (PINS) shall be
headed by a Vocational School Superintendent (VSS) who shall be chosen and
appointed by the Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture, and Sports
(now the DepEd).
However, no VSS was appointed. Instead, then DECS Region IV Office designated
then PNS Principal Eugenio J. dela Cuesta in a concurrent capacity as Officer-inCharge (OIC) of the PINS. After the retirement of Dela Cuesta, petitioner took over
as Secondary School Principal of the PNS.
Director Rexs successor, Pedro B. Trinidad placed all satellite schools of the PINS
under the direct supervision of the Schools Division Superintendent for Palawan.
This directive was later approved by the DepEd. Petitioner was instructed to turn
over the administration and supervision of the PINS branches or units. In another
memorandum, Schools Division Superintendent Portia Gesilva was designated as
OIC of the PINS. These events prompted different parties to institute various actions
restraining the enforcement of the DepEd orders.
Dr. Giron withdrew the designation of petitioner as OIC of the PINS, enjoining her
from submitting to the Regional Office all appointments and personnel movement
involving the PNS and the satellite schools. Petitioner appealed to the Civil Service
Commission assailing the withdrawal of her designation as OIC of the PINS.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Clarification before the Office of
the DepEd Secretary as to the designation of private respondent.
Dr. Giron filed a formal charge against petitioner who continued to defy the orders
issued by the Regional Office relative to the exercise of her functions as OIC of the
PINS despite the designation of private respondent as such. The administrative
complaint charged petitioner with grave misconduct, gross insubordination and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Petitioner filed the Petition for Quo Warranto with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Injunctive Writ before the RTC of Palawan against public
and private respondents. The Petitioner argued that the designation of private
respondent deprived her of her right to exercise her function and perform her duties
in violation of her right to security of tenure.
RTC rendered a Judgment by Default, declaring petitioner Rebecca T. Arquero as the
lawful Principal and Head of the Palawan Integrated National High School who is
lawfully entitled to manage the operation and finances of the school subject to
existing laws.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision.
Applying the rules on statutory construction, the appellate court emphasized the
need to harmonize the laws. The CA held that the PINS and its satellite schools

remain under the complete administrative jurisdiction of the DepEd and not
transferred to the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA).
The appellate court likewise held that petitioner failed to establish her clear legal
right to the position of OIC of the PINS as she was not appointed but merely
designated to the position in addition to her functions as incumbent school principal
of the PNS. Clearly, there was no violation of her right to due process and security of
tenure when private respondent replaced her.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has the right to the contested public office and to
oust private respondent from its enjoyment?
HELD: Petition is without merit
A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right
or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. It is
brought against the person who is alleged to have usurped, intruded into, or
unlawfully held or exercised the public office. It may be brought by the Republic of
the Philippines or by the person claiming to be entitled to such office.
In quo warranto, the petitioner who files the action in his name must prove
that he is entitled to the subject public office. In other words, the private person
suing must show a clear right to the contested position.[46] Otherwise, the person
who holds the same has a right to undisturbed possession and the action for quo
warranto may be dismissed. It is not even necessary to pass upon the right of the
defendant who, by virtue of his appointment, continues in the undisturbed
possession of his office.
On the basis of the evidence presented solely by petitioner and without
considering the arguments and attachments made by respondents to rebut
petitioners claims, we find that petitioner failed to prove that she is entitled to the
contested position.
It is undisputed that petitioner was appointed as the principal of the PNS. In
addition, she was designated as the OIC of the PINS. Said designation was, however,
withdrawn. Private respondent was, thereafter, designated as the new OIC. This
prompted petitioner to file the quo warranto petition before the court a quo.
As aptly observed by the CA, the law created two positions the VSS and the
principal or secondary school head teacher of each of the units or branches of the
integrated school. The legislators clearly intended that the integrated schools shall
be headed by a superintendent. Admittedly, petitioner did not possess the
qualifications to hold the position and she was merely designated by the DepEd as
the OIC of the PINS. At that time, she held in a concurrent capacity, the permanent
position of principal of the PNS. Having been appointed as OIC without the
necessary qualifications, petitioner held the position only in a temporary capacity.

The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to prevent a hiatus in the


discharge of official functions by authorizing a person to discharge those functions
pending the selection of a permanent or another appointee. An acting appointee
accepts the position on the condition that he shall surrender the office once he is
called to do so by the appointing authority. Therefore, his term of office is not fixed,
but endures at the pleasure of the appointing authority. The essence of an acting
appointment is its temporariness and its consequent revocability at any time by the
appointing authority.
Thus, under RA 6765, petitioner can only insist on her security of tenure as
principal of the PNS but not as OIC of the integrated school. Upon the withdrawal of
her designation, her right to the contested position ceased to exist.

Moro v. Del Carmen

March 30, 2011

G.R. No. 184980

PETITIONER: DANILO MORO


vs.
RESPONDENT : GENEROSO REYES DEL CASTILLO, JR.,

Ponente: ABAD, J.:

Facts:
The Office of the Ombudsman charged Generoso, Chief Accountant of the AFP
General Headquarters Accounting Center with dishonesty, grave misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the service. By virtue of AFP Special Order 91 dated April 1,
2006, , the AFP reassigned Generoso to the PAF Accounting Center. His position was
taken over by Danilo, then Chief Accountant of the Philippine Navy. On August 30,
2006, Generoso was place under preventive suspension. He was eventually
dismissed from the service on February 5, 2007, which he appealed to the Court of

Appeals. After the lapse of his six-month suspension (April 2, 2007), Generoso
attempted to reassume his position at the AFP General Headquarters but was
unable to do so, since Danilo declined to yield the position. Generoso then filed an
action for quo warranto before the Regional Trial Court, alleging that Danilo was
merely detailed at the GHQ Accounting Center when he placed under preventive
suspension, hence after the lapse of his suspension, he is entitled to reassume the
position being held by Danilo, who is a usurper. On his part, Danilo claimed that his
assignment to the position was a permanent appointment, Generoso having been
assigned to the PAF Accounting Center even before his suspension.
The RTC dismissed Generosos petition, holding that Danilo is holding the position
on a permanent appointment. Generosos reassignment to the PAF is valid up to one
year, and since his suspension took only six months, he is still required to report to
the PAF Accounting Center. Upon petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
the latter reversed the RTC decision, holding that SO 91 was void because it did not
indicate the duration of the reassignment. Further, the order of dismissal of
Generoso was appealed to the CA, hence, not yet final and executory. Danilo thus
elevated the case to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
whether or not respondent Del Castillo is entitled to be restored to the position of
Chief Accountant of the GHQ Accounting Center that he once held.
Held:
No, Del Castillo is not entitled to be restored to the position of Chief Accountant of
the GHQ Accounting Center that he once held.
The Supreme Court ruled that an action for quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Rules
of Court may be filed against one who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or
exercises a public office. It may be brought by the Republic of the Philippines or by
the person claiming to be entitled to such office. In this case , Del Castillo brought
the action for quo warranto in his name on April 4, 2007, months after the
Ombudsman ordered his dismissal from service on February 5, 2007. that dismissal
order was immediately executory even pending appeal. Consequently, he has no
right to pursue the action for quo warranto or reassume the position of Chief
Accountant of the GHQ Accounting Center.

VILANDO VS HRET

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court assailing the March 24, 2010 Decision [1] of =the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal(HRET) dismissing the petitions for quo warranto and declaring
private respondent Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong (Limkaichong) not disqualified as
Member of the House of Representatives representing the First District of Negros
Oriental and its ResolutioN[2] dated May 17, 2010, denying the motion for
reconsideration.
In the May 14, 2007 elections, Limkaichong filed her certificate of candidacy
for the position of Representative of the First District of Negros Oriental. She won
over the other contender, Olivia Paras. On May 25, 2007, she was proclaimed as
Representative by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on the basis of Comelec
Resolution No. 8062[3] issued on May 18, 2007. On July 23, 2007, she assumed office
as Member of the House of Representatives. Meanwhile, petitions involving either
the disqualification or the proclamation of Limkaichong were filed before the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) which reached the Court.
The petitions, which questioned her citizenship, were filed against
Limkaichong by her detractors: Louis Biraogo Olivia Paras and Renald F. Vilando
These three (3) petitions were consolidated with the petition for certiorari filed by
Limkaichong assailing the Joint Resolution issued by the COMELEC which resolved
the disqualification cases against her.
On April 1, 2009, the Court granted the aforesaid petition of Limkaichong,
reversed the Joint Resolution of the Comelec, dismissed the three (3) other
petitions, and directed the petitioners to seek relief before the HRET by way of a
petition for Quo Warranto.
On April 21, 2009 and May 27, 2009, petitioner Renald F. Vilando (Vilando), as
taxpayer; and Jacinto Paras, as registered voter of the congressional district
concerned, filed separate petitions for Quo Warranto against Limkaichong before
the HRET. These petitions were consolidated by the HRET as they both challenged
the eligibility of one and the same respondent. Petitioners asserted that
Limkaichong was a Chinese citizen and ineligible for the office she was elected and
proclaimed. They alleged that she was born to a father (Julio Sy), whose
naturalization had not attained finality, and to a mother who acquired the Chinese
citizenship of Julio Sy from the time of her marriage to the latter.Also, they invoked
the jurisdiction of the HRET for a determination of Limkaichongs citizenship, which
necessarily included an inquiry into the validity of the naturalization certificate of
Julio Sy.
On March 24, 2010, the HRET dismissed both petitions and declared
Limkaichong not disqualified as Member of the House of Representatives.
ISSUE:
Whether or not HRET erred in not disqualifying respondent as member
of the House of Representatives.
HELD:
No. In this petition, Vilando seeks to disqualify Limkaichong on the
ground that she is a Chinese citizen. To prove his point, he makes reference to the
alleged nullity of the grant of naturalization of Limkaichongs father which, however,
is not allowed as it would constitute a collateral attack on the citizenship of the
father. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done
through a direct action for its nullity. [13]

The proper proceeding to assail the citizenship of Limkaichongs father should


be in accordance with Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473. As held
in Limkaichong v. Comelec,[14] thus:
Clearly, under law and jurisprudence, it is the State, through its
representatives designated by statute, that may question the illegally
or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization in the appropriate
denaturalization proceedings. It is plainly not a matter that may be
raised by private persons in an election case involving the naturalized
citizens descendant.
Vilando asserts that as an incident in determining the eligibility of
Limkaichong, the HRET, having the plenary, absolute and exclusive jurisdiction to
determine her qualifications, can pass upon the efficacy of the certificate of
naturalization.
Such power of the HRET, no matter how complete and exclusive, does not
carry with it the authority to delve into the legality of the judgment of naturalization
in the pursuit of disqualifying Limkaichong. To rule otherwise would operate as a
collateral attack on the citizenship of the father which, as already stated, is not
permissible.
Thus, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) wrote that a collateral attack
against a judgment is generally not allowed, unless the judgment is void upon its
face or its nullity is apparent by virtue of its own recitals. [20] Under the present
situation, there is no evidence to show that the judgment is void on its face.
The HRET, therefore, correctly relied on the presumption of validity of the July
9, 1957 and September 21, 1959 Orders of the Court of First Instance (CFI) Negros
Oriental, which granted the petition and declared Julio Sy a naturalized Filipino
absent any evidence to the contrary.
Well-settled is the principle that the judgments of the HRET are beyond
judicial interference. The only instance where this Court may intervene in the
exercise of its so-called extraordinary jurisdiction is upon a determination that the
decision or resolution of the HRET was rendered without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or upon a clear showing of such
arbitrary and improvident use of its power to constitute a denial of due process of
law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated error, manifestly
constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy for such
abuse.[26] In this case, there is no showing of any such arbitrariness or
improvidence. The HRET acted well within the sphere of its power when it dismissed
the quo warranto petition.
In fine, the Court found sufficient basis to sustain the ruling of the HRET
which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of Limkaichong.

General vs Urro
GR. 191560, March 29, 2011
FACTS:
PGMA appointed the petitioner as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner on July 2008 in

place of Roces, the former commissioner, who died. On the same date, PGMA
appointed Escueta as acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner and designated him as
NAPOLCOM Vice Chairman.
Later, PGMA appointed respondent Urro in place of the petitioner. She also
appointed Constancia de Guzman in place of Celia Leones, and Escuetas as
permanent NAPOLCOM Commissioners.
When respondent recceived their congratulatory letter for their appointment(March
2010), petitioners then filed the present quo warranto petition questioning the
validity of the respondents appointments mainly on the ground that it violates the
constitutional prohibition against midnight appointments.
On July 30, 2010, Pres. Benigno S. Aquino III, issued E.O. No. 2 "Recalling,
Withdrawing, and Revoking Appointments Issued by the Previous Administration in
Violation of the Constitutional Ban on Midnight Appointments."
The petitioner argues that the appointment issued to him was a regular
appointment and he cannot be removed from office except for cause. He further
claims that Roces was supposed to serve a full term of six years counted from the
date of her appointment. Since she failed to finish her six-year term, the petitioner
claims that he is entitled to serve this unexpired portion.
The parties also dwelt on the issue of constitutionality of the respondents
appointments in light of E.O. No. 2.
ISSUE: WON the Quo Warranto is proper
HELD:
No. The petition is denied.
Quo warranto is a remedy to try disputes with respect to the title to a
public office
Since the petitioner merely holds an acting appointment (expired acting
appointment), he clearly does not have a cause of action to maintain the present
petition. The essence of an acting appointment is its temporariness and its
consequent revocability at any time by the appointing authority. The petitioner in a
quo warranto proceeding who seeks reinstatement to an office, on the ground of
usurpation or illegal deprivation, must prove his clear right to the office for his suit
to succeed; otherwise, his petition must fail.
Thus, the petitioner must first clearly establish his own right to the disputed office
as a condition precedent to the consideration of the unconstitutionality of the
respondents appointments. The petitioners failure in this regard renders a ruling on
the constitutional issues raised completely unnecessary. Neither do we need to pass
upon the validity of the respondents appointment. These latter issues can be

determined more appropriately in a proper case.

ARQUERO vs COURT OF APPEALS


GR No. 168053
September 21, 2011
Doctrine: The petitioner who files the action in his name must prove that he is
entitled to the subject public office.
Petitioner: Rebecca Arquero
Respondent: COURT OF APPEALS (Former Thirteenth Division); EDILBERTO C. DE
JESUS, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education; DR. PARALUMAN
GIRON, Director, Regional Office IV-MIMAROPA, Department of Education; DR.
EDUARDO LOPEZ, Schools Division Superintendent, Puerto Princesa City; and
NORMA BRILLANTES
Facts:
On October 2, 2003, petitioner filed the Petition for Quo Warranto with Prayer for
Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Injunctive Writ before the RTC of
Palawan against public and private respondents. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 3854. Petitioner argued that the designation of private respondent
deprived her of her right to exercise her function and perform her duties in violation
of her right to security of tenure. Considering that petitioner was appointed in a
permanent capacity, she insisted that private respondents designation as OIC of
the PNS is null and void there being no vacancy to the position. Petitioner thus
prayed that the RTC issue an order granting the writ of quo warranto enjoining
private respondent from assuming the position of OIC of the PNS, declaring the
questioned designation null and void and without operative effect, and declaring
petitioner to be entitled to the office of the principal of the PNS.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner has a right to institute this quo warranto proceeding as to
the contested public office and oust private respondent from enjoyment thereof
Ruling:
Yes. A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or
title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment. It is
brought against the person who is alleged to have usurped, intruded into, or
unlawfully held or exercised the public office. It may be brought by the Republic of
the Philippines or by the person claiming to be entitled to such office. In quo
warranto, the petitioner who files the action in his name must prove that he is
entitled to the subject public office. In other words, the private person suing must

show a clear right to the contested position. Otherwise, the person who holds the
same has a right to undisturbed possession and the action for quo warranto may be
dismissed. It is not even necessary to pass upon the right of the defendant who, by
virtue of his appointment, continues in the undisturbed possession of his office.

Munder v. COMELEC
FACTS: Petitioner Munder ran as mayor of Bubong, Lanao del Sur, and filed his
certificate of candidacy (CoC) on 26 November 2009. The last day for filing the
certificate of candidacy was on 30 November 2009.

On 13 April 2010, Sarip filed a Petition for Disqualification[5]with the Comelec on


the ground that Munder was not a registered voter of Bubong, Lanao del Sur, and
that the latter's application for candidacy was not accomplished in full.

In the 10 May 2010 elections, Munder won overwhelmingly. The Municipal Board of
Canvassers of Bubong, Lanao del Sur, thus proclaimed Munder as mayor on 15 May
2010.

On 29 June 2010, the Comelec Second Division held that the grounds invoked by
Sarip were not proper for a petition for disqualification, and that the latters petition
was actually seeking the purging of Munders CoC.

The outcome was, however, different when the Comelec En Banc, upon Sarips
Motion for Reconsideration,[12]reversed the ruling of the Second Division and
disqualified Munder in its 4 October 2010 Resolution. The Comelec ruled directly on
the substantive merit of the case, and not on the propriety of the remedy taken by
Sarip. It thus ruled on the question of the continuing possession by Munder of one of
the qualifications of the office of the Mayor being a registered voter of the
municipality where he runs as a candidate.
The Comelec En Banc decided the case on a single issue whether the person
described in the CoC and in the Certificate of Live Birth referred to the same person
in the Voters Certification, petitioner Alfais Tocalo Munder. The Comelec En Banc

ruled on this factual issue, stating that the said persons were not one and the same,
as they had different birth years.
The Comelec also disregarded the fact that Munder had already been proclaimed as
mayor of Bubong, Lanao del Sur. Consequently, it ruled against him and proceeded
to declare him disqualified to hold the office of the mayor, for which he had been
elected. The Comelec En Banc held:
The Supreme Court has time and again ruled that qualifications for an elective office
are continuing requirements and once any of them is lost, title to the office is
forfeited. Munder lacking the requisite qualification of being a registered voter,
should be removed from office.

It ordered Munder to vacate the Office of the Mayor, and the elected vice-mayor to
assume the position of mayor. It further directed the Department of Interior and
Local Government and the Philippine National Police (PNP) to implement the
Resolution against Munder. From this Resolution originated the two petitions filed by
the two rivals for the mayoral position.

At the instance of Munder, we issued on 18 January 2011, a Temporary Restraining


Order against the Comelec, DILG and PNP from implementing the 4 October 2010
Resolution of the Comelec removing Munder from the office.[15] The impending
execution of the Comelecs Resolution created divisiveness and disorder in the
municipality of Bubong such that even the military attested that they were on red
alert due to the volatile political situation in the area brought about by the possible
ouster of Munder. The Vice Mayor also prematurely assumed the office of the mayor
and allegedly withdrew the Internal Revenue Allocation without a resolution from
the Sangguniang Bayan. This aggravated the tension that had already been created
by the election dispute between the petitioners of these consolidated petitions. The
Court, thus, deemed a TRO justified to prevent disorder and bloodshed in Bubong.
In his petition, Munder argues that the Comelec acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of Sarips petition which was filed beyond the
reglementary period provided by law. Munder claims that Sarip should have instead
filed a petition for quo warranto after the formers proclamation as the winning
candidate. Munder likewise asserts that the Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion in effectively ruling upon his right to vote, when it attacked his status as a
registered voter, in order to disqualify him from the mayoralty office.

ISSUE: May a petition filed as a Petition for Disqualification properly invoke, as a


ground, that the candidate sought to be disqualified was not a registered voter and

thus not be barred by the earlier prescriptive period applicable to Petition to Deny
Due Course to or to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy?

HELD: Munder alleges that Sarips petition with the Comelec should be considered as
one to deny due course to or to cancel a CoC, and not for disqualification. One of
the important differences between the two petitions is their prescriptive periods. For
a Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy, the period to
file is within five days from the last day of the filing of the certificate of candidacy,
but not later than 25 days from the filing thereof. On the other hand, a petition to
disqualify a candidate may be filed at any day after the last day of filing of the
certificate of candidacy, but not later than the date of proclamation.

It has been argued by Munder, who was earlier sustained by the Comelec Second
Division, that the petition for disqualification should be treated as a petition to deny
due course to or to cancel a certificate of candidacy, which had already prescribed.
We agree with Munder as to the nature of the petition filed by Sarip. The main
ground of the said petition is that Munder committed dishonesty in declaring that he
was a registered voter of Barangay Rogero, Bubong, Lanao del Sur, when in fact he
was not. This ground is appropriate for a Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy.

To emphasize, a petition for disqualification, on the one hand, can be premised on


Section 12 or 68 of the [Omnibus Election Code], or Section 40 of the [Local
Government Code]. On the other hand, a petition to deny due course to or cancel a
CoC can only be grounded on a statement of a material representation in the said
certificate that is false. The petitions also have different effects. While a person who
is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the
person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not
treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.[20]

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, G.R. No. 194076 is hereby GRANTED. The Comelec En
Banc Resolution dated 4 October 2010 which granted the petition to disqualify Alfais
Tocalo Munder as Mayor of Bubong, Lanao del Sur is hereby NULLIFIED and SET
ASIDE. The Comelec Second Division Resolution dated 29 June 2010 dismissing the
petition for disqualification filed by Atty. Tago R. Sarip against Alfais Tocalo Munder is
REINSTATED. G.R. No. 194160 is hereby DISMISSED. For having been rendered moot

by this Decision, the Temporary Restraining Order we issued on 18 January 2011 in


favor of Alfais Tocalo Munder is hereby made permanent.

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