UNIVERSITY OF IMMACULATE, CONCEPCION, INC.

,
petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR,
THE UIC TEACHING AND NON-TEACHING PERSONNEL
AND EMPLOYEES UNION, LELIAN CONCON, MARY ANN
DE RAMOS, JOVITA MAMBURAM, ANGELINA ABADILLA,
MELANIE DE LA ROSA, ZENAIDA CANOY, ALMA
VILLACARLOS, JOSIE BOSTON, PAULINA PALMA GIL,
GEMMA GALOPE, LEAH CRUZA, DELFA DIAPUEZ,
respondent.
G.R. 151379 | J. Azcuna | Jan. 14, 2005
FACTS:
This case stemmed from the collective
bargaining negotiations between petitioner
University of Immaculate Concepcion, Inc.
(UNIVERSITY) and respondent The UIC Teaching
and Non-Teaching Personnel and Employees
Union (UNION). The UNION, as the certified
bargaining agent of all rank and file employees
of the UNIVERSITY, submitted its collective
bargaining proposals to the latter on February
16, 1994. However, one item was left
unresolved and this was the inclusion or
exclusion of some positions (secretaries,
registrars, accounting personnel, guidance
counselors) in the scope of the bargaining unit.
The UNION it filed a notice of strike on the
grounds of bargaining deadlock and unfair labor
practice. During the thirty (30) day cooling-off
period, two union members were dismissed by
petitioner. Consequently, the UNION went on
strike.
On January 23, 1995, the then Secretary of
Labor, Ma. Nieves R. Confessor, issued an Order
assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute.
On March 10, 1995, the UNION filed another
notice of strike, this time citing as a reason the
UNIVERSITYs termination of the individual
respondents. The UNION alleged that the
UNIVERSITYs act of terminating the individual
respondents is in violation of the Order of the
Secretary of Labor.
On March 28, 1995, the Secretary of Labor
issued another Order reiterating the directives
contained in the January 23, 1995 Order. Hence,
the UNIVERSITY was directed to reinstate the
individual respondents under the same terms
and conditions prevailing prior to the labor
dispute.
The UNIVERSITY filed a MR. In the Order dated
August 18, 1995, then Acting Secretary Jose S.
Brilliantes denied the MR, but modified the two
previous Orders by adding:
o
Anent the Unions Motion, we find that
superseding circumstances would not
warrant the physical reinstatement of
the twelve (12) terminated employees.
Hence, they are hereby ordered placed
under payroll reinstatement until the
validity of their termination is finally
resolved.
ISSUE:
1. WON the Sec. of Labor may take cognizance of an
issue involving employees who are not part of the
bargaining unit.
2. WON payroll reinstatement, instead of actual
reinstatement, is proper

HELD:
1.

YES. The UNIVERSITY contends that the

Secretary cannot take cognizance of an issue
involving employees who are not part of the
bargaining unit. It insists that since the
individual respondents had already been
excluded from the bargaining unit by a final and
executory order by the panel of voluntary
arbitrators, then they cannot be covered by the
Secretarys assumption order.
This Court finds no merit in the UNIVERSITYs
contention. In Metrolab Industries, Inc. v.
Roldan-Confessor,[13] this Court declared that it
recognizes the exercise of management
prerogatives and it often declines to interfere
with the legitimate business decisions of the
employer. This is in keeping with the general
principle embodied in Article XIII, Section 3 of
the Constitution,[14] which is further echoed in
Article 211 of the Labor Code.[15] However, as
expressed in PAL v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[16] this privilege is not absolute,
but subject to exceptions. One of these
exceptions is when the Secretary of Labor
assumes jurisdiction over labor disputes
involving industries indispensable to the national
interest under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code.
This provision states:
(g) When, in his opinion, there exists a
labor dispute causing or likely to cause
a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to the national interest,
the Secretary of Labor and Employment
may assume jurisdiction over the
dispute and decide it or certify the
same to the Commission for compulsory
arbitration.
Such
assumption
or
certification shall have the effect of
automatically enjoining the intended or
impending strike or lockout as specified
in the assumption or certification order.
If one has already taken place at the
time of assumption or certification, all
striking or locked out employees shall
immediately return to work and the
employer shall immediately resume
operations and readmit all workers
under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike or lockout. x
xx
When the Secretary of Labor ordered the
UNIVERSITY to suspend the effect of the
termination of the individual respondents, the
Secretary did not exceed her jurisdiction, nor
did the Secretary gravely abuse the same. It
must be pointed out that one of the substantive

evils which Article 263(g) of the Labor Code

seeks to curb is the exacerbation of a labor
dispute to the further detriment of the national
interest. In her Order dated March 28, 1995,
the Secretary of Labor rightly held
It is well to remind both parties herein that the
main reason or rationale for the exercise of the
Secretary of Labor and Employments power
under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, as
amended, is the maintenance and upholding of
the status quo while the dispute is being
adjudicated. Hence, the directive to the parties
to refrain from performing acts that will
exacerbate the situation is intended to ensure
that the dispute does not get out of hand,
thereby negating the direct intervention of this
office.
The Universitys act of suspending and
terminating union members and the Unions act
of filing another Notice of Strike after this Office
has assumed jurisdiction are certainly in conflict
with the status quo ante. By any standards[,]
these acts will not in any way help in the early
resolution of the labor dispute. It is clear that
the actions of both parties merely served to
complicate and aggravate the already strained
labor-management relations.[17]
Indeed, it is clear that the act of the
UNIVERSITY of dismissing the individual
respondents from their employment became the
impetus for the UNION to declare a second
notice of strike. It is not a question anymore of
whether or not the terminated employees, the
individual respondents herein, are part of the
bargaining unit. Any act committed during the
pendency of the dispute that tends to give rise
to further contentious issues or increase the
tensions between the parties should be
considered an act of exacerbation and should
not be allowed.
2.

With respect to the Secretarys Order allowing

payroll reinstatement instead of actual
reinstatement for the individual respondents
herein, an amendment to the previous Orders
issued by her office, the same is usually not
allowed. Article 263(g) of the Labor Code
aforementioned states that all workers must
immediately return to work and all employers
must readmit all of them under the same terms
and conditions prevailing before the strike or
lockout. The phrase under the same terms and
conditions makes it clear that the norm is
actual reinstatement. This is consistent with the
idea that any work stoppage or slowdown in
that particular industry can be detrimental to
the national interest.

In ordering payroll reinstatement in lieu of

actual reinstatement, then Acting Secretary of
Labor Jose S. Brillantes said:
Anent the Unions Motion, we find that
superseding circumstances would not
warrant the physical reinstatement of
the twelve (12) terminated employees.
Hence, they are hereby ordered placed
under payroll reinstatement until the
validity of their termination is finally
resolved.
As an exception to the rule, payroll
reinstatement must rest on special
circumstances that render actual reinstatement
impracticable or otherwise not conducive to
attaining the purposes of the law.
The superseding circumstances mentioned by
the Acting Secretary of Labor no doubt refer to
the final decision of the panel of arbitrators as
to the confidential nature of the positions of the
twelve private respondents, thereby rendering
their actual and physical reinstatement
impracticable and more likely to exacerbate the
situation. The payroll reinstatement in lieu of
actual reinstatement ordered in these cases,
therefore, appears justified as an exception to
the rule until the validity of their termination is
finally resolved. This Court sees no grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the Acting Secretary
of Labor in ordering the same. Furthermore, the
issue has not been raised by any party in this
case.

ESTATE OF NELSON R. DULAY, represented by his

wife MERRIDY JANE P. DULAY, v. ABOITIZ JEBSEN
MARITIME, INC. and GENERAL CHARTERERS, INC.
13 June 2012 | J. Peralta

FACTS: Nelson Dulay was employed by R General

Charters Inc. (subsidiary of P Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime
Inc) since 1986, intially as an ordinary seaman and later
as bosun on a contractual basis. He was detailed in P's
vessel, MV Kickapoo Belle, from 3 Sept 1999 to 19 July
2000.

13 August 2000: 25 days after the completion

of his employment contract, Nelson died due to
acute renal failure secondary to septicemia. At
the time of his death, Nelson was a bona fide
member of the Associated Marine Officers and
Seamans Union of the Philippines (AMOSUP),
GCIs collective bargaining agent. Nelsons
widow, Merridy Jane, thereafter claimed for
death benefits through the grievance procedure
of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
between AMOSUP and GCI. However, the
grievance procedure was declared deadlocked
as petitioners refused to grant the benefits
sought by the widow.
5 March 2001: Merridy Jane filed a complaint
with the NLRC Sub-Regional Arbitration Board in
General Santos City against GCI for death and
medical benefits and damages.
8 March 2001: Joven Mar, Nelsons brother,
received P20,000.00 from R pursuant to article
20(A)2 of the CBA and signed a Certification
acknowledging receipt of the amount and
releasing AMOSUP from further liability. Merridy
Jane contended that she is entitled to the
aggregate sum of Ninety Thousand Dollars
($90,000) pursuant to Article 20 (A)1 of the
CBA. Merridy Jane averred that the P20,000
already received by Joven Mar should be
considered advance payment of the total claim
of US$90,000.

LA took cognizance of the case by virtue of LC 217(a),

par. 6 and the existence of a reasonable causal
connection between the er-ee relationship & claim
asserted. It ordered payment of P4,621,3000
(equivalent of $90,000 less P20,000) at the time of
judgment. It also ruled that proximate cause of Nelson's
death was not work-related.

NLRC affirmed LA's grant of death benefits under the

CBA, but reversed the ruling re: proximate cause of
Nelson's death.

Special civil action for certiorari with CA, contending that

NLRC committed GAD in affirming jurisdiction its

jurisdiction over the case; ruling that a diff. provision of

the CBA covers the death claim; reversing LA findings
that cause of work is not work-related; setting aside the
release & quitclaim executed by the attorney-in-fact;
and not considering the P20,000 already received by
Merridy Jane through her attorney-in-fact.
CA: granted petition and referred case to the NCMB for
the designation of the Voluntary Arbitrator or
constitution of a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators for the
appropriate resolution of the issue on the matter of the
applicable CBA provision. It ruled that while the suit filed
by Merridy Jane is a money claim, the same basically
involves the interpretation and application of the
provisions in the subject CBA. As such, jurisdiction
belongs to the voluntary arbitrator and not the labor
arbiter; MR denied

ISSUE: W/N LA had jurisdiction over the case

HELD: No.

Arguments

Petitioner: Sec. 10 of RA 8042 (Migrant Workers

& Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995) vests
jurisdiction on the appropriate branches of the
NLRC to entertain disputes regarding the
interpretation of a collective bargaining
agreement involving migrant or overseas
Filipino workers; while Article 217 (c) of the
Labor Code which, in turn, confers jurisdiction
upon voluntary arbitrators over interpretation or
implementation of collective bargaining
agreements and interpretation or enforcement
of company personnel policies.
Respondents: Article 217, paragraph (c) as well
as Article 261 of the Labor Code remain to be
the governing provisions of law with respect to
unresolved grievances arising from the
interpretation and implementation of collective
bargaining agreements. Under these provisions
of law, jurisdiction remains with voluntary
arbitrators.

RATIO:
A careful reading of RA8042 would show that there is no
specific provision which provides for jurisdiction over
disputes or unresolved grievances regarding the
interpretation or implementation of a CBA. Section 10
simply speaks, in general, of claims arising out of an
employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law
or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
deployment including claims for actual, moral,
exemplary and other forms of damages.

On the other hand, Articles 217(c) and 261 of the Labor

Code are very specific in stating that voluntary
arbitrators have jurisdiction over cases arising from the
interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining
agreements.
In the present case, the basic issue raised by Merridy
Jane in her complaint filed with the NLRC is: which
provision of the subject CBA applies insofar as death
benefits due to the heirs of Nelson are concerned. The
Court agrees with the CA in holding that this issue
clearly involves the interpretation or
implementation of the said CBA. Thus, the specific
or special provisions of the Labor Code govern.

Article 13.1 of the CBA between GCI and AMOSUP

provides: "The Company and the Union agree that
in case of dispute or conflict in the interpretation
or application of any of the provisions of this
Agreement, or enforcement of Company policies,
the same shall be settled through negotiation,
conciliation or voluntary arbitration. The Company
and the Union further agree that they will use their best
endeavor to ensure that any dispute will be discussed,
resolved and settled amicably by the parties hereof
within ninety (90) days from the date of filing of the
dispute or conflict and in case of failure to settle thereof
any of the parties retain their freedom to take
appropriate action."
From the foregoing, it is clear that the parties, in the
first place, really intended to bring to conciliation or
voluntary arbitration any dispute or conflict in the
interpretation or application of the provisions of their
CBA. It is settled that when the parties have validly
agreed on a procedure for resolving grievances and to
submit a dispute to voluntary arbitration then that
procedure should be strictly observed.
Also, the above-quoted provisions of the CBA are in
consonance with Rule VII, Section 7 of the present
Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as
amended by Republic Act No. 10022, which states that
[f]or OFWs with collective bargaining agreements, the
case shall be submitted for voluntary arbitration in
accordance with Articles 261 and 262 of the Labor
Code.

Section 29 of the prevailing Standard Terms and

Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino
Seafarers on Board Ocean Going Vessels, promulgated

by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration

(POEA), provides as follows:
Section 29. Dispute Settlement Procedures.
In cases of claims and disputes arising
from this employment, the parties covered
by a collective bargaining agreement shall
submit the claim or dispute to the original
and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary
arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. If the
parties are not covered by a collective
bargaining agreement, the parties may at their
option submit the claim or dispute to either the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), pursuant
to Republic Act (RA) 8042, otherwise known as
the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act
of 1995 or to the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel
of arbitrators. If there is no provision as to the
voluntary arbitrators to be appointed by the
parties, the same shall be appointed from the
accredited voluntary arbitrators of the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board of the
Department of Labor and Employment.

The Philippine Overseas Employment

Administration (POEA) shall exercise original
and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
disciplinary action on cases, which are
administrative in character, involving or arising
out of violations of recruitment laws, rules and
regulations involving employers, principals,
contracting partners and Filipino seafarers.

With respect to disputes involving claims of

Filipino seafarers wherein the parties are covered
by a collective bargaining agreement, the dispute
or claim should be submitted to the jurisdiction of
a voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. It is
only in the absence of a collective bargaining
agreement that parties may opt to submit the
dispute to either the NLRC or to voluntary
arbitration.

The above interpretation of the DOLE, DFA and POEA is

also in consonance with the policy of the state to
promote voluntary arbitration as a mode of settling labor
disputes (Section 3, Article XIII and LC 211).

REYES vs.TRAJANO
FACTS: Public Respondent Trajano as OIC of the Bureau
of Labor Relations sustained the denial by the Med
Arbiter of the right to vote of one hundred forty-one
members of the Iglesia ni Kristo (INK), all employed in
the same company, at a certification election at which
two labor organizations were contesting the right to be
the exclusive representative of the employees in the
bargaining unit.
The certification election was authorized to be conducted
by the Bureau of Labor Relations among the employees
of Tri-Union Industries Corporation. The competing
unions were Tri-Union Employees Union-Organized Labor
Association in Line Industries and Agriculture (TUEUOLALIA), and Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied
Services (TUPAS).
The final tally of the votes showed the following results:
TUPAS 1, TUEU-OLALIA 95, NO UNION 1, SPOILED 1,
CHALLENGED 141
The challenged votes were those cast by the 141 INK
members. They were segregated and excluded from the
final count in virtue of an agreement between the
competing unions, reached at the pre-election
conference, that the INK members should not be
allowed to vote because they are not members of any
union and refused to participate in the previous
certification elections.
The INK employees promptly filed a petition to cancel
the election alleging that it was not fair and the result
thereof did not reflect the true sentiments of the
majority of the employees. TUEU-OLALIA opposed the
petition contending that the petitioners do not have
legal personality to protest the results of the election,
because they are not members of either contending
unit, but . . . of the INK which prohibits its followers, on
religious grounds, from joining or forming any labor
organization . . . .
ISSUE: W/N employees who are not part of any union
may validly exercise their right to vote in a certification
election
HELD: YES. Guaranteed to all employees or workers is
the right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist
labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of
collective bargaining. This is made plain by no less than
three provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines.
The right of self-organization includes the right to
organize or affiliate with a labor union or determine
which of two or more unions in an establishment to join,
and to engage in concerted activities with co-workers for
purposes of collective bargaining through
representatives of their own choosing, or for their
mutual aid and protection, i.e., the protection,
promotion, or enhancement of their rights and interests.

The right to form or join a labor organization

necessarily includes the right to refuse or refrain
from exercising said right. It is self-evident that
just as no one should be denied the exercise of a
right granted by law, so also, no one should be
compelled to exercise such a conferred right. The
fact that a person has opted to acquire
membership in a labor union does not preclude his
subsequently opting to renounce such
membership.
The purpose of a certification election is precisely the
ascertainment of the wishes of the majority of the
employees in the appropriate bargaining unit: to be or
not to be represented by a labor organization, and in the
affirmative case, by which particular labor organization.
If the results of the election should disclose that the
majority of the workers do not wish to be represented
by any union, then their wishes must be respected, and
no union may properly be certified as the exclusive
representative of the workers in the bargaining unit in
dealing with the employer regarding wages, hours and
other terms and conditions of employment. The minority
employees who wish to have a union represent them
in collective bargaining can do nothing but wait for
another suitable occasion to petition for a certification
election and hope that the results will be different. They
may not and should not be permitted, however, to
impose their will on the majority who do not desire to
have a union certified as the exclusive workers benefit
in the bargaining unit upon the plea that they, the
minority workers, are being denied the right of selforganization and collective bargaining.
The respondents argument that the petitioners are
disqualified to vote because they are not constituted
into a duly organized labor union but members of
the INK which prohibits its followers, on religious
grounds, from joining or forming any labor organization
and hence, not one of the unions which vied for
certification as sole and exclusive bargaining
representative, is specious. Neither law,
administrative rule nor jurisprudence requires that
only employees affiliated with any labor
organization may take part in a certification
election. On the contrary, the plainly discernible
intendment of the law is to grant the right to vote
to all bona fide employees in the bargaining unit,
whether they are members of a labor organization
or not.
Neither does the contention that petitioners should be
denied the right to vote because they did not
participate in previous certification elections in the
company for the reason that their religious beliefs do not
allow them to form, join or assist labor organizations,
persuade acceptance. No law, administrative rule or
precedent prescribes forfeiture of the right to vote by
reason of neglect to exercise the right in past
certification elections.

. PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS INC. v. PAN

AMERICAN EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (27 SCRA 1202)
Facts:
On August 25, 1965, Pan American Employees
Association filed notice of strike with the Department of
Labor and declared and maintained a strike on August
28, 1965 against Pan American World Airways. The
President of the Philippines certified to the Court of
Industrial Relations that the strike is of national interest
and both the union and the employer were called to a
conference. After several conferences, the union
asserted that it will not return to work unless its union
officers are included in the return-to-work order.
The petitioner Pan Am World Airways disagreed,
contending that the five officers not included were
conducting an illegal strike and should be dismissed
because keeping them would cause grave and
irreparable injury to it and, thus, the employees would
lose their incentive and motivation to work. They
claimed that it was illegal because there was a no-strike
clause in an existing Collective Bargaining Agreement. It
even agreed to deposit the five officers salaries even if
they were determined to be legally dismissed.
The CIR ordered the petitioner airline to return
the five officers to work while the merits of the dispute
are being determined. A motion for reconsideration was
denied.
Issue:
Whether the order to accept the five union
officers back to work is valid.
Held:
Yes, the order to return the five union officers to
work is valid.
The Court did not allow the five officers to be
excluded from work and be paid out because such an
unwarranted demand by the petitioner would deprive
the rank and file of their freedom of choice as to who
should represent them since an employer could simply
deem a union officer as irresponsible and a menace to
the working place and dismiss him. The demand, as the
Court declared, showed that the petitioner lacked
confidence in the respondent union when the collective
bargaining process itself required that confidence must
be displayed by both the employer and the employees.
In this case, the employers demand for
exclusion just because the officers went on strike and
the speculation, devoid of factual basis, that they would
lose their incentive and motivation to work impairs the
workers
right
to
self-organization
in choosing
representatives because the leaders they chose would
simply dismissed by the petitioner and could even be
viewed with suspicion because they were paid out by the
petitioner.

Samahan ng Manggagawa
Samahan, through its authorized
representative, Alfie F. Alipio, filed an application for
registration 5 of its name "Samahan ng Mga
Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard" with the
DOLE.
issued the corresponding certificate of registration6
respondent Hanjin Heavy Industries and
Construction Co., Ltd. Philippines
filed a petition7 with DOLE-Pampanga praying for the
cancellation of registration of Samahan' s association on
the ground that its members did not
fall under any of the types of workers enumerated in the
second sentence of Article 243 (now 249).
Hanjin opined that only ambulant, intermittent,
itinerant, rural workers, self-employed, and those
without definite employers may form a workers'
association. It further posited that one third (1/3) of the
members of the association had definite employers and
the continued existence and
registration of the association would prejudice the
company's goodwill.
Supplemental motion: that Samahan committed a
misrepresentation in connection with the list of members
and/or voters who took part in the
ratification of their constitution and by-laws in its
application for registration. Hanjin claimed that
Samahan made it appear that its members
were all qualified
DOLE RD: DOLE Regional Director Ernesto Bihis ruled in
favor of Hanjin.
same claim was made by Samahan in its motion to
dismiss, but it failed to adduce evidence that the
remaining 63 members were also
employees of Hanjin.
Misrepresentation: that all of its members were
employees of the former. Having a definite employer,
these 57 members should have formed a labor union for
collective bargaining.

Bureau of Labor relations:

the BLR granted Samahan's appeal and
reversed the ruling of the Regional Director. It stated
that the law clearly afforded the right to selforganization to all workers including those without
definite employers. 16 As an expression of the right to
self-organization, industrial, commercial and selfemployed workers could form a workers' association if
they so desired but subject to the limitation that it was
only for mutual aid and protection. 17 Nowhere could it
be found that to form a workers' association was
prohibited or that the exercise of a workers' right to selforganization was limited to collective bargaining.18
NO MISREPRESENTATION

CA
the CA rendered its decision, holding that the

registration of Samahan as a legitimate workers'

association was contrary to the provisions of Article 243
of the Labor Code.35 It stressed that only 57 out of the
120 members were actually working in Hanjin

ISSUE
THE COURT OF APPEALS SEfilOUSLY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT SAMAHAN CANNOT FORM A
WORKERS' ASSOCIATION OF EMPLOYEES IN HANJIN
AND INSTEAD SHOULD HA VE FORMED A UNION,
HENCE THEIR REGISTRATION AS A WORKERS'
ASSOCIATION SHOULD BE CANCELLED.
Samahan argues that the right to form a workers'
association is not exclusive to intermittent, ambulant
and itinerant workers. While the Labor
Code allows the workers "to form, join or assist labor
organizations of their own choosing" for the purpose of
collective bargaining, it does not prohibit
them from forming a labor organization simply for
purposes of mutual aid and protection.
Hanjin counters that Samahan failed to adduce sufficient
basis that all its members were employees of Hanjin or
its legitimate contractors,
Samahan reiterates its stand that workers with a definite
employer can organize any association for purposes of
mutual aid and protection. Inherent
in the workers' right to self-organization is its right to
name its own organization.

HELD:
Right to self-organization includes
right to form a union, workers '
association and labor management
councils
the right to self-organization connotes unionism.
Workers, however, can also form and join a workers'
association as well as labor-management councils
(LMC).
As Article 246 (now 252) of the Labor Code provides,
the right to self-organization includes the right to form,
join or assist labor organizations
fer the purpose of collective bargaining through
representatives of their own
choosing and to engage in lawful concerted activities for
the same purpose
for their mutual aid and protection. This is in line with
the policy of the State
to foster the free and voluntary organization of a strong
and united labor
movement as well as to make sure that workers
participate in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights, duties
and welfare.42
The right to form a union or association or to selforganization
comprehends two notions, to wit: (a) the liberty or
freedom, that is, the
absence of restraint which guarantees that the employee
may act for himself
without being prevented by law; and (b) the power, by
virtue of which an
employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining
an association. 43

In view of the revered right of every worker to selforganization, the

law expressly allows and even encourages the formation
of labor
organizations. A labor organization is defined as "any
union or association
o[ employees which exists in whole or in part for the
purpose of collective
bargaining or of dealing with employers concerning
terms and conditions of
employment."44 A labor organization has two broad
rights: (1) to bargain
collectively and (2) to deal with the employer concerning
terms and
conditions of employment. To bargain collectively is a
right given to a union
once it registers itself with the DOLE. Dealing with the
employer, on the
other hand, is a generic description of interaction
between employer and
employees concerning grievances, wages, work hours
and other terms and
conditions of employment, even if the employees' group
is not registered
with the DOLE.45
A union refers to any labor organization in the private
sector
organized for collective bargaining and for other
legitimate purpose, 46 while
a workers' association is an organization of workers
formed for the mutual
aid and protection of its members or for any legitimate
purpose other than
collective bargaining.47
Many associations or groups of employees, or even
combinations of
only several persons, may qualify as a labor organization
yet fall short of
constituting a labor union. While every labor union is a
labor organization,
not every labor organization is a labor union. The
difference is one of
organization, composition and operation.48
Collective
a common element
between unionism and the formation of LMCs is the
existence of an
employer-employee relationship. Where neither party is
an employer nor an
employee of the other, no duty to bargain collectively
would exist.52 In the
is the requirement that
such workers be employed in the establishment before
they can participate in
policy and decision making processes.
In contrast, the existence of employer-employee
relationship is not
mandatory in the formation of workers' association.
What the law simply
requires is that the members of the workers' association,
at the very least,
share the same interest.

Right to choose whether to form or

join a union or workers' association
belongs to workers themselves

The right to form or join a labor organization necessarily

includes the
right to refuse or refrain from exercising the said right.
by law, so
also, no one should be compelled to exercise such a
conferred right. 53 Also
inherent in the right to self-organization is the right to
choose whether to
form a union for purposes of collective bargaining or a
workers' association
for purposes of providing mutual aid and protection.
The right to self-organization, however, is subject to
certain
limitations as provided by law. For instance, the Labor
Code specifically
disallows managerial employees from joining, assisting
or forming any labor
union. Meanwhile, supervisory employees, while eligible
for membership in
labor organizations, are proscribed from joining the
collective bargaining
unit of the rank and file employees. 54
Hanjin posits that the members of Samahan have
definite employers,
hence, they should have formed a union instead of a
workers' association.
The Court disagrees. There is no provision in the Labor
Code that states that
employees with definite employers may form, join or
assist unions only.
because they are not covered by the
second sentence of Article 243
Ambulant, intermittent and itinerant workers,
selfemployed
people, rural workers and those without any definite
employers may form labor organizations for their mutual
aid and
protection. (As
Article 243 should be read together with Rule 2 of
Department Order (D. 0.) No. 40-03, Series of 2003,
All other workers, including ambulant, intermittent and
other workers, the self-employed, rural workers and
those without
any definite employers may form labor organizations for
their
mutual aid and protection and other legitimate purposes
except
collective bargaining.
[Emphases Supplied]
Clearly, there is nothing in the foregoing implementing
rules which
provides that workers, with definite employers, cannot
form or join a
workers' association for mutual aid and protection.
Section 2 thereof even
broadens the coverage of workers who can form or join
a workers'

association. Thus, the Court agrees with Samahan's

argument that the right
to form a workers' association is not exclusive to
ambulant, intermittent and
itinerant workers. The option to form or join a union or a
workers'
association lies with the workers themselves, and
whether they have definite
employers or not.
No misrepresentation on the part
of Samahan to warrant cancellation
of registration
Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that
misrepresentation, to
be a ground for the cancellation of the certificate of
registration, must be
done maliciously and deliberately.
no deliberate or malicious intent to
commit misrepresentation on the part of Samahan. The
use of such words
"KAMI, ang mga Manggagawa sa HANJIN Shipyard" in
the preamble of the
constitution and by-laws did not constitute
misrepresentation so as to
warrant the cancellation of Samahan's certificate of
registration.
Neither was there any showing that the alleged

misrepresentation was serious in character

Removal of the word "Hanjin Shipyard"

from the association 's name, however,
does not infringe on Samahan 's right to
self-organization
Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the BLR that "Hanjin
Shipyard"
must be removed in the name of the association. A
legitimate workers'
association refers to an association of workers organized
for mutual aid and
protection of its members or for any legitimate purpose
other than collective
bargaining registered with the DOLE. 59 Having been
granted a certificate of
registration, Samahan's association is now recognized by
law as a legitimate
workers' association.
it would be misleading for the members of
Samahan to use "Hanjin Shipyard" in its name as it
could give the wrong
impression that all of its members are employed by
Hanjin.