PCGG vs SANDIGANBAYAN

GR NO 151805 (2005)
FACTS:
In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company
(GENBANK)
encountered
financial
difficulties.
GENBANK had extended considerable financial support
to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur
daily overdrawings on its current account with Central
Bank. Despite the mega loans GENBANK failed to
recover from its financial woes. The Central Bank issued
a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable
to resume business with safety to its depositors,
creditors and the general public, and ordering its
liquidation. A public bidding of GENBANKs assets was
held where Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid.
Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with
the CFI praying for the assistance and supervision of the
court in GENBANKs liquidation as mandated by RA 265.
After EDSA Revolution I Pres Aquino established the
PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former
Pres Marcos, his family and cronies. Pursuant to this
mandate, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a
complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution
against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG issued
several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly
acquired by them by taking advantage of their close
relationship and influence with former Pres. Marcos. The
abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are represented
as their counsel, former Solicitor General Mendoza.
PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza
as counsel for respondents Tan et. al. with
Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza as then
Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively intervened
in the liquidation of GENBANK which was subsequently
acquired by respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently
became Allied Banking Corporation. The motions to
disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the
Code
of Professional Responsibility which prohibits former
government lawyers from accepting engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in the said service. The
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyting PCGGs
motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It failed to
prove the existence of an inconsistency between
respondent Mendozas former function as SolGen and
his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan
group. PCGGs recourse to this court assailing the
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE:
Whether
Rule
6.03
of
the
Code
of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent
Mendoza. The prohibition states: A lawyer shall not,
after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he
had intervened while in the said service.
HELD:
The case at bar does not involve the adverse
interest aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is
conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he

acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of respondents

et.al. before the Sandiganbayan. However there is still
the issue of whether there exists a congruent-interest
conflict sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from
representing respondents et. al. The key is unlocking the
meaning of matter and the metes and bounds of
intervention that he made on the matter. Beyond doubt
that the matter or the act of respondent Mendoza as
SolGen involved in the case at bar is advising
the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said
banks liquidation and even filing the petition for its
liquidation in CFI of Manila. The Court held that the
advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure
to liquidate GENBANK is not the matter contemplated
by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing that
drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency
procedures, regulations and laws, or briefing abstract
principles of law are acts which do not fall within the
scope of the term matter and cannot disqualify.
Respondent Mendoza had nothing to do with the
decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. He
also did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied
Bank. The legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not
an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the
jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include
the dissolution and liquidation of banks. Thus, the Code
6.03 of the Code ofProfessional Responsibility cannot
apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged
intervention while SolGen is an intervention on a matter
different from the matter involved in the Civil case of
sequestration. In the metes and bounds of the
intervention. The applicable meaning as the term is
used in the Code ofProfessional Ethics is that it is an act
of a person who has the power to influence
the subject proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied
by the Code do not exist where the government lawyer
does not act which can be considered as innocuous
such as drafting, enforcing, or interpreting government
or agency procedures, regulations or laws or briefing
abstract principles of law. The court rules that the
intervention of Mendoza is not significant and
substantial. He merely petitions that the court gives
assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. The role of
court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to
assist theCentral Bank in determining the claims of
creditors. In such a proceeding the role of the SolGen is
not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest
of
government.
Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is
denied.
Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:
Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics: A lawyer, having
once held public office or having been in the public
employ, should not after his retirement accept
employment in connection with any matter which he has
investigated or passed upon while in such office or
employ.

Indeed,
the
restriction
against
a
public official from using his public position as a vehicle
to promote or advance his private interests extends
beyond his tenure on certain matters in which he
intervened as a public official. Rule 6.03 makes this
restriction specifically applicable to lawyers who once
held public office. A plain reading shows that the
interdiction 1. applies to a lawyer who once served in the
government and 2. relates to his accepting engagement
or employment in connection with any matter in which
he had intervened while in the service
IN RE: MELING, B.M. NO. 1154
JUNE 8, 2004
In the matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee,
Haron S. Meiling in the 2002 bar examinations and for
disciplinary action as member of Philippine Shari'a Bar,
Melendrez.
FACTS:
MELENDREZ filed with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling
(Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to
impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a
member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.
Alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take
the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending
criminal cases both for Grave Oral Defamation and for
Less Serious Physical Injuries.
Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words
against Melendrez and his wife in front of media
practitioners and other people.
Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face
of Melendrez wife causing the injuries to the latter.
Alleges that Meling has been using the title
Attorney in his communications, as Secretary to the
Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a
member of the Bar.
MELING explains that he did not disclose the
criminal cases because retired Judge Corocoy Moson,
their former professor, advised him to settle
misunderstanding.
Believing in good faith that the case would be
settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy
over them, considered the three cases that arose from a
single incident as closed and terminated.
Denies the charges and added that the acts do
not involve moral turpitude.
Use of the title Attorney, Meling admits that
some of his communications really contained the word
Attorney as they were typed by the office clerk.

Office of Bar Confidant disposed of the charge of

non-disclosure against Meling:
Meling should have known that only the court of
competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired
judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against
Meling are still pending.
Even if these cases were already dismissed, he is
still required to disclose the same for the Court to
ascertain his good moral character.
ISSUE:
WON Melings act of concealing cases constitutes
dishonesty. YES.
HELD:
PETITION
IS GRANTED.
MEMBERSHIP
IS
SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the
suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as
the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from
taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of
Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is
DISMISSED for having become moot and academic
(Meling did not pass the bar).
Rule 7.01: A lawyer shall be answerable for
knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a
material fact in connection with his application for
admission to the bar.
He is aware that he is not a member of the Bar,
there was no valid reason why he signed as attorney
whoever may have typed the letters. Unauthorized use
of the appellation attorney may render a person liable
for indirect contempt of court.
PRACTICE OF LAW IS A HIGH PERSONAL
PRIVILEGE.
Limited to citizens of good moral character, with
special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and
certified.
Requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of
greater importance so far as the general public and the
proper administration of justice are concerned, than the
possession of legal learning.
Application form of 2002 Bar Examinations requires
the applicant that applicant to aver that he or she has
not been charged with any act or omission punishable by
law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or
administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or
convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or
crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending
case or charge against him/her.
Meling did not reveal that he has three pending
criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes
concealment, done under oath at that

IN RE: EDILLON 84 SCRA 554

FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly
licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The
IBP Board of Governors recommended to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys
for
stubborn
refusal
to
pay
his membership dues assailing the provisions of the
Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section
24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the
organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and
suspension
for
failure
to
pay
the
same.
Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an
invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is
being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status
as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP
and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a
consequence of this compelled financial support of the
said organization to which he is admitted personally
antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty
and properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution.
Hence, the respondent concludes the above provisions
of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of
no
legal
force
and
effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty.
Edillion to pay his membership fee to the IBP.
HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar
which every lawyer must be a member of as
distinguished
from bar
associations in
which membershipis merely optional and voluntary. All
lawyers are subject to comply with the rules prescribed
for the governance of the Bar including payment a
reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The
Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues
and it is not in violation of his constitutional freedom to
associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to
associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the
meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse
to vote in its election as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of
annual dues. The Supreme Court in order to further the
States legitimate interest in elevating the quality
of professional legal services, may require thet the cost
of
the
regulatory
program

the
lawyers.

Court has jurisdiction over matters of admission,

suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers
and their regulation as part of its inherent judicial
functions and responsibilities thus the court may compel
all members of the Integrated Bar to pay their annual
dues.

SANTOS VS LLAMAS
AC NO 4749, JAN 20, 2000
FACTS:
Atty. Francisco Llamas was complained of not paying his
IBP dues.He was also cited in the complaint as not
paying his professional tax or PTR as it was
intermittently indicated in his pleadings filed in court. It
was also an alleged falsity when he included his IBPRizal 259060 where in fact he was not in good standing.
Petitioner cited that Atty. Llamas was dismissed as
Pasay City Judge. But later revealed that the decision
was reversed and he was subsequently promoted as
RTC Judge of Makati. He also had criminal case
involving estafabut was appealed pending in the Court of
Appeals. In the numerous violations of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, he expressed willingness to
settle the IBP dues and plea for a more temperate
application of the law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Llamas is guilty of violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
YES. Respondent was suspended from the practice of
law for one (1) year, or until he has paid his IBP dues.
RATIO:
Even if he had limited practice of law, it does not
relieve him of the duties such as payment of IBP dues.
Rule 139-A provides:
Sec. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to
the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and
default in such payment for one year shall be a ground
for the removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys.
Under the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police

power of the State. The right to practice law before the
courts of this country should be and is a
matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the power
to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize
then a penalty designed to enforce its payment is not
void as unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,

dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any court; nor shall he mislead or
allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

by a promise of better service, good result or reduced

fees for his services. By recruiting Atty. Linsangans
clients, Atty. Tolentino committed an unethical, predatory
overstep into anothers legal practice.
LINSANGAN VS. TOLENTINO
A.C. NO. 6672, SEPTEMBER 4, 2009
598 SCRA 133 Legal Ethics Unethical Solicitation of
Legal Business
In 2005, Atty. Pedro Linsangan filed an administrative
complaint against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino alleging that
Atty. Tolentino, through his paralegal Fe Marie Labiano,
pirated a client of Atty. Linsangan. Said client later
executed an affidavit in support of Atty. Linsangans
allegations.
Atty. Linsangan also questioned the propriety of
Labianos calling card which appears as follows:
FRONT
NICOMEDES
LAW OFFICE

TOLENTINO

CONSULTANCY
&
MARITIME
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe
Paralegal

Marie

L.

SERVICES
Labiano

BACK
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION
AND
ASSISTANCE
TO
OVERSEAS
SEAMEN
REPATRIATED
DUE
TO
ACCIDENT,
INJURY,
ILLNESS,
SICKNESS,
DEATH
AND
INSURANCE
BENEFIT
CLAIMS
ABROAD.

2. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rules 1.03, 2.03, and

16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Although Atty. Tolentino initially denied knowing Labiano,
he admitted he actually knew her later in the
proceedings. It is thus clear that Labiano was connected
to his law office. Through Labianos actions, Atty.
Tolentinos law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen
were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of
Labianos word that Atty. Tolentino could produce a more
favorable result.
Labianos calling card is improper. The card made it
appear that the law office will finance legal actions for
the clients. The rule is, a lawyer shall not lend money to
a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to
advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is
handling for the client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers
independence of mind so that the free exercise of his
judgment may not be adversely affected. It seeks to
ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling
as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the clients
cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in
connection with the clients case, the lawyer in effect
acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or
an additional stake in its outcome. Either of these
circumstances may lead the lawyer to consider his own
recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a
settlement which may take care of his interest in the
verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his
duty of undivided fidelity to the clients cause.
The phrase in the calling card which states w/ financial
assistance, was clearly used to entice clients (who
already had representation) to change counsels with a
promise of loans to finance their legal actions.

ISSUES:

However, since there is no substantial evidence to prove

that Atty. Tolentino had a personal and direct hand in the
printing of said calling cards, he cannot be punished with
severity. At any rate, for all the infractions Atty. Tolentino
committed, he was suspended by the Supreme Court for
one year

1. Whether or not Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino encroached

upon the professional services of Atty. Pedro Linsangan.

NOE-LACSAMANA VS BUSMENTE
AC NO 7269, NOVEMBER 23, 2011

2. Whether or not Atty. Tolentino is liable for the improper

calling card of Labiano.

HUEYSUWAN VS FLORIDO
AC NO 5624, JANUARY 20, 2004

HELD:

ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK VS CA

GR NO 123698, AUGUST 5, 1998

In his defense, Atty. Tolentino denied knowing Labiano.

He also denied authorizing the printing of such calling
cards.

1. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rule 8.02 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility. A lawyer should not steal
another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him

This is the second time petitioner Eternal Gardens

Memorial Park Corporation has come to this Court

assailing the execution of the judgment dated August 24,
1989, rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City in Civil Case No. C-9297. Apparently, hope springs
eternal for petitioner, considering that the issues raised
in this second petition for review are but mere
reiterations of previously settled issues which have
already attained finality. We now write finis to this
controversy which has dragged on for seventeen (17)
years (funny!)

I.

II.

Facts
In 1981, respondent-spouses Jose Seelin and Lilia
Sevilla Seelin filed a complaint against Central
Dyeing & Finishing Corporation for quieting of title
and for declaration of nullity of Transfer Certificate of
Title in the RTC of Caloocan. RTC rendered the title
void.
Being final and executory, spouses Seelin moved for
execution which was granted by the lower court. It
also filed for a writ of possession, which was
opposed by Eternal Gardens contending that it was
unaware of the suit against Central Dyeing, and that
it was the true owner of the lot having bought it from
Central Dyeing in good faith.
But since it bought the lot from Central Dyeing, the
judgment of the RTC is binding to it, being the
successor-in-interest.
Petitioner went to the CA, which dismissed the case
affirming the RTC judgment citing Section 20, Rule
3, Revised Rules of Court, which states that a
transferee pendente lite does not have to be
included or impleaded by name in order to be bound
by the judgment because the action or suit may be
continued for or against the original party or the
transferor and still be binding on the transferee.
The petitioners filed for a motion of reconsideration
which was denied. Then, they brought it to the SC,
which upheld the CA decision.
For the second time, petitioners filed for
reconsideration with the CA stating that that the
decision of the trial court in said case never
mandated Central Dyeing to deliver possession of
the property to the private respondents; that certain
facts and circumstances which occurred after the
finality of the judgment will render the execution
highly unjust, illegal and inequitable; that the
issuance of the assailed writ of execution violates
the lot buyers freedom of religion and worship; and
that private respondents title is being questioned in
another case.
Hence, the case in the SCagain.
Issues
?

III.
Held
Petition must fail.
Petitioners fear that the grave lots will be disturbed,

desecrated and destroyed once the execution of the

judgment proceeds is more imagined than real. A
perusal of the Orders of the trial court with regard to
the execution of the judgment reveals that the
interests of said burial lot owners have been taken
into account by the trial court when it took steps and
made suggestions as to how their rights could be
amply protected.
"The court directs and orders the defendant to give
access to the plaintiffs and as proposed by the
plaintiffs, they are given authority to destroy a small
portion of the fence so that they can have access to
the property. But as to the demolition of the burial
lots, negotiation could be made by the defendant
with the former owner so that cash payment or cash
settlement be made.
that the enforcement of the writ of possession and
break open order should be applied only to the gate
of Eternal Gardens Memorial Park at the eastern
side nearest to the parcel of land in question where
the factory of the defendant is located, in order to
avoid disturbing the peace of the resting souls over
the graves spread over the parcels of land within the
said memorial park."

IN RE ALMACEN
GR NO L-27654, FEBUARY 18, 1970
IV.

Legprof

We note that while lawyers owe entire devotion to the

interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their
client's right, they should not forget that they are officers
of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice.
I.
Facts
Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia
Yaptinchay in a civil case. They lost in said civil case but
Almacen filed a Motion for Reconsideration. He notified
the opposing party of said motion but he failed to
indicate the time and place of hearing of said motion.
Hence, his motion was denied. He then appealed but the
Court of Appeals denied his appeal as it agreed with the
trial court with regard to the motion for reconsideration.
Eventually, Almacen filed an appeal on certiorari before
the Supreme Court which outrightly denied his appeal in
a minute resolution.

This earned the ire of Almacen who called such minute

resolutions as unconstitutional. He then filed before the
Supreme Court a petition to surrender his lawyers
certificate of title as he claimed that it is useless to
continue practicing his profession when members of the
high court are men who are calloused to pleas for
justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable

decisions and commit culpable violations of the

Constitution with impunity. He further alleged that due to
the minute resolution, his client was made to pay P120k
without knowing the reasons why and that he became
one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of
hypocrisy. He also stated that justice as administered
by the present members of the Supreme Court is not
only blind, but also deaf and dumb.
The Supreme Court did not immediately act on
Almacens petition as the Court wanted to wait for
Almacen to ctually surrender his certificate. Almacen did
not surrender his lawyers certificate though as he now
argues that he chose not to. Almacen then asked that he
may be permitted to give reasons and cause why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him . . . in an
open and public hearing. He said he preferred this
considering that the Supreme Court is the complainant,
prosecutor and Judge. Almacen was however
unapologetic.
Issue: Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined.
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that
minute resolutions are needed because the Supreme
Court cannot accept every case or write full opinion for
every petition they reject otherwise the High Court would
be unable to effectively carry out its constitutional duties.
The proper role of the Supreme Court is to decide only
those cases which present questions whose resolutions
will have immediate importance beyond the particular
facts and parties involved. It should be remembered
that a petition to review the decision of the Court of
Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial
discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the
courts denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are
already mentioned in the Court of Appeals opinion.
On Almacens attack against the Supreme Court,
the High Court regarded said criticisms as uncalled for;
that such is insolent, contemptuous, grossly
disrespectful and derogatory. It is true that a lawyer, both
as an officer of the court and as a citizen, has the right to
criticize in properly respectful terms and through
legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. His
right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in
a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of
the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been
encouraged by the courts. But it is the cardinal condition
of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall
not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.
Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of
the duty of respect to courts.
In the case at bar, Almacens criticism is
misplaced. As a veteran lawyer, he should have known
that a motion for reconsideration which failed to notify
the opposing party of the time and place of trial is a mere

scrap of paper and will not be entertained by the court.

He has only himself to blame and he is the reason why
his client lost. Almacen was suspended indefinitely.

WICKER VS ARCANGEL
GR NO 112869, JANUARY 29, 1996
4.) Kelly R. Wicker et. al vs. hon. Paul T. Arcangel G.R.
No. 112869. Jan. 29, 1996. 252 SCRA 444 PONENTE:
Mendoza FACTS: It appears that on Nov 18, 1993,
Wicker's counsel, Atty. Rayos, filed a motion seeking the
inhibition of the respondent Judge Arcangel from the
case. Respondent judge found offense in the allegations
on the motion for inhibition filed by complainants, and in
an order, held them guilty of direct contempt and
sentenced each to suffer imprisonment for five (5) days
and to pay a fine of P100.00. Petitioners filed a motion
for reconsideration, which respondent judge denied for
lack of merit in his order of Dec 17, 1993. HELD: The
power to punish for contempt is to be exercised on the
preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only
occasionally should it be invoked to preserve that
respect without which the administration of justice will
fail. Consistent with the foregoing principles and based
on the abovementioned facts, the Court sustains Judge
Arcangel's finding that petitioners are guilty of contempt.
Atty. Rayos, however, cannot evade responsibility for the
allegations in question. As a lawyer, he is not just an
instrument of his client. His client came to him for
professional assistance in the representation of a cause,
and while he owed him whole-souled devotion, there
were bounds set by his responsibility as a lawyer which
he could not overstep. Based on Canon 11 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Rayos bears as
much responsibility for the contemptuous allegations in
the motion for inhibition as his client. Atty. Rayos' duty to
the courts is not secondary to that of his client. The
Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins him to
"observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and
to judicial officers and [to] insist on similar conduct by
others" and "not [to] attribute to a Judge motives not
supported by the record or have materiality to the case."
RE: LETTER OF UP LAW FACULTY
AM NO 10-10-4-SC, MARCH 8, 2011
Statement of UP Professors. While the statement was
meant to reflect the educators opinion on the allegations
of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated
such allegation not only as an established fact, but a
truth. They expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del
Castillos explanation on how he cited the primary
sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a
contrary conclusion to those of the authors of the articles
supposedly plagiarized. The statement bore certain
remarks which raise concern for the Court. The first
paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in

Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act

of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest
Court of the land. The authors also not only assumed
that Justice Del Castillo committed plagiarism, they went
further by directly accusing the Court of perpetrating
extraordinary injustice by dismissing the petition of the
comfort women in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. They
further attempt to educate this Court on how to go about
the review of the case. The insult to the members of the
Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately
delaying the resolution of the said case, its dismissal on
the basis of polluted sources, the Courts alleged
indifference to the cause of petitioners, as well as the
supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of
the Court for even the most basic values of decency and
respect.

of the controversy,
punishable.

is contempt of

The publication of a statement by the faculty of the

UP College of Law regarding the allegations of
plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Supreme Court
was totally unnecessary, uncalled for and a rash act of
misplaced vigilance. Of public knowledge is the ongoing
investigation precisely to determine the truth of such
allegations. More importantly, the motion for
reconsideration of the decision alleged to contain
plagiarized materials is still pending before the Court.
We made it clear in the case of In re Kelly that any
publication, pending a suit, reflecting upon the court, the
jury, the parties, the officers of the court, the counsel with
reference to the suit, or tending to influence the decision

NUNEZ VS ATTY RICAFORT

AC NO 5054, MAY 29, 2002

court

and

is

The UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite

resentment against a resolution that would not reverse
the Vinuya decision. This runs contrary to their obligation
as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first
to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which
they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken
as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Re: Letter of the UP Law
Faculty entitled Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the
Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of
Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court, A.M. No. 1010-4-SC. October 19, 2010.

SANTIAGO VS ATTY RAFANAN

AC NO 6252, OCT 5, 2004
LANTORIA VS ATTY. BUNYI
AC NO 1769, JUNE 8, 1992
ESTRADA VS SANDIGANBAYAN
GR NOS 159486-88, NOVEMBER 25, 2003