Soriao vs.

Pineda (Not sure if Soriano or Soriao)

CA-G.R. SP No. 31546 August 10, 1994
Facts: Louie Soriao was a high school student in the sub province of Dinalungan, Aurora
(S.Y. 1993 to 1994). Due to his reputation of talking back to school authority during the past
years, he was refused readmission to complete his fourth and final year of high school through
a verbal notice not to readmit.
Soriao questioned the notice, averring that he was deprived of a hearing on the matter and thus
the verbal notice was a denial of his right to due process. The administration ignored the
students plea to reconsider its decision to deny him readmission claiming, it was their
prerogative. Seeking further remedies to no avail, Soriao filed a petition for certiorari to the
CA.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner was denied his right to education.
Ruling: YES. The Court of Appeals ordered Pineda, Head Teacher of the Juan C. Angara
Memorial High School to allow Soriao to enroll and study after he was meted out a
disciplinary action without due process. The Court of Appeals invoked the 1987 Constitution
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article XIV, Sections 1 and 2 and Article II,
Sections 13 and 17 of the 1987 Constitution provide:
Article XIV, Section 1: The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality
education at all levels, and shall take appropriate steps to make such education accessible to
all.
Section 2: The State shall:
(1) Establish, maintain, and support a complete, adequate, and integrated system of
education relevant to the needs of the people and society;
(2) Establish and maintain, a system of free public education in the elementary and high
school levels. Without limiting the natural right of parents to rear their children,
elementary education is compulsory for all children of school age;
(3) Establish and maintain a system of scholarship grants, student loan programs,
subsidies, and other incentives which shall be available to deserving students in both
public and private schools, especially to the under-privileged;
(4) Encourage non-formal, informal, and indigenous learning system, as well as selfstudy programs particularly those that respond to community needs; and
(5) Provide adult citizens, the disabled, and out-of-school youth with training in civics,
vocational efficiency, and other skills.

Also since it is the Constitution which granted petitioner the right of education, he may only
deprived of such right with due process of law as stated in Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987
Constitution, No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws.
Oposa vs Factoran (G.R. No. 101083

July 30, 1993)

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful
ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "intergenerational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the
issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or
impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's
vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66
(Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region.
The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented
and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine
Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized
for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our
environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C.
Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2
was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the
Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of
the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed
for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource
but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors
further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4
Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to
(1)

Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;

(2)
Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
timber license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5

Article II, Section 13: The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and
shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social well-being. It
shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and encourage their involvement in
public and civic affairs.
Section 17: The State shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture,
and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total
human liberation and development.

The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100
islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush
and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be
found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable;
they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and
flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a
balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a
ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural,
residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this

balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies,

such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the
"aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result
of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the
island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the
consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded
estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum approximately the size of
the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the country's unique,
rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities,
including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and
seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical
reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently
experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from
the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from
the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the
lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying
water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction
of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and
catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as
the "greenhouse effect."

12.
At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25
hectares per hour nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included the Philippines
will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and
deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted
as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present
expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the
trial.

16.
Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On
March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits
in the country.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

17.
Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing
serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

13.
The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage
of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations
yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages
enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the
generation of plaintiff adults.
14.
The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs
especially plaintiff minors and their successors who may never see, use, benefit from and
enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource
property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
15.
Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology
and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.

A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".

CAUSE OF ACTION
7.

Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8.
Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares
of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9.
Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million
hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.
10.
More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth
rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about
3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11.
Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license
agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares
for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex
"A".

18.
The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act
violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country
that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous
cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with.
19.
Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the
public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states
that it is the policy of the State
(a)
to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature
can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b)
to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos and;
(c)
to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of
dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20.
Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is
contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to

a.
effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and
"make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the
Constitution);
b.

"protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);

c.
"conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section
14, Article XIV, id.);
d.
"protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in
accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21.
Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind the natural
law and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
22.
There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant
action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against
him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to
the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the
Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause
of action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it
involves the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to
dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states no
cause of action against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent
Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of
contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground
that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the
parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter
in this case. 8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it
contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles
19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No.
192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in

Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and selfperpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative
obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful
environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of
discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging
than what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause,
petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts.
They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is
well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a
specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by
law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an
"environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state
in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid
cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be
permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the
executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners'
resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill
that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be
done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a
certain period of time usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same
can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and
hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations.
Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite
hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners
instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present
respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil
case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general
interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties
are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them
before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and
representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the
requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an
incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they
represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling
that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations,
file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be

based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such
rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve
that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a
little differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the
same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the
generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the
merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and
evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to
find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent
portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx

xxx

xxx

After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree
with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all
intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they
are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and
redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with
vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to
state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political
color and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court
without doing violence to the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) coequal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our
jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber
license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would
amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with
sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and
that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data.
A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly

incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly
provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the
same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of
Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less
important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right
belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than selfpreservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the
advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the
fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights
to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the
Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the
state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day
would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also
for those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain
from impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary
sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between
Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the
section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution air,
water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the
correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for
impairment of environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation
of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to
health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation,
development and utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C.
Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates
that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government
agency responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the
country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral,
resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain,
as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by law
in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the
present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement
of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the
sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and
enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the different segments
of the population to the development and the use of the country's natural resources, not only
for the present generation but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to
recognize and apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications
relative to their utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative
Code of 1987, 15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino
people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of
maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment and the objective of making the exploration, development and utilization of such
natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future
generations.
(2)
The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into
account social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources.

Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will
serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the
DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific
statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future
generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No.
1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of
the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature
can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social,
economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to
insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and
well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and
guardian of the environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other
hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful
ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and
functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance
the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to
respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the
granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their
right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no
further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its
essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and
act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right. 18

Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be
primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the
complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution
involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be
considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the
truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case
is: admitting such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance
with the prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the
rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a
motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to
manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what
the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal
order. The law itself stands in disrepute."

(2)
It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's
constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and
conservation of the country's natural resources.

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the
introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading
CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the
other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular
reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section
provides:

their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed
for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there
is the need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable
parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy
formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not
squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis
policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized
that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of
judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from
judicial inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A.
Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the
settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents
a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before
forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the
power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and
to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse
of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a
very elastic phrase that can expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive.
The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in
nature, we would still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII,
Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment
of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:

We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a
sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious
reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he
would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and
unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have
forever bound the Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and
conditions regardless of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He
was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be
read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify,
replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege
granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a
contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution.
In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is
not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege,
which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in
this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a
contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom
it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it
taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create
irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive
Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare
is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the
State to qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the
particular concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended,
modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require.
Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See
Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry,
G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:

The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our
jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber
license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would
amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24

Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27

cannot be invoked.

In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case
does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or
modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be
invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed mandating
cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the nonimpairment clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have
only been passed in the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing
the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and
enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The
same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of
public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of nonimpairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the
State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine
American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, 30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally
matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of
governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for
government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his
fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the
private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could
apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no
contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to
renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the
challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is
hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Separate Opinions

FELICIANO, J., concurring

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case
which, to my mind, is one of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few

years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence profoundly the
direction and course of the protection and management of the environment, which of course
embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have
therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the
bringing and, maintenance of this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of
petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I understand locus standi to
refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because
of the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved membership in this "class"
appears to embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the
future it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to benefit from the course of
action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus
standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the
field of environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly
concerned and the private persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity
involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any and all
circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the
governmental agency concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative
remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future determination in
an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific
fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14).
There is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is "fundamental" and
that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in character,
I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing
excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more
comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than a right to "a balanced and healthful
ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears to be
entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from
factories and motor vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage
into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines and whole
communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and
thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or
slash-and-burn farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources
through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other chemicals; contamination of ground water
resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed
out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title
XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 all
appear to be formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional statements of
basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right to a balanced and healthful ecology") and
15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon
the other hand, a compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies"
and "environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an
extremely wide range of topics:
(a)

air quality management;

(b)

water quality management;

(c)

land use management;

(d)

natural resources management and conservation embracing:

(i)

fisheries and aquatic resources;

(ii)

wild life;

(iii)

forestry and soil conservation;

(iv)

flood control and natural calamities;

(v)

energy development;

(vi)

conservation and utilization of surface and ground water

least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been violated or
disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to
defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process
dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation of law or applicable
regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded
conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Constitution which reads:
Section 1.. . .

(vii) mineral resources

Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court
has identified the particular provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment
Code which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce.
Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular
government agency charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and
programs dealing with each of the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The
Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate action on the
part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right
comprised in the constitutional statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that
Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and judicially
enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be
explored in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be
hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific
legal right a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II
(15) of the Constitution that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed
to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment
granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as
simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of
law, considering the general policy principles found in the Constitution and the existence of
the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an
effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to
dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of
action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and
"the right to health" are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully
submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy making. At
least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and management, our courts have
no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional qualification. Where
no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making
departments the legislative and executive departments must be given a real and effective
opportunity to fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them
before the courts should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession
agreements or TLA's petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded
in the proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief
demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of one or more of
the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners
implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they
may seek to dispute the existence of the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as
the reality of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights and the
claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative agency. They may
also controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under
all the circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including
the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out
in the Court's decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer examination.
Stonehill vs Diokno (G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967)
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 hereinafter
referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors several judges2 hereinafter referred to as
Respondents-Judges issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against
petitioners herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any

peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices,
warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal
property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or
"used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in
the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs
Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the
Constitution and the Rules of Court because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with
particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in
the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the
aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and
seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money
seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in
accordance with law on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this
original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending
final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining
Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as
aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in
due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and
declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or
representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the
Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the
search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are
valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any,
were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible
in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned
searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the
petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved,
insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above
mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents
and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the
offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of
petitioners herein.

As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest
of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8
Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose
rights have been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is
purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein
may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things
seized from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to
object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to
whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in
proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to the corporation
did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers were unlawfully
seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they were the rights of
the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the
lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose rights have been invaded. Certainly,
such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of defendants whose
property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could
they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any,
was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511.
It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged
unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the personal defendants but embraces only the
corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States,
[1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein,
the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction
previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein RespondentsProsecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be
settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures
made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding
question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in
evidence against petitioners herein.1wph1.t
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general
warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and
void. In this connection, the Constitution 13 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that
no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner
set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be
seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the
same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named
had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the
existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that
the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific
omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the
applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein
petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a
"violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the aforementioned applications without reference to
any determinate provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the
most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the
domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims
caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the
constitutional provision above quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not
difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in
power feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of
Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not
satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search
warrants was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for
and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all
business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and
loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal.
The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill
of Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to
defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.

Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain
that, even if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the
documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein.
Upon mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken
in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common
law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has
blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully
obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages against the searching officer, against
the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the
execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an
unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually
adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge
Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has
been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official
may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution
which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that
wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be
secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are
concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their
officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the
sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have
resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same
Federal Court. 20 After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs.
Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of
privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are led
by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official
lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee
against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the
same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then

just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and
seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and underserving of mention in a perpetual
charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from state
invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus
with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high
regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the Court held
in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the
cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth
Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its provisions. Even
Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when conceded operatively
enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction
upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent under the Boyd,
Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due
process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches state or federal it was logically and
constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine an essential part of the right to
privacy be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the
Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate
denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence
which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise
is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the
Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to deter to compel
respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way by removing
the incentive to disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of
constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once recognized that
the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and
that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore
constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise.
Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured by
its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police
officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our
decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the
Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law
enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true
administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the
applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the
commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is
no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law.
Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the
Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the
warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of
fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative
of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search
warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the

constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in
general, committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the
minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under
which the minority usually but, understandably finds itself in prosecuting agents of the
majority, one must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the
possibility 21 of securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the
party for whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated
June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House
No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the
Army-Navy Club, should be included among the premises considered in said Resolution as
residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl
Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the
offices of the corporations above referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners
and other effects under their exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which they
have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United
States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control
over the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof,
has Been Advanced, not in their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for
Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said
theory would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach
intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the
affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or
submitted in support thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent
with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for
reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted
in support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in
the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed,
should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion
thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the
future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby,
abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures
therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in
connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of
herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as
the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are
concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as
it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as
regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices
and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to
costs.

CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:

From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and from the
import of the deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the following distinct
conclusions:
1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this case are
general warrants and are therefore proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of section 1
of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;
2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search warrants were
consequently illegal;
3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1, should be, and is
declared, abandoned;
4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners are expressly declared
null and void the searches and seizures therein made are expressly declared illegal; and the
writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued against the use of the documents, papers and
effect seized in the said residences is made permanent; and
5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily demonstrated that
they have legal standing to move for the suppression of the documents, papers and effects
seized in the places other than the three residences adverted to above, the opinion written by
the Chief Justice refrains from expressly declaring as null and void the such warrants served at
such other places and as illegal the searches and seizures made therein, and leaves "the matter
open for determination in appropriate cases in the future."
It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately preceding
paragraph (numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.

On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings submitted to
this Court the petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and
return of the documents, papers and effects that were seized from places other than their
family residences.
Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the many years of judicial
construction and interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our courts have invariably
regarded as doctrinal the pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by federal courts,
especially the Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.
The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of
documents, papers and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be
summarized as follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b)
ownership and/or control or possession actual or constructive of premises searched gives
"standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn
application for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the
"aggrieved person," gives "standing."
An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three, all
were directed against the petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named
personally, followed by the designation, "the President and/or General Manager" of the
particular corporation. The three warrants excepted named three corporate defendants. But the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were also the same
"office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned by or under the control of the
petitioners in all the other search warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the President
and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of
April 2, 1962). The searches and seizures were to be made, and were actually made, in the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of the petitioners.
Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."

I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the nullity of
the search warrants served at places other than the three residences, and the illegibility of the
searches and seizures conducted under the authority thereof. In my view even the exacerbating
passions and prejudices inordinately generated by the environmental political and moral
developments of this case should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying down the law
not only for this case but as well for future cases and future generations. All the search
warrants, without exception, in this case are admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants
and are therefore admittedly and indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches
and seizures made were therefore unlawful. That the petitioners, let us assume in gratia
argumente, have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of the papers, things and effects
seized from places other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in any manner affect, alter
or otherwise modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of
the searches and seizures made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess legal
standing the said warrants are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures were illegal
and remain illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that "legal
standing" or the lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of
the lawfulness or illegality of a search or seizure.

Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and
suppress, and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure
regardless of their location at the time of seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261
(1960) (narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend of the defendant); Henzel vs. United
States, 296 F. 2d. 650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961), (personal and corporate papers of corporation
of which the defendant was president), United States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics
seized in an apartment not belonging to the defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492,
493 (9th Cir. 1925) (books seized from the defendant's sister but belonging to the defendant);
Cf. Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683 (10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk
neither owned by nor in exclusive possession of the defendant).
In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 1966), it was held
that under the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures, a person places
himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his
hotel room or his automobile:
Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature and scope of
Fourth Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a man

relies upon when he places himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be
it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile. There he is protected from
unwarranted governmental intrusion. And when he puts some thing in his filing cabinet, in his
desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be secure from an unreasonable
search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth Amendment could not tolerate the
warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the purloining of the petitioner's private papers
in Gouled, or the surreptitious electronic surveilance in Silverman. Countless other cases
which have come to this Court over the years have involved a myriad of differing factual
contexts in which the protections of the Fourth Amendment have been appropriately invoked.
No doubt, the future will bring countless others. By nothing we say here do we either foresee
or foreclose factual situations to which the Fourth Amendment may be applicable. (Hoffa vs.
U.S., 87 S. Ct. 408 (December 12, 1966). See also U.S. vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93
(November 13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).
Control of premises searched gives "standing."
Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized, the
petitioners have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or
leasehold interest in many of the premises searched. These proprietary and leasehold interests
have been sufficiently set forth in their motion for reconsideration and need not be recounted
here, except to emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or indirectly, for practically all
the premises searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises
2008, Dewey Boulevard; 1436 Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the
corporate offices (IBMC, USTC); had made improvements or furnished such offices; or had
paid for the filing cabinets in which the papers were stored (Room 204, Army & Navy Club);
and individually, or through their respective spouses, owned the controlling stock of the
corporations involved. The petitioners' proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the premises
searched therefore independently gives them standing to move for the return and suppression
of the books, papers and affects seized therefrom.
In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature and extent of
the interest in the searched premises necessary to maintain a motion to suppress. After
reviewing what it considered to be the unduly technical standard of the then prevailing circuit
court decisions, the Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):
We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We are persuaded,
however, that it is unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into the law surrounding the
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures subtle distinctions,
developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of private property law which,
more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped by distinctions whose validity is
largely historical. Even in the area from which they derive, due consideration has led to the
discarding of those distinctions in the homeland of the common law. See Occupiers' Liability
Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying out Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd.
9305. Distinctions such as those between "lessee", "licensee," "invitee," "guest," often only of
gossamer strength, ought not be determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to
constitutional safeguards. See also Chapman vs. United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).
It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises searched must own
the property seized in order to have standing in a motion to return and suppress. In Alioto vs.
United States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a Bookkeeper for several corporations from whose

apartment the corporate records were seized successfully moved for their return. In United
States vs. Antonelli, Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the corporation's
president successfully moved for the return and suppression is to him of both personal and
corporate documents seized from his home during the course of an illegal search:
The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, "either his own or the
corporation's was entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Under the
circumstances in the case at bar, the search and seizure were unreasonable and unlawful. The
motion for the return of seized article and the suppression of the evidence so obtained should
be granted. (Emphasis supplied).
Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the place searched or the
articles seize had the necessary standing to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule. But
in MacDonald vs. Unite States, 335 U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson joined by Justice
Felix Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even a guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree
he is under against criminal intrusion." This view finally became the official view of the U.S.
Supreme Court and was articulated in United States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years
later, in 1960, in Jones vs. Unite States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a
step further. Jones was a mere guest in the apartment unlawfully searched but the Court
nonetheless declared that the exclusionary rule protected him as well. The concept of "person
aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure" was enlarged to include "anyone legitimately on
premise where the search occurs."
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that the defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president of a corporation had
standing in a mail fraud prosecution against him to demand the return and suppression of
corporate property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra. The
court conclude that the defendant had standing on two independent grounds: First he had a
sufficient interest in the property seized, and second he had an adequate interest in the
premises searched (just like in the case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully searched the
corporation' premises and had seized most of the corporation's book and records. Looking to
Jones, the court observed:
Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as a "person aggrieved by an
unlawful search and seizure." It tells us that appellant should not have been precluded from
objecting to the Postal Inspector's search and seizure of the corporation's books and records
merely because the appellant did not show ownership or possession of the books and records
or a substantial possessory interest in the invade premises . . . (Henzel vs. United States, 296 F.
2d at 651). .
Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683, (10th Cir. 1962).
In Villano, police officers seized two notebooks from a desk in the defendant's place of
employment; the defendant did not claim ownership of either; he asserted that several
employees (including himself) used the notebooks. The Court held that the employee had a
protected interest and that there also was an invasion of privacy. Both Henzel and Villano
considered also the fact that the search and seizure were "directed at" the moving defendant.
Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 682; Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d at 683.
In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage and went to
Puerto Rico, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to move to

quash as unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution a grand jury subpoena duces tecum directed to the custodian of his files. The
Government contended that the petitioner had no standing because the books and papers were
physically in the possession of the custodian, and because the subpoena was directed against
the custodian. The court rejected the contention, holding that
Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal rights in the
books and papers as not to enable the question of unreasonable search and seizure to be
escaped through the mere procedural device of compelling a third-party naked possessor to
produce and deliver them. Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 1956).
Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed against said person
gives "standing."
The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp.
191 (1965, U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had stored with an attorney certain files and
papers, which attorney, by the name of Dunn, was not, at the time of the seizing of the records,
Birrell's attorney. * Dunn, in turn, had stored most of the records at his home in the country
and on a farm which, according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and
management." The papers turned out to be private, personal and business papers together with
corporate books and records of certain unnamed corporations in which Birrell did not even
claim ownership. (All of these type records were seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless, the
search in Birrell was held invalid by the court which held that even though Birrell did not own
the premises where the records were stored, he had "standing" to move for the return of all the
papers and properties seized. The court, relying on Jones vs. U.S., supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli
Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d 631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; and Schwimmer
vs. U.S., supra, pointed out that
It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were directed solely and
exclusively against Birrell. The only person suggested in the papers as having violated the law
was Birrell. The first search warrant described the records as having been used "in committing
a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341, by the use of the mails by one
Lowell M. Birrell, . . ." The second search warrant was captioned: "United States of America
vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p. 198)

Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless
whether these were directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the
documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate
papers) were held by them in a personal capacity or under their personal control.
Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to the
petitioners all personal and private papers and effects seized, no matter where these were
seized, whether from their residences or corporate offices or any other place or places. The
uncontradicted sworn statements of the petitioners in their, various pleadings submitted to this
Court indisputably show that amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and other
places were personal and private papers and effects belonging to the petitioners.
If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where the
objects of the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be: (a)
personal or private papers of the petitioners were they were unlawfully seized, be it their
family residences offices, warehouses and/or premises owned and/or possessed (actually or
constructively) by them as shown in all the search and in the sworn applications filed in
securing the void search warrants and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to corporations.
Under such categorization or grouping, the determination of which unlawfully seized papers,
documents and things are personal/private of the petitioners or purely corporate papers will
have to be left to the lower courts which issued the void search warrants in ultimately effecting
the suppression and/or return of the said documents.
And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners likewise have
clear legal standing to move for the suppression of purely corporate papers as "President
and/or General Manager" of the corporations involved as specifically mentioned in the void
search warrants.
Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my disquisition were
criminal prosecutions, the great clauses of the constitutional proscription on illegal searches
and seizures do not withhold the mantle of their protection from cases not criminal in origin or
nature.
U.S. vs Bustos (37 Phil 731)

Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to move to

suppress. Such was the rule even before Jones. (p. 199)
If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records stored with
Dunn, it matters not whether he had any interest in the premises searched. See also Jeffers v.
United States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 432 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct.
93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).
The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the United States did
not appeal from this decision. The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of
the present petitioners; as in Birrell, many personal and corporate papers were seized from
premises not petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell, the searches were "PRIMARILY
DIRECTED SOLETY AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both types of
documents were suppressed in Birrell because of the illegal search. In the case at bar, the
petitioners connection with the premises raided is much closer than in Birrell.

This appeal presents the specific question of whether or not the defendants and appellants are
guilty of a libel of Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Province
of Pampanga. The appeal also submits the larger question of the attitude which the judiciary
should take interpreting and enforcing the Libel Law in connection with the basic prerogatives
of freedom of speech and press, and of assembly and petition. For a better understanding, the
facts in the present appeal are the first narrated in the order of their occurrence, then certain
suggestive aspects relative to the rights of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and
petition are interpolated, then the facts are tested by these principles, and, finally, judgment is
rendered.
First, the facts. In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga
assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary through the law
office of Crossfield and O'Brien, and five individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman
Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in

office and asking for his removal. Crossfield and O'Brien submitted this petition and these
affidavits with a complaint to the Executive Secretary. The petition transmitted by these
attorneys was signed by thirty-four citizens apparently of considerable standing, including
councilors and property owners (now the defendants), and contained the statements set out in
the information as libelous. Briefly stated the specific charges against the justice of the peace
were.
1.
That Francisca Polintan, desiring to make complaint against Mariano de los Reyes,
visited the justice of the peace, who first told her that he would draw up complaint for P5;
afterwards he said he would take P3 which she paid; also kept her in the house for four days as
a servant and took from her two chickens and twelve "gandus;"
2.
That Valentin Sunga being interested in a case regarding land which was on trial
before the justice of the peace, went to see the justice of the peace to ascertain the result of the
trial, and was told by the justice of the peace that if he wished to win he must give him P50.
Not having this amount, Sunga gave the justice nothing, and a few days later was informed
that he had lost the case. Returning again to the office of the justice of the peace in order to
appeal, the justice told him that he could still win if he would pay P50;
3.
That Leoncio Quiambao, having filed a complaint for assault against four persons,
on the day of the trial the justice called him over to his house, where he secretly gave him
(Quiambao) P30; and the complaint was thereupon shelved.
The Executive Secretary referred the papers to the judge of first instance for the Seventh
Judicial District requesting investigation, proper action, and report. The justice of the peace
was notified and denied the charges. The judge of first instance found the first count not
proved and counts 2 and 3 established. In view of this result, the judge, the Honorable Percy
M. Moir, was of the opinion "that it must be, and it is hereby, recommended to the GovernorGeneral that the respondent be removed from his position as justice of the peace of Macabebe
and Masantol, Province of Pampanga, and it is ordered that the proceedings had in this case be
transmitted to the Executive Secretary."
Later the justice of the peace filled a motion for a new trial; the judge of first instance granted
the motion and reopened the hearing; documents were introduced, including a letter sent by
the municipal president and six councilors of Masantol, Pampanga, asserting that the justice of
the peace was the victim of prosecution, and that one Agustin Jaime, the auxiliary justice of
the peace, had instituted the charges for personal reasons; and the judge of first instance
ordered a suppression of the charges against Punsalan and acquitted him the same. Attorneys
for complainants thereupon appealed to the Governor-General, but whether the papers were
forwarded to the Governor-General as requested the record does not disclose.
Criminal action against the petitioners, now become the defendants, was instituted on October
12, 1916, by virtue of the following information:
That on or about the month of December, 1915, in the municipality of Macabebe, Pampanga,
P. I., the said accused, voluntarily, illegally, and criminally and with malicious intent to
prejudice and defame Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano who was at said time and place justice of
the peace of Macabebe and Masantol of this province, wrote, signed, and published a writing
which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous against the justice of the

peace Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano, in which writing appear among other things the
following:
That the justice of the peace, Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano, of this town of Macabebe, on
account of the conduct observed by him heretofore, a conduct highly improper of the office
which he holds, is found to be a public functionary who is absolutely unfair, eminently
immoral and dangerous to the community, and consequently unworthy of the office.
That this assertion of the undersigned is evidenced in a clear and positive manner by facts so
certain, so serious, and so denigrating which appear in the affidavits attached hereto, and by
other facts no less serious, but which the undersigned refrain from citing herein for the sake of
brevity and in order not to bother too much the attention of your Honor and due to lack of
sufficient proof to substantiate them.
That should the higher authorities allow the said justice of the peace of this town to continue in
his office, the protection of the rights and interests of its inhabitants will be illusory and
utopic; rights and interest solemnly guaranteed by the Philippine Bill of Rights, and justice in
this town will not be administered in accordance with law.
That on account of the wrongful discharge of his office and of his bad conducts as such justice
of the peace, previous to this time, some respectable citizens of this town of Macabebe were
compelled to present an administrative case against the said Roman Punsalan Serrano before
the judge of first instance of Pampanga, in which case there were made against him various
charges which were true and certain and of different characters.
That after the said administrative case was over, the said justice of the peace, far from
charging his bad and despicable conduct, which has roused the indignation of this town of
Macabebe, subsequently performed the acts abovementioned, as stated in the affidavits
herewith attached, as if intending to mock at the people and to show his mistaken valor and
heroism.'
All of this has been written and published by the accused with deliberate purpose of attacking
the virtue, honor, and reputation of the justice of the peace, Mr. Roman Punsalan Serrano, and
thus exposing him to public hatred contempt, and ridicule. All contrary to law.
It should be noted that the information omits paragraphs of the petition mentioning the
investigation before the judge of first instance, the affidavits upon which based and concluding
words, "To the Executive Secretary, through the office of Crossfield and O'Brien."
The Honorable Percy M. Moir found all the defendants, with the exception of Felix Fernandez,
Juan S. Alfonso, Restituto Garcia, and Manuel Mallari, guilty and sentenced each of them to
pay a fine of P10 and one thirty-second part of the costs, or to suffer subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency. New attorneys for the defense, coming into the case, after the handing
down of the decision, file on December 16, 1916, a motion for a new trial, the principal
purpose of which was to retire the objection interposed by the then counsel for the defendants
to the admission of Exhibit A consisting of the entire administrative proceedings. The trial
court denied the motion. All the defendants, except Melecio S. Sabado and Fortunato
Macalino appealed making the following assignments of error:
1.

The court erred in overruling the motion of the convicted defendants for a new trial.

2.
The court erred in refusing to permit the defendants to retire the objection in
advertently interposed by their counsel to the admission in evidence of the expediente
administrativo out of which the accusation in this case arose.

in the Philippine Islands. We conceive that the time is ripe thus to clear up certain
misapprehensions on the subject and to place these basic rights in their proper light.

3.
The court erred in sustaining the objection of the prosecution to the introduction in
evidence by the accused of the affidavits upon which the petition forming the basis of the
libelous charge was based.

Turning to the pages of history, we state nothing new when we set down that freedom of
speech as cherished in democratic countries was unknown in the Philippine Islands before
1900. A prime cause for revolt was consequently ready made. Jose Rizal in "Filipinas Despues
de Cien Aos" (The Philippines a Century Hence, pages 62 et seq.) describing "the reforms
sine quibus non," which the Filipinos insist upon, said: "

4.
The court erred in not holding that the alleged libelous statement was unqualifiedly
privileged.

The minister, . . . who wants his reforms to be reforms, must begin by declaring the press in
the Philippines free and by instituting Filipinos delegates.

5.
The court erred in assuming and impliedly holding that the burden was on the
defendants to show that the alleged libelous statements were true and free from malice.

The Filipino patriots in Spain, through the columns of "La Solidaridad" and by other means
invariably in exposing the wants of the Filipino people demanded "liberty of the press, of
cults, and associations." (See Mabini, La Revolucion Filipina.) The Malolos Constitution, the
work of the Revolutionary Congress, in its Bill of Rights, zealously guarded freedom of
speech and press and assembly and petition.

6.

The court erred in not acquitting the defendants.

7.
The evidence adduced fails to show the guilt of the defendants beyond a reasonable
doubt. This is especially true of all the defendants, except Felipe Bustos, Dionisio Mallari, and
Jose T. Reyes.
We have thus far taken it for granted that all the proceedings, administrative and judicial, were
properly before this court. As a matter of fact counsel for defendants in the lower court made
an improvident objection to the admission of the administrative proceedings on the ground that
the signatures were not identified and that the same was immaterial, which objection was
partially sustained by the trial court. Notwithstanding this curious situation by reason of which
the attorney for the defense attempted to destroy through his objection the very foundation for
the justification of his clients, we shall continue to consider all the proceedings as before us.
Not indicating specifically the reason for this action, let the following be stated: The
administrative proceedings were repeatedly mentioned during the trial. These proceedings
were the basis of the accusation, the information, the evidence, and the judgment rendered.
The prosecution cannot be understood without knowledge of anterior action. Nothing more
unjust could be imagined than to pick out certain words which standing by themselves and
unexplained are libelous and then by shutting off all knowledge of facts which would justify
these words, to convict the accused. The records in question are attached to the rollo, and
either on the ground that the attorneys for the defense retired the objection to the introduction
of the administrative proceedings by the prosecution, or that a new trial should have been had
because under section 42 of the Code of Criminal Procedure "a case may be reopened on
account of errors at law committed at the trial," or because of the right of this court to call in
such records as are sufficiently incorporated into the complaint and are essential to a
determination of the case, or finally, because of our conceded right to take judicial notice of
official action in administrative cases and of judicial proceedings supplemental to the basis
action, we examine the record as before us, containing not alone the trial for libel, but the
proceedings previous to that trial giving rise to it. To this action, the Government can not
explain for it was the prosecution which tried to incorporate Exhibit A into the record.
With these facts pleading justification, before testing them by certain principles which make
up the law of libel and slander, we feel warranted in seizing the opportunity to intrude an
introductory and general discussion of freedom of speech and press and assembly and petition

Mention is made of the foregoing data only to deduce the proposition that a reform so sacred
to the people of these Islands and won at so dear a cost, should now be protected and carried
forward as one would protect and preserve the covenant of liberty itself.
Next comes the period of American-Filipino cooperative effort. The Constitution of the United
States and the State constitutions guarantee to the right of freedom of speech and press and the
right of assembly and petition. We are therefore, not surprised to find President McKinley in
that Magna Charta of Philippine Liberty, the Instructions to the Second Philippine
Commission, of April 7, 1900, laying down the inviolable rule "That no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably
assemble and petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
The Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, and the Jones Law, the Act of
Congress of August 29, 1916, in the nature of organic acts for the Philippines, continued this
guaranty. The words quoted are not unfamiliar to students of Constitutional Law, for they are
the counterpart of the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which the
American people demanded before giving their approval to the Constitution.
We mention the foregoing facts only to deduce the position never to be forgotten for an instant
that the guaranties mentioned are part and parcel of the Organic Law of the Constitution
of the Philippine Islands.
These paragraphs found in the Philippine Bill of Rights are not threadbare verbiage. The
language carries with all the applicable jurisprudence of great English and American
Constitutional cases. (Kepner vs. U. S. [1904], 195 U. S., 100; Serra vs. Mortiga [1907], 204
U. S., 470.) And what are these principles? Volumes would inadequately answer. But included
are the following:
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of
public affairs. Completely liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the
case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men
in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged

with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with
reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and the dignity of
the individual be exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as
the individual is less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for the common good.
Rising superior to any official or set of officials, to the Chief of Executive, to the Legislature,
to the Judiciary to any or all the agencies of Government public opinion should be the
constant source of liberty and democracy. (See the well considered cases of Wason vs. Walter,
4 L. R. 4 Q. B., 73; Seymour vs. Butterworth, 3F. and F., 372; The Queen vs. Sir R. Carden, 5
Q. B. D., 1)
The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct.
The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or
badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a
justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be
effectively muzzled. Attempted terrorization of public opinion on the part of the judiciary
would be tyranny of the basest sort. The sword of Damocles in the hands of a judge does not
hang suspended over the individual who dares to assert his prerogative as a citizen and to
stand up bravely before any official. On the contrary, it is a duty which every one owes to
society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the
duty of all who know of any official dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act
of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and
punish them. In the words of Mr. Justice Gayner, who contributed so largely to the law of
libel. "The people are not obliged to speak of the conduct of their officials in whispers or with
bated breath in a free government, but only in a despotism." (Howarth vs. Barlow [1906], 113
App. Div., N. Y., 510.)
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and
the complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to
meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or
group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the
government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of
course, assume responsibility for the charges made.
Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have
demanded protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the
development and adoption of the doctrine of privilege.
The doctrine of privileged communications rests upon public policy, 'which looks to the free
and unfettered administration of justice, though, as an incidental result, it may in some
instances afford an immunity to the evil-disposed and malignant slanderer.' (Abbott vs.
National Bank of Commerce, Tacoma [1899], 175 U. S., 409, 411.)
Privilege is classified as either absolute or qualified. With the first, we are not concerned. As
to qualified privilege, it is as the words suggest a prima facie privilege which may be lost by
proof of malice. The rule is thus stated by Lord Campbell, C. J.
A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating
has an interest, or in reference to which has a duty, is privileged, if made to a person having a
corresponding interest or duty, although it contained criminatory matter which without this

privilege would be slanderous and actionable. (Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. and B., 344; 1 Jur.[N.
S.], 846; 25 L. J. Q. B., 25; 3 W. R., 474; 85 E. C. L., 344.)
A pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege is a complaint made in good
faith and without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public official when
addressed to an officer or a board having some interest or duty in the matter. Even when the
statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and
the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the
individual. But the statements must be made under an honest sense of duty; a self-seeking
motive is destructive. Personal injury is not necessary. All persons have an interest in the pure
and efficient administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is
privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes
he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. The privilege is not defeated
by the mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate terms. A further element of
the law of privilege concerns the person to whom the complaint should be made. The rule is
that if a party applies to the wrong person through some natural and honest mistake as to the
respective functions of various officials such unintentional error will not take the case out of
the privilege.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroy that
presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must bring
home to the defendant the existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and
the absence of probable cause will amount to proof of malice. (See White vs. Nicholls [1845],
3 How., 266.)
A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover
grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny would defeat the protection which the
law throws over privileged communications. The ultimate test is that of bona fides. (See White
vs. Nicholls [1845], 3 How., 266; Bradley vs. Heath [1831], 12 Pick. [Mass.], 163; Kent vs.
Bongartz [1885], 15 R. I., 72; Street Foundations of Legal Liability, vol. 1, pp. 308, 309;
Newell, Slander and Libel, various citations; 25 Cyc. pages 385 et seq.)
Having ascertained the attitude which should be assumed relative to the basic rights of
freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition, having emphasized the point that
our Libel Law as a statute must be construed with reference to the guaranties of our Organic
Law, and having sketched the doctrine of privilege, we are in a position to test the facts of this
case with these principles.
It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a private person, might
well be considered libelous per se. The charges might also under certain conceivable
conditions convict one of a libel of a government official. As a general rule words imputing to
a judge or a justice of the peace dishonesty or corruption or incapacity or misconduct touching
him in his office are actionable. But as suggested in the beginning we do not have present a
simple case of direct and vicious accusations published in the press, but of charges predicated
on affidavits made to the proper official and thus qualifiedly privileged. Express malice has
not been proved by the prosecution. Further, although the charges are probably not true as to
the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded
their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed
is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens to secure the removal from office of
a person thought to be venal were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege. These

respectable citizens did not eagerly seize on a frivolous matter but on instances which not only
seemed to them of a grave character, but which were sufficient in an investigation by a judge
of first instance to convince him of their seriousness. No undue publicity was given to the
petition. The manner of commenting on the conduct of the justice of the peace was proper.
And finally the charges and the petition were submitted through reputable attorneys to the
proper functionary, the Executive Secretary. In this connection it is sufficient to note that
justices of the peace are appointed by the Governor-General, that they may be removed by the
Governor-General upon the recommendation of a Judge of First Instance, or on the GovernorGeneral's own motion, and that at the time this action took place the Executive Bureau was the
office through which the Governor-General acted in such matter. (See Administrative Code of
1917, secs. 203 and 229, in connection with the cases of U. S. vs. Galesa [1915], 31 Phil., 365,
and of Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. and B., 344, holding that where defendant was subject to
removal by the sovereign, a communication to the Secretary of State was privileged.)
The present facts are further essentially different from those established in other cases in
which private individuals have been convicted of libels of public officials. Malice, traduction,
falsehood, calumny, against the man and not the officer, have been the causes of the verdict of
guilty. (See U. S. vs. Senado [1909], 14 Phil., 338, 339; U. S. vs. Contreras [1912], 23 Phil.,
513; U. S. vs. Montalvo [1915], 29 Phil., 595.)
The Attorney-General bases his recommendation for confirmation on the case of the United
States vs. Julio Bustos ([1909], 13 Phil., 690). The Julio Bustos case, the Attorney-General
says, is identical with the Felipe Bustos case, with the exception that there has been more
publicity in the present instance and that the person to whom the charge was made had less
jurisdiction than had the Secretary of Justice in the Julio Bustos case. Publicity is immaterial if
the charge against Punsalan is in fact a privileged communication. Moreover, in the Julio
Bustos case we find wild statements, with no basis in fact, made against reputable members of
the judiciary, "to persons who could not furnish protection." Malicious and untrue
communications are not privileged. A later case and one more directly in point to which we
invite especial attention is United States vs. Galeza ([1915], 31 Phil., 365). (Note also Yancey
vs. Commonwealth [1909], 122 So. W., 123.)
We find the defendants and appellants entitled to the protection of the rules concerning
qualified privilege, growing out of constitutional guaranties in our bill of rights. Instead of
punishing citizens for an honest endeavor to improve the public service, we should rather
commend them for their good citizenship. The defendants and appellants are acquitted with
the costs de officio. So ordered.
Villavicencio vs Lukban (39 Phil 778)
The annals of juridical history fail to reveal a case quite as remarkable as the one which this
application for habeas corpus submits for decision. While hardly to be expected to be met with
in this modern epoch of triumphant democracy, yet, after all, the cause presents no great
difficulty if there is kept in the forefront of our minds the basic principles of popular
government, and if we give expression to the paramount purpose for which the courts, as an
independent power of such a government, were constituted. The primary question is Shall
the judiciary permit a government of the men instead of a government of laws to be set up in
the Philippine Islands?

Omitting much extraneous matter, of no moment to these proceedings, but which might prove
profitable reading for other departments of the government, the facts are these: The Mayor of
the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, for the best of all reasons, to exterminate vice, ordered the
segregated district for women of ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years in
the city of Manila, closed. Between October 16 and October 25, 1918, the women were kept
confined to their houses in the district by the police. Presumably, during this period, the city
authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for sending the women to
Davao, Mindanao, as laborers; with some government office for the use of the coastguard
cutters Corregidor and Negros, and with the Constabulary for a guard of soldiers. At any rate,
about midnight of October 25, the police, acting pursuant to orders from the chief of police,
Anton Hohmann and the Mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, descended upon the
houses, hustled some 170 inmates into patrol wagons, and placed them aboard the steamers
that awaited their arrival. The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings,
and apparently were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an
investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in Mindanao. They
had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region and had neither directly nor
indirectly given their consent to the deportation. The involuntary guests were received on
board the steamers by a representative of the Bureau of Labor and a detachment of
Constabulary soldiers. The two steamers with their unwilling passengers sailed for Davao
during the night of October 25.
The vessels reached their destination at Davao on October 29. The women were landed and
receipted for as laborers by Francisco Sales, provincial governor of Davao, and by Feliciano
Yigo and Rafael Castillo. The governor and the hacendero Yigo, who appear as parties in
the case, had no previous notification that the women were prostitutes who had been expelled
from the city of Manila. The further happenings to these women and the serious charges
growing out of alleged ill-treatment are of public interest, but are not essential to the
disposition of this case. Suffice it to say, generally, that some of the women married, others
assumed more or less clandestine relations with men, others went to work in different
capacities, others assumed a life unknown and disappeared, and a goodly portion found means
to return to Manila.
To turn back in our narrative, just about the time the Corregidor and the Negros were putting
in to Davao, the attorney for the relatives and friends of a considerable number of the
deportees presented an application for habeas corpus to a member of the Supreme Court.
Subsequently, the application, through stipulation of the parties, was made to include all of the
women who were sent away from Manila to Davao and, as the same questions concerned them
all, the application will be considered as including them. The application set forth the salient
facts, which need not be repeated, and alleged that the women were illegally restrained of their
liberty by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the
city of Manila, and by certain unknown parties. The writ was made returnable before the full
court. The city fiscal appeared for the respondents, Lukban and Hohmann, admitted certain
facts relative to sequestration and deportation, and prayed that the writ should not be granted
because the petitioners were not proper parties, because the action should have been begun in
the Court of First Instance for Davao, Department of Mindanao and Sulu, because the
respondents did not have any of the women under their custody or control, and because their
jurisdiction did not extend beyond the boundaries of the city of Manila. According to an
exhibit attached to the answer of the fiscal, the 170 women were destined to be laborers, at
good salaries, on the haciendas of Yigo and Governor Sales. In open court, the fiscal
admitted, in answer to question of a member of the court, that these women had been sent out

of Manila without their consent. The court awarded the writ, in an order of November 4, that
directed Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the
city of Manila, Francisco Sales, governor of the province of Davao, and Feliciano Yigo, an
hacendero of Davao, to bring before the court the persons therein named, alleged to be
deprived of their liberty, on December 2, 1918.
Before the date mentioned, seven of the women had returned to Manila at their own expense.
On motion of counsel for petitioners, their testimony was taken before the clerk of the
Supreme Court sitting as commissioners. On the day named in the order, December 2nd, 1918,
none of the persons in whose behalf the writ was issued were produced in court by the
respondents. It has been shown that three of those who had been able to come back to Manila
through their own efforts, were notified by the police and the secret service to appear before
the court. The fiscal appeared, repeated the facts more comprehensively, reiterated the stand
taken by him when pleading to the original petition copied a telegram from the Mayor of the
city of Manila to the provincial governor of Davao and the answer thereto, and telegrams that
had passed between the Director of Labor and the attorney for that Bureau then in Davao, and
offered certain affidavits showing that the women were contained with their life in Mindanao
and did not wish to return to Manila. Respondents Sales answered alleging that it was not
possible to fulfill the order of the Supreme Court because the women had never been under his
control, because they were at liberty in the Province of Davao, and because they had married
or signed contracts as laborers. Respondent Yigo answered alleging that he did not have any
of the women under his control and that therefore it was impossible for him to obey the
mandate. The court, after due deliberation, on December 10, 1918, promulgated a second
order, which related that the respondents had not complied with the original order to the
satisfaction of the court nor explained their failure to do so, and therefore directed that those of
the women not in Manila be brought before the court by respondents Lukban, Hohmann,
Sales, and Yigo on January 13, 1919, unless the women should, in written statements
voluntarily made before the judge of first instance of Davao or the clerk of that court,
renounce the right, or unless the respondents should demonstrate some other legal motives that
made compliance impossible. It was further stated that the question of whether the respondents
were in contempt of court would later be decided and the reasons for the order announced in
the final decision.
Before January 13, 1919, further testimony including that of a number of the women, of
certain detectives and policemen, and of the provincial governor of Davao, was taken before
the clerk of the Supreme Court sitting as commissioner and the clerk of the Court of First
Instance of Davao acting in the same capacity. On January 13, 1919, the respondents
technically presented before the Court the women who had returned to the city through their
own efforts and eight others who had been brought to Manila by the respondents. Attorneys
for the respondents, by their returns, once again recounted the facts and further endeavored to
account for all of the persons involved in the habeas corpus. In substance, it was stated that the
respondents, through their representatives and agents, had succeeded in bringing from Davao
with their consent eight women; that eighty-one women were found in Davao who, on notice
that if they desired they could return to Manila, transportation fee, renounced the right through
sworn statements; that fifty-nine had already returned to Manila by other means, and that
despite all efforts to find them twenty-six could not be located. Both counsel for petitioners
and the city fiscal were permitted to submit memoranda. The first formally asked the court to
find Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of
Manila, Jose Rodriguez and Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of
Manila, Feliciano Yigo, an hacendero of Davao, Modesto Joaquin, the attorney for the

Bureau of Labor, and Anacleto Diaz, fiscal of the city of Manila, in contempt of court. The
city fiscal requested that the replica al memorandum de los recurridos, (reply to respondents'
memorandum) dated January 25, 1919, be struck from the record.
In the second order, the court promised to give the reasons for granting the writ of habeas
corpus in the final decision. We will now proceed to do so.
One fact, and one fact only, need be recalled these one hundred and seventy women were
isolated from society, and then at night, without their consent and without any opportunity to
consult with friends or to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for
transportation to regions unknown. Despite the feeble attempt to prove that the women left
voluntarily and gladly, that such was not the case is shown by the mere fact that the presence
of the police and the constabulary was deemed necessary and that these officers of the law
chose the shades of night to cloak their secret and stealthy acts. Indeed, this is a fact
impossible to refute and practically admitted by the respondents.
With this situation, a court would next expect to resolve the question By authority of what
law did the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act in deporting by duress these persons
from Manila to another distant locality within the Philippine Islands? We turn to the statutes
and we find
Alien prostitutes can be expelled from the Philippine Islands in conformity with an Act of
congress. The Governor-General can order the eviction of undesirable aliens after a hearing
from the Islands. Act No. 519 of the Philippine Commission and section 733 of the Revised
Ordinances of the city of Manila provide for the conviction and punishment by a court of
justice of any person who is a common prostitute. Act No. 899 authorizes the return of any
citizen of the United States, who may have been convicted of vagrancy, to the homeland. New
York and other States have statutes providing for the commitment to the House of Refuge of
women convicted of being common prostitutes. Always a law! Even when the health
authorities compel vaccination, or establish a quarantine, or place a leprous person in the
Culion leper colony, it is done pursuant to some law or order. But one can search in vain for
any law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor of the city of Manila
or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands and these women
despite their being in a sense lepers of society are nevertheless not chattels but Philippine
citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are other citizens to change their
domicile from Manila to another locality. On the contrary, Philippine penal law specifically
punishes any public officer who, not being expressly authorized by law or regulation, compels
any person to change his residence.
In other countries, as in Spain and Japan, the privilege of domicile is deemed so important as
to be found in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution. Under the American constitutional
system, liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded in jurisprudence and considered so
elementary in nature as not even to require a constitutional sanction. Even the GovernorGeneral of the Philippine Islands, even the President of the United States, who has often been
said to exercise more power than any king or potentate, has no such arbitrary prerogative,
either inherent or express. Much less, therefore, has the executive of a municipality, who acts
within a sphere of delegated powers. If the mayor and the chief of police could, at their mere
behest or even for the most praiseworthy of motives, render the liberty of the citizen so
insecure, then the presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand other municipalities of the
Philippines have the same privilege. If these officials can take to themselves such power, then

any other official can do the same. And if any official can exercise the power, then all persons
would have just as much right to do so. And if a prostitute could be sent against her wishes
and under no law from one locality to another within the country, then officialdom can hold
the same club over the head of any citizen.
Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta decreed that "No freeman shall be taken,
or imprisoned, or be disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be outlawed, or
exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him, but by
lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. We will sell to no man, we will not
deny or defer to any man either justice or right." (Magna Charta, 9 Hen., 111, 1225, Cap. 29; 1
eng. stat. at Large, 7.) No official, no matter how high, is above the law. The courts are the
forum which functionate to safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors.
"The law," said Justice Miller, delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United
States, "is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who by
accepting office participates in its functions is only the more strongly bound to submit to that
supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority
which it gives." (U.S. vs. Lee [1882], 106 U.S., 196, 220.) "The very idea," said Justice
Matthews of the same high tribunal in another case, "that one man may be compelled to hold
his life, or the means of living, or any material right essential to the enjoyment of life, at the
mere will of another, seems to be intolerable in any country where freedom prevails, as being
the essence of slavery itself." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356, 370.) All this
explains the motive in issuing the writ of habeas corpus, and makes clear why we said in the
very beginning that the primary question was whether the courts should permit a government
of men or a government of laws to be established in the Philippine Islands.
What are the remedies of the unhappy victims of official oppression? The remedies of the
citizen are three: (1) Civil action; (2) criminal action, and (3) habeas corpus.
The first is an optional but rather slow process by which the aggrieved party may recoup
money damages. It may still rest with the parties in interest to pursue such an action, but it was
never intended effectively and promptly to meet any such situation as that now before us.
As to criminal responsibility, it is true that the Penal Code in force in these Islands provides:
Any public officer not thereunto authorized by law or by regulations of a general character in
force in the Philippines who shall banish any person to a place more than two hundred
kilometers distant from his domicile, except it be by virtue of the judgment of a court, shall be
punished by a fine of not less than three hundred and twenty-five and not more than three
thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.
Any public officer not thereunto expressly authorized by law or by regulation of a general
character in force in the Philippines who shall compel any person to change his domicile or
residence shall suffer the penalty of destierro and a fine of not less than six hundred and
twenty-five and not more than six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas. (Art. 211.)
We entertain no doubt but that, if, after due investigation, the proper prosecuting officers find
that any public officer has violated this provision of law, these prosecutors will institute and
press a criminal prosecution just as vigorously as they have defended the same official in this
action. Nevertheless, that the act may be a crime and that the persons guilty thereof can be
proceeded against, is no bar to the instant proceedings. To quote the words of Judge Cooley in

a case which will later be referred to "It would be a monstrous anomaly in the law if to an
application by one unlawfully confined, ta be restored to his liberty, it could be a sufficient
answer that the confinement was a crime, and therefore might be continued indefinitely until
the guilty party was tried and punished therefor by the slow process of criminal procedure."
(In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich., 416, 434.) The writ of habeas corpus was devised
and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as
the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. Any further rights of the parties are
left untouched by decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the individual at
liberty.
Granted that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, respondents have raised three specific
objections to its issuance in this instance. The fiscal has argued (l) that there is a defect in
parties petitioners, (2) that the Supreme Court should not a assume jurisdiction, and (3) that
the person in question are not restrained of their liberty by respondents. It was finally
suggested that the jurisdiction of the Mayor and the chief of police of the city of Manila only
extends to the city limits and that perforce they could not bring the women from Davao.
The first defense was not presented with any vigor by counsel. The petitioners were relatives
and friends of the deportees. The way the expulsion was conducted by the city officials made
it impossible for the women to sign a petition for habeas corpus. It was consequently proper
for the writ to be submitted by persons in their behalf. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 78;
Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 527.) The law, in its zealous regard for personal liberty, even
makes it the duty of a court or judge to grant a writ of habeas corpus if there is evidence that
within the court's jurisdiction a person is unjustly imprisoned or restrained of his liberty,
though no application be made therefor. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec. 93.) Petitioners had
standing in court.
The fiscal next contended that the writ should have been asked for in the Court of First
Instance of Davao or should have been made returnable before that court. It is a general rule of
good practice that, to avoid unnecessary expense and inconvenience, petitions for habeas
corpus should be presented to the nearest judge of the court of first instance. But this is not a
hard and fast rule. The writ of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court or any
judge thereof enforcible anywhere in the Philippine Islands. (Code of Criminal Procedure, sec.
79; Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 526.) Whether the writ shall be made returnable before the
Supreme Court or before an inferior court rests in the discretion of the Supreme Court and is
dependent on the particular circumstances. In this instance it was not shown that the Court of
First Instance of Davao was in session, or that the women had any means by which to advance
their plea before that court. On the other hand, it was shown that the petitioners with their
attorneys, and the two original respondents with their attorney, were in Manila; it was shown
that the case involved parties situated in different parts of the Islands; it was shown that the
women might still be imprisoned or restrained of their liberty; and it was shown that if the writ
was to accomplish its purpose, it must be taken cognizance of and decided immediately by the
appellate court. The failure of the superior court to consider the application and then to grant
the writ would have amounted to a denial of the benefits of the writ.
The last argument of the fiscal is more plausible and more difficult to meet. When the writ was
prayed for, says counsel, the parties in whose behalf it was asked were under no restraint; the
women, it is claimed, were free in Davao, and the jurisdiction of the mayor and the chief of
police did not extend beyond the city limits. At first blush, this is a tenable position. On closer

examination, acceptance of such dictum is found to be perversive of the first principles of the
writ of habeas corpus.

I have not yet seen sufficient reason to doubt the power of this court to issue the present writ
on the petition which was laid before us. . . .

A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The
essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. The
forcible taking of these women from Manila by officials of that city, who handed them over to
other parties, who deposited them in a distant region, deprived these women of freedom of
locomotion just as effectively as if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either
money or personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when
and where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the
aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly waived
his right.

It would be strange indeed if, at this late day, after the eulogiums of six centuries and a half
have been expended upon the Magna Charta, and rivers of blood shed for its establishment;
after its many confirmations, until Coke could declare in his speech on the petition of right that
"Magna Charta was such a fellow that he will have no sovereign," and after the extension of its
benefits and securities by the petition of right, bill of rights and habeas corpus acts, it should
now be discovered that evasion of that great clause for the protection of personal liberty,
which is the life and soul of the whole instrument, is so easy as is claimed here. If it is so, it is
important that it be determined without delay, that the legislature may apply the proper
remedy, as I can not doubt they would, on the subject being brought to their notice. . . .

Consider for a moment what an agreement with such a defense would mean. The chief
executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private
citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon
to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under
no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We
believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court
and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has
inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has
illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason
why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority
of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must
necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents,
within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by
forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the
person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty
may not thus be easily evaded.
It must be that some such question has heretofore been presented to the courts for decision.
Nevertheless, strange as it may seem, a close examination of the authorities fails to reveal any
analogous case. Certain decisions of respectable courts are however very persuasive in nature.
A question came before the Supreme Court of the State of Michigan at an early date as to
whether or not a writ of habeas corpus would issue from the Supreme Court to a person within
the jurisdiction of the State to bring into the State a minor child under guardianship in the
State, who has been and continues to be detained in another State. The membership of the
Michigan Supreme Court at this time was notable. It was composed of Martin, chief justice,
and Cooley, Campbell, and Christiancy, justices. On the question presented the court was
equally divided. Campbell, J., with whom concurred Martin, C. J., held that the writ should be
quashed. Cooley, J., one of the most distinguished American judges and law-writers, with
whom concurred Christiancy, J., held that the writ should issue. Since the opinion of Justice
Campbell was predicated to a large extent on his conception of the English decisions, and
since, as will hereafter appear, the English courts have taken a contrary view, only the
following eloquent passages from the opinion of Justice Cooley are quoted:

The second proposition that the statutory provisions are confined to the case of
imprisonment within the state seems to me to be based upon a misconception as to the
source of our jurisdiction. It was never the case in England that the court of king's bench
derived its jurisdiction to issue and enforce this writ from the statute. Statutes were not passed
to give the right, but to compel the observance of rights which existed. . . .
The important fact to be observed in regard to the mode of procedure upon this writ is, that it
is directed to and served upon, not the person confined, but his jailor. It does not reach the
former except through the latter. The officer or person who serves it does not unbar the prison
doors, and set the prisoner free, but the court relieves him by compelling the oppressor to
release his constraint. The whole force of the writ is spent upon the respondent, and if he fails
to obey it, the means to be resorted to for the purposes of compulsion are fine and
imprisonment. This is the ordinary mode of affording relief, and if any other means are
resorted to, they are only auxiliary to those which are usual. The place of confinement is,
therefore, not important to the relief, if the guilty party is within reach of process, so that by
the power of the court he can be compelled to release his grasp. The difficulty of affording
redress is not increased by the confinement being beyond the limits of the state, except as
greater distance may affect it. The important question is, where the power of control
exercised? And I am aware of no other remedy. (In the matter of Jackson [1867], 15 Mich.,
416.)
The opinion of Judge Cooley has since been accepted as authoritative by other courts. (Rivers
vs. Mitchell [1881], 57 Iowa, 193; Breene vs. People [1911], Colo., 117 Pac. Rep., 1000; Ex
parte Young [1892], 50 Fed., 526.)
The English courts have given careful consideration to the subject. Thus, a child had been
taken out of English by the respondent. A writ of habeas corpus was issued by the Queen's
Bench Division upon the application of the mother and her husband directing the defendant to
produce the child. The judge at chambers gave defendant until a certain date to produce the
child, but he did not do so. His return stated that the child before the issuance of the writ had
been handed over by him to another; that it was no longer in his custody or control, and that it
was impossible for him to obey the writ. He was found in contempt of court. On appeal, the
court, through Lord Esher, M. R., said:
A writ of habeas corpus was ordered to issue, and was issued on January 22. That writ
commanded the defendant to have the body of the child before a judge in chambers at the
Royal Courts of Justice immediately after the receipt of the writ, together with the cause of her

being taken and detained. That is a command to bring the child before the judge and must be
obeyed, unless some lawful reason can be shown to excuse the nonproduction of the child. If it
could be shown that by reason of his having lawfully parted with the possession of the child
before the issuing of the writ, the defendant had no longer power to produce the child, that
might be an answer; but in the absence of any lawful reason he is bound to produce the child,
and, if he does not, he is in contempt of the Court for not obeying the writ without lawful
excuse. Many efforts have been made in argument to shift the question of contempt to some
anterior period for the purpose of showing that what was done at some time prior to the writ
cannot be a contempt. But the question is not as to what was done before the issue of the writ.
The question is whether there has been a contempt in disobeying the writ it was issued by not
producing the child in obedience to its commands. (The Queen vs. Bernardo [1889], 23 Q. B.
D., 305. See also to the same effect the Irish case of In re Matthews, 12 Ir. Com. Law Rep. [N.
S.], 233; The Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case [1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283.)
A decision coming from the Federal Courts is also of interest. A habeas corpus was directed to
the defendant to have before the circuit court of the District of Columbia three colored
persons, with the cause of their detention. Davis, in his return to the writ, stated on oath that he
had purchased the negroes as slaves in the city of Washington; that, as he believed, they were
removed beyond the District of Columbia before the service of the writ of habeas corpus, and
that they were then beyond his control and out of his custody. The evidence tended to show
that Davis had removed the negroes because he suspected they would apply for a writ of
habeas corpus. The court held the return to be evasive and insufficient, and that Davis was
bound to produce the negroes, and Davis being present in court, and refusing to produce them,
ordered that he be committed to the custody of the marshall until he should produce the
negroes, or be otherwise discharged in due course of law. The court afterwards ordered that
Davis be released upon the production of two of the negroes, for one of the negroes had run
away and been lodged in jail in Maryland. Davis produced the two negroes on the last day of
the term. (United States vs. Davis [1839], 5 Cranch C.C., 622, Fed. Cas. No. 14926. See also
Robb vs. Connolly [1883], 111 U.S., 624; Church on Habeas, 2nd ed., p. 170.)
We find, therefore, both on reason and authority, that no one of the defense offered by the
respondents constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas corpus.
There remains to be considered whether the respondent complied with the two orders of the
Supreme Court awarding the writ of habeas corpus, and if it be found that they did not,
whether the contempt should be punished or be taken as purged.
The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales,
and Feliciano Yigo to present the persons named in the writ before the court on December 2,
1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918. The respondents were thus given ample time,
practically one month, to comply with the writ. As far as the record discloses, the Mayor of the
city of Manila waited until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to the provincial
governor of Davao. According to the response of the attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the
telegram of his chief, there were then in Davao women who desired to return to Manila, but
who should not be permitted to do so because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted
effort naturally resulted in none of the parties in question being brought before the court on the
day named.
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1)
They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or

(2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons
could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to
show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present. (Code of
Criminal Procedure, sec. 87.) They did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf
the writ was granted; they did not show impossibility of performance; and they did not present
writings that waived the right to be present by those interested. Instead a few stereotyped
affidavits purporting to show that the women were contended with their life in Davao, some of
which have since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return. That through
ordinary diligence a considerable number of the women, at least sixty, could have been
brought back to Manila is demonstrated to be found in the municipality of Davao, and that
about this number either returned at their own expense or were produced at the second hearing
by the respondents.
The court, at the time the return to its first order was made, would have been warranted
summarily in finding the respondents guilty of contempt of court, and in sending them to jail
until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non-production of the persons were far from
sufficient. The, authorities cited herein pertaining to somewhat similar facts all tend to indicate
with what exactitude a habeas corpus writ must be fulfilled. For example, in Gossage's case,
supra, the Magistrate in referring to an earlier decision of the Court, said: "We thought that,
having brought about that state of things by his own illegal act, he must take the consequences;
and we said that he was bound to use every effort to get the child back; that he must do much
more than write letters for the purpose; that he must advertise in America, and even if
necessary himself go after the child, and do everything that mortal man could do in the matter;
and that the court would only accept clear proof of an absolute impossibility by way of
excuse." In other words, the return did not show that every possible effort to produce the
women was made by the respondents. That the court forebore at this time to take drastic action
was because it did not wish to see presented to the public gaze the spectacle of a clash between
executive officials and the judiciary, and because it desired to give the respondents another
chance to demonstrate their good faith and to mitigate their wrong.
In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more
zealous and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao, placards were
posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined in rounding up the women, and a
steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided. While charges and counter-charges
in such a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and while a critical reading of the record
might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude that there is
a substantial compliance with it. Our finding to this effect may be influenced somewhat by our
sincere desire to see this unhappy incident finally closed. If any wrong is now being
perpetrated in Davao, it should receive an executive investigation. If any particular individual
is still restrained of her liberty, it can be made the object of separate habeas corpus
proceedings.
Since the writ has already been granted, and since we find a substantial compliance with it,
nothing further in this connection remains to be done.
The attorney for the petitioners asks that we find in contempt of court Justo Lukban, Mayor of
the city of Manila, Anton Hohmann, chief of police of the city of Manila, Jose Rodriguez, and
Fernando Ordax, members of the police force of the city of Manila, Modesto Joaquin, the
attorney for the Bureau of Labor, Feliciano Yigo, an hacendero of Davao, and Anacleto Diaz,
Fiscal of the city of Manila.

The power to punish for contempt of court should be exercised on the preservative and not on
the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its inherent power in order
to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail.
Nevertheless when one is commanded to produce a certain person and does not do so, and
does not offer a valid excuse, a court must, to vindicate its authority, adjudge the respondent to
be guilty of contempt, and must order him either imprisoned or fined. An officer's failure to
produce the body of a person in obedience to a writ of habeas corpus when he has power to do
so, is a contempt committed in the face of the court. (Ex parte Sterns [1888], 77 Cal., 156; In
re Patterson [1888], 99 N. C., 407.)

Memorandum de los Recurridos of January 25, 1919, is granted. Costs shall be taxed against
respondents. So ordered.
In concluding this tedious and disagreeable task, may we not be permitted to express the hope
that this decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly government of laws and
to protect individual liberty from illegal encroachment.
Arellano, C.J., Avancea and Moir, JJ., concur.
Johnson, and Street, JJ., concur in the result.

With all the facts and circumstances in mind, and with judicial regard for human
imperfections, we cannot say that any of the respondents, with the possible exception of the
first named, has flatly disobeyed the court by acting in opposition to its authority. Respondents
Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, and Joaquin only followed the orders of their chiefs, and while,
under the law of public officers, this does not exonerate them entirely, it is nevertheless a
powerful mitigating circumstance. The hacendero Yigo appears to have been drawn into the
case through a misconstruction by counsel of telegraphic communications. The city fiscal,
Anacleto Diaz, would seem to have done no more than to fulfill his duty as the legal
representative of the city government. Finding him innocent of any disrespect to the court, his
counter-motion to strike from the record the memorandum of attorney for the petitioners,
which brings him into this undesirable position, must be granted. When all is said and done, as
far as this record discloses, the official who was primarily responsible for the unlawful
deportation, who ordered the police to accomplish the same, who made arrangements for the
steamers and the constabulary, who conducted the negotiations with the Bureau of Labor, and
who later, as the head of the city government, had it within his power to facilitate the return of
the unfortunate women to Manila, was Justo Lukban, the Mayor of the city of Manila. His
intention to suppress the social evil was commendable. His methods were unlawful. His regard
for the writ of habeas corpus issued by the court was only tardily and reluctantly
acknowledged.

Separate Opinions

It would be possible to turn to the provisions of section 546 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
which relates to the penalty for disobeying the writ, and in pursuance thereof to require
respondent Lukban to forfeit to the parties aggrieved as much as P400 each, which would
reach to many thousands of pesos, and in addition to deal with him as for a contempt. Some
members of the court are inclined to this stern view. It would also be possible to find that since
respondent Lukban did comply substantially with the second order of the court, he has purged
his contempt of the first order. Some members of the court are inclined to this merciful view.
Between the two extremes appears to lie the correct finding. The failure of respondent Lukban
to obey the first mandate of the court tended to belittle and embarrass the administration of
justice to such an extent that his later activity may be considered only as extenuating his
conduct. A nominal fine will at once command such respect without being unduly oppressive
such an amount is P100.

We do not believe in the pomp and obstentation of force displayed by the police in complying
with the order of the mayor of the city; neither do we believe in the necessity of taking them to
the distant district of Davao. The said governmental authority, in carrying out his intention to
suppress the segregated district or the community formed by those women in Gardenia Street,
could have obliged the said women to return to their former residences in this city or in the
provinces, without the necessity of transporting them to Mindanao; hence the said official is
obliged to bring back the women who are still in Davao so that they may return to the places in
which they lived prior to their becoming inmates of certain houses in Gardenia Street.

In resume as before stated, no further action on the writ of habeas corpus is necessary. The
respondents Hohmann, Rodriguez, Ordax, Joaquin, Yigo, and Diaz are found not to be in
contempt of court. Respondent Lukban is found in contempt of court and shall pay into the
office of the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one hundred pesos
(P100). The motion of the fiscal of the city of Manila to strike from the record the Replica al

TORRES, J., dissenting:

The undersigned does not entirely agree to the opinion of the majority in the decision of the
habeas corpus proceeding against Justo Lukban, the mayor of this city.
There is nothing in the record that shows the motive which impelled Mayor Lukban to oblige a
great number of women of various ages, inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in
Gardenia Street, district of Sampaloc, to change their residence.
We know no express law, regulation, or ordinance which clearly prohibits the opening of
public houses of prostitution, as those in the said Gardenia Street, Sampaloc. For this reason,
when more than one hundred and fifty women were assembled and placed aboard a steamer
and transported to Davao, considering that the existence of the said houses of prostitution has
been tolerated for so long a time, it is undeniable that the mayor of the city, in proceeding in
the manner shown, acted without authority of any legal provision which constitutes an
exception to the laws guaranteeing the liberty and the individual rights of the residents of the
city of Manila.

As regards the manner whereby the mayor complied with the orders of this court, we do not
find any apparent disobedience and marked absence of respect in the steps taken by the mayor
of the city and his subordinates, if we take into account the difficulties encountered in bringing
the said women who were free at Davao and presenting them before this court within the time
fixed, inasmuch as it does not appear that the said women were living together in a given
place. It was not because they were really detained, but because on the first days there were no
houses in which they could live with a relative independent from one another, and as a proof
that they were free a number of them returned to Manila and the others succeeded in living
separate from their companions who continued living together.

To determine whether or not the mayor acted with a good purpose and legal object and
whether he has acted in good or bad faith in proceeding to dissolve the said community of
prostitutes and to oblige them to change their domicile, it is necessary to consider not only the
rights and interests of the said women and especially of the patrons who have been directing
and conducting such a reproachable enterprise and shameful business in one of the suburbs of
this city, but also the rights and interests of the very numerous people of Manila where
relatively a few transients accidentally and for some days reside, the inhabitants thereof being
more than three hundred thousand (300,000) who can not, with indifference and without
repugnance, live in the same place with so many unfortunate women dedicated to prostitution.
If the material and moral interests of the community as well as the demands of social morality
are to be taken into account, it is not possible to sustain that it is legal and permissible to
establish a house of pandering or prostitution in the midst of an enlightened population, for,
although there were no positive laws prohibiting the existence of such houses within a district
of Manila, the dictates of common sense and dictates of conscience of its inhabitants are
sufficient to warrant the public administration, acting correctly, in exercising the inevitable
duty of ordering the closing and abandonment of a house of prostitution ostensibly open to the
public, and of obliging the inmates thereof to leave it, although such a house is inhabited by its
true owner who invokes in his behalf the protection of the constitutional law guaranteeing his
liberty, his individual rights, and his right to property.
A cholera patient, a leper, or any other person affected by a known contagious disease cannot
invoke in his favor the constitutional law which guarantees his liberty and individual rights,
should the administrative authority order his hospitalization, reclusion, or concentration in a
certain island or distant point in order to free from contagious the great majority of the
inhabitants of the country who fortunately do not have such diseases. The same reasons exist
or stand good with respect to the unfortunate women dedicated to prostitution, and such
reasons become stronger because the first persons named have contracted their diseases
without their knowledge and even against their will, whereas the unfortunate prostitutes
voluntarily adopted such manner of living and spontaneously accepted all its consequences,
knowing positively that their constant intercourse with men of all classes, notwithstanding the
cleanliness and precaution which they are wont to adopt, gives way to the spread or
multiplication of the disease known as syphilis, a venereal disease, which, although it
constitutes a secret disease among men and women, is still prejudicial to the human species in
the same degree, scope, and seriousness as cholera, tuberculosis, leprosy, pest, typhoid, and
other contagious diseases which produce great mortality and very serious prejudice to poor
humanity.
If a young woman, instead of engaging in an occupation or works suitable to her sex, which
can give her sufficient remuneration for her subsistence, prefers to put herself under the will of
another woman who is usually older than she is and who is the manager or owner of a house of
prostitution, or spontaneously dedicates herself to this shameful profession, it is undeniable
that she voluntarily and with her own knowledge renounces her liberty and individual rights
guaranteed by the Constitution, because it is evident that she can not join the society of decent
women nor can she expect to get the same respect that is due to the latter, nor is it possible for
her to live within the community or society with the same liberty and rights enjoyed by every
citizen. Considering her dishonorable conduct and life, she should therefore be comprised
within that class which is always subject to the police and sanitary regulations conducive to
the maintenance of public decency and morality and to the conservation of public health, and

for this reason it should not permitted that the unfortunate women dedicated to prostitution
evade the just orders and resolutions adopted by the administrative authorities.
It is regrettable that unnecessary rigor was employed against the said poor women, but those
who have been worrying so much about the prejudice resulting from a governmental measure,
which being a very drastic remedy may be considered arbitrary, have failed to consider with
due reflection the interests of the inhabitants of this city in general and particularly the duties
and responsibilities weighing upon the authorities which administer and govern it; they have
forgotten that many of those who criticize and censure the mayor are fathers of families and
are in duty bound to take care of their children.
For the foregoing reasons, we reach the conclusion that when the petitioners, because of the
abnormal life they assumed, were obliged to change their residence not by a private citizen but
by the mayor of the city who is directly responsible for the conservation of public health and
social morality, the latter could take the step he had taken, availing himself of the services of
the police in good faith and only with the purpose of protecting the immense majority of the
population from the social evils and diseases which the houses of prostitution situated in
Gardenia Street have been producing, which houses have been constituting for years a true
center for the propagation of general diseases and other evils derived therefrom. Hence, in
ordering the dissolution and abandonment of the said houses of prostitution and the change of
the domicile of the inmates thereof, the mayor did not in bad faith violate the constitutional
laws which guarantees the liberty and the individual rights of every Filipino, inasmuch as the
women petitioners do not absolutely enjoy the said liberty and rights, the exercise of which
they have voluntarily renounced in exchange for the free practice of their shameful profession.
In very highly advanced and civilized countries, there have been adopted by the administrative
authorities similar measures, more or less rigorous, respecting prostitutes, considering them
prejudicial to the people, although it is true that in the execution of such measures more
humane and less drastic procedures, fortiter in re et suaviter in forma, have been adopted, but
such procedures have always had in view the ultimate object of the Government for the sake
of the community, that is, putting an end to the living together in a certain place of women
dedicated to prostitution and changing their domicile, with the problematical hope that they
adopt another manner of living which is better and more useful to themselves and to society.
In view of the foregoing remarks, we should hold, as we hereby hold, that Mayor Justo
Lukban is obliged to take back and restore the said women who are at present found in Davao,
and who desire to return to their former respective residences, not in Gardenia Street,
Sampaloc District, with the exception of the prostitutes who should expressly make known to
the clerk of court their preference to reside in Davao, which manifestation must be made under
oath. This resolution must be transmitted to the mayor within the shortest time possible for its
due compliance. The costs shall be charged de officio.
ARAULLO, J., dissenting in part:
I regret to dissent from the respectable opinion of the majority in the decision rendered in
these proceedings, with respect to the finding as to the importance of the contempt committed,
according to the same decision, by Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila, and the
consequent imposition upon him of a nominal fine of P100.
In the said decision, it is said:

The first order, it will be recalled, directed Justo Lukban, Anton Hohmann, Francisco Sales,
and Feliciano Yigo to present the persons named in the writ before the court on December 2,
1918. The order was dated November 4, 1918. The respondents were thus given ample time,
practically one month, to comply with the writ. As far as the record disclosed, the mayor of the
city of Manila waited until the 21st of November before sending a telegram to the provincial
governor of Davao. According to the response of the Attorney for the Bureau of Labor to the
telegram of his chief, there were then in Davao women who desired to return to Manila, but
who should not be permitted to do so because of having contracted debts. The half-hearted
effort naturally resulted in none of the parties in question being brought before the court on the
day named.
In accordance with section 87 of General Orders No. 58, as said in the same decision, the
respondents, for the purpose of complying with the order of the court, could have, (1)
produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; (2) shown by
affidavits that on account of sickness or infirmity the said women could not safely be brought
before this court; and (3) presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their
lawyers waived their right to be present. According to the same decision, the said respondents
". . . did not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted; did not
show impossibility of performance; and did not present writings, that waived the right to be
present by those interested. Instead, a few stereotyped affidavits purporting to show that the
women were contented with their life in Davao, some of which have since been repudiated by
the signers, were appended to the return. That through ordinary diligence a considerable
number of the women, at least sixty, could have been brought back to Manila is demonstrated
by the fact that during this time they were easily to be found in the municipality of Davao, and
that about this number either returned at their own expense or were produced at the second
hearing by the respondents."
The majority opinion also recognized that, "That court, at the time the return to its first order
was made, would have been warranted summarily in finding the respondent guilty of contempt
of court, and in sending them to jail until they obeyed the order. Their excuses for the non
production of the persons were far from sufficient." To corroborate this, the majority decision
cites the case of the Queen vs. Barnardo, Gossage's Case ([1890], 24 Q. B. D., 283) and added
"that the return did not show that every possible effort to produce the women was made by the
respondents."
When the said return by the respondents was made to this court in banc and the case discussed,
my opinion was that Mayor Lukban should have been immediately punished for contempt.
Nevertheless, a second order referred to in the decision was issued on December 10, 1918,
requiring the respondents to produce before the court, on January 13, 1919, the women who
were not in Manila, unless they could show that it was impossible to comply with the said
order on the two grounds previously mentioned. With respect to this second order, the same
decision has the following to say:
In response to the second order of the court, the respondents appear to have become more
zealous and to have shown a better spirit. Agents were dispatched to Mindanao, placards were
posted, the constabulary and the municipal police joined in rounding up the women, and a
steamer with free transportation to Manila was provided. While charges and countercharges in
such a bitterly contested case are to be expected, and while a critical reading of the record

might reveal a failure of literal fulfillment with our mandate, we come to conclude that there is
a substantial compliance with it.
I do not agree to this conclusion.
The respondent mayor of the city of Manila, Justo Lukban, let 17 days elapse from the date of
the issuance of the first order on November 4th till the 21st of the same month before taking
the first step for compliance with the mandate of the said order; he waited till the 21st of
November, as the decision says, before he sent a telegram to the provincial governor o f Davao
and naturally this half-hearted effort, as is so qualified in the decision, resulted in that none of
the women appeared before this court on December 2nd. Thus, the said order was not
complied with, and in addition to this noncompliance there was the circumstances that seven
of the said women having returned to Manila at their own expense before the said second day
of December and being in the antechamber of the court room, which fact was known to Chief
of Police Hohmann, who was then present at the trial and to the attorney for the respondents,
were not produced before the court by the respondents nor did the latter show any effort to
present them, in spite of the fact that their attention was called to this particular by the
undersigned.
The result of the said second order was, as is said in the same decision, that the respondents,
on January 13th, the day fixed for the protection of the women before this court, presented
technically the seven (7) women above-mentioned who had returned to the city at their own
expense and the other eight (8) women whom the respondents themselves brought to Manila,
alleging moreover that their agents and subordinates succeeded in bringing them from Davao
with their consent; that in Davao they found eighty-one (81) women who, when asked if they
desired to return to Manila with free transportation, renounced such a right, as is shown in the
affidavits presented by the respondents to this effect; that, through other means, fifty-nine (59)
women have already returned to Manila, but notwithstanding the efforts made to find them it
was not possible to locate the whereabouts of twenty-six (26) of them. Thus, in short, out of
the one hundred and eighty-one (181) women who, as has been previously said, have been
illegally detained by Mayor Lukban and Chief of Police Hohmann and transported to Davao
against their will, only eight (8) have been brought to Manila and presented before this court
by the respondents in compliance with the said two orders. Fifty-nine (59) of them have
returned to Manila through other means not furnished by the respondents, twenty-six of whom
were brought by the attorney for the petitioners, Mendoza, on his return from Davao. The said
attorney paid out of his own pocket the transportation of the said twenty-six women. Adding
to these numbers the other seven (7) women who returned to this city at their own expense
before January 13 we have a total of sixty-six (66), which evidently proves, on the one hand,
the falsity of the allegation by the respondents in their first answer at the trial of December 2,
1918, giving as one of the reasons for their inability to present any of the said women that the
latter were content with their life in Mindanao and did not desire to return to Manila; and, on
the other hand, that the respondents, especially the first named, that is Mayor Justo Lukban,
who acted as chief and principal in all that refers to the compliance with the orders issued by
this court, could bring before December 2nd, the date of the first hearing of the case, as well as
before January 13th, the date fixed for the compliance with the second order, if not the
seventy-four (74) women already indicated, at least a great number of them, or at least sixty
(60) of them, as is said in the majority decision, inasmuch as the said respondent could count
upon the aid of the Constabulary forces and the municipal police, and had transportation
facilities for the purpose. But the said respondent mayor brought only eight (8) of the women
before this court on January 13th. This fact can not, in my judgment, with due respect to the

majority opinion, justify the conclusion that the said respondent has substantially complied
with the second order of this court, but on the other hand demonstrates that he had not
complied with the mandate of this court in its first and second orders; that neither of the said
orders has been complied with by the respondent Justo Lukban, Mayor of the city of Manila,
who is, according to the majority decision, principally responsible for the contempt, to which
conclusion I agree. The conduct of the said respondent with respect to the second order
confirms the contempt committed by non-compliance with the first order and constitutes a new
contempt because of non-compliance with the second, because of the production of only eight
(8) of the one hundred and eighty-one (181) women who have been illegally detained by virtue
of his order and transported to Davao against their will, committing the twenty-six (26)
women who could not be found in Davao, demonstrates in my opinion that, notwithstanding
the nature of the case which deals with the remedy of habeas corpus, presented by the
petitioners and involving the question whether they should or not be granted their liberty, the
respondent has not given due attention to the same nor has he made any effort to comply with
the second order. In other words, he has disobeyed the said two orders; has despised the
authority of this court; has failed to give the respect due to justice; and lastly, he has created
and placed obstacles to the administration of justice in the said habeas corpus proceeding, thus
preventing, because of his notorious disobedience, the resolution of the said proceeding with
the promptness which the nature of the same required.
Contempt of court has been defined as a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of the
court; and he is guilty of contempt whose conduct is such as tends to bring the authority and
administration of the law into disrespect or disregard. . . ." (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 488.)
It is a general principle that a disobedience of any valid order of the court constitutes
contempt, unless the defendant is unable to comply therewith. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p.
502.)
It is contempt to employ a subterfuge to evade the judgment of the court, or to obstruct or
attempt to obstruct the service of legal process. If a person hinders or prevents the service of
process by deceiving the officer or circumventing him by any means, the result is the same as
though he had obstructed by some direct means. (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 503.)
While it may seem somewhat incongruous to speak, as the courts often do, of enforcing
respect for the law and for the means it has provided in civilized communities for establishing
justice, since true respect never comes in that way, it is apparent nevertheless that the power to
enforce decorum in the courts and obedience to their orders and just measures is so essentially
a part of the life of the courts that it would be difficult to conceive of their usefulness or
efficiency as existing without it. Therefore it may be said generally that where due respect for
the courts as ministers of the law is wanting, a necessity arises for the use of compulsion, not,
however, so much to excite individual respect as to compel obedience or to remove an
unlawful or unwarranted interference with the administration of justice. (Ruling Case Law,
vol. 6, p. 487.)
The power to punish for contempt is as old as the law itself, and has been exercised from the
earliest times. In England it has been exerted when the contempt consisted of scandalizing the
sovereign or his ministers, the law-making power, or the courts. In the American states the
power to punish for contempt, so far as the executive department and the ministers of state are
concerned, and in some degree so far as the legislative department is concerned, is obsolete,
but it has been almost universally preserved so far as regards the judicial department. The

power which the courts have of vindicating their own authority is a necessary incident to every
court of justice, whether of record or not; and the authority for issuing attachments in a proper
case for contempts out of court, it has been declared, stands upon the same immemorial usage
as supports the whole fabric of the common law. . . . (Ruling Case Law, vol. 6, p. 489.)
The undisputed importance of the orders of this court which have been disobeyed; the loss of
the prestige of the authority of the court which issued the said orders, which loss might have
been caused by noncompliance with the same orders on the part of the respondent Justo
Lukban; the damages which might have been suffered by some of the women illegally
detained, in view of the fact that they were not brought to Manila by the respondents to be
presented before the court and of the further fact that some of them were obliged to come to
this city at their own expense while still others were brought to Manila by the attorney for the
petitioners, who paid out of his own pocket the transportation of the said women; and the
delay which was necessarily incurred in the resolution of the petition interposed by the said
petitioners and which was due to the fact that the said orders were not opportunately and duly
obeyed and complied with, are circumstances which should be taken into account in imposing
upon the respondent Justo Lukban the penalty corresponding to the contempt committed by
him, a penalty which, according to section 236 of the Code of Civil Procedure, should consist
of a fine not exceeding P1,000 or imprisonment not exceeding months, or both such fine and
imprisonment. In the imposition of the penalty, there should also be taken into consideration
the special circumstance that the contempt was committed by a public authority, the mayor of
the city of Manila, the first executive authority of the city, and consequently, the person
obliged to be the first in giving an example of obedience and respect for the laws and the valid
and just orders of the duly constituted authorities as well as for the orders emanating from the
courts of justice, and in giving help and aid to the said courts in order that justice may be
administered with promptness and rectitude.
I believe, therefore, that instead of the fine of one hundred pesos (P100), there should be
imposed upon the respondent Justo Lukban a fine of five hundred pesos (P500), and all the
costs should be charged against him. Lastly, I believe it to be my duty to state here that the
records of this proceeding should be transmitted to the Attorney-General in order that, after a
study of the same and deduction from the testimony which he may deem necessary, and the
proper transmittal of the same to the fiscal of the city of Manila and to the provincial fiscal of
Davao, both the latter shall present the corresponding informations for the prosecution and
punishment of the crimes which have been committed on the occasion when the illegal
detention of the women was carried into effect by Mayor Justo Lukban of the city of Manila
and Chief of Police Anton Hohmann, and also of those crimes committed by reason of the
same detention and while the women were in Davao. This will be one of the means whereby
the just hope expressed in the majority decision will be realized, that is, that in the Philippine
Islands there should exist a government of laws and not a government of men and that this
decision may serve to bulwark the fortifications of an orderly Government of laws and to
protect individual liberty from illegal encroachments.