SCC Judgment - B.C. Freedom of Information and Privacy Association v. British Columbia (Attorney General)

2/2/2017 B.C. Freedom of Information and Privacy Association v.
British Columbia (Attorney General) - SCC Cases (Lexum)
SupremeCourtJudgments
B.C.FreedomofInformationandPrivacyAssociationv.BritishColumbia(Attorney
General)
Collection: SupremeCourtJudgments
Date: 2017-01-26
Neutralcitation: 2017SCC6
Casenumber: 36495
Judges: McLachlin,Beverley;Moldaver,MichaelJ.;Karakatsanis,Andromache;Wagner,
Richard;Gascon,Clment;Ct,Suzanne;Brown,Russell
Onappealfrom: BritishColumbia
Subjects: Constitutionallaw
Notes: SCCCaseInformation:36495

SUPREMECOURTOFCANADA

CITATION:B.C.FreedomofInformationandPrivacy APPEALHEARD:October11,2016
Associationv.BritishColumbia(AttorneyGeneral), JUDGMENTRENDERED:January26,2017
2017SCC6 DOCKET:36495

BETWEEN:
B.C.FreedomofInformationandPrivacyAssociation
Appellant

and

AttorneyGeneralofBritishColumbia
Respondent

and

AttorneyGeneralofCanada,
AttorneyGeneralofOntario,
AttorneyGeneralofQuebec,
BritishColumbiaCivilLibertiesAssociationand
CanadianCivilLibertiesAssociation
Interveners

https://scc-csc.lexum.com/scc-csc/scc-csc/en/item/16348/index.do 1/23
2/2/2017 B.C. Freedom of Information and Privacy Association v. British Columbia (Attorney General) - SCC Cases (Lexum)
CORAM:McLachlinC.J.andMoldaver,Karakatsanis,Wagner,Gascon,CtandBrownJJ.

REASONSFORJUDGMENT: McLachlinC.J.(Moldaver,Karakatsanis,Wagner,Gascon,
(paras.1to60) CtandBrownJJ.concurring)

NOTE:ThisdocumentissubjecttoeditorialrevisionbeforeitsreproductioninfinalformintheCanada
SupremeCourtReports.

B.C.FIPAv.B.C.(ATTORNEYGENERAL)
B.C.FreedomofInformationandPrivacyAssociationAppellant
v.
AttorneyGeneralofBritishColumbiaRespondent
and
AttorneyGeneralofCanada,
AttorneyGeneralofOntario,
AttorneyGeneralofQuebec,
BritishColumbiaCivilLibertiesAssociationand
CanadianCivilLibertiesAssociationInterveners
Indexed as: B.C. Freedom of Information and Privacy Association v. British Columbia (Attorney
General)
2017SCC6
FileNo.:36495.
2016:October112017:January26.
Present:McLachlinC.J.andMoldaver,Karakatsanis,Wagner,Gascon,CtandBrownJJ.
ONAPPEALFROMTHECOURTOFAPPEALFORBRITISHCOLUMBIA
ConstitutionallawCharterofRights FreedomofexpressionElectionsIndividuals
ororganizationswhowishtosponsorelectionadvertisingrequiredbyElectionActtoregisterwithChief
Electoral Officer Meaning of sponsor of election advertising Whether individuals engaged in

political selfexpression come within definition of sponsor and need to register Whether registration
requirementisareasonableanddemonstrablyjustifiedlimitonexpressionofsponsorswhospendlessthan
$500onelectionadvertisingCanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms,ss.1 ,2 (b)ElectionAct,
R.S.B.C.1996,c.106,ss.228electionadvertising,229,239.
In2009and2013,theB.C.FreedomofInformationandPrivacyAssociationsponsoredelection
advertisingwithinthemeaningofBritishColumbiasElectionAct.Itwasthereforesubjecttotheimpugned
registration requirement in s. 239 of the Act. The Association sought a declaration that the registration
requirement,totheextentthatitappliestosponsorsofelectionadvertisingwhospendlessthan$500ina
givencampaignperiod,infringess.2 (b)oftheCharter andisnotsavedbys.1 .Specifically,itargued
thatrequiringthatindividualsororganizationswhowishtosponsorelectionadvertisingtoregisterisnota
reasonableanddemonstrablyjustifiedlimitonexpressionbypersonswhoconveypoliticalmessagesthrough
smallscaleelectionactivitieslikedisplayinghomemadesignsintheirwindows,puttingbumperstickerson
theircars,orwearingTshirtswithpoliticalmessagesonthem.Thetrialjudgedismissedtheapplication.He
acceptedtheAttorneyGeneralofBritishColumbiasconcessionthats.239oftheActwasaninfringement
oftherightoffreeexpression,butconcludedthattheinfringementwasjustifiedunders.1 oftheCharter
.AmajorityoftheCourtofAppealreachedthesameconclusion.
Held:Theappealshouldbedismissed.
Properly interpreted, s. 239 does not catch the categories of expression upon which the
Association relies. The words of ss. 228, 229 and 239 of the Act, read in their grammatical and ordinary
senseandharmoniouslywiththestatutoryscheme,theobjectoftheAct,andtheintentionofthelegislature,
indicate that a sponsor required to register is an individual or organization who receives an advertising
service from another individual or organization, whether in exchange for payment or without charge.
Individuals who neither pay others for advertising services nor receive advertising services from others
withoutchargearenotsponsorswithinthemeaningofs.229(1).Theymaytransmittheirownpointsof
view,whetherbypostingahandmadesigninawindow,orputtingabumperstickeronacar,orwearinga
Tshirtwithamessageonit,withoutregistering.
Althoughtheregistrationrequirementimposedonsponsorslimitstheirrightofexpression
guaranteedbys.2 (b)oftheCharter ,thelimitontheexpressionofsponsorswhospendlessthan$500is
justifiedunders.1 .Thepurposeoftheregistrationrequirementincreasingtransparency,openness,and
publicaccountabilityintheelectoralprocessandthuspromotinganinformedelectorateispressingand
substantial, and the registration requirement is rationally connected to this objective. The limit is also
minimally impairing. By confining the registration requirement to sponsors and exempting individual
politicalselfexpressionbypersonswhoarenotsponsors,s.239 tailorstheimpingementonexpressionto
whatisrequiredbytheobjectoftheAct.Moreover,theformsofadvertisinglikelytobesponsoredwithin
the meaning of the Act are also likely to be subject to the Acts attribution requirements, which are not
challenged. The registration requirements deleterious effects are limited since only political expression in
theformofsponsorshipofelectionadvertisingstandstobedelayedorinhibited.Therewillbefewcasesin
which an individual or group is subject to the registration requirement but not the attribution requirement,
andsothenumberofsponsorsforwhoms.239 isthesolereasontheycannotprotecttheiranonymitywill
befew.Theregistrationprocessissimpleandunlikelytodetermuch,ifany,expressioninwhichasponsor
wouldotherwiseengage.Theselimiteddeleteriouseffectsareoutweighedbythebenefitsofthescheme
permittingthepublictoknowwhoisengagedinorganizedadvocacyintheirelections,ensuringthatthose
whosponsorelectionadvertisingmustprovidethepublicwithanassurancethattheyareincompliancewith
electionlaw,andprovidingtheChiefElectoralOfficerwithinformationthatcanassistintheenforcementof
theActandininformingsponsorsofitsrequirements.
TheAttorneyGeneralofBritishColumbiawasnotobligatedtoleadsocialscienceevidencein
order to discharge its burden of justification under s. 1 of the Charter . Although not leading social
scienceevidencemayseriouslydiminishthegovernmentsabilitytojustifytheinfringementofaCharter
right,socialscienceevidencemaynotbenecessarywhere,ashere,thescopeoftheinfringementisminimal.
CasesCited
Referredto:Harperv.Canada(AttorneyGeneral),2004SCC33,[2004]1S.C.R.827Libman
v.Quebec(AttorneyGeneral),[1997]3S.C.R.569R.v.Zundel,[1992]2S.C.R.731R.v.Keegstra,[1990]
3 S.C.R. 697 Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 Bell ExpressVu
Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559 Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1
S.C.R.27PacificPressv.BritishColumbia(AttorneyGeneral),2000BCSC248,73B.C.L.R.(3d)264R.
v.Oakes,[1986]1S.C.R.103R.v.Bryan,2007SCC12,[2007]1S.C.R.527ThomsonNewspapersCo.v.
Canada(AttorneyGeneral),[1998]1S.C.R.877.
StatutesandRegulationsCited
CanadaElectionsAct,S.C.2000,c.9,s.353(1) .
CanadianCharterofRightsandFreedoms,ss.1 ,2 (b).
Election Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 106, ss. 228 contribution, election advertising, value of election
advertising, 229 [am. 2002, c. 60, s. 6], 231, 235(1) [rep. idem, s. 7], 235.1, 239, 240, 244, 245,
283(m.1).
ElectionAct,S.B.C.1995,c.51.
ElectionAdvertisingRegulation,B.C.Reg.329/2008,s.2.
ElectionStatutesAmendmentAct,2002,S.B.C.2002,c.60.
AuthorsCited
BritishColumbia.ChiefElectoralOfficer.ReportoftheChiefElectoralOfficeronRecommendationsfor
Legislative Change. Victoria: Elections BC, April 2010 (online:
http://www.elections.bc.ca/docs/rpt/2010CEOReportRecommendations.pdf archived version:
http://www.scccsc.ca/csodce/2017SCCCSC6_eng.pdf).
BritishColumbia.LegislativeAssembly.OfficialReportofDebatesoftheLegislativeAssembly(Hansard),
vol.21,No.16,4thSess.,35thParl.,June27,1995,pp.1624041.
CollinsCanadianDictionary.Toronto:HarperCollins,2010,sponsor.
Driedger,ElmerA.ConstructionofStatutes,2nded.Toronto:Butterworths,1983.
APPEALfromajudgmentoftheBritishColumbiaCourtofAppeal(Newbury,Saundersand
LowryJJ.A.),2015BCCA172,371B.C.A.C.65,636W.A.C.65,76B.C.L.R.(5th)26,334C.R.R.(2d)37,
[2015]12W.W.R.295,[2015]B.C.J.No.774(QL),2015CarswellBC1035(WLCan.),affirmingadecision
ofCohenJ.,2014BCSC660,308C.R.R.(2d)12,[2014]B.C.J.No.688(QL),2014CarswellBC1034(WL
Can.).Appealdismissed.
AlisonM.LatimerandSeanHern,fortheappellant.
KarenA.Horsman,Q.C.,andSarahBevan,fortherespondent.
MichaelH.Morris,fortheintervenertheAttorneyGeneralofCanada.
DanielGuttmanandEmilyBala,fortheintervenertheAttorneyGeneralofOntario.
DominiqueA.JobinandJeanVincentLacroix,fortheintervenertheAttorneyGeneralof
Quebec.
SheilaTucker and Joanne Lysyk, for the intervener the British Columbia Civil Liberties
Association.
Gillian T. Hnatiw and Zohar R. Levy, for the intervener the Canadian Civil Liberties
Association.
ThejudgmentoftheCourtwasdeliveredby

THECHIEFJUSTICE
[1]BritishColumbiasElectionAct,R.S.B.C.1996,c.106,requiresindividualsororganizations
who wish to sponsor election advertising to register with the provinces Chief Electoral Officer. This
registrationrequirementappliestoallsponsorsofelectionadvertising,regardlessofhowmuchtheyspend
duringthewritperiod.
[2] ItiscommongroundthatBritishColumbiasregistrationrequirementlimitstherightof
expression guaranteed by s. 2 (b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . The question on
appeal is whether it is a reasonable and demonstrably justified limit on persons who convey political
messages through smallscale election activities like displaying homemade signs in their windows, putting
bumperstickersontheircars,orwearingTshirtswithpoliticalmessagesonthem.
[3] Inmyview,theActdoesnotcatchsmallscaleelectionadvertisingofthisnature.Iwould
thereforedismisstheappeal.
I.Legislation
[4]Thechallengeinthiscaseistotheregistrationrequirementthats.239oftheBritishColumbia
Election Act imposes on the sponsors of election advertising. This Court has upheld a registration
requirementforthirdpartieswhospendatleast$500onelectionadvertising:Harper v. Canada (Attorney
General), 2004 SCC 33, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827, at paras. 14246, per Bastarache J., and para. 48, per
McLachlinC.J.andMajorJ.
[5] Section239,bycontrast,requiresanyonewhoisasponsorofelectionadvertisingto
register:
Electionadvertisingsponsorsmustberegistered

239(1)Subjecttosubsection(2),anindividualororganizationwhoisnotregisteredunder
thisDivisionmustnotsponsorelectionadvertising.

(2) A candidate, registered political party or registered constituency association is not
requiredtoberegisteredasasponsoriftheindividualororganizationisrequiredtofilean
election financing report by which the election advertising is disclosed as an election
expense.

(3) An individual or organization who is registered or required to be registered as a
sponsor must be independent of registered political parties, registered constituency
organizations,candidates,agentsofcandidatesandfinancialagents,andmustnotsponsor
electionadvertisingonbehalfofortogetherwithanyofthese.
[6]Section240describestheregistrationprocess:
Registrationwithchiefelectoralofficer

240(1)Anindividualororganizationwhowishestobecomearegisteredsponsormustfilean
applicationinaccordancewiththissectionwiththechiefelectoralofficer.

(2)Anapplicationmustincludethefollowing:

(a)thefullnameoftheapplicantand,inthecaseofanapplicantorganizationthat
hasadifferentusualname,thisusualname

(b)thefulladdressoftheapplicant

(c)inthecaseofanapplicantorganization,thenamesoftheprincipalofficersof
theorganizationor,iftherearenoprincipalofficers,oftheprincipalmembersof
theorganization

(d) an address at which notices and communications under this Act and other
communications will be accepted as served on or otherwise delivered to the
individualororganization

(e)atelephonenumberatwhichtheapplicantcanbecontacted

(f)anyotherinformationrequiredbyregulationtobeincluded.

(3)Anapplicationmust

(a) be signed, as applicable, by the individual applicant or, in the case of an
applicantorganization,by2principalofficersoftheorganizationor,ifthereareno
principalofficers,by2principalmembersoftheorganization,and

(b) be accompanied by a signed statement of an individual who signed the
applicationunderparagraph(a)thattheapplicant

(i)isnotprohibitedfrombeingregisteredbysection247,and

(ii)doesnotintendtosponsorelectionadvertisingforanypurposerelated
to circumventing the provisions of this Act limiting the value of election
expensesthatmaybeincurredbyacandidateorregisteredpoliticalparty.

(4)Thechiefelectoralofficermayrequireapplicationstobeinaspecifiedform.

(5)Assoonaspracticableafterreceivinganapplication,ifsatisfiedthattherequirements
of this section are met by an applicant, the chief electoral officer must register the
applicantasaregisteredsponsorintheregistermaintainedbythechiefelectoralofficer
forthispurpose.

(6)Ifthereisanychangeintheinformationreferredtoinsubsection(2)foraregistered
sponsor,thesponsormustfilewiththechiefelectoralofficerwrittennoticeofthechange
within30daysafteritoccurs.

(7)AnoticeorothercommunicationthatisrequiredorauthorizedunderthisActtobe
given to a sponsor is deemed to have been given if it is delivered to the applicable
addressfiledunderthissectionwiththechiefelectoralofficer.
[7]Section228defineselectionadvertising:
Electionadvertising

228ForthepurposesofthisAct:

...

electionadvertising means the transmission to the public by any means, during the
campaign period, of an advertising message that promotes or opposes, directly or
indirectly, a registered political party or the election of a candidate, including an
advertising message that takes a position on an issue with which a registered political
partyorcandidateisassociated,butdoesnotinclude

(a) the publication without charge of news, an editorial, an interview, a column, a
letter,adebate,aspeechoracommentaryinabonafideperiodicalpublicationora
radioortelevisionprogram,

(b)thedistributionofabook,orthepromotionofthesaleofabook,fornolessthan
its commercial value, if the book was planned to be made available to the public
regardlessofwhethertherewastobeanelection,

(c)thetransmissionofadocumentdirectlybyapersonoragrouptotheirmembers,
employeesorshareholders,or

(d)thetransmissionbyanindividual,onanoncommercialbasisontheinternet,or
bytelephoneortextmessaging,ofhisorherpersonalpoliticalviews
[8]Section229(1)definestheconceptofsponsorship:
Sponsorshipofelectionadvertising

229(1)ForthepurposesofthisPart,thesponsorofelectionadvertisingiswhicheverofthe
followingisapplicable:

(a) the individual or organization who pays for the election advertising to be
conducted

(b) if the services of conducting the advertising are provided without charge as a
contribution,theindividualororganizationtowhomtheservicesareprovidedasa
contribution

(c) if the individual or organization that is the sponsor within the meaning of
paragraph (a) or (b) is acting on behalf of another individual or organization, the
otherindividualororganization.

[9] TheActalsoimposesanattributionrequirement,whichrequiresallelectionadvertisingto
identify the name and telephone number or mailing address of its sponsor: s. 231(1). This attribution
requirementappliesregardlessofwhetherthesponsorissubjecttotheregistrationrequirementins.239,but
doesnotapplytoclassesofelectionadvertisingthatmayreasonablybeconsideredclothing,anoveltyitem
oranitemintendedforpersonalusethatareexemptedbyregulation:s.283(m.1)seealsos.231(2).British
Columbias Chief Electoral Officer has accordingly exempted from the attribution requirement clothing,
noveltyitems,includingwearablenoveltyitemssuchasbuttons,badges,wristbandsandnecklaces,and
small items of nominal value that are intended for personal use: Election Advertising Regulation, B.C.
Reg.329/2008,s.2.
II.FactsandJudicialHistory
[10] Theappellant,theB.C.FreedomofInformationandPrivacyAssociation,isanonprofit
societybasedinVancouver.Itengagesinpublicadvocacyinrespectoffreedomofinformationandprivacy
rights.
[11]In2009and2013,theappellantsponsoredelectionadvertisingwithinthemeaningoftheAct.It
wasthereforesubjecttotheimpugnedregistrationrequirementins.239.
[12]Theappellantsoughtadeclarationthattheregistrationrequirement,totheextentthatitapplies
tosponsorsofelectionadvertisingwhospendlessthan$500inagivencampaignperiod,infringess.2 (b)
oftheCharter ,isnotsavedbys.1 ,andisthereforeofnoforceandeffect.Theappellantconcededthat
anyonewhospendsmorethan$500onelectionadvertisingcanbecompelledtoregister:Harper.Itargued,
however,thatpersonswhoseexpendituresfallbelowthatthresholdshouldnotbecompelledtoregister.
[13]Thetrialjudge,CohenJ.,dismissedtheappellantsapplication:2014BCSC660,208C.R.R.
(2d)12.HeacceptedtheAttorneyGeneralofBritishColumbiasconcessionthats.239oftheActwasan
infringement of the right of free expression under s. 2 (b) of the Charter , but concluded that the
infringementwasjustifiedunders.1 .AmajorityoftheCourtofAppeal(perNewburyJ.A.,LowryJ.A.
concurring)reachedthesameconclusion:2015BCCA172,371B.C.A.C.65.
[14] Saunders J.A. dissented. She would have held that, as applied to smallscale election
advertisers [t]hose with bumper stickers on vehicles expressing views on environmental or economic
matters, those who place signs in home windows or signs on their property expressing support for or
disputingaproposalorinitiative,andthosewithpicketsignsorothermessagesadvancingapointofviewon
apublicissue(C.A.reasons,atpara.68)theinfringementofthes.2 (b)rightdidnotmeetthetestof
compelling justification required to justify a limitation on political speech: para. 67. She held that the
impugnedprovisionwouldhaveachillingeffectonsmallandindependentvoices(para.59),particularly
thosewhowouldstruggletocomplywiththeadministrativeburdenoftheregistrationrequirementandthose
who,forreasonsofpersonalsecurity,willnotregistertheiraddressesinapublicrecord:para.69.Forthese
individuals, in her view, the registration requirement would function as a complete barrier to political
expression: ibid. Saunders J.A. distinguished Harper on this basis in the absence of an exception for
inexpensive signage (para. 71) like the $500 expenditure threshold for registration in the Canada
ElectionsAct,S.C.2000,c.9,s.353(1) theadvantagetothepublicinterestinherentintheregistration
requirementforsignageofthenatureIhavediscussedisnotsogreatastoovercometheconsequentserious
infringementoffreedomofexpression:ibid.
III.Analysis
[15] Theregistrationrequirementins.239oftheBritishColumbiaElectionActprovidesthatan
individual or organization who is not registered . . . must not sponsor election advertising. By requiring
sponsorstoregisterbeforeengaginginelectionadvertising,itlimitstheirs.2(b)rightoffreeexpression.
[16]Politicalexpressionliesatthecoreofthe[Charter s]guaranteeoffreeexpression:Harper,
para. 1,per McLachlin C.J.and Major J.seealsoLibman v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1997] 3 S.C.R.
569,atpara.29R.v.Zundel,[1992]2S.C.R.731,atpp.75253,perMcLachlinJ.R.v.Keegstra,[1990]3
S.C.R. 697, at pp. 76364, per Dickson C.J. Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2
S.C.R. 1326, at pp. 135556, per Wilson J. Limitations on such speech, to be justified under s.1 of the
Charter ,mustbesupportedbyaclearandconvincingdemonstrationthattheyarenecessary,donotgo
toofar,andenhancemorethanharmthedemocraticprocess:Harper,atpara.21,perMcLachlinC.J.and
MajorJ.seealsoLibman,atpara.28,quotingEdmontonJournal,atp.1336,perCoryJ.
[17]Thefirststepistodeterminethescopeandnatureofthelimitationonfreeexpressionthatthe
law imposes. Having determined the scope and nature of the limitation, the second step is to determine
whetherithasbeenshowntobereasonableanddemonstrablyjustified,unders.1 oftheCharter .
[18] Inthiscase,thepartiespartcompanyatthefirststep.Theydisagreeonthescopeofthe
expressiveactivitycaughtbys.239,whichprovidesthatanindividualororganizationwhoisnotregistered
...mustnotsponsorelectionadvertising.Wemustthereforeestablishwhatitmeanstobeasponsorof
electionadvertising.
A.WhatIstheScopeandNatureoftheInfringementofSection2 (b)?
[19] Thecourtsbelowdidnotturntheirattentiontothefirststepoftheconstitutionalanalysis
thatis,determiningthescopeandnatureofthelimitationonfreeexpressionthattheregistrationrequirement
in s. 239 imposes. Both the trial judge and the Court of Appeal accepted as correct the Chief Electoral
Officersinterpretationoftheprovision,assetoutina2010reporttothelegislature:
Election advertising rules do not distinguish between those sponsors conducting full media
campaignsandindividualswhoposthandwrittensignsintheirapartmentwindows.TheElection
Act does not establish a threshold for registration, resulting in all advertising sponsors being
required to register and display disclosure information including individuals with a simple
handmadesignintheirwindow.
(ReportoftheChiefElectoralOfficeronRecommendationsforLegislativeChange(April2010)(online),
atp.16seetrialreasons,atpara.88C.A.reasons,atpara.22.)
This report, which the appellant introduced as evidence at first instance, supports the view that s. 239s
registrationrequirementappliestoessentiallyallelectionadvertising,asthattermisdefinedins.228.An
individualwhopostsahandmadesigninherwindowis,onthisinterpretation,asponsorofthatadvertising
withinthemeaningofs.239.
[20] SaundersJ.A.sconcernwiththeimpugnedprovisionseffectonsmallandindependent
voicesispredicatedonthisassumption.So,too,isthisappeal.Theappellantsubmitsthattheinfringement
in this case . . . is the laws impact on small spenders (emphasis in original). If s. 239 does not limit
expression as broadly as the appellant contends if individuals who display handmade signs in their
windows, place bumper stickers on their cars, or wear Tshirts with political messages on them are not
subjecttotheActsregistrationrequirementthentheappealfails.
[21] Iconcludethat,properlyinterpreted,s.239doesnotcatchthecategoriesofexpressionupon
which the appellant relies. This follows from the application of our longaccepted approach to statutory
interpretation,namelythatthewordsofanActaretobereadintheirentirecontextandintheirgrammatical
and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of
Parliament: Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, 2002 SCC 42, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, at para. 26,
quotingbothE.A.Driedger,ConstructionofStatutes(2nded.1983),atp.87,andRizzo&RizzoShoesLtd.
(Re),[1998]1S.C.R.27,atpara.21.Inthiscase,eachoftheseconsiderationsindicatesthats.239isdirected
only at those who undertake organized advertising campaigns that is, sponsors who either pay for
advertising services or who receive those services without charge as a contribution. In no case does the
registrationrequirementapplytothoseengagedinindividualselfexpression.
(1)TheWordsandSchemeoftheAct
[22] Section239(1)oftheActprovidesthatanindividualororganizationwhoisnotregistered
underthisDivisionmustnotsponsorelectionadvertising.Theregistrationrequirementisthusdirectedata
specificactivitythesponsorshipofelectionadvertising.
[23] Electionadvertisingisbroadlydefinedins.228asthetransmissiontothepublicbyany
means, during the campaign period, of an advertising message that promotes or opposes, directly or
indirectly, a registered political party or the election of a candidate. This is broad enough to cover the
individual expression of a political message by, for example, placing a handmade sign in a window or a
bumper sticker on a car, or by wearing a Tshirt with a political message on it. Such activities may
promot[e] or oppos[e], directly or indirectly, a registered political party or the election of a candidate,
particularly since s. 228 includes in this category the transmission of advertising message[s] that tak[e] a
position on an issue with which a registered political party or candidate is associated. Nor do handmade
signs, bumper stickers, or Tshirts fall within any of the exclusions from the definition of election
advertisingsetoutins.228.
[24]However,s.239oftheActlimitstheregistrationrequirementbyrequiringregistrationonlyby
individualsororganizationswhosponsorelectionadvertising.Theordinarymeaningofsponsordoesnot
suggestapersonengagedinindividualselfexpression,butratherapersonorgroupthatisundertakingor
sponsoring an organized campaign. A sponsor is a person or group that promotes another person or
group in an activity or the activity itself, either for profit or for charity: Collins Canadian Dictionary
(2010),atp.911(emphasisadded).Onecannotbeasponsorinperfectisolation.
[25]TheActsuseofthewordsponsorreflectsitsordinarymeaning.Section229(1)definesthe
sponsorofelectionadvertisingastheindividualororganizationwhopaysfortheelectionadvertisingtobe
conducted(s.229(1)(a))or,iftheservicesofconductingtheadvertisingareprovidedwithoutchargeasa
contribution,theindividualororganizationtowhomtheservicesareprovidedasacontribution:s.229(1)
(b).Apersonwhodisplaysahandmadesigninherwindoworabumperstickeronhercardoesnotpa[y]
for...electionadvertisingtobeconductedinanyordinarysenseofthosewords.Nomoneychangeshands.
Nor can she be described as an individual to whom advertising services have been provided without
chargeasacontribution.
[26]UndertheActsdefinition,anindividualororganizationcannotsponsorelectionadvertising
without either pay[ing] for the election advertising to be conducted (s. 229(1)(a)) or being provided
withoutchargetheservicesofconducting the advertising: s. 229(1)(b). The alternative definitions in s.
229(1)(a) and (b) describe the same activity in each case, someone is the sponsor and someone else
conduct[s]theadvertising.Theonlydifferenceisthat,inthefirstcase,thesponsorpaysfortheelection
advertising, while in the second case the sponsor receives the services without charge. Whether the
individualorgrouppaysforthatservice(s.229(1)(a))orreceivesitwithoutcharge(s.229(1)(b)),theremust
beaserviceprovidedfortheindividualorgrouptofallwithintheActsdefinitionofsponsor.Sponsorship
necessarilyinvolvesatleasttwopeoplethepersonprovidingtheservice(whetherformoneyorwithout
charge)andthesponsor.Apersonwhopostsahandmadesigninherwindow,orputsabumperstickeronher
car, or wears a Tshirt with a political message on it, is neither paying for nor receiving the service of
conductingadvertising.Sheisnotreceivingaservicefromsomeoneelse,andthusisnotasponsorunder
theAct.
[27] Inotethats.228oftheElectionActdefinescontributionasacontribution of money
provided to a sponsor of election advertising, whether given before or after the individual or organization
actsasasponsor.Thisisintensionwiths.229(1)(b),whichstatesthatanindividualororganizationwho
receivestheservicesofconducting...advertisingfromanotherindividualororganizationwithoutcharge
[1]
asacontributionisthesponsorofthatelectionadvertisting. Itisclear,inanycase,thatmorethanone
individualmustbeinvolved,whethertheadvertisingservicesarepaidfororreceivedwithoutcharge.
[28] The statutory scheme provides further support for the view that the Acts registration
requirementdoesnotcatchindividualexpressiononelectionissues.
[29]Section228definesvalueofelectionadvertisingas:
(a)thepricepaidforpreparingandconductingtheelectionadvertising,or

(b)themarketvalueofpreparingandconductingtheelectionadvertising,ifnopriceispaidorif
thepricepaidislowerthanthemarketvalue.
[30] Likeitsdefinitionofsponsorofelectionadvertising,theActsdefinitionofvalueof
electionadvertisingindicatesthatelectionadvertisingmusteitherbeconductedatasponsorsexpenseor
elsebeprovidedtothesponsorwithoutcharge.Further,preparingandconductingtheelectionadvertising
musthaveapricepaidthatcanbeassessedinrelationto and, in some circumstances, can be lower
than its market value. The value of election advertising, thus defined, determines whether the
sponsor must file a disclosure report in accordance with ss. 244 and 245. It is also measured against the
advertisinglimitsins.235.1.TheActcontemplatesthat,tobesubjecttotheserequirements,asponsorwill
have either paid a price for or received without charge the services of preparing and conducting election
advertising,andthattheseserviceswillhaveamarketvalueagainstwhichthepricepaidforthemmaybe
measured. The definition of sponsor in s. 229(1) can and should be read harmoniously with this
description.Sponsorshipcannotbeasolitaryendeavour.
[31] Ithereforeconcludethatthewordsofss.228,229,and239donotsupporttheinterpretation
giventothembytheappellant,BritishColumbiasChiefElectoralOfficer,orthecourtsbelow.Thewordsof
theAct,readintheirgrammaticalandordinarysenseandharmoniouslywiththestatutoryscheme,limitthe
registrationrequirementtosponsorsi.e.,individualsandorganizationswhoreceiveadvertisingservices
from others in undertaking election advertising campaigns. The Act uses the concept of sponsorship to
exemptanentireclassofpoliticalexpressionnamely,electionadvertisingthatisnotsponsoredfrom
theregistrationrequirement.Individualswhoneitherpayotherstoadvertisenorreceiveadvertisingservices
without charge are not sponsors. They may transmit their own points of view, whether by posting a
handmadesigninawindow,orputtingabumperstickeronacar,orwearingaTshirtwithamessageonit,
withoutregistering.
(2)TheObjectoftheActandtheIntentionoftheLegislature
[32]Interpretings.239asimposingaregistrationrequirementonlyonindividualsandorganizations
whoreceiveservicesfromothersinundertakingelectionadvertisingcampaignsandwhothussponsor
election advertising within the meaning of the Act is consistent with the purpose of the Act and the
intentionoftheBritishColumbialegislature.Here,historyprovideshelpfulcontext.
[33] TheElectionAct,S.B.C.1995,c.51,passedthelegislaturein1995.Atsecondreading,the
provinces Attorney General described the legislations cornerstones as fairness, openness, and
accessibilityoftheelectoralprocessanddeclaredthat[t]heprocessisnotopenifordinarycitizenscannot
clearly see what forces influence those who sit in this House representing them: British Columbia,
LegislativeAssembly,OfficialReportofDebatesoftheLegislativeAssembly(Hansard),Vol.21,No.16,4th
Sess., 35th Parl., June 27, 1995, at p. 16240 (emphasis added). With respect to the Acts third party
expenditurelimits,hesaid:
It is obvious that a limit on candidates wouldnt work very well and wouldnt be fair if third
parties were not limited in their advertising spending as well. Third parties could step in and
conduct parallel advertising campaigns that would foster the kind of unfair dominance of the
electoral process that were trying to correct. Limits on candidate spending in that scenario
wouldbemeaningless.[Emphasisaddedp.16241.]
[34]Thesestatementssupporttheconclusionthatthepurposeoftheregistrationrequirementisto
allow the public to know who is behind, or sponsoring, election advertising. It was intended to require
individualsandorganizationswhoconductparalleladvertisingcampaignsandwhocanbedescribedas
forcesthatinfluenceprovincialelectionstoregister,sothepublicknowswhotheyare.Thelegislative
purpose,atthetimeoftheActsenactment,wastoallowordinarycitizenstoclearlyseewhoisbehind
themessagestheyreceiveduringacampaignperiod,thuspromotinginformedvoting.
[35]Theregistrationrequirementwasnotaimedatcurbingtheexpressionofanindividualwho,in
anactofselfexpression,placesasigninhiswindoworabumperstickeronhiscar,orwearsaTshirtwitha
political message. The question of who is behind or immediately responsible for the content of the
messagedoesnotindeed,cannotariseinsuchcases.Registrationwouldservenopurpose.
[36]TheActslegislativehistoryconfirmsthatregistrationwasnotintendedtobeaprerequisitefor
individual selfexpression. From its enactment in 1995 until its amendment in 2002 (Election Statutes
AmendmentAct,2002, S.B.C. 2002, c. 60), s. 229(1) of the Act referred not only to sponsors of election
advertising,asitdoesnow,butalsotosponsorsofelectionopinionsurvey[s].Itdefinedthesponsorof
electionadvertisingoranelectionopinionsurveyaseithertheindividualororganizationwhopaysforthe
election advertising or election opinion survey to be conducted or who is provided the services of
conducting the advertising or survey . . . without charge as a contribution. A sponsor of election
advertising was simply an individual or organization who paid to conduct that advertising in the same
mannerthatanindividualororganizationwouldpaytoconductanopinionsurvey.Justas,inanyordinary
sense,payingforanopinionsurveytobeconductedorreceivingtheservicesofconductingthe...survey
. . . without charge entails more than asking questions of passersby, so too does paying for election
advertising to be conducted entail more than handing out campaign literature to those same passersby.
Both forms of sponsorship were originally defined together because both were directed at organized
campaignactivitiesinvolvingtheprovisionandreceiptofservices,whetherpollingservicesoradvertising
services.TheAct,asenacted,didnotseektocatchthepersonwhomerelyaskssurveyquestions,nordidit
intend to include the person who merely hands out flyers or otherwise engages in individual self
expression.Subsequentdeletionofthereferencestoopinionsurveysdidnotchangethisintention.
[37]ThisconclusionisbuttressedbyothersinceexcisedprovisionsoftheActpertainingtoopinion
surveys.Section235(1)formerlyrequiredthatanindividualororganizationwhofirstpublishesinBritish
Columbia the results of an election opinion survey during a campaign period must also publish, among
otherthings,thenameofthesponsorofthesurveyandthenameoftheindividualororganizationwho
conducted the survey, as well as various information about the surveys methodology. These publication
requirementswerestruckdownasanunjustifiedinfringementofs.2 (b)oftheCharter inPacificPress
v.BritishColumbia(AttorneyGeneral),2000BCSC248,73B.C.L.R.(3d)264,whichledtotheirrepealby
theElectionStatutesAmendmentAct,2002.Still,theAct,asoriginallyenacted,requiredthedisclosureboth
ofthesurveyssponsorandoftheindividualorgroupwhoconductedit.Thisindicatesthattosponsoran
election opinion survey would entail having another individual or organization conduc[t] it, and that
conduct[ing] such a survey would involve some discernible methodology. The conclusion that these
provisionsweredirectedatorganizedcampaignactivitiesinvolvingtheprovisionandreceiptofservicesis,
inmyview,inescapable.
[38]Inremovingreferencestoopinionsurveysin2002,thelegislaturedidnotexpandtheambitof
the definition of sponsor in s. 229(1) it remains an individual or organization who pays some other
individualororganizationtoconductelectionadvertising,orwhoreceivestheservicesofconductingthe
advertising...withoutchargefromsomeotherindividualororganization.Thelonepamphleteeronwhose
politicalexpressiontheappellantscasereliesisnotincludedinthisdescription.Inmyview,consideringthe
textandcontextoftheAct,thelegislatureneverintendedotherwise.
(3)WhoMustRegister?
[39] Forthereasonsdiscussed,Iconcludethatasponsorrequiredtoregisterisanindividualor
organization who receives a service from another individual or organization in undertaking an election
advertising campaign, whether in exchange for payment or without charge as a contribution. Individuals
engagedinpoliticalselfexpressiondonotcomewithinthedefinitionofsponsorins.229(1),andneednot
register.
[40]TheforegoinginterpretationlimitsnotonlythescopeoftheActsregistrationrequirement,but
alsoofitsattributionrequirement(s.231),itsdisclosurerequirement(s.244)anditsexpenditurelimits(s.
235.1). An individual working entirely on his own, without paying for or receiving any service in the
creationordisseminationofelectionadvertising,isnotrequiredtocomplywithanyoftheseprovisionsof
theAct.ThisisconsistentwiththelegislativepurposeoftheActsthirdpartyadvertisingprovisions,which,
asIhavediscussed,istoprovidethepublicwithinformationaboutthoseengagedinorganizedadvertising
campaignsduringanelectionperiod,nottoputconditionsonindividualselfexpression.Whenanindividual
himselfdistributeshandmadeflyers,thereisnoquestionofwhoisresponsibleforthatadvertising,andsothe
attributionanddisclosureprovisionsliketheregistrationrequirementwouldservenopurpose.
[41] Throughoutthisaction,theAttorneyGeneralofBritishColumbiaspositionwasconsistent
withtheinterpretationofs.239thatIhaveputforward.Initspleadings,itexpresslydeniedtheappellants
allegationthats.239forcespeopletoregisterwithagovernmentagencybeforebeingabletofreelyengage
inpoliticalexpression.Initsfactum,itassertedthatthepostingofahandmadesigninacarwindow,or
the wearing of a handmadeTshirt . . . are not in fact instances of sponsorship triggering the registration
requirement.
[42] Itistruethat,atonepointinoralargument,counselfortheAttorneyGeneralofBritish
Columbia appeared to concur in the suggestion that an individual who produces homemade signage
containinganadvertisingmessageduringanelectioncampaign,havingpaidforthematerialswithwhichthat
signageisproduced,couldbeasponsorofelectionadvertisingforthepurposesoftheActandsubjectto
the registration requirement in s. 239. The Attorney Generals position on the record, however, is clear: s.
239doesnotcapturethecasesofpoliticalexpressiononwhichtheappellantrelies.
(4)ConclusionontheScopeandNatureoftheInfringementofSection2 (b)
[43]Sponsorsofelectionadvertisingcannotengageinpoliticalexpressionintheformofsponsored
election advertising unless they first register. A sponsor is an individual or organization who receives a
service from another individual or organization in undertaking an election advertising campaign. As the
Attorney General of British Columbia concedes, s. 239 of the British Columbia ElectionAct infringes the
rightofexpressionofindividualsandorganizationswhoaresponsorsofelectionadvertising.Itdoesnot
infringetherightofexpressionofthosewhoarenot.
[44]Iacknowledgethat,inaclosecase,whetheraparticularindividualororganizationiscaughtby
theActsdefinitionofsponsormayprovedifficulttodetermine.Nosuchcaseisbeforeus,however.The
foregoingisasufficientbasisonwhichtodecidetheissueonthisappealnamely,whethersponsorswho
spend less than $500 on election advertising during a given campaign period may constitutionally be
requiredtoregister.
B.IstheInfringementJustifiedUnderSection1?
[45] Noonecontendsthatthelimitonexpressionimposedbyrequiringsponsorsofelection
advertising, as described above, to register would not be justified under s. 1 of the Charter . The
appellantsargumentthatthelimitisnotjustifiedunders.1 ispredicatedonamuchbroaderconstruction
ofss.229(1) and239 onethatwouldlimitthefreepoliticalexpressionofindividualsintheformof
handmadesigns,bumperstickers,andTshirts.
[46]Nordoestheappellantsubmitthattheregistrationrequirementisunconstitutionalwithrespect
to all sponsors of election advertising. It is only those sponsors who spend less than $500 whom the
appellantsayscannotconstitutionallyberequiredtoregister.Theonlyquestion,then,iswhetherthelimiton
the expression of sponsors who receive services in undertaking election advertising campaigns and who
spendlessthan$500isjustifiedunders.1 .
[47]AcomparisonwithHarpersuggeststhatthislimitonexpressionisdemonstrablyjustifiedasa
reasonablelimitinafreeanddemocraticsociety.InHarper,thisCourtunanimouslyheldthatrequiringthose
who spend more than $500 on election advertising to register was a justifiable limit on s. 2 (b). The
threshold for registration in this case sponsorshipof election advertising is similarly reasonable and
demonstrablyjustified.
[48]TheCanadaElectionsAct andtheBritishColumbiaElectionActeachapplytheirrespective
registrationrequirementstosome,butnotall,thirdpartyadvertisers.Underthefederallegislationatissuein
Harper, only third parties who incu[r] election advertising expenses of a total amount of $500 must
register: s. 353(1) . Under the British Columbia legislation, only third parties who sponsor election
advertising must register: s. 239(1). While Parliament has selected a quantitative threshold, the British
Columbia legislature has opted for a qualitative one. Each threshold is low, but each permits smallscale
individualelectionadvertisingwithoutregistration.
[49] TheappellantarguesthattheBritishColumbiaprovisionslimitspontaneousorunplanned
electionadvertisinginawaythatthefederallegislationatissueinHarperdoesnot.Thecourtsbelowagreed.
Itistruethatthetworegistrationrequirementsaretriggeredatdifferenttimes:theCanadaElectionsAct
requiresathirdpartytoregisterimmediatelyafterthe$500thresholdisreached(s.353(1) ),whilethe
British Columbia Election Act prohibits a third party who is not registered from sponsoring election
advertising(s.239(1)).However,ontheinterpretationofs.239adoptedhere,thedifferencediminishesto
insignificance.Section239limitsspontaneousorunplannedsponsorshipofelectionadvertising.Thefederal
andBritishColumbiaregistrationrequirementsapplyatdifferenttimesbecauseofthedifferencebetweenthe
formers quantitative threshold and the latters qualitative threshold. When all third party advertising
expensesareincluded,asunderthefederallaw,itmaynotbepossibletoanticipatepreciselywhenthe$500
threshold will be reached. But when only third party sponsorship is included, advance registration is
appropriate by its very nature, an organized election advertising campaign cannot be undertaken to its
sponsorssurprise.
[50] TheconclusionsuggestedbycomparingthiscasetoHarperisconfirmedbythetestfor
justificationsetoutinR.v.Oakes,[1986]1S.C.R.103.
[51]Thepurposeoftheregistrationrequirement,thecourtsbelowheld,istoincreasetransparency,
openness, and public accountability in the electoral process, and thus to promote an informed electorate:
trial reasons, at para. 116, quoted in C.A. reasons, at para. 41. I agree. This objective is pressing and
substantial:Harper,atpara.142.
[52]Theregistrationrequirementforsponsorsofelectionadvertisingisrationallyconnectedtothis
objective:Harper,atpara.143.
[53] Thelimitisminimallyimpairing.Byconfiningtheregistrationrequirementtosponsorsand
exempting individual political selfexpression by persons who are not sponsors, s. 239 tailors the
impingementonexpressiontowhatisrequiredbytheobjectoftheAct.Moreover,theformsofadvertising
likelytobesponsoredwithinthemeaningoftheBritishColumbiaElectionActarealsolikelytobesubject
totheActsattributionrequirements,whichtheAppellantdoesnotchallenge.
[54] Theregistrationrequirementsdeleteriouseffectsarelimited.Theremaybesmallgroupsof
British Columbians whowishto disseminate their views in a manner that would constitute sponsorshipof
election advertising below $500, but who are unwilling first to register their intention to do so with the
government, even if they are prepared to comply with the Acts attribution provisions. Their political
expressionwouldbechilledbytheregistrationrequirement.Othersmaybedeterredbytherequirementto
register in advance. However, these impingements on the s. 2 (b) right are limited, since only political
expressionintheformofsponsorshipofelectionadvertisingstandstobedelayedorinhibited.Sponsorship,
asdiscussed,involvesreceivingadvertisingservices.Itisanorganizedactivitythatinvolvesatleasttwo,and
usually more, people. It is by its nature not spontaneous. Moreover, there will be few cases in which an
individual or group is subject to the registration requirement in s. 239 but not the attribution requirement
unders.231andtheElectionAdvertisingRegulation,andsothenumberofsponsorsforwhoms.239isthe
solereasontheycannotprotecttheiranonymitywillbefew.Theregistrationprocessissimpleandunlikely
todetermuch,ifany,expressioninwhichasponsorwouldotherwiseengage.
[55] Againsttheselimiteddeleteriouseffectsmustbeweighedthebenefitsofthescheme.The
registrationrequirementpermitstheBritishColumbiapublictoknowwhoisengagedinorganizedadvocacy
intheirelections,bycreatingandmaintainingaregisterofsponsors.Theprovisionensuresthatthosewho
sponsor election advertising must provide the public with an assurance, in the form of a signed statement,
that they are in compliance with British Columbias election law. Finally, registration provides the Chief
ElectoralOfficerwithinformationthatcanassistintheenforcementoftheActandininformingsponsorsof
itsrequirements.
[56]Inmyview,thebenefitsofrequiringsponsorsofelectionadvertisingtoregisteroutweighthe
deleteriouseffectsonsponsorss.2 (b)right.
[57]TheappellantarguesthattheAttorneyGeneralofBritishColumbiawasobligatedtoleadmore
evidencethanitdidinordertodischargeitsburdenofjustificationunders.1 oftheCharter .Icannot
agree.
[58] InHarper,aswellasinR.v.Bryan,2007SCC12,[2007]1S.C.R.527,andThomson
NewspapersCo.v.Canada(AttorneyGeneral),[1998]1S.C.R.877,thisCourtconsideredtheevidentiary
standardthatappliesatthejustificationstageintheelectionlawcontext.IdonotreadHarper,Bryan, and
Thomson Newspapers as precluding cases in which such an infringement may be justified under s. 1
despitealackofsocialscienceevidence.Bynotleadingsocialscienceevidenceatthisstage,theAttorney
GeneralofBritishColumbiahasseriouslydiminisheditsabilitytojustifytheinfringementofaCharter
right,butithasnoteliminateditthoughlogicandreason,withoutassistance,canonlygosofar,theycango
farenough.Wherethescopeoftheinfringementisminimal,minimaldeferencetothelegislaturemaysuffice
andsocialscienceevidencemaynotbenecessary.Thatisthiscase.
IV.Disposition
[59]Ithereforeconcludethat,thoughs.239oftheBritishColumbiaElectionActtrenchesons.2
(b)oftheCharter ,theinfringementissavedbys.1 .
[60]Iwoulddismisstheappeal.Thepartieshaveagreedthattheywillbeartheirowncosts,andsoI
wouldordernone.
Appealdismissed.
Solicitorsfortheappellant:Farris,Vaughan,Wills&Murphy,Vancouver.
Solicitorfortherespondent:AttorneyGeneralofBritishColumbia,Vancouver.
SolicitorfortheintervenertheAttorneyGeneralofCanada:AttorneyGeneralofCanada,
Toronto.
SolicitorfortheintervenertheAttorneyGeneralofOntario:AttorneyGeneralofOntario,
Toronto.
SolicitorfortheintervenertheAttorneyGeneralofQuebec:AttorneyGeneralofQuebec,
Qubec.
SolicitorsfortheintervenertheBritishColumbiaCivilLibertiesAssociation:ShaprayCramer
FittermanLamer,VancouverBlakeCassels&Graydon,Vancouver.
SolicitorsfortheintervenertheCanadianCivilLibertiesAssociation:Lerners,Toronto.
[1]Thetensionbetweenthetwoprovisionsissomethingthelegislaturemaywishtoaddress.

SCC Judgment - B.C. Freedom of Information and Privacy Association v. British Columbia (Attorney General)

Diunggah oleh

Informasi Dokumen

Hak Cipta

Format Tersedia

Bagikan dokumen Ini

Bagikan atau Tanam Dokumen

Opsi Berbagi

Apakah menurut Anda dokumen ini bermanfaat?

Apakah konten ini tidak pantas?

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

SCC Judgment - B.C. Freedom of Information and Privacy Association v. British Columbia (Attorney General)

Diunggah oleh

Hak Cipta:

Format Tersedia

2/2/2017 B.C. Freedom of Information and Privacy Association v.

British Columbia (Attorney General) - SCC Cases (Lexum)

Electoral Officer Meaning of sponsor of election advertising Whether individuals engaged in

requirementforthirdpartieswhospendatleast$500onelectionadvertising:Harper v. Canada (Attorney

oftheCharter ,isnotsavedbys.1 ,andisthereforeofnoforceandeffect.Theappellantconcededthat

withoutchargetheservicesofconducting the advertising: s. 229(1)(b). The alternative definitions in s.

[27] Inotethats.228oftheElectionActdefinescontributionasacontribution of money

musthaveapricepaidthatcanbeassessedinrelationto and, in some circumstances, can be lower

conducting the advertising or survey . . . without charge as a contribution. A sponsor of election

requirementswerestruckdownasanunjustifiedinfringementofs.2 (b)oftheCharter inPacificPress

ofss.229(1) and239 onethatwouldlimitthefreepoliticalexpressionofindividualsintheformof

Anda mungkin juga menyukai