FIRST DIVISION

G. R. No. 149554 - July 1, 2003

SPOUSES JORGE J. HUGUETE and YOLANDA B. HUGUETE, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES TEOFEDO AMARILLO EMBUDO and
MARITES HUGUETE-EMBUDO, respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review assailing the Orders dated June 27, 20011 and July 26, 20012 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7, in
Civil Case No. CEB-24925.

On March 2, 2000, petitioner spouses Jorge and Yolanda Huguete instituted against respondent spouses Teofredo Amarillo Embudo and Marites
Huguete-Embudo a complaint for "Annulment of TCT No. 99694, Tax Declaration No. 46493, and Deed of Sale, Partition, Damages and
Attorneys Fees," docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-24925 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7. Petitioners alleged that their son-in-
law, respondent Teofredo, sold to them a 50-square meter portion of his 150-square meter parcel of land, known as Lot No. 1920-F-2, situated in
San Isidro, Talisay, Cebu, for a consideration of P15,000.00; that Teofredo acquired the lot from Ma. Lourdes Villaber-Padillo by virtue of a deed
of sale,3 after which Transfer Certificate of Title No. 99694 was issued solely in his name; that despite demands, Teofredo refused to partition the
lot between them.

On March 15, 2001, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss4 the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case,
arguing that the total assessed value of the subject land was only P15,000.00 which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial
Court, pursuant to Section 33(3)5 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691.6

Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss7 alleging that the subject matter of the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation and,
therefore, is cognizable by the Regional Trial Court, as provided by Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, as amended. 8

The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 9 which was denied on July 26,
2001.

Hence, this petition for review based on the following errors:

THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE PURSUANT TO SECTION 33
(3) OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 129 IN UTTER DISREGARD OF SECTION 19 (1) OF THE SAME LAW AS WELL AS SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE ENUNCIATED IN RUSSEL VS. VESTIL, 304 SCRA 738 (MARCH 17, 1999) WHICH, WITH DUE RESPECT, WAS
TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED AN ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS WHO SEEK AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF
AND THEREBY INVOKE THE AUTHORITY OF THE COURT IN THEIR COUNTERCLAIM ARE ESTOPPED TO DENY THE
JURISDICTION OF THE HONORABLE COURT.10

The petition lacks merit.

Petitioners maintain that the complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is for the annulment of deed of sale and partition, and is thus
incapable of pecuniary estimation. Respondents, on the other hand, insist that the action is one for annulment of title and since the assessed value
of the property as stated in the complaint is P15,000.00, it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court.

The pertinent portions of the complaint alleged:

4. Sometime in the year 1995, Teofredo A. Embudo, the son-in-law of plaintiffs offered them portion of Lot No. 1920-F-2, situated in San Isidro,
Talisay, Cebu, which defendants bought on installment basis from Ma. Lourdes Villaber-Padillo. Desirous to live near their daughter and
grandchildren, they accepted defendants offer. Immediately, plaintiffs paid defendants the sum of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00)
as full consideration and payment of the purchase of 50-square meter lot at a price of THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P300.00) per square meter;

5. Happily, plaintiffs built their house on the portion they bought from defendants which is adjacent to defendants house. Plaintiffs were issued
Tax Declaration No. 53170 for the house, copy is hereto attached to form part hereof and marked as Annex "A";

6. Notwithstanding repeated demands for the execution of the Deed of Sale, defendants with insidious machination led plaintiffs to believe that
the necessary document of conveyance could not as yet be executed for the reason that they have not yet paid in full their obligation to Ma.
Lourdes Villaber-Padillo, the original owner of the lot in question, when in truth and in fact, as plaintiffs came to know later, that the aforesaid
defendants were already in possession of a Deed of Sale over the entire lot in litigation in which it appeared that they are the sole buyers of the
lot, thusly consolidating their ownership of the entire lot to the exclusion of the plaintiffs. A copy of the Deed of Sale is hereto attached to form
part hereof and marked as Annex "B."

7. As a way to further their fraudulent design, defendants secured the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-99694 solely in their names
on the basis of the Deed of Sale aforementioned (Annex "A" hereof), without the knowledge of the plaintiffs. A copy of the aforesaid Transfer
Certificate of Title is hereto attached as an integral part hereof and marked as Annex "C."

8. Since considerable time had already elapsed that defendants had given plaintiffs a run-around, plaintiffs then demanded for the partition of the
lot, segregating a portion in which their residential house stands, and despite such demand defendants, without qualm of conscience refused and
still refuse to partition the lot;

xxx - xxx - xxx;

PRAYER

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Honorable Court is most respectfully prayed to render judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against
defendants, ordering

1. Defendants to partition, divide and segregate a portion on which the house of plaintiffs is situated, with an area of Fifty (50) Square Meters;

2. That the Deed of Sale dated December 28, 1995 entered into by and between defendants and the previous owner of the lot in question be
annulled and cancelled;

3. The Register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu to annul/cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 99694 in the name of the defendants and in lieu
thereof directing him to issue Transfer Certificate of Title in favor of plaintiffs for the 50-square meter lot and another Transfer Certificate of Title
in favor of defendants for the remaining 100-square meter lot;

4. The Municipal Assessor of Talisay, Cebu to cancel Tax Declaration No. 46493 in the name of the defendants and directing him to issue Tax
Declaration in the name of the defendants for the 50-square meter lot and another Tax Declaration in the name of the plaintiffs for the remaining
100-square meter lot;

xxx - xxx - xxx.11

In Caiza v. Court of Appeals,12 it was held that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has jurisdiction over it are the
allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. Moreover, in Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill, 13 we ruled that:

In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of
first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered
capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether the jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the
amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is
purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the
litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).

The reliance of the petitioners on the case of Russell v. Vestil 14 is misplaced. In the said case, petitioners sought the annulment of the document
entitled, "Declaration of Heirs and Deed of Confirmation of Previous Oral Partition," whereby respondents declared themselves as the only heirs
of the late Spouses Casimero and Cesaria Tautho to the exclusion of petitioners. Petitioners brought the action in order for them to be recognized
as heirs in the partition of the property of the deceased. It was held that the action to annul the said deed was incapable of pecuniary estimation
and the consequent annulment of title and partition of the property was merely incidental to the main action. Indeed, it was also ruled in said case:

While actions under Section. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable of pecuniary estimation, the law specifically mandates that they are cognizable
by the MTC, METC, or MCTC where the assessed value of the real property involved does not exceed P20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or
P50,000.00, if located elsewhere. x x x.15

In the case at bar, the principal purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint was to secure title to the 50-square meter portion of the property
which they purchased from respondents.

Petitioners cause of action is based on their right as purchaser of the 50-square meter portion of the land from respondents. They pray that they be
declared owners of the property sold. Thus, their complaint involved title to real property or any interest therein. The alleged value of the land
which they purchased was P15,000.00, which was within the jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Court. The annulment of the deed of sale between
Ma. Lourdes Villaber-Padillo and respondents, as well as of TCT No. 99694, were prayed for in the complaint because they were necessary
before the lot may be partitioned and the 50-square meter portion subject thereof may be conveyed to petitioners.

Petitioners argument that the present action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation considering that it is for annulment of deed of sale and
partition is not well-taken. As stated above, the nature of an action is not determined by what is stated in the caption of the complaint but by the
allegations of the complaint and the reliefs prayed for. Where, as in this case, the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain title to real
property, it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The Order dated June 27, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, Branch 7, dismissing Civil Case No. CEB-24925, and its Order dated July 26, 2001 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J. Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 119347. March 17, 1999]

EULALIA RUSSELL, RUPERTO TAUTHO, FRANCISCO TAUTHO, SUSANA T. REALES, APITACIO TAUTHO, DANILO
TAUTHO, JUDITHA PROS, GREGORIO TAUTHO, DEODITA T. JUDILLA, AGRIPINO TAUTHO, FELIX TAUTHO, WILLIAM
TAUTHO, AND MARILYN PERALES, Petitioners, v. HONORABLE AUGUSTINE A. VESTIL, ADRIANO TAGALOG, MARCELO
TAUTHO, JUANITA MENDOZA, DOMINGO BANTILAN, RAUL BATALUNA AND ARTEMIO CABATINGAN, Respondents.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari to set aside the Order dated January 12, 1995 issued by respondent Judge Augustine A. Vestil of the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56, dismissing the complaint filed by petitioners on ground of lack of jurisdiction, as well as his
Order dated February 13, 1995 denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the order of dismissal.

The facts of the case are as follows:

On September 28, 1994, petitioners filed a complaint against private respondents, denominated "DECLARATION OF NULLITY AND
PARTITION," with the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City, Branch 56, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN 2275. The complaint, in substance,
alleged that petitioners are co-owners of that parcel of land, Lot 6149 situated in Liloan, Cebu and containing an area of 56,977.40 square meters,
more or less. The land was previously owned by the spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho. Upon the death of said spouses, the property
was inherited by their legal heirs, herein petitioners and private respondents. Since then, the lot had remained undivided until petitioners
discovered a public document denominated "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF A PREVIOUS ORAL
AGREEMENT OF PARTITION," executed on June 6, 1990. By virtue of this deed, private respondents divided the property among themselves
to the exclusion of petitioners who are also entitled to the said lot as heirs of the late spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho. Petitioners
claimed that the document was false and perjurious as the private respondents were not the only heirs and that no oral partition of the property
whatsoever had been made between the heirs. The complaint prayed that the document be declared null and void and an order be issued to
partition the land among all the heirs.1crlwvirtualibrry

On November 24, 1994, private respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss2 the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the nature of the
case as the total assessed value of the subject land is P5,000.00 which under section 33 (3)3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No.
7691,4 falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Compostela. 5crlwvirtualibrry

Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss6 saying that the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case since the action is one
which is incapable of pecuniary estimation within the contemplation of Section 19(l) of B.P. 129, as amended. 7crlwvirtualibrry

On January 12, 1995, the respondent judge issued an Order granting the Motion to Dismiss.8 A Motion for Reconsideration of said order was filed
by petitioners on January 30, 1995 alleging that the same is contrary to law because their action is not one for recovery of title to or possession of
the land but an action to annul a document or declare it null and void,9 hence, one incapable of pecuniary estimation failing within the jurisdiction
of the Regional Trial Court. Private respondents did not oppose the motion for reconsideration.

On February 13, 1995, the respondent judge issued another Order denying the motion for reconsideration. 10crlwvirtualibrry

Hence, this petition wherein the sole issue raised is whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. MAN-
2275.

We find merit in the petition.

Petitioners maintain the view that the complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is for the annulment of a document denominated as
"DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED OF CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION," which is clearly one incapable of
pecuniary estimation, thus, cognizable by the Regional Trial Court.

Private respondents, on the other hand, insists that the action is one for re-partition and since the assessed value of the property as stated in the
complaint is P5,000.00, then, the case falls within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Compostela, Cebu.

For better appreciation of the facts, the pertinent portions of the complaint are reproduced hereunder:

xxx

3. That the plaintiffs and the defendants are the legal heirs of spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria N. Tautho who died long time ago;

4. That in life the spouses became the owners in fee simple of a certain parcel of land, which is more particularly described as follows:

A parcel of land containing 56,977.40 square meters, more or less, located at Cotcot, Liloan, Cebu.

designated as Lot 6149 per Technical Description and Certification issued by the Office of the Land Management copy of which are hereto
attached as Annexes "A" and "A-1" and are made part hereof: total assessed value is P5,000.00;

5. That the land passed to the children of the spouses.(who are all deceased except for defendant Marcelo Tautho), namely: Zacarias, Epifania,
Vicenta, Felicisimo, Maria, Lorencia and Marcelo, and which in turn passed to the plaintiffs and defendants upon their death they being their
descendants and legal heirs;

6. That the subject parcel of land has for year been undivided by and among the legal heirs of said previous owners;

7. That, very recently, plaintiffs discovered a public document, which is a declaration of heirs and deed of confirmation of a previous oral
agreement, of partition, affecting the land executed by and among the defendants whereby defendants divided the property among themselves to
the exclusion of plaintiffs who are entitled thereto; attached hereto as Annex "B" and is made part hereof is xerox copy of said document;

8. That the instrument (Annex "B") is false and perjurious and is a complete nullity because the defendants are not the only heirs of Casimero
Tautho; plaintiffs are also legal heirs and descendants of said deceased; moreover, there has been no oral partition of the property;

9. That pursuant to said document (Annex "B"), defendants had procured tax declarations of the land for their supposed "shares" to the great
damage and prejudice of plaintiffs;

10. That the property in controversy should be divided into seven (7) equal parts since Casimero Tautho and Cesaria N. Tautho had seven
children;

11. That the parties had failed to settle the controversy amicably at the barangay level; attached hereto as Annex "C" is Certification to file
Action;

12. That by reason of the foregoing unjust and illegal act of defendants, plaintiffs were forced to bring instant action and contract the services of
the undersigned counsel with whom they bind themselves to pay P30,000.00 as attorney's fees.

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to declare null and void the document (Annex "B") of declaration of heirs
and confirmation and to order the partition of the land into seven (7) equal parts; each part shall respectively go to the seven (7) children of
Casimero Tautho and considering six (6) of them died already the same shall go to their children or descendants, and to order the defendants to
pay plaintiffs attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00.

Plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs and remedies just and equitable under the premises. 11

We agree with petitioners.

The complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court is doubtless one incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore within the jurisdiction of
said court.

In Singsong vs. Isabela Sawmill,[12 we had the occasion to rule that:

[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion
of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on
the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is
purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the
litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts). 13

Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are those for specific performance, support, or foreclosure of mortgage or annulment of
judgment;14 also actions questioning the validity of a mortgage,15 annulling a deed of sale or conveyance and to recover the price paid16 and for
rescession, which is a counterpart of specific performance.17crlwvirtualibrry

While actions under Sec. 33(3) of B.P. 129 are also incapable of pecuniary estimation, the law specifically mandates that they are cognizable by
the MTC, METC, or MCTC where the assessed value of the real property involved does exceed P20,000.00 in Metro Manila, or P50,000.00, if
located elsewhere. If the value exceeds P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 as the case may be, it is the Regional Trial Courts which have jurisdiction
under Sec. 19(2).18crlwvirtualibrry

However, the subject matter of the complaint in this case is annulment of a document denominated as "DECLARATION OF HEIRS AND DEED
OF CONFIRMATION OF PREVIOUS ORAL PARTITION."

The main purpose of petitioners in filing the complaint is to declare null and void the document in which private respondents declared themselves
as the only heirs of the late spouses Casimero Tautho and Cesaria Tautho and divided his property among themselves to the exclusion of
petitioners who also claim to be legal heirs and entitled to the property. While the complaint also prays for the partition of the property, this is just
incidental to the main action, which is the declaration of nullity of the document above-described. It is axiomatic that jurisdiction over the subject
matter of a case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of
whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. 19crlwvirtualibrry

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The Order dismissing Civil Case No. MAN-2275, as well as the Order
denying the motion for reconsideration of said Order, is SET ASIDE.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo and Pardo, JJ., concur.

 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 149243. October 28, 2002.]

LOLITA B. COPIOSO, Petitioner, v. LAURO, DOLORES, RAFAEL, ESTEBAN, and CORAZON, all surnamed COPIOSO, and
COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This petition for review assails the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 62090 which dismissed petitioners petition for
certiorari as well as its Resolution denying reconsideration thereof.

On 4 July 2000 respondents Lauro, Dolores, Rafael, Esteban and Corazon, all surnamed Copioso, filed a complaint 2 for reconveyance of two (2)
parcels of coconut land situated in Banilad, Nagcarlan, Laguna, against Lolita B. Copioso, spouses Bernabe and Imelda Doria, and the estate of
deceased Antonio Copioso, as well as vendees Dolores Reduca, Mercedes Reduca, Rosario Pascua, Elvira Bombasi and Federico Casabar.

Respondents alleged that they together with their deceased brother Antonio Copioso were co-owners of the subject property having inherited the
same from their parents, and that through fraud and machination Antonio had the property transferred to his name and that of spouses Bernabe
and Imelda Doria who subsequently sold the same to third parties. They thus prayed for the reconveyance of the property by virtue of their being
co-owners thereof.

When respondents claimed in a manifestation with motion for bill of particulars that the assessed value of the subject property was P3,770.00,
petitioner Lolita Copioso and spouses Bernabe and Imelda Doria separately moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and not the Regional Trial Court (RTC) that had jurisdiction over the case considering that the assessed value of the
property was lower than P20,000.00.

The trial court in its twin orders of 5 and 12 September 2000 denied the motions to dismiss holding that since the subject matter of the action was
beyond pecuniary estimation it was properly within its jurisdiction. 3 Lolita Copiosos Motion for Reconsideration was denied, 4 hence, she filed
with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying for the annulment of the twin orders of the trial court which denied the
motions to dismiss and at the same time maintaining her position that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case because the assessed value of the
property was below P20,000.00.

The appellate court denied the petition thus affirming the jurisdiction of the RTC over the complaint for reconveyance. Motion for
reconsideration thereon was similarly denied by the appellate court, hence this petition.

Petitioner Lolita Copioso anchors her argument on Sec. 33, par. (3), of B.P. Blg. 129 otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980 as amended by Sec. 3 of RA 7691 which provides

Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: . . . (3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions
which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not
exceed twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, that in cases of land not
declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots.

Petitioner argues that the complaint for reconveyance cannot be resolved unless the trial court delves upon the issues of "title, possession and
interests" of each of the stakeholders over the subject parcels of land. She asserts that the allegations and relief prayed for in the complaint
coupled with the assessed value of the disputed property place the action within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC and not the RTC.

In turn, private respondents anchor their position on Sec. 19, par. (1), of the same law which provides

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. The Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: In all civil actions in which the
subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation: . . .

Simply, they claim that the instant complaint for reconveyance is a case of joinder of causes of action which include the annulment of sale and
other instruments of false conveyance incapable of pecuniary estimation thus within the legal competence of the RTC.

The law on jurisdiction of trial courts over civil cases is neither ambiguous nor confusing. Sec. 33, par. (3), in relation to Sec. 19 par. (2) of B.P.
129 as amended by RA 7691, deals with civil cases capable of pecuniary estimation. On the other hand, Sec. 33, par. (3), in relation to Sec. 19,
par. (1), applies to cases incapable of pecuniary estimation.

Sec. 33, par. (3), in relation to Sec. 19, par. (2), of B.P. 129, as amended by RA 7691, provides that in civil cases involving sum of money or title
to, possession of, or any interest in real property, jurisdiction is determined on the basis of the amount of the claim or the assessed value of the
real property involved, such that where the sum of money or the assessed value of the real property does not exceed P20,000.00, or P50,000.00 in
Metro Manila, jurisdiction lies with the MTC; and where it exceeds that amount, jurisdiction is vested with the RTC.

Indeed, the present dispute pertains to the title, possession and interest of each of the contending parties over the contested property the assessed
value of which falls within the jurisdictional range of the MTC. Nonetheless, the nature of the action filed, the allegations set forth, and the reliefs
prayed for, forestall its cognizance by the MTC.

As can be readily gleaned from the records, the complaint was for "Reconveyance and/or Recovery of Common Properties Illegally Disposed,
with Annulment of Sales and other Instruments of False Conveyance, with Damages, and Restraining Order." Private respondents alleged therein
that they were co-owners of the property along with their deceased brother Antonio Copioso; and that in or about 1998, with fraud and
machination, Antonio together with the spouses Bernabe and Imelda Doria made it appear in a public document entitled Pagpapatunay ng Kusang
Loob na Pagbabahagi that they were the co-owners of the subject property and had divided the same equally between themselves to the exclusion
of private respondents. Subsequently, they sold the subdivided lots to the other defendants namely Dolores Reduca, Mercedes Reduca, Rosario
Pascua, Elvira Bombasi and Federico Casabar.

Private respondents also sought payment of moral damages, exemplary damages, litigation expenses, attorneys fees plus appearance fees
amounting to more or less P286,500.00. They likewise applied for a TRO pending the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the
defendants from further alienating the common properties. They also prayed of the trial court to order the cancellation, annulment and/or
rescission of the four (4) deeds of absolute sale made in favor of the buyers, and to order Lolita B. Copioso and the estate of Antonio Copioso to
return the price that the buyer-defendants had paid to them for the land sold.

Clearly, this is a case of joinder of causes of action which comprehends more than the issue of title to, possession of, or any interest in the real
property under contention but includes an action to annul contracts, reconveyance or specific performance, and a claim for damages, which are
incapable of pecuniary estimation and thus properly within the jurisdiction of the RTC.

As correctly opined by the appellate court, if the only issue involved herein is naked possession or bare ownership, then petitioner Lolita Copioso
would not be amiss in her assertion that the instant complaint for reconveyance, considering the assessed value of the disputed property, falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC. But as herein before stated, the issue of title, ownership and/or possession thereof is intertwined
with the issue of annulment of sale and reconveyance hence within the ambit of the jurisdiction of the RTC. The assessed value of the parcels of
land thus becomes merely an incidental matter to be dealt with by the court, when necessary, in the resolution of the case but is not determinative
of its jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 16 May 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62090 as well as its 30 July
2001 Resolution denying reconsideration thereof is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Mendoza, and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

Austria-Martinez, J., on leave.

Callejo, Sr. J., no part in deliberation.

Endnotes:
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 139325 : April 12, 2005]

PRISCILLA C. MIJARES, LORETTA ANN P. ROSALES, HILDA B. NARCISO, SR. MARIANI DIMARANAN, SFIC, and JOEL C.
LAMANGAN in their behalf and on behalf of the Class Plaintiffs in Class Action No. MDL 840, United States District Court of Hawaii,
Petitioner, v. HON. SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 137, Regional Trial Court, Makati City,
and the ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS, through its court appointed legal representatives in Class Action MDL 840, United
States District Court of Hawaii, namely: Imelda R. Marcos and Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Our martial law experience bore strange unwanted fruits, and we have yet to finish weeding out its bitter crop. While the restoration of freedom
and the fundamental structures and processes of democracy have been much lauded, according to a significant number, the changes, however,
have not sufficiently healed the colossal damage wrought under the oppressive conditions of the martial law period. The cries of justice for the
tortured, the murdered, and the desaparecidos arouse outrage and sympathy in the hearts of the fair-minded, yet the dispensation of the
appropriate relief due them cannot be extended through the same caprice or whim that characterized the ill-wind of martial rule. The damage done
was not merely personal but institutional, and the proper rebuke to the iniquitous past has to involve the award of reparations due within the
confines of the restored rule of law.

The petitioners in this case are prominent victims of human rights violations 1 who, deprived of the opportunity to directly confront the man who
once held absolute rule over this country, have chosen to do battle instead with the earthly representative, his estate. The clash has been for now
interrupted by a trial court ruling, seemingly comported to legal logic, that required the petitioners to pay a whopping filing fee of over Four
Hundred Seventy-Two Million Pesos (P472,000,000.00) in order that they be able to enforce a judgment awarded them by a foreign court. There
is an understandable temptation to cast the struggle within the simplistic confines of a morality tale, and to employ short-cuts to arrive at what
might seem the desirable solution. But easy, reflexive resort to the equity principle all too often leads to a result that may be morally correct, but
legally wrong.

Nonetheless, the application of the legal principles involved in this case will comfort those who maintain that our substantive and procedural
laws, for all their perceived ambiguity and susceptibility to myriad interpretations, are inherently fair and just. The relief sought by the petitioners
is expressly mandated by our laws and conforms to established legal principles. The granting of this petition for certiorari is warranted in order to
correct the legally infirm and unabashedly unjust ruling of the respondent judge.

The essential facts bear little elaboration. On 9 May 1991, a complaint was filed with the United States District Court (US District Court), District
of Hawaii, against the Estate of former Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos Estate). The action was brought forth by ten Filipino
citizens2 who each alleged having suffered human rights abuses such as arbitrary detention, torture and rape in the hands of police or military
forces during the Marcos regime.3 The Alien Tort Act was invoked as basis for the US District Court's jurisdiction over the complaint, as it
involved a suit by aliens for tortious violations of international law.4 These plaintiffs brought the action on their own behalf and on behalf of a
class of similarly situated individuals, particularly consisting of all current civilian citizens of the Philippines, their heirs and beneficiaries, who
between 1972 and 1987 were tortured, summarily executed or had disappeared while in the custody of military or paramilitary groups. Plaintiffs
alleged that the class consisted of approximately ten thousand (10,000) members; hence, joinder of all these persons was impracticable.

The institution of a class action suit was warranted under Rule 23(a) and (b)(1)(B) of the US Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the provisions of
which were invoked by the plaintiffs. Subsequently, the US District Court certified the case as a class action and created three (3) sub-classes of
torture, summary execution and disappearance victims. 5 Trial ensued, and subsequently a jury rendered a verdict and an award of compensatory
and exemplary damages in favor of the plaintiff class. Then, on 3 February 1995, the US District Court, presided by Judge Manuel L. Real,
rendered a Final Judgment (Final Judgment) awarding the plaintiff class a total of One Billion Nine Hundred Sixty Four Million Five Thousand
Eight Hundred Fifty Nine Dollars and Ninety Cents ($1,964,005,859.90). The Final Judgment was eventually affirmed by the US Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a decision rendered on 17 December 1996.6
On 20 May 1997, the present petitioners filed Complaint with the Regional Trial Court, City of Makati (Makati RTC) for the enforcement of the
Final Judgment. They alleged that they are members of the plaintiff class in whose favor the US District Court awarded damages. 7 They argued
that since the Marcos Estate failed to file a petition for certiorari with the US Supreme Court after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had
affirmed the Final Judgment, the decision of the US District Court had become final and executory, and hence should be recognized and enforced
in the Philippines, pursuant to Section 50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court then in force.8

On 5 February 1998, the Marcos Estate filed a motion to dismiss, raising, among others, the non-payment of the correct filing fees. It alleged that
petitioners had only paid Four Hundred Ten Pesos (P410.00) as docket and filing fees, notwithstanding the fact that they sought to enforce a
monetary amount of damages in the amount of over Two and a Quarter Billion US Dollars (US$2.25 Billion). The Marcos Estate cited Supreme
Court Circular No. 7, pertaining to the proper computation and payment of docket fees. In response, the petitioners claimed that an action for the
enforcement of a foreign judgment is not capable of pecuniary estimation; hence, a filing fee of only Four Hundred Ten Pesos (P410.00) was
proper, pursuant to Section 7(c) of Rule 141.9

On 9 September 1998, respondent Judge Santiago Javier Ranada10 of the Makati RTC issued the subject Order dismissing the complaint without
prejudice. Respondent judge opined that contrary to the petitioners' submission, the subject matter of the complaint was indeed capable of
pecuniary estimation, as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of definite sums of money, allowing for easy
determination of the value of the foreign judgment. On that score, Section 7(a) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure would find
application, and the RTC estimated the proper amount of filing fees was approximately Four Hundred Seventy Two Million Pesos, which
obviously had not been paid.

Not surprisingly, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which Judge Ranada denied in an Order dated 28 July 1999. From this denial,
petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the twin orders of respondent judge.11 They prayed for the annulment of the
questioned orders, and an order directing the reinstatement of Civil Case No. 97-1052 and the conduct of appropriate proceedings thereon.

Petitioners submit that their action is incapable of pecuniary estimation as the subject matter of the suit is the enforcement of a foreign judgment,
and not an action for the collection of a sum of money or recovery of damages. They also point out that to require the class plaintiffs to pay Four
Hundred Seventy Two Million Pesos (P472,000,000.00) in filing fees would negate and render inutile the liberal construction ordained by the
Rules of Court, as required by Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly the inexpensive disposition of every action.

Petitioners invoke Section 11, Article III of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, which provides that "Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial
bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty," a mandate which is essentially defeated by the
required exorbitant filing fee. The adjudicated amount of the filing fee, as arrived at by the RTC, was characterized as indisputably unfair,
inequitable, and unjust.

The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) was permitted to intervene in this case.12 It urged that the petition be granted and a judgment rendered,
ordering the enforcement and execution of the District Court judgment in accordance with Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. For the CHR, the Makati RTC erred in interpreting the action for the execution of a foreign judgment as a new case, in violation of the
principle that once a case has been decided between the same parties in one country on the same issue with finality, it can no longer be relitigated
again in another country.13 The CHR likewise invokes the principle of comity, and of vested rights.

The Court's disposition on the issue of filing fees will prove a useful jurisprudential guidepost for courts confronted with actions enforcing
foreign judgments, particularly those lodged against an estate. There is no basis for the issuance a limited pro hac vice ruling based on the special
circumstances of the petitioners as victims of martial law, or on the emotionally-charged allegation of human rights abuses.

An examination of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court readily evinces that the respondent judge ignored the clear letter of the law when he concluded
that the filing fee be computed based on the total sum claimed or the stated value of the property in litigation.

In dismissing the complaint, the respondent judge relied on Section 7(a), Rule 141 as basis for the computation of the filing fee of over P472
Million. The provision states:

SEC. 7. Clerk of Regional Trial Court. -

(a) For filing an action or a permissive counterclaim or money claim against an estate not based on judgment, or for filing with leave of court
a third-party, fourth-party, etc., complaint, or a complaint in intervention, and for all clerical services in the same time, if the total sum claimed,
exclusive of interest, or the started value of the property in litigation, is:

1. Less than P 100,00.00 ' P 500.00

2. P 100,000.00 or more but less than P 150,000.00 ' P 800.00

3. P 150,000.00 or more but less than P 200,000.00 ' P 1,000.00

4. P 200,000.00 or more but less than P 250,000.00 ' P 1,500.00

5. P 250,000.00 or more but less than P 300,00.00 ' P 1,750.00

6. P 300,000.00 or more but not more than P 400,000.00 ' P 2,000.00

7. P 350,000.00 or more but not more than P400,000.00 ' P 2,250.00

8. For each P 1,000.00 in excess of P 400,000.00 ' P 10.00

(Emphasis supplied)rllbrr

Obviously, the above-quoted provision covers, on one hand, ordinary actions, permissive counterclaims, third-party, etc. complaints and
complaints-in-interventions, and on the other, money claims against estates which are not based on judgment. Thus, the relevant question for
purposes of the present petition is whether the action filed with the lower court is a "money claim against an estate not based on judgment."

Petitioners' complaint may have been lodged against an estate, but it is clearly based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of the US District Court.
The provision does not make any distinction between a local judgment and a foreign judgment, and where the law does not distinguish, we shall
not distinguish.

A reading of Section 7 in its entirety reveals several instances wherein the filing fee is computed on the basis of the amount of the relief sought, or
on the value of the property in litigation. The filing fee for requests for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage is based on the amount of
indebtedness or the mortgagee's claim.14 In special proceedings involving properties such as for the allowance of wills, the filing fee is again
based on the value of the property.15 The aforecited rules evidently have no application to petitioners' complaint.

Petitioners rely on Section 7(b), particularly the proviso on actions where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated. The provision reads
in full:

SEC. 7. Clerk of Regional Trial Court. -

(b) For filing

1. Actions where the value

of the subject matter

cannot be estimated --- P 600.00

2. Special civil actions except

judicial foreclosure which

shall be governed by

paragraph (a) above --- P 600.00

3. All other actions not

involving property --- P 600.00

In a real action, the assessed value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value, thereof shall be alleged by the claimant and shall be the
basis in computing the fees.

It is worth noting that the provision also provides that in real actions, the assessed value or estimated value of the property shall be alleged by the
claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees. Yet again, this provision does not apply in the case at bar. A real action is one where the
plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property or an action affecting title to or recovery of possession of real property.16 Neither the complaint nor
the award of damages adjudicated by the US District Court involves any real property of the Marcos Estate.

Thus, respondent judge was in clear and serious error when he concluded that the filing fees should be computed on the basis of the schematic
table of Section 7(a), as the action involved pertains to a claim against an estate based on judgment. What provision, if any, then should apply in
determining the filing fees for an action to enforce a foreign judgment?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

To resolve this question, a proper understanding is required on the nature and effects of a foreign judgment in this jurisdiction.

The rules of comity, utility and convenience of nations have established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign courts
of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries. 17 This
principle was prominently affirmed in the leading American case of Hilton v. Guyot18 and expressly recognized in our jurisprudence beginning
with Ingenholl v. Walter E. Olsen & Co.19 The conditions required by the Philippines for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment were
originally contained in Section 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was taken from the California Code of Civil Procedure which, in turn,
was derived from the California Act of March 11, 1872.20 Remarkably, the procedural rule now outlined in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure has remained unchanged down to the last word in nearly a century. Section 48 states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. 'The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest
by a subsequent title;

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.

There is an evident distinction between a foreign judgment in an action in rem and one in personam. For an action in rem, the foreign judgment is
deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an action in personam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right
as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title.21 However, in both cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible to
impeachment in our local courts on the grounds of want of jurisdiction or notice to the party,22 collusion, fraud,23 or clear mistake of law or fact.24
Thus, the party aggrieved by the foreign judgment is entitled to defend against the enforcement of such decision in the local forum. It is essential
that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy.25

It is clear then that it is usually necessary for an action to be filed in order to enforce a foreign judgment 26, even if such judgment has conclusive
effect as in the case of in rem actions, if only for the purpose of allowing the losing party an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, and in
order for the court to properly determine its efficacy.27 Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the
presumption of its validity.28

The rules are silent as to what initiatory procedure must be undertaken in order to enforce a foreign judgment in the Philippines. But there is no
question that the filing of a civil complaint is an appropriate measure for such purpose. A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right,29 and clearly an action to enforce a foreign judgment is in essence a vindication of a right prescinding either
from a "conclusive judgment upon title" or the "presumptive evidence of a right." 30 Absent perhaps a statutory grant of jurisdiction to a quasi-
judicial body, the claim for enforcement of judgment must be brought before the regular courts. 31

There are distinctions, nuanced but discernible, between the cause of action arising from the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and that arising
from the facts or allegations that occasioned the foreign judgment. They may pertain to the same set of facts, but there is an essential difference
in the right-duty correlatives that are sought to be vindicated. For example, in a complaint for damages against a tortfeasor, the cause of action
emanates from the violation of the right of the complainant through the act or omission of the respondent. On the other hand, in a complaint for
the enforcement of a foreign judgment awarding damages from the same tortfeasor, for the violation of the same right through the same manner
of action, the cause of action derives not from the tortious act but from the foreign judgment itself.

More importantly, the matters for proof are different. Using the above example, the complainant will have to establish before the court the
tortious act or omission committed by the tortfeasor, who in turn is allowed to rebut these factual allegations or prove extenuating circumstances.
Extensive litigation is thus conducted on the facts, and from there the right to and amount of damages are assessed. On the other hand, in an
action to enforce a foreign judgment, the matter left for proof is the foreign judgment itself, and not the facts from which it prescinds.

As stated in Section 48, Rule 39, the actionable issues are generally restricted to a review of jurisdiction of the foreign court, the service of
personal notice, collusion, fraud, or mistake of fact or law. The limitations on review is in consonance with a strong and pervasive policy in all
legal systems to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues.32 Otherwise known as the policy of preclusion, it seeks to protect party
expectations resulting from previous litigation, to safeguard against the harassment of defendants, to insure that the task of courts not be increased
by never-ending litigation of the same disputes, and - in a larger sense - to promote what Lord Coke in the Ferrer's Case of 1599 stated to be the
goal of all law: "rest and quietness."33 If every judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on
his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation. 34

Petitioners appreciate this distinction, and rely upon it to support the the enforcement of a proposition that the subject matter of the complaint is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. Admittedly the foreign judgment proposition, as it applies in this case, is counter-intuitive, and thus deserves
strict scrutiny. For in all practical intents and purposes, the matter at hand is capable of pecuniary estimation, down to the last cent. In the assailed
Order, the respondent judge pounced upon this point without equivocation:

The Rules use the term "where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated." The subject matter of the present case is the judgment
rendered by the foreign court ordering defendant to pay plaintiffs definite sums of money, as and for compensatory damages. The Court finds that
the value of the foreign judgment can be estimated; indeed, it can even be easily determined. The Court is not minded to distinguish between the
enforcement of a judgment and the amount of said judgment, and separate the two, for purposes of determining the correct filing fees. Similarly, a
plaintiff suing on promissory note for P1 million cannot be allowed to pay only P400 filing fees (sic), on the reasoning that the subject matter of
his suit is not the P1 million, but the enforcement of the promissory note, and that the value of such "enforcement" cannot be estimated. 35

The jurisprudential standard in gauging whether the subject matter of an action is capable of pecuniary estimation is well-entrenched. The Marcos
Estate cites Singsong v. Isabela Sawmill and Raymundo v. Court of Appeals, which ruled:

[I]n determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion
of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on
the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is
purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject of the
litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance (now Regional Trial Courts).

On the other hand, petitioners cite the ponencia of Justice JBL Reyes in Lapitan v. Scandia,36 from which the rule in Singsong and Raymundo
actually derives, but which incorporates this additional nuance omitted in the latter cases:

xxx However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to,
or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract (specific performance)
and in actions for support, or for annulment of judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases where
the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first instance. 37

Petitioners go on to add that among the actions the Court has recognized as being incapable of pecuniary estimation include legality of
conveyances and money deposits,38 validity of a mortgage,39 the right to support,40 validity of documents,41 rescission of contracts,42 specific
performance,43 and validity or annulment of judgments.44 It is urged that an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment belongs to the same
class.

This is an intriguing argument, but ultimately it is self-evident that while the subject matter of the action is undoubtedly the enforcement of a
foreign judgment, the effect of a providential award would be the adjudication of a sum of money. Perhaps in theory, such an action is primarily
for "the enforcement of the foreign judgment," but there is a certain obtuseness to that sort of argument since there is no denying that the
enforcement of the foreign judgment will necessarily result in the award of a definite sum of money.
But before we insist upon this conclusion past beyond the point of reckoning, we must examine its possible ramifications. Petitioners raise the
point that a declaration that an action for enforcement of foreign judgment may be capable of pecuniary estimation might lead to an instance
wherein a first level court such as the Municipal Trial Court would have jurisdiction to enforce a foreign judgment. But under the statute defining
the jurisdiction of first level courts, B.P. 129, such courts are not vested with jurisdiction over actions for the enforcement of foreign judgments.

Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. - Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in
proper cases, where the value of the personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such personal property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) exclusive of interest damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of which must be
specifically alleged: Provided, That where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the
same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of
action arose out of the same or different transactions;

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant raises the
question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of
ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.

(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the
assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where
such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation
expenses and costs: Provided, That value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. 45

Section 33 of B.P. 129 refers to instances wherein the cause of action or subject matter pertains to an assertion of rights and interests over
property or a sum of money. But as earlier pointed out, the subject matter of an action to enforce a foreign judgment is the foreign judgment itself,
and the cause of action arising from the adjudication of such judgment.

An examination of Section 19(6), B.P. 129 reveals that the instant complaint for enforcement of a foreign judgment, even if capable of pecuniary
estimation, would fall under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts, thus negating the fears of the petitioners. Indeed, an examination of the
provision indicates that it can be relied upon as jurisdictional basis with respect to actions for enforcement of foreign judgments, provided that no
other court or office is vested jurisdiction over such complaint:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. - Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

xxx

(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising jurisdiction or any court, tribunal, person or
body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

Thus, we are comfortable in asserting the obvious, that the complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary
estimation. But at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule
141. What provision then governs the proper computation of the filing fees over the instant complaint? For this case and other similarly situated
instances, we find that it is covered by Section 7(b)(3), involving as it does, "other actions not involving property."

Notably, the amount paid as docket fees by the petitioners on the premise that it was an action incapable of pecuniary estimation corresponds to
the same amount required for "other actions not involving property." The petitioners thus paid the correct amount of filing fees, and it was a grave
abuse of discretion for respondent judge to have applied instead a clearly inapplicable rule and dismissed the complaint.

There is another consideration of supreme relevance in this case, one which should disabuse the notion that the doctrine affirmed in this decision
is grounded solely on the letter of the procedural rule. We earlier adverted to the the internationally recognized policy of preclusion, 46 as well as
the principles of comity, utility and convenience of nations 47 as the basis for the evolution of the rule calling for the recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments. The US Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot48 relied heavily on the concept of comity, as especially derived from the
landmark treatise of Justice Story in his Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws of 1834. 49 Yet the notion of "comity" has since been criticized as
one "of dim contours"50 or suffering from a number of fallacies.51 Other conceptual bases for the recognition of foreign judgments have evolved
such as the vested rights theory or the modern doctrine of obligation. 52

There have been attempts to codify through treaties or multilateral agreements the standards for the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments, but these have not borne fruition. The members of the European Common Market accede to the Judgments Convention, signed in
1978, which eliminates as to participating countries all of such obstacles to recognition such as reciprocity and rvision au fond.53 The most
ambitious of these attempts is the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
prepared in 1966 by the Hague Conference of International Law.54 While it has not received the ratifications needed to have it take effect, 55 it is
recognized as representing current scholarly thought on the topic.56 Neither the Philippines nor the United States are signatories to the
Convention.

Yet even if there is no unanimity as to the applicable theory behind the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments or a universal treaty
rendering it obligatory force, there is consensus that the viability of such recognition and enforcement is essential. Steiner and Vagts note:

. . . The notion of unconnected bodies of national law on private international law, each following a quite separate path, is not one conducive to
the growth of a transnational community encouraging travel and commerce among its members. There is a contemporary resurgence of writing
stressing the identity or similarity of the values that systems of public and private international law seek to further - a community interest in
common, or at least reasonable, rules on these matters in national legal systems. And such generic principles as reciprocity play an important role
in both fields.57

Salonga, whose treatise on private international law is of worldwide renown, points out:

Whatever be the theory as to the basis for recognizing foreign judgments, there can be little dispute that the end is to protect the reasonable
expectations and demands of the parties. Where the parties have submitted a matter for adjudication in the court of one state, and proceedings
there are not tainted with irregularity, they may fairly be expected to submit, within the state or elsewhere, to the enforcement of the judgment
issued by the court.58

There is also consensus as to the requisites for recognition of a foreign judgment and the defenses against the enforcement thereof. As earlier
discussed, the exceptions enumerated in Section 48, Rule 39 have remain unchanged since the time they were adapted in this jurisdiction from
long standing American rules. The requisites and exceptions as delineated under Section 48 are but a restatement of generally accepted principles
of international law. Section 98 of The Restatement, Second, Conflict of Laws, states that "a valid judgment rendered in a foreign nation after a
fair trial in a contested proceeding will be recognized in the United States," and on its face, the term "valid" brings into play requirements such
notions as valid jurisdiction over the subject matter and parties.59 Similarly, the notion that fraud or collusion may preclude the enforcement of a
foreign judgment finds affirmation with foreign jurisprudence and commentators,60 as well as the doctrine that the foreign judgment must not
constitute "a clear mistake of law or fact."61 And finally, it has been recognized that "public policy" as a defense to the recognition of judgments
serves as an umbrella for a variety of concerns in international practice which may lead to a denial of recognition. 62

The viability of the public policy defense against the enforcement of a foreign judgment has been recognized in this jurisdiction. 63 This defense
allows for the application of local standards in reviewing the foreign judgment, especially when such judgment creates only a presumptive right,
as it does in cases wherein the judgment is against a person. 64 The defense is also recognized within the international sphere, as many civil law
nations adhere to a broad public policy exception which may result in a denial of recognition when the foreign court, in the light of the choice-of-
law rules of the recognizing court, applied the wrong law to the case.65 The public policy defense can safeguard against possible abuses to the
easy resort to offshore litigation if it can be demonstrated that the original claim is noxious to our constitutional values.

There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure
for the enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the
Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. 66 The classical formulation in international law
sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from the combination two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on
the part of States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter
element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. 67

While the definite conceptual parameters of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments have not been authoritatively established, the
Court can assert with certainty that such an undertaking is among those generally accepted principles of international law.68 As earlier
demonstrated, there is a widespread practice among states accepting in principle the need for such recognition and enforcement, albeit subject to
limitations of varying degrees. The fact that there is no binding universal treaty governing the practice is not indicative of a widespread rejection
of the principle, but only a disagreement as to the imposable specific rules governing the procedure for recognition and enforcement.

Aside from the widespread practice, it is indubitable that the procedure for recognition and enforcement is embodied in the rules of law, whether
statutory or jurisprudential, adopted in various foreign jurisdictions. In the Philippines, this is evidenced primarily by Section 48, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court which has existed in its current form since the early 1900s. Certainly, the Philippine legal system has long ago accepted into its
jurisprudence and procedural rules the viability of an action for enforcement of foreign judgment, as well as the requisites for such valid
enforcement, as derived from internationally accepted doctrines. Again, there may be distinctions as to the rules adopted by each particular
state,69 but they all prescind from the premise that there is a rule of law obliging states to allow for, however generally, the recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgment. The bare principle, to our mind, has attained the status of opinio juris in international practice.

This is a significant proposition, as it acknowledges that the procedure and requisites outlined in Section 48, Rule 39 derive their efficacy not
merely from the procedural rule, but by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution. Rules of procedure are promulgated by the
Supreme Court,70 and could very well be abrogated or revised by the high court itself. Yet the Supreme Court is obliged, as are all State
components, to obey the laws of the land, including generally accepted principles of international law which form part thereof, such as those
ensuring the qualified recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.71
Thus, relative to the enforcement of foreign judgments in the Philippines, it emerges that there is a general right recognized within our body of
laws, and affirmed by the Constitution, to seek recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, as well as a right to defend against such
enforcement on the grounds of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

The preclusion of an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment in this country merely due to an exhorbitant assessment of docket fees is alien
to generally accepted practices and principles in international law. Indeed, there are grave concerns in conditioning the amount of the filing fee on
the pecuniary award or the value of the property subject of the foreign decision. Such pecuniary award will almost certainly be in foreign
denomination, computed in accordance with the applicable laws and standards of the forum. 72 The vagaries of inflation, as well as the relative
low-income capacity of the Filipino, to date may very well translate into an award virtually unenforceable in this country, despite its integral
validity, if the docket fees for the enforcement thereof were predicated on the amount of the award sought to be enforced. The theory adopted by
respondent judge and the Marcos Estate may even lead to absurdities, such as if applied to an award involving real property situated in places
such as the United States or Scandinavia where real property values are inexorably high. We cannot very well require that the filing fee be
computed based on the value of the foreign property as determined by the standards of the country where it is located.

As crafted, Rule 141 of the Rules of Civil Procedure avoids unreasonableness, as it recognizes that the subject matter of an action for
enforcement of a foreign judgment is the foreign judgment itself, and not the right-duty correlatives that resulted in the foreign judgment. In this
particular circumstance, given that the complaint is lodged against an estate and is based on the US District Court's Final Judgment, this foreign
judgment may, for purposes of classification under the governing procedural rule, be deemed as subsumed under Section 7(b)(3) of Rule 141, i.e.,
within the class of "all other actions not involving property." Thus, only the blanket filing fee of minimal amount is required.

Finally, petitioners also invoke Section 11, Article III of the Constitution, which states that "[F]ree access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies
and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty." Since the provision is among the guarantees ensured by the
Bill of Rights, it certainly gives rise to a demandable right. However, now is not the occasion to elaborate on the parameters of this constitutional
right. Given our preceding discussion, it is not necessary to utilize this provision in order to grant the relief sought by the petitioners. It is
axiomatic that the constitutionality of an act will not be resolved by the courts if the controversy can be settled on other grounds 73 or unless the
resolution thereof is indispensable for the determination of the case.74

One more word. It bears noting that Section 48, Rule 39 acknowledges that the Final Judgment is not conclusive yet, but presumptive evidence
of a right of the petitioners against the Marcos Estate. Moreover, the Marcos Estate is not precluded to present evidence, if any, of want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. This ruling, decisive as it is on the question of filing fees
and no other, does not render verdict on the enforceability of the Final Judgment before the courts under the jurisdiction of the Philippines, or for
that matter any other issue which may legitimately be presented before the trial court. Such issues are to be litigated before the trial court, but
within the confines of the matters for proof as laid down in Section 48, Rule 39. On the other hand, the speedy resolution of this claim by the trial
court is encouraged, and contumacious delay of the decision on the merits will not be brooked by this Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and a new order REINSTATING Civil Case
No. 97-1052 is hereby issued. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ.,concur.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 75919 May 7, 1987

MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL., Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CITY LAND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, STEPHEN ROXAS, ANDREW LUISON, GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE MAISIP, Respondents.

Tanjuatco, Oreta and Tanjuatco for petitioners.chanrobles virtual law library

Pecabar Law Offices for private respondents.

-->
 RESOLUTION

chanrobles virtual law library

GANCAYCO, J.:

Acting on the motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Second Division of January 28,1987 and another motion to refer the case to and
to be heard in oral argument by the Court En Banc filed by petitioners, the motion to refer the case to the Court en banc is granted but the motion
to set the case for oral argument is denied.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Petitioners in support of their contention that the filing fee must be assessed on the basis of the amended complaint cite the case of Magaspi vs.
Ramolete. 1 They contend that the Court of Appeals erred in that the filing fee should be levied by considering the amount of damages sought in
the original complaint.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The environmental facts of said case differ from the present in that - chanrobles virtual law library

1. The Magaspi case was an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land with damages. 2 While the present case is an
action for torts and damages and specific performance with prayer for temporary restraining order, etc. 3chanrobles virtual law library

2. In the Magaspi case, the prayer in the complaint seeks not only the annulment of title of the defendant to the property, the declaration of
ownership and delivery of possession thereof to plaintiffs but also asks for the payment of actual moral, exemplary damages and attorney's fees
arising therefrom in the amounts specified therein. 4 However, in the present case, the prayer is for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the action against the defendants' announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid by the
plaintiffs for the property in question, to attach such property of defendants that maybe sufficient to satisfy any judgment that maybe rendered,
and after hearing, to order defendants to execute a contract of purchase and sale of the subject property and annul defendants' illegal forfeiture of
the money of plaintiff, ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff actual, compensatory and exemplary damages as well as 25% of
said amounts as maybe proved during the trial as attorney's fees and declaring the tender of payment of the purchase price of plaintiff valid and
producing the effect of payment and to make the injunction permanent. The amount of damages sought is not specified in the prayer although the
body of the complaint alleges the total amount of over P78 Million as damages suffered by plaintiff. 5chanrobles virtual law library

3. Upon the filing of the complaint there was an honest difference of opinion as to the nature of the action in the Magaspi case. The complaint
was considered as primarily an action for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land. The damages stated were treated as merely to
the main cause of action. Thus, the docket fee of only P60.00 and P10.00 for the sheriff's fee were paid. 6 chanrobles virtual law library

In the present case there can be no such honest difference of opinion. As maybe gleaned from the allegations of the complaint as well as the
designation thereof, it is both an action for damages and specific performance. The docket fee paid upon filing of complaint in the amount only of
P410.00 by considering the action to be merely one for specific performance where the amount involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation is
obviously erroneous. Although the total amount of damages sought is not stated in the prayer of the complaint yet it is spelled out in the body of
the complaint totalling in the amount of P78,750,000.00 which should be the basis of assessment of the filing fee.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library

4. When this under-re assessment of the filing fee in this case was brought to the attention of this Court together with similar other cases an
investigation was immediately ordered by the Court. Meanwhile plaintiff through another counsel with leave of court filed an amended complaint
on September 12, 1985 for the inclusion of Philips Wire and Cable Corporation as co-plaintiff and by emanating any mention of the amount of
damages in the body of the complaint. The prayer in the original complaint was maintained. After this Court issued an order on October 15, 1985
ordering the re- assessment of the docket fee in the present case and other cases that were investigated, on November 12, 1985 the trial court
directed plaintiffs to rectify the amended complaint by stating the amounts which they are asking for. It was only then that plaintiffs specified the
amount of damages in the body of the complaint in the reduced amount of P10,000,000.00. 7 Still no amount of damages were specified in the
prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

On the other hand, in the Magaspi case, the trial court ordered the plaintiffs to pay the amount of P3,104.00 as filing fee covering the damages
alleged in the original complaint as it did not consider the damages to be merely an or incidental to the action for recovery of ownership and
possession of real property. 8 An amended complaint was filed by plaintiff with leave of court to include the government of the Republic as
defendant and reducing the amount of damages, and attorney's fees prayed for to P100,000.00. Said amended complaint was also admitted.
9
chanrobles virtual law library

In the Magaspi case, the action was considered not only one for recovery of ownership but also for damages, so that the filing fee for the damages
should be the basis of assessment. Although the payment of the docketing fee of P60.00 was found to be insufficient, nevertheless, it was held
that since the payment was the result of an "honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as docket fee" the court "had acquired
jurisdiction over the case and the proceedings thereafter had were proper and regular." 10 Hence, as the amended complaint superseded the
original complaint, the allegations of damages in the amended complaint should be the basis of the computation of the filing fee. 11
In the present case no such honest difference of opinion was possible as the allegations of the complaint, the designation and the prayer show
clearly that it is an action for damages and specific performance. The docketing fee should be assessed by considering the amount of damages as
alleged in the original complaint.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

As reiterated in the Magaspi case the rule is well-settled "that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual
date of filing in court . 12Thus, in the present case the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of only P410.00 as
docket fee. Neither can the amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. 13 For an legal purposes there is no such original
complaint that was duly filed which could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings
and actions taken by the trial court are null and void.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Court of Appeals therefore, aptly ruled in the present case that the basis of assessment of the docket fee should be the amount of damages
sought in the original complaint and not in the amended complaint.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Court cannot close this case without making the observation that it frowns at the practice of counsel who filed the original complaint in this
case of omitting any specification of the amount of damages in the prayer although the amount of over P78 million is alleged in the body of the
complaint. This is clearly intended for no other purpose than to evade the payment of the correct filing fees if not to mislead the docket clerk in
the assessment of the filing fee. This fraudulent practice was compounded when, even as this Court had taken cognizance of the anomaly and
ordered an investigation, petitioner through another counsel filed an amended complaint, deleting all mention of the amount of damages being
asked for in the body of the complaint. It was only when in obedience to the order of this Court of October 18, 1985, the trial court directed that
the amount of damages be specified in the amended complaint, that petitioners' counsel wrote the damages sought in the much reduced amount of
P10,000,000.00 in the body of the complaint but not in the prayer thereof. The design to avoid payment of the required docket fee is
obvious.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Court serves warning that it will take drastic action upon a repetition of this unethical practice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library

To put a stop to this irregularity, henceforth all complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages
being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing
fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not bib accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from
the record.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar
pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended
pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi case 14 in so far as it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and
reversed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of merit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ.,
concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Paras, J., took no part.

 EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 79937-38. February 13, 1989.]

SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS AND D.J. WARBY, Petitioners, v. HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION,
Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City and MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG, Respondents.

Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles Law Offices, for Petitioners.

Tanjuatco, Oreta, Tanjuatco, Berenguer & Sanvicente Law Offices for Private Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. STATUTES; PROCEDURAL LAWS; APPLIED RETROSPECTIVELY. Private respondent claims that the ruling in Manchester (149
SCRA 562) cannot apply retroactively to Civil Case No. Q-41177 for at the time said civil case was filed in court there was no such Manchester
ruling as yet. Further, private respondent avers that what is applicable is the ruling of this Court in Magaspi v. Ramolete, wherein this Court held
that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee paid was insufficient. The contention that Manchester cannot apply
retroactively to this case is untenable. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.

2. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; VESTS IN COURTS UPON PAYMENT OF THE PRESCRIBED DOCKET FEES. It is not simply
the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction
over the subject- matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the
court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

3. ID.; ID.; PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIMS AND THIRD-PARTY CLAIMS; NOT CONSIDERED FILED UNLESS PRESCRIBED
DOCKET FEE IS PAID. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be
considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time
but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

4. ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF ADDITIONAL FEE REQUIRED WHERE JUDGMENT AWARDS CLAIM NOT SPECIFIED IN THE PLEADING.
Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment.

DECISION

GANCAYCO, J.:

Again the Court is asked to resolve the issue of whether or not a court acquires jurisdiction over a case when the correct and proper docket fee has
not been paid.

On February 28, 1984, petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL for brevity) filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Metro
Manila for the consignation of a premium refund on a fire insurance policy with a prayer for the judicial declaration of its nullity against private
respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong. Private respondent was declared in default for failure to file the required answer within the reglementary
period.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On the other hand, on March 28, 1984, private respondent filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the refund of
premiums and the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-41177, initially against petitioner SIOL,
and thereafter including E.B. Philipps and D.J. Warby as additional defendants. The complaint sought, among others, the payment of actual,
compensatory, moral, exemplary and liquidated damages, attorneys fees, expenses of litigation and costs of the suit. Although the prayer in the
complaint did not quantify the amount of damages sought said amount may be inferred from the body of the complaint to be about Fifty Million
Pesos (P50,000,000.00).

Only the amount of P210.00 was paid by private respondent as docket fee which prompted petitioners counsel to raise his objection. Said
objection was disregarded by respondent Judge Jose P. Castro who was then presiding over said case.
Upon the order of this Court, the records of said case together with twenty-two other cases assigned to different branches of the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City which were under investigation for under-assessment of docket fees were transmitted to this Court. The Court thereafter
returned the said records to the trial court with the directive that they be re-raffled to the other judges in Quezon City, to the exclusion of Judge
Castro. Civil Case No. Q-41177 was re-raffled to Branch 104, a sala which was then vacant.

On October 15, 1985, the Court en banc issued a Resolution in Administrative Case No. 85-10-8752-RTC directing the judges in said cases to
reassess the docket fees and that in case of deficiency, to order its payment. The Resolution also requires all clerks of court to issue certificates of
re-assessment of docket fees. All litigants were likewise required to specify in their pleadings the amount sought to be recovered in their
complaints.

On December 16, 1985, Judge Antonio P. Solano, to whose sala Civil Case No. Q-41177 was temporarily assigned, issued an order to the Clerk of
Court instructing him to issue a certificate of assessment of the docket fee paid by private respondent and, in case of deficiency, to include the
same in said certificate.

On January 7, 1984, to forestall a default, a cautionary answer was filed by petitioners. On August 30, 1984, an amended complaint was filed by
private respondent including the two additional defendants aforestated.

Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion, to whom Civil Case No. Q- 41177 was thereafter assigned, after his assumption into office on January 16, 1986,
issued a Supplemental Order requiring the parties in the case to comment on the Clerk of Courts letter-report signifying her difficulty in
complying with the Resolution of this Court of October 15, 1985 since the pleadings filed by private respondent did not indicate the exact amount
sought to be recovered. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed a "Compliance" and a "Re-Amended Complaint" stating therein a claim of
"not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual compensatory damages" in the prayer. In the body of the said second amended complaint however, private
respondent alleges actual and compensatory damages and attorneys fees in the total amount of about P44,601,623.70.

On January 24, 1986, Judge Asuncion issued another Order admitting the second amended complaint and stating therein that the same constituted
proper compliance with the Resolution of this Court and that a copy thereof should be furnished the Clerk of Court for the reassessment of the
docket fees. The reassessment by the Clerk of Court bases on private respondents claim of "not less than P10,000,000.00 as actual and
compensatory damages" amounted to P39,786.00 as docket fee. This was subsequently paid by private Respondent.

Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals questioning the said order of Judge Asuncion dated January 24, 1986.

On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 as damages so the total
claim amounts to about P64,601,623.70. On October 16, 1986, or some seven months after filing the supplemental complaint, the private
respondent paid the additional docket fee of P80,396.00. 1

On August 13, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision ruling, among others, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Denying due course to the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. L-09715 insofar as it seeks annulment of the order.

(a) denying petitioners motion to dismiss the complaint, as amended, and

(b) granting the writ of preliminary attachment, but giving due course to the portion thereof questioning the reassessment of the docketing fee,
and requiring the Honorable respondent Court to reassess the docketing fee to be paid by private respondent on the basis of the amount of
P25,401,707.00." 2

Hence, the instant petition.

During the pendency of this petition and in conformity with the said judgment of respondent court, private respondent paid the additional docket
fee of P62,432.90 on April 28, 1988. 3

The main thrust of the petition is that the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over Civil Case
No. Q-41177 on the ground of non-payment of the correct and proper docket fee. Petitioners allege that while it may be true that private
respondent had paid the amount of P182,824.90 as docket fee as herein-above related, and considering that the total amount sought to be
recovered in the amended and supplemental complaint is P64,601,623.70 the docket fee that should be paid by private respondent is P257,810.49,
more or less. Not having paid the same, petitioners contend that the complaint should be dismissed and all incidents arising therefrom should be
annulled. In support of their theory, petitioner cite the latest ruling of the Court in Manchester Development Corporation v. CA, 4 as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar
pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended
pleading. The ruling in the Magaspi Case in so far it is inconsistent with this pronouncement is overturned and reversed."cralaw virtua1aw library

On the other hand, private respondent claims that the ruling in Manchester cannot apply retroactively to Civil Case No. Q-41177 for at the time
said civil case was filed in court there was no such Manchester ruling as yet. Further, private respondent avers that what is applicable is the ruling
of this Court in Magaspi v. Ramolete, 5 wherein this Court held that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case even if the docket fee paid
was insufficient.
The contention that Manchester cannot apply retroactively to this case is untenable. Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be
construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to
that extent. 6

In Lazaro v. Endencia and Andres, 7 this Court held that the payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the
perfection of an appeal. In a forcible entry and detainer case before the justice of the peace court of Manaoag, Pangasinan, after notice of a
judgment dismissing the case, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal with said court but he deposited only P8.00 for the docket fee, instead of
P16.00 as required, within the reglementary period of appeal of five (5) days after receiving notice of judgment. Plaintiff deposited the additional
P8.00 to complete the amount of the docket fee only fourteen (14) days later. On the basis of these facts, this court held that the Court of First
Instance did not acquire jurisdiction to hear and determine the appeal as the appeal was not thereby perfected.

In Lee v. Republic, 8 the petitioner filed a verified declaration of intention to become a Filipino citizen by sending it through registered mail to
the Office of the Solicitor General in 1953 but the required filing fee was paid only in 1956, barely 5-1/2 months prior to the filing of the petition
for citizenship. This Court ruled that the declaration was not filed in accordance with the legal requirement that such declaration should be filed at
least one year before the filing of the petition for citizenship. Citing Lazaro, this Court concluded that the filing of petitioners declaration of
intention on October 23, 1953 produced no legal effect until the required filing fee was paid on May 23, 1956.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad

In Malimit v. Degamo, 9 the same principles enunciated in Lazaro and Lee were applied. It was an original petition for quo warranto contesting
the right to office of proclaimed candidates which was mailed, addressed to the clerk of the Court of First Instance, within the one-week period
after the proclamation as provided therefor by law. 10 However, the required docket fees were paid only after the expiration of said period.
Consequently, this Court held that the date of such payment must be deemed to be the real date of filing of aforesaid petition and not the date
when it was mailed.

Again, in Garica v. Vasquez, 11 this Court reiterated the rule that the docket fee must be paid before a court will act on a petition or complaint.
However, we also held that said rule is not applicable when petitioner seeks the probate of several wills of the same decedent as he is not required
to file a separate action for each will but instead he may have other wills probated in the same special proceeding then pending before the same
court.

Then in Magaspi, 12 this Court reiterated the ruling in Malimit and Lee that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee
regardless of the actual date of its filing in court. Said case involved a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land
with damages filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Upon the payment of P60.00 for the docket fee and P10.00 for the sheriffs fee, the
complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. R-11882. The prayer of the complaint sought that the Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of
the defendant be declared as null and void. It was also prayed that plaintiff be declared as owner thereof to whom the proper title should be
issued, and that defendant be made to pay monthly rentals of P3,500.00 from June 2, 1948 up to the time the property is delivered to plaintiff,
P500,000.00 as moral damages, attorneys fees in the amount of P250,000.00, the costs of the action and exemplary damages in the amount of
P500,000.00.

The defendant then filed a motion to compel the plaintiff to pay the correct amount of the docket fee to which an opposition was filed by the
plaintiff alleging that the action was for the recovery of a parcel of land so the docket fee must be based on its assessed value and that the amount
of P60.00 was the correct docketing fee. The trial court ordered the plaintiff to pay P3,140.00 as filing fee.

The plaintiff then filed a motion to admit the amended complaint to include the Republic as the defendant. In the prayer of the amended
complaint the exemplary damages earlier sought was eliminated. The amended prayer merely sought moral damages as the court may determine,
attorneys fees of P100,000.00 and the costs of the action. The defendant filed an opposition to the amended complaint. The opposition
notwithstanding, the amended complaint was admitted by the trial court. The trial court reiterated its order for the payment of the additional
docket fee which plaintiff assailed and then challenged before this Court. Plaintiff alleged that he paid the total docket fee in the amount of
P60.00 and that if he had to pay the additional fee it must be based on the amended complaint.

The question posed, therefore, was whether or not the plaintiff may be considered to have filed the case even if the docketing fee paid was not
sufficient. In Magaspi, We reiterated the rule that the case was deemed filed only upon the payment of the correct amount for the docket fee
regardless of the actual date of the filing of the complaint; that there was an honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as
docket fee in that as the action appears to be one for the recovery of property the docket fee of P60.00 was correct; and that as the action is also
for damages, We upheld the assessment of the additional docket fee based on the damages alleged in the amended complaint as against the
assessment of the trial court which was based on the damages alleged in the original complaint.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

However, as aforecited, this Court overturned Magaspi in Manchester. Manchester involves an action for torts and damages and specific
performance with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order, etc. The prayer in said case is for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction during the pendency of the action against the defendants announced forfeiture of the sum of P3 Million paid
by the plaintiffs for the property in question, the attachment of such property of defendants that may be sufficient to satisfy any judgment that
may be rendered, and, after hearing, the issuance of an order requiring defendants to execute a contract of purchase and sale of the subject
property and annual defendants illegal forfeiture of the money of plaintiff. It was also prayed that the defendants be made to pay the plaintiff,
jointly and severally, actual, compensatory and exemplary damages as well as 25% of said amounts as may be proved during the trial for
attorneys fees. The plaintiff also asked the trial court to declare the tender of payment of the purchase price of plaintiff valid and sufficient for
purpose of payment, and to make the injunction permanent. The amount of damages sought is not specified in the prayer although the body of the
complaint alleges the total amount of over P78 Million allegedly suffered by plaintiff.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

Upon the filing of the complaint, the plaintiff paid the amount of only P410.00 for the docket fee based on the nature of the action for specific
performance where the amount involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation. However, it was obvious from the allegation of the complaint as
well as its designation that the action was one for damages and specific performance. Thus, this court held the plaintiff must be assessed the
correct docket fee computed against the amount of damages of about P78 Million, although the same was not spelled out in the prayer of the
complaint.

Meanwhile, plaintiff through another counsel, with leave of court, filed a amended complaint on September 12, 1985 by the inclusion of another
co-plaintiff and eliminating any mention of the amount of damages in the body of the complaint. The prayer in the original complaint was
maintained.

On October 15, 1985, this Court ordered the re-assessment of the docket fee in the said case and other cases that were investigated. On November
12, 1985 the trial court directed the plaintiff to rectify the amended complaint by stating the amounts which they were asking for. This plaintiff
did as instructed. In the body of the complaint the amount of damages alleged was reduced to P10,000,000.00 but still no amount of damages was
specified in the prayer. Said amended complaint was admitted.

Applying the principle in Magaspi that "the case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing in
court," this Court held that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by payment of only P410.00 for the docket fee. Neither can the
amendment of the complaint thereby vest jurisdiction upon the Court. For all legal purposes they was no such original complaint duly filed which
could be amended. Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent proceedings and actions taken by the trial court
were declared null and void. 13

The present case, as above discussed, is among the several cases of under-assessment of docket fee which were investigated by this Court
together with Manchester. The facts and circumstances of this case are similar to Manchester. In the body of the original complaint, the total
amount of damages sought amounted to about P50 Million. In the prayer, the amount of damages asked for was not stated. The action was for the
refund of the premium and the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment with damages. The amount of only P210.00 was paid for the docket
fee. On January 23, 1986, private respondent filed an amended complaint wherein in the prayer it is asked that he be awarded no less than
P10,000,000.00 as actual and exemplary damages but in the body of the complaint the amount of his pecuniary claim is approximately
P44,601,623.70. Said amended complaint was admitted and the private respondent was reassessed the additional docket fee of P39,786.00 based
on his prayer of not less than P10,000,000.00 in damages, which he paid.

On April 24, 1986, private respondent filed a supplemental complaint alleging an additional claim of P20,000,000.00 in damages so that his total
claim is approximately P64,601,620.70. On October 16, 1986, private respondent paid an additional docket fee of P80,396.00. After the
promulgation of the decision of the respondent court on August 31, 1987 wherein private respondent was ordered to be reassessed for additional
docket fee, and during the pendency of this petition, and after the promulgation of Manchester, on April 28, 1988, private respondent paid an
additional docket fee on P62,132.92. Although private respondent appears to have paid a total amount of P182,824.90 for the docket fee
considering the total amount of this claim in the amended and supplemental complaint amounting to about P64,601,620.70, petitioner insists that
private respondent must pay a docket fee of P257,810.49.

The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case. The pattern and the intent to defraud the government of the docket fee
due it is obvious not only in the filing of the original complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint.

However, in Manchester, petitioner did not pay any additional docket fee until the case was decided by this Court on May 7, 1987. Thus, in
Manchester, due to the fraud committed on the government, this Court held that the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case and that
the amended complaint could not have been admitted inasmuch as the original complaint was null and void.

In the present case, a more liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike Manchester, private respondent demonstrated his
willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required. The promulgation of the decision in Manchester must have had
that sobering influence on private respondent who thus paid the additional docket fee as ordered by the respondent court. It triggered his change
for stance by manifesting his willingness to pay such additional docket fee as may be ordered.

Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still insufficient considering the total amount of the claim. This is a matter
which the clerk of court of the lower court and/or his duly authorized docket clerk or clerk in-charge should determine and, thereafter, it any
amount is found due, he must require the private respondent to pay the same.

Thus, the Court rules as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial
court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment
of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.

2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and
unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond
its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized
deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.chanrobles.com:cralaw:nad

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Clerk of Court of the court a quo is hereby instructed to reassess and determine
the additional filing fee that should be paid by private respondent considering the total amount of the claim sought in the original complaint and
the supplemental complaint as may be gleaned from the allegations and the prayer thereof and to require private respondent to pay the deficiency,
if any, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Corts, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and
Regalado, JJ., concur.
 SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 141947. July 5, 2001.]

ISMAEL V. SANTOS, ALFREDO G. ARCE and HILARIO M. PASTRANA, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS, PEPSI COLA
PRODUCTS PHILS., INC., LUIS P. LORENZO, JR. and FREDERICK DAEL, Respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

This petition for review seeks to annul the Resolution 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54853 dated 28 September 1999 which
summarily dismissed petitioners special civil action for certiorari for failing to execute properly the required verification and certification
against forum shopping and to specify the material dates from which the timeliness of the petition may be determined.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary

Private respondent Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. (PEPSI) is a domestic corporation engaged in the production, distribution and sale of
beverages. At the time of their termination, petitioners Ismael V. Santos and Alfredo G, Arce were employed by PEPSI as Complimentary
Distribution Specialists (CDS) with a monthly salary of P7,500.00 and P10,000.00, respectively, while Hilario M. Pastrana was employed as
Route Manager with a monthly salary of P7,500.00.

In a letter dated 26 December 1994, 2 PEPSI informed its employees that due to poor performance of its Metro Manila Sales Operations it would
restructure and streamline certain physical and sales distribution systems to improve its warehousing efficiency. Certain positions, including that
of petitioners, were declared redundant and abolished. Consequently, employees with affected positions were terminated.

On 15 January 1995 petitioners left their respective positions, accepted their separation pays and executed the corresponding releases and
quitclaims. However, before the end of the year, petitioners learned that PEPSI created new positions called Account Development Managers
(ADM) with substantially the same duties and responsibilities as the CDS. Aggrieved, on 15 April 1996, petitioners filed a complaint with the
Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal with a prayer for reinstatement, back wages, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

In their complaint, petitioners alleged that the creation of the new positions belied PEPSIs claim of redundancy. They further alleged that the
qualifications for both the CDS and ADM positions were similar and that the employees hired for the latter positions were even less qualified
than they were. 3 Likewise taking note of possible procedural errors, they claimed that while they were notified of their termination, PEPSI had
not shown that the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) was also notified as mandated by Art. 283 of the Labor Code which states

ARTICLE 283. Closure of Establishment and Reduction of Personnel. The employer may also terminate the employment of any employee due
to the installation of labor-saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment
or undertaking unless the closing is for the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written notice on the worker and the
Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof . . . (Emphasis supplied).

PEPSI, on the other hand, maintained that termination due to redundancy was a management prerogative the wisdom and soundness of which
were beyond the discretionary review of the courts. Thus, it had the right to manage its affairs and decide which position was no longer needed
for its operations. It further maintained that the redundancy program was made in good faith and was not implemented to purposely force certain
employees out of their employment. It also claimed that a close perusal of the job descriptions of both the CDS and ADM positions would show
that the two (2) were very different in terms of the nature of their functions, areas of concerns, responsibilities and qualifications. 4

On 18 June 1997, Labor Arbiter Romulus S. Protacio dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Furthermore, he ruled that the one (1)-month
written notice prior to termination required by Art. 283 was complied with.

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter. However, in its Decision 5 dated 5 March
1999 it found that the Establishment Termination Report was submitted to the DOLE only on 5 April 1995 or two (2) months after the termination
had already taken place 6 and thus effectively reversing the finding of the Labor Arbiter that the required one (1)-month notice prior to
termination was complied with. Nonetheless, the NLRC dismissed the appeal, citing International Hardware, Inc. v. NLRC, 7 which held

. . . if an employee consented to his retrenchment or voluntarily applied for retrenchment with the employer due to the installation of labor-saving
devices, redundancy, closure or cessation of operation or to prevent financial losses to the business of the employer, the required previous notice
to the DOLE is not necessary as the employee thereby acknowledged the existence of a valid cause for termination of his employment . . .
(Emphasis supplied).chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

On 10 September 1999, petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. 8 The Court of Appeals in the assailed
Resolution dismissed the petition outright for failure to comply with a number of requirements mandated by Sec. 3, Rule 46, in relation to Sec. 1,
Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Respondent appellate court found that the verification and certification against forum shopping
were executed merely by petitioners counsel and not by petitioners. The petition also failed to specify the dates of receipt of the NLRC Decision
as well as the filing of the motion for reconsideration. 9 Under the aforecited Rules, failure of petitioners to comply with any of the requirements
was sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.

Petitioners now present the sole issue of whether there was failure to comply with the requirements of the Rules in filing their petition for
certiorari.

We find no manifest error on the part of the Court of Appeals; hence, we affirm.

It is true that insofar as verification is concerned, we have held that there is substantial compliance if the same is executed by an attorney, it being
presumed that facts alleged by him are true to his knowledge and belief. 10 However, the same does not apply as regards the requirement of a
certification against forum shopping. Section 3, Rule 46, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly requires

. . . The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a sworn certification that he has not theretofore commenced any other action
involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency; if there is
such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been
filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes
to promptly inform the aforesaid courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom . . .

It is clear from the above-quoted provision that the certification must be made by petitioner himself and not by counsel since it is petitioner who
is in the best position to know whether he has previously commenced any similar action involving the same issues in any other tribunal or agency.
11

Petitioners argue that while it may be true that they are in the best position on know whether they have commenced an action or not, this
information may be divulged to their attorney and there is nothing anomalous or bizarre about this disclosure. 12 They further maintain that they
executed a Special Power of Attorney specifically to authorize their counsel to execute the certification on their behalf.

We are aware of our ruling in BA Savings Bank v. Sia 13 that a certification against forum shopping may be signed by an authorized lawyers who
has personal knowledge of the facts required to be disclosed in such document. However, BA Savings Bank must be distinguished from the case
at bar because in the former, the complainant was a corporation, and hence, a juridical person. Therefore, that case made an exception to the
general rule that the certification must be made by the petitioner himself since a corporation can only act through natural persons. In fact, physical
actions, e.g., signing and delivery of documents, may be performed on behalf of the corporate entity only by specifically authorized individuals.
In the instant case, petitioners are all natural persons and there is no showing of any reasonable cause to justify their failure to personally sign the
certification. 14 It is noteworthy that PEPSI in its Comment stated that it was petitioners themselves who executed the verification and
certification requirements in all their previous pleadings. Counsel for petitioners argues that as a matter of policy, a Special Power of Attorney is
executed to promptly and effectively meet any contingency relative to the handling of a case. This argument only weakens their position since it
is clear that at the outset no justifiable reason yet existed for counsel to substitute petitioners in signing the certification. In fact, in the case of
natural persons, this policy serves no legal purpose. Convenience cannot be made the basis for a circumvention of the Rules.

Neither are we convinced that the outright dismissal of the petition would defeat the administration of justice. Petitioners argue that there are very
important issues such as their livelihood and the well being and future of their families. 15 Every petition filed with a judicial tribunal is sure to
affect, even tangentially, either the well being and future of petitioner himself or that of his family. Unfortunately, this does not warrant
disregarding the Rules.

Moreover, the petition failed to indicate the material dates that would show the timeliness of the filing thereof with the Court of Appeals. There
are three (3) essential dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65. First, the date when notice of the judgment or
final order or Resolution was received; second, when a motion for new trial or reconsideration was filed; and third, when notice of the denial
thereof was received. Petitioners failed to show the first and second dates, namely, the date of receipt of the impugned NLRC Decision as well as
the date of filing of their motion for reconsideration. Petitioners counter by stating that in the body of the petition for certiorari filed in the Court
of Appeals, it was explicitly stated that the NLRC Resolution dated 11 May 1999 was received by petitioners through counsel on 30 July 1999.
They even reiterate this contention in their Reply.

The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is for the purpose of determining its timeliness. Such
a petition is required to be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or Resolution sought to be assailed. 16
Therefore, that the petition for certiorari was filed forty-one (41) days from receipt of the denial of the motion for reconsideration is hardly
relevant. The Court of Appeals was not in any position to determine when this period commenced to run and whether the motion for
reconsideration itself was filed on time since the material dates were not stated. It should not be assumed that in no event would the motion be
filed later than fifteen (15) days. Technical rules of procedure are not designed to frustrate the ends of justice. These are provided to effect the
proper and orderly disposition of cases and thus effectively prevent the clogging of court dockets. Utter disregard of the Rules cannot justly be
rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. 17

But even if these procedural lapses are dispensed with, the instant petition, on the merits, must still fail. Petitioners impute grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC for holding that the CDS and ADM positions were dissimilar, and for concluding that the redundancy program
of PEPSI was undertaken in good faith and that the case of International Hardware v. NLRC 18 was applicable.

This Court is not a trier of facts. The question of whether the duties and responsibilities of the CDS and ADM positions are similar is a question
properly belonging to both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. In fact, the NLRC merely affirmed the finding of the Labor Arbiter on this point and
further elaborated on the differences between the two (2). Thus it ruled
. . . We cannot subscribe to the complainants assertions that the positions have similar job descriptions. First, CDS report to a CD Manager,
whereas the ADMs do not report to the CD Manager, leading us to believe that the organizational set-up of the sales department has been
changed.

Second, CDS are field personnel who drive assigned vehicles and deliver stocks to "dealers" who, under the job description are those who sell
and deliver the same stocks to smaller retail outlets in their assigned areas. The ADMs are not required to drive trucks and they do not physically
deliver stocks to wholesale dealers. Instead, they help "dealers" market the stocks through retail. This conclusion is borne out by the fact (that)
ADMs are tasked to ensure that the stocks are displayed in the best possible locations in the dealers store, that they have more shelf space and
that dealers participate in promotional activities in order to sell more products.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

It is clear to us that while CDS are required to physically deliver, sell and collect payments for softdrinks, they do so not primarily to retail outlets
but to wholesale dealers who have retail customers of their own. They are not required to assist the dealers they deliver to in selling the softdrinks
more effectively whereas ADMs sell softdrinks to big retail outlets (groceries and malls who have shelves and display cases and who require
coolers and other paraphernalia). They do not only sell but they have to effectively market the products or put them in the best and most
advantageous light so that the dealers who sell the softdrinks retails can sell more softdrinks. The main thrust of the ADMs job is to ensure that
the softdrinks products ordered from them are marketed in a certain manner ("Pepsi-Way standards") in keeping with the promotional thrust of
the company.

Factual findings of the NLRC, particularly when they coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter, are accorded respect, even finality, and will not be
disturbed for as long as such findings are supported by substantial evidence, 19 defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 20 In this case, there is no doubt that the findings of the NLRC are supported by substantial evidence.
The job descriptions submitted by PEPSI are replete with information and is an adequate basis to compare and contrast the two (2) positions.

Therefore, the two (2) positions being different, it follows that the redundancy program instituted by PEPSI was undertaken in good faith.
Petitioners have not established that the title Account Development Manager was created in order to maliciously terminate their employment. Nor
have they shown that PEPSI had any ill motive against them. It is therefore apparent that the restructuring and streamlining of PEPSIs
distribution and sales systems were an honest effort to make the company more efficient.

Redundancy exists when the service capability of the work force is in excess of what is reasonably needed to meet the demands of the enterprise.
21 A redundant position is one rendered superfluous by a number of factors, such as overhiring of workers, decreased volume of business,
dropping of a particular product line previously manufactured by the company or phasing out of a service previously undertaken by the business.
22

Based on the fact that PEPSIs Metro Manila Sales Operations were not meeting its sales targets, 23 and on the fact that new positions were
subsequently created, it is evident that PEPSI wanted to restructure its organization in order to include more complex positions that would either
absorb or render completely unnecessary the positions it had previously declared redundant. The soundness of this business judgment of PEPSI
has been assailed by petitioners, arguing that it is more logical to implement new procedures in physical distribution, sales quotas, and other
policies aimed at improving the performance of the division rather than to reduce the number of employees and create new positions. 24

This argument cannot be accepted. While it is true that management may not, under the guise of invoking its prerogative, ease out employees and
defeat their constitutional right to security of tenure, the same must be respected if clearly undertaken in good faith and if no arbitrary or
malicious action is shown.

Similarly, in Willshire File Co., Inc. v. NLRC 25 petitioner company effected some changes in its organization by abolishing the position of Sales
Manager and simply adding the duties previously discharged by it to the duties of the General Manager to whom the Sales Manager used to
report. In that case, we held that the characterization of private respondents services as no longer necessary or sustainable, and therefore properly
terminable, was an exercise of business judgment on the part of petitioner company. The wisdom or soundness of such characterization or
decision is not subject to discretionary review on the part of the Labor Arbiter or of the NLRC so long as no violation of law or arbitrary and
malicious action is indicated.

In the case at bar, no such violation or arbitrary action was established by petitioners. The subject matter being well beyond the discretionary
review allowed by law, it behooves this Court to steer clear of the realm properly belonging to the business experts.

We agree with the NLRC in its application of International Hardware v. NLRC that the mandated one (1) month notice prior to termination given
to the worker and the DOLE is rendered unnecessary by the consent of the worker himself. Petitioners assail the voluntariness of their consent by
stating that had they known of PEPSIs bad faith they would not have agreed to their termination, nor would they have signed the corresponding
releases and quitclaims. 26 Having established private respondents good faith in undertaking the assailed redundancy program, there is no need
to rule on this contention.

Finally, in a last ditch effort to plead their case, petitioners would want us to believe that their termination was illegal since PEPSI did not employ
fair and reasonable criteria in implementing its redundancy program. This issue was not raised before the Labor Arbiter nor with the NLRC. As it
would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play and justice to allow a party to raise a question which has not been passed upon by both
administrative tribunals, 27 it is now too late to entertain it.

WHEREFORE, in the absence of any reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Resolution dated
28 September 1999 which summarily dismissed petitioners special civil action for certiorari for non-compliance with Sec. 3, Rule 46, in relation
to Sec. 1, Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
 THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 177456 : September 4, 2009]

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner, v. DOMINGO R. DANDO, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, filed by petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), assailing
(1) the Decision1 dated 20 November 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82881, which granted the Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by herein respondent Domingo R. Dando (Dando); and (2) the Resolution dated 4 April 2007 of the appellate
court in the same case denying the Motion for Reconsideration of BPI. The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, annulled the Orders dated
13 January 2004 and 3 March 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 149, setting Civil Case No. 03-281 for pre-trial
conference; and reinstated the earlier Order dated 10 October 2003 of the RTC dismissing Civil Case No. 03-281 for failure of BPI to file its pre-
trial brief.

The instant Petition stemmed from a Complaint for Sum of Money and Damages 2 filed on 13 March 2003 by BPI against Dando before the RTC,
docketed as Civil Case No. 03-281. The Complaint alleged that on or about 12 August 1994, Dando availed of a loan in the amount of
P750,000.00 from Far East Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC), under a Privilege Cheque Credit Line Agreement. 3 The parties agreed that Dando
would pay FEBTC the principal amount of the loan, in lump sum, at the end of 90 days; and interest thereon every 30 days, the periods reckoned
from the time of availment of the loan. Dando defaulted in the payment of the principal amount of the loan, as well as the interest and penalties
thereon. Despite repeated demands, Dando refused and/or failed to pay his just and valid obligation. 4 In 2000, BPI and FEBTC merged, with the
former as the surviving entity,5 thus, absorbing the rights and obligations of the latter.6

After Dando filed with the RTC his Answer with Counterclaim,7 BPI filed its Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial. Acting on the said Motion, the
RTC, through Acting Presiding Judge Oscar B. Pimentel (Judge Pimentel), issued an Order 8 on 11 June 2003 setting Civil Case No. 03-281 for
pre-trial conference on 18 August 2003. Judge Pimentel subsequently issued, on 16 June 2003, a Notice of Pre-Trial Conference, 9 which directed
the parties to submit their respective pre-trial briefs at least three days before the scheduled date of pre-trial. Dando submitted his Pre-trial Brief 10
to the RTC on 11 August 2003. BPI, on the other hand, filed its Pre-trial Brief11 with the RTC, and furnished Dando with a copy thereof, only on
18 August 2003, the very day of the scheduled Pre-Trial Conference.

When the parties appeared before the RTC on 18 August 2003 for the scheduled Pre-Trial Conference, Dando orally moved for the dismissal of
Civil Case No. 03-281, citing Sections 5 and 6, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. The RTC, through an Order issued on the same day, required
Dando to file a written motion within five days from the receipt of the said Order and BPI to file its comment and/or opposition thereto. The RTC
order reads:

On calling this case for the pre-trial conference, counsel for both parties appeared and even [respondent] Domingo R. Dando appeared. The
attention of the Court was called by the counsel for the [respondent Dando] that the counsel for the [petitioner BPI] only filed her Pre-Trial Brief
today at 9:00 o'clock in the morning instead of at least three days before the pre-trial conference, as required by the Rules. This prompted the
counsel for the [respondent Dando] to ask for the dismissal of the case for violation of Rule 18 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Counsel for the [respondent Dando] even claims that he has not received a copy of the pre-trial brief, but then according to the counsel for the
[petitioner BPI], a copy thereof was sent by registered mail to counsel for the [respondent Dando] since (sic) August 18, 2003, and considering
the nature of the motion of the counsel for the [respondent Dando], it is best that the [respondent Dando's] counsel reduce the same in writing
within five days from today, furnishing personally a copy thereof the counsel for the [petitioner BPI] who is hereby given five days from receipt
thereof within which to file her comment and/or opposition thereto, thereafter, the incident shall be considered submitted for Resolution.

Meanwhile, no pre-trial conference shall be held until the motion is resolved. 12

On 25 August 2003, Dando filed with the RTC his written Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 03-281, for violation of the mandatory rule on filing
of pre-trial briefs.13 BPI filed an Opposition14 to Dando's Motion, arguing that its filing with the RTC of the Pre-Trial Brief on 18 August 2003
should be considered as compliance with the rules of procedure given that the Pre-Trial Conference did not proceed as scheduled on said date.

In an Order dated 10 October 2003, the RTC granted Dando's Motion to Dismiss Civil Case No. 03-281, for the following reasons:

In resolving this motion, this Court should be guided by the mandatory character of Section 6, Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of Court which:
strictly mandates the parties to the case to file with the Court and serve on the adverse party and SHALL ensure their receipt thereof at least three
(3) days before the date of the pre-trial, their respective pre-trial briefs but likewise imposed upon the parties the mandatory duty to seasonably
file and serve on the adverse party their respective pre-trial briefs. The aforesaid rule does not merely sanction the non-filing thereof of the
parties' respective pre-trial briefs but likewise imposed upon the parties the mandatory duty to seasonably file and serve on the adverse party their
respective pre-trial briefs. Pre-trial briefs are meant to serve as a device to clarify and narrow down the basic issues between the parties so that at
pre-trial, the proper parties may be able to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and the facts before civil trials and this prevent said
trials from being carried in the dark.15

Consequently, the RTC decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the [herein respondent Dando's] motion to dismiss to be impressed with merit the same is hereby
GRANTED. Accordingly, the instant case is hereby dismissed with prejudice.16

BPI filed a Motion for Reconsideration17 of the 10 October 2003 Order of the RTC, praying for the liberal interpretation of the rules. Expectedly,
Dando filed his Comment/Opposition thereto.18

On 13 January 2004, the RTC, now presided by Judge Cesar O. Untalan (Judge Untalan), issued an Order resolving the Motion for
Reconsideration of BPI as follows:

The Court finds merit in plaintiff's motion.

Considering that although reglementary periods under the Rules of Court are to be strictly observed to prevent needless delays, jurisprudence
nevertheless allows the relaxation of procedural rules. Since technicalities are not ends in themselves but exist to protect and promote substantive
rights of litigants [Sy v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 127263, April 12, 2000; Adamo v. IAC, 191 SCRA 195 (1990); Far East Marble (Phils.), Inc. v. CA,
225 SCRA 249, 258 (1993)], in the interest of substantial justice, and without giving premium to technicalities, the motion for reconsideration is
hereby granted.19

At the end of its 13 January 2004 Order, the RTC disposed:

Wherefore, the Order dated October 10, 2003 is hereby reconsidered and set aside.

Let this case be set for pre-trial anew on February 13, 2004 at 8:30 in the morning. Notify both parties and their respective counsel of this
setting.20

It was then Dando's turn to file a Motion for Reconsideration, 21 which the RTC addressed in its Order dated 3 March 2004, thus:

Finding no new issue raised in defendant's motion, as to warrant a reconsideration of the assailed Order dated January 13, 2004, the instant
motion is hereby denied.

The Pre-trial set on March 19, 2004 at 8:30 in the morning shall proceed accordingly.22

Dando sought recourse from the Court of Appeals by filing a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 82881.23 Dando averred that RTC Judge Untalan committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing
its Order dated 13 January 2004. The Court of Appeals rendered a Decision on 20 November 2006 where it held that:

In this case, the BPI stated in its motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing its action that the delay in the filing of the pre-trial brief was
solely due to the heavy load of paper work of its counsel, not to mention the daily hearings the latter had to attend. We find this excuse too flimsy
to justify the reversal of an earlier order dismissing the action. The BPI did not come forward with the most convincing reason for the relaxation
of the rules, or has not shown any persuasive reason why it should be exempt from abiding by the rules. We therefore find the public respondent
to have gravely abused his discretion in considering and granting the BPI's motion for reconsideration. The BPI failed to even try to come up with
a good reason for its failure to file its pre-trial brief on time in order to relax the application of the procedural rules. Heavy work load and court
hearings cannot even be considered an excuse. The trial court cannot just set aside the rules of procedure and simply rely on the liberal
interpretation of the rules. Clearly, public respondent ignored the mandatory wordings of Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 18. Under Section 6, the
plaintiff's failure to file the pre-trial brief at least three days before the pre-trial shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial.
Under Section 5 of the same Rule, failure by plaintiff to appear at the pre-trial shall be cause for dismissal of the action. There is grave abuse of
discretion when a lower court or tribunal violates or contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. 24

The fallo of the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated January 13, 2004 and March 3, 2004, of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 149, in Civil Case No. 03-281 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The October 10, 2003 Order is hereby
REINSTATED.25

The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated 4 April 2007,26 denied the Motion for Reconsideration of BPI for lack of merit.

Hence, this Petition where BPI raises the following issues:

A. IS THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IN ISSUING THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION, CORRECT WHEN IT STRICTLY
APPLIED THE RULES OF PROCEDURE.

B. IS THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECT WHEN IT DECLARED THAT THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT
COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN THE LATTER RECONSIDERED AND SET ASIDE THE ORDER (ANNEX "H"
TO THE PETITION) DISMISSING THE CASE, DESPITE THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT'S DISCRETION OR POWER TO RELAX
COMPLIANCE WITH THE RULES OF PROCEDURE. 27

Relevant herein are the following provisions of the Rules of Court on pre-trial:

Rule 18
PRE-TRIAL

SEC. 6. Pre-trial brief. - The parties shall file with the court and serve on the adverse party, in such manner as shall ensure their receipt thereof at
least three (3) days before the date of the pre-trial, their respective pre-trial briefs which shall contain, among others:

xxx

Failure to file the pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at the pre-trial.

SEC. 5. Effect of failure to appear. - The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause
for dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the part of the
defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof. (Emphases
ours.)

It is a basic legal construction that where words of command such as "shall," "must," or "ought" are employed, they are generally and ordinarily
regarded as mandatory. Thus, where, as in Rule 18, Sections 5 and 6 of the Rules of Court, the word "shall" is used, a mandatory duty is imposed,
which the courts ought to enforce.28 rbl rl l lbrr

The Court is fully aware that procedural rules are not to be belittled or simply disregarded for these prescribed procedures insure an orderly and
speedy administration of justice. However, it is equally true that litigation is not merely a game of technicalities. Law and jurisprudence grant to
courts the prerogative to relax compliance with procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile both the
need to put an end to litigation speedily and the parties' right to an opportunity to be heard.29

This is not to say that adherence to the Rules could be dispensed with. However, exigencies and situations might occasionally demand flexibility
in their application.30 In not a few instances, the Court relaxed the rigid application of the rules of procedure to afford the parties the opportunity
to fully ventilate their cases on the merit. This is in line with the time-honored principle that cases should be decided only after giving all parties
the chance to argue their causes and defenses. Technicality and procedural imperfection should, thus, not serve as basis of decisions. In that way,
the ends of justice would be better served. For, indeed, the general objective of procedure is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival
claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the administration of justice. 31

In Sanchez v. Court of Appeals,32 the Court restated the reasons that may provide justification for a court to suspend a strict adherence to
procedural rules, such as: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of
the case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) a lack of any
showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) the fact that the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.33

Herein, BPI instituted Civil Case No. 03-281 before the RTC to recover the amount it had lent to Dando, plus interest and penalties thereon,
clearly, a matter of property. The substantive right of BPI to recover a due and demandable obligation cannot be denied or diminished by a rule of
procedure,34 more so, since Dando admits that he did avail himself of the credit line extended by FEBTC, the predecessor-in-interest of BPI, and
disputes only the amount of his outstanding liability to BPI.35 To dismiss Civil Case No. 03-281 with prejudice and, thus, bar BPI from recovering
the amount it had lent to Dando would be to unjustly enrich Dando at the expense of BPI.

The counsel of BPI invokes "heavy pressures of work" to explain his failure to file the Pre-Trial Brief with the RTC and to serve a copy thereof to
Dando at least three days prior to the scheduled Pre-Trial Conference.36 True, in Olave v. Mistas,37 we did not find "heavy pressures of work" as
sufficient justification for the failure of therein respondents' counsel to timely move for pre-trial. However, unlike the respondents in Olave, 38 the
failure of BPI to file its Pre-Trial Brief with the RTC and provide Dando with a copy thereof within the prescribed period under Section 1, Rule
18 of the Rules of Court, was the first and, so far, only procedural lapse committed by the bank in Civil Case No. 03-281. BPI did not manifest an
evident pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe a mandatory requirement of the Rules. In fact, BPI,
for the most part, exhibited diligence and reasonable dispatch in prosecuting its claim against Dando by immediately moving to set Civil Case
No. 03-281 for Pre-Trial Conference after its receipt of Dando's Answer to the Complaint; and in instantaneously filing a Motion for
Reconsideration of the 10 October 2003 Order of the RTC dismissing Civil Case No. 03-281.

Accordingly, the ends of justice and fairness would be best served if the parties to Civil Case No. 03-281 are given the full opportunity to thresh
out the real issues and litigate their claims in a full-blown trial. Besides, Dando would not be prejudiced should the RTC proceed with the hearing
of Civil Case No. 03-281, as he is not stripped of any affirmative defenses nor deprived of due process of law.39

Wherefore, premises considered, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated 20 November 2006 and Resolution dated 4 April 2007 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 82881 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders dated 13 January 2004 and 3 March 2004 in Civil
Case No. 03-281, insofar as they set aside the prior Order dated 10 October 2003 of the same trial court dismissing the Complaint of petitioner
Bank of the Philippine Islands for failure of the latter to timely file its Pre-Trial Brief, is REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 149, is DIRECTED to continue with the hearing of Civil Case No. 03-281 with utmost dispatch, until its termination. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 164876 - January 23, 2006]

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. LEONILA P. CELADA, Respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Respondent Leonila P. Celada owns 22.3167 hectares of agricultural land situated in Calatrava, Carmen, Bohol registered under TCT No. 16436, 1
of which 14.1939 hectares was identified in 1998 by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) as suitable for compulsory acquisition under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The matter was then indorsed to petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) for field
investigation and land valuation.

In due course, LBP valued respondent's land at P2.1105517 per square meter for an aggregate value of P299,569.61. 2 The DAR offered the same
amount to respondent as just compensation, but it was rejected. Nonetheless, on August 27, 1999, LBP deposited the said sum in cash and bonds
in the name of respondent.3

Pursuant to Section 16(d) of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, the matter was referred to the
DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), Region VII-Cebu City, for summary administrative hearing on determination of just compensation. The
case was docketed as DARAB Case No. VII-4767-B-990.

While the DARAB case was pending, respondent filed, on February 10, 2000, a petition4 for judicial determination of just compensation against
LBP, the DAR and the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Carmen, Bohol, before the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City. The
same was docketed as Civil Case No. 6462 and raffled to Branch 3, the designated Special Agrarian Court (SAC). Respondent alleged that the
current market value of her land is at least P150,000.00 per hectare based on the following factors:

14.1. The land in question has been mortgaged to the defunct Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bohol), Inc., for P1,220,000.00 on July 23, 1998 since it
was appraised at P15.00 per square meter;

14.2. Agricultural lands in said barangay are priced ranging from P140,000.00 to P150,000.00 per hectare and current land transactions reveal
said price range;

14.3. The land in question is titled or registered property, cultivated and fully developed with rice 5 and corn occupying the greater portion thereof;

14.4. The topography of the land, its soil condition, climate and productivity of surrounding lots justify the just compensation requested or asked
for;

14.5. Even the class and base unit market value for agricultural lands in Bohol is about thirty (30) times higher than the price offered per hectare
by DAR/LBP.6

On April 27, 2000, LBP filed its Answer7 raising non-exhaustion of administrative remedies as well as forum-shopping as affirmative defense.
According to petitioner, respondent must first await the outcome of the DARAB case before taking any judicial recourse; that its valuation was
arrived at by applying the formula prescribed by law whereas respondent's was based only on the "current value of like properties".

The DAR and the MARO likewise filed an Answer8 averring that the determination of just compensation rests exclusively with the LBP. Thus,
they are not liable to respondent and are merely nominal parties in the case.

Meanwhile, the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD) issued an Order 9 dated April 12, 2000 affirming the valuation made by LBP.
Respondent failed to appear in the DARAB case despite due notice.

On June 4, 2001, the SAC issued an order resolving petitioner's affirmative defense in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the Affirmative Defense of x x x Land Bank is hereby denied. Besides, in the mind of the court, the recourse to the DARAB is x
x x of no moment since it is only conciliatory to the parties.

Upon agreement of the parties, the pre-trial is reset to June 11, 2001 at 9:00 in the morning.

SO ORDERED.10

Thereafter, a pre-trial conference was conducted11 and trial on the merits ensued. On March 1, 2003, the SAC rendered judgment as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby fixes the compensation of the land of petitioner at P2.50 per square meter or a total
of P354,847.50 for the portion of 14.1939 hectares subject of compulsory acquisition under the CARP which it believes just, fair and equitable
under the present circumstances and which shall earn legal interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the time of its taking by the DAR.
Furthermore, respondent Land Bank is hereby ordered to indemnify petitioner the amount of P10,000.00 for attorney's fee and incidental
expenses of P5,000.00 and costs.

SO ORDERED.12

LBP elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals which, however, dismissed the appeal outright on the following grounds:

1. The petition is not accompanied with an affidavit of service, although there is an explanation that respondent, respondent's counsel and Judge
Venancio J. Amila were furnished with copies of the petition by registered mail x x x.

2. Petitioner's counsel indicated his IBP and PTR but not his Roll of Attorney's Number x x x.

3. Copies of (a) PARAD Decision x x x adverted to in the petition which fixed the land valuation for just compensation at P299,569.11 and (b)
petitioner's Petition for Judicial Determination of Just Compensation filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City, Branch 3, were not
attached as annexes, x x x.13

Upon denial of its motion for reconsideration,14 LBP filed the instant petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, alleging that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN X X X RIGIDLY OR STRICTLY APPLYING PROCEDURAL LAW AT THE EXPENSE OF
SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE AND THE RIGHT TO APPEAL.

THE SAC A QUO ERRED IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITION FOR DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION
WHILE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS IS ON-GOING BEFORE THE DARAB, REGION VII, CEBU CITY.

THE SAC A QUO ERRED IN FIXING THE JUST COMPENSATION OF THE LAND BASED NOT ON ITS ACTUAL LAND USE BUT ON
THE VALUATION OF NEIGHBORING LANDS.

THE SAC A QUO ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES AND INCIDENTAL EXPENSES X X X. 15

On the first assigned error, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals should have liberally construed the rules of procedure and not dismissed its
appeal on technical grounds.

We agree with petitioner.

The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner's appeal on three technical grounds, namely: (a) lack of affidavit of service; (b) failure of counsel to
indicate his Roll of Attorneys' number; and (c) failure to attach material portions of the records. However, the lack of affidavit of service is not
deemed fatal where the petition filed below is accompanied by the original registry receipts showing that the petition and its annexes were served
upon the parties.16 On the other hand, the failure of counsel to indicate his Roll of Attorneys' number would not affect respondent's substantive
rights, such that petitioner's counsel could have been directed to comply with the latter requirement rather than dismiss the petition on purely
technical grounds. As for petitioner's failure to attach material portions of the records, we held in Donato v. Court of Appeals17 that:

[T]he failure of the petitioner to x x x append to his petition copies of the pleadings and other material portions of the records as would support
the petition, does not justify the outright dismissal of the petition. It must be emphasized that the RIRCA (Revised Internal Rules of the Court of
Appeals) gives the appellate court a certain leeway to require parties to submit additional documents as may be necessary in the interest of
substantial justice. Under Section 3, paragraph d of Rule 3 of the RIRCA, the CA may require the parties to complete the annexes as the court
deems necessary, and if the petition is given due course, the CA may require the elevation of a complete record of the case as provided for under
Section 3(d)(5) of Rule 6 of the RIRCA x x x.18

An examination of the records and pleadings filed before the Court of Appeals reveals that there was substantial compliance with procedural
requirements. Moreover, we have held time and again that cases should, as much as possible, be determined on the merits after the parties have
been given full opportunity to ventilate their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfection. 19 After all,
technical rules of procedure are not ends in themselves but are primarily devised to help in the proper and expedient dispensation of justice. In
appropriate cases, therefore, the rules may be construed liberally in order to meet and advance the cause of substantial justice. 20

While a remand of the case to the appellate court would seem to be in order, we deem it proper to resolve the case on the merits if only to write
finis to the present controversy.

We do not agree with petitioner's submission that the SAC erred in assuming jurisdiction over respondent's petition for determination of just
compensation despite the pendency of the administrative proceedings before the DARAB. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,21
the landowner filed an action for determination of just compensation without waiting for the completion of the DARAB's re-evaluation of the
land. The Court nonetheless held therein that the SAC acquired jurisdiction over the action for the following reason:

It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has 'original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners.' This 'original and exclusive' jurisdiction of the RTC would be undermined if the DAR would
vest in administrative officials original jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative
decision. Thus, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is
clear from Sec. 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the
adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Sec. 57 and therefore would be
void. Thus, direct resort to the SAC by private respondent is valid. 22

It would be well to emphasize that the taking of property under RA No. 6657 is an exercise of the power of eminent domain by the State. 23 The
valuation of property or determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings is essentially a judicial function which is vested with
the courts and not with administrative agencies.24 Consequently, the SAC properly took cognizance of respondent's petition for determination of
just compensation.

In the same vein, there is no merit to petitioner's contention that respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies when she directly filed the
petition for determination of just compensation with the SAC even before the DARAB case could be resolved. The issue is now moot considering
that the valuation made by petitioner had long been affirmed by the DARAB in its order dated April 12, 2000. As held in Land Bank of the
Philippines v. Wycoco,25 the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable when the issue is rendered moot and academic, as in
the instant case.

With regard to the third assigned error, however, we agree with petitioner that the SAC erred in setting aside petitioner's valuation of respondent's
land on the sole basis of the higher valuation given for neighboring properties. In this regard, the SAC held:

It appears from the evidence of petitioner that the neighboring lands of similar classification were paid higher than what was quoted to her land
by respondent Land Bank as the value per square meter to her land was only quoted at P2.1105517 while the others which were of the same
classification were paid by respondent Bank at P2.42 more or less, per square meter referring to the land of Consuelito Borja (Exh. D) and Cesar
Borja (Exh. F). Furthermore, the land of petitioner was allegedly mortgaged for a loan of P1,200,000.00 before the Rural Bank of San Miguel,
Bohol and that it was purchased by her from a certain Felipe Dungog for P450,000.00 although no documents therefor were shown to support her
claim. Nevertheless, the Court finds a patent disparity in the price quotations by respondent Land Bank for the land of petitioner and that of the
other landowners brought under CARP which could be caused by deficient or erroneous references due to the petitioner's indifference and
stubborn attitude in not cooperating with respondent bank in submitting the data needed for the evaluation of the property. x x x At any rate, the
price quotation by respondent Land Bank on the land of the petitioner is low more so that it was done some four years ago, particularly, on June
22, 1998 (Exh. 1) and the same has become irrelevant in the course of time due to the devaluation of the peso brought about by our staggering
economy.26

As can be gleaned from above ruling, the SAC based its valuation solely on the observation that there was a "patent disparity" between the price
given to respondent and the other landowners. We note that it did not apply the DAR valuation formula since according to the SAC, it is Section
17 of RA No. 6657 that "should be the principal basis of computation as it is the law governing the matter". 27 The SAC further held that said
Section 17 "cannot be superseded by any administrative order of a government agency", 28 thereby implying that the valuation formula under DAR
Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 1998 (DAR AO No. 5, s. of 1998),29 is invalid and of no effect.

While SAC is required to consider the acquisition cost of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the
sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declaration and the assessments made by the government assessors 30 to determine just compensation, it is
equally true that these factors have been translated into a basic formula by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 49 of RA
No. 6657.31 As the government agency principally tasked to implement the agrarian reform program, it is the DAR's duty to issue rules and
regulations to carry out the object of the law. DAR AO No. 5, s. of 1998 precisely "filled in the details" of Section 17, RA No. 6657 by providing
a basic formula by which the factors mentioned therein may be taken into account. The SAC was at no liberty to disregard the formula which was
devised to implement the said provision.

It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies to interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force
of law, and are entitled to great respect.32 Administrative issuances partake of the nature of a statute33 and have in their favor a presumption of
legality.34 As such, courts cannot ignore administrative issuances especially when, as in this case, its validity was not put in issue. Unless an
administrative order is declared invalid, courts have no option but to apply the same.

Thus, Section 17 of RA No. 6657 states:

SEC. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. - In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like
properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations, and the assessment made by government
assessors, shall be considered. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the
property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as
additional factors to determine its valuation.

As stated earlier, the above provision is implemented through DAR AO No. 5, s. of 1998, which provides that:

A. There shall be one basic formula for the valuation of lands covered by VOS or CA:

LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)

Where: LV = Land Value

CNI = Capitalized Net Income

CS = Comparable Sales

MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration

The above formula shall be used if all three factors are present, relevant, and applicable.

A1. When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the formula shall be:

LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)

A2. When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the formula shall be:

LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)

A3. When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the formula shall be:

LV = MV x 2

In no case shall the value of idle land using the formula MV x 2 exceed the lowest value of land within the same estate under consideration or
within the same barangay or municipality (in that order) approved by LBP within one (1) year from receipt of claimfolder.

Accordingly, petitioner applied the formula under A1 above since the comparable sales factor ("CS factor") was not present. As observed by the
SAC itself, respondent refused to cooperate with the local valuation office of petitioner and did not provide the necessary data to arrive at a
proper "CS factor". DAR AO No. 5, s. of 1998 defines "CS factor" as follows:

C. CS shall refer to any one or the average of all the applicable sub-factors, namely ST, AC and MVM:

Where: ST = Peso Value of Sales Transactions as defined under Item C.2

AC = Acquisition Cost as defined under Item C.3

MVM = Market Value Based on Mortgage as defined under Item C.4

xxxx

C.2. The criteria in the selection of the comparable sales transaction (ST) shall be as follows:

A. When the required number of STs is not available at the barangay level, additional STs may be secured from the municipality where the land
being offered/covered is situated to complete the required three comparable STs. In case there are more STs available than what is required at the
municipal level, the most recent transactions shall be considered. The same rule shall apply at the provincial level when no STs are available at
the municipal level. In all cases, the combination of STs sourced from the barangay, municipality and province shall not exceed three transactions.

b. The land subject of acquisition as well as those subject of comparable sales transactions should be similar in topography, land use, i.e., planted
to the same crop. Furthermore, in case of permanent crops, the subject properties should be more or less comparable in terms of their stages of
productivity and plant density.

c. The comparable sales transactions should have been executed within the period January 1, 1985 to June 15, 1988, and registered within the
period January 1, 1985, to September 13, 1988.

xxxx

C.3. Acquisition Cost (AC) - AC shall be deemed relevant when the property subject of acquisition was acquired through purchase or exchange
with another property within the period January 1, 1985 to June 15, 1988 and registered within the period January 1, 1985 to September 13, 1988,
and the condition of said property is still substantially similar from the date of purchase or exchange to the date of FI.

xxxx

C.4. Market Value Based on Mortgage (MVM) - For MVM to be relevant or applicable, the property subject of acquisition should have been
mortgaged as of June 15, 1988 and the condition of the property is still substantially similar up to the date of FI. MVM shall refer to the latest
available appraised value of the property.

In the case at bar, while respondent attempted to prove during the hearings before the SAC, comparable sales transactions, the acquisition cost of
the property as well as its mortgage value, she failed to submit adequate documentary evidence to support the same. Consequently, there was
nothing from which the "CS factor" could be determined.

In contrast, petitioner arrived at its valuation by using available factors culled from the Department of Agriculture and Philippine Coconut
Authority,35 and by computing the same in accordance with the formula provided, thus'

COMPUTATION (Applicable Formula) : LV = 0.90 CNI + 0.10 MV

Comparable Land Transactions (P x x x x ____ ) = P x-x-x

Capitalized Net Income: Cassava 16,666.67 x 0.90 = 15,000.00

Corn/Coco 26,571.70 = 23,914.53

Market Value Cassava 8,963.78 x 0.10 = 896.38

per Tax Declaration: Corn/Coco 10,053.93 = 1,005.39

Computed Value per Hectare: Cassava - 15,896.38; Corn/Coco - 24,919.92

xxx

Value per hectare used: Cassava 15,896.38 x 6.0000 has. = 95,378.28

Corn/Coco 24,919.92 x 8.1939 has. = 204,191.33

Payment due to LO : P299, 569.61

The above computation was explained by Antero M. Gablines, Chief of the Claims, Processing, Valuation and Payment Division of the Agrarian
Operations Center of the Land Bank, to wit:

ATTY. CABANGBANG: (On direct):

xxxx

Q. What are the items needed for the Land Bank to compute?cralawlibrary

A. In accordance with Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1998, the value of the land should be computed using the capitalized net income plus
the market value. We need the gross production of the land and its output and the net income of the property.

Q. You said "gross production". How would you fix the gross production of the property?cralawlibrary

A. In that Administrative Order No. 5, if the owner of the land is cooperative, he is required to submit the net income. Without submitting all his
sworn statements, we will get the data from the DA (Agriculture) or from the coconut authorities.

xxxx

Q. In this recommended amount which you approved, how did you arrive at this figure?cralawlibrary

A. We used the data from the Philippine (Coconut) Authority and the Agriculture and the data stated that Cassava production was only 10,000
kilos per hectare; corn, 2,000 kilos; and coconuts, 15.38 kilos per hectare. The data stated that in the first cropping of 1986, the price of cassava
was P1.00 per kilo; corn was sold at P7.75 per kilo; and the Philippine Coconut Authority stated that during that time, the selling price of
coconuts was P8.23 per kilo.

Q. After these Production data and selling price, there is here a "cost of operation", what is this?cralawlibrary

A. It is the expenses of the land owner or farmer. From day one of the cultivation until production. Without the land owner's submission of the
sworn statement of the income, production and the cost, x x x Administrative Order No. 5 states that x x x we will use 20% as the net income,
meaning 80% of the production in peso. This is the cost of valuation.

Q. 80 % for what crops?cralawlibrary

A. All crops except for coconuts where the cost of expenses is only 20%.

Q. Summing all these data, what is the value per hectare of the cassava?cralawlibrary

A. The cassava is P15,896.38.

Q. How about the corn x x x intercropped with coconuts?cralawlibrary

A. P24,919.92.36

Under the circumstances, we find the explanation and computation of petitioner to be sufficient and in accordance with applicable laws.
Petitioner's valuation must thus be upheld.

Finally, there is no basis for the SAC's award of 12% interest per annum in favor of respondent. Although in some expropriation cases, the Court
allowed the imposition of said interest, the same was in the nature of damages for delay in payment which in effect makes the obligation on the
part of the government one of forbearance.37 In this case, there is no delay that would justify the payment of interest since the just compensation
due to respondent has been promptly and validly deposited in her name in cash and LBP bonds. Neither is there factual or legal justification for
the award of attorney's fees and costs of litigation in favor of respondent.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Tagbilaran City, Branch 3 in Civil Case No. 6462
dated March 1, 2003 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is entered fixing the just compensation for respondent's land at
P2.1105517 per square meter or a total of P299,569.61.

SO ORDERED.

a
1

10

11

[12 we had the occasion to rule that:

13

14

15

16

17

18

19