Sir Lectures On Metaphysics and Logic Sir John Hamilton PDF

LECTURES
O N
M E T A P H Y S I C S AND LOGIC
BT
SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, BART.

PROFESSOR OP L O G IC AND M E T A P H Y S IC S IN THE U N IV E R S IT Y OF E D IN B U R G H ;
A D V O C A T E , A. M. ( O X O N .) , E T C . ; CORRESPONDINO MEMBER OF TH E IN STITU TE OF FRANCE ; HOHOEABT

MEMBEE o r TH E AMERICAN ACADEMT OF ARTS AND SC IEN C ES I AND OF THE
LATIN SOC IETY OF JE N A , BTC.
E D I T E D BY
THE REV. HENRY L. MANSEL, B. D OXFORD,

AND
JOHN VEITCH, M. A., EDINBURGH.
IN TWO VOLUMES.
VOL. I I .
L O G I C .
NEW Y OKK :
SHE LD O A D C O NL P A N" Y",
L O G I C
BY
SII! WILLIAM HAMILTON. BART.

PRO FESSO R OP L O G IC A N D M E T A P H Y S IC S IN THE U N IV E R S IT Y O P E D IN B U R G H
E D IT E D BY THE
REV. HENRY L. MANSEL, B.D..LL D.,

%VA T N F L E T E P R O F E S S O R O F M O R A L A ^ D M E T A P U Y S I C A L P H I L O S O P n Y , O . T FO K D
AND
JOHN VEITCH, M. A..

P R O F E S S O R O F LO O IC, R H E T O R I C , AN D M E T A P H Y S I C S , S T . A N D R E W S .
NE YORK :
SHELDQ^s^ AXE CO M P A X T ,
AU TH O RIZATIO N .
M JE M Z fl. G O C L D A JfD L n fC O L K , O P B O ST O N , U N IT E D STA TES, A U E E X 0 L U 8 IV E L T A U T H O R
IZ E D B T M E T O P U B L IS H IN A M E R IC A T H E L E C T U R E S , M E T A P H Y S IC A L A N D L O G IC A L ,
O P T H E L A T E S IB W IL L IA M H A M IL T O N , B A R T .
HUBSBX HAM IIiTOK.

IS C u i T K ik o S t b e e t ,
i>ursCBOH, 14 S b p t ., 1&2.
R E EA.C E.
T he Lectures comprised in the present V olum e fonn

the second and concluding portion o f the Biennial
^Course on M etaphysics and Logic, which was com
menced by Sir W illiam H am ilton on his election to
the Professorial Chair in 1836, and repeated, with but
slight alterations, till his decease in 1856. The A p
pendix contains various papers, composed for the most
part during this period, which, though portions of
their contents were publicly taught at least as early
as 1840, were only to a very sm all extent incorporated
into the text o f the Lectures.
The Lectures on Logic, like those on M etaphysics,

w ere chiefly composed during the session in which they
were first delivered ( 1 8 3 7 -8 ) ; and the statements made
in the Preface to the previous volum e, as regards the
circumstances and manner o f their com position, are
equally applicable to the present course. In this, as
in the preceding series, the A uthor has largely availed
n r R E FACE.
liiiiisclf of the labors of previous writers, many of

whom are but little known in this country. To the
works of the German logicians o f the present century,
particularly to those of K rug and Esser, these Lectures
are under sjiecial obligations.
In the com pilation of the Appendix', some responsi

bility rests with the Editors ; and a few words o f ex
planation may be necessary as regards the manner in
which they have attempted to perform this portion of
tlieir task. In iniblishing the papers of a deceased
writer, composed at various intervals during a long
]ieriod of years, and treating o f difficult and contro
verted questions, there are two opposite dangers to be
guarded against. On the one hand, there is the dan-
irer of com inom ising the A uthors reputation by the
publication of docum ents which his maturer judgm ent
m ight not have san ction ed ; and, on the other hand,
there is the danger of com m itting an opposite injury
to him and to the ])idjlic, by w ithholding writings of
interest and vahu'. Had Sir W illiam H am ilton, at any
[leriod o f his life, published a system atic treatise on
Eoiîc, or hiid liis projected N ew A n alytic o f Loyical
Forms been left in a state at all approaching to com-
jjleteness, the 1k litors m ight ])robably have obtained a
criterion by w hifli to distinguish between those specu
lations w hifli would have received the final imprimatur
of their Author, and those which w ould not. In the
PREFACE. Vir
absence o f any such criterion, they have thought it

better to run the risk o f givin g too m uch than too
little ; to publish whatever appeared to have any
philosophical or historical interest, w ithout being in
fluenced by its coincidence w ith then- own opinions, or
by its coherence w ith other parts o f the A uthors writ
ings. It is possible that, am ong the papers thus pub
lished, may be found some w hich are to be considered
rather as experim ental exercises than as approved re
sults ; but no papers have been intentionally omitted,
except such as were either too fragmentary to be intel
ligible, or m anifestly imperfect sketches of what has
been published here or elsewhere in a more matured
form.
The N otes, in this as in the previous volum e, are

divided into three classes. Those printed from the
m anuscript o f the Lectures appear w ithout any dis
tinctive m a r k ; those supplied from the A uthors Com
m onplace-Book and other papers are enclosed w ithin
square brackets w ithout signature ; and those added by
the Editors are marked by the signature E d . These
last, as in the Lectures on M etaphysics, are chiefly con
fined to occasional explanations o f the text and verifi
cations o f references.
In conclusion, the Editors desire to express their ac

know ledgm ents to those friends from whom they have
received assistance in tracing the numerous quotations
vm r KEFACE.
and allusions scattered tliroiigli this and the preceding

volume. In particular, their thanks are due to H ubert
H am ilton. Esq., whose researches am ong his fathers
books and papers have supi)lied them with many val
uable materials ; and to H . W . Chandler, Esq., F ellow
of Pem broke C ollege, Oxford, who has aided them from
tlie resources o f a philosophical learning cognate in
many respects to that o f Sir W illiam H am ilton h im self
C O N T E I S r T S .
LECTUIIE I.
I N T R O D U C T I O N .
- PAGB
LOGIC I. ITS D E F I N I T I O N , ......................................................................................................1
LECTURE II.
L O G IC I. ITS D E F I N I T I O N HI STOR ICAL NOTICES OF O P IN IO N S

R EGA RD IN G ITS OBJECT A N D D O M A IN II. ITS UTILITY, . 14
LECTURE III.
LOGIC II. ITS U T IL IT Y III. ITS D IV I S I O N S S U B JE C T I V E A N D

OB JE CT IV E G E N E R A L A N D S P E C I A L , ........................................................... 28
LECTURE I V.
LOGIC III. ITS D IV I S I O N S P U R E A N D M OD IF IE D , . . . 41
LECTURE V.
PURE L O G IC .
PA R T I. S T O IC II EIO L O G Y . SECTION I. N O E T I C . ON T H E F U N
DAMENTAL LAWS OF T H O U G H T T H E IR C ON T EN T S AND
H I S T O R Y , ..................................................................................................................................52
B
X CONTENTS.
L E CT U U K y I.
PAGE
THE E r N D A M I N TAI. LAWS OF T H O U G H T T H E IR C L ASSI FICA

TION A N D LMlO R T , ...................................................................................................... G9
L E C T U E E VII.
.SECTION II. OF T i n : PR ODU OTS OF T H O U G H T . I. E N N O E M A T IC

OF C ON C EP TS OR N OT IO N S A. OF CON CEP TS IN G E N
ERA I............................................................................. 83
LECTU IiE VIII.
I .N N d F .M A T K ' A. OF CON CEP TS IN GE N E R A I. ; IL IN SPECIAL.

- I. T i l l . I R U l U F C T I V E RELAT ION Q U A N T I T Y , . . . 03
LECTURE I X.
FNNOF.MATIC. 15. OF C ON C EP TS IN SP EC IA L. II. T H E IR S U B -

JL C TIV F R ELA TIO N Q U A L I T Y , ...................................................................... I l l
L E CT U R E X .
E NNO EM ATIC. IMPERFECTION OF C O N C E P T S , ..................................................121
L E CT U R E XI.
E N N O E M A T I C . - HI RECIPPOCAL R E L A T IO N S OF CONCEPTS. A.
Q U \N T IT Y OF E X T E N S I O N S U B O R D I N A T I O N A N D COO RDI-
N . \ T I O X , .................................................................................................................................. 132
COXrENTS. XI
L E C T U R E XII.
I'AGK
E N N O EM A T IC . HI. RECII'IiOCAL R E LA T IO NS OF CONCEPTS. 15.

Q U A N T I T Y OF C O M P R E H E N S IO N ....................................................................
L E CT U R K XIII.
II. A POP II A N TIC , OR T H E D OC TRINE OF .JUDGMENTS . J U D G -

JIE N T S T H E IR N A T U R E A N D D IV ISIO N S, . . . . L59
L E C T U R E XIV.
A PO P H A N T IC . .JUDGM EN TS T H E IR QU A L IT Y , O P POSI T IO N , A N D
C O N V E R S I O N , ........................................................................................................................ 17.3
L E C T U R E ^ X V.
HI. D OC TRINE OF R E A S O N IN G S . R E A S O N IN G IN GENER AL.

SYL LOGISMS TII EIR D IV I SI O N S ACCORDING TO INT E R N A L
FORM, . . . 189
L E C T U R E XYI.
DOCTRINE OF R E AS O N IN G S . SYLLOGISMS TIIEIR D IV IS IO NS

ACCORDING TO IN T E R N A L FORM. A. SI.MPLE CATEGORI
CAL. I. D E D U C T I V E IN E X T E N S I O N , . . . . 20G
L E C T U R E XVII.
DOCTRINE OF R E A S O N IN G S . SYl.LOG IS MS T H E IR D IV ISI ON S

ACCORDING TO IN T E R N A L FORM. - A. SI M PL E CATEGORI
CAL. II. D E D U C T IV E IN C O M PR E H E N S IO N . HI. INDU^CTIVE
IN E X T E N S I O N A N D C OM PR E HE NSIO N . 15. C ON D IT ION A L
D I S . T U N C T I V E . ........................................................................................................................221
XII c o x TEXTS.
LECTURE XVIII.
PAGE
DOCTItlXK OF IJKASOXIXGS. SYLLOG ISMS T II E IL D IV ISIO N S

ACLH)KDIXG TO I X T L IiX A L F o L M . 15. COXDITIO.XAL IIY -
FOTIIKTICAL A X D IIYIOTII K T IC O -D IS JU X C T IV I:, . . . 2.3'J
LECTURE XIX.
DOCTKIXi: OF UFA.SOXIXGS. - SYLLOG IS MS TIIEIU DIVISIONS

ACCOUDIXG TO EXTERNAL FORM. A. CO.MPLEX E P I -
ClIEIR EM A A X D SORITl S ...............................................................................................2.37
LECTURE XX.
DOCTRINE OF R E A S O N IN G S . SYL LOGISMS T H E IR D IV I S I O N S

ACCORDING TO EX IE R N A L FOR.M. - 15. D E FE C T IV E E N -
T IIY M E M E .-C . liE G U L A R AND IRREGULAR FIGURE AND
MOOD FIRST A N D SE C O N D F I G U R E S , ..................................................27.3
LECTURE XXI.
DOC TRINE OF REASONINCJS. SYLLOG IS MS THEIR D IV I S I O N S

ACCORIMNG TO EXTERNAL FOR.M. T H IR D AND FOURTH
FIGURES, . . . 294
LECTURE XXII.
D OCTRINE r>F R E A S O N IN G S . SYLLOG ISMS T H E I li D IV I SI O N S

ACCORDING TO EXTERNAL FOR.M. C. RE GU LA R AND IR
REGULAR - FHJUIH. - REDUCTIO.N, ............................................................30ti
LECTURE XXIII.
D O<T R IN E OF R E A S O N IN G S . SYLLOG IS MS T H E IR D IV I S I O N S
ACCORDING TO VA LIDITY. F A L L A C I E S , ..................................................321
CONTENTS. XIII
LECTURE XXIV.
PACK
PURE LOCIC.
PART II. METI IODOL OC Y. SEC TIO N I. MET HO D IN G E N E R A L .

SECTION II. M ET HOD I N SPECIAL, OR LOGICAL M IITHO DOL -
OGY. I. D OC TRINE OF D E F I N I T I O N , ............................................................3.0
LECTURE XXV.
METHODOLOGl.
LOGICAL M ET HO DOL OG Y. II. DOCTRINE OF D IV ISIO N , . . 350
LECTURE XXVI.
LOGICAL M ET HOD OLOGY . HI. DOCTRIN E OF PR O B A T IO N , . . 360
LECTURE XXVII.
MODIFIED LOGIC.
PA R T I. M OD IF IE D STOICIIEIOLOGY. SE CTION I. DOCTRINE. OF

T R U T H A N D E R R O R . - T R U T H ITS CHA R A C TE R A N D K I N D S , 376
LECTURE XXVIII.
MODIFIED STOICIIEIOLOGY.
SECTIO N I. DOCTRINE OF T R U T H A N D ERROR. SECTION II. ER

ROR ITS C A U SE S A N D REME DIES. A. GE N ER A L CIRCUM
ST A N C ES SOCIETY, . . . . . . . 387
LECTURE XXIX.
ERROR - ITS C A U SE S AND REMEDIES. A. GENERAL CIRCUM-

STAxNCES SOCIETY. B. AS IN PO W E R S OF COGNITION,
FEE LING, A N D DESIRE. - I. A FF EC TION S - PRECIPITANCY
SLOT H H O P E A N D FEAR S E L F -L O V E ........................................................ 397
XI V CONTEXTS.
LECTURE XXX.
PAGE
E R liO R -rrS ('.M 'sr.s and re . m e d i e s . b. as in the co g n i-
TIO.NS, EEEI.IN'GS. A X D DI'.SIRES. H. W E A K N E S S A X D D I S -

r R O l O R T lU X E D STRENG TH UE T H E FA CULTIES OF K N O W L
EDGE , ...................................................................................................................................Ill
L E CT U R E X X X I.
E R R O R ITS C A U SE S AND REME DIES. C. L A N G U A G E . D. OB

JE CTS OF K N O W L E D G E ................................................................................................... 432
LECTURE XX.^
MO D I F I E D ME T H O D O L O G Y .
SECTIO N I. OF T H E A C QU IS ITIO N A N D PERFE CTING OF K N O W L
EDGE. - I. EX PE R IE N C E. A. P E R S O N A L : O B S E R V A T I O N
IN D U C T IO N A N D A N A LO G Y , . . . . . . . lit
LECTURE
OF T H E A C Q U IS IT IO N AND PE RFE CTING OF K N O W L E D G E . I.

E X P E R I E N C E . n. F O R E I G N : ORAL T ES TIM O N Y - ITS CRED
IBILITY, 4.37
EE CT U R E
OF T H E A C QU IS IT ION AND PI.RFIJT IN G rF KN O W L E D G E . I.

I.XPF.RII.NCF,. B. FOREIGN: REC o RDI:D 'IES TIM ON Y AND
WRITI.NliS IN GE N ER A L . - II. SP E C U L A T IO N , . . . . \r,8
LECTURE XXXV.
OI T HE Ar QI I.^'ITION A N D ILRFECTING OF K N O W L E D G E . III.

c d M M I NK A FION OF KN OW L I.D GE . A. IN.STRUCTION
o |:a L and W R I T T E N . B. C ON FE R E NC E D IA L O G U E AND
DI.MU T AT IO N, .............................................................................................................. 478
' C0 N T E NTS. XV
A P P E X D I X.
PAGE
I . T H E CHARACTE R A N D C O M PR E H E N S IO N OF LOGIC A FR A G
MENT, ................................................................................................................................. KM
II. G E N U S OF LOGIC......................................................................................................... 19&
III. D IV ISIO N S, V A R IE T IE S, A N D C ON T EN T S OF LOGIC, . . .701
IV L A W S OF T H O U G H T , ..................................................................................................506
V . NEW' A N A LY T IC OF LOGICAL FO RM S GE N E R A L R E SU LT S
FR A GM E N TS.
I. EXTItACT I ' UO. M P R O S P E C T U S OF ESSAY TOWARDS A NEW
ANALYTIC OF LOGICAL FORMS, ................................................................509
II. LOGIC, ITS P O S T U L A T E S , ......................................................................................... 512
III. QUANTIFIC ATIO N OF PREDICATE, l.MMEDIATE INFER
E N C E , CONVERSION, OPPOSITION, . . . . 514

IV. APPLICATION OF DOCTRINE OF QUANTIFIED PREDIC ATE
TO P R O P O S IT IO N S , ................................................................................529
V. APPLICATION OF DOCTRINE OF QUANTIFIED PREDIC ATE
TO S Y L L O G I S M S , ................................................................................................................... 536
VI. OBJECTIONS TO T H E DOCTRINE OF A QUANTIFIED PRED-
rCATE C O N S I D E R E D , ......................................................................................................539
V II. HISTORIC AL NOTICES OF DOCTRINE OF QUANTIFIED
PREDIC ATE, . . . 546
V I . CANONS OF SYL LOG ISM; GE N E R A L HISTORICAL NOTICES

A N D CRITICISM.
A. U IS T O n iC A L N O T IC E S .
I. F U N D a : M E N T A L l a w s op s y l l o g i s m QUOTATIONS, 5.59
II. P U N D A M E N T A L L A W S O F S Y L L O G I S M R E F E R E N C E S , .575
H I. E N U N C I A T I O N S O F T H E H K i l l l C R L A W S O F S Y I . L O G I S A I , 57(i
IV . O B J E C T I O N S T O T H E D I C T U M D E O M N I E T N U L L O , .578
V. GENERAL L A W S OF SVLLOGIS.M IN VER SE, . . 57S
V I. S P E C I A L L A W S O F S Y L L O G I S M I N V E R S E , . . 579
B. C R IT IC IS M
I . C RIT ICIS M OF T H E SPE CIA L LAWS OF SYLLOGISM, . . 579

I I . LAWS OF SECOND E IG UR E, . . . . . . -582
H I. a u t h o r s su p re m e can o n s o f CATEGORICAL S YLLO-
G I S A I S , ................................................................................................................................. -5S3
IV . u l t r a - t o t a l q u a n t i f i c a t io n o f . MIDDLE T E R M , . -5S1
XVI CONTENTS.
VII. ~ IND UCTIO N A N D EXA.MILE.

, PAGE
I. QI OTATIGNS FKOM AUTIIOKS, . . . . . . 589

II. - M A T K U I A I . I N D U C T I O N ' , ...................................................................................................... 597
VIII. l I Y P O T l I E T i r A L A N D D IS J U N C T I V E R E A S O N IN G IMMEDI
. \T E INF ERE NCE.
I. A L ' T I I O I t s D O C T I U N K F U A G M E N T S , ........................................598
II. H I S T O R I C A L N O T I C E S ............................................................. 6Ii
IX. - S O R I T E S , ............................................................................................................... 019
X. - SYLLOGISM.
I. ITS ENOUNCEMENT ANALYTIC AND SYNTHETIC ORDER
OK P R E M I S E S .
(ll) E N O U N C E M E N T OF SYLLOGISM, . . . . 621

(fi) O R D E R OF PREMISES, '62J
II. FIGI'RK UNFIGUUED AND FIGURED SYLLOGISM.
(I S' i -J) { ) CONTRAST AND COMPARISON OF THE VARI
OUS KINDS OF FOR.MAL SA' LLOOI SM D I F F E R E N C E OF
FIGURE A C C I D E N T A L , ................................................................. 626
(6) DOUIiUE CONCLUSION IN SECOND AND THIRD FIG
URES, . . . 027
III. HISTOIUUAL NOTICES REGARDING FIGURE OF SYLLOGISM, 0.92
IV. SYLLOGISTIC . "MOODS.
I. D I R E C T AND INDIRECT MOODS, . . . . 658

I I . IN DIR ECT MOODS OF SECOND ANDT H I R D F IG U R E S , 663
I I I . N E W . MOOD S N O T E S U P O N T A I J L E O F S Y L L O G I S M S . 665
X I . LOGICAL NOTA TION .
I. l a m r e r t s l i n e a r n o t a t i o n . 667
II. N O TA T IO N I( V . M A A S S , .............................................................................. 669
III. a u t h o r s S CHK. ' ME o f n o ta tio n . .

NO I. L I N E A R , ........................................................................................... 670
NO II. UNFIGURF.I) AND FIGURED SYLLOGISM, . . 673

NO. III. FIGURED SYLLOGIS.M TAI I LE OF . MO O D S , . 078
LECTURES ON LOGIC.
L E C T U K E
I N T R O D U C T IO N .
L O G I C I. ITS DEFINITION.
' G e n t l e m e n : W e are n o w about to en ter on the consi<leration

o f one o f tlie m ost im portant branches o f M en-
L o g i c p r o p e r m o d e P h ilo so p h y, tlie science which is conver-
in w h ich its c o n s id e ra - T h o u gh t. B u t, before
tio n o u g h t to be con- . t i i
j(,ted. c o m m en cin g the discussion, 1 would premise a
word in regard to the m od e in w hich it ought
to be conducted, with a v ie w to your information and improvemi-nt.
T h e great end winch eve ry instructor o u g h t to
E n d o f in s tru c tio n . . , . . ,
propose in the comm unication ot a science, is, to
afford the stud en t clear and distinct notions o f its several parts, o f
their relations to each other, and to the w h o le o f which th ey arc
the constituents. F o r unless he accomplish this, it is o f compara
tiv ely little m o m en t th at his information be in itse lf either n ew or
ini])ortant; for o f w h at con sequence are all the qualities o f a d o c
trine, i f that docti-ine be not com m u nicated? and comm unicated
it is not, i f it be not understood.
R ut in the comm unication o f a doctrine, the m ethods to be fol
lo w ed by an instructor w ho writes, and by an
M ethods o f w ritte n instructor wlio spcaks, are not the same. T h e y
and o ral in s tru c tio n r. -i i-i*
are, in fact, to a certain extent, necess.arily dit-
f e r e n t : for, while the reader o f the one can al
w ay s be referred back oi forward, can a lw ays compare one part o f a
* T h e fir s t s e v e n L e e tn r e s o f th e M e ta p h y s ic a l C o u r s e { L fc tn r e s o M e ta p h y s ic s , p p .
1 - 9 0 ) w e re d e liv e r e d b y S ir W illia m H a m ilto n a s a G e n e ra l I n tro c lu c iio n to th e
C onr.sc o f Lofîc p r o p e r . E d .
1
2 LOGIC. L e c t . I.
hook w ith .mother, nnd c.nn .ilwavs mcclit.nte nt leisure on eaeli step
o f the evolution ; tlie Iie.aror o f the otlicr, on the contrary, m u st at
every inoineiit he pr(|)arod, hy wliat has preceded, to com prehend
:it oiiee whal is to ensue. Tlie oral instructor lias thus a nineli more
arduous prohlem to solve, in accom plishing the end which he pro-
jiosos. F o r if, on the one hand, he avoid obscurity by conimnnicat-
ing oidy what eaii easily be nmlerstood as isolated fragments, he is
intelliirihle onlv because be com m nnicatcs notliine: w orth learnini^:
and if, on the other, he be nnintolligible in projmrtion as his doc
trine is eoiieateiiated and systematic, he equally fails in bis a t t e m p t ;
for a-s in the one case, there is n o th in g to leach, so, in the other,
there is n o th in g taught. I t is, therefore, evident, th a t the oral in-
.strnctor must accom m odate his mode o f teacdiing to the circnm-
stances u n d er which he acts. l i e m ust ende avor to make his audi
ence fully un derstand each step o f his m ovem en t hcforc an o th e r is
nttomjitcd ; and he m ust prepare them for details by a previous sur
vey o f generals. In short, w h a t follows should always be seen to
evolve itself o ut o f w h a t jirecedes. I t Ls in consequence o f this
condition o f oral in.strnction, that, w here th e dev e lo p m e n t o f a s}'s-
teinatic doctrine is attciripted in a course o f Lec-
Uf of Text-book in tuix?.s, it is usiial for th e lecturer to facilitate the
a fvstcniutic course of , , , . , -i
ixviurcs labor to Jns jinpils and limiself, by exh ib iting in
n Manual o r T ext-boo k th e o r d e r o f bis doctrine
and a sum m ary o f its contents. A s I have n o t been able to jirepare
this useful snbsidiaiy, I shall e nde avor, a.s far as jiossiblc, to supply
its w a n t I shall, in the first jilace, e n d e a v o r always to jiresent yon
xvith a general s ta te m e n t o f ev e ry doctrine to
Authors meOKxi of exidaincd, before descendin g to th e details
r r e ltc lio n . * _ _
o f ex p la n a tio n ; and in o r d e r th a t yon m ay be
insured in d istincter and more com prehensive notions, I shall, where
it is ]iossible, ooinjirise the general sta te m en ts in P ropositions ot
Paragr.'ijihs, which I .shall slowly d ic tate to yon, in o rd e r th a t the y
may he fully taken down in writing. T h is b ein g done, I sliall pro
ceed to :malyze these pro])ositions or paragraphs, and to explain
th e ir clauses in detail. 1'Iiis, I m a y observe, is tlie method followed
in those coimfrles w h e re iii.stiuetion b y prelection is turned to the
best a c c o u n t ; it is the one p re v a le n t on the C ontinent, m ore es
pecially in th e iiniTei'sitios of G erm any and H olland.
In pursuance o f this plan, I at o n c e c o m m en c e b y g iv i n g yon,
as the fii-st ]roposition or paragraph, th e follow ing. I may notice,
how ever, hy jiareiitliesis. that, as we ma}' have so m etim es occasion
to refer arlieiilately to tliese propositions, it would he proper for
yon to distinguish them hy' sign and number.
L e c t . I. LOGIC. 3
Tlic first parngrapli, then, is tli is :
^ I . A Sy.stein o f Logical In stnic tion consists o f T w o P a rts,

. 1, O f an Introduction to the sc ien c e;
P a r .i. O fw h a ta a y a . D o ctriu c Constituting the
te r n o f L o g i c c o n s is lB .
Science itself.
T hese, o f course, are to be considered in th e ir order.
*lf I I, T h e In tro d u c tio n to Logic should afford answers to the

following questions: i. W h a t is L o g i c ? i.
P a r . I I. T h e I n tr o - jj;
d u o tio n to L o g ic . ^ _
, ions? iv. W h a t is its H is to r y ? and, v.
W h a t is its Bibliography, th a t is, w h at are th e best books uj)on
th e subject?
I n reg a rd to the first o f those questions, it is e vident th a t its

answ er is given in a definition o f Logic. I therefore dictate to
you th e th ird paragraph.
^ I I I . W h a t is L ogic? A77siccr Logic

P a r . m. I . D e f ln i- Scicncc o f tlic L aw s o f T liou ght as
tio n o f L o g ic . ^
T h o u g h t.
T his definition, how ever, c a nno t be u n d ersto o d w ith o u t an ar

ticulate e.xpositiou o f its several ])arts. I there-
Exphcatiou. proceed to this analysis and e.xjilanation,
and shall consider it u n d e r the three following heads. In the first,
I shall consider the meaning, and history, and synonym s o f the
w ord Logic. I n the second, I shall consider th e G enus of Logic,
th a t is, e.xplain w hy it is defined as a Science. In the third, I shall
consider the O bject-inatter o f Logic, th a t is, explain to yon w hat
is m e an t by saying, th a t it is conversant about the Laws o f T h o u g h t
as T hough t.
First, then, in reg a rd to the significance o f th e word. Logic., you
are aware, is a Greek word, XoyiK^-, and XoyiKyj.
1. The word Logic ynaaaaTiKr], imTopiKL TTOinriKr), SiaXeKTLKy, I Iiecd
(a) Its History.
h ardly tell you, is an adjective, one or other oi
the substantives iTno-Ty/xr], .<tcieioy>, or TrfaygaTeia, stiolg., or
rath e r mnttcr o f stodg., being iimlcrstood. T h e term XoytKy, in this
special signification, and as distinctly m arking out a ]iarticnlar sci
ence, is n ot so old as the constitution o f th a t science itself. Ai'is-
totle did n ot designate by the term Xoymy, the science whose doc-
4 LOGIC. L ect. I
trino lie fii'st fully dovcloped. l i e uses, inrleotl, th e adjective Xoyi/cos

^ ^ in various com binations with o ther snhstantivos.
T im s I lind in his 7V/y.s?c.s', AoyiK-^ aTropta,' in
his Ji/it(oric, XoyiKal SvaêpclaL' in his J/ct(fj>/ii/sicHy XoyLKa<; diroBei^-
ci?.* in his l\^stiri(>r ^[>i(th/tics, hla XoyiKa* in his 7\)j>ics, Xoyi-
Kor -po/SXripa/ He, likewise, n ot mirie<iiiently makes use o f the
a<lvei-l) AoyiKcL?.' B y whom the te rm XoyiK-i} was first applied, as the
word e.xjirossive o f the science, docs n o t appear. Boethius, w ho
tlonrished at the close of the fifth and com inenceinent of the sixth
century, says, in his Comtnaitarij on the 7'ojncs o f Cicero^ the
nam e o f L o g ic was first given by the ancient
A n c ie n t 1 c r ip a t itic s . pori]latftics. Ill the w oiks o f A le x a n d e r o f Apli-
Alexander of Apii- podisitis, tlio old cst coiniiientator w e iiosscss oil
rodisiaj. _ ' _ *
the works of A ristotle (he flourished tow ards
th e cnil of the sccoinl century ), the term Aoyocr/, both absolutely
and in combination with Trpay/xareia, etc., is fieqnently employed ;
ami the word is familiar in the w ritings of all th e snbsetpicnt A ris
totelians. Previously, however, to Alextinder, it is ev id en t that
Aoyixn had become a common desigmition o f tlie
ficero. ' . . , . ,
sc ie n c e ; lor it is once and again thus ajiplied
by Cicero. So much for the history of llie word Xo/ 7 c, in so far
as regards its introduction and earlier em ploym ent. W e have now
to consider its derivation and moaning.
I t is derived fi'oiii Adyo?. and it had prim arily
b) 1 is derivation a n d samc la titu d e and variety o f signification as
Twor.dd meaning of Original. W h a t then did Adyos signify? In
G reek this word had a twofold meaning. It
d en oted both th o u g h t and its exjiression ; it was
equivalent both to the ratio and to th e oratio of the Latins. T h e
I fl. ili. e 3. E x f i S a w o p la v \o ytK -(]v . <> E . g . . A n a l. P o st., i. 21, 3 2 ; Phijs. \ i i i . 8;

* D u b ila l ioni in f|ii:i. nun o rfr iitii fin g iila r iu in M fta p h ., v i. 4, 17; x i . 1. L d .
||ib \-ic a n in i) c o n t i'tr i[ilu tio n i-, seil < r a tio c in a - ^ '
tioiM - -o 'a o rta c-t W a it/, a>J A r is t . O r^ '., C G e s p e c i a l l y , liis c o m m e n ta ry on tlic
v.il ii |I z r ,i. J^ a trn l an d > lia h n im l reason- A n a ly t ic s , I'. 2 { S c h o l i a , ed, U raiidis, p.
n ,g in A risto tle m e an tlie s a m e tilin g , viz., G l). w h ere lie d i v i d e s rj X o y iK i] t ( k u \ (T v \ -
r > 's - o n in g lo n n d ed o n ly on general p rin cip les K o y itn iK r ] v p a y p a T fia in to four braiiciieg,
f f p io b a b i ity, not on n ecessiiry Iriitlis o r o n a i r o S d K T i K 'f i , S i a K ( K T i K i ) , T T fip a tT T iK -l}. an d
JH r i a l e x | s . r i e i , r e . I ' . t ) . f f o - p K J T i K 'f ) . H ere L o t;ic used in a w id er
- T b i - e x p r e s s i o n .s-eiirs n o t in tlie R h e t o r ic , "d jectiv e an d a d v erb b e a r in
t .11 i n th e ^ V t n p h v ^ ,r ^ . Ii. iii. ( i v ) r . 3 . . -in d li. A risto tle , w h ile llie co g n ate te rm d ia le c t ic r e
X x i. r I In th e w e (in d th e tain s its o r i g i n a l sig n ificatio n . E l>.
e \p t.-.io :i K 'r y t K O i ( jv \ X n ~ fia p t o i Ii i c. 1. t) S e e T )' F i n ib n s . i. 7 ; T u sc. Q n r r s t .,i v . 1 4 .

_ I ,, CIC T 'ro p ro b ab ly b o rro w e d th is use o f th e
term fro m th e S t o ic s , t o w h o s e f o u n d e r ,Z e n o ,
ll xiii. (xlv ) C. 1 ('f. De Grner Anim.,
E a e r tin s (v ii .30) a sc rib e s tlio o r ig in o f th e
ii 3 Kl)
d iv is io n o f I liilo s o p h y in to L o g ic , P h y s ic s ,
< I ; i. c 2 1 E l ) .
a n d E th ic s, s o m e tim e s e r r o n e o u s ly a ttr ib u te d
5 h . V. c. 1. E d to P la to . E d .
L e c t . I. LOGIC. b
G r e e k s , in o r d e r t o o L v i n t e t li e n i n b i g n i t y tlins arisin g from the

confusion o f t w o different th in g s u n d e r o n e exj)ression, w ere c o m
p elled to a d d a differentia] e p i t h e t to th e c o m m o n term. .Vr ist o-
t l e , t o c o n t r a d i s t i n g u i s l i Xoyo?, m e a n i n g
How e.xpressed by Xoyo?, m e a n i n g i<peech, c a l l s t h e f o r m e r -h v
A r is to tle . ^ v , , . , . , ,
ccro), T o v v r rj xj/v)(r]^ t h o t t h d t a t th e
m i n d ; a n d t h e l a t t e r , Tor tJiut icithoiit} T h e s t i m e d i . s t i nc -
tion ca m e sub sctju ently to be e.xpressed by th e
By others. Xoyo? ei ' SidStros, f o r thought^ t h e vcrhum m e n tis ;
a n d b y Xoyos TrpoôpiKo?, f o r language^ t h e verh w n oris.^ It was nec
e s s a r y t o g i v e y o u t h i s a c c o u n t o f t h e a m b i g u i t y o f t h e w o r d Xoyos,
because the same passed i n t o i t s d e r i v a t i v e XoyiKi^; : i n d i t a l s o w; i s
necessary that you should be m a d e a w a r e o f t h e a m b i g u i t y in th e
n a m e o f th e science, b e c a u s e this again e x e r te d an inffnence on t h e
v iew s a d o p t e d in r e g a r d to t h e o b j e c t - m a t t e r o f t h e science.
But what, it m a y be asked, was th e appellation o f th e science
b e f o r e i t h a d o b t a i n e d t h e n a m e o f L o g i c ? for.
A p p e lla t io n s o f th e j ] , ^ y g g .,p ] ^ d o c tr in e h a d b een discrimi-
s c ie n c e a fte r w a r d s , , . , , . , n
c a lle d L o -(c iiatcd, a n d ev en carried t o a v e r y h ig h perfection,
b e f o r e i t r e c e i v e d t h e d e s i g n a t i o n b y w h i c h i t is
now generally know n. T h e m o s t a n c ie n t n a m e for w h a t w as s u b
sequently denominated I.ogic^ w a s D ia le c tic . But this m u s t be
u n d e rsto o d w ith certain limitations. B y P l a t o , t h e t e r m dialectic is
fretiiiently e m p l o y e d to m a r k o u t a jiarticiilar section o f philosophy.
B u t t h i s s e c t i o n is, w i t h P l a t o , n o t c o e x t e n s i v e w i t h t h e d o m a i n o f
L o g i c ; it includes, in d eed , Logie, b u t it d o es n o t ex c lu d e M etaphysic,
f o r i t is c o n v e r s a n t n o t o n l y a b o u t t h e f o r m , b u t a b o u t t h e m a t t e r
of our knowledge. (The m eaning of these expressions you are
soon to learn.)
This word, SiaXcKTiK?) (ri)(yr}, o r iina-TgfJLr], o r TrpaypaTcta, b e i n g
understood) is d e r i v e d , you arc aware, from
AioAeicTiKTj itsety ^laXeyecrSai, to h o ld co n versa tio n or discourse
iiiology. , .
to g e t h e r ; dicdectic, t h e r e f o r e , l i t e r a l l y s i g n i h c s ,
o f a conversation., colloquy., controversy, di.ynite. B u t I l a t o , w h o
defined thought an in te rn a l d i s c o u r s e o f t h e s o u l w i t h itself, a n d
who explained r6 SiaXeyco-ât b y t h e a m b i g u o u s e x p r e s s i o n t w Xoyoi
1 A n a t P o .c ., i. 10 . E d . o rig in a te d w i l l i tlie S to ic s. S e e W y tle n -

2 E . g ., P l i i l o , De Vita Mosis, p . C 72, e d it , b a c h s n o te o n P h i l a r c h s Momlia, p 44 A
P a r i s , 16 4 0 ; 1 l i i t a r c h , P/ii7o.^. f.isc cm ;/r(nciy/(- ( l o m . v i . p a r s 1, p . 3 7 8 , e d it O x o ii, 1 8 1 0 ) .
bus. c . 2 ( v o l. ii . p . 7 7 7 , C ., e d . F r a n c o f , 16 2 0 ) ; Ed.
S e x t u s E m p i r i c u s , Pyrrh. Hyp., i. 6 5 ; i S i m p l i - [Lthrburh der L o s 'it , E in le i-
tl F i s h a b e r , p . 1 0 .
In CaUg. Ari.cl.. p . 7 ; D a n ia s c e iiu . , Fid.
c iu s . tu n g . See TheeeUtus p . 18 9 . Sophista, p . 26 3
tkthod., i i . 2 1 . T h e e x p r e s s i o n s p r o b a b l y E d .]
Ct LOGIC. Lect. 1
XpijaSai} ( l i d n o t c e r t a i n l y d o v i o l e n c e e i t h e r t o t h e G r e e k l a n
guage or to his own opinions, in giving the
I 's e o f the t f r m />io- t i j. ^ \ r
,
U c ttc
. .
by ri at o.
nam e o f dialectic
^
to tlie itroeess, n o t m e r e l y ot
logical inference, bu t o f m elaphysieal specula
tion. In our own times, the P la to n ic signification o f the Avord
has been revived, and IIeu:el has applied it, in
r>v H e g e l . . , . 1 ,
even a m ore restricted m ean in g , to m etap h y sica l
s p e c u la tio n alon e.- Put if P lato e m jd o y e d the term D ia lectic
to d e n o te m o re th an L o g ic , A risto tle e m p lo y ed
A riM otle-.. e m p lo y - d c ilO tC IcSS. W i t l l ^ h i m , D ia k c 'ic is U o t
n ien t o f D ia U c lic . , . . .
a term f o r t h e ]>uro s c i e n c e , o r t h e s c i e n c e in
<; e n e r a l , but for a ]>arlicular a n d an applied ])art. It means
merely the Logic of Ih-obable flatter, and is thus convertible
with Asdiat h e otherwise denominates T opics (joTnKrj)} This, I
may observe, has been very generally inisunderstood, and it is
c o m m o n l y s u p p o s e d t h a t A risto tle uses t h e t e r m D ialectic in t w o
m e a n i n g s , in o n e m e a n i n g f o r t h e s c i e n c e o f L o g i c i n g e n e r a l ,
in a n o t h e r for the Logic o f Probabilities. T his is, h o w e v e r , a
mistake. There i.s, i n f a c t , o n l y a s i n g l e ] a s s a g e i n h i s Avr i t i ngs ,
on th e g r o u n d o f which it can possibly b e m a i n t a i n e d t h a t h e over
Lnijihns D ialectic i n t h e m o r e e . v t e n s i v o m e a n i n g . T h i s is i n h i s
R h etoric i. 1b u t t h e j i a s s a g c is n o t s t r i n g e n t , a n d D ia lectic m a y
there be plausibly interpreted in the more lim ited s i gn i f i c t a t i o n .
B u t a t a n y r a t e i t is o f n o a u t h o r i t y , f o r i t is a n e v i d e n t i n t e r p o l a
t i o n , a m e r e g l o s s Avhicli h a s cr e] >t i n f r o m t h e m a r g i n into the
text.^ T h u s it a])pears t h a t A risto tle possessed no single t e r m by
Avhich t o d e s i g n a t e t i i e g e n e r a l s c i e n c e o f A vhic h h e Avas t h e ] ) r i n-
cipal a u t h o r a n d finisher. A n a ly tic , a n d A p o -
O f A n a i y t i r , A p o d ,n .- ^vitli T opic ( c i p i i v a l e i i t t o D ialectic,
K c, T o p ic . . .
and including Sophistic)., Avero s o m a n y s] ) c c i a l
nam es by which he d eno ted p a r t i c u l a r jcirts, o r ]) a r t i c u l a r applic.t
tions o f Logic. I say n o t h i n g o f th e vacillatin g a n d vario u s em -
ploynient of the term s L o y ic a n d D ia lectic b y t h e S t o i c s , E p i c u
rean.^ a n d (jther a n c i e n t schools o f p h i l o s o p h y ; a n d now proceed
to explain to you the second head of the d e f i n i t i o n , vi z. , t h e
(ieni i. s, c l a s s , o f J-. ogic, w h i c h I g a v e a s S c i e n c e .
I t Avas a j x n i i t l o n g k e e n l y m o o t e d b y th e o ld l o g i c i a n s , A vhethei
I I A ld h . p I2TI. 'S.Cl. T i 5 S t a K f - y f f f ^ a t '* U f p \ Si (TvKKoyifffxov Sfxoloot S.iravTOi

KOI r v \ 6 y c raoroo nov xaK di; Tys Sta\fKTtKrif t ffr iv IS u v o iiT f/r o \ ij $
AA U ie jy c . i f ( . a.-K.-ii<li. Ircxjcni. /xipovt r io 6 s El>
( 'P > r n . t i. i> -T2 [, U a l f o r c u s . [ A. J><xlfnril C m n m c n U ir iits in
? S p r .n r .L 'o p n d i ', t 1 . r.I> ^ O r:>,m u ,n L o g ic u m ArlM oCcUs, I l ii n l if r a h f , 1G18
A T n p irr,. I. 1 A 'a X f t c r iH h i 5< a v W o y tC T - < 3 j, y> M u r e s , in hi.s v e r s io n .
uhf 6 d ir v W o y t(6 fx te o s . - Ki>. o m i t s t h i s p a s s a g e a s a n i n t e r p o l a t i o n . E d .]
L e c t . I. LOGIC. (
Logic were a science, or an art, or neitlier, or both ; and if a science,

w h eth e r a science practical, or a science .sjiecii-

2. I ooic itsUci.us j ji t i v e , o r at on ce sp ec u la tiv e and practical.
wlictlicr Science or i i t'i . . i . i
P h .toj'.iid the I'latonists viewed it as a science,
blit with them Dialectic, as I have noticed,
was coe.xtensive with the Logic and Metaiihysics of the Peripatetics
taken together. B y A ristotle himself Logic is not defined. Tlic
G reek Aristotelians, and many jdiilosopliers since the revival of
letters, deny it to he either science or art.'- T h e Stuic.s, in general,
viewed it as a science and the same was done by the A rabian and
Latin sclioolmen.^ I n more modern times, however, many A ris
totelians, all the Kamists, and a majority ot the Cartesians, m ain
tained it to be an art;'^ but a considerable jairty were found wlio
defined it as botli art and science.'' In Germ.aiiy, since the tim e of
Leibnitz, Logic lias been almost universally regarded as a science.
T h e controversy which has been waged on this
1 he q u e s t io n fu tile . j,. perhaps oiic o f the most futile in the
history o f speculation. In so far as Logic is concerned, the decis
ion of the question is- not of the very smallest import. I t was not
in consequence o f any diversity o f opinion in regard to the scope
an d n atu re o f this doctrine, th a t jihilosojdiers disputed by w hat
nam e it should be called. T h e controversy was, in fiict, only about
w h a t was jirojierly an art, and w h at was projierly a science ; ;nul as
men attac h ed one m eanin g or an o th er to these terms, so did th e y
.affirm Logic to be an art, or a science, or both, or neither. I slionld
not, in fact, have th o u g h t it necessary to sry anyth in g on this head,
were it n ot to g u a rd you against some mistakes of the resjtectable
author, whose w ork on Logic I have recom m ended to your a t te n
tio n , I mean D r. W h a te ly . In th e opening sentence of his
Elements., it is said : Logic, in the most exten-
whatei) q u o te d . sense wliicli the nam e can with ]>ropriety
be m ade to bear, may be considered as th e Science, and also the
A r t o f Reasoning. I t investigates the princijdes on wliicli arg u m e n
tation is conducted, and fnrnislics rules to secure tlio mind from
1 [C a m e ra r iu s, D isputati'nnes Pliitnsnphiccp. p. i. 1 s u b s . 4. H seq , p. 8 , e d . 1711 E d j

30] [I ar.s i q u . 3. e d . l'a r i> iis, 1C30. S e c C c r a id J o h n V o s s iu s , D e iWii. A riiiw i, .n iv 7.-
a lso Q u. 4, p. 44 E d .] Lo g ica , c. v i ]
2 [.See T lie n iis lin s , In A n al. P ost., 1 i. c. 24, 3 [gpg L a e r tiu s , In V ila Zenonis, I. v ii ] [ G2.
[O pera, p. G, V e n ic e , 1551. E d .] A m m o n iu s _ E d .)
lle r m i , In C tth g .. E n c l. [p. 3 , e d . A id l;j03. ^ [g co tu .s. Praeiicam enta, Q u. i. A lb c r tlis
- E d . ] S im p lic iu s . In C a t,g .. Erncf. [ 25, p. p , Prcfdirabilibus, C. 1 ]
5. e d . B a sile ic . 1551. E d ] Z a b a ie lla . Ue . , 1.
â lu ra Lngirce. [1. i C 5. cl .cr/. - E d .] S m i- " [E n m u s . Tn.snt. D ialect , 1. 1 . C. 1. Bur-
g le c iu s , Lngica, I) sp. ,ii. q u . 4 . [p C9, e d . O x - p e r s d ic in s . In stit. L o g .. 1. i. c. 1, [ 4. - E d .]
o n ii, 1G58 E d .] L ogica C oniiiibncensis, [T r a c t 6 S e e S m ig ie c iu s , as a b o v e . E d .
C* I. o G 1 C . L hct. I
e rror in its dednctions. I ts most nppi'opriate office, how ever, is

iliat of insliliitiiig an analysis of the process of the mind in reason
i n g : ami ill this point of view it is, as has heen stated, strictly a
science; while mentioned in reference to the practical rules ahove
mentioned, it may he called the a rt o f reasoning. This distinction,
as will hereafter ajipear, has heen overlooked, or n ot clearly pointed
out. hy most writers on the siihject; Logic having heen in general
regarded as merely an art, and its claim to hold a place am o ng the
scicmces having heen expressly denied.
All this is, from first to last, erroneons. In th e first place, it is
erroneous in u h at it says of the opinion prev-
C r ilic iz f il. 1 M 1 1 ,
alent am ong pliilosopher.s, in regard to th e genns
of Logic. Logic was not, as is asserted, in general regarded as an
art, and its claim to hold a place a m o n g the sciences cxjiressly
ilenied. T h e co n tra ry would have heen co rrec t; for the immense
majority o f logicians, aneieiit and modern, have regard ed Logic as
a science, and expressly denied it to he an art. In the second place,
supposing D r. W h a te ly s accc]itation of the term s art and science
to he correct, th e re is n o t a jirevions logician who would have
d rea m t of d en ying that, on snch an acceptation, Logic was hoth a
science and an art. But, in the third place, the discrimination
itself o f art and science is wrong. D r. W h a tc ly considers science
to he any k n ow ledge viewed ahsolntely, an d not in relation to prac
tic e , a signification in which every a r t would, in its doctrinal
part, he a science; and he defines a rt to he the application of
know ledge to firactice, in which sense Ethics, Polities, Keligion,
and all jiractical sciences, would ho arts. T h e distinction o f arts
and sciences is thus wrong.' But, in the fourth place, w ere the
distinction correct, it would he of no value, for it would distinguish
nothing, .since art and science would m a rk out no real difference
lietween the various hranclics o f know ledge, h u t only different
points of view u n d e r which the same hranch m ig ht he contemjdatod
1)V n s , each hoing in different relations at once a science and an
art. In fact, l)r. W h a tc ly confuses the ilistiiiction of scieiico th e o
retical and science practical with the distinction o f science and art.
1 am well aware t h a t it would he no easy m a tte r to give a general
definition of .science, as contradistinguished from art, and of art, as
ontradistingnislied from science; h ut if the words themselves can
not vafnlly he discriminated, it would he ahsiird to a tte m p t to dis
crim inate aiiylhing hy them. W h e n I, therefore, define Logic hy
t!if gcniis science, I do not attcmjM to give it more than the general
denom ination of a hranch of k n o w led g e ; for I reserve the discrimi-
I C o m p a r e L tctures on M tta p h y u c s , p. 81 a sn /. E d .
L f c t . I. LOGIC. y
nation of its pecnliar ch aracter to the differential quality afforded

by its object-niatter. Y on will find, when we have discussed the
third head of the definition, th a t Logie is not only a science, b u t a
(iLMUonstrative or apodictic science ; but so to have defined it, would
have bet'll ta u to lo g ic a l; for a science conversant about laws is con
versant about necessary m atter, and a science conversant about
necessary m a tte r is dem onstrative.
I proceed, tlierefbre, to th e third and last head o f th e defini
ti o n , to e.xplain to yon w hat is m eant by the
.3. Logic,Its object- o b ject-m atler o f Logic, viz., the L aw s <>f
matter ^ .
T h o u g h t as T h o u g h t. T h e consideration of
this head naturally divides itself into tliree questions: 1, W h a t is
T h o u g h t? 2, W lia t is T h o u g h t as T h o u g h t? 8, W h a t are the L aw s
o f T h o u Og h t as T h o uOg h t?
111 the first place, then, in saying th a t L ogic is conversant about
T h o u g b t, we mean to say th a t it is conversant
( a ) T b o n g b t , w b a t. , ^ , , , . t m,
a bo ut tlioiiglit strictly so called. i h e term
thougJit is used in tw o significations o f difterent e.xtent. I n the
Avider meaning, it denotes every cognitive act
In Its wider and liar- w h a te v e r ; by soMie philosophers, as Descartes
ro w e r m e a n in g . i , t i i c . i
and his disciples, it is even used for every mental
ino'lification of Avhich Ave are conscious, and thus includes the Feel-
ing.s, the Volitions, and the Desires.^ In the more lim ited meaning,
it denotes only the acts of the U n d e r s ta n d in g properly so called,
th a t is, o f the F a c u lty of Comparison, or th a t which is distingnishc<l
as th e E laborativ c or Discursive Faculty.^ I t is in this m ore re
stricted signification th a t th o u g h t is said to be
Objects tbat he be- objoct-m attcr of Log'ic. T h u s Logic does
jond tbe sphere of consider tlie hiAVs Avhicli regulate the othci
Logic. _ ^
powers o f mind. I t takes no im m ediate account
o f the fiiculties by which Ave acquire the rud e materials o f knoAvl-
c d g e ; it supposes these materials in possession, and considers only
the m a nner of their elaboration. I t takes no account, a t least in
the d e p a rtm e n t of P u r e Logic, of M em ory and Im agination, or of
the blind laws of Association, b u t confines its attention to connec
tions regnlateil by th e laws of intelligcnee. Finally, it does not
consider the laAvs them selves of Intelligence as given in the Pogii-
lative F aculty, I n te llig e n c e , Common Sense ; for in th a t faculty
these hiAvs are data, facts, ultim ate and, consequently, inconceivable ;
D e sc a r te s, Prinnpi'n, p i 9 " ( 'o g ita - in te llig e r e . v e lle , im a g in a r i, pe<l e fia m .senfire.

lio iiis iiu m iiie iiite llig o ilia o m n ia qu.T luibi.s id e m esl b ic q u o d c o g it a r e . E d .
c o iis c iis in iio b is fiu n t, q u a tc im s e o n im in 2 S e e Lectures on M etaphysics, le c t. x x .x iv .
n o b is c o n s c ie n t ia e st. A tq u e ita n o n m o d o p. 463. E d .
2
10 LOGIC. L ect. 1
b u t w hatever tran.scends th e sphere of tlie conceivable, transcends

th e sihere of l.ogic.
Such are the funetions about which Logic is n ot conversant, and
Mich, In the limited slgnitication of the word, are the acts which arc
i.ot <lenoininated 'I'honght. W e have h ith e rto found w hat th o u g h t
is n o t ; we must now endeavor to d eterm ine generally what it is.
T h e eonteinplation o f the world jn-esenls to our subsidiary facul
ties a m ultitude o f objects. T hese objects are
Thought proiicr , , . , , ' . , , , . ,
the l ude materials subm itted to elaboration by :i
higher and sclf-.active faculty, which operates upon them in o bedi
ence to certain laws, ami in conformity to certain ends. T h e ojiera-
tion o f this faculty is T h o u g h t. All th o u g h t is a conqiaiison, a
recogniti^n of sim ilarity or diftercncc ; a conjunction or disjunc
t i o n ; in o the r words, a synthesis or analysis o f its objects. In
Conception, th a t i.s, in the formation o f concepts (or general notions),
it compares, disjoin.s, or conjoins a t tr ib u te s ; in an act o f J u d g m e n t,
it compares, disjoins, or conjeins concejits; in Reasoning, it coni-
p.ares, di.^join.s, or conjoins ju d g m e n ts. In each step o f this jirocess
there is one essential e le m e n t; to think, to comjiare, to conjoin, or
di.qoin, it is necessary to recognize one thing through or u nd er
a n o th e r ; and therefore, in defining T h o u g h t proper, we may either
define it as an act o f Comparison, or as a recognitiun o f one notion
as in or u n d er another. I t is in perform ing this act o f thin k in g a
th in g u n d er a gener.il notion, th a t we arc said to u n d ersta n d or
com prehend it. F o r exam jile: an object is presented, say a book ;
this object <lctcrmines an impression, and I am even conscious o f the
impression, b ut w ith o u t recognizing to my.self w hat the th in g is;
in th a t case, there is only a jjercejilion, and n ot jiroperly a thoug ht.
R u t suppose ] do recognize it for w h at it is, in o the r words, coin-
jiare it with, and reduce it under, a certain concejit, class, or coin-
pleinent o f attributes, which I call hook; in th a t case, there is more
than a perception, there is a though t.
All this will, however, he fully explained to you in the sequel; at
]resent I only :ittenipt to give you a rude notion of w hat th inking
is, to the end th a t yon may be able vaguely to coinprchcnd the lim-
itJition o f Logic to a certain de]>artinent o f our cogiwtive functions,
and wh.-it is me.int by saying th a t Logic is a science o f thought.
L n t T h o u g h t simply is still too n n d c t c r m in c d ; the proper object
of Logic is som ething still more definite; it is
(l) Thought aMhoiit'ht ,, , , - i i
not tliouglit Ml general, blit th o u g h t considered
merely as thoug ht, o f which this science takes
ogiiizancc. T his expre.s.sion requires explanation ; we come th e re
L kct . I. LOGIC. 11
fore to tlic second question, W luit is niennt by T h o u g lit as

Tlionglit ?
T o answ er tins question, let ns roineinbcr wliat has ju s t been said
o f the act constitutive o f thoug ht, viz., th a t it is the reeognitiini
o f a th in g as coining u nder a con c ept; in other words, the inarkiiii;
an object hy an attrib u te or attributes previously kiicwn as coininun
to sundry objects, and to which we have accordingly given a gener.-d
name. In this process we are able, hy abstraction, to distingni.sh
from each o th e r , 1, T h e object th o u g h t of:
.Maiter and Form of jnanncr o f th in k in g it.
Ilio u g lit. . , =>
L e t us, em p lo y in g the old and estahlislied tech.
ideal expressions, call the first o f these th e matter, the second the
f o r m , o f the thought. F o r example, w h en I think that th e book
befure me is a folio, the m atter o f this th o u g h t is hook and fo lio;
th e form o f it is a ju d g m e n t. N o w , it is abundantly ev id en t that
th'.s analysis o f th o u g h t into tw o phases or sides is on ly the Avork
o f a scientific discrimination and c o n t r a s t ; for as, on the one hand,
th e matter o f which w e th ink is on ly cogitable through a certain
form, so, on the other, the form under Avhich Ave think cannot he
realized in consciousness, unless in actual application to an object. '
N o a v , Avlien I said th at L o g ic Avas conversant
L o s ic p ro p e rly co n - tliuiight considered m erely as thou g h t, I
v e rs n n t o n ly w ith th e . , , t
m e an t simply to say, th a t Logic is conversant
F o r m o f T h o u g h t.
with the form of tho u g h t, to the exclusion of
th e m atter. T his bein g understood, I now ])roceed to show hoAv
Logic only p r o p o s e s ho\v Logic only can ]iro])Osc th e form of
th o u g h t for its object o f consideration. I t is indeed true, th a t this
lim itation o f Logic to the form of th o u g h t has not always heen
kep t stead ily in v ie w b y lo gician s; that it is only gradually that
proper vicAvs o f the science have heen sp ecn lativ ely adopted, and
still more grad ually that th e y have heen carried ])ractically into
effect, insomuch th a t to the present hour, as I shall hereafter show
y o n , th e r e ar e s u n d r y d o c t r in e s .still t a u g h t as lo g ic a l, Avhicli, as
relative to the m a tte r o f tho ught, are in fact foreign to the science
of its form.
B u t although it is impossible to shoA v hy the history of the
s c i e n c e , t h a t Logic is c o n v e i'sa n t Avitli t h e form.
T h is fiio w n b y a con- e x c liis io n o f tlic m a tte r , o f t l i o n g l i t ; th is
sifleration o f llie n a- , , . , i ^ i
.tu r e a n d, c o n d.... .
can, however, be satisfactonlvj done bv. a coiisid-
ifio n s o f
the th in g itself. '
oratioii of the nature and conditions of the
th in g itself. For, if it he m aintained th a t Logic
takes n o t merely the form, h ut the m a tte r of th o u g h t into accoiuu
1 E sse r , L o g ik , 3, p. 4, 2d e d it. A lu n ste r, 1830. E d .

12 LOGIC. Lect. G
(tbe m atter, you will recollect, is a collective expression for the

several objects about which tbouglit is coiivci'saiit), in th a t case,
Logic must either consider all those objects w ithout distinction, or
make a selection o f some alone. N o w the former o f these alterna-
ti\c s is manifestly impossible; for if it were ieqnii-ed th a t Logic
should comirise a full discussion o f all cogitable objects, in oth er
words, if Logic must draw within its sjihcrc all other sciences, and
thus constitute itself in fact the one universal science, every one at
once perceivos the absni'dity of the reipiisition, and the impossibility
o f its fullilmeiit. B u t is the seeund altern ative more reasonable?
Can it be ])rojoscd to Logic to take eognizanee o f certain objects
o f th o u g h t to the exclusion of o th e rs? On tliis snjiposition, it
must be shown why l^tgic should consider this })articiilar object,
and n o t also t h a t ; b u t as none b u t an arb itra ry a n s w e r th a t is,
no answ er at a l l can be given to this interrogation, the absurdity
of this alternative is no less manifest than th a t o f th e other. T h e
particular objects, or the m a tte r o f tliought, being th u s excluded,
the form o f huiiian th o u g h t alone remains as th e o b je et-m a tte r of
our science; in o th e r word.s, L ogic has only to do with thin k in g as
thinking, and has no, at least no im m ediate, concernm en t with th a t
which is th o u g h t about. Logic thus obtains, in common parlance,
the apjicllation o f a formal science, not im lced in the sense as if
Logic had only a form an d not an object, b u t simjdy because the
form of hu m an th o u g h t is the object of L o g ic ; so th a t the title
j o n t t u l science is juvjjierly only an abbreviated expression. ^
I proceed now to the question u nder this head, viz., W h a t is
m eant by the L aw s o f T h o u g h t as T lio u g h t ? in
o the r words, W h a t is m e a n t by the F orrnal L aw s
T h o u g h t a.' 1 b o u g h t.
o f rilO U gllt?
W e have already lim ited the object o f L ogic to the form of
thought. B ut th e re is still reipiired a last and final lim itation ; for
this form contains more than Logic O can leOgitim atelv consider. IIu-
mail thou g h t, regarded merely in its formal relation, m ay be eonsi<l-
crc<l in a twofold point o f v ie w ; for, on the one hand, it is either
known to ii> nicrcly ti-oiii experience or observation, we are
merely aware of its phenom ena historically or einjiirically, or, on the
<^)ther, by a rellectivc speculation, by analysis and abstraction, we
seek out and di.seriiiiinate in the manifestations of th o u g h t w h a t is
contained of neee.'-sary and universal. T h e enijiirical or historical
eonxideration o f <mr th inking faculty docs n o t belong to Logic, bu t
to the J'lucnom enology of Mind, to l^sychology. 'J'lie emjuiical
I K?er, L ngtk, ] 3, p p . .0, 6. C f. K r u g , D tn k lfh re oJer L o g ik , i 8 , p. 17 t t s tq ., 2(1 e d it. 1819

Ed.
L e c t . I. LOGIC. 13
observation of the plienoinena necessarily, indeed, iirecodes their

speculative analysis. B ut, n otw ith stan d in g this, Logic possesses a
peculiar jn-ovince of its own, an d constitutes an independent and
exclusive science. F o r where our empirical consideration o f the
m ind term inates, th e re our speculative consideration com m ences;
the necessary elem ents which th e la tte r secures from the contingent
materi.als of observation, these are w h a t constitute the laws of
th o u g h t as th o u g h t.
1 Cf. E sser, L ogik, { 4, p p . 6, 7. E d

LECTURE II.
INTRODUCTION.
LOGIC I. ITS n E F IN IT IO X HISTORICAL NOTICES OF OPINIONS

REGARDING ITS OBJECT AND DOMAIN II. IT S UTILITY.
I x m y last L ec ture I commoiiced th e consideration o f L o g ic ,

o f Logic iiroperly so denom inated, a science
R e c a p itu la iio n . 1 .- r i i t-
tor the cultivation ot wliicli every L n ro p e an
university has provided a sjiecial chair, h u t which, in this country, in
conseqnonce of the misconceptions which have latterly arisen in re
gard to its n atu re and its end, has heen very generally superseded ;
insomuch that, for a considerah!e period, the chairs o f Logic in onr
Scottish nniversities have in fact ta u g h t .almost ev erything except
the doctrine which th e y were estahlislied to leach. A fter some pre
cursory ohsorvations ill regard to the m ode o f com munication which
I should follow in m y L ectures on this snhjoct, I entered on the t r e a t
m e n t of tlie science itself, and stated to yon th a t a systematic view
o f Logic would consist o f tw o parts, th e one hcing an Intro d u c tio n
to the doctrine, the o th e r a hody of th e D o ctrine itself. I n the in
troduction w ere considered certain jircparatory points, necessary to
he understood before en terin g on the discussion of the science itself;
and I stated th a t these prc])aratory points were, in relation to onr
science, exhausted in five questions and their answers 1, W h a t is
L olmc? 2, WliMt is its value V 3, IIow is it d is t rib u te d ? 4, W h a t
is its h isto ry ? o, AVliat arc its subsidiaries?
I then proceeded to the consideration of the first o f these ques
tions ; and as the answ er to the question, w hat is Logic, is given
ill its definition, I defined Logic to he the science conversant about
the laws o f th o u g h t considered merely as th o u g h t; w arning yon,
li(.wevcr, th at llii.s definition could only he understood after an artic
ulate explanation o f its coiiteiils. N o w this definition, I showed
yon, naturally fell into three ]art.s, and each o f these parts it be
h o o v e d t o eori'îder and illnsiratc hy itself. T h e first was the Avoid
si'^Miifie.int of the th in g d e fin e d , Loyic. dhe second was the
genn.s hy which Logic was defined, science. T h e th ird wa.s the
L e c t . II. LOGIC. I /3
object-m attcr con.stituting tb e differential quality of Logic, the

laws o f tbouglit as tliought. E ach of these I considered in its order.
I, first o f all, explained the original m ean ing of the term L ogic, and
gave you a brief history o f its application. I then stated Avhat was
necessary, in reg.ard to the genus, science; and, lastly, w h at is of
principal importance, I endeavored to m ake you vaguely aware of
th a t Avhich you ca n n o t as y e t be supposed co n qietcnt distinctly to
com prehend ; I mean the pecnliar cha racter o f the object, objeet-
m a t t e r , about which Logic is conversant.. T h e object of Logic,
as stated in tbe definition, is the laws o f th o u g h t as th ou g h t. T his
reipiired an articulate explanation ; and such an explanation I en
deavored to afford you u n d e r th ree distinct h e a d s ; expounding,
1, W h a t was m eant by t h o u g h t ; 2, W h a t was m e an t by th o u g h t
as th o u g h t; 3, W h a t was m e an t by the laws o f th o u g h t as thou g h t.
In reference to th e firSt head, I stated th a t Logic is conversant
about th o u g h t taken in its stric ter signification, th a t is, a bout th o u g h t
considered as the operation o f the U n d e r s ta n d in g P rope r, or o f th a t
faculty Avhieh I distinguished as the E la bora tive or Discuis iv e ,
th e F a c u lty o f Relations, or Comparison. I a tte m p te d to make you
vaguely apprehend w h at is th e essential char.acteristic o f tho ught,
viz., th e comprehension o f a th in g u n d e r a general notion or attr i
bute. F o r such a comprelicnsion en ters into every act o f th e dis
cursive faculty, in its different gradatio ns o f Conception, J u d g m e n t,
and Reasoning. B u t by saying th a t L ogic is co n v e rsan t about
th o u g h t proper, Logie is n o t y e t disciim inated as a jieculiar science,
for there arc m an y sciences, likewise, inter alia, conversant about the
operations and objects o f th e E laborativ e F acu lty . T h e r e is re
quired a further determ in a tio n o f its objeet-m atter. T his is done
b y the limitation, t h a t L ogic is con versant n o t m erely a bout thou ght,
b u t a bou t th o u g h t as th o u g h t. T h e exjilanation o f this constituted
th e second head o f our exposition o f the objeet-m atter. T h o u g h t, I
showed, could be viewed, by an analytic abstraction, on tw o sides
or ])hases. W e could eith er consider th e object thou g h t, or the
m anner o f th in k in g i t ; in o the r words, we could scientifically dis
tinguish from each o th e r th e m a tte r and th e form o f though t. N o t
t h a t th e m a tte r and form have any separate existence ; 110 object
lieing cogitable e.xcopt u n der some foian o f th o u g h t, and no form of
t h o u g h t having a n y existence in consciousness excc]it some object
be tlionglit u n d e r it. ^'his, however, formed no im pedim ent to onr
analysis of tbose elements, through a m ental ah.straction. T his is in
fiict only one o f a tho usand similar absti'actions we are in the h.abit
of m a k in g ; and if such were imjiossible, all Iminan science would
be ini]) 0 ssible. F o r exam p le: extension is only presented to sense.
16 LOGIC. L e c t . 11
u nder some niodifie.ation of color, and even imagination c a n not I'C])-

resent extension except as colored. W c may view it in ]>liantasy
as black or white, as translucent or ojKUpie ; b u t represent it wo can
not, except either u n d er some ]iositivc variety o f light, or u nder the
negation of light, which is darkness. B u t, ])sychologieally consid
ered. darkness or blackness is as much a color, th a t is, :i ])ositive
sensation, as whiteness or red n e ss; and thus wc cann ot image to
ourselves au g h t extended, n o t even sjiacc itsolfj out of relation to
color. B u t is this inability even to im agine extension, ajtart from
some color, any hindci'ance to our considering it scientifically apart
from all color? N o t in th e sm a lle st; n o r do M a th em atic s and the
o th e r sciences find any difficulty in tr e a tin g of extension, w ithout
even a single reference to this condition o f its actual manifestation.
T h e case o f Logic is precisely th e same. L ogic considers th e form
a]iart from the m a tte r of th o u g h t ; and it is able to do this w ith o u t
any tro u b le ; for thoug h the form is only an actual phoenonienon
when ajiplied to some matter, object, yet, as it is not necessa-
I'ily astriete<l to a n y object, we can always consider it abstra ct from
all objects ; in o the r words, from all m a tte r. F o r as the m a th e m a
tician. who c.annot constru ct his diagrams, either to sense or to im
agination, ajiart from some particulai' color, is still able to consider
the jirojierties o f extension ap a rt from all colo r; so the logician,
th ough he cannot concretely represent th e forms of th o u g h t except
in examjiles of some jiarticular m a tte r, is still able to consider the
jirojierties o f these forms apa rt from all m atter. Tlic jiossibility b e
ing thus ajijiarent o f a consideration o f the form abstractly from
the m.atter o f tho u g h t, I showed you th a t such an abstraction was
necessary. T h e objects (the m atter) o f th o u g h t are infinite ; no
one science can cm brace th e m all, and therefore, to suppose Logic
conversan t about the m a tte r o f th o u g h t in general, is to say th a t
T.ogic is an o th er nam e for th e cncyclopaadia th e omne scihile
o f hum an knowledge. T h e absurdity o f this sujiposition is ajipar-
cnt. B u t if it be iinjiossible for Logic to tre a t of all the objects
o f thought, it cannot ho snjiposed th a t it treats of a n y ; for no rea-
1)11 can be given w hy it should limit its consideration to some, to the
exclusion o f others. As Logic c.annot, therefore, jiossibly include all
objects, and as it faannot jiossibly be shown w hy it should include
only some, it follows th.at it m ust exclude from its domain th e con-
;idcration o f the m a tte r o f th o u g h t a lto g e th e r ; and as, apa rt from
the m a tte r of thought, there only remains the fonn, it follows th a t
Logie, as a jiccial science of thought, mnstl>e viewed as conversant
exclu-ively .about the tbnn of thought.
B u t th e lim itation o f the o bje ct-m a tte r o f Logic to the form of
L kct. II. LOGIC. IT
tliouglit (and t h e e.xpression fo r m o f th ou gh t is c o n v e r t i b l e w i t h

the expression th ou gh t a s th ou gh t), is n o t y e t
(c) ihe Laws of e n o u g h to d isc rim in ate its p ro v in ce fro m tluit o f
Thought as Thought. * . '
O t h e r s c i e n c e s ; f or P s y c l i o l o g y , o r tlie Eni])ir-
i ca l S c i e n c e o f I \ I i n d , is l i k e w i s e , a m o n g t h e o t h e r m e n t a l p h a s n o m -
ena, c o n v e r s a n t a b o u t th e p l n e n o m e n a o f form al t h o u g h t . A st i l l
further limitation is t h e r e f o r e r e t p i i s i t e ; a n d t h i s is g i v e n in s a y
ing t h a t L o g i c i s t l i e s c i e n c e n o t m e r e l y o f T h o u g h t ns T h o u g h t ,
b u t o f t h e L a w s o f T h o u g h t .as T h o u g h t . I t is t h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n
which af t oi -ds t h e p r o x i m a t e a n d j i e c u l i a r d i f f e r e n c e o f L o g i c , in
c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n f r o m all o t h e r s c i e n c e s ; a n d t h e e x j i l a n a t i o n o f i t s
m e a n i n g c o n s t it u t e d tlie th ird h ead o f illustration, w h ich t h e objcct-
m a t t c r in t h e d e f i n i t i o n d e m a n d e d .
The p ln e n o m e n a o f t h e formal, o r su bje ctiv e p h as es o f th o u g h t ,
are of tw o kinds. T h e y a r e e i t h e r s u c h as ar e
The phaenomena of c o n t i n g e n t , t h a t is, s u c h OS m a y o r m a y n o t ai l -
formal thought are of .
t wokiuas-contingent " " ^ h a s a r e n e c e s s a r y , t h a t is,
and necessary. such as caiinot b u t app ear. These t w o classes
o f ph.oenomena arc, h o w e v e r , o n ly m anifested in
c o n j u n c t i o n ; t h e y are n o t d isc rim in ated in t h e actual o])erations o f
thought; and it req u ires a sp e cu lativ e analysis to separate them
i n t o t h e i r se v e r a l classes. I n so f a r as t h e s e p l n e n o m e n a a r e c o n
sidered m e r e l y as p h f e n o m e n a , t h a t is, i n s o f a r a s p h i l o s o p h y is
m e r e l y o b s e r v a n t o f t h e m as m a n i . e s t a t i o n s in g e n e r a l , t h e y b e l o n g
to t h e science o f E m p ir ic a l or Historical Psychology. B ut when
p h i l o s o p h y , b y a r e fl e c ti v e a b s t r a c t i o n , a n a l y z e s t h e neccss.ary f ro m
t h e c o n t i n g e n t f o r m s o f t h o u g h t , t h e r e r e s u l t s a s c i e n c e , w h i c h is
distinguished from al l o t h e r s b y taking for its o b ject-in atter th e
former of these classes; and t h i s s c i e n c e is L o g i c . Logic, t h e r e
f ore, is a t l a s t f u l l y a n d finally defined as t h e science o f t h e n e c e s
sary forms of thought. Here term inated o ur last Lecture. But
though f ul l and final, t h i s d e f i n i t i o n is n o t explicit; and i t still
re m a in s to ev o lv e it in to a m o r e precise expression.
Now, when we s a y t h a t L o g i c is t h e science o f the necessary
f o r m s o f t h o u g h t , w h a t d o e s t h e q u a l i t y o f n e c e s s i t y h e r e i mi )l yV
I n t h e f i r s t ] ) l acc, i t i s e v i d e n t t h a t i n s o f a r
Form of thought. c ^ c
Fourcoudition.-<ofit.s thought IS u e c e s s a i T , t h i s f o r m
necessity. miist b e d e t e r m i n e d or necessit.ated b y t h e na-
1. Determined by the t^re o f the thinking Subject itself; for i f it
nature of the thinking i i ^ ^ i
w ere d eterm in ed bv a n v th in g external to th e
subject r..<elI. ,
mind, then would it n o t be a necessary, b u t
merely contingent determination. The first condition, therefore,
3
18 LOGIC. L kct. II.
of' tlic necessity of a form of th o u g h t is, th a t it is subjectively, not

objectively, cloterinincd.
In the second jilaoo, if a form of th o u g h t be subjectively neces-
sarv, it m ust be original and not acquired. F o r
2. O rijjiiial. . . ^
it It were acquired, there m ust have been a time
when it did not e x i s t ; hut if it did ever actually not exist, wo must
be able at least to conceive th e jio.ssibility o f its n o t exi.sting now.
Hnt if we are so able, tlicn is the foian n o t necessary; for the crite
rion of a c o n tin g en t cognition is, th a t wc can rciiresent to ourselves
the jiossibility of its non-existence. T h e second condition, there-
Ibre, of the necessity of a form o f th o u g h t is, th a t it i.s original, and
iidt acquired.
' I n the third jilace, if a form o f th o u g h t be necessary and origi
nal, it m ust be univ ersal; th a t i.s, it cannot b e ,
3. U nivei-snl. . . . , ,
th a t It ncce.ssitatcs on some occasions, and docs
n ot nccc.ssitate on others. F o r if it did n o t necessitate universally,
then would its iiecessitation he contingent, and it would conse-
(jnently not be an original and necessary jirinciple of mind. T h e
third condition, therefore, o f the necessity of a form o f th o u g h t is,
t h a t it is universal.
In the fouilh place, if a form o f th o u g h t be necessary and uni-
vcisal, it m ust be .a la w ; for a law is th a t which
4 . A l a w. .
ap]uies to all cases w ith o u t cxcejition, and irom
which a deviation is ever, and everyw here, impossible, or, at lea.st,
unallowed. T h e fourth and last condition, therefore, o f the neces
sity <ifa form of th o u g h t i.s, tliat it is a law. ' This last condition,
likewi.sc, enables iis to give tlie most exjilicit enunciation o f the
objoet-iiiattor of Logie, in saying th a t Logic is
The objcci-mattnr science of the Law.s of'^riiought as T h o u g h t,
of I. Of i i c c. \|i l i ci tl y , . n 1 t -i i n ni l i ^
.-noiiiiw.i the I" ormal Jâws oi 1 lioiiglit, or
the science o f the Law s o f the F o rm of T l i o u g h t ;
for all these are m e re h ' various expressions o f th e same thing.
Before ]iroceediiig further, it may he jiroper
i.fiionii hiMorical t:ik< a vcry general retrospect of the views
r< t r o - i n c l o r \ i i - w - iii , , , , . - i i i
, t o tli<
r <v' nl
, o ,,
ljicl
tliat have
. .
pi'cvailcd
.
in regard to the object and
ami Uomaiii o f Lotc douiaiu of Logic, froiii tlic cm wli(ii the scicncc.
received its lii-st grand and distinctive develop
ment from the genius o f A ristotle to tlic present time.
1 may s:iy, in gi'iieral, th a t the view which I
.Mi ri t fil i hi - Ai i l l i or ' . x , - i - r- 1 1
. , , liaM' now jiresciited to you 01 th e object and
ot Loi'ic. . . . .
d o m a i n o f T>ogie, i.s t h e o n e w h i c h e o i i e e i i l r a t e s ,
corrects, and completes tiio views which have been generally bold
) Ki-fer, L ngik. \ 6, [i]). 9, 10, w illi a few ori;(iiiul in le rp o la lio n s . E d
L e c t . II. LOGIC. 19
by logicians o f th e peculiar jn-ovincc of th e ir science. I t is the one

to which tlicy all gravitate.
I t is unfortunate, th a t by far the g re a te r num b er of the logical
w ritings o f xVristotle havo perished, and th a t
those which remain to ns exhibit only his views
o f the science considered in its pai'ts, or in certain special relations.
N o n e of the treatises which are now collected in the Organon,^
considers th e science from a central p o in t; and we do n ot even
possess a general definition of Logic by its illustrious founder. I t
would, therefore, be unjust to the m ighty master, if, :is has usually
been done, we estim ated his concejdion of the scicmec only by the
partial views contained in the fragm entary or special ti-eatises which
have chanced to lloat ashore from the general wreck o f his logical
writings. T h ese by them selves are certainly enough to place the
Stagirite high above comparison with any subsequent logician ; but
still, if he lias done so much in the half-dozen treatises th a t still
remain, w hat m ay w e . n o t conceive him to have accomplished in
the forty which are recorded and seem to have been lo st? I t is,
therefore, n ot to be attrib u te d to A ristotle, th a t subsequent logi
cians, m istaking his surviving treatises o f a logical nature few in
num ber, and w ritten, in general, n ot in exjiosition o f the ])ure sci
ence, b u t only of the science in certain modified ajiidications for
a systematic b ody of logical doctrine, should have allowed his views
o f its jiartial relations to infinence their conceptions of the science
absolutely and as a whole. B y this influence of the Ai-istotelic
treatises, we m ay explain the singular circumstance, that, while
many, indeed most, o f the subsequent logicians sjiccnlatively held
th e soundest views in regard to the jn-ojier object and end of Logic,
few or none of them have atteiiqited by these A'iews to purify the
science o f those extraneous iloctrini's, to which the anthoi-ity of
A ristotle seemed to have given a rig h t o f oecnjiam'v within its
domain. I shall not attem jit to show you, in
O reck A n s io ie iin u s p x t e n s o , liow coiTect, ill general, were the notions
a n d L a tin S clio o lin e n . . i i i t i
entertained by the G reek Aristotelians, and even
b y the Latin schoolmen, for this would require an cx]lanation of
th e signiflcation of the tci'ins in which th e ir opinions were emboil-
icd, which would lead me into details which the im portance of the
m a tte r would hardly w arrant. I shall only say, in general, that, in
their multifarious controversies under this head, the diversity of
their opinions on subordinate jioiiits is not more remarkable than
their unanim ity on priiieipal. Logic they all discriminated as a sci-
I See b e lo w , p. 24. E d .
-0 LOGIC. L ect. I I
enoo of the fn in and not o f the m a tte r o f though t. T hose o f tlio

.'clioolmen wlio lield the ohjeet of Logic to he things in general,
held this, however, u n der tlie qiialirieation th.at things in general
were not im m ediatelv and in them selves considered hv the loiiici.an,
hnt only as lliev stood u n d er th e general forms inqiosed on them
hy the intellei l ( q n aten n s secnndis intcntionihns snhstahant
a mode o f sjioaking which is only a ])cri]-hrasis o f onr assertion, th a t
Logie is conversant ahont the forms o f thonglit. T h e o the r school
men, again, who m aintained th a t the ohjeet o f Logic was thonglit
in its ]>rocesscs of simple ajiprchensioii, ju d g m e n t, and reasoning
(three, two, or one), carefully exjilained th a t these oiierations were
not in th e ir own n atu re jiroposcd to th e logician, for as snch they
helonged to .Vnimastic, as th e y called it, or Psychology, h n t only in
so far as th e y were dirigible or subject to laws, :i s ta te m e n t which
i ' only a Ics.s simple expression of the fact, th a t Logic is the science
o f the laws of thought. Fin.ally, those schoolmen who held th a t
th< ivhjeet-mattcr o f Logic was found in second notions as applied
to first, only m e an t to s.iy th a t Logic was conversant with concep
tions, ju d g m e n ts ami reasonings, n o t in themselves, h u t only as reg-
iilai(jrs o f thought,'' a s ta te m e n t which merely varies and ])er-
plexes the expression, th a t th e object o f Logic is the formal laws
of thoug ht.
I'lie same views, various in appearance, but, when analyzed, es
sentially the same, and essentially correct, may
Lfibmtio-noifian traced through th e L eihnitio-W olfian school
aiid Kuiiiiaii Sclioolb. .
into the K a n t i a n ; so that, while it m u st he
ow ned th a t the y w ere n ever adequ ately carried out into practie.d
application, it c a n n o t be denied th a t the y were theoretically not
unsound.
T h e cou n try in which, perhaps, th e n atu re of
Bacon,Locke. , . , , , i i n
T.,ogic has heen m ost com pletely and generally
m isnnderstoud, is G re at Britain. Bacon wliolly misconceived
I L o j ic n - ko'B- coiii-idcriit fo r m a s iiile ii- ileo (iu fla in se cu n d a ' iiite iitio n e s in v e iita '
Ii I,111 c o r n m n i i e - . " A I b iT tii 31a;(iiii><, I n su n t ad re;;iili:i;diirn d i> ciirsiiiii, d e (jiiibus
b ' Ifi" . 1,. I. Iran. i. c . s. Kur v a r io u s )iro|>rie est l.o;,'icii .See a ls o Z a b a r e lla a n d
c I n -l.c tlu-ories on llie fib je e t-in a lle r o f ( a rn era riiis as a b o v e . E n .
I . o c e . ..... .s c o l n ., S n j ..r L 'n n : P o rp b yrd q u - [ m .n e r a r i.is , b b p . P I,it.. 1*. i. Q i.. 1 . 1>.
/. b a r e l l a . /> X ajnrn , b. I. cap. g_ ^ P b H o s n p h in , .3 0 7 . [ 1- V ,
1 j I Jjinirn^ l-.,.\cr. I , e<l. lla^Gie ( oinitis,
r I)^*pninltonri p/nloôphtrrf. V u r ^ 1 OH. .1 1 i> r cn . # v ' * .
' ' . h l> .) D I f a e r m is . [ T r a r .la tin lo tm %
1 2. t < onipnrp l)\srus^\on^^ 11 . , i> * : r. tw
* * Ph\lo%<tp!nn\ P r a d iitlin T o s t , C I p . 4*^.
ed. 1 a r i s i i s , 1 0 4 0 . E d .]
<, .1 \* I)^ A riium sivf JF
/ .- - .r n . r i. 1 < o m j lir e A l e x . <lc A b ' s , In 4 S e .- Z a b a r e l l a a n d ( a m e r a r iiis , a s a b o v e
.1 /1 // 1 IV 1 .7. * D i a b e t i c a eQ i i i v e i i l a iKl Ei>. [ C o ii i i ia r e I o i i c i i i s , O.r.o/.v ;Vi/7o.<op/./.
r e ? u l a n d u m d i- c u r s u m i n l e l b - c l i i s e t r a lio n iH ; c., D i s p . i. q u . u l l . . p 4S, 2 d e d . I a r i s , 1619 ;
its clinrncter in certain respects; b u t liis errors are insignificant,

when compared with tlie total misapprehension of its nature by
Locke. T h e character o f these mistakes I shall have occasion to
illustrate in th e sequel; at present I need only say, that, while
those who, till lately, a tte m p te d to w rite on Logic in the English
language were otherw ise Avholly inco m p eten t to the task, they, at
th e same time, eith er shared the misconceptions o f its nature with
Locke, or only contributed, by th eir own hapless attempt.s, to ju s
tify the prejudices prev a len t against th e science which they professed
to cultivate and improve.
I t would be unjust to confound with o th e r attenqits of our cou n try
men in logical science th e work o f Dr. W liately.
w h a te iy , g e n e ra l a iith o r , i f iio t c iu lo w e d w itli a iiy h ig li ta l-
c lia ia c te r o f Iiis Ele- , ,, , , , . '
en t tor philosophical speculation, jiossesses at
least a sound and vigorou s understanding. He
unfortunately, hoAvever, Avrote his Elem ents o f L o g ic in singular
unacquaintance Avith all that had been Aviitten on the science in
ancient and in m odern times, Avith th e excep tion, apparently, o f tw o
Avorks o f tw o Oxford logicians, the Institutio o f W allis, and the
Compendium o f A ldrich, both Avritten above
a cen tu ry ago, neither o f them rising above a
hum ble mediocrity, ev en at the date o f its coni-
jiosition ; and A ldrich, Avhom W h a t e i y unfortunately regards as a
safe and learned gu ide, had h im se lf Avritten his book in ignorance
o f A ristotle and o f all tlie principal authors on the science, an
ignorance manifested by the grossest errors in the most elem en tary
jnirts o f the science. It is not, therefore, to be Avondered at, th at
the E lem ents o f W h a te iy , tliqugh the production o f an able man,
are so tar behind the ad v an ce m e n t o f the science o f Avhich th ey
trea t; that th ey are deformed Avith numerous and serious errors;
and that the on ly recom m endation th e y possess, is that o f bein g the
best book on the subject in a la nguage Avhich has absolutely no
other d eserv in g o f notice !
I have noAV, therefore, to call your attention to D r. W h a t e l v s
account o f th e ohjcct-niatter and domain of
AVbateiys view of Logic. T h e treatise o f Dr. W h a te iy , says his
tlie o b je c t-m a lte r an d -vr-'" r> i i . . tv tt- i t
ice-rriiiciiial aiul epitoniator Dr. Hinds,- di.s-
d o n i iiii o f L o g ic s ta t
ed a n d critic ized . plays, aiul it is the oiily 0110 th at has clearly
done so, the true n atu re and use of Logic ; so
t h a t it m ay be approached no lo nger as a dark, curious, and merely
1 See D iicu ssio n s, p. 128, seco n d e d itio n , 2 In tro d u ctio n to L o g ic. P reface , p. v iii. O x-
fo o t-n o te . fo rd , 1827. Ed .
LOGIC. L e c t . 11,
speculative stmiy, such as one is ajit in fancy to class with astrology,

and alchoniv."
1-ei us try wlictlior this eulogy he as merited as it is unm easured.
N ow , Dr. W h a te ly cannot tin ly be s.aid clearly to display the na
ture of Logie, because in dillerent passages he
wimieiyprop ose# (o pi'ojioscs to it ditlerent and co ntradicto ry ob-
Loeio iliU'ereut ami -i . t i W
,
coiiirailictory ...
objecl- c c ts; and lie c. a n not be said to disiilay
i the true
mailer. iiatuie of Loglc, for o f these different objects
th e re is not one which is the true.
In scver.al jiassages,' he says th a t the jirocess or operation of
reasoning is alone the apjirojiriate pro\ ince o f Logic. N ow , this
sta te m en t is incoiTcct in tw o rcsjiects. In the first jfiace, it is in-
con-ect, inasmuch as it lim its the o b ject-m atter of Logic to th a t
p art o f the D iscursive F a c u l ty which is esjiecially den om inated
Reasoning. In this view Logic is m ade convertible with Syllogis
tic. This is an old error, which has been frequently refuted, and
into which W h a t e l y seems to have been led by his guide D r. Wallis.
In the second place, this s ta te m e n t is incorrect, inasmuch as it
makes the process, or, as he also calls it, the op-
Theoperation 01 itca- eratioii, of reasoning the ohjcct-m atter o f Logic.
#<111111},'not (lie oliject- ..t i i i i
,, ol .. Lopfic,
matier T as N ow, adeluntion which mcrciv 'aftirins th a t
Wliately allirm.-. Logic is th e ScieilCO wllicll luiS tllC plOCCSS of
reasoning for its object, is not a definition of
this science at all; it does n ot contain the differential quality by
which Logic is discriminated from o th e r scien c es; and it docs not
prevent the most erroneous o|nnions (it even suggests the m ) from
being taken nj) in regard to its nature. O th e r sciences, as P sy c h o l
ogy ami -Mct:i|)hysic, jirojiosc for their object (am o n g the o th e r fac-
nllii-^) the operation o f reasoning, b u t this considered in its real
n a t u r e : Logic, on tho contrary, has th e same for its object, b u t only
in its formal cajiacity; in fact, it has in projirioty o f sjjccch nothing
to do with the jiroccss or operation, b u t is conversant only with its
hiwv. Dr. AVh.itclys definition is therefore not only incomjietent,
bill <lcliisivc ; it would confound Iôgic and Psychology and Mcta-
(thy-ic, and tend to pcrjictiiate tho misconcejitions in regard to the
n itiirc of I.,ogic which have been so long prevalent in this country.
I bit Dr. W hatclv' is not only w rong as meas-
\\ luii-lv <Tr<irmoiiK- , i .
i> m,.i cm iru.iici.iriiy fo' <ign stamlard, he IS w rong as meas-
m k.< i/iiipiiatx tii<; nrcd by his o w n ; he is himself contradictory.
a.iw,iiai<- ciijici-mai- that, in some jilaccs, he
'' makes th e operation o f re.asoning not only the
princijia! b u t the adequate object o f J.ogic. W ell, in others he
I S e c pp. I, 1.3, 140, tliinJ e d itio n .
makes this total or ad equate object to he l.anguage. B u t as th ere

cannot he tw o adequate objects, .and as language and th e opera
tion of reasoning are not the s.ame, thei'c is, therefore, a con tradic
tion. In introducing, he says, the niention of hinginige jirevi-
onsly to the definition of logic, I have dejtarted from estahiished
practice, in order th a t it may he clearly understood th a t logic is
entiiely conversant ahont la n g u a g e ; a tru th which most writcis on
th e subject, if indeed they were fully aw are of it themselves, have
certainly n o t taken du e care to impress on th e ir readers. ' .tXnd
ag a in : Logic is wholly concerned in the use of language.
In our last L ecture, 1 called yo nr a ttention to the am biguity of
the term Xoyo?, in Greek, m ean ing amhignously either th o u g h t or its
expression ; and this am biguity favored th e i-ise of tw o co u nter
opinions in regard to the object of logic; for while it was genei-ally
and correctly held to he im m ediately conversant ahont the internal
Xoyos, thought, some, however, on the contrary, m aintained th a t it
was im m ediately conversant ahont th e external Xoyos, language.
N ow , by some nnacconntahle illusion. Dr. W h a te ly , in different
places, ad opts these opposite opinions, and enunciates them w ithout
a w ord of explanation, or w ith o u t even a suspicion th a t the y arc
co ntradictory o f each other.
F ro m w hat I have now said, yon may, in some degree, be able to
ju d g e how far credit is to be accorded to the
T h e tru e n a tu r e o f assertion, th a t Dr. W h a te ly is the only logician
L o g ic m o re c o rre c tly clearly displayed th e tru e n atu re and
u n d e rs to o d b y the n r t i
scholastic logicianso f Logic. I l l filct, SO far IS this assertion
th a n b y W h a te ly . from the truth, th a t the o h jeet-m atter and scope
of Logic was far m ore correctly understood
even hy th e scholastic logicians than hy Dr. XVhately; and I may
caution yon, by the way, th a t w h at yon m ay find stated in the E l e
ments of the views of the schoolmen tou c h in g the nature and end
o f Logic, is in gener.d w ro n g ; in iarticnlar, I m ay notice one
m ost erroneous allegation, th a t the schoolmen a ttem p ted to cmjiloy
logic for the jnirpose o f physical discovery.
B u t if, com pared only with the older logicians, the assertion of
D r. H in d s is found nntcnahle, w hat will it he found, if we compare
W h a te ly with th e logicians o f the K antian and Leihnitian schools,
o f whose w ritings neith er the Archhislio]) n or his ahhreviator seems
ever to have h e a r d ? A nd here I may observe, th a t G reat Britain is,
I believe, th e only coun try of F n ro p e in which hooks are w ritten
hy respectable authors upon sciences, o f th e jirogrcss o f which, for
1 P a g e 56 2 P ag e 74. 3 B esides m o st vag u e. - Jo ttin g .

2- i LOGIC. L e c t . II.
above a century, tb e y have never taken the trouble to inform

ihemselves.
T h e secoml question, to which in the In tro duc tion to Logic an
answ er is retjiiii'ctl, is , W h a t is the V;;lne or
I I . T h e U t ility o f i .. n /> t
,L o g ic . L tilitv OI this science.-' before iiroceeding
1 o
to
a special consideration of this question, it may
be J i r o p e r to observe, in general, tliat th e real utility of Logic has
been obscured and disjiaraged by the false utilities which have too
fretjuently been arrogated to i t ; for when logic was fouml unable
to accomjilish w hat its unwise encomiasts hatl jiromised, the recoil
was natural, and as it failed in jierforming everything, it was lightly
inferred th a t it could jierform nothing. B oth of these ('.xtremes arc
eijiially erroneous. T h e re is th a t which Logie can, and there is th a t
which Logic cannot, jierfo rm ; and, therefore, before attem jiting to
show w hat it is th a t we o u g h t to exjiect from the study o f this
science, it will be jiropcr to show w hat it is th a t we o u g h t not. I
shall therefoi(, in the first jilace, consider its false utilities, and, in
th e second, its true.
T h e attribution o f every false utility to Logic has arisen from er
roneous ojiinions held in regard to the object of
U t ilitie s fa ls e ly a l- , . ' ,
t r ib u te ,1 to L o g ic . the scicnco. So loiig as It was sujijAosed th a t
logic
O took anyW cognizance
O o f the m a tte r of
thought, so long as it was n ot distinctly understood tluit the form
of th o u g h t was the exclusive object o f this science, and so long as
it was not tlisencumbered of its extraneou s lumber,' so lone: O
must
erroneous ojiinions have been jirevalent as to the n ature and eom-
jirehension of its end.
I t was accordingly, in th e first place, frequently siipjiosed th a t
Logic was, in a certain sort, an in.stninient of
discovery. T h e Utle of o r g a n o n ,-
instrument, bestow ed on the collection we
jiossess of tbe logical treatises of Aristotle, contributed to this er
ror. T hese treati.sc.s, as I observed, are b u t a few of the m an y w rit
ings o f the Stagirite on Logic, and to him we owe neither th e order
in which they stand arranged, nor the general nam e u n der which
they are now eornprehended.' In later times, these treatises were
sujijiosed to contain a comjilete system of Logic, and Logic was
viewed as the organ not only of Philosojihy, hut of the sciences in
general. T h u s it was th a t L o l m c obtained not only the name o f m -
strurnenf, or instrumental philosophg, h u t m any o the r high-sound-
I Spe I r a n d ls A ris io l'U t. seine nkndem isehen 140. T r< -n ,lelen b u rg , E lem en ta Log- A rislo l.,
/ e itg - n n tt/n uru/ nach sttn H iuh/olge.r, I, i. p. p. 38. E d .
ing titles. I t was long generally styled th e A r t o f arts a n d Sci-

oice o f sciences. Logiea, says Scotiis, est ars artinin ct scien-
tia soientiarurn, qua apcrta, oinnes aliie a p e r in n tiir ; et qua clausa,
oinnes ali;e c h m d n n t n r ; cum qu i qmelibet, sine qua nulla. ' In
modern times, we have systems o f this science u nd er the titles of
I7 a d Veritateni Cgnosura V e rita tis ^ i'apnt ct A pex P hilos-
ophice* Ileuristica, sive Introdiictio a d Artenx Inveniendi^ etc.
B u t it was n ot only viewed as an in stru m e n t o f discovery, it was
likewise held to be the intallible corrector of our
A s th e c o r r e c to r o f intellectual viccs, th e invigoiator o f our intel-
iu te lle c t u a l v ic e s. . . . . .
Icctiial imbecility. H enc e some entitled theii'
Logics, The Afedicinc o f the Afind^^ The A r t o f 'Thinkijig^ 7'he
L ighthouse o f the Lnteilect^ The Science teaching the T ig h t Use
o f Peaso)i^^ etc., etc. N o w , in all this th e re is a m ixture o f tru th
an d en-oi'. T o a ceitain extent, and in certain points of view. Logic
is the organ o f jihilosophy, th e criterion o f truth, and the corrector
o f erroi-, and in others it is not.
In reference to the dispute, w h e th e r logic m ay M'ith propriety be
called the instncment, the organon of the oth er
I n w h a t r e sp ec t L o g ic scicHces, the qucstiou m a y be at once solved by
is a n in s tr u m e n t o f th e ,. . . ^ i i i ,
.
sciences.
a distinction. One science mayJ be stvlecl
-
the
in stru m e n t of another, eith er in a material or in
a formal jioint o f vieu'. In the former point of view, one science is
the or<xan o f another when one science determ ines for another its
contents or ohjccts. T h u s M athem atics may be called the material
instrim ient o f the various branches of physical science ; P hilology
or study o f th e languages, Latin. Greek, H ebrew , Chaldee, etc.,
with a k now ledge o f th e ir relative h is t o r y constitutes a material
iiistriimont to Christian T h e o lo g y ; and the jurist, in like manner,
finds a materia] instrum e nt in a know ledg e o f the history of the
country whose laws he expounds.' T hus, also, Physiology, in a
1 M a u ritii E x p o s itin Q in r s lio n u m D n c tn r is 5 G u n n e r , A r s H e u r is lic a I n le lle c lu a h s . L ip-

S u b lilis in q u in q u e Univrr.<.alin P o r p h y r i i,( .i u x s t . sise, 1T5G. T r a t t a lo i l i M u s e r S e b a s lia n o E r i z z n ,
i (S c o t i O pera, L u g d . 1C39, to m . i. p. 434.) d f l l ' I n s t n i m e n l o et V ia I n v n i t r i i e d e g l i a n t u h i
M a u r itiu s refers to S t A u g u s tin as h is a u th o r - n elle s n e n ti e , V e n ic e . 1554. E d .
it y fo r th e a b o v e q u o t a t io n . It s lig h t ly re- G T b e h in ilia u s e n , JlLr/ifoia M e n tis , s iv e A r ti s
s e m b le s a p a ssa g e in th e 1. ii. c. 13. In v fn ir n d i P r a c e p ta O m e r n lia , A n is t . IGST.
Ed. L a n g e , M e t/ic in a M e n tis , lla l.T , 1703 E d .
2 G iiiid lin g , V ia o il V e r ita te m M o n d e m , I la - 1L A r t d e P eiiser, c o m m o n ly k n o w n as the
laj, 1713 D a r ie s, Via a il V e r ita te m , J e u a e , Tort H o y a l L o g ic . S e v e r a l o tiie r w o r k s h a v e
1764 (2d e d it). E d . . a p p e a le d in .d e r th e sa m e t i t l e . E d .
3 1 . L a u r e i n b e r g i ii s , C n n n sn ra E n n a M e n tis 8 (;ro .^ sp ru , P /ia ru s im e lle c tiis , s i v e L o g ie a
.'. JbogKa I l o s l o v l i , 1G.33. U I ,o e i u is , E U c tiv a . l A p s .. IQ'M. El>
R a ti o i i i s , A r n lie m . 1G17. E d . 9 IV a tts, L o g i c , or th e R ig h t Use o j R e a s o n .
1 S e e K n ig . 9 , p. 23. fro m w h o m Ed. '
s e v e r a l o f llie a b o v e d e fin itio n s w ere p r o b a b ly 10 S e e G e n o v e s i, p 4 1, [E / e m e n t o n i m A r ti s
ta k e n . E d . L o g ic o -C r itic c e L ib r i E , 1. i. c. iii. E d .)
I'L) LOGIC. L e c t . II,
inalorial point of view, is tlie oiganon of m e d i c i n e A r i s t o t l e has

indeed well said, th a t medicine begins where the jihilosojdiy of
nature leaves otf. In the latter point of view, one science is the
organon of another, when one science determ ines the scientific
form of another. Xow, as it is generally ad m itted th a t Logic
stands in this relation to the o the r sciences, as it ajipcitains to
Logic to consider the general doctrine of 3Iethod and o f sys
te m atic construction, in this resjiect Logic may be properly
allowed to be to tlie sciences an instrum ent, b u t only a formal
in strum ent.'
In regard to the o the r titles o f honor. Logic cannot with juo-
priety be d en om inated a [Heiiretic or] A rt
L i'sric i i o l p ro i> o rIv i- t v .
1 1 . Discovcrv. r OI' discovery or invention is
iin a n o l di.'CO M TV. . .
n o t to be ta u g h t by rules, but is either the
free act of an original genius, or the consequence o f a lucky aeei-
ilent, which either conducts the tinder to sonietliing nnkiiown, or
gives him the impulse to seek it out. Logic can at best only a n a ly t
ically tcacb bow to discover, tb a t i.s, by the developm ent and dis
m e m b erm e n t o f wliat is already discovered. By this process the ie
is n o th in g new c\ olvcd, and our know ledge is not amplified ; all
that is accomplished is a clearer and distiiicter comprehension of
the o ld ; onr know ledg e is purified and systematized. I t is
well observed by Antoniu.s, in C ice ro: Nnlluni est jirfficeptum
in bac arte quoinodo vcrum iiiveniatur, sed la n tu m est, quomodo
judicetiir. ^ lôgic is tlnis n o t cre a tiv e ; it is only plastic, only
formative, in relation to onr knowledge.
Again : Logic c a nnot with jiropriety be styled the m edicine of
the mind, at least w ith o u t some qualifying ad-
iii wimi HUM! i.<gicjt>eiive, to sh ow that the on lv rem edy it can
ca n b e - i v l f i l Ihc n ic ii- . r. , .1 . ,
icineoi tbemin.i. 'I'p 'y O' lOHiial cri'or.s, wliiIc our material
errors lie beyond its reaeli. T his is evident.
Logic is the science of the formal law.s o f though t. B u t we cannot,
ill lim iting onr consideration to the laws o f formal thinking, investi-
g.'itc the contents, the m a tte r o f oiir th o u g h t. Logic can, th e re
fore, only jiropose to purge the nnderstandiiig o f those errors which
lie in the eonfiision and jierjile.xities o f an inconsc(juent thinking,
1his, however, it m ust be confessed, is no radical cure, b u t m erely a
pnrifie;ition of tlic un derstanding. In this resjiect, however, and to
thi-i e.xtmt. Logic may ju s tly jiretend to be tbe medicine of tbe
1 /" f-ensH ft S fn illi. c l , 3 K r u g , lyOgik, 9, p. 24. E d . C f. [R ich -

2 K n ig , L ngik, I 9, |>. 2,3: C f. P la in e r , Philo- te r , Ixogik, p. 83 ft sn j.]
toph n ch t A ph on sm en , J'l. i. p. 23, c d . 1793. E v . ^ D e OrcUorc, i i. 38. E d .
L e c t. II. LOGIC. 27
iiiiiid, and may tliercforo, in a formal relation, be .styled, as by some

logicians it has in fact heen, Catharticon intellectus.
By these observations the value o f Logic is not dej)reciate<l ,
they oidy prepare us to form an estimate o f its real amount. P r e
cisely, in fact, as too much was promised and expected from this
study, did it lose in credit and esteem. '
1 K ru g , L ogik, 9, pp. 24-6. E d . C f (R ic h te r, L ogik, p. 85.]

LECTURE III.
INTRODUCTION.
LOGIC II. ITS U TILITY III ITS D IV IS IO N S SUBJECTIVE

AND OBJECTIVE GENERAL AND SPECIAL.
T h e In.st L e c tu re was occupied witli llie consideration o f the

la tte r p a rt of the intro d u c to ry (incstion, W h a t
R e c a p itu la tio n . . , ^ i ,
IS L ogic f and with t h a t of the first pai't o f the
second, W h a t is its U tili ty ? In the L ec tu re preceding the last,
I had given the definition o f Logic, as th e science of the laws of
th o u g h t as th ought, and, tak in g the several p a its of this definition,
had articulately e.vplaincd, 1, W h a t was the m eaning and history
o f the word L o g i c ; 2, W h a t was the im port o f the term science.,
the genus of L ogic; and, 3, W h a t was signified hy laws of th o u g h t
as though t, the object-m atter o f Logic. T his last I had considered
under three head.s, oxjilaining, 1, W h a t is mc.'mt by th oug h t; 2,
W h a t i.s m eant by thought as th o u g h t; and, 3, W h a t is m e a n t by
h nrs o f thought as thought. I t was uiider the last o f these heads
th a t the last L ecture com menced. I had, in the preceding, shown
that the form of th o u g h t comprises tAvo kinds o f plnenomena, given
always in conjunction, hut th a t we are able by abstraction and
analysis to discriminate them from each other, dhe one of these
cla.''>es com prehends w hat is contingent, th e o th e r w h at is necessai y,
in the manifestations o f thou ght. T h e necessary clem ent is the
peculiar and exclusive object of L o g ic ; whereas th e plueiiomona of
ihoiight and of inind in general arc indiscriminately propose<l to
P'-ychology. Logic, therefore, I sai<], is distinguished from the
other jthilo.sophical .''cieiiccs by its definition, as the science o f the
nccf^'-;iry form o f thou g h t. Thi.s, however, though a full and final
definition, is cajiahle o f a still more explicit enunciation ; an d I
showed how we are entitled to con vert th e term neces.sarg into tho
term h n n s ; and, in doing so, I took the ojiportiinity of exitlaining
how, the necessity o f a ment.al eleirieiit being given, there is also
implicitly given the four conditions, 1, Tliat it is su bjective; 2',
T h a t it is o n g i n a l ; 3, T h a t it is universtil ; ami, 4, T h a t it is a
law. T h e full and explicit definition o f Logic, therefore, is, tle
L k c t . III. LOGIC. 29
science of the L aw s of T ho nglit as T h o u g h t ; or, llic science of the

L aw s of the h^'orin of T h o u g h t ; or, the science of the Iôrinal Laws
o f T h o u g h t ; these heiiig only th ree various exjiressions o f w h at
is really the same.
Logic hcing thus defined, I gave a hrief and general retrospect
o f the history o f oiiinion in regard to the pro per object and domain
o f Logic, and showed how, th ough m ost logicians had taken, specii-
latively and in general, a very correct view o f the n atu re o f their
science, th e y had n ot carried this view o u t into apjilication, hy
excluding from the s]liere of P u r e .and . \h s tr a c t Logic all not
strictly relative to the form o f th ought, h n t had allowed m any
doctrines relative merely to the m a tte r of th o u g h t to complicate
and to deform the science.
I th e n called atten tion to the opinions of the au th o r whom I
recom m end to yo ur attention, and showed th a t Dr. W h a te ly , in his
sta te m en ts relative to the object-matter o f Logie, is vague and
obscure, erroneons and self-contradictory; and th a t so far from
being entitled to the jiraise o f having heen the only logician who
has clearly displayed th e tru e n ature o f the science, on the contrary,
in th e exposition o f this nature, he is fijr inferior, n o t only in per-
sjiicnity and precision, h n t in truth , to the logicians of almost every
age and country except onr own.
A n d here, ta k in g a view of w hat we liave already estahiished,
I would interpolate some observations which I
O b ser v a tio n s in te r - o ugh t in my last Loctttre to have made, before
qnestior''wiiat h a v i n g the Consideration o f the first question,
i,ogie viz., W h a t is L ogic? Logic, we have seen, is
exclusively conversant ahont thought, .about
th o u g h t considered strictly as the ojteration of Comparison, or the
faculty of R e la tio n s ; and th ought, in this restricti'd signification, is
the cognition of any mental object hy ano th er in which it is consid
ered as in c lu d e d ; in other words, th o u g h t is the know ledge of
things u n d e r conceptions. B y the way, I would
Thu teim sroirf/;ioM , , , , .i
,
a n d Concept.
here pause
*
to m.ake an observation uiion
tlie
word conce])tion, and to ]irc])are yon for the e m
ployment of a te rm which I mean hereafter to adojit. Yon are
aware, from w h a t I have already said, th a t I do not use conception
in the signification in which it is applied hy .Mr. S tew art. H e
nsni])s it in a very lim ited meaning, in a m eaning which is jiecnliar
to himself, viz., for the simjile and nnmodifiiMl representation o f
an object presented in Pcree])tion.' Reid, again, vacillates in the
signification he attaches to this term, using it sometimes as a
1 See Lectures on M etaphysics, lect. x x x iii. p. 4-52. Ed .

30 LOGIC. L e c t . III.
synonym for Im.ngin.ation, sometimes ns com preliending n o t only

Imaginntion, b ut L'm lcrstan(ling and the object o f U n d e rsta n d in g .'
It is in the la tte r relation alone th a t I CA'er cm-
Autiior>ini)io\nioni coiTcct and g e n u in e signi-
ol those terms ' o o
hcation, w h eth e r we regard the derivation o f
the word, or its general use by philosojihers. Conception, in E n glish ,
is equivalent to conccptio and coiicejjtus in L a tin ; and these terms,
by the best philosojihers, and the most e x te n s iv e schools, have been
e in p lo y o l as sy n o n y m o n s for notion (itoO'o), the ;ict or object o f the
U n d ersta n d in g Proper, or F.acnlty o f R elations. So far, therefore,
yon are siitlieieiitly prejtared not to attribute to the word conception,
w hen you hear it front me, the m ea n in g Avhich it bears in th e jthilo-
sujihical writings Avith Avhieh you are m ost likely to be familiar.
W h a t is the jireeisc m ea ning o f the term Avill be soon fully e x
plained in its ]iroj)or jtlaoc, Avhen Ave co m m en c e the tre.atment o f
L o g ic itself^ R u t Avhat I jirincipally pause at jircsent to say is
that, lor the sake o f jierspicuity, I think it necessary, in reference to
this w o n l, to m.ake the folloAving distinction. T h e term conception,
like p e r o p tio n , im a g in a tio n , etc., me.ans tAVO things, or rather tho
same th in g in tw o different relations, rel.ations, hoAVCA'cr, Avhich it
is o f great imjiortance to distinguish, and to mark tho distinction
liy tlie em p lo y m e n t o f d istinct words. Conception means lioth the
act o f conceiving, and (he object c o n c e iv e d ; U'S perception, both the
act o f perceiving, and the th in g jicrceived ; im a g in a tio n , both the
;ict o f im agining, and Avhat is im agined. N o w , tliis is a source o f
gi'oat A'agnene"S in oiir jihilosojthical discussions: liave Ave no means
o f avoid in g this in coiivenioncc ? I th ink a v c li.ave ; and that, too,
w ithout com tnittiiig :my v iolence njton lan gu age. 1 Avonld jn'opose
th fblloAving distinction : h'or the act o f conceiving, the term con-
n p tio n .shoidd he eiiijiloycd, .and that e x c lu s iv e ly ; Avhile for the
obj<-ct o f c(>iic<ptMiii, or that Avhich is con c eive d , the term conce]>t
shoiihl h<* used. C o n c tp t is the Itiiglish o f the Latin conceptnm ,
id ipiod ro n n p tu tn rsf, .and had it no vestel riglit .as .an nctnal
dmiiziai o f the hingnagc, it h.as g ood w'.arr.aiit for its naturalization-,
'rina'c .are .a tlions.ainl words in hhiglish formed on jnvcisely llie
same anahi'_'y, as prr-crpf, digi.st, etc., etc. Rnt Ave h.avc no occ.asioii
to appc.il to .analogy. Tlie term i-on<:ept was in com m on use am on g
the ohha- philosojihical Avriters in F n g lish y thcjiigh, like ni.any other
A-.alinhle cx])rcssif)us t>f these .authors, it has been overlook ed Ity onr
1 ' I x r i i i r f t n n .V 'C i/z td /v '/-,. | c c t . x x x i i i ]). iiil( ! l) i; ; f ii( li." .Si'O O c c t ir n , 7/> . S e n c , ) i. (I. 2 ,
4 '.'- I .e . r ]ii. S , ;iii<) B ii.O , 1. i. <1. .3, <|. .5 ]
2 .''<< I .K -I, [ fn S e n t .. ] I i) i# t 2. (,11 1 ii 3 S c i; Z i i c l i a r y C o k i - , A r t o f L n g ir k . l ^ o i u l o i i
<. t 2. ' M 2 I'.v O f c a n i a i >I r ic i^ t < j |I k - is . ]>]). 11, 101, et n H h i ; ( i i d c D i i I la r v r .
' is Uijt-tl a*)'iiJ <]inaJ icrriiinat acturri A r c h e lo g ia Jh ito s o p h ic a Nova, or Mew i ri"~'-i'e\
L e c t . III. LOGIC 31
E nglish lexicographers. I m ay add, th a t nearly th e same fortune

has hefallen the term in F re n ch . Conceqit was in ordinary use hy
th e old F re n ch philosophers, b u t had la tte rly w axed obsolete. It
has, however, I see, heen reinstated in its rights since th e rea w a ken
ing o f ])hilosopliy in Bh-anec; and, in particular, it is now employed
in th a t language in tran slatin g from the G erm an the term B e g r ijf.
I shall, therefore, make no scrniilc in using th e expression concept
for the object o f concejition, and conception I sliall exclusively em
ploy to designate the act of conceiving. W h e t h e r it m ig h t not, in
like manner, he pro]ver to introduce th e term percepit for the object
of perception, I shall n o t at p resent inquire.
B u t to return from this digression. Logic, we have seen, is ex
clusively conversant a b o u t th o u g h t strictly so
^ A n a lo g y betw een denom inated, and th o u g h t ]u-oper, we have seen,
L o g ic an d M a th e m a t- jg eogiiitioii of oiie ohject of tliouglit by aii-
other, in or u n d er Avddch it is m entally in c ln d e ti;
in o the r words, th o u g h t is the k n ow ledg e o f a th in g thro ugh a
concept or general notion, or of one notion th rou gh another. In
thonglit, all th a t we th in k a bout is considered either as som ething
containing, or as som ething contained ; in o th e r words, eveiy p ro
cess of th o u g h t is only a cognition of the necessar}' relations of om-
concepts. T his being th e case, it need not move onr w onder th a t
Logic, within its p rop er s])here, is of snch irrefragable certainty,
tliat, in the midst o f all the revolutions of philosojihical doctrines,
it has stood not only nn shattered h u t unshaken. In this res]icct,
Logic and M athem atics stand alone am ong th e sciences, and their
jiecniiar certainty flows from the same source. B oth are conversant
a bo ut the relations o f certain a p r io r i forms of in te llig e n c e :
]\Iathematics about the necessary forms o f Im ag in atio n ; Logic ahont
th e necessary forms o f U n d e r s ta n d in g ; M a th em atic s about the re
lations of onr ]-cprcsontations o f objects, as out o f each o the r in
sjiace and ti m e ; Logic a hont the relations of onr eoiicejits of o b
jects, as ill or u n der each other, th a t is, as, in different relations,
]-es]iectively containing and contained. B oth are thus d e m o n stra
tive or .absolutely certain sciences only as each clcvelojis wliat is
given wh.'it is given as necessary, in the mind itself. T h e laws
of Logic arc g rou nded on the mere possibility o f a know ledge
tlirsiiigli the concepts o f the L^nderstanding, and th ro ugh these w
know only hy eom preliending the many under the one. Coiiceni-
ing the nature of the objects delivered hy th e Subsidiary Faculties
o f Philosophy. L o n d 16G3, 1. i., b. ii., c. 4, p. B a y n e s , N ew A n a ly tic o f L o g ica l Form s, pp. 5

22. F o r se v er a l a iitlio r itie s for th e use o f th is 6 n o te. E d .
term a m o n g th e o ld e r E n g lish l o g ic ia n s , se e
to tbe El.aborativo, Logic prononiiees notliing, b ut restricts its con-

sitlcration to tlie laws according to which tlieir agreem ent or disa
g ree m en t is aHirmed.'
It is o f itself manife.st th a t every science m u st obey the laws of
Logic. I f it does not, such prete n d ed science
Logic I-iiicnegatixe fouiidcd Oil reflection, and is only an irra-
c o r i H l i o i i ol i n i l h . . 1 1 t 4 1,
tional absurdity. A ll inference, evolution, con
catenation, is con d ucted on logical principles principles wliich
arc ever valid, e ver imperative, ever tbe same. B u t an e.xtension
<if any science tlirough L o g ie is ab solutely im possible; for by con-
fbnniiig to logical canons w e acquire no k n o w le d g e receive notb-
iiiir new , but are on ly enabled to render w h a t is already obtained
more iiitelligilile, by analysis and arrangement. L o g ic is o n ly tlie
n cgatixe eoiiditiuii o f iriitli. T o atteinjit by a mere logical kiiowl-^
e d g e to aiiqilify a science, is an absurdity as gre.-it as if Ave should
atteiiijit by a k n o w le d g e o f tbe gramm atical hiAvs o f a la n gu age to
discover what Avas Avritten in this language, Avithout a perusal o f the
several Avritings th em selves. B u t th o u g h L o g ic can n ot extend ,
eaiinot amplify a seieiiee by the d iscovery o f iicav fiicts, it is not to
be sii])]iosed that it does not contribute to the progress o f science.
T h e jirogress o f the sciences consists n ot merely in the accumulation
o f new matter, but likcAvise in th e d etection o f ih e relations subsist
ing :imong the materials accum ulated ; and the reflective abstraction
by Avhicli this i.s effected, m ust n o t o n ly folloAV the laAvs o f Logic,
but is most jioAverfiilly cultivated b y the habits o f logical study.
In these intercalary observations I liave, hoAvever, insensibly en-
ero.ached upon the second q u e s t io n , "Wliat is the U t i l i t y o f L o g ic?
On this question I now' dictate the folloAving jiaragraph :
IV . As the rules of Logic do not regard the m a tte r hut

only the form o f thoug ht, the U tility of
Par. IV. utility of Logic iTiiist, in likc manner, be view ed as
L o g ic . . . .
lim ited to its influence on onr m a n n er of
thinking, and not sought for in any effect it can e x e rt upon
w hat we think about. I t i.s, therefore, in the first place, n ot to
be considered useful as a iMalerial In stru m en t, th a t is, as a mean
of ex tendin g our knowledge by the discovery of new tr u th s ;
hut merely as ;i Formal Iiistriiiiieiit, tliat is. as a mean by which
knowledge, already acquired, may be methodized info the form
accoTiimodated to flic conditions of onr nnderstandiiig. In the
eermd jilaee. it is not to be rcgardi'd .as a Medicine of the mind
1 Cf. L a c b m a n n , L of/ik, E in lc itu n g , 20. 2 [A n c illo n , E sa a is Philoanphiques, t. ii p

E d it. 1 8 2 8 . E d. 2 9 1 .]
L e c t . III. LOGIC. 33
to tlic e x te n t o f rem ed y in g tlie various errors w hich originate

in the nature o f the objects o f onr k n o w led g e , but m erely to
the e x te n t o f jiiirging the mind o f those errors which arise
from inconsequence and confusion in thinking.'
Logic, hoAvever, is still o f e m in en t utility, n o t o n ly as p resen tin g

to us the m ost in terestin g object o f contem plation in tlic mechanism
o f human th ou g h t, but as teach in g how, in m any relations, to dis
crim inate truth from error, and hoAV to m eth od ize onr knoAvledge
into system ; Avhile, at the same time, in tu rning tbe mind upon
itself, it affords to onr higher faculties one o f their m ost in vigorating
exerci.ses. A n o th e r u tility is, that L o g ic alone affords us the means
requisite to accomplish a rational criticism, and to co m m unicate its
results. *
W h a t is noAV sum marily stated in the p r ecedin g paragraph, I
illustrated, in m y last Lecture, in detail, in so far as it was requis
ite to d isencum ber the real value o f our scien ce from those false
utilities which, in place o f en h an cin g its Avorth in th e ojiinioii o f
th e Avorld, have, in fact, mainly contributed to reduce the common
estim ate o f its im portance far beneath the truth. I n o w proceed
to term inate Avhat I have to say under this head by a fcAv Avords, in
exposition o f w hat renders tb e cultivation o f L og ic o f gen u ine
logic one o f the m ost im portant and jirofitable o f our studies.
A d m i t t i n g , th e r efor e, t h a t t h is s c i e n c e t e a c h e s n o t h i n g ucav ,
t h a t it n e i t h e r e x t e n d s t h e b o u n d a r ie s o f knoAvl-
L o g ic g iv e s u s, t o a ed ge, iior unfolds the m ysteries A vhieh lie bevond
c e r ta in e x t e n t , clom in - n n
couq.ass o f th e reflective intellect, and
io n o v e r o u r t h o u g h t s
that it only in vestig ates the im m utable laws to
w h ich the mind in th in k in g is subjected, still, inasmuch as it d e v e l
ops the application o f th ese law.s, it b estow s on ns, to a certain e x
tent, a dominion over our tboiights them selves. A n d i.s it no th in g
to Avatcli the secret workshop in which nature fabricates cognitions
and thoughts, and to jionetrate into the sanctuary o f self-eonseioiis-
ness, to the end that, h a vin g learnt to k n o w ourselves, a v c may be
qualified rightly to iinderstaiid all e lse? Is it n oth in g to seize the
helm o f thought, and to be able to turn it at onr Avill ? For, through
a research into the laAvs o f thinking. L og ic g iv e s us, in a certain
sort, a possession o f the tlioughts them selves. It is true, indeed,
th at the mind o f man is, like the universe o f matter, govern ed by
eternal laws, and follows, even Avithoiit coiiscioiisness, the invari
able canons o f its nature. B u t to k n o w and understand itself, and
1 C f. K r u g , L ngik, ^ 9. E d .
5
34 l OGTC. L ect. in.
out of the boundless obnos o f plimnonionn presented to the senses

to fonn eoncepts, through concepts to reduce th a t chaos to h an n o n v
and arrnmxement,
and thus to establish the dominion of intelligence O
o\ er the universe o f existence, it is this alone which constitutes
man's g rand and distinctive preeminence. ' Man, s.ays the g rea t
P.ascal, is but a reed, the very frailest in n a t u r e ; but he is a reed
that thinks. I t needs not th a t the Avhole universe should arm to
(rush him. l i e dies from an exhalation, from a dro]) of water. B u t
should the universe cons|)iro to cru.sh him, man AVonld still he nobler
than that by whieli he tails; for he know s th a t he d ie s; and o f the
vietorv which the universe has over him, the universe knoAvs n o th
ing. Tim s our Avholc dignity consists in th o u g h t ............................Let
ns labor, then, tct think arigh t; this is th e feiindation o f morality,
In the Avurld o f sense, illusive appearances hover around us like
evil sjnrits; unreal dre.ams m ingle th em selv es
S u p p l i e s in p a r t t h e l<),oAvledge ; tlic accustom ed assumes
c r i l c r i o n o f l r u t h fr o m , . , , . .
the character ot certa in ty ; and the associations
o f th o u g h t are m istaken for the c o n n e ctio n s o f
existen ce. W e th u s require a criterion to discrim inate truth from
error; and this criterion is, in part at least, supplied to ns b y Logic.
L ogic teaches us to analyze the con c rete masses o f onr knoAvlc(lge
into its elem ents, ;ind thus g iv e s us a clear and d istinct ajijirehcnsion
o f its parts, it teach es ns to think co n sisten tly and with m ethod, and
it teaches us h o w to build up onr nccmniilated k n o w le d g e into a firm
and harinonioiis e<lifice.' T h e stu d y o f logic is as iiece.ssaiy for
correct tliinking, :is the stu d y o f gramm ar is for correct sjieak ing;
Avcre it not oth erw is e and in itself an in terestin g s tu d y to inves-
ti'.G'ite the meehaiiism o f the human in telle ct in the m arvellous
frocec<es o f th oim hl. T h e y , at least, w ho are familiar Avith this
mech:mim, are less exp osed to the c o v e r t fall.acies Avhich so ca.sily
<lehide those niiaccnstomed to an analysis o f these proct'sses.
B u t it is not only by affording know ledg e and skill t h a t L ogic is
thus useful ; it is perhaps equally conducive to
imiRoraie# iiir I . n- same cnd by bostoAving iiower. T h e retor
sion o f th o u g h t upon its elf the th in k in g of
thoii'jht is a vigorous effort, and, consc(jiicntly, an invigorating
exereisc o f the I 'n d e r s t a n d i n g ; and as the u n d e rsta n d in g is the in-
stnim m it of all scientific, o f all philosophical, spcciilalion. Logic, by
preem inently eid tiva tiii" th e understan ding, in this resjtect likewise
1 [ I t p i n r i c l i I ' l c l i l o r ) . [ iJ t/r den C if g r n s ta n d F a ii;;^ !rc.) C om pare D is c u s s io n s , p. 3H

u n d den V m /a n i; d e t L n g ik , p p . 3 . 4 , L ci] > ic, K u.
1-2.', Kr, 3 Cf. U ic lite r , Lngik, p p . 5 , 0, 12. E d
2 Pensnex I*, i art iv . i C. ( v o l . ii. p . R4. c d . < K r u } ;. Iôgik, f 9 , j>. 2 0 . E d .
L e c t. HI. LOGIC. 35
vindicates its ancient title to be viewed as the ho.st p reparatory dis

cipline for Philosoiihy and the sciences at large.
Thei-e i.s, huwevcr, one utility which, th ough of a subordinate
kind, I m ust not omit, though I do not remendver to have seen it in
sisted on hy any logical writer. In reference to this, I give you the
following paragra])h :
V. B u t Logic is further nsofnl as affording a N o m en c la tu re

o f the laws by which les(itimate tld n k in s
P a r. V. U tility o f _ i i i i i- i
Logic,-as affording IS govcm od. and o f tlic violatioii of tlicse
a seientifle nomencla- laWS, thron"ll wllicll thoilgh t bcCOnieS vicioUS
ture.
or null.
I llu s t r a t io n . I t is said, in Hndibra.s,'
T l i a t a ll a l l h e t o r i f i a n s ru le s
S e rv e o n ly h u t to n a m e h is to o l s ;
and it m ay be safely confessed th a t this is o n e of the principal utili

ties o f R hetoric. mere kn ow ledge o f the rules o f R he to ric can
no more enable ns to compose well, tha n a m ere know ledge of the
rules of Logic can enable ns to think'w ell. T h e re is required from
nature, in both, the f a c u lty ; h nt this faculty must, in both d e p a r t
ments, he cultivated hy an assiduous and also a well-directed exer
c i s e ; th a t is, in the one, the powers o f Comjiarison m ust be ex
ercised according to the rules o f a sound Rhetoric, in the other,
according to the rides o f a sound Logic. I n so far, therefore, the
u tility o f either science is sonictliiiig more than a mere nam ing of
tlieir tools. B u t the nam in g of tlieir tools.
I m p o r ta n c e o f a bci- tiionjrh in itself of little value, is valuable as th e
e n title n o m e n c la tu r e . ^ . . .
condition o f an im p o rta n t function, which, w ith
o ut this, could not he performed, 'Words do n ot give th o u g h ts ; hnt
w ith o u t words, th o u g h ts could n ot ho fixed, limited, and expressed.
T h e y are, therefore, in general, th e essential condition o f all th in k
ing, w orthy o f the name. Now , w hat is tru e o f hum an th o u g h t in
general, is true of Logic and R he to ric in particular. T h e nom encla
tu r e in these sciences is th'c nom enclatnro of certain general aiialv-
se.s and distinctions, which exjiress to the iifitiated, in a single word,
w hat the uninitiated could (su p p o sin g w hat is n o t probable
th a t he could jierform th e relative jiroee.sscs) neither n nd erstand nor
cxpr ss w ithout a tedious and vague ])eri])hrasis; while, in hi.'=! hands,
it Would assume only the ajqiearance of a ]artienlar observation, in
stead of a particular instance of a general and acknow ledged rule.
T o take a very sinqile example : th ere is in L ogic a certain sophism,
1 p . C a n t i. 89 E d
LOGIC. L ect. I ll
r.r net ot* illegal interference, b y wliich tw o th in gs arc, perhajis in a

very concealed and circuitous niannei, made to
jirove each other. N o w , the man unacquainted
with L ogic m ay pcrliajis d e te c t and be convinced o f the f d l a c y ;
but b ow will he e.xjiose it ? H e m ust enter upon a lo n g sta te
ment and exjilanation, and after much labor to liim self and otber.s,
be jirobably does not make bis objection clear and dem onstrative
after ;ill. But be tw e en those acquainted w ith Logic, the wliole
matter would be .settled in tw o words. It w ould be enough to say
and <how that the infei-encc in question in volved a circuhis in con-
<hnh H<h>, and the refutation is at once understood and a dm itted. Tt
i> in like inaniiei- that one lawyei* will exjiress to another th e 7'atio
d> ri<l,,ndi o f a case in a single technical expression ; w h ile their
clients will oid y jicrjilex th e m selv es-a n d others in their attem p ts to
>et forth tlie merits o f their cause. N o w , i f L o g ic did n o th in g more
than establish a certain number o f decided and decisive rules in
reasoning, and afford us brief and precise expressions b y Avbich
to bring jiarticular cases under th ese general rules, it w ould confer
on all w h o in any w a y cmjiloy tlieir in tellect that is, on the culti-
vntoi'S o f ev ery liuinan science the m ost imjiortant obligation.
f*or it is o n ly in the jiossession o f sncli cstcblislicd rules, and o f such
a technical nomenclature, that w e can accomjilish, with lacility, and
to an adequate ex ten t, a eritieisin o f any work o f reasoning. L o g i
cal la nguage is thus, to the general reasonei', w h a t the notation o f
A rithm etic, and still more o f A lgebra, is to the inathcinatician.
Both eimble us to comjireliend and exjires.s, in a few significant sa iu-
bol>, Avhat Avould otherAvise overjiower us by tlieir com jilexity ; and
tliiis it isthat n o th in g Avould contribute more to facilitate and e x
tend lh( fiiciilty o f reasoning, than a general acquaintance Avitli the
ruh's and lan gu age O o f Logic,
7 an ad v an ta ge
' e x te n d in CgD in d eed to
e v e r y dcjartm ciit o f knoAvledge, b u t m o r e e sjiocia lly o f inijio rta nce
t<- t h o s e jirofession s Avhieh arc o c e u jiie d in in fe r e n c e , and conA-'ersant
wi t h ab^'tract m a tte r , su c h a.s T h e o l o g y a nd LaAW
I iioAV jirocecd to the third ot the jirelirninarv questions viz.,
H o w is Jjogie d ivid ed ? N o w , it is manifest that
this question may he vieAved in tw o relations;
for, in asking b o w is L ogic divid(d, avc either
mean bow many kinds are there o f L ogic, or into Iioav m a n y con-
' t i t m nt jiarls is it distributed ? W e m ay consider L o gic cither as
a universal, or as an integrate, Avliole.
I o l J .o jjic i n l o X a lu r 'a l a iid A r l i f i c i a l . iiio p t .

U** Ii f t #-00)1 p o i n t w i t l i n a l i v r ' f in intl.
j 'UZ7le<) J > i pl c u l n j g g l e * f j r b e h i n d .
C f. K r u g , L ofpk, i>. 2^. T r o x le r i. 48.

L e c t . I II . LOGIC. O' t
I t is necessary to consider tlic former question first; for, Vjcfore

]roceediiig to show wliat are the jiarts of which
^ r. T h e S p e c ie s o f logic is made up, it is recpiisite previously to
determ ine w hat the logic is o f which tliese parts
are the components. U n d e r the former head, I therefore give you
the fo llo w in g :
^ V I . L og ic, considered as a Gem is or Class, may, in differ

ent relations, he d iv id ed into different Sjio-
par. VI. Logic, by . A n d , ill tlic fiisL phicc, Considered hv
relation to the mind, 1
is Objective and Sub.relation to tlic iiiiiid or tliinking siihject.
Logic is divided into Ohjective and S nhjec
tive, or, in tlie language of some older authors, into L o g k a
system atica and L o g ic a hahitaatis}
B y Ohjective or System atic Logic is m e an t th a t com plem ent of

doctrines o f whicli the science of Ltigic is made
E x p lic a t io n . , r. , i t t i t
u p ; hy Snhjective or lla h itn a l Logic is m eant
the speculative kn ow ledge of these doctrines which any individual,
(as Socrates, P lato, A ristotle) m a y possess, and the jiractical dex
tcrity with which he is ahle to ajiply them.
N ow , it is e v ident th a t hoth tliese Logies, or, ratlicr. Logic con
sidercd in this twofold relation, o u ght to he jiro
Both these Logics posed to liiiiiself hy MU acadcmical instructor,
ougiit to be proposed ^ must, therefore, neglect neither. Logic con-
as th e e n d o f lo g ic a l ^ .
in s tr u c iio n . si<lexHl as a sysleiii o f rules, is only valuable as
a mean tow ard s logic considered as a hah it of
the mind ; and, therefore, a logical in struc tor o u g h t not to think
t h a t lie fulfils his d u ty th a t he acconijdishes all th a t he is called
on to jierforni if lie limit himself to the m ere ciiounceinent of a
code of doctrine, leaving his p ujifs to turn his instructions to th e ir
own .account as host they may. On the contraiy, he is hound to rec
ollect th a t he should he som ething more than a hook ; th a t he ought
not only himself to deliver the one Logic, h n t to take care tliat his
jtnpils acquire the other. T h e former, indeed, he m u st do as a con
dition of the l a t t e r ; h u t if he considers the system atic logic which
he jjrononnccs, as of any value, except in so far as Ids jnijiils convert
it into an liahitnal logic, lie un derstands notliing o f the character of
th e function Avliich he a tte m p ts to perform. I t is, therefore, incnm-
1 S e e T im p le r , p. ST7; V o s s iu s , p. 217; P a - v a r io u s d iv is io n s o f L o g ic , see T im p le r , L o g t-

c iu s. [Logiccp S y ste m a . anthore M . Clemente cm S y s te m a , 1. i. c. 1. q. 1320, p. 40 66,
r/)n/7lero, H a iio v ia ;, 1612. V o s s iu s , D e A'o(i/ra G is b e r t ab I s e n d o o n i , E ffa ia Philosop/iica,
A riiu m , 1. iv . Sii-e de L o g ic a , c. ix . I a c iu s, In [C e n t. i. 51 63, p. 95 et sey., e d . D a v e n t r ia
P orph yrii Isagogen , p. 2, e d . F r a u c o f , 1697. O n 1643. E d .]
oS LOGIC. L ect. I ll
boiU on an academical instructor, to do wli.-t in him lies to induce

lii.s I'Upils, by legieal exercise, to dige.st w li;.t is jtieseiitcd to tlicin
as an objective system into a subjective habit. L ogic, therefore, in
both these rel.ations belong.^ to us, and neither can be n eglected
without c om p rom isin g the utility o f a course like llie present.
^ II. In the second jdace, by lel.ation to its apjilication or

iion-a])plicatioii to ohjccts. Logic is divided
r.nr.VII. by A b stra c t or Gcncr.al, and into Concrete
r wl a . i on i o o b j c c ( 8 i s
A-siract or General. or Siiccial. T h e foiaiier of these is called.
ami C onorele or Spe- G rock A l ' i s t O t e l i a i l . S , BiaXcKTLKr]
- p a y g d T o n ' , and, by the Arabi.an and Latin

schoolmen, L ogiea doctns; Avhile the laltei- is denom inated, by
the Greeks, SiuAfK-oo) ec xp^(rft kul yvp.\'a(jia irpayp.dTU)Vby the
A rabians and Latins, L u gica utcns.
Abstract Logic considers (he laws of ih o n g h t as potentially apjtli-

c.able to the object.s of all ails and sciences, b ut
K xpiicatioii. Mctii.ally a])]>licd to tliose of a n y ; C on
crete Logic considers these l.aws in th e ir actual and im m ediate appli
cation to tlic uhjecl-m atter of this or th a t jiailicul.ar science. T h e
foi-mer o f these is one, and alone liclongs to jdiilosophy, Avhcrcas
the hitter is as iiiullitorm as the aits and sciences to which it is
relative.'
This division o f Logic does not rem o u n t to Aristotle, b u t it is
Ibimd in his most jwieient comiiient.atoi', A lexan-
Ti.i#diviKionofLo};ic Aidirodisiaii, and, after him, in mo.st of
rcinniiiiis lo ,\l*'xuii- , , , . . ,, , .n
dcril.eApiirodMan. Logieiaiis. A le x a n d e r illus
trates thc^ opjiosition of the logic divorced from
thiiiLTs (\">pi<; TpayiJ-diTi.n-, r(:hns avidso), to the logic apjilied to
thill'js (iv )g)qrrL s a l yvp.varrui. Trpayp.aroir, Vcin/S Ojiphcata^, by a
.8imile. d'lie Ibniier, he says, may he resembled to a geometrical
ti'_;iiii*. .âv :i triangle, when eonsidered abstractly and 'in itsell;
wherc.ax the halter may he resembled to the same triangle, as con
cretely exi>liiig in this or th a t particnlar m.atter: for a tia.aiiglc con-
si'lerecl in it.selfis ever otic and tho sa m e; b ut viewed in relation lo
its nnitti-r, it varies aia-ording to the v:u'iety of th a t m.atter; for it
i- ditle reiit as it is of sih e r, gold, l e a d as it is of Avood, o f stone,
ete. dhe s.aiiie holds good of Logie, (ileiier.al or A b s tr a c t Logic
I x e K rii;;. j) 27 [ U 'g ik , j 10 A iiin . I'.D.) g n n u m . p. 2-3. q. v. [ 2. A lo x a n d c r A p lir o -

I-<-tidi)<,r)i, I'.p iin . C f i i . i . .V7; (|<dliii, di>ii-i:#i< L i,;;lcani i la m a b jin ic la m sim ilc iii
J .r t g n g r J ,r , g i ,n . p . 12.) T lio in u n ru ti< -ii i# i - k c a il ILiir:u u fo iiio lr ic a ;, u lp o tc I r ia iig u lo ,
fu ll) jîvfii b) I.a lfijr e u s , Com rricniarius in Or- d u iu iu be fcl per be b]>cclatur; L o g ic a m v e r o
Lect. III. LOGIC. 39
is always one and the sa m e; but a.s applied to tliis or to tb a t objoci

o f consideration, it appears iniiltifonn. So far Ale.xander. This
appearance of inultiforniity I may, liowe\ er, add, is n o t real ; foi-
the mind has truly only one mode of tiiinking, one nmde o f rca.son-'
ing, one m ode o f co nductin g itself in tlie invesligalioii of triilli,
w hatever m ay be the object on which it exercises itself. Logic
m ay therefore be again well compared to the
Illu s tra te d by com - i c
. ' autliority oi an universal empire ui Jiii ein-
pansous. _ '
jiire g o verning tbc world by common laws. In
such a dominion there are m any provinces, various regions, :md dil-
ferent proefeetures. T h e r e is one prtefect in Asia, anotlier in Eurojie,
a third in Africa, and each is deeoratcd by different titles; b u t eneli
governs and is governed by the coinnioii laws o f th e em pire con
fided to his adniinislration. T h e n atnre o f General Logic may
likewise be illustrated by anoth er comparison. T h e Tham es, for
instance in passing L ondon, is a single river, is one water, b u t is
there applied to m any and different uses. I t is em ployed for d rin k
ing, for cooking, for brewing, for washing, for irrigation, for naviga
tion, etc. In like manner, Logie in itself is o n e : as a science or
an art, it is single; but, in its applications, it is o f various and m ulti
form use in the various branches o f knowledge, conversant be it with
necessary, or be it w ith co n ting ent m atter. O r further, to take tin-
example o f a cognate science, if any one w ere to lay down difterent
gram m ars of a tongue, as th a t may be applied to the difterent p u r
poses o f life, he would be ju stly derided by all grammarian.s, indeed
by all m e n ; for who is there so ig n o ran t as n o t to know th a t there
is b ut one g r a m m a r of the same language in all its various ajiplica-
tions?
T hus, likewise, th ere is only one m ethod o f reasoning, which all
the sciences indifterently e m p lo y ; and although men are severally
occujiied in different pursuits, and altliough one is, tlierefore, entitled
a Tlieologian, another a Ju rist, a tliird a Pliysician, and so on, each
c u m r eb u s c o n ju u c fa m s im ile m e k le m tri- ' S e e R a m i Sr/i., p. 350, [P . R a m i Sr/m la i>i

a iig u lo liu ic a u t i ll i m a le r ix im ijr e sso . K a m Li6em(es A rlfs, B a silu ;e, 157t;. L'iiii.s est Lu-
t r ia n g u li in .se u n a e s t e t e a d e m r a tio ; a t p ro feli:e S e q u a u a , ad m u lto s ta m e ii iisu s e t vr.rio.s
\ a r ie t a t e m a teriic v a r ia . A liu d e iiim e sl ar- a c e o m m o d a liis , la v a a id u m , a q u a iu lu m , v e h e ii-
g e n tp u n i, a liu d a u r c u m , a liu d l ig iie u m , la p i- d u m , i n ig a n d u m , c o q iie u d u m : s ic u n a e.=t
d e u u i, a u t p lu iu b ju n i. T h e p a ssa g e r e ferred L o g ic a , v a r ii et m u lt ip lic is usus, in p ro p o si-
to is p r o b a b ly o n e in th e C o m m e n ta r y o n ttie tio iiu n e c e ss a r ia , p r o b a b ili, c a p tio s a ; ars ta-
Prior A n alytics, p. 2. od. A id . T h e d is lin c fio n m en u n a . S i (Ir a m in a fic a s t ie s a liq n is in e|)-
its e lf, t lio u g li n o t th e i llu s tr a t io n , is g iv e n ttis n o b is in s titn a t, u n a m c i v i . ein , n lte ia n i
m o re e x a c t l y in th e la n g u a g e o f th e t e x t b y a g r e ste m . te r tia m d e v itis a in h o r u m , m e r ito
s o m e o f the la te r c o n n n e n ta lo !-s. S e e Ihe I n - rid ea tiir a (1 r a m m a tic is o in n ih n s . q u i u n a m
tr o d u c fio u s o f A m in o n in s t o t h e Categories, (Ira rn m n tica m n o r u n t o m n iu m eju sd em Iin-
a n d o f I h ilo p o n u s to th e Prior A n a ly tic s. gua; h o m in u u i c o in m u iu m . E d .]
E d .]
em ploys th e same jirocesses, and is governed hy the same laws, of

thou g h t. Logic itself is, therefore, widely difier-
G cn er a i L o g ic is cut from the use tlic api)lie:itioii of Logic,
a lo n e one. si> eciai F u r Logic is asti'ictcd to no determ in a te m atter.
L o g ic IS in a n ilo ld . an d i i , n i
i n r t o f th e scien ce in all t h a t IS t l l C o h j c c t o f reS S O T l
( ' 'S t y m i e d tO
w h ic h it is a p p lie d . aiul iiiteHigeiico. T h e use of Logic, on the co n
trary, althoug h potentially appljcahle to ev-
I'l-y m atter, is always actually manifested hy sjiecial reference to
some one. In jioiiit o f fiet. Logic, in its particular applications, no
longer remains logic, h u t hecomcs p a r t and jiarcel o f the a r t or sci
ence ill which it is aiijjlied. T h u s Logic, applied to the objects of
geom etry, is n o th in g else th a n G e o m e tr y ; Logic, applied to the
objects of pliysic.s, n o th in g else th an N atural Pliilosoidiy. W e have,
indeed, certain treatises o f Logie in reference to different sciences,
which may he viewed as som ething m ore than these sciences them-
.selves. F o r ex a m p le : we have treatises on Legal Logic, e t c ; h nt
Mich treatises are only introductions only m ethodologies o f the
arl or science to which th e y relate. F o r such special logics only
exhibit the mode in which a determ in a te m a tte r or ohject o f sci
ence, the know ledg e of which is presupposed, m u st be trea ted , the
conditions which regulate the certain ty of inferences in t h a t m a t
ter, and th e m e th ods hy which our k n o w led ge o f it m ay be co n
structed into a scientific whole. Special Logic is th u s n o t a sin-
_de discijiliiie, not the science o f the universal laws o f thou g h t, b u t
a congeries o f diseijilines, as num erous as there are sjiecial sciences
in which it may he applied. A b s tr a c t or General Logic, on th e con
trary, in virtue o f its universal character, can only and alone be
o n e ; and can exclusively jireteml to the d ignity o f :in in d e p en d e n t
science. This, therefore, likewise exclusively concerns us.
LECTURE I V.
IN TRO DUC TIO N.
L O G IC III. IT S D IV IS IO N S P U R E A N D M O D IF IE D .
I n iny last Lecture, after teriuiiiatiug the consideration of tho sec

ond intro d u c to ry question, touch ing th e U tilities o f Logic, I p ro
ceeded to the third intioductory tiuestion,
R e c a p itu la t io n . . . . y, ^ i
W h a t are the Divisions of L ogic? and staled
to yon the tAvo most general classifications o f this science. Of
these, the first is the diAision of Logic into OhjectiAê and Subjec
tive, or System atic and H a b i t u a l ; the second is its division into
General and Sjiccial, or A b stra c t and Concrete.
T o speak only o f th e latter. A b stra c t or G eneral Logic is logic
viewed as tre a tin g of the formal laws o f thou g h t, Avithout respect
to any p articular m atter. Concrete or Special Logic is logic vicAved
as tre a tin g o f these laAvs in relation to a certain mattei-, and in sub
ordination to the end o f some determ in a te science. T h e former of
these is one, and belongs alone to philosophy, th a t is, to 'th e science
o f the universal princijiles o f k n o w le d g e ; th e la tte r is as manifold
as the sciences to Avhich it is subservient, and of Avhich it, in fact,
constitutes a ]>art, viz., th e ir M ethodology. This division of
logic is given, b u t in different terms, by the G reek Aristotelians and
by the Latin schoolmen. T he G reek division docs n o t re m o unt to
Aristotle,- b u t it is found in his earliest expositor, A lex a n d er of
A])hrodisias, and he Avas probably n o t th e first by Avhom it Avas
enounced. I t is into BiaXeKTLKTj Trpay/xdrojv, L og ic a rebus avulsa,
th a t is. Logic merely formal. Logic ajiart from th in g s ; in other
Avords, abstract from all iiarticnlar m a t t e r ; and BiaXcKTLKr] iv yprjuci
sal yi/xi'ao-ia Trpay/xdrwv, Lôgica rebus oppllcata, th a t is. Logic as used
and exercised upon th in g s ; in o the r Avords, as apjilicd to certain
special objects.
T his distinction o f L ogic by the Greek A ristotelians seems alto
g e th e r unknow n to m odern logicians. Tlie division of Logic by the
scholastic A ristotelians is the same Avith the preceding, b u t the
term s in Avhich it is exju'cssed are less precise and unambiguous.
6
-1-2 LOGIC. L e c t . IY .
T h is division is into the L o g ic a docens and Iôgica utcns. Tlie

L o g ic a doccns is e.xplained as logic considered as an ab stra ct th e
o r y , as a preceptive system of rules, quc tr a d it pneeejita ;
the L ogica utcns, \\)i logic considered as a conci ete practice, as an
apj)lieation of these rules to use, quaj u titu r prieccptis. '
This scholastic division o f Logic into doccns and utens has, I see,
been noticed by some o f th e more m odern an-
Tiu* division of i.og- tlioi's ; blit it lias bcoii a ltogether mistaken, which
ica doLcns, and L og- \v()uld iiot liavc becu, had these authors been
icu uiYiis, iin.'tiik en b y ^
oine modern autiiois. aw arc o f tlic m e a n in g in Avliicli tbe term s were
em ployed, and liad th e y not been ignorant, of
(be more e.xplicit cxiuession o f it b y th e Gieeks. T h u s tlie term s
docens and utens are emjiloyed by W o l f to m ark a distinction not
the same as th a t which the y designate in the scholastic logic, and
as the Wolti.-m distinction will not sta n d the lest o f criticism, the
term s themselves have been rep u d ia ted by those who were not
aw are th a t thci'c was an older and a more valid division which
they alone properly expressed. W o l f makes the Jôgica doccns,
tlie mere k n o w led ge o f the rules: the JjOgica utens, tha h abit or
dexterity o f ajijdying them. T his distinction o f General and S pe
cial logic, W o l f and the Wolfian logicians, likewise, d enote by th a t
of T heoretical and l^ractical Logic. T h ese term s ai'c in themselves
by no me:m.s a bad expression of tbe distinction ; b u t those by w hom
they were em ployed, unfortuiiatcjy did n o t lim it their Practical
Logic to w h at I have defined as Special, for u n d er P ra ctical they
iiieliuled not only Special, b ut likewise ]\Iodificd Logic, o f which
we are now to .<peak.
H av in g explained, then, this prim ary division o f Logic into G en
eral and Special, and stated th a t General Logic, as alone a branch
o f ])hilosophy, i.s alone the object o f o u r co nsideration; I proceed
to give the division o f General Logic into tw o g rea t s])Ocie.s, or
rathe r parts, viz., into P u i e or A bstrac t, and Modilied or C on
crete.
V III. In the third jdace,
P a r . V III. G e n e r a l I'efei'eiice to tlic eircuiiistaiices under which
L o g ic , d iv id e d In to . . . , ^ .
H
P u r e a n d M o d .fle d . OXCI'CISC by U S , LogIC
Logic
O General or A b stra c t i.s divided into
P u re and ^Modified ; a division, however, wliich i.s perhaps
1 R m i g U r i l J y is i'n . Dii-ii. Ii. q . v l. F o r pcho- H W o lf, P h i l o s o p h i a R a t i o n a l i s , 8 , 9, 10. 12.

Ia.lie a iitlio r ilie .-, M-<-yViiiiina*!. / t i / F . jl/'layiA., K d. [C f. .S la llle r , S a u fe r , a n d J la k o ,]
I t C I . iv. .S c o lin , S u y i t r C n n - . P o r p h y r l i , t j . 1 ( .S la lllfr , L o g i c a , ( 18, p . 12; S a n ltT , r o s i l n i i i i s
Ki> L o g i r n , 1*. I. anil 11. 1778; I n s l i l . L o g . . 1* I .i iid
2 [An K n ig ] (n-c hi< J-ogik. 1 1 1 ,1 ' 30. C o m - II. 1799; F a u lu s illa k o d e K er e k -O e d e . ('o>np.
p a r e K a iil, L o g ik , F .in le itu n g . ii. Ku.J /a .tiii. I. I . a n d 11., 4 lh e d it., 1 7 7 3 . l.iiJ
L ect. IV. LOGIC. 40
rath e r tlie clistrihntion o f a science into its jiarts than of a genns

into its species. P u r e I.rOgic considers tlie laws of tliouglit
proper, as contained a p r i o r i in the nature of pure intelligence
itself. Modified Logic, again, exhihits these laws as iiKxlitied
in tlieir actual ajijilications hy certain general circiiinstances
external and internal, contin gent in themselves, h nt hy which
hum an th o u g h t is always more or less inlluenced in its m ani
festations.'
P u r e Logic considers T h o u g h t P ro p e r sim ply and in itself, and

a p a r t from the various circnmstances hy Avliicli
l u r e L o ^ ic . affected in its actual application. U n
man th o u g h t, it is evident, is n ot exerted except hy men and in di
vidual men. B y men, th o u g h t is not exerted out of connection
Avith the other constituents of th eir intellectual and moral charac
ter, and, in each individual, this ch aracter is variously modified hy
various co n tingent conditions o f different original genius, and of
different cireninstaiiees contrihn ting to develop different faculties
and hahits. N o a v , th e re may he conceived a sci-
M od ifled L o g ic . . . , , ,
ence, Avliicli considers tliouglit n o t merely as
determ ined hy its necessary an d universal laws, h n t as contingen tly
affected hy th e empirical conditions u nder which th o u g h t is aetnally
e x e r te d ; Avhieh shows Avli.at these conditions are, Iioav they im
pede, and, in general, modify, the act o f th in k in g ; and hoAV, in fine,
th e ir influence m ay he counteracted. T h is science is. Modified or
C oncrete Logic. W h a t I have called Modified
Hodmrd^'LcT-ic'^^ Logic is identical Avith Avhat K a n t and o the r
pliilosophers have d en o m in ated Apjjlied Logie.
[Angeicandte L o g ik , L o g ic a appdicata?)- This expression I thin k
improper. F o r the te rm A p p l ie d LeOgic can
T h a t e r m A p p li e d Q^ly Avith pro priety he used to denote Special
or Concrete L ogic ; a n d is, in fact, a h rief and
excellent translation o f the term s hy Avliich Special, Logic was des
ignated hy th e Greeks, as th a t iv xpwet sal yvfj.vao-ia-n-payya.Twv. A nd
SO, in fact, hy the Latin Logicians was the Greek expression re n
dered. L e t ns consider the m eaning of the tei-m applied. Logie,
as ajiplied, m ust he applied to something, and th a t som ething can
1 F o r d is tin c tio n o f rea so n in ahstm cto a n d q u e t ,p 23Q,[Sa]>jmh<ng der S ch rifte n u 'tk h e d m

r e a -c n in ronrrGo, g r o u n d in g th e d is tir ,c lio n Lngisr/im Cttlcul Herrn Prof. Ploucquetsbetreffen,
o f an A b str a c t (or I u ie ), aitd a C o n c ie le (o r T u b in g e n , 1773. K u .]
.Alodrlieil) L o g ic , see Io y l e s H'orik, iv . p. 164 2 K a n t, L o g ik , E in le it u n g ii.; llo lfb a u e r .
S e e i.'.io L am b ert [AVk-.k O rgtm on, Dinnninlo- A n fa n g sg riin d f tier L o g ik , ^ 17. 406; K r u g
]i i , i E d ] , } 444, w h o s a y s I h a t th e s c ie n c e s L o g ik . E in le it u n g , 11; F r ie s , System d a
in g e n e r a l a r e o n ly a p p lie d lo g ic s . C f. I lo u c - L o g ik , 2. E d .
44 LOGIC. L ect. TV.
only bo .an object or m atter. Now, Special L ogic is necess.arily .an

ajiplied logic; tlicrclbre the teiin ttpplUd, it' given to what I would
call Modified Logic, woidd not distinguisli Modified from Sjiecial
Logic. But further, the te rm applied as given to ^Modified Logic,
considered in itself, is w ro n g ; for in ^Modified Logic th o u g h t is no
inoi-e considered .as aetually ajijilied to any particular m a tte r than
in Ihire Logie. Modified Ixigic only considers the necessary in
conjunction with the c o nting ent conditions u n d e r Avhich thouglit is
actually e.vei'tible; b u t it does not consider it as ajijilied to one
class o f objects moix- than to an o tlic r; th a t is, it does n ot consider
it a.s aetn.ally aj.jdied to any, b u t as jiotenti.ally ajiplic.able to ;;11.
In every point of vicAV, tlierefore, the term ojplied, as given to
]Modificd Logic, is im projicr; wherea.s, if used at
H o w p r o p e r ly cm- .^jj^ o u g h t to be iised as a synonym for sp e c ia l;
whicli I would jiositively have don.e, Avere it n ot
that, liaving been u n fo rtu na te ly bestowed hy high authority on Avhat
I have called ^Modified Logic, the em jiloym ent o f it to designate
a totally difterent distinction m ig h t g en e rate confusion. I have
therefore refrained from m aking use o f th e term . I find, indeed,
that all logicians Avho, heforc K ant, ever emjiloyed the exjtrcssion
A p p lied Logic, emjiloyed it us convertible Avith Special or C oncrete
Logic.' In fine, it is to 1/e observed t h a t the term s p u re and ap>-
pli<d, as usually emjjloyed in opjtosition in tlie K antian jihilosojiliy,
and in th.at o f G erm any in gencr.al, ai'e n o t jiroperly rel.ative and
correlative to eacli other, h'or pu re lias its jn-ojier correlative in
modified or m i x e d : ap p lie d its jirojjer relative in unajtpUed,\\\i\X
i-S (lieorcedfro m things, tliat is, abstract.
Blit jias.sing from words to things, I m ay observe th.at it can he
questioned Avhotlior ^Modified or C oncrete Logic
.Aio'i)lied Lo g ic n o t c'utitlcd to the dign ity of an e.ssential p art of
proiK rly an essential . . i i .. v .
part o f L o g ic . J.ogic in general, far less of a cooi'dinate sj^ccics
as ojiposed to P u r e or Abstr.act T>ogic. Y on are
aAvaro, from Avlât I have jii-ovioiisly stated u n d e r th e first intro d u c
tory qtiestion, th a t Logic, .as convers.ant a bout a ceit.ain class of
mental jihaaionien.a, is only a ji.art of th e general jiliilosoj^hy of
mind ; h u t that, as exclusively conversant about Avhat is nccess.ary
in the jiliicnonicna of thoug ht, tliat is, tlie laAvs o f thinking, it is
eontradistingiiished from Knijiirical P sychology, or th.at jiliilosojiliy
of miml Avhich is iiiei-ely observant and inductive of the mental
Iiluciiomen.a ns facts. B u t if Modified or Concrete Logic be consid-
I Ilalforcux, [R E u lfu r ti C o m m n t t a r iu s d c p a r a t a m ; a l i a m r e b u s a p p l i c a f a m e t Cu m i i s
in (r r g a n u m . q . V. J 2. p. 22. tjra,cl . . c o n j u u c l a m . K d.]
alicrn d ic u n f L o g i c a m a b jii..c la m n ct a rebu s
JyECT. I V . LOGIC. 45
ered eithoi' ns n p a rt or ns a species of General Logic, this disca-iin-

ination of Logic, as the N oniology of thoug ht, from Psychology, ns
the Ifiitenomcnology o f mind, will not h o l v l . F o r Modified Logic,
]>rcsii|>|)()sing a kn ow ledge of the general and the conting ent plim-
noinena of mind, will th u s eitlici- comprise P sychology witliin its
spliei'o, or be itself coinjirised within the sjihcre of Psychology.
But whichever altei-native may be preferred, tbe tw o sciences are
no longer distinct. I t is on tliis ground th a t I bold, that, in reality,
Ylodilied Logie is n eith er an essential p a r t nor an in d e p en d e n t spe
cies of General Logic, but tb a t it is a mere mi.xture of Logic a.nd
Psychology, and may, therefore, be called either Logical P sy ch o l
ogy or Psychological Logic.* T h e re is th u s in tru th only one
Logic, th a t is. P u re or A b stra c t Logic. B u t while this, I think,
m ust bo ad m itte d in speculative rigor, still, as all sciences are only
organized for liuman ends, and as a general consideration of th e
modifying circumstances wliich affect the abstra ct laws of tliought
in tlieir actual manifestations, is of groat jiractical utility, I trust
t h a t I sliall n ot be regarded as deforming the simplicity o f the sci
ence, if I follow the example of mo.st modern logicians, and add (Ijc
it u nder protest) to P u r e or A bstrac t Logic a part, or an appendix,
u n d e r th e nam e of Modified Logic. In d istributing th e science,
therefore, into tliese tw o jirincipal heads, you will always, I re-
(piest, keep steadily in mind, that, in strict jiropriety, P u r e Logic
is the only science o f Logic Modified Logic being only a scien
tific accident, am biguously belonging eithei- to Logic or to P s y
chology.
T his being understood, I now jiroeeed to state to you the di.s-
tribntioii o f tbc general science into its parts ;
(o iis p e c tu .s o f th e imiiortance th a t you now
C ou rse o f L o ^ ic ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
obtain a comprehensive view o f the relation o f
these parts to each o th e r and to the whole which the y constitute,
in order th a t you m ay clearly understand th e jioint tow ards wliich
wc travel, and every stage in our jirogress, I shall comjirise this
whole sta te m en t in the fidlowing jiaragrajili, which I shall endeavor
to make snfficiontly intelligible witliout much subsequent illustra
tion. T h a t illustration, however, I will give in my n ex t L ecture.
A.s this paragrajih is inte n d ed to afford you a consjiectns o f the
ensuing Course, in so far as it will be occupied with Logic, I need
liardly say th a t yon will find it som ew hat long. I t is, however, 1
lieliex e, the only jiaragrajih of any ex te n t which I shall hereafter
be oliliged to (!iet:itc.
1 [S e e R ic lilc r , p G~,[ C berden G eg en sla n d u n d den t7>n/fing'rft>r Log-i'A, 17, L c ip s ic , 1825. E d .J

4G LOGIC. Lkct. IY.
J IX . G e x e k a l or A i i s t u a c t L o g i c , wc
P a r. IX D ie tr ib u - Imvc scGii, is (liviclcd iiito tw o pnits, into
tlo n o f L o c lc in to I ts i ^ Ar
.
p a rts .
I iTRE nml into M o d i f i e d . Of tncse in
tlieir order.
I. P u r e L o g i c in.iy, I tliink, best bo distributed upon the follow

ing prineiples. W e may th in k ; and wc m ay think well. On
the one hand, the conditions o f thin k in g do not involve the
eomlitions o f tliin king w ell; hut th e conditions o f thinking
well involve th e conditions o f thinking. Logic, therefore, as
the science of tho u g h t, m u st necessarily consider the conditions
of the jiossihility o f thoug ht. On the o th e r hand, the end of
th o u g h t is n ot m erely to think, b u t to think well; therefore, as
the end of a science m ust he conformed to the end o f its ob-
ject-m a tte r, Logie, as the science o f though t, must disjday not
only the laws o f possible, h n t the laws of jierfeet, thinking.
Logie, therefore, naturally falls into tw o parts, tlie one of which
investigates tlie formal conditions o f mere th in k in g ; the other,
the formal conditions of thin k in g well.
i. In rega rd to the f o r m e r : T h e conditions o f mere
th in k in g are given in ceit:iiii elem e n ta ry r e q u isite s; and tliat
]>art of Logic which analyzes and considers those, m a y b e called
its Stoichoiology, or D o ctrin e of E lem ents, ddicse elem ents
are either L aw s or P rodu cts.
ii. In regard to tlio latter, as perfect thin k in g is an end, and
as, the elem entary means being supposed, the conditions o f an
end are the w.ays or m ethod s hy which it m a y b e accoinjilislied,
th a t ]art of Logic which analyzes and considers the m ethods
of perfect thinking, may he called its M ethodology, or D octrine
of M ethod.
T h u s P u k e L o g i c is divided into tw o parts, into Stoichei-
ology, or th e D o ctrine o f Elem ents, and M ethodology, or the
D o e tn n c of ]\Iethod. O f these in th e ir order.
Logical .Stoiclieiology, or the doctrine conversant a bout the
elem entary requisites o f m ere thonglit, I shall divide into I wd
jtarts. T h e first of these trea ts o f the F u n d am e n tal L:iws of
th in k i n g ; in otlicr words, o f th e universal conditions o f the
think:ihle N oetic Noinology. T h e second trea ts o f the
laws o f thinking, :is go v ern in g the special fiinctions, faculties,
rtr p roducts of thoug ht, in its three g radatio ns o f Conccqition ;
or, a.s it is otherw ise called, Simjile A p|)relien sion, J u d g
m ent, .and lioasoniiig, Diaonotic Dynamic.
Thi.s seoond ji.art o f .Stoiclieiology will, therefore, fall into
t.KCT. IV. LOGIC. 47
throe subordinate divisions corresponding to tlicse several de

grees o f Conception, J u d g m e n t, and R easoning. So iiiucli for
the D octrine o f Elements.
Logical jNIctliodology, or tho doctrine conversant about the
regulated ways or m ethods in which the means of thinkiiiTr
are conducted to th e ir end o f th in k in g well, is divided into as
m any parts as there arc methods, and th e re are as m any m e th
ods as thei'c are diffenmt qualities in the end to be differently
acconqilished. N o w the perfection of th o u g h t consists of th ree
virtues, Clear T h inking, D istin ct T hinkin g, and Connected
T h in k in g ; each of thes(! virtues is accomplished by a distinct
m e tho d ; and the th re e m e thods will consequently afford the
division o f Logical M ethodo logy into thi-ec jiarts.
T h e first p art conqn-ises th e m etho d of Clear T hinking, or
the doctrine o f Illustration or Definition.
T h e second part comprises the M e th o d o f D istinct T h inking,
or th e doctrine o f Division.
T h e th ird jiart comprises the M ethod o f Concatenated or
Connected T hinkin g, or the D octrine o f Proof.
These parts are only, how ever, th re e particular applications
of M e t h o d ; they, therefore, constitute each only a Special
M ethodology, B u t sucli m ethodology, or union of m eth odolo
gies, supposes a previous consideration o f method in genei-al, in
its notion, its species, and its conditions. Logical M ethodology
will th erefore consist o f tw o jiaits, o f a General and o f a Spe
cial, the Special being subdivided, as above stated. So m uch
for the distribution of P u r e L o g i c .
I I. M o d i f i e d L o g i c falls naturally into T h re e P arts.
T h e F ir s t P a r t trea ts o f the nature o f T r u t h and E rror, and
of the highest laws for th e ir discrimination, A lethiology.
T h e Second trea ts o f the Im p e d im e n ts to thinking, Avith the
Means o f th e ir R em oval. T hese im ped im ents arise, 1, from
the JMind; 2^ F ro m the B o d y ; or, 3,'F rom E x te rn a l C ircum
stances. In relation to the Mind, these im pedim ents originate
in the Senses, iu Self-Coiisciousness, in ]\Iemoi-y, in xVssocia-
tion, in Im agination, in Reason, in th e faculty of Language, in
th e Feelings, in the Desires, in th e W ill. In relation to the
Body, they originate in Tem jieram ent, or in the state o f Health.
In relation to E x te rn a l Circumstances, the y originate in th.o d i
versities o f E ducation, o f R ank, o f A ge, o f Climate, o f Socird
Intercourse, etc.
T h e T h ird P a r t treats o f the A ids or Subsidiaries of thin k
48 LOGIC. L ect. IV.
in g ; and thin k in g is aided either, 1, Tlirungh the Acquisition,

or, '2, T h ro u g h tlic Coininuiiic.ition, of Know ledge.
T h e former o f these subsidiaries (the acquisition of k n o w l
edge) consists, 1, O f E x perie nce (and th a t eitlier by ourselves
or by o t h e r s ) ; 2, O f Generalization (and this thro u g h I n d u c
tion and A n a l o g y ) ; and, 3, O f T estim o ny (and this eith er Oral
or Wi-itten). U n d e r this last head falls to he considered the
Credibility of W itnesses, the A u th e n tic ity and I n te g r ity of
W ritin g s, the Kulcs of Criticism and o f In terp reta tio n .
T h e latloi- of these subsidiaries, the C om m unication o f K u o a v I-
edgc, is cither One-sided or Reciprocal, T h e .former consists
o f Instruction, either Oral or W r it te n ; th e la tte r o f C onversa
tion, Cimfercnce, Uisjnitation,
8o m uch for the distribution o f J M o d i f i e d L o g i c .
Tabular view of the Oil the oppositc pagc is a general ta b u lar vieiv
i>ivi.-ioii..= of Lo;;ic. o f tlic Divisioiis o f Logic O HOW O given.
T h e fourili and fifth questions o f th e In tro d u c tio n A v o n l d noAV
fall to he considered, viz.. W h a t is the H istory
IV The H i s t o r y o f aiid wluit is tlic Bibliography, o f L ogic ? W e r e
I A v r i t i n g a hook, and n o t g i v i n g a course o f Lec-
T h i- q u e s tio n p o s t- . , i
tiires njion Lo g i e, 1 Avonld c e r t a i n l y c o n s i d e r t h e s e
q u e s t i o n s in t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n t o t h e s c i e n c e ; h n t
I WDiild d o t hi s Avilli t h e a d m o n i t i o n t h a t b e g i n n e r s sl i onl d pass
llic'ê over, ami m a k e t h e m s e l v e s first o f all f ami l i ar Avitli t h e d o c
t r i nes o f w h i c h t he s c i e n c e is i t s e l f t h e c omj t l e me n t . F o r AvhyV
The hi s t o r y o f a s c i e n c e is a nar r a t i v e o f t h e o r d e r in Avliich its
>everal jiarls h a v e b e e n d e v e l o p e d , : md o f t he c o n t r i h n t i o n s Avliich
h a v e he e n ni.-nle t o it h y di f f erent c u l t i v a t o r s ; h n t sn c h a n a r r a t i v e
i ieccssai i ly si i pji oscs a p r e v i o u s knoAvl cdge o f t h e c o n t e n t s o f t he
s c i en ce . a k n o w l e d g e w h i c h is i de nt i c a l Avith a k n o w l e d g e o f t he
science itself It is, t he r ef or e, e v i d e n t , t h a t a h i s t o r y o f L ogic can
o n l y h e jiropfksed wi t h a d \ : i n t a g e t o t h o s e Avho are a l r e a d y in s o m e
d e g r e e fami li ar wi t h L o g i e i t s e l f : and ;is, in a c o ur s e like t he itresent,
I :ini h o u n d t<> jiresiiine t h a t y o n are n o t as y e t c o n v e r s a n t Avith t he
sei mi ee, it f o l l o ws t ha t such a h i st o r y e:ii i not Avith : my j jropri oty he
al t e i i i p t e d in t he e o m m e n e e m e i i l , h n t o n l y tOAvards t he eoneli i si oii ,
o f t he Le el i i re -.
In r<-gard to the fifth qii(*stioii, \\'h :i t is the Bililiograjdiy or
Lit (>rat lire of Logie? the same is true, in so
A' . I l l c i J i b l i o ' T O I i l l V , , , , r- 1 1 1
o f I.OillC
. f:ir
_
:is ;i know ledge ot th e hooks w ritten upon
I
a
sc i e i i e c is c f i r r c l a l i v e t o a kiiOAvledgc o f i t s liis-
to r\. A t t h e s a m e l i m e , n o t l i i n g e o iild h e m o r e u n p r o f i t a h l e t h a n
L e c t . IV LOGIC. 49
A T A B U L A R V I E W
D IV IS I O N S OF LOGIC
'1. Noetic,
Nomology.
i. Stolcheiology.
a .C o n c ep tio n .
r2 . D ia o n etic
'6 . J u d g m e n t,
D y n a m ic .
c. R ea so n in g .
fl. Pure.
'C le a r T h in k in g . D e finition
o r Illu stra tio n .
' D is tin c t T h in k in g . 2. D i
ii. Methodology. v isio n .
G e n e r a l C o n n ec te d T h in k in g . 3.
OR j P ro b a tio n o r P ro v in g .
A b st r a c t \
L o g ic .
1. T h e M ind.
i. T ru th a n d E r ro r C er
ta in ty a n d Illu sio n .
ii. Im p e d im e n ts to T liin k - '\ '^*6 B ody,
in g , w itli R em edies.
T h ese Im p e d im c n tsj
(II. M o d ifie d .' a rise fro m . . . \ 3 . E x te rn a l C irc u m stan c e s.
1. T h e A c q u isitio n o f K n o w l-'
edge.
iii. A ids o r S u b sid ia rie s to .

Thinking through
2. T h e C o m m u n ic atio n o f
K n o w ledge, etc.
;')G LOGIC. L ec t. IV .
ft)i- mo t) n'l'ito to you a long series of w o rk s to w hiclt you Imve not

arooss, liy authorscif whom yon ]n-ob:irt)ly never heard, oiton in lan-
giiagos whiidi tow o f you umlorsland. In tho iresoiit stage of your
.stu lies, it is not recjuisito th a t you should know of inaiiy books, l)iil
that you slunihl road alleulivoly a few ; non. mnlta scd inn/tnin.
I shall therefore ailjonrn, at least, tho considoi-ation of the (iiiostion.
W h a t in crouorcl are the principal books on the science of Logic?
simpiv recom m ending to yon a few, not absolutely the host, lint sneh
;>s von e:in most e.isilv proenre; sneh as are in languages which most
of you can I'ead.and which are of sneh a eharaeter as may be studied
with most general advantage.
Ot works in onr own language, as those most accessible and most
intelligible to all, th e re arc nnfortnnnlely hardly
Cifiiernl iio'ici; ol' i i t i . "i -i '
, , . anv which J can recom m end to A(u as exhilnting
works on I.o-ic. . . ,
the doetriiies of Logic, eith er in purity or coin-
jileteness. T h e L o g ic of W a tts , o f D uncan, and others, are Avoith
reading, as hooks, b u t not as books iqion Logic. T h e K l a n a d s o f
Logic hy Dr. W h a te ly i i q i o n th e Avhole, the one best en titled to
yo ur attention, tho ugh it is erroneous in various respects, and im per
fect in more. T h e ab rid g m en t o f thisAVork by H in d s contains w hat
of the original is m ost Avorthy o f study, in the com m en cem ent of a
logical education. In F re n ch , there are sun dry works deserving of
yo ur attention (Damiron,' Delarivicre); b u t the only one Avhich I
Avould at present earnestly recom m end to your study, is the cele
brated P o r t Pvoyal A r t o f T h in k in g , TJArt de Tenser, an an o n y
mous work, l)ut th e authors o f Avhich Avere the tAvo distinguished
.lanscnists, A n ia u ld and Xieole. I t has been freqnently rejirintcd ;
and there is recently a stereotyjx'd edition, by Haclu ttc, o f Paris.
Avhich can easily be procured. T h ere arc nioi-o than one tran s
lation o f the work into Latin, and a t least tw o English version.s, both
bad.^
In Latin tliere is a v ciy elegant eomjAcnd of Logic by tlie late
illii'-trioiis D.iiiicl W y lte n b a e h , o f L eyden. Besides the D u tch edi
tions, whirdi ar<> bandsonie, lliero is a clioa)) reprint juiblished by
Prores8or Al.-ias, o f Hallo. avIio Ins, liowever, veiiliirod on the iniAvar-
r:mt:ille lilierty o f silently altering the text, b(>sides om ittin g w hat
he did not e o m id e r : 8 abôliiteh'iiidispcms.ahlo for a 1ext-hook. This
ivfirk c:m he easily pronired. dhere is also in Latin a system of
1 f'nurs df PhUosnphir. I. iv .; Txigiqiif, t a r i-, )jur;;h, 18.50; 2(1 c d ilin n , 1R51. In tlio tn lr o -
lk.37 E l). (liio tio n lo tliis vor.aion w ill hi; lo n iid iiii
- Ixigi'pic ('i/isMipie, l'n r l, 1S29. E i). I'cco iin t o f th e v a r io u s o d ilio iis a n d tra n sla
3 A i Ij! d a i.d far n if i'r io r Ir a n t-la lio ii t i n lio n s o l llie w o r k . E d ,
fU sO f|u en lly a | p iiir c d h y Air. J 'a y iie s, E d io -
L k c t . I V. LOGIC. 51
L o g i c b y G e n o v e s i , u n d e r t h e t i t l e , Genuensiti A r s L o g i c o - c r i t k a .
Lliis w o r k is, l i o w e v e r , e . x t r e i n e l y r a r e even in Italy, and it w as
m a n y y e a r s b e f o r e I w a s a b l e t o pi o c n r e a c o p y . T h e r e w a s a n e d i t i o n
o f t h i s w o r k ])u blished in G e r m a n y in 17G0, a t A u g s b u r g , b u t t h e
i m p r e s s i o u s e e m s t o h a v e b e e n s m a l l , f o r i t a l s o is o u t o f p r i n t . The
Italia n L o g ic o f G e n o v e s i has, h o w e v e r , b een repeatedly reprinted,
a n d t h i s , w i t h t h e v a l u a b l e a d d i t i o n o f R o n i a g n o s i , is e a s i l y o b t a i n e d .
O f t h e o ld er w riters on L o g ic in L atin , th e o n e I w o u ld p rincipally
recommend t o y o u is B u r g e r s d y k B u i ' g e r s d i c i u s . H i s I n s tit u -
t Ones L o r jic w i s n o t a r a r e w o r k , t h o u g h , a s t h e r e a r e n o r e c e n t
e d i t i o n s , i t is n o t a l w a y s w i t h o u t t r o u b l e t o b e o b t a i n e d .
L E C T U R E V.
P URE LOGIC.
PART I.-S T O IC H E IO L O G Y .
SF X T IO N 1. N O E T IC . ON THE FUNDAM ENTAL LAW S OF

T H O U G H T T IIE IR CONTENTS AND H IST O R Y .
H av in g t e r m in a t e d o n r e o n s id e r a tio n o f tlie v a r io u s q u e s t io n s o f
w liic h tlie In tro d u ctio n to L o g ic is c o n q io s e d ,
Ave p r o c e e d t o t l i e d o c t r i n e s A vl iich m a k e u p t h e
s c ie n c e itse lf, a n d c o m m e n c e t h e F i r s t G r e a t D i v i s i o n o f P u r e L o g i c
that Avhich t r e a t s o f i t s e l e m e n t a r y o r c o n s t i t u e n t p r o c e s s e s ,
Stoicheiology. P u t S t o i c h e i o l o g y w a s a g a i n d i v i d e d i n t o t w o ]>arts,
i nl f i a pai - t w h i c h c o n s i d e r e d t h e F u n d a m e n t a l L a w s o f T h o u g h t
in g e n e r a l , a n d into a jairt w hich considered t h e s e l a w s a s a] ) ] , l i ed
To a n d I ' c g n l a t i n g t h e s p e c i a l f i i n e l i o n o f T h o u g h t i n i t s v a r i o u s
gradations of Conception, Ju d g m e n t, and Pe.asoiiing. The title,
t l i er <' f or e, o f t h e j i a r t o f L o g i c o n w h i c h Ave a r e a b o u t t o e n t e r i s ,
p u r e Lfujir^ P o r t T. Stotchdolrxjij Section J. X oetic. Go the.
F n iu h irn d itn l L o irs o f llioueiltt.
B e f o r e , h o w e v e r , d e s c e n d i n g t o t h e c o n s i d e r . a t i o n o f t h e s e h a ws , i t
is neeesâry to make one or tw o ])reliininary
ii< c laracicr oi statem en ts to u ch in g the cliar.actcr o f th.'it thought
Thought in g e n e r a l. ^ ^
o f w hich th e y are t h e n ecessa ry co n d itio n s; and,
o n t h i s p o i n t , T g i v e , in t h e f irs t phaee, t h e f o l l o w i n g p a r a g r a p h :
** X . lAigie considers T h o u g h t , n o t as the operation of

t h i n k i n g , b u t as its ])rodnet; it d o e s not
t r e a t o f C'oncc])tion, J u d g m e n t , and Rea
soning, b u t o f Concc|)ts, J u d g m e n t s , an d Reaso n in gs.
I b.ave a l r e. ad y e m l e a v i i r e c l to give yon a general knowledge of

w l n i t is m e . a n t b y t/ouojht. Y o n ai-e .aw.aro t h a t
Tiiotiffiii n> the f>h t c Ti n is, ill r e l a t i o n t o L o g i c , e mi i l o Ac s l in
j e c t <)l L o g ic . . . . . . . .
its strictest and most limited significaation,
vi/... .as t h e .act o r ] i r o d n e t o f t h e D i s c u r s i v e F a c u l t y , o r F , a c u i t y o f
L e c t. V. LOGIC. 53
R elations ; b nt it is now pvoi'er to consider, sonicw bat more closely,

the determ inate nature of this process, and th e special point of
view in whieli it is regarded by tbe logician.
In an act of thinking, there are three things which we can dis
crim inate in consciousness, 1, T here is the
i i i e su b je c t, fo rm , th inking subjcct, tli.at is, th e mind or ego,
a n d m a tte r o f t h o u g h t . . J ,
Avhich exerts or m am lests the t h o u g h t; 2,
T h e re is the object ab out which we think, which is called the matter
of th o u g h t; and, 3, T h e r e is a relation between subject and ob
je c t o f which we are conscious, a relation always manifested in
some determ inate mode or m a n n e r ; this is X.\\q f o r m o f thought.
N ow , o f these three. L ogic does not consider
T h o u g h t as th e ob- either the first or the second. I t Likes no ac-
ji'Ct r e .'i'c ctiv ely of , n i i
isy c b o io g y an d couiit, at Icast uo direct account, of the real
of
L o g ic . subject, or o f the real object, of thought, but is
limited exclusively to the form o f thought. T his
has been already stated. B ut, again, this form of tbouglit is con
sidered by Logic only in a certain aspect. T h e form of tho u g h t
may be viewed on tw o sides or in tw o relations. I t holds, as has
been said, a relation both to its subject and to its object, and it may
.iceordingly be viewed eith er in the one o f these relations or in the
other. In so far as the form o f th o u g h t is, considered in reference
to the thin k in g mind, to the mind by which it is ex e rted , it is
considered :is an act, or operation, or e n e rg y ; and in this relation it-
belongs to P h a nomcnal Psychology. W h e re a s , in so f:ir as this
form is considered in reference to w hat th o u g h t is about, it is con
sidered as the p rod uct of such an act, and, in this rel.-ition, it be
longs to Logic. T hus Pha3nomenal P sy cholo gy trea ts o f tliought
Jiroper as concejition, ju d g m e n t, reasoning; Logic, or the Nomology
of the understanding, ti-eats of th o u g h t p roper as a coiicejit, as a
ju d g m e n t, ns a reasoning. W h a te iy , I have already shown yon,
am ong other errors in his d eterm ination o f tbe objeet-m atter of
Logic, confounds or reverses th is ; for he jirojioses to Logic, not
th o u g h t considered as a product, b u t reasoning alone; and tiuit, too,
considered as a jiroducing operation. H e thus confounds Logic
with Pliaenomenal Psychology.
Be it, therefore, observed, th a t Logic, in tre a tin g of tlie formal
laws o f thought, treats o f these in reference to tho ught cunsidcred
!is a jirodnct; th a t is, as a concept, a j u d g m e n t, a reasoning; wher(*as
Psychology, as the Phaenoinenology o f mind, eoiisidei-s th o u g h t as
the Jiroducing act, th a t is, as concejition, ju d g m e n t, reasoning.
(Y o u here see, by the way, the utility o f distinguishing concept and
conception. I t is unfortunate th a t we cannot also distingni.sh more
54 LOGIC. L e c t . V.
prooisely j u d g m e n t and reasoning as p roducing acts, fi-om a j u d g

ment and a reasoning as jirodncts.)
P a r . X I. T h o u g h t a Tliouglit, as tlic kiiowlcdge of

mediate and complex oiic tiling
O ill relation to aiiotlicr,' is a m e di
c o g u itlo n .
ate and complex cognition.
T h e distinctive peculiarity o f th in k in g in general is, th a t it in-

vuh os the cognition of one thin g by the cognition of another. All
th inking is, therefore, a medi.ate cogn ition: and
K x p lic a tio ii. . , ; . , , . , T , .
IS tliiis (listmguislied irom our knosvledgc in per
ception, external and intermil, and in im agination ; in both of which
acts we are im m ediately cognitive of the object, external or internal,
pre.-eiited in the one, anil of the object, external or internal re
presented in the other. In the I rcsentative and R epre se n tativ e
F:ieulties, our know ledge is o f som ething considered directly and in
itself; in thought, cm the contrary, we know one object only tbroiigh
the know ledge o f another. T h u s in percejition, o f either kind, and
in iniagiii.-ilion, the object known is always a single determ in a te ob
j e c l ; whereas in thoug ht, in th o u g h t proper, as one object is
only known th rou gh another, th e re m ust always be a plurality of
objects in every single thon ght. L e t us take an example o f this,
in regard to the simjilest act o f tho u g h t. W h e n I see an individ
u a l , say Bueephalns or H ig h fly er, or when I rejiresent him in
imagination, I have a direct and im m ed ia te apprehension of a cer
tain object in :ind through itself, w ith o u t reference to a u g h t else.
But when I |)ronounee th e le n n Horse, I am unable either to ))er-
ceive in nature, or to rejiresent in imagin.ation, a n y o n e determ in a te
object co nesiio n d in g to the word. 1 obtain the notion corres])ond-
iiig to this word, only a.s the result of a comparison o f m any por-
ccptioiis or im aginations of Bucephalus, Highflyer, Dobbin, and
o the r individual horses; it, therefore, contains m.any representation.s
under it, h.as reference to m.any object.s, out o f relation to wliieh it
eaimot pos>ibly be nadizcd in tliouglit; and it is iu consccpieuce of
this necessity of rep resenting (potentially :it least) a plurality of
individn.il olfeets u n d e r tlic notion horse, th a t it obtains the donoin-
in.atioii roHCtj,t, that i.s, som ething takcm up or apjirchended in coii-
rieciioii with soiiicl.'iing else. 'J'hi.s, liowever, requires a furthe r ex-
plic.ition. WliiMi we pca-forni an act of tliouglit, of positive thought,
this is done hy th in k in g something, and we c.an think an y th in g only
by th inking it as ex istin g ; wliile, ag.aiii, we cannot think a thin g to
exi-t except in ccrt.aiii determ in a te modes o f existence. On the
other hand, when wc j^crform an act o f negative thought, this is
L ect. V. LOGIC. 5o
lone by tliinking sometliing as not existing in this or th a t d etenn i-

iiate mode, and when we th ink it as existing in no d eterm inate
mode, we eease to think it at all; it heeomes a nothing, a logical
n on entity (gton-ens Logicnra).
I t being thus understood th a t th o u g h t can only he realized hy
thinking som e th in g ; it being further niulerstood th a t this some
thing, as it is though t, m ust he th o u g h t as existing; and it being
still further understood th a t we can think n th in g as existing only
Ity th ink in g it as existing in thi.s, th.at, and the other deteriniiiate
m a nner o f existence, and th a t w h enever we cease to think som e
thing, som ething existing, som ething existing in a determ in a te m a n
ner of existence, we cease to think a t all ; this, I say, lieiug u n d e r
stood, it is here jiroper to make you, once fur all, acquainted with
th e various term s hy which logici.ans designate the modes or m a n
ners "of cogitable existence. I shall therefore comprise these in
th e following jiaragraph :
^ X II. W h e n Ave thin k a thing, this is done hy conceiving

it as possessed o f certain modes of being.
Par. xTi. The vari- 01 qiialitic.s, aiid llic siiiii o f tlicsc qualities
ous terms by which coiistitutes its coiicept or notion (vovixa, iv-
t h e m o d e s o f c o g i- ^ ^ \ /r~ ^
ta b le e x is te n c e a re VOLOLy CTTtPOLO.^ tlO t i *
d e s ig n a te d . A s thcsc qualities or modes ( T ro to V '^ r c ? , qual-

itates, m o d i) are o n ly identified with the
th in g h y a mental attribution, th ey are called attributes (garr;
yopovpeva, attributa) ; as it is o n ly in or through them that we
say or enounce au g h t o f a thing, th e y are called ^medicates,
pyredicables, and predicaments, or categories, tliese words b ein g
here used in their more ex te n siv e signification [Xeyoptva
KaT-qyopiaL, Kar-qyopgp.aTa KaT7]yopovp.va, p n c d ic a ta , p r a dicabilia,
yyradicam enta) ; as it is o n ly in and through tliem that we rec
ognize a thing for w hat it is, th ey are called notes, signs, m a rks,
characters {notee, signa, characteres, d isc rim in a ) ; finally, as it
is only in and through them that Ave b eco m e aAvare that a thing
is possessed o f a peculiar and determ inate existence, th ey are
called properties, dif'erences, determ in a tio n s (projirietates, de-
term in a tio n es). A s conseq u ent on, or restdting from, tlie ex ist
ence o f a thing, th e y have likcAvise obtained the name o f con-
seqaents (iTrop-eva, conseqnentia, etc.). W h a t in reality has no
qualities, has no existen ce in thought, it is a logical n o n e n
t i t y ; hence, e converso, the scholastic ajiliorism, non-entis
n ulla sunt prcedicata. W h a t , again, has no qualities attributed
i>(j LOGIC. Lect. V.
to it. tliongli nttribiitablc, is said to be in d e tc n n in e d (dStopto-Tov,

ii(dttirn')H i(in) it is only a possible object o f thuught.*
T h is jiaragrapli, wliicli I have dictated th at yon tnigbt be made

o n ce for all acquainted with the relative terms in
Kvi.iicanon. w lint am oiig logicitiDs, requires but little e.\])lana-
I' iiivolM'il ill Iliiiik- . . , 1 1 1 1
,
iiij: nil ol'ji'Cl. lion. I may. 'state,
7 how ever,1 that the mind onlyj
thinks an object by separating it from o th ers;
th.-it is, by marking it ou t or characterizing i t ; and in so far as it
does this, it encloses it within certain fixed limits, th.-it is, determ ines
it. Ibit if this discrim inative act be expressed in words, I predicate
the m.irk.^, notes, characters, or determ in ation s o f tlie t h i n g ; and if,
again, these be com p rehen d ed in one total thought, th ey co nstitute
its eoncept or notion. If, for exam ple, I think o f Socrates as .son o f
,^ oji/ironiscuii, as A th e fiin u , as 2 ^^dlosoj)her, as ]nif/->iosed, these are
unlv so m any characters, limitations, or determ inations, which I pre
dicate o f Socrates, which distinguish him from all other m en, and
to gether make tip m y notion or concejit o f him.
B u t as ih o n g h t, in all its gradations o f conce]ition, ju d g m e n t, and
reasoning, is on ly realized b y .th e attribution o f
The atiribunoii iii- certain qualities or characters to the objects of,
vo lv eil in ih o u g lit is , . , i i , -i . .
reg u lated by Iiiws -ibout wIiicli We th in k ; SO tills attribution is
regulated by laws, w hich render a great ]tart o f
this process a b solutely necessary. B u t w h en I speak o f law s and o f
their absolute n ecessity in relation to thouglit,
u hat IS meant by a ^ m ust iiot suitiiosc that tliosc law s aiul that
law as ai'idicable to . . ,i i
free iiiteiiigeiiee. iiecessity are tlic saiiic 111 the world of mind as
in the world o f matter. F o r free intelligences,
a law is an ideal n ecess ity g iv e n in the form o f a precept, w hich we
ou gh t to follow, bu t which w e m ay also violate if w e ji le a s e ;
whereas, for the e x iste n ces which co nstitute the universe o f nature,
a law is on ly another name for those causes which operate blindly
and universally in p rod u cing certain inevitable results. B y l<ao o f
or by lo(jic(tL necessitij, w e do not, therefore, mean ;i p h ysi
cal law, such as the la w o f gravitation, b u t a general ]irece])t which
w e are able certainly to violate, but which i f w e do n ot obey, our
w hole process o f th in k in g is suicidal, or absolutely null. T h e s e laws
art!, consequently, th e ]irimary condition.^ o f the jmssibility o f valid
thought, and as the w h ole o f Bure L o g ic is only an articulate
d ev elo p m e n t o f the various m o d es in w hich th ey arc applied, their
consideration in general co nstitu tes the first chapter in an orderly
1 ( .S c h u lz e , ( 13 . I W s lin g , p . C 3.] [Die Lehren Uer reirun Loeik, U lm , 18 2 6 . Ct

K ru g , Logik, } 16 . E i> .]
L kct. V. L OGI C. 57
system o f tlie science. N o w , in exj)l.nining to you this subject,

the m ethod I shull ])ursu(i is the fo llo w in g: I
Order ol' considera- the lUimbci- ;Uk 1
tioii ol'tlie liiiidiiiiieii- . . . / i i ^ i i
tui 1.UVS or ihoug).t. =îgiKhc;mce o f the l.iws :is eo m m on ly received ;
I shall then more iiarticuhirly consider each o f
these by itse lf and in relation to the others ; then detail to you their
history; and, tinally, state to you m y ow n v ie w s in regard to their
deduction, number, and arrangement.
^ X I I I . T h e F u n d am en ta l L aw s o f T h o u g h t, or the condi
tions o f the thinkable, as com m on ly received.
Par. XIII. Fun- .arefour: 1. T h e L a w o f I d e n tity ; 2. T h e
d a m e n t :: ! L aw s of /. y-, t i t
Thougiit. Law of C on tra d ictio n ; 3. i h e L . - . w o f L x -
clusion or o f E x c lu d e d M iddle ; and, 4. T h e
L aw o f lie a so n and Consequent, or o f Sufficient R eason.
O f these in their order.
T h e principle o f I d e n t ity {^principium Id e n tita tis )

X IV .
expresses the relation o f total sam eness in
Par. XIV. Law of whicli ii co u ccpt staiuls to all, and the rela-
Id e n tity . _ , *
tion o f partial sam eness in which it stands
to each, o f its con stitu en t characters. In other words, it d e
clares the im possibility o f th in k in g the conce]>t and its charac
ters as i-eciprocally unlike. It is expressed in the formula A is
M, or A = A ; and b y M is d en oted ev ery logical thing, every
product o f our th in k in g faculty, concept, ju d g m e n t, reason
ing, etc.*
The principle o f I d e n t ity is an application o f the principle o f the

absolute equ ivalen ce o f a w h ole and o f all its
E x p lic a tio n . p^rts taken together, to th e thin kin g o f a th in g
by the attribution o f co n stitu en t qualities or characters. T h e coucejit
o f the th in g is a whole, the characters are the parts o f that whole.-
T h is law may, therefore, be also thus enounced, E v e r y th in g is
equal to itself, for in a logical relation the th in g and its concept
co in cid e; as, in Logic, we abstract altogeth er from the reality o f the
th in g which the c on cep t represents. It is, therefore, the same
w h eth er w e say that the con cep t is equal to all its characters, or
th at the th in g is ecpial to itself
T h e law has, likewise, been exp iessed by the formula In the
1 [ S c h u lz e , Logik, 1 7 . G e r l a c h , Logik, ^ 2 S e e S c h u lz e , p. 32-3. E d .

3 7 .] C f. K r u g , Logik, 1 7 . E d . 3 See K ru g , Logik, p . 40. E d .
58 LOGIC. L ec t. V.
li'oi.lic:ito, the tvliole is con tain ed exjilicitly, wliicli in th e subject is

contained iinjdicitly. I t is also in v o lv ed in the axiom ATota notm
(St iiotn re I
T h e logical impoi-tancc o f the law o f id e n tity lies in this that
Itslu p ic n i i m p o r t a n c e 'f ^lie principle o f all logical affirmation and
riie principle or 111! definition. A n ex:imj)le or tw o may be g iv en to
logical a U ir m n t io n a n d illustrate this.
1. In a couccjn, which w e m a y call Z, the
characters a, b, and c, are th o u g h t as its co n stitu en ts; consetpiently,
the concei)t, as a unitv, is efiiial to the chai'ticters
T h is illu s tr a te d . , , r# / ,
taken to g eth e r Z = (â + b + c). It the.form er
be affirmetl, so also is the la tte r ; therefore, Z being (a + b-\-c) is a,
is />. is c. T o take a concrete e x a m p l e : T h e concejtt v ia n is a
c o m p lem en t made up o f the chartieters, 1, substance, 2, m aterial,
3, organized, 4, anim ated, 5, ra tio m d , G, o f th is e a r th ; in other
w o n ls m an is substance, is m aterial, is organized, is a n im a te d , is r a
tional. Jiein g , :is e n ter in g into ev ery attribution, may be discharged
as alfonling no distinction.
2. Agtiin, su])j)ose that, in the exam p le g ive n , th e character a is
made nji o f the characters I, m , n, it follows, b y the same la w o f
Id en tity, that 7^ = a = (l,m , n) is I, is m , is n. T h e concej)! m a n
contains in it the character a n im a l, and the character a n im a l co n
tains in it the characters corporeal, organized, licin g , etc.
T h e second la w is the princi])le o f Contradiction or N o n -c o n tra
diction, in relation to which I shall d ictate the follo w in g paragraph:
^ XV. W h e n an object is d eterm ined by the affirmation o f

a certain character, this object can n ot be
C o n tra d ic tio n . tliouglit to bc tlic saiiic wlicn siicli character
is denied o f it. T h e im possibility o f this is
en ou n ced in w h a t is called the jn'inciple o f Contradiction
{p r in r ip iin n C ontradictionis sea Jt(i>ugnanti(n'). A ssertions
con cern ing a th in g are m utually contrailictory, when the one
asserts that th e th in g possesses the character winch the other
asserts that it d oes not. T h is la w is logically expressed in the
f o r m u l a Wh.at is contradictory is unthinkable. A -= in o t
A = 0, or A A -= . 0.
N o w , in the first place, in regard to the name

I ta p ro fx ;r n a m e .
/. ,
o f this law, it m ay be observed that, as it en
join s the absence o f contradiction as the indis])ensable condition o f
1 See K an t, Logilc, p. 40. Ed.

L ect. V. LOGIC. 59
thou g h t, it ough t to bo callcMl, n ot tlie L aw of Contradiction, b u t

the L aw of N on-contradiction, or of non-repiujnantia}
T h is law has frequently been enounced in the formula I t is
impossible th a t the same thin g can at once be and
H ow en ou n ced . ^ GXposcd to sundry objections.
I t is v a O 2 ;ue,' and therefore useless. I t does n o t indicate w h eth e r a
real or a notional existence is m e a n t; and if it mean the former,
then is it n ot a logical b u t a metaphysical axiom. B u t even as a
metaphysical axiom it is im p e r f e c t ; for to th e expression at once
(siniid) m ust bo added, in the same place, in the same respect, etc.
T h is law lias likewise been expressed by the formula C o n tra
dictory attributes c a nnot be united in one act of consciousness. B u t
this is also obnoxious to objection. F o r a j u d g m e n t expresses as
good a u n ity of consciousness as a concept. ButAvhen I ju d g e th a t
rou nd and square are contradictory attributes, th e re are found in
this j u d g m e n t co ntradictory attributes, b u t y et a unity of con
sciousness. T h e formula is, therefore, vag uely and inaccurately
expressed.
T h e logical im p ort o f this laAV lies iu its being th e principle of all
logical negation and distinction.
T i.e p r in c ip le o f a ll I d e n ti ty an d the law o f C ontra-
lo g ic a l n e g a tio n and n . .
d is tin c tio n dictioii are coordinate a n d reciprocally relative,
and n eith er can be educed as second from the
o th e r as first; for in every such a tte m p t at derivation, the snitjiosed
secondary laAV is, in fiict, ahvays necessarily presupposed. T hese
are, in fact, one and th e same Iuaa, differing only by a positive and
negative expression.
In r e l a t i o n t o t h e t h i r d laAA', t a k e t h e f o l l o A v i n g p a r a g r a p h :
^ X Y I. T h e principle of E x clu d ed T h ir d or Middle viz.,

betAveen tAvo contradictories (jmincipium
E x c lu d e d M id d le .
Exclusi M t d i i vel Tertii), enounces th a t
c o n d i t i o n o f t h o u g h t Avhich c o m p e l s ns, o f
tAvo r e p u g n a n t n o t i o n s , Avhich c a n n o t b o t h c o e x i s t , t o t h i n k
e it h e r t h e o n e o r t h e o t h e r as e x istin g . H e n c e arises th e g e n
e r a l a x i o m O f c o n t r a d i c t o r y a t t r i b u t i o n s , Ave c a n o n l y alfirni
o n e o f a t h i n g ; a n d i f o n e b e e x j i l i c i t l y a f fi r m e d , t h e o t h e r is i m
plicitly d e n ie d . A either is or is not. A either is or is not Ii.*
B y the laAvs of I d e n ti ty and Contradiction, I am Avarranted to
1 C o m p a r e K r u g , L o g ik , 18. E d . 3 T h is is s h o w n m o r e in d e ta il b y H o tfb a u e r
2 C om pare th e c r itic is m o f K a n t, K r itik d . r. Anfangsgrhm de d e r L o g ik , | 23. E u .
V., p. 134, e d . K o se u k r a n z . Ed . * S e e S c h u lz e , L o g ik , 19. Ed .
60 LOGIC L ect. V.
coneliule from the tru th o f one contradictory proposition to the

falsehood of the other, and by the law o f Ex-
Logicni signiiicanec j w arranted to conclude from
o l tlii.' la w . 1 1 1 < !
tb e ialseliood o f one co ntradicto ry |)roj)Osition to
tbe truth o f the other. A nd in lliis lies the jiceuliar force and im port
o f this last principle. F o r the logical signilicance of the law o f Ex-
cliideil .Middle consist.s in thi.s, th a t it limits or .shuts in the sjihere
of the think.-iblc in relation to affirmation ; for it determines, that,
o f the tw o forms given in th e laws of I d e n tity and Contradiction,
and by these laws affirmed as those exclusively possible, the one or
the o th e r must be affirmed as necessary.
T h e law of E xcluded iNIiddlc is the principle o f D isjunctive J u d g
ments, th a t is, of ju d g m e n ts in which a plurality
The principle ofDi.s- o f ju d g m e n ts are contained, and which stand in
juuciive .Imlgineiils. . i i i i / a
such a recijirocal relation th a t the affirmation of
one is the denial of the otlier.
I now go on to the fourth law.
X V II.
T h e th in k in g o f an object, as actually cha racter
ized by jiositive or by negative attributes, is
Par, XVII. Law of u o t left to tlic ca|irice o f U n d e r s ta n d in g
sufficient Keaaon. or f.,eu]tV of tllOUght; blit th a t faCUlty
o f neaaou and Conae- * . .
quent. m ust be necessitated to this or tb a t d e te r
m in a te act o f th in k in g by a kno w led g e of
som ething difi'erent from, and indejicndent otj tlie jiroccss of
th inking itself. This condition o f our u n d ersta n d in g i.s ex-
jiressed by the law, as it is called, o f Sufficient Reason {pr'tnci-
l>inni Rafionis Sujhi'/'eitf/s) ; b u t it i.s more properly d en o m i
nated the law o f Reason and ro nseijiie nt (prtncipitan
>:t C o nstrationis). J 'h a t know ledge by Avliich the mind is
ncce."sit;ite<l to allirm or jiosit .something else, i.s called the logi-
cdl vtdHon, ground, or antecedent; th a t sometliing else which
the mind i.s necessitated to affirm or jiosit, is called the logical
constypient; mid the rel.'ition betw een tlio reason and conse
quent, is called the logical connection or conseipience. Thi.s
l;iw is expressed in the foiiiuila Infer noth in g w ith o u t a
ground or rea.son.'
R .ia tio n x 'file relations between Re.ason and Consc-

b e tw e e n
R eaxon and fpieiit, wlicii eomprelieiidcd in a ])ure tbouglit,

C on.-e-
.are the following:

1. W h e n a reason is exjJicitly or implicitly given, then there must
1 See Schulze, L o g ik , ^19, and Krug, L o g ik , ^20. Kd

L ect. V. LOGIC. 01
exist a co nsequent; and, vice versa, wlien a consequent is g i\e n ,

tliei-e m ust also exist a reason.
2. W h e re there is no reason there can he no c o n s e q u e n t; and,
vice rcrsa, where there is no conse<inent (either implicitly or explic
itly) there can he no reason. T h a t is, llio concepts of reason and of
consequent, as reciprocally relative, involve and suppose each other,
'file logical significance of the law of R eason and Con.seqnent lies
in th is , T h a t in virtue o f it, th o u g h t is consti-
L o g ic a i s ig n ific a n c e a scrics o f acts all iudissoliihly con-
' n e c t c d ; each necessarily infei-ring the other.
T h u s it is th a t th e distinction and opposition o f possible, actual and
necessary m atter, Avhich has been in tro d u c ed into Logie, is a doc
trine wholly extraneous to this science.
I may observe th a t Reason is som ething different from Cause,
and C o nsequent som ething different from Effect;
R e a so n a n d Conse- thoug h causc and cffcct, ill S O far as the y are
q u e iit, a n d C a u se a n d . , . , , , , i i
conceived in though t, sta n d to each otlier in the
relation o f reason and consequent. Cause is
thus th o u g h t of as a real object, which affords the reason of the
existence o f another real ohject, the e ffe c t; and effect is th o u g h t of
as a real ohject, which is th e consequent of an o th er real object, the
cause. Accordingly, every cause is recognized in th o u g h t as a rea
son, and every effect is recognized in th o u g h t as a c o n s e q u e n t; b ut
the converse is not true, th a t every reason is really considered a
cause, and every consequent really considered an effect. W c must,
therefore, carefully distinguish mere reason and mere consequent,
th a t is, ideal or logical reason and conscqncnt, from the reason
which is a cause and the consequent which is an effect, th a t is, real
or metajjhysical reason and consequent.
T h e expression logical reason a n d consequent refers to the mere
synthesis o f th o u g h ts ; Avhereas the exjjression
L o g ic a l a n d M e ta - metaphysical reason a n d consequent denotes the
phv .i c a l R e a s o n a n d , . i? . tt . u
*C on se q u e n ^t. real connection of existences. H ence the ^
axiom
^
o f Causality, as 'a metaphysical jirinciiile, is es-
sciitially different from the axiom of Reason and Consetinent, as a
logic.-il jirinciple. Both, however, are frequently confonnded with
each o th e r ; and the law of Reason and Consequent, indeed, for-
lyerly found its place in the systems o f Metaphysic, while it was
not, at least exjilicitly, considered in those of
( ie iic r a iiiy o f th e Logic. T h e tAvo toriiis condition and con<litioned
l e n n s C o n d itio n a n d , ^ -i 1 , 1 .1 f
C on d itio n ed .
^ hannily
1 t j
express
i
at once the relations both ôf
reason and coiisctjnent, and of cause and effect.
A condition is a thin g A vhic h determ ines (negatively at least) the
6*2 LOGIC. Lect. V
e x i s t e n c e o f n n o t l i e r ; tlic c o n d i t i o n e d is .a t h i n g w h o s e e x i s t e n c e is
d e t e r m i n e d in a n d b y a n o t l i e r . I f u s e d in an ideal o r lo g ic a l sig n ifi
c atio n , a n d c o / e / / 0 ' o / ? ( v U m p o r t o n l y t h e r e a s o n in c o n j u n c
t i o n Avith i t s c o n s e ] n e n t ; i f u s e d in a r e a l o r m e t a j i h y s i c a l s e n s e ,
t h e \ ' e x p r e s s t h e c a u s e i n c o n n e e t i o n AA'ith i t s e f i e e t .
I haA-e uoAV, in t h e p r o s e c u t i o n o f o u r i n q u i r y i n t o t h e f u n d a m e n
t a l laAvs o f l o g i c a l t h i n k i n g , t o s a y a fcAA"^ A\mrds
History of tlie de-r e g a r d t o t h e i r H i s t o r y , th e ir h isto ry b e in g
veiopmeiit of the fun- n a rra tio n of t h e o r d e r i n Avhieh, a n d o f t h e
damcMtal L a w s i i i
Yixoufzhu p h ilo s o p lic r s b y wlioiii, t l ie y w e r e a r tic u l a te l y
d e A 'e l o ] i e d .
O f the first three laws, AA h i e h , from their in tim ate cognition, rn.ay
n o t u n r e a s o n a b l y bo r e g a r d e d as o n l y t h e th r e e
The law of Identity g ides or p lia sc s o f a s i n g l e laAAg t h e l a w o f Iden-
last developed in the . , . , i r* i i n
order of lime Avliich S tan ds first lu th o or d e r or n a tu re ,
AA*as i n d e e d t h a t la st doAêloped in t h e or d e r o f
t i m e ; t h e a x i o m s o f C o n t r a d ic t i o n a n d o f E x c l u d e d iMiddlo haA'ing
b e e n l o n g e n o u n c e d , ere t h a t o f I d e n t i t y had b e e n d i s c r im i n a t e d
and raised to t h e rank o f a c o o r d in a t e princi]ile. I sh all not, t h e r e
fore, noAA- folloAA t h e or d e r in Avhich I d e t a i le d t o y o u th o s e laAVS,
b u t t h e or d e r in AA'hich t h e y Avero c h r o n o l o g i c a l l y g e n e r a l i z e d .
T h e prineiplos o f Contradiction and o f E x clu d ed jMiddle can both
be traced back to P la to , by Avhom t h e y Avere
The principles of enounced and frequently applied ; th ough it AAms
rontradictionand Ex- ^jjj after, that either o f them obtained
eluded .Aliddle can be ^
traced back 10 riaio. a d istin ctiv e appellation. T o take the principle
o f Contradiction first. J'his laAv P lato frecpiently
em ploys, bnt tho m ost remarkable passages are found in t h e J * /io _ d o ,
in the S /> p /iis (o ^ .and in the fourth and seventh books o f the J i e p n b l i c ?
T h is laAv Avas, hoAvever, more d istin ctively and
Law of foniradic- cmplniticallV euouiiced b y Aristotle. In one
lio n e iM ]ih n lic n l]v ' .
miouncedbyAri-iotie. y m anifest t h a t iio oiie can
conceive to him self th at the sam e thing ean at
oneo be and not be, for thus he Avould hold rejm gnant opinions,
I K r u g . L o g il:, p p . 02. 0.3 T l i i i- x p o s ili o n F o r , in a s m iic li a s I h is ] ir in c ip lc is n o t in a le -

o f till- l a o f Ib 'u s o n a m ) C o ih f(|iio n i d rjc s r i a l , it i^ o n ly a d c r i v a l i o n o f Ib o t b r c e b .r
n o t rip r( - - i- n l ib o A i i l l i o r - l a l ( - t v i e w . In a n ia l l i i w s ; a n d in a s m u c h us if is r r n ile r i a l, it
n o t e to till- IhfriisMiitif, p K ;b ( liiT c a s im ila r c o i n c id e s w i l l i ll i e p r i n c i p l e o f C a u s a l i t y , ar^d
d o r tr in e l a d been m a il la im - il in Ih e a r l i c l e is e x t r a - l o g i c a l . T in ; Law s of T li o i i g l i t ,
a o r i g i i a l l v p u b lis b e r l) . h e . a i s : l l i e lo g i- ])r<)pcrly so c a lle d , a r c llm s r e d u c e d t o t h r e e ,
r a l r e 'a l i o n o f /.-o.*rm a n d ( nnî<ivint, as mnre th o s e of Idtntily.^ Contrnr/iction, and Ex-
th a n a n e ie n rfdlary o f th e la w of X u n rn n - c lu r / f / El>.
I s (< r f i o n i n it-llin -e i ) b a - e - , i , 1 a m e o n iid r.n t , ,, ,

- . 1 . 1 H .See P/ifT'/e, p . 10 .3 : Sophtsta, n.2[>2; Rcpitb-
o f I r o s in g , e r r o n e o n - . A m i a g a in , in th e
same work, p Oi3' 'The jirineiple of Suffi- h mi. p. ^D.
nrnt lltafon should be excluded from Logic. Metnph., 1. lii. (iv.) c. 3.
Lect. V. LOGIC. G3
and subv ert the reality of truth. W herefore, all who a tte m p t to
dem onstrate, reduce ev e ry th in g to this as th e ultim ate d o c trin e ; for
this is by n atu re the princijile of all o th e r axioms. A n d in several
jiassages of his M e t a p h y s i c s , ^ in his J R r i o r A n a l y t i c s ^ - and in his
P o s te r io i' A n a ly tic s ^ he observes th a t some had attem p ted to
dem onstrate this jirincijile, an a tte m p t which betrayed an igno
rance o f those things w hereof we ought to require a dem onstration,
and o f those things w h e re o f wo o u g h t n o t ; for it is impossible to
dem onstrate e v e ry th in g ; as in this case, we m ust regress and re
gress to infinity, and all dem onstration would, on th a t snppo.sition,
be impossible. .
F ollow ing Aristotle, the P erip atetic s established this law as the
high est principle of know ledge. F ro m the
ICS th e In^TJiest
^ p r in c i- G reek Aristotelians it o b tained th e nam e by^
p ie o f k n o w le d g e . O b- wliich it has Subsequently been denom inated,
ta in e d its n a m e fro m t h e y i r i t i c i p l c , 0 1 * I c iv ) , o v u x i o m , o f c o n tr a d ic tio n ,
th e G re e k A r is to te - dvTK/iacrews). T h is name, at least, is

(^ a ^ iw fx a r y j i
found in th e C om m entaries Mf A m m o nins and

Philoponus, w here it is said to be the criterion which divides tr u th
from falsehood th r o u g h o u t the universe o f e.xist-
The S c b o o l m e n , mi i i i i ,
ence. * I h e schoolmen, in general, ta u g h t the
same d o c trin e ; and Suarez even .says, th a t the
law o f contradiction bolds th e same suprem acy am ong the princi
ples of existence.'^
A fter the decline o f th e Aristotelian philosophy, many co n tro v e r
sies arose touching the truth, and still more to u ching the prim itive
or axiomatic character, of this law. Some main-
C o n tr o v e r s ie s re- t a iu o d th a t it w a s in d e m o n s t r a b le ; o th e r s th n t it
s p e c tin g th e tr u th a n d n i i- i ,
ch a r a c te r o f th is la w . p r o v o d , b lit p r o v e d Only i n d ir e c t ly b y a
r e d u c t i o a d a h s u r d w n ; while otlior., again, held
th a t this could be directly done, and that, eonsotiiiently, tbe law of

C ontradiction was u ot entitled to tlie dignity of a first princijile.''
1 L. iii. c. 4. Si/Tcai/ Kol fxij o u r w v S ta ip e l rh \p evd o s s a l

2 L . ii. c. 2. a \rj^ fla v . in A n a l. Post., 1, i. c. x i . f 30
b. Ei>. [C f. A u g u s tin u s X ii'liiis S u e ssa iin s,
i F o r th e n a m e , see A m m o n iu s . In I)e Inter- p g s, gd P a r is , 1540.]
p re t., C o m m e n t., j). 1,53 b. e d . A id . V e n o t. 1546. '
P h ilo p o n u s , In Anal. Pr., p. 13 h, 38 b, c d . ^ [ A ls le d iu s , ArDA/m Liberalium S ystem a
V e n e t 1531. In .-Inal Pc.sC. ,, 30 b, cd . A id . (S' O). p. 174. C o g n it io a p r io ri est ],r iu c i|.i-
V c n e t. 1534. T h e la n gu aire q u o te d in th e t e x t h o c , w ,p o s sib le
is n e a r ly a tr a n s la tio n o f A m m o n iu s In C ateg.. ' ^ o u s u le A h taph ,
, tt 4 A / \ s , .Snnrezii: * H o c, iiKJiiam, te n e t p r im a tiim
p . MO a. H /j.eu y a p K a r a ^ a a is Kai a ird ib - . . . . . ' i- , A .
^ \ , N / ^ in te r p n n c ip iii c o g n o 5 c e n d i, sic u t D e u s in te i
a a t s a d eTri TrauToou r w u uutccu Ka\ fxr] uutccu p r iiic ip ia e s s e n d i. ]
S.atpeT ah a y j j ^ h s a l r h v|/eD5os. A m m o n - 6 C f. S u H re z.D isp u ta t,o n es M etapbysicer. D is p .
m s IS fo llo w e d by P h H o p o n u s. w h o . s a y s , - jj,- ^ 3 _ E d . [ A ls t c d iu s , E n rydoperdia. 1. iii.,
Tb 5e r ' i s ayTKpdereccs a^'iwfw. in i ira v a te v juei/ Archelogia, c. v ii. p. 80.]
G4 LOGIC. L ect. V
In like manner, its em p lo y m en t was made a further matter o f

controversy. Finally, it was dis])Uted w hether it were an im m e
diate, native, or a jn-iori datum o f in tellig en c e; or Avhether it
were an ii jm s ttr io r i and ad ven titiou s generalization fioin e.xperi-
enee. T h e latter alternative, that it was on ly an induction, Avas
maintained hy L oeko. T h is opinion wa.s, hoAv-
ever, A'alidh' refuted h v Leihnitz, a v I i o shoAved
that it IS ad m itted the m o m en t the t e n h s o f its
ennneiation are understood, and th at Ave im plicitly fo llow it even
when Ave are not e x p licitly conscious o f its dictate. Leihnitz, in
some parts o f his Avorks, seem s to identify the principles o f I d e n
tity ami C ontradiction; in others, he distinguishes them, hnt educes
the law o f Id en tity ou t o f the law o f Contradiction. I t is needless
to pursue the sn h seq nent history o f this principle, Avhicli in latter
tim es has found n o n e to ga in say the n ecessity
I t- t r iiih d e n ie d b\ universality o f its truth, e x c e p t a m o n g those
m o d e rn a b s o lu lts ts . . o
philosophers a v I i o , in Germany, h a ve d ream t that
man is c o m p e te n t t o a cognition o f the ahsoln te : and as a cognition
o f the ahsolnte can on ly he estahiished th rough positions repng-
and, therefore, on logical princijiles, m n tn a lly exclu sive, they
have found it necessary to start Avith a denial o f the fundam ental
laws o f t h o u g h t ; and so, in tlieir effort to soar to a p h ilosoph y
ahdve logic and intelligence, th ey h ave snhverted the conditions o f
linman jiliilosophy altogether. T h u s S c h e llin g and H e g e l prudently
repudiated the jirinciples o f Contradiction and E x c lu d e d M id dle as
liaviii.r any application to the ahsolnte w h ile again those jihiloso-
phers (as Cousin) w ho iittem pt a cognition o f the ahsolnte Avithont
a preliminary repudiation o f the laws o f Logic, at once in v olve
th em selv es in contradictions, th e co g e n c y o f Avhich th e y do not <leny,
and from whicli th e y arc Avholly iinahlc to extricate themselves.''
1 R " n y , 1$ i. c h . ii. ] 4 i:i>. ))o iiilo d o u t b y tlie la tle r in h is Geschlc/tie der

2 E ivjm , It. i. c li i j E n Philosnp/tic, (U A riv, x v . [). 5 0 8 .) E n . [On
3 ('i)m |iari! TU rodirfc, ; 41. M o n u d o ln g iry .31, r c jc c lio ii o f llie L iig icn l L a w s, by .Sclicdliiig,
w ith X ou rm iijr EsuiLi, 1. i c h . i. j 10; 1. iv . l le iif l, e tc , se e B a c lim a m i, Uher die Pkilosojihie,
ch . ii 1 El> im in e r Z it, p. 21'^. ed . .Jen a. ISIS. U o L a iin .
4 S e e S c l i i d l i l i g . Vom h h nh Prinrip der Phi- W i^smsrhnflslehre, i v . , Lnuik. 7 1 8 . S i g w a r t ,
Ininphi'. ) 1 I; H eg el, lytg ik . h. iic. 2; E n cyk- iM gik, 5 S , p . 42, e d . 183 - 7. l U T ' b a r t , D r Priii-
lo p n lir , t 11.7, 110 .sc lie ltin g em leav o rs to ri/iio Lngi:o Ejrr.hisi M rt/ii in lrr Contr/idirtnrin
a b ro g ate th e p rin cip le o f f oiilradictioii in non negU grndo, O O ltiiig , 18.33. llarleii.-leiii,
relatio n to th e h ig h e r p h i b i s o p h y . h y as.^nm - D r MnUndn P/iilnwphinr. Logirrr. Lrgihus ndstrin-

ing th a t o f b leiility ; th e em p irical an tag o - g - n lu , finihn'i m m h rn iiiin n i/n , E i p s i . ' C . 1 S .3 5.
iii-rn hefw eci, /.gT a n d n e 7i - < g e b e i n g m erged O n tlie lo g ic al a n d in e lap liv sic alsig iiific ar.e e
in th e id en tity ot th e a b -o ]n le >gn. Ilegid o f th e p tic ip le o f C o n tra d ic tio n , sec l*lat-
re g a rd - hoM i p -ieeip le a iV e a - v a l i d oi Iv f o r ner. P'ld. A p h .. 1 4 O7 .3 . an d K an t, K rin k d

tl e fin ite I 'n ile r -ta in lin g . a n d a in r p p l i e a h ' e rtin rn Vrrniinft. j i . 101. e d . 1700.]
t o th e 1 ig h e r p r w a . e a o f th e i:e a n n Thik b S e e th e A u th o r 's c r itic is m o f C o u sin , Dis-
diffe e n c e Ix-U veen th e t w o p h ilo s o p h e r s is tuss io ns ,-p . \ ri s t y - E d .
Lect. V. LOGIC. G5
B u t this hy the way, and on a subject wliich a t present you c a nnot

all be snp])Osed to un derstand. .
T h e law o f E xclu d ed IVIiddle between tw o contradictories re-
inonnts, as I liave said, also to Plato, though the
Law of L xciud ed Secoud A ld b ia d c s, t h e d i a l o g u e in w h i c h i t is
Aliddle. l b .
most clearly expressed, m u st be adm itted to he
spurious.' It is also in the fragments of Pseiido-.Vrchytas, to be
found in Slobaens. I t is exjilicitly and einjihat-
K xplicitly en ou nced jc a lly cm o iin ce d h y A r isto tlc in m a n y Iia ssa g cs
bv A n s l o l l e . , . , . t
both of his Jfe ta p h y sic s (1. ni. (iv.) c*. 7.) and
o f his A ncd ytics, both P r io r (1. i. c. 2) and P o ste rio r (1. i. c, 4). Iu
the first o f these, he says: I t is impossible t h a t there should exist
any medium between c ontra dictory ojiposites, b u t it is necessary
eith er to affirm or to d en y everytliing o f e v e rything. A n d his e x
pressions are similar in the other books. Cicero says th a t the
foundation of Dialectic is, th a t Avhatever is
enounced is cither true or false. T his is from
his A ca d e m ics (1. ii. c. xxix.), and there are parallel passages in his
Topics (c. xiv.) and his D e Oratore (1. ii. c. xxx.). This law, though
universally recognized as a principle in the G reek P e r ip a te tic school,
and in th e schools o f th e m iddle ages, only received th e distinctive
ajipellation by which it is now know n at a com paratively mo<lern
date. I do n o t recollect having m et with the term p r in c ijn u m e.v-
clusi m e d ii in any a u th o r older than the Leili-
Uaum garten. nitzian Bauiiigarten,'' thoug h Woli' speaks of
the exclusio m td ii inter contradictoria.
T h e law of Id en tity , I stated, Avas n ot cxjilicated as a cooi-dinate
principle till a com paratively recent period. T h e
Law of id e n tip . earliest authov in Avhom I h ave found this done.
A n toin us A ndreay. ^ ^ '
is A n to n in s Andreas, a scholar o f Scotus, Avho
flourished at the en d o f the thirteenth and b eg in n in g o f the four
tee n th centnry. T h e schoolman, in the fourth book o f his C om
m entary o f A r isto tle s AFetapJiysics^' a com m entary Avhich is full
o f th e m o st in genious and origii.al vicAVs, not only asserts to the
laAV o f I d e n tity a coordinate d ig n ity Avith the laAv o f Contradiction,
1 S e c o n d A tc lb ia d fS , ]i. 139. See also So- iiaciis E le m e n ta L o g ic a , 1. l i. c . 14, [p . 172, c d .

p Ai sia , p . 250 F d . 1C03 C o n t r a d i c e n t l u m u s u s e x p l i c a t i i r ii ii o
2 Fc i o g f f. 1. II. c. 2, p . 1^8, e d . A n t w e r p , 1575; a x io m a te : C o iitra d lce n fla n o n jiossunl de
In r t li. t o n i . 1. p. 22, e d . U e e r e n Cf. S i n i p l i - eodein .siraul esse vera; ct neccssarium est
cius. In A n s t . C a U g ., p p. 97, 103, e d . B asil, co n lr a d ic e n tiiim a lte r u m ciiilib et lei coiiven -
1551 r.D. ire , a l t e r u m n o n c o n v e n i r e F d ]
3 L e x c o n t r a d k to r i a r u m , p r in c ip iu m c o n tr a d i- ^ M e la p h y s ic a , k 1 0 . - F n .
c e n liu m (SC. p r o p o s i ti o n u m ) , a s Us ed in t h e
scliools, included the law o f C o n tr a d ic t io n eX n tologia, [>2. ho.
and th e la w o f E x c lu d e d Aliddle. S e e Aloli- C Q i it e s t i o v. p . 21 a, c d . A ' e n e t . , 1513. F d
06 LOGIC. L ect. V.
Imt, against Ari.stotlo, be m aintains t h a t th e jirinciple o f Id entity,

ami not tlio principle of C ontradiction, is the one absolntely first.
'I'hc funniila in which A n d re as expressed it w.as Ens est ens. Siih-
<o]nontly to this author, the question concerning the rcl.ative prior-
i i v o f the tw o laws o f I d e n tity and o f Contradiction became one
much ag itated in tbc schools; though th ere were also found some
who a.ssorteil to th e law o f E x clu d ed M iddle this siiprome rank.*
Leibnitz, as I have said, did not always distin-
" gnisli tbe principles of I d e n ti ty and of C o n tra
diction. B y W o l f the former was styled the princiiile o f Certainty.
{p r in c ip h im C c r t i t u d i J i i s ) but bo, no more
than Leibnitz liimself, sufficiently discriminated
b etw een it and the law o f Contradiction. Tliis Avas, hoAvever, d on e
b y B annigarten, an o th er dis tinguished folloAver
B aunigarten. Loibiiitz, and from him it reeeiA-ed th e name
t)f th e ]trinci|ile o f P osition , that is, o f Affirmation or Id en tity .
{pn 'n cipiu m E o s itio n is sive Tdent/tatis), the name by Avhich it is
noAv universally knoAvn. T h is principle has found greater favor, in
the ey es o f the ah.soliitist philosophers, than those o f Contradiction
and E x c lu d e d Middle. B y F ic h te and S c h ellin g
i i c h i e and S ciiei- been jilaccd as the primary pi inciple o f all
pliilosopUy.* I l o g e l alone subjects it, along Avith
the other laAvs o f thought, to a l igid bu t falla
cious criticism ; and rejects it along Avith tliem, as b e lo n g in g to that
low er s|hcre o f knoAvledge, Avhich is co n v ersa n t o n ly Avith th e rela
tive and finite.'
T h e fourth lavq tb a t o f Reason and Conse-
L nw < ,f R eason and q u e i l t , w h i c l l St.Mllds . ' i p a i l b v i t s e l f frOlll tllC OtllCI
on> -i< |ii . i.t. tlirec, Avns, l i k e th e la w s o f C o n tr a d ictio n and
R i c o g i i i z e d l ) } - I l a t o ^ _
and Arixioiie. P b \clinle<l M i d d l e , r c c o g i i i z e d b ) ' P lato. l i e lays
i t doA vn a s a p o s t u l a t e o f r e a s o n , t o a d m i t n o t h
i n g A vith oiit a cause; and tb e sam e is f i c q n e n t l y done by b is
, . sch o la r A i i s t o t l c . " B o t h , l i o A v c v c r , in reference
'Apxv^Vf y 'o s T (o )s . ... , , ,.
to tins iirinciple, em iilov tlie ainhigiions term
Apxv yf.y(T(ws. * '^ , *
cause (ulrta atrioc).
Aristotle, itnlecd, distin-
giii.'<he.s the laAv o f licason, as the ideal principle o f k n o w le d g e (apxv
1 [ A l e x , d e A le, Jn A r if t. M e tn p h .. i v . I. 9.) 3 M 'tn p h y s ic n . 11. El>.

( o i n p a r e S u a r e z , J jis p . M > tu p k ., D i s p . 111. ( 3. < .See K i c l i l e , C n in i/h i" '. tier g e s a m m te n IVix-
A ' e x a i i d e r jirofexM-s l o a g r e e w i l l i A r it il o l l e . s - n s d i a f t s lr k r e , I, 1. . S c l j e l l i n g , V um /cA, 7 .
ifj g i v i n g (). flrO j i l a c e l o t l i e p ri i ic i i< l e o f 1 1 1 ).
^ oiitradieiion, but, in fact, be i d e n t i t i e s it '> .she a b o v e , p . 04, n o t e 4. Er>.
w i l l ) t h a t o f E x c l i j i l e d A l i d d l e , d f f/u oviii a ffir - 0 P iiiU b u s, p. 20. Ki>.
m ah o r c l n c g n tio Ml). 7 ll. g . A n a l Pns' , ii 10; P/ii/s . ii. 3 ; M etrip k ..
2 O n to lo g ia . j 3 3 . 2S s. - - l o , j. ] 3; R A o . , ii. 2 3 Kd.
L ect. V. LOGIC. 67
T7J9 yvwo-ew?, p r in c ip iu m cognoscf^nd!), from tlie real princijile o f

l^roduction, (apx^ yerccrea)?, p r in d p iiD n f i e n d l, p n 'n c ip iia n es-
seiidi)} J>y Cicero, tlie axiom o f reason and
ThrshooiincM' eoiiseqiieiit was, in like manner, compreliended
under the formula, tiih ils in e causdp a formula
adopted by the sch o o lm en ; although they, after Ai-istotle, distin
gu ished under it the ra tio esseodi, and the ratio cogiwsccndi.
Tn modern tiine.s, tlie attention o f iihilosojihers was called to this
law o f Leibnitz, who, on th e tw o juanciples o f
L e ib iiit z c a lle d a t- ]4casou and o f Contradiction, founded the whole
I c n t io ii to L a w o f .S u f- i t t - i i i
ficient Ueasoii. cd ih cc Ol liis ]ill 1losopliv. L lulef tlic latter
law, as I have m en tio n ed, he comjirehended,
h ow ever, the princi])le o f I d e n t it y ; and in the former he did not
sufficiently discriminate, in terms, the la w o f C.ausality, as a real
lirincijde, from the la w o f Reason, jiroperly so called, as a formal or
ideal princijile. T o this axiom he g a v e various d e n o m in a tio n s ,
n ow calling it the jirincijile o f D e te r m in in g R eason , n ow the jirinci-
jile o f Sufficient Reason, and n o w the principle o f C o nv en ien ce or
A greem en t {coni'enieotia ) ; m aking it, in its real relation, the ground
of all ex is te n c e ; in its ideal, the ground o f all jicsitive k n ow le d ge.
On this subject there was a celebrated con troversy b etw een Leibnitz
nd Di'. Sam uel Clarke, a controversy on this, as on other points,
e m in e n tly w orthy o f you r study. T h e d ocu m ents in which this con
troversy is contained, w ere jmblished in th e E n g lis h edition under
(he title, A collection <>f P a p e r s ichich p a sse d hetvceen the I n te l earned
M r. P e ih n itz a n d D r. Clarke, in the yea rs 1715 a n d 1716, relating
to the P rin c ijjle s o f M a tu ra l P h ilo so p h y a n d P elig io n , L o n d on ,
1717.'*
W o lf , the m ost dis tinguished follow er o f Leibnitz, em ploys the
fo r m u la X o t h in g is w ith o u t a sufficient rer.-
W o lf. , . . , , . . .
son w h y it is, rather than w h y it is n o t; that is,
if a n y th in g is su]ij:)osed to be (p a n it nr esse), so m eth in g also must
be supposed, w h en c e it m ay be understood w h y the same is laither
than is not. l i e blam es the schoolmen for confusing reason
(ra tio ) with cause (ransa) : bu t his censure equally apjilies to his
nl.aster Leibnitz, as to th em and A risto tle; for all o f these jihiloso'
jiher.s, though th e y did n o t confound the tw o j^rinciples, e u ip lo y c l
ambiguous terms to d eno te them .
1 i l l ' i v . {v ) 1 r .D . o r I d e i i l K y is a s s i m c d ns llu ' . 0 1 1 : fU 'tio n c-

- De Difhintiniir, u . c . 2 S. E n :ill m n lliL T n a lic s a n d th a t o f S i i f c d o i . t L
3 S e c T/idcr)ii'(, ; 44 Monri /olngle, 3 1.3 2 . so n a .' th e f o u n d a t i o n o f n a t u r a l p liilo si^ p l.;
- K d . Ed .
I S (,e e s i c c i .i l l v L c i h n i t z 's Secon d L ette r, -5 .Sco F i s c h e r * L o g i k . [ 5 9 , p .38, c d . 1 S 3 S
D. 2 0 , in w h ic h l l ; e jr in c ijjle o f C o n t r a d ic t io n C o m p a r e W o l f , O n to lo g ia , 7 0 , 7 1 . E d . ]
dS L O GI C. L ect. T.
Tlio Leil)iiiti:in d o c t r i n e o f t h e n n iA m r s a l i t y o f t h e l a w o f Sufii-

cient Peaso n , both as a jirinciple o f existence
ni-ciissio ii regnrd-
a n d o f t h o u <O
r h t', e x c i t e d m u c h d i s c n s s i o n ainonor
O
ing t l io l.o ib n itzin n
d o c t r i n e o f t h e li n v o f
th e philoso])hers, m o r e ])articnlarly o f G e r m a n y .
. ''u ff ic i o n t K e iis oi i. I n th e earlier h a l f o f t h e last cen tu ry , so m e con-
ti'overted the validity of the itrinciple, others
a t t e m p t e d t o i -est ri ct i t.' Among o t h e r a r g u m e n t s , i t is a l l e g e d , b y
t h e a d v o c a t e s o f t h e f o r m e r o p i n i o n , i f t h e ]>rinciple b e a d m i t t e d ,
t h a t e v e r y t h i n g m u s t h a v e a s u f f i c i e n t r e a s o n w h y i t is, r a t h e r t h a n
w h y it is n o t , o n t h i s h y p o t h e s i s , e r r o r i t s e l f w i l l h a v e s u c h a r e a
s o n , a n d , t h e r e f o r e , m u s t c e a s e f o r t h w i t h t o b e error.^
3Iany philosophers, as W o l f and Baumgarten, endeavored to
I c m o n s t r a t e t h i s pi'i nci ji le b y t h e p r i n c i p l e o f C o n t r a d i c t i o n ; w h i l e
others, with better success, s h o w e d that all s u c h d e m o n s t r a t i o n s
w e r e il l ogi cal .
In the m ore recent system s o f philosophy, the universality and
n e c e s s i t y o f t h e a x i o m o f B e a s o n has, w i t h o t h e r lo g ic a l law s , b e e n
c o n t r o v e r t e d a n d r e j e c t e d b y s p e c u l a t o r s on t h e absolute.^
1 A F c u e r liii a n d D a r ic s . S e e R a c liin a n n , Allgnneine Logik, P . i. p .

[K ie s e w e lt e r , 5 7 ];
L o g it, p ', 1'), L c i p s i g , 1 S 2 S ; C f . D e g e n n i d o , c o in p a i e Lermres on Metaphysics, i i . p p . 39 6 ,
//O f Comp, ftes Sy$t. fh Phil., f . ii. p. 1 4 5 , e d . 397, n o te s. E d .
Ep . 4 [O n p r in c ip le of D o u b le N e g a tio n as
- See U u c lin in u ii, Logih, p . 5G. W it li tlie a n o t h e r la w o f I 'lio u g lil, .see F rie .s , L o g i t ,
fo r e g o in g liis t o r > ' o f ( lie la w s o f T lio iig lit, 4 1, p . 19 0 ; C a lk e r , Denklehre oder Logik iind
co m p a re th e sa m e a u th o r, L o g it, 1 8 - 3 1 . Dialtktik, 16 5 , p . 453; iiaucke, Lehrbuch der
Ed . Logik, 64, p . 4 1 . ]
LECTURE VI.
S T O I C H E I O L O G Y .
SECTION L NOETIC.
THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THOUGHT TIIEIR CLASSIFI

CATION AND IMPORT.
H a v in g concluded the Introductory Questions, w e entered, in

o u r l a s t L e c t u r e , u p o n o u r s c i e n c e itself. The
R ecap itu lation . P u r e L o g i e is t h e D o c t r i n e o f E l e
ments, or th at which considers the conditions of m ere o r jn ss ihl e
thinking. T h e s e e l e m e n t s arc o f t w o kinds, th ey are either the
f u n d a m e n t a l law s o f t h o u g h t as r e g u l a t i n g its n eces sa ry products, or
t h e y are th e p r o d u c t s th e m s e lv e s as r e g u la te d b y th ose laws. The
f u n d a m e n t a l l a w s a r e f o u r in n u m b e r , t h e l a w o f I d e n t i t y , t h e l a w
of Contradictimi, the law of E xcluded Middle, the law o f R e a s o n
and Consequent.* The products of thought a r e t h r e e , 1, C o n -
cejits or N o t i o n s ; 2, J u d g m e n t s ; a n d , 3, R e a s o n i n g s . I n o u r last
L e c t u r e , \ ve c o n s i d e r e d t h e first o f t h e s e t w o jiarts o fth e doctrine
o f element.s, a n d I w e n t t h r o u g h t h e g e n e r a l e x p l a n a t i o n of the con
tents and i m p o r t o f th e fo u r laws, a n d their history. W ith o u t re
capitulating w h at was then s t a te d , I shall now proceed to certain
g e n e r a l o b s e r v a t i o n s , w h i c h m a y b e sug< .......................................... "
laws.
A n d , f i r s t o f al l , I m a y r e m a r k , t h a t
classes. The first (
G en eral ob servation s
in r ela tio n to the fo u r th re e principles
Iu n i i a m e n t a i la w s of and E x c l u d e d j Mi d dl
th on glit. These fall priuci jllc o f Ro!
in t o t w o ela sses. m i ^
I h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n is
e n t reci]u-ocal c o n n e c t i o n o f t h e l a w s , an
t h e i r results.
In the f irs t ]ilace, i n regard to the (
t w e e n t h e l a w s t h e m s e l v e s , i t is a t o n c e
1 See, h o w e v e r, p . 62, noti

70 LOGIC. L e c t . VI.
.' t:\iul i n n f a r inoro ]iro\iinalo relation to eaeli o t h e r t h a n t o t h e

fourth. The tirst tliree are, i n d e e d , so inti-
riiis chisdiicniioii niatelv eoniieetcd, that tliongli i t ha.s n o t e v e n
iou.io,i. w, on the n t t e n n . t e d to earrv th e m up into a higher
t l i l l e r i Mi c e 1)1 connec- . . . , , , . ,
non between the laws pniieiple, and t h o u g h th e vanou.s an d eo n trad ie-
theni.dives. torv eiideavors th at h a v e l.>ên m a d e to elevate
one or o t h e r in to an a n t e c e d e n t, an d to d e g r a d e
<i tl i ers i n t o c o n s e c i n e n t s , h a v e o n l y s h o w n , b y t h e i r f a i l u r e , t h e i m -
p o >i l i i I i i y o f r e d u c i n g t h e t h r e e t o o n e ; st i l l s o i n t i m a t e is t h e i r
e o i m e e t i o i i , t h a t e a c h in f a c t s u p p o s e s t h e o t h e r s . T h e y are like th e
th r e e sides o f a t ria n g le ; not th e same, n o t r edu cib le to unity, each
pretcunling with ecpi al r i g h t t o a j n i o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n , a n d each, if
considered first, g i v i n g in its o w n e.xistence the e.vislence o f t h e
o t h e r tw(^. Tliis i n t i m a e y o f relation does not subsist betw een the
principle of Ifeason and Consequent and the three other laws;
th e y d o not, in t h e sa m e n eces sa ry m a n n e r , su g g e s t each o t h e r in
thought. T h e e x ' p l a n a t i o n o f t h i s is f o u n d i n t h e d i f f e r e n t n a t u r e
o f t h e i r r e s u l t s ; a n d t h i s is t h e s e e o n d s u b j e c t o f o u r c o n s i d e r a t i o n . '
In the second place, th en , t h e d istin ctio n o f t h e four law s into
t w o c l a s s e s is n o t o n l y w a r r a n t e d b y t h e di ffcr-
T, On iiie iiiiTeieiicc (jf t h e i r l u u t u a l d e p e n d e n c e i n t h o u g h t , b u t ,
.)! tin einl winch the i j l ^ y wi s c , b v t h e d i f t e r c i i c e o f t h e e n d w h i c h t h e
I WO severally
accoinpii.-h t w o classcs Severally accomjilish. F o r t h e first
three laws not only stand a j i a r t liy t h e m s e h es
(fm-ming, as it w e r e , a si n g l e ju i n ei j i l e viewed in three different
.a.Npeets), b u t t h e y n e c e s s i t a t e a resu lt v ery different, b o th in k i n d
a n d in d e g r e e , f r o m t h a t d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e l a w o f K e a s o n a n d C o n -
. - eqi i ei i t . d'l ie d i f f e r e n c e in t h e i r r e s u l t c o n s i s t s in t h i s , w h a t e v e i '
vi < j | a t e s t h e haws , w h e t h e r o f I d e n t i t y , o f C o n t r a d i c t i o n , o r o f E x -
clu<lc<l I Mi d d l e , we f eel to be a b s o l u t e l y i ii qi oss ibl e, n o t only in
thoiiL,dit b u t i n e x i s t e n c e , ddius we c a n n o t attri'Inite e v e n to Oin-
n i p o tc nc i* t h e p o w e r o f m a k i n g a t h i n g di f fei 'e nt f r o m i tseli' o f m a k -
iicj- a t h i n g a t o n c e t o b e a n d n o t to be, o f m a k i n g a t h i n g n e ith e r
t o b e n o r n o t t o bca These three laws t h u s d e t e i a u i n e to us t h e
Nphere o f po ssiljility a n d o f impossibility; ami this no t m e r e l y in
t h o u g h t b u t in r e a l i t y , n o t o n l y l o g i c a l l y l i u t m e t a p b y s i c a l l y . Very
d i f f e r e n t is t h e r e s u l t o f t h e l a w o f l l e a s o n an d Conscujueiit. 'I'his
))iinciph' m e r e l y e x c l u d e s f ro m t h e s p h e r e o f jio sitive t h o u g h t w h a t
w e c a n n o t c ( u n p r e h e n < l ; f o r w h a l e \ ei- w e c o m p r e h e n d , t h a t t h i ' o n g h
whi cdi w e c o m p r e h e m l i t is i t s r e a s o n . W h a t , therefore, violates the
1 Kor a latfT rlfvclopment of the Authorn philosophy as regards the distinction here indi
caed, feee D i s c u s s i o m , j>. (Xj2 t l u q . liu.
L f. c t . VI. LOGIC 71
law o f R eason and Consequent merely, in virtue of this law heeomes

a logical zero; th a t is, we are compelled to think it as nnthink.MhIc,
h n t not to think it, tho u g h aetnally non-existent sidijectively or in
th ought, as therefore actii.ally nuii-existeiit o l ) j c i li\ elv or in reality.
A n d why, it m.ay he asked, tloes the law o f Ivcasoii and Conseijnent
n ot eqn.ally d eterm ine the sjihere of gener.al possihility, as the l.aws
of Id e n tity , Contra<liction, and E xclu ded MidilleV W hy are we to
view the mithink.ahle in the one case no t to he equally impos.sihle in
reality, as the nnthiiik.ahle in the o th e r? Some philosophers have,
on th e one hand, asserted to the D eity the pow er of reconciling eoii-
tr a d i c tio n s ; while, on the other, a g re a te r n nm hc r have made the
coneeivahle in linman th o u g h t the gauge of the
T w o c o u n t e r op in- possible ill existence. W h a t wai rants ns, it may
io n s r e g a r d in g th e i i i i i
liinits o f
Y .1
objective
he asked, to coiulemii these_ ori osite inuced-
i
p o s s ib ility . as equally unpliilosojiliieal ? In answ er to
this, tlio.ngli the m a tte r belongs more projierly
to Metapliysic tha n to Logic, I m ay say a few words, which, h o w
ever, I am aware, cannot, hy m any o f yon, be as y e t ade<|uatelv
understood.
T o d eny the universal ajqilication of th e first three laws, is, in
fact, to subvert the reality o f t h o u g h t ; and as this subversion is
itself an act o f thou ght, it in fact annihilates itself.
W h e n , for exainjile, I say th a t A is, and then say th a t A is not,
by th e second assertion I snblate or take away
T lie r e s p e c t iv e wliat, hy tlio first assertion, I posited or laid
sp h e re s o f th e tw o down ; thought, in the one case, niidoing hv
c la s s e s o r th e l a w s o f . i i i i
t h o u g h t d e fin e d a n d negation wliat, III th e other, it had by afhrrmi-
iiiustrated. tioii doiic. Blit wlicn it is asserted, th at A
T o d e n y th e u n iv e r - existing and A noii-existiiig are nt once true,
s a l a p p lic a t io n o f t h e ^yhat docs tliis imply ? I t implies th a t negation
br.st t h r e e l a w s , is to . . .
affirmation correspond to nothing out of the
s u b v e r t th e r e a l i t y o f
th o u g h t . m ind th a t there is no agreem ent, no disa

g re e m e n t between th o u g h t and its o h je c ts ; and
this is ta n ta m o u n t to saying th a t tru th and falsehood are merely
em p ty sounds. F o r if we only think hy affirmation and negation,
and if these are only as th e y are exclusive o f each other, it follow>,
th a t unless existence and non-existence he ojqioscd ohjeetively in
the same m anner a.s affirmation and negation are opposed snhjec-
tively, all onr thomglit is a mere illusion. T h u s it is. th a t those who
would assert th e possibility of contradictions hcing at once triu-.
in fact annihilate the jiossibility of truth itself, and the whole signifi
cance of thou ght.
1 C o m p a r e L e C le r c , Logica, p . ii . c . 3 . E d .
T2 LOGIC. L e c t . Ti.
B u t t h i s is n o t t l i e c a s e w l i o n w e d e n y t h e u n i v e r s a l , t h e a b s o l u t e
a)i]ilication of the law of Keason and Consc-
itut th is is not in- qiieiit. W hen I s a y t h a t a t h i n g m a y be, of
voived in ttiedenial of w i d e l i I c : u i i i o t e o i i c o i v e t l i c ] ) Os s i b i l i t y ( t h a t is,
the universal apnlica- , . . . .
tio u o fth eia w o fU ea - fo>Ht' v i i . g It a s t h c c o n s c H , u e n t o f a c e r t a i n
.-o n a n d C ouseiiueut. r c a s o i i ) , 1 o i il v s a y t h a t t h o u g h t is l i m i t e d ; b u t ,
within its limi ts, I d o n o t d e n y , I d o n o t s u b
vert, its t r u t h . B u t h o w , i t m : i y b e a s k e d , is i t s h o w n t h a t t h o u g h t
i< t h u s l i m i t e d ? H o w is i t s h o w n t h a t t h e i n c o n c e i v a b l e is n o t a n
in d ex o f th e inqtossible, an d t h a t those philosojihers w ho have e m
ployed it as the criterion o f the ab s u rd , are t h e m s e lv e s g u ilty of
absurdity? T h i s is a m a t t e r w h i c h wi ll c o m e under our considera
tion at a n o th e r tim e and in its jirojier p l a c e ; a t
T his law show n in jircscnt i t will b c Sufficient t o s t a t e in g e n e r a l
giiR-rai not to be ihe h v p o t h e s i s w l i i c l i i n: d<es t h e t h i n k a b l e
ii ie a < iir e o f objoclive n i
po.^.-ibiiiiy. i n o n s n r e o f t h e j ^ os s i bl e , b n u g s t l i o p r i n c i p l e
o f R e a s o n a n d C o n s e q u e n t a t o n e e in to collision
\ t' iHi t h e t h r e e h i g h e r l a w s , a n d t h i s h y p o t h e s i s i t s e l f is t h u s r e d u c e d
;it o n c e t o c o n t r a d i c t i o n and absurdity. F o r if w e ta k e a c o m p r e
hensive view of the p h a m o m e n a o f t h o u g h t , w e .shall f i n d t h a t al l
tli:it w e c a n p o s i t i \ e l y t h i n k , t h a t i.s, al l t h a t is w i t h i n the jurisdic
tion o f t h c l.iw o f R e a s o n a n d C o n s e q u e n t , lies b e t w e e n t w o ojipo-
.îte p o l e s o f t h o u g h t , w h i c h , a s e x c l u s i v e o f e a c h o t h e r , c a n n o t , o n
the jirinciples o f F l e n t i t y a n d Contradiction, both be true, b u t of
w h ich , on t h e ]irinciplc o f E x c l u d e d M id d le , t h e one or the other
must. Let us tak e, for cxamjjle, a n y o f t h e g e n e r a l ubjects o f our
knowledge. L e t u s t a k e b o d y , o r r a t h e r , s i n c e b o d y a s e x t e n d e d is
included under extension, let us l a k e extension itself' or sp. acc.
X o w , e x t e n s i o n a l o n e will e x h i b i t t o u s t w o pa ir s o f c o n t r a d i c t o r y
i n c o n c e i v a b l e s , t h a t is, i n al l , f o u r i n c o n i p r e h e n s i b l e s , b u t o f w h i c h ,
t h o u g h al l a r e e c j u a l l y . u n t h i n k a b l e , a n d , o n t h e I n q i o t h e s i s i n que.s-
l i o n , al l , t h e r e f o r e , e q u a l l y i m j i o s s i b l e , w e a r e c o m p e l l e d , b y t h e l a w
o f hhxcluded 3 I id d le , to a d m i t s o m e t w o as t r u e a n d n e c e s sa ry .
E x t e n s i o n , t h e n , m a y b e v i ( * we d e i t h e r as a w h o l e o r as a p a r t ;
and, in each a s ji e e t , it a f f o r d s u s t w o incogitable cont i- .adi ct ori es.
1, I ' a k i n g i t a s a w h o l e : s p a c e , i t is e v i d e n t ,
I'.y r c f t r e n c c l o Lx- n i u s t e i t h e r b e l i m i t e d , t h . a t i.s, h. ave a n e n d , ;i
leiifioii, 1, Ah a . i- i i i
circumference; or iniinmted, that is, h a v e no
end, no circumference, ' ^riiese .are c o n t r a d i c t o r y
su jip o s ilio n s: bo th , therefore, cann o t, b u t o n e m ust, be true. Xow
let us t r y jios itivel y to c o m p r e h e n d , jiosi tivel y to conceive, t h e p o s
sibility o f e i t h e r o f t h e s e t w o m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e a l t e r n a t i v e s . Can
w e r e p r e s e n t o r r e a l i z e in t h o u g h t e x t e n s i o n a s a b s o l u t e l y l i m i t e d ?
L ec t . V I. LOGIC. 73
in o t h e r A vor ds, c a n w e m en ta lly h e d g e ro u n d th e AA'liole o f s p a c e ,

c o n c e i v e i t a h s o l n t e l y h o u n d e d , t h a t is , s o t h a t h e y o n d i t s h o u i i d a r y
, t h e i O is no o u tly in g , no su rru m id in g , sjia ce?
Space or e.xtei.sion jg i,sij,ssil,!e*. WIiatcA cr eolin.a.ss ol space
u. ubsoliilely bounded, . , , ,. . . ,, , ,
unibinkiible by any limitation ol thought, Ave
s h a l l f i n d t h a t Ave h a v e n o d i f H c i i l t y in t r a n s c e n d
in g th e s e lim its. N a y , Ave s h a l l f i n d t h a t Ave c a n n o t hn t transcen d
th e m ; for we are u n a b le to tliin k any exten t o f sjiaee e x c e p t as
w i t h i n a s t i l l u l t e r i o r s p a c e , o f A vl ii ch, l e t n s t h i n k t i l l t h e p o w e r s o f
tliin k in g fail, avo can n e v e r reach th e cir cu m fe r en ce . Tt is t h u s
im p o ssib le for ns to t h i n k s p a c e as a t o t a lit y , t h a t is , a s a b s o l u t e l y
h o u n d e d , h n t a ll-co n ta in in g . W e m a y , t l i o r c f o i e , l a y d o w n t h i s first
W e c a n n o t t h i n k sp.-ice a s l i m i t e d .
e x t r e m e as in c o n c e iv a .h le .
L e t ns now consider its co n tra d icto ry ; can we coinjireliend the
possihility of infinite or nnliinitod space? T o
Space unlim ited in- su p p o sc tliis
i s a d i r e c t c o n t r a d i c t i o n in t e r m s ;
conceivable, as con- . ; . , i w -r
tradiciory . c o m jire lie iid th e iiic o m p re h e n s ih le . W e
t h i n k , Ave c o n c e i v e , Ave c o m p r e h e n d , a t h i n g , o n l y
as Ave t h i n k i t as A v ith in o r u n d e r s o m e t h i n c f e l s e ; h u t t o d o this o f
t h e i n f i n i t e i s t o t l i i n k the i n f i n i t e as f i n i t e , A v h ic h i s c o n t r a d i c t o r y
and absurd.
N o w , h e r e i t m a y h e a s k e d , Iioav h a v e Ave t h e n t h e w o r d i n f i n i t e ?
H ow h a v e Ave t l i e n otion A vh ic h th i.s Avord e x -
objeciion fromthe p i'csse s? The a ii s A v e r to th is q u estio n is eon-
naiiie and iiotiou of , .
Rallied 111 th e distinction o f jiositive and nega tiv e
the luiiuiie obviaied.
thought. W e h ave a positive coiicejit o f a
th ing, Avhen Ave think it b y the q u a l i t i e s o f Avliieli it is the c o m p l e
ment. B u t as the attrihntioii o f qualities is an
Distinction of posi- affirm a tio n , as a ffirm a tio n a n d n e g a t io n are r e la
tive and negative , , . i ^ i i
, , , t i v e s , a n d a s r e l a t i v e s a r e k n o w n o n l v in a n d
(bought and notion. *
tliio n g li each oth er, w e ca n n o t, th erefore, h a v e a
co n scio u sn ess o f th e affirm ation o f a n y q u a l i t y , A v itli o iit h a v i n g at
th e sa m e tim e th e co rrela tiv e c o n s c io u sn e s s o f its n e g a tio n . N ow,
th e o n e c o n s c io u s n e s s is a p o s i t i v e , t h e o t h e r c o n s c i o u s n e s s is a n e g
ativ e n o tio n . But, i n p o i n t o f ff ic t , a n e g a t i v e n o t i o n i s o n l y t h e
n e tO
ra tio no f a n o t i o n ; avc t l i i n k o n l V
v h y* t h e a t t r i h i i t i o n o f c e r t a i n
qualities, and the negation of these qualities and of thi.s attrihntioii,
is siin])lv, in so far, a denial o f onr tliinking at iill. As affirmation
alwavs* siiLTirests
OO negation,
O everv oosit've notion iiinst likewise sn<_f-
2(cst a nescative notion : and as lanonap'e is the '-eflex o f tlioiitrli',
th e jiositive and ne g a tiv e notions are exnrepsed hy jiositive and
n eg ative names. T h u s it is with tl;e infinite. T h e finite is tiie on ly
object o f real or positiA'e th o u g h t ; it is t e a t .alone Avliich Ave th ink
10
I-I LOGIC. L ect . \T.
b y tlie attribution o f determ inate cliaracters ; tlie infinite, on tlie

eontniry, is eon eeived only by tlie th in k in g away o f every character
b y which the linite was co n c e iv e d ; in other
ihe lutiiiite ex- word.s. We co n ccive it on ly as inconceivaljle.
' Tliis relation o f th e infinite to the finite is
shown, indeetl, in the term s by which it is cx-
|iressed in ev ery language. T h u s in Jjatiii, in jin itu m ; in Greek,
"i-r(.ipov\ ill German, lOiemUich ; in all o f which original ton g u es the
word e.xiiressive o f the infinite is o n ly a n ega tiv e e.xpression o f the
finite or limited. T h u s the very objection from the ex iste n ce o f a
iiaine and notion o f the infinite, w hen analyzed, only proves more
clearly that the infinite is no object o f th o u g h t ; that w e c on ceiv e
it, not in itself, but on ly in correlation and contrast to the finite.
T h e indefinite is, how ever, som etim es confounded with th e infin
it e ; th o ug h there are hardly tw o notions which.
The imkfinitc and ^vithout b e in g contradictory, difter more widelv.
lMliiiile, liow d i s t i l l - ^111 ! / -
1 lie indefinite lias a snbjective, the infinite an
objective relation. T he one is m erely the n e g a
tion o f the actual apprehension o f limits, the oth er the neg atio n o f
the possible ex iste n ce o f limits.
P u t to return w h e n c e we have been carried, it is manifest that
we can no more realize the th o u g h t or eoneep-
space aa bounded o f infinite, unbounded, or unlimited sjiace,
iiid siiace as unbound- .1 i- .1 c c
... . tlian we can realize tlie conceiition or a finite or
'd being two liicon-
teivabie coniradicto- a b solutely boun ded sjiace. P u t th ese tw o ineon-
ies. tlie law of Keasoii ccivablcs are recijirocal contradictories, and i f
Iiid ooiise.iiieiit can- uiiablc to coiuprchoiid the p ossib ility o f
Dot, therefore, form . , , -i 1 1 1 n
heeriterioi. of obj-c- h ow evcr, Oil the priiicij.le o f E x-
live po-.-ibili(y. chided ]\Iiddlc one or other must be admitted,
the h ypothesis is m anifestly fiilso, th at jtroposcs
the siibjocti\ e or formal law o f P ea so n and conserpient as the crite
rion o f real or objective ]iossibility.
It is needless to .<how that the same result is g iv e n by the exper
im en t made on extension considered as a jiart,
llio furtiirr hhowii divisible. H ere, i f Me attem iit to d ivid e ex-
bv ri fi-ri Jic<-to E.xti ii- . . . 1 n i
,ioii 2 A i a i art tcnsiuii 111 tlioiiglit, Me .shall neither, on the one
hand, succeed in e o n ceiv in g the jiossibility o f an
absolute miniiniirn o f space, that is, a miniiuiim ex hi/jjot/tesi e x
tended, but Mhich cannot be conceived as divisible into jiarts, nor,
on the other, o f e irrying on this division to infinity. P u t as these
lie e<uitradicti>ry opposite.s, th ey again afford a similar refutation o f
the hypotlic.sis in rjuestion.
B u t the sam e conclusion is reached b y simjily considering the
L ect. V L LOGIC. 75
law o f B eason ami C onsequent in itself. T his law enjoins T h in k

notliing w ithout a reason why we m ust think i t ;
3, iiy reieieiice to ihiiik noth ing except as contained in,
tlie Isnv of Ueiisoii and ,
Cou.se<iuent itself. cvulved oiit of, som ething else which we
already know. X ow , this r e a s o n , - - this some
thin g else, ill obedience to this very law, must, as itself known,
bc itself a consequent of some o the r a n t e c e d e n t; and thi.s antece
d e n t be again the consequent o f some an terior or higher reason;
and so on, a d iiijinitian. B u t the hum an mind is not jiossessed of
infinite jiowers, or of an intluile series of reasons and coiiscqiieiits;
on the contrary, its faculties are vcry limited, and its stock of know l
edge is very small. T o erect this law, therefore, into a standard of
existence, is, in fact, to bring down the iiifiiiiliide o f the universe to
llie finitude of man, a proceeding tha n w liich n o th in g can be im
agined more absurd. T h e fact is, th a t the law
riie linvs of Reason B easou and C onsequent can, with the law o f
and Consequent, etc., Effect, the low of Siibstiince and
reclucible to a JBglier ^
principle. Pliaeiiomenoii, etc., be, i f I am not mistaken, all
reduced to one high er principle, a priiici})le
which explains from the very lim itation o f the hum an mind, from
the very im becility o f its powders, a g re a t variety of pluenoiiiena,
which, from the liberality o f jihilosopbers, h ave obtained for tlieir
solution a mniiber o f positive and special principles. This, h o w
ever, is a discussion which would here be out of jilaee.* W h a t, huw-
ever, has been said m ay suffice to show that,
Summary statement ^vliilc the first three laws of th o u g h t are o f an
of the spheres of tlie i i i i i i i
laws of tiiouoiit absolute and universal cogency, llie fonrlli is only
of a cogency relative and jiarticular; that, while
the former d eterm in e the possibility, n o t only of all tbouglit, b u t of
all real know ledge, th e la tte r only regulates the validity o f m ediate
or reflective th o u g h t. T h e laws of Id e n tity , Contradiction and E x
cluded M iddle are, therefore, n ot only logical b u t nietajthysical jiriii-
cijiles, the law* of B easun and Consequent a logical jirinciplc alone ; a
doctrine which is, however, the converse o f w h at is generally taught.
I jiroceed, now, to say a few words on the general iiifluenee which
these laws exert njion th e ojierations o f think-
The general ii.flii- ing. These ojicratioiis, how ever varioii.s and
ei.ce which the forego- nuiltiform they m ay seem, are so governed in all
lag laws exert on the . .. . , , t i i
operations of think- tl*Gir iiianife.statioiis by th e preceding laws, thr.t
ing. no th o u g h t can jireteiid to vtilidity and tnitli
which is not in consonance with, which i.s not
governed by, them. F o r man can recognize th a t alone as real and
1 See Discussions, p. 609. Ed.
iG LOGIC. L ect. VI
assnretl, wliich the laws of his u n d e rs ta n d in g s a n c ti o n ; and he can

not but regard that as false and unreal, which these laws condemn.
From this, how ever, it by no me.ans follows th a t w hat is th o u g h t in
coiilunnity lo these laws, is therefore true ; for the sphere of th o u g h t
i> f.ir wider th.an th e sphere o f I'eality, and no inference is valid
from the eorreetest thin k in g o f an olyoet to its actn.al existence.
W hile these laws, therefore, arc the highest ciiterion o f the n o n
reality o f an object, they arc no erilerion at all of its re a lity ; and
they thus stand to existence in a negative and not in a positive rela
tion. A nd what I now s.ay o f the fu ndam en tal prineijiles of th o n g h t
ill general, holds equally of all their p ro xim ate and special applica
tions, th a t is, of the whole o f Logic. Logic, as I have already ex-
]>laiiied, considering the form alone o f th o u g h t to the exclusion of
its matter, can d raw no conclusion from tho correctness of th e m a n
ner of th in king an object to the re.ality of the object itself. Y e t
am ong m odern, nay recent, philosoiiher.s, tAV'O
Tlic true relation.# of i ^ i i i
I O 'i c o v e r lo o k e .l in O p p O S ltC d o c tn ilC S liavC S Jir U llg up, w lllC ll, OH
tw o w a y ." : 1 . L o g i c op ])o sito sidcs, liavo o v c r lo o k c d th e t r u e rcla-
erroncoii"!)' iiciii to tloiis o f L o g ic . O iic p arty of jih ilo so p h crs
be ihc iiositive "taud- defining tru th in g e n e ra l, t h e a b s o lu te hur-
ard of irulli. ^ . . . .
m o n y ol our th o u g h ts and c o g n itio n s, d iv id e
tru th in to a form al or lo g ica l, a n d in to a m a teria l or m e ta p h y sic a l,
a c c o r d i n g a s t h .a t h a r m o n y is i n c o n s o n a n c e w i t h
The .iivision of truth form al t h o u g h t , Or, o v c r a n d a b o v e ,
into logical and ineta- , , i i- i i i i i mi
i,by#icai.-criticized. real k ii o w l o d g c .' J he enteia o ii
o f formal truth th e y ])hicc iu the jiriueijdes o f
Contradiction and o f Sufficient R eason, en o u n cin g that wh.at is non-
con tVadictory and coiisetpient is formally true. T h is criterion, whitdi
is positive and iinmedi.atc o f formal truth (inasiiiueh as w h at is
noii-contradielory and conscipient can alw ays be th o u g h t as jiossi-
ble), they style a n eg ative and m ed iate criterion o f material truth :
,as what is self-coiitradietory and logically inconsequent is in reality
iin p o ssih le; at the s.aine time, what is n o t self-contradictory and not
logic.ally incoiiseipioiit, is not, h ow ever, to be regarded .as ha v in g an
actn.al evisleiicc. Rut Iku-c the foiiiid.ation is treacherous ; th e no
tion o f truth i.s false, ^Vhen we speak o f truth, Ave are not satisfied
with k n o w in g th.at a th o u g h t harmonizes Avith a cert.ain system o f
th oughts and co g n it io n s; hut, over ami above, avo recjiiirc to be
assured that Avh.at w e think is real, and is as wo
Truth, wliat. , . , , , , , ,
t h i n k It t o b e . A re w e s a t i s f i e d o n t i n s j i o i i i t ,
Ave t h e n r c g . a r d o n r t l i o i i g h t s a.s t r u e ; A v l i e r e a s i f w e .are n o t s a t i s
fied o f t h i s , Ave d e e m th em f a l s e , ho A v w e l l s o e v e r t l i e y m a y q iia d -
1See Kant, Logite, Einloltung, vii.; Krug, Logik, i 22-, Vrice, Logik, j 42. Ed.
L f. c t . VI. LOGIC. 7(
rate Avitli any the ory or system. I t is not, therefore, in any ahsolnte
hai-mony of mere th o u g h t th a t trntli consists, h n t solely in the cor
respondence of our th o u g h ts with their ohjects. T h e distinction of
formal .and material tiaith is thus not only nnsoniid in itself, hut
o]posed to th e notion o f tru th universally liehl, and enihodied in all
langn.ages. C u t if this distinction he inept, the title of Logic, ns a
jiositive sta n d a rd o f tru th , m ust he denied ; it can only he a n e g a
tive ei'itcrion, heing conversant with th o u g h ts and n o t with things,
with the ])ossihility and not with the actn.ality of e.xistence. *
T h e jircccding inaccuracy is, however, of little m o m e nt compared
. with the heresy of an o th e r class of philosophers,
2. T h e A b s o lu t is t s to whosc ohsorvatioiis on this point I can, I i o a v -
p r o c e ed on a s u b v c r - ever, oiilv allude. Some of yon may, pcrliajis,
s io ii o f th e lo g ic a l r. , t i i i- i i
Imd a difticnlty in helieving the statem ent, th a t
there is a considerahle jiarty o f jihilosophors,
illustrious for the h igh est sp eculative talent, and w h ose systems, i f
not at present, Avere, a fcAV years ago, the m ost celehrated, i f not the
m o st nnivorsally accredited in Europe, Avho estahlish their meta-
])hysical theories on the snhversion o f all logical truth. I refer to
those philosophers Avho hold that man is capable o f more than a
relative notion o f ex istence, that he is c o m p e te n t to a knoAvledge
o f ahsolnte or infinite b ein g (for th ese terms th e y use co n v e r tih ly ),'
ill an id e n tity o f knoAvledgo and existence, o f h im self and the
D iv in ity . T h is doctrine, Avhieli I shall not n o w attem p t to make
you nnderstand, is develop ed in very various s c h e m e s ; that is, the
different pliilosojilicrs attempt, hy very different and contradictory
metliods, to arrive at the same end ; all those system s, lioAvever,
agree in this, th ey arc all at variance with the four logical laAvs.
S om e, indeed, arc established on the exjiross denial o f the validity
o f these laws ; and others, w ith o ut daring o v ertly to reject tlieir au
thority, are still built in violation o f tlieir precept. In fact, i f con
tradiction remain a criterion o f falsehood, if L o g ic and the laws o f
th o u g h t hc not vieAved as an illusion, the jihilosophy o f the absolute,
in all its forms, admits o f the most direct and easy refutation. B u t
on this m atter I on ly n ow touch, in order that yon m ay not be
ignorant that there are philosojiliers, and jihilosopliers o f the h ig h
est name, Avho, in pursuit o f the phantom o f ahsolifte knoAvlcdge,
are con ten t to rcjnidiatc relative k n o w led g e, logic, and the laws o f
thought. T h is hallncination is, how ever, njion the Avane, and as
each o f these tlioorists contradicts his brother, L o g ic and Common
Sen se Avill at length refute them all.
Before leaving the consideration of this subject, it is necessary to
1 E sser, L o g ik , p. 65 -6 . E d . 2 S e e a b o v e , p. 64, u o le 4. E d .
78 LOGIC. L e c t . V I.
notice a mistake c f Dr. Bcid, wliich it is n o t more remarkable

tliat lie should have com m itted, tha n t h a t others
Jhsiakc of Kcid iii ],nve bccii fouiid to follow and applaud it, as the
i i ' g a n l t o ( o i ' .c o p ii o i i . . ^ .
' correction of :i general error. In the fourth
E s sa y on the Jntcdcctuai Poteers, and in the third cliajitcr, entitled
^histakes concerniny Concrjifion,^ th e re is th e following passage,
wliioli at onee exhibits not only bis own opinion, b u t the iniivcrsality
of the doctrine to wliieh it i.s opposed :
T h ere remains, he says, ano ther m istake concerning concc]v
tion, which deserves to be noticed. I t is, th a t
R eid q u o te d , r. , . . z* i
onr conception ot thin gs is a test ot tlieir jios-
sibility, so that, w h a t wc can distinctly conceive, wc m ay conclude
to be ])Ossible ; and of w h at is impossible, wc can have no con
ception.
This opinion lias been hold by jihilosojibers for more than a h u n
dred years, w ith o u t contradiction or dissent, as far as I k now ; and,
if it be an error, it m:iy bc o f sonic use to inquire into its origin, and
the causes th a t it has been so gener.ally received as a maxim Avhose
tru th could n o t be b ro u g h t into donbt.
I m ay licrc observe th a t this lim itation of th e jirevalence of the
opinion in question to a very modern jieriod is altog ether in c o rre c t;
it was equally p rev alen t in ancient times, and as m a n y passages could
easily bc quoted from th e G reek logicians alone as D r. B cid has
quoted from the philosophers o f th e ce n tu ry i>rior to himself. Dr.
Kcid goes on :
One of the fruitless questions agitated am on g the scholastic
jdiilosophers in th e dark ages was. W h a t is the criterion o f tru th ?
As if men could have any other w.ay to distinguish triitli from error,
but by the righ t use o f th a t jiower o f J u d g m e n t which G od has
given them.
D escartes endeavored to jm t an end to this controversy, by
m aking it a fundam ental princi])le in his system, th a t w h ate v er we
clearly and distinctly jiereeivc, is true.
T o niidcrstaiid this principle of D escartes, it m ust bc observed
flint be trave the nam e of ion to every pow er of the Iniman
u n d e r s ta n d in g ; ainl in expl.aining this very maxim, he tells ns
that sen.se, im agination, and pure intellection, are only different
modes of perceiving, and so the maxim was understood by all his
ftillowcrs.
The learned Dr. Gndwortli seem s also to have ado]ted this prin-
I'iplc. T he critcric)ii o f true k n o w le d g e, he says, is o n ly to bc
looked for in our k n o w le d g e and eoneeptioiis th e m se lv e s : for tlio
I CoUecWl Works, p. 37G-8. E d .

L ect. VI. L O G I C . 79
en tity o f all theoretical tru th i.s n o th in g else b u t clear intelligibility,

.'ind w hatever is clearly conceived is an en tity and a tru th ; h ut th a t
which is false, D ivine jiower itself canno t m ake it to he clearly and
distinctly understood. A falseliood can n ever he clearly conceived
or apinvliended to he true. {E ternal a n d irnmntahle Jlorality, j).
172, etc.)
T his Cartesian m axim seems to me to have led the w ay to th a t
now u n d e r consider.ation, which seems to have been adopted as the
jiroper correction o f th e former. W h e n the auth o rity o f D escartes
declined, men began to see th a t Ave m ay clearly and distinctly con
ceive Avhat is not true, h n t th o u g h t th a t onr concejtion, though n ot
in all cases a test o f trntli, m igh t be a te st o f possibility.
This indeed seem s to hc a necessary eoiiseqnence o f the received
doctrine o f ideas ; it h cin g e v id e n t that there can he no distinct im
age, either in the mind or anyAvhere else, o f that wliicli is im pos
sible. T h e am biguity o f the Avord conceive, Avliich Ave observed,
E s s a y i. cliaj). i., and the com m on phraseology o f saying, v:e cannot
conceive snch a thiny, when Ave Avonld sign ify th at Ave think it im-
possilile, m ig h t likoAvise contribute to the reception o f this doctrine.
Hnt w h a t e v e r Avas t h e or ig in o f t h i s ojiinion, it seems to prcAail
universally, and to be received as a maxim.
T h e hare having an idea of th e proposition proves the t h in g not
to he im possible; for o f an imjiossible proposition th e re can be no
idea, D r. Sainnol Clarke.
O f th a t Avliieh n either does nor can e.xist we can haA'e no idea.
Lord Bolinghroke.
T h e measure o f im possibility to ns is in coneeivahlcncss, that o f
Avhich w e have no idea, hnt that reflecting njion it, it ajijiears to he
nothing, we prononnee to he imjiossihle. Ahernetliy.
In CA'cry idea is inijilied th e jiossihility o f the existen ce o f its
ohject, n o th in g h ein g eleai'cr than that tliei-e can be no idea o f an
im possibility, or conception o f Avhat cannot exist. Dr. Price.
Impossihile est enjns nnllam notionem forniare possiimiis; jios
sihile e contra, cni aliqna respondet notio. Wolfii Ontoloy.
I t is an e.stnhlished maxim in metajiliysics, th a t Avliatever the
m ind conceives, includes the idea of possible existence, or in other
Avords, th a t noth in g we im agine is absolutely impossible.' D.
H um e.
I t were easA' to m u ste r nji m any other rcspectalile authorities for
this maxim, and I have never found one that called it in question.
I f the maxim he true in the exten t Avliieh the fanioiis Wolfins
has given it in the |i;issage ahove (jnoted, we sli.all have a sliort road
to the determ ination of every question about the possihility or iin-
80 L O G I C . L e c t. V L
possibility o f things. W o need on ly 1-ook into our own breast, and

that, like the U riiu and T hmniniin, will g iv e an infallible answer. I f
Me c.-in c on ceive the thing, it is p ossib le; i f not, it is inqjossible.
-Vnd .surely ev ery man may knoM' M'hether he can con ceive Mhat is
;dlinned, oi' not.
O th er philosophers have been satisfied Mith one h alf o f the
ma.xiin o f ^Volfins. T h e y say, that M-hatever Me can co n ceiv e is
]ossible ; but th ey do not say, that M'hatever m'c cannot co n ceiv e is
iiupo>sil)le."
On this I may remark, that Dr. Reids criticism of W o lf must be
admitted in so far as that philosoijher maintains our inability to con
ceive a thing .as possible, to be the rule on Avhich M'e are entitled to
ju o no u nec it impossible. But Dr, Reid now advances a doctrine
Mhieh I cannot but regard as radically erroneous.
"I cannot help thinking even this to be a mistake which ])hiloso-
jiher^ have been uiiMarily led into, from the causes before mentioned.
l\Iy I'easoiis are these :
1. WhaleA cr is said to be possible or impossible is expressed by
a ])ro])ositioii. Xom', Mhat is it to conceive a proposition ? I think
it is no more th.an to undei'stand distinctly its meaning. I knoM' no
more that can be meant by simple apprehension, or conception,
Mhen applied to a proposition. The axiom, therefore, amounts to
this; Eveiy jiroposition, o f M'hich you understand tho meaning
distinctly, is possible. I am persuaded that I understand a s distinctly
the meaning o f this jiroposition, A n y two sides o f a triangle are to
gether ctjaal to the third, as of this. A n y two sides o f a triangle are
together greater than the th ird ; yet the first of these is impossible,
XoM ' t h is is a s i n g u l a r m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e sen se in M 'hic h i t
h a s b e e n a l w a y s h e l d b y p h i l o s o i i h e r . s , t h a t M 'hat
r r il ic i z e d . . . . , . ' . , , ,
IS contradictory is con ceiv e d as inconceivable and
imj) 0 .8sible.' N o jihilosopher, I make bold to say, ever dre.amt o f
d en y iiig th.at Me can dis tin ctly nnderst.and the m eanin g o f the pi'ojio-
sition, the terms o f M'hich M'o recognize to be contradictory, ;md, as
contr.idietory, lo :iniiiliilatc each other. W h e n m'o en ou n ce the pro-
]iositii)ii, A is not \ , wo clearly comjireherid the sejiar.ate m ean in g
rf the term s A and not A , and also the import o f the assertion o f
their identity. J>ut this \ cry nnder.standing consists in the co n
sciousness that the iM'o terms are eoutradictorie.s, and th.at as such
it is irnjujssiblc to unite them in .a ment.al ju d g m e n t, though they
stand united in a \erb a l ju-ojiosition. If m'c .allemjit this, the Im'o
mutually exclusive, tcaans not onl} c.annot he th o u g h t a.s one, but iu
fac-i annihilate e.ach <)lher ; and thus the result, in jilace o f a jiositive
I S e e th e A u th o r s n o te s, R e id 's W orks, p . 377. E d .

L ect. Y L L O G I C . Ll
Jiidgtnent, is a negation of tlionglit. So far Dr. Reid is wrong. Dr.l

he is not guilty of the absurdity attributed to liiiii by Dr. Gleig; he
does not say, as by that writer he is made to say, that any two
sides of a triangle maybe conceived to be equal to tbe third, as dis
tinctly as any two sides of a triangle may be conceived to be greater
than the third. * These are not Dr. Reids words, and nothing h<
says warrants the attribution of such c.xpressions to liiin, in the sense
ill which tliey are attributed. He is made to bold, not merely that
we can understand two terms as contradictory, bnt that we are able
to combine them in the unity of tlionglit. After the passage already
(jiioted, Reid goes on to illustrate, in various points of view, the
siqqiosed error of the ])hilosopliers; but as all he says on this
liead originates in the misconception already shown of the opin
ion he controverts, it is needless to take any further notice of his
arguments.
W e have thus considered the conditions of Logic, in so far as cer
tain laws or Jirinciples ave prescribed; we have
I o s tu la te s o f L o g ic . , . . . . ^
now to eonsider its conditions, m so lar as cer
tain jAostnlates are demanded. Of these there are more than one :
but one alone it is here requisite to signalize ; for although it be ne
cessarily supposed in the science, strange to say, it has, by logical
writers, not only been always passed over in silence, but frequently
and inconsistently violated. This postulate I coinjiriso in the follow
ing paragraph :
^ XV III. The only postiilato of Logic which requires an ar

ticulate ciiouncement is the demand, that
P a r. X V III T h e io g i- p,efore dealing with a iudgineiit or reasoning
c a l p o s tu la te . . . .
exjiressed in language, tlie imjiort of its
terms should be fully understood ; in other wonbs. Logic jiostii-
lates to be allowed to state cxjilieitly in language all that is
implicitly contained in the thought.
This jiostulate cannot be refused. In jioint of fact, as I have said.

Logic lias always jiroceeded on it, in overtly o.\-
T iiis p o s tu la te c a n - pressing all tlic stcjis of the mental jirocoss in
n o t be re fu se d . t o i i _
reasoning, all the projiositions of a s\ llogisni ;
whereas, in common jiarlaiicc, one at least of these stejis or jirojiosi-
tioiis is usually left nnexjiressed. This jiostnlato, as wc shall liaA c
occasion to observe in the setjuel, though a fundamental c o n d i t i o n
of Logic, has not been consistently act'*d on by logieiaiis in tlieir
developnioiit of the science; and from this omission Innc aiiseii
1 A r t . M e ta p h y sic s , Encycloperdln Britanm 'ca, 7th e d it., p . 620. - E d
11
82 LOGIC. L ec t. VI.
inncli confusion a n d deficiency an d e r ro r in o u r p r e s e n t sy s te m of

Logic. T h e i l l u s t r a t i o n o f t h i s p o s t u l a t e will a p j v r o p r i a t e l y fin d its
place on occasion o f its np}d icatio ns . I n o w a r t i c u l a t e l y s t a t e it,
liocause it i m m e d i a t e l y f ol lo w s in o r d e r t h e geuer.al a x i o m s o f t h e
s c i e n c e ; a n d , a t jvresent, I o n l y b e g t h a t y o u will b e a r it in m i n d . I
m ay, how ever, before leaving t h e subject, observe
T his p o s tu la te im - ( w h a t l ias a l r e a d y , I b e l i e v e , b e e n m entioned),
plied in th e d o c trin e tli.at A r i s t o t l c S t a t e s o f s v l l o g i s t i c a n d , o f c o u r s e ,
o l Svllogi.<m, ac co rd - . ^ . , ,
ill" to A ris to tle S t a t e m e n t applies to L o g i c in generiil t h a t
t h e d o c tr in e o f syllogism deals, n o t w ith t h e ex-
t e n i a l e x p r e s s i o n o f r e a s o n i n g , in o r d i n a r y l a n g u a g e , b u t w i t h the
in tern al re a so n in g o f t h e m i n d itself.' B u t o f this again, and m ore
ful ly, in t h e p r o p e r p l a c e s .
In like m a n n e r , w e m i g h t h e r e , as is d o n e in M a t h e m t i t i c s , p r e
mise certain definitions; b u t th es e it will b e m o r e c o n v e n i e n t tc
s t a t e as t h e y o c c u r i n t h e progress of our developm ent. I there
fore p.ass o n t o t h e Second Section of the D octrine o f Elem ents,
w h i c h is o c c u p i e d w i t h t h e P r o d u c t s o f T h o u g h t ; in o t h e r w ords,
w ith the processes regulated b y the previous conditions,
1A lt a i. P tU ; i. 1 0 . E d .
LECTURE VII.
S T O T C H K I O I . O G Y .
SECTION I I . OF T H E P R O D U C T S OF T H O U G H T .
I. E N N O E M A T IC O F CO NCEPTS OR N O T IO N S .
A. OF CONCEPTS IN G E N ER A L .
I C O N C L U D E D , in tiiy Inst lecture, all that I think it necessary to

say in Iegai'd to the F u n d am en ta l L aw s o f T h ou gh t, or the neces
sary conditions o f the thinkable. T h e discussion, [ am aware, must
have been found so m ew h at dry, and even abstruse; n ot that there
is the sm allest difficulty in regard to the apprehension o f the laws
them selves, for these are all self-evident propositions, bnt because,
tliougli it is necessary in a sy stem atic aiew o f L ogic to com m ence
Avitli the elem en tary priuci])les o f thought, it is impossible, in sjic.ak-
in g o f these and their ajijilication, not to em p loy expressions ot the
m ost abstract generality, and even not to suppose a eertain aequaint-
ance Avith Avords and things, Avliich, how ever, on ly find their expla
nation in the su bsequent developineiit o f the science.
H a v in g considered, therefore, the four L aw s o f T h o u gh t, Avith the
one lôstulate o f Logic, Avhich constituted the
The p r o d u c ts of First Section of the Doctriuc of Logical Ele-
T h o u g h t, C o n c e p ts , ments, I iioAV proceed to the S e c o n d th .-it
J u d g m e n t s an d R ea- t i t
wluciY IS conversniit about Logical J^roducts.
These products, though identical in kind, arc ot
three different degrees; for while Conccjits, Jiidginonts. and Hea-
sonings, are all equally the jiroduets of the same Faculty of Compar
ison, they still fill into three classes, as the act.
T h ese arc a ll p ro- and, consequently, the result of tlie act, is of a
d u c ts o f ( o m p a n s o n , greater or a less simiilieil v. These three d e g r e t ' s
an d a ll m o d ilic a tio n s ^ i
o f jud-vineiir. ^ t r i c t l v , o n l y in o d ific a tin n s o t tlic
second, as both eoiiec]>ts and reasonings may be

reduced to judgments; for the act of judging, tliat is. (he act ot
affirming or denying one thing of another in thought, is that in
A v h ic h the U n d e r s ta n d in g or F a c u lty of Comparison is essentially
^4 LOGIC. L e c t . \T 1
cxprc.:scd. B y anticip.ation : A concept is a jn c lg m e n t; for, on

the one Inind, it is n o th in g h n t tlie result of a foregone jn d g in e n t, or
serie.s of jndginents, fixed and reconled in a word a sign ; and it
i-; only amplified hy the annexation o f a new attrihnte, th ro ugh a
k'ontinnance o f tlie same jiroeess. On the o the r hand, as a concept
thus the synthesis or comjilexion, and the record, I may add, of
one or more prior acts of ju d g m e n t, it can, it is evident, he analyzed
into these again ; every concejtt is, in fact, a j u d g m e n t or a fascicu-
lii> of jiidginciits these ju d g m e n ts only n ot explicitly developed
ill thonglit, ami n ot formally expressed in terms.
Ae'.ain, a reasoning is a j n d g m c n t ; for a reason is only the affirma
tion o f the connection o f tw o things with a third, and, tlirongli th a t
tliird, with each other. I t is thus only th e same function of thought,
which is a t work in Concejition, J u d g m e n t, and I J c a s o n in g ; and
these express no real, no essential, distinction o f ojieration, h nt
ileiiote only the diftercnt relations in which wc m ay regard the indi-
\ isihle act o f tlionght. Thus, the consideration o f coiieejits cannot
he vflected out of all relation to, and w ithou t even some anticipation
>if, the doctrine of jnd ginents. T h is heing jireimsed, I now proceed
to the consideration o f the P ro d u c ts o f T h o u g h t, viewed in the
three relations of the three degrees, o f Concejits, J u d g m e n ts , and
Ke.i soilings.'
U n d e r the Second Section of Stoiclieiology, Concepts or N otions
fn-in the first chapter.
N<iw, in tr e a tin g of Concepts, the order I .^liall follow is this ; I
shall, in the first jilaee, tr e a t of them in general ;
^ I O f in the second, tr e a t o f them in special. U n d e r
.n-cu>--ion. firm er, or general head, will he considered,
], W h a t they a rc ; 2, IIow th e y are jtrodiiced.
U n d e r the latter, or sjiecial liea<l, they will he considered under
their various relations. A nd here, I may ohserve, th a t as yon
ohtain no information from Dr. W h a te ly in re-
\Miau-l) HotniPHon <,;i,.,j j)i-ini;n-y ];nvs of tho u g h t, these
o M ii.-ilo c lrin e o f C o n - . . , ,
laws heing in fact ajijiareiitly unknow n to e \ e r y
British logician, old or new, so you will fimi
hnt little or no aid from liis F/> nui/t.s tow ards an iiiiderslamliiig of
t i c doci riiic of coiicejits. His omission, in this resjiect, cannot he ex-
cii'i-d hy his error in regard to the ohjoct-niat te r o f l.ogie ; th a t ohject,
\<iii w ill rcc-ollcot, hcing on liis view, or rather one o f liis views, not
thoii-_d'i in general, <jr the jirodiicts o f the coiiijiarative faculty in
I Iliiiric, T r . n t a r r ,f H u m a n N a l u r ' , I k i. jn o lir ni-io ii is irn jio s'ib lo w i l l i o t i t jiiilf'ineiil,

part lii j7 .la- 'M iom a-iiis, ]> 2 % ] ( 'oriiiian; a l s o K n i g , 2-3, A n m . i i . p 70
[ c . x t i x . 11 2, w h e r e b e h o l d s t h a t niiD pIe a p - K o .]
L kct. VI I. LOGIC. '8.7
tlioir tlirco degrees, b u t rc.asoningor argum entation alone ; foi- e\ ei

on the Ii v])otlicsis th a t Logic is thus limited, still, as tlic doctrine ol
re.asoning can only be seieiitihcally evolved out of the doctrine of
concepts, the consideration of the la tte r forms the indisjicnsahle
condition of a s.atisfactory tr e a tm e n t of the former. B u t not only is
W h a te ly s doctrine of concepts, or, in his language, of llie process
of sinqile apprehension, meagre and imperfect, it is even necessary
to forewarn you th a t it leads to confusion and error. T here is a
fundam ental distinction of Aviiat is called the Extension and the
Comprehension of n o tio n s a distinction which,
wiisiteiy a b u s iv e ly in foct, as yoii W ill find, forms the very c.ardinal
employs tlie terms Ex- pQint, qu which the wliolc t h e o r y o f Logic t u r n s ,
tension am i Compre- . ,3 , . .
hensionasconvertibie. B u t n o t O n l y IS this d i s t i n c t i o n not c x p h i u i e d . It IS
n ot even articulately stated ; nay, the very words
Avhich logicians have em ployed for the expression of this contrast,
are absolutely used as synonym ons and convertible. Instead , th e re
fore, o f referring yon for infbrm.ation in regard to our p resent object
of consideration, to Dr. Wh.atcly, I am sorry to be compelled to
caution you against p u ttin g confidence in bis guidance. B u t to re
turn. T h e following I dictate as the title of the first head to he
considered :
A O f C o n ce p ts o r O f Coiiccpts or Notioiis ill G e n e r a l: W h.it

N o tio n s in g e n e r a l. ,
W h a t th e y are. a '' ^ h c y
I n ansAvering this qnc.stion, let us, first, consider the m eaning of

the expressions; and, .secondly, the n ature of th e th in g expressed.
^ X IX . Concept or notion (Iwota, ivvorj/xa, vor^fJLa, imvoLa,'

conceptio, notio), are term s einjiloyed as
F a r . XIX. C o n c e p t s . couvertiblc, btit, Avliilc the y denote the same
- ( a ) M e a n in g o f th e tlicy dciiote it ill a different jioint of
te rm s. J i
vieAv. Conception, the act of Avhich concept
is th e result, expresses the act of com p rehen ding or grasping iqt
1 In G reek , th e te r m s e r r o ia (eVrorjriKd s ) , liu s , Lexicon Philosnphicum , v . K S v n a , p. 890.

i v v 6 v p a ( io v o r ,fx a r tK 6 s ), i n d o t a ( eVmorjTcc- P- 80. fi- d a ^ p a r a . C f. p. 310. v. Co.
I , J , /) c e p l i i s ; p . 6 3 3 , V. I n le n t i o . E d .] ( ) u v o r jp a r a
d s ), r o iju a , to s a y n o t liiu g o f etrti/orjjua } 7Tt- . . , A , . j
\ . see A r is to t le . D f/n D r p r . c I a n d AAaitz.
o o m a r c K S s ], are all m o r e or le.ss o b je ctio n - ^ o ,;. A r is t o t le , De A n .m a .
a b le , as a ll m ore o r less a m b ig u o u s ly u sed fo r ^ ... ^ g _ u o i,p a r a are
th e o b ject or p r o d u c t o f t b o u g h i, in an act o f , ,
* , , ,, ,, , c le a r ly e q u iv a le n t to III o n r n ic iiiiiiig
C o n c e p lio n , or, a s It lias b e e n u.siially c a lle d ... v ^ ' g
, , , . . o- , . , o [c . G H u c v oiiv T w v a O 'a tp cT w v v67)cns cv
by th e lo g ic ia n s , S im p le A p p r e lie iisio ii See ^ ^
lU e m m id a s, E ph om e Logiea [c. V . Hep] E ttii/- r o v r o i s , g f p l & o 'jk c a n r h ^ e v 8 o s i v o is 5
oi'as, p 31. ed 1G05. E d ]; E u g e n io s , Lngicn ifal r b i|/CSos ko) r h a A ij^ e s , a v v ^ e a i s r is
lA oyorrj, c. ii p. 170. L eip " ic. 17G'. E d ] ijSrj v o r jp d r o iv Siaircp c v tjvToiv. k . t . A .
S te p b a n iis , Tfiesaiirns, r. N oes.- M ocker. C lavis
Phil. A rist., v . N oi 7juaTa, p. 227 et se q .; M icra e-
8b L O GI C . L kct. ATI
i n t o u n i t y t h e v a r i o u . s q u . a l i t i e s b y wl i i c l i a n o b j e c t is c l i a r a c t e v -
i/.eil ; n otivn ag a i n , signifies eitlier the act of appre
h e n d i n g , s i g n a l i z i n g , t l i a t is, t h e v e i n a i k i n g o r taking n o t e of,
t h e v a r i o u s n o t e s , m a r k s , oi- c h a r a c t e r s o f a n o b j e c t , w h i c h i t s
qualities allbrd ; or th e resu lt o f t h a t act.
In Latin, t h e w o r d couoipere, i n its m a n y v a r i o u s apjili cat ions,

a l w a y s e.xpr ess es, a s t h e e t y m o l o g y w o u l d iudi-
lliustniied, em- c: i t e, t h e p r o c e s s e)nl>r(ir})itj or co m p reh en d in g
p lo vn ieiit o r t lie a iw o ^ si i i i i i '
, , the m a n u into the one, as could he shown bv an
vn m e iit e c o i i n j/ r r i , a m i
n n im i c o n c ^ p tu s . ai'ticulate aiial vsi s o f t h e j i h r a s e s in w h i c h t h e

term occurs. It was, accordingly, under this
general signification, t h a t this w o r d a n d its d e riv ativ es w e re ana
logically a|)plied to th e o])eration o f m in d . A n i m o c d 'm ode con-
cijitrc, a s u s e d b y C i c e r o , P l i n y , S e n e c a , a n d o t h e r R o m a n w r i t e n s ,
m e a n s t o com jirehend o r u n derstan d, t h a t is, t o e i n b r a c e a m u l t i t u d e
o*' ilifie r e n t objects by their common qualities into one act of
t h o u g h t ; a n d a n i m i conceptus w a s , i n l i k e m a n n e r , a p ] ) l i e d b y t h e
a n c i e n t wi i t e r s t o d e n o t e t h i s o ] ) e r a t i o n , o r i t s r e s u l t . T he employ
m e n t o f concipere, concepdus, a n d concejdio, a s
OI ronoprrt, cnncrp- technical t c r m s , in t h e P h i l o s o i i h y o f i\Iind,
D /S. h i m ! w itli- , .
oui mijiiuci. without t h e e.xplanatory ad ju n c t, w as o f a later
i n t r o d u c t i o n wa.s, i n d e e d , o n l y j i o s s i b l e a f t e r
t h e y h a d b e e n l o n g f a m i li a r l y u s e d in a ji sy c h o l o g i c a l re l a t i o n . Rut
w h e n so introduce<l, t h e y c o n t i n u e d to be e m p l o y e d b y jihilosophers
i n g e n e r a l i n t h e i r j i r o p e r s i g n i f i c a t i o n a s c o n v e r t i b l e w i t h th ou ght o r
('om irehentdon, a n d a s o p p o s e d t o t h e m e r e oppr<diension o f S e n s e
or Imagination. N ot, indeed, that exam ples enough m a y n o t be
a d ' l i i c e d o f ( h ( i r a b u s i v e a ] ] ) l i c a t i o n t o o u r i m m i ' i l i a t e c o g n i t i o n s o f
in dividual objects, lo n g before ]Mi. S t e w a r t Ibrmally apjilied the
t e r m con n ption t o a c e r t a i n a ccid en tal form o f r e p r e s e n t a t i o n to
the simple repro'lnction or rejietition o f an aet of j i e i 'c ep t io n in
imagination.' In using the t e r m s conce]dion and concejd i n t h e
'êii'-e wh i i - h I h a v e e x p l a i n e d , I t h e r e f o r e e m p l o y t h e m n o t o n l y i n
strict eiintoniiily to th eir g r a m m a t ic a l m e a n in g , b u t to th e m e a n i n g
w h i c h t h e y ha\-e g i m e r a l l y o b t a i n e d a m o n g jihilosojihers.
The term notion, l i k e conrtgdion, e x ] i r e s s e s b o t h a n a e t a n d i t s
]ir()dnet. I shall, h o w e v e r , as h a s c o m m o n l y
Thf Krm nnonn. j,, h i t t e r rclatioii.
l o w cmp Mvi'd by tlio i i i-i * i
J Ins word has, like n m cejdm n , la-eii som etim es

abusively ajiplied to diuiote not o n ly our k n o w l
ed ge o f things by their com m on characters, but, likewise, to include
1 See L e c tu n s o n M U a p h ysics, p. 452 sey. E d.

L k c t . V II. LOGIC. 87
llie mere jiresentations o f S en se and reincsentations o f l^liantasy.

dliis abusive einjjloyment lias, however, not been so iiu(iiient in
reference to this term as to the term conception ; but it must be
ackn ow ledged, that n oth in g can be imr.gined more vague and vacil
lating than the m eaning attached to notion in the writings o f all
British jihilosophers, Avithont exception. S o much for the expi-es-
sions concept and notion. I noAV g o on to that which th e y express.
^ X X .' In onr Consciousness apjirehension of an indi

vidual object, there m ay be distinguished
P a r . X X . C o n c e p ts , fo llow in g c ogn itiou s : 1 , The
(b l N a t u r e o f t h e . . . .
th in g . im m ediate and irrespective k n o w le d g e a v c
have o f tho individual object, as :i com ple
m ent o f certain qualities or characters, considered simply as
b elo n g in g to itself. 2, T h e m ed iate and relative knoAvledge
we h.'ive o f this object, as comjirising qualities or characters
com m on to it Avith other objects.
T h e former of these cognitions is th a t contained in the Bi-e-
sentations of Sense, extern.al and internal, and R e presentations
o f Im.agination. T h e y aie only o f the individual or singnl.ar.
T h e latter is th a t contained in th e Concejits of the U n d e r
standing, and is a knoAvledge o f th e common, general, or uni-
Acrsal.
T h e conceiving an object is, therefore, its recognition m e di
ately through a con cep t; .and a C oncept is the cognition or
idea of the general character or characters, jioint or points, iu
Avhich a plurality o f objects coincide.
T h is requires som e illustration, and it Avill be best afforded by

considering the history o f onr knoAvledge. Oiii-
C o n c e p ts , t h e ir n a - njental activitv is Tiot first exerted in an aiipre-
tu r c illu s tr a te d b y ref- , - r , . . .
e r e i.c e to th e h is to r y I'Gnsion of the gcuer.al, common properties o t
o f our knowledge. t hi ng s . O il the Contrary, ohj e c t s are origlii.ally
Ob?ecfs are o r ig in a lly jircscntcd to iis ill coufused and inqierfi'ct jiercc])-
p r e sen tc d in c o n fu s e d n ,, , i .e i i i o
,. ^
a n d imperfect percep-
tions. J he
_
rude materials furnished bv bense,
lio n s . retained in 51emory, reproduced by R em inis
cence, and represented in Im agination, the U n
dersta n d in g elaborates into a higher knoAvledge, siiiqily by me;iiis
o f Comparison and Abstr.action. Tlie jiriinary act of Comparison
is exerted upon the individual objects o f lêrception and Iinagiiiatioii
1 O n th is a n d th r e e f o ll o w i n g p a r a g r a p h s et seq. [M ed ita tio n rs de Cog7iifio7i Yeritaio,

a p p ly L e ib n itz 's d is tiiic tiu n o f I n '.iiiliv e a n d t l fd eis. E d .]
S y m b o lic a l K n o w le d g e , se e 0/<rra I I . i. p. 14
s s LOGIC. L ect . V ll.
alone. In tlie innltitndc and comple.xity o f these ohjects, certain

attrihntes are found to jirodnce similar, others
Office.^ of rompan- prodnce dissimilar, iinpres.sion.s. T h e ohser-
soii and A b .'tn ic tio n . . , . , . ,>
orattontioii vatioii ot tliis fact determ ines a reficctive con
sideration o f their jiropertics. Ohjects are i n
tentionally compared to g eth er for the jinrpo.se o f d iscoverin g their
.-similarities :md diflerenee.-s. W h e n tliinLfs O are found to ao;ree
O or to
di'.agree in certain resjiects, the coiisciou.sness is, hy an act o f voli
tion, conccntrate<l niion the ohjects Avhich tints partially agree, and,
ill tliem, upon those ipialities in or through which th e y a g ree; ami
hy this concentration wliieh con stitutes the act called A tte n tio n
what is efleeted V On the ohjects and (pialities, thus atten tiv ely
considered, a strong light is s h e d ; hut jirecisely in projiortion ns
these ;n-e illum inated in consciousness, the others, to which w e do
not attend, are thrown into ohsciirity.
'file result o f ^Vtteiitioii, hy con cen tratin g the m ind upon cert.iin
(pialities, is thus to w ithdraw or ahstraet it from
I'resciMon. AKcniion. .pj technical la nguage, Ave are s.aid to
and Abslructiun are 7 i 1 1 1 i 1
, -
Ciinelutive naiucs for p
* re scin
_ d the iiliaenomena
* Avliich Ave excln siv elv
the taiiK-proce5.s. Consider. 7 o jirescind, to attend, and to abstract,
are m erely different hnt correlative names f j r
the same process; and the first tw o are nearly convertihle. W lic n
we are said to p re scin d a (piality, we are m erely supposed to attend
to that (jnality e x e ln s iv e ly ; and when Ave abstract, w e are properly
said to (distract f r o m , th at is, to throw other attrihntes out o f ac
count. I may ohserve that the term abstraction is very often ahm
sively em jiloyed. B y Ahstraction w c are frequently said to attend
ex clu s iv ely to certain pluenoniena, those, to Avit, Aviiicli a v c ah-
str.act; Avliereas, the tei-in abstraction is jirojicrly apjilied to the
qualities Avhicli we abstract from ; and hy abstracting from some, a v c
are enabled to consider others more atten tiv ely . A tte n tio n and
Ahstraction arc only the same process v iew ed in diffeient relations.
T h e y are, as it Avere, the positive and n ega tiv e poles o f the same
act.'
B y Comparison, the points o f resemblance am o n g tilings h ein g
thus discovered, and h y Att(*ntion co nstitu ted into exclusive ob
jects; hy the same act th ey are also reduced in consciousness from
m nltitnde to unity. W h a t is m eant hy this Avill he ajiparent from
the followin<r considerations.
1 .S(-e Lf.r.iurts on M d a p h y sU s, p. 474 . a n d LogiA:, 6; K r u g , Log-iX, 49. E d . [ S c h u lz e

iia c b m a n u , L o g ik , 44 C o m p a r e K a n t, L o g ik , i 23; V ro h h cU , L o g ik , i l i , p. 11 et seyi
L e c t . V II. LOGIC. 89
W e are conscious to ourselves that w e can repeat onr acts o f con

sciousness that w e can think the same ihomodit
The reduclioii ol'ub-
, over and over. T h is act, or this thonglit, is al-
jc'cls fioiu multitude . , r' 7
to unity,-C'xphiinod "avs ill rc.-ditv the same, though in.anifested at
and illustrated. different tiiiios i for 1 10 0 1 10 can iiii.agine that in
Tiiougbt IS one and repetition o f one and the same thought, he
the same, while its , , ^ , o i - .
.
contents are uleiiticnl.1 has a .iiliirality ut tlionglits
o ; tor he is conscious
> ^ ^
that it is one and the same th o u g h t which is
rejieated, so lon g as its con ten ts reimiin identietd.
X o w , this relation o f absolute similarity which subsists betw een
the rejietitions o f the same tliought, is found to
01 jccts are to us the hold be tw e en onr represciitatioiis o f the reseni-
same when we are un- , e i . rn i i
,, ,
bliiig qualities of ol) ects. i wo ohieets have sim-
able to distinguish. . . . .
their cognitions. qualities oiily as these qualities afford a
similar presentation in sense or a similar repre
sentation in imagination, and qiitilities are to us coiiqiletely similar,
when we are unable to distinguish
O their cognitions.
O B u t what we
cannot distinguish, is, to us, the sa m e; tlierefore, objects which d e
termine nndistinguisliable im pressions upon ns, are perceived and
represented in the same mental modification, and are subjectively
to us precisely as i f th e y w ere ob jectively identical.
B u t the consciousness o f id e n tity is not merely the result o f the
indiscernible similarity o f total objects, it is
The confciousne.s equally tlic iT'Sult o f th e similarity o f any o f
of identity is equally tlicir parts partial characters. F o r by ab-
the result of the siiui- ^ i r *
, strac tin g observation from tlie qualities, points,
larity of auy of the , . . . . .
partial characters of wliicli objects differ, and lim iting it to those
objects. in which th e y agree, w e are able to consider
them as identical in certain respects, how ever
diverse th ey m ay appear to be in others, whieli, for the inoineiit,
w e llirow ou t o f view . F o r e x a m p l e : let B , C, and D represent a
series o f individual objects, which all agree in posse.ssiiig the resem
bling attributes o f y y y, and severally difter in c;ieli resjieetiveiy
p ossessing the non-resem bling attributes q o, u. X o w , in so far as
w e e xclu siv ely attend to the resem bling qualities, Ave, in the first
])lace, obscure or rem ove out o f vieAV tlieir non-resembling charac
ters ?, o, XI, while AVC remain exclu sively conscious o f their resem
bling qualities y y y. But, in the second jilace, the (pialities
expressed by y y y determ ine in ns co gn itiv e energies Aviiieli we are
Atnable to distinguisii, and Avliich Ave, tlierefore, consider as the
same. W e therefore vicAV the three similar qualities in the three
different objects as also id en tica l; Ave consider the y in this, the y
in that, and the y i n the third object, as o n e ; and in so far as the
12
00 L O G I C . L e c t. Y IK
tlirce objects participate in this oneness or identity, we regard them

.as a l s o the same. In otlior Avords, avc classify B, C, and D, u nder y ;
1/ is the genus ; B, C, and I) are its individuals or sjiecie.s, severally
distinguislicd Irom each o the r by tlie non-rescmhling properties,?,
o , K. XoAv, it is the points of sim ilarity tlins discovered and iden-
tiHed in tlie unity o f consciousness, Avhich constitute Concepts or
Notions.
It is evident that the same process of Comparison and Abstrac
tion m.ay be again i.erformed on the concepts thus formed. Tliey
are, in like manner, compared togetlier, and
Cieneriilizalioii. . . , . ,
tlioir points 01 resemblance noted, exclusively
considered, and reduced to one in th e syntliesis o f thouglit. This
]roce.'<s is called Generalization; th a t is, tlie process o f evolving the
general or one, out o f the individual and mani-
Concepts or notions fQjq Notioiis and coiiccjits are also sometimes
designated by th e style general notions
general conceptions. T h is is snpei-fluous ; for, iu
propriety of speech, notions and concepts are, in th e ir very nature,
general ; Avhile the o th e r cognitive modifications to Avhich th e y are
o p p o se d , jiercejitions and im aginations, have, in like manner,
their o s e n c c in their individuality.
B y the Avay, yon m a y h ave noticed that I n ev er use th e term
idea. T h e re.ason o f m y n o n -em p lo y m e n t o f
//'Q, reason why that Avord is tliis: T h er e is no possible diversity
I.ot regularly employ- m ean in g ill Avliich th at term has n o t been
ed, and ênse iu wliich i i ii i />
ii is occa.sionaiiyuscHi, usurpcd ; and it Avould oiily confuse you, w ere 1
by ii.e Author. to a tte m p t to enum erate and explain them. I
may, hoAvever, occasionally n o t oscheAV the
Avord ; but if you ever hear it from me, I b eg you to observe, th at I
ajiply it, in :i loose and general signification, to compi-ehcnd the
prescnttiiions o f Sense, the rcjiresentations o f P h an tasy, and the
concepts or notions o f the U n d ersta n d in g . W e are in Avant o f a
generic term to express th e s e ; and the Avord representation [reqyre-
sentatio), Achich, since the tim e o f Leibnitz, has been c o m m on ly
used by the jdiilosojihers o f the C ontinent, I h:ive restricted to
denote, Avhat it on ly can in projiriety express, the im m ed ia te object
or jirodnct o f Im agination. W e are, likoAvise, in Avant o f a general
term to express Avhat is com m on to tho presentations o f P erception,
and the representations o f l f ii a n t a s y , that i.s, their in d ivid u ality and
irnniediaey. T h e Cermans express this by the term Anschauung,
M'hich can only be translated by intuition (as it i.s in Latin by Ger
mans), M'hich literally means a. looking at. 'J'his exiirossion has,
hoM'cver, been iireoccupied in E n glish to d en ote th e apprehension
L ect. VII. L O G I C . SI
AVC h a v e o f s e l f - e v i d e n t t r u t h s , a n d i t s a p p l i c a t i o n i n a d i f t h r e n t s i g
n i f i c a t i o n , A v o n ld th erefore he, to a certain e x t e n t , lia b le to mn-
h ig n ity . I sh all, th erefore, co n tin u e, fo r t h e i> resen t at lea st, to
s t r u g g l e o n w it h o u t siieh a c o m m o n te r m , t h o u g h th e n e c e s s it y th u s
im p o se d o f a lw a y s o p p o sin g jiresen ta tio n and rep re sen ta tio n to con-
c c } ) t is b o t h t e d i o u s a n d p e r p l e x i n g .
^ XXL A c o n c ep t or n o tio n th u s in v o l v e s 1. T h e repre

sen ta tio n o f a part o n ly o f th e A 'a r io u s a t t r i -
G e n e ra l C h a ra c te rs
^ h n t e s o r c h a r a c t e r s o f Avhich a n i i i d i v i d i i a l
O)ff C o n c e p t s . _
P a r . X X I . (a) (a A C o n - o b j c c t is tlic s iiiu ; a iu l, c o n s o t p ic iit ly , n fio rd s
osee pp tt aa lT
f f oorrd
d ss oo nn ll yy iinn - o i i c - s i d c d aiul i n a d e q u a t e k n o w l e d g e
a d e q u a te k n o w le d g e .
o f t h e t h i n g s A vh ic h a r e t h o u g h t u n d e r it.
T h i s is t o o s i m p l e t o r e q u ir e a n y c o m m e n t a r y . It is e v i d e n t t h a t
^ . A vhe n Ave t h i n k S o c r a t e s h y a n y o f t h e c o n c e p t s ,
Athenian, Greek, European, man, biped, ani
mal, being, avc th ro w out of vic A v th e far g r e a t e r num ber of
characters o f Avh ich Socrates is th e c o m p lem en t, and th ose, lik e
w ise, w h ic h m o r e p r o x iin a te ly d e te r m in e or c o n s titu te h is in d iv id u
a lity . It is, lik eA vise, eA 'ident, t h a t in p r o p o r t i o n a s Ave t h i n k h im
hy a m ore general con cep t, avc sh a ll r e p r e s e n t h im by a sm a ller
b u n d le o f a ttrib u tes, and, co n seq u en tly , r e j ir e s e n t b ifii in a m ore
p artial and on e-sid ed m anner. T hus, if we th in k h im as Athe
nian, Ave s h a l l t h i n k h i m h y a g r e a t e r n u m b e r o f q u a l i t i e s t h a n i f w e
th in k h im h y Greek; a n d , in l i k e m anner, onr rep resen ta tio n w ill
h e less a n d le ss a d e q u a te , as w e th in k h im h y ev ery h ig h er co n cep t
ill t h e s e r i e s , European, man, biped, animat, being.
^ X X II. 2, A coiicejit or notion, as the result o f a compari

son, necessarily expresses a relation. I t is,
P a r . X X I I . (b) A Con. , . '' , .
oept a f f o r d s no abso- therefore, n o t cognizable in it s e l f ; th a t is, it
lute object of knowi- a f i o i ' d s 110 a h s o l i i t c Ol' i r r e s p e c t i v e o b j e c t o f
k n o w l e d g e , h n t c a n o n l y h e r e a l i z e d in c o n
s c i o u s n e s s h y a j i p l y i n g it, as a t e r m o f r e l a t io n , to o n e or m o r e
o f th e o b j e c t s , A vhic h agree in th e p o in t o r p o in t s o f rcseiii-
b l a n c e Avliich i t e x p r e s s e s .
In this paragraph (if I m ay allude to Avliat yon m a y n ot all he

aAvare o f) is contained a key to the Avliole m ystery of Generalization
and General T e r m s ; for the whole disputes hetwecn the Conce})-
tiialisls and X ominalists (to say n o thing o f the licalists) have only
arisen from concejits h aving been regarded as afibrding an irre-
92 LOGIC. L ec t. Y U .
spcctive and in d e p en d e n t object of tbonght.* T his illusion has

arisen from a v ery simple circumstance. Objects
Tliis paragraph con- compared to g e th er are found to possess certain
tiini- 11 key lo the attributc.s, wliich, as p rodu cing iiidiseeniible
invslorv ol Generali- . . i i i -i
/atioii' ami General modifications in iis, are to ns absolutely similar,
lerm- Tliey are, theivfore, considered tlie same. T h e
relation o f sim ilarity is thus converted into
identity, and th e real plurality o f resembling qualities in nature is
factitiously reduced to a unity o f t h o u g h t ; and this iiiiity obtains a
name in wliieli its relativity, n ot being expressed, is still further
removed front observation.
But the niom ent we a t te m p t to represent to ourselves any of
these concepts, any o f these ab stra ct generalities,
A\ h e r e in c o n s is t s i^Lgoliite objccts, by tlicmsclvcs, and out of
th e g e u e r a iit> o t a pej^tion to any concrete or individual realities,
concept.
th e ir relative n atu re a t once reiipitears ; for we
find it a ltogether impossible to represent any of the qualities ex
pressed by a concept, excejit as attached to some individual and
detcrrninate o bje ct; :ind th e ir whole g enerality consists in t h i s ,
that though wc iiinst realize them in th o u g h t u n d e r some singular
of the class, we may do it u n d er any. Tints, for e.vaiiiple, we can
not actually represent tlie bundle o f attrib u tes contained in the
concept ?R.R,*as an absolute object, by itself, and ap a rt from all th a t
reduces it from a general cognition to an iiidividu.al representation,
W c cann ot figure in im agination any object ad e q u ate lo the general
notion or te rm m an ; for the man to be bore im agined m ust bo
n eith er tall n o r short, neither f;it nor lean, n eith er black nor white,
neither man nor woman, neith er young nor old, b u t all and yet
none o f these at once. T h e relativity of onr concepts is thus shown
in the contradiction and absurdity of the opjtosite hypothesis.
I I 'o r a f u ll a c c o u n t o f t h is d is p u te , se e Lectures on M etaphysics, p. 47" et sea. E d .

LECTURE VIII.
S T O I C H E I O U O G Y .
SECTION II. OF THE PRODUCTS OF THOUGHT
L ENNOEMATJC.
A. OF CONCEPTS IN GENERAL; B. IN SPECIAL I. TIIEIR

OBJECTIVE RELATION QUANTITY.
I n our last L ecture, we began the Second Section of Stoiclieiol-

ogy, the consideration o f the P ro d u c ts of T ho u g h t. T h e jiroduct
o f th o u g h t m ay be considered as Concepts, as
Recapitulation.with J u d g m e n ts, and as R easo n in g s; these, however,
fu r th e r e x p la u a tio u , . ,
a n d il lu s tr a t io n . Viewed as the results o f ditterent
faculties, fai- less as processes in d e p en d e n t of
each other, for th e y are all only the pro d u ct of the same energy in
different degrees, or ra th e r in sinqiler or more complex applications
to its objects.
In trea tin g of Concejits, Avhich form the subject of the F irst
C h a pte r of this Second Section, I stated th a t I should first consider
them in general, and then consider them in sp e c ia l; and, in my last
Lecture, I had nearly concluded all th a t I deem it requisite under
the former head to state, in regard to their peculiar character, thcii-
origin, and their general accidents. I, first of all. exjilained the
meaning of the tw o terms, coiiceqxt and notion, Avords convertible
with each other, b u t still severally deno tin g a diflerent aspect of
th e .simple operation, Avhich the y equally exjiress. N otion being
relative to and expressing the apprehension, the re m a rk in g ,
the tak in g note of, the resembling attributes in object.s; concept,
the grasping up or synthesis of these in the unity o f thought.
H a vin g shown Avhat was properly exjiressed by the terms notion
and concept, or conception, \ w e n t on to a more articulate oxjilana-
tion o f that Avhich they Avcre cnqiloyed to denote. A n d here I
.again stated Avhat a C on cep t or N o tio n is in itself, and in contrast
I'D a Presentation o f Perce])tion, or Reju'osentatiou o f Phantasy.
Our knoAvledge through either o f tho latter, is a direct, immediate,
94 LOGIC. L ect. VIII.
irrospeftivo, detenniiinle, iiulivifliial, niicl ndeqii.ate eogiiitioii; tliat

is, a singular or iudividiial object is k now n in itself, by itself, throu gh
all its attrihntes, and w ith o u t reference to aught h u t itself. A con
cept, oil the contrary, is an indirect, mediate, relative, iiideteriiiinate,
and partial cognition o f any one o f a nninher of ohjects, b u t not an
actual representation either o f them all, or o f the whole attributes*
o f any one ohjeet.
T h o u g h it he not strictly within the province of Logic to explain
the origin and formation o f onr notions, the logician assuming, as
data, the laws and products o f thonglit, as the m athem atician as
sumes, as data, extension and iinmher and th e axioms hy which
their relation is d eterm ined, both leaving to the metaphysician
the inquiry into th e ir g r o u n d s ; this n o tw ith stan din g, I deemed
it not imin-opcr to give yon a very hrief s ta te m e n t o f the mode and
eircnmstanccs in which onr coneejits are elaborated o ut of the pre
sentations and representations of the snhsidinry fiicnlties. Different
ohjects n're com plem ents jiartly o f similar, p artly o f different, a ttr i
butes. Similar qualities are those w hich stand in similar relation
to onr organs and faculties, and w here the sim ilarity is complete,
the effects which th e y d eterm ine in ns are, by n.s, indiscernihle. To
ns th e y are, therefore, virtually th e same, and the same we, accord
ingly, consider them to he, though in different ob jects; precisely as
we consider the th o u g h t of th e same ohject to he itself the same,
when repeated at intervals at different tim es in consciousness.
Tlii.';, hy w ay of jireface, being understood, I showed that, in the
formation of a conccqit or notion, the ]rocess m ay he analyzed into
four momenta. In the first jilace, we must have a plurality of oh-
jccts pre.sented or rejjrosented hv the subsidiary faculties. 'Idiese
ficiilties must furnish the rude material for elaboration. In the sce-
oiid place, the ohjects th us supplied are, hy an act o f th e U n d e r-
.(landing, com pared together, and th e ir several qualities ju d g e d to
he similar or dissimilar. In th e tliird place, an act o f volition,
c.allcd A tten tio n , concentrates consciousness on the qualities thus
recognized as sim ilar; ami tliat coneentratioii, hy atteiilioii on llicm,
involv(s an abstraction o f coiiscicjiisncss from those whicli have
heen recognized and throw n aside as d issim ila r; fur the jiower off
conscifMisness is liiniteil, and it is clear or vivid jirecisely in propor
lion to the sim plicity or oiieiie.ss o f its oliject. A ttention and .^Vh-
'tra c tio n are the tw o poles o f the same act o f tliou glit; the y are
like the opprisitc scalc-s in a b a la n c e the one m ust go ti]i n.s the
other "ocs dow n. In tin- fourth ]il;ice, tlie qualities, which hy com-
]arison arc ju d g e d similnr, :md hy attention are constituted into an
exclusive ohject o f thou ght, these are already, hy this process,
L ect. VIII. LOGIC. 95
identified in consciousness; for th e y are only ju d g e d similar, inas

much as th e y produce in us indiscernible elfects. T h e ir synthesis in
coiisciousiiess may, however, for jirecisions sake, be stated as a
fourth step in th e jiro c e ss; b ut it must be rem em bered, th a t at least
the tliree la tte r steps are not, in reality, distinct and in d ependen t
acts, b u t are only so distinguished and stated, in ord er to enable
ns to comiirehend and speak about the indivisible operation, in the
diflereiit asjiects in which we may eonsider it. In th e same Avay,
you are not to suppose th a t the m ental sentence Avhich m ust be ana
lyzed in order to be e.vpre.sscd in language, has as m any parts in
consciousness, as it has words, or clauses, in speech ; for it forms, in
reality, one organic and indivisible whole. T o re]eat an illustra
tion I have already given, the parts o f an act of th o u g h t stand in
th e same relation to each o th e r as the parts of a triangle, a figure
Avhich we cannot resolve into any sim pler figure, b n t whose sides
and angles we m ay consider apart, and, therefore, as p a r ts ; though
these are, in reality, inseparable, being tb e necessary conditions of
each other. B u t this by the tvay.
T h e qualities o f different individual things, th u s identified in
thoug ht, and constituting concepts, u n d e r which, as classes, these
individual thin gs them selves are r a n g e d ; these prim ary concepts
m ay themselves be .subjected to tb c same process, by whicb they
were elaborated from th e concrete realities given in P erce ption and
Im agination. W e may, again, com pare different concepts together,
again find in th e plurality o f attributes which th e y com prehend,
some like, some n n lik e ; we m a y again atten d only to the similar,
and again identify these in th e syntliesis of consciousness; and this
process o f evolving concepts o u t o f concepts Ave m ay go on per
forming, until th e generalization is arrested in th a t ultim ate or pri
m a ry concept, th e basis itself o f all attributes, tue concept of
B ein g or Existence.
H avinO g thus endeavored to 0g iv e * A'Ou0 a general vicAv o f Avhat con-
cepts arc, and b y Avliat process th e y arc* formed, I stated, by Avay of
corollary, some o f tlieir general characteristics. T h e first o f these I
m entioned is th e ir partiality or inadequacy; tliat is, th e y com pre
h end only a la rger or smaller portion o f the whole attrib u tes belong
ingO to the things O classified o r contained u n d er them.
T h e second is their relativity. F o rm e d by comparison, the y cx-
jiress only a relation. T h e y cannot, therefore.
R e la tiv ity o f C o n - ^ absolute objcct to coiisciousiie>s,
c e p ts . . . .
the y cannot bc rcjireseiited, as univcrsals, in
imagination. T h e y can only be th o u g h t of in relation to some one
o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l o b j e c t s t h e y c l a s s i f y , a n d A vheii A'ieAved i n r e l a t i o n
96 LOGIC. L e c t . VIIL
to it, thov can be rcpvc.senteil in imagiiialion ; b u t then, as so ac tu

ally rcprcseiitei.1, th e y no longer constitute general attributions, they
fall back into more sjieeial (leterininations of the iiulividual object in
which the y are rejiresented. T h u s it is, th a t the gen e rality or uni
versality of concepts is potential, n ot actual. T h e y are only genei-
:ds, inasinneli :is th e y may be apjilied to any o f the various objects
they contain ; b u t while tliey c a n not be actually elicited into con
sciousness, except in apjilication to some one or otlier of llicsc, so,
they cannot be so ajiplied w ith o u t l o s i n g , tanto, th e ir univers: 1-
ity. Take, for example, the eoncejit horse. In so far as by horse
we merely thin k of the word, th a t is, of the combination formed by
the letters h, o, r, s, e, this is not a concept a t all, as it is a mere
rcjiroscntation o f certain individual objects. T his I only state and
eliniiiiate, in order th a t no possible am biguity should be allowed to
link. B y horse, then, m eaning n ot merely a rejiresentation of the
word, bu t a cnnccjit relative to certain objects classed u n d er i t ;
tlic conccjit horse, I say, cannot, if it remain a concept, th a t is, a
universal attribu tion, be rejtrcscntcd in im a g in a tio n ; but, except it
be represented in imagination, it cannot be ajAplied to any obje ct;
and, except it be so applied, it can not be real-
Concepts liave a po- j t h o u g l i t a t all. Yoii m a y tr y to cscapo
tcntial. not an actual, , , / i i-i i xr
universaiitv horiis 01 the dilemma, but you cannot. lOii
ca nnot realize in tliongh t an absolute or irrespec-
t i \ e concejit, corresjionding in universality to tlie ajiplication of tlie
word ; for tlie snjijiosition of tliis involves n um erou s contradictions.
All existent horse is not a lelation, b u t an e x ten d e d object jiossessed
of a d e term in a te figure, color, size, etc.; horse, in general, cannot,
therelbre, be rejirescnted, excejit by an image of som ething extended,
and o f a dete rm in a te figure, color, size, etc. H ere now em erges the
eontradiction. If, on the one hand, you do n o t rejiresent som ething
extended and o f a d eterm in a te figure, coloi-, and size, you have no
rejiresentation o f any horse. There i.s, therefore, on this alternative,
n othing which can be called the actual concejit or image of a horse
at all. If, on the otlier hand, you do rejiresent so m ethin g extended
and <if a determ in a te figure, color, and size, then you ha\'e, indeed,
the image of an imlividual hor.se, b u t n ot a universal concejit coad-
((jnate with horse in general. F or how is it jiossible lo have an ac t
ual rejiresentation o f a figure, whieh is not a determ in a te f i gi ne?
but if of a dctermiiiato figure, it m ust be th a t o f some one of the
many different figures under whieli horses apjiear; hut then, if it he
onl\ of one of these, it eaniiot bo the general coiieept of the otliers,
which it docs not rejire.sent. In like manner, how i.s it jiossihle to
have the actual rejiroscntation of a thin g colored, Avhich is not the
L ect, VIII. LOGIC. 97
rejircscntation of a (leterminate color, th a t is, cither white, or Idack,

or gr.ay, or hrowii, etc.? h u t if it hc any one of these, it can only
represent a horse ol' this or th.at particul.ar color, and c a nno t he the
general concept of horses o f every color. T h e same result is given
hy the oth er a t tr ih n te s ; and w hat I originally stated is tlins mani
fest, th a t eoncejits have only a potential, n o t an actual, nnivci's.al-
i t y ; th a t is, the y are only universal, iii.asmnch as they raa}- he apjilied
to any o f a certain class of ohjects, h u t as actually ajijilicd, they are
no longer general attrihutions, hnt only sjieeial attrihntes.
B u t it does not from this follow th a t concepts are mfii-e words,
and th a t th e re is n o th in g general in th o u g h t it-
n u tc o u c e ,,ts a re u o t,
Ih eretore, m ere w o r d s. , ^ . d j d
pliilosoplier; for no philosoj)lier hns ever denied
th a t we are capable o f a p p re hending relations, and in particular
the relation o f sim ilarity and difference; so th a t the whole contro
versy between th e conceptnalist and nominalist originates in the
am biguous em |)loym ent o f the s.ame term s to express the represen
tations of Im agination and the notions or concepts of the u n d e r
standing. This is significantly shown by the ahsolnte non-existence
o f the dispute am ong the philosophei-s of th e m ost metaphysical
country in Europe. In G ermany, the question o f nominalism and
eoneeptnalism has n ot been agitated, and w h y ? Simply because
the German language supplies term s by which concepts (or notion.s
o f th o u g h t jirojier) have heen contradistinguished from the presen
tations and representations o f the subsidiary faculties.' B ut this
is n.ot a snhject on whicli I o ught at jiresent to hai'e touched, as it
is, in tru th , foreign to the domain of L o g ic ; and I have only been
led now to recni- to it at all, in consequence o f some difficulties ex-
jtressed to me hy members of the class. All th a t I wish yon now
to nnderstand is th a t concejits, as the result of conijiarison, that
is, of the ajijirchension and affiiination o f a relation, are necessarily,
in their nature i-elative, and, consequently, not cajiahle o f rejircsen-
tation as ahsolnte attrihntes. I shall term inate the consideration
of concejits in general by the following paragraph, in which is
stated, besides their inadequacy and ixdativity, their dependence on
language:
^ X X I I I , T h e concept thus formed hy an abstraction of

the resembling fi-om the non-resemhling qualities o f o b j e c t s ,
would again fall hack into the confusion and inlinitnde fi-om
1 S e e th e A u th o r 's n o te , R eid's W orks, p. 412; a iu l Lectures on M eta p h ysics, p. 4 n ct s,rj

Ed
13
98 LOGI C. L ect. VIII.
which it has been called out, were it n ot rendered p erm anent

for consciousness, by being fixed and ratified
Par. xxrii. Con. in a verbal sign. Considered in general,
c e p ts ,- ( c ) T _ e ir de- th o u gh t and huionagc are reciprpcally d e
pendence on L an- ^ o i ^ j
Euage. p e n d e n t; each bears all th e imperfections
and perfections o f the o th er ; but Avithoiit
language there could be no k n o w le d g e reali/.ed o f the essential
properties o f things, and o f the con n ection o f their accidental
states.
T his also is not a subject o f wliich .tlie consideration properly

belongs to Logic, b u t a few words m ay not be
The relation of Lnu- inexpedient to iiiakc yon aware, in general, of the
pungc torhou"iit, and intim ate coiiiiections o f th o u g h t and its cxpres-
the influence which it . t c .1 c i n 1 1 i
e.xens on our .nentai jiowcrful influence which lan-
operution.* cxci'ts upoii 0111 * mental operations. Man,
in fact, o n ly obtains the use o f his faculties in
ob tainin g th e use o f speech ; for la nguage is the indis])onsable mean
o f the d evelopm ent o f his natural powers, w h e th e r intellectual or
moral.
F*or Perception, indeed, for the m ere consciousness o f the sim ilar
ities and dissimilarities in the objects perceived.
Language uniicces- jjjg apprehension o f the causal connection
narv in certain mental . .1 i t /
operations C ertain t liiiig s , and lor t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h i s
know ledge to th e a tta in m e n t o f certiu'n ends,
nr> language is necessary; and it is only the exaggeration o f a tru th
into :in error, when pliilosojiliers maintain that la nguage is the indis-
jiensable condition o f even the sim pler energies o f knowledge.
L angua ge i.s the attribution of signs to onr cognitions o f tliing.s.
Jbit a.s a cognition must have been already there, before it conid
receive a sign ; eonseijuently, th a t know ledge which is d en oted by
Ihe formation ami aj)j)lieatioii o f a word, nuist h ave jirecoded tlu*
ynibol Avliich (Icnotes it. Sjieech is thus n ot the mother, but the
godm other, of knowledge. P u t thongli, in general, we must bold
that language, as the jiroduct and eorirdative o f 1liought, must be
view ed as jioslerior to the act o f th in kin g itself; on the other hand,
it niu>t be ailmitted, that wo could never have risen above the very
lowe.st degrees in the scale o f tlionglit, w ith ou t the aid o f signs.
A sign is necessary, to g iv e stability to our intellectual ju-ogiv'ss,
to establish eneh step in our advance a.s a tioav starting-jioint for
onr advance to another beyond.
country m ay bc ovei'run* by an armed host, bnt it is otiI v
conquered by tbe eslabli.shment o f fortresses. AVord.s are flie
LKCT. v m . LOGIC. 99
fo rtresses o f tlio n g h t. T h e y e n a b le ns to rea liz e o n r d o m in io n o v e r

w hat we have alread y overru n in th ou ght; to
Mental operations to m ake e v o iy iiite lle e tm il conquest th e ba sis o f
w llic ll laniriiaj'c is in - i ,
tlispoiisable, and
.
oiierations
its
_* _
tor ôtliers still lieyoiid. _ Or another
l e la t io n to th e se illustration: Y ou have till heard o f the jiroce.ss
o f tuniiclliiig, o f tu n n ellin g through a s.and-baiik.
In this operation it is impossible to succeed, unless ev ery foot, nay
alm ost every inch in our progres.s, be secured by an arch o f masonry,
before w e attenqit tho e.veavatioii o f another. N oav, la nguage is to
the mind precisely w hat the ;ireh is to the tunnel. T h e ôAver o f
thinking and the pow er o f exeav.ation are not dejiendent on the
Avord in the one case, on the mason-Avork in the oth er; but Avithoiit
these subsidiaries, neither jiroeess could be carried on beyond its rud
im entary coiiiiiieiieement. T h ou g h, therefore, Ave alloAV that ever}-
m o v em en t forward in la ngnage must he determ ined b y an a n tece
d en t inovem eiit forAvard in th o u g h t ; still, unless th o u g h t be accom
panied at each jioiiit o f its eA'oliition, by a corresponding evolution
o f language, its further d evelo iu n en t is arrested. T h u s it is, that
the higher exertions o f th e higher faculty o f U n d e rstan d in g, the
elassifiuatioii o f the objects ])resented and represented by the subsi
diary poAvers in tlic formation o f a hierarchy o f notions, the con n ec
tion o f these notions into jiu lgm ciits, the inference o f one jm lg m e n t
from another, and, in general, all our consciousness o f tlic relations
o f the uiiiversnl to the i>artieular, c on sequ en tly all science strictly
so deiiominat-ed, and ever y iiidiictiA e knoAvledgc o f the past and
future from the laAVS o f n a t u r e : not only these, bu t all ascent
from the sphere o f sense to the .sjiherc o f moral and religions intelli
gence, arc, as experience proA'es, if not altogether im possible Avithout
a language, at least possible to a very Ioav degree.
A d m ittin g even th a t the m in d i s e .a j i a h l e o f c e r t a i n e l e m c n t . a r y
c o n c e p t s A v i t h o n t t h e fi x ; iti< m a n d s i g n a t u r e o f l a n g u a g e , s t i l l t h e s e
a r e b u t s j i a r k s A vhie h A v o n ld t A v i n k l e o n l y t o o x j i i r e ; a n d it r e i p i i r e s
A vords t o g i v e tliein p r o n iin e n e e , a n d , b y e n a b li n g us to c o lle c t and
ela b o ra te th em i n t o u c a v c o n c e p t s , t o r a i s e o u t o f Avhat Avoiild o t h -
ci-Avise b e o n l y scattered a m i tra n sito ry scin tilla tion s a viA id and
e n d u r in g lig h t.
I h e i- e t e r m i n a t e t h e G e n e r a l an d jiro ce e d to th e S p e c ia l c o n s id
eratio n o f C o n c e p t s that is, t o v i c A v t h e m in
n o r ( oncoj.ts or tlicii s o v c r a l R e l a t i o n s . N oav , in a lo i r i c ;. ! p o i n t
NoUoiis 111 special. ^ . i
o f v i e w , t h e r e a re, it s e e m s t o m e , o n l y th r e e
J io s sib le r e l a t i o n s in w h i e h e o i i e c j i t s c .m h e c o n s i d e r e d ; for t h e o n l v
r ela tio n s th e y h o ld are to tlieir o b jec ts , to llie ir su b je c t, or to ea ch
100 L O G I C . L e c t. V III.
other. Tn relation to their objects, the y are considered as inclu

sive ota grea ter or smaller nninher o f attrihntes, th a t is, as ajiplica-
hle to a g rea ter or smaller n nm he r of ohjects; this is technically
styled tlieir Qiiantitg. In relation to their subject, th a t is, to the
iniinl itself, thev are considered as s ta n d in g in a higher or a lower-
degree of eonseiousness, the y are more oi- less clear, more or less
distinct ; this, in like manner, is called tlieir QuaUtij. I n relation
to each otlicr, they arc consiilercd as the same or different, coordi
nated or snhordinated to each o th e r; this is tlieir Relation, strictly
so e a lk u y U n d e r tliese th ree heads I now, therefore, proceed to
treat them ; and, first, of their Q u antity.
^ X X I V . As a concept, or notion, is a th o u g h t in which an

indefinite iihirality o f characters is hound
P a r . X X IV . Q u a n - . . i t
tity Of C o n c e p t s of a Unity of consciousiic.ss, and njipli-
tw o k in d s . I n te n s iv e cahlc to ail indefinite ])liirality of ohjects, a
an d E x te n siv e . , i -i
concept IS, tlierefore, neecssanly a quantity,
and a qu an tity v arying in ainonnt according to the grea ter
or smaller niiinhers of characters o f wliieh it is the conijilement,
and the g re a te r or smaller nn m h e r of things of which it may
he -(aid. T his (juantity is thus o f two kinds ; as it is cither an
Intensive or an kXtcnsive. T h e Internal or Intensive (^Juantity
of a concejit is determ ined hy the g re a te r or .smaller nn m her
of coii>titneiit characters contained in it. T h e E xternal or E x
t- ii-die (Jii'Jntity o f a concept is d eterm ined hy the g re a te r or
.--iii.illei- iiiiiiiher of elassifii-d concepts or realities contained un
der it. ddie former (the Intensive (iiiantity) is called hy some
laltei- Oi'cek logicians the depth (fSdSo<;), hy the Latin logical
writers the comprehension {comjtrehensio, q u a n d ta s compre-
hensionis, comjihuras, or qa uititas conipiJe.rns). 'Plie lattei (the
Ext<>n--i\ c (^Jiiaiitity) is called liy the same la tte r Greek Logi-
eiaii-(, llie hrxtdth (A.uro?) ; hy zVristotle, f; Trcpioy^, to irepuxetv,
TO TTcpicyefrJai; hy tile logical writers o f the western or Latin
world, the ej'te.H <ioii or circuit {cu'tensio, (jaantitas extensionis,
* O n tlieir rel-jiion t o l l i e i r o r i - i i i .T K ilirecI .3. Ily leln lio ii In oncli oilier lliey liavp rc-
o r i n d i r e c t , i- ee E - e r. [Systew d < r I.ngllc, 4 0 . lalin n firicllv fo called
(1. O ; E l< ] 1. I!v rolalion In tlieir foiliject flic y have
M III - N II. N o tio n - m ay he tlin -b e tte r O e a ri ess a n d distiiictnes--.

,|j_ , ('I'lii-la s t b a d b e lte r b e r e le -iite d to A letliod-
. . , . , , . , , o l o - v . l M n n n r i i n 'l n .
1" I . v relatio n to iliem aeh eo tliev h a v e llie , , ...
J S e e I .> r h / r f S n il M i h i p / i i / s i r s . i i 4 i 4 n
,
A ri--
ni i n v of c o rn p r e lie n s io n . , , '
lo lle does n ot u s e T T fpioY i; a s a s n b s t a i t n e .
2. I . v re a tio ii to tlieir o ljecis th e y have tlio ii-b th e ic rb . I n ib activ e a n d | i a s s i v e . is

th e q iian lily o f e x ten sio n . T lifsc tw o I I ii ih em p lo y ed i n I b i - s i - n i f i c a l i o n , . g-. d i m / . / V i o r
q u a n tity in g e n e r a l. i. 27: AA o. iii. 5. E d .

L ec t. VIII. L(m: i c. 101
amh'tus, qiiantitns (unhitus)-, and likewise the (fo/ns..- or

sp/iere ol' a notion [rcgio, sjihoira)}
The Internal Quantity of a notion, its Intension or Coniprehen-

sioii, is made uj) of those different attributes of
Geiiei-at E xp lication . , . , , . 1 t ,
wliieli the eoneept is tlie eoneeived sum ; that
is, the various characters connected by the couee]jt itself into a
single whole in tliought. d'he E.xteriial Quantity of a notion or its
e.xtension is, on the other hand, made up of the number of objects
whicll are thought mediately through a conccjit. For examjile, the
attributes rational, sensible, moral, etc., go to constitute tbe inten
sion or internal quantity of the concejit wuui/ whereas the attrihute.s
European, American, philosopher, tailor, etc., go to make uji a coii-
cejit of this or that individual man. These two quantities are not
convertible. On the contrary, they are in the inverse r::tio of each
otlier; the greater the dejith or comjirehension of a notion tlie less
its breadth or extension, and vice versa. You will observe, like
wise, a distinction which has been taken by the best logicians.
Both quantities are said to contain; but the quantity of extension
is said to contain under it; the quantity of comprehension is said to
contain in it.
By the intension, comprehension, or dejith of a notion, we think
the most qualities of the fewest objects; whereas by the extension
or breadth of a coiieejit, we think the fewest qualities of the most
objects. Ill other words, by the former, we say the most of the
least; by the latter, the least of the most.
Again ; yon will observe the two following distinctions : the first,
the exposition of the eoiiijireliensioii of a notion is called its
Definition (a sinijde notion cannot, therefore, be delined); the
second, the exjiosition of the Extension of a notion is called its
Division (an individual notion cannot be divided).
1 [Cf. Porpkyrii, Isagoge, cc. i. ii. viii ; Caje- liic ex ten siv e. P o rp h y rin s a u tcm lo rp ieb atu r
t a n . Ill Porplnjrii Pra'licabilin., cc. i. ii [p. 37 ed. liic d e e.xtensiva eo llectio iie, ideo d ix it, f;eiiuf
1579; prcfi.xed to his C o n im e n ta ry on th e Cai- esse m aîs c o lle c iiv n u i.' g u o te d b y S tah l.
fgnrifs. first p u b lish e d in 1496. A d h oc Regulce Philosopbi'cp, til. x ii., reff. 5, p. 3S1
h r e v ite r d ic itiir. qu o d esse m a îs co lle c tiv u m Cf. reg. 6, ed L o n d o n , IfuS E d .] [Pon-
m iilto ru in p o te st in te llig i d u p lic ite r : lin o Roynl Logic. P i. c. 6. p. 74. cd . I 1 I 8 . lloe-
m o d o intensive, e t sic species m agi* est collec- th in s, hitrnr/nrtin nd St/llngism n.. Opera, p. 562:
tiv a , q n ia n iagis u n it a d u n a ta ; a lio m o d o rx - In Tapira Cicernnis C nm nuntarii. Vlh. i.. Optra,
tensive, et sic trenns est m a g is co llccfiv n m . p. 765. cd. R asihe. 1570. P eiisch iiis, S ystma
<]iiia m n lto pliira sub siia a d u n a tio n e c a d u n t. L n g in n n . pp. 11, 92: R a iim g a rte n . Arrnasit
q u an i su b specie! am b itu U n d e species et 56. 57. cd Ila la -A la g d e b u rg a -. 1773
g en u s se lia b e n t sicn t duo duces, q u o ru m a lte r K ru g , Logik. i 26; S c h n 'z e . Lngik. i .3(1; Esser,
h a b e to x e rc itiim p arv iim sed v a ld c u n a n im e m . Logik. S 34 rt seg..- E u g e n io s p. 194 tt seq.
a lte r cx ercitiim m a g n u m , sed d iv e rsa riim [Ao-vofTj, c. iv .. ITepl 'Evvoioiiv Bo&ows t *
factio n u m . llle e n im m a g is c o llig itin te n s iv e , ku} n xdrous E d .]
102 LOGIC. L e c t . Y III.
W l m t folloAvs is in f nrt l i oi - i l l ust rat i on o f t h e ])aragi-a])h. Notions

or e o n e e p t s st.and in a n e c e s s a r y rel at i on t o cer-
spcoiai niuuration ohj eets , t h o u g h t i h r o u - l i t h e m ; for w i t h o u t
III A . .. ^
co.Kvpi La.iuanuiy- S o m e t h i n g t o t h n i k ot, t he r e c oul d e.xist no
t h o u g h t , n o n o t i o n, no c o n c e p t . B u t in so fili
al w e t hi nk an o bj e c t t hr o u g h a eonee])t, Ave t h i nk it as jiart of, or
as c o n t a i n e d under, t ha t e o i i e e p t : and in so far as w e t h i nk a coii-
eejtt o f its o bj e c t or o bj ect s , w e t h i n k it as a u n i t y c on t a i ni ng ,
a e t u a l l y or poteiiti:illy, in it a pl u r al i t y o f at t r i b ut i o ns . O u t o f t he
r el at i on o f a eoiiee|>t t o its o bj e c t it ne c e s s a r i l y r, stilts, t ha t a c o n
c ept is a (in:mtiim or ( p i : m t i t y ; for tliat wh i e h c o n t a i ns o n e or mo r e
uni ts b y w h i c h it m a y be m e a s u r e d , is a qu a nt i t y .
B u t t he q u a n t i t y o f a c o n c e p t is o f t w o , and tAvo 0 ])])osile, ki nds.
C o n s i d e r e d iiitci-iially, th.at is, as a u n i t y AA'hich
ThiMiuanui) ol [wo o'tmerallv do e s , c o i i l ai n in it a pl ural i t y
k iiitls: 1. ln k * n s)v e. - ' ^ ^ i
o f ]arls 01* c*oiii])oiic*iit attribute's, a c o n c e p t lias
a certain q u a n t i t y , AA'liich m a y he c al l ed its Internal or iutensioe
(jiiantity. T h i s is g e n e r a l l y cal l ed its r a m p r e h e n s i o n , s o m e t i m e s its
d jtt/f (3dSo<;, and its ijuantitas congde.ctis. H e r e , t h e parts, t h a t i.s,
t he 'CAcra! a t t r i b ut e s or e haraet ers , AA-hieh g o t o c o n s t i t u t e t he t ot al
c o n c e p t , are sai d t o be c o n t a i n e d in it. F o r e x a m p l e , t he c o n c e p t
utan is c o m p o s e d o f tAA'o c o n s t i t u e n t part s or al t ri hi i t es , t h a t is, o f
tAAo paiti.-d eoii eei its, rational and antntol; for t he char act e rs
riHloiial and anhmd are o n l y an a n a l y t i c a l ex| u- essi on o f t he syi i -
t he t i e u n i t y o f t he e o i i e e p t nian. B u t e ach o f t h e s e partial c o n
c ept s , Avhich t o g e t h e r make iqi tlie e oi i qi rehensi oi i o f t he total
eoiice])t man, a l e themselA-es aaIioU's, m a d e up in like niai ii i er o f
ltart>. 'J'o t ake o n l y t he e o i i e e p t o / z o / o / / ; t hi s c o m p r e h e n d s iu
it, as |iarts, / / c / d / / a n d sensitlce and organized, for a liA'iiig and seii-
tieiiL o r g a n i s m m a y be c o n s i de r e d as an a na l yt i c a l d e A c l o p m e n t o f
the i-ousi i tii cii ts o f t he . syntheti c un i t y animal. B u t each o f t he s e ,
aL'iiii, is ;i c o n c e p t , c o m p r e h e n d i n g ami m a d e iqi o l ' p a r t s ; a nd t he s e
parts, agai n, are reI.-itiAe Avholes, diA'isihle i nt o o t he r e oi i s t i t ue nt
c o n c e p t s ; nor ne e d AAe s t o p in our ana l y s i s till aa'o laaich at t ri but e s
AA hich, as s i mpl e , .stand as a pri mary oi' u l t i ma t e e l e m e n t , i nt o AA-hi(h
t he >crics can he r es o h' ed. Noaa-, y o u aauII ohserA-e, t hat as the
]cirls o f t he parts ar( parts o f t he aaIioIc, t he coiiec])t as i m m e
d i a t e l y c o m p r i ' hc n d i i i g tlic c o n c e p t s ralioiml a nd aninml, luetli-
a l c l y comji-.-ehends t he i r ]iarts, and t he parts o i ' t h e i r ]>arts, to t he
en 1 o f t he cA-olutioii. T h u s , w c can say, not o n l y t ha t n a m is an
anImal, \}\\i t ha t he is a I'n'liig Icing, a .sentient being, o\e. d'hc
logical a x i o m , Nota. ivjUc e.d nota rei ipsias, or, as otherAA'ise e x
L e c t . V III. l o g i c . 103
pressed, PrmdirjLtnm p r k d l c a t i est piyedicatum suhjecti? is o n l y

a s p e c i a l e n u n c i a t i o n o f t h e g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e , th .at t h e j i a r t o f a ]>art
is a ] ) a r t o f t h e w h o l e . Y o u w i ll , h e re .after, s e e th.a t t h e C u in p rc-
lien sioii o f n o t i o n s a ffo r d s o n e ot tlie t w o g r e a t h r a n c h e s o f r e a s o n
in g, w liic h , th o u g h m a r v e ll o u s ly o v e r lo o k e d h y l o g i c i a n s , is a t l e a s t
o f equal i m p o i t a i i c e Avith t h a t Avliieli t h e y h a v e e x c lu sive ly d e v e l
o p e d , a n d w h i c h is f o u n d e d on t h e o t h e r k in d o f q n a i i t i t y e x h i h i t e d
h y c o n c e p t s , a n d t o Avhicli I n o w j i r o e e e d .
B u t a c o n c e p t m a y a l s o h e c o n s i d e r e d e x t e r n a l l y , t h a t is, a s a u n i t y
A vh ieh c o n t a i n s u n d e r i t a p l u r a l i t y o f c l a s s i f y i n g
2. Lxieusuc. n t t r i h u t c s o r s n h o r d i n a t e c o n c e p t s , a n d , in th is
res])ect, it h a s a n o t h e r ( ju a n t it y w h ic h m a y h e c a lle d its extermd o r ex

tensive q u a n t i t y . T i i i s i s e o m n i o i i l y c a l l e d \\s extension ; s o m e t i m e s
i t s sphere o\- domain, sjdaera, regio, quantitas am h ittu ; a n d , h y t h e
G r e e k l o g i c i a n s , i t s breadth d r latitude, TrAaro?. H e r e t h e j i a r t s Avliich
t h e t o t a l c o n c e p t c o n t a i n s , a r e s a i d t o h e c o n t a i n e d under i t , h e e a i i s e ,
h o l d i n g t h e r e l a t i o n t o it o f t h e j i a r t i c n l a r to t h e g e n e r a l , t h e y a r e s u h -
o r d i n a t e d o r r a n g e d u n d e r it. F o r ex aiiijile , th e c o n c e p ts man, horse,
dog, etc., a r e con tain ed u n d e r th e m o re g e n e ra l co iicejit a n im al,
th e co n eejits triangle, square, circle, rhombus, rhomboid, e t c . , are con
tain ed u n d e r th e m o re gen eral cawcxi\)l f g u r e ; i i i a s i i i n c h a s t h e s iih -
o rd iiia te co iieejits can ea ch o r a n y he th o u g h t th r o u g h th e h ig h e r or
m ore gen eral. B u t a s e a c h o f t h e s e s n h o r d i n a t e c o n e e j i t s is i t s e l f a
w h o l e o r g e n e r a l , Avliich c o n ta in s u n d e r it jia rts o r m o r e jia r tie n la r
c o n c e j i t s , i t f o ll o A v s , a g a i n , o n t h e a x io m or s elf-e vid en t tru th th a t a
j i a r t o f a j i a r t i s a j i a r t o f t h e Avliol e, a n a x i o m A vh ich, y o u Avill h e r e
a f t e r see, c o n s t it u t e s t h e o n e p r iiic ijile o f all D e d u c t i v e r e a s o n in g ,
i t foll oAVs, o n t h i s a x i o m , t h a t A v lia t e v e r is c o n t a i n e d u n d e r t h e jia r -
t ia l o r m o r e j i a r t i c n la r c o n c e p t , is c o n t a i n e d n iid o r t h e t o t a l o r m o r e
general co n ce jit. Thus, fo r ex am p le, triangle is c o n t a i n e d u n d e r
figu re; a l l , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t i s c o n t a i n e d under triangle, a.s rectangled
triangle, equilateral triangle, e t c . , w i l l , lik e w ise , he co n tain ed u n d er
Jigure, h y A vh ich Ave m a y , a e c o r d i n g h ' , th in k and d escrih e them .
Snch, in general, is Avliat is m eant h y the tw o quantities o f con-
cejits their Comjirehension and E xten sion .
B u t these quantities are not on ly different, th ey
In ten siv e and E x- o j ij io s c d , a ild SO o j i j i o s e d , t h a t th o u g h each
te n s n c (luantities are g,ipj,oses the Other as the Condition ot its own
opposed to each other. *> _
existence, still, h ow ever, tvithin the limits o f co n
junct, o f correlative existence, they stand in an inverse ratio to each
I A o f A v i-lo n e 's first a iilip re- K a T v y o p o v fie v o v \4 yeT a i vdu T a K ai k o tA toC
d ic M u ei.tu I 1 uU , (afeg , iii. l . " O f f a (1 -0 70 tou v K O K fit x iv o j ^77>rj(T ;T O i. E u .
- Sec ab ove, p 100, i;ote 2, p. 101, note 1 Ed.

104 L OGI C. L ect . ITH.
\
o t l i c r , t h e ii i . axi i i mi i i o f t l i e o n e b e i n g t h e n i i n i i n n m o f t h e o t h e r .
O n this I g iv e y o u t h e follow ing itanigrniih :
^ XXV. A n o t i o n is i n t e n s i v e l y g r e a t in jirop ortion t o t h e

greater uu inber, am i i n t e n s i v e l y sm all in
Par. XXV. Lawreg. projio riio u to tlio Sm aller n u m b e r , o f d e te r -
u l a t i u g t h e m u t u a l rc- . . . , . . ,
lattous of Extcu.iou i n m a l i o u s or a t t r ib u t e s coiitniiied i n i t. Is
andcomprehcusion tlio Coiiiprelieiisioii of a coiieopt U lllilli-
m u n i , t h a t is, is t h e c o n e e i i t o n e i n w h i c h a
lilurality of attributes can no lunger be dislingnished, it is
called w h e r e . a s , i n a s m i i e l i a s i t s a t t r i b u t e s st i l l a d m i t of
d i s c r i m i i i a t i o i i , i t i s c a l l e d com plex or c o m p o u n d }
\ n o t i o n is e x t e n s i v e l y g r e a t i n p r o | ) o r t i o n t o t h e g r e a t e r n u m
b er , a n d e x t e n s i v e l y s m a l l in p r o p o r t i o n t o t h e s m a l l e r n u m b e r ,
of determinations or attributes it c o n t a i n s u n d e r it . W hen
t h e E x t e n s i o n o f a c o n e c i i t b e c o m e s a m i n i m u m , t h a t is, w h e n i t
c o n t a i n s n o o t h e r n o t i o n s u n d e r it, i t is c a l l e d a n in d iv id u a l}
T h e s e t w o q u a n t i t i e s s t a n d alw a y s in an in v erse r atio to each
other: F o r t h e g r e a t e r t h e C o m j i r e h e n s i o n o f a c o n c e p t , t h e less
is i t s E x t e n s i o n ; a n d t h e g r e a t e r i t s E x t e n s i o n , t h e l e s s i t s C o m
prehension.
To illustrate this: W hen I t a k e o u t o f a c o n c e p t , t h a t is, a b

s t r a c t f r o m o n e o r m o r e o f its a t t r i b u t e s , I d i m i n -
Illu slra tio ii. , , .
isli i t s c o i i i p r e l i e i i s i o i i . I b u s , w h e n I r oi i i t h e c o n
cept 7nau, e q u i v a l e n t t o ra tio n a l a n im a l, I a b s t r a c t f r o m t h e a t t r i b u t e
o r d e l e r m i n a t i o i i ra tio n a l, \ l e s s e n i t s i n t e r n a l q u a n t i t y . B u t b y t h i s
d im in u tio n o f its com iueliensioii I g iv e it a w i d e r e x te n s io n ; for w h a t
r e m a i n s is t h e concept au b n a l, ;in<l t h e c o i i c e j i t a n im a l e m b r a c e s
u n d e r it a far g r e a t e r i m i n b e r o f o b j e c t s t h a n t h e c o n c e p t m an.
B e fo r e, h o w e v e r , ]irocce<ling f u r t h e r in i l l u s t r a t i n g t h e f o r e g o i n g
p a r a g r a p h , i t m a y b e p r o p e r t o g i v e y o n .also t l i e f o l l o w i n g :
If X X V I . Of the logical iirocesse.s by

P a r . X X V I. P r o o e s a .
which these counter quantities of concepts
es b y w h ic h th e Com - , ^ ^ *
prehension and Ex. a i c ai i i j i l i f i cd, t l i c o u c wl i i c l i a m p l i f i e s t h e
tfn s io n o f N o tio n s Coiii]reheiision is called D e te rm in a tio n ,
a re a m p lifie d a n d ' . ,
re so lv e d . aiul s o i u c t i m e s ca ll ed (j<nicrctio)i, t h e o t h e r
w h i c h a m p l i f i e s t h e E x t e n s i o n is c a l l e d .Ih-
stractifjn o r fJm credizatiem . J je jin itio n . and J jio is io n a r c s e v e r -
1 K r tig , lytgik. ] ZH. Kn. a v rh (t^Siv itfp io x fi ra^ fXSr) rCivyti.Siv

i K n ig , i W , \ L l). Tr K f o v d ^f i r a l s o iV ti'a r Sta<popats. 'E t i o i/re
3 K ru g . j 27. E d . ; [ S c h u lz e , /-o g it, , y
33. Cf. la .n .I .y r y , A w . c viii H lO.J
I'ZTt r i pciy yt'yr, Trj -rwy im' yh 'O t tlStKtiraToi^. - K d .]
L e c t . V III. LOGIC. 105
ally tlie resolution o f tlie Coniprelicnsion and o f the Extension

o f notions, into their jiarts. A Sinijile notion cannot be defined ;
an Individual notion cannot be divided.'
Tlie reason of tliis opposition of the two quantities is manifest in

a m om ent, from tlie consideration o f th e ir sev-
i ii u s ir a i io n o f tlie c o n iitre lic n sio ii o f a c o n c e p t is
t w o f o r e g o in g p a ra -
n o th in g m ore than a sum o r c o m p le m e n t oi the
d is tinO
g u is h i nO
g e l i a r a c t e r s ,> a t t r i b u t e s ,i o f Avhich
t h e c o n c e p t is m a d e i q i ; a n d t h e e x t e n s i o n o f a c o n c e p t is n o t h i n g
m o re th a n th e su m o r c o m p le m e n t o f th e o b je c ts
C o m p r e iie iis io ii a n d tlie m se lv c s, A vlioso re se m b lin g eliaracters w ere
E x te u b io n a ie op- abstracted to constitute the couceiit. Now, it
pos t ' d i ll an inverse . . . , , . . . . ,
r a tio to e a c h o th e r . IS e v i d e n t , t l i a t tlio m o r e d istin ctiv e eliaracters
tlie c o n c e p t c o n t a i n s , t l i e m o r e m i n u t e l y i t Avill
d istin g u ish and d e t e r m in e , a n d t h a t i f it c o n ta in a jileiiiim o f dis-
tin e tiv e eh araeters, it m ust con tain tlie. d istin c tiv e the deter
m in in g eh araeters o f som e in d iv id u a l o b jec t. I I oav d o t h e tw o
q u an titie s n o w s t a n d ? I n r e g a r d t o t h e c o m p r e li e n s io n o r d e jit h , it
is e v i d e n t , t h a t i t i s l i e r e a t i t s m a x i m u m , t h e c o i i c e q i t b e i n g a c o m
p l e m e n t o f t h e A vliole a t t r i b u t e s o f a n in d iv id u a l o b j e c t , A vh icli , b y
these attrib u tes, it th in k s and d isc rim in a te s fro m e v e r y oth er. On
tlie c o n t r a r y , tlie e x t e n s i o n o r b r e a d t l i o f t h e c o n c e j it is h e r e a t its
m in im u m ; fo r, a s tlie ex ten sio n i s g r e a t in p r e j i o r t i o n t o t h e n u m
b e r o f o b je c t s to w h ie h tlie c o n c e jit can b e a jijilie d , a n d a s t h e o b je c t
is h e r e o n l y a n i n d i v i d u a l o n e , i t i s e v i d e n t t h a t i t c o u l d n o t b e les.s,
A vitliout c e a s i n g t o b e a t a ll. A g a i n , to r e v e r s e th e p ro ce s.s: tliro w -
in g o u t o f tlie c o m p re h e n sio n o f th e co n c e p t, th a t is, a b s t r a c t i n g
f r o m t h o s e a t t r i b u t e s , A vh ic h b e l o n g i n g e x c l u s i v e l y t o , e x c l u s i v e l y d i s -
t i n g u i s l i , t h e i n d i v i d u a l , Ave a t o n c e d i i n i n i s l i th e c o m jireh en sio ii,
b y r e d u c in g th e sum o f its a ttrib u te s , an d an ijilify th e e x t e n s io n o f
t h e c u i i c e p t , h y b r i n g i n g A vithin i t s s p h e r e a l l t l i e o b j e c t s , A vh ich tlu-
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , iioav tli r o A v n out o f the c o m jn e h e n sio n , had jire-
v io n sly ex clu d e d from tlie e x t e n s io n . C o n tin u in g the proce.'^.s, b y
a b s t r a c t i o n Ave tliroAV o u t o f t h e sum o f q u alitie s co n stitu tin g the
c o m jire lie iisio n , o t h e r d is c r im in a t in g a ttiib u tes, and fo rtliA vith t h e
e x t e n s i o n is p r o j i o r t i o n a l l y a m ji l i f i e d , b y t lie e n t r a n c e i n t o its s ji h c r e
o f all t h o s e o b je c ts A vh ieli Iiad p re v io u sly been d ebarred by tlie
d e te rm in in g ciia ra c te ristic s la st d isc a rd e d . Thus jiro e e e d in g , and
at each step ejectin g from tlie c o m p re lie n sio n those eliaracters
1 [S y n o n y m s o f A b s t n i c l i o i i : 1, A n a ly s is 1. A n a ly s is ( o f E x t f ii s io i i) ; 2 . S y iillie s is ; 3.
( o f C o m p r e h e n s io n ); 2, S y n t h e s is ; 3. G eiier - S p e c ilic a tio u ; 4 , E e s l r ic lio n ; 6 , lu d iv id u a -
ific a tio n ; 4. I n d u c lio n ; 5. A m p lific a tio n . tio n .]
S y n o n y m s o f D e t e r m in a t io n o r C o n c r e t io n :
u
l OG LOGIC. L e c t . V IIL
Avliicli .arc found tlio pro.xiinate im p ed im en ts to the amplification o f

the e.xtensioii o f the concept, Ave at each step diminish the former
ipiantity jireeisely as wo inerease the la tter; till, at last, wc arrive
at that co ncep t which is the iieeess.ary con stitu en t o f every o th e r ,
at that eonce]it Avhicli .all comjircheiision and all extensio n must
eq ually contain, hnt in Avhich eoin]ireliension is at its minimum,
extension at its inaximnm, I mean the con cep t o f B e in g ov E x is t-
tn ct?
W e have thus soon, that the inaximnm o f com prehension and
the m inim um o f ex ten sion are found in the con-
Dcfmition ami Oi- ^cpt o f an individual, th.at the ma.ximum o f
kision. are tlio pro- . . . . . , .
c c - o - b) wliich Com- cx tciisio n aiu l th e m in n n iim or c o m jire lie n sio n
iirohonsion ami Ex- are found ill tlic coHcojit o f the ahsoliitcly sim-
toiiMoii of Concepts 001100)11 o f existence. N on',
are re.-olved. , . , . . .
coinprelieiisioii and extension, as (jnantities, are
Avholes; for Avholes are on ly the coinploinent o f all tlieir p.arts, and
as w holes are on ly h y ns clearly eomprehoiided as we distinctly
comprehend their parts, it fo llo w s: 1, T h a t com prehension and
extension may each he analyzed into its parts; :ind, 2*', T h a t this
analysis Avill allonl the mean hy Avhich each o f those quantities can
he clearly and dis tin ctly understood. B u t :is the tw o quantities are
o f :in opposite mitnre, it is manifest, that the tw o proeesses o f analy
sis Avill, likewise, he opposed. T h e analysis o f the intensive or
((iinpreliensivc q uantity o f concepts, that is, their depth, is accom-
jilislied h y Definition ; that o f tlieir ex te n s iv e quantity, or hreadth,
hy division. On Definition and D iv isio n I at present touch, not to
((insider them in th em selv es or on their oAvn account, that is, as the
m eth od s o l' d e a r and o f distinct thinking, for this Avill form the m at
ter o f a s]iecial fliscnssioii in the S eco n d P art o f L o g ic or M e th o d
ology, Imt siiiijily in so far as it is re(|iiisitc to speak o f th e m in
illustration o f the gener.al nature o f onr concepts.
T h e expository or e.xjdamitory analysis o f a coiictqit, considered
as an intensive w hole or f|ii;iiitiim, i f iiroiicrly
lieni.itm.i Illu.-tratcd. _ , , , , 1
enected , is (lone hy its resolution into tw o con-
cejits o f which it is p m x im a te ly coiiijioiiinled, that is, into the higher
coiic(]it under which it im m ed ia tely stands, and into the con cep t
w h i c h a f f o r d s t h e c h a r a c t e r h y Avhieli i t i s d i s t i n g u i s h e d from
the other coordinate eoiiccqits under that h igher concept. This is
its definition ; th.'it is, in higical l:mgnage, its exposition h y an
aiialy-'is into its Genns ami Differential Q u a lity ; the g e n u s heing
the higher concept, under which it sta n d s; the differential (piality
1 Till*, like olher logical relalion, may b(; typified by a sensible figure. [See below, p. 108.
-EM . _
L e c t . V III. LOGIC. 1 0 1
the low er concept, by which it is clistingiiisliecl from tb e other con-

ccjits subordin.Tte to the genus, mid on u level or eoordimite with
itself, mid wliieli, in logical Imiguage, are called Species. F o r ex
ample : if we attem iit an exjiository or explanatory analysis of the
concept man, considered mi an intensive qumility or eoiiqilexus ol
attributes, we analyze it into animal, this being the hig h e r coiieejil
or genus, u n der which it sta n d s ; mid into rational, the attribute* of
reason being th e characteristic or differential quality by wliicli mait
is distiiiguislied from the oth er concepts or species which stand
coordinated willi itself, under the g enus th a t is, b'rational
animal or brute.
H ere you will observe, th a t though the analysis be of the com pre
hension, y et it is regulated by the extension ; th e extension reg u la t
ing tbe ord er in which the coiniirehension is resolved into its parts.
T h e exjiository analysis of a concept, an extensive whole or
quantum , is directly opjiosed to th e preceding,
' ' to which it is correlative. I t takes the higher
coiice]t, and, if conducted aright, resolves it into its proxim ately
lower concepts, by a dding attrib utes which afford their distinguish
ing O characters or differences. T his is d iv is io n : T hus,' for exam-
pie, taking the highest concept, th a t of ens or existence, by adding
to it the differential concejits per se or siibttantial, and non per se
ur a xidented, we have substantial existence or existence p er st,
eqnl\'alent to substance, 'and accidentcd existence or existence non per
se, equivalent to accident. W e may then divide substance by sim
ple mid not-simple, equivalent to compound, and again simple by
materied mid non-material, equivalent to immatericd, equivalent to
spiritucd: and m a tte r or material substance by organized not-
organizcd, equivalent to brute ^natter. Organized m a tte r we may
divide by sentient or aninud, and twn-sentient or vegetable. A n i
mal we may divide by rational and irrationed, and soon, till we
reach a concept which, as tb a t of an individual object, i.s, in fact,
not a general coiicojit, b ut only in jlropriety a singular representa
tion.
Thus, it is manifest, that, as Definition is the analysis o f a complex
concept into its com pon ent parts or attributes.
T h e Ind el iii ab le nnd -n , i . i
if a concept bc simple, tb a t is, if it contain in it
I n d iv i s ib l e . * '
only a single attribute, it m ust be indefinable;
and again, th a t as Division is the analysis of a h igher or more g e n
eral concept into others low er and lc*ss general, if a conccjit bc an
iudivi(bi:il, th at is, only a bniidie of individual qualities, it is ind i
visible*, is, ill fact, not a ]iropcr or abstract concept at all, b u t oi iv a
concrete rcjireseiitatioii of Im agination.
108 LOGIC. L ect. V III.
D ia g ra m re p re s e n t T h e folloAving Di.agrnra' represents B rea d th

in g E x te n sio n an d
and Dejith, Avitli tlie rehitions o f Affirmation and
C onip n -tieiision of
C oncepts. N e g a tion to tlicse quantities.
S chem es o f th e T avo Q u a n titie s .
L in e o f Breadth. A f f . N eg.
B. D.
li
A A A A A A
vi. 1.
E E E E E \E
V. 2.
I I I I 1^
iv. 3.
O 0 0
iii. 4.
ii. 5.
U U I
Y \Y
i. G.
#4
Ph
Ground o f Reality.
In the p re c e d in g T a b le th ere are rep resen te d : b y A, A, etc.,

t lie h i g h e s t g e n u s o r A videst a t t r i b u t e ; b y Y , t h e
E x p la n a tio n .
lo w est sp e c ie s or n arrow est a ttrib u te ; A viiils t
th e o th e r fo u r h o riz o n ta l s e r i e s o f voA vels t y p i f y t h e s u b a l t e r n g e n
era and sp e c ie s, o r the in te rm e d ia te attrib u tes. The vowels are
reserved e .v c lu s iv e ly fo r c la s se s , o r c o m m o n q u a l i t i e s ; A vhereas t h e
consonants z, z ', z " ( a n d A vhich, t o r e n d e r t h e c o n t r a s t m o r e o b t r u
s iv e, are n o t c a jh ta ls) reitresen t in d iv id u a ls, or sin g u lars. Every
h ig h e r cla ss o r m o r e c o m m o n a t t r i b u t e is s u p p o s e d (in c o n f o r m i t y
Avith l o g i c a l j i r c c i s i o n ) t o b e d i c h o t o m i z e d , t o b e d i v i d e d i n t o t w o
by a lo w e r cla ss or attrib u te, and its co n trad icto ry or n eg ative.
T h is co n trad icto ry, o f Avliich o n l y the com m encem ent ap jie .ars, is
m arked by ;m i t a l i c voA vel, j i r e c e d e d b y a jie rp e n d ic iih ir lin e ( | )
sig n ify in g not or non, an d a n a lo g o u s to th e m in u s ( ) o f the m ath
em atician s. I'h is b e in g u n d e rsto o d , tho tab le at o n c e e x h ib its th e
real id en tity and rational d i f f e r e n c e s o f B r e a d t h a n d D e p t h , Avhich,
th o ugh d e n o m in a te d quantities, a r e , in reality, on e and the sam e
q u a n t i t y , v i c A v c d in c o u n t e r r e l a t i o n s a n d f r o m o p p o s i t e e n d s . N oth
i n g is t h e o n e , w h i c h is not p ro tanto, t h e o t h e r .
In Breadth.: th e su p rem e g e n n s (A, A, e t c . ) is, as it a p p e a rs , ab so -
1 T h e D ia g ra m a n d re la tiv e te x t to en d o f L e c tu re a re e x tra c te d b y th e E d ito rs fro m th e

A u th o r s Discussions, p . 6 9 9 7 0 1 . E d .
L ect, V m . LOGIC. 109
lately the g rea test w hole; an individual (z) absolutely th e smallest

p a r t ; whereas the in te rm edia te classes are each o f th e m a relative
]iart or species, hy reference to th e class an d classes ahove i t ; a
relative whole or genns, hy reference to th e class or classes helow
it. In Dep>th: the individual is ahsolntely the g re a te st whole, the
highest genns is ahsolntely the smallest jiart; w hilst ev e ry relatively
low er class or species, is relatively a g re a te r whole th a n the class,
classes, or genera, ahove it. T h e tw o quantities are thus, as the
diagram represents, jirecisely th e inverse o f each other. T h e grea ter
the B readth , the less the Dejith ; the g rea ter the D ep th , th e less the
B rea d th ; and each, within itself, affording the correlative dilferonces
o f Avhole and part, each, therefore, in opposite resjiects, contains and
is contained. B ut, for distinctions sake, it is here convenient to
employ a difference, n o t a ltog ether arbitrary, of expression. W e
should sa y : cont.aining and contained u n d e r f for B r e a d t h ;
containing and contained i n f for D ep th . T his distinction, which
has been taken by some m odern logician,?, though u n kn ow n to m any
o f them, was n ot observed hy A ristotle. W e find him (to say n o th
ing of o the r ancient logicians) using the expression iv dXw eTvat or
virdpxctv, for either whole. T h o u g h different in th e order o f thought,
(ratioiie), the tw o quantities are identical in the n atu re of things,
{re). E:ich snjiposcs the o th e r ; and B rea d th is n o t more to be dis
tinguished from Dejith, than the rehitions of the sides, from the rela
tions o f the angles, o f a triangle. In effect it is precisely the same
reasoning, w h eth e r w e argue in D e p t h , z' is { i.e . as subject,
contains in it the in h e re n t attrib u te) some Y ; all Y is some U ; all
U is some O ; all O is some I ; all I is some E ; all E is some A ;
therefore, z' is some A : or w h e th e r we argue in B rea d th , Some
A is (i. e. as cl.ass, eont.ains under it th e subject part) all E ; some
E is all I ; some I is all O ; solne 0 is all U ; some U is all Y ; some
Y is z ' ; therefore, some A is z'. T h e tw o reasonings, internally
identical, are exteiaially the converse o f each o th e r ; the premise
and term , which in B rea d th is m.ajor, in D e p th is minor. In syllo
gisms also, w here the contrast of the tw o quantities is abolished,
there, with difference of figure, the differences o f m ajor and m inor
jiremise and te rm fall likewise. In truth, however, common lan
guage in its enonn cem ent of jiropositions, is here pcrliajis more cor
rect and jihilosojihical than the technical language o f logic itself.
F o r as it is only an equation only an affirmation o f id en tity o\
its negation, which is, in cither quantity, projiosed ; therefore the
siihst:mtive verb {is, is not), used in hoth cases, sjicaks more accu
rately, than the cxjircssidii, contained (or not contained), in of the
one, contained (or not contained), under of the other. In fact, the
110 LOGIC. L e c t . V IIL
tiro qiuuititics ami the tico quantifications have by logicians been

neglected togd/ier.
T his T able (the principle o f which becomes m ore palpably d e m
onstrative w hen the parts of the table are tu rned into the jiarts of a
circular m a chine*) c.xhibits all the m utual relations of the counter
q u a n titie s . 1, I t represents the classes, as a series of resemblances
thou ght as one (b y a repetition of the same le tte r in tlie same
series), bnt as really d istinct (by separating lines). Thus, A is only
not A, A, A, etc.; some A nim al is not some A n im a l; one class
of A nim als is not all, every, or an y o th e r ; this A nim al i.s not t h a t;
Socrates is not P la to ; z is n o t z'. On tbe o the r hand, K is E A ;
and V is Y U 0 I E A ; every lower and higher le tte r in the series
coalescing n n in te rn ip te d ly into a series of reciprocal subjects and
]>redicates, as slioAvn by the absence of all discrim inating lines.
T im s Socrates (z') is A thenian (Y ), G reek ( P ) , E uropean (O), ]Man
(I), Ylammal ( E ) , A nimal (A). O f course the series m ust be in
gram m atical and logical harinony. ^Ye m ust n o t collate notions
abstract and notions concrete. 2, T h e T able shows the inverse
correlation of the two quantities in respect of am ount. F o r ex a m
ple : (/. c. A, A, etc.), the highest genus rep resented as having six
times the Breadtli of Y ; Avhilst Y (;'. e. Y A ), the lowest sjiecies,
has six tim es the D e p th of A .- r- 3 , l*he table manifests all the
classes, as in themselves unreal, subjective, ideal ; for these are
merely fictions or artifices o f the mind, for th e convenience of th in k
ing. U iiiversals only exist in nature, as the y cease to be universal
in th o u g h t ; th a t is, th e y are reduced from general and abstract
attrib u tes to individual and concrete qualities. A Y are only truly
objective as d istributed through z, z', z", etc.; and in th a t ease tliey
are not univcrsals. ^\s Boethius expresses it : Omiie quod est, eo
quod est, siiigiilare e.st. 4, T h e opposition of class to class,
th rough eonlrailictory attributes, is ilistinguislicd by lines dificrent
from tliose m a rk in g tbe separation of one part of the same class
from another, rims, Animal, or Sentieiitly-orgaiiized (A), is con-
tr.'isteil with Xot-anim.'il, or Xot-sentieiitly-organizcd ( | ^1), b y lin e s
tliieker tlian those which merely discriminate one animal ( .\) from
anotlier (A).
I A m a ch in o o f lliih kinfi wan ('o n sirn ctefl 2 e e fu r tlie r in D iscussions, p . 701 et s e q .

by (fie A iitlio r . an d u-c<l in llic c la ?-room to Ed.
illu -t r a le th e d o c lr in e o f th e t e x t . E d .
L E C T U R E IX.
S E C T IO N II. OF T H E PRODUCTS OF THOUGHT
I. E N X O E M A T I C .
B. OE CONCEPTS IN S P E C IA L . II. T I I E I R S U B JE C T IV E RELA

T IO N Q U A L IT Y .
H a v i n g concluded the consideration o f th e relation o f con cep ts

to their objects, the relation in w h ich their
R e la tio n o f C o n c e p ts Q n a n titv is given, I noM' proceed to consider
t o t h e ir su b je ct. ^ , . . . , . ,
their relation to their conceiving subject the
relation iu Avhich is given their Quality. This consideration of the
quality of concepts does not, in m y opinion, belong to th e D octrine
of Elem ents, and ought, in scientific rigor, to be ad jo urned alto
g e th e r to th e l\rethodology, as a A'irtue or perfection o f th ought.
A s logicians, hoAvever, have generally tre a te d of it likcAvise u ndei
the former doctrine, I shall do so too, and com mence Avith the fol-
loAving paragraph.
*[[ X X V I I . A concept or notion is the unity in conscious

ness of a certain plurality of attributes, and
consequently, supposes the pow er of
e ou aiatB In i t s l o g ic a l th inking thcsc, both sejiarately and to-
p e r f e e t io n o r im p e r - ojether. B u t as thcrc are inanv gradations
f e c t io n . p . . .
in the consciousness with Avhich th e charac
ters of a concept can he th o n g h t severally and in conjunction,
there Avill consequently be m any gradations in the actual P e r
fection or Imperfection of a notion. I t is this perfection or
imperfection Avhich constitutes th e logical Q uality o f a con
cept.'
k
I t is thus the gOreater or smaller degree
^ o f consciousness Avhich
accompanies the concept and its object, th a t determ ines its quality,
1 K r u g , L o g ik , J 30. C f. E sse r , L o g ik . 45 et seq. E d .

112 LOGI C. L ect . IX.
.mil according to wliicli it is called logic:iily jicrfect or logically

imi'crfect. Now , there may he distingnislicd two degrees of this
loLjical jicrfcction, the n ature o f which is sum m arily expressed in the
t'ollowing paragrajih.
*i\ X X V I I 1. T h ere :ire tw o degrees of

Par. X XVIII. The tJig l o g i f a l perfection of concepts, viz.,
ireicaTpIrfectou Ind Cleumess aiid tlicir aiid.

I m p e r f e c t i o n o f Con- C O U S C q n e il t ly , tWO Opj lOsitC d c g r C C S o f tlicil'
oo p ts , t h e i r Cle ar- . n ,
ness and D istinct. eo rres))o n d in g im iierfeetio n , v iz ., th eir
n e s s , a n d t h e i r Ob- Obscuritij aiid tlicii' Imlistinctness. T h ese
scurity and India- p .. . , i
tinctness toiir qiiafitics cxpi'css the iiei-iection and im
perfection of concepts in extremes. B u t
hetween these extrem es there lie an indefinite n n m h e r of in te r
mediate degrees.
A c o n c e p t is s : iid t o h e clear {clarei), w h e n t h e d e g r e e o f
c o iiM -io n s u e s s is s n c h a s e n a h l e s u s to d is t in g u is h it as a w h o le
from oth ers ; and obscure {obscura), w hen th e d eg ree o f eon-
s c i o n s n e s s is i n s n f l i e l e n t t o a c c o m p l i s h th is. A c o n c e j i t is sa id
to he distinct [distincta, perspicuu), w hen th e degree o f con-
h c i o n s u e s s is s n c h a s e n a h l e s n s t c d i s c r i m i n a t e f r o m e a c h o t h e r
th e several c lia ia eters, or c o n s titu e n t p arts o f w h ic h th e con
c e p t is t h e s u m ; a n d indistinct or confused {indistincta, con-
f u s a , imperspicua), w h e n th e a m o u n t o f c o n sc io u sn e ss req u isite
fur t h i s is w a n t i n g . Confused {confusa), m a y h c e m p l o y e d as
th e g e n n s in c lu d in g obscure a n d in distin c t}
T h e expressions clearness and obscurity, and distinctness and

indistinctness, as apjilied to concejits, originally
ori^Mnai application dciiotc cci taiii modifications of v is io n ; from
of ii.c expressions aiiaiogically e x t e n d e d .t o the
rUarness, obsciirilij, clc. . . . 1
iiiusirat.d by re fe r - sciisc.s, to imagination, and finally to
ence to vision. tho u g h t. I t niay, therefore, cuahlc us th e hotter
to coinprelieiul tlieir secondary apjilication, to
ctmsider th eir jnim itivc. T o Leihnitz we owe th e precise distinc
tion o f concepts into clear and distinct, and from him I borrow the
followin' 4: illustration. In darkness the comiilete obscurity of
night wc sec nothing, there is no jiercejition, no discrimina-
I f f i q a r c K m ;;, 31 a s f j . K u. Essais, Ij ii. cl), x x ix . T lie illu sfra lio n , bow-

.1 i-f e . I.rgir iir. 31.7 >1 sty K a iil, Kr. t]. ever, (locK not occur in eiflier of lliese pas-
r ' / . I ., i; I i l l ' I l i a ., a rl. i., )). 4 11,3 (1 sa-es. It was jirobably borrowed from K rug,
<d Kfi . L ogik. 81, and attributed lo L e ib n ilz by an
; !.i ,1." / o ' o n tt i/r Cognitioof, Vuilote, oversigbt Hu.
tl I In s Optra, ed. E rd m a n n , p. 7b), N ouvtaux
L k c t. IX. LOGIC. 110
tion o f objects. A s th e lig h t dawns, the obscurity diiuiiiishes, tbc

leep and nniforin sensation" o f darkness is modified, w e are co n
scious o f a change, w e see som ething, luit are still unable to
distinguish its features, w e know not w hat it is. As the light
increases, the outlines o f w holes begin to ajipcu.r, but still not with
a distinctness sufficient to alloM' ns to perceive them com p letely ;
but when this is rendered possible, by the rising in len sity o f the
light, w e are then said to see clearly. W e then recognize m oun
tains, plains, houses, trees, animals, etc., that is, w e discriminate
these objects as whole.s, as unities, from each other. B u t their
])arts, the manifold o f Avhich these unities are the sum, their
parts still lose them selves in each other, tliey are still bnt indis
tin ctly visible. At length, w h en the d ay ligh t has fully sprung, we
are enabled lik ew ise to discrim inate tlieir parts; avc iioav see dis
tinctly w hat lies around ns. B u t still Ave see as yet only the whole.s
Avhich lie p roxim ately around us, and o f these o n ly the parts Avhich
possess a certain size. T h e more distant Avholes, and th e smaller
parts o f nearer Avholcs, are still seen by us only in tlieir conjoint
result, on ly as th ey concur in m a k in g up that w h ole which is for ns
a visible minim um. T h u s it is, that in the distant forest, or on the
distant hill, Ave perceive a green surface ; but Ave see not th e several
leaves, w h ich in the one, nor the several blades o f grass, Avbich in
the other, each contributes its effect to produce tliat aiiioniit o f
impression Avliich our consciousness requires. T im s it is, that all
Avhich w e do perceive is made up o f parts Avhich Ave do n o t perceive,
and consciousness is it s e lf a con q d c m e n t o f impressions, Avhicli lie
b eyo n d its apprcbension.' Clearness and distinctness are thus only
relative. F o r betAveen the ex tr em e o f obscurity and tb e extrem e
o f distinctness, there are in vision an infinity o f in term ediate d e
grees. N oav, the same th in g occurs in tbouglit. F o r Ave m ay either
be conscious on ly o f the con cep t in general, or Ave may also be con
scious o f its various co nstituen t attribute.s, or both th e con cep t and
its parts may be lost in th em selv es to consciousness, and on ly recog
nized to exist by effects Avliich indirectly e vid en ce their existence.
T h e perfection of a notion, as I said, is contained in tAvo degrees
or in tAvo virtues, viz., in its clearness and in it.s
C learness an d ob- d istin c tn e s s ; and, of course, the opposite vices
s c u r i t y as i n c o n c e p t s . _ . . . . ;
of obscurity and indistinctness afford two d e
grees or two vices, constituting its imperfection. A concept is
said to be clear, avIicu the degree of consciousness by Avliicli it is
accompanied is siitHcient to discriiiiiiiate Avliat avc tbiiik in and
through it, from Avhat Ave think in and th rough o th e r notion s;
1 S e e L e c tu r e s on M e ta p h y s ic s , p . 241 e t s e q . E d .
15
114 LOGIC. L e c t . IX.
whereas i f the d eg ree o f consciousness be so remiss th at this and

other concejits run into each other, in tliat case the notion is said to
he obdoio'C. It is ev id en t that clearness and obscurity a d m it o f
various d e g r e e s ; each b ein g capable o f alm ost infinite gradations,
according as the object o f the notion is discriminated with greater
or less vivacity or jirccision from the objects o f other notions. A
con cept is absolutely dear, Avhcn its object is
The iibsoiiiteiy clear d istinguished fi'oiii all other o b j e c t s ; a coiieejit
and absolutely ob- , i . . . ,
IS absolutely obscure, w hen its object can be
distingui.shed from no o th e r objecl. B u t it is
only the absolutely clear and the absolutely obscure which stand
jpposed as contradictory c.xtrcines; for the same notion can at
once be relatively or com paratively clear, and relatively or com
paratively ob.senre. A bsolutely obscure notions, th a t is, concepts
whose objects can be distingui.shed from n o thing else, exist on ly in
th e o r y ; an absolutely obscure notion being, in faet, no notion at
all. F o r it i.s of the very essence o f a concejit, th a t its object
shduhl, to a certain degree at least, be com jirehended in its jieciiliar,,
conseijucntly, iu its distinguishing, characteristics. But, on th e
other hand, o f notions absolutely clear, th a t is, notions Avhose
objects cann ot possibly be contoiinded with a u g h t else, w h ether
know n or u n k now n , o f sneh notions a lim ited intelligence is jjos-
sessed o f very few, and, consequently, our h nm a n concejits are,
projierly, only a m ix tu re o f th e ojiposite qualities; clear or obscure
as ajiplied lo them, m eaning only th a t the one quality or the other
is the jirejionderant. In a logical relation, the illustration of notions
consists ill tho rai.'îng them from a jireponderant obscurity to a jire-
jionderaiit clearness or from a low er degree to a higher. ' So
much foi- the (piality o f cleaine.ss or obscurity consiilered in itself.
rim mMincm.*a,.d t'oneejil m ay be either Di.stinct or
iiidi.-iiiiciji(2i of r on- Iiid is tiiif t; the distinctness and indistinctness
='1'' o f concejits are therefore to be con.sidereil ajiart
from their clc/irness and obscurity.
Blit before e ntering njion the nature of the distinction itsellj I
may observe th a t we owe the diserimination of
iiiMorirai noiic- ..f .j^.j I,listiiict from Clear and Obscure
thifi d i i U i i i c l l o n . . _ .
Due lo imibnitz notions to llic acuteness of the g rea t Leibnitz.
B y the Carte.sians the distiiiclioii had not been
taken ; thoiiuh the .anthors o f the JLn'f. Jloyal J.,oylc come so near,
that wc may avcII marvel how th e y failed exjilicitly to enoiinee it.
I K - t r, J p. 9 1 .f i 2 . [ I x i g i k , [ 4 0 Ki> ] Depcarlcs and L e i b n i t z , f e e Ilie A p p e n d i x to

P a rt I cl i . i x T o r a e o i n j ari- rui r>f iliig Mr. P . a y n e s s t r a n f l a l i o n o f t l i e P o rt R o ya l
fi t; o e n t of tl.e d i.(iiiclion w ith tliO"e o f /. og /lt , p. 42.3 ( f e c o n d e d i t i o n ) . E u
L e c t . IX . L O G IC . l l o
Tliough Locke jiublislied liis E s s a g Concerning H u m a n Under-

^ ^ standing .some five ye.-lrs subsequent to tlie paper
in which Leibnitz then a very youiig man
had, am ong o the r valuable observations, prom ulgated this distinc
tion, Locke did n ot advance beyond the limit already rt'ached by
the C artesians; indeed, the praises th a t are so freiinently lavished
on this philosojiher for his doctrine concerning the distinctions of
Ideas, the conditions o f Delinitioii, etc., only prove th a t his
encomiasts are ignorant of w hat had been done, and, in m any re
spects, far b e tte r done, by D escartes and his s c h o o l; in fict, with
regard to the Cartesii'in Philosojihy in general, it m ust be confessed,
th a t Locke has m any errors to exjiiate, arising p artly from oversight,
and jiartly from the most unaccountable misajqireliensioii o f its doc
trines, I t is almost needless to say, th a t those who, in this country,
have w ritte n on this subject, jiosterior to Locke, have n ot advanced
a stej) beyond h i m ; for though Leibnitz be often m entioned, and
even occasionally quoted, by onr British jihilosojibers, I am aware
b f none who possessed a system atic acquaintance w ith his jihiloso-
phy, and, I m ight almost say, who w ere even superficially versed
either in his own Avritings or in those of-any o f the illustrious th in k
ers of his school.
B u t to consider the distinction in itself. W e have seen that a
concejit is clear, Avlien Ave are able to recognize
Ib e d istin ctio n in it ns difterent frotii Other conccpts. B u t we may
discriminate a Avhole from other Avholes, a v c may
discriminate a concept from other concejits, th ou gh a v c have only a
confused knoAvIedge o f the parts o f Avhich that Avholc, or of the
characters o f Avhich that eoncejit, is made nji. T his m a y be illus
trated b y the analogy o f our P ercejitiv e and
Illu strated ' b y tbe R ep resentative Faculties. W c arc all acquainted
an alojry o f P e r c e p t io n i v i i *
,5
and Pep resen lation.
With iminv, sav . ;i thousand, individu als; tliat is,
we recognize such and sucli a cou n ten an ce as
the coiintenauee o f John, and as not the coiintenanec o f James.
T homas, Ricliard, or any o f the other 'J09. Tliis we do Avith a clear
and certain knoAvledge. B u t tlie connteiiances, which w e thus dis
tinguish from each other, are, each o f them, a c om p lem en t made up
o f a urea.t nmnbcr o f sejiarate traits o f features; and it might, at
first vicAV, be sujijiosed that, as a whole is on ly the sum o f its parts,
a clear coe-nitioii o f a Avhole co un tenance can o n ly be realized
throuu:b a distinct k n o w led g e o f each o f its con stituent features.
B u t the slightest consideration Avill prove that this is n o t the case,
F o r hoAV -fcAV o f us are able to say o f any, the most familiar face,
wliat are the particular trait.s which g o to form the general result;
IIG LOGIC. L ect. IX.
and y e t , on tlin t a c c o u n t , w e Iicsitatc n e i t h e r in regard t o onr o w n

k n ow led ge o f an in d iv id n n l, no r in r e g im l t o th e k n o w l e d g e p o s
se ss ed h y othe r s. Su])]iose a witne.ss he a d d u c e d
T li e j u d i c i a l d e t e r - . ^ ,i . i .
m iu a .io u I.c tw e e n life J" co iirt o fJ u s tic c to p ro v c th e id e n tity o r UOU-
aiid doaih fupposes i d e n t i t y o f a certain in d iv i d u a l w i t h t h e perpc-

tiie diiierencc bctweei) ti'ntor o f a Certain Crime, th e e o im n is s io n o f
a clear mid distinct i i i i i i i i i i
, , . w in c h he liad c lin n ee d to see, w o u ld t h e c onn-
k now lcdge
sel h e a l l o w e d to i n v a l id a t e t h e c i-edihility o f th e
w i t n e s s h y , first o f all, r e q n i i i n g h i m to sjiccify t h e v a r io u s e l e m e n t s
o f w h ic h th e to ta l l i k e n e s s o f t h e a c c u s e d Avas c o m p o u n d e d , and
t h e n h y s h o w i n g that, as t h e Avitness c it h e r c o u ld n o t s p e c i f y th e
>evei-al ti'aits, or sjiccified Avhat did n o t a g r e e Avitli t h e fe a tu re s o f
th e a c c u s e d , h e Avas, th e r e fo r e , i n c o m p e t e n t to jirove t h e i d e n t i t y or
n on -id en tity required? T h i s Avoiild n o t h c a l lo w e d . Pfor t h e co u r t
Avonld h o ld t h a t a m a n m i g h t h a v e a c le a r jie r c c p t io n a nd a c lear
r e jir e se n ta tio n o f a fa ce and figure, o f Avhich, h o w e v e r , h e h a d n o t
>e])arately c o n s i d e r e d , a nd c o u l d n o t se jia ra te lv i m a g e t o him self,
th e e o n s t i t n e n t e le m e n t s . T hu s, even the ju d ic ia l determ ination o f
life am i d e a t h su pjioses, as real, t h e dill'eie n c e h e t w e e n a c le a r a nd
a d i s t i n c t knoAvledc'C : for a d i k i n c t k n o w l e d g e l ie s in t h e k n o w l -
edire <if t h e e o n s t i t n e n t jiarts; w h il e a cleai- k n o w l e d g e i.s o n l y o f
t h e c o n s t i t u t e d Avhole.
C o n t i n n i n g on r illu str a tio n s from th e h u m a n c o n n te n a n c c : avc
all h a v e a clea r k n o w le tlg e o f a n y f a c e A vliich avc
F iirllier illu str a tio n ],;^ v c .SOCII, h i l t feW o f US h a v C d istillC t k lio w l-

f i o l i i t h e t i u iu a i i c u u i i - , , . , , . , p ...
cd L fC ev e n of th o se A vith w i n c h Ave a r e la m ilia r ;
teuaiicc. ^
hilt the jiaiiiter, Avho, having looked iqioii a
connlenance. can retire and rcjirodnce its likeness in detail, has
necessarily hoth a clear and a distinct know ledge o f it. X'ow, w hat
is thus the c.-ise with jiercejilions ;nid representations, is equally the
ease with notions. \Ve may hc nhlc clearly to discriminate one
concept from an ither, allhoiigli the degree of eonseirmsness does
not eii.-ihle IIS disiiiietly to <liseriminate the varion.s co m p onen t char
acters of either eonee]il from each other. T h e Clearness and the
Distinctness o f a iiol.ioii are thus not the sa m e; the former involves
merely the jmw er o f distingni.shing the total ohjects o f onr notions
from each o th e r; the l.atter involves t h o j i o w e r o f di.stingiiisliiiig the
several characters, the several attrihntes, o f Avliicli th a t ohject is
the .Sinn. In the former the unity, in the la tte r the mnltijilicity,
<if the notion is c.alletl into relief.
T h e distinctness o f a cfuicept snpjtoses, however, the Clearness;
an<l may, therefore, hc regan led as a higher degree o f the same
quality or jiei'fectioii. T o th e distinctness of a notion, over ami
L ect. IX . LOGIC. 111
above its general clearness, there are required three c o n d itio n s,

1, T h e clear apprehension of its several char-
SpeciaicoiHiitioiisoi- actci's or conipoiieiit jiarts; 2, T h e clear con
C o n ce p t, nnd o f its
trast or discrimination
. .
of tliese;j and,) 3,j T hev-
ii^.recs. c le ar re co g n itio n of the nexus by Avhich t h e
s e v e r a l p a r t s a r e b o u n d uj) i n t o a u n i t y o r w h o l e .
A s t h e c le a r n e s s , so t h e d i s t i n c t n e s s , o f a n o t i o n is s u s c e j i t i b l e
o f m a n y degrees. A c onec qit m a y b e c a l l e d distinct, Avhen i t i n
volves th e a m o u n t o f c o n scio u sn ess re q iu iv d to d isc rim in a te from
e a c h o t h e r i ts p r i n c i j ia l c h a r a c t e r s ; b u t i t is so m u c h t h e m o r e d i s
t i n c t , 1, In j i r o p o r t i o n to th e g r e a te r n u m b e r o f th e characters
a p p r e h e n d e d ; 2, In p ro p c u t i o n t o t h e g r e a t e r c l e a r n e s s o f t h e i r
d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ; a n d , 3, I n p r o p o r t i o n t o t h e j ir e c i s io n Avith Avhich
t h e m o d e o f t h e i r c o n n e c t i o n is r e c o g n i z e d . B u t th e g r e a t e r dis
t i n c t n e s s is n o t e x c l u s i v e l y o r e v e n p r i n c i p a l l y d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e
g r e a t e r n u m b e r o f th e c learly a p p r e h e n d e d c h a r a c te rs ; it d e p e n d s
still m o r e o n t h e i r s u j i e r i o r i n q i o r t a n c e . In jia rtieulai-, i t is o f m o
m e n t A v he ther t h e c h a ra c te rs be p o sitiv e o r n e g a tiv e , in te rn a l or
e x t e r n a l , p e r m a n e n t o r t r a n s i t o r y , j ie c u l i a r o r e o m m o n , e s s e n t i a l oi
a c c id e n tal, o rig in al or d e riv e d . F r o m t h e m e r e c o n s id e i- a tio ii o f t h e
d if f e r e n c e s s u b s i s t i n g betA veen a t t r i b u t e s , t h e r e e m e r g e t h r e e I'ules
t o b e a t t e n d e d t o in bestoA ving on a c o n c e j i t i ts r e q u i s i t e d i s t i n c t
ness, In t h e first p l a c e , Ave s h o u l d e n d e a v o r t o d i s c o v e r t h e jiosi
t i v e c h a r a c t e r s o f t h e o b j e c t c o n c e i v e d ; as i t is o u r jm i-pose t o
k n o w Avhat t h e o b j e c t is, a n d n o t Avhat i t is n o t . W h e n , hoAvever,
as is n o t n n f r e c i n e n t l y t h e c.ase, i t is n o t a t o n c e e a s y t o d i s c o v e r
Avhat t h e j io s i t i v e a t t r i b u t e s a re , o u r e n d e a v o r s h o u l d b e fi r s t d i
re cted to th e d e te c tio n o f th e n e g ativ e ; a n d th is n o t o nly because
i t is a h v a y s a n a d v a n c e in kn oA vle dg e, Avhen Ave a s c e r t a i n AAh a t a n
o b j e c t i.s n o t , b u t , likeAvise, b e e a n s c t h e d i s c o v e r y o f t h e n e g a t i v e
c h a r a c t e r s c o n d u c t s u s t r e q n e n t l y t o a d i s c o v e r y o f t h e j io s it i v e .
I n t h e s e c o n d p l a c e , a m o n g t h e j io s i t i v e q u a l i t i e s Ave s h o u l d s e e k
o u t th e in trin sic a n d jie r m a n e n t before th e e x trin sic a n d t r a n s it o r y ;
for th e fo rm er give ns a jm re r and m ore d e te rm in a te k n o w le d g e o f
a n o b j e c t , t h o u g h t h i s o b j e c t m a y likcAvise, a t t h e s a m e t i m e , jir e -
s e n t m a n y e x te rn a l re la tio n s a n d m u ta b le m o d ifications. Am ong
t h e p e r m a n e n t a t t r i b u t e s , t h e ' j u ^ p e r o r p e c u l i a r a l w a y s m e r i t a
preferen ce, if for no othei' reason, b e c a u se t h r o u g h th e m , a n d n o t
t h r o u g h th e c o m m o n qu alities, can th e jiro p e r o r jie e u liar n a tu r e of
t h e o l ij e c t b e c o m e knoAvn t o us.
In the third jilaec, am ong the jierm anent characters we ough t
first to h u n t o ut the necessary or essential, and then to descend
from them to the contingent or a c c id e n ta l; and this is n o t only
US LOGIC. L e c t. IX
because we tlius give o rd er and eonneetion to our notions, but,

likewise, because the coiitingeiit eliaracter.s are frequ ently only to
be conqirelicnded tlirongli th e neee.ssary.*
Ib it before lea\ ing this p art o f onr snhjeet, it m ay be proper to
illiutrate the distinction o f Clear and D istinct
The di.oiuciion of n o t i o n s 1)V o iic Of t w o c o i i c r c t e cx ani])les. O f
C lc iir iin d D it lin c l n o - . * , , , ^ ^ t .
.
n o u ; )llM>traU'(l
,b y m anv tliiiiifs ^
we have clear but not distinct _ iio-
concreice-xainpies. tioiis. Tliiis, WC liavc a clcar, b u t iiot a distinct.
notion of colors, sounds, tastes, smells, etc. F o r
we arc fully able to distinguish red from white, to distinguish an
acute from a grave note, the voice of a fi-iend from th a t of a str a n
ger, the scent of roses from th a t of onions, the tiavor of sugar from
that o f vin e g ar; b u t by w h at ]>lurality o f scjiarate and eiiuneiable
ebaracters is this discrimination m a d e ? I t is because we are unable
to do this, th a t we cannot describe such jiercejitions and rejiresen-
tatieiis to others.
I f yon ask o f me. says St. A ugustine, w hat is T im e, I kn o w
n o t; if you do uot ask me, I know . W h a t docs this m e a n ?
Simply th a t he had a clear, b u t n ot a distinct, notion o f Time.
O f a triangle we have a clear notion, when we distinguish a tri
angle from (jther figures, w ith o u t specially eousideriiig the charac-
ter!7 which constitute it w hat it is. B u t when we think it as a ]or-
tion o f space Ijoiinded hy three lines, as a figure whose three angles
are eipial to two right angles, etc., then we obtain of it a distinct
concept.
W e now come to the consideration of the question, H o w does
th e DiNtiiietiiess of a concept stand affected by
H o w ( h e f )i hl in c in e .' , . . . ^ , o i g
. .
ol a ( o i ic e pt IS a f l f c l c d
, the tw o (iiiantities
i
of a concept J
and_
in ref-
by Ih.- i w o q u a n i i i i c s erciiee to tliis jioint I would, in the first ]>lace,
o f a ( o i ic e p t. dictate to you the following paragraiih :
X X I X . A s a concept is a jihiralily of characters bound up

into unity, and as tliat jiliirality is contained
Par.XXIX.DiBtinct. paitl} ill its Iiiteiisive, jiartly u n d er its Kx-
n c , in te rn a l an d E x- q u a n t i t y , itS DistillCtl.eSS is, ill liko
te r n a l. _ _
manner, in relation to these f(uantities.
partly an Internal or Intensive, partly an external or E xtensive
Distinctness.
In explanation o f tins, it is to be observed, that, as tbe distinct-

Ill'S of a concept is contained in the clear aiqireliension o f the
1 h-s< r. iM gik. 1 47. i> O.T-9.5. E l). 3 H n ig , L o g ik , ^ 34; E sse r , L o g ik , ( 4 8 .
2 C o n J tS M u n s,x \ c . 14 E u . Ed.
L k c t. JX. L O G IC . 1 19
v a r i o u s a t t r i b u t e s o f A vl iich i t i s t l i e s u m , a s i t i s t h e s u m o f t h e s e
a ttrib u tes in tw o o p p o site relatio n s, w h ich con-
K xplicalion. . . n , i
stitute, in fact, tw o opposite qiiaiititie.s or w holes,
and as these wdioles are severally e.ipahlo o f illustration hy analysis,
it follow's, th a t each ot these analyses will contribute its jiecnliai-
share to th e general distinctness o f the concept. Tlins, if the dis
tinctness o f a notion hears reference to th a t plurality wliieh consti
tutes its comprehension, in other words, to th a t wliicli is contained
in th e concei)t, the distinctness is denom inated an internal or in
tensive distinctness, or distinctiiess'o f comprehension. On the other
hand, if the distinctness refers to th a t plurality wdiieh constitutes
the extension o f the notion, in o th e r words, to wdiat is contained
under it, in th a t case, the distinctness is called an external or exten
sive distinctness, a distinctness o f extension. I t is only when a
notion combines in it hotli of tliese sjjeeies o f <listinctness, it is only
when its parts have heen analyzed in reference to the tA VO q u an
tities, th a t it reaches the highest degree o f distinctness and o f ]>er-
fection.
T h e I n t e r n a l D i s t i n c t n e s s o f a n o t i o n is a c c o m p l i s h e d h y E x p o s i
tion o r D e f i n i t i o n , t h a t is, h y t h e e i i n m e r a t i o i i
Defiuition an d D iv i- c h a ra c te rs o r p artial n o tio n s c o n ta in e d in
i t ; th e E x t e r n a l D is tin c tn e s s , a g a in , o f a n o tio n
is acco m p lish e d throu gh D iA 'ision , t h a t is , t h r o u g h the enum er
a tion o f th e o h je c ts w h ic h are c o n ta in e d u n d e r it. Thus the con
cept m a n is r e n d e r e d in te n siv e ly m ore d i s t i n c t , A vh en Ave d e c l a r e
t h a t m a n is n rational a n im a l ; i t is r e n d e r e d e x t e n s i v e l y m o r e d i s
t i n c t , Avlien Ave d e c l a r e t h a t m a n i s p a r t l y male, -[xw-xXy femede m a i k
In t h e f o r m e r c a s e , Ave r e s o l v e the concept m an in to its se v e ra l
c h a r a c t e r s , in t o its p a r t i a l o r c o n s t i t u e n t a t t r i h n t e s ; in t h e la t t e r ,
Ave r e s o l v e i t i n t o i t s s n h o r d i n a t e c o n c e p t s , o r i n f e r i o r g e n e r a . In
sim ])le n o t io n s , t h e r e is t h u s p o ssib le an e x te n -
sim p ie notions ad- s i v e , h u t i i o t a i l i n t e n s i v e , d i s t i n c t n e s s ; in i n d i -
m it o f an exten siv e , y id iia l iiotion s, t h e r e is p o ssib le an in te n siv e ,
individual n otions o f , , v m i .1
an in te n siv e , d istin ct- ^nt iiot an ex tcn sivc, d istin ctn ess. Thus the
ness. concepts existence, green, siceet, etc ., t h o u g h , as
a b so lu te ly or relative ly sim p le , tlieir com pre
h en sio n can n o t be a n aly zed into a n y c o n stitu en t attrib u tes, and th e y
do n o t, tlie r e fo r e , a d m i t o f d e fin itio n ; still it c a n n o t b e said that
t h e y are in e ap ah le o f h e in g re n d e re d m o re d istin ct. F o r do w e not
an alyze tlie p lu r a l it ie s o f w h ic h these con cepts are t h e s u m , Avlien
w e s a y , t h a t e x i s t e n c e i s e i t h e r i d e a l o r r e a l , t h a t g r e e n is a y e l l o w i s h
1 K r u g , p. 9 5, [L o g ik , 3 4 . E d . ] 2 Esser, L o g i k , 4 8. E d .
120 LOGIC. L e c t . IX.
o r a b l u i s h g i o e n , t h a t s w e e t is a p u n g e n t o r a m a w k i s h SM cet?
a n d d o w e n o t , b y t liis a n a l y s i s , a t t a i n a g r e a t e r d e g r e e o f lo g ic a l
p e r f e c t i o n , t h a n w h e n w e t h i n k t h e m o n l y c le a r l y a n d as w h o l e s ? '
A c o n c e j i t , h a s , t h e r e f o r e , a t t a i n e d its h i g h e s t
T h e h ig iK st p o in t of p o i n t o f d i s t i n c t n e s s , w h e n t l i e r e is siieli a c o n -
IiL tiiictiies." o f a C o n - . e . i , .,1 i
s c i o ii s n e s s ot i ts c h a r a c t e r s t h a t , in r e n d e r i n g its
co in jireh en sio n d istin c t, w e touch on n o tio n s
w liie h , a s s i m p l e , a d m i t o f n o d e f i n i t i o n , a n d , in r e n d e r i n g i ts e x t e n
sion d i s t i n c t , w e t o u c h o n n o t i o n s Avhich, as i n d i v i d u a l , a d m i t o f n o
u lte rio r div isio n . I t is t r u e , i n d e e d , th.at a d i s t i n c t n e s s o f t h i s
d e g r e e is o n e w h i c h is o n l y i d e a l ; t h a t is, o n e t o w h i e h Ave a re
ahvays a jip ro x im atin g , b u t w hich avc n e v e r a re ab le a c tu a lly to
reach . In o r d e r t o a j i j ir o a c h as n e a r a s p o s s i b l e t o t h i s i d e a l , w e
m u s t a h v a y s i n q u i r e , Avhat is c o n t a i n e d in, a n d w h a t u n d e r , a n o t i o n ,
a n d e n d e a v o r t o o b t a i n a d i s t i n c t c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f i t in b o t h rehi-
tidiis. W h a t , in t h i s r e s e a r c h , f i r s t p r e s e n t s i t s e l f Ave m u s t a g a i n
a n a l y z e aneAA', Avith r e f e r e n c e a l w a y s b o t h t o c o m j i r e h e n s i o n a n d
to e x t e n s i o n ; a n d d e s c e n d i n g f ro m t h e h i g h e r t o t h e loAver, f r o m
t h e g r e a t e r t o t h e less, avc o u g h t t o s t o p o n l y Avhen o u r p r o c e s s is
a r r e s t e d in t h e i n d i v i d u a l o r i n t h e s i m p l e ,
1 K r u g , L o g i k , [ 34, A n m e r k . , i. p p . 9 5 , 96 . E d . ^ K s t e r , L o g i k , 48 , p . 9 6 . K *
L E C T U R E X.
SECTION IT. O F THE PRODUCTS OF TIIOUOHT
I. ENNOEMATIC.
IMPERFECTION OF CONCEPTS.
I t is now necessary to notice an Im perfection to Avhicli concepts

are peculiarly liable, and in tbe exposition of
Im p e rfe c tio n o f C on- i i t z? i ^ i
which 1 nnd it necessary to em ploy an expres
sion, Avhicli, though it has the highest philoso])h-
ical authority for its use, I would still, in consequence of its am biguity
in English, have avoided, if this could have been done w ithout
com prom ising the knoAvledge of Avhat it is in tended to express.
T h e expression I mean, is intuitive, in the .particular significalioii in
which it is used by Leibnitz,* and th e continental philosophers in
general, to den ote w hat is common to our direct an d ostensive
cognition o f individual objects, in Sense or Im ag in ation ( P r e s e n
tation or R epresentation), and in opposition to our indirect and
symbolical cognition o f general objects, through the use of signs or
language, in the U n d ersta n d in g . But, on this head, I would, first
of all, dictate to you th e following paragraph.
IF X X X . As a notion or concept is the fictitious whole or

u nity m ade np of a plurality of attributes,
fe^tTons^^conorpTs" ~ * \ * v h o l c too oftcii o f a Very complex
m ultiplicity; and as this miiltijilicity is only
m entally held together, inasmuch as the concept is fixed and
ratified in a sign or w o rd ; it frequently hajipeiis, th.at, in its
einployment, the Avord does not suggest the Avhole am ou nt of
th o u g h t for Avhich it is th e adequate expression, but, on the
contrary, Ave frequently give and take the sign, either w ith an
1 M editation es de Cognitione, Veritate et Jdeis, Opera, c d . E r d m a n n , p . 80. E d .
IG
122 LOGIC. L ec t. X.
obsciii'c or iiulistiiu't conscionsnoss o f its meaning, or even

w i t h o u t a n a c t u a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s o t i t s s i g n i i i c a l i o n a t all.
This liability to the vices o f Obscurity and In d istinctness aris'es,

1, From the v e i y nature o f a conceiil, which is
iiiurtnition. b in din g u] o f a multi]licity in u n ity ; and
2. F r o m i t s d e j i e n d e n c e U]on l a n g u a g e , a s t h e n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n
o f its existence and stability. In consecpience o f this, when a
n o t i o n is o f a v e r y c o m p l e x a n d h e t e r o g e n e o u s c o m p o s i t i o n , w e a r e
f r e q u e n t l y w o n t t o u s e t h e t e r m b y w h i c h i t is d e n o t e d , w i t h o u t a
clear or distinct consciousness o f the various characters o f which
the notion is t h e s u m ; and t h u s i t is, t h a t w e b e i t h g i v e a n d t a k e
W o r d s w i t h o u t a n y , or, a t l ea s t, w i t h o u t the adequate comjilement
of thought. I m ay exemplify this: Y o u a r e a w a r e , t h a t in c o u n
tries w h e r e b a n k - n o t e s h a v e n o t s u p e rs e d e d t h e use o f t h e precious
m e t : d s , l a r g e ] )ayi nent .s a r e m a d e in b a g s o f m o n e y , j m r i i o r t i n g t o
c o n t a i n a c e r t a i n n u m b e r o f a c e r t : i i n d e n o m i n a t i o n o f c o i n , or , a t
le: i st , a c e r t . a i n a m o u n t i n v a l u e . X o w , t h e s e b.igs are o fte n se aled
Uj) a n d )a>sed f r o m o n e p e r s o n t o a n o t h e r , w i t h o u t t h e t e d i o u s p r o
cess. a t e a c h t r a n s f e r e n c e , o f c o u n t i n g o u t t h e i r c o n t e n t s , a n d this
upon the f a i t h , t h a t , i f e x a m i n e d , t h e y Avill b e f o u n d actu ally to
contain th e n u m b e r o f pieces for w h ic h t h e y are m a r k e d , a n d for
w h i c h t h e y jtass c u n - e n t . In t h i s s t a t e o f m a t t e r s , i t is, h o w e v e r ,
eviilent, t h a t m:iny erro rs or frau d s m a y be c o m m i t t e d , a n d t h a t a
b:'g m a y be g iv e n and taken in p a y m e n t f o r o n e s u m , w h i c h c o n
t a i n s a n o t h e r , o r w h i c h , in f act , m a y n o t e v e n c o n t a i n a n y m o n e y a t
.all. Xow t h e c a s e is s i m i l a r in r e g a n l t o n o t i o n s . A s the sealed
b a g o r ronhsOH t e s t i l i e s t o t h e e n n m e r a l e d s u m , a n d g i v e s u n i t y t o
w h a t Would o t h e r w i s e b e an u n c o n n e c t e d m u l t i t u d e o f jjieces, e a c h
o n l y r c j i r e s e n t i n g its s e jia r a te v a l u e ; so t h e sign o r w o r d jt ro ve s a n d
r a t i l i f s t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a c o n c e p t , t h a t is, i t v o u c h e s t h e t y i n g u)i o f
a cert:iin n u m b e r o f a t t r i b u t e s o r c h a r a c t e r s in a si n g l e c o n c e j i t ,
a t t r i b u t e s w'hich w o u l d o t h e r w i s e e x i s t t o ns o n l y as a m u l t i t u d e o f
separate ami imeonnected representations o f value. So far the
a n a l o g y is m a n i f e s t ; b u t i t i s o n l y g e n e r a l . T h e bag, the g u a ra n
t e e d Mi ni, a n d t h e c o n s t i t u e n t c o i n s , r e j i r e s e n t i n a st i l l m o r e p r o x i -
m. ' i t e m a n n e r t h e t e r m , t h e c o n c e j i t , a n d t h e c o n s t i t u e n t c h a r a c t e r s .
F o r in r eg .ar d t o e a c h , w e m a y d o o n e o f t w o t h i n g s . On the one
h. ' i nd, w e m a y t e s t t h e b a g , t h a t is, o f i e n i t , a n d a s c e r t . a i n t h e a c c u -
n i c y o f it.s s t a t e d v a l u e , b y c o u n t i n g o u t t h e ])i eces w h i c h i t j m r
port.-* t o c o n t a i n ; o r w e m a y a c c e j i t a n d j i a s s t h e b a g , w i t h o u t s u c h
a cntical enum eration. I n t h e o t h e r case, w e m a y t e s t t h e g e n e r a l
t e r m , j i r o v e t h a t i t is v a l i d f o r t h e a m o u n t a n d q u a l i t y o f t h o u g h t o f
L ec t. X. LOGIC. 123
Avhicli it is th e sign, by spreading out in consciousness tlie various

eharaeters of which the conceiit professes to be the coiiqjleiiient; or
we may take and give the term Avithoiit such an evolution,'
I t is evl.leiit li'om this, that notions or concepts are peculiarly
liable to gre t vagueness and ambiguity, and th.at their symbols are
liable to be passed about w ithout the proper kind, or the adeipiute
amount, of thought.
This interesting subject has n o t escaped the observation of the
])hilosophers o f this country, and by them it
T lie lia b ilit y t o iim - Jn f;iet, with g rea t ingenuity been illus-
b ig u ity a , Hi v a g u e n e s s t,..,ted ; b ut US they are apparently ignorant

o l c o n c e p ts n o tic e d b y , ^
t l 's t
B i ii i s h p b iio s o p h e r s . m a tte r Imd, before them, engaged the
attention of su ndry foreign philosophers, by
whom it has been even more ably canvassed and exitoiinded, I
sluill, in the exposition of this jioint, also do ju stice to the illustrious
thinkej's to Avhoin is due the hono r of having originally and most
satisfactorily discussed it.
T he following passage from 3Ir. S te w a rt Avill afford th e best foun
dation for m y subsequent rem a rk s : In the
on section I m e ntioned D r. Caiiqibell as an in
genious defender o f the system of th e N o m in
alists, and I alluded to a jiarticnlar application which he has made
of their doctrine. T he reasonings whieh I had then in view, are to
be found in the seventh chap ter o f the second book of his Bluloso-
i l i y o f lihctoric, in which ch a pte r he proposes to explain liotv it
happens, th a t nonsense so often escapes being d etected both by the
w riter and the reader. T h e title is som ew hat ludicrous in a grave
}ihiloso])hical woi'k, b u t the disipiisition to which it is prefixed, con
tains m any acute and profound rem arks on th e n atu re and jiower
of signs, both as a medium of communication, and as an instrum e nt
of thonght.
Dr. Cam])bells speculations w'ith respect to language as an in
stru m e n t of thou ght, seem to have been sug-
K efers to H u m e . i - ir tt 5
gested b y tlie lo llo A vin g p a s s a g e in J i r . l l n i n e s
Treatise o f Jlinnan N a t u r e : - I b e lie v e e v e r y on e w h o e x a m in e s
tlie s it u a t io n o f h is m in d in r e a s o n i n g , Avill a g r e e W'ith m e , t h a t w e
do n ot an n e x d istin ct and c o n q ile te id e a s to e v e r y term w e n nik e
use o f; and t l i a t in t a l k i n g o f G o v e r n m e n t , C hnreh, N e g o tiatio n ,
C o n q u e st, avc seld o m s jire a d o u t in o u r m in d s all t h e s im j j le id e a s
o f w hieh th ese c o m p le x on es are con q iosed . It i s, h o A v e v e r , o b s e r v
a b l e , t h a t n o t A v i t h s t a i i d i n g t h i s i m p e r f e c t i o n , Ave m a y a v o i d talk in g
1 A h in t o f th is illu s tr a t io n is to be fo u n d in D e g e r a n d o , Ds S ig n es, v o l. i. c h a p . v iii. p

200. E d . 2 B art i. 7. E d .
124 LOGIC. L e c t. X.
nonsense on these subjects, niul may jierceive any repugnance

am ong the ideas, as well as it we bad a full comjireliension of tliem.
riuis if, instead of saying, th a t in w ar tho weaker have always r e
course to negotiation, we should say, th a t th ey have always recourse
to comiucNt ; tiie custom which we have aecpiired, o f attrib u tin g
certain relations to ideas, still follows the words, and inakbs us
imm ediately perceive the absurdity of th a t jirojiosition.
In the remarks which Dr. Campbell lias made on this passage,
he has endeavored to e.xjilain in w hat m anner o ur habits of think in g
:ind speaking gradually establish in the mind such relations am ong
the words we em|>loy, as enable us to carry on jiroeesses of reason
ing by means of them, w ith o u t a tte n d in g in every instance to tlicir
jiarticnlar signification. W i th most of his rem arks on this subject
I jierfcctly ag re e ; b n t the illustrations he gives of them are o f too
grc.-it e.xtent to be introduced here, and I xvonld not wish to run
the risk of im pairing th e ir jiersjiicuity by a t te m p tin g to U'bridge
tlieni. I must, therefore, refer such o f m y readers as wish to pros
ecute the speculation, to his very ingenious and jihilosophical
treatise.
In conser|uence o f these eircumstance.s, says D r. Campbell, it
liaitpens that, in m atters which are perfectly
A :.(l C a m p b e ll. ^ ,, ,
familiar to us, we are able to reason by means
of words, w ith o u t e.vaniining, in e\'ery instance, th e ir signification.
Alm ost all the possible ajiplieatioiis of the term s (in o the r words,
:ill the acf|uired relations o f the signs) have become custoniary to
us. T h e coiisetinence is, th a t an niuisnal apjilicatioii of any te rm
is instantly d e t e c te d ; this detection breeds doubt, and this d oubt
occasions an im m ediate recourse to ideas. Tlie recourse o f ihe
mind, when in any degree puzzled with tho signs, to the know ledge
it has of the things signified, is natural, and on such suhjeets jier-
fectly easy. A nd of this recourse the discovery o f the meaning,
or of the nnnieaniiifrness O o f Aviiat is said,' is the imm ediate effect.
Ibit in niattei's th a t are by no means familiar, or are treated in an
iiiicominon niaimer, and in such as are of an abstruse and intricate
nature, the case is widely different. T h e instances in which a v c
are chiefly liable to be iinjiosed on by AVords A v i t l i o u t meaning, are
(according to Dr. Campbell) the three following:
''First, W h e n tiiere is an e.x'uberance of metaidior.
Sfcfiii(1hi, W h e n the term s m ost fietiueiitly occurring denote
things which arc of a com plicated natnre, :iiid to Avhicli the mind
is not siifliciently familiarized. Such are the word.s Coverniiieiit,
Church, St:ile, Constitution, Ibdity, P ow er, Com merce, Legislature,
Ju n sd ictio n , Pi opoilion, S ym m etry, Elegance.
L k ct. X. LOGIC. 125
Thirdly, 'W hen tlic term s em])loyeil arc very abstract, aiul con
seqiiently of very extensive signification.
'J''lie mure general any word is in its signification, it is the moia
liable to he abused hy an im proper or unm eaning ajiplication. A
very general term is ap])licahlc alike to a m n ltitn de o f difierent
indiviiluals, a p articular term is applicable b u t to a few. W h e n the
rightful applications o f a word arc extrem ely nnmerons, th e y can
not all he so strongly fixed hy hahit, b u t that, for g re a te r security,
Ave must ])erjotnally recur in onr minds from the sign to th e notion
we have of th e th in g signified ; and for the reason aforementioned,
it is in snch instances difticidt jirecisely to ascertJiin this notion.
Tim s the latitude of a word, ihongll different from its amhigiiity,
hath often a similar effect. '
XoAV, on this I would, in th e first jilace, ohserve, th a t th e credit
attributed to I lu m e hy D r. Camjihell and Mr.
L o c k e a n iic ip a ie d Stow art, as having been the first hy AAhoin the
liu n ie in r e m a r k in g observation had been made, is, even in relation
tlie e m p lo v m e n t of t-. i i -i i rr i
to Lritish ].liilosoi.hers, iiot correct. Iliim e has
ter m s w it h o u t d is tin c t
m e a n in g . stated no thing which had not, with equal em

phasis and an equal developm ent, heen jirevi-
ously stated hy Locke, in four different jdaces o f his E s s a y ?
Thus, to take only one out o f at least four jiassages directly to the
same effect, and out of m a n y in wliich the same is evidently m ain
tained, he says, in th e ehajiter e n t i t l e d O f the Abuse o f W ords:
O thers there h( , avIio ex tend this abuse still
L o c k e q u o te d . n . i i t . i i i
f a r t l i e r , Avho t a k e s o l i t t l e c a r e t o l a y h y Avords,
Avhich in t h e i r p r i m a r y n u t a t i o n h a v e s c a r c e a n y c l e a r a n d d i s t i n c t
i d e a s Avliieli t h e y a r e a n n e x e d to, t h a t h y an u n p a r d o n a b l e n e g li
gence they familiarly u s e w o r d s , Avhich t h e j i r o p r i e t y o f l a n g u a g e
h a s fixed t o v e r y i m p o r t a n t idea s, Avithout a n y d i s t i n c t m e a n i n g at
al l. W isdom, glory, grace, e t c . , a r e Avor ds f r e q u e n t e n o u g h in
e v e r y m a n s m o n t h ; h u t if a g reat m a n y of those w h o use them
s h o u l d h o a s k e d Avhat t h e y m e a n h y t h e m , t h e y Avonl d h e a t a s t a n d ,
a n d n o t knoAV w h a t t o a i i s v e r : a j i l ai n j i r o o f , t h a t t l i o i i g h t h e y h a v e
learned those sounds, and have them ready at their t o n g u e s e n d ,
y e t t h e r e a r e n o d e t e r m i n e d i d e a s l ai d iij) i n t h e i r m i n d s , w l i i e h a r e
to he cx|)ressed to o th ers hy tlieni. 3Ien having heen aecnstomed
f r o m t h e i r c r a d l e s t o l e a r n w o r d s , w h i c h a r e e a s i l y g o t a n d r e t a i n e i ,,
b e f o r e t h e y kncAV, o r h a d f r a m e d t h e e o m j i l e x i d e a s l o w h i c h they
Avere a n n e x e d , o r Avhich Avere t o h e f o u n d i n t h e t h i n g s t h e y w e r e
1 E lem en ts, v o l. i ., n V /t.t, v o l. ii. c h n p . iv . - C o m iia r e E ssa tj, B . i i . . c li. x x i i , T; ii..

4. p p 193, 165. x x i x . 9 ; ii. x x x i . 8 ; iii. i.x. 6 ; iii ., x . 2 F,i>
12G LOGIC. L ect. X.
tlio n g h t to stand for, t h e y u s n a l l y c o n t i n u e t o d o s o a ll t h e i r l i v e s ;

nnd w ith o u t t a k i n g t h e jin in s n e c e s s a r y to s e t t l e in t h e i r m i n d s d e
te r m in e d id e a s, tlie v u se th e ir w o r d s for su c h u n s te a d y a n d c o n fu se d
m itiiin s as t h e y liavc, c o n t e n t in g t h e m s e h cs w ith th e s a m e AVords
o tlier p e o p le use: a s i f t h e i r v e r y s o u n d n e c e s s a r i l y c a r r i e d Avith i t
eo n sL a n tly th e sa m e m e a n in g . T h i s , t h o u g h m e n m a k e a s h i f t Avith,
in t h e o r d i n a r y o c c u r r e n c e s o f life, w h o r e t h e y fin d it n e c e s s a r y t o h e
u n d e r s t o o d , ;iiul t h e r e f o r e t l i e y m a k e s ig n s till t h e y are s o ; y e t th is
i n s i g n i f i c a n c y i n t h e i r A v o r d s, A vhen t h e y c o m e t o r e a s o n co iieern in g
e ith er th eir te n e ts or i n t e r e s t , m a n i f e s t l y fills t h e i r d i s c o u r s e w ith
ahnndance o f em pty, iin in tellig ib lo n o is e a n d j a r g o n , esp z'cin lly in
m oral m atters, w h e r e the w ords, for th e m ost jiart, sta n d in g for
a rb itrary a n d n n in c io n s c o lle c t io n s o f id ea s, n o t regu larly and jier-
m a n e n t l y u n i t e d in n a t u r e , t l i e i r b a r e s o u n d s a r e o f t e n o n l y t h o n g h t
on, or at lea st very obscure and u n certa in n o tio n s a nn e.ved to
them . ^ l e n t : i k c t h e w o r d s t h e y f i n d in u s e a m o n g t l i e i r n e i g h b o r s ,
.and t h a t t h e y m a y n o t s e e m i g n o r a n t A v h a t t h e y s t a n d f o r , u s e t h e m
co n fid en tly , w itlio iit m uch tro u b lin g th eir heads about a certain
fixed m e a n in g : A vhereby, b e s i d e s th e ease o f it, t h e y o b ta in th is
a d v a n ta g e , that a s in s u c h d i s c o u r s e s t h e y a r e .s e ld o m in t h e r ig h t ,
so t h e y are as se ld o m t o b e c o n v i n c e d t h a t t h e y a re in t h e w r o n g ; it
b ein g a ll one to go about to draw th ose m en out o f tlieir m is
ta k es, w h o h a v o no settled n o tio n s, as to d i s j i o s s e s s a Aa g r a i i t o f
h is h a ljita tio n w h o has no settled abode. T h is I guess to be s o ;
;m d e v e r y o n e m a y o b s e r v e in h i m s e l f a n d o t h e r s , A v h e t h e r i t b e o r
n o ."
F rom a comparison of this jiassago with those I have given you
from Stew art, Campbell, and Hume, it is manifest that, am ong B r it
ish philosophers, T.ockc is entitled to the whole h o nor of the obser
vation : for it could easily he shown, even from the identity of
expression, ilm t H um e must have bori'owed it from L ocke; and
of H u m e s doctrine the I a v o otlier philosophers profess only to be
expositors.
T his curious and im p o rta n t observation was not, however, first
m ade by ;iny British pliilosojihci-; for Leibnitz
Tlx- (ii"tii)ciioii o f ] , ; , , ] i i r j t only aiiticijiatcd Lockc, in a jniblication
l i i l u i l i v f a n d Sj in lio li- . ,i / i , if i i .1 ^
cal
, ,k i i o w l,c f l,g r ; , ,
li r r t
iiiior
'
t<j the. h ssw L hut aflordc<l
. ,
the most pre-
l a k d . t y Uibiiiiz, i-'isc a n d U n i v e r s a l c x jila n a lio n o f th e p h a m o m e -
non , w h ich has y e t b een g iv e n .
T o him we o a v c the mem orable distinction o f onr knoAvlcdge into
In tu itive and Symbolical, in Avliicli distinction is in volved the exjila-
I Essay concrrning H um nn Undersianding, \ i>\ ii p. 228; [I*. I I I . , ch. X. [[ 3, 4 E d . ]

n a t io n o f th e p lu e n o in e n o n in q u e s t io n . Tt i s t h e cstab lisln n en t o f
th is d is t in c t io n , li k e w i s e , w iiic li has siip ersed etl
This disimction has in G e r m a n y t h e w h o le co n tro v ersy c f llo m in a l-
siipeisetied the eontio- C o n c c p t u a l i s m , w h i c l i , ill c o n s c q u c n c e
xeisj of Nominalism tlic n o n - e s t a b lis lim c n t o f t h is d is t in c t io n , a n d
a n d C o n c e p tu a lis m in
Cennany. the relative in ip erfe ctio ii of our p h ilo so p h ica l
la n g u ag e, has id ly ag ita te d the P sy ch o lo g y of
this c o u n t r y a n d o f F r a n c e .
T h a t th e d o c tr in e s o f L e ib n itz , on th is and o th e r card in al p oin ts
o f jis y c h o lo g y , sh ou ld h a v e rem ain ed a jip a re n lly
Unacqiiaintance of unknown to e v e r y p h ilo s o jih e r o f th is c o u n tr y ,
the phii()Popher.s of ^ m a t t e r n o t le ss o f w o n d e r th a n o f re g r e t,
this country with the ^
doctrines of Leibuiiz <ind is O nly to be excused by the m a n n e r in
which L eibnitz g a v e bis Avritings to tbe world.
H is m o st v a lu a b le th o u gh ts on the m o st im p o rta n t s u b j e c t s Ave re
generally thrown out in short treatises or letters, and these, for a
lo n g t i m e , Ave re t o b e f o u n d o n l y i n p a r t i a l c o l -
.Aranner in which he le c tio iis, a n d s o iu e t im e s to b e la b o r i o u s l y s o u g h t
eax'o his writings to , . . . .
the world <.ispersed as t h e y Averc, in the vtinons scien
tific Journals and Transactions o f ev ery country
o f E u ro p e; and even Avhen his Avorks w ere at length collected, the
attem pt o f his editor to arrange his papers according to tlieir sub
jects (and Avhat subject did L eibnitz n o t discuss?) Avas baffled by
the multifarious nature o f their contents. T h e m ost im portant
o f his philoso]ihicai Avritings his E ssa g s in refutation o f L ocke
were n ot m erely a p osthum ous publication, bnt on ly published
after the collected edition o f his W o r k s b y D n t e n s ; and this trea
tise, even after its publication, Avas so little known in Bi-itain, that
it remained absolutely un k n ow n to Mr. StCAvart (the only British
jiliilosopher, h y tlie way, Avho seem s to have had any acquaintance
Avitli the Avorks o f L eibnitz) until a very recent jieriod o f bis life.
T h e matter, hoAvever, w ith Avhich a v c are at jiresent engaged, Avas
discussed b y L eibnitz in one o f his \mry earliest Avritings ; and in a
paper en titled D e Cognitione, V eritate, et Id eis,
His paper, De Cog. i n i R ] J n tlic A c ta E ru d ito r iin i o f 1G84, w e
n \ t t o n e .,V ( r H n t e .,fl ^ ^
liaA C, in the coinjiass o f tw o quarto pages, all
that has been adva.nced o f jirincipal imjiortance in regard to the
jieculiarity o f our co gn itio ns by concept, and in regard to the dojicn-
dcnce o f our concejits njion langunge. In this jir.j cr, besides est:.b-
lishiiig tlie difference o f Clcar and D istin ct k n o w led ge, lie enounces
the inomerable distinction o f IntiHth e and Svm holical knoAvledge,
a ilistin ctio n not c e rta in ly nnknoAvn to th e la te r jih ilo so jih e rs o f
t h i s c o u n t r y , b u t A vh ic h , f i o n i th c i i - n o t p o . s s e s s i n g t e r m s in A vh ic h j; r c -
12S , LOGIC. L e c t . X.
cisely lo em b od y it, lias a lw ays rem.-iined vague and inapplicable to

comm on use. Speakin g o f tlie analysis o f comple.x notions, he says :
F o r the m ost part, how ever, cspeeially in an
iR'ibiinz qiiotca on nnalvsis o f any length, w e do not v iew at once
1ntniliv o ninl .sviuboi- * . , . . , i i
ical knowledge (iioii siinul iiitucmur) the w h o le characters or
attributes o f the thing, but in jilace o f these we
eiu])loy signs, the explication o f w hich into w hat th ey signify, we arc
wont, at the m om en t o f actual th ou gh t, for the sake o f b revity, to
omit, k n o w in g or b eliev in g that w e have this explication alw ays in
our ]iower. T hus, when I think a chiliogon (or jiolygon o f a th o u
sand equal sides), I do n o t alw ays consider the various attributes,
o f the side, o f the cipi.ality, and o f the number a thousand, but use
these words (w h o se m ea n in g is ob scurely and im perfectly presented
to the mind) in lieu o f n o tio ns which I have o f them , because I
remember, that I possess the signification o f these words, though
their a])plication ami cxjilication I do n ot at present d eem to be
necessary: this kind o f think in g I am used to call H in d or sy m -
holia.d'. w e em p loy it in A lg eb ra and in A rith m etic, but in fact
universally. A n d certainly, w hen the notion is v ery com p lex, we
cannot think at once all the ingredien t n o tio n s: but w here this is
]os.-ilile :it least, inasmuch as it is possible I call the cognition
in tn itire . O f the jjrimary elem en ts o f our notions, th ere is given
no other k n o w led g e th.an the in tu itiv e : as o f our com posite notions,
there is, for the m ost ]iart, ])0 ssible on ly a sym bolical. From these
coiisideratiuns it is also evident, that o f the th ings which w e dis
tinctly k n o w w e are not conscious o f the ideas, exce]it in so far
:is w( em]ih.)y an intuitive cognition. A n d , indeed, it hajipens
that we often falsely b elieve th.at w e have in our mind the ideas
u f th i n g s ; erroneously sujijiosing, th.at certain term s which w e em-
jiluy, had been a])plicd .and explicated ; .and it is not true, at least
it is am biguously ex])rcssed, wh.at som e assert, th.at w e c.annot
sjie.ak cuiiceriiing a n yth iu g, understiim ling what w e s.ay, without
h.aving an idea o f it .actually present. For we fre(|nently ajqily any
kind o f me.ining to the several words, or w e merely recollect iis.
that we have formerly understood them, but because we arc content
with this blind thinking, .ami do not follow out the resolution o f
the notions, it ha]ipeiis, th.at contr.adietions .arc allow ed to lie hid.
w hich percluima* the coiiqiosite notion in volves. . . . J'hus, at
fir-t sir^lit, it must seem, th.at wc could form an idea o f a maximum
velocity (m otus celerrirni), bir in using the terms we umlerst:iml
wh.at we s.ay ; we shall find, however, th.at it is imjiossibh*, for the
notion o f .a rpiickest motion is .shown to be contradictory, and,
tfierefore, inconceivable. L et us supjiose, that a w heel is turned
L e c t. X. LOGIC. 129
with a ve locity absolutely at its m a x im u m ; every one perceives

that i f one o f its spokes be produced, its outer end will be m o v e d
more rapidly th.an the nails in the circumference o f the w h e e l ; the
motion, therefore, o f these is n o t a maximum, which is contrary to
th e hypothesi.s, and, therefore, in volves a contradiction.
T h is quotation will suffice to sh o w you how correctly Leib nitz ap
prehended the nature o f concepts, .as op p o sed to
EflVctof thisdistinc- tlic presentations and representations o f the sub-
tion by Leibiiiiz on sidiary facilities; and the introduction o f the tcn u
tbej.hiiosopiiy of Ger- S ym b o lica l k n o w led g e, to designate the tornier,
many.
and the term In tu itiv e k n o w le d g e to couqireheml
the tw o latter, terms w hich have ever since beco m e classical in his
own country, has b esto w ed on the German la nguage o f jihilosojdiy,
in this respect, a jiower and precision to which that o f uo other nation
can lay claim. In conseq u en ce o f this, w hile the jdiilosophers o f
this country h av e been all alo ng painfully e x p o u n d in g the phamom-
enon as one o f the m ost recondite arcana o f p sych ology, in Germany
it has, for a century and a half, subsided into one o f the e lem en tary
doctrines o f the science o f mind. It was in con seq u ence o f the
establishm ent o f this distinction by Leibnitz, that a peculiar ex p res
sion { l e y r i f f , conceptus) was appropriated to th e sym bolical notions
o f the U n d er stan d in g , in contrast to the in tuitiv e presentations o f
Sen se and representations o f Im agination, which last also were fur
nished with the d istin ctive apjiellations o f in tu itio n s [A n sc h a iu o i-
yen, in tu itu s). Thus it is, that, by a more copious and w ell-ap
pointed language, jihilosophy has, in Germany, been raised above
various controversies, which, merely in c on sequ en ce o f the poi erty
and v ag u eness o f its English nomenclature, have id ly occupied our
speculations. B u t, to return to the mere logical question.-
T h e doctrine o f Leibnitz in regard to this natural im perfection o f
our concejits was not overlooked b y his disciples.
T h e d is iin c tio n np- j y Q ^ ^ passage from the Lesscr
plTof llilfnili! ^ cen tury old, and

which was respectably translated from German
into E nglish in the year 1770. T h is translation is n o w rarely to be met
with, which m ay account for its b eing apjiarently to tally un k n ow n to
our British jihilosophers; and yet, upon the w hole, with all its faults
and inqrcrfpctions, it is perhaps the most valuable work on L o g ic (to
say n oth in g o f the P o r t R o y a l lo g ic ') in the English language.
By A V o rd s, w e u s u a lly m a k e k n o w n o ur
^ ô lfquoted ^ô^d* t h o u g h t s to O thers: and t h u s th e v are n o th in g
or te rm s. w lm l. - , . , . o i i r
but uttered articulate signs ot oiir th o u g h ts tor
the information o f others: for examjde, i f one asks me w h a t I am
17
130 LOGIC. L e c t. X.
think ing of, niul I answer, the s u n ; by this w ord I acquaint liiin
wliat object iny tlionglits are th en cnqtloyed about,
I f t w o jicrso iis, t h e r e f o r e , are t a l k i n g t o g e t h e r , i t i s r e q u i s i t e , in
o r d e r to b e u n d e r s t o o d , first, t b a t lie w h o sp ea k s, sh a ll jo in som e
n o tio n o r in e a iiin g to e a c h w o r d ; s e c o n d ly , t h a t h e w h o h e a r s, shall
jo in th e v e r y sa m e n o tio n th a t th e sp e a k e r d ocs.
C o iise q n e n tly , a certain n otion o r.m e a n in g m u st be connected
w ith , an d t h e re fo re s o m e t h in g h e sig n ifie d b y , e a c h w o r d .
X o w , in o r d e r t o k n o w w h e t h e r w e u n d erstan d w h a t w e speak,
or th a t onr w o r d s are not m ere en q ity sou n d , w e ou gh t, at ev ery
w ord w e utter, to ask o u r selv e s w hat n o tio n or m e a n in g w e jo in
th erew ith .
F o r it is c a r e f u l l y t o b e o b s e r v e d , t h a t w e have n ot alw ay s the
n o tio n o f th e t h in g jiresen t to ns, o r in view .
In fpeaking oriiiink- w l i c i i AVC s p e a k o r th in k o f i t ; but are satisfie d
ng. the mcnning o f im a g in e AVC S u ffic ie n tly u n d e r sta n d
w ords not a lu tiy s ^ ^ ^ ^
attended to. Avliat AVC s p c a l c , i f AVC t l i i i i k Ave r e c o l l e c t tbat
w e have had at another tim e th e n o tio n w h ich
i s t o h e j o i n e d t o t h i s o r t h e o t h e r Avord ; a n d t h u s Ave r e j i r e s c n t to
o u rse lv e s, as at a d istan ce o n ly , or o b scu rely, the th in g den oted
b y t h e t e r m ( 9, c . i .) .
H ence it u su a lly l i a ] ii > e n s , that A vhc n Ave c o m b i n e Avords t o
geth er, to each o f w h ich apart a m ean in g or
H o w w o r d s without n o t i o i i aiiSAvei's, Ave i m a g i n e avc u n d e r s t a n d w h a t
meaning ma> be nn- utter, th o u gh t h a t w l l i c l l is d o i l O t c d b y SUCll
d e r s lo o d . . . .
c o m b in e d w o r d s b e im p o ssib le, an d , c o n seq u e n tly ,
can h a v e n o m e a n in g ; fo r t h a t w h i c h is im p o .s s ib le is n o t l i i n g a t a l l ;
and o f n o tliin g th ere can be no id ea. For in sta n ce , avc have a
n o t i o n o f g o l d , a s a l s o o f i r o n : h u t i t is im ]io.ssilile t h a t ir o n c a n , a t
anv tim e, be g o b l ; co n sefp ien tly n e ith er c a n avc l i a v c any n o tio n
o f i r o i i - g f d ' l ; a n d y e t w c u n d e r s t a n d Avhat j i e o j i l e m ean w hen th ey
m en tio n iron-gold.
In the in > lan ce a l le g e d , it ce rta in ly strik es e v e ry one at first
th a t th e exin-essio n iron-qoid \s an e m p t y s o u n d ;
F u rl her p r o v e d . * '' 1 .
b u t y e t t h e r e a r c a t h o u s a n d i n s t a n c e s in AvIiicIi i t
d o e s n o t so e a s ily s trik e : F o r e x a m p le , w h e n I s a y a l e e t i l i i i e a l Iavo-
liiic f ig u r e , c o n t a i n e d i i i i ' l o r t w o r i g h t - l i n e s , I a m e q u a l l y Avell i i n d c r -
vtood as w h e n 1 s a y a r ig lit- lin c 'l t r ia n g le , a fig u r e c o n ta in e d u n d e r
three rig lit-liiie s; and it slio n ld seem we had a d istin ct n otion o f
both figu res ( 1.3, c. i.) l I o A v c v e r , :is avc s l i o w in g e o i n c l r y t h a t
tw o rig h t-liiu 's c;m n e \(* r c o n ttiin a sptice,* i t is a l s o im p o ssib le to
fo rm a n otion o f ;i r e c t i l i n e a l t w o - l i n e ' l fig u re ; an d, c o n seq u en tly ,
t i n t e x p r t .- s s i o n i.s tin e i n j i t y s o u n d . J u s t s o i t h o l d s Avith t h e v e g e -
t.ahlc soul o f plants, supposed to be a siiritnal being, w hereby

plants are enabled to vegetate and g r o w : for tiiongli those words
taken apa rt are intelligihle, y e t in their coinhinalion they have no
m anner of meaning. J u s t so if I say th a t the A ttra c tiv e Sj)irit, or
Attr.active Cord, as Linus calls it, or the A ttrac tiv e Force, as some
philosophers at this day, is an immaterial jninciple snperad ded to
matter, w hereby th e attractions in n ature are perform ed ; no notion
or m eaning can possibly he joined with these Avords. T o this bead
also belong the N atura l S y m p ath y and A n tip a th y o f P l a n t s ; the
Band o f R i g h t or laAA' {vinculum ju r is ) , used in the definition of
Obligation, hy Civilians; the j)rinciiIe of Evil of the M anicheans,
etc.'
1 L ogic, or R a tio v n l Thoughts on the Pow ers o f the G erm an o f B a ro n W otfius, c . ii., p . 64 67,'
lie H u m a n U n derstandin g. T ranslated fro m L o n d o n , 1 7 7 0 . E d .
LECTURE XI.
S T O I C H E I O T . O G Y .
SECTION I. OF THE PRODUCTS OF THOUGHT.
I. ENXOEMATIC.
III. RECIPROCAL RELATIONS OF CONCEPTS.
A. QUANTITY OF EXTENSION SUBORDINATION AND CO

ORDINATION.
I NOW |iroceel to tlie third and last Hclation o f C o n c e p t s , that

of con cep ts to each other. T h e tw o fonnei- relations o f notions
to their objects and to their subject gc.vc theii* Q u a n tity and Q u a l
ity. This, the relation o f notions to each other, gives w hat is
em phatically and strictly denom inated their Jlelation. In this rig
orous signification, the Hclation o f C oncepts may be thus defined.
^ X X X I. T h e R elation ])ro]ier o f notions consists in those

determ inations or attributes which b elo ng
P ar. X X X I. E ecip- tlieiu, iiot v iew cd as aiiart and in them-
rocal B elations of , , n r
C o n epts. selves, but as reciprocally comjiared. C'on-
cepts can on ly be comjiarcd to geth er with
reference, either, 1, d'o their E x te n s io n ; or, T o their Com-
jmdiensioii. .i\ll their relations ai'c, thcre.'bre, d e p en d en t on the
one or on the other o f these quantities.'
X X X ll. A s d'*pendeiit nixm E xte n sio n , conceiits stand

to eaidi other in the fi\X mutual relations,
l-ixcliision; -2. O f Coi-xteiision ; .3,
O f Subordination ; -1, O f Cobrdin.ation ; and
b. O f Intei-seeiion.
1. One con cep t excliides another, when no jiai't o f the one
coincides with any p a it o f the other, 2. One conce])t is eoe.x-
1 Cf. K ru g , ] 36. K d . 2 See d ia g ra m , p. 1.33.

L e c t . X I. LOGIC. 138
CONCEPTS, THEIR RELATIONS PROPER:

TO W IT OF
1 E x c ln s io n I
2. C o sx te n sio n T
3. S u b o rd in a tio n
4. C o o rd in a tio n
I I-
CD
5. In te r s e c tio n , o r
P a r tia l C o in c lu
s io n a n d C oex-
clo sio n .
1 T h e n o ta tio n b y s tr a ig h t lin es w as firs t em p lo y ed b y th e a u th o r in 1848. E n .

134 LO G IC. L e c t . XI.
tensive Avitli anotlier, wlien eaeli lias the same n ninher of snh-
ordiiiate eoiicejtts niuler it. o. One eoneejit is suhoirlinate to
another (which m ay he called the S u p e r o y d t n a t e ) Avlieii the
former is inelnded within, or makes a jiart oh the sphere or
extensiuii of the latler. 4. T w o or nuire concejits are coordi
nated, when each exelndes the o the r tfoin its sjiliere, h n t when
hoth go im m ediately to make iiji th e extension o f a third con-
ccjit, to which they are cosnhordinate. 5. Concepts intersect
each other, when the sjiliere of the one is jiartially contained
in tiie sphere o f the other.'
O f Exclusion,/(orsc, s y l l o y i s n i , are examjiles: th e re is no ahso

lnte exclusion.
Exarajiics ol iiio Inc cxamjilcs o f Coiixtensioii, th e concejits
mutual relalious of . j i ,
liv iu y , b e i n y , and o r y a m z e d b e i n g s , may he
given. For, using the term l i f e as ajijilicahle to

jihoits as well as animals, there is n o thing living which is not organ-
izetl, and noth in g organized Avhich is not li\'iiig. T h is recijirocal
rehilioii will he rejireseiited hy tw o circles covering each other, or
hy tw o linos o f etjmil length and in jiositive reliition.
*Vs extimjiles o f Snhordiiiation iiiid Coordination, w a n , day,
horse, stniid, ;is correlatives, in siiliordinatioii to the concept aniw.al,
and. as recijirocal eorreltitives, in eocirdiiitition with each other.
IVliiit I would call the recijirocal relation o f Intersection, takes
jil.ace hetween concejits when th e ir sjilieres cross or cut each other,
tli.al is, fill ji.artly within, jiartly w ithout, each other. Tlui.s, the
concejit black .and the eoneojit h eavy m ntnally intersect e.ach other,
for o f these some hlack things are heavy, some not, and .some heavy
th ings are hl.aek, some not.
O f these relations, those o f Snhordiiiation :md
.'iii.oniiiiaiion and Coordiinitioii lire o f jirineiji.il inijioj-t.ance, as on
((Kirdinalion of jjriii- i i i i #.
ci,.al imi.ortanc... ^''llolc Systclll ol chlSSlhca-
tion ; iiinl to them alone it is, therefore, i.eces
sarv to ar-ci)id :i more ji.articiihir consideration.
U n d e r the Snhordim ition of notions, there are various term s to
exjiress the difle iaait inodes o f this rei.ation ;
fcmii .-xprc^Hvc of these it is nece.ssiiry th.at yon should now le.ani
tin- dilliTi-nf of , , ... i i i r
^ ,
tin- rr-lalion ol Siibor-
.ami liere.aiter
_ hear in mind, tor tlicA' ; torin :in_
,iiaiioi). essenti.al ji.art o f the l.angn.age o f Ijogic, and will
eiiiiie frcijiiently, in the sequel, to he employed
in considering the .amilysis of Ikonsonings.
1 Cf Krug, L o g ik , 4 1 . E d .
Lkct XI. LOGIC. 135
*[[ X X X I I I . O f notions which stand to each otlier in the

rel.ations of S u b o rd in a tio n , the one is the*
P a r. X X X III. S upe- / r, / .- .
nor and In fe r io r . OV SuptVlOr (uOtiO, COHCejXtKS, SUpC-
B road er and N arrow - rio)'), lllC Otl.Cl' the LoiCC) Ol' In ferior
e r n o tio n s . (jwtio, conccptus, inferior). Tlie superior
notion is likewise called the Wider or Broader (latior), the
inferior is likew'ise called the N arroteer (a)igastior)}
T he meaning of these e.xprcssions is snfticiently manifest. A

notion is called the higher or superior, inasmueh
E x p lic a t io n . viowcd as S t a n d i n g over an o th er in the
relation of subordination, as ineludiug it Avitliiii its domain or
sphere ; and a correlative notion is called the lotcer or inferior, a.s
thus standing u nder a superior. Again, the higher notion is called
the wider or broader, as containing u n d e r it a g re a te r nu m b e r of
th in g s ; tlie lower is called the narrower, as containing u n d er it
a smaller number.
1" X X X I V . T he liigher or wider concept is also called, in

co ntra st to the lower or narrower, a Uni-
p a r . X X X IV . U n i- versal O l' General N otion (vonua KaSoXov,
v e rs a l an d P a r tic u la r
notions. notio, couceptus, uiiiversalis, g c/iera lis)', the
lower or n arrow e r concept, in contrast to
the higher or wider, a P a rtic u la r Notion, vorj/xa fxcpiKov, notio,
conceptus pyarticularis?'
T h e m eaning of these expressions, likewise, requires no illustra

tion. A notion is called universal, inasmuch as
E x p lication . Considered as binding uj) a m u ltitu d e of
parts or inferior concejits into the unity of a w ho le; for univcrsus
means in unum versus or a d ununi versus* th a t is, m a n y turned
into one, or m a n y regarded as one, and universal is employed to
denote the attribution o f this relation to objects. A notion is called
particular, inasmuch as it is considered as one o f the parts o f a
hig h e r concejit or whole.
^ X X X V . A superior concept, inasmuch as it constitutes a

common attrib u te or character for a n u m b e r of inferior coii-
cejits, is called a General N otion (roiy/za Ka%Xov, notio couceptus
yenerali.'t), or, in a single word, a Genus (yo'o?, yenu.^). A
1 C f. K r u g . L ogik, [ 42 E d . la ti, R m lim en ta Logica, p 39.] [L o g ic a , to m .

2 rS ee A m m oniii'^. In Dp L i t r r p r f t., f 72 h . i ., P I ., c iv . 8 . 4 tli e d it , V e n ic e , 1772. CC
(B r a n d is, S c h o h i i n A r i . d u i . , p . 113); F a c c io - K ru g, 42. E d .]
136 LOGIC. L e c t. XI.
notion, inasmuch as it is considered as at once affording a c o m

mon attribution for a certain com p lem en t
a n d S p e c ie s . interior con cep ts or individual objects,
and as itse lf an inferior concept, contained
under a higher, is called a Special jVotioii (rr//Aa ciSikov, notio,
craiceplus, special is), or, in a single word, a Species (eiSo?, sj)e-
cits). T h e abstraction which carries ii]) sjiecies into genera, is
-ailed, in that res])cct, G enerification, or, more loosely. Gener
alization. T h e determ ination Avhieh divides a gen u s into its
sjiecies is called, in that respect. Specification. Genera and
Species are both called Classes ; and the arrangem ent o f th ings
under them is, therefore. C lassification}
i t is manifest that the distinction into Genera and Species is a

merely relative distinction ; as the same notion
Expiicniion. T h e QUO rcspect, a gonus, i l l another respect, a
(iiMmction o f G e n u s specics. F o i cxceiit a notion has no higher
:iiid .species lOci-eiV . , . .
notioii, that IS, ex c e p t it be it s e lf the w id est or
m ost universal notion, it m ay a lw ays be regarded
as subordinated fo a n oth er; and, in so far as it is actually thus re
garded, it is a s]>ecies. A g a in , ev ery notion excejit th at which h;;s
under it only individuals, is, in so far as it is thus \ ie\vcd, a genus.
For examjilc, th e notion trianyle, i f view ed in relation to the notion
(ff rectilineal fig u r e , is a s]iecies, as is lik ew ise rectilineal fig u r e
itself, as v ie w e d in relation to fig u r e sinpily. A g a in , the concejit
tra ingle is a genus, when view ed in reference to the co n cep ts,
rig ht-angled triangle, acute-angled triangle, etc. A right-angled
triangle is, h ow ev er, on ly a s]iecic.s, and not possibly a genus, if
under it be n ecessaiily included individuals alone. But, in jioint o f
fact, it is iiu])Ossible t reach in th eor y any low e st sp ecies; for we
c;m alw ays co n ceive som e difference by which any con cep t may be
d ivided a il iufinifann. T his, h ow ever, as it is on ly a speculative
curio>ity, like the infiiiitesiinal divisibility o f matter, m ay be thrown
out o f view in relation to practice; and, therefore, the definition, by
Poriihyry and logicians in general, o f the lo w e st species ( o f which
I am im m ed iately to sjieak), is jiraetically correct, even though it
cannot be vindicated against theoretical objection.s. On the other
hand, we soon and easily reach the h igh est genus, w hich is given in
TO or, ens alig u id , being, thing, som ething, etc., which are on ly vari
ous expressions o f the same absolute universality. O ut o f these
I K r u g , L o g ik ,S 4 3 . E d .
L ect. X I. LOGIC. 137
c o n d itio n .s t h e r e arise certiiiii d e n o m in a t i o n s o f c o n c e p t s , w h i c h it

i s , l i k e w i s e , n e c e s s i i r y t h a t y o n h e m a d e a w a r e of.
Ill reg.'ird to the terms Generification and Specijication, these are
limited e.xprossions lor the proeesses of Ahstrae-
Gfiieniication and D e t e r m i n a t i o n , c o n s i d e r e d in a p a r t ic n -
Spocirtcation, wliat. , . i tx
lar relation. Ahstraction and Determination,
you will recollect, we have already spoken of in general;' it will,
therefore, he only necessary to say a very few words in reference to
them, as the several operations hy which out of species wtj evolve
genera, and out of genera we evolve species. And first, in regard
to Ahstraction and Generitieatioii. In every
G e n e r ific a tio n . . t . .
c o m p l e x n o t i o n , w e cr.n l i i n i t o u r a t t e n t i o n t o i t s
co n stitu en t characters, to the ex clu sio n of som e one. W e thus
t h i n k aAvay fr o m t h is on e, w e a h s t r a e t fr o m it. X o w , the con cept
w h i c h r e m a i n s , t h a t i.s, t h e l a s c i c n l i i s o f t l i o n g h t winus th e on e char
a c t e r w h i c h w e h a v e t h r o w n o u t , is, in r e l a t i o n to t h e o r i g i n a l , - t h e
e n tire co n cejit, th e n e x t h ig h e r, th e jir o x im a t e ly s u jie r io r n o tio n .
B u t a c o n c e p t a n d a n e x t h ig h e r c o n c e p t a re to ea ch o th e r as s p e cie s
and genus. T h e p rocess o f A h s tra c tio n , th erefo re, h y w h ich out o f
a p ro xim ately lo w e r avc ev o lv e a p r o x i i n a t e l y h i g h e r c o n c e p t , is,
w h e n Ave s p e a k w i t h l o g i c a l p rec isio n , calle d th e p ro c e ss o f Geueri-
ficiition.
'fa k e , fo r exam ple, the c o n c e jit man. T h is concept is p ro xi
m ately com posed o f the tw o con cep ts o r co n stitu en t c h a ra c te rs ,
animal and rational heing. I f Ave t h i n k e i t h e r o f t h e s e c h a r a c t e r s
UAvay f r o m the other, we sh all have in that oth er a jiro x im a te ly
h i g h e r c o n c e j i t , t o A vh ic li t h e eo n co jit man s t a n d s in t h e r e l a t i o n o f
a sjiec ies to its g e n u s . I f Ave a b s t r a c t f r o m animal, t h e n man Avill
s t a n d a s a s p e c i e s in s u h o r d i n a t i o n t o t h e g e n n s rational heing, and
th e c o n c e p t animal Avill t h e n afford o n ly a d iffe re n c e to d istin g u is h
man as a co o rd in ate sjio cics fro m immaterial intelligences. I f , o n
the other hand, avo a h stra e t fro m rational heing, t h e n man w i l l
s t a n d a s a s j i e c i o s in s n h o r d i i i a t i o n t o t h e g e n n . s animal, h a v i n g f o r
a co o rd in ate sjiceics irrational animal. S u c h i s t h e j i r o c e s s o f
G en erification . X o w fo r the c o n v e rse jiro ce ss o f S jie c ific a tio n .
E v e r y s e r i e s o f c o n c e p t s Avhieh has h een o h tain ed h y ah stractio n ,
m a y he rejiro d u c e d in a n i n v e r t e d o r d e r , A vh en ,
S p e c ific a tio n . i t o i
descending from the highest notion, a v c , step hy
step, add on the several characters from which a v c had nhstractcd in
our ascent. This jirocess, as you rememher, is called Determina
tion ; a very appropriate expression, iiiasnincb as by each charac.
1 S e e a b o v e , p. 87 ei seg. E d .
18
lo S L O GI C. L kct. XL
t e r o r a t t r i b u t e wl i i c l i w e a d d o n , w e l i m i t o r d e t e r m i n e , m o r e and
more, the abstract v a g u e n e s s oi- e . x t e n s i o n o f t h e n o t i o n ; u n t i l , a t
last, if e v e r y a t t r i b u t e b e a n n e x e d , t h e s u m o f a t t r i b u t e s c o n t a i n e d
in th e notion becomes convertible with the sum of attributes of
\\ h i c h s o m e c o n e r e t e i n d i v i d u a l o r r e a l i t y is t h e c o m p l e m e n t . Xow,
w h e n w e d e t e r m i n e a n y n o tio n b y m l d i n g on a s u b o r d i n a t e concept,
w e d i v i d e i t ; f o r t h e e x t e n s i o n o f t h e h i g h e r c o n e e p t s is p r e c i s e l y
e q u a l to t h e e x t e n s i o n o f t h e a d d e d eo nce]) t jd u s its n e g a t i o n . Thu.s,
i f t o t h e \ - o n c e p t a n i m a l w e a d d o n t h e n e x t l o w e r c o n c e j i t ratio/n.l,
w e d i v i d e i t s e x t e n s i o n i n t o t w o h a l ve . s , t h e o n e e q u a l t o r a t io n a l
a n i m a l t h e o t h e r e i p i a l t o i t s n e g a t i o n , t h a t is, t o ir r a t i o n a l a n i
mal. T h u s a n a d d e d c o n c e p t a n d i t s n e g a t i o n a l w a y s c o n . N t i t u t e t h e
im m ediately low er notion, into which a higher notion is d i v i d e d .
B u t a s a n o t i o n s t a n d s t o t h e n o t i o n s j t r o x i m a t e l y s u b o r d i n a t e t o it,
in t h e i m m e d i a t e r e l a t i o n o f a g e n u s t o its spe cies , t h e p r o c e s s o f
iJeterm ination, by which a c o n c e j i t is t h u s d i v i d e d , is, i n l o g i c a l
l a n g u a g e , a ) ) j ) r o p r i a t e l y d e n o m i n a t e d Specification.
S o m u e h in g e n e r a l for t h e S ubordination of notions, considered
as t i e n e r a a n d Species. There are, h o w e v e r , v a r i o u s g r a d a t i o n s o f
th i sr e latio n , a n d cei'tain t e r m s b y which these are denoted,which
it is r c ( ] u i s i t e t h a t y o u s h o u l d learn and lay u p in m e m o r y . The
most im portant of these are co m p re h e n d e d in t h e follow ing p a r a
graph :
^ X X X V I . A G e n u s is o f t w o d egrees, a h i g h e s t and a
lower. In its h i g h e s t d e g r e e , i t is c a l l e d
P a r X X X V I. O ra d a - , r. Lr ry i ,
tions of Genera and tlic bujn'cm e o r J lo s t G eneral G enus (yccos
speeiea.andtheirdes- yeviKWTUTov, geiius su m m u n i o i (jeneralissx-
ignationa. /
7 1 1 0 /)), is d e f i n e d , t h a t w h i c h b e i n g a
genus cannot become a species. In its lower deg ree, it is
called a Siihalier/i o r In term e d ia te (yevos vTrdWrjXov, (jenus suh-
(dtcmron. o r me/l.i/o/i), a n d is d e f i n e d , t h a t w h i c h b e i n g a
g e n u s can also b e c o m e a species. A Species al si; is o f t w o
degr ei ' . s , a l o w e s t . and a h i g h e r . In its l o w e s t d e g r e e , i t is
calle<l a Go/ce.^t o r J/ o. sg Spcci/d Sp>ecies (elSos elSiKOJTUTor, sj/ecies
inftm a, 7/lti/mt, ox .specialissinia?)^ a n d i s d e f i n e d , t h a t w h i c h
b e in g a species c a n n o t b e c o m e a g e n u s . In its h ig h e r d eg ree,
i t is ealle<l aS /d xd tern o r I d term ed i<ite Sj/ecies (el8o<; {nrdXXr]Xc,y,
species .s/dx/lterz/a n/ediai), a n d is d e f i n e d , t h a t w h i c h b e i n g a
s peci es m a y also b e c o m e a g e n u s . d'hiis a S u b a l t e r n Genus
a n d a S u b a lte r n Sjiecies are convertible.
1 v id e Tim jiler, p 253, [Logiree S y s ta n a , L. il c. l.q . 16. E d.]

L e c t. XI. LOGIC 1.39
T h e distinctions and definitions in this paragraph are tak en from

tlie celebrated Introduction* o f P o rp h y r y to the
E .\p lic a tio n . . p . . , , , i ,
Categories oi Aristotle, and the y have been g e n
erally adopted by logicians. I t is evident, th a t the only absolute
distinction here established, is th a t between the H ig hest o r Supreme
Genus and the L ow est S pecies; for the o th e r classes to wdt, the
Subaltern or In te r m e d ia te are, all and each, either genera or
species, according as avc regard the m in an ascending or a descend
ing order, the same concept being a genus, if considered as a
Avhole containing u n d er it inferior conccits as parts, and a .<?pecies,
if considered as itself the p a r t o f a h ig h e r concejtt or Avhole. T he
distinction of concejits into Genus and Sjiecies, into S u prem e and
Interm e d iate Genus, into L ow est and I n te rm e d ia te Species, is all
th a t Logic takes into ac c o u n t; because these arc all the distinctions
of degree th a t are given necessarily in th e form of thou g h t, and as
abstracted from all d e term in a te m atter.
It is, however, jiroper here to say a word iu regard to the Cat
egories or Predicaments of Aristotlc. These are
C a te g o r ie s o f A n s - classcs iuto Avliicli E xistence is divided,
lo tle . ^
viz., .1, S u b stan c e; 2, Q u a n ti ty ; 3, Q u a lity ; 4,
Relation ;5, A ction ; G, Passion ; 7, AVhere ; 8, AYheii; 9, P o stu re ;
and 10, H abit. (B y this last is m e an t th e relation o f a containing
to a contained.) T h e y are com prehended in the two following
verses:
Arbor, sex servos, fervore, refrigerat ustos,
Kuri eras stabo, nec tunicatus ero.2
In r e g a r d t o t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e Avord category, i t is a t e r m b o r -
roAved from t h e c o u r t s o f laAv, in Avhich i t l it-
O rigin ai m e a n in g erally signifies au accusation. In a philosophical
a n d e m iilo v m e n t o f i' i ^ i . .
.
tlie term catf^gonj.
ajiplieatiou,
.
it has tw o. meanings, or ra th e r it is
used in a general and in a restricted sense. In
its general sense, it means, in closer conforinit.y to its original aji-
j)lic;ition, simjily a pyredieation or a ttr ib u tio n ; in its restricted
sense, it has been deflected to denote jircdications or a ttiibntions
of a very lofty genei-ality, in other Avords, certain classes of a veiy
Avide extension. I may here notice, that, in modern jibilosojihy, it
has been very arbitrarily, in fact A'ery abusively, jierverted from
both its jiriinary and its secondary signification am ong the ancients.
Aristotle first employed the te rm (for the sujijiositioii th a t he hor-
1 C ii., 23, 2S, 29. F a c c io la t i. I.ngirn, [t. i , R iirlim enla I.og!cn, 1 '
2 M u r m e llii Isagoge, c . i. A id c ilic r a c liu s I. c . iii. p 32. E d . ]
IL ex. Phil. V. PrwU icam enta E d .] p. 1085.
140 LOGIC. L k c t. XL
rowed his c.-Uegories, name and tiling, from the Pythagorean Archy-
tas is now exploded the treatise nniler the name of this philos
opher heing jiroved to he a comparatively recent forgery'), I
.say, zVristotle first emjiloyed the term to denote a certain classifica
tion, it of the modes of ohjective or real existence; and
the word was afterwards employed and apjilied in the s.nme manner
hy Plotinus, and other of the older jiliilosopliers.
K a n t s c -n ii)lo )m c iit
By Kant' again, and, in conformity to his ex-
o f tlio torn i.
amjile, hy many other recent jiliilosopliers, the
word has heen usurped to denote the a prioi'i cognitions, or fiin-
danienlal forms of thought. Nor did Kant stopjiere ; and I may
explain to you the genealogy of another of his
T ra n srtn d fn l an d exjiressions, of which I see many of his German
T ranscendental, I h e ir
discijiles are unaware. By the Schoolmen,
o r ig in a l e m p lo y m e n t
a n d use b y K a u t. whatever, as more general than the ten cate
gories, could not he contained under them, was
said to rise heyond them to transcend them ; and, accordingly,
snch terms as heing, one, xehole, good, etc., were called transcendent
or transcendental {transcendentia or transcendentalia)? Kant, ns
he had twisted the term categorg, twisted also these correlative
exjiressions from their original meaning, lie did not even emjiloy
the two terms transcendent and transcendental as correlative. The
1 .See D iscussions, p. 140. Kl>. S a n d e r s o n , p. 20, [ J liir m e lliu s g iv e s as b is

2 .'tee e s p e c ia lly M etaph ., iv . V. In tlic tr e a o w n I lie v e r se s
tise s p e c ia lly d e v o te d to tlie m , t lic C a te g o r ie s C o n ip le x iim , C o n s ig iiilic a iis , F ic tu m , I o ly -
are v ie w e d ra tlier in a g r a m m a t ic a l th a n in a sernum ,
in e la p liy s ic iil iis];ect. Ki). A o x lo g ic a ;, O eu s, E x c c d e iis , I r iv a t io , Ia rs-
EiiJi. \ ' I I . i., c i. Ivt). q u c,
4 K tttik d . r V., ji 78 (ed . U o sc iik r u n x ), Pro- Ilaec, slu d io s e , c a le g o r iis n o n a c c i|)iu iitiir .
tegom cna, ^ 39. llu ,
A n d S a n d e r s o n [ L o g ic a , L . i. c. v iii.), a fte r
5 [.'-ec K a c e io la ti, liu d ., ]>. 3 9 ; a n d In st., ]>.
c it in g th e n in c iiio iiic o f th e C a te g o r ie s th e m
2*>.) [L o g ic a , I. i., H u dim rn ta L ogica, I'. 1., C.
s e lv e s , a d d s , I n a liq n a ista r iiin ch issiiin i
iv ., ^ 7. A liu d est categocicum , q u o d s ig u if ie a t
q u ic q u id u sp ia m reriin i est c o llo c a lu r ; iiio d o
c e r ta in (tu a n id a m rem c iite g o r ia coiii])ri lien -
sit unu m q u id , rcnle, c o m p letu m , litnitatc. ipie ac
sam : a liu d e" i//n , q n o il iitilla c a tc g o r ia c o ii-
Jinil/j-, nalurer.. K x iila iit e r g o h is se d ih iis la -
tiiie tn r , sed per o iiiiie s v u g a lu r , c u jiism o d i
tin tio n e s Secundai, P riva tio n e s, e t F ic la , q u ia
Mint s.evnl/fi, Ijnnitas, ordo. et s illlilia I illllta .
n o il (tuiit r e a lia ; C on crtta, E y u iro ra , e t Copt-
lyigica, t. ii., I n s titu tio n 's lx)giccj\ I. I ., c . ii.
p lex a ,(\\]'in n o n s i i i i t n i i a ; Por.s, q iiia n o n est
.'-util riu a d a in v o c a b u lil, rjuie v a g a et Iran-
c o m p le tu m q u id ; D u es, q iiia n o n est finita>;
v n d / n t i a d ic n n t n r : (p iod g e n u s q iio d lib e t e x -
Tiausci n d tn s , q iiia n o n e sl lin iitu ta ; iia tu ra ;.
s iiis-r e n t in o m n i c u ie g o r ia . I liijii-iiio d i su n t
l l i i i c v e r s i c ii l i :
tn s , ali'p tid , res, u nu m , vcru m , b o n u m . C f.
C o in p le x u m , C o n sig n ific a n s , I r iv a t io , F ic-
IU>/'s W inks, \! 087 n o te . 17u.]
tiiin ,
K xe u d ed fro m Ih e A r is to t e lic C a leg o rie.s,
I ars, I le u s , .F k ju iv o c u m , 'I'raii.sccndeiie,
all e x c e jil th e f o llo w in g :
K iis r ii l io i ii s :
K x jia r le voci.s V o x n iia e t s im p le x , r e S iiiit e x c h is a decern c la s s ih iis ista n o v c m
bus c o n c in n a lo c a iid ls . K u .]
Kx p a - t'T c i E iitia per se se , fin ita , r e a lia , [T hat th e t.'a tcg o ries o f A r is to tlc a rc n o t ap
t o la .
p lic a b le t o C o d , see ( I se u d o ) A u g u s tin , De
.See jtliers In M u r ir ie lliu s, b a g o g e , c. 1. j C ognitione Verce V ita , c . i ii.]
L e c t. XI. LOGIC. 141
la tte r he applied as a synonym ô\' n priori, to d enote those element.'^

of th o u g h t which were native and necessarv to the mind itself, and
Avhich, thoug h not manifested out o f experience, Avore still not con
tingently derived from it by an a posteriori process o f generaliza
tion. T h e term transcendent, on the contrary, he a])])licd to all
pi'ctcnded knoAvledge th.at tran.scended expericneo, and Avas not
given in an original iirinciple o f the mind. Transcendental he thus
applied in a favorable, transcendent in a co n d e m n a to ry accepta
tion.' Blit to return from this digression.
T h e Categories o f A ristotle do n ot jiroperly constitute a logical,
b u t a metaphysical, treatise ; and they are, ac-
C a teg o n es o f A n s- cordiiigly, iiot overlooked in the A ristotelic
t o tle M e ta p h y sic a l. i t-c * T>i M i i ' l l 1
books on the h i r s t Bliilosopliy, Avhich have ob
tained the nam e of Metaphysics (ra p.era to, (pvcnKa). T h e ir insertion
in the series o f the surviving treatises o f A ristotle on a logical
argument, is, therefore, an error.
Blit, l o o k i n g a t t h e s e c l a s s e s a s t h e h i g h e s t g e n e r a i n t o A vhie h
s i m p l e b e i n g is d i v i d e d , t h e y a re, I t h i n k , o b n o x i o u s t o v a r i o u s o b
je c tio n s. W i t h o u t j i a n s i n g t o s hoA v t h a t in o t h e r
C a te g o r ie s c r itic iz e d i es jiGC ts t h e y ai'c i m j i c r f e c t , i t is m a n i f e s t t l i a t
as a c la s s iflc a tio ii o f , -n .
the supreme gciiiis or category Jieiny is n ot
im m ediately divided into these ten classes, and
th a t the y neither constitute coordinate nor distinct species. F o r
Being ( t o 6V, ens) is jirimarily divided into Being hy itself (ens pjet
se), and B eing by accident (ens per accidens). B eing by itself oowq-
sjionds to the first C ategory of A ristotlc, equivalent to sub stance;
B eing by accident conqireheiids the other nine, b ut is, I think, more
properly divided iu the folloAving m a n n e r : B eing by accident \s,
viewed either as absolute or as relative. As absolute, it floAVS either
from the m atter, or from the form of things. I f from th e m atter,
it is Quantity, A ristotles second ca te g o ry ; if from the form, it is
Quality, Aristotles third category. A s relative, it corresponds to
A ristotles fourth category, Belation ; and to R elation all the other
six may be reduced. F o r the category Where is the relation o f a
thing to other things iu space; the category When is th e relation of
a th in g to other things in time. Action and Passion constitute a
single relation, tlie relation o f tlie agent and the patient. Posture
is the relation of the parts o f th e body to each o t h e r ; finally. Habit
1 Kriiilc cl. r. V., p. 240, e d it. U o s e iik r a iiz . 3 AVith t h is c la s s ific a tio n o f th e C a te g o r ie s ,
E d . com p are A q u in a s , hi A rist. M eta p h ., L . v.
- 'I'lial th e C a te g o r ie s o f A r is to t le are n o t le c t. 9. S u a r e z , D isp u ta tio n e s UTetnphysica.
lo g ic a l hut m e(ap liy." ical, se e C. C a r le to ii; D is p . 39, 12. 15. E d .
tT lio m a s C o m p to n C a r lo to n , Fhilosophia, Uni-
versa, D isp . M et. d. v i. 1 . E d .]
142 LOGIC. L e c t. XL
is the relation of a thing containing and a thing contained. The

little I have now said in regard to the categories of Aristotle is
more, jierliaps, than I was strictly warranted to say, considering
them, as I do, as wholly extralogical, and I have merely referred to
them as exhibiting an exanrjile of the application of the doctrine
of classification.*
I mav, likewise, notice, by the way, that in the physical sciences of
arrangement, the best instances of which are seen
Names fortJiediiTor- in the dificrcnt departments of Natural History,
ent steps in the series is found ueccssary, ill oi'dcr to mark the relative
of classes in the idivsi- , o i x * t t t i
, .
cn l s c ie n c e s o f ar-
p
1
ace 01 caeli step in the ascending and deseend-
_ I =
raugeineut. iug scrics of classcs, to bcstow on it a ptirticular
designation. Thus kingdom, class, order, tribe,
fam ilg, genns, snbgeniis, species, subspecies, variety, and the like, are
terms that serve conveniently to in.ai-k out the various degrees of
genertdization, in its ap]lication to the descriptive sciences of na
tnre. With such speci.al applications :ind contingent differences.
Logic h:is, however, no concern. I therefore jiroceed to the last
relative denomination of concepts under the head of Subordination
in Extension. It is expressed in the following paragrajih:
^ X X X V Il. Agenus as containing under it species, or a

.
sjieeies as containing under it indii'idnals, is
.f called a Logical,
c a l a n d M e ta p h y s ic a l t/ t
or Universal, i or Subject,
y i
Wholes and Parts. Or Subjectivc, oi Potential W h ole; while
sjieeies as contained under a genus, and in-
ilividiials as contained under a sjiccies, are called Logical, or
Universal, or Subject, or Subjeetice, or Jôtential Parts. E con-
1 lnT<- n o t h in g in r e g a rd to w h ic h a 1716. C h a iiv in , LpxIcoii P M lo so p h icu m ,v. Cate-

g r e a te r d iv e r -ity o f o ])in io ii lias jir e v a ile d , gor>m a. [ F o r v a r io u s a ltc m p ls a t re d n c tio n
e \ e n a m o n g I .o g ic ia n s , th a n th e n n m h e r o f a n d c la s s ilic a lio n o f th e c a te g o r ie s , see I 'lo ti-
t !ile_Mine I-or ome a llo w o n ly Iw o S u b - n n s, Ennt-iul . V I, I., ii., c. 8 et s iq . {T en n e-
ta ee aii'I .M oile; o th e rs th r ee S u b sta n c e . m iiiin , d i'irh d -r Phil., \ \ . , p . \7 3 n sn ).) Hit
-Mode, a i d I lid a lio ii; o th e rs fo u r M in d , vid flie A r m e n ia n , in I. r iiiid is , h'cholin nd
Stm co. .M iiIIit, an d .M otion; o th e r s scvi-n A r is lo l., p i\) U a n iu s, A v im o d . A risto t [],.
\. liic h tire c o in jir e h e n d e d in th e fo llo w in g iv ., )). 80 H .0 7 ., ed. 15.50. F d .] .lo . F ic u s .Mi
' i.-ticli: r a n ilu la n u s , ('on rlu sion rs. O pera, p. 90, ed.
" .IFn, M eniiirn, Q iiies, M otiis, P o sitiira , F ig - B a s il, 1572; B a iir e n liu s A tilfa, [ /liVi/erl/Vo Di.s-
p a ta tin n e s, c c . i. ii F t).] F n g e n io s , h o y iK ))
.V aoriot, d e d e r n n l e x o r d ia r e b u s." 1' 125 ct 1 ^7 . On c a t e g o r ic ta b le s o f v a r io u s
, . a u lb o r s , see I ie n z in g e r . Inst. Log , ii. 6 000, ii.
S e c o n d lin e b e lte r . . .
tjo On I ii'lo r v o l c a te g o r ie s in a n li< iu ilv , see
' StinI c u m M ateria, c u n c la r n m e x o r d ia re- jv ip r .sen , Chrysipperr. Ph il. F n n d n m en ta , ji 1
'''I'" et sell F o r th e d o c tr in e s o f th e I la lo n is ls
.{r ia n t'e 's I.agir. c . ii q 1 ,2 : Reid's Aeenunt an d .Stoics o n Ibe su b je ct o f th e C a te g o r ie s,
o f ICorl*. p G-3 >t sry S e e F a c c io l.'ili, L o g ira , se e J 'a c c io la li. Inst. L og., [l.ogirei t. ii., p. ii .
t i R iilii ..n ta l.ngie.a. F . 1 . c. iii. ]) .32. Ji. 84 e.t seq. (,'1. 'Jfe iid o le n b iir g li, fhs-lilr.hie
F u r c lio t, In s tit. P hilos., t. i. L o g ic a , p. 82, e d . der K ategorienlehre, p p . 251, 2 6 7 . E d .]
L e c t. XI. LOGIC. 143
verso, nn individual as containing in it species, o r a species as

containing in it genera, is called a Lfetaphysical or Form al or
Actual Whole ; wliile sjiecies as contained in an individual, and
genera as eont.-iiiied in species, are called Metaphysical, or F o r
mal, or Actual Parts? T his nomenclatnro, however, in so for as
metajihysical is ojiposed to logical, is incjit; for we shall see
th a t both those wholes and jiarts are equally logical, and th a t
logicians have been at fault in considering one o f them, in their
doctrine o f reasoning, to the exclusion o f th e other.
A whole is th a t which contains jia rts; a jiart is t h a t which is

contained in a whole. B u t as the relation of a
E x p lic a t io n .' , , i i i t i
A v h o ie a n d p a r t s is a r e l a t i o n d c p e r i d e n t o n t h e
p o in t o f v ie w from w h ic h th e m in d c o n te m p la te s th e o h j e c t s o f its
k n o w l e d g e , a n d as t h e r e are d if fe r e n t p o i n t s o f v iew ' in w h i c h th ese
m a y b e c o n s id e r e d , it fo llo w 's t h a t t h e r e m a y a ls o b e d if f e r e n t w lio le s
a n d parts. P h ilo s o p h e r s h a v e , a c co r d in g ly , m a d e v a r io u s e n n m er a -
tioiis o f w h o le s ; a n d , A v i t h o u t p e r j i l e x i n g y o n Avith a n y m i n u t e d i s
cu ssio n of th eir v a rio u s d iv isio n s, it m a y he jirojier, in order to
m a k e y o n b e t t e r a w a r e o f t h e I avo A v h o l e s Avith A vh ic h L o g i c i s c o n
versant, ( a n d t h a t t h e r e a r e tAVo l o g i c a l A v h o le s , a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y ,
tw o grand form s o f r ea so n in g , and not one alon e, as a ll l o g i c i a n s
h a v e h ith erto tau gh t, I slia ll h e r e a f te r e n d e a v o r
G en er a l v ie w o f c o n v iiic c v o ii), to th is en d , I saA', i t maA' he
Ilie v a r io u s p o s s ib le ,. ,
ex p ed ien t to g iv e yon a general v icav oi th e
Aa r i o u s w h o l e s i n t o A v h ic h t l i c h u m a n m i n d m a y
gronji np the oh jects of its s jie cn la tio n .
Wholes may first he divided into tAVo genera, into a W hole
hy itself {totum per se), and a W hole hy acci-
W h o le per se. a n d f i \ ttti i *
W h o le accidm s. ^ W h o lc q i C r SC IS
t h a t Avliicli the jiai'ts o f th e ir jirojier n atu re
necessarily c o n s t i t u t e ; thus hody and soul constitnte the man. A
W ho le p e r arcidens is th a t Avliich the jiarts make iiji c o n tin g e n tly ;
as when man is considered as m ade np o f the poor an d th e rich.
A W h o le per se may, again, he subdivided into five kinds, into a
Logical, a Metajihysical, a Physical, a 3Iatlie-
Wboie per.e divided and a Colfcctivc. 1, A Logical, stvled
into, 1, Logical; 2 =>, C 1 , C l - A- *13
Aietapbysicai. Universal, a Snhject or Snhjective, a P o
te ntial W h o l e ; and, 2, A iMetajiliysical, styled
also a F o rm a l or an A ctual W h o l e , these I have defined in the jiara-
1 S e e T im p le r , L ogica, [jt. 232 et seq.] F a c - ica R e stitu ta , F . I I I . , c. ii., 2. e d . tJeneva;.

sio la ti, [L o g ic a , t. i., R u d im en la L ogica, 1. I I ., 166S. E d .J B u r g e r sd y k , [In stitu tio iies Log-
c v i,, ]), 51, 52. E d .] D '-od on , p. 447 tZ-ogica:, )>. 51 E d .]
1 4 4 L O GI C. L ect. XI.
grnpli. I t is m a n i f e s t t l i a t t l i e l o g i c a l a n d m e t . i p h y s i c a l w h o l e s a r e
th e convei'se o f each other. F o r a s t h e l o gi c a l w h o l e is t h e oeni is,
the logical jiarts th e species and i n d i v i d u a l ; in t h e metajihysical,
( co)i(r<i^ a n i n d i v i d u a l is t h e w h o l e o f w h i c h t h e s p e c i e s , a s p e c i e s t h e
w h o l e o f w h i c h t h e g e n e r a , a r e t h e jiails. A m e t a ] ) h y s i c a l w h o l e is
thus manifestly the whole determ ined by the comprehension of a
c o n c e p t , a s a l o g i c a l w h o l e is t h a t w h o l e d e t e r m i n e d b y its e x t e n
sion ; a n d if it can be shown that the whole o f comprehension
allbrds the conditions of a process of reasoning equally vali<l,
c q u a l l v u s e f u l , e q u a l l y e a s y , a n d , t o s a y t h e l e a s t o f it, e q u a l l y n a t u
r al , as that aftbrded b y the whole of the extension, it m u s t be
allowed that it is e q u a l l y well en title d to th e n a m e o f a logical
whole, as t h e w h o le w h ich has hitherto exclusively obtained that
^ ^ denomination. 3, A P h y s i c a l , o r , a s i t is l i k e
w i s e c a l l e d , a n E . s s e n t i a l W h o l e , is t h a t w h i c h
c o n s i s t s o f m a t t e r a n d o f f o r m , i n o t h e r Avords, o f s u b s t a n c e a n d o f
. . a c c i d e n t , as its essential parts. 4, A M athe-
4 , .A lalliem alical. . . ' .
matical, called likewise a (Quantitative, an In-
teg ial, more propcidy an Integrate, W h o le {to tu m intefjratuni)^ is
that which is com posed o f integral, or, moi-e jiroperly, o f in tegrant
pai-ts { p a rte s intcgrantes'). In this Avhole e v e i y part lies ou t o f every
other pai t, Avhereas, in a jthysical Avhole, the m atter and form, the
substance and accident, jiermeate and m od ify each other. T hus, in
th e integrate Avhole o f a human body, the head, b ody, and limbs, its
in tegrant parts, are not contained in, but each lies
out of, each other. 5, A C ollective, styled also a
W h o le o f A gg reg atio n , is that Avhich has its material ]4.arts separate
and .accidentally thrown together, as an ;ii-my, a heaji o f stones, a
jiilc o f will at, etc.'
P u t to ]irocccd n o w to an e x p la n a tio n o f t h e t e r m s in th e p a r a
g r a p h last d ic ta te d . O f these, n o n e seem to r eq u ire a n y exposition,
save the w ords sn h p e tic e a n d jxiten tlal, a s s y n o n y m s a p j i l i e d t o a
.Loixic.al o r P n i \ e r s a l w h o l e o r p a r t s .
d' l i e f i r m e r o f l l i c s e , t h e t e r m snhjec'ire., o r m o r e j i r o p e i d y svb-
J d t, as applied to th e species as jiarts su b ja cen t
Theiprm ai ri ] y i n g uiidcr, a g c i n i s , to tlic in d i v i d u a l s ,
a aiiiilieil t o * 1 , , 1 1
, , , a s ii ai ' t s . s n l i i a c e n t t o , o r l\ ni'. 2: u n d e r , a s p e c i e s ,
L ojrical w h o le nud I ' . " .
i' a c l e a r a m i a p p r o p ri a t e exjiression. P u t , as
ajiplied to genus or s]iecic.s, considered as
snhject is m a n i f e s t l y i ni ] r o | i e r , a n d t h e t e r m snh~
A\ h o l e s , t h e t< r i n
Jtrtivc. h a r d l y d e f e n s i b l e . I n l i k e m a n n e r , t h e t e r m universal, as
1 See above, p. 143, note. E d .

XI. LOGIC 145
applied to genns or species, considered as logical wholes, is c o r r e c t ;

b nt as ajijilied to individuals, considered as logical parts, it is used
in op])Osition to its p ioper meaning. T h e desire, however, to obtain
e|)itbets common both to the parts and to the whole, and thus to
indicate at once the relation in general, has caused logicians to vio
late the pro|iri'jties both of language nnd of thought. B u t as tin.
terms have been long estalilished, I think it sufficient to jnit you on
yonr g u ard by this observation.
In regard to the term potential, I shall, before saying anything,
rend to you a passage from the A at lent Meta-
riio tunn pntnitiai. jdn jsiei of the learned Lord Monboddo.* In
L ord M o iib o d d o q u o - , r- i . . . -i i i i
the n rst place, it is impossible, by tlie nature of
things, th a t the genns should contain the species
as a ])art of it, and tlie species should likewise contain the gonn.s, in
the same respect. But, in different respects, it is possible th a t each
of them may contain the other, nnd be contained by it. W e mast,
therefore, try to distinguish t h e different m anners of containing, and
being contained. xAnd there is a distinction th a t runs th rough the
wliole of ancient jihilosophy, solving m any difficulties that aic
otherwise unsnrmoiintable, and which, I hojie, will likewise solve
this difficulty. T h e distinction I rne.an is th e distinction betw ixt
w hat exists 8um/xet, or potentially on' v, nnd th a t which exists iuepyfui,
or actindly. In the first sense, ev e rythin g Exists in its c a u s e s ; and,
in the o the r sense, noth in g exists b u t w hat is actually produced.
X ow, in this first sense, the whole species exists in the g e n n s ; for
the genus virtually contains the whole species, not only w h a t aetu-
:dly exists o f it, b u t w hat may Cxist o f it in any future time. In
the same manner, the lowest species, beloiv which there i.s no thing
but individuals, contains virtually all those individuals, present and
future. Tims, the sjieeies nia)i coinjirehends all the individuals now
existing, or th a t shall hereafter e x is t; which, therefore, are said t<
be jiarts of tlie sjieeies man. On tbe otlier hand, the genns is ac tu
ally contained in the species ; and the species, likewise, in each of
the individuals under it. Tims, the genns an im a l is actually con
tained in the sjieeies man, w itho ut which it could not be conceived
to exist. xAiid, for the same reason, th e sjieeies man is actually con
tained in each individual. I t is a jiiece o f justice which I think I
owe to an author, hardly known at all in the western jiarls of
Eurojie, to acknow ledge th a t I got the h in t of the solution of this
difficulty from him. T h e author I mean is a living G reek author,
Eiigenius Dinconus, at present Professor, as I .am, informed, in the
1 V o l. i. p. 479.
19
146 LOGIC. L ect XL
Patrinrcli's University at Constantinople, who has w ritten an

e.xcellctit s y s t e m o f l o g i c in v e r y g o o d A t t i c G r e e k .
' P h i s , o r r a t h e r a s i m i l a r p a s s a g e a t p. 7 3 o f t h e f o u r t h v o l u m e o f
t h e A n t i e n t J le ta p h g sic s, a l l b r d s JMr. S t e w a r t a n
sicwariP sincnire? o p p o i 't u i i i t v o f m a k i n g s u n d r y U n f a v o r a b l e stric-
oii iliis pn. s i i g e con- ' , . , , t . .
tnres on tlie technical language of L o g i e , in
r e g a r d t o Avhi ch h e a s s e r t s , t h e a d e j i t s a r e n o t ,
to this day, u n a n i m o u s l y agreed and a d d s , t h a t i t is a n e x t r a o r -
i l i n. ar y c i r c u m s t a n c e , t h a t :i d i s c o v e r y o n w h i c h , in L o r d jMonbod-
d o ' s o] ) i ni o t i , f/ie ir/wlc truth o f the s y l lo g i s m depiemls, s h o u l d b e o f
so v e r y r e c e n t a d a t e . ' X o w t h i s is . a n o t h e r e x . a m j d e w h i c h m :
s e r v e t o j u i t y o u o n y o u r g u a r d a g a i n s t a n y c o n f i d e n c e in t h e a s s e r
tions and arginnents e \ e n o f learned men. Y o u m a y be surpriseil
t o h e a r , t h a t s o f a r is E n g e n i n s f r o m b e i n g t h e a u t h o r o f t h i s o b -
. v e r v a t i o n , a n d o f t h e t e r m p o t e u t i i d a s a] )] i l i ed t o a l o g i c a l w h o l e ,
t h a t b o t h a r e t o b e f o i n n l , w i t h f e w e x c e p t i o n s , in al l t h e o l d e r s y s
te m s o f Logic. To <|UOte o n l y o n e , b u t o n e o f t h e b e s t a n d best
known, that of Burgersdyck, he says, s ] t e ; i k i n g of the logical
m IioIc: E t q u i a u n i v e r s a l e s u b j e c t a s sp e c i e s ot i i u l i v id u a no)i actu
< - o n t i n e t s e d ] ) O t e n t i a ; f a c t u m e s t , u t h o c t o t u m d i c t u m s i t totum p o -
c u m cet ei â; s ] ) c c i e s t o t i u s d i c a n t u r to tu m actm de, q u i a p a r t e s
siias actii c o n t i n e n t .* '- ^\rlsto-tle n o t i c e s t h i s d i i f e r e n c e o f t h e t w o
wholes.*
I T a v n i g t h u s t e r m i n a t e d t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f c o n c c j i t s as r ec ip ro -
4a l l y r e l a t e d i n t h e ] e r ] ) c i i d i c u l a r l i n e o f S u b o r d i n a t i o n , a n d in t h e
q u a n t i t y o f laxtension, in so far as t h e y are viewed as co n t . a i u i n g
<l : i sses, I n m s i , b e f o r e proceeding to consider them u n d e r this
<pi;mlity in tlie h o r i z o n t a l li n e o f C o o r d i n a t i o n , .state to you two
t e r m s b y w l i i c h c h a r a c t e r s o r c o n e e ] ) t s a r c d e n o m i n a t e d , in so f ar as
t h e y .are v i e w e t l a s d i f f e r e n c e s b y w h i c h a c o n c e p t is d i v i d e d into
t w o s u b o r d i n a t e parts,
^ X X . V V I I T . T h e c b a r a c t e r , o r c o m p l e m e n t o f c l i a r a c t e i s, b y
which ;i l o w e r g e n u s or species is d i s t i n -
par, x x x v i i L Gen- gui . s l i c d , b o t l i froi i i t l i o g e i i i i s t o w h i c h i t is
r l c , S p c e lf lo , a n d In- ~
d i v i d u a l D if f e r e n c e .Subordinate, and from tlio other genera or
.species witli whicli it is coiirdin.atod, is
called the O enerir <jr the Sjiecifie J)ifer<<'e {^lacfyojia ytviKij,
and dOiKr), d if'e r o ttla generica, d ljfere u tiu s p e c if ca).
T h e .sum o f eharaeter.s, again, by which a singular or individn:;]
1 K U m 'n tt, v o l . ii ., r. iii , ( 1; U 'erli. vol. 3 V ifk; T i r n - a - . [I, II. c i !)' T i

. p y y j a r i f l p . 2fiO, t i o l e . - r r n . J- .d. J
- 1 . , c . \ i v . , p . 13. o d . l O V i . I.d
L ec t. XI. LOGIC. 147
thin g is discrimin.ated from tlie species u n d er which it stands

and from other individual things along with whieh it stands,
is called tlio Individual or Singular or Numerical Difference
{differentia individualis vel singularis vel tiumerica).*
T w o things are thus said to be generically different, inasmuch as

they lie ajiart in tw o different g e n e r a ; sjiecifi-
E x n lic a t io n n* T /f i .
cally difterent, inasmuch as the y he apa rt in two
different species; individually or numerically different, inasmuch as
the y do n ot constitute one and the same reality. T h u s animal and
stone m a y b e said to be generically d iffe ren t; horse and ox to be
specifically d ifferent; H ighflyer and Eclipse to
G e n er ic an d S p e c ific , . . .
D ifleren c' i"*niencally or individually diflcreut. I t is
evident, however, th a t as all genera and species,
except the highest of the one and the lowest of the o the r m ay be
styled indifferently either g en e ra or sjiecies, generic difference and
specif c difference are in general only various expressions o f the same
tiling; and, accordingly, the term s heterogeneous and homogeneous,
which ajiply properly only to the correlation o f genera, are usually
ajijilied equally to the correlation of species.
Individual existences c.an only be perfectly discrim inated in P e r
ception, external or interiuil, and th e ir numerical
g u la r DifTerence.
differences are endless ;' for o f all *jiossible contra-
dictory attrib utes the one or the o the r must, on
the princijiles of Contradiction and E xcluded Middle, be considered
as belonging to each iiidividiuil thing. On the other hand, sjiecies
and genera m ay be perfectly discriminated by one or few charac
ters. F o r example, man, is distinguished from every genus or
species o f animal by the one character of rationality; triangle, from
every other class of m.athematical figures, by the single char.acter of
trllatereditg. It is, therefore, f ir easier adequately to descrilie a
genus 01 ' species than an individual ex iste n ce; as in the la tte r case,
we iiiiist select, out of the infinite m u ltitude o f characters whicli an
individual coinjirisos, a few o f the m ost prominent, or those hy
which the th in g may most easily be recognized. P u t as those
which we thus select are only a few, and are only selected witli
reference to our faculty of apjirehension and onr cajiacity o f m em
ory, they alw.ays constitute only a jietty, and oftzai n ot the most
essential p art o f the numerical differences by which the individuality
of the object is determined.
H a v in g now te rm inate d the consideration o f th e Subordination of
1 K r u g , L o g ik , 45. E d . 2 K ru g , L o g ik , 45. p. 134-5. - Ed.

14S L OGI C. L kct. XI
concojits under E x ten sion , it is only necessary to obsei-ve that their

Coordination under that q uantity affords n oth in g which reqiiiies
ex|>lanalion, excep t w h at is contained in the fo llo w in g jiaragrajih :
V X X X IX . XotioiLS, in so far as th ey arc considered the

coordinate species o f the same gen u s niav
a;::;on"of"ncept; Conspecies : and in so far as Cot;.
species are considered to be different but
not contradictory, th ey ai-e jn-opcrly called D iscrete or D is
ju n c t X u tio n s (^notiones discrette vel disjuncU c). T h e term
D isp u ru tc {n o lio )^s disparatcn) is frequently ajiplied to this
o]t]iosition o f notions, but less jiroperly ; for this ought to he
reserved to d en o te the corresponding o)ipositifm ot notions in
the qu.intity o f Compi'ehension.
I conclu d e the consideration o f concepts, as d e p e n d e n t on E x t e n

sion, by a statem ent o f the tw o general laws, by wliicli both Sub-
oriiinatioii and Coordination o f notions, under this quantity, are
regulatetl.
XT., '^riic w hole cla ssifin tin u i.f things by Genera and
Sp ecies is govern ed bv tw o laws. T h e one
these, the law o f '.Homogeneity {princi-
subordinationand Co- p iu u i Jlo m o g cn eita tis), T h a t IlOW (lif-
ordmation, under Ex- SOCVCr UiaV be ailV tWO COnCO))tS,
teiiftion, are r gul .t- v * i ?
cd.-VIZ., o." nomoc - they both still stand snbordiiinted under
neity and Heterogc- soiiic liiglicr (imcc|'t; ill otlicr words, tliiims
nelty. . . . . .
the most dissimilar must, in certain respects,
be similar. T h e other, the law o f D cferogeneitg {p rin c ip im n
J/t tt-rogt.m ifa tis), i.s, T hat every concept contains other co n
cepts under it; .and, therefore, when divided proxim atcly, we
dc'ccmd alwiiys to other concc])ts, luit never to in dividuals; in
other words, things the most h o m o g en eo u s s im ila r must,
ill certain respect.s, be h e terog en eou s dissimilar.
O f these tw o hiws, tli( former, as the ])riuei])1e which enables,

.and in f;ct eoin|iels, ns to rise from siieeies to
K.vpiicntioii. <_rcniis, is th.at which d eterm ines the itroeess o f
.(III r i i i i- a l i o ii am i ', . . . , . . ,
-p..-iii.-;.iioii. Genenlieatioii ; and tin- latter, as the ]naneij)le
which euablos, ami in fact compels, us to find
al\v'._ I <cic.s iimli'r a genus, is that which regulates the process o f
.Speeific.ition. T h e .second o f these* laws, it is (viilent, is only true
i'leally, only true in theory. 4'ho infinite divisibility o f concepts,
L e c t. X L LOGIC. 1 -1 9
like the infinite divisibility of sjiace and time, e.xists only in speciihi-
tion. A nd tliat it is theoretically v.alid, will be
l,p.w of iietcrogc- iiuuiifest, if WC take two siinil:ir ciaiccjits, th a t
neityoueonly in the- concepts with a small ditfcrence: let us
then cle.arly represent to onrsel ves tliis difference,
and we shall find th a t how small soever it may be, wo c.an alw.ays
conceive it still less, Avilliont being nothing, tliat i.s, we can divide it
a d in fn itu m ; b n t as each o f these intinitc.simaliy diverging ditfer-
(aices affords always the condition of new sjiecies, it is ev id en t tliat
we can nev er end, th a t is, reach the individual, except per sid tw n }
T here is ano ther law, whicli K a n t proninl^mtes in the Critique
o f P u r e R e a so n ; and whieli may be called the law o f Logical
Aftiiiity, or the law of Logical Contiiuiity. It
Law ofLogicn! Ai- jg T liat IIO tw o coordinate species touch
so closelv on each other, bnt th a t we can con
ceive o th e r or others interm ediate. T h u s m an and oraiuf-outang,
elephant and rhinoceros, are jiroximate species, b u t still how grea t
is tlie difference between tliem, and hoAV m any species can we not
imagine to ourselves as possibly inte rjac en t?
T his law I have, however, thi'owii out of account, as n o t univer
sally true. F o r it breaks down when we ajiply
G ro n n d s o n w in c h niathematical elassifie.ations. T h u s all an-
th is la w m u st bo re- , ^ . . t-,
, <des are either acute or right or obtuse, h o r
je c t e d . ^ _
between those three coordinate sjiociGS or g enera
no others can jiossibly be interjected, thoiigli wo may always subdi
vide each of these, in various inauiiers, into a m ultitu d e o f lower
sjiecies. T his law is also not true when the coordinate species are
distinguished by contradictory attributes. T h ere can in these be
no interjacent sjiecies, on the jirincijile of E xclu ded Middle. F o r
e x a n ijile : in the Cuvierian cla.ssification tlie genns a n im a l is
divided into the two species of vertehrata and invertehrata, th a t is,
into anim.'ils with a backbone with a sjiiiial m a rro w ; and animals
w ithout a bac k b o n e w ithout a sjiin.a] marrow. Is it jiossible to
conceive th e jiossibillty of any interm ediate class?
I C f K ru g L ogik. 5 45 p. 135, a n d pp. 1.35. 3 B a c lim a n n , [L o g ik . [ Gl. p p . 102, 1 0 3 .

137. Ei) E d ] [C o m p a r e F r ie s , L o g ik , [ 2 1. E d )
1. 510. e d . R o s e n k r a u z , C f. K r u g , L ogik,
p. 138. E d .
LECTURE XII.
S 'J O I C II K I O I. O G Y.
.SECTION II. TI I E PRO D U C T S OF THOUGHT.
I. KNNORMATIC
III. RECIIRIOCAL REL.VTIONS OF CONCEPTS.
B. QUANTITY OF COMPREHENSION.
H a v in g now conclntled tlic consiilerntion of tlic Reciprocal R e

lation of Conccjil.s as deterniinetl by the quantity
R fc ip r o c a l R e la tio n Extension, I jiroceed to treat of that rela
ol' i io lio iis in C oin p rc
lic n s io n
tion as regulated hy the counter quantity of
Conqirehension. On this take the following
jiaragrapli:
^ XLI. W hen two or more concejits are comjiared together

according lo llieir Coinjireliension, they
P a r. X L I. id e n ti- either coiiicidc or tliev do not: that is, they
c a l a n d D if fe r e n t n o - .
lions. : either do or do not eoinjirise the same char
acters. Xotions are thus divided into Iden
tical and J)ijfercnt {conceptns identici et diversi). The Iden
tical are eitlier .ihsolntely or rel:itively the same. Of notions
Ahsoliilily Jdcnfical there :ire :icliia]ly none; notions Relatb'ely
Jdiiilital iiiv c;i]lc<l, likewise, Similar or Caynate {nofioaes
similes, iiffhies, cmjiaila ) ; :ind if the common attrihntes, hy
which they are allied, he jiro.viniate and necess.iry, they are
called R( riprocatiny or Convertible {notiones recijn'ocae, con-
V( rtihiles)}
In exjilanation of this jiaragrajih, it is only necessary lo say :i

word in reg.ard to notions .ihsolntely Ideiitic:d. That such are
1 [l-jiser, L o g i k , 3J. ]
JjECT. x ii. l o g ic . 151
impossible, is manifest. Fo r, it being assumed th a t such exist,

as absolutely identical, the y necessarily have no
Expiiciition. differences by wliicb tbey can be distinguished ;
Absolutely Identical i ^ i x i- i i i .!
. . ...
n o t io n s im p o s s ib le .
b ut wliat arc imliscernilile Cx.n be known, neither
as tw o concepts, n or as two identical concejits;
because we are, exhypothesi, unable to discriminate th e one from
th e other. T h e y arc, therefore, to us as one. N otions absolutely
identical can only bc adm itted, if, ab stracting our view altugctlicr
from the concepts, wc denom inate those notions identical, whicb
li.ive reference to one and the same object, and which arc conceived
cith er by different minds, or by tlic same jn iiid , b u t a t different
times. Tlicir difference is, therefore, one not intrinsic and neces
sary, b n t only extrinsic and contingent. Ttikeii in this sense, rfi.s'c-
lutely Identical notions will be only a less correct expression for
P eciprocatin g or Convertible notions, *

^ X L II. Considered u n d er th e ir Com prehension, ccneejits,;
again, in relation to each other, are said to
sm ouo?cLepT either Congruent or Agreeing, inasmuch
as th e y may be eounecled in tlio u g h t; or
Conflictivc, inasmuch ns they cannot, Tlie eoiitlietiun eon.sti-
tu te s the Opposition o f notions ^ t o uvTiKciaSai, ojipositio). This
is twofold ; 1, Im m ediate or Contradictory Opposition, called
likewise Pepugnance ( t o avre/iart/cws dvriKua-Bai, avTLcfiaai^, opposi-
tio im m ed ia ta sive contradictoria, re p u g n a n tia )\ and, P , M e
diate or Contrary OjlpOSition ( t o AavTtw? di'TiKeiaSui, AapTiorr^s,
ojipositio m ediata vel contraria). T h e former em erges when
one concept abolishes (toUit), directly or by siiiijde negation,
w h a t ano ther establishes [jônit); the latter, Avhen one concejit
does this not directly or by simple negation, b u t th rough the
affirmation o f som ething else,
I d e n tity is not to be co rfo u n d ed with A g re em en t or Congni-

ence, nor D iversity with Conffictioii. All iden-
E x p iic a tio n . tical coiicejits arc, indeed, c o n g r u e n t; b u t all
I d e n t it y a n d A g r e e - coiigniont iiotioiis are uot identical. T h u s
m e n t, D iv e r s it y and ^ .
fo n flic tio n . ****<^ vh'tuc, bcautg and riches, m a g n a n im ity
*^*5 *
and stature, are congru ent notions, inasmiieli as,

ill th inkin g a thing, th e y can easily be combined in tho notion we
form o f it, although in themselves very different from each other.
1 [E sser , L o g ik , 36, p . 79.] C f. K r u g , L o g ik , 2 C f. D r o b is c h , L o g ik , p . 17, j 25 seq.

i 87, a n d A u r a . i. E d .
152 LOGIC. L e c t. XII,
I n like manner, all conflietive notions arc diverse or different notions,

for nnles.s different, they conld not be m ntnally c o n llic tiv e; b u t on
the olliei* liand, all different concejits aic n ot eonfiictive ; b u t those
only whose ditl'erenee is so grea t th a t each involves the negation of
the o t h e r : as, foi examjile, r/rC/e :md vice, heanty and deform ity,
m d t h and poverty. T im s these notions are hy jireem inenee, /car
k o fje . said to he although it is true that, in tliinking, we
can ojijiose, or jilaee in antithesis, n o t only different, hnt even id e n
tical, concejits.
'Po sjieak now of the distinction o f C on tradictory and C o n tra ry
Ojiposition, or o f C ontradiction and C o n tra rie ty ;
C o u in u lic t o n ' a n d i . i / t
< iin tr a r y ( ii> position.
ot tliese _ tlie lormer _ Contradiction is
cxeinjilitied in the ojijiosite.s, yellov), not yeh
ion, xvedkiny, not irtdlciny. ITere each notion is directly, ininiedi,
ately, and ahsolntely, I'ejiugmmt to the other, th e y are recijirocal
negatives. T his ojijiosition is, tliercffoi'e, jirojierly called th a t of
Contradiction or o f I te piiy n an ce; and the ojijiosing notions th e m
selves are contra'Lctory or rcpuynant notions, in a single word, con
tradictories. 'Plie latter, or Contrai-y Ojijiosition, is exemjilified in
the ojijiosites, ydloir, bine, red, etc., tcalking, .standing, lying, etc.
In the ease o f Contradielîry Ojijiosition, th e re are only two
conflietive attrih n tes coneeivahle; and o f these one or o the r must
he jiredicated o f the ohject th ought. In the ease o f Coiiti-ary Ojijio
sition, on the o the r hand, moi'c than tw o eoiillietive eliar.acters are
jiossihle, and it is not, tlierefore, necessary, th a t if one of these he
not Jiredicated of an ohject, any one o th e r must. Thus, though I
cannot at once sit and stand, and conse(jnently sittin g and standing
.are attrib u tes each severally ineomjiatihle with the otlier; y et I may
exist n either sitting nor standing, I m ay lie; h n t I must either sit
or not sit, 1 m ust eith er stand or not stand, etc, Snch, in general,
arc the ojijiositioiis o f Contradiction and C o n tra riety .
It is now necessary to say a word in regard to llieir logical sig
nificance, Im m e d iate or C o n tra dictory Ojijio-
ij.gicai Hignificuiice gJtion constitutes, in Logic, .illirmative and neg-
o f ( o n lr a d ic t o r y a n d . . i i
ConiraryoppoHiiion. notioiis. L y th e former som ething is
jiosited or aflirmed {ponitur, affirmatur) ; hy
the latter, som ething is snhlated or denied {tollitar, m g a ta r ). This,
liow eicr, is only done jiolontially, in so far as concejits are viewed
ajiarl from ju d g m e n ts, for .actual aflirination and actual n e g a t.oii
siijijiO'C an act <tf j u d g m e n t ; hnt, at the same time, in so far ns two
((inccjits .affiird the elements, and, if hronght into relation, necessi-
lalc the formation o f an afllrinative or negative jirojiositioii, they
may he considered as in tlieinselvcs negative and aftirinative,
L e c t . X II. L O G IC . 153
Further, it is evident that a notion can only be logically denied

by a contradiction. For when we abstract IVoni the matter of a
notion, as Logic does, it is impossible to know that one concejit
excludes another, unle.'<s tiie one be supposed the negation of the
other. Logically considered, all jiositive or afiirniative notions are
congruent, that is, they can, as far as their form is concerned, be all
conceived or thought together; but whether in reality they can
coexist that c.annot be decided by logical rules. If, therefore,
we would, witli logical jirecision and certainty, ojipose things, we
must ojijiose them not as contraries (yl B (J), but as contradicto
ries (xl not A B not B C not C). Hence it also follows,
that tliere is no negation conceivahle without the cdnconiitant con-
cejition of an atlii-mation ; for we cannot deny a thing to exist, with
out having a notion of the existence which is denied. '
There arc also certain other relations subsisting between notions,
compared together in reference to their Comprehension.
^ X L III.
Notions, as compared with each other in respect
of their Comprehension, are further distin-
sionotmn ^ intrin- g|,igPe(| Intrinsic and Extrinsic. The
former are made nji o f those attributes
which are essential, and, consequently, necessary to the object
of the notion : these attributes, severally considered, are called
Essentials, or Internal Denominations (ovauoBt], essentialia, de-
nominationes interna;, intrinsicw), and, conjunctly, tlie Essence
(ovala, essentia). The latter, on the contrary, consist of those
attributes which belong to the object of the notion only in a
contingent manner, or by jiossibility; and which are, therefore,
styled Accideiits, or Extrinsic Denominations (avyfiefir]koto,
accidentia, denominattones externm or extrinsicce).-
So much for the mutual relations of notions in reference to their

Comprehension, when considered not in the relations of Involution
and Coordination.
Having thus given you the distinctions of no-
in v o iu fio n a n d Co- tioiis, as foiiiidcd O il their more general relations
ord ination of C o n ce p ts u u fle r th e q u a iititv o f C o m jire h e n s io n , I n o w
under C o niprelien- , i , i
S io n ,- th ese w h o lly p ro c e e d to c o iis id c r th e m u n d e r th is q u a n tity
n eg lecte d by lo g ician s. in their proximate relations; that is, in the rela
tion of Involution and the relation of Coordi
nation, These relations have been, I may say, altogether neglected
1 K r u g , L o g ik , p . 118120. E d . 2 K r u g , L o g ik , 3 9 , E d .
20
154 LOGIC. L e c t. XII
by lo g ician s; an d , in c o n s e q u e n c e o f this, t h e y have necessarily

o v e r l o o k e d o n e o f t h e t w o g r e a t d i v i s i o n s o f all
H en ce re a s o n in g in r o a s o u i u g ; f o r all o u r r e a s o n i n g is e i t h e r f r o m
coin)>reliension over- i i
looked by lo g icia n s. ^he w h o le to th e p a r ts a n d f ro m th e jiarts to th e
w h o l e , in t h e q u a n t i t y o f e . xt e n s i o n, o r f r o m t h e
w h o le to th e p a r ts a n d from t h e p a r ts to t h e whole, in t h e q u a n t i t y
o f com ju'chension. In each quantity there is a d e d u c t i v e , a n d in
e a c h q u a n t i t y t h e r e is a n i n d u c t i v e , i n f e r e n c e ; a n d i f t h e r e a s o n i n g
u n d e r eith e r o f these t w o q u a n titie s w e r e to be o m itte d , it o u g h t,
jieihaps, to h a v e been t h e o n e w h ich t h e logicians h a v e exclusively
cultivated. F o r t h e i j u a n t i t y o f e x t e n s i o n is a c r e a t i o n o f t h e m i n d
itself, a n d o n l y c r e a t e d t h r o u g h , a s a b s t r a c t e d from, t h e q u a n t i t y o f
c o m p r e h e n s i o n ; w h e r e a s t h e q u a n t i t y o f c o n q i r e h e n s i o n is a t o n c e
given in t h e v e r y n a t u r e o f t h i n g s . T h e f o r m e r q u a n t i t y is t h u s
s e c o n d a r y a n d factitiou.s, t h e l a t t e r p r i m a r y a n d n a t u r a l .
T h a t logicians should hav e neg lected th e process o f reasoning
w h i c h is c o m j i e t e u t b e t w e e n t h e i a r t s a n d w h o l e
nut p ro b a b ly con- q u . a n t i t y o f c o n q i r e h e n s i o n , is t h e more
le m p ia ic d by A ris to ) - e i n a r k a b l e , a.s, a f t e r A r i s t o t l e , t h e y h a v e i n g e n
eral a r t i c u l a t e l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d t h e t w o q u a n t i t i e s
from each o ther, and, after A ristotle, m a n y o f t h e m h a v e explicitly
e n o u n c e d t h e s p e c i a l Law o n w h i c h t h e l o g i c o f c o n q i r e h e n s i o n p r o
ceeds. T h i s p r i n c i p l e e s t a b l i s h e d , b u t n o t a j i j i l i e d , is c x j i r e s s c d in
t h e a x i o m T h e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e c h a r a c t e r is t h e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e
t h i n g ; or, T h e p r e d i c a t e o f t h e p r e d i c a t e is t h e predicate of the
subject [Mota n o tw est n o ta rei i p s iu s ; P rte d ica tm n jn re d ic a ti est
p r o d i o i t u m sidijecM). T h i s a x i o m is e n o u n c e d by A ristotle;' and
its a p p l i c a t i o n , I h a v e l it tle d o u b t , w a s fu lly u n d e r s t o o d b y h i m . In
f act, 1 t h i n k i t e v e n p o s s i b l e t o s h o w i n d e t a i l t h a t h i s w h o l e a n a l y
sis o f t h e s y l l o g i s m has reference to b o th quantities, and that the
gr c. at alystniseness o f h i s J^rior A n a l y t i c s , t h e t r e a t i s e i n w h i c h h e
d e v e l o p s t h e g e n e r a l f o r m s o f r e a s o n i n g , arise s f ro m this, t h a t h e
h a s e n d e a i o r e d t o rise t o f o r m u h c sn t l i ci en t l y g e n e r a l t o e x p r e s s a t
once w h a t w as c o m m o n to b o th k i n d s ; an a t t e n q i t so far b e y o n d
th e intelligence o f s u b s e q u e n t logicians, t h a t th e y h av e w h o lly mis-
n m lc r sto o d ;md p e r v e r te d his d o ctrin e. T hey understand this d o c
t r i n e , o n l y a s a p j i l i e d t o t h e r e a s o n i n g in e x t e n s i v e q u a n t i t y ; a n d i n
r e l a t i o n t o t h i s k i n d o f r e a s o n i n g , t h e y h a v e c e i t a i n l y m a d e ji.alpa-
b l e a n d e a s y w h a t i n A i ' i s t o t l e is a b s t r a c t a n d di ffi cul t. B u t then
t h e y di<l n o t o b s e r v e t h a t A n s t o t l c s d o c t r i n e a p p l i e s t o t w o s j i e c i e s ,
of w h i c h t h e y o n l y c o n . s i d e r o n e . I t w a s c e r t a i n l y p r o p e r t o br i i vg
1 C ateg., c . li\. E d .
L e c t. XII. LOGIC. 155
down the Aristotelic logic from its high abstraction, and to deliier
its rules iu proximate application to each o f the two several species
of reasoning. This would have been to fill up the picture of which
the Stagirite had given the sketch. But by viewing tlie analytic as
exclusively rel.ative to the reasoning in extension, though they sim
plified the one-half of syllogistic, they altogether abolished the
othei-. This mistake this partial conception of the science is
common to all logicians, ancient and modern ; for in so far as I am
aware, no one has observed, that of the quantities of comprehension
nnd extension, each affords a reasoning jiroper to itself; and no one
has noticed that the doctrine of Aristotle has reference indifferently
to both; although some, I know, having perceived in general that
we do reason under the quantity of comprehension, have on that
founded an objection to all reasoning under the quantity of exten
sion, that is, to the whole science of Logic as at present constituted.
I h.-ive, iu some degree, at present spoken of matters which properly
find their development in the sequel; and I have made this autici-
p.atiou, in order that you should attend particularly to the rel.atiou
of concepts, under the quantity of comprehension, as containing
and contained, inasmuch as this affords the foundation of one, and
that not the least important, of the two great branches, into Avhich
all reasoning is divided.
% X L IV . AVe have seen th.at of the two quantities of no

tions each affords a logical AA^hole and
P a r . x L i v .^ in v o - Parts ; and that, by oiiposite errors, the one
lu ti o n a n d C o o rd lu a - , ,
tion. 01 these has, through over inclusion, been
called the logical; Avhllst the other ha.s,
through over exclusion, been called the metaphgsical. Thus,
in respect of their Compreheiision, no less than of their Exten
sion, notions stand to each other in a relation of Containing
and Contained ; and this relation, which, in the one quantity
(extension) is styled that of Subordination, may in the other
(comprehension), for distinctions sake, be styled that of Invo
lution. Coordination is a term Avhich may be applied in either
quantity.'
In the quantity o f comprehension, one notion is involved in
another, when it forms a part of the sum total of characters,
Avhich together constitute the comprehension of that other;
and two notions are iu this quantity coordinated, when, Avhilst
neither comprehends the other, both are immediately compre
hended in the same lower concept.
I (Cf. D ro b isc h , L ogik, [[ 22 ,2 3 . F is c h e r, L ogik, [ 49.]
156 LOGIC. L ec t. X n
F r o m Avliat has been formerly stated, you are aw are t h a t the

n n a n tity of comiirehension, belonging to a no-
E x p lic a lio u . . ' .
tion, IS the comjdement oi cliaracters which it
contains in i t ; and that this quantity is at its maximum in an indi
vidnal. Thus the notion of the individnal Socrates, contains in it,
besides a mnltitnde of others, the characters of Son o f Sophronis-
cas. Athenian, Greek, Kuropean, man, animal, organized being, etc.
But thcsc notions, these characters, are not all equally proximate
.iiid im m ediate:/ some are onlv q-iven in and through
O O others. Thus
the character Ûhcnian is applicable to Socrates only in and th rough
th a t o f Son o f Sojdtroniscas, th e character o f Greek, only in
;ind th rough th a t o i Athenian, th e character of Furopean, only
in nnd throngii th a t o f Greek, and so fo rth ; in o th e r words, Soc
rates is an A th en ian only as the son o f Soplironiscus, only a G reek
as an A then ian, only a E u ro p e an as a Greek, only a man as a Eiiro-
jiean, only an animal as a man, only an organized being as an ani
mal. Those characters, therefore, th a t are given in and th ro u g h
others, stand to these others in the relation of parts toAvholes; and
it is only on th e principle P a r t o f the p art is a p a r t of the wholc,
th a t the rem oter jiarts arc the parts o f th e prim a ry whole. T hus,
if we know t h a t the individual Socrates co m prehends the character
son o f Sophroniscns, and th a t the eharaeler son o f Sophroniscus
comjirclicnds the character Athenian ; we are the n w arranted in
saying th a t Socrates coniprelieiids Athenian, in o th e r Avords, th a t
Socrates is an Athenian. T h e examjile here taken is too simjile to
slioAv in Avhat m a nner onr notions are originally evolved out of the
more comjtlcx into the more simple, and th a t the progress o f seienee
is n o thing more tha n a jirogressive unfolding into distinct conscions-
ne.^^s of th e various elem ents com prehended in the character.s, origi-
n.ally know n to ns in tlieir vague or confused totality.
It is a f a m o u s qne .stio n a n i o r i g j iliilo so p lie r s , 'Whether o n r
k n o A v le dO
q e c o m m e n c e s Avith the Cq*e ii e ra l o r Avith
C o n iro v trey regard- .^j,g i n d i v i d u a l , A v l i c t l i e r children fir.st einjiloy
i n g t h e P n m u m C ogni- / i t i
co m m on, or lirst einjiloy proper, names, in tins
controversy, th e reasoners have severally proved
the opposite opinion to he nntenahle ; hut the qne.stion is at once
solved hy sh o w in g th at a third opinion i.s th e true, viz., that onr
knoAvledge coinmericos Avitli the confused and comjilex, Avliich, as
regarded in one jioint o f v ie w or in another, m ay easily he mistaken
either for the individnal, or for the general. T h e discussion o f this
prohlem belongs, lioAvevor, to P sy c h o lo g y , not to Logic.' It is suffi
cient to say in general, that all ohjects are jircsented to us in
1 S e Lectures on M etaphysics, 1. xxxri., p . 493 seq. Ed.

L e c t. X H . LOGIC. 157
complexity; that we are at first more struck with the points of

resemblance than with the jioints of contrast; that the earliest no
tions, and, consequently, the earliest terms, are those that con-e-
s])ond to this synthesis, Avhile the notions and the terms arising
from an analysis of this synthesis into its jiarts, are of a subsecjuent
formation. But though it be foreign to the province of Logic to
develoj) the history of this procedure; yet, as this procedure is
natural to the human mind. Logic must contain the form by Avliich
it is regulated. It must not only enable us to reason from tbe sim-
jile and general to the comjdex and individual; it must, likewise,
enable ns to I'ever.so tbe jiroeess, and to reason from the comjilex
and individual to tbe simjile and the general. And this it does by
that relation of notions as containing and contained, given in' the
quantity of comprehension. The nature of this reasoning can
indeed only be shoAvn, when Ave come to treat
In C o m p r e h e n s io n , of syllogism ; at jirescnt, I only request that
tlie i n v o lv in g n o tio n ^^.jjj j^g.,,, j mjnd the relations of Involu-
is th e m o re c o m p le x ; . i t , i i x- x i
. , , ,,
tlie in v o lv e d , tlie m o r e
tion and Coordination, in Avhi eh notion s stand
s im p le . to each other in the Avhole or q uantity o f c o m
jirehension. In this qu an tity the in v o lv in g n o
tion or Avhole is the more com p lex notion ; th e in v o lv ed notion or
jmrt is the more simjile. T h u s pigeon as co m p rehen d in g bird,
bird ns com prehen d in g feathered, fea th ere d as com p reh en d in g warin-
blqoded, warm-blooded as co iujirehending heart xdth f o u r cavities,
heart with f o u r cavities ns comjirehendiiig breathing with lungs, are
severally to each other as notion s in v o lv in g and in volved . Again,
notions, in the Avhole o f comjirehension, are coordinated Avhen th ey
stand to geth er as c on stitu tin g parts o f the no-
c o o u i in a t io n iu C o m - which th ey are both im m ed ia tely com-
p relien .sion . ^
T h u s the characters ovipetrous and
jirehended.
warm-blooded, heart with f o u r cavities, and breathing by lungs, ns
al! im m ed iately eontribnting to iiinke uji the coiujirebension o f the
notion bird, are, in this resjiect, severally considerei] as its coordi
nate jiarts. T h ese characters are not relative and correlative not
containing and cout.ained. F o r Ave have oviparous animals Avhich
are not w arm-blooded, and Avann-blooded animals Avbicli are not
oviparous. A g ain , it is true, I believe, tbat all Avarm-blooded ani
mals have hearts Avith four cavities (tw o auricles nnd tw o ventricles),
and that all animals Avitb siieli hearts breathe b y lungs and not by
gills. B u t then, in this ease, Ave have no right to snjijiose that the
fii-st o f these characters comjirehends the second, and that the sec
ond com prehends the third. F o r Ave should be equally entitled to
assert, that all animals breathing b y lun gs possessed hearts o f four
158 LOGIC. L e c t . XU.
c av it ies , a n d t h a t all a n i m a l s w i t h s u c h h e a r t s a r e w a r m - b l o o d e d .
T h e y ar e t h u s t h o u g h t as m u t u a l l y t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f e a c h o t h e r ;
a n d w h i l s t w e m a y n o t k n o \ v t h e i r reciiiroCal d e p e n d e n c e , t h e y are,
l i o w e v c r , c o n c e i v e d b y us, as on a n e q u a l f o o t i n g o f c o o r d i n a t i o n .
( T h i s a t l e a s t i s t r u e o f t h e t w o a t t r i b u t e s heart w i t h f o u r cavities
a m i h rc a th in y b y l u n g s ; f o r t h e s e m u s t b e v i e w e d as c o o r d i n a t e ;
but, taken t o g e t h e r , t h e y m . a y b e v i e w^ e d a s jointly necessitating
the a t t r i b u t e o f warm-bloocb-d, a n d , t h e r e f o r e , m a y be viewed as
c o m p r e h e n d i n g it.) O n this I give y o u th e follow ing paragraph.
^ XLV. N o t i o n s c o o r d in a te d in t h e w h o l e o f com]>rehen-
sion, are, in respect of the discriminating
, P a r. X L V . c o b rd i- c h a r a c t e r s , d i f f e r e n t w i t h o u t an}' sim i l ar i t y .
n a tio n o f n o tio n s in i i i rr.
Comprehension. hcy are thus, tanto, a b s o l u t e l y d i f f e r
e n t ; a n d , a c c o r d i n g l y , in p r o p r i e t y a r e calle d
D i s p a r a t e K o t i o n s {notiones disparates). On the other hand,
n o t i o n s c o o r d i n a t e d in t h e q u a n t i t y o r w h o l e o f e x t e n s i o n , are,
in reference to th e objects b y t h e m d isc rim in ated , different (or
diverse) ; but, as w e h a v e seen, t h e y have always a common
a t t r ib u t e o r a tt r ib u t e s in w h ich t h e y are alike. T h u s t h e y are
o n l y r e l a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t ( o r d i v e r s e ) ; a n d , in lo gi cal l a n g u a g e ,
a r e p r o p e r l y c a l l e d D i s j u n c t o r D is c r e te N o t i o n s {notiones^ dis-
ju nctce, discretCB)}
I [D ro b isch , JLogt'Ar, 23, 24. Cf. F is c h e r, hogik^ 49 t t se j.]

LECTURE ^
S T O I C IT K I O L O G Y .
SECTION I I . OF TII E PRODUCTS OF T H O U G H T .
II.-A P O rH A X T IC , OR THE D O C T R IN E OF JU D G M EN T S.
JU D G M EN TS. T H E IR NATURE AND D IV IS IO N S .
H a v i n g terminntecl the D o c trin e o f Concepts, Ave noAv proceed

to the D o c trin e o f Jn d gin ents. Concejits and J u d g m e n ts, as I
originally stated, are n ot to he vieAVed as the
D o c trin e o f J u d g - o f different operations, for ev'ery concejit,
as the product o f som e p recedin g act o f C om
parison, is in fact a ju d g m e n t fixed and ratified in a sign. B u t in
eonsoqnence o f this acquired jierinancnce, con cep ts afford the great
means for all su h sequcnt comparisons and ju d g m en ts, and as this
no\A' forms their principal relation, it hehoA'ed, for conA-enicnce,
th ro w in g ou t o f vieAA' their original gen e a lo g y , to consider N o tio n s
as the first jirodnct o f the U n d erstan d in g , and as the conditions or
e lem en ts o f the second. con cep t m a y be vicAAed as an im plicit
or u n d evelo ped ju d g m e n t ; a j u d g m e n t as an exp licit or d ev elo p ed
concept. B u t aa g m ust i i o a v descen d to articulate statem ents.
^ X L Y I. T o J u d g e {Kpiveivj ju diciire) is to recognize the

relation o f co iignieiice or o f confiiction, in
menr-what. AA'liicli tAVO coiiccjits, tw'O individual things,
or a concejit and an individnal, compared
together, stand to each other.'" T h is recognition, considered as
an internal conscionsnc.s.s, is called a Judgment (Xoyos a.Tro(f>avTL-
Kos, ju d ic iu m ) ; considered as expressed in language, it is called
a Projyosition or P red ica tio n (aTro'câms, Trporao-ts, 8tao-Tr//za,
1 T h e v erb K p iv e t v , to j u d g e , a n d s till m o re 2 [A risto tle uses th e te rm i r p S r a m s m erely

th e s u b sta n tiv e , K p ic r is, j u d g m e n t , a rc ra re ly f o r 'tlie prem ise o f a sy llo g ism , esp ecially th e
used b y th e G reek s (n ev er b y A ris to tle ) m a jo r (he h a s n o o th e r w o rd fo r p rem ise);
as tc c h u ic a l te rm s o f L o g ic o r P sy c h o lo g y . w h e re a s a tr S ip a v T ts he em p lo y s alw a y s f o r a n
160 LOGIC. L e c t. X IU
}V'opositio, p r a d ic a tio , 2 Jf'0 fiu n cia tu m , enunciatio, effa iu m , p ro -

fa tu in , a.vio>na)}
A s a jiu lg iu c n t supposes a relation, it necessarily im plies a plural

ity o f thoughts, but con versely a jilurality o f
H x p h c a t io u , w iia t th o u gh ts cloes uot neccssarilv im p ly a iu d gm en t.
is im p lie d in Ju d g - , , . . , ,
i l i e th ou g h ts Avhose succession is determ ined
by the mere laws o f A ssociation, are, though
manifested in jdurality, in relation, and, con sequ en tly, in connection,
not, however, so related and so con n ected as to co n stitu te a j u d g
ment. T h e tho u gh ts icater, iron, and ru stin g , may folloM' each
other in the mental train; th e y m ay even be vicAved to g e th e r in a
sim ultaneous act o f consciousness, and this Avithout our considering
them in an act o f Comparison, and Avithont, therefore, conjoining
or disjoining them in an act o f ju d g m e n t. B u t Avhen tw o or more
thoughts are g iv en in consciousness, there is in gen eral an endeavor
on our part to d isc ov er in them , and to d evelo p a relation o f con-
j riien ec or o f confliction ; that is, Ave endeaA or to find ou t Avhether
these th ou gh ts Avill or Avill not coincide m ay or m ay not be
blended into one. I f th e y coincide, we ju d g e, Ave en ounce, their
co ngruence or c o m p a t ib ilit y ; i f th e y do not coincide, Ave ju d g e , avo
enounce, their confliction or incom patibility. Thus, i f Ave compare
the th o u gh ts vn.i'er, iron, and ru stin g , find them congruent,
and con nect them into a single th ou gh t, t h u s icater ru sts iro n ,
in that case Ave form a Ju d g m en t.-
But i f tAvo n otion s be j u d g e d conginient, in other wmrds, be con
ceived as one, this their u nity can on ly be real-
condition under jp coiisciousnes.s, inasmucli as one o f these
w h icli n o tio n s are co n - . . . , ... -i ^ t
sidercd congruent notioiis IS view cil as ail atti'ibutc or d eterm in a
tion o f the other. For, on the one hand, it is
impos.sil)le f i r us to think as one. tw o attributc.s, that is, tAvo things
vicweil as <letermining, and yet neither determ in in g or qualifying
the oth er; nor, on the other hand, tw o subjects, tlnit is, tw o things
th o u g h t as tletennined, and y et neither o f them d e t e r m in c l or qiial-
ifietl Ijy the other. For example, Ave cannot tliink the tAVo attri
b utes (h rtrien l and pnhrr as a single notion, unless Ave convert the
one o f these attrilintes into a subject to be determ ined or fpialified by
the o th er: but if avc do, i f avc say, ichat is electrical is p olar, avc
at once reduce the duality to unity, avc ju d g e i\\n i p o la r is one o f
p iiu n c in t io n co n ^ id f-ro d r.o l a m c n d y h v IIo - l . p . 3CS. O rg an o n P a a i , p p . 9 2 , 1 2 7 , 24 0 jt i,.,

jji- t ic . S e e A i n m o iilu o . in I)r Jnnrjrrtl., f. 4 a . 4 1G , 4 17 .]
<iT p. 4 I . a t . K a c r i o l a t l . H udlmfnla I . 1 I'.y .S to ic s a n d I t a i n is t s .
n. c . i p. 69. 'Wait/., Cominentanui in Organon, ^ C f. K r u g , Logik, i 61. Anm . i. p. 149, 160.
L e c t. X III. LOGIC. I 6 l
the con stitu en t eliaracters o f th e notion electrical, or th at w h at is

electrical is contained under the class o f th in gs marked ou t b y the
coinmoii character o f jôlarity. In like manner, we cannot think
the tw o subjects iron and mineral as a single notion, unless we co n
vert the one o f the subjects into an attribute by Avliicli the other is
determined or qualified ; but if w e do, i f w e say, is a m in
eral, we again reduce the duality to u n ity ; w e ju d g e that one o f the
attributes o f the subject iron is, that it is a mineral, or that iron is
contained under the class o f things marked out by the coinmoii
character o f mineral.
From w hat has u o a v been said, it is e v id e n t that a j u d g m e n t
m ust c o n t a i n and e.xqiress three notions, Av hic h,
A ju ig m e n t m u st Jiowever, US mutually relative, Constitute an iiidi-
c o iila iii th r e e n o tio n s. . . . .
visible act o f th ought. It must contain, 1, T h e
notion o f so m e th in g to be d e t e r m in e d ; 2, TIt'o notion o f so m e
th ing b y Avhich another is d eterm ined ; and, 3, A notion o f the
relation o f determination betAveen the tAvo. T h is Avill prepare yon
to understand the folloAving paragraph.
^ X L V II. T h a t Avhich, in the act o f J u d g in g , Ave think as

the determ ined or qualified notion, is tech-
par. XLVII. Sub- nically called the Subject (uTroxetjuevov, sub
jection) ; that w hich Ave think as the deter
m in in g or qualifying notion, the Predicate
(Karrjyopov/xfvov, pn'Oidicatinn); and the relation o f determ ina
tion, recogniz ed as subsisting betAveen the subject and the p r e d - ^
icate, is e.-illed the Copula. B y A ristotle, the jiredicate includes
the c o p u la ; ' and, from a hint b y him, the latter has, b y subse
q uent Greek logician.s, been styled the Appredicate (Trpoo-zcarT?-
yopovfxivov, apprcedicattim)f 'Idie S ubject and Pred icate o f a
proposition are, after A ristotle, tog etlier called its T'erms or
Extremes^ (opoi dxpa rripaTa, termini)-, as a projiosition is by
him som etim es called an Interval (Stdo-Ti^/ia),'* being, as it Avere,
a line stretched out betAveeu the e.vtremes oi terms. AVe may.
therefore, articulately define a ju d g m e n t or proposition to be
the product o f that act iu w hich a v c pronounce, that, o f tw o
1 S e e D e In terp., c. 3. w h e r e tlie p r jp a , o r d e n o te th e p r e d ic a te o f a p r o p o s itio n , -see

v e r b , in c lu d e s tlie p r e d ic a te a n d c o p u la A m m o n iu s , o n De In P rp ., p. 110, b. e d . A id .
u n ite d . I'.i> A'enet . 1540 S e e b e lo w , p. 102. K n. (F o r
2 S e e De Jnterprelutinne, c . 10, 4. ''O ra l' H'e o r ig in o f tin's d is tin c tio n s e e U le m m id a s
Se r h eari r p lr o v iT p v a K a r r ty o p r ir a i, &u (a fte r A r is to t le ) , Logica, p. ISO.]
e .x p re ssio n to w h ic h m a y be tr a c e d th e s c h o - 3 A n al. Prior., I. 1, 4. E d .
la s t ic d is tin c tio n b e tw e e n .<ccHri'/i a n d tcrtii a i/. i A n al. P rior.. 1 15 10 25 Ed.
lacentis. F o r th e ter m irp o O K arr(yo p o vp ievo v '
21
162 LOGIC. L e c t . X IIL
n o t i o n s t h o u g h t .as s u b j e c t a n d a s p r e d i c a t e , t h e o n e d o e s o r
d o e s n o t c o n s t i t u t e a p a r t o f t h e o t h e r , e i t h e r in tlie q u a n t i t y
o f E x t e n s i o n , o r i n t lie q u a n t i t y o f C o i n p r e l i e n s i o n .
T h u s in t h c proposition, i w n is magnetic^ w c l i a v e iro n f o r t h e

Subieet, m agnetic f o r t l i e P r e d i c a t e , a n d t h e
Jllusirafioii. 1 , . .r
s u b s t a n t i v e v e r b is foi' t h e C o j u i h i . I n r e g a r d to
tliis last, it is n e c e s s a r y t o s a y a f e w w o r d s . I t is n o t a l w a y s t h e
c.ase, t l i a t i n j i r o p o s i t i o n s t h e c o ] u d a is e x j i r c s s e d b y t h e s u b s t a n t i v e
v e r b is o r est, an<l t h a t t h e c o p u l a a n d jiredicate s ta n d as d i s t i n c t
words. In a d j e c t i v e v e r b s t h e c o p u l a a n d p r e d i c a t e c o i i l e s c e , a s in
t h e ] i r o p o s i t i o n , the sun shines, sol Incet, w h i c h is e q u i v a l e n t t o the
.'oin is sh in in g , sol est lucens. I n e x i s t e n t i a l p r o p o s i t i o n s , t h a t is,
t h o s e in w h i c h m e r e e x i s t e n c e is p r e d i c . a t e d , t h e s a m e b o l d s g o o d .
For when I sa y I am, E g o sum , t h e a m o r s u m h a s h e r e a f a r
h i g h e r a m i m o i e e m j i h a t i c i m j i o r t t h . a n t h a t o f t h e m e r e c o j u i l a o r
link o f connection. F o r i t c x j i r e s s e s , I a ) n ex istin g. E g o s u m exist-
ns. I t m i g h t s e e m t h a t , in n e g a t i v e p r o p o s i t i o n s , w h e n t h c c oj ui la
is a f fe c t e d by the negative particle, i t is c o n v e r t e d into a non-
oojmla. B ut if we take the w ord copula in a i v i d e r m e a n i n g , f o r
that through which the subject and j i r e d i c a t c : i re c o n n e c t e d in a
m u t u a l r e l a t i o n , it will a p p l y n o t o n l y t o .af fi rmat ive b u t t o n e g a t i v e ,
i K)t o n l y t o c. a t e g o r i c . a l b u t t o h y p o t h e t i c a l a n d d i s j u n c t i v e , ]i r o] ) os i -
lioiis. ' I m. ay n o t i c e t h a t ]iro] )Osi ti ons w i t h t h e s u b j e c t , ] ) r e d i c a t e ,
a n d c o i m l a , all t h r e e a r t i c u l a t e l y ex j i r e s s c d , h a v e
b e e n c al l c<l b y t h e s c h o o l m e n t h o s e o f t h e t h i n l
faljacent { jiro jio sitio n es te r ti i ad jn ce n tis, o r te r tii
oiT/Vc/i"), i n a s m u c h a s t h e y m. a n i f c . s t l y c o n t a i n t h r e e jiarts. T l i i s is
a barli.arous cx])rc ss ion f o r w h a t t h e G r c c k . s , a f t e r A r i s t o t l e , c.al led
77f)(/T(l(reL<; I k rptVou ( t e r n ) Kin-gyopovjx.iv<jv. F o r t h e s a m e r c . as on, p r o p
o si tio n s ivith the copula and ]n'cdicate in o n e , w ere c;dlcd th o se
o f t h e s(C<jnd a d ja c e n t?
" W h . a t li.as n o w b e e n s a i d w i l l e n a b l e y o u t o j t e r c e i v e h o w f a r
concepts and ju d g m e n t s coincide, .ami h o w f:;r
Of.ncf-iJt- siii.i t h e y differ. O u t h c o n e h a n d , t h e y c o i n c i d e in tlu*
m f-nl*., l i o w f n r l l i c v . t i r. i
.oinri.iean.imfl-.T, ' f <- Howi i i g r c s p c e t s : I n t h e f i r s t pl .ace, t h e c o n c e p t
a n d t h( ! j n d g i m i i i t a r c b o t h j n a x l u c t s ; t h c o n e t h e
] r o d i i c t o f a r e m o t e , t h e o t h e r t h e j i r o d u c t o f .an i n i n i e d i . a t e , a c t o f
c o m] a r i . s o n . Jn t h e s c e o m l j i h i e e , i n b o t h , a n obj ( *ct i s d e t e r m i n e d
})V a c h a r a c t e r o r a t t r i b u t e . F i n a l l y , in t h c third pl . ace, i n b o t h .
1 K ru g , Lngik, { 6 2 ; A n m . , ii , jip . 1.6 3 -4 . .S c h iilz o , p . 7 4 ; C ra k a u th o rp e . L m r -i.

~ -K d . ( C f jr r ip a r f lia c lir n a iir i, p. 12 7 ; p p . ICO, 1 6 7 .]
2 .See a b o v e , ]. 161, n o te 3. El>.
Lect. X III. LOGIC. 163
tliing.s relatively different in e x is te n c e are reduced to a relative

id en tity in the u n ity o f th ought. On the other hand, th ey differ in
the follow in g respects; In the first jilace, the determ ination o f an
object by an attribute is far more express in tbe j u d g m e n t
tlian in tbc c o n c e p t; for in tbc one it is d eveloped, in the otliei',
oidv implied. In the second jilaee, in the con cep t the u nity o f
th o ug h t is founded only on a similarity o f quality; in the ju d g m e n t,
oil the other hand, it is founded on a similarity o f relation. * F o r in
the notion, an object and its ebaracters can only be c on ceived ;;s
one, inasmncli as th e y are con g ru en t and n ot eontlictive, for thus
only can th ey be united into one total coneeiit. B ut, in the j u d g
ment, as a subject and jiredicate are not necess.-irily tb o n g h t nmlcr a
similarity o f quality, the ju d g m e n t can comprehend not o n ly con
gruent, but lik ew ise conflictive, and even contradictory, n o tio n s; for
tw o concejits which are coinjiarcd tog eth er can be recognizeil as
sta n d in g in the relation either o f congruence or o f repugnance.
Such is tbe sameness, and such is the diversity, o f concejit and
j u d g m e n t. *
W c have thus seen th at a j u d g m e n t or proposition consists (if
three parts or correlative notion.s, tbc notion o f a subject, the
notidii o f a predicate, and the notion o f th e mutual relation o f these
as d eterm ined and d eterm ining.
J u d g m e n ts may, I think, be jirimarily divided in tw o ways, llnj
. divisions b ein g detei-mined b y the genei-;il dc-
J u d g m e n ts, h o w pend en cies in w hich tlieir co m p on en t jiarts stan 1
d iv id e d . * , , , , , k i l l
to each other, and the classes afforded by
these divisions, w h en again considered, Avitliont clistinctidii, in the
different juiints o f v ie w g iven by Quantity, Quality, and Rclr.tlon,
will exhaust all the possible forms in Avhicli ju d g m e n ts are manifested
^ X L V I I I . T h e first great distinction o f J n d g m e n ts is taken

from the relation o f Subject and Pi-cdicale,
Par. XliVIII. First aS rociJllOCal 1V Avbole and Jl.art. I f the S u b
division of Judg- . , . 1 1 ,1
ments. - Comprehen- *** d cten n ilied UOtlOIl be \ 1CA\ cd Ms lIlC
s iv e a n d E x t e n s iv e . C o n t a in in g w lio lc , WC lia v c an In te n siv e or
C o m p r e h e n s iv e p ro jio sitio n ; i f th e I^ red icate
o i d c t c i i n i n i n g n o t i o n bc A i e w e d :is t b c co n tain in g w h o le , avc
h a v e an E x t e n s i v e p ro jio sitio n .
T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n o f j i r o j A O s it i o n s i s f o u n d e d o n t h e d istin ctio n of
t h e tAvo c p i a n t i t i e s o f c o n c e jit s , th e ir C om p reh en sion a n d th e ir
1 E s s e r , J-ogik, ^ 56, p. 111.

104 LOGIC. L ec t. X llv
Extension. The relation of subject nnd predicate is c o n t a i n e d

w ith in t h a t o f w h o le a n d part, for w e can alw ay s
F..xpiicaiion, - this viow citlicr th e determ ining or the determ ined
.nnmctioii (ouiutod notion as t h e w h o le which c o n t a i n s t h e otlicr.
.>11 t h e ( i i i n i ) i v l K i i M o i i , , , , , , ,
aii.i Lxiensiou of Con- 1 ' " ' ' "'hole, h o w e v c r , wl i i c l i t h e s u b j e c t c o n s t i -
eeiitv. tutes, and the whole which the predicate consti
tutes, are ditfercnt, b e i n g sev erally d eterm in etl
b y t h e 0])]iosite q u a n t i t i e s o f c o m p r e h e n s i o n a n d o f e x t e n s i o n ; a n d
:is s i d j e c t a n d j i r e d i c a t e n e c e s s a r i l y s t a n d t o e a c h o t h e r in t h e r e -
l.-.tinn o f t h e s e i n v e r s e q u a n t i t i e s , i t is m a n i f e s t l y a m a t t e r o f i n-
d i l f c r e n c e , i n s o f a r a s t h e m e a n i n g is e o n c c n i e d , w h e t h e r w e v i e w
t h e s u b j e c t as t h e tvliole o f c o m p r e h e n s i o n , w h i c h c o n t a i n s t h e jtrc-
di c a t e , or t h e p r e d i c a t e as t h e w h o l e o f e x t e n s i o n , w h i c h c o n t a i n s
tin. s n l i j e c t . I n j i o i u t o f f a c t , i n s i n g l e j t r o p o s i t i o n s i t is r a r e l y aji -
jiai-ent w h i c h of the tw o w h o l e s i s m e a n t ; f o r t h e c o p u l a is, est,
etc., e q u a l l y d e n o t e s the one form o f the relation as the other.
T h u s , in t h e j i r o p o s i t i o n / v a n is ttoo-legged, t h e c o ] ) u l a h e r e is
convi'rtible with contyo'ehends o r c o n ta in s i/t it, f o r t h e p r o j i o s i t i o n
means, c o n ta in s in it tino le gg ed; t h a t is, t h e s u b j e c t m a n , a s a n
intensive whole or complex notion, comjn-ehcnds as a jiart t h e
f i r e d i c . a t e ttoo-legged. A g a i n , i n t h e p r o ] i o s i t i o n m a n is a hiped, the'
c o p u l a c o i a - e s j i o n d s t o c o n ta i n e d nnder. f o r t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n is t ant ; ' . -
n i O n n t t o man, is con ta im d , 'under hijicd, t h a t is, t h e j i r c d i c a t e
Idjxal, a s a n e x t e n s i v e w h o l e o r c l a s s , c o n t a i n s u n d e r i t a s a ] art t h e
s u b j c ' c t 7nan. B u t , in ] i o i n t o f f a c t , n e i t h e i o f t h e t w o p r o p o s i t i o n s
u n a m b i g u o u s l y sl i ow. s w h e t h e r i t is t o b e \ - i c w e d a s o f a n i n t e n s i i e
' r o f a n e x t e n s i v e p u r p o r t ; n o r i n a s i n g l e j i r o p o s i t i o n is t b i s o f a n y
moment. A l l t h a t c a n b e s a i d is, t h a t t h e one form o f expression
! ' b e t t e r a c c o m m o d a t e i l t o cx| U- e s s t h e o n e k i n d o f j i r o p o s i t i o n , t h e
o t h e r l i e t t e r a c c o m m o d . a t e < l t o e x j i r e s s t h e ot hei '. I t is o i d y w i n n
| U' ( ) po, si t ions a r e c o n n e c t e d into syllogism, t h a t it bee(>mes e v i d e n t
whfthci- the subject or the jire dicate be the whole in oi- u n d e r
whieh the o th eris containeil; and i t is o n l y as t h u s c o n s t i t u t i n g
t w o dilfcrcnt, t w o co n tr a ste d , form s o f reasoning, loians th e m ost
g e n e r a l , a s u n d e r e a c h o f t h e s e e v e r y o t h e r is i n e l u d e d , t h a t t h e
di-itinclion b e c o m e s n e c e s s a r y in r e g a r d t o (o n c e j i t s a n d j i r o j i o s i -
lions. The di-tinciion o f j u-o ji os it io ns i n t o Extensive and Intcn-
.-ive, i t is n e e d l e s s t o s a y , is, t h c a - e f o r e , l i k e w i s e t l i c m o s t g e n e r a l ;
a n d , a c c o r i l i n g l y , i t is o i d y i n s u b o r < l i n a t i o n to this distin ctio n that
t h e o t h e r distinctions, o f w h ich w e are a b o u t to treat, are valid.
I now jjrocecd to t h e se co n d <livi.sion o f J u d g m e n t s , a n d c o m
m e n c e w i t h t h e f o l l o w i n g j j ai -agraj Ji :
L e c t . X III. l o g i c .
^ X L I X . T h e second division of J u d g m e n ts is founded on

tlie diftercnt m ode in wliich the relation ot
P a r. X L IX . S econd ^letcnuination mav subsist h etw een the sub
d iv isio n of Ju d g - . . . rp i
m e n ts, - C a te g o ric al jc c t and JircdicatC 0 1 a p r O p O S ltlO ll. I IllS
a n d C o n d itio n a l,-Ih e i'i.ljition is either Simple or Conditiomd

l a t t e r o f w h ic h is su b - _ _ _
d iv id e d i n to H ypo- { p V O p O s it io s im p > l(X , p r O p O S lt lO C O I u U t lO H -
th e tic a i. D is ju n c tiv e . Qii tlic foriucr alternative, the pvop-

a n d D i l c m m a t ic . / _ ,, , . 7 1
osition IS called Categoriccdp on liie l.atter,
inasmuch as the condition lies either in th e snhject or in the
predicate, or in botli the snhject and predicate, there are three
species of proposition. In the first case, the proposition is
ILjpothetieal, in th e second, Disjunctioe, in th e th ird D ilem-
m a tic or llijpothetieo-disjanctim?
I shall consider these in tlieir o r d e r ; and, first, of Categorical

propositions. B u t here it is proper, before ]ro-
E x p iic a t io n , 1 . C a t e - ccediiig to expound w hat is designated hy the
goncai J u d g m en ts. cateqoricid, to commence with an exjilana-
T h e te r m c a te g o n c a l. e ' . i n
tion o f the term itself. T in s word, as far as now
k nown, was first e m p lo y ed h y A ristotle in a logical signification, I
have already explained the m ean in g o f the term category;'' hut you
.arc n o t to suppose that cnteyorical has any reference to the ten
sntnma yenera o f the Stagirite. B y A r isto tle the term KaT-qyopLKos
is frequently emjiloyed, more esjiccially in the books o f the P r i o t
Analytics, and in these hooks alone it occurs, if I am correct in
m y estim ate, eigh ty-seven times. N o w yon Avill
it.s signification as obseivc, that in no single instance is this Avord
1, c(. b\ Aristotle. applied hy A ristotle, ex cep t in one nnambignons
sigiiific.ation, that is, tlie signification o f affirmative ; and it is thus
bA' him used as a term convertihle Avith K a r a c ^ a T t K o s , and as opposed
to the tAVO sy n on y m s o f negation he indifferently cmploy.s, divoefa-
T tK o s and cTTcpgTLKos? Such is the m eaning o f the
Its meaning in tlie \vord ill A ristotelic Usage. >Toav yon Avill oh-
unungb otb is d is c i- Jt obtained a totally different m ean
in g in the Avritings o f his discijiles. T h is ncAV
m ean in g it jirobahly obtained from Theophrastus, the im mediate
discijile o f A ristotle, for h y him and fkidem ns Ave knoAV that it Avas
so em p lo y e d ; and iii this new m ean in g it Avas exclu sively ajiplied
1 [ C a t e g o r ic a l b a d b e t t e r b e c a l l e d A b s o lu t e , 2 C f. K n i g , L o g ik , 57- E d . [ A I o c e n ic t ,
a s Is d o n e b y O a s s e n d i, L o g ic a , p . 2S 7, e d . loc. c d . ; S c '.iu l.ic , L o"//.-, j -15, 5 2 , 6 0 6 9 .]
O x o n ; or P e rfe c t, as b y A lo e e n ic u s , w h o h a s 3 See ab ove, p. 1 3 9 . E d .
a ls o A b s o lu t e . See C o n t e m p la lio iu s P e r ip a t t lic c e , 4 C om pare D is c u s s io n s , p . 152. E d

ii. c . 2 , p . 3 9 et aey.]
106 1 . 0 GIG. L e c t. X l i l
b y al l t h e G r e e k a n d L a t i n e x p o s i t o r s o f t h e P e r i p a t e t i c ] i h i l o s o p h y ,
in fact, b y all subsequent logicians without exceiition, Ju this
se co n d signilication, t h e t e r m catetjorical, a s a]])l ied t o a ] i r o p o s i -
t i o n , d e n o t e s a j u d g m e n t i n w h i c h t h e p r e d i c a t e is s i n q i l y a t H r m e d
or den ied o f th e subjeet, an d in c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n t o t h o s e j n o p o s i -
t i o n s w h i c h h a v e b e e n c a l l e d h ijpo th ctical a n d d ls ja n c tice. In this
e h a n g e o f s i g n i f i c a t i o n t h e r e is n o t h i n g v e r y r e -
This (Iifrereiice of markable. B n t i t is a s i n g u l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e
.'iiiiilication not hilh- , i , i t , o i
eito obbcrved. t h a t , t l i o u g l i t h e A r i s t o t e l i c e m ] d o y m e i i t ol t h e
w o r d b e in e v e r v* i n s t a n c e a l t o O
g e t h e r c l e a r a n d t i n-
a.mbiguons, n o one , eithei' in a n c i e n t or in m o d e r n tim es, s h o u ld e v e r
h a v e m a d e t h e o b s e r v a t i o n , t h a t t h e w o r d w as u s e d in t w o d ilf e r e n t
m eanings; a n d t h a t in t h e o n e m e.aning it was used exclusively by
A r i > t ( ) t l e , a n d i n t h e o t h e i - e x c l u s i v e l y b y al l o t h e r l o g i c i a n s . I fi nd,
i n d e e d , t h : i t t h e G r e e k c o m m e n t a t o r s o n t h e Ovfjanon d o , i n r e f e r
e n c e t o j i a r t i c u l a r j t a s s a g e s , s o m e t i m e s s t a t e , t h a t KarvTyopt/co? is t h e r e
useil b y A r i s t o t l e in t h e s i g n i f i c a t i o n o f a ffin n a tic e / b u t , i n s o fai'
as I h a v e b e e n a b l e t o .asccitain, n o o n e h a s m a d e t h e g e n e r a l ob-
s e i w. a t i o n , t h a t t h e w o r d w a s n e v e r a ] ) p l i e d b y A i ' i s t o t l e in t h e s e n s e
i n w h i c h a h i n e i t w.as u n d e r s t o o d b y all o t h e r l o g i c a l w r i t e r s . So
m u c h for tlie m e a n i n g o f t h e t e r m c a te p o rm d ; as n o w e m p l o y e d
f o r sim p le o r absolute, a n d a s o p j a j s e d t o c o n dition a l, i t is u s e d i n a
.-eiise d i f f e r e n t f r o m i t s o r i g i n a l a n d A r i s t o t e l i c m e a n i n g .
In regard to the nature o f a C a t e g o r i c a l . l u d g m e n t i t s e l f , i t is
necessary to say alm ost nothing. F o r , as this
Nature ofaCalegor- ^^Ô t e r m s S t a n d
ical .Iiidgmeiil. " . , . , , . , . ,
to each otlu'r sim p ly m t h a t relation w hich
e v e r y j u d g m e n t i m p l i e s , t o t h e e x c l u s i o n o f al l e x t r i n s i c c o n d i t i o n s ,
i t is e \ i d c i i t , t h a t w d i a t w e h a v e a l r e a d y s a i d o f t h e e s s e n t i a l n a t u r e
of jm lgm ciit i n g e n e r a l , af1br<ls al l t h a t c a n b e s a i d o f c . i t e g o r i c a l
j u d g m e n t s in ] i a r t i c u l a r . .V c a t e g o r i c a l j i r o p o s i t i o n is e x j i r e s s e d i n
t h e f o l l o w i n g f o r m i i h e A /.s-1>, (jr, .V is not B . I jiroceed, therefore,
t o t h e g c i i i i s o f p r o ] ) o s i t i ( m s a s o j i p o s e d t o c ; i t e g o r i ( ; : d , \ iz., t h e
C on d it i on .; ! , Coiiditionc<l. d'his genus, as s t a t c <l in the p:ir;;-
g r a p b , coi ii jt ri ses t w o sjiccics, a c c o r d i n g as t h e
II _ c.M.Ciiioiai condition li es m o r e j i r o x i n i a t e l y in t h e s u b j e c t ,
u^ dr n llaC^c ( I 1*1* 1 111
. .
coiiij.i po Pi>icc*s.
or in l ie i1i r e Mi e a l e , t o w h i c l i is t o be a d d e d ,
e i t h e r :is a t h i r d s j i e e i e s o r a s ;i c o i n j i o n n d of
t h e s e t w o . t h o s e )t r o p o s i t i o n s in wh i e l i t h e r e is IwofoM condition,
t h e <iie b e l o n g i n g t o t h e subject, t h e o t h e r to t h e p red icate. The
f i r s t o f t h e s e , ;is s l a t e <l , f o r m s t h e c l a s s I l y p o t l i e t i c . a l , t h e s e c o n d
t h a t o f Di.sju nc tivc, tlic t h i r d t h a t o f D i l c m m a t i c , pro jiosi tions. I
m a y notice, b y t h e w a y , t h a t t h e r e i.s a g o o d d e a l o f v a r i a t i o n in
L ect. x n i . LOGIC. 107
the language of logicians in reg a rd to the term s Conditional and

Hypothetical. Y o u are aware th a t cojiditionalis,
Variaiioiis in regard j,, Latin, is coinmonly apjilicd as a translation of
to the appiic.ition of vTroSiTLKo<i ill G re e k ; and by Boethius, w ho was
!h c te r m s C on ditionu l ^
iun\ iitjp o th ttk a L ^hc tivst aiuong tlie L atins who elaborated tlie
logical doctrine of hyjiotheticals, the tw o term s
are used convertibly with each other.' B y m any of th e Schoolmen,
however, th e term hypothetical {hypotheticus) was used to denote
the genus, and the term conditional, to denote the sjiecies, and from
them this nom enclature has passed into m any of the more modern
cuinjiends o f logic, and, am ong others, in to those of Aldrich and
W hately. This la tte r usage is wrong. I f citlicr term is to be used
in subordination to the otlier, conditional, as the more e.vtensive
term , ou g h t.to be applied to designate the g e n u s ; and so it has ac
cordingly been em ployed by the best logicians. B u t to jiass from
words to things.
I said th a t H yp o th etica l propositions are those iu which the con
dition qnalifving the relation between the sub-
1. llypolbetical. . , . , , , .
je c ta n d jiredicate lies proxim ately m the subject.
Ill tlie proposition, B is A, the subject B is unconditionally th o u g h t
to exist, and it thus constitutes a categorical jirojiosition. B u t if
wu think the subject B existing only conditionally, and u n d er this
conditional existeiico enunciate th e ju d g m e n t, we shall have the
hypothetical jirojjositioii I f E is, A is, or, in a concrete exa m
p l e R ainy weather is wet iceather, is a categorical jirojiosition,
I f it rains, it will be icet, is a hyjiothetical. In a hyjiothetical jirop
osition the objects th o n g h t stand in such a m utual relation, th a t
the one can only be th o u g h t in so far as the other is th o u g h t; iu
other words, if we think the one, we m u st necessarily think the
other. T h ey tlius stand in the relation of Ke.ason and Consc(]uent.
F or a reason is th a t wliich, being affirmed, necessarily entails the
affirm.ation of som ething else ; a consccpient is th a t which is only
affirmed, inasmuch as som ethin g jirevioiis is affinmid. ddie relation
betw een reason and consequent is necessary. Frn* a reason followed
by nothing, would n ot be the re.ason of anything, and a consequent
which did not jiroceed from a reason, would m it he the conscHpiciit
of anything. A n hypothetical juojiosition must, therefore, contain
a reason and its consequent, and it thus jiresents the ajijiearance of
tw o members or clauses. T h e first c l a u s e th a t which contains
the reason is called tho Aîtecedoit, also th e /le tz so u , th e Condi-
1 C o m p a r e D iscussions, p . 150. F o r B o e t h iu s , see h is t r e a tis e D e SyU ogism o H yp o th etico , L

i. Ed .
168 LOGIC. L ec t. XIII.
txoyi, o r iho IT ypoth esis (h ypo th esis, co n ditio , ra tio , antecedens ,

i.e., m em b rn m s i v o jn-opositio)', t h e s o e o i i d , w h i c h c o n t a i n s t l i e c o n -
.'ôijiient n e c e s s i t a t e d b y t h i s g r o u n d , i s c a l l e d t h e ConscqueyU, a l s o
t h e 7'hesis (eonsequens, thesis, ratio n n tin n , c o n d it io n a t u m ) . The
r e l a t i o n b e i w e e n t h e t w o c l a u s e s is c a l l e d t h e Consequence (conse-
qio'iiti i), a i n l is e x j i r e s s e d b y t h e j i a r t i c l e s i f o n t h e o n e h a n d , a n d
then, so, therefore, e t c . , o n t h e o t h e r , w h i c h a r e , t h e r e f o r e , c a l l e d t h e
( \nisecutive p a r t ic l e s (p a r tic u lw consecutive).^ T h e s e a r e f r e q u e n t l y ,
h o w c ' v e i , n o t f o r m a l l y e x p r e s s e d .
' r i i i s c o n s e q u e n c e ( i f is then is) i s t h e c o p u l a i n h y p o t h e t i c a l
p r o p o s i t i o n s ; for t h r o u g h it t h e c o n c e p ts are
A livpotlH'liciil jucig- 1 1 1 1 . .
MR'llt But. COIllJJO.'ltU. g h t t o g e t h e r , SO a s t o m a k e ui),
b r o u r* I in co n s ci ou s-
U(ss, b u t a s i n g l e a c t o f t h o u g h t ; e o n s e i j u c n t l y ,
ill i t l i e s t h a t s y u t h e s i . s , t h a t c o n n e c t i o n , w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s t h e h y p o
thetical judgineiit. A lthough, therefore, a hypothetical judgment
ajipcar double, and m a y b e c u t i n t o t w o d i f f e r e n t j u d g m e n t s , i t is
nevertheless not a composite jndgnient. F o r i t is r e a l i z e d t h r o u g h
a si m p l e a c t o f t h o u g h t , in w h i c h i f a n d then, t h e a n t e c e d e n t a n d
t h e conseijuent, are t h o u g h t a t o n ce an d as inseparable. T h e jirop-
osition. i f B is, then A is, i s t a n t a m o u n t t o t h e j i r o p o s i t i o n , A is
ih rou yh B . B u t t h i s i s a s s i n q i l e a n a c t a s i f w e c a t e g o r i c a l l y
judged B is A , t h a t is, B is u n d e r A . O f these two, neith er the
o n e I f the sun shines, n o r t h e o t h e r then it is d a y i f t h o u g h t
a f i a r t f r o m t h e o t h e r , Avill c o n s t i t u t e a j u d g m e n t , b u t o n l y t h e t w o in
conjunction. B u t if w e t h i n k 7'he sio i shines, a n d it is d a y ,
e a c h b y itself, t h e n t h e w h o l e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e t w o t h o u g h t s
is a b o l i s h e i l , a n d w c h a v e n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n t w o i s o l a t e d c a t e g o r i -
cal j i n l g m e n t s . T h e r e l a t i v e s ( / a n d the/i, i n w h i c h t h e l o g i c a l s y n
t h e s i s li es, c o n s t i t u t e t h u s a n a c t o n e a n d i n d i \ i s i b l e .
F o r th e s a m e reason, a H y p o t h e t i c a l j u d g m e n t c a n n o t b e c o n
verted into a Categorical. F o r the thought.
Not convertible into thro u qh B , is w h o l l y different from the
a C ategorical. . u i j ^ t - /- y i
t h o u g h t , A is in B . The jndgnient I f God
is righteous, then v i l l the v d c k e d be pu n ish ed , a n d t h e j u d g
m e n t yL righ teo u s G o d p u n is h e s tin; vncked, a r e v e r y d i f f e r e n t ,
t i l t h o i i g h t h e m a t t e r o f t h o u g h t is t h e s a m e . In t h e f o r m e r j u d g
m e n t , the puuishrnenJ o f the xcicked. is v i e w e d as a c o n s e q u e n t of
tin righteou sness o f G o < l; w h e r e a s t h e l a t t e r c o n s i d e r s i t is tin :it-
t r i b i i t e o f a righ teo u s (7od. B u t as t h e c o n s e q u e n t is r e g a r d e d a s
s o m e t h i n g d e p e m l e n t from, t h e a t t r i b u t e , on t h e c o n t r a r y , as s o m e
t h i n g i n h e r i n g i n, i t is f r o m t w o w l i o l l y d i f f e r e n t j i o i n t s o f v i e w
I K rug, L o g ik , 57, Anm. 2, p. 109. E d.

L e c t. Xm. LOGIC. 1G9
th a t tlie tw o ju d g m e n ts are fonned. T h e hypothetical ju d g m e n t,

therefore, A is through B, is essentially different from the categori
cal ju d g m e n t, A is in I> ; and the tw o jn d g m e n ts are regulated by
different fnndament.al 1 iws. h'or the Categorical ju d g m e n t as e.\-
pressivc of tlie relation of subjeet and attribute, is determ ined by
the laws of I d e n tity and Contradietion ; the H ypothetical, as ex
pressive of the relation of Heason and Consequent, is regulated by
the principle o f th a t nam e. * So much for Hypotheticals.
D isjunctive ju d g m e n ts are those in Avhieh the condition qnalify-
. ing the relation betw een th e subject and predi-
2. D is ju n c tiv e . . . . . f
cate, lies jiroxiinately in tbe jtredicate, as in the
jiroposition, D is either B or C, or A. In this class of ju d g m e n ts a
certain jilurality o f a ttributes is jn'edieiited of the subject, b u t in
such a m ann er th a t this jilurality is not jiredieated conjnnotly, b u t it
is only ju d g e d that, u n d er conditions some one, and only some one,
of this bundle o f attrib u tes ajijiertains to tbe subject. W h e n I say
th a t Men are either Black, or White, or Taiong, in this jirojiosi-
tion, none of these three predicates is unconditionally affirmed ; bu t
it is only assumed tb a t one or o th e r m ay be afhnned, and tbat, any
one being so affirmed, tb e others must, eo ijiso, be denied. T h e a t tr i
butes thus disjunctively jiredicable of the subject, constitute to g e th er
a certain sjihcre or whole of extension ; and as the a ttrib utes m u tu
ally exclude each other, th e y m ay be regarded as recijiroeally reason
and consequent. A disjunctive proposition has two forms, according
as it is regulated by a contradietory, or by a contrary, ojijiositioii.
A is either B or not B, This minei'al is either a metal or not, are
exainjiles of tbe form er; A is either B, or C, or D, This mineral is
either lead, or tin, or zinc, are examjilcs of the latter. T b e oppo
site attributes or characters in a disjunctive jiroposilion are called
the D isju nct Members {membra disjuncta) ; and th e ir relation to
each oth e r is called the D isjunction {disjunctio), which in English
is expressed by the relative particles either, or {uut, rel), in conse
quence of which these w ords constitute th e D isjunctice particles
{particuke disjunctivw). In proj>ositions o f this class the copula
is formed by either is, or is, for hereby the concepts are b rought
to g e th er so as to constitute a single object o f consciousness, and
tints a synthesis or union of notions is effected.
N ow , altliougli in consequence o f the multiplicity o f its pred i
cates, a disjunctive jiroposition may be resolved into a jilurality of
1 K r u g , L o g ik , { 57, p. 168, A n m . 2. E d . r u le , P ro p o sitio C on diiionalis n ih ilp o n it in esse.

[ H y p o t h e t ic a ls ta k e a c c o u n t u o t o f th e co r - C h ristia n W e is s , Lc/iriMc/i c/cr Log-iX-, p . 109, e d
r e ctiie ss o f tlie tw o c la u se s , b u t o n ly o f t h e ir 1801.]
c o n n e c tio n (con.sequentia). H e n c e t h e lo g ic a l
22
170 LOGIC. L e c t. X III.
jiidginoiits, still it is not on tli.at account .a coniple.v or com posite

ju d g m e n t. F o r it is realized b y one simjde e n e r g y o f tliouglit, in
vvliicli the tw o relatives the either and the or
Di>junciivc judg- arc tliouglit together, as inseparable, and as
luoiit, noi in reality b ind in g lip tlic ojiposiiig jirodicates in to a single
composite, nnd nol , p i t
convertible into a cat- sphcrc. In coiiseqiieiice ol tins, a disjunctive
ogoricai. proposition cannot be converted into a categor
ical. F o r in a categorical ju d g m e n t a single
jircilicatc is simply atlirmed or denied o f ;i subject; wliereas in a
lisjuiiciive jiidgim*nt tliere is neither athrniatioii nor negation, but
the opposition o f certain attributes in relation to a certain subject
constitutes the thought. Ilo w beit, therefore, that a disjunctive and
a catcgoric.il ju d g m e n t may have a certain resemblance in respect
o f ihoir object m a tter; still in each the foriii o f th o u gh t is w h olly
diflereiit, and the disjunctive ju d g m e n t is, conseiiiieutly, one essen ti
ally diftcreiit from the categorical. '
Dilcuim atic ju d g m e n ts are those in which a condition is found,
both ill the subject and in the predicate, and as
3 Dilemmalic. . . . , , . ,
thus a combination of an liypotlietical lorin and
o f a disjunctive form, th e y may also ap])ro|)riately be d en om in ated
irgp oth etico-dix jioictive. I f X is it is ei'her B or C I f a n
action he jn'ohihlt I , it is p r o h i b i t e d eiti.er by n a t u r a l or b y p o s i t i v e
hoc I f u co y n itio n be a co g n itio n o f f a c t , it is g i v e n either
th r o u g h an act o f extern al p e r c e jd io n o r th ro u gh a)i act o f setf-
conscioustiess. In such propositions, it is not necessary that the
disjunct ])redicatcs should be lim ited to t w o ; and besides wliat are
strictly called diten n n a tic j u d g m e n t s , we may have others that would
pro|)crly obtain the names o f trile m m a tic , tetrcdemm.atic, p o tg te m -
m a tlr , etc. B u t in refereiiee to iiropositions, as in referenee to sy l
logisms, d ih .m m a is a word used not merely to denote* the cases
where there* arc on ly tw o disjunct members, hut is, likewise, c.xtcnded
t o any plurality o f op p osin g predicates. T here remains here, h o w
ever, alw ays an amhigiiity ; ami perh;ips, on that account, the term
hypothetico-(l!sjum :tice m ig h t with propriety he substituted for cAYew-
m a tlc. A ])ro])osilioti o f this class,.though bcar-
A Dilemmalicjudg- ing both MU hyp othetical and a disjunctive form,
mem imiivDibic, ami caiiiiot, liowcver, bc analyzed in to an liypotlieti-
tio l re fliic ib le t o a p ill- i *i t
rality of categorical '""I " 'bsjmiCtlVC ju d g m e n t. I t COIlStltutCS
propoMiioiis. as indivisible a unity o f th o u g h t ns eit h er o f
th e s e ; and can as little as th ese be reduced
w itliont distinction to a plurality o f categorical pro|iositions.
E v e r y form o f .Judgments wliicli w e have liitlierto considered,
1 K rug, L ogik, pp. 170,171. C om pare K an t, L ogik, 29. E d .

L e ct. X H L LOGIC. 171
lins its corresponding form of Syllogism ; and it is as constituting

the fonndatioiis o f different kinds of reasoning, th a t th e considera
tion of these different kinds o f jirojiositions is of principal imjior-
tance. T hese various kinds of jiropositions may,
.Jiidgmenis consid- howcvcr, be considered in the different jioints of
ered in reference to Q ;,tity, Quality, and Relation. A nd
(juaiKity. ^ . , .
first of Q u a n ti ty ; in reference to which I give
yon the following paragraph.
^ L. T h e Q u a n tity o f J u d g m e n ts has reference to the whole

of Extension, hy the nnm h er of the objects
Par. L. 10. The com- conconiiiig wliicli AVC jud q c . On this I
mon doctrine of the , ,, i i n 51-0 i c
division of Jndg- s lia ll S ta te a r t ic u l a t e l y , 1 , I h e d o c t r in e ot
ments according to t lic L o g i c i a i i s ; a n d , 2, T llC d o c t r ii ic Avliicli
their Qnantity. 2 . , ,
The doctrine of the I coiiceive to bc tlic Diore correct.
author on this point. 1. (TliQ docti'iiie of the Logiciaiis.) T h e
common doctrine, Avliicli, in essentials, dates
from A risto tle ,' divides Projiositions according to their Q n a n
tity into four classes; viz., (A), the Unicersal or General {pr.
imiversales, generales, Trporaorets at kuTIoXov) ; (B) th e P a r tic n la r
{p r . partici/lares irpoTdcrus p-epiKal, at iv /xepet) ; (C) th e In divid-
nal or Shujnlar {p r. individaales, singulares, expositorire, rrpo-
raoret? at kuT eKatrrov, t o , d.Top.a) ; (D) th e Pidefinlie {j)r. imprcn-
finita, indejinitce, Trporda-us dSLopia-TOL, dirpocrSLopLaTOL). T h e y
mean by iiniverscd propositions, those in Avhich the subject is
taken in its whole extension ; h y p a r f icular propositions, those
in Avhich the snhject is taken in a jiart, indefinitely, of its e x te n
sion ; by individualqn'oqiositions, those in Avliich the snhject is
a t a miiiininm o f extension ; hy inde/inite propositions, those
in wliich the snhject is no t articulately or overtly declared to
he eitlier universal, jiarticnlar, or individnal.
2. (The doctrine I jirefer.) This doctrine appears to me
nntenahle, and I divide Projiositions according to th e ir C2nan-
tity in the following m a n n e r ; In this respect tlieir differences
arise either (A), :is in Ju d g m e n ts , from th e necessary condition
o f the Intm-mil T h o u g h t ; or (B), as in Propositions, merely
from the accidental circnmstances o f its E x te rn a l Expression.
U n d e r the former head (A), J u d g m e n ts are either (a) of
D ete rm in ate or Definite Q uantity, according as their sjiliere i.s
circninsL-ribed, or (h) o f Q n a n tity In d e te rm in a te or Indefinite,
according ;is th e ir sjJiero is nncircnmscrihed. Again, J u d g
m ents of a D ete rm in ate Q n a n tity (a) are either (1) of a W h o le
1 D e In terp ., c . 7. A n al. P iio r., i. 1, E d .

1 7 2 LOGIC. L ect. X H I.
U n d i v i d e d , i n w h i c b c a s e t h e y c o n s t i t u t e a U niversal o r Gen
eral J^ro]iosition ; o r ( 2 ) o f a U n i t I n d i v i s i b l e , i n w h i c b c a s e ,
t h e y e o u s t i t u t o a n I n d iv id u a l o r S in g u la r J*ropositio)i. A
J u d g m e n t o f a n I n d e t e r m i n a t e Q u a n t i t y (1>) c o n s t i t u t e s a J \c r-
(icular J^roposiiinn.
U n d e r t h e l a t t e r h e a d ( B ) , P r o p o s i t i o n s h a v e e i t h e r , a s ]>rop-
ositions, th eir tpiantity, d e te rm in a te or indeterm in a te, marktal
o u t b y a verbal sign, or t h e y have n o t; such quantity being
i n v o l v e d in e v e r y a c t u a l t b o u g b t . 'Ih e y m a y b e c a l l e d i n t h e
o ne case (a) P red e sig n a te : i n t h e o t h e r ( b ) J^reindesignate.
Again, the com m on doctrine, rem o u n tin g also t o A r i s t o t l e , '
takes into view only the Subject, and regulates the quantity of
t h e ] i r o] Ks i t i on c . x c l n s i v e l y b y t h e q u a n t i t y o f t h a t t e r m . The
P re d icate, indeed, A risto tle an d th e logicians do n o t allow to bc
affected by q u a n t i t y ; at least t h e y h o ld it to b e a lw a y s P a r t i c u
l a r in a n A f f i r m a t i v e , a n d U n i v e r s a l i n a N e g a t i v e P r o j i o s i t i o n .
T h i s d o c t r i n e I h old to b e t h e resu lt o f an i n c o m p le te a n a l y
s i s ; a n d I l i oj i o t o s h o w y o n t h a t t h e c o n f u s i o n a n d m u l t i p l i c i t y
of which our jircsent Logic is t h e c o m p l e m e n t , i s m a i n l y t h e '
consequence o f an a t t e m p t at synthesis, before th e u ltim a te ele
m e n t s b a d b een fairly r e a c h e d b y a s e a rc h in g analysis, a n d o f a
n e g l e c t , in t h i s i n s t a n c e , o f the fundam ental postulate of the
science.
o f a AVhole U n d iv id e d
I U n iv e r s a l o r G e n e r a l J u d g m e n t s .
o f D e te r m in a t e o r
I D e fin ite Q u a n ti ty .
2.
o f a U n i t In d iv is itile
( M e n ta l) J u d g m e n t s
I I n d iv i d u a l o r S in g u la r J u d g m e n t s ,
o f I n d e t e r m in a te o r
I n d e f i n ite Q u a n ti ty f o r m i n g P a r t i c u l a r J u d g m e n t s .
jj ( (h e ir Q u a n t i t y E x p re s .s e d P r c d e s ig n a tc .
(Verbal) P r o p o s i tio n s < 1,

/ t b e ir Q u a n ti ty N o t E x p r e s s e d P r c in d e s i g n a tc .^
1 [>> I n t t t p , c 7 . K i> . Iircfiicale. Hut o f tliesc g o m e are b u t verbal

- Viilr 'III tl A in. a j 11(1 A m In in I n t., varietie.g o f t h e m in e jiu g'in eiit, and others
S (.. ir 72, 1 1 1 - 1 1 . 3 [III Il i c (iiM o l llicM- are e x c lin .e d on m aterial out.(Is, s o llial bis
l>t i- ap(i <. A i n I II o n I II ((, | i r o c c ( - ( l i n ; . o n ii l i i c n d y d i v i s i o n l i n a l y c o i n c i d e s i l b A r i . s l o t i c s . In
aritlirnciicBl c a lc iila lio ii. I 'l ii iii ie ru lc r. i-ixti'cii llie second j i a s si i K C ' I ' b e o p l i r a s l i i s is c i i e d in
v a i n l i e a (,1 t l i e I'lo|.O K ,Iioii. a n y oik.* o f l o u r illu s t ia lio n o f a v ery (jbsenre staten iei.I con.
( j i n i I il ir - i n i I k; m b j c d , ( n i l n o t n it, n o n '. cern in ;,' Ilie o p p o s i t i o n o f i n d e s i g n a t e | rojio-
n o t n o n ' o r to ? n r ), b f i i i p c a p a b l e o f c o m b i s i t i o u s . E d .]
n a t i o n w i t b a n y o n e o f t o u r ( | u a n t i i i e 8 In t b e
L e c t. XUL LOGIC. 173
U niversal J u d g m e n ts are those in which the Avhole n u m b e r of

objects w ithin a sphere or class are ju d g e d of,
Explication. Uni- m ortal , or Ere.nj man is mortal,
ver.'iil Jiulginenls. . , i i i i
the all in t h e o n e c a s e d e h m u g t h e A vi iole co l
le c tiv e ly , the every in t h e o t h e r d e l i n i n g it d i s c r c t i v e l y . In such
ju d g m e n t s the n o tio n o f a d e te n n iiia te w h o le n e s s o r t o t a l i t y , iu th e
t b r m o f o i n n i t u d e o r a l l n e s s , is i n v o l v e d .
Individual J u d g m e n ts are those in which, in like m anner, the
whole of a certain siihere is ju d g e d of, b u t in
S in g u la r o r I n d i- ,.|,])crc tlierc is fouiul only a single object,
v id u a l J u d g m e n t s , . .. . , , . n .-t
or co llectio n Latiline is
o f sin g le o b je cts, as
a m bitious, 77.e tiodve apoMes were inspired.
I n such iudtrments the notion of determ in a te wholeness or totality
in t h e f o r m o f o n e n e s s , i n d i v i s i b l e u n i t y , is i n v o l v e d . '
P artic u lar J u d g m e n ts are those in which, am ong th e objects
w i t h i n a cer tain sjihere or class, w e j u d g e cou-
1 articular Judg (jepnino- s o i u e in d efin ite uum ber less th a n the
inents, wluit.
Some men are virtuous JSIamj
w h o le , as
boys are courageous AFost women are compassionate. T l i c i n d e f
i n i t e p l u r a l i t y , Avithin t li e t o t a l i t y , b e i n g h e r e d e n o t e d b y t h e w o r d s
some, many, most. T here arc certain AVords
AVords w h ic h se rv e Avliicli s c i ' v e t o m a r k o u t t h e q u a n t i t y in t h e c a s e
to m a rk o u t q u a n tity U niversal, Individual, and P a rtic n la r propo-
iii U n iv e r s a l, I n d iv id - . . , , . , , . .
n a i, a n d P a r tic u la r T h e words A v h i c h designate iiniver-
S 'tio iis .
P r o p o s itio n s . sa lity are all, the whole of, every, both, each, none,
no one, neither, always, everywhere, e t c . The
w o r d s AA'hich m a r k o u t p a r t ic u la r it y arc some, not all, one, two, three,
oto., sometimes, somewhei-e, etc. T h e r e are also terius Avhich, t h o u g h
t h e y d o n o t .r e a c h to an u n iv er sa l Avhole, a p p r o x i m a t e to it, as many,
most, almost all, the greatest p a rt, oXc,., f e w , very f a r , h ardly any,
etc., w h ic li, in t h e c o m m o n e m p l o y m e n t o f l a n g u a g e , and in refer
e n c e to m e r e ly p r o b alile m a tter , m a y b e v i e w e d as a l m o s t t a n t a
m o u n t to m arks o f u n iv e r s a lit y .
B y logic i.M iis in general i t is s t a t e d , that, in a lo g ic a l relation ,
an In d iv id u a l i s c o n v e r t i b l e Avitli an U n iversal
D is tin c t io n o f U n i- p r o p o s i t i o n ; a s ill b o t h s o m e t h i n g i s p r e d i c a t e d
ve r sa l a n d I n d iv id u a l g ^ q j^ e t , am T n e i t h e r ad m its o f an y
fro m I a r tic u la r J u d g - . -r-> i t i i-i
e x c e p tio n . but a P a rtic u la r Jn d gm cn t, lik e-
Avise, p r e d i c a t e s . s o m e t h i n g o f a avIi o I g s u b j e c t ,
and ad m its o f no ex c ep tio n ; fo r it em b ra c e s a l l t h a t is v i e w e d as
t h e s u b j e c t , a n d e x c l u d e s a l l t h a t i s v i e w e d a s n o t b e l o n g i n g t o it.
' In diviflu u m {propriu m ) sig n a tu m , a n d in d i- p a rtic id a rf v a g u m . T h e fo rm e r o f e a c h , a n d th e

vid u u m v a g iim . S o particu lare sig n a tu m , a n d la tt e r o f e a c h , c o r r e s p o n d in g . M em oranda.
1T4 LOGIC. L ect. XIIL
T lic Avliolc distinction consists in this, that, in UniAcrsal and in

Individual J u d g m en ts, the number o f the objects ju d g e d o f is
thought by us as d efin ite; whereas, in Particular J u d gm en ts, the
number o f such objects is th o u g h t by us as indefinite. T h a t In d i
vidual J u d g m e n ts do not coricspond to U niversal J u d g m e n ts, merely
in virtue o f the on en ess o f their stdijeet, is shown by this, that, if
the individual be rendered indetinite, the j u d g m e n t at on ce assumes
the character o f pai ticularity. F o r c.vamide, the jn ojiositions, A
G erm an in r c n h d the a rt o f p r in tin g , A n Jengiishnian generalizeel
the lair o f g ra v ita tio n , are to be vioAved as particular propositions.
But, if Ave su bstitute for the indefinite e.\]iressions a G erm an and
an Jnglishnian, the definite cx])rcssions D a u st and X eirto n , the
j u d g m e n t obtains the form o f an universal.
W it h regard to quantity, it is to be ob served, say the logicians, that
Categorical J u d g m e n t s arc those alone Avhich
Catpôricat Jud"- adm it o f all the forms. H yp o th etica l and D is-
meiiis nioiip. accord- jniictive propositions are ahvavs universal. F o r
in g to lo g ician s, a d m it i i i i r
o f all th e io rm s o f hypotheU cals, b y t h e position o f a reason,
1
q u a n tity . tlicrc is positcd evcrv consequent o f that reason;
and in disjunctives th e sjihere or exten sion o f the
subject is so defined, th al the disjunct attributes are jtredicated o f
the Avhole sjihere. It may, indeed, som etim es seem as if in such
p ropositions s o m e th in g Avere said o f some, and, co nsequently, that
the j u d g m e n t is particular or indefinite. F o r exanijde, as :in hyjio-
thctical, I f som e m en are harn etl, then others are u n lea rn ed ; as
a disjunctive, T hose m en v lio are learneel are either ph ilo so p h ers
or neA. B u t it is easily seen that these ju d g m e n ts are essenti.ally o f
a general character. In tlie first ju d g m e n t, tlie real consequent is,
tla n all eAln r s a r e u o l e a r m d and in the second, the true suhject is,
all learned m en, for this is in v o lv ed in the c x jir c ssio n Those
m en ir/to eire leartnd, etc. '
Such is the doctrine o f the Logicians. T his I cannot but bobl
to 1^- e n - o n c o u s ; for avo can easily construct,
T liisd yctrin etrro n e- i .1 1 .1 . 1 ' t
propositions, Avlielfier liypot liotical or di.sjum -
tive, AA'liicli ftaniiot be construed eitlier as 1111 .-
veisal or singular. F o r example, Avlieii Ave s a y ,liAqiotbelicnlly, I f
sunn ])o<lo is, then som'e a n im a l is; or, ilisjimctively, S om e men
ar< <it}n r ro g m s or fo o ts : in eillier c.ase, tlie jiropositiim is iiidefi-
iiit<- or p.arlieiibir, ami no in gen u ity can s Iioav a plausible reason Avliy
it should be vieA ved as definite, as general or individual.
1 K n i g , / y ) e >T', ( .07. A i i m . 4 . p . 1 7 1 n i ' q . i. ( 122. S c l i u l z c , I .o g i k , 4 CO. C n v t r n ; 1;..

Ll< ( ( I. 1 I d f T l j a i i o r , A n f n n g i g t i i n k ' t l r . r A o g i i , p er, l-o g ik , ] 0 2 , p . 177. [ S e e b e l o w , p . 2.37
1213. .si/ a ri. ^ ] <U n u y , <-d. 18.3.6. n o l e 1. E d . ]
K i e b e u c t l c r , O ' r i / n j / r i j j fxnr.r a l i g i m t i m n L o g ik ,
LECTURE XIV.
S T O I C H E I O fx O G Y .
S E C T IO N I I . OF T IIE PRODUCTS OF T H O U G H T
II. APOPHANTIC.
JUDGM ENTS. TH EIR Q UALITY, OPPOSITION, AND CONVERSION.
T he first part o f onr last L e c tu re Avas occupied Avith the doctrine

of Ju d g m e n ts, considered as divided into Simple
R e c a p itu la tio n . C o n d i tio n a l; Simjile being exclusively
Categorical, Conditional, cither H ypothetical, Disjunctive, or H ypo-
thetico-disjuiictive. W e then jiroceeded to trea t of the Q u a n tity
of jirojiositions, and, in this resjiect, I stated th a t they ave either
Definite or Indefinite ; th e Definite comjirising the tAvo subordinate
classes of General or U niversal, and o f Singular or Individual
propositions, Avliile th e Indefinite are correspon dent to P artic u lar
propositions alone. In regard to tbc term s definite and indefinite, I
Avariied yon tb a t I do not ajijily tlicin in th e sense given by logical
Avriters. W i t h them, Indefinite jiropositions denote those in Avhich
the q u an tity is not explicitly declared by one of tbc designatory
terms, cdl, evenj. some, monij, etc. Sncli proj>ositions, hoAvevcr,
ou ght to be called pre-in designate {prce-indesignaUe, aTrporrStopto-Tot),
th a t is, not m arked out hg a prefix, a term better adajited to indi
cate this external accident of their enunciation; for, in jioint of fact,
these preindcsignate projiositions are either definite or indefinite,
and quite as definite or indefinite in meaning, as if their quantity
had been exjiressly marked out by tbe jiredesignatory term.'^.
T his being iireiniscd, I now go on to the n ex t
Second division of . , " , A. . ,
.ludgments.ortiiatac- division of J u d g m e n ts th e division proceod-
ftoi'ding to t h e i r Qual- i n g O il t h a t g r o i u i d w liic li b y L o g i c ia n s h a s b e e n
called the Qaalitg o f Jn d g m e n ts. In itself the

term quality is here a very vague and a r b i t r a r y e x p r e s s i o n , f o r avc
170 LOGIC. L e c t. XIV.
might, with equal iiropviety, g iv e tlie name o f q u a lity to several

other o f the d istin gu ish in g principles o f propositions. F o r ex a m p le
the truth or lalsehood o f propositions has been also called their
q u a lity ; and som e logici.ans have even given thc name o f q u a lity
to the ground o f the distinction o f j u d g m e n ts into categorical, hypo-
thetic.al, and disjunctive. W h a t , how ever, has been universally, if
not alw ays exclu sively, styled the q u a lity o f propositions, both in
.ancient and modern time.s, is that according to which t h e y are dis
tributed into A thrm ativc .and N e g a tiv e .
^ LI. In respect o f their Quality, J u d g m e n t s are divided into

tw o classes. F o r either the S ubject and
Par. LI. Judements, t-. t i i n
in respect of their P red ic ate m a y be recogmzcd US reciprocally
Quality, are Affirma. coiitaiiiing aiid coiitaiiiecl, in the oiiiiositc
tive and Negative. . . i
quantities oi L xten sio n and C o m p rehen
sion; or t h e y m ay bo recognized as not stan d ing in this rela-
sion. Ill the former case, the subject and predicate are affirmed
o f each other, and the jiroposition is called an A Jjirniative
(7rpora(Tt9 KaratâriKr) or Karr]yopLKi), Jucliciuui aJfl)"UiativU7H 01
]>usitirum) ; in the latter case, t h e y are denied o f each other,
and the projiosition is called a N e g a tiv e {-TrpoTaa-L^ aTroehariK-q or
(jTiprjTiK-q, J u d ic iu m n eg a tivu m ).
In this paragraph, I h a v e en o u n ced more gencr.ally than is done by

logicians the relation o f predication, in its affirmative and n eg a tiv e
pha.ses. F o r their definitions o n ly a])]Jy either to the subject or to
the predicate, taken as a w h o le ; whereas, since
i:\piicaiioii. Oeii- ,.,y indiflerently view' either the subject as
eroiitN oi Die (ledi.i- whulc in relation to the predicate, or thc
t j o n o f jirffljcalioii jn ^ . . .
ii.c paragrai<ii. predicate as the w'hole in relation lo the subject,
a cc o n lin g as we consiiler the pro])Osition to e x
press an in ten sive or to express an e x ten s iv e ju d g m e n t, it is
projier in our definition, w h eth er o f ])redication in general, or o f
affirmation and negation in jtarticular, to couch it in such terms that
it m ay indilfereiitly eomprehend both these classes, both these
plui'-e',, o f propositions.
Av exam ples ofy\ffifrnative and N e g a t iv e propositions, the fo llo w
ing may suffice: A is B A is not B God
Hi r i n u l i \ i * r i ? i ' l X * ' g " . . . . .. 7 . , . 7. . 7
aln I- 1 ropiF-illoiif IS lucre 'In (rod is not vm .dietire. in an A f -

firniatix e ju d g m e n t, there is a comjilete iiudiision
o f the su b j e c t within the jiredic.ite :i.s an ex ten s iv e w h o le ; or o f
the ]iredic:ite within the subject ;is an inten siv e whole. In N e g a
tive ju d g m en ts, on the contrary, there is a total exclusion o f the
L ect. XIV. LOGIC. 177
subject from the sphere of the predicate (extensively), or of the

predicate from the comprehension of the subject (intensively). In
affirmative propositions there is also distinctly enounced through
what predicate the notion of the subject is to be tbouglit, that is,
what predicate iniist be annexed to the notion of the subject; in
negative proposition.s, in like manner, it is distinctly eiioiiiiced
through what predicate the notion o f the subject is not to be
thought, that is, what predicate must be shut out from the notion of
the subject. In negative judgments, therefore, the negation essen
tially belongs to the Copula; for otherwise all propositions without
distinction Avould be affirmative. This, however, has been a point
of controversy among modern logicians; for many maintain that the
negation belongs to the predicate, on the follow-
T h at N e g a t io n d o e s m g . grounds : If the negation pertained to the
n o t b e lo n g to th e C op - copiila, tlvcrc coiild he no syn th esis o f the tw o

Ilia, h e ld b y so m e lo g i- y
cians. term s, the whole act o f ju d g m e n t w ould be
subverted, Avhile at th e same tim e a non-con
necting copula, a non-copulative, is a contradiction in terms. B u t
a negative predicate, th a t is, a predicate by which som ething is
taken aAvay or excluded from the subject, involves n o th in g con
tra d ic to ry ; and, therefore, a j u d g m e n t Avith such a predicate is
com petent.'
T h e opposite doctrine is, hoAvever, u n d o n h te d ly the more correct.
For i f Ave p l a c e th e n eg a tio n in th e jired ic.a te.
I
T h e o p p o site d o c i m e n eg a tiv e ju d g m en ts, as alreadA s a id , a r e n o t dif-
m a in ta iu e d by th e A u - a o * .
th o r . lerent in lorm from affirmative, b ein g merely
affirmations that the object is contained Avithiii
the sphere o f a neg ative predicate, or that a neg.-itive predicate
forms one o f the* attributes o f the subject. This, hoAvever, the
advocates o f the ojiinion in question do not venture to assert. T h e
objection from the apparent contradiction o f a n o n -co n n ectin g cop
ula is valid only if the literal, the grammatical, m ea nin g o f the
term copula be co e x te n s iv e Avith that Avhieh it is ajiplied logically to
express. B q t this is not the case. -If literally taken, it indicates
on ly one side o f its logical meaning. W h a t the
T ru e im p o r t o f th e *, , . . , ,
lo g ic a l c o p u la w ord copula A 'e ry inadequately denotes, in the
fo rm o f th e rela tio n b etA veen th e subject and
predicate of a judgment. N oaa', in negative judgments, this form
1 K r u g , LogiX, 55. A n m . 3. E d . [C o m - B a r d ili. G run driss der ersten LogiX. 12 D er-

pare o n th e s a m e sid e B u ffler, L ogique, i., 75 o d o ii, L o g ica , p 642 C l. p. 515 ft seq. Con-
el seq. B o lz a n o . W iessensehaftslehre. L o g ik , v o l tra : K a n t, L o g ik , 22, A n m . 3. B a c lim a n n ,
ii , ^ 1 2 7 ,1 2 9 ,1 3 6 S c h u lz e , L o g ik , 50, p. 74. L o g ik , S4, p. 127. E sse r , L o g ik , i 59, p. 115 ]
23
1 78 LOGIC. L e c t. X IV ,
ospcntially consists in the act o f taking a part out o f a whole,

and is as necessary an act o f th o u g h t as the p u ttin g it in. T h e
notion o f the one contradictory in fact in v o lv es th e notion o f the
other.'
T h e con troversy to ok its origin in this, th at every negative
j u d g m e n t can be expressed in an affirmative
Orijrm ofiiieconiro- foi-pp when the negation is taken from the coi>-
v ersy ro g sm liii" th e i , t mi 4 .
pince of nogatioi. ]daccd in the predicate. Thus, A ns not
B m ay be changed into, A is nof-B. T h e co n
trast is b etter expressed in Latin, A non est B A est In
fact, \vc arc comjielled in E n glish to borrow the Latin non to make
th e diflTerence u n am b ig u ou sly ajiparent, saying, A is non-B , instead
o f A is not-Vi. B u t this jiroves n o th in g ; for by this transposition
o f the negation from the copula to the predicate, we are also ena
bled to express every affirmative projiosition through a double neg.a-
tion. Thus, A is B, in the affirmative form is eq u iva le n tly en o u n ced
b y A is not o - B A 7ion est non-B , in the negative.
T h is possibility o f en u n cia tin g n e g a tiv e jiropositions in an affirma
tive, and affirmative jiropositions in a n egative
Negative terms, fom i, bas been the occasion o f mneb jierversc
Low designated bv Ar- . . . 4 , 9 1
rennem eiit .among logicians. A r i s t o t l e d e n o m
inated the n eg ativ e terms, such as no n B, non
hom o, non alhiis, etc. avofxara ddpifTTa, literally, indefin ite nonns, B o e
thius, how ever, unhajipily translated A risto tles Greek term aopicr-
To? by the Latin in fin itn s, reserving the term
By Boethius. brdefinitus to render dSio'picrro9 as ajijilied to
projiositions, bu t o f which the notion is more apjiropriately ex-
presscil, as w e have seen, b y the word indesigna te [in d esig /m tu s),
or better p re in d esig n a te (jiranndesigno.tus). Ttie Sehoolineii, fol
lo w in g Boetlliu.S, thus called the oj/o'/z-ara dopwra
i.j the .sciiooimen A vU tot\c no/ninej,17 )f i n i f a and the now they
fityli'd the pa7'tiruia infinitenis. O ut o f sueb e lem en ts th e y also
constructed J^/'Opositiones In fn iitO i; that is, ju d g m e n ts in wbicli
either the subject or the prcdieatoi was a nega-
Propa*,t,onr, infinito notioH, MS noii-kom o est virid is, and ho/no
of th e s c h o o lm e n , . . i. , , , t * 1 1
es^t n o n -virid /s, and these th e y dislin gm sh ed
from the sinijilc negative, hom o non est v ir
idis. Herein Boelliiiis and the schoolm en hav e been followed by
Kant,' through t h c W o l f i a n lo gician s; for he exp lains Infinite J u d g -
1 B a ch m a n n , I x g ik , p 127. E n 4 L o g ik , f 2 2. C o m p a r e W o l f , P h ilo s . R a,
2 D e I le r ia e la tio n e , c . 2 . E l> . l i o n ., f 2 0 9 . E d .
S I n D e I n le r p r e ta tio n e , L . 11. f 1. O p tr a , p .
150. Ed .
L e ct. XIV. LOGIC. 179
iiiOiits as tliose which do n ot siinjdy indicate, th a t a subject is not

contained u n d er th e sjihere of a predicate, b u t th a t it lies out of its
sjiiiere, somewhere in the infinite sphere. l i e lias thus considered
th e m as com bining an act o f negation and an
o n iiiis poin t fol- affirniatioii, inasmuch as one th in g is
low vd by K an t. , , , /
aihrmcd in tliem through the negation oi an
other. I n consequence o f this view, he gave them, after some
AA^'olfians, the name of .L im ita drr, which he constituted as a third
forui of ju d g m e n ts u n d e r quality, all propositions being thus
either Allirmati\-c, Negative, or Limitative. T h e whole question
toiicliing tiie validity o f the distinction is of no practical conse-
q n e n t e ; and consists merely in w heth e r a g r e a te r or less la titu de is
to be given to certain terms. I shall not, therefore, occupy your
a ttem /on bv V entering o on aiiv* discussion of w h at niav
* he urged
o in
refutation or defence. B u t if w hat I have al-
K aiits th r e e -fo ld d i- peady Stated of the nature of negation and its
vision o /P r o p o s ilio n s . , , , , ,
unfounded. connection with tlie copula, be correct, there is
no gro u n d for reg a rd in g lim itative propositions
as a class distinct in form, and coordinate with Affirmative and N e g
ative jud gm en ts.'
I f we consider th e q u a n tity and quality o f ju d g m e n ts as com
bined, there emerges from this ju n c tu r e four separate forms of p rop
ositions, for th e y are either U niversal Affirmative, or Universal
N egative, P artic u lar Affirmative, or P a r tic n la r N egative. These
forms, in o rd er to facilitate the s ta te m e n t and analysis o f the syllo
gism, hav e been designated by letters, and as it is necessary that
you should be familiar with these symbols, I shall state them in the
following p aragraph.
IF LIT.I n reference to th e ir Q u a n tity and Q uality together,

P ropositions are designated bv the vowels
or^tvopoMt.l?ae E, I, O. TllC Universal Affirmative are
cording to their dcuoted bx' A ; tlic Universal N eyatire bv
E ; the RarHcular Affirmative by I ; tlie
Particular Negative by O. T o aid the
m emory, these distinctions have been com prehended in the
following lines :
Asserit A, negat E, sed universaliter amb,

Asserit I, negat 0, sed particulariter ambo.2
1 Com pare K rug, L ogik, 55. A n m . 2 . 2 Petrus llisp a n u s, Sum m uU r, T ract, f. par
E d . [A gain st Ihe d islin ctio u , see B aclim an n, lie. 4, f. 9. Cf. Petrus T artarelus; Kzyosirw
Logik, 84, p. 128. S ch ulze, L ogik, [ 50 in SujnwaZai, T ract, i. f. 9 b. Ed.
Drobisch, 42.]
ISO LOGIC. L e c t. XIV.
I m a y li cr c, l i k e w i s e , s h o w y o u o n e , a n d p e r h a p s t h e b e s t , m o d e ,
in wliich th e s e different fo rm s can b e e x p r e s s e d b y d iag ram s.
T h e in v en tion o f tliis m o d e o f sensualizing by circles the abstrac

tions o f L ogic, is generally g iven to Euler, w ho
r i i c tirst c r n p lo y in c n t
o f c i . c u l a r d ia g ra m s
cm]'loyt: it in bis I.rtte rs to a G erm an P rin c e ss
in lo g ic i m ji r o p e r l y on different J fa tte rs o /J d u /s ic s a n d P h ilo s o p h y }
a s c r i b e d t o K ii lc r . To B ut, to say n o th in g o f other m clb o d s, this by
bi - f o u n d in C l i r i s l i a n
circles is o f a niiicli earlier origin. F o r 1 find
W eiM -.
it in th e X u c le n s P o y ic w Weisiance, wliicli ap-'
pt-arcd in 1712; but tliis was a itostliniiions publication, and the
author, Christian W c is e , w h o was R e c to r o f Zittau, died in 1708.
I m a y notice, also, that Lamberts m etbod o f
L a m b e r t s m e ih o d accoiniilisliing tlic saiiic cud, by parallel lines
to be fo u n d in A n te - ^ i-n ' i' i i e i i .
of dillerent lengths, is to he found in the Jm y ic
o f A lsle d iu s, ])uhlished in 1G14, coiiscf|uenl!y
ahove a century and a h alf prior to Lamberts A7iiie.s O ryanon? O f
Lamberts originality there can, ho w ever, I think, be no d o u b t; for
be w:is e x c e e d in g ly eiirions about, and not overleariied in, the his
tory o f llio-e siibsidia, w hile in bis ]ibilosopliieal eorres])ondence
m.iiiv o i h e r in ven tion s o f tin; kind, o f far inferior interest, are
reeo-'led, bill there is no allusion w h a tev er to that o f Alstcdius.
1.eforc le av in g this ]iart o f the subject, I m ay take notice o f another
I I ' a -lii- i.. L M ir e x . v x v . . f d . f o n m o l . F .n . I.O"ir<r. S y s lr m a Ifn r m o n ir u m of A ls le d iu s

I A v '- r y i r n p r f c t d ia g r a m o f t b is k i n d , ( 1C 14 ) , p . 3 9 3 . L a m b e r t s d i a g r a m s ( AV i/a.? Or-
w i t h Ih e lin e s o f c f| u a l I c n g t l i , In i l l i i s l r a l i o n g /in o n , v o l i. p . I l l et se t/.) a r e m u c h m o re
o f t h e fir s t s y l l o g i s t i c f ig u r e , is g iv e n in t h e c o m p le te . F d .
L ect. XTV. LOGIC. 181
(livision of I'roiiositions, m ade by all logicians viz., into P ure and

Modal. P ure projiositions are those in which the predicate is cate
gorically allii-med or denied of the snhject, simjily, w ithout ;iiiy (jnalifi-
cation ; Modal, those in which the jii-edicate is categorically aflirmed
or denied o f the snhject, un d er some mode or
D is tiu c t io n o f P r o - qualifviug determ ination. F o r examjile, Ale.c-
n o s itio iis in to P ure , t. . 17 7
and i io t ia i Under conquered Parvus, is a jm r e , Alexander
conquered Pariu s honorahhj, is a modal projio
sition.' N o th in g c^n be more futile than this distinction. The
m ode in snch projiositions is noth in g more than
T h is d is tin c tio n fu tile . 7. , t nn ^
a p a r t of th e jiredicate. i l i e predicate m ay be
a notion o f any comjilexity, it may consist of any n n m h e r of atlri-
hutes, o f any n n m h e r even o f words, and the mere circumstance
th a t one o f these attrib u tes should stand proniinenlly out hy itself,
can establish no difference in which to originate a dislinetion o f the
kind. O f the examjiles adduced, th e pure jirojiositioii, Alexander
conquered Parius, means, heing resolved, Alexander teas tlce con
queror o f P a riu s, Alexander being th e subject, icas th e cojmla,
and the conqueror o f Pariu s the predicate. N ow , i f we take the
mod.al, Alexander conquered Pariu s honorably, an d resolve it in
like manner, we shall have Alexander v'as the honorable conqueror
o f P a riu s; and liere tlie whole difference is, th a t in the .second the
predicate is a litle more comjilex, heing the honorable conqueror o f
Parius, instead o f the conqueror o f Parius.
B u t logicians, after Aristotle, have jiriricipally considered as
modal jirojiositions those th a t are modified by
D iv iM o n o f M o d a l jj^t,.jLutions of NecessitA, Impossibility,
P r o p o s itio n s b y lo g i- ^ * i ^ ?
d an s. M o d a is as ContingencG, and Possibility. But, in regard lo
in v o lv in g th e c o n s id - tlieso, th e casc is precisely the sa m e; the mode
e n itio n o f th e m a tte r j g jpeicly a p a r t o f th e predicate, an d if so,
o f a p r o p o sitio n are , . , , , , .
c x tr a - io g ic a i n o th in g Can be more uiiAvarranted than on this
ac c id e n ta l, on th is e x tra -lo g ic a l, c ir c u m s ta n c e to
e s t a h lis h a gre.at d iv is io n o f l o g ic a l p r o jio s it io n s . T h i s e r r o r is s e e n
in a l l i t s f l a g r a n c y Avlien a p p l i e d t o p r a c t i c e . T h e d iscrim in ation o f
Jiro p o sitio n s in to P u r e a n d M o d a l, a n d th e d isc rim in a tio n o f M o d a l
Jiro p o sitio n s in to N e c e s s a r y , Im p o s s ib le , C o n t in g e n t , P o s s ib le , a n d
th e reco g n itio n o f th e se as lo g ical d is t in c tio n s , r e n d e r e d it im p e r a
tiv e on th e lo g ic ia n , as lo g ic ia n , to k n o A v A v h a t m a t t e r Avas n e c e s
sa ry, im p o ssib le , co n tin ge n t, and jio ssih le . For ru le s Avere laid
1 T h ese m o d a is are n o t a c k n o w le d g e d by b y th e S c h o o lm e n . C o m p a r e A m m o n i u s , /
A r is to tle , w h o a llo w s o n ly th e fo u r m e n tio n e d D e In terp ., p . 14S b , e d . 1546. E d .
b e lo w . T h e y a p p e a r , h o w e v e r , in b is G reek 2 D e Interp., c. 12. C o m p a r e A n al. P rio r., i
c o m m e n ta to r s , a n d fr o m th e m w e r e a d o p te d 2 . Ed.
1S2 LOGIC. L ect. X IV .
d ow n in regard to tlie various logical ojierations to Avhicli jirojjosi-

tions Avere snbjeeted, according as these Avcre d eterm ined b y a
maltcT o f one o f tliese m od es or o f anotlier, and this, too, Avhen the
modal character itse lf Avas n ot marked out by any jieculiarity or
form o f c.xjiression. Thus, to take one o f m an y jiassages to the
sam e ellect in W h a t e i y ; s i i e a k i n g o f t h e quality
, AVliiilelv quoled. . . , ' '
jirojiositions, he say.s,
01 hen the subject of
a jirojiosilion is a Coiiinion-lenn, the universal signs ( all, no, every,)
are used to indicate th a t it is distributed (and th e jirojiosition con-
.'cquenlly is universal) ; th e particu la r signs ( some, etc.), tlie con
trary. Should there be no sign at all lo the eoinnion te n n , the
quan tity of th e jirojiositioif (Avhicli is called an In d tjin ite jirojiosi
tion) i.s ascertained by tbe nxatttr; i.e., the nature of tlie connee-
tion between th e e x tre m es : Avhieh is eitlier Xeeessary, Imjiossible,
or C ontingent. In necessary and imjiossible m atter, an Indeiinite
is understood as a universal; e.g., birds have Avings; i. e., all: birds
are not qiiadriijieils; i.e., n one: in co nting ent m a tte r (e. e., Avhcre
the term s jiarlly (/. e. sonietinies) agree, and jiartly not), an Indefi
nite is inulerslood as a jiarticular; c . //., food is necessary to life ; i.e.,
sonu' food; birds sin g ; i. e., some d o ; birds are no t carnivorous;
some are not, or all are not. '
X o a v all tliis jiroeeeds ujion a radical mistake o f the n a tu re and
domain o f Logie. Logic is a jnirely formal
Criticized. . , . " . , ,
science; it knows notliing oi, it establishes iiotb-
ing'iijion, llie eireiimstances o f the matter, to wliieb its form may
clianee to be ajijilied. T o be able to say that a
On Iho sui>i>osilioii , . . , .
ii.i Logic nikes cog- neee.ssary, inijio.ssible, or contingent
iiizui.ce oi the iiK.dai- m atter, it is requisite to generalize its nature
itj ol ohjici.s iiii.s from an extensive observation ; and lo make it
"ti.i.te C.II1 haxe no i i u a i i i i b e i i t Oil t l i e l o g i c i a n t o k n o w t h e m o d a l i t y
. . . .
o f all t h e o l i j e e t s t o w h i c h h i s s c i e n c e m a y h e
aj'jilied, i.s at once to declare th a t Logie has no ex iste nce; for this
eondilion of its existence is in every jioint of view iinjiossilile. I t
i> imjiossilile U, Inasimicli as Logic Avoiild thus jircsnjijio.se a
knowleilgi* of the Avholc cycle of hiiiiian seienee; and it i.s iinjiossi-
b!e I , liceaiise it i.s not now, and never Avill bc, deleniiined wliat
tilings are of necessary or contingent, of jiossible or imjiossible exist
ence. .Sjieaking of tilings imjiossilile in natnre, Sir T h om a s Brown
declared that it is imjiossilile th a t a qnadnijiud eonld lay an egg, or
that a qiia<lrnj)ed could jiossess the beak of a bird ; and, in tlie ago
of Sir T hom as B i o a v i i , these jirojiositions Avonld have shown as
1 Elem ents o f iM gik, book ii. cliu]). ii. 2, jjp. C.3, 64.
L ect. X IV . LOGIC. 183
good a title to be regarded as of impossible m a tte r as some o f tlic

examples adduced by Dr, W liately. T h e discovery of N ew H ol
land, and of the O rnithorhynchus, however, turned the imiiossiljlc*
into the actual ; lor, in th a t :inimal, tliere is found a qn.adniped
which at once lays an egg and presents th e bill of a duck. On the
jiriiiciple, then, th a t Logic is exclusively convers.ant abo ut the fcrms
o f thought, 1 have rejected the distinction of jirojiositions and syl
logisms into pure ami modal, as extra-logical. AVIiatever c.annot he
slated by A, B, C, is no t o f logical im p o r t; and A, B, C, know
nothing of the necessary, impossible, and contingent.
I t m a y b e proper, however, to exjilaiii to you the m eaning o f three
term s which .are used in relation to P u re and
E x p la n a t io n o f three Modal jirojiositions, A jirojiositiou is called
ter m s used in r e fe r e n c e H s v s c r /o r z /, w l i c i i it c n o u i i e e s w li.a t is k u o w ii : is
to I u ie a n d M o d a l , r, 7 r . , . , .
I'r o p o s itio n s . actiial ; Frohlematic, when it enounces w h at is
kno w n as possible ; Apodeictic or Denionstixi-
tive, when it enounces w h a t is know n as necessary.
T h e last point o f Aie w in which j iid g m en ts ai o considered, is their
Relation to each other. In resjiect o f these rela-
T in rd D iv is io n o f tioiis, pi'oiiositioiis luivc obtained from Logicians
J u d g m e n t s K ela tio n . , . , , A
to e a c h o th e r . jiai'ticiilar nainc.s, which, however, cannot be un
derstood w ith o u t at the stime time resiardiiiG: the
m a tte r which the ju d g m e n ts cont.ain. As the distinctions o f J u d g
m ents and o f Concejits arc, in this respect, in a grea t m easnrc analo
gous, both in nam e and nature, it will not be necessary to dictate
them.
W h e n th e m a tte r and form o f tw o ju d g m e n ts arc considered as
th e same, th e y are called Identical, Convertible.
^^Judgments identi- E q u a l or E q u iv alen t {proposhiones identicm,
pares, conve7'tibiles,a;qai}-)ollentes)\ on the ojipo-
D iffe r e n i. sitc alternative, th e y are called Different
d iv ersa ). I f con.sidercd in certain re.speets the
R e la tiv e ly I d e n t ic a l. s-Miio, i l l Others different, th e y are called l e l a -
tivelg Identical, Sim ilar, OV Cognate {]'. I'cla-
tive identicte, similes, affines, cognatoi). T h is resemblance may
be either in the subject and conqireheiisioii, or in the jiredic.ite and
extension. I f th e y have a similar subject, their
* jiredicates are D isp a ra te {disqxirata), if a simi-
D is ju n c t. 1'"' I'l-edicate, th e ir subjects are D isjunct {dis-
ju ncta).
1 S e e D w c iw io n J, p. 145 f 1 ie? . E d . [C o m - L o g ik , 19. p . 72, a n d 23, p. 79; S c h u lz # ,

p a re B a c h m a n n , L o g ik , 73, p . 115; R ic h t e r , L o g ik , 52, p. 78.]
2 K a n t, L o g ik , 30 E d .
1 8 4 . LOGIC. L ec t. X IV .
W h e n tw o j u d g m e n ts differ m erely in their q u an tity o f e x t e n

sion, and the one is, therefore, a jinrticnlar, the
other a general, t h e y are said to be subordinated,
and tbeir relation is called S u b o rd in a tio n {sub ordinatio). The
subordinating (or as it might, jierhaps, bc more
su b a 'ten ia te. f , i ' ' 7. \ n
properly styled, the ju d g m en t, is
calle<l the S u baltcrnant {subalternans) \ the subordinate ju d g m e n t
is called the Subalternate (subcdternatuni).
W h e n , o f tw o or more ju d g m en ts, the one affirms, the other d e
nies, and w hen th e y are th us reciprocally differ-
^ (]>pofition of Jiidg- quality, th e y arc said to bc Opposed or
C onflictive {p r. oppositce, JvTtKct/iciui), and tbeir
relation, in this resjjcct, is called O pposition (oppositio). Tliis op
position is either that o f C on tra d ictio n or Jie-
t mitradiction. pm gnance {contradictio, ucTieâin?), or th at of
C ontrariety {contrarietas, cmcTiorr/?).
I f neither contradiction nor contrariety exists, the ju d g m e n ts are
called CQngrnent { p r . congruentes, consonantes,
co iigru eu t Judg- consenticntes). In regard to this last statem ent,
inent>. .
you will find in logical books, in general,* that
^ Subcoiitrar>-opposi- t|,p|.e o])i)Ositioii o f w h a t are called S u b
contraries {subcontraria), m ea n ing by these par
ticular ]iropositions o f different (jiiality, as, for example, som e A are
B, som e A are not B ; or, som e m en are learned, som e m en are
not h a r n e d ; and t h e y are called Subcontraries, as th e y stand siib-
ordinatc<l to the universal contrary pro])Ositions, All A are B, no
A is B ; or. A ll m en are learned, no m a n is learned. B u t this is a
mistake, there is no opposition b e tw e e n Subcon-
^ trarie.s; for both m ay at once be maintained, as
both at on ce m ust be true i f the som e bc a nega-
\un\ o{'(dl. ' f h e y cannot, how ever, both be false. T h e opposition
in this ca.se is o n ly a])]iarciit and it was probably only laid down
from a lo ve o f sym m etry, in order to make out the o|)])ositioii o f all
the corners in the square o f Opposition, w hich you will find in
alm ost ev ery work on Lolmc.
1 El'm rnii 0/ Lngik, b y D r. W h a le ly , p a rt C o n / m t n c fn i/ i iV o r a Z-ogi'ca, T r a c t i i i . D i s p . i i i . ,

ii. c h a p . Ii. [ .3 ,) .. 6 8 , 3 d e d i t . I . u t g ee S c l i e i b - f 2 , p . 1 2 1 , e d it . 1 7 1 1 . K a i i t e x p r e s s l y r e je c t s
le r. rip'Tv Lfigim, I'ar.H I ii. c . x i . p . 4 8 7, e d . S iib c o iitr a r ic ly , Logik, 5 50, A iim . fk jn ip a r e
166.5. L I r lc b , [ I n n h . Jsog. tl M n ., ] 18 3 , p . K r u g ,/ .e g iA - , 5 6 1 , A i n n . 4 I t r a iii s s , G r u m h is s
iV ). L d . J (Jfr L o g ik , p . 10 5 . D e ii/ iiig e r , I n s litu tio n e .i
2 F o r w h ic li r e a s o n A r i s t o t l e d e s c r ib e .s it a s L n g k a i, v o l. i i . } 7 1 3 , p . 13 8 . C a r a m iic l, p 3 3
a n o p p o s i t io n in l a n g u a g e , b u t n o t in r e a l i t y . [ R a t i o n a l i s et R e a lis P h ito s o p h ia ,a u lh o r c lo a n n e
A n a l. P r io r ., ii. 1 5 . K l>. [C o m p are F o n seca, C a r a m u e i L o h k o w i t z , S . T k . L o v a n U n s i D o e to re ,
I n iiu . D ia U c l., I-. ii i. c . 6 , p . 12 9 , e d . 1 6 0 1 . vlW ats A/e/ro 3 f i/ , L o v a i i i i , 10 4 2 . E d J
L ect. X IV . LOGIC. 185
Finally, Aarious relations of ju d g m e n ts arise from Avhat is called

their Convei'sion. W h e n th e subject and ]>redi-
C o iiv e r s io n o l P r o - ^ eatcgorical lU'OUOsitiou (for to this W(!
p o s ilio iis . . 1 ,
now h u n t onr coiif.i. eratioii) are tiamsposed, the
]u-oposition is said to he conveited ; the jn'ojiositioii gi\'eii and its
jirodnct are both c.alled the J u dicia co/iversa; tlie relation itself of
recijirocation in whieh tlie ju d g m e n ts stand is c.alled Conversion,
sometimes Ohversion and I'ransposition (I'eciprocatio, convcrsio,
ohversio, (ranspositio, fieTdAeinq, ixerafioX-q, aVTia-
iciins e m p lo y e d to rpccf)^). T h e givcii jiropositioii is c.alled the
denote t lie orignidi Converted or Converse {Judicium, pronosit'o,
a n d c o n v e r te d p r o p o - .
sitioii. jn'ujuceus, conccrsum, coneersu) , the other, into
wllicll it is converted, th e Converting {Jud.,
prop., convei'tens). T h e re is, how ever, m uch am biguity, to say the
least o f it, in th e term s eom m only em ployed by Logicians to des-
igii.ale th e tw o jirojiositions, t h a t given, and th.at the p ro d u ct of
the logical elaboration. T h e prejucent and suhjcicent m.ay jiass, but
tlioy have been very rarely employed. Tlie te rm co.a-
pcp.w, the converse or co nverted ju d g m e n t, specially for the original
proposition, is worse th a n am b iguous; it is aiijilied gener.allyto both
ju d g m e n ts ; it may, in fact, more app ro priately d en ote the other,
its jirodnct, to which in deed it has, b u t th ro u g h a blunder, been
.actually apjilied by A ld ric h ,' and he is followed, of course, by
Wli.alely. T h e original projiosition oug h t to be called th e Convert-
end or Conx'crtihle {p r. convertenda,convertihiUs)? T h e te rm Con
verting {convei'tens) em ployed for th e projiosition, th e pro d u ct of
conversion, m arks o ut no th in g of its jieciiliar
P roposals e x p o s ita character. T h e expression p r . exposita, apjdied
its u se b y A ld r ic b er- , . ' j. x i i i
r o n e o u s. by Aldrich, w ith o u t a w ord of comment, to this
ju d g m e n t, is only a n o th er instance o f his daring
Ignorance ; for th e phrase ])r. exjiosita had n o th in g to recom m end
it in this relation, and was em ployed in a wholly different m eaning
by logicians and m athem aticians.' I n this error A ldrich is followed
1 R u d im en ia L o g ic a , L . i. c . i i. c ia n s , to d e n o te th e s e le c tio n o f an in d iv id u a l
2 [S o N o ld iu s , p. 263, [L o g ic a R eco g n ita , H a f- in s la n c e w h o s e q u a litie s m a y be p e r c e iv e d b y
liiaj, 1766. E d .] s e n s e { f K T i^ tv a i, expontre, objicere stn su i), in

I C r a k a n th o r p c , S a n d e r s o n , a n d AVallis [d e - o r d e r to jiro v e a g e n e r a l r e la tio n b e tw e e n n o -
n o m in a te th e o r ig in a l p r o p o s itio n p r . con- tio n s a p p r e h e n d e d b y th e in te lle c t . T h is
versa, its p r o d u c t ;>r. contertens. S e e C r a k a n - m e th o d is u sed b y A r is to t le iu p r o v in g th e
th o r p e , L o g ira . L. iii. c . 10, j). 179, ed 1677. c o n v e r s io n o f p r o p o s itio n s a n d th e r e d u c tio ii
S a n d e r s o n , L ogica. L . ii. c . 7, p. 76, c d . 1741. o f s y llo g is m s . S e e A n al. Prior . i. 2 ; i. 6 ; i. 8 .
AV allis, In stiiu lio L o g ic a , L . ii. c . 7, ]i 113, T h e in s tiin c e s e le c te d is c a lle d th e ir p o s itu m .
e d it. 1729. W a llis a lso uses p r. ronvertenda as (rb tK T eS eV ); and h e n c e s in g u la r p r o p o s itio n s
a s y n o n y m for pr. conversa. E d ] a n d s y llo g is m s a re c a lle d ex p o sito ry. C o m p a r e
4 T h e te r m exposition (e K ^ e a is ) is e m p lo y e d P a c iu s o n A n al. P r., i. 2, a n d S ir AA . H a m i t
b y A r is to t le , a n d b y m o s t su b s e q u e n t lo g i- t o n s n o t e , ReicPs W orks, p . 6 9 6 . E d .
24
186 LOGIC. L kct. X IV .
by Wli.ately, wlio, like bis able predecessor, is Avliolly u nversed in

the literature an d language
O ~ o f Logie.O
T h e logicians after A risto tle have distinguished two, or, as Ave may
tak e it, three, or even four, species o f Conver-
SiK'Cies o f C o in or- f jio il
MOii d is liiig iiis lie d b y , j' . i i ii i o- 7
lo-iciaii.d. * hrst, AvliicIi IS called Sintjue ov P u r e
Conversion {convcrslo simplex, rot? opot^Tpo? tav-
Ti)i\ Aristotle, i. e., cum tenninis recijn'ocatis)^ is Avheii th e q uantity
:ind qindity of tlie tw o j u d g m e n ts ai'c the same. I t holds in U n i
versal X e g a ti\ e and P.artieular Affirmative projiositions.
2. T he second, Avliieh is called Conversion hy Accident {c. pier a,:-
cidens, iv fiipn, Kara Al istotle), is Avhen, the (piality rem aining
nn;iltei-ed, the q u a n tity is reduced. I t holds in U niv ersal Affirina-
ti\e s . T hese tw o are th e sjieeies o f the conversion of jirojiositions
acknow ledged liy all ; lliey are evo h'e d by A ristotle, not, as m ight
have been exjiected, in his tre.atise On Enouncement, b u t in tb e sec
ond cliapter o f tlie first book of his P r i o r A nahjtics?
3. T he third, Avhicli is called Conversion by Contraposition (c.
per op]tositiont)n, c. ]!tr contra 2 >ositionem,\)o\\i by Boethiu.s, cco<-
trapositio, dt'TLdTftocfiTj (Tvv dvTLSiirti, Alexander),* is Avhen, instead of
the subject ami jiredicate, the q u an tity and quality rem a in in g tlie
same, there is jilaeed the co n tra d icto ry of eaeli. This holds in Lîii-
versal Afiirinatives, and most logicians alloAV il in P a r tic u la r X ega-
tives. I t i.s com m em o rated b y A risto tle in the eiglitli c lia jite ro f the
second book of his 7'opics : it is tliere called th e inverse consecution
fro m contradictions.
I shall here m ention to you some iniieinoiiic verses in Avhieh the
doctrine ol' conversion is exjiressed.
A liiP inoiiic verse." c-x- 1 o t) t i- i .1
. .
jires.'iiig CD iiversion _
1 . JiCganliiig

conversion as limited to tlie
Sinijile a n d A ccidental, and excluding alto gether
Contrajiosition, Ave have tho doctrine contained in the tw o following
ver>es.
I Too 'ipois a v T i m p f ip f t v . AmU. P r., i. 2 , iogisnio C a lrg o n 'c o .L . p . 3^7. T im s ro iiiw .o o

I w lie n e a c li term is th e c x ii e l e < |u iv a le iit 'liv id e il i.r iiiia r ily in lo c. s im p le x niuI c. p -r
ol' tlie o tlie r .Sec T r e iid e le iib iir g , E lr m tn la conirapo.silion em . A r i.s lo lle d o e s u o t use i v
Log. A n st .if W - , In I)r A n tm n , p . m - , AVaitz, a s s u b s e q u e n t lo g ic ia m s, lo r f. k/m inw /o.
la A riu . Org., v o l. i. |i. .3 7. 3 Kr>. m a in ly f o r p a rtic u la r in o p iio s itio ii
( lio e iliiu s seeni.s tlie lirsl w h o g a v e Ib e u n iv irsa l. (S e e A n a l: Prior, i. 2, 4 .) T lie y
n a m e o f fo n r rr s io p .r A rci.h n s. AVilh h im it I'" '' "'""k: i'l ll"'''- U'-e o f tlic w o r d s arxi-
I -I r'ojs-rly b o tli A m i> lla llv c a n d l ie s lr l c li v e d m ia l amX p a ru u l.)
( S o R id ig e r, D r Srnsn Vrri n F a lsi, pp. 2.50, 3 U tro d u c tio a d S y llo g ism o , C atrgorios, a n d
?A3, 2d w l i ,., 17-g2. n - c l . c r U g i k , p . 108.) I t .syllcg ism o C atrgorico, L . i. ^ K d.
I op j) 0 "ed as a c o n s p e c ie s l o r . grn rrn h s, a n d
b o th arc f|.< c ie s o f c. s im p h x , w h ic b is o p - 4 In A n a l. P rio r., f. 10 b , e d it. A i d . 1 5 2 0 .
p osed to C o n tr a p o s itio n . S e e Opera, D e S y l- K d.
L ect. XIV. LOGIC. 187
E, I, sim pli c it e r vertenclo, sij^na in a ii e b u n t;

A s t A c u ra vertis, s i g n a m i n o r a cape.i
0 is not convertible. '

2. A d m ittin g Contraposition as a legitim ate species o f conver
sion, the Avholc doctrine is em bodied in th e following verses hy
P etrus I lis p a n n s :
F E c I ( F E s I) shnplicitcr, c o n v e r titu r E v A (E p A) p e r A ccid.

Ast 0 (A c 0 ) p e r C onlrap.; sic fit co nver si o tota.2
Or, to condense the three kinds o f conversion with all th e propo

sitions, prejacent and snhjacent, in a single line:
E c c e , T IB I, S im p .; A r m i G ER O S, A c c . ; A r m a , b On o , C o n t. ^
I t m ay he proper now to m ake you acquainted w ith certain dis-

, tinctions of ju d g m e n ts and propositions, which,
D is-tm ctio n o f P r o - th o u g h uot S tr ictly of a logical ch a r a cte r, it is
p o s ilio iis n o t s tr ic tly . , , ^ i i i c
o f im portance th a t yon should be aware oi.
Considered in a m aterial point of view, all
ju d g m e n ts are, in the first place, distinguished into Theoretical and
P ractical. T heoretical arc such as declare th a t
iiie o r e t ic a i a n d P r a c - a Certain character belongs or docs n ot belong
to a certain o h je c t; Practical, ?>\\c\\ as declare
.i:it som ething can he or o ug h t to he done, b roug ht to hear.
Theoretical, as well as practical ju d g m e n ts, are either Indemon-
strahle, w hen th e y are evident of themselves
I n d e m o n s tr a b le a n d require, and whcu th c v are.
D e m o n s tr a b le . , , tv ' 7 7
incapable of proof; or th e y are Pemonstrable,
when th e y are no t im m ediately ap p a ren t as true or false, h nt require
some external reason to estahlish their tr u th or falsehood.
In dem o nstra hle propositions arc ahsolnte principles {ap^Qxi, prin-
cipia)-, th a t is, from'Avhich in th e conslriiction of a system of
science, cognitions alto g eth er certain n ot only are, h n t m u s t he
derived. D cinonstrahle propositions, on the other hand, can, at
hest, constitute only relative principles; th a t is, snch as, themselves
requiring :i higher principle for th e ir w arrant, may y e t aftord the
basis o f su ndry o th e r propositions.
1 [G iv e n b y C h a n v in , L f x P / n 7 . , V. C o n ce n io . T a r ta r etu s, E x p o sitio in Sum m tU as P e tri H is-

D e u z in g e r , L istitu tio n e s L o g ic a , ii. 140.] p a n i. T r a c t, i ., f. 9 b . E d .]
- S e e I e ir u s l li s p a n u s , p . 9 , [Sum m uU B,
T ract, i., p a r tic . 4, f. 9, e d 1505. C f. P e tr u s 3 [H is p a n u s , Sum m ulce, I. c. C h a u v in , I. c.]
1S3 LOGIC. L e c t . XI V.
I f t h e indenionstr.nble p ro p o sitio n s b e o f a th eo retical character,

t h e y a r e called A x io m s : if o f a praetic.al e h a r a c -
Axiums and Tostu- ]\xs.tuJates. T h e foiiner arc principles of
ll ltos
iinincdiate certainty; the latter, principles of
iniincdiate apjilication.
D e m o n s t r a b l e ])roi osi ti ons, i f o f a t h e o r e t i c a l n a t u r e , a r e c a l l e d
Theorems (th co rem a ta ) \ i f o f a j j r a c t i c a l , / / o -
1J' ^ l e m s {jyrohlcmata). T h e former, as pro p o sitio ns
of a m ediate certainty, require proof; they,
t h e r e f o r e , c o n s i s t o f a Thesis ; m d i t s D o n o n s tr o tio n / t h e l a t t e r , as
of mediate . a p p l i c a t i o n , s u p p o s e a Q uestion (quaestio) a n d i t s S o lu
tion (resol u tio )T
A s species o f t h e foregoing, t h e r e are, likewise, distinguishel
C orolla ries (consectaria, co ro lla ria ), t h a t is.
C o ro llarie s. . . , . , , ..
])ro]iositions w h i c h now, without a new jiroof,
out oftheorem s or postulates pres iously dem onstrated. Projiosi-
t i o n s w h o s e v a l i d i t y r e s t s o n o b s e r v a t i o n o r e.x-
E.xperimetai i-ro,>o- , , e r i i i i e n t a r c c a l l e d E x p e r ie n tia l, E x p e r i m e n t a l
silion s.
qrropositions (em pirernata, experientke, eoqxerk
m en ta). ITypotheses, t h a t is, p r o p o s i t i o n s w h i c h a r e a s s u m e d w i t h
p r o b a b i l i t y , in o r d e r t o e x p l a i n o r p r o v e sonie-
Mypoiiieses. t h i n g else w hich c a n n o t o t h e r w i s e b e expl .ai ii ed
or proved. l e m m a t a , t h a t is, p r o p o s i t i o n s b o r r o w e d f r o m a n o t h e r
science, in o r d e r to serve as subsid iary proposi-
Ix-m in ala. . . , . n i i -t-<. n
t i o n s in t h e s c i e n c e oi w h i c h w e t r e a t , hinally.
Scholia, t h a t is, p r o p o s i t i o n s w h i c h o n l y s e r v e as illu stratio n s o f
w h a t is c o n s i d e r e d i n c h i e f . T h e clearest and
most apjiropriate examples of these various
k i n d s o f p r o j i o s i t i o n s a r e g i v e n i n m a t h e m a t i c s . *
1 E cser, L ogic, { 79, p p . 147, 1 4 8 . E d . [C o m p a re K ru g , LoffiX, 67, G8.]

LECTURE XV.
S E C T IO N I I . OF T H E PRODUCTS OF THOUGHT
HI THE D O C T R IN E OF R E A SO N IN G S.
R E A S O N IN G IN G E N E R A L S Y L L O G IS M S T IIE IR D IV IS IO N S AC
C O R D IN G TO IN T E R N A L FORM.
I n' niy last L ecture, I termin.nted th e D o ctrine of Ju d g m e n ts ,

:uul now jiroceed to th a t of Reasonings.
W hen th e n ece.ssity o f th e j u n c t io n o r s e p a r a tio n o f a certain
su h iect-n o tio n an d a certain j i r e d i e a t e n o t i o n is
T h e a c t o f r e a s o n in g n ia iiifest from th e natnre o f th ese n otio n s
' th e m s e lv e s ; h n t w h e n , at th e sa m e tim e, avc are

d e s i r o u s o f knO A ving A v h e th e r t h e y m u s t h e t h o u g h t a s inelu siA 'c, nr
as e x c l u s i v e o f each o t h e r , in th is c a s e , Ave f i n d o n rseh 'es in a
state o f d o u b t or in d ecisio n , from our ig n oran ce o f A vh ic h o f th e
t w o c o n t r a d i c t o r y jir e d ic a te s m u s t b e affirm ed o r d e n i e d o f tb e s u b
ject. B u t th is d o u b t can be d issip a ted , tin s ig n o ra n ce can be
r e m o v e d , o n ly in one Avay, o n l y b y p r o d u cin g in ns a n e c essity
to connect Avith, o r d isco n n ect from , th e su b ject one of th e ic-
p u g n a n t p red ica tes. And sin ce, ex h yp o th ed , th is n e c e s s ity does
n o t a t le a s t , d o e s n o t i m m e d i a t e l y a r is e fr o m t h e s i m p l e knoAvl-
e d g e o f t h e s u b j e c t in it s e lf , o r o f t h e p n ' d i c a t e in it s e lf , o r o f b o t h
t o g e t h e r in t h e m s e l v e s , i t f o l lo A v s t h a t i t m u s t b e d e r i v e d f r o m s o m e
e x te r n a l so u rce, a n d d e r iv e d it can o n ly bc, i f d e r iv e d , from s o m e
o t h e r k n o A v l e d g e , A v h ic h a f f o r d s u s , a s i t s n e c e s s a r y c o n s e q u e n c e , t h e
rem oA 'al o f t h e d o u b t o r i g i n a l l y h a r b o r e d . B n t i f th is kn oA vled ge
h a s for its n e c e s s a r y c o n s e q u e n c e t h e r e m o v a l o f th e o r ig in a l d o u b t,
t h i s k n o A v lec lg e . m u s t s t a n d t o t h e e x i s t i n g d o u b t in t h e r e l a t i o n o f
a g e n e ra l ru le; a n d . a s e v e r y r u l e i s a j u d g m e n t , it Avill c o n s t i t u t e a
general p ro p o sitio n . B u t a general ru le does not sin q d y and of
itself reach to th e r em o v .a l of doubt aud in d ecisio n ; th ere is re
q u ir e d , a n d n e c e s s a r i l y r e q u i r e d , o v e r a n d a b o v e t h i s f u r t h e r knoAvl-
100 LOGIC. L ix t . XV.
e d g e t l i a t t l i e n i l e h a s r e a l l y a n a p p l i c a t i o n , or , w h a t i s t h e s a m e
t h i n g , t h a t t h e d o u b t r e a l l y s t a n d s u n d e r t h e g e n e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n , as
a e a s e Avliieh c a n b c d e c i d e d b y i t a s b y a g e n e r a l r u l e . B u t when
t h e g e n e r a l r u l e h a s b e e n d i s c o v e r e d , ni u l ayI i c u its ap p licatio n to
t h e d o u b t h:i s l i k e w i s e b e e n r e c o g i r z e d , t h e s o l u t i o n o f t h e d o u b t
i i n mc t l i . - Ue l y f o l l o w s , a n d tliorewitli th e determ ination of which of
the contrad icto ry predicates m u st or m u st n o t he alHrmcd o f the
subject; and this d eterm ination is a e c o m p a i i i e d w i t h a conscious
ness of necessity or absolute certainty. * A sim ple c.vamplc will
]d:iec t h e m a t t e r in a c l e a r e r l i g h t . AYl ici i the*
I tistr a te d b v ail e x - e ..i i , ,
notion or t h e s u b c c t m a n is " i v e n a l o i m Avilh
t h e c o n t r a d i c t o r y p r e d i c a t e s fr e e agent a n d neoes-
sa rg agent, t h e r e a r i s e s t h e d o u b t , w i t h Avhich o f t h e s e c o n t r a d i c
t o r y l u ' e d i c . a t c s t h e s u b j e c t is t o b c c o n n e c t e d ; f o r , a s c o n t r a d i c t o r y ,
they cannot both b e al l irm cd o f t h e su b je c t , am i, as c o n t r a d i c t o r y ,
t h e o u c o r t h e o t h e r m u s t b e s o a l l i r m c d ; in o t h e r w o r d s , I d o u b t
whetlier m an b e a fr e e agent o r not. T h e n o t i o n meoi, a n d t h e
repiigiiaiit n o tio n s fr e e agent a n d necessary ayent, d o n o t , i n t b c m -
s e h e s , afford a solution o f t h e d o u b t ; a n d I m u s t e n d e a v o r to dis
c o v e r S l i me o t h e r n o t i o n which will e n a b l e m e to decide. Now,
ta k in g the jiredicate fr e e ayent, t h i s l e a d s m e t o t h e c l o s e l y c o n
n e c t e d n o t i o n m o ra lly ro^pemslhle ayent, w h i c h , l e t i t b c s u p p o s e d
that I o th e r w is e k n o w to bc ueccssr.rily a free ag en t, I t h u s obtain
t h e projiosition, H cc ry m o ra lly responsible agent is a fr e e agent.
Jiiit this p r o p o s i t i o n does not o f itself contain the solution of the
d o u b t ; f o r i t m a y st i l l b e a s k e d , D o e s t l i c n o t i o n m o ra lly responsible
(njt.ni c o n s t i t u t e a j i r e d i c a t c Avhicli a p j i c r t a i n s t o t h e n o t i o n o f m a n ,
the suhjeet? T h i s ( | n e s t i o n i s s a t i s f i e d , i f i t is r e c o g n i z e d t h a t t l i o
notion m a n i n v o l v e s i n i t t h e n o t i o n o f a rnorallg responsible agent.
I c a n t h e n s a y , ^Fan is a m o ra lly responsible agent. These two
]iroj)osiiions b e i n g t h u s f o r m e d a n d a p ji li cd to t h e s u b s i s t i n g doiilit,
t l i( r e m o v a l o f this d o u b t follows o f i t sel f f a n d , i n ]dace of the
p rev io us indecision, wlietlier m a n b c a f r e e a g e n t o r n o t , t h e r e f ol
lows, w ith t h e conscio u sn ess o f n eces sity or ab s o lu te certainty, the
connected ju d g m e n t that M a n is also a fr e e agetd. T h e whole
process t h e w h o le series o f j u d g m e n t s will s t a n d t h u s :
E v e r y m o ra lly rpspoiisilh'. a ye n t is a fr e e a y e n t;
M a n is a m o ra lly re.sponsihle a ye n t ;
T h e re fo re , w a n is a f r e e aye n t.
L e t US c o n s i d e r i n w h a t r e l a t i o n t h e d i f f e r e n t c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t s o f
1 PGeser, L o g ik , i 82, p. 163.

L e c t. XV. LOGIC. 191
tliis process stand to each other. It is evident that the whole pro
cess consists of three notions and their mutual
T h e e x a m p le g iv e n rel.ations. The three notions are, fre e agent,
is a l{ e n s o n in g in th e responsible agent, and man. Their mntiial rela
w h o le o f E x t e n s io n ,
s.inl m ay be re])re-
tions tire all those of whole and ptirt, and whole
s e n te il by th r e e c ir c le s . and part in the quantity of extension ; for the
noUow fre e agent is seen to contthn under it the
notion respyonsihle agent, and the notion responsible agent to contain
under it the notion man. Tims, these throe notions arc like three
circles of three various extensions severally, contained one within
.another; and it is evident, that tlie jirocess hy which wc recognize
that tlic narrowest notion, man, is contained under the widest
notion, responsible agent, is precisely the same hy AvliicIi we sliould
recognize the inmost circle to be contained in the outmost, it wc
were only supposed to know tlie i-elation of tlicse together by tbeii
relation to the middle circle. Let A B C denote a
the three circles. Now, ex kxjpothesi, we know,
and only know, that A contains B, and that B con
tains C; but as it is a self-evident principle, tliat a ,
]iart of the part is a jzart of the whole, we cannot, V v..
with onr knowledge that B contains C, and is con
tained in A, avoid recognizing th.at C is contained in A. This is
precisely the case with the tliree notions fr e e agent, responsible
agent, m a n ; not knowing the relation between the notions fre e
agent and man,but knowing that fr e e agent contained under it
responsible agent, and that responsible agent contained under it
man, wc, upon the principle that the part of a jiart is a part of the
wliole, are compelled to think, as a necessary coiisocpience, that
fre e agent contains under it man. It is thus evident, that the pro
cess shown in the example adilncpd is a mere recognition of the
relation of three notions in the quantity of extension, onr knowl
edge of therelation of two of these notions to each other being not
given immediately, but obtained through onr knowledge of their
relation to the third.
But let us consider this process a little closer. The relations of
the three notions, iu the above ex.aiuple, are
T h e rea.<oning o f those given in the quantity of Breadth or E x
E .x ten sio n m ay be
tension. But every notion has not only an
e x h ib it e d in C o m p r e
h e n s io n t h is illu s
Extensive, but likewise au Intensive, quantity,
tra te d . not only a quantity in breadth, but a (piaii-
tity in dejith ; .md these two quantities stand to
each other, as wc have seen,' always in a deterinin.ate ratio, the
1 See ab o v e , p. 104. E d .
192 LOGIC. L e c t . XV
ratio o f in v e r sio n . I t A voukl, t h e r e f o r e , a p p e a r , a p > r io r i; X ,o be a

neeessarv p resu in jitio n , tlia t if n o tio n s bear a certain rela tio n to
e a c h o t h e r in th e o n e q u a n t it y , t h e y m u s t b e a r a c o u n t e r r e la tio n to
e a c h o t h e r i n t h e o t h e r q u a n t i t y ; c o n s e q u e n t l y , t h a t i f Ave a r e a b l e ,
n m ler th e q u a n t it y o f e.v te n sio n , t o deduce from th e r ela tio n s of
tw o n o t io n s to a th ird th e ir r ela tio n to e a c h oth er, a c o rresp o n d en t
e v o ln tio n m ust be co in jieten t o f th e sam e n o t i o n s , in t h e q u a n t i t y
o f e o in p reh en sio n . L e t us tr y A vhether th is t h e o r e t ic a l p r e s u m p t i o n
b e AVMiranted (( p o s t e r i o r i , a n d b y e x p e r i m e n t , a n d A vbether, in th e
ex a m jile g iv e n , th e jirocoss c a n be in v e r te d , a n d th e sam e resu lt
o b t a i n e d Avith t h e sam e n ecessity . That e x a m p le , as in e x te n s io n ,
Aviis :
A ll responsible agents arc free agents;
B ut man is a responsible agent;
Therefore, man is a free agent.
In o t h e r A vor d s, t h e n o t i o n r e s p o n s i b l e a g e n t is c o n t a i n e d under
X\\Q w o i i o w f r e e a g e n t ; b u t th e n o tio n is c o n t a i n e d under th e
n o tio n r e s jm n s ib le a g e n t; th erefore, on th e p r in c ij d e t h a t t h e ]iart
o f a ]-)art i s a ] i a r t o f t h e A v h o lc , t h e n o tio n m e tn is a ls o co n ta in ed
u n d er th e n o t i o n a g e n t. N oa a, o n t h e g e n e r a l d o cti'in e o f th e
relation o f th e tAvo q u a n t i t i e s , avc m u s t , i f Ave A v o u l d ob ta in th e
sam e r e s u l t i n t h e c o m p i ' e b e n s i v c Avbicli i s h e r e o b t a i n e d u n d er the
e x te n s iv e q u a n tity , in v e it t l . e A v b o le process, th a t is, t h e n otio n s
A v h ic h in e x t e n s i o n a r e A v h u l e s b e c o m e i n c o m i i r e b e n s i o n jiaits, and
th e n o tio n s A vh ic h in th e fo rm er are parts, b e c o m e in t h e la tter
A v h o lc s . Thus th e n o t i o n f r e e a g e n t , A v h ic h , in t h e e x a m p l e g i v e n ,
Avas t h e g r e a t e s t A v h o le , b e c o m e s , i n t h e c o u n t e r p r o c e s s , t h e s m a l l
est ]>art, a n d th e n o tio n r n e t n , Avliicli avms t h e sm a llest p a rt, uoav
b e c o m e s t h e g r e a t e s t A v b o le . The n o t io n r e s p e m s ib le e tg e n t r e m a in s
th e m id d le q u a n tity or n o tio n in b o t h , b u t its I'elation to th e tAvo
oth er n o tio n s is r e v e r s e d ; A vh at Avas foi m e r ly its part b e i n g uoav
i t s A vholo , A vha t Avas f o r m e r l y i t s avIio Ic b ein g uoav its part. The
p r o c e s s Avill, t h e r e f o r e , b e tliu s e x p lic it ly e n o u n c e d :
T/iP notion m an rom prehends in it the notion responsible a g e n t:

B u t the notion res),onsible agent eom prchentls in it the notion fr e e a g e n t;
T h ir ifo r e , on the p r in r ip le th a t the ]jiirt t f a p a r t is a p a r t o f the whole, the notion m a n
also rrjinprihi m is in it the nrjtion fr e e agent.
Or, in com m on la n g u a g e :
M a n is a responsible a g e n t;
B ui a resjjonsihle agent is a free agent;
Therefore, man is a free agent.
Lect. XV. LOGIC. 19o
This reversed process, in the quantity of comprehension, gives, it i.s

evident, tlio same result as it gave in the quantity of extension.
For, on the sujiposilion, that we did not immediately know that the
notion man comprehended //'ce agent, .hwl recognized that man
comprehended responsible agent, and that responsible agent com
prehended fr e e agent, Ave necessarily are compelled to think, in the
event of Giis i-occgni'.ion., that the nctioi: ma^ comprehends the
notion fr e e agent.
It is o n ly necessary further to ohserve, th a t in the one p r o c e ss ,
that, to Avit, in extension, the copula is, means is
the copula in ex- contained Under, Avhereas, in the olher, it m eans
teii.Moii a n d compie- comprehends in. T h u s the p ro p osition , God
iKTision o f a c o u n te r . , ,
u .a n in g . merciful. Viewed ns in tlie o n e q n n n t i t y , sig-
niHes God is contained under mercifid, t h a t is,
tlie not i on God is c o n t a i n e d n n d e r t h e n o t i o n merciful; v i e w e d as
in t h e other, m e a n s , God comprehends m ercif ul, t h a t is, t h e n ot i on
God comprehends in it t h e n o ti on merciful.
N o w , th is process of t h o u g h t ( o f Avliieh I have endeavored to
g iv e yon a general n o tio n ) is c a l l e d lieasoning; h u t it has, lik e
w ise, o h ta in e d a va riety o f o th er d e sig n a tio n s. The d e f i n i t i o n of
t h i s p r o c e s s , Avith i t s i i r i n c i p a l d e n o m i n a t i o n s , I shall i n c l u d e i n th e
fo llo A v in g jiaragrajih .
^ LITT. R e ason in g is an act o f m ediate comparison or

J n d g in e n t ; for to reason is to recognize
P a r . L i i i . D e f in it io n that tw o iiotioiis Stand to each other in the
of th e p r o e e sB o f , .
R e a s o n in g , w i t h t h e relation o t a A vli ole and its jia rts, tliro u g li
p r in e ip a i d e n o m in a - a reco gn itio n , th a t th e se n o tio n s severallA
t io n s o f p r o c e s s a n d i i , , ^
p r o d u c t. Stand ill the same r e l a t i o n to a t h i r d . Con
sidered as an act, Reasoning, or Discourse
o f Reason ( t o A o y t^ e c r J a i, X.oyurg.6i, Sidvuia, t o S ta v je ic rS a t), is, like-
AAise, called th e act or jirocess of Argumentation {argimienta-
tionis), of Ratiocination (ratiocinatioyiis), of Inference or
Illation {iaferendi), of Collecting {colligendi), o f Concluding
(concludendi), of Syllogising (jov o-uAAoytêo-Jat, harh.arously
syllogisandi). T h e term Reasoning is , li k c A v i s e , given to the
pro d u ct ot the a c t; and a reasoning in this sense (ratioci-
natio, ratiocinium), i.s, likewise, called an Argumentation
{argvmentatio ) ; also, Ireqnently, an Argument {argnmentum),
an Inference or Illation {illatio ) ; a Collection {collectio), a
Conclusion {conclusio, (rvyTripao-fjia ) ; and, finally, a Syllogism
(crvAAoyicrp.o?),
25
194 LOGIC. L e c t. X V .
A few w ords in e.xplan.ation of these will suffice ; and, first, of

the tiling and its definition, thereafter o f its
E x p lic a t io u .
names.
In regard to the act of Reasoning, noth in g can be more erroneous
than the o rdinary distinction of this jirocess, as
1. T lie A c t o f U c a s- o]icration of a faculty different in kind from
" those o f J u d g m e n t and Concejitioii. Concep
tion, J u d g m e n t, and Reasoning, are in reality only various applica
tions of the same simple faculty, th a t o f Comparison or Ju d g m e n t.
I h:.ve endeavored to .show tliat concejits are merely the results,
rcmlered jierm anent by language, of a previous process of compari-
s i u i ; th a t jiidirnient is n o th in g b u t comparison, or the results of
comjiarison, in its im m ediate or simjiler form ; and, finally, that reas
onin g is noth in g b n t comjiarison in its m ediate or more comjile.x
apjilication.' I t i.s, therefore, alto g eth er erroneous to maintain, as is
com m only done, th a t a reasoning or syllogism is
A rea.son in g is o n e ^ t n o rC d c C O m p O lin d w llo lc, m ad e 1 1 J1 o f judg-
iir g a n ic w lio lc . . , f
m e n t s ; as a j u d g m e n t is a comjiound whole,
made up o f concejits. T his is a m ere mechanical mode o f cleaving
the mental jihenomena into jiarts; and holds the same relation to a
genuine analy.sis o f mind which th e act of the b u tc h e r does lo that
o f the anatomist. It is true, indeed, th a t a syllogism can be sejia-
rated into three jiarts or jiropositioiis ; and th a t these jiroj ositions
have a certain moaning, when considered ajiart, and out o f relation
to each other. But, when th u s considered, th e y lose the whole sig
nificance whicli th e y had when united in a re a soning; for their
w hole signific.ance consisted in th e ir reciprocal rel.atiou, in the
light whicli th e y miitnally reflected on each other. W e can cer
tainly hew dow n an animal body into parts, and consider its m e m
bers aji.art ; but tliese, thongli not absobilcly void o f all m eaning,
when view(d singly and out of relation to tlieir whole, have lost the
jirinciji.al and jiciailiar significance Avhich tliey jiosscsscd as th e coef-
ficicnis o f a one organic ami indivisilile whole. I t is tlie same with
a syllo'_'i-"iii. Tlie jiarts which, in th e ir organic union, jmssessed life
and imjiorlaiicc, wlien .sejiaratcd from cacli oth er remain zmly eniin-
î.ations <îf v.auiie gzaieralilics, or o f futile identities. 4'lioiigli, wlion
cxjires'z-d in l.angiiagc, it be necessary to analyze a reasoning into
parts, and to stale these jiarts one aflei anotlier, it is n ot to be sini-
jioseil that in th o n g h t one notion, one projiosition, is known before
or after a n o t h e r ; for, in eoriseiousness, th e three notions and theii'
rec ijirocal relations con.stltute only one identieal and simultaneous
cognition,
1 S e e a b o v e , p p . 83, 97. E d , .
L e c t. XV. LOGIC. 195
T h e logieians haA'e Indeed all tre a te d the syllogism as i f this

Avere not the case. T h e y have considered one
E rro r of logicians in pvopositioii as naturally the last in e.xiiression,
tlicir Irealinent ol tlie , , . , i i- i n i .1
Syllogism accord ingly called the coxx-
clasion; Avliilst the otlier tw o , as naturally g o in g
hefore the other tw o, th e y have sty led the premises, form ing to
geth er Avhat they call the anteeedexxt. T h e tw o premises they have
al.^so considered as the one the greater {major), the other the less
{xnixxoxj, by exclusive reference to the one quantity o f extension.
A ll this, hoAvcA-er, is, iir iiiy vicAV, coinjiletely erroneous. F o r avc
may, in the theory ot L ogie, as Ave actually do in its practical appli-
eations, indilfercntly eno u nce Aviiat is called th e coucfasioxx first or
last. In the latter case, the cunclusion forms a thesis, and the prem
ises its grounds or reasons; and instead o f the inferential there
f o r e {ergo, dpa), avc Avonld em p loy the exp licative T h e Avhole
difTerenee consists in this, th at the com m on order is syn th etic,
the other analytic; and as, to express the th ought, Ave m u st analyze
it, the analytic order o f sta te m en t appears certainly th e m o st direct
and natural.' On the subordinate m a tte r o f the order o f the p rem
ises, I do not hero touch.
B u t to s p e a k o f t h e p ro c e s s in g e n e r a l ; w it h o u t t h e p o A v c r o f
r e a s o n in g Ave s h o u ld have been lim it e d in onr
u iii iiy of the process P iio A v le d g e ( i f k n o w l e d g e o f s u c h a l i m i t a t i o n
o f rcasoiiihg. ^
A v o iild d e s e r v e t h e n a m e o f k n o A \d e d g e a t a l l ) ,
I s a y A v it h o n t r e a s o n in g Ave s h o u l d h a v e b e e n l i m i t e d t o a k n o A v l-
e d g e o f A v h a t is g i v e n b y i i n i n e d i a t e i n t u i t i o n ; a v c s h o u l d h a v e b e e n
u n a b le to d r .n v a n y in f e r e n c e f r o m t h i s k n o A v le d g c , a n d h .a v e b e e n
sh ut out fro m tb e d is c o v e r y o f t h a t c o u n t le s s m u lt it u d e o f t r u t h s .
A v h ic h , t l i o u g h o f h i g h , o f p a r a m o u n t im p o r t a n c e , a r c n o t s e lf -e v i
d e n t. T h i s f a c u l t y is , lik c A v is c , o f p c c i i l i : i r u t i l i t y , in o r d e r to p r o
t e c t 11s, in o n r c o g i in t io n s , f r o m e r r o r a n d f a ls e h o o d , a n d to re m o A e
t h e s e i f t h e y l i a v e a l r e a d y c r e p t in . F o r e v e ry , th e m o s t c o m p le x ,
w eb o f th o u g h t m a y be re d u ce d to s im p le s y llo g is m s ; and A vbcn
t h is is d o n e , t h e i r t r u t h o r f a ls e h o o d , a t le a s t in a l o g i c a l r e l a t io n ,
f la s h e s a t o n c e in t o v ie w .
O f th e te rm s b y Avhieh t h i s p r o c e s s is d e i io m -
2. Terms by which in a t c d , Beoso/iixig is a m o d if ic a t i o n fro m th e
tlie process of Uca."on- p q . p i H. h raisooxier ( a n d thisa derivation from
ing is (lenoiniiiatcfl. , t . i i . . .
t h e J . a t in a n d c o r r e s jt o n d s to ratioetiiatio,
.la .o n ii ,,, .alio h a s in d e e d been in im e d ia le lv t r a iis f c r r e d
CUBltlOU.
in t o o n r l a n g u a g e u n d e r t h e f o r m ratiocixxatioxi.
Itatiocixiatioxi d e n o te s p r o p e r ly th e jir o e e s s , b u t , i m p r o p e r l y , a ls o
1 A r i s t o t le s A n a ly tic s a re s y n t h e t ic .
11-"-) LOGIC. L ect. X V
t h e j i ro di ic t o f ro n. so ii in g; J latloclu lu m m a r k s c.velusivcly t h e p r o
duct. T h e o r i g i n a l m c a i i i n g o f r a t io w a s c o m
p u ta tio n , and, f r o m t h e c a l c u l a t i o n o f n u m b e r s ,
it w a s t r a n s f e r r e d t o t h c j i r o c e s s o f m e d i a t e c o m j i a r i s o n in g e n e r a l .
D is c o u r s e {d iscnrsu s, Si droi a) i n d i c a t e s t h e o j i e r a t i o n o f c o m p a r i
s o n . t h e r u n n i n g b a c k w ; , r.'.s .and f o i ' w a r d s b e t w e e n t h e c h a r a c t e r s o r
n o e s u f o b j e Us - - ( c ' i . s t a . ' in t ( 0 notas^ Siav uaS (A : t u s t e r m
ma}', therefore, b e jirojierly ajijdied to thc Elabiirative Faculty
in gencr.al, w h i c h I have just called thc Discursive. The terms
disrniirse and d is cu rsu s , Stdvoia, a r e , h o w e v e r , often, nay gen
e r a l l y , n s i d f o r t h e I ' c a s o n i n g j i r o c e s s , s t r i c t l y c o n s i d e r e d , a n d dis-
r u r s i c t is o v e n a j i p l i e d t o d e n o t e m e d i . a t c , i n o p ] ) O s i t i o n t o i n t u i t i v e ,
j n d g m e i i t , as is d o n e b y M i l t o n . ' T h e c o m j i o n n d t e r m , discou rse
o f rta so n - u n a m b i g u o u s l y m a r k s its e m j i l o y m e n t in t h i s sense.
A r g u m e n t a t i o n is d c i a v c d f r o m a rg u m e n ta ri.
Arûmeiir^* w h i c l i m c a u s a r g u n u n t i s u ti ; a r g u m e n t a g a i n ,
a rgu rn entu m , w h a t is assumed in order to
a r g u e s o m e t h i n g , is p r o p e r l y t h e m i d d l e n o t i o n i n a r e a s o n i n g ,
t h a t t h r o u g h Avhi ch t h e c o n c l u s i o n is e s t a b l i s h e d : a n d b v t h e L a t i n
R h e to r i c i a n s it w a s defined, ju'obabile iiiv entum ad faciendam
fidom. It is o f t e n , h o w e v e r , a])]>lied w i t h a rgu -
coextensive
m< n tatio n . J nfcrcnre o r illatio n ( f r o m infero').
In fe re n c e . . , ' . . , .
i i i d i c a t ( s t h e e : ; r r \ i n g o u t i n t o t h e l a s t ] ) r opos i -
tion w hat was virtually contained in the antecedent judgm ents.
T o conclude Iconclmlerc), a g a i n , s i g n i f i e s t h c
To c o n c lu d e . ^ ^ ,
act of c o n n e c tin O
g :md sliu ttinO
g into the hist
j i r o p o s i t i o n t h e t w o n o t i o n s w h i c h s t o o d a j i a r t in t h e t w o first. A
conclusion (<-onclusio) is u s u a l l v t a k e n , in i t s
ronclusion. . , ,
strict or pro]i(>r signification, to mean tlic last
Jiroposition o f a rea so n in g ; it is som etinies, however, used to exjiress
the jtrodiict o f the w h ole process. To syllogize means to form syllo
gisms. A yllogisni (frvA.Ao-ytfr/xo?) seem s originally,
I'n .S yllogize. p, ." , i i
.
s> llogi^rn.
like ratio, to have ileiioted a <;omiiutatton z
an
a d d i n g np a n d , l i k e t h e g r e a t e r j i a r t o f t h e
t e c l m i e a l t e r m s o f L o g i c in g e n e r a l , w a s b o r r o w e d b y A r i s t o t l e f r o m
the niathematieians.'' This jirimary meaiiing of these tw o words
I / < < / . < ( , V. 4 S 0 , reiiFon, iiided w illi tin- in flu e n c e of d ivin e

W li. -ncc th e g n i C '.-' l . i > ,
I i<a*r n r< r i v < , a m i r eo Mi n n I n r b i l n . . . ' I f ' i c e i o . O r n lo r ir r P i i r l i l l a n i s , c 2. C l . I)is -
In r r i v t o r i i i l u ' a < . ; d i i c o u r a o t u s s i o n a , ]). 1 111. Ml>.
N oil. Ko. 4 [ St;(; 1 ' i c c a r t u. -, O /-. A r i u ., j ip 407, 40.S.
2S liakl.oare,actl,fc. 2,- Aininoniii.s, /,i ep.m/m Vr.s. f 1 riiilopo-

nu.^, I n A n . Prior, f. W)*. I ticiii.a. Com. i n Org.,
A bcaM. that wanu <li.cour.<-or reaaon, j,p J22. Uorlin.s, Log. P>r>p. j.. 119. R ut
W o u l d h a v e m o u r n e d lon ge r. j p gg^ [.S cl.u lzc, LogiJ^
H o o k e r, E. P., i i i . 8 , 1 8 B y d is c o u r s e o f J 70 , p . 1 0 1 . Discussions, p 0 6 7, n o t e . E d . ]
L f.o t. X A '. l o g i c . 197
favors tlie tlioory of those pliilosopliers who, like H o b b e s ' and Lci-
ilenfrost, maintain th a t all th o u g h t is, iu fact, at bottom only a c:il-
ailation, a I'cckoniiig. IvXXoyujixuq may, however, be cousidered as
expressing only wliat the eoiiiposition of tiie w ord denotes, a col
lecting together; for rrvXXoyiQo-Cat comes from a-rXXeyeiv, wllicll signi
fies to collect'd Finaliv, in Latin, a svllogism is
C ollectT o. ,, 77 . 1 ' 77 ri 7 , .
called collectio, and to reason cotliger^. 1 Ins
refers to tlie act of collecting, in the coiiclnsioii, the tw o notions
scattered in the premises. .
F rom w h at lias already been said touchin g tlie character o f the
reasoning proees.s, it is easy to see w h a t are the
riio fccneral c o iid i- , . .. , . i ' n .
lio n s or .s 1 ( " sn i.
goiioral eoliditioiis wlueli every syllogism sup
poses. For, as the essential nature of reasoning
consists ill this, th a t some do u b t should be removed by the ajipli-
eatioii to it of some decisive general rule, there are to every syllo
gism three, and only three, r(*(piisites necessary; 1, A d o u b t ,
which of tw o con tradictory predicates m ust be aftirmeil o f a certain
subject, the problem or qneslion (problema, qnacisituin) ; 2, d'he
apjilieation of a decisive general rule to the d o u b t; and, .1, T he
geiier.d rnlci itself. B n t these requisites, when the syllogism is con-
strnetod and exju-essed, cliange their jilaees ; so th a t the general rule
stands first, the application of it to the dou b t stands second, and the
decision in regard to the dou b t itself stands last. Each o f these
necessary coiistitiieiUs o f a syllogism forms by itself a distinct, tl. ongh
a correlative, jiroposition ; every syllogism, then-fore, contains three
propositions, and these three jiropositioiis, in th eir comjilement and
correlation, eonstitiite tlie syllogism. ' It will be projier, liowever,
here to dictate a paragrajih, express!ve of the denomiii.itions leelmi-
cally g iven to the jiarts, wdiicli proxim ately m ake iqi the .syllogism.
LIA'^. A R easoning or Syllogism is composed o f tw o

parts, th a t wdiieli detGrmiiics or jireeedes, and th a t Avhieh
follows or is determ ined. T h e one is called th e Autcredent
{<intecedens)\ the other, the Conserjuent {consequent). T he
.Vnteeedent comjirises the tw o jirojiositions, the one of whieh
1 L e v i n t h n n ,V t . \ . c . i > \ C om p u ta tio siv e L o g - a x ,\K o y i a p 6 s . . . o:s a j W l y o v Ti)v

ica, c. 1. C l. S l e w a i t , E U m m ts, 1. ii. c . ii. nacrt Tots upois hie(nrapp.evriv
3 ; ll'orCs, v o i, iii. p. 132 .Sfr/. E p . (('. Z a b iiie lh i. hi Anal. PoO .. 1. 1, U p ,r a Log-
2 De M m te H u m a n a , c. v iii. [ 4, 10, pp 112, icn, p. 010. 'S .jW o y ia p .h s, n o n a v W o y h r i n
118, vii. 1703. Ed \6 y c n v , 8C(1 i|u a s i a v K k o y p t o v A o y o v , colUcno
3 Eujienio.'!, A o y ig r ], p. 405. ct ibi lU c n im i- lU'o/ii.s . r a tio a u te in c<)lliji:i ilic ilu i-, iliim cut..
(las [K ai TO p e g xo;j.a.. o n a v W o y f ] n s t a r ) c n s io in fc tiir ; i;i;a iv a v o i.v iiis io n e p o liu s,
\iiy c o g T c\ii6i/(tiv i v auTrZ . . . 'O 5e q u a m a p r o p o s itio n ib u s d ic tu s est s y llo x i*
BAcyUyuiS. i v EttitOjU. A o y . K<p. \ d , I I o t^ n iu s." E d .]
Be Kat a v r h r h f fv p ir e p a g p a K ah eZ rai {(pT}(T\) 4 E sser, L o g ik , [ S3, p. 156.
193 LOGIC. L ect. X \ .
enounces tlie general rule, and the other its application. These,
from their naturallv p r ecedin g the conse-
( E oposi-
which prosimr.tciy (I'oncs j)i'(i?niss(e, sia)t/)(ioiics, nttmbr(L ante-
ism cedcntia, Xijfj-ixaTa). Ot the piemises, the
one which enou nces the genei'al rule, oi' the
rel.atiou o f the gi-e:Ucst (piantity to the le.sser, is called the J/aJor
P ix n iisc , c>r M u jv r P rojfosU ion, or the J iro p o sitio n sinijily
{jirojiositio )/n//or, p ro p o sitio jtrim a , j>roj>ositio, siim]>tu)H,
sinnj>tio iiuijor, sum jitio, thesis, e.rjxositio, intentio, Trjwa-Xrj^'Lc,
poVatri^ 7/ pet'ôji, Xrjppa t o pdôv). d'he othci' lil'cmise, which
enounces the application o f the genei'al rule, oi the relation o f
the lesser quan tity to the least, is called the J /i/io r Jirem ise,
the M in o r P ro p o sitio n , the A s s u m p tio n , or the SnbsionpAioxi
(j)ropositio xninor, ]>ropositio altera, assum p tio , subsum ptim i,
suhsum ptio, sump>tio m inor, Trfunacns i/ iXaTTiDV, Xrjppa t o iXaTTOv).
It is manifest that, in the coun ter (pialities o f B read th and
I)e])lh, the tw o jii'emises will hold an ojiposite I'elation o f
m.-ijor and minor, o f rule and application. T h e C o nsequent is
the final piujiositioii, w hich en on n ees tlie decision, or the rela
tion o f the greatest (piantity to the le:ist, and is called th e Con
clusion (conrlusio, conclusion, jn'o]xositio conclusa, collectio,
com jthxio, sunona, conne.do, illatio, intentio, and, in Greek,
(TvpTTCfjaapa, ri) crccuyo/xeroi',* t o e~t(êpop,cor). dhis ]>art is usu
ally d esign ated by the conjunction T herefore ienjo, upa), and
its sy n on y m s, ddie eoiielnsion is the P roblem {]>roblema),
Q uestion (<jnnstio, q u n s itu m ), which was originally asked,
stated n o w as a deei.sion. T h e ]>ruhlem is nsnally omitted
in the ex-pi'ession o f a syllogism , Imt is one o f its essential
parts, dhe whole noinenelalui-e o f the sylhjgistic jiarts, be it
obsei-ved, h;is I'efei-ence to tlie one-sided view s o f the logicians
in regard to the proee.ss o f reasoning.
T h e S yllogism is divided into tw o jiarts, the

i-.xiiiication. A iite e e d e iit and the ( o iiseip ieiit: the aiiteec--
Ai I c c c d i'i it a n d , , i i . . .
' on-ci|uciii 'h-nt coiiijireliemlmg the tw o jirojiositions, m
w hich the middle notion is compared with the
tw o notions we w ould compare to g e t h e r ; and the con seq u en t coni-
1 ' l. i i g c i i o . AoyiKi] j:n%%itn.] [ t. i . , J)c CVnsiirn Vtri, L . ii . p . 0l)0 ft seq., cd .

2 ' s i -i - A ! < ' X A p l i r o d i ' - i f n i h i H , 7/1 z l n r t C / V i o r . , Ei .) l ! a c l i i M ! i i i i i , 7-ogi7.-, p . 1 S 4 . Fac-
r . 4, r. IT'-. lio c lliiii* , In Toj/ir.a Clrtroni.%, 1. c i ( d a l i , .S cx liiK l i i i i p i r i c n s . [ I 'a c c i o l a l i , liurJi-
i , j). 70 4 .] im nla Logir.a, c . ii i. p . 8.3, c d . 175(). S e .x tu s
3 [.Sec I t . A g r i c o l a , D< Invtntiortf DiaUctiriT, E i n i i i r i c u s , Hypolyposes, L . ii. p . 80 et alibi,
I., ii. c . x i v . p p . 4 0 1 , 4 1 7 , 4 2 0 . V i v e s , Optra E d .]
Lect. X V . LOGIC. - 190
jirising tlie o n e p r o p o s i t i o n , w h i c h e x p l i c i t l y e n o u n c e s t h e r e l a t i o n
i m p l i c i t l y g i v e n in t h e p r i o r o f t h e s e t w o n o t i o n s t o e a c h o t h e r .
T h e t w o ])ropositioiis w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e t l u; a n t e e e d e i i t a r e c a l l e d ,
among other names, the J -r o u ise s . 01 these,
I'lrnii.ses. ' . i i ,
tlie iiro])Osition e x p r e s s i n g t h e r ela tio n or w h o le ,
Avliich o n e of tlie o r ig i n a l l y g i v e n n o t i o n s h o l d s to t h e assim ieil or
m i d d l e n o tio n ;is its part, is c a lle d , a m o n g o t h e r ai)])ellations, th e
M a j o r P r o p o s i ti o n , th e M a j o r P r e m is e , or The
P r o p o s itio n , s a f $6)(7]v. I ' h e o th e r |) r op o sition
o f t h e a n t e c e d e n t e ii o i in e i n g t h e r ela tio n o f w h o le , w h ic h t h e a s
s u m e d or m i d d l e n o t i o n h o l d s t o t h e o t h e r o f t h e g i v e n n o t i o n s as
its part is c alled, a m o n g o t h e r ap])ell::tioiis, t h e M i n o r J^roposi-
tion, t h e 3 I i n o r J d e m i s e , t h e A s s a m ji ti o n , or
M inor. , .. ,
S u b s u m p tto n .
tlie I l i ese, a s t e r m s o t i v l a t i o i i ,
vary, o f course, Avitli the relation in the counter quantities. 'Jdie
o n e ] ) r o p ( ) s i t i o n , Avhich c o n s t i t u t e s t h e c o n s e q u e n t , i s c a l l e d , a m o n g
other a])])el lat ions, t h e Conclusion. Perhaps the best n a m e s for
t h e s e t h r e e r e l a t iv e jirop ositioiis o f a s y l l o g is m
Miinpiion, Snbsump- .^yguld b e S u m ittio n , S u b su m p tio n , Conclusion,
lion, and Conclusion. ^ _
a s t h o s e Avhieli e x p r e s s , m o s t b r i e f l y a n d natu
rally, t h e n a t u r e a n d recijiroeal d o jien d en ce o f t h e t h r e e j u d g m e n t s
o f a syllogism. In t h e f i r s t p l a c e , t h e e x j u - e s s i o n s S u m p t io n and
S u b s u m p ti o n are appropriate l o gi cr . l expres-
Urounds of their s i oi i s , in cousequeuce of their both show ing
adoption as best names Logic Con siders t h e m , n o t as a b s o lu t e l y ,
lor tlie lliree proposi- "
tiousot asyliogitm. 9 u t o u l y as l iy ] ) u t h c tie a l ly tr ue ; for L o g i c d o e s
n o t Avarrant t h e t r u t h o f t h e p r e m i s e s o f a s y l
logism ; it only, on the supposition th a t these jiremises are true,
g u aran tees the legitim acy o f the inference, the necessity o f the
eoneliision. I t is o n t h i s a c c o u n t t h a t t h o p r e m i s e s h a v e , b y t h e
G r e e k l o g ic ia n s, b e e n A c r y p r o p e r ly st y l e d Xrj/J--
Lcmma. , i t - * .
jxara, corresjioiidmg to the J.atin s u m p t i o m s ;
and Avere th e r e any n ecessity to resort to Greek, t h e Jlajor P ro p o
sition, Avbieh I Avoiikl call S u m p t i o n { s u m p t io ) , m ig h t be Avell
denom inated Iêm m a \ and the ]\Iiiior Pro]iosition, Avbieb I
Avoiild call the S u b s u m p ti o n (s u b su m p tio ), m i g h t 'b e Avell d e n o m i
nated the J b ip o le m m u . In the second place,
Hypolemma. , , i , ,
tliongh botli jireimses are .snmptums, or lem
m a t a , y e t t h e t e r m su m p tio n , a s s p e c i a l l y a p p l i e d t o t h e ] \ I a j o r P r e
m i s e , is f u l l y A v a r r a n t e d b o t h b y ] f r e c e d e n t a n d prineijilo. F o r , in
like m a n n e r , th e m a jo r p ro p o sitio n th e m a j o r l e m m a has alw ay s
1 See A lexan d er, In A nal. Prior., f. 14, b. Scholia, ed . Brandis, p. 150. E d .

200 LOGIC. L e c t . XV.
obtained both from the Greek and L atin logicians tlie gen eric term ;
il has been called, The P r o p o s iO o n , The JyOnina ( p r o p o s it io , y irpo-
raai^. ru Xijfxpa) a n d as tliis is tlie jn d gin eiit wliivli ineliulcs and
allows both llic olbcrs. it is well entitled, as the |irinci]i:il jiroposi-
tioii. t(i tlic style and title o f (he p r o p o s iti o n , the. h jn m d . (he su m p -
tion by preeiniiienee. In tlie tliinl jilaee, the term su b s u m p tio n is
prefi-rahle to the term a s s u m p ti o n , as a dcnomi-
.\.'-U II.|)li()ll . 1 A I- Tl 1
nation ot the Alinor i r e m i s e ; lor tlie term
siihsum/ition jirecisely marks ou t its rel.ation o f subordination to
tlie major premi.se, wlicre.as the term a s s u 7 n/)fion does not. yl.s-
sum pfirm wonltl iinleed, in contrast to suI>sumption, Inive been an
nne.xeeptionablo word by wliicb to d esign ate tbe major jiroposition,
Ini'l it not been that logicians h.ave very goner.illy einjiloyed it to
d esign ate the minor, so that to re\ erse its ajijilicalion would be jiro-
d ii e t i ie o f i:;e\it:ible confusion. B u t for this objection, I should
certainly have jna-ferred the term a s s u m p tl o )i to that o f su m p tio n ,
for the ajijiellation o f the major jirojiosilion ; not that in itself it is
a jirelerahle e.xjiression, but simjdy because a s s u m p ti o n is a word
o f finiili.ar usage in the E n glish language, wbieli s u m p tio n and suh-
sumj)(io/i cert:.inly arc not.
T h e jireceding are reasons w liy the relative terms s u m p ti o n and
suhsunijition ought to be einjiloyed, as b ein g pos-
Objociions to the i t i vcl V g o o d OXJircssioiis ; lint the exjicd ien ey o f
dciiomiiiaii..iis of tlie tJiyj,- ;ulojition b eco m cs still more in.anilest. wlien
lio|)<i.'iliiiiis of tlie 1 - 1
.-iliogi-iniiioniinary
'''t' comj.nred and co ntrasted with corre-
lee sjionding d en o in in alio ns in ordinary use. F o r
Major I'rojiositioii ten iis tu a jo r p r o p o s iti o n and in a jo r pu'cmise,
and rp-nii.-e. .Minor . ... , .
... ,
I rn|ii)Min)ii and 1 re-
m m o r ^p r o iiio sitio n and m i n o r zprem ise, are ex-
,ni-e. jiosed to various objeelioiis. In the lirst jil.aee,
th ey are eomjilex and tedious exjiressions, whereas
s u m jitio n and su bsumption, are simjde and direct. In tbe .secoin!
jdaee, the abbreviations in etmnnon use (the major jirojiosilion being
called the m a jo r, the minor jirojiosilion b ein g called the m i n o r ) arc
.imbigiions. not finly in eonsetjiienee o f their l agiieness in general, but
bee.'in.sc lliere are tMo other jarts cif the syllogism to which these
exjiressions, in a jo r and m in o r, may (qiially ajijily. For, as yon will
s.oon he informed, the tw o notions which w e eoinjiarc together
through a third, are called tlie m a j o r and the m i n o r ter m s oi' \\w
syllogism ; so that when mc talk o f majors and minors in reierenee
to a syllogism, it remains iima'ilain w hether we enijiloy these words
to d en ote the jirojiosilioiis or the ternis o f a rcsisoiiiiig. Still more
ribjeetionable are the correlative terms, P r o p o s i t i o n and A s s u m p
tion, as s y n o n y m s for tbe major and minor premises. T h e terra
L ec t. X Y . LOGIC. 201
p r o p o s i t i o n i s :i w o r d i n t o o c o n s t a n t e m p l o y m e n t i n i t s v a g n e a n d
gencrni sense, to bc imambiguonsly used in a
r.oposition. Assump- î o- , j i i i cnt i on s o I . r c c i s e a n d s p e c i a l a s t h e o n e i n
lion . .
qne^tio;l; ; m l , i n r o n s e ( [ i U n c e o f t b i s a m b i g u
ity, its e m p l o y m e n t in th is signiticatioii h a s lieeii i n f a c t l o n g v e r y
generally abandoned. A g a i n , t l i c t e r m a ss u n ip tio n d o e s n o t e x p r e s s
t h e distin ctiv e pcculiai'ity o f t h e m i n o r ])i - emi se, t h a t o f b e i n g a
snboi'dinate jn'oposition, a p ro p o sitio n taken or assum ed under
another; this w o rd would i n d e e d , a s I h a v e n o t i c e d , h a v e b e e n a]-
])Ii cd w i t h f a r g r e a t e r p r o ] n - i e t y , h a d i t b e e n u s e d t o d e n o t e t h e m a j o r
in p l a c e o f t h e m i n o r j n ' c m i s o o f a s y l l o g i s m .
d ' h e s c ai ' e a m o n g t h e r e a s o n s Avhi ch h a v e i n c l i n e d m e t o e m p l o y ,
a t l.-:!st a l o n g w i t h t h e m o r e o r d i n a i - y d e n o m i n a -
Tiie ii.'.e of t i o i i s , t l i c t e m i s s u m id io n a n d svh su in ption . X o r
!ind Sulj.sumptiun .aiic- . . . i i
fiouedbyp-cc.dcnt. ô b c s up ] ) OS e d , t h a t t l u s i i s a g e IS d e s t i t u t e
o f ]n-ocedent, f or I c o u l d a d d u c e in its f a v o r e\ en
the high autliority o f Boethius.' I n g en eral an d w i t h o u t reference to
Lo g ic , it ap i i ea r s m a r v e l l o u s h o w , in E n g l i s h p h i l o s o p h y , w o c o u l d so
l o n g d o w i t l i o n t t h e n o u n siihsinnption, a n d t h e v e r b to subsume, f o r
these d e n o t e a relation which w e h a v e v e ry f re q u e n tly occasion to ex-
])i'css, a n d t o c x j i r c s s w h i c h t h e r e a r e n o o t h e r t e r m s w i t h i n o u r r e a c h .
T Ve h a \ e a l r e a d y i n E n g l i s h a ssu m p dio n a n d assum e, ijre siim p tio n
a n d p re s u m e , c o n su m p tio n a n d consume, a n d t h e r e is n o i m a g i n a b l e
r e a s o n w h y w e .should n o t l i k e w i s e e n r i c h t h e l : m g n a g c , t o s a y n o t h i n g
0 ^ su inption, b y t h e a n a l o g o u s e x p r e s s i o n s subsumpdiu)i a n d subsume.
In regard to th e proposition constituting tlie consequent of a
sy l l o g i s m , t h e n a m e w h i c h is o-cncrallv b e s t o w e d
. Tlie Conclusion. ' . , yy i ^ i
o n It, t h e Concluston, is n o t e x p o s e d t o a n y
serious objections. T h e r e is t h u s n o r e a s o n w l i y i t s h o u l d b e s u p e r
s e d e d , a n d t h e r e is in f a c t n o o t h e r t e r m entitled to a preference.
S o m u c h ill r e f e r e n c e t o t h e t e r m s b y w h i c h t h e j i r o x i m a t e p a r t s o f
a syllogism are den o ted . I n o w ]iro cee d t o s t a t e to y o u in g e n e r a l
t h e D ivision o f S y llo g ism s in to Sjiccies d e t e r m i n e d b y t h e s e ])arts,
and shall t h e n j i r o c e e d t o c o n s i d e r t h e s e s e v e r a l s ]i cci es in d e t a i l .
B u t I h a v e f i r s t o f al l t o s t a t e t o y o n a d i v i s i o n o f S y l l o g i s m s , w h i c h ,
as c o n r q ir eh c nd in g , o u g h t t o j i r c c e d e all o t h e r s . I t is t h a t o f S y l l o
gism s into E xtensive and Conqu'ehensivc.
^ LV. The F irst Division o f S y l l o g i s m s is t a k e n f r o m t h e

d i f fe r e n t k i n d s o f q u a n t i t y u n d e r w h i c h t h e r e a s o n i n g ])roceeds.
I ' Q n o n i n m c n iin o m n is s y llo ^ 'ifm u s e.x t io :' U o e i h \ \ \ s , D e S y l l o g i s m o H y p o t h e i k o , Wh-
p r o p O ! . i t i o n i b n s t e x i l n i , p r i m a vel p ro p o sitio , i E d .
\ el su m p tu m vocatnr; secuinla vero a s .\ iit n p -
26
-02 LOGIC. L ect. X V .
For w h i l e e v e r y s y l l o g i s m i n f e r s t h a t t h e ]i ai' t o f a p a r t i s a
])art o f t h e w h o l e , it d o c s t h i s e i t h e r in t h e
Par. LV. F i r s t D i- * . . , .
vision of Syllogisms q u a n t i t y o f E . x t e i i s i oi i , t h e P r e d i c a t e of
into E x te n siv e and U o tio ilS C O n iliarcd ill tllC Q u C S t i o i l
Com prehensive.
an d Conclusion bein g the g re a te st whole, and
the S ubject th e smallest p a r t ; o r in t h e c o u n t e r q u a n t i t y o f
Comprelicnsion, the Subject o f these tw o notions being the
g r e a t e s t w h o l e , a n d t h e I ' r e d i e a t e t h e s m a l l e s t jiart.
A f t e r w h a t T h a v e a l r e a d y s t a te d in reg ard to t h e n a t u r e o f these

ojijiosite (]uantitics, under the doctrine of Concepts and Judg
m en ts,' a n d after t h e illu stratio n s I h a v e g iv en y o u o f t h e ]iossibility
o f c o n d u c t i n g a n y r e a s o n i n g i n e i t h e r o f t h e s e q u a n t i t i e s a t wi l l , ^
e v e r y syllogism in t h e o n e q u a n t i t y b e i n g c o n v e r t i b l e i n t o a sy l l o
gism a l i s o l n t e l y e q u i v a l e n t i n t h e o t h e r (pi Mi i t i t y, i t w i l l b e l i e i e
needless to e id a rg e upon the iiatnre o f this distinction in g e n e r a l .
T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n c o n q i r e h e n d s all o t h e r s ; a n d its i l lu s tr a tio n , t h e r e
fore, sii])poscs t h a t t h e n a t u r e o f t h e various su b o r d i n a t e classes o f
syllogism s sh o u ld b e jtrevionsly u n d e r s to o d . I t will, t li ere fo rc , b e
e x j i e d i e i i t , n o t a t ] r e s c n t t o e n t e r o n a n y d i s t i n c t c o n s i d e r a t i o n of
this division o f reasonings, b u t to sh o w , w h e n t r e a t i n g o f syllogism s
u n d e r their various subaltern c la s se s , h o w e a c h is c a p a b l e o f b e i n g
c a s t in t h e m o u l d o f c i t h e r q u a n t i t y , a n d not, as logicians suppose,
in t h a t o f e x t e n s i v e q u a n t i t y a l o n e .
The next distinction o f S y l l o g i s m s is t o b e s o u g h t f o r c i t h e r in
t h e c o n s t i t u e n t e l e m e n t s o f whicli t h e y are com -
M altcr and form o f , . , i i i
,,
gyllogigrns.
n o s e d , o r in t l i e i n a n n e r i n w l i i e l i t h e s e a r e c o n -
i
nccled. ' J ' h e f o r m e r o f t h e s e is t i ' c l i n i c a l l y c a l l e d
t h e m a t te r o f a s y l l o g i s m , t h e h i t t e r i t s f o r m . Y o u must, however,
o b s e r v e t h a t t h e s e t e r m s a r c liere u s e d in a r e s t r i c t e d i n e a n i n g . Both
m a t t e r a m i f o r m u n d e r t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n a r e i n c l u d e d in t h e f o r m o f a
s y llo g is m , w h e n w e s p e a k o f f o rm in contr.ast t o t h e e m p i r ic a l m a t
ter uhich it m a y co ntain . J' liis, t h e r e f o r e , is a d i s t i n c t i o n under
i l i a t f o r m w i t h w h i cl i L o g i c , a s y o n k n o w , is e x e l n s i v e l y c o n v e r s a n t ;
and the m atte r hero spoki-n o f s h o u l d bc called, for d i s t i n c t i o n s
s a k e , t l i c f o r m a l or roxe.'t.Hory m u tte r o f a s y l l o g i s m . I n this sense,
t h e n , t h e m a t t e r o f ;i s y l l o g i s m nicaiis m e r e l y th e jirojiositions and
term s of which e v e r y s y l l o g i s m is n e c e s s a r i l y m a d e up;^ whereas,
1 . S f f o b o v c . J) 1 0 0 f t sff). E d , M a te r ia (nylloK ipnii) a lia cut p r o . \ i m a , alia

2 S e e a b i i v i - , i V.<1 f t M.'i El>. rciiiola. I t e r r i o l a t i ii i i t t e r m i n i p r o p o s i t i o n u m ,
3 I r o x i r n a l e c i k I r e m o t e m a i l e r . M a r g in a l p r o x i m a v e r o huiiI i t r o p o s i l i o i i e s ijts ie, ( | u i b u l
J u ttin g (See llu rlad o de M tu iio z a , J jh /n it. co u lcscit b y llog ism u s. E d .]
P h il., D isp . L o g ic a , U 1. d. X. ] 4 8 , p. 405.
L k c t. X V . LOGIC. 203
otlierwise, the fur'in o f a syllogism jioints out the way in Avhieh these
constitiieuts are coimeeted.* T his being understood, I rejieat that
the ne.vt distiiietion of syllogisms is to be sou g h t for eith er in their
m a tte r or in their ibrm.
Now' in regard to their m atter, syllogisms cannot differ, for every
syllogism, w ith o u t e.xeeption, requii'es tlie same
T h e ir fo r m , th e co nstitu e n t paits, a question, th e snbsumjitiou
ground ot the iic.xt u n d e r a general rule, and the snmjition of
grand distinction of ^ .
syllogisms. the genernl rule its e lf ; which th ree eonsUtuents,
in th e actual ennneiation of a syllogism, change,
as I have already noticed, their relative situation; w hat was first
in th e order o f th o n g h t being last in the order of exjiression.
T h e difiei-enee o f Syllogisms can, therefore, only be sought for
in th e ir different foians ; so th a t th e ir distinc-
The lorm of syllo- tious are oiily loi'iiial. L ilt th e form o f a sjllo-
g isn i t w o f o ld , i n tc n m l . . , , . . . t . ' /
and i-xtvrnai coiisiderefl 111 ils grea test generality, is of a
tw'otold kind, viz., either an In te rn a l and E sse n
tial, or an E x te rn a l and A ccidental. T h e former o f these depends
on the rel.ations o f th e co nstitu e nt parts o f the syllogism to e;ieh
other, as determ ined by the n atu re of th e th in k in g subject itself;
the la tte r of these depend s on the external expression of the eon-
stitn e n t jiails o f the syllogism, w hereby llie term s and propositions
are variously determ ined in jioiiit of number, jiosition, and eoiiseeii-
tion. W e must, therefore, in conformity to the order o f nature, first
of all, consider w h at classes of syllogism are given by th e ir internal
or essential form ; and thereafter inquire w h a t are the classes
afforded by th e ir external or aeeidental modiffeations. F irst, then,
in regard to the In tern al or Essential F o rm of Syllogism.
A Syllogism is only a syllogism when th e conclusion follows
from the premises with an absolute c e r ta in ty ; and as this ce rtain ty
is determ ined by a universal and necessary law o f th ongh t, there
iinist, eoiiseqiiently, be as m a ny kinds of Syllogism as tliere are
various kinds o f premises affording a consequence in virtue o f a
different law. Betwoen the premises there is only one possible
order of dependency, for it is always th e sumption, th e major
premise, wdiich, as the foundation of th e whole syllogism, m u st first
he taken into aceoniit. A n d in determ ining O the difference o f svl-
^
logisms, the snmiition is the only iiremise which can be taken into
aeeoimt as affording a difference of syllogism; for the m inor ]ire-
inise is merely the snbsnnqition of the lesser quan tity of the two
1 K in g , L o g ik , 5 72, A u n i., i. E d . [C f. F r ie s , L o g ik , 4 4 .] 2 E sser, L ogic, 85, p

159. p: d .
204 LOGIC. I.K C T . XV
n o t i o n s , co iic tM i i i n g w h o s e r e l a t i o n avc i n q n i r o , n n d o r t h e q n e s t i o a
and th is i.ren iiso ahvav.s n jip cars in one and th e sam e f o r m , in
th at, i i . a iiie iy , n f a e . a t e g o r i c a l ] i r o p o s i t i o n . The sam e is , lik o A v i s e ,
t h e e;i>e in r e g a r d t o t h e e o n e h i s i o n , a n d , t h e r e f o r e , w e e :iu n o m o r e
l o o k toAv.'irds t h e c o n c l u s i o n for a dA 'term iiiatioii o f t h e d i v e r s i t y o f
sy llogiM ii th an tO A v a n ls t h e su h su m p tio n . W e have th u s o n ly to
i n q u i r e in r e g a l ' d t o t h e v a r i o u s p o s s i h l e k i n d s o f m a j o r p r o ] o s i t i o n .
XoAV as all sn n ijitio n s arc ju d g m e n ts , and a s avc h a v e alrea d y
fou n d th at th e m ost general d iv isio n o f ju d g-
.>\iii.gisni> to be jn t'nts, iic x t to th e itriiuarA ' d istin ctio n of in -
iiiM d eil a cco n ln ig to ^ ^
th e ciin ra cter o f tiieir tc iisiv c and c x t c i i s i v e , is i n t o sim p le and con-
M ini| l i o n s a n d t h e l a w d i t i o i i a l , t h i s d i v i s i o n o f j u d g m e n t s , A vhich, Avhen
reg n ia tin g the co n n ec- .p .y e d o p c d , a ffo r d s t h e cla.sscs o l c a t e g o r i c a l , d is-
lio n b e t w e e n iireiiiises . . , i i i i i.
a n d eo n ein U o n . ju iictiv o , h y p o th e tic a l, and h v p o th c tic o -d isju n c t-
iv e jiro p o sitio n s, Avill fu rn ish ns Avith all th e
jMissihk* < l i f f e r e n c c s o f m a j o r j u e m i s c s . Jt is a l s o m a i i i l e ^ L t h a t in
any of th ese a fo resa id p r o p o s itio n s , (ca teg o rica l, d isju n ctiv e,
h y p o t h e t ic .a l, a n d h y p o t h c t i c o - d i s j n n c t i v c ) , a d e c i s i o n o f tin ' q u e s
t i o n , A\ h i c h o f tAvo r e ] m g i i a i i t p r e d i c a t e s b e l o n g s t o a c e r t a i n s u b
j e c t . can be o b ta in e d a c c o r d in g to a u n iv er s a l a n d n e c e s s a r y law .
In a e . a t e g o r i e a l su m p tio n , th is is o o m p c t e n t t li r o n g li th e laAvs o f
Id en tity and C o n t r a d i c t i o n ; f o r Avhat b e l o n g s or d o es not b e lo n g
to th e sn p ero rd iiia te n otion , b e lo n g s or d o e s n o t b e lo n g to th e snb-
ord in .ate. In d isju n c tiv e s i i i n | i t i o n s , t h i s is c o m j i e t c n t t l i r o n g l i t h e
l.-iAv o i E x td iid etl V Iid < llc ; s i n c e o f all th e o p p o site d eten u iiia tio n s
o n e a lo n e b e lo n g s to th e o b je c t; so th a t i f o n e is a ffr m e d , th e oth ers
m u '-t b e . f o n j u n c t i v c l y , d c n i ( ' d : ; in d i f o n e is d e n i e d , t h e o t l i c i ' s m u s t
b e , ( l i ' j u u c t i A c l y a t b'. ast, a fli r in e < l . In liy p o th e tic a l su m p tio n s, th is
i-- c o n i p i ' t c u t t l i r o n g l i t h e hiAv o f I l e a s o n a m i Co u s ( ( j u e n t ; f o r Aviiere
t l i ( r e a s o n is , t h e r e m ust be th e e o n s e q u o n t , a n d Avliore t h e c o n s t -
f p i e i i t is , l l . e r e m u s t b e t h e v e a s m . " - d h e r e .are t h u s o b t a i n e d t h r e e
fir fou r g r ea t c l a s s e s o f S y l l o g i s m s , Avhose e s s e n t i a l ch a ra cteristics
1 s h a l l c o m p r i s e in t h e f o l l o A v i u g p a r a g r a p h :
L \ I. S y l l o g i s m s a r c d i v i d e d i n t o d i f f e r e n t c l a s s e s , a c c o r d
i n g a s th(. c t i n n e c t i o n bctA vecii th e ] i r c i n i s c S a n d c o u c l u s i o i i is
I F > - e r . / y i g j f - , f l-.'j. t '.D. Itaynep's K s x a y o n tlir K m .' A n a l y t i c o f L o g i.-a l

e r > - < T . J ji'g ik , ] Sr,, | , 101 T h is clap- F o n n .i , ( l i e a n l l i o r ' . s l a t e r v i e w i s e , \ ] ) r e s p e ( l a s
s . l i c i l i i i M <il l l i i g i . r i i ' * c a i i i i o l b e r i - g a r d e t i a.s I'ollovtR . A l l V n h a h i i i l i ; r e i i c e is o n e t h a t
exj i - - i i i g l l i< -iii itli o r 'u li iia l v i e w ; a c c o r d i n g iiieorn ctly calb'd r r u c g n n r a l , f o r t l i e C on-
l o b i c l i . a s b i ' l o r e o b - i T v i - d , llii. j i r i i i c i p l e o f j n n r l i v r a n d D i s j n n r li r e I'orrri.s o f I h i p o l h f li c n ,
Iba-on a n d f oii-isjiii nt is n o t a d r n i l t e d a - a rea .so n iiig are red u cib le to i m m e d i a t e infer-
i.iw o r th jiighl. s , . ( . a b o v e . ]i. r.2. n o t e 1 In ei;ce.. " C om pare O w .u s s io m , p. 051 s > q .
a n o t e b y s i r AA". H a m i l t o n , a p p e n d e d t o J l r . i - v.
1 EO T . X V . LOGIC. 205
determ ined by the different fundam ental laws, 1, o f I d e n tity

and Contr.adietion ; 2, O f E.xclnded Mid-
g r a n d d i v i s i o n o f S yl*
Ole;
3, O f Reason and Coiisetiueiit;
1
these
logisms - according several deteriiiiuatioiis affording the three
to th e la w r e g u la tin g CateCJOriml, Disjuncfi 06, aiid
th e in fe re n c e .
of lLjj>vthet!cal Syllogisms. T o these may
he added r fourth class, tlu Jlgpothet'co-aisju'icti''e o lJilcr>
m atic Syllogism, which is d eterm ined hy the two last laws in
combination.
Before proceeding to a consideration o f these several syllogisms

in detail, I shall, first of all, give you examples
E -xainpies o f th e gp^.cics together, in order th a t you
f o u r sp e c ie s o f s y l l o - , , i i
may have, wliile tre a tin g ot eacli, at least a
general notion of their differences and similarity.
1 C a t e g o r ic a l. 1. O f a Ca t e g o r ic a l S y l l o g is m .
S u m p t i o n , .................. A l l m atter is created :

S u b s u m p tio n , . . . . B u t the h ea v en ly bodies a rc m a te r ia l;
C o n c l u s i o n , ............... T h erefo re, Ihe heavenly bodies a re created.
2. D is ju n c tiv e . 2 . O f a D i s .t u x c t t v e S y l l o g is m .
.S u m p t i o n , T h e hope o f im m o rta lity is eith er a r a tio m d exp ecta tio n or a n {llitsion,-

S i i b s n i n p t i o n , . . . B u t the hope o f im m o rta lity is n r a tio n a l e x p e c ta tio n ;
C o n c lu s io n , . . . . T h erefo re, the hope o f im m o rta lity is not a n illusion.
3 H y p o th e tic a l. 3. O f an IIy f o t iie t ic a l S y l l o g ism .
S u m p tio n , I f L o g ic does not p r o fe s s to be an in s tr u m e n t o f in v en tio n , the reproach

th a t it disrover.s nothing is u n fo u n d e d ;
. S u b s u m p tio n ,. . . B u t L o g ic docs not p ro fe s s to hc a n in stru m e n t o f in v en tio n ;
C o n c lu s io n , . . . . T h a 'e fo r e , the reproach that it discovers nothing is u n fo u n d e d .
4 I ly p o th e t ic o - d is - 4 . O f t h e D i l e m .m a o r IIy p o t iie t ic o -d is ju n c t iv b
j'H 'C 'b e . S y l l o g i s .m .
S i i m ) ) t i o i ', I f m a n icere su ite d to live out o f society, he w ould eith er be a g o d or a

beast ;
S u b s u m p tio n , . . . B u t m an is neither a god nor a b e a st;
C o n c lu s io n , . . . . T h erefo re, he is not s u ite d to liv e out o f society.
LECTURE XVI.
S T O I C IT E I O L O G Y .
SECTION II . OF T H E TRODUCTS OF T H O U G H T
III. DOCTIUNK OF REASONINGS.
SITLOGISMS. TIIEIR DIVISIONS ACCORDING TO INTERNAL

FORM.
A. SIMPLE CATEGORICAL. I. DEDUCTIVE IN EXTENSION.
I n o n r last L e c t u r e , I e n t e r e d on t h e D iv isio n o f S yllogism s. I

first s t a t e d t o y o u t h e p r i n c i p le s on w h i c h this
Kccapituiaiioii. fUvisiou m u s t p r o c e e d ; I t h e n e.xplained t h e
n a t u r e o f t h e first g r o a t d i s t r i b u t i o n of ncaso n in g s into those of
Inten siv e an d those o f E x te n siv e Q u a n t i t y ; and. thereafter, th a t o f
t h e f p c o n d gre.at d i s t r i b u t i o n o f I'o aso ni ngs i n t o Simple and Condi-
ti on. al . t h e Sini]ile cont.aiiiing a s in g le speeies, t h e Categoi'ical;
the Conditional eomprising three speeies, th e Disjunctive, the
I I V] ) Ot l i et i eal , and Ily]iotlietieo-disjunetive.' These four species
f vbowed yon. were sevei - ; i l l y d e t e r m i n e d b y different fun d am en tal
T.;i\vs o f ' I ' li oiiLdit : tin* C a t e g o r i e . d r e p o s i n g o n t h e l a w s o f I d e n t i t y
a n d C o n t r . ' i d i e t i o n ; 1 b e D i s j n n e t i v e o n t h e l:i\v o f E x c l u d e d J l i d d l e ;
the Ily p othetieiil on the ];iw o f R e a s o n and Uoiisoqnent ; and the
llypotlietieo-di'-jnnetivc on th e laws o f E x c l u d e d ^ Mi d d l e a n d Rea-
'on r i nd C o n ^ e q n c i i ) i n e o m b i n a l i o n .
I now go on to th e special eonsideration of the first o f those
c l a s s e s o f Sv l l o g i s n i viz.. t h e S y l l o g i s m w h i c h
r Mmii.-" nr)gi*.m. d e n o m i n a t e d <'(ilefjoricdl. A n d i n r c -
Thf ^ iflf/o. 14a). ^ ^
g a r d lo t h e nieaiiiiig a n d h i s t o r y o f t h e t e r m m t-
efiorirab i t w i l l n o t b e n e c e s s a r y t o s a y . ' i i i y t h i n g i n a d d i t i o n t o w h a t
1 Compare above, p. 107 E d.

L e c t . X V I. LOGIC. 207
I h a v e a lr e a d y s t a t e d in s p e a k i n g o f j u d g m e n t s . ' A s used originally

categorical m e a n t m e r e l y affirm ative, a n d
b y A r i s t o t l e , tlie t e r m
w a s o p p o s e d t o negative. B y T beo jilirastn s it was e m p l o y e d in tbe
sense a b s o l u te , sim ple, direct, and as ojiposed
T h e te rm Cnltgorkal. - , . , . . ,
to co n d itio n a l ; and in tins sigmtication
O it lias
continued to be em ployed by all subsequent logicians, w i t h o u t
their having been aware t h a t A r i s t o t l e n e v e r e m p l o y e d i t in t h e
m e a n i n g in w h i c h a l o n e t h e y u s e d it.
^ L V I I . A Categorical S y l l o g i s m is a r e a s o n i n g w h o s e f o r m
is d e t e r m i n e d by tb e laws of I d e n tity and
Par. IiVII. The Cate- C o n tr a d ic tio n , a n d wliose s u m p tio n is t h u s
g o r ie a l S y l lo g i s m , . . . -r ,
a categ o rical jiropositioii. In a Categorical
Syllogism t h e r e are t h r e e jirineipal notions,
h o ld in g to each o t h e r t h e relation o f w h o le a n d j i a r t ; a n d these
ar c so c o m b i n e d together, th a t they constitute throe proposi
tions, in wl i i c l i each jirinci ji al notion occurs twice. These
notions arc called T erm s {term ini, opoi), a n d a c c o r d i n g a s t h c
n o t i o n is t h e g r e a t e s t , t h c g r e a t e r , o r t h e l ea s t, i t is c a l l e d t h e
M ajor, t h e M iddle, o r t h e M in o r T erm .- T h e ] Mi d( l l e T e r m is
c a l l e d t h e A r g u m e n t {argurnentum , Xdyo?, Tn'o-rts); t h e 3 I a j o r
a n d ] \ [ i n o r T e r m s a r c c a l l e d E .rtrem es {extrem a, d/cpa). I f the
syllogism p r o c e e d in t h e q u a n t i t y o f E.xtension (a n d this form
alone has been considered b y logicians), th e predicate of tbe
conclusion is t h e greatest whole, and, consequently, the M ajor
Term ; tbe subject of the conclusion, t h e sm allest part, and,
consequently, the M inor T erm . I f the syllogism jiroceed in
the quantity of Comprehension, the subject of thc conclusion
i s t h e g r e a t e s t wdi ol c , a n d , c o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e 3 I a j o r T e r m ; t h e
p r e d ic a te o f t h e conclusion, t h c sm allest part, and, eoiiscqiicntly,
t h e ]\Iinor T e r m . In either quantity, thc propo sitio n in w hich
t h e r e l a t i o n o f t h c m a j o r t e r m t o t h e i i i i cl dl e i s c x j i r c s s e d , is t h c
A um ption o r J fa jn r J^rem isc, a n d t h e p r o j i o s i t i o n i n w h i c h is
exjiressed t h e r c h . t i o n o f t h c m i d d l e t e r m t o t h c m i n o r , is t h e
Su b sum ption or M in o r P rem ise. The general forms of a C a te
gorical Syllogism u n d e r th e t w o qu antities, are, co n seq u en tly ,
t h e followiiifr:
1 S e e a b o v e , p . 1G 5 (i seq. Ed. L v i. c. x i i . p. 34.3. H u r t a d o cle ^ t e i id o z a , p

2 [O n j i r i n c i p l e o f n a m e o f J l a j o r a n d 3 Ii- 40 9 .] [D i.'ip u t. P /iih s o p h ir c r , t. i . ; D i s p . L ogirep,
r.o r t e r m ? , se e A l e x . A p h r o d i ^ ie n s is , In A n . d . x . } 50 f t .ifq . T o l o s a ', 1 6 1 7 . S e e a ls o D is-
P r io r ., L. i. c c . iv . V. I lii lo p o iiu s , In A n . cti.<:sion.^, p. 6 6 6 f t scq. f.D .J
P r io r ., L . i. f. 2 3 b . F o i i s c c a , I n s t i l . D i a l e c t.,
2 'J 6 l o g i c . L ect. X V L
AX LXTEXSIVE SYLLOGISM AX IXTLXSIVE SYLLOGISM.

B is A C is IJ
C IS B B IS A
C IS A C IS A
AW iiiiiii is m o r ta l; C u iu s is a m a n ;
B u t C u iu s is a m a n ; B u t a ll m an is m o rta l;
T h o c f u r i , C a in s is m ortal. T h erefo re, C a in s is r .o r ta l.
I n t h e s e e.xainples, y o u a r e a w a r e , f r o m w h a t lias p r e v i o u s l y b e e n
s a i d , ' t h a t t h e c o p u l a in t h e t w o differen t qu an -
1-AXplicatioii. . . . . . .
t i t l e s is p r e e i s e l y o f ;i c o u n t e r m e a n i n g ; i n t h e
q u a n t i t y o f e . x t e n s i o n , s i g n i f y i n g c o n ta in e d u n d erq i n t h e q u a n t i t y
o f c o m p r e h e n s i o n , . s i g n i l y i n g c o n ta in s in it. T hus, ta k in g the sev
e ra l t u r m u h e , t h e E x t e n s i v e S y l l o g i s m w ill, w h e n e x p l i c i t l y e n o u n c e d ,
b e as fo llo w s :
T h e M id d le term B is c o n ta in ed u n d er th e B la jo r term A ;
K x c n ip lc o l th e E x M in o r term C is contained u n d er the M id d l e term B ;
tcii.-ivc C a lt g o r ic a l
.sillo g i-iD T h erefo re, the M in o r term C is also co n ta in ed u n d er the B la jo r
term A .
O r, to ta k e th e c o n c re te e x a m p le :
2'he M id d le term a ll m en is con ta in ed u n d e r the M a jo r term m o r ta l;

B u t the M in o r term C a m s is c o n ta in ed u n d er the M id d le term a ll m en ;
T h erefe re , the M in o r term C a in s is also co n ta in ed u n d er th e 3 I a je r term m o rta l.
O n th e co iitra i-y t h e I n t e n s i v e S y llo g is m , w h e n

o f th e I n te n s iv e . J o ^
e x p h c . a t e d , is a s f o l l o w s :
T h e M a jo r h r m C co n ta in s in it the M id d le term B ;
B u t the M id d h O rm B c o n ta in s in it th e M in o r term A ;
T h r e jo r e , the M ajejr term C also contains in it the M in o r term A .
O r , in t h e c o n c r e t e e x a m p l e :
T h e M a jo r term C a iu s c o n ta in s in it the M id d le term m a n ,

But the Middle term mint tantaias in it the Minrjr term mortal;
T h ir e fo r i, the M a jo r term C a in s also co n ta in s in it the M in o r term m ortal.
T hus yon sec t h a t b \' I'c v e rsin g t h e o rd er o f th e t w o ])rer nise.s,

a n d by r e v e r -in g th e m e a n in g o f th e co p u la, w e c a n a lw a y s c h a n g e
a c:it( go i-ic :d '- y l l o g i s i n o f t h e o n e ( p i a n t i t y i n t o a c a t e g o r i c a l s y l l o -
g i.sm o f t h e o t h e r
1 .êe a b o v e , p. 10.3 l.i>.

2 N o t in I n d u c t iv e .Syllogi.sm g. J o ttin g . [.See b e lo w , p. 228. E d .]
L ect. XVI. LOGIC. 209
In this par.agraph is enounced tlie general nature of a categorical

syllogisin, as coiiipelcnt in both the quantities of extension and
cotnpreliension, or, with more jiropriety, of comprehension and ex
tension ; for comprehension, as jirior to extension in the order of
nature and knowledge ought to stand first. But as all logicians,
with the doubtful exception of Aristotle, have limited their consid-
.eratioii to that process of reasoning given in the quantity of exten
sion, to the exclusion of that given in the quantity of comprehension,
it will be proper, in order to avoid misapprehension, to jilace some
of tlie distinctions expressed in this paragraph in a still more
explicit contrast.
In the reasonings under botii quantities, the words expressive of
the relations and of the things related are idciiti-
T iie l e a s o n in g in cal. The things compared in both quantities
C o m p r e l.e u M o n and q^ number. In Cacll
th a t in E x t e n s io n e x - .
tliere are three notions, three terms, and three
p l ic it iy c o m p a r e d a n d
c o n tr a s te d . propositions, combined in the same coinjilexity ;

and, in each quantity, the same subordination of
a greatest, a greater, and a least. The same relatives and the same
relations are found in both quantities. Bnt though the relations and
the relatives be the same, the relatives have changed relations. For
while the relation betweeu w'hole and part is the one uniform rela
tion in both quantities, and while this relation is thrice realized in
each between the same terms; yet, the term wbieh in the one quan
tity was the least, is in the other the greatest, and the term which in
both is intermediate, is in the one quantity contained by the term
which in the other it contained.
N oav, y o u are to o b s e r v e th a t lo g ic ia n s , lo o k in g o n ly to th e r e a s o n
in g c o m p e te n t u n d er th e q u a n tity o f e x te n sio n .
N a r r o w a n d er ro iic- and, th erefore, lo o k in g o n ly to th e p o ssib ility o f
o u s d e f in it io n s bv lo - single relation between the notions or terms
g ic ia n s o f tb e .Alajor. v n i i
.M iddle, a n d .Minor svllogisiii, havc. 111 coiiseqiience of tins one-
term s. sided consideration of the snhject, given tlefiiii-
tioiis o f these relatives, Avhich are tru e only
when lim ited to the kind o f reasoning Avhich they exclnsiveh' con
te m plated. This is seen in their definitions of the Alajor, Aliddle,
and Alinor Terms.
In regard to the first, they all simply define the Atajor term to be
the predicate of tho coiieliision. This is true of
1. M ajor.
the reasoning under extension, hut of that ex
clusively. For the Al.ajor term, that is, the term which ooiitairiS
both the otiiers in the reasaning of coiiipreheiisioii, i.s the subject
of the conclusion. Again, the Aliu.or term they all simply define to
27 '
210 LOGIC. L ect. XVT
be tlio subject of the conclusion; and this is likewise true only of

the reasoning under extension : for, in the reason-
2. J lin o r . . i i i n
ing under comprehension, the Minor term is the
Jiredicate o f the conclusion. F inally, they all simjily define the
Middle term as that which is contained under thc jiredicate, and
^ contains under it the snhjeet of the conclusion.
But this definition, like those of the two other
terms, m u st be revei'sed as ajijilied to the reasoning under eomjirchcn''
sion. I have been thus tediously explicit, in order that you should
he fully aware of the contrast of the doctrine I jirojiose, to what yon
wi l l fi nd ill l o g i c a l b o o k s ; a n d t h a t y o u m a y b c j i r e p a r e d f o r tli e
further devclojiment o f this doctrine, for its ajijilicatioii in detail.
In regard to the nomenclatiire o f the Major, ]Minor, and Middle
terms, it is not ncccss.ary to say imich. The
XomeiiciaiureofMa- cxji rcssion term {termuHis, dpoA, wa s first e m-
jor.Minor,and Middle , , , , . , , i., i
ployed liy Aristotle, and, like the greater part
of his logical vocabulary, Avas, as I have o b s e r v e d ,
borroAA'cil from the language
O O of jMatheniatics.' Yon are aware that
the Avord term is ajijilied to the ultim ate constitu en ts both o f jirojio
sitions and o f syllogism s. T h e term s o f a jirojiosition arc the
subject and jiredicate. T h c term s o f a syllogism are th c three
n otion s Avhich in their threefold conihination foiin the three projio
sitions o f a syllogism . T h e major and minor
A r is to tle .? d e fin iiio u tcrius A i istotlo, by another inatheniatical ineta-
o f llie lerm .s o f a s y llo - , n , /w \ .1 1
jilior, c al l s t h e extremes (u/cpa), t h e xnajor and
m i n o r e x tr e m e s ; a m i h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e s e a n d
o f t h e m i d d l e t e r m is, n n l i k e t h o s e o f t h e s u b s e q u e n t l o g i e i an s , so
g e n e r a l , t h a t i t Avill aji j il y Avith j i e r f e e t j i r o j i r i e t y t o a s y l l o g i s m in
cither quantity. I cal l , h e s a y s , t h e m i d d l e t e r m t h a t Avliich is
bot h itself in a n o t l i e r a n d a n o t h e r i n i t ; a n d Avhich, b y i t s p o s i t i o n ,
lies in t h c i n i i l d l c ; t h e o x l r e n i c s I c a l l b o t h t h a t Avhich is in a n o t h e r
: ind t h a t in Avhicli a n o t h e r is. i \ n d in a n o t h e r j i l ace h e s a y s , I def ine
t h e m a j o r c x t i ' e m e t h a t in Avhicli t h e m i d d l e i s ; t h e m i n o r e x t r e m e
t h a t Avhicli is s i i l i o r d i n a t e d t o t h e m i d d l e .
I may notice that tlie part of his definition of
iiis d e f in i.io ii o f i i i o describes it as tbat
>i;l<llc Ic rn i, a,? riiiil- . , , . . , 1 11 i
(lie hy ),Or. l io n . Iioi w l i i e b , b y I t s J i o s i t K il l, l i e s 1 1 1 t l i e m i d d l e , d o e s n o t
a i.iriica i.ic lo Ihcrnoiiir ,'ijijilv t o t l i c i i i o d c ill A v liic li s u b s e q u e n t l o g i c i a n s

III winch siihHc.iuciit e n o m i c (G li c syllogism. F o r l e t .V b c t h e m a j o r .
lopiciaiiR e n o u n c e lire ,, , - i n ' \ n . c V
Ry))o;ri.m ^ I'*" term of an
te n sive S yllo gism , this Avill be exjiressed tlius.-
> S e e S c h c ib ic r , [ O p'ra L n g ira , I ars. iii. C. 2, 2 A n a l. P rio r. Ij. i., C. 4 , } 4.

j> h; , and a b o v e , j>. 10., n o te 4 I t'ri'l . j 6.
L ect. X V I. LOGIC. 211
S u m p t i o n , ..................H I'.s A , i. e. B is contained u n d er A.

S u b s u m p tio n ,. . . . C is Ii, i. e. G is co n ta in ed u n d er 15.
C o n c lu sio n , C (.s A , i. e. C is also contained u n d er A.
In th is syllogism th e m id d le t e r m B s t a n d s first a n d l a s t in t h e
p rem ises, and, th erefore, A r i s t o t l e s d efin itio n
B u t q u ite ap p licab le o f the m id d le te r m , n o t o n ly as m id d le b y na-
to th e reaso u iiig in . . , . , n i
C o m p reb en sio ii. tu rc, co n tain in g tlie m in o r and co n tain ed by
th e m ajo r, b u t as m id d le b y p o sitio n , s ta n d in g
a f t e r t h e m a j o r a n d b e f o r e t h e m i n o r , b e c o m e s ine]ot. I t w i l l a]>ply,
how ever, co m p letely to th e reaso n in g in c o m p r e h e n s i o n ; fo r t h e
e x te n s iv e syllogism g iv en a b o v e b e in g c o n v e rte d in to an inten siv e,
b y r e v e r s i n g t h e t w o jire m is e s, it w ill sttin d as fo llo w s :
S u m p t i o n , ............... C i's B, /. e. C contains in i t B .

S u b s u m p tio n ,. . . . B is A , i. e. B contains in it A.
C o n c lu sio n , C /s A , i. e. C also c o n ta in s in it A.
It does not fo llo w , h o w e v e r , from this, t h a t A risto tle e ith er

c o n t e m p l a t e d e x e l n s i v e l y t h e r e a s o n i n g in e o m -
It does not, however, , . , , i i i
follow, that Aristotle p reheiision, o r th a t he c o n te m p la te d th e reaso n -
coiitempiated exciu- iiigs ill both quan tities: for it is very easy to
siveiy the reasoning gtatc a I'casoniiig ill extcnsioii, SO that the major
111 Compieiiension. term shall Stand first, the m iddle terra second,
and the minoiTast. W e can state it thus :
S u m p t i o n , ................. A is B , i. e. A contains under it B.

S n b s u i n p tio n ,. . . . B is C , i. e. B contains under it C.
C o n c lu sio n , A is C , i. e. A contains u nder it C.
T h i s i s a s g o o d a s y l l o g i s m in e x t e n s i o n a s t h e f i r s t , t h o u g h i t is
n o t s t a t e d in t h e m o d e n s i n i l t o l o g i c i a n s . W e m a y a ls o c o n v e r t it
in to a c o m p re h e n siv e sy llo g ism , b y re v e rs in g its ])reinises a n d th e
m e a n i n g o f t h e c o i> u la, t h o u g h h e r e a l s o t h e m o d e o f e x p r e s s i o n w i l l
be u n u s u a l:
S u m p t i o n , ............... B I's C, i. e. B is contained in C.

S u b s u m p tio n ,. . . . A is B , i. c. A is co n ta in ed in B .
G o n c ln s lo n , A is C , i. e. A is contained in C.
F rom th is y o u w ill see, th a t it is n o t to th e m ere ex tern al

a rra iio 'ein en t o f th e te rm s , b u t to t h e n a tu r e o f t h e ir re la tio n , t h a t
w e m u s t l o o k in d e t e r m i n i n g t h e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e s y l l o g i s m .
B efore le a v in g th e c o n s id e ra tio n o f th e te rm s o f a sy llo g ism , I
m :iy n o t i c e t h a t t h e m o s t c o n v e n i e n t m o d e o f s t a t i n g a s y llo g is m in
-1- LOGIC. . L ect. X V I
a n a b s t r a c t f o rm , is b y t h e l e t t e r s S , P , n m l M , S sig n ify in g th e
s u b j e c t , ns P th e p red icate, o f th e con clu sio n ,
iio s t c o n v e u ie n i M th e m id d le te r m o f th e sy llo g ism . T h is
m iK if o f .vtadnK a i - j i - pleased lo ro co llcct, as we shall
loirism in au a b str a c t . ^
,'orm. fijn ] it necessary to em p lo y tliis notatio n in
s h o w in g th e d ifferen ces o f sy llo g ism s from th e
liflbrent a r ra n g e m e n t o f th e ir term s.
I h av e fo rm erly sta te d t h a t c a te g o ric a l sy llo g ism s a re r e g u la te d
b y th e fm id a m o n ta l la w s o f Id(>iitity a n d Con-
r a ic g o r ic a i S y lio - tr a d ic tio ii; th e law of Id e n tity r e g u l a t i n g ..Vf-
gi^m s d iM iied iiiio fin n ativ o , th e law o f C o n trad ictio n , N e g a tiv e ,
s p e c ia l cla.ses a c c o r d - ' ^ o >
iu g t o iiic a p p lic a tio n s C a te g o iT cn ls. ^ A s, how ever, th e law s o f I d e n -
of the laws of idcii- tit}' a n d C o n trad ictio n are capable of certain
tity a n d C o n tr a d ic tio n sp e c ia l a ])p licatio iis, llie sc w ill afford t h e g r o u n d
u n d e r th e r e la tio n o f t / /-(. i o n
whole and part. f a d iv isio u o f C a tc g o rical S y llo g ism s in to a
, c o r re s p o n d in g n u m b e r o f classes. I t has been
a l r e a d y s t a t e d , t h a t a l l r e a s o n i n g is u n d e r t h e r e l a t i o n o f w h o l e a n d
p art, and, co n seq u en tly , the law s o f Id e n tity and C o ntrad ictio n
w ill fin d tl i c i r a p p l i c a t i o n t o c a t e g o r i c a l s y l l o g i s m s o n l y u n d e r t h i s
relation.
P ) u t t h e r e l a t i o n o f w h o l e a n d p a r t m a y b o r e g a r d e d in t w o j i o i n t s
o f v i e w ; fo r w e m a y e ith e r lo o k from th e w h o le
The relation of l o t h e ] i a r t s . Or l o o k f r o m t h e j i a r t s t o t h e w h o l e ,
whole and jiari may I f i i i s l i c i i i g t h e c a s c , m a y We n o t a p ) ) l y t h e p r i n -
be rig.iidtd III iwo ^.jp]gg o f I d e n t i t y a n d C o n trad ictio n in s u c h a
point,-' ul v ie w , a n d *
thu^ aiibrds two class- "'<1 }' t h a t wc e ith e r reason from th e w h o le to
fcs of iteasonings. t h e p a r t s , 01 ' f r o m t h e j i a r t s t o w a r d s t h e w h o l e ?
L e t us c o n s id t'r: lo o k in g a t th e w hole an d th e
[tarts t o g e t h e r on t h e p r in c ip le o f I d e n t i t y , w c a r e a s s u r e d t h a t th e
w hole and all its [ la rts are o n e , th at w h atev er is t r u e o f th e
o n e is t r u e o f t h e o t h e r , t h a t t h e y a r e o n l y d i f f e r e n t e . v p r e s s i o n s
f o r t h e d i f f e r e n t a s p e c t s in w h i c h w e m a y c o n t e m p l a t e w h a t i n i t s e l f
is a b . " o l u l e l y i d e n t i c a l . On th e p rin cip le , th e re fo re , t h a t th e w h o le
is o n l y t h e s u m o f t h e p a r t s , I a m e n t i t l e d , o n t h e o n e h a n d , l o o k i n g
fro m t h e w h rile to its ]ia)ts, t o s a y w i t h ab so lu te c e r ta in ty , W h a t
b e l o n g s to a w h o le b e l o n g s t o its ] ia rt; a m i w h a t d o e s n o t b e lo n g
t o a w h o l e d o e s n o t b e l o n g t o i t s [ i . a rt : .and o n t l i e o t l i e r , l o o k i n g
f r o m t h e j i a r t s t o t l i e i r w l i o l o , t o s a y , W h a t m a k e s u p all t h e [ l a r t s
c fiiistitiites t h e w h o l e ; a m i w h a t d o e s not m ake u p all t h e jia r ts
d o c s n o t c o n s titu te th e w h o le. Nôw, t h e s e t w o a p p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e
p rin c ip le s of I d e n t i ty a n d C o n tr a d ic tio n , as w e lo o k fro m o n e te r m
i){ t h e r e l a t i o n o f w h o l e a n d p a i 't , oi- f r o m t h e o t h e r , d e t e r m i n e t w o
d ifferen t k in d s o f reaso n in g . F o r if w c reason d o w n w a rd s, from
L e c t. XVI. LOGIC. 213
:i cont.aining wdiole to .a cont.ained part, tve shall have one sort of

reasoning wliieh is c;illed the D eductive; whereas, if we reason up
wards, from the constituent jiarts to a constituted whole, we sh:ill
have anotlier sort of re:isoning, which is ealled the Inductive. This
I shall briefly express in the following jiaragrapli.
L V I I I , C ategorical Syllogisms are Deductive, if, on

^
P a r . L V III. C a te g o r-
thc jirincijiles
*
o f I d e n ti ty? and Contradic-
lo a l S y llo g is m s d i- tioii, AVC rcasoii dowiiAvards, from a con-
v id e d in to D e d u c tiv e taiiiiiig wliolc to a contained p a r t: th e y
a n d In d u c tiv e . ~ _ i i J
are Inductive, if , o n t h e s e p r i n e i j i l e s , Ave
reason u j iA v a r d s , f r o m the c o n s t i t u e n t p a r t s t o a c o n s t i t u t e d
A v h o le .
This is sufficient a t jiresent to afford yon a gener;il conception

of the difference o f D e duc tiv e and Indu ctive
I. D e d u c t n e C a te - Categoiicals. T h e difference of these tAvo kinds
g o r ic a l S y llo g is m s . ^ ^
o f reasoning will be properly exjilained, Avhen,
after h a v in g ex p o u n d ed the natnre o f the fonner, Ave proceed to
consider the nature o f the l.-itter. W e shall ii o a v , therefore, con
sider the character o f the d ed u ctive process, the j'rocess Avhieh
has been certainly and most sueeessfully analyzed b y logician s; for,
th ough their treatm en t o f d ed u c tiv e reasoning lias been one-sided
and inijierfect, it is n o t jiositively erroneous; Avhereas, tlieir analy
sis o f th e in du ctive process is at on ee meagre and incorrect. A n d ,
first, o f the jiroxim ate canons by Avhich D e d u c tiv e Categoricals
pxe regulated.
^ L IX . I n D e d u c tiv e Categoricals th e universal laws o f

I d e n tity and C o n tradiction take tw o modi-
p a r. L IX . D e d u c tiv e fonns, accoi'ding as these syllosdsms
C a te g o ric a ls , - th e ir i , r py ,
c an o n s. procccd 111 th e q u an tity ot Comjirehension or
in th a t o f Extension. T h e jieculiar canon
by which In ten siv e Syllogisms of this class are regulated, is ,
W h a t belongs to the jiredicate belongs also to th e su b je ct;
Avliat is re p u g n a n t to the jiredicate is rejm g nant also to the
subject. T h e peculiar canon by Avliich E x tensive Svilogisms
of this class are regula ted is, W h a t belongs to the genus
belongs to the species and in d iv idual; w h a t is rejm gnant to
the genus is r e p u g n a n t to the species and individual. Or,
m ore briefly, W h a t jiertains to the high er class jiertains also
to th e loAver.
214 LOGIC. L k c i '. X ^ l
Both tliese laws are ciiouncod by Aristotle,' and both, from him,
have passed into the writings of siibse(pieiit logicians. The former,
as usually expressed, i.s, J^nvdicutian jircL-
I'.x p lii'n tio ii. 7 . . . . . . , 7-
dicati est ctKtm p ro dicatum sidgccti; or, Auta
nutu (st ttiam nota rci ij>su(s. The hitter is corresjiondent to what
is e:ilk(l the Dicta de Omni et de Aûllu; the Dictum de Omni,
when least ambiguously expressed, being, Quicquid de omni
vakt, vakt ttiam de quibusdem tt singulus; and tlie Dictum de
Nullo being, Quicquid de nuUo valet, ncc de quihusdam nec de
.-ini/ulis valet. But as logicians have altogether overlooked the
reasoning in Comprehension, they have, conse(iuciitly, not jiereeived
the jiroper application of the former canon ; Avhicli, therefore, rc-
uiaiiied in tlieir systems cither a mere bars dbeurre, or else was
only forci-d into an unnatural couueetioii with the priiicijilc o f the
syllogism of extension.
Before stating to you how the preceding canons are again, in
their proximate appliealioii lo categorical .syllo
( o iiiie c tio n o f tlie gisms, for eon veil ience sake, still more exjdieitly
proiioxit io n s a n d t f i m s
enounced in cert:iiii special rule.s, it will be
o f tlic C a tc g o i ica l .S\ 1-
lo g i'in illu s tr a lc d by jiroper to show you the method of marking the
s e n s ib le sy m b o ls . eoiinection of the jiropositions and terms of a
c.ategorical syllogism hy seiisihle symbols. Of
these there arc various kinds, hut, as I formerly noticed, the hest
ujion thewhole, because the siuijilest, i.s that hy circles. Accord
ing to this method, syllogisms with aflirmativo and negative con
clusions would he thus rejiresented.
A K F IK M A T IV E .
E x t. I n t.
In t. E x t.
S- -V
M- -M
P
-M
1 CnUg . c .3 . Anrd. P r io r., i 1 . Ed n a te specie.s, in c o r n p r e lie n sio n a ll th e im m e

2 (A n o l.ji'C tio n t o t h e m o d e o f s y llo g is lic d ia te a llr ib iile s .) [E o r .th e a u llio r s final
n o t a t i o n b y cir clcH i<, t l i a l w c c a n n o t , b y I b is s c h e m e o f n o t a tio n , s e t T a b u la r S c h e m e nt
rropdf. h o w th a t l l ie c o n l i il r ie il e x l i a i i l s Ib e eiiil o f v o ln in c . Ei>.]
r o t t a i n in i r : f o r w f r a r in o t d iv i d p t h e a r e a o f '! .See a b o v e , p. 180. C f. K r u g L o g ik , 79
II c i r c l e b e tw e e n any n it in b e r o f e o t il a i n e t i p. 2 1 .5 . E d .
c ir c le s , r e p r e s e n tin g in c x i c i i s i o t i a ll c o o r d i
L kct. XVI. LOGIC. 215
N E G A T IV E .
Ext. lu t.
SP
MM
PS
Y o u are now p rep ared for th e s ta te m e n t a n d illu stratio n o f th e

v a r i o u s j i r o x i m a t e r u l e s b y w h i c h all c a t e g o r i c a l
P r o x im a t e R u le s o f sy llo g isiu s are re g u la te d . A n d , first, in r e g a r d
C a te g o r ic a l S y llo - . . ..i r
g ism s 1. E x t e n s iv e . these I'ules in relation to the reasoning ot
E xten sio n .
A ld rich , says D r. W h a te ly , has g iv en tw elv e riilc.s, w h i c h 1
fin d m i g h t h e m o r e c o n v e n i e n t l y r e d u c e d t o six. N o syllogism can
b e f a u l t y w h ic h v io ltitc s n o n e o f t h e s e r u le s . ' T h is red u ctio n o f
t h e s y l l o g i s t i c r u l e s t o s i x is n o t o r i g i n a l t o D r . W l i a t e l y ; b u t litid
be l o o k e d a little c lo s e r in t o t b e m .atter, b e m i g lit h a v e se e n tiu it t b e
six w h ic h h e a n d o t h e r lo g ic ia n s e n u m e r a t e , m a y , w i t h o u t a n y sae-
ritice o f p recisio n , and w ith even an in crease o f p ersp icu ity , be
r e d u c e d to th re e . I sh a ll s ta te th e s e in a p a ra g ra jib , a n d th e n illu s
t r a t e t h e m in d e t a i l .
^ LX. An E x te n siv e C ate g o rical S vllo-

P a r. LX. The T h ree " ^ .
R u le s o f t h e E x te n - g ism , if r c g u b ir ly a n d fu lly e x p r e s s e d , is
sive C ategorical Syl- c r o v e m c d b y tllC t l i r C e f o l l o w i u g r u l c S 1
log ism . o J o
I. It mn.'^t h a v e three, and o
T e rm s , c o n s titu tin g th re e , a n d on ly th ree. P ro p o sitio n s.
II. O f tb e p rem ises, tb e S u m p tio n m ust in (p ian tity be
D e f i n i t e (i. e. u n i v e r s a l o r s i n g u l a r ) , a n d t h e S u b s u m j i t i o n in
q u a lity A fiirm ative.
I I I . T h e C o n c lu s io n m u s t c o r r e s p o n d in Q u a n t i t y w ith tb e
S u b s u n q itio n , a n d in Q u a l i t y w i t h t h e S u m p tio n .*
1 Elements, o f L o g ik , It. ii. c . ill. 2, p. 85, 8th b a iie r . A n fa n g sg ru n d e d t r L o g ik , 317, p. 164.

e d i t . Ei>. Ita c liin a n n , L o g ik , 122, j). 187. E sser, Logik,
2 K r u g , L o g ik . SO. E d . [C f. A le x a n d e r 88, 89 S c h u lz e , L o g ik , 79. P r ie s , Logik,
A p lir o d is ie iisis , In A n . I r iu r ., L . I ., f. 17, A M . 55, p . 224.]
D e r o d o u . L ogica R e s titu te , p. 639 f t seq. llo t f-
216 LOGIC. L e c t . X V I.
T h e s e t l i r e e s i m p l e l a w s e o n q i r i s e all t h e r u l e s w h i c h lo g ician s
la y d o w n w ith so c o n f u s in g a m in u te n e s s .' The
iiiiiftniiion. iirst is : A c a t e g o r i c a l s y l l o g i s m , i f r e g u l a r a n d
U u le . o 7
jK T fe ct, m u s t h a v e tlire e , a n d o n ly three, p ro p
o sitio n s, m a d e u p o f th re e , a n d o n ly tliree , te rm s. T lie n ecessity
o f t h i s r u l e is m a n i f e s t from the v e r y n otion o f a c a te g o ric a l s y llo
gism . In a c a t e g o r ic a l s y l l o g i s m t h e r e la t io n o f t w o n o t io n s to eacli
o i l i e r is d e t e r m i n e d tliro u g li tlic ir relatio n to a t h ir d ; and, conse-
( p i e n t l y , e a c h m u s t b e c o m p a r e d o n c e A vith t h e in te rm e d ia te n o tion ,
am i on ce w itli each oth er. I t is t h u s m an ifest tlia t th e re m u st be
three, and cannot p o ssib ly bo m ore than three, t e r m s ; an d that
th ese three term s m ust in th e ir th ree fold com p ariso n , co n stitu te
tliree, an d o n ly th r e e , p ro]>o sition s. I t is, b o A v e v e r , t o b e o b s e r v e d ,
t h a t it m a y o fte n l i a j j p e n a s if, in a v a l i d syllo -
A\ h a t IS p r o p e r l y to g ism , th ere w e re m o re than th r e e iiriiieip al no-
b e r e g a r d e d a s a lo g i- . , tt i i
tio n s, th re e term s. B u t , in t h a t c a s e , t h e t e r m s
or n o tio n s are o n ly c o m p le x , an d e x p r e s s e d b y a
j i l u r a l i l y o f A v o r d s. H e n c e i t is , t h a t e a c h s e v e r a l n o t i o n e x t a n t in
a s y l l o g i . s i n , a n d d e n o t e d b y a s e ] j a r a t e Avor d, i s n o t o n t h a t a c c o u n t
to b e vicA ved :.s a l o g i c a l t e r m o r t e r m i n u s , b u t o n ly t h o s e A vli ic h,
e ith e r sin g ly o r in co n n ectio n Avitli o t h e r s , co n stitu te a p rin cip al
iiio m ciitn m of th e sy llo g ism . ' T h u s , in t h e f o l k i w i n g sy llo g ism ,
th e r e are m a n y m o r e th an th ree several n o tio n s ex p ressed b y th ree
several A v o r d s, b u t th ese, Ave s h a l l fin d, c o n s t i t u t e in r e a lity o n ly
t h r e e ]rincip al n o t i o n s o r l o g ic a l t e r m s :
Sum ption lie who conscientiously performs his duty is a truly good man;
Sut)u mp tio n . . . Srtrrntcs ronsriejttionsly performs his duty ;
C onclusion Thirefore, Socrates is a truly good man.
H e r e t h e r e a r e i n a l l s e v e n s e v e r a l n o t i o n s d e n o t e d b y s e v e n sej)-
a ratc A v o r d s : 1 . C o n s c le n tio a s h f'i. J^crforrns, ?>. J Jitty, T ru ly ,
G ood, G. 3Iari, 7. S o c ra te s ^ b u t o n l y t h r e e j i r i n c i p a l n o t i o n s o r
lo g i c - a l t e r m s , v i z . , 1. C o u sc ie n tio u sly p e r f o r m s h is d u ty ,'i. T r u ly
(jo o d raau, ?>. S o cra tes.
W h e n , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f t h e m i d d l e t e r m in
th e sn m ])tio n .MMd s u b s u m p t i o n is u s e d in Iavo
UuaU rninT'Tm inerrum . . . . . .1 .
s i g n i f i c a t i o n s , t h e r e m a y , in t h a t c a s e , a p ] ) c a r t o
b e o n l y t l i r e e t e r m s , w h i l e t h e r e a r e in r e a l i t y f o u r ; o r a s it is t e c h
n ic a lly sty le d in l o g i c , a q u a te rn io te rm in o ru m ? On th is a cco u n t,
1 S e e S c b e i b l e r , (Ipera L o g u a , p a r e , iv ., p. 2 K r u g , Log-iA:, 8 0 , p . 2 4 6 . A n m . 1. E d
laC. K eckerm an n, S y ite m a L o g ic a M in u s, 3 [C f. F o n s e c a , [I n s tit / > ia b , L . v i . c . 2 0 , p
t. )., p . 2 3 0 . E d . 3T/J. E d .]
L e c t. X V I. LOGIC. 217
the syllogism is vicious in p oint of form, and, consequently, can

afford no inferenee, liowbeit th a t the several jiropositions may, in
Jioint of matter, be all true. A n d w h y ? hecause there is here no
mediation, consequently no eoiinection betw een the different terms
of the syllogism. F o r exam ple:
T h e a n im a ls a re void o f reason;
M a n is a n a n im a l;
T h e r e fo r e , m an is vo id o f reason.
Here the conclusion is invalid^though each proposition, by itself,

and in a certain sense, may he true. For here the middle term, ani-
mtd, is uot taken iii the same meaning in the major and minor jiroji
ositions. For in the former, it is taken iii a narrower signification,
as convertihle with brute, in the latter in a wider signification, as
convertible with animated organism?' '*
The second rule is: Of the premises, the sumption must in
quantity he definite (universal or singular), the
S e c o n d R u le .
subsumption must in quality he affirmative.
The suiuptiou must in reference to its quantity be definite; hecause
it affords the general rule of the syllogism. For if it were indefi
nite, that is, particnlar, w'e should have no security that the middle
term in the subsumption comprised the same part of the sphere
which it comprised in the sumption.
M
T hus:
So m e M a re P ;
A ll & are V ;
A U S a re P .
Or, in a concrete exam ple:

S o m e vxnrks o f a r t a re c u b ic a l;
A U p ic tu r e s are w o r k s o f a r t ;
T h erefo re, u ll p ic tu r e s a re c u b i c a l;
In regard to the subsumption, this is necessarily affirmative. The

sumption is not limited to either quality, because the proposition
enouncing a general rule may indifferently declare AU M is P, and
Ak) jM is P. The assumjition is thus indeterminate in regard to
quality. But not so the projiosition enouncing the ajijilicatiou of a
general rule. For it must subsume, that is, it must affirm, that
something is contained under a comlitiou ; and is, therefore, neces
sarily affirmative. W e must say S is M. But in respect of quantity
1 K r u g , L ogik, p. 247. E d .
28
21S LOGIC. L kct. X \ l .
ii is i n i c l c t c m i i n e d , f o r w e e . i n e i t h e r s a y A ll S is M , o r S o m e S is
31. I f t l i e s u b s u i i i i t l i o i i is n e g a t i v e , t h e r e is n o i n f e r e n c e ; f o r i t is
n o t n ecessary th a t a g e n u s sh o n h l c o n tain o n ly th in g s o f a certain
species. T h i s is s h o w n i n t h e follo A v iiig e x a m p l e :
A ll men are animals;

JNb horse is a man ;
Therefore, no horse is an animal. *
O r, as a b s t r a c t l y e x p r e s s e d :
A ll M are P ;
B u i no S is M ;
N o S is P.
T h u s i t is, t h a t i n a r e g u l a r e x t e n s i v e c a t e g o r i c a l s y l l o g i s m , t h e
su m p tio n m ust be alw ay s d eliiiite in q uan tity , th e su b su m p tio n
a l w a y s a l H n n a t i v e in q u a l i t y . ^
I h a v e , h o w e v e r , to ndtl an o b s e r v a t i o n r e q u i s i t e t o ]>roA-ent t h e
p o ssib ility o f a m isc o n c e p tio n . In s t a t i n g it as
Muonccpiion in re- a riilc o f o x te iis iv c c a t c g o iie a ls , t h a t t h e s n m p -
gard todeliniteiiups o f . .. i i c . V " i i \ -r
Pump.ion i secomi ^1011 l u i i s t b c d e f i n i t e ( i i n n m r s a l o r sin g u lar), if
rnie obviated. yoii a r e a t all c o n v e r s a n t w i t h lo g ic a l b o o k s , y o u
Avill h a v e n o t i c e d t h a t t h i s r u l e is n o t i n u n i s o n
w ith th e d o c trin e th erein ta u g h t, a n d y o n m a y , a c c o n l i n g l y , b e siir-
p rise< l t h a t I s h o u l d e n o u n c e as a g e n e ra l r u l e Avhat is a j t p a r e n t l y
co n trad icted b v t h e f i ie t t h a t there are sy lloO
g ism s valid sw
vllo-
g i s m s o f v a r i o u s f o r m s , i n w h i c h t h e s u m p t i o n is a p a r t i c u l a r , o r
t h e sid )sm n ])tio n a n e g a t i v e , p r o p o s itio n . I n e x p l a n a t i o n o f thi.s, i t
is e n o u g h a t j i r e s e n t t o say , t h a t in t h e s e s y llo g is m s t h e p r e m is e s
a r e i r a n s p o s e t l in t h e e x j n e s s i o i i . Y o n Avill, h e r e a f t e r , f i n d t h a t t h e
su in iJtio n is n o t alw ay s th e p roposition Avhieh s t a n d s f i r s t i n the
ennnei.atioii, as th e c o n e lu s io n is n o t a l w a y s t h e
Tlie mere orde r o f p r o p o s i t i o n Avhicli S t a n d s l a s t . S u c h tran s]io si-
.nunciatioM does not lioiis are, Iio w c v e r, o n ly e x te r n a l a c c id e n ts , a n d
c on .k tilu te th e puinp- i i , , ,
, ,, t h e m e r e o r d e r in w h i c h th e p rem ises a n d con-
llon or pubsurnptiou 1
ill a reasoning. e lu sio n of a sy llo g ism are enounced, no m ore
c h a n g e s th e ir n a tu r e am i th e ir n ecessa ry relation
t o e a c h o t h e r , t h a n d o e s t h e m e r e o r d e r i n Avhich t h e g n im m atic.al
p a r t s o f a s e n t e n c e a r e e x jir o s s e d , a l t e r t h e i r essenti.al c h a r a c t e r a n d
recijirocal (le |ie iid e n c e . In t h e j i h r a s c s c/> a n d bonus v i r ,
in b o t h , t h e c ir irj a s u h s t a i i t i v e a n d t h e bonus a n a d j e c t i v e . I n th e
1 K ru g , L o g ik , p. 218. K acbm anu, L o g ik , ( 124. E d.

L e c t. X V L LOGIC. 219
.soiiteiice vai-ionsly enounced, Alexander D a r iu m vicit, A lex a n

der vicit D a r t uni, D a r iu n i A lexander vicit, D a riu in vicit A le x
ander, Vicit Alexander D a r ta n t , Vicit Darinin, A l e x a n d e r :
in these, a diftereuce o f order may d eno te a difference of the in te r
est we feel in th e VJirioiis co ustitue ut notions, hu t no diffeieuce of
th e ir Ograiuiuatical or lo<fieal
O
relations. I t is th e same with syllo-
V
gisms. The mei-e order of enunciation does uot

W lia t tr u ly c o n s ti- change u suiuptiou iiito a suhsum ption, nor a
tu le s th e s u m p tio n a n d , ^
, .
s u b s u m p tio n in a re a -
subsuiuiitiou
_ *
into a sumiition.
_
I t is their essen-
soiling. tifil relation :md correlation in th o u g h t which
constitutes the one proposition a major, and the
oth e r a m inor premise. I f the former precede th e la tte r in the
e.xpression o f the reasoning, the syllogism is technically r e g u la r; if
the latter precede the former, it is technically irregular or trans-
jiosed. This, howeA'er, as you will hereafter more fully see, has uot
heen attende d to h y logicians, and in coiise(}uence of their looking
aw ay from the internal and necessary consecution o f the premises
to th e ir merely external and accidental arrangem ent, th e science
had heen deformed and perjilexed hy the recognition of a m u lti
tu d e of different forms, as real and distinct, AA'liicli exist only, and
are only distinguished, by certain fortuitous accidents o f expres
sion, This heing understood, you will n o t mai'A'cl a t th e rule in
regard to th e q u an tity of sum ptions in extensive syllogisms (which,
hoAvever, I limited to those th a t were regularly and fully expressed),
that it must he definite. Nor will you marvel at the counter
canon in regard to the quality of sumptions in intensive syllogisms,
th a t it m ust he affirmative.'
The necessity of the last rule is equally manifest as that of the
preceding. It is: The conclusion must corre-
T h ir d R u le . ' , . . . , , , . , .
spond in q u an tity with the siuisumption, and in
quality Avith th e .sumjition, T his rule is otherw ise enounced hy
logicians : T h e conclusion m ust always follow the Aveakor or worser
part, th e negative and th e particular heing held to be w eaker or
worser in relation to the affirmative and universal. T h e conclusion,
in extensive categoricals (u ith which av c are at present occupied)
is m ade up of the m inor term , as subject, and o f the major te n u , as
predicate. X ow , as th e relation of these tAvo to n u s to each othVr
is determ in ed hy th eir relation to the middle term , and as the m id
dle term is compared Avith the major term in the sumjition ; it fol
lows th a t the major terra m ust hold the same relation to the minor
1 [S e e B a c h m a n n , h o g ik , 124, pp. 192, 194 K ru g , L o g ik , 82. p. 249 C f. 83, p. 264, and

Anm 3 D r o b is c h , L o g ik , 73, h. 65, 42, 109, p. 362. F a c c io ia ti, R u d im en ta Logica,
44, pp. 34, 36. S c h u lz e , L o g ik , 79, p . 114. R . iii. c. iii. p 91.]
220 LOGIC. L ect. XXL
in t h e c o n c lu s io n w h ic h it h e ld t o t h e m id d l e in t h e s u m p tio n . If
t h e n t h e s u m p t i o n is . a t h r m a t i v e , s o l i k e w i s e m u s t b e t h e c o n c l u s i o n ;
o n th e o t h e r h a n d , i f t h e s u m p t i o n b e n e g a tiv e , so lik e w is e m u s t b e
ih e c o n clu sio n . In th e su b su m p tio n , th e m in o r te rm is c o m p a r e d
w i t h t l i e m i d d l e ; l l i a l is, t h e m i n o r is a f f i r m e d a s u n d e r t h e m i d d l e .
In th e conclusion, th e m a jo r te r m can n o t, th erefore, bc p re d ic a te d
o f m o r e t h i i mO s t h a n w e r e a f f i r m e d a s u n d e r t h e m i d d l e t e r m in t h e
su b su m p tio n . I s t h e s u b s u m p t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , u n iv e r s a l, so lik e w is e
m u s t b c t h e c o n c l u s i o n ; o n t h e c o n t r a r y , is t h e f o r m e r p a r t i c u l a r , so
likew ise m u s t b e th e la tte r . *
1 K ru g, L o g i k , S 80, p. 250-1. E d .
LECTURE XVII.
S T O I C H E I O L O G Y c
SECTION II. OF T H E PRODUCTS OF THOUGHT
III. THE DOCTRINE OF REASONINGS.
SYLLOGISMS. TIIEIR DIVISIONS ACCORDING TO INTERNAL

FOR]\I.
A. SIMPLE CATEGORICAL. II. DEDUCTIVE IN COMPREHEN-

222 L O G I C. L i n t . XAGI.
to tlic species and individual. Each o f tlicsc, ho w ever, in its more

]>ro\iinate :iii]dication, is still further d evelop ed into a plurality o f
im uv explicit rules. In reference to E x te n siv e S y llogism , the gen-
cr:il h;w, or tlie P ic tia ii de O m ni ct de E id lo (as it is technically
called) is ev o lv ed into a series o f rules, which h ave heeii multiplied
to tw elve, are usually recalled to six, hut which, th ro w in g out o f
account irregular and imjierfcct syllogism , may be c o n v e n ie n tly
reduced to three. T h e se are,* I. A n E x te n siv e Ciitogorical O D ed u c-
tive Syllogi.sin must have three, and only three, t e r m s .constitut
in g three, and o n ly three, jiropositions. II. T h e sum ption m ust in
(juantity be definite (/. c., universal or singnlai-) ; Ihe subsumption
must in quality be affirmative. J II. T h e conelnsion must corre
spond in quan tity with the subsum ption, and in qnalitv with the
sumption. T h e Lecture fconclnded w ith an explanation o f these
rules in detail.
AVe liavo now , therefore, n e x t to consider into w h a t rules the
la w o f In ten siv e or C o m prehensive Sy llo gism
2. T h e I n t e n s iv e C a ie - jg tleveloiied, ill its more proxim ate application,
g o r ie a l D e d u c liv e S y l- . . . , . . . .
.Now, jis t h e in tensive and exten.s;vc syllogism s
are alw ays the eonnterjiarts o f each other, the
proxim ate rules o f the tw o forms m n st,,eon seqn cn tly, be cither jire-
cisely the same, or jirecisely the converse o f each other. A c c o r d
in gly. tak in g the three rules o f e x te n s iv e syllogisms, w e find that
the first law is also, w ith o u t difference, a rule o f in ten sive sy llo
gisms. B u t the second and third, to maintain their essential id en
tity, must be extern ally c o n v e r t e d ; fo r to cliange an ex te n sive
syllogism into an intensive, w e must transjiose the order or subor
dination o f the tw o jiremiscs, and reverse the reciprocal relation o f
th e teinis. d'he three Lmneral
rules o f an In ten siv e Cateixorical
O
D e d u c tiv e S y llo gism will, therefore, stand as follow s:
^ LXL In ten siv e Categorical D e d u c tiv e S y llogism , that

is, one o f D ep th , i f rcgnlariy and fully cx-
P a r. L X I. Ilu le B o f , . i i i -i .
th e I n t e n s i v e C a t e c o r - piossed, IS g o v o n ie d by tho thrcc following
le a l D e d u c tiv e S y . o - ru lc S :
I. It must have three, a

terms, fo n s titiitin g three, ami on ly three, projiositions.
II. O f the ])ieniises, the Sum ption must in quality ho Affir
mative, and tlic Snbsimqition in quantity D efinite (that is, uni
versal or *(ingnlar).
III. 'flie Conclusion m u st not exceed the Sunqition in Quan
tity, and in (Quality m u st agree with the Subsum ption.
LEr-r. XVII. LO GI C. 223
In regard to the first o f these rules, the rule which is identical

for syllo gism s w h eth e r e xten sive or intensive, it
E x p lic a t io n . g . j y nnytliin g; for all that I stated
in regard to it under the first o f these forms, is

valid in regard to it under the second.
I proceed to the seeond, w hich is, T h e sum ption m u st in qual
ity be afiirmative, tbe subsum ption m ust in qiian-
S e c o n d R u le . definite (that is, universal or singular).
A nd, here, we ha v e to answ er the q u e st io n , W h y in an intensive
syllogism mn.st the sum p tion be afiirmative in quality, the su b sum p
tion definite in q u a n tity ? L e t ns take tbe follow ing sy llogism as
explicated :
S comptvhcmh ;
does not comprehend P ;
Therefore, S does not comprehend P.
Prudence comprehends virtue;

But virtue does not comprehend blameworthy;
Therefore, prudence docs not comprehend blameworthy.
H ere all g o e s on regularly. W e descend from the major term

doice to tbe m iddle term virtue, and from tbe m iddle term virtu e to
the minor term hlum ev'orthy. B u t let us reverse tb e premises.
W e at once see that tbougli there is still a discoverable meaning,
it is not directly g iv en, and that w e must rectify and restore in
th o u gh t w hat is perverse and preposterous in expression. In tbe
previous cxamjile, the snmiition is ailirmative, tbe subsum ption neg
ative. N o \v le t us take a n e ga tiv e sumption :
S does not comprehend ;

But eomprchends P.
H ere there is no conclusion com p eten t, for w e can neither say S

com prehends P, nor S does not com prehend P . Or to take a co n
crete c x a m i il e :
Prudence does not comprehend learning;

But learning comprehends praiseworthy.
W e can draw, it is evident, no conclusion ; for we can neither say,

from the relation o f tbe tw o jiropositions, that P rtidcn ce com pre
hends p r o i sen'or thy, nor that P ru d en c e does not com prehend praise-
vcorth y.
224 LOGIC. L ect. X V II.
T h e reason w liy an e.xtcnsive sy llogism requires a universal sum]>-

tion, ami an in ten sive syllogism an affirmative,
c.r o u n d s o f iiie ru les aiul w h y the oiie I'eqnires an affirmative and
re jin r d iiig .suni|iiion other a definite su bsum ption, is th e follow-
a n d .'îibsim iption iu . . i , i,
H x le n s iv e a n d C o m - '" S ' 1 b c C O lld lt lO ll C o m m O ll tO b o t l l S y l l o g l S l U S
is th at the suiiijitioii slioiild exjiress a rule. B u t
p r e b e n s iv e S y llo g is m s .
in the e x ten s iv e syllog ism this la w is an univer

sal rule, that is, a laile to w bich there is no e x c e p t i o n ; but then it
may be exjiressed either in an affirmative or in a n ega tiv e form,
w bereas in the in ten siv e sy llogism this law is expressed as a posi
tion, as a fact, and, therefore, admits on ly o f an affirmative form,
hilt, as it is n o t necessarily universal, it admits o f lim itations or
exeoptions. T h is ojiposite character o f the sum p tion s o f the tw o
forms o f syllo gism s is correspondent to thc 0 ))]iosite character o f
their subsuiiijitions. In the e x te n s iv e syllogism, the subsum ption
is, and can on ly be, an affirmative declaration o f th e application o f
the sum] it ion as a universal rule. In the in ten siv e syllogism, the
subsninjition is either an affirmation or a negation o f th e apjilica-
tioii o f the simijition as a jiositive law. H e n c e it is tha t in an in
tensive syllog ism the major premise is necessarily an affirmative,
while the minor m ay be either an a(firmative or a n e g a tiv e propo
sition.
Ill regard to the secon d clause o f the secon d I'ule, the reason
wli v the subsum ption in an in ten siv e sy llogism m u st be definite in
quantity, is because it w ould otherw ise be im possible to affirm or
d e n y o f each other the m in or and the major terms in the conclu
sion. F o r exa m p le :
.Sumption Prudence is a virtue; i. c., Prudence comprehends virtue.

.Siili'iiiiijition. . . Some virtue is praiseworthy; i.e., Some virtue comprehends praiseivorthy.
1'rom these w e can draw no conclusion, for the indefinite som e v ir

tue does not co n n ect the m.ajor term qm udcnce and the minor term
p r d is c ir o r t ln j into the necessary relation o f w hole and part.
In regard to the third rule, T h e coneliision must be corre
sp o n d en t in fjiiaiitity with the sunqition, and in
T h ir d Itiile. i i i '
quality with the snlisiinijition, it is not n eces
sary to say anytliiiig. Here, as in the e x te n s iv e syllogism , tlic con-
(111-1011 eaiiiiot be stronger than the w eak est o f its anteceden ts, that
is, if any premise lie negative, the conclusion can n ot but be n egative
a b o ; and it any premise be pai'tieiilar, the conclusion cannot be but
]iartieiil;ir lik e w ise ; and as a w eaker quality is only found in the
subsuinption, and a w eaker quantity in ibo siiiiqition, it follow'S that
L ect. X V n . LOGIC. 225
(as tlie rule declares) the conclusion is regulated by tlie suiiqitioii

in regard to its (piantity, and b y the snbsninption in regard .to its
quality. It is, how ever, evid ent, that though warranted to draw a
universal conclusion from a gen eral sum ption, it is alw ays conqie-
te n t to draw only a [lai'ticnlar.
So much for the proxim ate law s b y w hich Categorical D e d u c t iv e
S y llo g is m s arc g o vern ed, when considered as
I I. I n d u c t iv e C ate- perfect and regular i n extcrmd form. W e shall,
g o r ic a l S y llo g is m s . * - 1 , 1 1 i
in the sequel, Imve to consider the speei:.! rules
b y which the varieties o f D e d u c tiv e Categorical Syllogism s, as d e
termined b y tlieir external form, arc g o v ern ed ; but at present we
must proceed to the general consideration o f the other cltiss o f cat
egorical syllogism s afforded b y their internal form, I metin those
o f Induction, the discussion o f w hich I shall c om m en ce by the
fo llow in g paragraph :
L X I I . A n I n d u c tiv e Categorical Sy llo gism is a reasoning

in which Ave argue from the notion o f all
P a r . liXii. I n d u e - co u stitu cn t parts discretivclV, to the
tiv e C ategorical Syl- , i 1 n
logism.-wiiat. notion 01 tlic constitutcd Avliole colle ct
ively. Its general laAvs are identical Avitli
those o f the D e d u c tiv e Categorical S y llogism , and it m ay be
exqiressed, in like manner, either in th e form o f an Inten siv e or
o f an E x te n s iv e S yllogism .
W e shall, in the sequel, hav e to consider more particularly the

nature and [leculiaritios o f L o gica l Induction,
T h e view. o f logi- Avlicn AAx com c to treat o f the F igu re o f Syllo-
c ia n s r e g a r d in g th e . , , 1 .1 .. t
T . T
n a tu r e o l L o g ic a l I n - o
Logi-
t^rid A v h e n w e c o n s i d e r t h e
_ o
n atu re
_
or
d u c tio n e r ro n eo u s. cal or Form al, ill contrast to Philosophical oi'
R eal Induction, under the head o f Modified
Logic. A t jiresent, I s h a l l on ly say, that all you Avill find i n l o g i c a l
A vorks of th e e h tiracter of lo g ical in d u c tio n is u tte rly erroneous;
for alm ost all logicians, e x c ep t A ristotle, consider induction, not as
regulated by the necessary I u a v s o f thought, but as determ ined by
the probabilities and presum ptions o f the sciences from which its
matter lias acci<lentally been b o r r o A v e d . T h e y h a v e n ot c o n s i d e r e d
it, logically, in its formal, but only, extralogically, in its material
conditions. Thus, logicians h.ave treated in L o g ic o f the in ductive
in fe re n c e from t h e p a r t s t o t h e A vhole, n o t a s e x c l u s i v e l y A v arran te d
by the hiAV o f Id en tity , in the con vertib ility o f the avIioIo airl .-'M
its parts, but tln'v have attem p ted to cst.ablish an illation from :i few
o f th e se p arts to th e w h o le ; and th is, e ith e r as su p p o rte d by tlie
29
220 LOGI C. L e c t. XVII
goiioral analogies o f natni'C, or b y the special presum ptions afforded

b v the several sciences o f objective c.vislcncc.'
Logicians, with the oxco]ition o f Ari.stotle, w ho is, ho w ever, very
brief and nn cxp lieit in bis treatm en t o f this sub-
T iie c iin n ie ic r s of jcct, have tlius dofon n cd tbeir science, and per-
L o g ic a i o r F o im iii, p]pxed th e v c i y simple doctrine o f logical in-
aiu l o f R e a l o r .31 a te- i . . .
dtictioii, b y coiifoundiiig formal w ith material
r ia l, I n d u c t io n .
induction. A ll in diietivc reasoning is a reason

in g from the jiarts to the w h o le ; but th e reasoning from the ]iarts
to the w hole in th e various material or objective sciences, i.s very
different from the reasoning from the parts to tbe w h o le in the one
formal or sub jective science o f Logic. In the former, the illation is
n ot siiu])ly founded on the law o f Id en tity , in the co n vertib ility o f
a w h ole and all its jiarts, but on certain iiresiiiiqnions drawn from
an experience or observation o f the eon.staney o f nature; so that, in
these sciences, the inference to the w hole is rarely from all, but
gen era lly from a small num ber of, its co n stitu ent parts; conse
quently, in th em , the conclusion is rarely in ti-ntli an induction
properly so called, but a m ix e d conclusion, drawn on an in ductive
presumption com b in ed w ith a d e d u c tiv e ])remisc. F o r example,
th e physical jihilosophcr thus reasons:
This, that, and the other magnet attract iron ;

But this, that, and the other magnet represent aU magnets;
Therefore, all magnets attract iron.
N o w , in this syllog ism , the leg itim a cy o f the minor premise, T h is,
th at, a n d the other m a g n et represent all m agnets, is founded on the
principle, that nature is uniform and constant, and, on this g e n
eral principle, the reasoner is p hysically wari'anted in m ak in g a lew
]):irts eq u iva len t to the w hole. B u t this ])rocess is w h o lly incom-
]etent to the logician. 'Pho logician k n o w s n otliin g o f any princi-
])les exce])t the laws o f th ou gh t. l i e ca nn o t transcend the sphere
ot necessary, :ind ]):iss into the sphere o f ])rohable, th in k in g ; noi'
c:m he hring hack, and incorporate into his own formal science, the
com litions whic*h regulate the ])rocednre o f th e material sciences.
T h is h eing the case, indiuTion is either n o t a logical ])rocess differ-
<*nt from d eduction, for the induction o f tlie o b jective philosopher,
in so far as it is formal, is in fact d e d u c tiv e ; or tliere ninst he an
induction g ov ern ed by oth er laws than tliosc w hich warrant the
induction o f the objective jtbilosojiliei-. N o w , if logicians bad
1 C om pare D incussion.i, p. 159. E d .

;.KCT. XATl. LOGIC. 22T
looked to their own sciences, and n ot to sciences w ith wliich, as

logicians, th e y had no concern, th e y would have
C iin o n s of the i)c- seen th a t there is a process of reasoning from
d u c f iv e a n d lm ln c t iv e ^q^ ^q^
S y J lo g ism s e q u a lly i i
^^rinai. Wliole to the parts, tliat tins process it governed
by its own laws, and is ecpially necessary and
in d e p e n d e n t as th e other. T h e rule b y wliicli the D educ tive Syllo
gism is governed is: W l ia t belongs, or does n o t belong, to the con
tain ing whole, belongs, or does n o t holoiig, to eacli and all o f the
contained jiarts. Tlic rule by wliich the Inductiv e Syllogism is
gov erned is: W l ia t belongs, or docs n o t belong, to all th e constitu
en t Jiarts, belongs, or does n ot belong, to the constituted wliole.
T hese rules c.xclusively deteriuiiic all formal inference ; w h ate v er
transcends or violates them ,' traiisceiids or violates Lo"ic. O Both
are equally absolute. I t would be not less illegal to infer by the
deductive syllogism, an attriliiite belon ging to tlie whole o f som e
th in g it was not conceived to contain as a p a r t ; than by th e ind u c
tive, to conclude o f the whole w h a t is n o t conceived as a jiredicate
of all its constituen t jiarts. In either case, the consequent is not
th o u g h t as dcteriuiiied by the a n te c e d e n t; the premises do nol
involve th e conclusion.'
T o tak e the example jireviously adduced as au illustration o f a
T h ese reasoninss material or jiliilosopliical induction, it would be
illu s tr a t e d . th u s cxprcsscd as a formal or lo g ic a l:
T h is , th a t, a n d (he other m agnet a ttra c t ir o n ;

B u t th is, that, a n d the other m agnet a re a ll m agnets ;
T h e re fo re , a ll m agnets a ttra c t iron.
H ere th e inference is d eterm ine d exclusively b y a law o f thouglit.

In the subsumption, it is said. T his, that, a n d the other m agnet etc.,
are all m agnets. T his means, 7 h is, that, a n d the other m agnet are,
th a t is, constitute, or rather, are conccuêd to constitute all m agnets,
th a t is, the vhole, the class, the genus magnet. If, therefore,
exjilicitly enounced, it will be as follows : This, that, a n d the other
m agnet are conceived to constitute the v:hole class m agnet. T he
conclusion is Therefore, all m agn ets a ttract iron. This, if cxjili-
catcd, will give Tlierefore, the ichole class m agnet is conceived to
a ttract iron. T h e whole syllogism, therefore, as a logical induc
tion, will be :
I [C f. K r u g , L o g ik , 166, 167. S a n d e r s o n , [Q ucattiones in A n . P rior., h . ii. <j. v iii. p 316.

Cow penctiiim L o g . Arti.s, L . iii. c. x . p . 112. e d .1 6 1 0 . E d .]
W o lf. P h il. R a tio n a lis, 477, 478. S c o tu s.
228 LOGIC. L ec t. X V II.
This that, and the other magnet attract iron;

But this, that, omt the other magnet, etc., are conceived to constitute the genus magnet;
Thinforc, the genus magnet attracts iron.
It is alm ost needless to .advert to an objection Avbich, I see, am ong

others, has misled W h a te ly . I t m ay be said
O b je c tio n o b v ia te d . . , ' t i
that th e minor, J /its , that, a n d the other m a g
net are all m agnets, is manifestly fiilse. T his is a very superficial
objection. It is very true that neither hei-c, nor im leed in alm ost
.any o f our inductions, is the sta te m e n t o bjectively correct, that
tlie enumerated jiartienlars are re.ally equ ivalen t to the Avhole or
class Avhich th e y constitute, or in Avhich th ey are contained. But,
as an objection to a logical syllogism , it is Avholly in com petent, as
wliolly cxtr.alogical. Foi- the logician lias a right to siqipose any
material im possibility, any material fa lsity ; be takes no a cco un t o f
Avbat is o b jectiv ely imjiossible or false, and lias a right to assume
Avhat premises he jilease, provided that th e y do not in v o lv e a con-
tra<liction in terms. In th e exainjile in question, the snbsnnqition,
T his, that, a n d the other m a g n et are all m agnets, has been already
explained to mean, n ot that th ey really are so, but m erely that th ey
are so th o u g h t to he. I t is o nly on th e snjiposition o f this, that, and
the other m agnet, qX.c , lieing con ceived to coii-
K('muia: for Indue- .stitutc the class that the inference ]iro-
tive S llogiprus In , , . ... .. , ,
. . . , ceci.s, a n d , on tins siiiiiiosition, it will not b e
( o m p r ch en t:io u a im ' '
i.xteD PioD . denied that the inference is necessary. I stated
tliat an in d uctiv e sy llog ism is equally co m p e ten t
in com prehension and in exten sion. For examjile, let us snjijiose
that X , y, z, rejiresent jiarts, and the letters A and B Avlioles, and
we li.ave the folloAving formula o f an inclnetive sy llogism in
Corajirehension :
X, /., constitute A ;
A comprehends L ;
Therefige, x, y, comprehend I?.
This, if con v erted into an e x te n s iv e syllogism , b y transposing

the jiremises and reversing the cojmla, g iv es :
A is contained under 15;

X , y , /., eon stitute A ;
Therefore, x, y, '/,, are rejntained under 15.
But in tlii.x syllogism it i.s e v id e n t that the premises are in an un-

iiatiiral ortler. W e m ust not, therefore, here transpose the premises,
a.s we I'.o in co n v ertin g a d e d u c tiv e categoric.al o f com prehension
L e c t . X V II. LOGIC. 229
into one of extension. W c m a y obtain nn iiubictive syllogism in

tw o dilferent forms, and in either comprehension or extension,
.according :is the parts stand for the m.ajor, or for the m iddle term.
I f th e mitiDr term is formed of the parts, it is evident there is no
induction ; ior, in this case, they only constitute that q u an tity of
the syllogism which is .always a part, and never a whole. L et x, y,
z represent the p a r ts ; Avhere not sujierseded hy x, y, /, S will rt'pre-
seut the m.ajor te rm in a comprehensive, and the minor term in an
extensive syllogism; P will rejiresent th e major term in an exten
sive, and the minor term in a comprehensive syllogism, and ]\[ the
m iddle term in hoth. I shall first take the In d u ctiv e Syllogism
o f Comprehension.
F ir st Ca s e , (T h e p tirts li o ld in g th e j S e c o n d C a s k , ( T h e p a r t s h o ld i n g t h e
p la c e o f t h e m a jo r te r r a S .) p la c e o f th e m id d le te r m .)
X, y , z co n stitute J I ; S com prehends x , y , z ;
J I com prehends P ; X, y , z constitute P ;
T h erefo re, x , y , z com prehend P . T h erefo re, S com prehends P .
x\gain, in tlie I n d u ctiv e Syllogism o f E xte n sio n :
F ir st C a s e , ( T h e p .a rts h o ld i n g t h e S e c o n d C a s e , ( T h e p a r t s h o ld i n g t h e
p la c e o f t h e m .a jo r t e r m P .) p la c e o f th e m id d le t e r m .)
X, y , z co nstitute J I ; x , y , z a re contained u nder P ;
S is co n ta in ed under J I ; x , y , z constitute S ;
T h tr e fo r e S is contained u n d er x , y , z. I T lu r r fo r e , S is contained u n d er P .
Before leaviug this subject, I m ay notice th a t the logical indue

tion m aintained by W h a te ly and m a ny others,
W h a te ly an d o th e r s diverges cveu more tlian th a t of th e older logi-
e r r o n e o u sly m a k e the fi-Qin the triitli, inasmuch as it tuakcs tliis
I n d u c t iv e S y llo g is m _ _
D e d u c tiv e syllogisiu a dcductive syllogism, o f Avliich the
sumption, which is usually understood and uot
expressed, is always substantially the .same, namely, W h a t belongs
(or does n ot belong) to the individttal.s we have
D o c t ii n e of the examined, helontis (or does not helonqf) to the
o ld e r lo g ic ia n s . r' \ .
Avhole class u n d er wliich th e y are contained.
This doctrine was first, I think, introduced hy Wolf,* for the
1 [C f. W o lf. P hitosophia R atin n n lis, 479, ( E n lh y m e m a t e ) v e l m a jo r v e l m in o r procmis-

first e d . 1728 S o , b e fo re W o lf, S c h r a m m , s a n in i. in lio c ( I n d iic lio iie ) s e m p e r m a jo r
A risto t. Philos. P rin cipia. p . 27, e d . lle!in .< t., p r o p o s itio s u b iiite llig itu r . U eters as fo l-
1718. Ir .d iic ti (i;e e x m iiltis siiig iih ir ib iis lo w D e Jnr/uctionc. Philos. A h o r f , D isp .
c o llig itu r u n iv e r sa le s iijip o s iio lo e o in a jo r is x x v i . p 2.52 rt seq." S e e a lso C r a k a n fh o r p e ,
p ro p osition i.s h o c c a n o n e : Q u ic q u id c o m p e tit L o g ica , c x x . p. 217, c d . 1677. [C f. D isci/iriorw,
o m n ib u s p a r tib u s, h o c c o m p e tif t o t i; in is t o p . 170, n o t e . E d .]
230 LOGIC. L ect. X V il
provion.s logicians viowod the subsum ption as th e common, and,

llierclbro, tlie sujipressed premise, this premise ahvays sta tin g th a t
tho individuals, or particulars enum erated, m ade up th e class un der
which they w ere severally contained.' F o r e.xamplc, in the instance
irom the m a g n e t we have already taken, the subsum ption would be,
This, that, a n d the other m agnet, a n d so fo r th , are the whole class
magnet. This doctrine of th e older logicians is
t'oiTCCt as far as it , n i , i i
correct a.s far as it goes; and, to m ake it abso-
gOL'S. s .
liitcly correct, it would only have been necessary
to have established tlie distiiietion between tlie logical induction as
gov erned by the a p r io r i conditions of tlionght, and jihilosoiihical
induction as legitim ated by th e a p o ste rio ri conditions of tlie m a t
ter, about which th e impiiry is coiiversaiit. This, however, was not
done, and th e whole doctrine o f logical induction was corrup ted
aud confounded by logicians in troducing into th e ir science tlie con
sideration o f various kinds o f m.atter, and a d m ittin g as logical an
induction sujijioscd iinperleet, th a t is, one iu whicli there was infer
ence to tlic whole from some only of the co nstitu e nt parts. This
Iiniierfect Indiietion, they held in eontingciit
l)ociii..e of Imper- i ^
. m a tte r to he contingent, iii necessary m a tte r to
foct liiduclioii. _^ ^ ^
he necessary, as if ii logical inferenco were not,
in all cases, necessary, ami only necessary as governed by th e neces-
.vary laws o f thouglit. T his misappreliciision o f th e nature o f 'l o g i
cal or formal induction, aud its diflcreiico from jihilo.sopliical or
material, has been th e reason w hy Baeoii is at
Bacon at fiuiUiii Ills pm lt ill liis eiiticisin of A ristotles doctrine o f
crilicii-m of ArisloUc's . , . i i i ^ 1 .
. . of Induction.
doctrine . iiuluctioii. f o r ,i looking
a only at tlie doctrine
^
of llie imluctive syllogism given by A ristotle
in the Organon, and not jicreeiving th a t the question th e re was
only concerning tlie n.atnre of induction as governed by the laws of
th ough t, lie forthw ith assimied th a t tliis was tho induction practised
by tlic S tagirite in his study of nature, ;ind, in the teeth botli of
the precept and jiractice of the pliilo.'-mjilicr, condeiniicd tlic Aris-
totclic induction in the mass, as Hying at once to general priticiples
from th e hasty enum eration ol a few individiuil instances. I n d u c
tion, as I mentioned, will, however, once and again, engage onr
attention in the sequel ; b u t I liavc tliouglit it proper to be some
w hat c.\]ilicit, tliat you m ig h t carry with you a clearer concejitioii
1 [O n I iid u c liiiii in g e n e r a l, pee Z a b a r e lla , x x . p. 2.54 K c c k e n iia n n , O r i n a ,X ,.\ . p p . 269,

T r ib u te in / I n , P rir/r. \t. \~ i) >t s n / ., f> iiira L o g - 703 L liliiiiei l , O r g a n o n . \ 280, 287
I"/. ( .Vpin iid ix I J lo lin a u-', E U t n m l a L n g ir a , p. 183. E u g e n io s Ao-ynfrj, p 410. J o . E r.
L i. e ii. p. 99. I - e i.d o o r n , C n rsu s L 'i g i r u s , I icu.s .M irai.dulanii.s.] [ O p r r a , E x a m t n Doct
L. iii. q ii p. .301. t re lliu p , /ja g o ^ e , L iii c . V a m l . C/e/iI. L . v . p ~4G e t seq. E d .]
L kct. XVII. LOGIC. 231
of tlie nature of tliis process, as contrasted with the J^ôeess of the

Deductive Syllogism.
Having terminated the general consideration of Categorieal Syl
logisms, Deductive and Iiuluetive, I now pro
ceed to the next class of Heasoniiigs afforded
1 . D iP ju n c i iv e . internal form; I ineaii thc class of Dis
junctive Syllogisms.
^ LXIII. A Disjunctive Syllogism is a reasoning, whose

Par L X III A D is - foriii is determined by the b-nv of Excluded
ju n c t iv e s y l l o g i s m , IMiddlc, aiid wliosc suiiiptioii is accordingly
a di.sjiinetive jiroposition, either of Contra
diction (as, A is either B or not B ) or of Contrariety (as, A
is either B, or C, or D). In sueh a judgment, it is enoniieed
that B or not B, or that B, C, or D, as ojijiosite notions taken
together and constituting a totality, are each of them a jio.ssi-
ble, and one or other of them a necessary, predicate of A. To
determine wdiieh of these belongs, or does not belong to A, the
subsninjitioii ninst eitlier affirm one of the jiredicates, and the
conclusion, eo ipso, eonseqiiently, deny tlie other or otlieis; or
it must deny one or more of them, and thus necessitate in the
conclusion, either the deteniiinate affirmation of the other, or
the indeterminate affirmation of the others. A Disjunctive
Syllogism is thus either Affirmative, constituting the Modus
ponens, or Modus jxonendo tollens, or Xegative, constituting
the Modus tollens, or Modus tollendo ponens.
In each of these inodes there are two cases, Avhich I compre
hend in the following mnemonic verses;
(A ) A f f ir m a t iv e , or iS IoD U s p o n e x d o t o l l e n s :
1. F a lle n 's u iit f a l l o r ; f a l l o r ; non f a l l e n s ergo.

2. F a lle r is a u t f a l l o r ; tii fa l le n 's ; ergo ego nedum .
(B) N e g a t iv e , o r M o d u s t o l l e n d o r o n e .n s:
1. F a l le r is a u t f a l l o r ; non f a l l o r ; fa l le r is ergo, l
2. F a l le r is a id f a l l o r ; non f i d l e n ' s ; ergo ego fa l l o r .
(n illustration of this paragrajih, I have defined a di.sjunctive

F - p r c a t io n syllogism, one whose form is determined by the
law of Excluded Middle, and Avhose smnjitioii
H, accordingly, a disjunctive jiroposition. I have not, as logicians
in general do, defined it directly, a syllogism wdiose major jire-
1 T li is l i n e i s f r o m P u r c h o t , Instit. Philos. Logica, t . 1 , p . 18 4 . T h e o lli e i n a r e t h e A u t h o r s

o w n . Ed .
232 LOGIC. L e c t . X V II.
m is c is a di.sjiin ctive p r o p o s itio n . F o r tlio n g li i t b e tr u e t h a t e v e r y

(lis j u n e t iv e s y l l o g i s m has a d i s j u n e t i v e major
A .-oiogiMii wiih i)reinise, tho c o n v e r s e is n o t t i n e ; for e v e r y syl-
tlisjiinctivo ninjor p ie- * ^ ^ ^ . .
iiiise is iKii mcos.Miriiy log isiii t h a t lias a d i s j u n c t iv e sn iiip tion is not,
11 disjuiiciive reason- oil t h a t ac co iiiit, iiecess.'irily a d i s j u n c t iv e sy llo-
gisiii. F o r a d i s j u n c t i v e s y l l o g is m o n l y e m e r g e s ,
Avlieii llie e o n c ln s i o n ha s r e fe r e n c e l o t h e r ela tio n o f recip rocal
allirniatio n a n d n e g a t i o n s u b s i s t i n g hetAveeii t h e di.sjnnct m c m h e r s
ill t h e m ajor jirem ise, a c o n d i t i o n n o t, h o w e v e r , c o n t a i n e d in th e
m e re e.v istence o f t h e d i s j u n c t i v e snmjitioii.* F o r e x a m p l e , in t h e
svliogi.sin :
B is eith er C or D ;
B u t A is B ;
T h e re fo re , A is either C or D.
This syllogism is as much a reasoning determined, not hy the law

of Fxcliuled Middle, hnt solely hy the laiv of Identity, as the fol
lowing :
B is C.
A is B.
T h e re fo re , A is C-
F o r ill b o t h w e c o n c l u d e , C (in o n e , 0 or D ) is an attribute q/ B ;

but B is an attribute o f A : therefore, C (C or D) is an attributeo f
A , a J iro cess, ill e i t h e r case, r e g u l a t e d e x c l u s i v e l y h y t h e l.iw o f
Identity.
This being jiremised, I now proceed to a closer examination of
the nature of this reasoning, and shall, first, give you a general
notion of its jirocediire; then, secondly, discuss its jirincijile; and,
thirdly, its constituent jiarts.
p . tH-i.ora] view of D i.quu ctive S yl-
ihe Dif-juuctive .Syllo- logisiii m a y he g i v c i i ill t h e f o l l o w i n g s c h e m e ,
in w liic h y o u will o b s e r v e t h e r e is a c o m m o n
su m p t i o n t o t h e n e g a t i v e nnd a fiir m a tiv e m o d e s :
, , , _ A I.S either B or C.
(a.) Form ula for a
.Syllogism with two A f f ir .mative , or JIodus N egative , or Mod US tol-
dLjunct members. fone .vdo toeli : ns LENUO FONENS
A 'o w A IS B ; N o w A is not B ;
T h erefo re, A is not C. llu r e fo r e , A is C.
1 Of. S c b fib le r ,0 /)iT /j I x i g i e a , P a r s. iv . 2 S lg w a r t , pp. 154. 157. [Ih tm lbuch z u r Vor-

" N e q u e enirn sy llo g ih rn iis d is ju iic lu s s e m p e r U su n g m Mber the L o g ik , von I I . C. IV. S ig w a rt,
e s t, curn p r o jio sitio est d is jiiu c t iv a , se d c u m 3d e d . T u b in g e n , 1835, 246, 2 4 8 . E d .]
lo ta q u ie t tio d ik jio n itu r in p r o p o s iilo n e . E d .
L kct. X V II. LOGIC. 233
Or, in a concrete exam p le :
Semprom'us is either honest or dishonest.

A f f iu m a t iv k , o r M o m s i o x e n d o N i x i a t i v i :, o r M o d u s t o l l e n d o
TOLLENS I'O N E X S
Senipronius is honest;
jS 'o iv Now Scinpronius is nol honest ;
Therefore, Senipronius is nol di.shoncst- 1 Therefore, Semjnvnius is dishonest.
T h is formula is, h o w ever, o n ly calculated for the casc iu which

there are only tw o disjunct members, th a t is, for
( b .) F o r m u l a fo r a
^1,(7 ( , f negative O r contradictory opjiositiou ;
S y l l o g i s m ^Mtll m o r e q. disjunct m em bers are more than two,

th a n tw o disjunct , . . . .
m em b ers. th a t is, if there is a jiositive or contrary oj/jiosi-
tion, there is then a twofold or niaiiilold enijiloy-
meiit of the M odu s poiiendo toUeus and Alodus tollendo ponens,
according as th e afiirniation and negation Is d eterm in a te or in d e te r
minate. If, ill th e J/o(/zz6' pionendo tollens, one disjunct m em ber is
determ inatoly affirmed, then all the others are denied ; and if sev
eral disjunct mem bers arc ind e term in a te ly affirmed exeejit one, then
only th a t one is denied. If, in the Adodus tollendo pionens, a single
m em ber of the disjunction be denied, then some one of th e others is
dcterm inately affirmed ; and if several be denied, so th a t one alone
is left, th e n this one is dcterm in a tely affirmed. ' T his will appear
more clearly from the following forniiilai. L e t th e common Snmjition
both of th e Alodus pjonendo tollens and A lodus tollendo pon en s bc -
A is either B, or C or D.
I. T h e M o d u s 1o x e n d o T o l l e n s
First Case. A is either B or C or D ;

Now A ts 15;
Therefore, A is neither C nor D.
Second Case. A is either 11 or G or D;

Now A is either B or Q\
Therefore, A is not D.
II. T he M o d u s T o llen d o P o n en s
First Case. A is either B or C or D;

Now A is nol B ;
Therefore, A is either C or D.
S econd Casc. A is either B or C or D;

Now A is neither B nor C;
Therefore, A is D.
I E s s e r , L o g ik , 9 3 , p . 18 0 . E d .
' 30
2 o4 l o g i c . L e c t . X V ll.
Or, to ta k e these in concrete examples, let th e Com m on S um p

tion be :
#
The ancients were in genius either superior to the niodirns, or inferior, or equal.
I. T h e M o d u s P o x e x d o T o l l e n s
First Case. The ancients tvere in genius either superior to the modems, or inferior,
or equal;
Xow the ujwients were sigirrior ;
Therefore, the ancients wereneithei' inferior nor equal.
Second Case. The ancients were in genius either superior to the moderns, or inferior,
or equal;
Now the ancients were either superior or equal ;
Therefore, the ancients were not inferior.
II. T h e M o d u s T o ll e n d o P o n e n s
First Case. The ancients were in genius either superior to the moderns, or inferior,
or equal.
Xow the ancients were not inferior:
Therefore, the ancients were either superior or equal.
Second Case. The ancients were in genius either superior to the moderns, of inferior,
or equtd.
Xow the ancients were neither inferior nor equal;
Therefore, the ancients were siiperi,w.
Such is a general view of its procedure. Xow', 2, for its prin-

ci]de.
2= llie principle o f u ] f j p g essential character of tb e D isjunctive
the Dujuiicmt .s>iio S}dlogism consist in tins, th a t th e affirmation
gjm . ^
or negation, or, w h a t is a b e tte r expression, the
position or sublation, o f one or o th e r o f tw o contradictory a ttributes
follows from th e siibsuinjitioii o f the onpo.site ; th e re is necessarily
implied in tho disjunetive process, that, when of tw o opposite i>redi-
cates one is jiosited oi- aflirmed, th e o th e r is snblated or denied ;
and that, when th e one is snblated or denied, th e o th e r is posited or
affirmed. B n t thc iiroposition, t h a t o f tw o r e p u g n a n t attributes,
the one being posited, the oth e r m u st be snblated, and the one
being snblated, the o th e r m u st be posited, is at once manifestly
the law by wliich tlie disjunetive syllogism is governed, and m ani
festly only an ajiplication of the law o f E x cluded Middle. F o r the
M odus jxjjicttdo tollens there is the sjiecial ride, I f the one charac
ter be jiosited the oth e r eh aracter i.s s u b la te d ; and for thc M odus
tollendo jto n o ts there is the sjieeial rule, I f the one character be
snblated, the o th e r cliaracter is jiosited. Tlie law of th e disjunctive
syllogism is here enounced, only in reference to tb e case in which
L ect. X V II. L O G I C . 235
the members of disjunction are contradictorily opposed. A n oppo

sition of contrariety is not of purely logical c o n c e rn m e n t; and a
di.sjuuctive syllogism with characters opposed in contrariety, in fact,
consists of as m a ny pure disjunctive syllogisms as there are opposing
predicates. *
3. I now go to the th ird and last m a tte r of consideration, the
several parts o f a D isjunctive Syllogi.sm.
T li e s e v e r a l p a r t s T h e question concerning the special laws of
syllogism , or, Avliat is the same
thing, w hat is the original and necessary form
o f a disjunctive syllogism , as d eterm ined hy its general principle or
law, this question m ay he asked, not o n ly in reference to the
w h o le syllogism, but likew ise in reference to its several parts. T h e
original and necessary form o f a disjunetive syllogism consists, as
w e luive seen, ill the reciprocal position orsuhlatioii o f contradictory
characters, hy the suhsuiiiiitiou o f one or other. H e n c e it follows,
that the disjunctive syllo gism must, like the categorical, in v o lv e a
threefold ju d g m e n t, a i z . : 1, A j u d g m e n t in Avhieh a subject is
determ ined hy tAvo contradictory iiredicates ; 2, Ji. j u d g m e n t in
which one or other o f the oppositc predicates is su bsum ed, that is,
is affirmed, either .as ex isten t or n o n -ex iste n t; and, 3, A j u d g m e n t
in Avhich the final decision is enounced concernin g the existgiice or
n on -existen ce o f one o f th e repugnant or reciprocally exclu sive pre
dicates. B u t in these three propositions, as in the three proposi
tions o f a categorical syllogism , there can on ly be three principal
notions viz., the notion o f a subject, and the notion o f tAvo co n
tradictory attributes, Avhich are gen erally enounced in the sumption,
:md o f Avhieh one is jiosited or sublated in the suhsumjition, in order
that in th e conclusioi> the other may be sublated or posited. T he
case o f contrary opjiosition is, as Ave have seen, easily reconciled and
reduced to that o f contradictory ojipositiou. T h e law s o f the
several parts o f a disjunctive syllogism , or more properly the origi
nal and necessary torm o f these several parts, are g iven in the
iolloAving p ara gra ph :
^ L X IV . 1. A regular and perfect D isjunctive Syllogism

m u st have three, jiropositions, in Avliieli, if
P a r . L X IV . T h e law s j j i g suiujition be siiuplc aiul th e disjunction
of th e D is ju n c tiv e i i i i i i
Syllogism. purely logical, ou ly three jirincijial notions
can he found.
2, T h e Sumption, in relation to its q u antity and quality, is
1 E sse r, Logik, 9 4. E d . 2 E sser, Logik, 95. E d .

-X LOGIC. L f .c t. X V II.
.alw ays u n i f o n n , b e i n g U n i v e r s a l a n d A f f i r m a t i v e ; b n t t h e S iib -

s n i n j i t i o n is s u s c e p t i b l e o f v a r i o u s f o r m s i n b o t h r e l a t i o n s .
3, T h e C o n c lu sio n eori-es])oiuls in (p iaiitity w ith the sub-
' s u m j i t i o n , a n d i s 0] ) p o s e d t o i t i n q u a l i t y . '
T h e lirst rule i s , regul ar and jierfect disjunctive syllogism

m u st hav e three projiositions, in Avbieh, i f the
Fhlt'Kuir* siinqition be simple, and the disjunction ])urely
logical, o n ly three jirincipal notions can be
found. Like the categorical syllogism , the disjunctive consists o f
a snnqkion, co n stitu tin g the general ru le ; o f a subsum ption, c o n
ta inin g its apjdication ; and o f a coiiclusioii, ex pressin g the j u d g
m ent inferred. D isju n ctiv e syllog ism s are, therefore, true and
g en uin e rea so n in g s; and i f in the sumjition th e disjunction be
contradictory, there are in the sy llo g ism o n ly three principal n o
tions. In the case o f contrary disjunctions, there may, in deed,
ajipear a greater num ber o f n o tio n s; but as such syllog ism s are in
reality composite, and are m ade up o f a plurality o f syllog ism s Avitli
a contradictoi-y disjunction, this objection to the truth o f the rule is
as little valid as the eircum stance, tha t the subject in the sum ption
is som e tim es twofold, threefold, fourfold, or manifold ; as, foi- e x a m
ple, in .th e simqjtion J o h n , Ja m es, T h o m a s, are either v irtu o u s or
vicious. F o r this is a cop u lative ])roposition, Avhieh is com posed o f
three simple propositions viz. J o h n is, etc. It', therefore, there be
such a sumjHion at the head o f a di<jimctive syllogism , it is in this
case, likewise, com])Osite, and m a y be analyzed into as m an y simple
syllog ism s w ith three principal notions, as there arc simple proposi
tions into which the sumption may be resolved.
T h e s e c o n d i-ule is, T h e s n n q i t i o n i s, in r e l a t i o n t o i t s q u a n t i t y
and fin ality , a lw a y s u n ifo rm , b e in g u niversal
S eco n d K u le . / , . .
and atiirinalive ; bnt the siiijsnmption is suscep
tible o f different forms in both relations. I f Ave look, indeed, to the
subject alone, it m ay seem to be possibly equally gener.il or jiarticn-
lar; for Ave can equally say o f so?7ie as o f all A, that th e y arc either
B or C. B u t as all universality is relative, and as the sumption is
alw ay s more e x te n s iv e or more conqirehensive than the subsum p
tion, it is thus true that the sum ption is ahvnys general. A gain ,
lo o k in g to the predicate, or, as it is com plex, to the predicates alone,
they, as exclu sive o f each other, appear to in vo lv e a negation. B u t
in looking at the Avliole proposition, that is, at the subject, the
copul.o, ,anfl the ]redicates in co nnection, avc* see at once that the
1 Eeser, I. c. K ru g , L o g ik , ) 86. Ed. 2 K n ig , L o g i k ,t . e. E d.

L iic x . X V I I . LOGIC. bb I
copula is afiirtiiativc, for th e n egation in v olv ed in th e predicates is

confined to tlint term alone.'
In regard to the third rule, which enoiinoes, That the con-
clii.sion should have the same quantity Avith the
rmrd Uu e. subsuinptioii, but an ojijiosite quality, it is
requisite to say nothing, as tho first clause is only a special apjdica-
tioii of the rule common to all syllogisms, that the conclusion can
contain nothing more than the jiremises, and must, therefore, follow
the Aveaker jiart; and the second is self-evident, as only a special
application of the pi-incijde of Excluded Middle, for, on this laAAg if
one contradictory be affirmed in the subsninjition, the other must be
denied in the conclusion, and if one contradictory be denied in
the snbsmnption, tbe other must be affirmed in the coiielusion.
The Disjunctive, like every other species of syllogism, may be
either a reasoning in the quantity of Compre-
r iie D is ju n c tiv e S y l- Jjension, or a reasoning in the quantity of Ex-
lo g is m o f C o m p r e lie n - . i e .
tonsiou. T h e Contrast, how ever, o f these tw o
s io i. a u d E x i e u s io n .
quantities is not manifested in th e same signal
manner in the disjunctive as in the categorical d e d u c liv e syllogism,
more especially o f thc first figure. In th e categorical dedu ctive
svllogism , the reasonings in the I a v o counter quantities are obtrusively
(li.stingnisbed b y a comjilete conversion, n ot on ly o f the internal
significance, bnt o f the external ajipeavance o f the syllogism . F or
not on ly do the relative term s change places in the relation o f
Avhole and part, but the consecution o f the an teced en ts is reversed;
the minor premise in th e one syllogism b eco m in g the major jiremisc
in the other. This, hoAvever, is not th e case in disjunctive sy llo
gisms. H ere th e same jirojiosition is, in both quantities, ahvays the
major jiremise; and th e Avhole ch a ng e that takes jilace in c on vert
in g a disjunctive syllogism o f the one quan tity into a disjunctive
syllogism o f the other, is in the silent reversal o f the cojmla from
one o f its m eanings to anothei-. T his, hoAvever, as it determ ines no
ajiparent difference in single jn-ojiositions, and as the disjunctive
snmjition remains ahvays the sam e proposition, ou t o f Avhich thc
subsumption and the conclusion are evolved, in the one quantity as
in the other, th e reversal o f the suinjition, from ex tension to c o m
jirehension, or from comprehension to extension.
E x a m p le s. . . . . ,
occasions neitlier a real nor an ajiparent cliange
ill the syllogism. Take, for example, the disjunctive sy llog ism :
I S e e K ru g . L o g ik , 8 6 , A iim . 2. 111) . fjiia n tita te m n is i su a r u m p a r tiu m . . . s ic u t

[B n c h m a n n , L ogik, 141, p . 351. Con-.rn : P r o p o s ilio l lv p o t h e li c a h a b e t t a n tu m q u a n -
T w e stc ii, L o ff/i, 137. ed . 1825, p . 119. E.'ser. titr.tem s u a r u in p a r liu m ." S e e a b o v e , p . 174,
L o g ik , 95. D e r o d o ii, L ogira R r s tilitta . p. a u d u o l e l . E d .]
676.] [ P r o p o s itio D is ju u c tiv a n u lla n i b a b e t
238 LOGIC. L e c t. X V n .
Plato is either learned or unlearned;

But Plato is learned.
Therefore, Plato is not unlearned.
N o w lot US exp licate this into an in ten siv e and into an e x te n s iv e

syllogism. A s in In t e n siv e Sy llo g ism it will s t a n d :
Plato compreheiids either thcattrihute learned or the attribute unlearned;

But Plato eowpnhcnds the attribute learned ;
Therefore, ete.
A s an E x te n s iv e S y llo gO ism it will stand :
Plato is routaitml either under the ela.ss learned or the class unlearned;
But Plato is eontained under the class learned;
Therefore, etc.
I'rom this it appears, that, th o u g h the difference o f reasoning in

the several quantities o f com prehension and e xten sion obtains in
disjunctive, as in all other syllogism s, it does not, in the disjunctive
syllogism, d eterm ine the same remarkable change in the external
construction and con secution o f the parts, which it does in categori-
eal syllogisms.
LECTURE XV III.
S T O I O H E I O L O G Y .
S E C T IO N I I . OF T IIE P R O D U C T S OF THOUGHT
II I. D O C T R IN E OF R E A S O N IN G S .
S Y L L O G IS M S . T H I R R D IV IS IO N S A C C O R D IN G TO IN T E R N A L
FORM .
B. C O N D IT IO N A L . H Y P O T H E T IC A L AND H Y P O T IIE T IC O -
D IS JU N C T IV E .
H a v i n g now considered Categorical and Disjunctive Syllogisms,

the next class of Reasonings afforded by the difference of Internal
or Essential form is the Hypothetical; and the general nature of
these syllogisms is e.xpressed in the following paragraph :
% LX V . An Hypothetical Syllogism is a reasoning whose

form is detei-miucd by tbe law of Reason
P a r . L X V . 2. H ypo- Cousoqiieut. It is, tliorcforo, regulated
th e tic a l s y llo g is m ,- ^ i i .. i
i ts g e n e ra l o lia r a e te r. tllC tW O p i l l l C i p l O S 01 \V n i c l l t l i a t I .I W IS
the complement, the one, With the

reason, the consequent is affirmed; the other, With the
consequent, the reason is denied : aud these two principles
severally afford the condition of its Affirmative or Constructive,
aud of its Negative or Destructive form (Jlodus ponens et
AIoduA tollens). The sumption or general rule iu such a syllo
gism is necessarily an hypothetical proposition { I f A then B
is). In such a jiroposition it is merely enounced that the prior
member (.V) and the jiosterior member (B) stand to each other
in the relation of reason and consequent, if existing, but with
out it being determined whether they really exist or not.
Such determination must follow iu the subsumption and con
clusion ; and that, either by tbe absolute affirmation of the
240 ^ LOGIC. L ect. XVm.
a n t o c c d e i i t in t l i e s n b s u i n j t t i o n , .and tlic* i l l a t i v e a f H n n a t i o n of
t h e c o n s e q u e n t in t h o c o n c lu s io n ( t h e m o d u s p o n e n s) ; o r b y
the a b x o lu te neg atio n o f th e e o iis c q u e iit in t h e s u b s u m p t i o n ,
and th e illativ e n e g a t i o n o f t h e a n t e c e d e n t in t h e c o n c l u s i o n
(tho m o d u s to lh n s ) } The general form o f an h y p o th etical
s y l l o g i s m is, t h e r e f o r e , t h e f o l l o w i n g :
Common Sumption I f A is , then B i s ;

1, 2,
Modus Po nk ns: Modus To l l e n s:
But A is ; But B is n o t;
T h erefore, B is. T h erefore, A is not.
Or,
A B
1) M o d u s P o n e x s Si p o te ris p o s s u m ; sed ta p o te s; ergo ego p o ssu m .
B A
2) M o d u s T o l l e n s S i p o tr r is p o ssu m ; non p o ssu m ; n e c p o te s ergo.^
I n i l l u s t r a t i n g t h i s p a r a g r a p h , I s h a l l c o n s i < l c r , 1 , T h i s s p e c i e s o f
s y l l o g i s m in g e n e r a l ; 2 , I t s p e c u l i a r p r i n c i p l e ;
Iv x p lic a tio n . , ' . i i
a n d , o , i t s sjiec ia l la w s .
1 , L i k e e v e r y o t h e r s p e c i e s o f s i m p l e s y l l o g i s m , t h e H y p o t h e t i c a l
is m a d e u p o f t h r e e propositions, a su m p tio n ,
p . Hypothetical syi- a stib s u m jitio n , a n d a c o n clu sio n . T here m ust,
og.-ni III gci.erai. iilacc, b e a n h y p o t h e t i c a l p r o p o s i t i o n
Coiitaii s ihree propo- , o i i i x*
h o l d i n g t h e jtlacc ot a g e n e r a l ru le , a n d rroni
th is p ro jio s itio n t h e o t h e r jia rts o f t h e sy llo g ism
m ust be deduced. T h is first jiro jio sitio n , th e r e f o r e , co n tain s a
su m jitio n . B u t as th is p ro jio sitio n c o n ta in s a re h itii e a n d c o rre la
tiv e m e m b e r, o n e m e m b e r, th e re la tiv e clause, e n o u n c in g a t h i n g
as c o m l i t i o n i i i " ; tlie o th e r , t h e c o ri'o la tiv e c h m sc , e n o u n c i n g a t h i n g
as co n ditioiie*! ; a n d as t h e iv liole jiro jio sitio n e n o u n ces m erely th e
d ejie n d e n c y b e tw e e n th ese r e l a t i v e s , a n d j u d g e s n o t h i n g i n i*egai-d
td th e ir e x iste n c e considered ajiart and in t h e m s c h e s , this
*.'ji<mnc(*ment m ust lie m a d e in a s e c o n d p r o jio s itio n , v liich shall
ta k e o u t o f th e su m jitio n o n e o r o th e r o f its relativ es, a n d c a te g o ri-
1 ,1 'o r u ' o f U ini- f o n r n t a n d t o l l t n t , se c Prio r , I. c. 2.3, f. 60, V e n e t ., 1536. S la g o n

p'r*j i J*. !) S i i - i r i i i / / J! t It i i r n , etprrn p. tiliiD . I n A n n l . Prio r. , f. 16. h . A l e x . A p lir o -
611. W o l f PhU. H o t ( 40'.. 110. .Mark Ilu n - disien?i.. f n A n t i . Pr io r. . IT. 87, 88, 100, 130.
ran u e th e ter m - a pi *it1oi e ad jio.i-i A id . l'<20. /a TVieica. f. 0.7, A ' d ., 1.513. A n o iiy -
tio n e in ." and a r n 'i.o le ad r< n n .li n em " m oiia A u th o r . On Siilln gitir.r, f. 44, ed . 1537.
[ I n U i t u ' i o r c t ly._iirrr. I, j r <>, ( 4. p 240. S c h e ih er, 0//ifv< L o g i c n . p a r s iv p. 513. I.ol-
f'f. p. 213, - a m iir ii. ISI2. l.I i.] z.aiio, W i.irm rrh nft^ fhrr. Lngilc, ii. p . 56f)
2 On th e 1lyj> o!h e .ca l s j l ! o g if .m in p e n - W a irz. O rganon, In A n . P rior., i. c 23]
e r a l, -e A m m o n iiD . In I )' In i r, ..
f. 3, V c n e tiig , 1546. I l.iio r r nn" Pi A nnl. * i lir e.i are th e A u th o r 's o w n . Er>
L kct. X V III. LOGI C. 241
eally e n o u n c e its e x is te n c e u r its n o n -e x is te n c e . T l i i s s e c o n d j>ro-

p o sitio n contains, th erefo re, a su b su m p tio n ; and, th ro u g h th is su b
s u m p t i o n , a j u d g m e n t is l i k e w i s e d e t e r m i n e d , i n a t h i r d p r o p o s i t i o n ,
Avitli r e g a r d t o t l i e o t h e r r e l a t i v e . T h is la st jtro p o sitio n , th e re fo re ,
c o n ta in s th e co n clu sio n p ro jic r o f th o sy llo g ism .
B u t a s t h e s u m p t i o n in a n h y i i o t h e t i c a l s y llo g is m co n tain s tw o
relativ e clauses, an an teced e n t and a conse-
lu a liy p o tlietical q n e i i t , it, th erefo re, aiipears d o u b l e : and a.s
g y llo g ism llie r e is c o in - . , ^ .
p e te .it a t w o f o ld k in d < ?'t h er o f i t s t w o m e m b e r s m a y b e t a k e n in t h e
o f r e a s o n in g , th e )io- s n b s u n i p t i o n , t l i c r o is, c o n s c ( ] i i c n t l y , c o m j i e t e n t
<ius pon en s a n d m odus tw o f o ld k iiid o f roasoiiiiig. F 'o r w e c a n e i t h e r ,
i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , c o n c l u d e f r o m t h e ti u t h o f t h e
i i n t e c e d e n t to t h e t r u t h o f t h e c o n s e q u e n t ; or, in t h e s e c o n d p la c e ,
co n c lu d e from th e false h o o d o f th e c o n s e q u e n t to th e falseh o o d o f
th e a n te c e d e n t. T h e f o rm e r o f th e s e in o d e s o f h y jio th e tic a l infer
e n c e c o n s t i t u t e s w h a t is s o m e t i m e s c a l l e d t h e C o n stru ctive H y p o
th etical,\> w i m o r e j i r o p e r l y t h e M o d u s P o n e n s : t h e l a t t e r w h a t
is s o m e t i m e s c a l l e d t h e D e s tr u c tiv e IL jp o th etica l,\)\\\, m o r e j i r o j i e r l y
t h e M o d u s T ollen sI^ A s ex am p les o f th e tw o m o d e s :
Jlodus Ponens I f Socrates lie virtu ou s, he m erits esteem ;

B u t S ocrates is virtu ou s .*
T h erefore, he m erits esteem.
Modus Tollens I f S ocrates be virtuous, he m e rits esteem ;
B u t S ocrates does not m erit esteem ;
T h eirfo re, he is not virtuous.^
So m uch for th e character o f th e H y p o th etical S y llo g isa- in

g eneral. I n o w p ro c e e d to c o n s id e r its p e c u lia r p rin c ip le .
2 , I f t h e e s s e n t i a l n a t u r e o f a n H y p o t h e t i c a l S y l l o g i s m c o n s i s t
in th is , t h a t t h e s u b s u m p t i o n a ffirm s o r d e n i e s o n e o r o t h e r o f tlie
tw o p arts of a th o u g h t, s ta n d in g to each o th er in th e relatio n
o f th e th in g co n d itio n ing and t h e t h i n g c o n d itio n e d , it w ill b e th e
1 K r u g , L o g ik , 81, A iiin . 1, p. 254. C om - U e r e , 1 / it be d a y is c a lle d r h r iy o v ^ o v o i,

pa re E sse r , L o g ik , 90, p. 173. Ed. b o th b y I e r ip a le tic s a n d b y S to ic s ; the sun is
2 [ N o m e n c liitiir e o f T lie o i.lir a s tu s , E u d e - on the fanA , is c a lle d eTriijiei/oi/by I'cr.p a
n iu s, a n d o ilie r Ie r ij.a te tic s , in re g a rd to te lic s , ATj-yo;/ b y S to ic s . T h e w h o le , I f H
H y p o th e tic a l S y llo g is m , in c o n tr a s t w ith th a t be d a y , the sun is on the earth, is c a lle d t l
o f Ilie^ Stoics. <Tvvy)u.p.evov b y P e r ip a le tic s , r h rpoTTiKSv by
n p a 7 M ara u o iip a r a tpwual ( I V iip a te t ic ) , s t o i c s : B ut it is d a y . is AfTaXTjilas to P eri-
nre c a lle d b y (he S to ic s r e s p e c tiv e ly , r v y - p a te tic s, Trp6a-\T]\f,ts to S to ic s . T/urefore. the
X a u o vT a eK'popaca, X tK r a . on the earth, is e v p ir e p a tr p a to P crip a -
T ak e th is H y p o th e tic a l S y llo g is m : tc t ic s , ('nttpopd to S to ic s . See P h i . o p o n u s ,
TfitU da.th es-un is or, the earth ; L- i C. 2S. f 60 a , ed . V c iie l.
But it is da,j; ' 1536. R r a n d is, Scholia, p 169. C f. A n o n y
Therefore, the sun is cm the earth. I.'.Oils A u th o r , On S yllo g ism s, f. 44.]
31
242 LOGIC. L e c t . X V I I l.
l.aw o f an livjiothctical syllogism, that, I f the condition or antece

dent he affirmed, so also must be the eoudi-
2". Its pcciiiinr prin- tioucd or coiiscquciit, and that if the conditioned
c ip lc , Ihe la w o f Keii- i i i i* i i
ôn niul toiisequent.. o r c o n s e q1u e n t be d e n i e d , so l i k e w i s e m u s t b e
the condition or antecedent. B ut this is mani
festly nothing else than the law o f Sufficient Reason, or of Reason
and Conso(jiRq)t. ' The ]>rinciple o f this syllogism is thus variously
enounced, P o s ita conditione, c o v d itlo n n tu w ; siiblato
r.onditionato, toU itur conditio. Or otherwise,
H o w e iio in ic o d . 1 . 7 . . . .
A }'(itio?ie a d ra tio n a tu m , a n eg attone ra tio n a h
a d negationem ra tio n is,t'a Ie t conscqnentia. The one alternative of
either rule being regulative o f m o d u s qyonois, tbe other of the m o d u s
toUcns?
But here it may he asked, why, as we conclude from the truth
o f the antecedent to the truth o f the consequent
W h y w e c a n n o t c o ilra tio n e a d va tio n a tu m ), twA from the false-
c iu d e fr o m th e tru th ^f the consequent to the filschood o f the
o f tlie c o n s e q u e n t t o *
th e tr u th o f th e a u to - a n t e c e d e n t {a negations r a tio v a ti a d negatio-
ccdont, and from the pcm ra tio n is), c a i i We n o t c o n v e r s e l y c o n c l u d e
fa ls e h o o d o f th e a n te - tiMith o f t h e C o n s e q u e n t t o t h e t r u t h
c e d e n t to th e fal.ô- 1 0 1 , i / - ,
o*
h o o d o f th e c o iis e - a n t e c e d e n t , a n d f r o m t h e f a l s e h o o d of t h e
q u e n t. antecedent to the falsehood o f the consequent?
In answer to this question, it is manifest that
this conld be validly done, only on the following siqqiosition,
namely, if every consequent had only one possible an te ce d e n t; and
if, from an anlccedonl false as considered absolutely and in itself, it
were inipossihlc to have consequents true as facts.
Tims, in the first jilacc, it is incompetent to conclude that be
cause B exists, that is, bee.ausc the eonsecpient meniber of tlic sump
tion, oonsidored as an absolute projiosition, is Irnc, tliercfiire tlie
snpposi'd reason exists, that is, tliereforc the alleged antecedent
member must be true; for B may Inivc other reasons besides A,
siicli as C or 1). In like manner, in tlie second ])lacc, we should
not be warranted to infer, that because tlic siqijiosed reason A is
unreal, :m<l the antecedent member false, therefore the result 1> is
also unreal, and the eonseipient mcinher false; for the existence of B
miglit he determined by many other i-easons than .V.* For exam])le:
I f Ih're (ire sharpers in the rom jniny, we oiKjhl not to (jamble;

lin t thire are no sharpers in the ronijtrnij/;
Thirefejre, we. ouijiit to gamble.
1 K*Kt, Logik. J01. p. 174. Kl). 2 .Sec Kant, Logik. 75,70. Krng, Logik, ] 82. En
3 Krug, Logik, ( 82, p. 250. En.
L kct. XVIIL LO GI C. 243
Here the conclusion is ns f alse as i f Ave c on A 'e rs ely i n f e r r e d , that

because xoe ought not to gamble, there are no sharpers In the room.
Logieians ha\e given theinsolves a Avorld of jiaiiis in the dis
covery of general iiiles for the conversion of
C o n v e r s io n of iiy- H ypothetical .Syllogisms into Categorical.' But,
p o tiie tic a i to C a te g o r - iilacc, this is uiiiiece.ssary, in so far as
ic a l S y llo g is m s , is 1, , ' , ,
U n n ecessary. it IS applied to iiiaiiitest the validity o f an hy p o
thetical s y l l o g i s m ; for the hyjiothetieal syllo
gism manifests its ow n A'alidity with an ev id e n c e not less obtrusiA'c
than does the categorical, and, thei-efore, it stands in no need o f a
rednction to any higher form, as i f it were o f this a one-sided and
accidental modification. W it h equal jirojiriety m ig h t we inquire,
h o w a categorical syllogism is to be co nverted into an liyjiotlietieal.
In the second place, this convei'sioii is not
2^ N o t a lw a y s p os- jjjw;iys jiossilile, and, therefore, it is never ne-
SiblC. T , , /
cessary. In cases Avliere tlie suinjition ot an
h yp oth etical syllogism contains on ly three notions, and where, o f
these three notions, one stands to the other tw o in the relation o f
a m iddle term, in th ese cases, nn hyp oth etical syllogism may
w ith ou t difliciilty be reduced to categoricals. Thus, Avlien the
form ula I f A is, then B is, sig n ifies f f A k C, then A is also B :
that is, A is B, inasmuch, as it is C ; in this case the categorical
form is t o be a icAved as the original, and the h ypothetical as the
deri\'ative. F o r e x a m j ile :
I f C a in s he a m a n , then he is m o rta l;
B u t C a in s is a m a n ;
T h erefo re, he is m ortal.
H ere the notion m an is reg arded as com prehending in it, or as

contained under, the notion m o r ta l; and as being comjirehended
in, or as containing u n d e r it, the notion C u iu s; it can, therefore,
serve as middle te n n in the categorical syllogism to connect the
tAvo notions Caius and m ortal. T h u s ;
M a n is m o r ta l;
C a iu s is a m a n ;
T h erefo re, C a iu s is m ortal.
1 [ F o r th e re d u c tio n o f h y p o fh e tic a l? , se e se e K n ig , L ogik, p. 356, a n d L exiknn, iii. p

AA'olf. Philnt. H at.. 412. Ueu-'cli, S ijstn n a 559 F r ie s , L o g ik , 62, )). 267. B a e lim a n n .
L ogiciiiii, 663. AIoH iiivus, E lm in U a Logica, L o g ik , SO, A n m . 2. ( I n p a r t), A lis t o t le ,
L i. fraet. iii. c. 1, i>, 95. K e c k e r m a n n , O p tra , A n al. Prior., L . 1. c. 44, p. 274. ed . F a c ii, (lu
1. ])|i. 266, 767. r r o llilia , h n g o g e , L . iii c. p a rt). Faciu,?, In A risl., O rganon. In- ril , p
17, p. 243 K ie s e w e ttc r . A llgcm cine L o g ik , i. 194]
239, p. ll.j. F.'sor. Logik. H 99. 100. A g a in s t , 2 K n ig . L ogik, p. 258, A n m , 3 F.d.
244 LOGIC. L e c t . X V III.
In sueli cases it requires only to discover the middle tenu, in

order to reduce the hyi)othetical syllogism to a categorical form;
and no rules are retjiiisite for those who eomijrehond the nature of
the two kiud.s of reasoning.
But in those cases where the sumption of an hypothetical syllo
gism contains more tli.aii three notions, so that the formula. I f A
is, then B 13 , signities. I f A is C, then is B also D, in such cases,
an easy and direct conversion is impossible, as a categorical syllo
gism ailmits of only tliree principal notions. To accomplish a
reducliou at all, we must make a circuit through a plurality of eat-
ug(irieal syllogisms hefore we can arrive at an identical conclusion,
a process which, so far from tending to simplify and explain, con
duces ouly to perplex and obscure.*
On the other hand, we can always easily convert an hypotheti
cal syllogism of one form into another, the
Hypotiieticai syllo- moclus ponens into the m odus tollens, the
gisms ol one loim p/Q/P/g tollcus iiito the m odus ponens. This is
e a s ily c o n v e r tib le i n to _ _
tiia t of doiio hy a mcro contra]iosition of the antece
a n o th e r .
dent and consequent of the sumption. Thus,

the Ponent or Constructive Syllogism :
I f S n rrn tes he v h iiio u s , then he m erits esteem ;

B u t Sorrritrs is v ir tu o u s ; *
T h e r e fo r e , he m e rits esteem ,
may thus be converted into a Tollent or Destructive syllogism:
I f Socrates do not m erit esteem, then he is not v ir tu o u s ;

B u t he is v ir tu o u s ;
T h e re fo re , he m erits esteem.
This latter syllogism, though apjiarcntly a Constructive syllo-

irism, is in reality a Destructive. For, in m odo ponente, we con
clude from the tiaith of the antecedent to the truth of the conse
quent ; hnt here we really conclude from the falsehood of the
eon>se(|iient to the falseliood of the antecedent. dhis latter syl
logism, if fully expressed, would iiideeil hc as follows:
I f Se>e~r<ttex ele> ne>t merit esteem, he. is not virtuous ;

B u t Seu rutes is lint luit rirtuoiis ;
Therefore, he; does ivA wA merit esteem.
I Ciirnparc M ark D u n c a n , In stil. I n g , L. iv . [ B o lz a n o , Wissenschaftslehre, L o g ik , ii. 2C6, p

c 0 . i 1 p. 7 r i f '7 . l ) -T (v \< rn , L o g i r r t lU a i- W 2 .]
tx ila . I } ' A e g u m f e i l a h o n ' , 100, p. C72. Ed. 2 Knig, L o g ik , p 250, 200. Ed.
L k ct. X V T IT . L O G I C . 245
3. I now go on to a s ta te m e n t and consideration o f the special

rules by which an hypothetical syllogism is governed.
^ L X Y I . T lic sp c c ia l rules by which an

P a r . L x v i . 30 S p e -
H vpotlictical Svllogism is regulatcd arc the
o ia i R u le s o f H y p o -
t h e t i e a l S y l lo g i s m .
. . O -'7>
fo llo w in g :
I. A regular and perfect hypothetical syllogism m u st have three
propositions, in which, however, more than three jirincipal
notions may be found.
II. T h e Sum ption is, in regard to q u a n tity and quality, uniform,
being always Definite aud A ffirmative; whereas the Subsum p
tion varies in both relations.
I I I . T h e Conclusion is regu lated in q u a n tity and quality by th a t
m em ber of th e sumption which is n ot sub su m ed ; in modo
ponente, they are cougruciit; in modo tollente, they ai'c ojiposed.'
T h e question to uc h ing th e special laws ( f the hypothetical syl

logism, or, w h a t is th e same thing, th e question
E x p lic a f io u . F ir s t , . , , ,
R u le . T h is r e g u la te s to uc h ing th e original and necessary form of the
th e g e n e r a l fo rm o f hypothetical syllogisiii, OS d eterm ined by its
th e h y p o t h e t ic a l s y llo - general princijfic, the law of Reason ami
C onsequent, this question may be referred
both to the whole reasoning and to its several parts. T h e original
and necessary form o f th e hypothetical syllogism, as d eterm ined by
its general ju-iuciple, we have already considered. From this, a.s
already noticed, it follows as a coroll.ary, th a t th e hypothetical, like
every oth e r syllogism, m u st contain a threefold jn d g m e u t : 1, A
j u d g m e n t whose c o n stitue n t mem bers stand to each other in the
relation of reason and con seq u e n t; 2, A ju d g m e n t which sub-
.vumos as existent, or n o n -exi4c n t, one or oth e r o f these con stituent
members, standin g to each oth e r in the relation of reason and con
s e q u en t; and, 3, Finally, a ju d g m e n t decisive o f the e.xistence or
non-existence of th a t c o nstitue nt m em ber which was n ot subsum ed
in th e second ju d g m e n t. In these three jirojiositions sumption,
snbsuiuption, aud conclusion thcie may, however, be found more
tlmn three principal n o tion s; aud this is always the case when tiie
suiujitiou contains more th an three jirincijial terms, as is exemjilified
in a proposition like th e following: I f God reward virtue, then will
virtuous men he also happy. Here, however, it must, at the same
time, be understood, th a t this proposition, in which a la rger plural
ity of notions than three is apjiarcnt, contains, however, only the
1 K r u g , L o g ik , i 83. E d .
24G L OGI C. L ect . X V H l
l l i o i i g l i t o f o n e n n t e c e d e n t n i i d o f o n e c o n s e q u e n t ; f u r a s i n g l e coii-
se q iie iit s u p p o s e s a w h o le a n t e c e d e n t , h o w eoiiijilex s o e v e r it lu u y
bc, an d a sin g le an teced e n t involves in it a w h o le c o iise cp ieiit,
tlio iig li m a d e u p o f a n y n u m b e i- o f p a r t s . B o t h o f t h e s e ])ossibili-
tie s are se e n in t h e e x a m p l e , n o w a d d u c e il, o f a n liv p o tb e tic .a l j u d g
m e n t . in w h i c h t h e r e o c c u r m o r e t h a n th re e p rin cip al u u tio n s. I f,
how ever, a n b y ])O tlietical j)roiosition i n v o l v e
c .r o iiii.i on R iiic ii tlio u o h t u f a single a n te c e d e n t a n d
tb e I lv p o ilie t ic a ! b y l- * ^ ^
logi.'u i h as boun re- >f a s i n g l e c o n s e q u e n t , i t w i l l f o l l o w t h a t a n y
ganicl US iiavingonly h v p o t l i c t i c a l s v l l o g i s i u c o i i s i s t s i i o t o f i i i o r e tlir.i)
i o urm > and i o l)u t o f Icss tliaii tlircc, caiiital n o tio n s;
propO i?iliuns. , ^ '
and, in a rig o ro u s sense, th is is actu ally th e
c ase. ' O n th is g r o u n d , a c c o rd in g ly , so m e lo g ician s o f g r e a t a e u te -
nobs h a v e v i e w e d th e h y p o th etical s y l l o g i s m a s :i s y l l o g i s m o f t w o
t e r m s a n d o f t w o p i-o jio sitio n s. ^ T h i s is, h o w -
T liis v ie w e r r o n e o u s . r- , , i
ever, e r ro n e o u s ; l o r , in an liv p o th etieal syllo
gism , th e re are v irtu a lly th re e te rm s . That u n d e r th is form of
re a so n in g a w h o le syllogism can he evo lv ed o u t o f n o t m o re th an
tw o cajiitnl iio tiuiis d e p e n d s on thi.s, t h a t the tw o c o n stitu e n t
no tio n s o f an h v ]io th e tica l sy llo g ism present a ch aracter in th e
suiiqitioii a l t o g e t h e r d if fe r e n t fro m w h a t th ey e x h i b i t in t h e s u b
su m p tio n and concliisicjii. In the suiiiptioii th ese n o tio n s stan d
bu iiiid l o g e l l i e r in t h e r e l a t i o n o f r e a s o n a n d c o n s e q u e n t , w i t h o u t ,
h u w e v e r , a n y d e t e r m i n a t i o n in r e g a r d to th e r e a l i t y o r u n r e a l i t y o f
on e or o t h e r ; if o n e be, th e n the o t h e r is, is all t h a t i s e n o u n c e d .
In th e su b s u m p tio n , on th e o th e r h a n d , th e e x iste n c e or n o n -e x ist
e n c e o f w h a t o n e o r o t h e r o f t h e s e l u j t i o n s c o n q i r i s e s is e x p r e s s l y
a .b s e r t e d , a n d th u s t h c co n cejit, e x p re s s ly allirnied or ex p ressly d e
n i e d , m a n i f e s l l v o b t a i n s , in t h e s u b s i i m p t i o i i , a w h o l l y d i f f e r e n t s i g -
n i l l c n n e e fiTun w h a t i t b o r e w h e n on ly enou n ced as a ciy n d itio n o l
r e a l i t v o r i i n r e a l i l y ; a n d , in l i k e n i a n n e r , t h a t n o t i o n w h i c h t h e s u b -
sniiiption left iin to u e lie d , a n d e o n c e r n i n g w h o s e e x i s t e n c e o r noii-
existciic(. t b e conclusion d ecides, ob tain s a ch aracter id to g e tlie r
d i f f c r u n t ill t h e e n d f r o m w h a t i t j i r e s e i i l c d i n t h e b e g i n n i n g . And
t h u s , ill s t r i c t p r o ] r i e t y , t h e r e a r e f o u n d o n l y t h r e e c a p i t a l n o t i u i i s
i n a n l i y ] ) u t h e t i c a l s y l l o g i s m , n a m e l y , 1 , T h c n o t i o n o f t h e r e c i | ) r o -
c al dependence o f .subject and j i r e d i e a t e , 'J, T h e no tio n o f th c
reality or u n reality o f th e a n t e e e d e n t , a n d , !J, 'J d i e n o t i o n o f th e
re a lit} o r iin re .ality o f t h e c o n s e q u e n t . '" S o m u c h in e x p l a n a t i o n
I l-ju'CT, L o g ik , i 02, j) 17.5-6. E d . L o g ik , H 210, 2.51. I le r b a r t, L o g ik , \ 65. Ei

h e f K a n t. J jig ik , ; 75. Kanl'H v ie w i? c lie r , L ogik, 100, p . 1.37.]
forn b alleO by K r u g , ] 8.3. E d . ( .\
v ie w t-im ilar lo llia t o f K a iit is lie^d by W e iss, 3 E sscr, loc. cil. E d
L ect. X V III. L O G I C . 247
of the first sjieeial law, or th a t regulative o f the general form of the

hypothetical syllogism.
T he second law sla.tes the conditions o f these tw o jiremises,
th a t th e suuiiilioiL in reterence to its q uantilv
S e c o n d R u le , . . , . . '
and quality, is uniiorm, heing always deiinite,
th a t is, singular or universal, and affirmative; while the suhsiimj-
tion, in hoth relations, remains free.
In regard to the sumption, Avlieii it is said th a t it is always defi
nite, th a t is, singular or universal, and affirma-
T h a t th e s u m p tio n jjijg niiist he iiiiderslood in a qualified
is aU vu ys d e flu ile to /t < i i i i
I,e undersiood in a T ouchiiig the former, it may indeed he
(luulified sente. said th a t q uan tity may he altogether throw n
out o f account in aii liyjiotlietieal syllogism.*
F o r a reason heing once snpjiosed, its conseijueiit is necessarily
affirmed w ith o u t lim ita tio n ; and, hy the disjunction, the extciision
or comjirehension of the snhject is so defined, th a t the opposite
determ inations m ust to g e th e r wholly exhaust it. I t may, indeed,
sometimes appear as if w h at was eiiouiiced in an In potlictical sumj)-
tion were enounced only of an indefinite nuniher, o f som e; and
it, consequently, th en assumes th e form of a particular proposition.
F or instance, I f some men are virtuous, then some other men are
vicious. B u t here it is easily seen th a t such ju d g m e n ts are o f an
universal or exhaustive nature. In th e proposition adduced, the
real antec ed e nt is. I f some men {only) are virtuous; th e real con
sequent is, then all other men are vicious. I t Avonld, jierhajis, ha\ e
heen b e tte r h ad th e relative to ta lity of th e major jjrojiositioii of a
hypothetical syllogism been expressed hy an o th er term than univer
sal? F o r the same reason it is, th a t the differeiiee of extensive and
comprehensive q u an tity determ ines uo external change in the ex
pression of an liyjioilietical syllogism ; for every li vjiotliclieal syllo
gism remains the same, w h e th e r we read it in the one q u an tity or
in the other.
I n regard to th e oth e r s ta te m e n t of the rule, th a t the sumption
of an liyjiothetical syllogism m ust he alwavs
T h at th e su m p tio n is i i-i i i i f
, ^
a lw a y s a ffir m a tiv e .
affirmative, this, likewise, dem ands a word oi
illustration. I t is true tluit the antec ed e n t or
the consequent of such a sumjitiou m ay he negatiA'o as Avell as
affirm ative; for example, I f Caius he not virtuous, he is not entitled
to respect; I f the sun he not risen, it 6 iiot day. B u t here the
1 [S e e A le .x a n d e r A p h r o d is ie n s is , In A n al. 2 S e e a b o v e p. 188. C o m p a r e E sse r , L o g ik ,

P r io r , f. 5 a. Scholia, e d . B r a n d is , p 144. 92, p. 177. E d .
D e r o d o n , LogYffi p. 6 S 8 .] [C o m p a r e
a b o v e , p p . 1S8, 236. E d ]
24S LOGIC. L icct. X V I I l
pvopositioiL ;is nii liyjiothetic.al judgment, is nnd must be affirmative.

For tlie affirmative iu such a judgment is contained in the positive
assertion of tlio depciidenco of consequent or aiitecodcnt; and if
such a dependciico be not allirmed, an liypotlictical judgment can
not exist.
In regard to wliat is stated in the rule concerning the conditions
of the subsumption, th.at this may either be
riie hubsumiilion. , .
general or partieiilar, alhnnative or negative,
it will not be requisite to say anythiug iu iihisli-atioii. For, as the
subsumption is merely an absolute assertion of a single member of
the .sumption, aud as sucli member may, as. au isolated jiroposition,
lie of any quantity or any quality, it follows that the subsumption
is equally unlimited.
In reterencc to the third ride, which states that the conclusion is
regulatcd in quantity and qualitv bv that inem-
Third Rule. , 7. , ,
ber 01 tlie suiujitioii whidi is not subsumed, and
this in m odo jionente by coiigrueiice, in m odo toUente by ojiposition,
it will not be requisite to say much.
In the conclusion, the latter clause of the snmjition is affirmed
in m odo poocnte, because the former is affirmed iu the subsumjition.
In this casc, the conclusion has the same quantity and quality as the
clause which it affirms. I n m odo tollente the antecedent of the
snmjition is denied iu tho conclusion, because in the subsumjition
the consequent clause had been denied, Tliere thus emerges an
opjiositioii between that clause, as denied in the conclusion, and
that clause as afliniied in the snmjition. The conclusion is thus
always ojiposed to the antecedent of the snnijitioii in quantity, or
in quality, or in both together, according as this is differently deter
mined by the dillerent constitution of tlie propositions. For
cxamjde:
J f Rome m en w ere o m n iscie n t, then w ould they he (ts G o d s;

B u t no m an is <t G o d ;
U te r tfo re , some m en a re nol o m n iscien t, th a t is , no m an is o m n iscie n t.
I now Jiroceed to the consideration ol the last class of syllogisms

3 Mypoiiiciico-dis- tiHbrdcd by the Internal Form, the class of
jniiciive or Oiiem- Dilcmmatic or Ilypotlictico-disjunctivc Sylo*
matic SjiiogiKTnH. gisms, aiid I Comprise a general cnunciatiou of
their nature in the following jiaragrajih.
1 K n ig , L o g ik , i 83, p. 265. E d .
L ect. X V III. LOGIC. 249
^ LXVII. I f tlie sumption of a syllogism ho at once liypo-

tlietic.al and disjunctive, and if, iii the suh-
potteucSrsrunouve' sum]itioii, tlio wliolc disjuiictioii, as a couse-
syiiogism or Di- quout, he suhhitcd, ill order to suhlate the
antecedent in the conclusion ; such a rea
soning is called an H ypothetico-disjxoxctive S yllo yism , or a
D ilem m a. The form of this syllogism is the following.
I f A ex is t, then eith er B o r C e x is ts ;
B u t neither B nor C e x ists ;
T h erefo re, A does not exist.^
W e have formerly seen that an hypothetical may hc eomhined

with a disjunctive iudgment; and if a iiroiiosi-
E x p lica tiou .
. ^ 1 , 7 7
tion of such a character be placed at the liead
of a reasoning, we have the Hypothetico-disjunctive Syllogism or
Dilemma. This reasoning is properly an hypothetical syllogism, in
which the relation of the antecedent to the consequent is not abso
lutely affirmed, but affirmed through opposite and reciprocally ex
clusive predicates. J f A exist, then either B or C exist. The
sumjitiou is thus at once hypothetical and disjunctive. The suh-
sumjition then denies the disjunctive meiuhers contained in the con
sequent or jiosterior clause of the sumption. P u t neither B nor C
exist. And tlieii the inference is drawn in the conclusion, that the
reason given in the antecedent or prior clause of the sumption must
likewise he denied. Therefore A does not exist? For example :
I f m a n be not a m o ra lly responsible being, he m u st u-nnt either the p o w e r o f reco g n izin g

m oral good ( a s an in tellig en t a g e n t), or the p o w e r o f w illin g it ( a s a fr e e a g e n t).
B u t m an w a n ts neither the p o w e r o f recognizing m oral good ( a s an intelligent a g e n t), nor
the p oicer o f w illin g it ( a s a f r e e a g e n t) ; ,
T h erefo re, m an is a m o ra lly responsible being.
An hypothetico-disjunctive syllogism is called the dilem m a or

horned syllogism in the broader acceptation of
D esign htions o f the term {dilcrnma, cerratxnxis, cornutus sc. syllo-
H y p o th etic o -d isju n c- qism u.f). W e iiiiist not, howcver, coiifouiul the
liv e S yllogism . a / ^
corxiiitus and crocodilinxis of the ancients with
onr hypothetico-disjunctive syllogism. The former were sophisms
of a particular kind, which we are hereafter to consider; the latter
I K rug, L o g ik , 8 7 . Ed. [C o n tra , sec 257. A ld rich , Ki//>nen(a Log/ca, c. iv. 3, p.

T roxler, L ogit, ii. p. 103 n*. T hat th e D ilem - 107, O xford, 1S52. Ilatiicr, r/tilosopliiiche
ma is a n egative in d u ction , see W allis, L o g ica , A p h e rism en , i. 5S3, p. 2S0.]
L. iii. c. 19, p. 218. Cf. Fries, L ogik, ^ 60, p. 2 K rug, foe. cit. E d .
32
250 LOGIC. L e c t. xvm .
is n. r e g u l a r and leg itim ate form o f reasoning. In regard to th e

a p p lic a tio n o f t h e t e r m s , it is c a lle d t h e co n iu ta s o r Jiortied syllo-
ylsn i, l i w a n s e i n t h e s u m p t i o n t h e d i s j u n c t i v e m e m b e i ' s o f t b e c o n -
so(]ueiit are o jip o scd like h o r n s to th e assertion o f tb e ad v ersary ;
w ith t h e s e , w e t h r o w it f r o m o n e s i d e t o t b e o t h e r in t h e s u b s n m p -
t i o n ; in o r d e r t o t o s s it a l t o g e t b e i - a w a y in t h e eonelusion. I f th e
d isju n ctio n bas on ly tw o m o m b o 's , t h e sy llo g ism is t h e n called a
d d a n m a {bicornls) in t h e s t r i c t a n d p r o p e r s i g i i i t i c a t i o n , l i t e r a l l y
double su m p tio n . O f t h i s t h e c x a m ] i l e p r e v i o u s l y g i v e n is a n i n
stance. I f i t h a s t h r e e , f o u r , o r f i v e m e m b e r s , i t i s c a l l e d trilem )na
{tricornis), tetralem m o {(2 uudricorn is),p en tu lem yn n (^(ptinquecomis) ;
i f m o i-e t h a n f o u r , i t is, h o w e v e r , u s u a l l y c a l l e d p o ly le m m a {m ulti-
cornis). B u t , i n t h e l o o s e r s i g n i f i c a t i o n o f t h e w o r d . D ile m m a is a
g e n e r i c e x p r e s s i o n f o r a n y o r all o f t h e s e . '
C o n s i d e r e d in i t s e l f , t h e h y p o t h e t i c o - d i s j u n c t i v e s y l l o g i s m is n o t
t o b e r e j e c t e d , f o r in t b i s f o rm o f r e a s o n i n g w e
Luies for sifting a co iielu d e w ith eo g ciicy , p ro v id e d w e a tte n d
l>rupa*e(l Dilemma. 7 *
to t h e la w s a b - e a d y g i v e n in r e g a r d t o t h e h y p o
th etical and d is ju n c tiv e syllogism s. It is n o t , h o w e v e r , t o b e d e
n i e d , t h a t t h i s k i n d o f s y l l o g i s m is v e r y e a s i l y a b u s e d f o r t b e p u r p o s e
o f d e c e iv in g , th r o u g h a tr e a c h e r o u s a jq ie a ra n e e o f so lid ity , a n d fro m
tei-rifying a ti m o r o u s a d v e r s a r y b y its h o n i e d a s p e c t. In th e sifting
o f a jiro jio sed d ile m m a , w e o u g h t, th e re fo re , to lo o k clo sely a t th e
t h r e e f o l l o w i n g p a r t i c u l a r s : 1 , ' W h e t h e r a v er i t .-i b i e e o n s e i p i e n e e
subsists b e tw e e n the a n te c e ile iit a n d co n secp ien t o f th e s u m p tio n ;
2 . W l i e t h e r t h e o p p o s i t i o n in t h e c o n s e q u e n t is t h o r o i i g h - g o i i i g a n d
v a l i d ; a n d , 3, W h e t h e r i n t h e s i i h s i i m p t i o n th e d isjn iietiv e m e m
bers arc legitim .M tely siih lated . For th e cxaiiqde of a d ilem m a
w h ich v io lates th e se co n d itio n s, ta k e th e fo llo w in g :
J f viriw ict re a habit worth arqiiirituj, it must insure eithir pow er, or ivealth, or honor,
or jtleasu re ;
TjiiI virtue insures none of these ;
Therefore, virtue is not a habit worth attaining.
H e r e : ] . T h e i n f e r e n c e i n g e n e r a l is i n v a l i d : f o r a t h i n g m a y
he w o r th a c q u irin g , th o u g h it d o e s n o t se c u re a n y o f th o s e a d v a n t a
g e s eniim erate< l. 2 . d 'l i e d i s j i i i i e t i o n is i n c o m p l e t e ; f u r t h e r e a r e
o th e r g o o d s w h ich v irtu e in su res, th o u g h i t m a y n o t i n s u r e tho.'Ae
here opposed. .3. T h e s u b s u n i p t i o n is a l s o v i c i o u s ; f o r v i r t u e l i a s
freq u e n tly o b tain ed for its jio sscsso rs tb e very a d v an tag es here
d e n ie d .
1 cit. A n m .,2 . Ed . [C f K eck - 2 K n ig , L o g ik , [ 87. Anm 8. p. 281 -

ermaDD, Oj/era, t. i. p p . 2 0 i, 76'J ] Ed.
L k c t . X V IIL LOGIC. 251
Before leaving this subject, it may be proper to make two obser

vations. The first of tliese is, that though it has
The whole of the been Stated that Categorical Syllogisms are guv-
logieal laws,-lden- q ^q^ Coiltradic-
litv, Coiilradictioii, ' . ,
KxchKie.iMi.hiie,and lioii, that Di.sjuiictive Syllogisms are governed
Reason and Conse- by the luw of E.vcluded Aliddle, and that Ilyjio-
(luont,are operative tlictical Syllogisiiis are governed by the law
in each torm of svllo- % i
01 lieason and Consequent, this statement
is not, liowever, to be understood as if, iu these
several classes of syllogism, no other law were to be found in
operation except that by wiiicli tlieir peculiar form is deteniiiued.
Snell a supposition would be altogether erroneous, for in all of these
dillerent kinds of syllogism, besi.les tiie law by whieh each class is
principally regulatcd, and from which it obt.'iiiis its distinctive cliar-
.acter, all the others contribute, though iu a less obtrusive iiiaiiiier, to
allow and to neeessitale llie jirocess. Thus,
This illustrated though tlic laws of Identity and Contradiction
1 In Categorical ^q^ ];iws wliich preeminently regulate the
Syllogisms. _ * . .
Categorical Syllogism, still without the laws
of Excluded Aliddle, aud Keasoii and Consequent, all inference iu
tliese syllogisms would be impossible. Thus, tliougli the law of
Identity affords the basis of all tifliniuitive, and the law of Coiitra-
dietiou the basis of all negative, syllogisms, still it is the law of
Exeluded Aliddle which legitimates the inqilieation, tliat, besides
affirmation and negation, there is no otlier possible quality of predi
cation. In like manner, no inference in categorical reasoning could
be drawn, were we to exclude the determination of Be.ason and
Consequent. For we only, in deductive reasoning, conclude of a
part what we assume of a whule, inasmuch as we tliink the whole as
the reason, the condition, the antecedent, by which the jiart,
as a consequent, is determined ; and we only, in inductive reason
ing, eoiicliule of the whole what we assume of all the parts, inasmuch
as we think all the jiarts as the reason, the condition, the aute-
ccflcnt, by which tlie whole, as a consequent, is determined. In
point of fact, logically or formally, the law of
The law of i.ieiitily Identity aii.l the law of Reason and Consequent
foimaiiy the same with affirmative foiTU, are at bottom the same;
that of Reason and . , , ,
Coiise.pient. Identity constitutes only tlie law c.f
Reason and Consequent, the two relatives
being conceived simultaneously, that is, as subject and predicate;
the Law of Reason and Coiiscquent con.stitutes only tlie law of
Identity, the two relatives being conceived in sequence, that is, as
2."2 LOGI C. L e c t. XVIII.
nntcccdoiit and consequent.' And ns tlic law o f Tloason and Con

sequent, ill its jiositivc form, is only that o f Identity in iiiovemeiit;
so, ill its negative form, it is only that of Contradiction in movement.
Ill Di.xjunctive Syllogisms, again, though the law o f Excluded
3Iiddle be the jirineiiilc which bestows on them
_. Ill Dipjuiictnesji- (heir iioculiar form, still these svllogisins arc not
logiMIlP. . ^ .
imlopendciit o f the laws of Identity, ol Contra
diction, and o f Reason and Consetpient. The law of Excluded
3Iiildle cannot bc conceived apart from the laws of Identity and
Contradiction ; tlicse it iiiqilics, and, without the priiicijilc o f Reason
and Consequent, no m o\cn ient from the coudiiioii to the condi
tioned, that is, from the afiinnatioii or negation o f one contradictory
to the affirmation or negation o f the other, would bc jiossible.
Finally, in Hypothetical Syllogisms, tlioiigh the law of Reason
and Consequent bc the iirominent and distinc-
3. In ii>poti)cticai iniiiciplc. Still tlic h'lw.s of Identity, Contra-
Svllogipras. ' h,
diction, and Excluded 3Iiddle arc also there at
work. The law of Identity affords the condition of Affirmative or
Constructive, and the law o f Contradiction of N egative or Destruc
tive, Hypotlioticals ; Avhile the law o f Excluded JMiddlo limits the
reasoning to those two modes alone.
The second observation I have to make, is one suggested by a
difficulty Avliich lias been proposed to me in
DifTicuiiy in regard t),c doctriiic, that all reasoning is
10 ihe doctrine, tiiat , r- c
all reasoning is eillier either froiu wliolc to jiait, 01 trom the Jiarts to
from wiioie lo pari or tlic wliolc. Tlic difficulty, -wliich could O n l y
from ilie jiaris lo the Jinvc piosoiitcd itsolf to tin .iciitc and observant
w h o le , o b v ia te d . . . , . . ,
intellect, it gave me mucli s.atislaetion to hear
jirojiosed ; and I shall have still greater gratification, if I should
l>e able to remove it, by showing in Avhat sense the doctrine
advtmcel is to be nmlcrstood. It was to this effect: In C.atc-
gorir.al Syllogisms, deductive and inductive, intensive and exten
sive, the reastming is manifestly from whole to jiart, or from the
Jiarts to the whole, and, thert'forc, in regard to the doctrine in
question, as relative to categorical reasoning, there was no difliculty.
Rut this was not the ciise in i-cgard to Hypothetical Syllogisms,
d'licsc arc governed by the law of Reason and Consecjiient, and it
docs not ajijic.'ir how the :inteeedcnt and consequent stand to each
fithcr ill the relation o f whole and part.
Ill .showing how the reason and the consequent arc to bc viewed
as wlmle and jiart, it i.s necessary, first, to I'cjieat, that the i-ea.son
1 [Compare KBpiien, Dar.UeUung des Wtsenx dtr Philotophie, p. 102 et seq., NUrnberg, 1810.[
L ec t. X V III. LOGIC. 2oo
or anteecHlent m eans tlie condition, that is, the com ideinent o f all,
w ith o u t w hich so m e th in g else would not h e ;
TTiis d iffic u lty c o n - co nseq uen t means the conditioned, tliat
m d ered witii re.'pcct j com iileinent o f all that is d eterm ined to
to H y p o th e tic a l s y llo - , , , .
be liy the e.xistence ot so m etn in g else. \ on
A n te c e d e n t an d C o n - iniist further bear in mind, that we have notliing
se q u e n t are e q u a l t o stan d in g in the relation o f
C o n d itio n a n d C o n d i- , ^ ^ ,
reason and consc(|nent, except in so lar as they
are th o uglit to stand in tliat relation ; it is with
th e ra tio cognoscendi, not with the ratio essendi, th.at we have to
do in L o g ic ; th e former is, in fict, .alone properly denom inated
reason and consequent, while the l.atter o u ght to be distinguished
as cause and effect. T h e ra tio essendi, or the law o f Ciiuse and
Effect, can indeed only be th o u g h t u n d er the foian o f the ra tio cog-
noscendi, or o f the jirineiple of Reason and C on seq u en t; b u t as the
two are n ot convertible, inasmuch as the one is f ir more extensive
than the other, it is jiroper lo distinguish them , and, therefore, it is
to be recollected, th a t Logic is alone conversant Avith the ra tio cog-
noscendi, or the law o f Reason and Consequent, .as alone conversant
with the form of thought.
T his b e i n g u n d e r s t o o d , i f t h e reaso n be conceived as th.at Avliich
c o n d i t i o n s , in o t h e r AVords, as t h a t Avhieh c o n -
H e iic e th e reason o r t.aiiis the necessity o f the existence of th e eoii-
coiiditioii m u st c o n - . . . . . . . ,
lain t h e c o n s e q u e n t. scqticiit; it IS evident tli.at it IS eoneeiveti as
con tain in g the eon seq u ent. For, in the first
place, a reason is on ly a re.ason i f it be a sufiicient re.ason, that is, if
it comiirise all the conditions, tliat is, all th.at necessitates the e x is t
enee, o f the con seq u en t; for i f all the conditions o f an yth in g are
present, th.at thing m ust necessarily exist, since, if it do not exist,
then som e condition o f its existen ce m u st have been Avanting, th.at
i.s, there Avas not a sufficient reason o f its existence, Avhich is co n
trary to the supposition. In the second place, i f the reason, tlie
siifficient reason, be co nceived as com prising all the eondition.s o f
the existen ce o f thc consequent, it ninst be co nceive d as coinjirisiiig
the consequent to g e t h e r ; for i f the con sequent be supjiosed to c o n
tain in it any one jiart not co n ceive d as contained in the reason, it
m.ay contain tAVo, three, or any number o f parts equally nncontaincd
in tiie reason, c on sequ en tly it may be co nceived as a lto geth er nil-
contained in tlie reason. B n t this is to siipjiose th.at it has no
reason, or that it is not a cons(( i u e n t; which again is coiitr.ary to
the hyjiothesis. T h e Ihav o f R ea son and Consequent, or c f tlm
Condition and the C onditioned, is o n ly in fact another e x p r e s s i o n
o f A risto tles laAV, that the Avhole is necessarily conceived as prior
LOGIC. L e c t . XVTII
to tlio part, totinn p a rte p r ia s esse, vccesse est? It is, liowcvcr,

more accni'ntc; for A risto tles la w is citlioi
The Law of Hcason inncciiralo or am biguous. Inaccurate, for it is
ami Coiisisiueiit oiilv ^, , , , .
anolher expres>ion oV lieCOSSanly
Ari-totie's law. that lUTor ill the oi'dor o f tlioiiglit to the Jiarts, than
the whole is necessa- to SMv that the jRiits are neccssarily jirior in the
r il, c o n c e iv e d as p r io r th o u g h t t O the Avholc. W h o l e and
lo ih e |>art. .
Jia r ts a r e r e l a t i v e s , a n d ns s u c h a r e n e c e s s a r i l v
A r is to tle 's la w c r iti- . i i
t eo e.v isten t n, tlio iig lit. L n t A vhile e a c h im jilies
the other, and the notion o f each necessitates
the notion o f the other, w e may, it is evident, v ie w either, in
thought, as the c on d ition in g or antecedent, or as
Whole and Parts re- ,, t ,- . ^ rn, ,
. , ,
f))cctively iniiy be the oonditioned or consequent.
f Tim s, on the one
viewed in thought hand, wc m ay regard the Avholc ns tlic jiriof and
either as the condi- determ in in g notioii, as eont.aiiiing the jinrts, ;md
tionmg or as the con- parts ns the posterior and determ ined notion,
d ilioiied. . , , ,
as contained b y tlie Avliole. On the other liand,
w e m ay regard the jiarts as the prior and determ in ing notion, as co n
stitu tin g (he whole, and the whole as the jiosterior and determ ined
notion, as co n stitu ted by the jmrts. In the former case, the w hole is
th o ug h t as the reason, the jiarts are th o u g h t as the co n se q u en t; in
the latter, the jiarts are th o u g h t as the reason, the w ho le is th o u g h t as
the consecjiient. X ow. in so far as the w h ole is t h o u g h t as the rea
son, there will be no difficulty in a d m ittin g tliat tlie reason is con
ceived as co ntain ing the parts. B n t it may be asked, bow can the
Jiarts, when th o u g h t as the reason, be said to contain the w h o le ?
T o tills tlie answ er is easy. All tlie jiarts contain (he whole, j u s t as
much ns the whole contains all the jiarts. O lijectively considered,
the w h ole does not contain all the jiarts, nor do all the jiarts con
tain the w hole, for the whole and all the jiarts are jircciselv eq uiva
lent, absolutely identical. But, sub jectively considereil, that is,
as mere tlioiiglits, we may citlicr think the whole by all the jiarts,
or tbink all ib c jiarts by the wliole. If we think all the parts by
the whole, we siiliordiiiate the notion o f the j>ails to the notion o f
1 M -ii/tiiij 'I. iv, 11 A r is to t le , h o w e v e r , g a r d e d ns c o ijx ie n s iv e w it h th a t g iv e n in th e

h iw -.'i doiibli- II lalirm . T h e w h o le , w h e n t e x t . .See Die n e x t iio le . JCd .
V ,. 1 1 1 . Ill :-s ml 111 \ e i . i . o i l i c e i l . m iiht be 2 T h is i.s snlj.'H antiiilly expres.sed b y Ari.--
I : I I II - p r io i III t il l' p a i t , lo r Ih e l a llc r t o t l e , I. c., w lio se (li.O iiielio n is a p p lie a h le
I I , 1 i-'i : in ii h iiio ii to Ih e w h o le . f i t l i e r to Ihe o r d e r o f I h o iig h l o r lo th a t ol
p l.t i.tia ly . h ow i viT Ihe p u t s m a y b e re- e x is le n c e . ifa r a Y fV fc r ii/(,. e., l o g a n le d as a
, i i l i ' i a- j.riu r; lo i th e w h o le in ig lit be c o m p l e l e sy.O ein), tlie w b o le is n e liia lly , Ibe
, 1 II , 1 a - a - O ein e i I.oMt th e d e O r iic tio n parl.s are o n ly iio li n lia lly . e x i s t e n t ; w h ile , on
II I ;a c- W h e e th e w h o le j. n o t c o n - th e o ilie r h a n d . icaTo. (p ^ o p a e (i. e., ii g a r d 'il
Cl I . :.r! . , l\ c ii i e t i li il e d , Ih is r il a l io i i Is a s d is o r g a iiiz e il e lein en l.s). th e p a i ls exi.-t ac-
I ii- i'l lliiis A i M o t l e 's lu le m a y be re- t n a lly . Die w h o le o n ly |) o le iit ia lly , E d .
L e c t . X V T II. LOGIC. 2 5 .>
the wliolo; tlint is, wo conceive tho parts to exist, as wc conceive

their existence given tlirongli the existence o f the whole containing
them. I f we think the whole hy all the parts, we snhordinate the
notion o f the whole to the notion of the p a r ts ; th a t is, we conceive
the wliole to exist, as we conceive its existence given through tlie
existence o f the jiarts wliieli constitute it. Now, in the one case,
wo th in k the whole .as conditioning or comiirising the parts, in the
other, th e jiarts as conditioning or comiirising the whole. In the
former case, the parts are th o u g h t to exist, heen use th e ir whole
ex ists; in the latter, the whole is th o u g h t to exist, hecause its parts
exist. In eitlier case, the jirior or d e term ining notion is th o u g h t to
comprise or to contain th e posterior or detor-
A]',p lic a tio n of this mined. T o Hjiply this do ctrin e: On the one
d o c tr in e to th e so lu - , , . . ^ , n
..
hand, every science '. is true only as all its sev-
lio n o f th e d ilf ic u lly
eral rules are t r u e ; in this instance the science
p r e v io u s ly s ta te d .
is conceived as the determ ined notion, th a t is,

as contained in the ag gre g ate of its co n stitue n t rules. On tho
other Inind, ejieh rule of an y science is true only as tho science
itself is tru e ; in this iustnueo th e rule is conceived as the detor-
minod notion, th a t is, as contained in the whole science. Thus,
every single syllogism obtains its logical legitim acy, because it is a
consequent of the doctrine o f syllogism ; th e la tte r is, therefore,
the reason of each several syllogism, and th e whole science of
Logic is abolished, if each several syllogism, conformed to this doc
trine, he not valid. On th e otlier hand, the science of Logic, as a
whole, is only necessary inasimicli as its com jilementary doctrines
are necessary; and these are only ifocessary inasmuch as th e ir indi
vidual ap])licatioiis are necessary; if Logic, therefore, as a ivliole. he
n ot ivecessary, the necessity of the jiarts, ivliieh constitute, d e te r
mine, and conijireliend th a t whole, is siihVerted. In one relation,
therefore, re.ason and consequent ;ire as the ivliole and a contained
part, ill another, as all the jiarts and the constituted or comjirised
whole. Blit ill hoth relations, the reason the d e term ining notion
is thought, as involving .in it tlu* existence of the coiisequeiit or
(letennined notion. Tims, in one jioirit of view, the genus is the
detenu iiiin g notion, or reason, out o f Avliich are evolved, as conse
quents, th e sjiecies and indiv id u al; in another, the individual is tho
determ ining notion or reason, o u t of which, as consequents, are
evolveil the sjiecies and goiiiis.* In like manner, if we regard the
sulijeet :is th a t in which the attributes iiiliore, in this view the
snhject is the reason, th a t i.s, tlie whole, of which th e attributes are
I T h is is c x jir e ss ly a llo w e d Iiy A r is to t le , AV. H a m ilto n h im s e lf, Disciission.i, p. 1 7 3 .
M'Uiph , iv Co, is i.u o to 1 fi< vi h.r.i hy S ir K d.
250 LOGIC. L e c t. X V III
a p a rt; w lieroas if w e re g a r d th e a ttr ib u te s as th e m o d e s th ro u g li

w h ich alone tho su b je c t can e.xist, in th is v iew th e a ttr ib u te s are
t h e r e a s o n , t h a t is, t h e w h o l e , o f w h i c h t h e s u b j e c t is a j i a r t . In a
w o rd , w h a te v e r w e th in k as c o n d itio n e d , w e th in k as c o n ta in e d hy
s o m e t h i n g e l s e , t h a t is, e i t h e r a s a p a r t , o r a s a c o n s t i t u t e d w h o l e ;
w h a t e v e r w e t h i n k a s c o n d i t i o n i n g , w e t h i n k e i t h e r a s ;i c o n t a i n i n g
w hole, o r as a sum o f co n stitu tin g p arts. W h at, th erefo re, th e
s u m p t i o n o f a n h y p o t h e t i c a l s y l l o g i s m d e n o t e s , is s i m p l y t h i s : I f A,
a no tio n co n ceiv ed as c o n d itio n in g , a n d , th e re fo re , as in v o lv in g B ,
e x i s t , t h e n B a l s o is n e c e s s a r i l y c o n c e i v e d t o e x i s t , i n a s m u c h a s i t is
c o n c e i v e d a s f u lly c o n d i t i o n e d b y , o r a s i n v o l v e d in, A . I a m afra id
t h a t w h a t I h a v e n o w said m a y n o t b e fo u n d to h a v e r e m o v e d th e
difficulty, b u t i f it s u g g e s t to y o u a tr a in o f re fle c tio n w h ic h m a y le a d
y o u to a s o lu tio n o f t h e difficu lty b y y o u r o w n eflbrt, i t w ill have
do ne b etter.
So m uch for I ly p o th e tic o - d is ju n c tiv e syllogism .s, t h e last o f th e
fo u r classes d e t e r m i n e d b y th e in te rn a l form o f r e a s o n in g . In th ese
four sy llo g is m s, th e C a te g o rical, th e D isju n c tiv e, th e H y p o th et-
ie.'d, a n d t h e I l y p o t h e t i c o - d i s j u n c t i v e , a l l t h a t t h e y e x h i b i t is c o n
fo rm ab le to th e n ec e ssa ry law s o f th o u g h t, a n d th e y are each d is
tin g u ish ed from the o th er by th eir essential n atu re; for th eir
su m p tio n s, as ju d g m e n ts , jiresen t ch a ra c te rs fu n d am en tally dlflfer-
ciit, a n d from th e s u m p tio n , as a g e n e r a l rule, t h e v a lid ity o f sy llo
gism s p rim a rily a n d p rin c ip a lly d e p e n d s.
LECTURE XIX.
S T O I C H E I O D O G Y .
S E C T I O N II. O F T H E P R O D U C T S O F T H O U G H T
III. D O C T R IN E OF R EASO N IN G S.
SY L L O G ISM S. T H E IR D IV IS IO N S A C C O R D IN G TO EXTERNAL
FORM .
A. CO M PLEX, E P IC H E IR E M A AND SO R IT ES.
I n our tr e a tm e n t o f Syllogisms, avo have hith e rto taken n ote only

o f th e In tern al, or E ssential F o r m o f Reason-
S y llo g ism s, th e ir besides this internal or essential form.
E x te r n a l F o rm .
there is another, an E x te rn a l or A ccidental
F o r m ; and as th e -fo rm e r Avas contained in th e reciprocal relations
o f th e con stituent jiarts o f the syllogism, as determ ined by the
nature o f the th in k in g subject itself, so th e la tte r is contained in the
outer expression or e nounc em ent o f th e same parts, AAh ereby the
te rm s and propositions are variously affected in respect o f their
num ber, position, and o rd er of consecution,. T h e varieties o f Syl
logism arising from th e ir extern al form may, I think, be con
veniently reduced to th e th ree heads expressed in th e following
paragraph:
11 L X V I I I . Syllogisms, in resjiect o f their E x te rn a l Form ,

a d m it o f a threefold modification. For
P a r . L xvni. D i v l - . ^ ;
S io n o f S y l l o g i s m s a c . HS purc, th e y are at once >bimple,
c o r d i n g to E x t e r n a l and Complete, and R egular, so, as quali
fied, th e y are either Complex, or Incom -
2 >lete, or Irreg u la r; the tAVo former o f these modifications
regard ing th e num b er of their jiaris, as ajiparently either too
m any or too fcAv; th e last regardin g th e inverted order in
which these p arts are enounced.
38
258 LOGIC. L ect. X I X
I shall consider these several d ivisions in their

Expiicatiou. order; and, first, o f the syllogism s which vary
A. Complex Syllo- i c c i .1 '
ir o in th e sin ijd e lo rm of rea so n in g by th eir
a jq ia re n t co n ip lc.x ity .
B ut, before to u c h in g on the varieties o f sy llo g ism afforded by
tbeir apparent c o m p le x ity o f com position, it
Kciation of S)iio- proper to premise a few words in re-
gisiu8 to each Otlier. ^ .
gard to th e relation o f sy llo gism s to eacli other.
Every syllo gism m a y b e considered as absolute and independent,
inasmuch as it a lw ay s contains a conqdote and inclusive series o f
tliouglit. B u t a syllo gism m a y also stand to other sy llog ism s in
such a relation that, alo ng Avith these cori-elative syllogism s, it
m akes nj) a greater or lesser series o f th o ug h ts, all h o ld in g to each
other the d e p en d en ce o f a n te c e d e n t and con sequ en t. A n d such a
reciprocal dejiendcnce o f syllog ism s becom es necessary, Avlion one
or other o f th e predicates o f the principal syllogism is d estitu te o f
co m p le te certainty, and w hen this certainty m u st be established
through one or more correlative sy llogism s. ' A syllogism, vicAved
as an isolated and in d ep en d en t Avbole, is called
Classes and dcsig- ^ M on o syllo g ism {m o n o syllo yikm u s), that is, a
nations of related syl- s i n g l e 1-casoniiig; wliercas, a series o f co rrela tiA c
Jogisins Monosyllo-
sy llo g ism s, fo llo w in g each o t h e r in t h e r e c ij iio -
cal r ela tio n of anteced en t and con seq u en t, is
Chain SL T oIdng!'' P o h jsy llo y ism {jio h jsyllo yism u s), ihtxl
is, a m u l t i p l e x o r c o m p o s i t e r ea so n in g , and m ay
likcA vise b e d e n o m i n a t e d a C ludn o f P c n m n in y {series syllo ylstica ).
S u c h a c h a i n s n c b a s e r i e s m a y , b o A v e v e r , liaA'c s u c h a n o r d e r o f
d ep en d en ce, th a t eith er each su ccessiv e sy llo g ism is t h e r e a s o n o f
t h a t Avliich j i r o c e d e d , o r t h e jiro ccd in g s y llo g is m is th e reason of
t h a t A v b ic h f o ll o A v s . I n t h e f o r m e r c a s e , Ave c o n -
H id Analytic and o l i i d e a i i a l v t i c a l l v o r r c g r c - s s i v o l V ; in t h e n c c o n d ,
.-.vu th fclic ^ ^ . , - ,
sy ntlictica lly or jirogressively. T h a t syllogism
in the cries which contains the reasoning o f the jiremisc o f anothci,
is called a J^rosylloyism { p r o s y llo y is m u s ) ; and
rro-yiiopdsrn. syllogism Avliich Contains the con sequ en t o f
K).i-yil0Kim another, is called an P p isy llo y isrn {(pisyU oyis-
n n ts).
E v e r y Chain o f R ea so n ing must, th ere
fore, be made up both o f P ro syllo g ism s and o f Ejiisyllogisnis. '
Wlif-n the scrips is com posed o f m ore than tAvo syllogism s, the
same syl]ot_dsm may, in different relations, bc at on ce a jirosyllogism
and an cjiisy llog ism ; and that reasoning Avhich contains th e jiriniary
1 E e r . 0 , g i k . i 104. I j ) 2 K ru g L o g ik , 1 111. E d .
L k c t . XTX. LOGIC. 259
o r h i g h e s t r e a s o n is a l o n e e x c l u s i v e l y a p r o s y l l o g i s m , a s t h a t r e a s o n
i n g Avhieh e n o u n c e s t h e l a s t o r l o w e s t c o n s e q u e n t is a l o n e e x c l u
siv e ly an e])isy llo g ism . But th is conealeiiation o f s y llo g is m s , as
a n te c e d e n ts and c o n seq u en ts, m a y be eith er i n a n i f c . s t , oi- o c c u l t ,
a c c o r d i n g as t h e p l u r a l it y o f s y l l o g i s m s m a y c i t h e r b e o p e n l y d is
p la y e d , o r as it m a y a ])p e a r o n ly as a s in g le s y llo g is m . T h e p o ly
sy llo g ism is, t h e r e f o r e , lik ew ise eith er nianife.st or o ccu lt. The
occult ])olysylIogism , w itli w liich alone we arc at present con
c e r n e d , c o n s i s t s c i t h e r o f ]>artly c o m p l e t e and p a rtly ab b rev iated
s y llo g is m s , o r o f s y l l o g i s m s all e q u a l l y a b b r e v i a t e d . In th e form er
c a s e , t h e r e e m e r g e s t h e c o m p l e x s y l l o g i s m c a l l e d E p ic h e ir e m a ; in
the latter, th e co m p lex syllogism called Soritesd''- Of th ese in
th e ir o rder.
^ L X IX . A sy llo g ism is n o w v u l g a r l y c a l l e d a n E p ic h e i
re m a (livLxdpyipa.), w h e n t o c i t h e r o f t h e t w o
P a r . L X IX . Tbe . i i i
E p ic h e ire m a . prcm iscs, o r to h oth, th o rc IS a n n e x e d a
re a s o n fo r its s u p p o r t. A s:
B is A ;
B u t C i's B ; f o r it is D ;
T h erefo re, C is also A .2
O r,
A l l vice is o d io u s ;
B u t avarice, is a v i c e ; f o r it m a k e s m en s la v e s;
T h erefo re, a v a ric e is odious.^
In illu stratio n o f th i s p a r a g r a p h , it is t o b e o b s e r v e d th at th e
E iiic h e ire m a , or R e-aso n -rcn d eriii" S '\ d lo o -is m .
E x p lic a t io n . . . . o j o
IS e i t h e r single or do u b le, acco rd in g as one
or b o th o f th e prem ises are fu rn ish ed w ith an au x iliary reason.
T h e single e p i c h e i r e m a is c i t h e r a n e p i c h e i r e m a o f t h e f i r s t o r s e c
o n d o r d e r, a c c o r d in g as t h e a d s c ititio n s jiro iio sitio n b elo n g s to tb e
su m p tio n or to th e su b sn m p tio n . T h e r e is l i t t l e o r n o t h i n g r e q u i
site to b c sta te d in r e g a r d t o t h i s v a r i e t y o f c o n i] ilc x s y l l o g i s m , as
i t is m a n i f e s t l y n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n a r e g u la r e p isy llo g is m w ith an
a b b rev iated p ro sy llo g ism in te rw o v e n . T h e re m ig h t be so m e th in g
1 K sscr, L o g ik , ^ 104. E n . [C f. R e u sc h , 3 In f u ll ,
S y sie m a L ogicum , 678, p. 664, Teiue, 1741.] , 1 7
l u full 1 1 J iVfial mal'cs men slaves IS a v tc e ;
' C is D * But aiarice makes ynen slaves;
pj ^ Therefore., avance is a vice,
Thei'vfore^ C is B.
260 LOGIC. L e c t. XIX.
.said t o u c h i n g t h e n a m e , w l i i c l i , a m o n g t b e a n c i e n t r h e t o r i c i a n s , w a s
used n o w in a s tr ic te r , n o w in a lo o se r, sig n ilie a tio ii.' T h is, h o w
e v e r . a s it b a s l i t t l e i n t e r e s t i n a l o g i c a l j i o i n t o f v i e w , I s h a l l n o t
tro u b le y o u b y d e ta ilin g ; a n d n o w p r o c e e d to a fa r m o r e im p o r t a n t
.mil in tere stin g su b ject, th e second v ariety of co m p lex syllo
g is m s , tb e S orites.
^ LXX. AVhcn, on t h e c o m m o n p r in c i p le o f all r e a s o n i n g ,

th at t h e p a r t o f a p a r t is a j i a r t - o f t h e
rUM w hole, w e do not stoj) at the seeond
g rad atio n , or at tb e part of tb e h ig h est
p a r t , a n d c o n c l u d e t h a t p a r t o f t h e w h o l e , a s A l l B is a y /a rt
o f the tchole A , a n d a ll C is a p a r t o f the p a r t B , th erefo re a ll C
is a lso a p a r t o f the vdiole A , b u t jn o e e c d t o s o m e i n d e f i n i t e l y
r e m o t e r p a r t , a s D , E , F , G , IT, e t c . , w h i c h , o n t h e g e n e r a l p r i n -
e i p l e , w e c o n n e c t in t b e c o n c l u s i o n w i t h i t s r e m o t e s t w h o l e ,
t b i s c o m j i l e x r e a s o n i n g is c a l l e d a C h a in -S y llo f/ism o r S o rites,
I f th e w h o le from w hich w e d e sc e n d b e a c o m p re h e n siv e q u a n
t i t y , t b e S o r i t e s is o n e o f C o m p r e h e n s i o n ; i f i t b e a n e x t e n s i v e
q u a n t i t y , t h e S o r i t e s is o n e o f E x t e n s i o n . T b e fo rm u la o f th e
first w ill b e :
J ) E is D ; t h a t is , E com prehends D ;
2) U )s C; t h a t i.s, D com prehends C;
3) C IS B ; t h a t is , 0 c o m jm h e n d s B ;
4 ) B is A ; t h a t is, B com prehends A ;
Thrrrefore, E is A ; in o t h e r w o r d s , E com prehend s A ,
T h e fo rm u la o f tb e s e c o n d w ill b e ;
1) B IS A ; t i r a t is, A c o n ta in s u n d er il B ;
2) C IS B ; t h a t is, B contains u n d e r it C;
3) D IS C; th a t is, C co n ta in s u n d er il D ;
4 ) E IS I ) ; tlia i is, T) c o n ta in s u n d er it E ;
T h erefo re, E is A ; in o tl ie r w o r d s , A contains nnelcr it E .
T lifse reaso n in g s are b o th P rofyressire, e a c h i n i t s s e v e r a l q u a n

tity . as d e s c e n d in g fro m w h o le to p a r t. B u t a s w e m a y also, a r g u -
iucr b a c k from p a r t to w h o le, o b ta in tb e sa m e c o u cln sio u , th e r e is
a l 'O e i u u p e t e u t iu c i t h e r q u a n t i t y a J leg re ssiv e S o rite s. H ow ever,
F or orn'' i olicft< o f th e se v a r ia tio n s , se e .33; F a c c io la t i, zlcroa.sfs, De E picltirem a le, p.

( I II Ti lai . fnsi. ')rni , v . 10, 2 , V . 1 4 ,5 . C om - 127 / t .ur/ In A r is to t le th e term is used fo r a
f.hr<- a l o .s c liw i-ig lia u s e r o n E p ic te tu s , i. 8; d ia le c t ic s y llo g is m . S e e T opica, v iii. 1 1 . ^
T r e n d e lc iib u r g , EU m >nta L ogices A rittotelicce, Ed.
L k c t . X IX . T. 0 G I C . 261
t l i e foi'mnl.T. th e R e g r e s s i v e S o r i t e s in t h c o n e q u a n t i t y , w ill b e
o n l y t h a t o f t h e P r o g r e s s i v e S o r i t e s i n t h e o t h e r .*
E x p lic a tio n . A s a co n c re te ex am p le o f th e s e :
[. P r o g r e s s i v e C o m p r e i i e x s i v e S o r i t e s .
B u c e p h a lu s is a h o rse ;
C o n c r e te e x a m p le s A horse is a q u a d r u p e d ;
o f S o r ite s . A q u a d r u p e d is a n a n im a l;
A n a n im a l is a su b sta n c e ;
T h e r e fw e , B u c e p h a lu s is a substance.
O r as e x p lic a te d :
T h e represen ta tio n o f the in d iv id u a l B u c e p h a lu s com prehends o r c o n ta in s in it the

notion h o rse ;
1 [On tlie S o r ite s in g e n e r a l, sec C r a k a n - c e p ts a re c o e x te n s iv e . S e e a b o v e , p. 133,

th o r p e , Logica, L. iii. c . 22, p . 219. V a lla , D ia g r a m 2. D ia g r a m s X o s . 3 a n d 4 r e p r ese n t
D ialect., L . iii. c . 54, fo l. .38, e d . 1509. W . D u n tlie A ffir m a tiv e S o i it e s in tlie ea.se iu w h ic h
c a n , I n s tit. Log. L . iv. c . v ii. G. p. 255. F a c - tlie c o n c e p ts a re su b o r d in a te . S e e a b o v e , p
c io la t i, Acroases, De .Soriie, p. 15 et seq. J le - 133, D ia g r a m 3. D ia g r a m X o . 5, ta k e n in
la iie litlio n , Erotein. D ia l., L iii. De Soriie, p. c o n n e e tio ii w it li X o . 3, rep r ese n ts th e X e g a -
743. W o f. Phil. R a t., 430, el seq W a lc h , tiv e S o r ite s . T h u s, t o ta k e th e Ih -o g ressiv e
L exikon , v. SoritC S. Erie.?, Logik, 64.] C o m p r e lie n s iv e S o r i t e s : E is D , D is C. C
2 D ia g r a m s X o s . 1 a n d 2 r e p r ese n t th e a ffir is 15, 15 is A , no A is P ; Ihtre/ore, no E is P .
m a tiv e S o r ite s iu th e c a se in w liic h t lie c o n Ed.
262 LOGIC. L e c t . X IX
T h e notion hoi-se c o n ip n h e n d s the notion q n a d r u p c d ;

T h e notion e jtu td n q n d rom prehends the notion a n i m a l ;
T h e notion a n im a l com prehends the notion su b sta n ce;
T h e n fo r e [on the com m on p r in c ip le th a t the p a r t o f a p a r t is a p a r t o f the w h o le),
the re p r ts tn ta lio n o f the in d iv id u a l, B u c e p h a lu s , coinptrchends or co n ta in s in it
the notion substance.
II. Ke g u e s s iv e Co m p r e u e x s i v e S o r i t e s .
A h a n im a l is a su b sta n c e ;
A q u a d r u p e d is a n a n im a l;
A horse is a q u a d r u p e d ;
B u c e p h a lu s is a h o r s e ;
T h e re fo re , B u c e p h a lu s is a substance.
O r as e x p lic a te d :
T h e notion a n im a l co m p reh en d s the notion substance ;

T h e notion q u a d r u p e d com prehends the notion a n im a l;
T h e notion horse com p reh en d s the. notion e jn a d ritp e d ;
T h e rep resen ta tio n , B u c e p h a lu s , c o m p reh en d s the notion h o r s e ;
T h erefo re [o n the com m on p r in e ip le , e tc .) , the representatio n , B u c e p h a lu s , co m p re
h ends the notion substance.
I I I . P r o g r e s s i v e E x t e x s i v e S o r i t e s ( w h ic h is , a s e n o u n c e d b y t h e c o m m o n
c o p u la , id e n tic a l in e x p r e s s io n w i i li t h e L c j T c s s iv e C o m p r e h e n s iv e S o r ite s ,
N o. I I.):
A n a n im a l is a substance ;
A q u a d r u p e d is an a n im a l;
A horse is a q n u d r u p e d ;
B u c e ijh a ltis is a h o r se ;
T h erefo re, B u c e p h a lu s is a substance.
O r as e x p l i c a t e d :
T h e notion a n im a l is co n ta in ed u n d er the notion s u b sta n c e ;

T h e notion qnadrui>ed is co n ta in ed u n d e r the notion a n i m a l ;
T h e notion Imrse is co n ta in ed u n d e r the. notion q u a d r u p e d ;
T h e representation B u r e p h a lu s is co n ta in ed undro' the notion h o rse ;
T h erefo re (on the, rom inon jtrin c ip le , e tc.), the representation B u c e p h a lu s is co ntained
u n d er ihe notion subslancc.
IV . T h e II e g p . e s s j v k E x t e n s i v e S o r i t e s ( w h i c h is, a s e x p r e s s e d b y t h e a m -
bigiioii.s c o p u la , v e r b a l ly id e n tic a l w itli th e P r o g r e s s i v e C o m p r e h e n s iv e
.S o rite s ,N o . I . ) :
B u c e p h a lu s is a ho rse;
A h(jTse is a q u a d r u p e d ;
A q u a d r u p e d is a n a n im c d ;
A n a n im a l is a s u b sta n c e ;
T h e r e fo r e , B u c e p h a lu s is a substance.
L ect X IX . LOGIC. 203
O r as ex p licated ;
T h e rejiresentation B u c e p h a lu s is co n ta in ed u n d e r the notion horse;

T h e notion horse is contained under ihe notion q l a d n i p e d ;
T h e notion q u a d r u p e d is con ta in ed u n d er the notion a n im a l;
T h e notion a n im a l is co n ta in ed iiiu h r the notion substance;
T h e re fo re , the representation B u c e p h a lu s is co n ta in ed u n d er the notion substance.
T h e re is thus n o t th e smallest difficulty either in regard to the

peculiar n atu re of th e Sorites, or in regard to
1. T h e fo rm a l in fe r - its relation to the siiiiplo syllogism. Ill the first
e n c e 111 S o r ite s e q u a lly p l a c e , i t i s e v i d e n t t h a t t h e f o r m a l i n f e r e n c e in
n e c e ssa r y as iu sim p le ^ ,
s y llo g is m . equ l i l y i K ' c e s s a r y a n d e q u a l l y
So iT tcs IS
manifest as in th e siui])le syllogism, for the prin
c i p le th e p a r t o f a p a r t is a p a r t o f the Avhole is plainly not
less applicable to th e rem o test than to th e m ost iiroxiiiiate link in
the subordination o f whole :ind ptirt. In th e second place, it is
e vident th a t the Sorites can be resolved into as
2. S o r ite s r e so lv a b le q , syllogisiiis as th e re are middle
in to .sim ple s y llo g is m s . ' * , . . - .. .
terras between th e subject and predicate of the
conclusion, th a t is, in te rm edia te wholes and parts between the
g r e a te st whole and th e smallest part, Avhich th e reasoning connects.
T hus, th e concrete example o f a Sorites, alre.ady given, is virtually
comjiosed of th re e simple syllogisms. I t will be enough to show
this in one of th e q u an titie s; and, as th e m ost persjiicuous, let us
take th a t o f Comprehension.
T h e Progressive Sorites in this q u an tity was
T h is illu s tr a te d . as follows (and it is needless, I presume, to
explicate it) :
B u c e p h a lu s is a horse ;
A horse is a q u a d r u p e d ;
A q u a d r u p e d is a u a n im a l;
A n a n im a l is a s u b sta n c e ;
T h e re fo re , B u c e p h a lu s is a substance.
H e r e , b e s i d e s t h e m a j o r a n d m i n o r t e r m s {B ucephalus a n d sub
stance), Ave h a v e t l i r e e m i d d l e t e r m s horse, q u adru ped, a n i
mal. W e s h a l l , c o n s e q u e n t l y , h a v e t h r e e s i m p l e s y l l o g i s m s . T h u s ,
in t h e f i r s t p l a c e , Ave o b t a i n f r o m t h e m i d d l e t e r m horse, t h e fo ll oA v -
i n g s y l l o g i s i n , c o n c l u d i n g quadrupled o f B u ce p h a lu s :
1. B u c e p h a lu s is a horse;
B u t a horse is a q u a d r u p e d : *
T herefore, B u c e p h a lu s is a q u a d ru p ed .
264 LOGIC. L e c t . X IX .
H av in g tlins established th a t Bucephalus is a quadruped, Ave

employ (piadruped as a m iddle te n n by aa' I u c I i to eonneet B u ceph a
lus with ayiimal. W c therefore make th e eonelnsion o f tho previous
syllogism (Xo. I.) tho sum ption o f th e folloAving syllogism (No. II.) ;
I I. B iicc p h iiln s is a q m d r u p e d ;
B n t a ( jm d r n p c d is (in itn im a l;
T h e r e fo r e , B u r c p h a lu s is a n a n im a l.
H aving obtained a n o th e r step, Ave in like m a n n er m ake anim al,

which was the m inor term in the jn'oeeding syllogism, the middle
term of the follow ing; and th e conclusion o f No, II. forms the
major premise of No. I II.
III. B u c e p h a lu s is an a n im a l;
B u t a n a n im a l is a s u b sta n c e ;
T h e re fo re , B u c c p h td n s is a substance.
In th is la st s y llo g is m , avo re a c h a c o n c lu sio n id en tica l A vith t h a t

o f th e So rites,
In the th ird place, it is e v id en t th a t tho Sorites is equally natural
as the sim])le syllogism ; and, as the relation is
3. Sonios equally equally cogciit and equally manifest between a
iia iiir a l as s im p le s y l- i , i i i i .
A v lio le a n d a r e m o t e , a n d a A v h o lo a n d a p ro xi
m a t e , p a r t , t h a t it is f a r l e s s p r o l i x , a n d , c o n s e -
fp ien tly , fa r m o re c o n v e n ie n t. W h a t is o m i t t e d i n a S o r i t e s is o n l y
th e id le rep e titio n o f th e s a m e s e lf-e v id e n t p rin c ip le , an d as th is can
w it h o u t dan gei- o r in c o n v e n ie n c e be ad jo u rn e d until the end o f a
'( I 'i e s o f n o tio n s in t h e d o jie n d e n c e o f m u tu al s u b o r d i n a t i o n , it is
p l a i n t h a t , in r e f e r e n c e t o s u c h a serio.s , a sin g le So rites is a s m u c h
p re fe r.ib le to a n m n b e r o f sim p le s y llo g ism s, as a c o m jire h e n siv e
c i p h e r is p r e f e r a b l e t o t h e a r t i c u l a t e e n u m e r a t i o n o f t h e u n i t s A vh ic h
it c o l l e c t i v e l y r e iir e se n ts .
Before Jiroceeding to touch on the logical history o f this form of
syllogism, and to com m ent on the doctrine in r eg a rd to it m ain
tained hy all logieians, I .shall conclude Avhat it is jjroper fu rth e r to
state concerning its general character.
^ L X X I . A Sorites may be either Categorical or I ly p o th e t-

icid ; arnl, in both forms, it is govern ed by
P a r. L X X I. S o r ite s , folloAving h'lAVS : ---SjiCakillg o f tllC CoiU-
- C a tC K O rlc a l a n d H y . . o i i
p o th c tic a i. or r r o g r e s s iv e S o r i t e s (in Avincli ren
* so n in g you A v ill o liserv e tb e m ea n in g of
he Avord p ro y ressive is rev ei'sed ), A vhic h proceeds from th e
L e c t . X IX . LOGIC. 205
iiu liv id iia l t o t h e g e n e r n l, n iid t o w liieli t h e o t l i c r f o r m m .a y h e

e a s i l y r e d u c e d : 1 . T h e n i i m b c ' r o f t h e p r e m i s e s is u n l i m i t e d .
2. A l l th e p rem ises, w ith e x c e p t i o n o f t h e l a s t , m u s t b e .affir
m a t i v e , .Uid, w i t h e x c e p t i o n o f t h e fii'st, d e f i n i t e . .3. T h e f i r s t
j i r c m i s e m .ay b e e i t h e r d e f i n i t e o r i n d e f i n i t e . 4 . T h o hast m a y
b o e ith e r n e g a tiv e o r affirm ative.
E x p lic a t io n .
I h a v e a lre a d y g iv en y o u ex am p les o f th e c a t
F o r m u la o f H ypo eO
g o rical S o rites. T h e fo llo w inO
g is t h e f o r m u l a
th e tic a l S o r ite s. of th e h y p o th e tic a l:
Pro g r e ssiv e. R eg ressiv e.
I f D is, C i s ; I f B is, A i s ;
I f C is, B i s ; I f C is, 15 is ;
I f B is, A i s ; I f D is, C i s ;
( I n m oclo p o n e iitc ) , ( I n m oclo p o n e n t e ) ,
N o w D is ; N o w D is ;
T h erefo re, A i'.s also. T h e r e fo r e , A is.
( O r in m oclo to lle n te ) , ( O r in m oclo to l le n t e ) ,
N o w A is m t ; N o ic A is n o t ;
T h erefo re, D is not. T h erefo re, D is n o t.
O r, to ta k e a c o n c re te e x a m p le
P r o g r essiv e.
I f n a r p a g o n he a r a r ic io n s , he is in ten t on g a m ;
I f in te n t on g a in , he is d isco n ten te d ;
I f discontented, he is u n h a p p i/;
N o w Ila r p a g o n is a v a r ic io u s ;
H e is, thei'efore, u n h a p p y .
Reg r e ssiv e .
I f B a rp a g o n be discontented, he is u n h a p p y ;
I f in ten t on g a in , he is d is c o n te n te d ;
I f a r a r ic io n s , he is intent on g a in ;
N o iv B a r p a g o n is a ra ric io u s ;
T h erefo re, he is u n h a p p y .
I n r e g a r d to th e re so lu tio n o f th e H y p o th e tic a l S o rite s in to sim p le

p s y l l o g i s m s , i t is e v i d e n t t h a t i n t h i s P r o g r e s s i v e
R e s o lu tio n o f H y p o - J c?
t h e tic a l . S o r ite s in fo S o r i t e s w e m u s t t a k e t h e t w o f i r s t j u o p o s i t i o n s
sim p le sy llo g isn i.s. as p r e m is e s , a n d t h e n in t h e c o n c lu s io n C o n n e c t
I. IT o g re s .-iv c S o r ite s .
th e an teced en t of the fo rm er p ro p o sitio n w ith
th e co n se q u e n t o f th e latter. T hus:
34
266 LOGIC. L kct. X I X .
I. I f FTarpagon be tim r ic io u s , he is in ten t on g a in .

I f intent on y iiin , he is discontented ;
T h r r ifo r e , i f U n rp n y o n be a cn ric io u s, he is disco n ten ted .
W e now e sta b lish th is conclusion, as the su m p tio n of th e

fo llo w in g syllogism :
II. I f lla rp a g o n be a v a r ic io u s , he is d is c o n te n te d ;
I f discontented, he is u n h a p p y ;
T h erefo re, i f I la r p a y o n be a v a r ic io u s , he is u n h a p p y .
I n like m a n n e r avc go to th e n e x t sy llo g ism ;
III. I f Ila r p a y o n be a v a r ic io u s , he is u n h a p p y ;
jV oiv Ila r p a y o n is a v a r ic io u s ;
T h erefo re, he is u n h a p p y .
In th e R e g re s siv e S o rites, avc p r o c e e d in t h e s a m e fashion ; o n ly

th a t, as h ere th e c o n seq u en t o f th e second prop-
II U c g r e s s iv e S o r ite s . . . . i ^
osition IS the a n teced e n t or the nrst, Ave reverse
the consecution o f th ese premises. T h u s :
I. I f Ila r jja fjo n be intent on g a in , he is discontented ;

I f discontented, he is u n h a p p y ;
T h f'rrfo re, i f Ila r p a y o n be in ten t on g a in , he is u n h a p p y .
W e th e n ta k e th e t h i r d p ro p o s itio n for th e s u m p tio n o f t h e n e x t,

t h e s e c o n d s y llo g is m , a n d t h e c o n c lu s io n o f t h e p r e c e d i n g fo r its
su b su m p tio n :
II. I f Ila i'p a g o n be a v a ric io u s, he is in ten t on g a in ;

I f in ten t on g a in , he is u n h a p p y ;
T h erefo re, i f Ila r p a y o n be a v a r ic io u s , he is u n h a p p y .
W e noAv t a k e t h i s la st c o n c lu sio n for th e s u m p tio n o f th e last

sy llo g ism ;
HI. I f Ila r p a y o n be a v a r ic io u s , he is u n h a p p y ;
X o w Ilu i-p a g o n is a va ric io u s ;
'llu r e fo r e , he is u n h a p p y .
B u t it m a y be ask ed , can th e re be no D isju n c tiv e S o rite s ? To

th is it m av be Jinsw ereil, t h a t in th e sense in
I)i jiiiic liv e .Sorites. ' 1 ,
*4 A vhic h a c a t e g o r i c a l and h yp o th etica l sy llo g ism
is p o s s i b le , v iz.. so th at a term of th e p recw lin g jiro p o sitio n
sh o u ld be th e su b ject or p red ica te o f th e folloA vin g, in t h i s s e n s e ,
L e c t. X IX . LOGIC. 267
a disjunctive sorites is im possible; since tw o opposing notions,

w hether as contraries or contradictories, exclude each other, and
cannot, therefore, be com bined as subject and iiredieate. But
when the object has been determ ined by tw o opposite eliaraeters,
the disjunct m em bers m ay be amplified a t pleasure, and there fol
lows certainly a correct conclusion, provided th a t th e disjunction
be logically accurate. A s :
A. is either B o r C.
N ow ,
B is either D o r E ; { C is eith er F o r G ;
D is either H o r I ; F is e ith er ]M o r N ;
E IS either K o r L . | G is either 0 o r P .
T h erefo re, A is eith er H , o r I, o r K , o r L , o r jM, o r N , o r 0 , o r P .
A lthough, therefore, it be tru e t h a t such a Sorites is c o r r e c t ;

still, wei'e we astricted to such a m ode o f reason-
C o m p ie x a n d u iise r th o u g h t would be SO difficult, as to be almost
v ic e a b le . 07 o ^^
impossible. B u t we never are obliged to employ
such a reasonin g; foi* when we are once assui'ed th a t A is either B
or C , and assured we are of this by one of the fund am ental laws of
thought, we have n e x t to consider w h eth e r A is B or C, an d if A is
B, th en all th a t can be said o f C, and if A is C, then all th a t can be
said o f B, is dismissed as Avholly in-elevant. In like m anner, in the
case of B, it must be d eterm ined w h e th e r it is D or E, and in th e
case o f C, w hethe r it is F or G ; and this being determ ined, one of
the tw o membei's is necessarily th row n o u t o f account. A n d this
compendious m ethod we follow in the process o f th o u g h t spon
taneously, and as if by a n atura l impulsion.
So much for th e logical ch a racter o f th e Sorites. I t now remains to
make some observations, p artly historical, p artly critical,iu connec
tion with this subject.
In regard to th e history o f th e logical doctrine o f this form of
reasoning, it seems taken for g ranted, in all the
H is t o r ic a l iio iic e o f systems o f the science, th a t both th e nam e Sorites,
S o r i t e r * ^ * * ' a p p l i e d to a chain-syllogism, and th e analysis
of the n atu re of th a t syllogism, are p a r t and p ar
cel o f th e logical inheritance beq u e ath ed to us by A ristotle. N o t h
ing can, however, be more erroneous. T h e nam e
N e ith e r n a m e n o r Soiitcs does u o t occiir ill any logical treatise of
Ltotir*^ A ristotle ; nor, as far as I have been able to dis
cover, is there, except in one vague and cursory
allusion, any reference to w hat the nam e is now em ployed to ex-
263 LOGIC. L e c t. X I X
pre.s?.' X.Tv, f u r t h e r , t l i c w o r d S o rite s i s n e v e r , ! m a k e b o l d t o s a v ,

a p p lie d b y a n y a n c ie n t w r i t e r to d e s ig n a te a c e rta in form o f re a s o n
ing. O n t h e c o n t r a r y . S o r i t e s , t h o u g h a w o r d in
S o r ite s , w ith a n c ie n t n o t u n f r o q i i e n t c m i i l o y i u e n t b y ;iiiciciit a u th o r .^
a u th o r s , u sed t o d c s now liere o c c i i i 's in any o t h e r lo g ical m e a n in g
II jiartjcular ^ ^ c>
k ii.d u f s o p h h in o f a p articu lar kin d o f so p h ism , o f
w h i c h t h c S t o i c C h r y s i p p i i s w a s rc])U ted t h e i n
v e n to r.* Swpos, y o u k n o w , i n G r e e k , m e a n s a h ea p o r p ile o f a n y
ag g reg ated s u b s t a n c e s , a s s a n d , w h e a t , e t c . ; a n d S o rite s, l i t e r a l l y a
h e a p tr, w a s a n a m e g i v e n t o a c e r t a i n cap tio u s a rg u m e n t, w h ich
o b t a i n e d i n L a t i n f r o m C i c e r o t l i c d e n o m i n a t i o n o f ucervulis.^ The
n a tu r e o f th e a r g u m e n t w as th is: Y o n w e re asked,
e x am p le, w h e th e r a certain q u a n tity o f so m e
th in g o f variab le a m o u n t w ere large or s m a ll,
say a certain sum o f m o n ey . I f y o n sa id it w a s s m a ll, t h e a d v e r s a r y
w ent on g rad u ally ad d in g to it, a s k i n g you at each in crem en t
w h e t h e r it w e r e still s m a l l ; till a t l e n g t h y o n sa id t h a t it w a s la r g e .
T h e l a s t s u m vv h i c h y o n h a d a s s e r t e d t o b e s m a l l , w a s n o w c o m p a r e d
V ith th a t w hich you no \v a s se rte d to bc larg e, a n d you w ere at
le n g th forced to a c k n o w le d g e t h a t o n e su m w hieli y o u m ain tain ed
to b e larg e, a n d a n o t h e r w h ic h y o n m a in ta in e d t o b e sm a ll, differed
fro m e a c h o t h e r b y t h e v e r y p e t t i e s t coin, or, i f t h e s u b je c t w e r e
a pile o f w h e a t, b y a sin g le co rn . T h is so p h is m , as ajiplied b y E u b u -
iides ( w h o is e v e n s t a t e d b y L aertiu s^ to be tb e in v e n to r o f tb e
S o r i t e s in g e n e r a l ) , t o o k t h e n a m e o f <âA.a/cpo9, ca lvu s, the bald. It
w a s a s k e d , w a s a m a n b a ld w h o h a d so m a n y th o u s a n d h a irs ; y o n
answ er. N o : tb e a n ta g o n is t g o e s on dim in isliin g an d d im in isliiiig
th e n u m b e r , till e i t h e r y o n a d m it th a t he w h o w as n o t bald w ith a
certain n u m b e r o f hairs, b e c o m e s bald w hen th at c o m p l e m e n t is
d im in islie d b y a sin g le h a i r ; o r y o n g o on d e n y in g h im to b e b ald ,
u n t i l lii.j h e a d b e b v p o t b e t i e a l l y d e i i n d c d . S uch w as th e q u ibble
w b i c h o b t a i n e d t h e n a m e o f S o rite s, a cero a lis, clim a x , (jra d a tio ,
etc. T h i s , i t is e v i d e n t , b a d n o real a n a lo g y w ith th e form o f r e a
s o n i n g n o w k n o w n i n l o g i c u n d e r t h e n a m e o f S o rite s.
1 TTit; paF8(,e referrerl to is p r o b a b ly A n a l. 2 P e r a iu s, S a l. v i. 80.

P rior., i. 2-5. I'.ut Ib c r c waH n o n e e d o f a
' In veiitu*, Cliryiii|i c, tui finltor ac crv i. E d .
i-]A-cial tr e a tn ie iil o f tlie .S o rites, a s it is
m e r e ly a c o r n b iiia lio n of o r d in a r y s y l- [C ice r o a p p lie s .S'orOcito an a r g u m e n t w liic b
lo g i m s , and su b ject to th e sa m e r u les. K d . w e w o u ld c a ll a S orites, b u t it c o u ld a ls o be a
(T b e j.r in c ijile o f tlie .S orites is to be fo u n d in C b ry sip jie a n . D e F in ib u s, L . iv . c . 18.]
A ri.'-totle's r u le , f'al>g., c 2 I r a d ic a t u m -I D e D iv in a lio n e , ii. 4. t^ u c m a d m o d u m
p r o -d lc a ti et j ir a d ic a liim su b jecti." S e c a ls o , S o r ili rc sista s? q u ern, si n e c e ss e s it. L a tin o
A n ai. P o st., 1 .2 Z tt seij. CL I 'a c iu s , Ccrm ment., v e r b o lic e a l acerra/ewi a ]ip e lla r e . C f. F a c c io -
I'/.i. IJertius, Logica P 'n p a te tic n , h iii lali,/Icrort.o'.i, ii. ]i. 17 v. K d.
A p i e n d ix , p. 179.] 4 L. ii. [ 108. Kn
L kct. X JX . LOGIC. 2 G9
B u t wlien was tlio nam e p erv e rte d lo thi.s, its secondary signiliea-
tion ? O f this I am confident, th a t the change w.as
L a u re n tin s A '.iiia llie ^ Q t oldcr than the fifteenth century. I t occurs in
first to use S o r ite s in lo g ic ia n s p r c v io u s to th a t j ic i'io d .
its p r e sen t a c c e p ta - . 7. 1 i
I t IS to bo found in none of th e Greek logicians
o f the L ow er E m pire ; nor is it to be m et with
in any o f the m ore celebrated treatises on Logic hy th e previous
Latin schoolmen^ T h e earliest a utho r to whose writings I have been
able to trace it, is the celebrated L aurentius Valla, whose w ork on
D ialectic was pul)li.shed after the middle of the fifteenth century.
He calls the chain-syllogism coacervatio syllogismorum ((piem
Gracci o-wpov v o c a n t ).' I m ay notice th a t in th e D ialectica of his
contem porary and rival, George of Trebisond, the process itself is
described, bnt, w hat is remarkable, no ajipropriate nam e is given to
it. I n the .systems of Logic after the com m encem ent of th e six
te e n th century, no t only is the form o f reasoning itself described,
b u t described u n d e r th e name it now bears.
I have been th u s particular in regard to th e history o f the Soi-itos,
w ord and thing, n o t certainly on account
T h e d o c tr in e o f l o - im portance of this history, considered in
g ic ia n s r e g a r d in g Ih e , , , ,
Sorite." illu s tr a te s th e ir itself, b u t bccausc It AviIl enable you th e bcUer
o u e -sid e d v ie w o f tlie to apjirehcnd w hat is now to be said o f tho illus-
n a tu r e o f r e a so n in g in tration wliich the (locti'ine, ta u g h t by logicians
themselves of th e nature of this particular p ro
cess, affords of the one-sided view which th e y have all ta ken of the
nature o f reasoning in general.
I havc already shown, in regard to th e simple syllogism, th a t all
deductive reasoning is from whole to p a r t ; th a t there are tw o kinds
of logical whole and tw o kinds of logical part, the one in the
q uantity of comjirehension, th e oth e r in the q u antity of extension ;
and th a t there are consequently tw o kinds of reasoning corresponding
to these several quantities. I further show ed th a t logicians h ad in
siiiijile syllogisms marvellously overlooked one, and th a t the simplest
and most natural, of these descriptions o f reasoning, th e reason
ing in the qu an tity of c o m p re h e n sio n ; and th a t all th e ir rulcs were
exclusively relative to the reasoning which proceeds in th e q u antity
of extension. N ow , in to -d ay s Lecture, I haA'e shown that, as in
simjile syllogisms, so in th e comjilex form o f th e Sorites, there is
equally comjictciit a reasoning in comprehension and in extension,
though undoubtedly, in the one case as in the other, th e reasoii-
1 DiaUclkcr. D ispu tation es, L ib . iii. C. 12. .See 2 S e e G eorgii T rnp^ zuntii De Re D ialectica
L aurentii ValUr O ptra, B a s ile * , 1540, p. 7 4 2 . iiie lZ u s, C o lo n iie , 1.5-3.3, f. 00*. C f. th e S c h o lia
Ed, o f N e o m a g u s , ibid. f 6 7 . E d .
270 LOGIC L e c t . XTX
i n g in c n n i p r o h c n s i o n is m o r e n a t n r n l a n d e a s y in i t s e v o l u t i o n t h a n
th e reaso n in g in e.xtension, in a s m u c h as th e m id d le t e r m , iu th e
f o r m e r , is r e a l l y i n t e r m e d i a t e i u p o s i t i o n , s t a n d i n g b e t w e e n t h e m a
jo r and t h e m i n o r t e r m s , w h e r e a s , in t h e h i t l e r , t h e m i d d l e t e r m is
n o t iu s i t u a t i o n m i d d l e , b u t o c c u p ie s tlie jio sitio n o f o n e o r o t h e r o f
t h e c.xtrem es.
N o w , i f in th e case o f sim ple sy llo g ism s, it b e , m arv ello u s th a t
logicians sh o u ld h a v e a lto g e th e r ov erlo o k ed th e
Logicians have over- p o s s i b i l i t y o f a r e a s o n i n g i n c o i n j i r e h e n s i o i i , i t is
lo o k ed 1)ie S o r i t e s o f i i i ' .i i ^ i i i
., . . d o u b l y* m a r v e l l o u s t h a t , w i t h th is t h e i r iIi r eI i i o s -
L xteiision.
se ssio n , t h e y s h o u l d , in t h e e a s e o f t h e S orites,
h av e a lto g e th e r o v erlo o k ed t h e ])O ssibility o f a r e a s o n i n g in e x t e n
sion, B u t so it is.' T h e y h a v e all f o l l o w e d e a c h o i l i e r in d e f i n i n g
th e S o rites as a c o iie a te n a te d sy llo g ism in w h i c h th e ]ired icate o f
t h e p r o p o s i t i o n j i r c c c d i n g is m a d e t h e s u b j e c t o f t h e ] ) r o [) O s i ti o n f o l
l o w i n g . u n t i l w e a r r i \ e a t t h e c o n c l u d i n g j i r o j i o s i t i o n , i n w h i c h tlie
j t r e d i e a t e o f t l i e l a s t o f t h e p r e m i s e s is e n o i i i i c e i l o f t h e s u b j e c t o f
t h e first. T h i s d e l i i i i t i o n ap])lie^s o n l y t o t h e P r o g r e s s i v e S o r i t e s in
co m p reh en sio n , and to the U egrossivc S orites in ex ten sio n : but
t h a t t h e y d i d n o t c o n t e m j t l a t e t h e l a t t e r f o r m a t all is c e r t a i n , b o t h
b e c a u s e i t is n o t l i g h t l y t o b c p r e s u m e d t h a t t h e y h a d in v i e w t h a t
artificial a n d r e c o n d ite fo rm , a n d b e c a u s e tb e e x a m p le s a n d i llu s tr a
t i o n s t h e y sii]i])ly j i o s i t i v e l y p r o v e t h a t t l i e y b a d n o t .
T o th e P ro g ressiv e S o r i t e s in e x t e n s i o n , a n d to t h e lli'g re s s iv e
S o r i t e s in c o m p r e h e n s i o n , t h i s d e f i n i t i o n is i n a p -
Diffcrcnec between p l i c a b l o ; f o r ill t l i o s c , t h e s i i l i j c e t o f t h e i i r e m i s e
Ihc two f o n n s o f Sori- , ...
] ) r e e e d i i i g is n o t t h e ] ) r e d i c ; i t e of t h e p r e m i s e f o l
lo w in g . But the difference b etw een the tw o
f o r m s is b o l t e r sta te d th u s : In th e J-r o g r e s s i v e S o r i t e s o f c o i n -
p re h e n s io n a n d th e R e g re s s iv e S o rite s o f e x te n s io n , tlie m id d le tc r m s
a r e t h e jire d ic a le .s o f t h e jirio r prem ise.s, a n d t h e s u b j e c t s o f t h e p o s
t e r i o r ; tlie m id d le term is h e r e in p o s i t i o n in te rm e d ia te b etw een
t h e c.xtroines. O n l l i e c o n t r a r y , in t h e P r o g r e s s i v e S o r i t e s o f e x t e n
sion and in t l i c R e g r i ' s s i v e S o r i t e s o f c o n i p r e l i e n s i o n , t h e m id d le
te r m s are th e siib jeets o f tlie p r io r p re m is e s a n d tlic jire d ic a to s o f
t h e ] i o s t e r i o r ; t h e i n i i M I e t e r m is h e r e in p o s i t i o n n o t in te rm e d ia te
Ijetw ecn th e e x tre m e s.
To th e q u e s t i o n , w h y , in th e case o f sim p le sy llo g ism s, th e
lo g ic ia n s o v e rlo o k e d t h e r e a s o n in g in c o m p r e h e n s i o n , a n d , in t h e
I [Ilk lip p r n o llcfH (b e erro r o f t l io n e w l i o 1e r i p a l c l i c i , ot c u m liis G a . s s o i u l i i s , q n i S o r i -

m a k f S o i i t o " o n l v o f c o i r ip tc li cr iH iv * ; w h o l e . l e m hoIiiiii a d pritdicalnm p erlin e re cxisli-
S e c h i - / ) ' S f ii o t i'iri t l I 'l ih l , U ii. c . 10, ] b m a t . 15n.]
p . 4''0. f I p. . 34.3 n , I 6.] [ E r r a n t vnlô
L k c t . X IX . LOGIC. 271
caso o f tlie S o r i t e s , t h e r e a s o n i n g in e x t e n s i o n , i t is, p e r h a p s , ii n -

possib le to afford a sa tisfacto ry e x p lan atio n .
P r o b a b le r e a so n t i ^ i -ii
, . . R u t AVC m a y p la u sib ly c o n i o c t u r e , AAMiat i t i s o u t
w liy lo g ic ia n s o v e r - ^ j
lo o k e d , in th e case o f o f o u r poAA^cr c o r t a i i i l y t o pruAc. In regard to
sim p le s y llo g is m s , Ihe s i m p l e s y l l o g i s i i i s , it AA'as an o r i g i n a l d o g m a o f t h e
r e a so n in g in C om prc- p j .,t o n i c s c h o o l, a n d an e a r ly i l o g m a o f th e P e r i
p a te tic, th a t p h ilosojih y that scien ce, str ic tly
so c a l l e d \Akas o n l y c o i n ' o r s a n t Avith, a n d AAâs e x c l n s i A ' c l y con-
tained in, n n i \ e r s a l s ; a n d t h e d o c t r i n e o f A r i s t o t l e , Avhich t a u g h t
t h a t all o u r g e n e i al knoAAd edge is o n l y an i n d u c t i o n f r o m a n o b s e r v a
t i o n o f p a r t i c u l a r s , Avas t o o e a s i l y f o r g o t t e n o r p e r v e i - f e d b y liis folloAA'-
ers. I t t h u s o b t a i n e d a l m o s t t h e f o r c e o f an a c k n o A \ d e d g e d p r i n c i ji l o ,
t h a t e v e r y t h i n g t o b e knoAvn m u s t b c knoAvn u n d e r s o m e g e n e n i l
Ibnn or n o tio n . H e n c e tbo e x a g g e r a te d im jiortan ce attrib u ted to
d e f i n i t i o n a n d d e d u c t i o n ; i t n o t b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d , t h a t Ave o n l y t a k e
o u t o f a g en era l n otion Avhat avc had p rev io u sly p laced th erein ;
a n d t h a t t h e a m p l i f i c a t i o n of' o n r k n o A v l e d g e i s n o t t o b e s o u g h t f o r
from a b o v e , b u t f r o m beloAAq n o t f r o m s p e c u l a t i o n a b o u t a b s t r a c t
generalitie.s, b u t fro m t h e o b s e r v a tio n o f c o n c r e t e p a rticu la r s. R ut,
liOAvevcr e r r o n e o u s a n d i r r a t i o n a l , t h e p ersu a sio n b ad its d ay and
in f in e n c e ; a n d it p erh a jis d e t e r m in e d , as o n e o f its effe cts , t h e t o t a l
n e g le c t o f on c-balf, a n d t h a t n o t t h e l e a s t i m p o r t a n t h a l f, o f t h e
r e a s o n in g jiroccss. F o r , Avhile m e n th o u g h t o n ly o f lo o k in g up-
Avards t o t h e m o r e e x t e n s i v e n o t i o n s , as t h e o n l y o b j e c t s a n d t h e
o n ly m ed ia o f scien ce, th e y to o k little h e e d o f the m ore com pre
h en siv e n otion s, and a b so lu tely c o n te m n e d i n d i v i d u a l s , as o b j e c t s
Avbieh c o u l d n e i t h e r b e s c i e n t i f i c a l l y knoAvn i n t b e i n s c l v e s , n o r s n p -
] i ly t h e con d ition s o f s c ie n t if ic a lly knoA ving a n g b t b e s id e s . The
lo g ic o f co m jir c lie n sio n and o f in d u ctio n Avas, t h e r e f o r e , n e g l e c t e d
or ign o red , th e lo g ic o f e x te n s io n and d e d u c tio n e x c lu s iv e ly cnl
tiv a te d , as alon e a fford in g th e rnlc.s b y Avbicli Ave m i g h t ev o lv e
h i g h e r n o t i o n s i n t o t h e i r s u b o i d i n a t e c o n c e p t s . " T h is m a y h elp to
cx p l.a in Avhy, s n b s e q n e n t l y t o A r i s t o t l e , L o g i c Avas c u l t i v a t e d in s o
p a r t i a l a m a n n e r ; b u t Avhy, s u b s e q u e n t l y t o R a c o n , t h e l o g i c o f c o t n -
p relien sion sh o u ld still h a v e e s c a p e d o b s e r v a tio n a n d s t u d y , I am
a lt o g e th e r at a lo ss to im a g in e . J b i t t o t h e q u e s t i o n , w h y , Avhen
r e a s o n i n g in g e n e r a l Avas a ieAved o n l y as i n t h e q u a n t i t y o f e x t e n
sion , t h e m in o r form o f t h e S o r it e s s h o u l d h a v e
And w liv , in th e
. b e e n vicAved as e x c l u s i v e l y in t h a t o f c o m p r c -
onso o f tlie S o r ite s , *' i V i
iiie y o v e r io o k e c i the b c iisio n , m a y , pcrliaps, b e e x j d a in e d b y th e fol-
.oasoning in Exieii- loAviug c o n s i d e i a t i o u : t h i s fo r m A v a s n o t o r i g i -
nally a n a ly z e d and e x jio iin d cd b y th e a c u te n e ss
o f A risto tle, R u t i t c o u l d n o t e s c a p e n o t i c e t h a t t h e r e Avas a f o r m
272 LOGIC. L kct. X I X
o f ro a so n in g , o f v e ry frctiucMii c i i i j j l o y i n c i i t , b o t l i by p b ilo so p b crs

and rh e to ric ia n s , in w hich a sin g le conclusion w as d raw n from a
n u iltip lie ity o f p re m ise s, a n d in w h ic h th e iire d ic a te o f th e fo re g o
in g p re m ise w as u su a lly th e s u b je c t o f th e fo llo w in g . C ic e ro , for
e.xam ple, a n d S e n c e n , a r c full o f s u c h a r g u m e n t s ; a n d t h e n a t u r a l
n n d e a s y e v o l u t i o n o f t h e r e a s o n i n g is i n d e e d p e c u l i a r l y a j i p r o p r i a t e
to d e m o n s tra tio n . T h u s , to p r o v e t h a t e v e r y b o d y is m o v a b l e , w e
h a v e th e fo llo w in g se lf-ev id en t d e d u c tio n . E v e r y b o d y i s in s j i n c e ;
Mh a t is i n s p a c e is i n s o m e o n e p a r t o f s j i n c c ; w h a t is i n o n e p a r t
o f s j i a c e m a y b e i n a n o t h e r ; w h a t m a y b e in a n o t h e r p a r t o f s p a c e
m ay change its sjiac e; w hat m ay change its s p a c e is m o v a b l e ;
t h e r e f o r e , e v e r y b o d y is m o v a b l e . W h e n , th erefo re. V alla, o r w h o
e v e r else h a s t h e h o n o r o f first i n t r o d u c i n g t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f th is
form o f re a.so n in g in to L o g ic , w a s stru c k w ith th e cogency and
c le a rn e ss o f th is c o m p e n d io u s a r g u m e n ta tio n , h e d id n o t a t t e m p t to
reduce it to t h e c o m l i t i o n s o f t h e e .x te n s iv c s y l l o g i s m ; a n d subse
q u e n t lo g ician s, w h e n th e fo rm w as o n c e in tro d u c e d a n d reo o g n ized
in t h f i r s c i e n c e , w e r e , a s u s u a l , c o n t e n t t o c o p y o n e f r o m a n o t h e r ,
w ith o u t su b je c tin g th eir bo rro w ed m aterials to any o rig in a l or
rig o ro u s c ritic ism .
Ut nemo in sesc tcntat dcsccndcre; nemo!

Sed praecedenti speetatur mantiea tergo.i
A cco rd in g ly , n o t o n e o f th e m has noticed, th a t th e S o rites o f th e ir

s y s t e m s ju - o c e e d s in a d ifte rcn t q u a n tity from th a t o f th e ir sy llo
g i s m s in g e n e r a l , t h a t t h e i r l o g i c is t h u s a t v a r i a n c e w i t h i t s e l f ;
f a r les.s d i d an y o f th e m o b se rv e t h a t this, an d all o t h e r f o r m s o f
re a so n in g , a rc cajiab le o f bein g d raw n in an o th er q u an tity from
th a t w h ich t h e y all e .x c lu s iv e ly c o n t e m p l a t e d . And y et, h ad they
ap jilied t h e i r o b s e r v a tio n v / ith o u t jire p o ss e ss io n to th e m a t t e r , t h e y
w ould easily h a v e se e n t h a t t h e S o r i t e s c o u l d b e c a s t in t h e q u a n -
tiiy o f e x te n s io n , eip ially as c o m m o n sy llo g ism s, a n d th a t c o m m o n
sy llo g ism s co u ld b e e.ast iu t h e q u . a n t i t y o f e o m p r e h e u s i o u , e i j i i a l l y
as th e S o rite s . I h a v e alre.ad y s h o w n t h a t t h e s a m e S o r i t e s m a y be
draw n c i t h e r iu e o m p r e h e u s i o u o r in e x t e n s i o n ; a n d iu b o t h t p i n u -
tities pro ceed e ith e r b y p ro g ressio n or by regres-
Lx.'innple f.r iiie So- s io u . B l i t t h e e x a m p l e g i v e n m a y , jie r h a jis , h e
rilPB ill 7 omiirclicii . - , , i / . i
, . V iew ed as se e e tc d . I a L n s, t l e r e f o r e , t a k e a n y
non and I.xtciinoii. '
Ot her; a n d t h e first t h a t o c c u r s t o m y r e c o lle e -
t i o u is t h e f o l l o w i u g f r o m S e n e c a , * w h i c h I s h a l l t r a n s l a t e :
1 l creiu9, iv 2.3, - E d 2 E p is i., 85- Ed.

L e c t . XI X. LOGIC. 2i3
l i e who is prudent is teinpprate;

He who is temperate is constant;
He who is co)istanl is unperturbed;
l i e who is unperturbed is without sorrenu;
H e who is without sorrow is h a p p y ;
Therefore, the prudexit man is h appy.
In th is S o rites, e v e r y th in g slid es easily a n d s m o o th ly from th e

w h o l e t o t h e ]> arts o f c o m p r e h e n s i o n . B u t , t h o u g h t h e p r o c e s s will
b e r a t h e r m o r e b y h i t c h e s , t h e d e s c e n t u n d e r e x t e n s i o n w ill, i f n o t
q u ite so p le a s a n t, b e e q u a lly ra p id a n d c e rta in .
B e who is without sorrow is h a p p y ;

B e who is unperturbed is luithout sorrow;
B e icho is constant is unperturbed;
B e who is temperate is constant;
Be who is prudent is tem perate;
Therefore, the prudent man is happy.
I do n o t th in k it necessary to ex p licate th ese tw o reasonings,

w h ic h y o u a re fu lly c o m p e te n t, I am su re , to d o w i t h o u t difficulty
fo r y o u rselv es.
W h a t r e n d e r s i t still m o r e w o n d e r f u l t h a t t h e l o g i c i a n s d i d n o t
ev o lv e th e c o m j i e t e n c y o f t h i s p r o c e s s in e i t h e r
T h e G o c le n ia n S o
q u an tity , and th u s obtain a k ey to th e o p e n in g
up o f the w hole m y s te ry o f sy llo g istic reason
in g , is t h i s : t h a t i t is n o w a b o v e tw o c e n tu rie s sin ce th e Inverse
o r R e g r e s s i v e S o r i t e s in c o m p r e h e n s i o n w a s d i s c o v e r e d and sig n al
ized b y R o d o lp h iis G o e le n iu s , a c e le b r a te d p h ilo s o jih e r o f M a r b u r g ,
in w h ich u n iv ersity he occu p ied th e ch air o f L o g ic and JM eta-
physics.* T h is S o rite s has from h i m o b t a i n e d t h e n a m e o f G ocle
n ia n ; w h i l e t h e p r o g r e s s i v e S o r i t e s h a s b e e n c a l l e d t b e c o m m o n o r
A risto telian . T h is latter d en o m in atio n is, a s I have p rev io u sly
noticed, an erro r; for A risto tle , th o u g h certain ly n o t ig n o ra n t of
t h e p r o c e s s o f r e a s o n i n g n o w c a l l e d S o rite s, d o e s n o t e n t e r n j m n its
co n sid eratio n , e ith e r u n d e r o n e form or a n o th e r. T h is o bservation

b y G o clen in s, o f w h ic h n o n e o f o u r B ritish lo g ician s seem aw are,
w asa ste p to w a r d s th e e x jilicatio n o f th e w h o le jirocess; and we
are, th e r e f o r e , le ft still m o r e t o m a r v e l h o w t h i s e x i d i c a t i o n , so easy
a n d m anifest, sh o u ld n o t h a v e been m ad e. B e fo re te r m in a tin g th is
su b je ct, I m a y m e n tio n t h a t th is form o f sy llo g ism has been som e
t i m e s s t y l e d b y l o g i c i a n s n o t o n l y S o rite s, b u t a l s o co a cerva tio , con-
I G oelenii Isagngf in O rganinn ArL<ttoteli.i, c le iiia n S o r ite s b e fo re G o clen in .* , see P a ciii* .

F r a n o o f., 1598, p. 255 E d . [ F o r tlie G o - C om m ent, in A n al. P rior., i. 25. p. 159 ]
35
CT4 LOGIC. L ect. XIX
gcries. g ra d a tio , clim ax, nnd d e p r im o a d td tim vm . T h e old name,

hefore Valla, which the process ohtained am ong th e Greek logicians
o f the Low er Empire, was the vague and g en eral ajipellation of
complex syllogism , a-vXXoyia-ixo<; crvvScTo^.*
So much for th e tw o forms o f reasoning which m ay he reg arded
as comjio.site or comjilex, an d wliich logicians
E p ic h e ir e m a ar.d .So- , ,, .
r ite s, as p o iy s y iio - generally considered as red u n d a n t. B u t
g is m s , c o m p a r a t iv e ly here it is projier to remark, th a t if in one point,
s im p le , a n d n o t p ie o n - Jg^ individual .syllogisms, the E picheirem a
and Sorites m ay he viewed as coiiiparatively
complex, in another, th a t is, as polysyllogisins, th e y may he viewed
as coiujiaratively simple. F or, resolve a Sorites into the v.arious
syllogisms afforded hy its m iddle terms, and compare the m ultitude
o f projiositions through Avhich th e conclusion is thus tediously
evolved, with the sh ort and rapid process of th e chain-syllogisin
itself, and, instead o f complexity, w e should r a th e r he disposed to
predicate o f it e x tre m e simjilicity. In jioint o f foct, we m ig ht
arrange th e E p ic h eirem a and Sorites with far g r e a te r jiropriety
u n d e r elliptical syllogisms, th a n , as is com m only done hy logicians,
u n d e r th e jileonastic. This last classific.ation is, indeed, altogeth er
erroneous, for it is a g r e a t mistake to suppose t h a t in either o f these
forms there is auijht r e d u n d a n t.
I [ B le m m id a s , E pitom e L o g ic a , c . 31.] 2 [ S e e L e ib n itz , N o u ve a itx E s s a is, L . i v . c

x v i i. 4 , pp. 445, 446, 448, e d . lla g p e .]
LECTURE XX.
S T O T C H E T O L O G Y .
S E C T IO N II. OF T H E E R O D U C T S OF T H O U G H T
I I I D O C T R IN E O F R E A SO N IN G S .
SY L L O G ISM S. T H E IR D IV IS IO N S A C C O R D IN G TO E X T E R N A L
FOR M .
B. D E F E C T IV E , E N T H Y M E M E .
C. R E G U L A R A N D IR R E G U L A R , F IG U R E A N D M OOD.
I PROCEED n o w to th e Second C lass o f S y llo g ism s, th o se , to

AAi t , w h o s e E x te rm il F o rm is defective. T h is
B . S y llo g ism s d efec- , t n , , r
liv e in E x te rn a l F o r m . ^ ^ C onform ity to th e d o c tr in c o f
m o d e r p l o g i c i a n s , Avhos e i i n a n i m o i i s o p i n i o n o n
t h e s u b j e c t I s h a ll c o m p r e h e n d in t h e f o l l o w i n g p a r a g r a p h .
^ L X X II. A cco rd in g to lo g ician s, in g e n e ra l, a defectiv e

s y l l o g i s m i s a r e a s o n i n g in w h i c h o n e o n l y
Par. L x x n . The t i r e m i s c s is a c t u a l l y e n o u n c e d . It
E n tn ym em e. ^
is, t h e r e f o r e , t h e y s a y , c a l l e d a n E iU h ym em e
(ivSvyrjiJLa), b e c a u s e t h e r e is, a s i t w e r e , s o m e t h i n g h e l d b a c k in
t h e m i n d (eV Sv/xlo). B u t , a s i t is p o s s i b l e t o r e t a i n c ith e r th e
sn m jitio n o r th e sn b sn m jttio n . th e E n th y m e m c is t h u s o f t w o
k in d s : an E iith y m e m e o f th e F irs t, an d au E n th y m e m e o f
th e S econd, O rd er. T h e Avhole d i s t i n c t i o n is, h o A v e v c r , e r r o n e
o u s i n [ui n c i p l e , a n d , e v e n i f n o t e r r o n e o u s , i t is i n c o m j i l e t e :
f o r a T h i r d O r d e r o f E n t h y m e m e s is c o m p e t e n t b y t h e su]pres-
sion o f t h e c o n c lu s io n .
S u c h , a s i t is s t a t e d i n t h e f o r m e r p a r t o f t h e p a r a g r a p h , is t h e
d o ctrin e yon v.nll find m ain tain ed , Avith s i n g u l a r u n an im ity , by
m odern lo g ic ia n s; a i u l , Avith h a r d l y a n e x c e p t i o n , t h i s c l a s s i f i c a t i o n
2 T6 xOGIC. L e c t. X X .
of syllogisms is slnted iiOo oiiiy witiiout a suspicion o f its own cor-

rcL-tncss, but as a diAision cslablislied on the
L x p lic a t io n . llie . , , . . .
c o iiiiu o n d o c t r in e o f n illllO lltj of t l l C g i u n l o t l o g i c llilllS C lt.
the Eutii.MUfino futile, Jii botli assci tions they are, lioweA cr, wi'ong,
au.i erroneously at- for tlie classiffcatioii itsclf is fiitiIc, ail(1 A rislotlc
trihuied lo Aristotle. i ,
attoiTls ll no c o u n ten a n ce ; while, at the same
time, if a distinction o f .syllogisms is lo be taken from the ellipsis
(jf ihcir Jiropositions, tiie subdivision o f entliyinemcs is no t com
jilete, inasmuch as a syllogism may e.xist with boili jnemises ex-
jiiesM'd, and th e conclusion understood.
I shall, therefore, in the fir.st jdace, sliow th a t thc E n lh y m e m e, as
a syllogism o f a defective enoiineeincnt, constitutes no sjjecial form
if reasoning; in tlie second, th a t A risto tle does not eonsider a syl-
loLfisni of such a eharacter as such a sjiecial Ibnn ; and, in the third,
that, a d m ittin g th e validity of the dislinelion, the restriction o f the
E n th y m e in e to a syllogism o f one siijijiressed jjreinise can n o t be
eom jietenlly m aintained.
I. In regard, then, to th e validity of the distinction. T his is
dispi'oved on the following g r o u n d s : F irs t of
1 riie Entirmeme ,,]|^ jj^^ discrimination of the E n lh y m e m e , as a
r.tii a Fpecial fo rm o f . ^ /
reabOLiEii. svllogi^ni of OIIC sii]>])rcssen premise, from the
ord in ary syllogism, would involve a discrimi
nation of the reason ing of Logic from the reasoning in common
use ; for, in general reasoning, we rarely exjiress ail th e projiosi
tions of a syllogism, and it is almost only in the treatises on A b
stract Logie th a t wc find examjiles o f reasoning in which all the
mem bers are exjilicitly enonneed. B u t Logic does not create ncAV
fonns o f syllogism, it merely exjionnds tliosc which are already
given ; and while it shows th a t in all reasoning th e re are, in tlie
m ental jiroeess, necessarily three jndgn ienls, the mere iion-exjires-
sion of any o f tliese in language, no more constilnles in Logic a
particular kind of syllogism, than does th e ellijisis o f a term consti
tute in G ram m ar a jiarticular kind o f concord or g overn m ent. But,
secondly, Syllogism and E n th y in e m e are not distinguished as re-
.sjioetivcly an intralogieal and an extralogical form ; both are snji-
posed etjually logical. 'Pliose who defend the distinction are, th e re
fore, nece.-'arily comjicllcd lo maintain, th a t Logic regards the
.accident o f the external exi ression, and not the esscnee of the
internal tlionghl, in holding tliat the E nth ym ein e is really a defec
tive reasoning.
1 I'o m p a r e Id u u a s io n s , p. l.>3 et seq. E l). I le r o 'lo n , L ogica fte s titu ta , Iar.s V . tra c t, i. c
2 [T h a t .SyIlogi.ifi a u d E n lliy m i'in p a re u o t 1., p. C02.]
proi>eriy d in tin c t ej)Ocics o f le a b o u iu g , see
L e c t. X X . L O G I C 277
I t thus appears, tliat to constitute the E n th y m e m e as a species

'.f reasoning distinct from Syllogisms Projier, h y th e difference of
])e;fect and imjierfect, is o f all absurdities the greatest. B u t is this
.absurdity llie ivork o f A ris to tle ? and this leads us to the second
head.
II. W i t h o u t en terin g njion a regular examination of the Aariou'*!
jiassages o f th e A ristotelic treatises relative to
II. The cii.Minciion -tj^jg point, I may observe, in the iiiast jdaeo, that
of the Lulh) iiiLiiie as . . , i , i , ,
a special form of rea- A ristotlc cxprcssly declares m general, th a t a
so u in g n o t m a d e b y syllogisiii is considered by the logician, not in re-
A ris to tle . lation to its cxjiression ( o n Trpo? t o v A d y o r ) , but
e x c l u s i v e l y a s a m e n t a l p r o c e s s (dAAd. Trpds t6v iv

rrj A d y o v ) .' T h e distinction, therefore, of a class of syllogisms,
as foimded on a verbal accident, he th u s of course, imjilieitly and by
anticijiation, condemns. B u t A ristotle, in the
T h e E n th y m e m e o f , , , . . -i i t -. i
A ris to tle - - w h a t secoiid p la c e , d o e s d is tin g u is h the En thym em e
as a c e rta in k in d o f s y llo g is m , as a s y llo g is m
o f a p e c u lia r m a tte r, as a s y llo g isin fro m sig n s and lik e lih o o d s.
N o w i f, h a v i n g d o n e t h i s , i t i v e r e h e l d t h a t A r i s t o t l e o v e r a n d a b o v e
d istin gn ish ed the En thym em e also as a syllo g ism Avith one su ji-
pressed p rem ise, A r is t o t le m ust be supposed to d efin e th e E n t liy -
m em e b y tw o d ifferen ces, a n d by tw o d ifferen ces w liich have no
m u tu a l a n a l o g y ; fo r a s y llo g is m fro m s ig n s a n d lik e lih o o d s d o es not
m ore n a t u r a l ly fa ll in to an ellip tic a l fo rm than a sy llo g is m o f a n y
o th er m atter. Y e t t h is a b s u r d i t y h a s b e e n a n d is a l m o s t u n i v e r s a l l y
b e lie v e d o f th e a cn te st o f h u m a n in te lle c ts, a n d on g r o n n d s w h ic h ,
w h e n e x a m in e d , afford n ot th e s li g h t e s t Avarrant fo r s u c h a c o n c lu
sio n . On the critic ism o f t h e s e g r o u n d s i t A vo iil d h e o u t o f p l a c e
here to en ter. S u ffic e it to s a y , t h a t t h e t e x t s in t h e Organon and
R hetoric, A vh ic h m a y b e adduced in s u p jio r t o f th e v u l g a r o jiin io n ,
Avill b e a r n o s u c h i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ; t h ; ; t in o n e ji a s s a g e , Avhere t h e
Avoi-d d reA ^s {im perfect) is a p j i l i e d t o t h e E n t h y m e m e , t h i s A vo r d ,
if gen u in e, need s ig n ify o n ly that the reaso n in g from sig n s and
p ro b a b ilities a ffo r d s n o t a p e r f e c t o r n e c e s s a r y infci-cnee ; b u t th a t,
in p o i n t o f f a c t , t h e Avoixl ureXffi is t h e r e a m a n ife st in te rp o latio n ,
' m a d e to a c c o m m o d a t e tlie A r i s t o t e l i c to t h e e o in in o n d o c t r i n e o f th e
E n t h y m e m e , f o r i t is n o t e x t a n t in t h e o l d e s t n ia n u sc rijit.s, a n d has,
ac c o rd in g ly , w ith o u t any referen ce to the present qu estion , been
e je c te d fro m th e b e st re ce n sio n s, an d , a m o n g oth ers, fro m th e re c e n t
e d it io n o f t h e Avorks o f A r i s t o t l e b y t h e A c a d e m i c i a n s o f B e r l i n ,
an ed ition fo u n d ed on a c o lla tio n of tho p rin c ip a l m an u scrip ts
1 A n al. P o st., i. 10. E d . 2 A n a l P rior., ii. 27. R k e t., i. 2 E d .

2TS LOGIC. L kct. XX
th ro u g h o u t E u ro p e .' I t is n o t , h o w e v e r , t o b e d e n i e d t l i a t t h e t e r m
JJnthi/m eine w : i s a p p l i e d t o n s y l l o g i s m o f s o m e
A p p lic a tio n s o f th e n n e.v p ressed p art, in lery a n cien t tim es; bnt,
term E iit'ii/viem f.
a l o n g w itli tliis m e .iiiin g , it w a s also e m p l o y e d b j'
Hv I>ion_vsiuN of
H a lic a r n a ss u s An- th e G r e e k a n d R o m a n rb e to rie ia n s for a tb o iig lit
tlliil'o l R /irtoricto AU t - in g e n e r a l , as b y D i o n y s i u s t h e IT alicariiassian,'
' nl ir piitiT. A n ln s
.and t h e a u t h o r o f t h e J lh e to ric to A lc x a m h r , a t
i ie l li u s C ieero . q u iu -
lilia n . trib u te d t o A r i s t o t l e , f o r a n acu te d ic tu m ,
b y S o j i a t e r ^ a n d A n l u s Gcllius, f o r a r e a s o n i n g
from c o n t r a r i e s o r c o n t r a d i e t o r i e s , as b y C ieero ." Q u in tilian gives
t h r e e m e a n i n g s o f t h e t e r m ; i n o n e s e n s e , s i g n i f y i n g ''omnia m ente
co n rtjita ,' i n a n o t h e r , ''s o ite n tia cu m ra tio n e , i n a t l i i i d ,
m tn ti co)iclusio, vel e.i\con sequ en tibu s, vel ex rcpu gn an tibu sA ^
A m o n g th e a n cien ts, w h o ein jilo y ed th e te r m for a sy llo g ism w ith
som e suppressed p art, a co n sid erab le num ber
D e n o te d , w ith s o m e
of ih e a n c ie n ts , a h eld, w ith onr m odern lo g ician s, t h a t it w as a
s y llo g is m w it h s o n ic sy llo g ism deficient o f one or o th e r p re m is e , as
su p p ressed p art. The
A le x a n d e r th e A p b ro d isia n , A iiiin o n iu s H crm iic,
A ] d n o d is ia n . A n i-
m n n iu s. r iiilo p o n n s .
P l i i lo p o i i i i s , etc. Som e, how ever, ns Pachy
P a c liy m c re s. Q u in t il m er es, o n ly reco g n ized th e absence of th e
ia n . U l),ia n . .S ch oli m a jo r jirc m ise. S o m e, on th e c o n tra ry , th o u g h t,
ast on H e r in o g e n e s.
lik e Q u in tilia n ," t h a t t h e siijiiiicssed jiro p o s itio n
M ight t o b e t h e c o n c l u s i o n ; n a y , U l p i a n , t h e G r e e k c o m m e n t a t o r
1 F o r a fu lle r liis to r y o f tliis in te r p o la tio n , 4 S o p n tri A p a m een sis Prolegom ena in A risli-
s e e D tsc u isio n s, p. 154. K d. [ F o r th e c o r r e c t dem A ristid is Ojr. Ortiri., ed . J e b b , v o l. i. f. d
d o c tr in e o f th e A r is to t e lic E n th y in e m c , se c 3. K oi r y rS ry ii/dvp.Tj/xdrcni' T V K v 6 rr\ri 6tj-
M a r io tte , E ssa y de L o g iy iic , 1*. ii. d is c . iii. p p .o (r b fv i^ e i. In C a n te r s Prolegom ena ( h is c x -
10.3. Iuris, 1078. E d .] jiressio ii is ren d e r ed sen ten tian irn d en sita s, and
2 E iastuia a d Cn P o m p tiu m d r prrrcipuis Ilis - th e w o r d iv b o p .r\p .a riK 6 s in llie s a m e p a ssa g e
to n cis. c. 5 TJjs pLtUTOL /foA A iA o-yias tKUVOv by a rgutus in a r g u m m lis . l?ut corn[iarc D is
Kal TO? j t K o u t o v Tali' t v b v i x t i x a T w v K a r a cussions. ]). 157 E ll.
n u \ v ixTTfpf?. T h e expres-sion t t A o u t o s t v - 3 Nortes A u U c, v i. 13. Q u asreb an tu r
<3-jp.tpjaTij}v i> ren d e r ed by .1. C. T . E r n e sti, a u te m j.o n g r a v ia iie c r c v e r e iid a , scd
G'i.'ank ii EiiUr : se e lli> J .rrikon Technologic; A i/r-o-ra (p ix d a m Icp id a c t m in u ta . Ed.
OrrrroTnm R 'liio ririr. v. (i>tivfj.e/ia. T h e sa m e C Topica, c. 13. E l).
ntence i. repia led in n e a r ly th e s a m e w o r d s 1 In st. O ral., v. 10, 1. Ed.
by D io ir. -iu-. in b is Vileruin Srriptorinn Cen 3 S e e A le x a n d e r , In Tofiica, p p 6, 7, ed.
tura. iii 2. - l-.D. A id . 1513. A n iin o n iiis , In Q ninyue Voces Por-
.3 'J'lie a u th o r o f Ibe HJnlorira n d A k x a n - p h y r ii, f. 5 a, e d . A id . 1540 I h ilo p o n u s , In
dru tti, c. i-la.ses tlie e n lliy m c n ic a r n o i.g A n a l. Post., T. 4 a, e d . A i d . T534. T h e se u u th o r-
p ii.o f- an d in c 11, d e fin e s il a s a ilie s are c ite d in th e a u th o r s n o te . D iscu ssion s,
r o o f, d r a w n from a n y k in d o f o p jio s iflo n . p. 150. Ed
ZMX\jp.Jtp.ara o' ia r'iir o'l J t v o v t o r y K b y y 0 E p ito m e LogicfS A rislo telis, O x o n ., ICCC, p.
i:al rrj iTpd^fi i v a v r w v p c v a , d W a K a\ r o ts 1..3 .See a lso b is E/i/Ioiik III C niversam A risto-
a \\o ir d r a c r/. Tbi." w o r k I.s a tlr ib u le d b y t d i s D issern id i A rte m , a p p e n d ed lo lia s a r iu s s
V x -to r iiis to A n a x im e n e s o f Lani|>sncui), a n d tr a n s la t io n o f A m m n n iu s on I o r ])liy r y
'h i- r o n je r tn r e is a d o jd e d b y th e la te s t e d ito r , L u g d ., 1.547, p. 2-14. Ed.
^JK;i,gel F.d. W In st. O rat., v . 14, 1. Ed.
L k ct. XX. LOGIC. 279
o f D e m o s tlie n e s, a n d th e sc h o lia st on IT e n n o g e n c s th e lilie to ric ia n ,

a b s o l u t e l y d e f in e a n E n t h y m e m e a s y l l o g i s m , in w h i c h t h e c o n
c l u s i o n is u n e x p r e s s e d . -
III. T h i s le a d s us to t h e t h i r d h e a d ; for on n o p r in c ip le can it bc
show n, th a t o u r m odern l o g i c i a n s a r e c o r r e c t iii
111 . A dm it tin g tlic c l e n v i i i g o r n o t c o n t e m p l a t i n g t h e i i o s s i b i l i t v ot
v a lid ity o f t h c d is c r iiii- , * . , , . mi i '
iiiu tio ii of th e Eiitiiy- ^lio r c t i c o n c e o f th e c o n clu sio n . T h e o n ly prin -
meme, it cuiiiiot be c i p l e Oil w h i e h a s y l l o g i s m is c o m p e t e n t , w ith
r e str ic te d to a s y llo - o t h e r o f i t s j i r o p o s i t i o i i s u n e x ] u - e s s e d , is
q ,.
gism ofonesnppressed ^ S u p p r e s s e d is t o o m a n i f e s t
premise. ^ ^
to req u ire en o u n e e m e n t. O n t h i s [ i r i n c i p l o , :i
s y l l o g i s m is n o t l e s s j i o s s i b l e w i t h t h e c o n c l u s i o n , tlitiii w i t h eith er
o f t h e p r e m i s e s , u n d e r s t o o d ; a n d , in p o i n t o f fa c t, o c c u r s q u i t e as
f r e q u e n tly as a n y o th e r . T h e lo g ician s, th e re fo re , to c o m p le te th e ir
d o c trin e , o u g h t to h av e su b d iv id ed th e E iith y -
E x a m p ie s o f E n th y - m e m c i io t m e r e l y i n t o E n t h y m e m e s o f t h e first
memes of the hirst, sc co iid , b u t also iiito E n t h y m e m e s o f t h e
Second, and Third, , , , , , i i
third order, a ccording as tlie sumption, th e su b
sum ption, or the conclusion is suppressed. As
exam ples ot th e se various E n th ym em es, th e fo llow in g m ay suffice:
T h e Ex p l ic it Sy llo g ism .
E v e r y lia r is a c o w a r d ;
C a iu s is a l i a r ;
T h e re fo re , C a iu s is a co w a rd .
I. E n t h y m e m e o f t h e F i r s t O r d e r (the Sumption u n d e r s t o o d . )
C a iu s is a lia r ;
T h erefo re, C a iu s is a cow ard.
II. E n t h y m e m e o f t h e S e c o n d O r d e r (the Suhsiimption understood.)
E v e r y lia r is a c o w a rd ;
T h erefo re, C a in s is a co w a rd .
III. E n t h y . a i e m e o f t h e T h i r d O r d e r ( t h o Conclusion u n d e r s t o o d . )
E v e r y lia r is a c o w a r d ;
A n d C a iu s is a lia r.
1 U lp ia n , A d D /m o sth O lyn ih ., ii. f. 7 b , e d . itie s o n th is q u e s tio n is g iv e n b y th e a u th o r ,

A i d ., 1527. A iio iiy m i ad l le r n io g o n e m . Ue D i s r u s d o t i s , y . \ b l . Ed.
In ven lio n e, lib . iv . S e e H hnorrs G reed , ed . 3 [T h a t th e E n th y m e m e is o f th r ee o rd ers is
A id . 1509, v o l. ii. p. 371. I n th e s a m e w o r k , h o ld by V ic to r iiiu s (in C a s s io d o r n s Opera, vol
p. 365, th e .scholiast a llo w s th a t e ith e r p r e m is e ii. p. 536, e d . 1729. Rhetores Pithm i. p. 341, ed.
or c o n c lu s io n m a y b e o m itte d . Ed 1599). o r r a th e r o f fo u r o r d e r s, fo r th e r e m ay
be an E n th y m e m e w ith o n ly o n e p r o p o s itio n
2 A n e n la r g e d a n d c o r r e c te d lis t o f a u th o r - enounced. S e e V ic to r iu u s , as a b o v e .]
280 LOGIC. L f. c t . X X .
I n t h i s I n s t , y o u s e e , t h c s u j i p r e s s i o n o f t l i e c o n c l u s i o n is i . o t o n l y
n o t v io le n t, b u t its e x p re ss io n is e v e n m o r e s n -
L p ig r a m ra a tic ex- periluous th:m tliut o f e ith e r of
th e p rem ises.
ample? uf Knlliviiieme * . _ ,
with suppressed con- ô l u c fi c l c v e r e p i g r a m o f t h e
e lu sio n . G reek A n t h o l o g y , i n w h i c h t h e r e is a s y l l o g i s m
w ith th e con clu sio n siijipressed. I shall not
(lu o te t h c o r ig in a l, b u t g i v e y o u a L a t i n a n d E n g li s h i m i t a t i o n , w h ic h
w ill s e r v e e q u a l l y w ell to illu strate the jio in t in q u e s tio n .' The
L atin im itatio n is b y t h e l e a r n e d p rin te r Ile n ric u s S tejih an u s, a n d
h e a p p lie s bis e p i g r a m to a c e r t a i n P etru s, who, I m ake no d oubt,
w as th e F ra n ciscan , P e tru s a C o rn ib u s, whom B uchanan, Beza,
R a b elais, a n d o th ers h ave also s a tiriz e d .'' I t ru n s, as I reco llect,
th u s:
S u n t m o n a c h i n e q u a m ; iic q iia m n o n u n n s o t a l t e r : .
P ra ? ic r P e t r n n i b m n c s : e s t s e d c t h ie m o n a c h u s .
The E n g li & l i im itatio n w as w ritte n by P o rso n upon G o ttfried

Ilerm an n (w hen th is w a s w r itte n , c o n f e s s e d ly t b e ]w ince o f G r e e k
sch o lars), w h o w h en h ard ly tw e n ty bad attack ed P e r s o n s f a m o u s
c a n o n s , in his w o r k , D e M e tr is G rcecorum et llo m a n o ru m .^ The
m e r i t o f t b e e p i g r a m d o e s n o t c e r t a i n l y lie in its t r u t h .
T h e G e r m a n s in G re e k ,
A r c s a d ly to s e e k ;
N o t fiv e in fiv e s c o re ,
B u t n in e ty - f iv e m o r e ;
A ll, s a v e o n ly H e r m a n n ,
A n d H e r m a n n s a G e r m a n .
I n t h e s e e j i i g r a m s , t b e c o n c l u s i o n o f t h e s y l l o g i s m is s u p p r e s s e d ,
y e t i t s i l l a t i v e f o r c e is f e l t e v e n in s p i t e o f t h e e x j i r e s s e x c e p t i o n ;
n a y , in r e a l l y c o n q u e r i n g b y im p licatio n tb e ap jiaren t d isc la im e r,
con.si.-is t h e w h o l e ] ) o i n t a n d e l e g a n c e o f t h e e j i i g r a m . T o p u t th e
fo rm e r in to a sy llo g istic s h a p e ,
1 TTie o r ig in a l i an e p ig r a m o f P h o c y lid e s , a n o , alii.sque t a r i is in sig n ib u s p o e tis exeerjM car-

p reserved by .-I r a b o , 15. x . p. 4S7, e d . f'a s a u - n iin a . Excutlebat II. Step h a n u s, ex cu ju t etia m
bon, C ornp ore A n lh o lo g ia G ra ca , i. p. E p ig r a m m a tis G rtrd s el L a tin is aliqu ot cateris
.04, ed . ISninck. L ip s , 1794. Poehr, M m ores a d jecta su n t, 1509. p 217.
O raci, ed . O a is fo r d , i. )). 4 H . T h e jia r o d y by P o is o n is g iv e n in A Short
K al r 6 5 t tpcouvAlSto, ' A /p .o t Kano! * o i x i

6 i v hs 5' od" o r ig in a l G reek ,
^ , , w ltli I 'o r s o n s i m ita t io n , is a ls o g iv e n in D r .
n d v T t s , t t A V n p o K \ i o v s Kol npoxX fT jr W e ll e s le y s A n lholngm P o lyg lo tta , p. 4 3 3 - E d .
A t p io i . 2 S e e I5 u c lia n a ii, Franci.^rfini/J, 1. 7C4 B eza,
F o r tb e L a tin im ita t io n b y S t e p h a n u s , se e P ocm nia, p. 85, e d . 1569. lla b e l a is , L . iii . ch.
Tfuo'J. Bezat P o e m a ta , item ex G eorgia Buchan- 14. E d
L ect. XX. LOGIC. 281
S u m p t i o n T h e m o n k s, one a n d a ll, a re good-for-nothing varlcts, ex cep tin g P e te r ;

S u b s u m p tio n B u t P e te r is a m o n k.
N ow , w hat is, Aviiat m ust he, understood to complete th e sense?

W h y , the conclusion,
T h erefo re, P e te r is a good-for-nothing varlet lik e the rest.
T h e r e is recoi-ded, likewise, a d y ing deliverance of th e philosopher

Hegel, the Avit o f Avliich dejtends ujioii th e same am higuous reason
ing. O f all my discijiles, he said, one ouly undei'stands m y
philosoj)hy; and he does not. * B u t Ave m ay take this for au a d
mission hy the philosopher himself, th a t th e doctrine of the A bsolute
transcends hum an eomprohensioii.
W h a t has noAV heen said, m ay suffice to show, u ot only th a t we
m ay have euthym cm es Avith any of th e th ree propositions u n d er
stood, h u t th a t th e distinction itself o f th e enthymeuie, as a species
o f syllogism, is inept.
I noAv go on to the T h ir d Division of Syllogisms, u n d e r the head
o f their Extei-iial or A eeidcutal form, I mean
c. S j ii o g is m s E e - division o f syllogisms into R e g u la r and
g u la r a n d Ir r e g u la r . j ^ o
Irregular, a distinction determ ined h y th e or
dinary or ex tra o rd in ary a rran g e m en t of th e ir constituent parts. I
eomineiice this subject Avith th e folloAving jjaragrajjh.
^ L X X III. A syllogism is Irr e g u la r hy rela tio n , 1. To

the transjioscd order of its P ro p o sitio n s; 2.
P a r . L x x m . K in d s
o f I r r e g v u a r S y l lo - T o tlic trausposcd ordcr o f its Tei'ius ; and
3. T o th e transposed order of both its
Projiositions and T erm s. O f these in th eir order.
1. A syllogism in exteusiou is R egular, in the oi-dor of its
Propositions, when the suhsum ption folloAvs th e sumjition, and
tho conclusion folloAVs the suhsumption. In this resjiect (dis
counting the differeiiee o f the quantities o f d epth and hi-eadtli),
it, therefore, adm its of a fivefold ii-regulai-ity u n d er three heads,
for either, 1. T he tAvo jiremises m ay he transposed ; or, 2.
The' eoiielusion may precede th e jiremises, and here, either the
sumjition or the suhsum ption m ay stand first; or, 3. Tlie con
clusion may he placed hetween the jiremises, and here either
th e siiinjition or th e suhsunijitioii m ay stand first. Thus, rejire-
senting the sumjitioii, suhsumption, and conelusion hy the letters
A, B, C, Ave have, besides the regular order, 1. B, A, C, 2. C,
1 S e e Discu.t.sions, p. 788.- E d .
36
282 LOGIC. L ect. XX
A, B, 3. C, B, A, 4. A, C, B , o. B, C, A. (T h is doctrine
o f tlie logicians is, hoivever, one-sided and erroneous.)
2. .V syllogism is B e guh ir or Irregular, in respect to th e o r
der o f its T erm s, according to the place which the m iddle te n n
holds in the premises. I t is regular, in Com prehensive Q u a n
tity, when the m iddle te rm is th c predicate o f the sumption and
thc subject of th e suhsnm ption ; in E x te n siv e Q u antity, Avhcn
the m iddle term is th e subjeet o f th e sumiitioii an d th e pred i
cate o f thc subsum ption. F r o m th c regular order o f the term s
tliere are th ree j)Ossible deviations, in cither q u antity. F o r the
m iddle term may occur, 1. T w ice as p re d ic a te ; 2. T w ice as
s n h j e e t ; and, 3. In Com prehensive Q u an tity , it m ay in thc
sumption be subject, and in th e subsum ption p r e d ic a te ; in E x
tensive Q uantity, it m ay in tb c sum ption be predicate, and in
the subsum ption subject. T a k i n g th e le tte r M to designate the
m iddle term, and th e letters S and P to designate th e subject
and Jiredicate of th e conclusion, th e following scheme will reji-
rcsent all th e jiossible jiositions o f th e m iddle term, b oth in its
regO
ular and its irregularO
arrange O
m ent. T h e R e gO u la r constitutes
thc F i r s t F ig u r e ; the I rr e g u la r order th e o th e r Three.*
A. In C om preh en sion.
I. II. III. IV.
S is M. S is ]M. M is S. M is S.
M IS P . P is M. M is V. P is M.
S is P. S is P. S is P. S is P.
B. I n E x t e n s i o n .
I. II. III. IV.
M is P. P is M. M is P. P is M.
S is i l . S is il M is S. M is S.
S is P. S is P S is 1'. S is P.
Th-esc relative jiositives o f th e middlq te rm in th c jiremises,

constitute, I repeat, Avhat are c.alled tlie E o u r S y llo y istic F ig -
urcH {<Txnya-Ta,ffjurai) ; and these positions I have com prised in
the tw o following nm em o nic lines.
I n Co m p r e h e n s i o n .
P n r . s u b ; turn jtru; p n n ; turn sub s u b ; d m iq n e su b pros.
In E x t e n sio n .
S u b p n e ; lu m p r tc prrce; t u u i s u b s u b ; dcnU pie p r m suh.'^
1 C f. K r u g , L o g ik , ( 104. E d . I u r c lio t, In st. P h il., L o g ic a , t. i. c . iii. p. 199

2 T h is fo r m u la fo r E x t c i^ io n is i.ik c n T b c o '.lier liu c is (h e A u th o r s o w n . E d .
L ect. X X . LOGIC. 283
O f these tw o kinds o f irregulaiTty in tho external form o f syllo

gisms, t h e ' f o r m e r th a t of propositions is
E x p lic a t io n . o f f i r less im portance than the latter th a t of
Ir r e g u la r ity iii th e ^ ^ ^
e x ie r n a l fo rm o f s y l- teiTiis; and logicians liuve even th row n it altu-
lo g is iii, a r is in g Irom getlicr out o f .account, ill thcir consideration of
t r a n sp o sitio n of th e Syllogistic F igurc. T h e y arc, however, eqnallv
P r o p o s itio n s . , .*
w rong 111 passing over th e irregular consecution
o f th e propositions o f a syllogism, as a m.atter of absolutely no mo
m e n t ; and in a t trib u tin g an exaggerated iiii-
i h a i a s y llo g is m c a n portaiice to cvcry variety in the arran g e m en t
be p e r s p ic u o u sly c x - U . rn
pressed b y a n y o f ib e terms. T hey ouglit at least to have made
liv e ir r e g u la r c o iis e c u - the studeiit of Logic awaic, th a t a syllogism can
lio n s o f Its P r o p o s i- porspicuously expressed not only by th e n o r
mal, b u t by a n y o f th e five consecutions of its
propositions Avhich devi.ate from the regu lar order. F o r example,
lake th e folloAviiig syllogism : .
A U v irtu e is p r a is e iv o r th y ;
B u t so b riety is a v ir tu e ;
T h erefo re, so b riety is p ra ise iv o rth y .
T his is th e regular succession of sumption, subsum ption, a n d con

clusion, in a syllogism of exten sio n ; and as all th a t can b6 said, on
the present question, o f the one quantity, is applicable, m u ta tis
m u tan dis, to the other, it will be needless to show articulately th a t
a syllogism in coiiqirehension is equally susceptible o f a transposi
tion o f its propositions as a syllogisin in extension. K ee p in g the
same quantity, to wit, extension, let us first reverse th e premises
leaving th e conclusion in the last place (B, A, C).
S o b rie ty is a v i r t u e ;
B u t a ll v irtu e is p r a is e w o r th y ;
T h erefo re, so b riety is p r a is e w o r th y .
This, it will be allowed, is sufficiently perspicuous. L e t us now

enounce the conclusion before th e premises ; and, u n d e r this head
let th e premises be first ta ken in th e ir natural order (C, A, B).
S o b r ie ty is p r a is e w o r th y ;
F o r a ll v irtu e is p r a is e w o r th y ;
A n d sobriety is a v irtu e .
N o w let th e premises be transposed (C, B, A ).

284 LOGIC. L f .c t. X X
S o b rie ty is p r a is e ic o r t h y :
F o r sobriety is a l i r t u e ;
A u d a ll virtu e is p r a is e u v r th y .
T l i e r e tor r e s s i v e r e n s o i i i i i fo; i n b o t h t h e s e c a s e s is n o t le s s m a n i f e s t
th a n th e jiro g re ssiv e re a s o n in g o f th e re g u la r o rd er.
In th e last p lace, le t ns i n te r p o la te th e c o n c lu s io n b e t w e e n th e
p r e m i s e s in t h e i r n o r m a l c o n s e c u t i o n ( A , C, B ) .
A l l v irtu e is p r a is e w o r th y ;
T h e re fo re , sobriety is p r a is e w o r th y ;
F o r so b riety is a v irtu e .
S e c o n d l y , b e t w e e n t h e jire m is e s in t h e i r r e v e r s e d o r d e r (B , C , A ).
S o b r ie ty is a v ir tu e ;
T h erefo re, so b riety is p rai.sew orthy ;
F o r a ll v irtu e is ra isc w o rth y
In t h e s e t w o c a s e s t h e r e a s o n i n g is n o t o b s c u r e , t h o u g h p e r h a p s
th e e x p ressio n b e in e le g a n t; for th e j u d g m e n t placed a fte r th e c o n
c l u s i o n h a d j i r o b a b l y b e e n a l r e a d y s u i i p l i c d in t h o u g h t o n t h e e n u n
ciation of th e eonelusion, an d , therefore, w hen su b seq u en tly ex-
l>re.ssed, i t is f e l t a s s u p e r f l u o u s . B u t t h i s is a c i r c u m s t a n c e o f u o
lo g ic a l iiuiiortaiice.
I t is t h u .s m a n i f e s t , t h a t , t h o u g h w o r t h y o f n o t i c e in a s y s t e m o f
L o g ic , th e tra n s p o s itio n o f th e p ro jio sitio n s o f a sy llo g ism affords
n o m o d ific a tio n s o f f o rm y i e l d i n g m o r e t h a n a sujierficial c h a r a c te r .
L o gician.s, t h e r e f o r e , w e r e n o t w r o n g in e x c l u d i n g t h e o r d e r o f t h e
jiro jio .sitio n s a s a g r o u n d on w h ich to c o n s titu te a d ifferen ce o f sy l
lo g istic form : h u t w e shall se e t h a t t h e y h a v e n o t b e e n c o n s is te n t,
o r n o t s u tlle ie n tly s h a rji- s ig h te d , in th is e x c lu s io n ; fo r se v e ra l o f
t h e i r i 'e e o _ , n i z e d v a r i e t i e s o f f o r m s e v e r a l o f t h e m o o d s o f s y l l o
g i s t i c f i g u i c c o n s i s t i n n o t h i n g b u t a r e v e r s a l o f t h e jnxMiiises,
In r e . a l i t y , h o w e v e r , t h e r e is n o i r r e g u l a r o r d e r o f t h e s y l l o g i s t i c
jiro jio s itio n s , e x e e jit in t h e s in g le c ase w h e r e t h e
T r u e d o c ir in e o fc o n - c o i i c l u s i o i i is j i l a c c d b e t w e e n t h e p r e m i s e s . For
Kcuiion. fiyll(Kri.siiii m a y b e e i t h e r c a l l e d S y n th e tic , in
;yllo;'ihm c it h e r .Sj n- J tr J ^ .
t u c tic or A n a ly t ic . âse tlic jiremises come first, and the eonelusion
is l a s t ( t h e case alone c o n tem jilated by th e
l o g i e i a n s ) ; o r i t m a y h e c a l l e d A n a ly lie , l l i e p r o j i o s i t i o n s t y l e d th e
e o n e lu s io n jire c e d in g , t h e jiro p o s itio n s ca lle d t h e jire m is e s fo llo w in g ,
as its r e a s o n s (a case n o t c o n te m jila te d b y t h e lo g ic ia n s). The
1 Cf. K rug, L o g ik , ] 104, A nm erk, i. E d.

L e c t. X X . LOGIC. 28.5
A n aly tic and S y n t h e t i c s y l l o g i s m s m .ay a g a i n be each considered

a s in t h e q u a n t i t y o f E x t e n s i o n , o r a s in t h e q u a n t i t y o f C o m p r e
h e n s io n ; in w h ic h cases, w e shall h a v e a c o u u tc r-o i-d e r o f th e p r e m
ises, b u t o f w h i c h o r d e rs , as i n d e e d o f such qu an tities, o n e alone
h a s b e e n c o n s id e re d b y th e lo g ician s.
I n o w , th erefo re, g o on to th e se co n d a n d m o re im p o r ta n t g r o u n d
o f reg u la rity an d ir re g id a rity th e n a tu ra l an d
The n a tu r a l and
tra n s])o se d o r d e r o f th e S y llo g istic T e rm s . The
tran .sposed o r d e r o f . i i i i . X .
Ihe S y llo g is t ic T e r m s. d e te r m in e d b y th e differen t p o sition of
the m iddle term b y relation to the major and
m i n o r t e r m s in t h e p r e m i s e s o f a s y l l o g i s m a r e c a l l e d E ig u r e s \a-xq-
uara, firn/rw) a name g iv en to them bv Aris-
F ig n r e s o f S y llo g is m . , , , .. .
t o t l e .* Ot th ese th e f i r s t is, o n th e p revalent
d o c t r i n e , n o t p r o p e r l y a f i g u r e a t all, i f b y f i g u r e b e m e a n t in L o g ie ,
a s in G r a m m a r a n d R h e t o r i c , a d e v i a t i o n f r o m t h e n . a t n r a l a n d r e g
ular fo rm o f exjiression. O f th e s e figures th e
g n r h 'e 'i b T A ^ W o U e ." ' d istin g u ish ed b y A risto tle, w h o
d e v e l o p e d t h e i r r u l e s w i t h a t e d i o u s rn in u te y ie s&
s o m e ti m e s o b s c u re , a n d n o t a l w a y s in tlie b e s t o r d e r , b n t .a lto g e th e r
w ith an a c u te n e ss w hich, if e v e r eq u alled , h as c e rta in ly never been
su rjiassed . T h e fourth, w h ich W h a te ly a t
h o iir t h F ig u r e a t tn b - f o r m e r e d i t i o n s o f h i s E le m e n ts
u ted to ( b i l e n .b u t on i i .
s le n d e r .ou th o rT y. O th er rc c o n t O x fo rd logici.ans s e e m to su p
p o se t o he, lik e t h e o th e r s , o f A r i s to te lic orig in ,
w e o w e jierliap s to t h e i n g e n u i t y o f G a le n . 1' s a y fxerhaqis, f o r
t h o u g h in lo g ic a l t r e a t i s e s a t t r i b u t e d w i t h o u t h e s i t a t i o n t o t h e g r e a t
]jh v s i e i a n , a s i f a d o c t r i n e t o be. f o u n d i n l iis w o r k s , t h i s i s a l t o g e t h e r
erroneous. T h e r e is, I a m c e r t a i n , n o m e n t i o n o f t h e f o u r t h f i g u r e
in a n y w ritin g o f G alen now ex t.an t, a n d n o m e n t i o n o f G a l e n s
a d d itio n o f t h a t fig u re b y a n y G re e k o r L a d n a u t h o r i ty .o f an age
a j ip r o x im a tin g to his o w n . T h e first n o tic e o f th is G a le n ic F i g u r e
is b y t h e S p a n i s h A r a b i a n , A v c r r o e s o f C o r d o v a ,
F ir st asc rib e d t o G a- i . i y-. o .
leu b y A v e r r o e s Commentary on the O rganonr A v erroes
flo u rish ed a b o v e a tlio n sa n d y e a rs p o ste rio r to
G a l e n ; a n d f r o m h i s r e p o r t a l o n e ( a s I h a v e .also a s c e r t a i n e d ) docs
t h e in -c v a le n t o jiin io n t a k e its rise, t h a t w e o w e to G a l e n th is a m p l i
fication ( o r c o r ru p tio n , as it m a y he) o f th e A r is to te lic d o c tr in e s o f
lo g i c t i l figui-e. T h e re has been la te ly p u b lish e d from m an u scrip t,
by D id o t o f P aris, a n e w l o g i c a l t r e a t i s e o f Galen. Tn t h i s w o r k ,
i n w h i c h t h e s y l l o g i s t i c f i g u r e s a r e d e t a i l e d , t h e r e is u o m e n t i o n o f
I A n al. Prior , 1 . 4 . - K d . [C f. P a c iiis , Com- 3 r a A T j r o P , E ia a y c o y ^ AiaA e/fT i/clj i e

m en t., pp. IIS. 122.] n a o ic r iy q w y S ' (1S44) E d .
- P tio r A n a ly tic sj [B . i. c li. 8. E d .]
286 LOGIC. L e c t. XX
T f o u r t h figure. G n le n , tlie re fo ro , ns f i r .ns w e knoAV, a f f o r d s n o

e x c e i n i o n t o t l i e o t h e r a u t h o r s u ] )o n L o g i c . In th ese circu m stan ces,
i t is n e e d l e s s t o o b s e r v e h o w s l e m l e r is t h e t e s t i m o n y i n f i i v o r o f ih.e
r e p o r t ; a n d t h i s is o n e o f m a n y o t h e r s in Avhich a n idle sto ry , on ce
to ld an d re ta ile d , o b ta in s u n iv e rsa l c r e d i t as an e s ta b lis h e d fact, in
consequence o f th e iire v a le n t ig n o ra n c e o f th e fu tility o f its fo u n
datio n . O f th e le g itim a e y o f th e F o u r t h F i g u r e I shall sp e a k , a fte r
h a v i n g s h o w n y o n t h e n a t u r e o f its r e a s o n in g .
B efore p ro c e e d in g fu rth er in th e considera-
c 'o m p ie x m o d ific a - F i g u r e o f S y l l o g i s m , i t is, h o w e v e r ,
t io n o f th e F ig u r e o f i' tjt * .
sviio<iim n ecessary to sta te a co m p lex m o d ific a tio n to
Mh i c l i i t is s u b j e c t , a n d w h ich is c o n t a i n e d in
t h e fo l lo A v iu g p a r a g r a p h .
^ L X X IV . The F ig u re of S yllogism is m o d i f i e d by th e
Q u a n tity a n d Q u a lity o f th e p ro p o sitio n s
P a r . ^ 2c x i v . syiio- ^ y |.,i c P c o u s t i t u t c t l i o r e a s o n i n g . A s the
g is tic M oods. ^
co m b in atio n of (Jn an tity am i Q u a lity af
fords fo u r k in d s o f p ro p o sitio n s U n iv e r s a l A ffirm ativ e ( A ),
U n iv ersal N e g a tiv e ( F ) , P a r tic u la r A ffirm ativ e (I), P a rtic u la r
N e g a tiv e (O ) ; a n d a s t h e r e a r e t h r e e p r o p o s i t i o n s in e a c h s y l
lo g ism , th e r e a r e c o n s e q u e n t l y in all s i x t y - f o u r a r r a n g e m e n t s
p o s s ib le o f t h r e e p ro ])O sitio n s, d i f f e r i n g in q u a n t i t y a n d q u a l i t y ;
a r r a n g e m e n t s w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e w h a t a r c c a l l e d t h e S i/llof/is-
tic JFoods (rpoTTot, m o d i). I m a y in te rp o la te th e o b se rv atio n :
T h e (J rc e k lo g ic ia n s a f te r A r is to tle , lo o k in g m e r e ly to t h e tw o
p r e m i s e s in c o m b i n . a t i o n , c a l l e d t h e s e Figzijgics^ [j-v^vytaL, ju g a -
tion es, conjiigatlonest, c o m h in a tio o e s). A risto tle h im self n ev er
uses rporo? fo r e i t h e r m o o d o r m o d a l i t y s p e c i a l l y ; n o r d o c s h e
u s e (Tv^vyia i n a n y d e f i n i t e s e n s e , llis on ly w o rd f o r m o o d i.s
t h e v a g n e e x p r e s s i o n .rgdogism .
T h e g r e a te r n u m b e r o f th e s e m o o d s arc, h o w e v e r, in c o m p e
te n t, as c o titra d ic to ry o f th e g e n e ra l ru les o f s y llo g is m ; a n d
t h e r e a r c in a l l o n l y e l e v e n Avhich c a n possibly e n te r a le g iti
m a te syllogism . T hese o l ( (v e n m o o d s a g ain arc, for th e sam e
r e a s o n , iif)t all a d m i s s i b l e i n e v e r y l i g i i r e , It ii t s i x o n l y in e a c h ,
t h a t i, in .all t w a m t y - f o n r ; a m i a g a i n o f t h e s e t w e n t y - f o u r , f i v e
arc useless, a n d , th e re fo re , u s u a lly n e g lc e to d , as h a v i n g a par-
ticn h ir conelusion w h e r e .a u n i v e r s a l is e o m p e t o n t . T h e n ine
t e e n nsc fiil m oftfls a d m i t t e d b y l o g i c i a n s m a y , h o w e v e r , b y th e
q u au tifie .itio n o f th e jire d ic a te , b e still f u r t h e r sim jd ifio d , b y
s u p e r s e d i n g th e signific.an ce o f F i g u r e .
Lect. XX. LOGIC. 287
In en terin g on th e co n sid eratio n o f th e v ario u s M o o d s o f th e

S y l l o g i s t i c F i g u r e s , i t is n e c e s s a r y t h a t y o u re -
Explication. ,, . 1 . 1 1 t
call t o m e m o r y t h e t h r e e la w s I g a v e y o u or t h e
C a te g o r ic a l S y llo g is m , a n d in p a r t i c u l a r t h e t w o c la u s e s o f t h e se c
o n d la w , T h a t th e sm n jitio u m u s t b e d e fin ite (general or sin g u
lar), a n d th e su b sn m jitio n aflirinativo, clau ses w h ich are m ore
v a g u e ly e x p re sse d b y th e tw o la w s o f th e lo g ic ia n s t h a t n o c o n
clu sio n c a n b e d r a w n f ro m tw o p a r tic u la r p ro m ise s a n d t h a t n o
c o n clu sio n can b e d r a w n fro m tw o n e g a tiv e p ro m ise s. T h is b ein g
p rem ised , you reco llect th a t th e fo u r co m b in atio n s o f Q u a n tit) an d
Q uality, co m jio ten t to a p ro p o sitio n , w e re d esig n ated b y th e four
letters. A , E , I, 0 , A d en o tin g a un iv ersal affirm ativ e; E a
u n iv e rsa l n e g a t i v e ; I, a p a r t i c u l a r a f fir m a tiv e ; 0 , a p a r t ic u la r
n eg ativ e.
A s s e r it A ; n eg ;at E ; v e r n m u n i v e r s a l i t e r a m b o e :
A s s e r it I ; n c f ra t 0 ; sccl p a r t i c u l a r i t e r a m b o .^
A , it a ff irm s o f th i s , th e s e , a l l ;
A s E d e n ie s o f a n y :
I, it a ffirm s , a s 0 d e n ie s .
O f s o m e , o r fe w , o r m a n y .
T h u s A a ff irm s w l i a t E d e n ie s ,
A n d d e f in ite ly e i t h e r ;
T im s I a ffirm s w h a t 0 d e n ie s .
B u t d e f in ite ly n e ith e r .2
Now, as each sy llo g ism h as tw o prem ises.

T h e possible c o m b i- C on sequ en tly, six te e n d if fe r e n t com -
n a tio n s o f prem ises. 1 v . . .
b in a tio n s p o ssib le o f p re m is e s d iffe rm g in q u a n
tity a n d q u ality v iz .:
1) A A . 2) E A . 3) I A . 4 )0 A.
-A E. EE. IE . OE.
A I. E I. II. 01.
A 0. EO. 10. 0 0.
N o w tbe question arises are all o f these sixteen possible com

binations of different premises valid towards a legitimate conclu
sion? In answer to this, it isevident tluit a considerable number
1 See above, p. 180 E d . W ilson, Rule o f Reason, p. 27 a, 1551.

2 [T he f o llo w in g a r e p r e v io u s E n g lis h m e t - .. ^
n c a l v e r sio n s o f th e se l i n e s : I O denies; both partially."
" A dnctli aflirme, E doeth denigh, which are bothc , . . .
univcrsall: W alllS, InsM utlO LoglcCE, 1G86, L . . C. 4, p 11
1 doeth aflirme, O doctli denigh, which\vc pnrticu- 105 ]
lar c.all.
288 LOGIC. L fxt. XX.
o f these are at once invalidated by the first clause o f the second

law o f the categorical syllogism , in so far as
i i o w m n n y o f th e se recognizcd by logicians, by which all moods with
are s v ilo g is t ic a lly v a l- ,
tw o Jiarticular Jiremises are e.veluded, as in these
there is no general rule. O f this class are the
four moods, I I, I 0 , O I, and O 0 . And the second clause of
the same law, in so far as recognized by logicians, invalidates the
moods of tw o negative jwemises, as in these there is no subordina
tion. O f this el:;ss are the four m oods E E, E 0 , 0 E, and O 0 .
Finally, by the tw o clauses o f the second rule in conjunction, the
mood I E is said to be excluded, because the jiarticular sumption
contains no general rule, and the negative subsninjition no subordi
nation. (This, I think, is incorrect.) T hese exclusions have been
admitted to be valid for every Figure ; there, consequently, remain
(say the logieians) as tho possible modes o f any legitim ate syllogism ,
the eight follow ing A A, A E, A I, A 0 , E A , E I, I A, O A ;'
but some o f these, as apparently contradictory o f the second rule in
it' more definite assertion-^, that the suinjition must be general
and the subsninjition affirmative, I shall, after stating to you the
common doctrine o f the logicians, show to be really no exceptions.
But Avhether each o f the moods, though a p r io r i possible, affords
a Jiroper syllogism in all tbe figures this dc-
A V h e tiier e a c h m o o d punds Oil t l i c d efin ite r ela tio n s of th e m id d le
,h a tis a r W a r ; p o .'ib le
airord s a jwojkt s v l l o . , ^ .
Tliesc, therefore, require a closer investigation.
^ri.m in a ll i h e f i - u r e s .
I shall consider them, with the logicians, princi-

jially ill the quantity o f extension, but, rnutatis m u ta n d is, all that
is true in the one quantity is equally true in the other,
N oav if, in t h c first figure, avc c o n s i d e r th e s e e i g h t m o o d s w ith
re f e re n c e to th c g e n e r a l rules, avc shall find t h a t
I ,jjj jji jjqg afford c o r r e c t sy llo g ism s ;
b u t o n ly th o s e Avbich are c o n s t r u c t e d in c o n f o r m it y to t h e fo llow
in g J i a r t i c u l a r rules, Avhieh a r e , hoAvever, in th is figure, id e n t ic a l Avith
th o s e Ave h a v e a lr e a d y g iv e n as g e n e r a l laAvs o f e v e r y peifeet and
r e g u l a r c a te g o rie a l syllogism .
The syiiib 1 o f the First Figure is,
Al { to r F.xtcnK ion; Y . | fo r C o m p re h e n sio n .
The fir.st rule i.s, The sumption must he universal. W ere it

particular, and, consequently, the subsumption universal, as:
I C f n a c h m a n n , L n g ik , S 129 E d .
L ec t. X X- LOGIC. 289
S o m e M a re P ;
B u i a ll S a re M ,
we could not know whether S were precisely the part of M which

lies in P , and it might be altogether out o f P. In that case, a uni
versal negative conclusion would be the correct; but this cannot
be drawn, as there is no negative premise, and tliongh accident
ally perlia])S true, still it is not a necessary consequence o f the
premises. '
The second rule is, Tlie subsumption must be affirmative.
Were it negative, and consequently the sumption affirmative, in
that case S would be wholly excluded from the sjihere o f M ; and,
consequently, the general rule under which M stands would not be
applicable to S. T h u s :
A ll M are P ;
N o S is M ;
N o S is P .
A l l colors a re p h y s ic a l p h ve n o m e n a ;
N o so u n d is a color;
T h erefo re, no so u n d is a p h y s ic a l phce n o m en m ,
Here the negative conclusion is false, but the affirmative, which

would be true, all sounds are p h y s ic a l phcenom ena, cannot be
inferred from the premises, and, therefore, no inference is competent
at all.
Thus, in this figure, o f the eight moods generally admissible, I A
and 0 A are excluded by the first; A E and
L e g itim a te m o o d s o f ^ 0 by the second rule. There remain, there-
^''rhefrTymbois legitimate moods, A A, E A,
A I, and E I. Tlie lower Greek logicians de
noted them by the terms,
rpdppaTadEypaipe, Fpat p i S i , Tex<'*/cdy ;
the Latin schoolmen by the terms
B a r b a r a , C d a re n t, D a r i i , a n d F e r io .
1 R a c h m a iin , L o g ik , } 1.30, p. 203. E d 2 B a c h m a n n , as a b o v e . E d . [C f. D e r o -

[S o H o llm a iin , P/iil. RationcU is, gum Logica d o n , L ogica R e stitu ta , V . i v . p. U lr ic h , as
ru lgo d icitu r, f 461. G o ttin g se , 1746. L o v a n i- a b o v e . L o v a n ie u s e s , a s a b o v e . Ilo I I m a n n ,
e iisc s, C oin n itn ln ria in Isa g . Porphyrii ei in L o g ica , 462.]
om nes Libros A risl. de D ia ltc tic a , A n al. Prior, L .
i. p , 215, L o v a n ii, 1547. U lr ic li, In stit. Log. 3 F o r a n a c c o u n t o f tlie se m nem onic#..
et M el., j 191, Jenas, 1785. F o n s e c a , I n s tit. se e Discwssions, p. 671, s e c o n d e d itio n . Ed
D ia l., L . v i. c. 21, p. 363.]
37
290 LOGIC. L ect. XX
In the L atin syiuhols, Avhich arc far m ore ingenious and complete,
and in regard to the history o f Avhich I shall say som ethin g in the
sequel, the vowels are alone a t present to he considered, and of
these the first exjircsses th e sumption, th e second the suhsumption,
and the third tho conclusion. T h e correctness o f thcsc is shown
hy th e following examples and delineations.
T h e first mood of this ficrure:
I. B a r b a r a . I. B arbara.
A U M a re P ;
A l l S are J I ;
T h e r e fo r e , a ll S a re P .
A l l th a t is com posite is d isso lu b le ;

A U m a te r ia l th in g s are c o m p o s ite ;
T h erefo re, a ll m a teria l th in g s a re dissoluble.
II. C elarent. II. C e l a r e n t .
N o J I is P ;
A ll S a re J I ;
T h e r e fo r e , no S is P .
N o f i n ite being is ex em p t fr o m e r r o r ;
AU m en a re f i n ite b ein g s;
T h erefo re, no m an is ex em p t fr o m error.
I II . D arii. III. D a r ii.
A U J I a re P ;
S o m e S a re J I ;
T h erefo re, some S a re P .
A ll virtu es are la u d a b le ;
Srjme h a b its are v irtu e s ;
T h erefo re, some h a b its a r e lau d a b le.
T his diagn'am makes it manifest to th e eye w hy th e conclusion

c-'in otdy he pai'ticular. As oidy a p art o f the sphere S lies in the
Sjihere M, this part m u st lie in the sphere P , as the whole o f J\I lies
therein ; hut it i.s o f this ji.art only th a t a n y th in g can he afiirnied in
the eonclnsion. 'flie, oth e r jiarl o f S can either lie Avliolly o ut of
I ', or Jiartly in I* h n t out of JÎ; h u t as the premises afiinii nothing
o f this jiart, the eoneliision cannot, therefore, include \t.
L kct. XX. LOGIC. 291
IV . Ferio- IV. F e r io .
iVoM tsP;
Som e S a re ;
T h e re fo re , som e S a r e not P .
N o v ir tu e is r e p r e h e n s ib le ;
S o m e h a b its a re v irtu e s ;
T h erefo re, som e h a b its a re not reprehensible.
T h e c o n c lu s io n in th is case c a n o n ly b e p a r tic u la r , as o n ly a p a r t
o f S is p l a c e d in t h e s p h e r e o f M . T h e o t h e r p a r t o f S m a y lie o u t
o f P o r in P . B u t o f th is th e p rem ises d e te rm in e n o th in g . *
S e c o n d F ig u r e . T h e s y m b o l o f t h e S e c o n d F i g u r e is
PM , S M,
fo r E x te n s io n ; f o r C o m p r e h e n s io n .
SM , P M,
T h i s f i g u r e is g o v e r n e d b y t h e t w o f o l l o w i n g
Its rules.
rules. O f t h e s e t h e f irs t is O n e p r e m i s e m u s t
b e n eg ativ e.^ F o r w e re th e re tw o aflirm ativ e prem ises, a s:
A llT a r e ll-,
A ll B a r e l i ]
A n m etals a r e m in e r a ls ;
A l l pebbles a re m in era ls;
t h e c o n c l u s i o n w o u l d b e A l l pehhUs a re m eta ls, w h i c h w o u ld be

false.
T h e s e c o n d r u l e i s : T h e s u m p t i o n m u s t b e u niv ersal.^ * AVere
1 B a c h m a n II, io g iF , p. 204200. Ed. S c o tu s .] [q u m stio n e s in A n a l. P rio r., L . \. q

2 [.See D e r o d o ii, Logica R c stitn ln , P . iv . p. 20, f. 208. E d .]
6-37. I lo llin a iin , L og/M , 463, 464. L o v a n i- 3 S e e l lo l lm a u n , a n d L o v a n ie n s e s , as c ite d
e n s e s. Com . in A risl. A n a l. P rior., L . i. p. 218. above. E d .
292 LO G IC. L ect. X X .
the suniption particular, the subsumption behooved to be universal;

tor otherwise no conclusion would be possible. B u t in that case the
sumption, whether affirmative or negative, would afford only an
absurd conclusion.'
If affirmative, as
Som e P are M ;
N o S is M ;
T h erefo re, som e S a re noi P .
So m e a n im a ls la y eggs, i. e . a re e g g -la yin g th in g s ;

N o horse la y s eggs, i. e. is a n y eg g -la y in g t h i n g ;
T h e re fo re , som e horses a re not a n im a ls .
K negative, as
S o m e P a re not M ;
A ll? , are M ;
T h e re fo re , some S a r e not P .
S o m e m in era ls a r e not p recious .stones;

A U to p a zes a re p recio u s s to n e s ;
T h e re fo re , som e to p a zes a r e not m inerals ;
in both cases the conclusion is absurd.

There thus remain, say the logicians, only the moods Cesare,
Catne.i(refi, Eestino, JJaroco.
1 C esare. I. C e s a r e .
N o P is M ;
A l l S are M ;
T h erefo re, no S is P .
N o th in g m a te ria l h a s fr e e w ill;
A l l s p ir its havc f r e e w i l l ;
T h erefo re, no sjrnrit is m a teria l.
n . C am estrea. II. C a m e s t r e s .
A l l P are M ;
JVoSi sM;
A l l colors a re v isib le ;
N o so u n d is v is ib le ;
T h erefo re, no s o u n d is a color.
1 [C f. F o n s e c a , IiD tit. D ia l., L . v i. c. 21, p. 303.]

L fx t. XX. LOGIC. 293
H I . F e s tin o . II I. F e s t i n o .
N o 1> is M ; N o vice is p raisew orth y;

Seme 8 are J I ; Some actions are p ra isew orth y;
Therefore, some S a r t not P. Therefore, some actions are not vices.
The diagram here is alternative, for as the conclusion can only

comprise a part o f S, as it is only the consequence o f a partial suh
ordination of S to M, the other parts o f S which are out of M may
either lie within or without P. The conclusion can, therefore, ouly
be particular.
I V . B a fo c o . IV . B a r o c O .
AU P are J I ;
Some S are not J I ;
Therefore, some S are not P .
AU birds are ovip a ro u s;

Some antm als are not oviparous;
Therefore, some anim als are not b ird s. ^
1B ach m a n n , L o g ik , a s a b o v e . E d .
LECTURE XXI.
S E C T I O N II. OF T H E P R O D U C T S OF T H O U G H T .
III. D O C T R IN E OF R E A S O N IN G S .
S Y L L O G IS M S . T H E IR D IV IS IO N S A C C O R D IN G T O E X T E R N A L
FORM .
F IG U R E T H IR D A N D F O U R T H .
In o u r last L e c tu re , after te n n in a tiu g th e g e n e ra l co n sid eratio n

. . o f t h e n a t u r e o f F i g u r e a n d M o o d in C a te g o r i c a l
K ecapitulatiou.
S y llo g is m s , w e w e r e e n g a g e d in a r a p i d s u r v e y
o f th e n in etee n leg itim ate and usefu l m o o d s b e lo n g in g to th e four
figures, a c c o r d i n g to tb e receiv ed d o c trin e o f logicians (conse-
r p i e n t l y , e . v c l n s i v c l y in F x ten sio n ) ; nnd I h a d d isp lay e d to you
tb e law s a n d m o o d s o f th e F i r s t a n d S e c o n d F ig u re s . B efore, th e r e
fore. p r o c e e d i n g t o a n y c r i t ic is m o f t b i s d o c t r i n e , i t b e h o o v e s u s to
t e r m i n a te t h e v ie w o f t h e t w o r e m a i n i n g figures.
T o e a c h o f t h e first t w o fig u res, lo g ic ia n s at-
Third Figure. t i i b u t c f o u r m o o d s ; t o t h e t h i r d t h e y c o n c e d e
s ix ; and to t b e f o u r t h five. The s c h e m e o f t h e T h i r d F i g u r e , iu
F x t e n s i o n , is
M P,
M S.
T h i s f i g u r e ( a l w a y s in e x t e n s i o n ) is g o v e r n e d b y t b e t w o f o l lo w
in g law s : th e first is, The su b su m ijtio n
m u s t b e afiirm ativ e.' W e r e tb e m in o r p rem ise a
n e g a t i v e , n s in t h e s y l l o g i s m ,
A ll M arc P; A V fiddles are musiccd instruments;

N o M IS S; B u t no fid d le is a fiu te;
1 (.See A ri.M otlc, A n al. I^ io r., ). C, H 8, 10. I lo llr n a n ii, L o g ica , 406. L o v a n ie n s c s , In An.
P rior.. L. i. p. 220.]
L ect. X X I. LOGIC. *290
Therefore, no S is P ,
i iu ru t h e c o iic lii.sio n w o u l d b e r i d i c u l o u s ,
Therefore, no f a t e is a m u sic a l in stru m en t. F o r 31 a n d S c a n l i o t l i
e x c l u d e e a c h o t h e r , a n d y e t b o t h V.e w i t h i n t h e s p h e r e o f P .
T h e second l a w is, T h e c o n c l u s i o n m ust be p articu lar, and
jia rtic n la r alth o u g h b o th p rem ises are u n iv e rsa l.' T h is m ay be
s h o w n b o t h in a t i ir m a tiv e a n d n e g a t i v e sy llo g is m s . In th e ease o f
affirm ativ e sy llo g ism s, a s :
A ll M a r e P ;
B u t a ll M a re S ;
h e r e , y o n w ill o b s e r v e , 31 lies in t w o d if fe r e n t s p h e re s P a n d S,
a n d t h e s e n n i s t in t h e c o n c l u s i o n b e c o n n e c t e d in a r e l a t i o n of sub
o rd in a tio n . But S and P m ay be d isp a rate n o tio n s,^ a n d , c o n
se q u en tly , not to bc so e o iiu o eted ; an absurd co n clu sio n w ould,
therefore, be th e result. F o r e x a m p le ,
A l l hh 'd s a re a n im a ls w ith f e a t h e r s ;
B u t a ll b ir d s a re a n im a ls ivith a h e a r t;
T h e re fo re , a ll a n im a ls w ith a hea rt a re a n im a ls w ith fe a th e r s
A g a in , say th e lo g i c i a n s , in r e g a r d to n e g a tiv e s : In th ese

o n ly th e su in p tin ii ca n b e n e g a tiv e , as th e s u b s u m p tio n (b y th e first
ru le ) m u s t be affirm ative. T hus:
N o M is P ; N o s ilv e r is iron ;
or,
B u t a ll J I a re S ; B u t a ll s ilv e r is a m in era l.
H e re th e con clu sio n JTo S is P , JSfo m in era l is iron, w o u l d

b e false.
T e s t i n g t h e e i g h t p o s s ib le m o o d s in E x t e n s i o n b y th e s e special
ru le s, t h e r e r e m a i n f o r t h i s f ig u r e , six, w h i c h b y t h e L a t i n logician.s
have been nam ed, D a ra p ti, Jfelapton, D isa m is, D a tis i, liocarclo,
F eriso n . T h e first m o o d o f th is fig u re is:
I D a r a p t i. I . D a r a p t i .3
a re P ;
B u t a ll J I a re S ;
T h erefo re, some S a re P ;
or.
A l l g ild in g is m e ta llic ;
A l l g ild in g shines ;
T h e re fo re , som e th in g s th a t sh in e a re m etallic.
1 [ P u t see H o llm a n n , Logica, 332, 458. t h e c o m jir e lic i.s id ii o f tlieii' c o iiiin c ii .viihjec;
L o v a n ie n s e s , 7)1 a n . Prior., L. i. p. 220.] M. S e e a b o v e , p. 158. K i).
2 D isp a ra te n otion s, i. e., cobrdinate parts of 3 [Some of th e ancient logicians, among
296 LOGIC. L e c t . X X I.
Here it i.'? ninnife.'st that M cannot at oncc lie in two different

sphere.s unless these partially involve, partially intersect each other.
But only iiartially; for as both P and S are more extensive than M,
and are both only connected through i\I ( i.e . through a jiart of
tbemselve.s), they cannot, except jiartially, be identified with each
other.
The second mood of this figure i.s,
II F e la p to n . II. F e l a r t o n .
N o M is P ;
T h e re fo re , some S a r e not P ;
o r.
N o m a te r ia l substance is a m oral su b je c t;
B u t o il th a t is m a te r ia l is ex ten d ed ;
T h e re fo re , som ething ex ten d ed is not a m oral subject.
\on will observe, that according to this diagram, the conclusion

ought to be N o S is P, because tbe whole o f S lies out of tbe
s])herc of P; and as in tlie concrete example, tbe notion extended
is viewed as out of the notion raontl subject, we might eonelude,
N o th in g extended is a m o ra l .subject. But this conclusion, tbougb
materially correct, cannot, however, be formally inferred from the
premises. In tbe sum)ition, indeed, the whole of j\I is excluded
from the sphere o f P ; but in the subsumption 31 is included in the
sjihere S, that i.s, we think that the notion 31 is a part of the notion
S. N o w in tbe conclusion, S is brought under P, and the conclusion
o f a categorical syllogism, in reference to its quantity, is, as you
remernfier, by tbe third general law regulated by tbe quality of the
subsumption. But as in thc present case thc snbsnmjition. notwith
standing tbe universality o f the expression, only judges o f apart of
olhf-rs IoryilijT)-, have made two moods of 23, 24, Aid. 15.31. Philoponufl,/n 4/iaI.'Pnor,,
Darapti, as Arlstolle himself does in Ccsare L. i. c. 6, f. 18 b. Apuleius. D e I I iM tw l. D oci.
and I'amej-tres, ill Di(.amis and Dalisi. .See Plat., L, iii. ppfra, p. 37. 38. ed. Elmeiihorf-l.]
Ilfx-thitis. I)f S y lln g iim o C au g o rirn . L. ii.. Op-
rrn, p TDinltbi. Cf. /.abarclla, Oj>era Lngita, 1 [Ari.tolle gives Fapemo, Anal. Prior, i. 7-
D< Quarta Figura Syllog., pp. 119, 120 tl seq. (Hurgersd>ck, In stit. L o g ia r, L. 11 0. 7, p-
A lex . Aphrodteiensis, In Anal. Prior , I. 5, ff. 109, Caniab., 1017.)]
[J:C T . X X I. LOGIC. 297
S ; the eonclusion can, in like innnneiq onlj' jm lg e o f a p a r t of S.

O f the other jiarts o f S thelO is n o th in g enounced in the jireraises.
T h e relation betw een S and P could likewise be as follows:
N o M is P ;
B u i a ll M are S ;
or,
N o p ig e o n is a h a w k ;
B u t a ll p ig e o n s a re b ir d s ;
H e re the conclusion could n o t be a universal iieg.ative, There-

fo r e , no S is P , Therefore, no b ird is n Juiu'k fur the sjihere of
S [bird) is g re a te r than th.at of either M [jrigeon) or P [hcnch) \ it
may, however, be a jiarticulnr neg.ative Therefore,"som e S are n o t
P {therefore, som e birds are not h aieks), because tbe sumjition
has excluded M and P [pig eo n and haiok) from each oth e rs sjihere,
and, consequently, th e jiart o f S which is equal to M is different
from th e p a rt of S which is equal to P . B u t if this be th e ease
when the subsum ption has a universal expression, th e same, a f o r
tiori, is true when it is particular.
T h e third m ode of this figure is:
III. Disamis I I I . D isam is.
S o m e M a re P ;
T h e re fo re , som e S a re P ;
o r,
Som e a cts o f h o m icid e a r e la u d a b le ;

B u t a ll acts o f hom icide are c r u e l;
T h erefo re, some a ucl a d s a re laudable.
T h e fourth m ood of thi.s figure is :
IV. Datisi. IV . D a tisi.
A im areV]
B u t som e M a re S ;
T h erefo re, some S a r e P ;
o r,
A n acts o f h o m icid e a re c r u e l;
Som e acts o f ho m icid e a re la u d a b le ;
T h erefo re, som e Id itd a b k a cts a re cruel.
38
298 LOGIC. L ect. X X I.
This diagram makes it manifest tliat more than a single case is

possible in this mood. A s the subsnmption is particular, the eon-
clusiou can only bring that part o f S whicb is M into identity with
P ; o f the other parts of P there can be nothing determined, and
these other parts, it is evident, may either lie wholly out 'of, or
partly within, P.
The lifth mood of this figure i s :
V. liocardo. V. B ocardo.
S o m e M are not P ;
T h e r e fo r e , some S a re not P ;
or,
S o m e syllo g ism s a rc not r e g u la r ;

B u t a ll syllo g ism s a re th in g s im p o r ta n t;
T h erefo re, some im p o r ta n t th in g s a re not th in g s re g u la r.
T he sixth mood o f this figure i s :
V I. Ferison. A^L F e u i s o n .
N o M is P ;
B u t som e M a re S :
T h erefo re, som e S are not P ;
or,
N o truth is w ith o u t r e s u lt;
S o m e tr u th s a re m is u n d e r s to o d ;
T h erefo re, som e th in g s m isu n d ersto o d a re not w ith o u t r e s u lt.
Here, as in the promises, only that part o f S which is M is

excluded from P, consequently the other ]>arts of S may either like
wise lie wholly out of 1, or partially iu I-*. *
So much for the moo<ls o f the third figure.
1 liach m au n , L o g ik , i 132, p. 211218. E d .

L eci. XXI. LO G IC . 299
F o u r t h F ig u r e . T h e formula o f th e F o u rth F ig u re is :
P M,
M S.
I ts L a w s. t( T his figure is regulated by th re e laws.

I. O f these th e first is, I f th e sum ption be afiirmative, the
subsumption m ust be universal. T h e necessity of this law is easily
seen. F o r if we had th e prem ises:
A ll P are M;
B u t some M a re S;
in this case AI may, or m ay not, be a notion superior to P ,

On the former alternative, if AI be high er than P , and likewise
liiglier than S, then the whole o f S m ig h t lie contained u n d er P .
In this case, the proper conclusion would be a universal afiirmative;
wllicll, however, can not follow from the premises, as th e subsum p
tion, cx Jnjpotliesi, is particular. On the la tte r alternative, even if AJ
were not superior to S, still, since P is only a p a rt o f AI, we could
not know Avhether a p a rt of S were contained un der P or not. F o r
exam p le:
A l l m en a re a n im a ls ;
B u t some a n im a ls a re a m p h ib io u s.
F r o m t h e s e p r e m i s e s n o c o n c l u s i o n c o u l d b e dr a A v n .
I I. T h e secon d rule by Avhich this figure is g o v e r n e d is I f
either premise be n eg a tiv e, the sum p tion m ust be uuiversal.
S u p p o s e Ave h a d t h e p r e m i s e s
So m e P a re nol M;
B u i a ll M are S ;
T h e r e fo r e , som e S a re not P;
or,
S o m e a n im a ls a re not fe a th e r e d ;
B u t a ll fe a th e r e d a n im a ls a re b i r d s ;
T h erefo re, som e b ird s a re not a n im a ls .
I n th is case th e w h o le o f S l i e s A v ith in t h e sphere o f P ; th ere

c a n n o t , t h e r e f o r e , folloAV a p a rticu la r n eg a tiv e c o n clu sio n , and if
n o t t h a t , n o c o n c l u s i o n a t all. T h e sam e A v o ii ld h a j i p o n Avere th e
sm n |itio n a p articu lar affirm ative, a n d th e su b su m p tio n a u n iv ersa l
n eg a tiv e.
I I I . T h e th ird rule of th e fourth figure is I f th e subsum ption
300 LOG IC. L e c t. XXL
bc affirmntivc, the eonelnsion ninst be particnlnr. T his (th e logi-

ci.nns say) is manifest. F o r in this figure S is higher than M, and
higher than P , consequently only a ]>art of S can be P.
I f wc test by these rules th e eigh t possible moods, th e re are in
this figure five found com petent, which, am ong sundry o th e r names,
have obtained the following: JBramantip, Camenes, D h n a ris,
Fcsapo. Fresison.
O f tliese moods the first is:
I B r a m a n tip . I. B k a j i a n t i p , o t h e r w i s e B a s i a l i p , e te .
A l l P a re J I ;
A l l J I a re S ;
T h erefo re, some S a r e P ;
o r,
A l l greyhoH m ls are dogs ;

B u t a ll dogs a r e q u a d r u p e d s ;
T h erefo re, some q u a d r u p e d s a re g reyh o u n d s.
T h e second m ood is called:
II. C am en e*. H , C a m e x e s , C a l e .m e s , o r C a l e n t e s , e tc .
A l l P a rc J I ;
B u t no JI is S ;
T h erefo re, no S is P ;
o r,
A l l r u m in a tin g a n im a ls h a ve f o u r sto m a c h s;
B u t no a n im a l w ith f o u r stom achs is c a r n ir o r o n s ;
T h erefo re, no ca rn iv o ro u s a n im a l ru m in a tes.
T h e third mood in the fourth figure is variously d e n o m in a te d :
H I . D im a ris. III. D i m a u i s , o r D i . m a t i s , o r D i b a t i s , e tc .
S om e P a r e M ;
B u t -all J I a re S ;
T h e r e fo r e , som e S a re P ;
Sr/rne p r a c tic a lly virtu o u s m en a re necessita ria n s ;

A U n ec essita ria n s s p e c u lid iv e ly sulvrw t the d istin ctio n o f vice a n d
v irtu e ;
T h rrrfo rp , som e who sp ecu la tiv ely su b vert thc d istin ctio n o f vice
a n d v irtu e a re p r a c tic a lly virtu o u s m en.
T h e fourth m ood o f this figure is:

L ect. XXL LOGIC. 3 01
fV . F esap o. IV. F esapo.
N o T is M;
A ll M are S ;
T h erefo re, some S a re not P ;
or,
N o negro is a l l i m l o o ;
B u t a ll H in d o o s a re b la c k s ;
T h e re fo re , som e b la c k s a re not negroes;
or,
A cco rd ing to the first o f these diagrams, all S is excluded from

P , and thus the conclusion w ould seem w arran ted t h a t N o S is
P . T h is conclusion cannot, howcver, be inferred; for it Avould vio
late th e third rule o f this figure. F o r while Ave, iu the sumption,
have ouly excluded M, th a t is, a p a rt of S, from P , and as the oth er
Jiarts o f S aie not taken into account, we are, consequently, not
entitled to deny the.ê ot P . T h e first diagram, therefore, Avhieh
sensualizes only a single case, is uot coiidequate Avith th e logical
formula, and it is necessary to add th e second in ord er to exhaust
it. T h e second diagram is, therefore, likewise a sensible represen
tation ot F e s a p o ; and th a t diagram makes it evident th a t th e con
clusion can only be a p articula r negative.
T h e fifth and last mood is ;
A'. F r e s is o n . V . F r e s is o n .
N o P is M ;
B u t some M a re S ;
T h erefo re, som e S a re not P ;
or,
N o m oral p r in c ip le is a n a n im a l im p u ls e ;
B u t some a n im a l im p u lses a re p r in c ip le s o f a c tio n ;
T h erefo re, some p r in c ip le s o f a c tio n a re not m oral p r in c ip le s.
or,
802 LOGIC. L e c t. XXL
The clcmonstrntion is here the same as in the former mood.

Since tiie subsumption only places a part of AI in the sphere o f S,
the conclusion, whose quantity is determined hy tho subsumption,
can only deny P o f that part o f S which is likewise a part of AI.
Having thus concluded theêxjiosition of the various Figures aud
Aloods o f Syllogisms, as recognized by logicians,
A lood nnd F ig u r e iu . ^ r\ *. -n
C om prehen.M on rofcroiico to Fxtcnsivc Quantity, It will not
be necessary to say more than a word in general,
touching thcse figures and moods in reference to Coinjirehensive
Quantity. W hatever mood and figure i.s valid and regular in the
one, is valid and regular in the other; aud every anomaly is eqnallv
an anom.aly in both. The rulcs of the various figures which wc
havc considered in regard to syllogisms in Fxtensioii, are all, with
out excc])tion or qualification, ajijilicable to syllogisms in Compre
hension, witli this single jiroviso, that, as the same proposition forms
a difterent premise in the several (piantities, all that is said o f the
sumption in extension, should bc understood o f the subsumption in
coinjtrehcnsion, and all that is said o f the sunqition in comjirehen
sion. should be understood o f the subsumjition in extension. What,
therefore, has hitherto been, or may hereafter be, stat ed of the mood
and figure o f one quantity, is to be viewed as apjilicablo, mu tatis
rnutandis, io the other. This being understood, I jiroceed, in the
first place, to show you that the comjilex seiies
C r itic ism o f the logical fomis wliicli I have ennmertited may
tnglcai'formr**^'"^* lic Considerably diminished, aiid the doctrine of
syllogism, consequently, reduced to a higher
simjilicity. In doing tliis I shall consider, first, the Figures, and,
secondly, thcir Afoods.
Now, as I'cgards the number of flic Figures, yon are aware, from
, ...
1 . riiu ! ignrcfl.
what I formerly stated, tluit Aristotle only con-
teinplatcd tho three first, :ind that the fourth,
iiiciourth. which is, by those who do not misttike it for au
Aristotelic form, referred with little jirob.ability to Gtden, w.as wholly
uniioliccd until the end of the twelfth or the beginning of the thir
teenth centnrv, w hen it waas incidentally communicated, .as :m inno
vation o f the jihysieitm of Perganms, by the celebrated Averroe.s, in
bis comrnenttiry on the P r io r Am ihitics o f Aristotle, but by Aver-
roes liitnself rejeeted :is an illegitimate novelty. Tho notice of this
figure by the eomment.ator u.as, liowev(r, enough ; and though re-
jiudiatod by tlio gre.at majority of tlie rigid Aristotelians, the author-
I lla c lir n a iin , L o g ik , 19.3, ]) 2 1 8 22.3. - In Annl P r io r , \.S . O p e,a A r is to td is , t. I.,

hit f . 78. V e iie t iis , 1500. E d .
L ect. XXL LOGIC. 303
ity of Scotns, by whom it was defended,* secured for it at last, if not

a universal approval, at least a very general toleration, as a legiti
mate though an awkward form. The arguments indeed by which
it was attempted to evince thc incompetency o f this figure, were
not of a character calculated to enforce assent; for its inference is
not less valid than that o f any other, however tortuous and per
verse it may be felt to be. Tn fact, the logicians, in consc(|uence of
their exclusive recognition of the reasoning in extension, were not in
possession of the means o f showing, that this figure is a monster un
deserving O o f toleration,' far less o f countenance and favor. T shall not,'
therefore, trouble yon with the inconelnsive reasoning on the part
either of those who have assailed or o f those who have defended
this figure, but .shall at once put yon in possession o f the ground on
which alone, I think, its claim to recognition ought to be disallowed.
In the first place, then, yon are aware that all reasoning is either
in the quantity o f comprehension, or in the
G ro u n d s o n w liic h qunntity o f extension. Yon are aware, in the
secoiul, that thcsc quantities are not only differ
o u g h t to b r c L a iim v c 7
ent, hnt, as existing in an inverse ratio o f each
other, opposed. Finally, in the third jilace, you are aware that,
though opposed, so that the maximum of the one is the minimum
of the other, yet the existence o f each supposes the existence of the
other; accordingly there can be no extension without some compre
hension, no comprehension without some extension.
This being tbe case, it is evident that, besides the definite reason
ing from whole to part, and from parts to whole,
A c r o ss in fe r e n c e within the soveml quantities and in their per-
p o ssib lc fro m E x lc n - ,, . , , , .
. . ,
s io n t o C o m p r e h e n -
pendiciilar lines, there is also competent

nn in-
Sion a n d vice versa. definite inference across from the one quantity to
the other. For if the existence o f the one quan
tity be only jiossible under the condition of the other, we may
always, it is self-evident, in the first place, from the affirmation of
anything in extension, indefinitely atfirm it in comjirehension, as,
recijuocally, from the affirmation of anything in comjirehension, w<
may indefinitely affirm it in extension ; and, in the second jilace,
from llie negntion of anything in extension, Ave may absolutely deny
1 T ills sta te m e n t is m a rk ed as d o u b tfu l in c r n c lu s i o n is ; p er c o n s e q iie n s n e c d iv e r s ita s

th e A u th o r 's C oininoii-pU '-cc B o o k . S c o lu s fig u n e ."
{Qiirr.u. in A n al. P rior., \ . q . 34) c.x p ressly rc- T h e F o u r th I 'ig u r e is, h o w e v e r , sa id by
jccts th c r o u r t h F ig u r e , l i e s a y s : S o lu m B id ig c r ( O 'S e n sK Wn rt Fat.?;, ]i. 337) t o h.a\ e
trilm s m o d is p o te st lie ii clcbita o r d iiia tio re- h een in tr o d u c e d by G a le n a n d .Scolus. llo.s-
ppcctu e x ir c m o r u in s e c u n d u m subjectiO i!e:ii ])in ia ii:is (D e Controver.dis D ia h r lir is , c x i x .)
et ])r ;c d ic a tio n c m ; ig lt u r trcs lig iin e c t n o :i a ttr ib u te s (e r r o n e o u s ly ) th e in v e n tio n o f th is
p lurcs . . . . q u ia p er s o la m tra n sp o .? itio n en i lig u r e to S c o t u s . C o m jia re a ls o N o ld iiis .
n o n p e r v e u it d iv e r s ita s a lic u ju s p.-'.'cmissa; n e c Logica R ecognita, c. x iii. 4, p. 277. E d .
304 LOGIC. L e c t. XXl
it in comprehonsion, as, reciprocally, from the negation o f anything

in comprehension, we may absolutely deny it in exteusiou.
Now, what has uot been observed, such is exclusively the iufcr-
once iu the Fourth Figure ; its two last rules
T in s th e n a tu r e o f nothiuir hut ail euuuciation of these
th e in fe r e n c e in tlie , ^ ,
K o u rih F ig u r e . two coiulitioiis of a cvoss inference from the one
quantity to the other; and the first rule will he
hereafter shown to he only an error, the result of not observing that
certain moods are only founded on the accident of a transposed
order of the premises, and, therefore, constitute no subject for a logi
cal legislation.
To prove this statem ent o f the nature o f the inference in the
Iroi e d a n d iiiu s tr a - fourtli figure, it is Only iieccssary to look at its
te d . abstract formula. In extension this is
P is M ;
M is S ;
S is P .
Here in the premises P is contained under M, and M is contained

under S ; that is, in the premises S is the greatest whole nnd P the
smallest part. So far, this syllogism in extension is projterly a syl
logism iu comprehension, iii whicli the subject of the conelusion is
tho gi'ealest whole, and its pi'cdicate the smallest part. From such
premises we, therefore, exjiect, that the conclusion carrying out what
was estahiished in the antecedent, should affirm P as the part o f S.
In this, however, our expectation is disajipointed; for the reasoning
suddenly turns round in the conclusiou, and affirms S as a part o f P.
And how, it may he asked, is this evolution iu the conclusion com
petent, seeing that it was not prepared, and uo warrant given for it
in the [iremiscs. To this the answer is prompt and easy. The con
clusion in this figure is solely legitimated hy the circumstance, that
from an identity hetween the two terms in one quantity, we may
alwavs infer some identity hetween them in the otlier, and from a
non-identity hetween them in one quantity, we can always infer a
non-identity in the otlier. And that in this figure tliei'e is always
a transition in the conclusion from the one quantity, is evident; for
that notion which in the jiremises was the greatest whole, becomes
ill the conclusion the smallest jiart; and that notion which in the
Jiremises w;is the smallest p.ai't, heeomes iu the conclusiou the great
est wliole. N ow , how is this manamvre jiossihle? how are we
entitled to s;iv that hecause A contains all I], therefore B contains
some .A? Only, it is clear, hecause there is here a change from the
coiiiaiiiing of the one quantity to the containing o f the other; and
L e c t. XXL LOGI C. 305
because, each quan tity necessarily im p ly in g th e indefinite existence

o f the othei-, w c are co nseq u ently p erm itted to render this necessary
implication the ground o f a logical infei-ence.
It is manifest, however, in the first place, that such a cross and
hybrid nnd indirect reasoning from the one
T h is h y b r id in fe r - quan tity to tlic Other, ill the fourth figurc, is
e n c e i#, 1. U iiiia tu r a ).
Avholly of a different character and account from
the reasoning in the other three figures, iu which all inference,
whether upwards or downwards, is equable and homogeneous
within the same quantity. The latter in short is natural and easy;
the former, unnatural and perverse.
Ill the second place, the kind of reasoning competent in the fourth
figiii'c is wholly useless. The change from the
2. U seless. , , , 7. ,
one quantity to the other in the course of a syl
logism is Avarranted by no necessity, by no expediency. The reason
ing in each quantity is absolute and complete Avithin itself, and all
that can be accomplished in the one process can equally Avell be ac
complished in the other. The jumping, therefore, from extension to
comprehension, or from comprehension to extension, in the conclu
sion o f the fourth figure, is a feat about as reasonable and useful iu
Logic, as the jumping from one horse to another Avould be reason
able and useful in the race-course. Both are achievements possible ;
bnt, because possible, neither is, therefore, a legitimate exercise of
skill.
W e may, therefore, on the ground that the fourth figure involves
a useless transition from one quantity to another, reject it as a logi
cal figure, and degrade it to a mere logical caprice.
But, in the third jilace, there is a better ground ; th e inference,
though valid in itself, is logically, is scientifi-
3 . L o g ically in v a lid . cally, invalid. F o r the inference is on ly legiti
m ated b y the o ccult conversion o f th e one quantity into the other,
Avhich takes place in the mental process. T h ere is thus a step taken
in the reasoning AAhich is not o vertly expressed. W e r e the Avhole
process stated in language, as stated it logically ou gh t to be, instead
o f a simple syllogism Avith one direct conclusion, Ave should h.ave a
com p lex reasoning AAith tAvo c o n clu sion s; one conclusion direct and
im m ediate (the inference, to Avit, o f conversion), and from th a t im
m ediate conclusion another m ed iate and indirect, but Avhicli, as it
stands, appears as the one sole and exclusive conclusion from the
premises. Tliis ground, on w hich I think the fourth figure o u gh t to
be specially abolished, is stated w ith the requisite details in the L o g i
cal A p p en d ix contained in th e second edition o f m y D isc u ssio n s on
P h ilo so p h y }
3 9 1 p . 663 E d .
LECTURE XXII.
S T O I O F T E T O I . O O Y .
S E C T T G X II. OF T H E P R O D U C T S OF T H O U G H T
III. D O C T R IN E OF R E A SO N IN G S .
S Y L L O G IS M S . T H E IR D IV IS IO N S A C C O R D IN G TO E X T E R N A L
FORM .
C. R E G U L A R A N D IR R E G U L A R .
F IG U R E R E D U C T IO N .
In my Inst L ecture, after te rm in a tin g the view o f th e nineteen

M oods o f the F o u r Syllogistic F igures, accord-
Uecapiiuiaiion. doctriiic o f logicians, I en tered on the
co n sid eratio n , how far their doctrine concerning th e n u m b e r and
legitim acy o f these various figures and luood.s was correct. In the
co nduct o f this discussion, I proposed, first, to tr e a t o f th e F igures,
nnd, secondly, to tr e a t o f the Moods. Cornineneing, then, with th e
Figures, it is manifest th a t no e.veeptioii can jiossihly be ta ken to
th e first, wliich is, in p oint o f fact, no figure a t all, b u t tb e one reg
u la r, tb e one natural form o f ratiocination. T h e o th e r th ree fig
ures divide tbeinselvcs into tw o classes. T h e one o f these classes
coinprcliends tbe fo u rth ; tb e other, tb e second and third figures,
d'be fonrlb figure stands, on the common doctrine o f tb e logicians,
in a more nnfavorabk* situation th a n tbe second .and third. I t was
no t recognizcfl by A ristotle ; it obtained admission into tbe science
at a com paratively recent period ; it bas never in fact been univer
sally reco'jni/.ed ; ami its ju'ogress is manifestly inoi'c jicrvcrsc, cir
cuitous, and unnatural, than th a t o f any other.
In recrarrl to this fonrth figure, I stated th a t tbe controversy am ong
logicians toucbiiig its legitim acy bad been w ith o u t r e s u l t ; its op
ponents failing to show th a t it o n g b t to be rejected ; its defenders
failing to show th a t it was deserving o f recognition. I th en stated
t h a t the logicians, in tlieir one-sided view o f tb e reasoning process,
Lect. X X U . L O G I C . 307
had let slip the one gi-cat principle on which the le gitim acy of this
figure was to he determ ined. I then exjilained to yon th a t the jiecn-
liarity o f the fourth figure consists in this, t h a t th e premises are
ajiparently tlie jiremises of a syllogism in one kind of quantity, while
its conclusion is th e converted conclusion o f a syllogism in the other.
I t is th u s in every point o f view c onto rted and preposterous. Its
Jiremises are transposed, and th e conclusion follows from those, not
directly, b n t tlirongli the m edium of a conversion. I showed how,
and how far, this kind o f reasoning Avas com petent, and th a t though
th c inference in th e fourth figure is valid, it is inconvenient nnd nse-
Ic.ss, and therefore, th a t the form itself, th o u g h undoubtedly legiti
mate, is still only a legitim ate monster. H erew ith th e L ecture te r
minated.
N oaa', loo k in g sujierficially at the matter, it m igh t seem, from what
has n o w been said, that the fourth o u gh t to be
G en er a l c h a r a c te r o f at oncc exjiiinged froiu tlic scrics o f logical fi<Z-
th e S e c o n d , T h ir d , a n d , . . -n i
F o u r th F ig u r e s ^ closcr examination
sliow ns AVI 11
that this decision Avould be rash. In jioint o f
fact, all figure properly so called, th at is, CA'cry figure, with the e x
ception o f the first, m ust be rejected equally Avith the fourth, and on
the follow in g ground, that th e y do not, in virtue o f their ow n
expressed jiremises, accomjilish their ow n inference, bnt that this is
done b y the mental interpolation o f certain comjihinentary st(ps,
w itliout wbicli no eonelnsion in these figures could be draAvn. TI ica'
arc thus in fiict reasonings apparently simple, bnt in reality c o m p l e x ;
and when thc whole mental jiroeess is exjiressed, th e y are found to
be all o nly syllogism s in the first figure, Avith certain corollaries o f
the difterent projiositions intermingled.* T h is doctrine corresponds
with that o f the logieians, in so far as they, after Aristotle, have
allow ed that the last three figures arc o nly valid a*s reducible to the
first; and, to accomplisli this rednction, th e y have snjijilied us Avith
a m ultitude o f empirical rules, and lavished a world o f in g en u ity in
rendering the w o rk in g o f th ese com p lex rules more easy. From
W h a t e i y and thc com m on books on L ogic, yon
Latin ai.u G re e k a re o f co iirse a c q u a in te d A vith t h c i m j i o r t o f t h c
in iie m o in c i!, ih e ir au. co iiso iia u ts ill th e c a b a listic a l verses, B arbaru ,
Ihors. ^
Cehirent, Qic.
nnd it m u st lie confessed that,
taking these verses on their ow n ground, there are fcAV human
inventions Avhich disjilay a higher ing en uity. T h eir history is ap-
1 T liis d o c tr in e o f F ig u r e , w liic h is d e v e l- n'tri-r, i. p. 55, c d . R o s e :ik r a n z a n d S c h u b e r t

op ed in p a r a g r a p h l.x x v ., i.s m a in ly ta k e n F.i).
fro m K a n t. S e e his F.ssay, D ie Falsche S p itz -
fim lig k e it der v itr Syllogistisch en F ig u ren , 1702. 2 S e e D iscussions, p. GG6 . E d
308 LOGIC. L e c t . X X li
pnrently nltogotlier u n know n to logicians. T h e y were, in so far as

th e y relate to tlie three first or A ristotelic figures, the invention of
P e tr u s Ilispami.s, who died in 1277, P ojie Jo h n X X I I . (or as he is
reckoned by some th e X X L , and by others the X X .) . H e was a
native of Lisbon. I t is curious th a t the corresjionding G reek m n e
monics were, so far as I can discover, th e invention of his contem-
jiorarv Xicejihorus Blemm idas, who was designated P a tria rc h of
Constantinojile.' B e tw ee n them , thcse tw o logicians th u s divided
the tw o highest places in th e C hristian h ie ra rc h y ; b u t as the one
h ad hardly begun to roign w hen he was killed by th e downfall of
his jialace, so th e o th e r n eve r entered on his ofiice by accepting his
nomination at all. Tlie several works of the P o p e and the P a t r i
arch were for m any centuries the g r e a t text-books of Logic, the
one in th e schools o f th e G reek, th e oth e r in th e schools of the
L atin church.
T h e Greek symbols arc far less ingenious than th e L atin, as they
only m ark th e consecution, quantity, and quality
T h e G reek s y m b o ls o f tlio different jirojiositions o f the vaiious iiioods
Laiin'^*^'* t h r e e generally adm itted figures, w ithout
show ing to w h a t mood of th e first the moods o f
the otlier tw o figures are to be reduced, far less by w hat jiarticulai-
jirocess this is to bo done. All tliis is accomjilislied by (bf syiidiols
o f llio R om an Pontiff. . \ s to th e rel.ative originality, or the juaority
in jtoint ot date, of thcsc several inventions, I am niialde to .speak
with certainty. I t is jirobablc, how ever, th a t the Blem m idas was
th e first, both because his verses are th e simjiler and rudei-, and be
cause it is no t known tliat lie was accpiaiiited with th e ivritiiigs of
the W e ste rn logicians; w hereas I find th a t the Suminulm of His-
jianns are in a g re a t m easure ta ken, not indeed from the treatise of
Blemm idas \\\)Oi\'Dialect from the S yn o psis o f the Oryanon
of his som ew hat earlier eonteinjiorai-y Alicliael Psellus.
B ut the wliole o f th e rules given by logicians for the Reduction
o f Syllogisms are nnphilosopliicîl, for th e y are
Tl' 'I*''- m erely the emjiirical sta te m en ts of the ojiera-
rii)).-Iiii-till- Ih'c.iiclioii . *7. 1 1 . ! 1-1 1
ril " ui . |i hi l -
tniii o f a iirinciple
1 1
in detail, winch.
principle it-
.oi,hieai. self has been overlooked, but Avliicli, wlien once
r; tioindly exjilicatcd, siijiorsedes tbe whole com-
nli-x ajijiaratiis o f rules for its mechanical ajijilication.
If I succeed, therefore, in explaining to you how the last three
I r.iii K c I h sn iw in n s. p. C72. - E l), tlifi w o r k w llic ll };oe!i b y tb e n a m e o f I s c llu s

- '"e I '.a iii.a [ ll it tn r i a tie Vitis P nnti/icum b e iiip in a ll p r o b a b ility a t r a n s la t io n fro m I lis -
Row rinnTiim ,;, IS I. eI. ].j7 2 . E l)]. panu.", Ib e in n em o n ic.s, w itb o n e e x c e p tio n ,
3 T lie r ev erse is p r o b a b ly th e tr u e r a c c o u n t; b e in g o m ilte d . S e c D iscu ssio n s, p. 128. E d .
L k ct. X X II. LOGIC. 309
Figures arc only th e m utilated expressions of a complex mental

process, I shall not only su hvert their existence
T h e la s t llir ee F ig - . x - . n - i - i
u r e s .M .- y t h e .n u tiia ie d roasomug not Virtually identical
fxpressious of a com- witli the first figui'C, I sluill iiot O l d } ' relieve,
p ie x m e n ia l p r o c e ss, you fi'oiii tlic uccossitv of Studying tlio tcdious
a n d v ir t u a lly Id e n tic a l disgustiug rulcs of tlicir reduction, h u t in
w ith th e first. r -
fact vindicate th e g re a t jiriiieiples of reasoning
from apjiarent anomaly. For, iu the first place, if the three last fig
ures arc adm itted as genuine and origimd forms of reasoning, the
principle th a t all reasoning is th e recognition o f the relation of a
least p a rt to a g r e a te st whole, th ro u g h a lesser Avliole or g rea ter
part, is invalidated. F o r, in th e three la tte r figures, the middle
term does not really hold .the relation o f an in te rm edia te whole or
]art to the suhject and predicate o f th e conclusion; for either, in
the second figure, it contains th e m hotli, or, in th e third, is contained
hy them hoth, or, in the fourth, at once contains the g r e a te st whole
(that is, the predicate in extensive,^ th e subject in compreheiisive,
quantity), and is contained by the smallest p a rt (that is, the suhject
in extensive, th e predicate in comprehensive, q u an tity ). Iu the sec
ond Jilace, if these th ree figures are ad m itte d as indcjieud ent and
le gitim ate forms, the second general rule I gave you for categorical
syllogisms is invalidated in both its clauses. F o r it will no t hold
true, that every categorical syllogism m ust have an universal suinj>
tion and an aftirmative snbsumption. T h e law of the universal
q u an tity of the sumption is violated in th e th ird figure, hy Disamis
and Bocardo, in the fourth, hy Dirnaris; th e law of the afiirmative
quality o f the snbsum ption is violated, in th e second figure, by Ca-
inestrcs and B a r o c o ; and, in the fourth, h y Camenos. I, therefore,
proceed to reconcile all these anomalies by the extinction of the
last three figures, as more than accidental modifications of th e first,
and commence with th e following jiaragrapli.
^ LXXV. The three last (that is, Second, Third, Fourth)

Figures arc merely livbrid or mixed reasoii-
Par. LXXV. The . . i i r
second, Third, and steps of tlic j.i'occss are
F o u r th F ig u re s only oiily partially cxpiosscd. The uucxprcssod
a c c id e n ta l m odifloa- , l i-
tio n s or f .t h7,e F
Tni-r s t.. steps
1 arc,t iii to
general, conver.sive iiitcrciiccs,
which wc are entitled to make, 1 , F rom the
absolute negation o f a first notion as predicated o f a second, to
the absolute negation o f the second notion as predicated of the
f i r s t i f no A is B ; then no B is A ; 2, F ro m the total or
jiartial affirmation of a lesser class or notion of a greater, to the
partial affirmation o f th a t gre a te r notion o f th a t lesser, i f all
(or some) A fs B ; thexi some B is A .
310 L O G I C . L k ct. X X II.
T a k in gC* tlio figures

O and moods in tlieir common o r d e r :* in the
Second F ig u re the first mood is Cesare, of
J lo o d s o f S econd
Figure. 1. Cesare. wlllcll th e foiTinda IS :
No r/s M;
B n t a ll S a re M ; '
T h e re fo re , no S is P .
H ere the ostensible or expressed snmjition, H o P is M, is m entally

converted into the real snmjition by th(* inference, Then no M is
P. Tlie oth e r propositions follow regularly, v iz .:
B u t a ll S a re M ;
T h erefo re, no S is P .
In reality Coiarent. T h c real syllogisui, fiilly cxpresscd, is th u s :
I te a l S u m p ti o n , . . . . N o J I is P ;
S u l i s u n i p t i o n , ................B u t a ll S a re J I ;
C o n c lu .s io n ....................... E r g o , no S is P .
T o save time, I .^hall h e n c e fo rw a rd sta te the com plem entary proji-

ositiiins which constitute th e real and jiroxim ate parts o f th e syl
logism, by the nam e o f real, proxim ate, or interpolated siiinjition,
snbsuiiij)ti(in, or eonelnsion ; and those who take notes may simjily
m ark tlic'C, by jilacing th e m w ithin brackets. T o avoid confusing
the conversit c inference with the ostensible conclusion o f the syl
logisiti, I sliall mark the former hy th e illative conjunction then;
the latter hy the illative eonjinietion therefore. I shall take the
concrete exninjilcs which I chanced to give in illustration of the
various inocds. In Cesare th e concrete examjile w as:
0 - t f i i s i l ) l f .S u m p tio n , . . . . . N o th in g that is m n te r in l has fr e .e w i l l ;

Ib 'u l, In U T p o liiti-il, .S iiin p iio ii, . . . . ( T hen nothing that h a s fr e e w ill is m a te r ia l ; )
. S n t i 'U r n p l i o i i , ................................................. B u i a ll s/jirils hare f r e e w i l l ;
C o n c lu s io n ...................................................................T h e r e fo r e , no s p ir it is m a lerin l.
d'hrow ing out o f account th e ostensible snmjition, and considering

the syllogism, in its real nature, as actually evolved out of th e snmji
tion inentally iiiider.stood ; we have thus, instead o f a syllogism in
Cesare o f the second figure, a syllogism in C elarent o f th c first.
T h e seeming irregularity is thus reduced to real order.
J'he .second mood of tlie second figure, viz. Cainestre.s,* is rath e r
1 (That Ces'an,- and Cninc?trcs arc ll.o fame S i/llo g ., p. Ill, and anllioritics cited above, p
ivllogbm with accideiilal ord'-r of jiremises, 200, note.]
*ee Z a b a r e l l a , O p tr a J x ig ic a , D e Q uarCa F ig u r a
L e c t. X X II. LOGIC. 311
m ore iiTegular, and, therefore, tlie process o f red ressin g it, though
equally easy, is som e w hat more complex. The
2. C am eetres. n i
formula i s :
A l l V are M ;
B u t no S is I I ;
H ere, in th e first place, tlie premises are transposed, for you re-
membei- b y the second cfcneral law o f syllogisms.
I n r e a lity C e la r eiit. : . . . / o
th e sum ption m u st m extension be universal, and
th e subsumption aftirmative. By a prelim inary operation, their aj)-
pare n t consecution must, therefore, be accom m odated to their real.
T h e premises being restored to order, there is y e t a fu rth e r intricacy
to unravel. T h e siimptioii and the conclusion are neith er o f them
jiroxiniate; for we d e p a rt from a eonversive sumption, an d primarily
obtain a conclusion which only gives us th e ostensible conclusion, in
th e second instance, th ro u g h an inference. T h u s :
O s te n s ib le S u m p t i o n , .........iVb S is M ;
P r o x i m a t e o r R e a l S u m p ti o n , . . . ( ho M is S ;)
S u b s u m p t i o n , ..................................... . A l l V a re
P r o x i m a t e o r R e a l C o n c lu s io n , . . ( T h e r e fo r e , no P is S ; )
O s te n s ib le C o n e l u s i o n , T h e r e fw e , no S is P .
.
T h e concrete exam ple given was :
A l l colors a r e v isib le ;
B u t no sound is visible ;
T h e r e fo r e , no so u n d is a color.
R e versing th e premises, we havm :
A p p a r e n t S u m p ti o n , . . . . N o sotoul is v is ib le ;
P r o x i m a t e o r R e a l S u m p ti o n , . ( T h e n n o th in g visible is a so u n d ;)
S u b s u m p tio n , .............................. A ll colors a r e risible ;
P r o x i m a t e o r R e a l C o n e lu s io n , ( T h e r e fo r e , no color is a so u n d ;)
w liie h g iv e s , a s a e o n v e rs iv e
i n f e r e n c e , th e
E x p re ssed Co n c l u s i o n , . . . . T h en no sound is a color.
T h u s it is eviden t th a t Camestres, in th e second figure, is only a

'm odification o f C e la re u t in the first.*
C f. K ru g, 109, p. 368. M ark D u n - [ D e r o d o n , L ogica K e s tit., P a r s . iv . p . 648

c a n , I n s tit. Logicce, L . i v . c. 4, p. 229. E d . R e u s c h , S y s te m a L o g ic u m , 439, p . 613.]
312 LOGIC. L f. c t . X X IL
T h e tliircl mood o f the Second F igure, F estino, presents no diffi-

3 F e s iiu o cultv. W e liavc only to in terpolate th e real
sumption, to which the snbsum ption and conclu-
lu re a lity F e rio . . , mi
Sion iiro.ximately refer. Ihus:
E .\p re s .s e d S u m p ti o n , . . . jVo P is M;
R e a l o r Ir o x i i n a t e S u m p ti o n , ( T h en no J I t s P ) ;
S u b s u m p t i o n , ...............................B i//s o m e S a r e M ;
C o n c l u s i o n , .....................................T h e r e fo r e , some S a r e not P .
O u r concrete exam ple was :
E x p r e s s e d S u m p ti o n , . . . N o vice is la u d a b le ;
Som e ai tions a r e la u dable ;
T h e r e fo r e , some, actions a r e not vices.
H ere we have only to interpolate, as th e real su m ption :
N o th in g laudable is a vice.
Festino, in the second figurc, is th u s only herio iu the first, w ith its
sumption c o n v e n e d . .
T h e foiirlli mood, Baroco, is more troublesome. In fact, this
^ m ood and Bocardo, iu the third figure, have
been at once tlie cruces and the opprohria of
logicians. T h e y have, indeed, succeeded in reducing these to the
first figure by w h a t is called th e reductio a d
impossibile, th a t is, b y circuitously sh ow ing th a t
if you den y the conclusion iu these syllogisms,
the contrad ictory inference is absurd ; b u t as o f tw o contradictories
one or other must be true, it, therefore, remains th a t the original
conclusion sh:ill be ad m itte d . T h is process is aw kw ard and p erplex
in g ; it likewise only constrains assent, b u t does n ot afford k n o w l
e d g e ; while a t the same tim e we have here a syllogism with a n eg
ative subsumption, whicli, if legitim ate, invalidates the universality
of our second general rule. N ow , on th e princijile I have proposed
to yon, tliere i.s no difficulty w h ate v er in the i-ednction of this or of
any other mood. Here, however, we do not, as in th e oth er moods
o f th e second figurc, find th a t the syllogism jiroximately departs
from an unexiiressed sumption, b u t th a t the jirox-
In reality D i.rii . , * . '
im atc suljsumption and the jiroxim ate conclu
sion have been rejilaccd by tw o derivative propositions. T he
formula o f Baroco is:
L e c t . X X II. LOGIC. 8R
A ll P f tr e M ;
B u t some S a r e not M ;
T h e r e fo r e , some S a r e not P .
Blit the following is th e full m ental process :
S u m p ti o n .......................... . . . . A ll P are M ;
R eal S u b s u m p t i o n , ........................................... (Som e no/-M a r e S ; )
w h ic h g iv e s th e j T hen, some S m-e n o t-U ;
E x p r e s s e d S u b s u m p tio n , . . . . . ( O r, some S a re not M ;
R e a l C o n e h is io n , . . . . . . ( T h e r e fo r e , some not-F a r e S ;
w h ie h g iv e s th e ( T hen, some S a re n o M ;
E x p r e s s e d C o n e h is io n ............................. ( O r, some S a r e nol P .
Or, to take onr concrete example :
A ll b ird s a r e o vijm rous ,

B u i some an im a ls a re not oviparous ';
T h e r e fo r e , some an im a ls a r e not birds.
O f th is th e e x p l ic a t e d p ro c e s s iv ill sta n d as f o l l o w s :
S u m p t i o n , .................A l l birds a re o v ip a ro u s ;
R eal s n b s n m p l i o n , . {Som e things m i oviparous a rt. inim rtls;)
w h ie li g iv e s Ih e ( Then, some an im a ls a r e not-oviparous ;
-t
E x p r e s s e d S u b s u m p t i o n , ............................... i O r, a re not oviparous ;
^ . ( ( T h e r e fo r e , some things not b ird s a re uni-
R e a l o r P r o x i m a t e C o n c lu s io n , . . . . J ' '
. . . . . L m a ts ; )
w h ic h g iv e s th e
, ^ . ( Then, some a n im a ls a r e n o t-b ird s ;
E x p r e s s e d C o n c l u s i o n , ..................................... J
I O r, a r e not birds.
N ow , in this analysis o f th e process in Baroco, we n ot only re

solve th e whole problem in a direct and natural and instructive
w a y ; b u t Ave g e t rid o f th e exception which Baroco apparently
affords to tlie general rule, th a t th e subsum ption o f a categorical
must be affirmative. H e r e you see h ow the real subsumption is
affirmative, and hoAv, from h aving a negative determ ination in its
subject, it by conversion assumes th e apjiearance of a negative proji-
osition, the affirmative proposition som e t/n'nys not-birds are a n i
m als, being legitim ately converted, first into som e a n im a ls are
and this again being legitim ately coinerted into som e
a n im a ls are no t birds. Y on recollect that, in the doctrine o f Pro]i-
ositions,' I slioAAêd yon how every affirmative proposition eonld be
adequately expressed in a negative, and every negative in an affir
mative form ; and th e utility of th a t observation you now see, as it
! S e e a b o v e , p. 178. E d .
40
8 1 4 LOGIC. L ect. X X ll
enables ns simply to solve the problem o f the reduction o f Baroco,

and, as we shall also see, o f Bocardo. Baroco is thus directly re
duced to Darii o f the first figure, and not, as by the indirect process
o f logicians in general, to Barbara.' On this doctrine the name
Baroco is also improper, and another, expressive of its genuine
alfinity, should be imposed.
W e pioceed now to the Third Figure. You muII observe that,
as in the Second Figure, with the exception o f
T h ir d F ip u r e
Baroco, it was the sumption of the two premises
which was affected by the conversion, so in the third it is the sub
sumption. For in Camestres o f the second, and in Disaniis and
Bocardo o f the third, figure, the premises are transposed. This
uuder.st()o<l subsumption is a conversive infei'ence from the expre.ssed
one, ami it is the ]iroxitnate antecedent from which the real con
clusion is immeiliately inferred.
In the first mood o f this figure, D arapti, th e subsum ption is a
1 . D a r a p ti. Universal affirmative ; its conversion is, therefore,
Ju r e a lity D a r ii. into a particular affirmative. I ts formula is
S u m p t i o n ................................................... Mare 1 ;
E x p r e s s e d Siib.'umption, . . . But are
w hic h fîvcs the
R ea lly P r o x i m a t e S u b s u m p t i o n , . ( Then some S are M ; )
fr o m w h ic h dire ctly flows
T h e C o n c l u s i o n , ....................................Therefore, some S are P.
I T h er e .seem s to b e an e r ro r in th e t e x t im o a s c h o la s t ic is p e r sp e cta m f u ls s e : sed d e s

h ere. T h e s y llo g is m , a s f in a lly r e d u c e d , i.s p e c ta in ; q u ia in jtrim a fig u r a j)r o p o sitio m i
n o t in D a r ii, n o r in a n y le g it im a te m o o d ; n o r a llir n ia n s a t ir ib iit i in tin iti, qu iim jjr im o
a n d its n a tu r a l r e d u c tio n , a c c o r d in g t o th e in tu it u v ld e a ttir es.=e n e g a n s , form a; e v id e n -
m e t h o d a d o p te d by th e A u th o r , is n o t to D a tia m o b s c u r a t : a tq iii s y llo g is m o r u m r e d u c tio
r ii, b u t to I'erio , b y m e a n s o f an u u ex p resE cd c o m p a r a ta e st n o n ad fo rn u e b o n ita te in o b -
s u m p tio n . Thus s c u r a n d a in , sed illu s tr a n d a t n . In stu u tio n fs
L o g ic a , L . iv . c . 3, i 4. p. 280 S a lm u r ii, 1612
A ll P are .M s
Thtn no n o /-> J n r t P; T h e s y llo g is m o f th e t e x t m a y a ls o be e x
.Some S are not-XI; h ib it e d m o re c ir c u ito u s ly , as D a r ii, b y re ta in
TlicrtSoTe, tome S a r e not P. i n g th e a ffir m a tiv e q u a lit y iti th e c o n v e r te d
p r o p o s itio n . T h u s:
T h is is th e m e th o d a d o p te d b y th e f o llo w in g
l o g ic ia n s , r eferred to b y th e A u th o r in h is A ll nol-hl are not-Pj
C o n ir n o n -r iu c e I. o o k , v iz .: N o ld iu s , w h o Som e S a re not M ;
c a lls iJ a ro c o , F a c r o n o , I ^ g ir a Ile c o sn ita , c a p . T h e r e fo r e , to m e 8 are n o t- P .
x iL i 1 2 , p. &>J, 1 0 0 0 ; I te u sc h (w h o fo llo w s T h is is th e m e th o d o f r e d u c tio n e m p lo y e d

N o ld iu s ), Sy^ tfm n ].n g iru m , ) OS'), p. 611, 2d b y D c r o d o n , w h o , in th e s a m e w .iy , w o u ld
c d .,1 7 4 1 : W o lf. /'/nV. K o tio n a lis, ^ 884; Ita ch - r e d u c e r a m e s t r e s to lla r b a r a , L n g ir a lie stlln ta
m a n n , L o g ik , ) 1.3.3, A n in ., i. p. 224. b e f o r e P . iv . tr a c t, i. o 2, a rt. 6 , p. 648. I'h e e r r o r
a n y o f th e a b o v e - m e n t io n e d w r ite r s , J Iark h e r e n o tic e d s e e m s to h a v e o r ig in a te d in a
D u n c a n g iv e s th e r e d u c tio n o f C a m e str e s to m o m e n ta r y c o n f u s io n o f th e r e d u c tio n o f
t.e la r e n t, a n d o f I.a r o c o t o F e r io , by c o iln - b a r o c o w ith th a t o f b o c a r d o ; w h ic h , h o w
te r p o -'itio n . l i e a d d s, w it h s p e c ia l r e te r e n c c e v e r , c o u ld n o t be r e c tifie d w it h o u t g r e a te r
to th e r e d u c tio n o f Itarfjco to F e r io b y th is a lte r a tio n s in th e t e x t th a n th e E d ito r s c o n
m e t h o d , l l a n c r e d u c tio n is sj>ciem e x ls t - s id e r th e m s e lv e s j u s tilie d In m a k in g E d
L kct. X X II . LOGIC. 315
O ur concrete exam ple was
S u m p tio n , A ll g ild in g is m e ta llic ;

L .\p rc s .se d S u b s u m p t i o n , .....................................B u t a ll g ild in g M n e s ;
w h ic h fiiv es, a s a c o n v e r s io n , th e
R e a l S u b s u m p t i o n , ...........................................T hen, som e th in g s that shine a re g il d in g ;
a n d f r o m th is l a s t im m e d i a te l y p r o
c e e d s th e
C o n c l u s i o n , ............................................................. T h e r e fo r e , some things th a t s h in e a r e m etallic.
T h u s D arapti, in tlie th ird figure, is n o th in g b u t a one-sided

derivative of Darii in tlie first.^
T h e second mood of th e T h ird F ig u re is F-
2 . Feiaptoii. laptou. I t s formula
S u m p ti o n , ..................................... i V o J I i s P ;
E x p r e s s e d S u m p t i o n ...................... A ll M a re S ;
T h e R e a l S u b s u m p tio n , . . . { T h e n , som e a r e 'M - ,)
f r o m w h ic h
T h e C o n c l u s i o n , ........................ T h e r e fo r e , some S a r e not P .
O u r example was
S u m p t i o n , ............................................................. N o th in g m a te r ia l is a f r e e a g e n t;
E x ])re s s e d S u b s u m p t i o n , ...............................B u t e v ery th in g m a te r ia l is e x te n d e d ; '
O f w h ic h th e R e a l S u b s u m p tio n is th e
V ( T hen, som ething ex ten d ed is m a te r ia l;]
c o n v e r s e , ......................................................... )
T h e r e fo r e , som ething ex te n d e d is not a f r e e
F r o m w h ic h th e C o n c l u s i o n , ........................ <
( agent.
F ela p ton, in the th ird F igure, is thus only a modification of F erio

in th e first.
T h e th ird m ood in this figure is Disamis. Its
3. D is a m is .
lormula
Som e M a re P ;
B u t a ll M a r e S ;
T h e r e fo r e , some S a r e P .
H e re th e premises are transposed. T h e ir or-

I n r e a lity D a r ii. i i .n t
d e r being rectified :
S u m p t i o n , ................................................................... .4 // M a r e S ;
E x p r e s s e d S u b s u m p t i o n , ..................................... B u t some M a r e P ;
1 [ R e u s c li, S y ste m a L o g icu m , 539, p . 614.]

31G L O G I C . L ect. X X II.
A M iicli, b y c n n v c rs iv c in f e r e n c e , privcs th e
( T hen, som e P a re M ;)
P r o x iin n ie .S iib s n in p tio n ,.........................
F r o m w llicll p r o c e e d s th e R e a l C o n c lu s io n , ( T h e r e fo r e , some P a r e S ;)
W llic ll, bo y c o n v e rrss io n , g iv e s th e E
leli, L x p re sse d i
. ? T hen, som e S a r e P .
C o n e l u s i o n , ....................................................\
O ur ex.umple was (llie reversal o f tlie premises being r e c tif ie d ) :
S u m p t i o n , ............................................................. A l l acts o f hom icide a r e c r u e l;

E x p r e s s e d S n b s u m p t i o n , ...............................B u t some acts o f hom icid e a re la u d a b le ;
W liie h g iv e s , u s 11 c o n v e rs iv c in f e r e n c e , ) ( P /ieii, some laudable acts a r e a cts o f hom i-
ilic P r o x i m a t e S n b s u m p tio n , . . .) c i d e ;)
F r o m th is P r o x i m a t e C o n c lu s io n , . . . ( T h e r e fo r e , some laud a b le acts a r e c r u e l; )
W h ic h a g a in g iv e s , a s its c o n v e rs e , t h e ) , , , ,,
V T h e r e fw e , som e c r u e l a cts a r e laudable.
E x p r e s s e d C o i i c l n s i o n ,.................................)
T h u s Disamis in th e th ird is only Darii in the first figure.

T h e fourth mood o f th e T h ir d F ig u re is Datisi, which is only
Disamis, th e premises n o t heing reversed, and
IIn ^r e a lity D a r n. conclusion n ot a conversivc inference. Tt
requires, therefore, only to interpolate th e prox
imate subsum ption. T h u s :
S u m p t i o n , ................................... A l l b \ a r e V ;
E x p r e s s e d S u b . s u m p t i o n , B u t som e M a r e S ;
.
G iv in g b y c o n v e r s i o n , ( T h e n , some ^ a re b \;)
.
F r o m w h ic h l a s t t h e C o n c lu s io n , . . . T h e r e fo r e , some S a re B .
S u m p t i o n , ......................... .........................A l l acts o f hom icide a r e c ru et,,

E x p r e s s e d S u h s u m p t i o n , ....................... *. B u t some acts o f hom icide a r e la u d a b le;
W h ic h g iv e s , h y c o n v e rs io n , tlic P r o x i - ) ( T h en , some laudable a cts a r e a cts o f hom i-
i n a tc S u h s u m p t i o n ............................................) cide ;)
F r o m w h ic h llic C o n c lu s io n , . , . . T h e r e fo r e , some laudable a cts a r e cru el.
Thus, Dati.si likewise is only a distorted Darii,

T h o fifth mood of th e dhird F ig u re is the famous mood Bocardo,
Avliicli, as 1 have mentioned, with Baroco, hut
far more than Baroco, was th e opprobrium of
the scholastic system of I'cduclion. So intricate, in fiict, wa.s this
nioo<l cori'idered, th a t it was looked upon as a traji, into Avliicli if
you once got, it was 110 easy m a tte r to find an exit. B ocardo was,
durin g the m iddle age.s, the nam e given in Oxford to the A cad em i
cal .Jail or Career a nam e which still remains as a reliquc o f the
ancient logical glory o f th a t venerable seminary. R ejecting, then,
L ect, X X II. LOGIC. 317
th e perplexed and unsatisfactory reduction by tbc logicians o f Bo-

cardo to B a rba ra by an apagogical exposition, I commence by s ta t
ing, th a t Bocardo is only Disamis un d er th e form of a negative
affirm ative; its premises, therefore, are transposed. R e m o v in g th e
transposition, its formula is

B u i some M a r e not P ;
T h e r e fo r e , som e S a r e not P ;
Avhich is thus explicated, like Baroco
S u m p t i o n , ...........................................................A W M a r e S ;
E .x p re ss c tl S u b s u m p t i o n , ............................. Som e J I a re n o t P ;
W liic li g iv e s , b y c o n v e rs iv e in f e r e n c e , . ( T h en , some n o t-T a re J I ; )
F r o m th is R e a l S u b s u m p tio n p r o c e e d s tb e2 Y
> ( T h e r e fo r e , som e n o t-P a r e S ;)
P r o x i m a t e C o n c lu s io n ,
W b ic li a g a in g iv e s , b v c o n v e r s io n , th e )
' S- T hen, some S a r e n o t-F ;
E x p r e s s e d C o n c l u s i o n ,...............................)
W h e n c e a g a i n , ............................. . . . . Som e S a r e not P ;
O n r concrete exam ple was th c o rd er o f the premises being

redressed :
S u m p t i o n , ............................................................. A l l syllogism s a re im p o r ta n t;
I'L x p ressed S u b s u m p t i o n , ...............................B u t some syllogism s a r e not r e g u l a r ;
) ( T h en , some th in g s not r e g u la r a re syllo-
F r o m Avbieb, b v c o n v e rs iv e in f e r e n c e ,, . . 1
, ..
' V g ism s ;)
A n d fro m th i s P ro x im a te S n biss ni im
m p tio
t io n ) T h e r e fo
f o r e , so
some things not r e g u la r a r e im -
p r o c e c d s t b e P r o x i m a t e C o ni c li
liis io n , . ) p o r ta n t;
F ro m w h e nic
ce, by c o n v e rrss io n , th e E x - )
, . c Then, some important things are not-renular,
,.......................................)
p r e s s e d C o n c l u s i o n ,..................................... o >
W hence i im p o rta n t thing s a r e not reeju-

t lar.
Bocardo is thus only a p erv e rte d and perplexed Darii.*

T h e last mood o f th c T h ird F ig u re is Ferison,
In re.am y F erio. whicli is w ith o u t difficulty i t only being re
quired to interpolate th e real subsumption, from
which th e conclusion is derived. I ts formula is
S u m p t i o n , ............................................................. A b J I is P ;
E x p r e s s e d S u b s u m p t i o n , ...............................B u t some J I a re S ;
1 (See Iso ld iu s, Log. Her. c. x ii. 12, p. 301. B o c a rd o is c a lle d D o c a m ro c b y N o ld iu s . Cf

R eu sch , S yst Log., 539, p. 611.]
318 LOGIC. L e c t. xxn
^ h ic h civ c.s, b v c o n v c rs iv o in f e r e n c e , th e I
r T h en , some S a r e J I ;
S n b s i iin p i io n .......................................................)
F r o m w liicli iin in e d in te ly flo w s t h e C o n - )
^ T h erefo re, som e S a r e not P .
e l u s i o n , ............................................................... >
S n m p tio n , . . N o truth is without r e s u l t ;

E x p ix 's s c d S u b s u m p t i o n , ...............................B u t some truths are m isu n d ersto o d ;
T h e C o n v c rs iv o I n f e r e n c e f r o m w h ic h is . T h en some things m isunderstood a r e tr u th s ;
A n d fro m th i s I m p l ie d S u b s u m p tio n i m - ) T h e r e fo r e , some thin g s m isu n d ersto o d a r e not
m e d ia te ly p r o c e e d s th e C o n c lu s io n , . ) w ithout result.
Fcrisoii^ i.s tints only Ferio, fringed with an

Fourth Figure. ., .
accident of conver.sion.
The Fourth Figure is distinguished from the two former in this
that in the Seeond and Third Figures one or other, hut only one
or other, o f the premises requires the interpolation of the mental
inference ; whereas, in the Fourth Figure, either both the premises
require this, or neither, but only the conclusion. The three first
moo<ls (Bamalip, Calemes, Dimati.s) need no conversion of the prem
ises ; the two last, Fesapo and Fresison, require the conversion
of both.
The result o f the foregoing discussion is thus accordingly that, in
rigid truth, there is no figure entitled to the dig-
Tho First Figure the nity of a simple and inde])endent form o f rea-
oiii> Miiiiiie and iiKie- soiling, exccpt that which has improperly been
p<-ndeni form of roa- o i i i
tenncul the First; the three latter figures being
only imperfect or elliptical e.xpressions o f a com
plex process o f inference, which, when fully enounced, is manifestly
I.Illy ;i reasoning in the first figure. There is thus but one figure,
or, more properly, but one proeess of eategorieal reasoning; for the
term jie/urr is abu^îvely a]>plied to that whieh is of a eharacter reg
ular, sini])le, ami e^^sential.
Having, therefore, coneluded the treatimmt of figure in respeet
of ('ategorieal Syllogisms, it remains to <;on-
1 igiircof iiyi.ciiift- sider how far the other species o f Simple Syllo-
icai, Di-juncm.-, and .rjsi,,;.; tfic; livpothetical, the disjunctive, and
II licn-Difjuncl-
ive sjiiogiMMH hypothetico-<lisjmictivo are subji'ct to this
accident of form. In regard to the Hypothetical
Syllogi-m, this kind o f reasoning is not lialile to the affection of
(iguro. It is true indeed that we may construct a syllogism of three
hypothetic.al jiropositions, which shall be susccjitible o f all the fig-
I ['rr.iiifl Fay.i tlia t F rri'-o n , I. o c a n lo , a n d F e la p to n , a re u se le ss, a s c o n c lu d in g in d ir e c tly

In A n a l. P rior., h i. <! 24 ]
L k c t. X X II. LOGIC. 319
ures incident to a categorical reasoning; but this is itself in fact

only a categorical syllogism hyjiothetically expressed. For e x am p le:
I f K is, th e n R is ;
B u t i f S is, then A is ;
T h e r e fo r e , i f S is, then B is.
This syllogism may certainly be varied through all the figures,

but it is not an hypothetical syllogism, in the proper signification
of the term, but manifestly only a categorical ; am1 those logicians
who have hence concluded, that a hypothetical reasoning was ex
posed to the schematic modifications of the categorical, have only
shown that they did not know how_to discriminate these two forms
by their essential differences.
In regard to the Disjunctive Syllogism the case is different; for
as the disjunctive, judgment is in one point of view only a categor
ical judgment, whose predicate consists o f logically opposing mem
bers, it is certainly true that we can draw a disjunctive syllogism
in all the four figures.
I shall use the letters P, iM, and S ; but as the disjunction requires
at least one additional letter, I shall, where that is necessary, take
the one immediately following.
F ig u re I.
M is either P oi- Q ;
S is U ;
T h e r e fo r e , S is e ith er P or Q .
F ig u re II.
F irs t c a se
P is eith er or X ;
S is neith er nor X ;
T h e r e fo r e , S is not P .
S eco n d ca se
P is n e ith e r M tior X ;
S is either jM o r X ;
T h e r e fo r e , S is not P .
Figure III.
M is eith er P o r Q ;
iM is S ;
T h e r e fo r e , some S is eiJher P o r Q .
320 LOGIC. L ect.X X H .
F ig u r e IV .
F ir s t c a s e
P is eith er J I o r N ;
B oth M a n d X a re S ;
T h e r e fo r e , some S is P .
S eco n d case
P is e ith er w X ;
N e ith e r J I nor X is S ;
T h e r e fo r e , S is not P.A
O f C o m p o site S y llo g ism s I need say n o th in g co n cern in g th e

E p i c h e i r e m n , Avhich, i t is m a n i f e s t , m a y b e i n
i ig u re o f C om posite fig u re e q u a lly as a n o th e r. B u t it is le s s e v i-
."yllogifiiis. W
d e n t th a t th e S o rites m ay be o f a n y fig u re; and
l o g i c i a n s s e e m , in f a c t , f r o m tb e ir d e fin itio n s, to h a v e o n ly c o n te m
p lated i t s p o s s i b i l i t y in t h e f i r s t f i g u r e . I t is, h o w e v e r , c a p a b l e o t
all t h e f o u r s c h e m a t i c a c c i d e n t s b y a l i t t l e c o n t o r t i o n ; b u t a s t h i s
at best c o n stitu te s o n l y a l o g i c a l c u r i o s i t y , i t is n e e d l e s s t o s j i e n d
.any t i m e i n i t s d e m o n s t r a t i o n .
So m uch for th e F o r m o f reaso n in g , b o th E sse n tia l and A cci
d en tal, a n d th e D iv isio n s o f S y llo g ism s w hich are fo u n d e d th e re o n .
1 See C lir. J U ran iss, Grundriss der Logik, d ilfe re n t figures, see H e r b a r t, Lehrbuch zur
394, p. 146. C o m p a re K ru g , LogtA:, p. 3ST if? . Elnleitung in die Philosophie, \ 70. D ro b isch .
2 F o r a eo m p lic a te d tlie o ry o f S o rite s in Ntue DariteA/iirg rfer LogiAr, 8084. E d .
LECTURE XXIII.
S E C T IO N I I. OF T H E P R O D U C T S OF T H O U G H T
III. D O C T R IN E OF R E A SO N IN G S.
S Y L L O G IS M S . T H E IR D IV IS IO N S A C C O R D IN G TO V A L ID IT Y .
F A L L A C IE S .
A l l th e v arieties o f S yllogism , w h o se n e c e ssa ry law s a n d c o n tin

g e n t m o d ific a tio n s w e h a v e h ith e r to c o n sid e re d , are, ta k e n to g e th e r ,
d i v i d e d i n t o classes b y r e f e r e n c e t o t h e i r V a l i d i t y ; a n d I sh a ll c o m
prise th e h e a d s o f w h a t I shall a f te r w a r d s illu s tr a te , in t h e f o llo w
in g p arag rap h .
^ L X X V l. S y llogism s, b y a n o th e r d istrib u tio n , are d istin

g u ish e d , b y re sp e c t to th e ir V a lid ity , in to
Par. L x x v i . sy lio - Corrcct 01 T tu, a n d Incorrect or False.
gismB, C o r r e c t and
Incorrect. I h o I n c o i T O c t 0 1 I a l s c aic again (th o u g h
n o t in a lo gical p o i n t o f v ie w ) d i v i d e d , b y
reference to th e o f t h e r e a s o n e r , i n t o P aralogism s,
in ten tio n
F a u lty , a n d Sophisms, o r Deceptive, Reasonings. T h e
in to
P a r a l o g i s m {paralogism u s) i s j u o p e r l y a s y l l o g i s m o f w h o s e
f a l s e h o o d t h e e m p l o y e r is n o t h i m s e l f c o n s c i o u s ; t h e S o p h i s m
{sojliisnia, captio, cavillatio) is p r o j i c r l y a f a l s e s y l l o g i s m , f a b
ricated and em p lo y ed for th e purpose of d eceiv in g o th ers.
T h e term m a y be applied i n d i f f e r e n t l y in e i t h e r s e n s e .
T h e s e d i s t i n c t i o n s .are, h o w e v e i ' , f r e q u e n t l y c o n f o u n d e d ; n o r in
a lo g ical re la tio n are th e y o f acco u n t. F a ls e S y llo g is m s arc,
a g a in , v ic io u s, c i t h e r in r e s p e c t o f t h e i r f o rm o r o f t h e i r m a t t e r ,
o r i n r e s p e c t o f b o t h fo rm a n d m atter.*
1 K r u g , L o g ik , 115. E d .
41
622 LOGIC. L ect. X X lb
I n r e g a r d lo tlie first d is tin c tio n c o n t a in e d in th is p n r .ig r n jih ,

o f S yllo g i.sin s i n to Coi-i-c et o r T r u e and Incor-
E.xpiicniioii. r e e l 01 - F a l s e , i t is r e q u i s i t e t o s a y a f e w w o r d .s .
Logii'ul aud abso- ^ . t , i . , , .
.u.e truib dkcri.ni- iK'OOSsary to distiu g u isli lo gic al truth, t h a t is,
Iiaied. t h e t r u t h w i i i c h L o g i c g u a r a n t e e s in a r e a s o n i n g ,
from th e a b s o lu te t r u th o f th e se v en il j u d g m e n t s
o f w h i c l i a r e a s o n i n g is c o m p o . s e d . I h a v e f r e q u e n tly in c u lc a te d on
you th at L o g i c d o e s n o t w a r r a n t t h e t r u t h o f its p r e m i s e s , e.x c e p t
in s o f a r a s t h e s e m a y b e t h e f o r m a l c o n c ' u s i o n S o f a n t e r i o r r e a s o n
in g s , it o n ly w a rra n ts (on th e h y p o th e s is t h a t th e p re m ise s are
i in ly a s su m e d ) th e tr u th o f th e in fe re n c e . In th is v iew th e c o n c lu
s i o n ni.ay, a s a s e j i a r a t e p r o p o s i t i o n , b e t r u e , b u t i f t h i s t r n t l i b e n o t
a necessa ry c o n s e q u e n c e from t h e j i r e m i s e s , i t is a f a l s e c o n c l u s i o n ,
t h a t is, in f a c t , n o c o n c l u s i o n a t .all. N o w , o n t h i s j m i i i t t h e r e is a
l u c t r i n e j u c v a l e n t am ong log ician s, w h ic h is n o t o n l y e r r o n e o u s ,
bu t, if ad m itted , is s u b v e r s i v e of th e d istin ctio n of L o g ic ns a
jiiircly fo rm a l sc ie n c e . T h e d o c t r i n e i n q u e s t i o n is in i t s i - e s n l t t h i s ,
t h .a t i f t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f a s y l l o g i s m be tru e, th e ju -en iises m ay
b e e i t h e r t r u e o r false, b u t t h a t i f t h e c o n clu sio n be false, o n e oi-
b o t h o f t h e j i r c m i s e . s m u s t b e f a l s e ; i n o t h e r w o r d .s , t h a t i t is j i o s s i -
b k - t o i n f e r t r u e f r o m f a l s e , b u t n o t f a l s e fi-om t r u e . A s an ex am p le
o f th is I h a v e seen g iv e n th e fo llo w in g sy llo g is m :
.i-t rislolle is a R o m a n ;
A J to m a n is a I'Jitro p e a n ;
T Jirrrfore, A r is to tle is a E u r o p e a n .
The i n f e r e n c e , i n s o f a r a s o x j i r i ' s s c d , is t r u e ; b u t I w o u l d rem ark

t h a t t h e Mdiolc i n f e r e n c e Avbieh t h e j u ' c m i s e s n e c e s s i t a t e , a n d Avliich
th e c o n e l u s i o n , t b e i ' c f o r e , v i i ' t i i a l l y c o n t a i n s , is n o t t r u e , is f a l s e .
For tlm j u T 'i n is o s o f the jireecd in g sy llo g isn i gave not o n ly th e
ooiieliision.AristolJe is a Furopean, b u t :iIso t h e c o n c l u s i o n , yln's-
l<jth is not d (li'oijr ; f o r i t n o t m e r e l y f o l l o w s f i 'o in t h e j u e i n i s e s
l h : i t A r i s t o t l e is c o n c e i v e d u n d e r t h e i i n i \ ' c r s a l n o t i o n o f w h i c h th e
e o n c o j't Rom an f o n i i s a p a i l i c i i l a r K jd icre, b u t l i k e w i s e t h a t h e i.s
co nceiv cM l a s e x c l u d e d from all th e o th e r jiai-ticnlai-sjihcres w h ic h
are co n tain ed under th at n n iv c i'sa l n o tion. 'J d i e c o n s i d e r a t i o n of
th e tru th o f th e jireniiso, is a y t o m a ? / , i.s, h o w e v e r , m o r e
ji ro jie r ly l o b e r e g a n l e i l a s e x t r a l o g i c a l ; b u t i f so, t h e n th e co n sid -
oration o f llu* c o n c l u s i o n , Aristotle is a E uropean, o n a n y o t h e r
v iew th an a m ere form al in fo re n e e from c e rta in g iv e n a n te c e d e n ts ,
i.s, l i k e w i s e , e x t r a l o g i e . a l . L o g i c i.s o n l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h th e form al
tru th th e tcclinical v alid ity o f its sy llo g ism s, a n d a n y th in g
L e c t. X X III. LOGIC. 323
beyond th e leg itim acy o f tb e consequence it d ra w s fro m certain

l i y p o t l i e t i c a l a n t e c e d e n t s , i t d o c s n o t ] ro fess t o v i n d i c a t e . L o g ic al
tru th and fa lseh o o d are th u s co n tain ed in th e co rre ctn ess and
in c o r re c tn e s s o f logical i n f e r e n c e ; and it w as, th e re fo re , w ith no
i m p r o p r i e t y t h a t w e m a d e a t r u e o r c o r r e c t , a n d .a f a l s e o r i n c o r r e c t
s y l l o g i s m c o n v e r t i b l e o . v p r c s s i o n s .*
In re g a rd to th e d istin ctio n o f In c o rre c t S yllogism s into P a r a lo
gism s and S o phism s, n o th in g need be said.
T h e d is tin c tio n o f L ,, . i n
I n c o r r e c t S yiiogi-rn .s S t a t e m e n t IS s u f h c i c n t l y m a n i f e s t ;
into Piiraiogism s and a n d , a t t h e s a m e t i m e , i t is n o t o f .a l o g i c a l
S o p h is m s , n o t o f l o g i- im p o rt. F o r logic d o c s n o t regard th e in len -
c a iim p o it . w ith w h ich reaso n in g s are em p lo y ed , b u t
co n sid ers ex clu siv ely th e ir in te rn a l leg itim acy . B u t w h ile th e dis
tin ctio n is o n e , i u o t h e r r c s j i e c t s , j n o ] ) c r t o b e n o t i c e d , i t m u s t b e
o w n e t l t h a t i t is n o t altoO
g e t h e r w i t h o u t a loO
gical value. For it
b eh o o v e s us to d isc rim in a te th o se a r t i f i c i a l s o p h i s m s , t h e c i 'i t i c i s r a
o f w hich requires a certain acq u ain tan ce w ith lo g ical fo rm s, a n d
w h ich , as a p la y o f i n g e n u ity a n d an e x e rc ise o f a c u te n e s s, a re n o t
w i t h o u t t h e i r in t e r e s t , fro m th o s e p a r a l o g i s m s w h ic h , t h o u g h n o t so
artificial, a re o n tlia t a c c o u n t o n ly t h e m o r e f r e q u e n t c a u s e s o f e r r o r
a n d d e lu sio n .
T h e l a s t d i s t i n c t i o n is, h o w e v e r , l o g i c a l l y m o r e i n q i o r t a n t , v i z ., 1 ,
O f r e a s o n i n g s i n t o s u c h as are m a t e r i a l l y falla-
F o r m a ! a n d m a te r ia l . , , , , , r. , .
cious, t h a t IS, tliro iig h tlie o b je c t- m a ttc r oi th e ir
p r o ] ) o s i t i o n s ; 2 , I n t o s u c h a s a r e f o r m a l l y f iilla-
c i o u s , t h a t is, t h r o u g h th e m a n n e r o r f o r m in w liich t h e s e p r o p o s i
t i o n s a r e c o n n e c t e d ; a n d , 3, I n t o s u c h a s a r e a t o n c e m a t e r i a l l y a n d
fo n n n lly fallacious. M aterial F a l l a c i e s lie b e y o n d th e ju risd ic tio n
o f L o g ie . F orm al F allacies can on ly be ju d g e d o f by an ap p lica
tion o f th o s e rules, in th e ex p o sitio n o f w h ich w e hav e h ith e rto
been engaged.
The a ])]d icatio n o f th e s e ru le s w ill a ftb rd t h e o p ] i o r t u n i t y o f a d
d u c in g a n d re so lv in g so m e o f th e m o re cap ital
r.iiÊmr"^ tb o se S o phism s, w hich ow e th eir o rig in to
th e in g en u ity o f th e a n cien t G reeks. 3Iany
o f t h e s e s o p h i s m s a p p e a r t o u s in t h e l i g h t o f a m o r e ]>lay o f w i t
and a c u t e i i e s .s , a n d w e a r e l e f t t o m a n ' e l a t t h e i n t e r e s t w h i c h t h e y
o rig in a lly e x c ite d , a t th e c e le b rity w hich th e y o b tain ed , an d at
the iiiqiortaiice a tta c h e d to th e m b y so m e o f th e m o s t d is tin g u is h e d
th in k ers o f an tiq u ity . T h e m a r v e l w ill, h o w e v e r , b c in s o m e d e g r e e
abated, if w e ta k e th e fo llo w in g c irc u m sta n c e s in to co n sid eratio n .
I Cf. Esser, L o g ik , 109. Ed.

324 LOGIC. L e c t . X X III.
In tlic liist ]>laco, in tlie earlier ages o f Greece, tlie m e t h o d o f

science was in its infancv, and the la w s o f th o u g h t were not yet
investigatoil Avith th e accuracy and iniim tcness requisite to render
the detection o f these fallacies a very easy matter. H o w h eit, there
fore, nu n had an obscure consciousness o f their fallacy, th ey could
not at once point out the jilace in Avhich the error la y ; th e y Avere
thus taken aback, confounded, and constrained to silence.
In the seco n d jdace, th e treatm en t o f scicntilic subjects Avas
more oral and social than with n s ; and the form o f instruction
princijially tha t o f d ialogu e and conversation. In antiquity, men
did not isolate th e m selv es so much in the retirem ent o f their
h o m e s ; and th e y read far less than is now necessary in the m o d
ern world ; con seq u en tly, Avith th o se Avho had a taste for science,
the n ecessity o f social com innnication Avas greater and more urgent.
Ill tlu-ir converse on m atters o f scientific interest, a cuteness and
priAfundity were, jicrhaps, less co n d u civ e to distinction than v iva c
ity, wit, d e x terity in questioning, and in the d isco ve ry o f o b jec
tions, self-possession, and a confident and iiiicompromising dctencc
o f bold, half-true, or even erroneous assertions. T hrough such
means, a very superficial intellect can frc(piently, eve n Avitb us,
puz/.lc and juit to silence another far aeiiter and more jirofonnd.
Bnt, ninuiig the Greeks, the Sojihists and ]\Iegaric philosophers Avorc
accomplished masters in these arts.
In the third place, as we k n ow from A risto tle and D io g e n e s
LaeriiiisJ it was the rule in their dialogical disputations, th at every
question behoox ed to be answ ered b y a yes or a no, and thus the
in terrogator had it in his jiower to constrain his adversary alw ays
to m ov e in a foreseen, and, c on seq u ently, a d eterm ina te direction.
Thus the Sojihisms Avere somcAvhat similar to a g am e o f forfeits, or
like tho passes o f a conjurer, w hich ainnse and astonish for a little,
but the marvel o f wliicli vanishes the m o m e n t Ave uiidorstand tlie
j)rinci])le on wliicli th e y are jiorformed.
As the vario u s fa llac ies arise from s e c re t v io la tio n o f th e lo g ic a l
l a w ' - b y w b ir - b th e d ifiereiit c la sses o f s y llo g is m s arc g o v e r n e d , and
nc < y l l o i x i s m s a r e C a t e g o r i c a l , o r I l y j i o t b e t i c a l , o r D i s j u n c t i v e , o r
IIv jto lb o tic o -d is ju n c liv o , w e m a y jiro p e rly c o n sid e r F a lla c ie s u n d e r
t h o s e i i n i r b e a d s , a m i a s t r a n s g r e s s i o n s o f t h e s y l l o g i s t i c laAVS in
t h e ir s p e c ia l a jijilic a tio ii to t h e s e s e v e r a l k in d s o f s y l lo g i s m .
L X X V II. d 'h e S y l l o g i s t i c L a w 's d e t e r m in e , in r e fe r e n c e to

a ll t h e c l a s s e s o f S y l l o g i s m , t h e t h r e e f o l l o A v i n g j i r i n c i j d e s ; a n d
I A r i-l Snp/i. E k n c h ., c . 17. LaertiiiM, L. ii. c. 18, ] 1.3.5. T h e r e fe r e n c e s are g iv e n b y B a ch -

m a n n . I'.u. 2 B a c b m a n n , L o g ik , ] 884, p . 513.
Le c t X X III. LOGIC. 325
rill F a l l a c i e s a r e v i o l a t i o n s o f o n e o r o t h e r o f t h e s e p r i n c i ii l c R ,
in r e la tio n to o n e o r o tiie r class o f s y llo g is m .
Tar. LXXVII. PoHa- L o g ic al F o n u am i th e M a t-
eio8, - t h e i r cli'/isioa t c i o f a s y l l o g i s i i i b e c o r f c c t , t h e n is t b e
aDdclassiflcatlon. C o i i c l n s i o n trUC.
II. I f t h e s y l l o g i s m lê ^ M a t e r i a l l y C o r r e c t , b u t F o r m a l l y I n
c o r r e c t , t h e n t b e C o i i c l i i s i o i i is n o t ( o r o n l y a c e i i l e n t a l l y ) t r u e .
III. If the sy llo g ism be F o rm a lly C o r r e c t, b u t ^M aterially
In c o rre c t, tlien the C o n c lu sio n is n o t (or on ly a ccid en tally )
true.
F a l l a c i e s , a s v i o l a t i o n s o f t h e s e p r i n c i p l e s in m o r e i m m e d i a t e
reference to o n e o r o th e r o f th e F o u r C lasses o f S y llo g ism ,
m u s t a g a i n b e v ic io u s in r e f e r e n c e e i t h e r t o t b e fo rm , o r t o t h e
m a t t e i , o r t o b o t h t b e f o i a n a n d m a t t e r o f a s y l l o g i s m . F alla
cies a re t h u s a g a in d iv id ed i n t o F o r m a l a n d M a te r ia l, u n d e r
w h ich classes w e shall p r im a r il y a r r a n g e th e m .
IT L X X Y I I I . O f F o r m a l F a l l a c i e s , t b e C a t e g o r i c a l a r e t h e
Par. LXXVIII. Por- i^ ^^ t frc q u e n t, a n d o f th ese, th o se w h o se
mai Paiiaeies Cj.te- v i c c l i c s ill h a v i n g foui- i n ])l;-c( o f t h r e e
term s {quateryiioiLe te r m i n o r u m ) \ f o r t h i s ,
in consequence o f th e a m h i g n i t y o f its ex]>ression, d o e s not
im m ed ia te ly beti-ay itself. IT iider th is genus are co m p rised
t h r e e sjiec ie s, w h i c h are se v era lly k n o w n u n d e r t h e n a m e s of,
1 , F a ll a e ia sensns c o m p o s it i et d i v i s i ; P , F a l l a c i a a dicto
rcciiiidum q u i d a d d ic t u m s im p lic ite r, et vice v e r s a ; 3 , F a l l a
c ia Jifjurce d ic tio u is.
T h a t in a c a t e g o r i c a l s y l l o g i s m o n l y t h r e e t e r m s a r e a d m i s s i b l e ,
.. has been a lre a d y show n. A categ o rical svH o-
K xp Jicu tion . ^ ^ V
F a lla c ie s a r is in g g ism , w ith fo iir cajiital n o tio iis, h a s n o c o n n e c -
fro m a Quaurnio Ttr- tio u ; an d i s C a ll e d , b y w a y o f j e s t , t h e lo y ic td
minorum. q u a d r u p e d { a n i m a l q n a d r u p e s lo y ic u m ) . T h is
vice u su a lly o c c u rs w h e n th e n o tio n s are in r e a l i t y d i f f e r e n t , b u t
w h e n t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e is c l o a k e d b y t h e v e r b a l i d e n t i t y o f t h e t e r m s ;
for, o t h e r w i s e , i t w o u l d be too tr a n s p a re n t to d eceiv e eitlier th e
r e a s o n e r h i m s e l f o r a n y o n e else. T h is vice, m a y , h o w e v e r, h e o f
vario u s k inds, a n d o f th ese there are, as sta te d , th r e e p rin cip al
sp e cies.
T l i e f i r s t is t h e F a l l a c i a sensus comp/ositi et d iv i s i , t h e F a l
la c y o f C o m p o s itio n a n d D i v i s i o n } T h i s a r i s e s w h e n , i n t h e s a m e
1 [See Fonseca In s tit. D i a l , L. viii. c. v p. IOC, Ingolstadii, 1G04.]

J2G LOGIC. L ec t. X X III
syllogisM i, w e e m p l o y w ords now co llectiv ely , now d istrib u tiv ely ,

s o t l i a l w h a t is t r u e in c o n n e c t i o n , w c i n f e r m u s t
1. Fn.'/ann s iisiiscom. t i ' u c ill S e p a r a t i o n , u i i d t'/ce v e r s a ; a s , f o r
positi tt ilirisi. ,
e x . a m p l e : A n m a s t s n i ; C a m s s m s ; there-
forr. C a ia s m u s t si'/o ' H e r e w e a r g u e , Iroiii t h e u n a v o i d a b l e l i a
b ility in m a n to sin , t h a t t h i s p a r t i c u l a r sin is n e c e s s a r y , a n d for
this in d iv id u al sin n er. T liis fallacy m a y arise
Modes oi this Iai- dilfcroiit w av s. 1 , Tt m a y a r i s e w h e n t b e
lacy. . . . . .
j n - c d i c n t e i.s j o i n e d w i t h t h e s u b j e c t i n a s i m p l e
and in a m o d a l r e l a t i o n , f o r e x a m p l e : W h ite can be ii. e. become)
black, therefore irhite can be black. '1, I t m a y a r i s e f r o m t h e c o n
t u s i o n o f :i c o p u l a t i v e a n d d i s j u n c t i v e c o m b i n a t i o n . T l i u s 9 con-
sists or is mtnle up q/* 7 - | - 2, w h ich are o d d a n d even n umbers,
t h t n f o r c 9 is o d d a n d even. 3 , I t m a y a r i s e , i f w o r d s c o n n e c t e d
in t l i e j i r c m i s c s a i'c d i s j o i n e d in t h e c o n c l u s i o n . T h u s : S oc ra tes is
di.ad, thert'fure S o cra tes is. ~
A ll e x a m p l e o f t h e f irs t o f tlie s e c o n t i n g e n c i e s th .at w h i c h is
th e m ost fre q u e n t and d a n g e r o u s o c c u rs w h e n , from its u n i v e r
sa lity , a jiro p o s itio n m ust bo in te rp re te d w ith restrictio n . T hus,
w h e n o u r . S ;iv io iir s a y s , 7'he b li n d sh a ll see, 7 7/e d e a f sh all hear,
h e d.ocs n o t nie.aii t h a t t h e liliiid, a s b l i n d , s h a ll se e , t h a t t h e
d e a f , a s de.af, sli::ll licai-, l i n t o n l y th at th o se who bad been b lin d
and tle:if s h o u l d Ie c o v e r t h e use o f th e se senses. To argue th e
0 |t) io .- ite w o u l d h e t o i n c u r t h e f a l l a c y iu q u e s t i o n .
T h e s e c o n d f a l l a c y is t h .a t A d icto sec u n d u m ( p i id a d d i c t u m sim-
] ) lid l e r , a n d i t s c o n v e r s e , A dicto si m p l ic i te r a d
2. FaUada a dirtn se- dictiim se c u u d u m q uid. T h e f o r m e r o f t h e s e
cundnm qu,./ ad datum f i iH a c v A d icto secHudum q u i d a d d ic t u m
ai;il lls COII- * ,
sirn]}liciter : i r i s e s w h e n , from w h.at is true
o n l y u n d e r ccrt.ain m odiiications an d relatio n s,
w e infca- i t t o h e t r u e a h s o l n t c l y . d ' h n s , if' f r o m th e fact th a t som e
C a th o lii-s hohl th e i i i t 'a l l i h i l i t y o f t h e Pojie, w e sh ould co n clu d e
that th e i i i f i i H i h i l i t y o f t h e P o p e is .a t e n e t o f t h e C a t h o l i c C h u r c h
i n g /a i e r . a l . 'J 'h c l a t t e r t h e f a l l a c y c/ d icto s i m p l ic i te r a d dictu m
tit I'll,tthnn q u i d is t h e o p j i o s i t e s o p h i s m , w h e r e f r o m w h a t is t r u e
aliso h itcly w e c o n c l i n l e w h . a t is t r u e o n l y in c e r t a i n m o d ifica tio n s
a n d r e l a t i o n . - , a s , f o r e x a m p l e , w h e n f r o m t h e p r e m i s e t h a t j\ra n is a.
I K ru p . I jtg tk ^ n o , j). 120. I'.l) [O n t lie A lv a r e z , in G a le , Ihilosnphin G e m ra lis, L . iii

(li-iii I tiuii o l SV/I.1H.7 Com jiiisiti t l JJivisi, t o c . iii. s e ct. 2, 8, p. 4CG ]
famiiUM in I In- qui-.-iion o l fo r e k n o w le d g e and
liI x T lv . wi- ilH liiflo r y in U iiiz , Co?nm,>iturii 2 [ I le iiz in g e r ,] [D ie L n g ik a h W issensdta/t
a ' I t ip u la liiin ts , d t S i i m t i a . d t I'h d , tU Viri- d tr Ije n k k iin sl, d a rg e ile lU A 1,1)8, I tU m h c T g ,1636
a t t, a t de Vita D 'i, D iep . X X X iii. p. 2C1 t l s tq . Ml).]
L e c t. X X III. LOGIC. 327
livin g organism, w e i n f e r t h a t A p a in te d or scidptured w a n is a

living organ ism }
T h e t h i r d f a l l a c y t h e S o p h isw a figurcv dictionis a r i s e s w h e n
AV'e m e r e l y p l a y w i t h th e a m b ig n ity o f a w ord. The w ell-know n
syllogism ,Jjhis syllaha e s t ; M u s caseum r o d i t ; E rgo, sgllaba cu-
seum rodit,^ i s a n e x a m p l e ; o r ,
Herod is a fox;
A fox is a quadruped ;
Therefore, Herod is a quadruped.
S ophism a equtv-
T o th is fallacy m a y b e r e d u c e d w h a t are called th e
ocationis, t h e Sop/iisma amphiboUai, a n d t h e Sophisnia uccentus,^
w h ich are on ly c o n te m p tib le m o d ific a tio n s of th is c o n tem p tib le
fallacy.
^ L X X I X . O f ^ M a t e r i a l F a l l a c i e s , t h o s e a r e o f t h e m o s t fi'e-
q u eiit o ccu rren ce, w h ere, from a prem ise
P a r . LXXIX. M a t e - -\yPich i s i i o t ill r e a l i t y u n i v e r s a l , w e coii-
rial F a lla c ie s.
elu d e u n iv e rs a lly ; or from a n o t i o n Avhich
is n o t in r e a l i t y a m i d d l e t e r m , w e i n f e r a c o n c l u s i o n . U nder
th is g e n u s t h e r e a r e v a r io u s s p e c ie s o f fallacies, o f w h ic h th e
m o s t r e m a r k a b l e a r c , 1 , t h e
Sophism a cum hoc {vel pxost hoc),
ergo propter hoc ; 2, S ophism a o r ign ava xxitio ; oj
S ophism a polgzeteseos ; a n d 4, S ophism a heterozeteseos}
In th is p a ra g ra p h you w ill o bserve th at th ere arc g iv en tw o

g e n e ra o f M a te ria l F a lla c ie s , th o se o f an U n -
E x p iic a tio n . U n ii'c r s a lity [sophismata fictas iiniversali-
1aiiacies of an Un- fatis), a n d t l i o s c o f ail I l l u s i v e R e a s o n (sophis-
real Universality, and ^
of an Illusive Reason. matci f i i l s i meclH^ o r u oii ctnism lit cuiisce). I
m a s t first e x p la in t h e n a t u r e o f these, co n sid
ered ap art, th e n show t h a t t h e y b o t h fall t o g e t h e r , t h e one b ein g
o n ly th e categ o rical, th e o th e r o n ly th e h y p o th e tic a l, ex p ressio n o f
t h e s a m e v ice ; a n d , fin ally , c o n s i d e r t h e v a r i o u s s p e c ie s i n t o w h ic h
t h e g e n e r i c fa lla c y is s u b d i v i d e d .
O u r d e c is io n s c o n c e r n i n g i n d i v i d u a l o b je c ts , in so fa r as t h e y
belo n g to certain classes, are very fre q u e n tly
1 O f an U n real fallacies of th e fo rm er k i n d ; th at is, c o n c l u -
U n iv e r s a lity . ^ i t
sions fro m p r e m i s e s of an unreal u n iv ersality .
F o r ex am p le : The Jeios are rogues, The Carthaginians, f a i t h -
1 C f. D e n z in g e r , L o g ik , 564. E d . 3 O n llie s e f a lla c ie s , s e e D e n z in g e r , Logik,

55 559, 560, 561. E d .
2 S e n e c a , E ;p.,48. E d . * C f. K r u g , L o g i k , 117. E d .
3 2 8 L O G I C . L e c t. X X IU
less, The Cretans, liars, The French, braf/adocios, The Ger

mans, m>istics, The rich, purse-proud, 7'he noble, h augh ty,
Women, f r i v o l o u s , 'The learned, pedants. Tliose and similar
jiidgmonts, wliicli in general are true only of many, at best only
o f the majority, o f the subjeets o f a el.ass, often constitute, how
ever, the grounds o f the oiunions we form ot iiuliviilmds; so that
these opinions, with their groumls, when expressed :is eouelusion
and premises, are nothing else than fallaeies of an unreal generality,
sojihismata f c tc c universalitatis. It is impossible, liowever, to
decide by logical rules wbetlier a proposition, such as those above
stated, is or i.s not universally valid; in tlii.s, exiierienee alone can
instruct us. Logic requires only, in general, that every sumption
should be nnivcrsally valid, and leaves it to the sevcr.al sciences to
pronounce whether this or that jiarticnlar snmption does or does
not fiilfd this indisiionsable condition. sophism a fictw iini-
rer.salitatis is thus a fallacious syllogism o f the class o f catcgoricnls.
But the second kind o f material fallacies, the sophisms of Unreal
IMiddle, are not less frequent than those of
2 O f U n r e a l M id d le , . ^ . . .
unreal universality. When, for example, it is
.argued (as was done by ancient ]liilosopbcrs) that the magnet is
animated, because it moves another body, or that the stars are
animated, because they move t h e m se lv e s; here there is assumed
not a true, but merely an apparent, reason; there is, consequently,
no real -mediation, and the sophisrna f a l s i m e d ii is committed.
l"or, in these c.ases, the conclusion in the one depends on the
sumption, I f a body moves another body, it is a n im a te d ; in
the other, on the snmption, I f a body 07ioves itself it is a n i
m a t e d / h u t na the antecedent and consequent in neither of these
.smni)tions are really connected as reason and conseiineiii, or as
cause and eflcct, there is, therefore, no valid inference o f the
conclusion.^ The sophisrna non causa: at causas
T h e fallacies o f Uii- h y p o th e tic a l sy llo g ism ; b u t, as it m a y
real Itea -on a n d o f , ^ n i .1 ii r 1
..............
be categonc.allv enounced, tins fali.acy ot unreal
Lnreal Universality _ ' r
co in ci de rcasou will coincide with the categorical fal
lacy of unreal universality. Thus, the second
c.xample above a lle g ed :
I f the s ta rs move, them selves, th e y a re a n im a te d

B u i the s lu rs d o move. Ihem .selves;
Thenferre., the sta rs a re a n im a te d :
is thus expressed by a categorical equivalent
1 K ru g , I ^ g ik , i 1 1 7 . A n m ., p. 422. E d . 2 C f. K r u g , L o g ik , p. 423. E d .
L e c t. X X III. LOGIC. 32 9
A l l bodies th a t m ove them selves a re a n im a te d ;

B u t the sta rs m ove th e m selves;
T h erefo re, the sta r s a re a n im a te d .
In the one case, the sumption ostensibly contains the subsninption

and conclusion, as the correlative jtarts of a causal w h o l e ; in the
other, as the correlative jtarts o f an extensive whole, or, had the
categorical syllogism been so cast, of an intensive whole. The two
genera of sophisms may, therefore, it is evident, be considered as
one, taking, however, in their jtarticular manifestation, either a
categorical or an hypothetical form.
I may notice that the sojihism of Unreal Generality, or Unreal
Eeason, is hardly more dangerous in its jiositive
I'a ih ic y or U n re a l than ill its negative relation. For we are not
H eason as d a n g e r o u s ^lore disposcd lightly to assuiiie as absolutely
ill its n e g a t iv e as ill ils , i i t
ito s itiv e fo rm . universal what is universal in relation to otir
experience, than lightly to deny as real what
comes as an excejition to our factitious general law. Thus it is
that men having once generalized their knowledge into a coinjtact
system of laws, are found nnifoniily to deny the reality of all phe
nomena Avhich cannot be comprehended under these. They not
only pronounce the laws tliey liave generalized as veritable laws
of nature, which, haply, they may be, but they pronounce that
there are no higher laws; so that nil which does not at once find
its place Avithiii their systems, they scout, without examination, as
visionary and fictitious. So much for this ground of fallacy in gen
eral; we now jtroceed to the species.
N o3v, as unreal reasons may be conceived infinite in number, the
minor species of this class of sophisms cannot
be enumerated; I shall, therefore, only take
la c y of U u r e a l R e a so n . , ^ ^ j
notice o f the more remarkable, and which, in
consequence o f their greater notoriety, have been honored with
distinctive appellations.
Of these, the first is the S oph ism a cum hoc {pel p o s t hoc), ergo
pro p te r hoc. This fallacy arises when, from the
(s.) sophnma cum hoc contimrciit conseciitioii of certain phenomena in
(vH po st hoc), ergo prop- ^ i t
t,^rhoc. order ot time, w e inler their mntnal depend
ence as cause and effect. When, for example,
among the ancient Romans, a general, without carefully consulting
the augurs, engaged the enemy, and suffered a defeat, it was in
ferred that the cause o f the disaster was the unfavorable character
of the ausjiices. In like manner, to this sophism belongs the con
clusion, so long prevalent in the world, tliat the appearance of a
42
330 LOGIC. L e c t. X X I ll
comet was the liarhinger of famine, pestilence and war. In fact,

the greater nnmher of the hypotheses which constitute the history
o f physics aud iihilosojiliy, are ouly so many examples o f this fal
lacy. Ihit no science has exhihited, aud exhibits, so many flagrant
instances of the soidiism cum hoc, eryo prop ter hoc, as that o f med
icine ; for, iu proportion as the connection o f causc and effect is
})cculiarly obscure iu jihysie, jdiysieians have only heeu the holder
in assuming that the recoveries which followed after their doses,
were not coueomitants, hut effects. This sophism is, in practice, of
great influence and very frequent occurrence; it is, however, iu the
ory, too jiersjiicuous to Icquire illustration.
The second fallacy is that which has ohtained the name o f Igncivara-
tio, or iSophisma p iy r u m , iu Greek, dpyos Aoyos.'
(b ) Ig n a v a R atio. ,,,, . . , , . . ,
l l i e excogitation ot tins argument is commonly
attrihiiied to the Stoics, by whom it was employed as subsidiary to
their doeti-inc o f fate. It is an argument hy which a man eiideav-
^ ors to vindicate liis inactivity in some jiarticu-
h x a m p ie . relation, hy the necessity o f the conse-
(juciieo. It is an hyjiothetico-disjunctive syllogism, aud, when fully
exjiressed, is as follows :
b u n i p i i o n ...................I f I ought to ei:ert m y s e lf to effect a ce rta in event, th is event eith er m u st

ta k e p la c e or it m ust n o t;
S u b s u m p tio n . . . . I f it m ust ta k e p la c e , m y exertion is s u p e r flu o u s ; i f it m u st not ta k e
p la c e, m y exertion is o f no a v a i l ;
C o n c lu s io n ............... T h erefo re, on either a lte rn a tiv e , m y exertion is u s e le ss ." ^
Cicero, in th e twelfth ehajiter o f liis hook, idq/o, thus states i t :
I f it be fa t e d th a t you recover fr o m y o u r p resen t disca.se, w hether yo u c a ll in a doctor or not,

yo u w ill recover; a g a in , i f it be f a t e d th a t you do not rixo v cr f r o m y o u r p resen t d is-
ai.se, w h etlu r you ca ll in a doctor or not, yo u w ill not recover;
B u t one or olher o f the co n tra d icto rie s is f a t e d ;
T h /n fo r e , tv call in a doctor is o f no consequence.
Others have enounced the sumption in various forms, for ex-

amjtle : I f it he impossihle hut that 'you recover f r o m the jxresent
disease, etc., o r J f it he true that xjoa xoUl recover f r o m this
di.sease, or I f it he decx'eed hy G o d that
Hr various dcRigna- ^ disease, aiid SO likewise
lio n s . / . .
in different manners; according to which like-
wi.se the question itself has ohtained various titles, as A rgu m e n t
1 .See Jlf-n a g c on D io g e n e s L a e r tiu s , L. ii. H a ss e n a i, O p tra , t . i. D e L o g . O rig. t t Var., L

p. 1Z3. L d . [ F a c c io la li, AerorLsa, v . p. 55. i. c . 0, p 5 1 ]
2 K r u g , L o g ik , 117, p . 424. n .
L ect. X X III. LOGIC. 331
D e F a t o D e P o ssih ilib u s D e Libero A r b i t r i o D e D roviden-

t i a D e D i v b d s D e c r e tis D e Futuris Co)itbigentibus D e P h g s -
ica fra<leterm biatioiie, etc. N o eonti'ovevsy is more ancient,
none more nniversal, none lias more keenly agitated the minds ot
men, none lias excited a greater iiitliieiK-e njiun religion aud morals;
it has not only divided schools, but nations, and lias so modified
not only their opinions, but their practice, that whilst the Turks, as
converts to the doctrine of Fate, take not the slightest precantioii
in the midst of pestilence, other nations, on the contrary, who admit
the contingency of second causes, carry their precautionary jiolicy
to an O])posite excess.
The common doctrine, that this argument is an invention o f the
Stoics, and a ground on which ttiey rested their
* doctrine o f tlie physical iiecessitation o f human
action, is, hotvever, erroneous, if we may accord credit to the testi-
inoiiv of Diogenes Laertius, who relates, in the Life of Zeno, the
founder of this sect, that he bestowed a sum o f two hundred minae
on a certain dialectician, from ivhoni he had learned seven species of
the argument called the X d y o s S c p f w v , meteas, or reaper, which differs
little, if at all, from the ignnoa ra tio } For how this sophism is
eonstnicted, and with what intent, I find recorded in the coinmen
inry of Aninionins on tlie book of Aristotle Ilept 'FjpgrjvcLa<;.- Of
the same character, likewise, is the argument called the A d y o s Kvpi-
cvu)v,i\\Q ratio dominans, OY controllbig reason, the jiroeess o f which
Arrian describes under the nineteenth chajjter of the second book
of the sayings of Fpictetns. ll i e lazg reason, the reapier, and the
controlling reason, arc t ms only various names for the same process.
In regard to the vice of this sojihism, it is manifest that it lies in
the sumption, in which the disjunct members
l l i e v ic e o f tlu s iniperfectl V enounced. It ought to have
s o p liism .
been tlins eoneeived ; It 1 ought to exert m y
self to effect a certain event, which I cannot, however, of myself
eftect, this event iinist either take place from other causes, or it
must not take place at all. It is only under such a condition that
my (xertion can, on either alternative, be useless, and not if the
event depend wholly or in jiart for its accomjilishment on my exer
tion itself, as the conditio sine <pia nond ^ It is plain, however, that
1 S e e L a e r tiu s, v ii. 25. T lic o b s e r v a tio n in e r ed fro m A r r ia n , b u t n o t tlie n a tu r e o f tlie

llie te x t is fr o m F a c c io la t i, A croasis, v . ji. 57, a r g u m e n t il.=elf. l l is a lso m e n tio n e d , th o u g h
ed. 1750. E u . n o t e x p la in e d , by L u c ia n , Vit. A u ct., c . 22
Ilu la r c h , Sym pn.s., i. 1, 5. G e lliu s , N . A ., i . 2
2 r . 91 b. ed A id . A d i e t . , 1546. - Ed. C o m p a r e F a c c io la li, A croasis, v . ji. 67. - E d.
3 T h e p u r p o se o f th is s o p liism m a y bc g a t h , * K r u g , L o g ik , p 424. E d .
332 LOGIC. L k c t . XXTTT.
tlic refntntion of this sophism does not nt all affect the doctrine of
necessity ; for this doctrine, except in its very .ahsm-dest form, the
F a tu in Turcicu)n, makes no use of such a reasoning. ^
T h e third fallacy is the So}>his)nn jioh/zeteseos ov qiaestionis du-
jiliris, t/ie sop/iism o f continuous questioning,
(c) Soii/iism a i o!zc- i \ i- fi -i
winch attem pts, Irom the imiiossibdity of assign
ing the limit of a r e la ti\e notion, to sIkov by
continneil in terrogation the iiiqiossibility o f its determ ination at
all. T h ere arc certain notions which are only conceived as relative,
as ]iroiiortional, and whose li.nits we cannot, therefore, assign by
the gradual addition or iletraction o f one determ ination. B u t there
is no conseqiience in th e pro])Osition, that, if a notion cannot be
determ ined in this m anner, it is incapable o f all determ ination, and,
therefore, absolutely inconceivable and null. ' Such is the Sorites,
th e natu re o f which I have already explained to
I ts v a n o u h d e s ig iia - This reasoning, as applied to various ob-
nou s. - ^ I 1
jccts, obtaineil various names, as, besides the
.Sorites or .iVcervus, we have the crescens,^ the (/>aAa/<pds or calmis,^
the vTreftScTLKu^, sn]>er}>ositus or superlutious* the rjavxdôiv or
qniescens, etc., etc.* The Sorites is well defined by Ulpian," a soph
ism in which, by very small tlegrees, the tlis])ntant is brought from
the evidently true to the evidently false. For example, I ask. Does
one grain o f corn make up a heaj) of grain? My ojiponent answers,
No. I then go on asking the same question of two, three, four, and
so on a d in fn itu m , nor can the rcsjiondent find the number at which
the grains begin to constitute a heap. On the other hand, if we
depart from the answer, that a thousand grains make a heaj), the
interrogation may be continued downward to unity, and the answiu er
be unable to dettTinine the limit where the grains cease to make up
a heap The same process may be performed, it is manifest, upon
all the notions o f jiroportion, in space and time and degree, both in
continuous ami discrete (piantity.^
The fourth and last fallacy o f this class is the sopJiisma hetero-
zctescos,ox sophism o f counter-questioning^ wwA as apjilicd to vari-
1 K rn ff, l ^ g i k , ] 117. K d. T.cge, 177. D e Verb S ig n ! /. N n tiir a c a v il-

2 W y l l i ' i i b o c l i , Ihu. 1>kS .r a X in n V in'l., lutiiuiiK, fiiiain O iu 'ci (TuipeLTrjy a i> i)e llu n n it,
p. .>79: l rr)r,/,iu P/iil. , ]> iii c. 9, } 4 . Kl>. ]i:rc c.-t, ul iil) r a al) c \ id o iite r v(.Tis ])c-i- b rev-
" D in g L a i - i l . ii. Ibi^. ( IIjab'C-ndi, De iHsiiiia.s iniiliiliuiic.'i d is ])iita lio ad ca qii.'i; c v i-
l j , g O rig , c .1. K e. d f ii li i r fa ls a u n i t p c r d u c a lu r . (]u o le d by
4 K p ic lflii- , iii. 2, 2. A s in tc r p r e le d ( J a fs e iid i, i n Lngicm O rigin e tt V a rin a U , L . ).
by O a w n id i, i n L o g . O U g.. c . fi. lliit liic c . 8, j). 41, a n d b y J le iia g e , A '/ I /ic r l , ii. 108.
tru e rt-ading i.n p r o h u b ly niroiieriK O V s. S u e Ed.
S c lixvcigb a;n ;r's iio iu . K d. 7 K rug, L o g ik , 117. E d .
5 C ic e ro , Acrt/!., il. 29. E p ic te tu s , D U s tr i. H [S e e G as.'-cndi, O p tra , t. i. D e L o g . Orig
i). 18, 19. - Ed. et Var. L . i. c. G, p. 5 1 .]
L e c t . X X III. LOGIC. 333
ous objects, it obtained, among tlie ancients, tlic names of th e D i -

%
.l e m m a , ^ t h e O o r n u t a s f t h e J y i t i g i o s n s , t h e
(d) Sophisma hetcro- A ch ille s,^ th e M e n t i e n s } th e A l l i e n s ,^ th e
zfteseos.
Us
.
v a r io u s n a m e s.
E l e e t r a } the

O b v d a tu s ^ th e E ec ip ro c n s}^
? y
the CrocodilinHS^ the ovtl<;}^ the In ductio
i m p e r f e c t a and to this should also be referred tlie Ass o f Biiri-
daiius,- It is a liyp>thetico-disjuiictive rca-
I ts c h a r a c te r . . , . , . . . ,
soiling, wliieli rests on :i certain sujipositioii, and
which, through a reticence o f this supposition, deduces a fallacious
inference. To take, for an e.xaniple o f this fallacy, tlie Kepanvog or
Cornntus: it is asked: H ave you cast your horns? I f you
answer, I have; it is rejoined. Then you have had horns: i f you
answer, I have not, it is rejoined. Then you have them still.' To
this question, and to the inferences from it, the di.junctive proposi
tion is siipposcfl, A certain subject lias either had horns or has
them still. This disjunction is, liowcver, only correct if the question
is concerning a subject to which liorns previously belonged. I f I
do not suppose this, the disjunction is false; it must, consequently,
thus run : a certain subject lias eiilier bad or not ba<l horns. In
the latter case tliey could not of course be cast. The alternative
inferences { t h o i y o u h a r e h a d t h e m , or t h e n y o u h a r e t h e m s t i l l )
have no longer ground or plausibility.'^ To take another instance in
the L i t i e / i o s u s or J R e c i p r o c u s . O f the liistorv
'Ih e LitigiosuS t
of t]iis fuiions dilemma tliere are two accounts,
the Gieck and the Roman. The Roman account is given us by
Aldus Gellius,' and is there told in relation to an action between
Prottigoras, the prince of the Sophists, and
1 lie cnse o f r r o t a g - Euatlilus, a voung man, his disciple. T h e disci-
o r a s a iic l E u a tlilu s ^ ^ i
pie luid covenanted to give his master a large
sum to accoinpli.sh him as a legal rhetorician; the one lialf of the
snin was paid down, and the other was to be paid on the day when
Enathlns should plead and gain his first cause. But when the
' H er m o g e iip s , Df Inffnt., L . iv ., a n d Pro- 8 A u h is G e lliiis , X. A ., L . v . c . 1 0 ,1 1 E d .

leg. acl Il-rmngmfm. S e e W a lz s Hhetorts 9 L u e ia ii, I c. Q u in t ilia n , Inst. Oro., i. 10
Grrrc/, v o l. iii. p 107, iv . p. 1 4 . E d 5. C f 'SXcnage, Ad Diog. Laert., E. ii 1 0 8 .
- S c iic e a , Epist., io. IM enage, Ad Diog La- E d .
cr., I. ii 108 E d . 10 A m r a o u iu s , Ad Arist. Categ., f. 58. C f.
"Diog. L a e it.. L. i.x. 2.3. A r is to t le , PAy.., J le n a g e , toe. ra . E d
vi. 9. .Soph. E.'enrh., 24. E d . U C ie e ro , De Inventione, L . i. c . 3 1 . E d .
4 M en a g e, A ! Diog. Laert., L ii. 108. C ic e r o , I- S ec D e n z in g e r . Logik. 5 571, fr o m w h o m
A rn /.\\.29 . Ed. th e se d e s ig n a tio n s are ta k e n . Reid's Uorfcs,
.i D o g E a ert., ii 108. El>. p. 238. E d .
0 L u cia n , Vit. Anrt.. 22. Cf. J le n a g e , Arf 13 D io g . L a e r t., v ii 1 8 7 . E d .
Diog. iM eri., L. ii. 10,S. E d . 14 K r u g , Logik, p. 425. E d .
3 1 e n a g e , ibid. E d . 15 L. v. c. 10.
334 LOGI C. L e c t. XXIIL
scliolar, after tlic duo course o f preparatory instruction, was not im

the same liiirry to coinincnce pleader as the inaster^to obtain the
remainder o f his fee, Protagoras brought Enathlus into court, and
addressed his opponent in the following reasoning; Learn, most
foolish of young men, that however matters may turn up (whether
the decision to-day be in your favor or against yon), pay me my
demand you must. For if the judgment be against yon, I shall
obtain the fee by decree o f the court, and if in your favor, I shall
obtain it in terms o f the compact, by which it became due on the
very day yon gained your first c.anse. You thus must fail, either by
judgment or by sti])ulation. To this Enathlus r e join e d : JMost
sapient o f masters, learn from your own argument, that whatever
may be the finding of the court, absolved I must be from any claim
by yon. For if the decision be favorable, I ])ay nothing by the sen
tence of the judges, but if unfavorable, I pay nothing in virtue of
the compact, because, though pleading, I shall not have gained my
cause. The judges, says Gellins, unable to find a ratio decidendi,
adjourned the case to an indefinite day, and idtimately left it unde
termined. I find ;i jiarallel story told, among the Greek writei-s, by
Arsenins, by the Scholiast o f Ilcrmogene.s, and
rax a"iid TiXr Siiidas,^ of the rhetorician Coni.v {anglice
Crow) and his scholar Tisias. In this c.asc, flic
judges got off by delivering a joke against both parties, instead of a
decision in favor of eiiher. 'We have here, they said, the plaguy
egg o f a pl.aguy crow, and from this circnmstance is said to have
originated the Gict'k provci'b, k u k o v K o p a K o ? K a K o v w o r .
II crewith M'c terminate the First Gi-eat Division o f Pure L ogic,^ O
.Stoichiology, or the Doctrine of Elements.
1 [ I ro lf^ o m o iia lo lle r n io p c iie s , in W a lz s 313, .31-4. Q u o ted b y S ig w a r t , 3.33, ji

H hrtnrfs Chrrri, to m . iv . pp. 13, 14. A r.enii 211, 3d e d it. S u id a s , q u o te d b y S c h o t tu s
V io le t u in , e d it. I V a lz , .' t u t t g a r d , 18.32, p p . A ila g ia G racoru m , p. 4.10, 1012.]
LECTURE XXIV.
PURE LO G IC .
P A R T II.-J\IE R 'H O R O L O G Y .
SE C T IO N I. M E T H O D IN GENERAL.
S E C T I O N II. M E T H O D IN S P E C I A L , O R L O G I C A L M E T H O D O L O G Y
1 _ d o c t r in e o f d e f in it io n .
G e n t l e m e n , W e c o n c h u le d , in o u r la s t L e c tu r e , t h e c o n s id e r a
tio n o f S y llo g ism s, v ie w e d as I n c o r r e c t o r F a l s e ;
M eth o d o lo g y . o t h e r w o l'd s , tlic d o c t r i u c o f F a l l a c i e s , in so
fa r a s t h e f a lla c y lies w itliin a s in g le s y llo g is m . T h is, h o w e v e r, you
w ill n o t i c e , d o e s n o t e x h a u s t t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f f a l l a c y in g e n e r a l ,
fo r t h e r e a re v a r io u s sp e c ie s o f false r e a s o n in g w h ic h m a y affe ct a
w liole tr a in o f sy llo g is m s. T l i e s e o f Avhich t h e P e titio P r in -
cipii, t h e Ign oratio Elenchi, t h e Circiilus, a n d t h e Saltus in Con-
cladendo, a r e t h e p r i n c i j i a l w i l l b e a p p r o p r i a t e l y c o n s i d e r e d in
th e sequel, w h e n w e co m e to tr e a t o f th e D o c tr in e o f P r o b a tio n or
D em o n stratio n . W i t h F a lla c ie s te r m in a te d th e one G ra n d D iv isio n
of P ure L o g ic , t h e D o ctrin e o f E le m e n ts , or S to ich e io lo g y ,
an d I o p en th e o th e r G ra n d D ivision, th e D o c trin e o f M e th o d , or
M e th o d o lo g y , w ith th e fo llo w in g p a r a g ra p h .
^ L X X X . A S c i e n c e is a c o m p l e m e n t o f c o g n i t i o n s , h a v i n g ,
in p o i n t o f F o r m , t h e c h a r a c t e r o f L o g ic a l
P ar. L X X X . M ethod . . .
in general. P e r f e c ti o n ; in p o i n t o f M a t te r , t h e charac
ter of P e a l T ru th .
T h e c o n s titu e n t a ttr ib u te s o f L o g ic al P e rfe c tio n are th e P e r
spicuity, t h e Completeness, t h e H arm on y, o f K n o w l e d g e . Put
th e P ersp icu ity , C o m p leten ess, an d Ila rm o iiy o f o u r co g n itio n s
are, for t h e liu n ia n m in d , p o ss ib le o n ly t h r o u g h Method.
j M e t h o d ill g e n e r a l d e n o t e s a p r o c e d u r e i n t h e t r e a t m e n t o f
a n o b ject, c o n d u c te d a c c o r d in g to d e te r m in a te rules. M eth o d ,
33G LOGIC. L e c t . X X IV .
iu reference to S cience, d e n o te s, therefore, th e arrangem ent

and e la b o ra tio n o f c o g n itio n s, a c c o rd in g to d e fin ite rules, w ith
tb e view o f confei-ring on th e se a L o g ic al P c i'fe c tio n . The
^ l e t h o d s b y w h ic li w e p r o c e e d in t h e t r e a t m e n t o f t h e o b j e c t s
o f o iir k n o w l e d g e a r e t w o ; o r r a t h e r M e t h o d , c o n s i d e r e d in its
i n t e g r i t y , c o n s i s t s o f t w o ]u-ocesscs, A n a ly s is a n d Synthesis.
I. T h e A n a l y t i c o r R e g r e s s i v e ; in M d iich, d e p a r t i n g f r o m
th e in d iv id u al a n d th e d eterm in ed , w e ascend alw ay s to th e
m ore and m o r e g e n e r a l, in o r d e r fin ally to a tta in to u ltim ate
jirin cip les.
II. The S y n tlie tic or P r o g r e s s i v e ; in w h ich we depart
from ]irin cip les o r im iv ersals, a n d fro m th e s e descend to the
d e te r m in e d a n d tlie in d iv id u a l.
T liru u g h th e fo rm e r w e in v e s tig a te a n d a s c e rta in th e re a lity
o f th e several o b jects o f s c i e n c e ; tb ro u g h tbe latter w e con
n e c t t b e li a g m e i i l s o f o u r k n o w l e d g e i n t o t h e u n i t y o f a s y s t e m .
In its S to ich eio lo g y , o r D o c tr in e o f E le m e n ts , L o g ic considers

th e c o n d itio n s o f p o ssib le t h o n g l i t ; fo r th c u g lit
E .\])iic atio ii. o.x erted u n d e r t h e g e n e r a l la w s o f
r o '> ib ilit y a n d P e r - ^ t i t t i
fection o f T h o u g h t. Id e n tity , C o n tra d ic tio n , E x c lu d e d M id d le, and
R ea.soii a n d C o n s e q u e n t ; a n d t h r o u g h the g e n
eral fo rm s o f C o n c e jits, .J u d g m e n ts , a n d R e aso n in g s. T h ese, th ere-
f i u e . m a v b e s a i d to c o n s titu te t h e E l e m e n t s o f t b o n gOl i t . R ut we
m a y co n sid c i' tlio u g lit n o t m e r e ly as e x is tin g , b u t as e x is tin g w ell ;
l l i a t is, w e m a y c o n s i d e r i t n o t o n l y i n i t s p o s s i b i l i t y , b u t i n i t s ] i e r-
f c c t i o n ; a n d t h i s p e r f e c t i o n , in s o f a r a s i t is d e p e n d e n t o n t h e f o r m
o f t h i n k i n g , is a s m u c h t h e o b j e c t - m a t t e r o f L o g i c a s t h e m e r e p o s
sib ility o f lliin k iiig . Xow th a t p a r t o f L o g ic w hich i.s c o n v e r s a n t
w ith th e T êrfcction, w i t h t h e W e l i - b e i n g o f t h o u g h t , is t h e D o c
tr in e of A lcthoil, JM e th o d o lo g y .
A b 'th o d in g e n e r a l i s t h e r e g u l a t e d ]iro ced u re to w a r d s a certain
e n d ; t h a t is, a ] i r o c e s s g o v e r n e d h y r u l e s , w h i c h
Mc-Uiod ill e e u e ra l, . , i i ,
g u id e US by th e sh o rte st w ay stra ig h t to w a rd s
a certain jio in t, a n d guard us a g a in s t d ev io u s
ab err.atio n s.' Xow the end of th o u g h t is t r u t h , k n o w l e d g e ,
1 (O n J l f t h i x l . - w Alf'X . A p lir o d ., In A n a l. iio siu s, /V Cnnslitntinne A il s Dialfctirrp, ]). 4.3

Prif/r., 1. 3ti. . \ I I I . 1530. A in in o iiiii.v , / / I rrnrrm . i t scq., ciI. 1554, w illi r e la tiv e c o m n ie iita r y .
PoTji/iyrii, f. 2P<, A lil. 1515. P liiln p o n n s , In T im p U a , S i/sl/tn n Lngicrp, \ j. \v. c . v iii. ]i. 716
An Pnnr , f 4. In A n . Post , 1 01. E n slr a - t t sfi/. ( i . D o w n a n i. C n m m incnrii in P. lin n ii
till-. In Art. Post. ff. ]b, 5.3b. .See a lso 3 1 o liu - D io lrc tic a m , L ii. c . 17, p. 472 f t srq. O n llic
a u , Zaban.-lla. N u n n e'.lu '', T im p le r , D o w - d is tiiic lio u b e tw e e n J le t lio ii a n d O rd er, see
n a in .] f.M o lin m is, ly ig im . L . ii., D f M ithm ln, J^.cturrs on M U aph ystcs, le c t . vl. p 68, a n d
p. 215 ft sup Z aliare'.la, Oprrn I.ngira, Df. n o t e E d .]
MeUrodU, L. i. c. 2, p. 131. P e te r J o liu N u n -
L ect. X X IV . LOGIC. 337
sc ien ce, e x p r e s s io n s w h ic h m a y liere ho c o n s id e r e d as c o n v e r tib le .

S c i e n c e m a y , t h e r e f o r e , b c i'e<rarcled a s t h e nc'r-
S c ie n c c , w lia t. c ' r
fection o f tb o u g lit, a n d to th e a c c o m p lis h m e n t
o f th is ])crfection tb o 3 I e th o d o l o g y o f L o g ic m u s t b e a c c o m m o d a te d
and co n d u civ e. B u t S c i e n c e , t h a t is, a s y s t e m o f tr u e o r certain
k n o w le d g e , su jip o ses tw o c o n d itio n s . O f th e s e , t h e first h a s a r e la
tio n to th e k n o w in g s u b je c t, an d supposes th at
mal'a.fd'M alrial 'f d istinctly.

c o m p l e t e l y , a n d in c o n n e c t i o n . T h e second has
a relatio n to th e o b jects k n o w n , a n d s u p j i o s e s t h a t w h a t is k n o w n
has a tru e or real ex iste n ce. T h e fo rm e r o f these c o n s titu te s the
F o r m . i l P e r f e c t i o n o f s c i e n c e , t h e l a t t e r is t h e 3 I a t e r i a l .
N ow, as L o g ic is a science exclusively conversant about th e
form o f t h o u g h t , i t is e v i d e n t t h a t o f t h e s e
L o g ic ta k e s in to a c co n d itio n s, o f th ese tw o elem en ts, of
c o u n t o n ly t lie fo rm a l , . . .
p e r fe c tio n o f s c ie n c e . sc ieiic e o r p e r f e c t t h i n k i n g , L o g ic can o n l y ta k e
in to a c c o u n t th e fo rm al jierfection, w h ic h m ay,
th erefo re, be d istin c tiv e ly d e n o m in a te d th e lo g ica l jyerfection o f
th o u g h t. L o g ic a l M e t h o d o l o g y w ill, therefoi-e.
L o g ic a l M e tlio d o l- . i i' i i
oo-y what e x p o sitio n o f the rules and w ays by
w hich w e a ttain the form al or logical perfec
tio n o f th o u g h t.
But 3 Ie th o d , co n sid ered in g en eral, co n sid ered in its unre
stric te d u n iv ersality , consists o f tw o processes,
j i c i h o d in g e n e r a l c o rre la tiv e a n d c o m p le m e n ta r y o f each o th er,
c o n s is ts o f t w o c o r - ^ i i i
r e la tiv e a n d c o m p ie - F o r it p r o c o c d s e ith e r fro m tlie w h o l e to th e
n ie iita r y p r o c e ss e f, p a r t s , o r f i 'o m th e pai ts to th e w h o le . A s pro-
A i ia iy .s is a n d S y n t iic - c o e d i n g f ro iii t h e w h o l e t o t h e p a r t s , t h a t is, a.>^
reso lv in g , as u n lo o sin g , a c o m p le x to ta lity in to
its c o n stitu e n t elem en ts, it is A n a l y t i c ; as p ro ceed in g from the
Jiarts to th e w h o le, t h a t is, a s reco m p o sin g c o n stitu e n t elem en ts
i n t o t h e i r c o m p l e x t o t a l i t y , i t is S y n t h e t i c . T hese tAvo p r o c e s s e s
a r e n o t , in s t r i c t j i r o p r i e t y , t w o s e v e r a l m e t h o d s , b u t t o g e t h e r c o n
stitu te o n ly a sin g le m eth o d . Each a l o n e is i m j i e r f e c t ; e a c h is
co n d itio n ed or co n s u m m a te d b y th e o t h e r ; an d , as I fo rm e rly ob-
s e r v e < l ,' A n a l y s i s a n d S y n th e sis are as n ecessa ry to th e m se lv e s an d
t o t h e l ife o f s c i e n c e , a s e x p i r a t i o n and i n s p i r a t i o n , in connection,
are necessary lo each oth er, and to the p o ssib ility of an im al
e x iste n ce.
I t is h e r e jiroper to m ake yon aw are of the co n fu sio n Avhich
p rev ails in regard to the ap jfiic a tio n o f th e te r m s A n a lysis and
1 See Lectures on M itn p /iysics, p. 70. Ed-

43
338 LOGIC. L k c t. XXI V.
S y n th e s is } It is manifest, in general, from the meaning of the

word.-^, that the term a n a l y s i s can only be applied
Confusion ill rvgnrd to the S e p a r a t i o n o f a Mdiole i n t o i t s p a r t s , a n d
to tbe nppiicntioii of ^hat tlic term si/iithesis can only be applied to
tlic lorin.< Ainilvsis , i i o
aiui Syuiiicsis. collc'clion of' iiito a whole. So lai',
no ambiguity is ])Ossihlc, no room is left for
abuse. But yon are awai-e that there arc different kinds of M'hole
and parts; and that some of the wholes, like
ihese couiiier pro- wltole of Comjiichension (called also the
ces.scs a.s iip|)litU to * v _
tlic counter wholes of J fe to p h y s ic a l), and the whole of E.xtension,
coinpreiiciisioii and (called also ihc lo y ir a l), nvd in the inverse ratio
K.vtension.correspond
with eucli other. . . , t
is necessarily in the other a whole. It is evi
dent, then, that the countei- processes of Analysis and Synthesis, as
applied to these coiintei wholes and parts, should fall into one, or
correspond; inasmneh as each in the one quantity shoiiltl he <lia-
mctrically opposite to itself in the other. Thus Analysis, as apjilied
to Conijirehension, is the reverse process of Analysis as npplietl to
Extension, but a corresponding process with Synthesis; and vice
versa. Now, should it happen that the existence nnd opjiosition of
the two (jiiantities arc not considered, that men, viewing the
whole of Extension or the whole of Comprehension, each to the
oxelnsion of the other, must define Analysis and Synthesis with
reference to that single ipiantity which they cxeliisi\ (*ly take into
account; on this siqiposition, I say, it is manifest that, if dif
ferent jihilosophers regard different wholes or
iin.cc tlic tcrm.s quantities, we may haê the terms a n a l y s i s and
Anaijsis and s>n(lie- si/nthesis alisoliitcly iiscd by different iihiloso-
t-i- ii-cd in a conlrary ' a a i ^
pliers in a contrary or reverse sense. And this
has actually happened. The anoienls, in gen
eral, looking alone to the whole of Extension, use the terms a n a ly s is
I [ Z i i b a r c l l ! ) , Lngirn. l.ihrr ih n>grrssii, lo g ic ia n s g e n e r a lly llic r e v er se .] [S e e liii.

|i|i 4-1, 'b S e e al.'-o, In Anal Ilistir . K. ii. Pr/jrepta Phil. I.ogi-ir. 1. I l l e i. } .3,)). 84.
ie \i s|. |,|p. 1212. 121.3. .M oliiiieiis, Lngirn, L. 1781 M en tetn s iia iih 'n a f n r a S y n llie fic a n -.
211
)i. A p ix a n liv , p f t .4. 7 ., w in i n o t ic e s tliiil .M ellio d u m s e f|n i, e a q n e ad m iiv e r s a le s ideas
b o ili th e A iia lM ic a n d S y n l li e t i c o iu e r m a y iie r v e n ir e . . C o iilr a r iu in est ile r A n i
]ir<ce<d fro m th e j/eiicra l to th e p a r lic u la r . ly tie a .'.M e fb o d i, qii.-c a b m iiv e r s a lib u s in iliiim
.'(e a lso , 1 0 th e sa m e e fle c t, lloir))!nier,f/Vycr d iic it et ad jie c n lia r ia p r o g r o d ilu r , d iv id e iifM
ill' A nal'/.iit in >!>' P liilosnpiii', ji 41
i t s ti/.. lie iie r a in sn a s I 'o iin a s .
C o n tr a c o m m u
I l'ille , r-10 (.a> -sendi. Pln/nrri. S i c l i o iii. iiein .'eii.suin ef v e r h o n im iia liir a n i, .Synfh ei-
.M end Ia r t. L i.\ O p ' r a , t. ii p . 4 6 /). V ic - iea n i v o c a n t M e th n d n m . (|ini' d iv id it , A n ;
forin, Sm' n iitu 'lifh 'rr iJ iirsli Umtg iJir I jig ik , lyticarii eoidra. (pi<e e(im|)Oiiif. Ir.cf n/i
1214. Treiid'-lenbiirg, ICUmnilit Arts- fin. In the edition of the Prmpin by .Af'iasi
I l'h io ,\) . 9 Troxler, L n g i k , \ i p. 100. n ** M'yttenbacli is made to say precisely llie IC
Kiiii'. iMglk.i, 111. p 10), n. *, and ] 120, p. verse of what he lays down in the original
4.31 Wiltcnbach makes ,Syntlif-lic method edjtion. Sec Prcp.r.. Phil. L o g ., cd. Maass, r
I .< gre-.. fromparticolaiH 10 universals; olher 64. Kd.]
L e c t. XXIV. I.OGIC. 339
and analytic simply to denote a division of tlie genus into species,

of the s])ccics into individuals; the modonis, on the other liand,
in genei'.il, looking only at the whole of Comprehension, emjiloy
these terms to exqn-oss ;i resolution of tho individual into its various
attributes.' But though the contrast in this respect between the
ancients and moderns holds in general, still it is exposed to sundry
exceptions; for, in both periods, theic are pliilosophers found at tho
same game of cross-])Ui'])oses with their contemporaiies as the an
cients nnd inoilerns in general arc with each otlier. This difference,
Avhicli has nei er, as far as I know, been fully observed and stated,
is tlie cause of great confusion and mistake. It is jiropcr, therefore,
wlien we use these terms, to use thorn not in exclusive relation to
one whole more than to another; and, at the same time, to take
care that we guard against the niisappreliension that might arise
from the vagne and one-sided view which is now universally preva
lent. So nnieli for the meaning of the words analytic and synthetic.
whieh, by the ivay, I may notice, are, like most of our logical terms,
taken from Geometry.
The Synthetic Method is likewise called tlio P royressive; the
Analytic is called the Peyressive. Now it
Th e S\ ntiiotic Metii- plain t h a t this a]iplication o f th e term s proyres-
o d h a s been c.ii led t he is a l t o g e t h e r a r b i t r a r y . Fm-
VC, a n d th e . ^
Aiiiiiyiie Ihe Uegre?- import of tliesc woi'ds oxprcssos a relation
.-ive. The.se dcsigiia- to u certain ])oiiit of departure, iiterniinnsa
tion.s wholly arbitrary, and to a certain |ioint of termination, a
and of variou.s appli- . , , - ,
terminus ad quem ; and it tliese have only an
arbitrary existence, tlie correlative words will,
consoqneiitly, only be of an arbitrary a])plication. But it is mani
fest that the jioiiit of de])arture, the point from ivhich the Iro-
gressive [irocess starts, may be cither the concrete realities oi' our
experience, the prineipiata, the notiora nobis; or the abstract
g(*neralitie.s of intelligence, the principia, the notiora natura.
Each of these has an equal right to be regarded as tlie starling-
pnint. The An.alytic process is chronologieally first in the order of
knowlo<lge, and we may, therefore, reasonably call it the proyres-
sioe. as starting from the primary data of our observation. On the
other liaiid, the Synthetic jirocess, as following the order of consti
tution, is first ill the order of nature, and we may, therefore, like
wise reasonably call it the proyrtssive, as starting from the jiriinary
eleiii Ills of existi'iice. The ajijilication of these terms as synonyms
1 [Sue A i i s t o l le , P/iysica, L . i v . c. 3. T im ji- A n a ly s is o f G e o m e tr y , se e r io l i n u s . Ennead.

ler , Logicm S ijsin n n , L . ii. c- i qii. 11. p. 24S ] iv . L . i x . c. 5. l ld lo p o iiu s . In An. Pont..
2 See above, p I'Jd, n. 4 Kl>. [On tlie S6a,Venet. 15-34.1
340 LOGIC. L ect. X X IV .
o f t h e a n a l y t i c a n d s}n t h o t i c p r o c e s s e s , is, a s w h o l l y a r b i t r a r y , m a n
ifestly o p e n to eoiibision and co n trad ictio n . And such has been
th e ease. I lin d t i n t t h e jiliilo s o p lie rs a r e as m u c b a t eross-jm rjjose.s
in t l i e i r a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e s e t e r m s t o t h e A n a l y t i c and S y n th etic
p r o c e s s e s , a s in t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f a n a l y s i s a n d s y n t h e s i s t o t h e d i f
f e re n t w holes.
I n g e n e r a l, h o w e v e r , b o t h in a n c i e n t a n d m o d e r n tim e s , S y n t h e s i s
has been called the P r o y r e a s iv e , A n a l y s i s t h e
In general, Synthe- li c y r e s s i v e , jiio c c s s ; an a jip licatio n of term s
h.is been de.og- vdiieli lias i i r o b a b ly t.ak en its rise f r o m a p a s s a g e
n a ie d t lie T r o g r e ^ siv e , . . . , ,
an d A n a ly s is the Ke- A i ' i s t o t l c , w l i o s a y s t h a t t l i c i 'c a r e tAVO Avays
gressive Iroccss. o f sc ien tific p r o c e d u r e , th e one from p rin ci
p l e s (aTTo Tuir d p x o s v ) , t h e O t h e r t o p rin c ijile s ( iir l
rd? upxaf). F r o m t h i s , a n d f r o m a n o t l i e r s i m i l a r p a s s a g e i n P l a t o , ( ? )
t h e t e r m jn 'oyressive h a s l i e e n a p p l i e d t o t h e p r o c e s s o f C o m p r e h e n -
s i v o S y n t h e s i s { p r o y r c d i e n d i a p rin c ip n is a d p r h i c i p i a l a ) , t h e t e r m
n y r t s s i c e , l o t h e j i r o c e s s o f C o m p r e h e n s i v e A n a l y s i s ( p r o f p e d ien d !
n p r i n c i p i a t i s (nl p>riitcijda.y
S o m u c h fo r t h e g e n e r a l r e l a t i o n s o f ^M ethod to t h o u g h t , a n d th e
g e n e r a l c o n s t i t u e n t s o f iM c th o d itself. I t noAv
A lctliod in sn o c ia l . i , ,
r e m a i n s t o c o n s i d e r Avhat a r c t h e p a r t i c u l a r aji-
[lic atio n s o f M e t h o d , b y w h ic h L o g ie a c e o in p lis h e s t h e F o r m a l P c r -
l e c t i o n of t l i o n g h l . In d o i n g t h i s , i t is e v i d e n t t h a t , i f t l i e f o r m a l
jio rtec tio n o f t l i o n g b t is m a d e up o f v a rio u s v irtu e s, L o g ic m u st
a c c o in m o ib ite its m e tb o d t o t h e a c q u i s i t i o n o f t h e s e in d e t a i l ; a n d
th at t l i e \-;irio ;is j i r o e e s s c s b y Avbieb tb e . 'C s e v e r a l v i r t u e s a r c a c-
q i i i r e i l , Avill, in t b e i r u n i o n , c o n s t i t u t e t h e s y s t e m o f L o g i c a l M e t l i o d -
-ilo '_ v. O n t h i s I w ill g i v e y o u a p a r a g r a p h .
L X X X I . T h e F o r m a l P e r f e c t i o n o f t h o u g h t is m a d e u p o f
, . th e t h r e e \ i r t u e s o r c h a r a c t e r s : 1 , O f
Par. L X X X I. Logl- ^
caiiieihodoiogy.-ita G le am CHS ^ 2, O f J ) k th i c tn t s s , i i i v o l v i i i g
Three Parts. G01,1],ltlcnCHS ; , O d J F ovm o ny . The
c h .a r a c tc r o f C l e a r n e s s d e p e n d s jirincip.ally d u t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n
o f the C o m p reh en sio n o f on r n o tio n s; th e ^ haraeter of D i s -
ti i i c t n e . s s d e p e n d s p r i n c i j i a l l y o n t h e <b v e l o j u n e n t o f t h e F x t e i i -
.sion of our n o tio n s; and the ch aracter o f H arm o n y , on th e
1 E ih. S ir , T lie r efern n ce to D a t o , f|u c lp d in L . C a sa u b o n V n o te . On th e view n

w b orn A r i 't f i' lf iiic t.lio iii* a s n in k iiig a s im ila r o f .Alolliod olA r U io lle a n d I la lo , sice .Schfib-
d i^ liijc tio ii. ih ]ir<ibab'v lo be tb iin d by c o m - Icr a n d O o w iia n i.] [.S c b e ib le r , O p tra Logica,
p a r in g Iw o K -p a r a ie I)a-âg|H in lln; R rpuhlic, J'ars. iv ., Tract. Si/liog,, c ; .v i i., D e M etliodo.
B . iv . J). 4 .3 .',, vi p. y>4. I'.li. ( r i a t o i,>< s a id tit. 7, p 003 D o w iia in .C o m . in P. R a m i Dia-
l o h a v e ta n g b t A n a ly s is l o J x io d a m a s th e U ctica m , L ii. c 17, p. 482. E d .]
Tbasian. See L aertius, L. iii. 24, and I'roclu s,
L e c t. X X IV LOGIC. 341
m u tual Concatenation o f our notions. T h e rules by which

these three conditions are fulfilled, constitute the T h re e P a r ts
o f Logical jMethodology. O f thc.se, th e first constitutes tlie
D octrine o f D f p'nitiou.; the second, the JJoctrine o f J j i d d c n i :
and the third, the D octrine o f D r o b a tio D
W h e n we turn atten tio n on onr thou ghts, and deal with them
^ to the end th a t th e y may he constituted into a
scientific whole, wc m u st ])erforiii a three fold
operation. AVe must, first of all, consider w h a t we think, th a t is,
w h at is com prehended in a th o u g h t. I n the second place, we must
consider how m any thin gs we th in k of, th a t is, to how m any objects
the tiiought ex ten d s or reac-hes, th a t is, how m any are conceived
u n d e r it. In th e third place, we m ust consider why we th in k so
an d so, and not in any oth er m a n n e r , in oth er words, how the
th o u g h ts are hound to g e th e r as reasons and conse([iients. T h e first
consideration, therefore, regards the comprehension ; th e second, tlie
extension ; the third, th e concatenation of our thoughts. B u t the
eoniprehension is ascertained by d e fin itio n s; th e extension by divi
sions; and th e concatenation by probations. ^ AVe jiroeeed, tliere-
fore, to consider these T h re e P a r ts of Logical Aletbodolegy in
detail ; and first, of D eclaration or Definition, in reg ard to wiiieh I
give th e following jiaragrujiii.
^ L X X X I I . H o w to m ake a notion Clear, is shown by the

logical doctrine of Declaration, or Defini-
Par ixxxii.i.The Pg w ider seiisc. A D eclaration (or
Doctrine of Deelara- -t .. .
tion or Definition. Definition in Its Wider sense) is a C ategori
cal Projiosition, consisting of tw o clauses or
members, viz., o f a S ubject Defined (jnonbrum d efn itian ) and
of th e D efining A ttrib u te s of the subject, th a t is, those by which
it is distinguisbed from oth e r things (jnembrum d efn ien s). T his
la tte r m em ber really contains th e Definition, and is often itself
so denom inated. Sim]de notions, as containing no plurality of
attributes, are incapable o f definition,'''
1 K r u g , L o g ik , J 121a. E d . [U a m u s w a s 08. a n d m a k e s l o u r s p e c ia l lo g ic a l m e th o d s ,
the first to in tr o d u c e M e th o d a s a p a r t o f D iv is io n , D e f in it io n , A n a ly s is , D eraon.stra-
L o g ic u n d e r S y llo g is tic (see h is D ia U cticn , L. tio n . E n sta c h iu s tre a ts o f M e th o d u n d e r
ii c. 17), a n d th e Iort R o y a lis t s (1662) m a d e J u d g m e n t , a n d S c h e ib le r u n d e r S y llo g is t ic .]
it a fo u r th p a r t o f lo g ic . S e e La L cgique on [E u s ta c h iu s , Siim ?na Philosophim . L o g im . P . ii.
V Art lie Penser, P r e m . D is ., p. 26, pp. 47, 50. T ra ct. 2. De M ethodo. p. 106, e d . E u g d . B a -
O uat. P a r t., p 445 ft set/, ed . 1775 G a sse n d j. ta v ., 1747 F ir st e d itio n , 10)9. S c h e ib le i;
in b is In stitu tio L ogirn, h as P a rs iv .. De M fth - O p .ra L o g ira . P a r s iv . c. x v i ii . p. 595 et s e q .
odo. H e d ie d in 1665; h is L ogic a p p ea red Ed ]
p o s th u m o u s ly in 1658. J o h n o f D a m a s c u s - K r u g , Z.ogi/fc, 1 2 1 . E d .
speaks s tr o n g ly o f M e th o d in h is D ia lectic, c h . ' 3 K r u g , L o g ik , i 121b. E d .
342 LOGIC. L kct. X X IV .
T h e terms declaration aixl dcjinition, 'wliich ai'C licre used as apjili-

cable to the sam e jirocess, e.\'])ress it, how ever,
Tiie'tl'ni''TK'ciura- *" asjiects. Tlio term declaration {dec-
lion 1111(1 iKihiition larotio) is a word som ew liat v a g u ely em p loyed
e .x i i r o * * iiio * n in e p r o - j ] ) English ; it is here used strictly in its projier
Cf*' in d iiU re iit iis - gensc ot throwing light n)>on, clearing iqy.
d'hc term definition {defnitio) is employed in a
more general, and in a more special, signification. Of tlie latter wc
are soon to sjieak. At jircsent, it is used simply in the meaning of
an enclosing within limits, the sepeirating a thing fr o m others.
Were the ic-rm declaration not of so vague and vacillating a sense,
it would be better to employ it alone in the more general accepta
tion, and to reserve the term de finition for the special signification.
^ L X X X III. Tlie process of Definition is founded on the

logical relations of Subordination, Coordi-
P a r . LXXXIII. D e f i- iiMtioii, Mild Coiigrueiice. To tliis end we
nition in U s s t r i c t e r discriminate the constituent characters of a
sense, w h i t .
notion into the Essential, or tliose which
belong to it in its iinrestrieted universality, and into the Unes-
se/itial, or those which belong to some only of its species. The
Es.'-eiitinl are again discriminated into Orlgined and iJerivatice,
a divi>ion which coincides with tliat into Internal or Proper,
and External. In giving tlic sum ol' the original characters
constiliieiiL of a notion, consists its JJef nition in tlic stricter
sense. iV Definition in the stricter sense must coiise(|Ucntly
afiurd at least two, and properly only two, original chai-aetors,
viz., that of tlie G'c-'yo/s immediately superior (yc//os
and that (ff tlie Jliftren ce by whicli it is itself marked out
from its eobrdiiiates as a distinct sjiccics [nota specialis, differ
entia specifica)}
Declarations (or definitions in the wider sense) obtain various

denoiiiinalion.s, according as the process is ]ier-
i.xplicaiicii. formed in diirerent maimers and degrees. X
\aru.io i.uiicf of \ ) qc\-,\ v\\\.\ ow \s cw\\vi\ AW E.i-plicettion [e x p lica tio ).
Doc.Ill anon. _ \
Kxpiicaiion. wlicii the jiredicalo or defining member indeter-
Kxpo.-iiion. iniiiately (*volves only Tronic of the chai-acters
belonging to the siilijeet. ft is called an E.rposi-
tlon [expmsitio), wlion the evolution of a notion is continued tlirougli
1 [Cf. Ariiotl(?. Tninrn. i. 6. Jifckc-rmann, pp 109,6.76. Sclieibler, Topica, c 30. Ricblcr,

.SyHema Ijtgita- Minus, J., i.e. 17. 0/><ra,t i. Logik, p. 91.]
L ect. X X I V . LOGIC. ' 343
several exjilicatioiis. It is cai!e<: a 'Ucscriplion (dcscriptio), when

the sabioct is made known tlirougli a number
D escription. . . tt n i, ,
Deiinitioii proper concrete cli n-actenstics. Iinally, it is ealletl
.a Definition Drojitr, when, as I have saiil, two
of the essential and original attributes of the deliiicd subject are
given, wliei-eof tbe one is common to it with thc various species of
the same genus, and the other discriminates it from these,'
Delinitions are distinguished also into Verbal or Nominal, into
Real, and into Genetic {definitiones nomincdes,
Delinitions, N orn- recdes, geueticcp), as they are conver-
inal, Ileal, and Uene- ^ . -.i .1
s a n t wi t li tli e m e a n i n g ot a t e r m , Wi t h t l : e n a t u r e
lie. _ . . . .
of a thing, or with its rise or production.- Nom
inal Dctiriirions are, it is evident, merely explientioiis. They are,
theret'ore, in general only used as jireliininary, in order to ])re]iare
(he way ihr mero p.orfoct declarations. In Real Definitions the
thing -ietoieil is eoiisiuered as already there, as cxi.sting (or), and
the notion, therefore, as given, precedes the definition. They are
thus merely analytic, that i.s, nothing is given explicitly in the jiredi-
eate or defining membci', which is not contained iinjdicitly in the
subject or ineiiiher defined. In Genetic Definitions the defined
subjoet is considered as in the jirogress to be, as becoming yiyv6fj.-
vov; llio notion, tlierefbrc, lias to be made, and is the i-esult of the
deliniiion, which is consequently synthetic, that is, jilaces in the
predicate or defining member more than is given iu the subject or
member defined. As examples of these three species, the following
till CO definitions of a circle may suffice : 1. The Nominal Defini-
lii.iii, The word circle signifies a unifoi-mly curved line. 2. The
Real Definition, xV circle is a line retiii-ning upon itself, of which
all tiie jiarts are equidistant from a given point. 3. Ti-e Genetic
Definition, A circle is formed when we draw around, and always
at the same distance from, a fixed point, a movable point whicb
leaves its trace, until tbe termination of the movement coincides
with the commencement.'' It is to be observed that only those
notions can be genetically defined, which relate to quantities rejire-
sonted in time and space. 3Iatbeinalies are principally conver
sant with .'ucli notions, and it is to be noticed that the mathematician
usually denominates such genetic definitions 7'ecd definitions, while
the others he calls without distinction noniincd definitions. *
The laws of Definition are given in the following paragraph.
1 C f. K r u g , L ogik. 122. E d lio n , fr o m W o lf, Philosophia R a tio n a lis, j 191

2 [C f. R e u s c li, S y ste m a L o g icu m , { 309 et Ed.
iffy.] 4 K r u g , L o g tk , 122. A n i n . S, pp. 448, 449
3 T h is e x a m p le is ta k e u , w ith s o m e a lte r a - E d .
344 LOGIC. L kct. X X IV .
^ L X X X I \'. A definition slionld bc Adeqimtc (adequata),

tliat is, the sniijcft defined, and llie prcdi-
n m o ' i i d e f i n i n g , should be equivalent or of the
same extension. If not, the sphere of the
jireilicate is either less tli.an that of the subject, and the defini
tion Too Xarrow (iingnsfior), or greater, and the definition
Too Wide (lafior).
II, It should not define by Xegative or Divisive attributes
(AL sit ncfjaus, ne f a t per difu/icta).
III, It sfionld not be T.antological, Avbat is contained in
tli( defined, should not be repeated in the defining clause {JSfe
sit circidas vel diallelon in defniendd).
IV, It should be Precise, that is, contain nothing unessential,
nothing siqierflnons {D e fn itio n e sit abundans).
\ . It should be Perspicuous, that is, couched in terms intcl-
ligihle, and not figurative, but projier and compendious.'
The First of these rules: That the definition should bc ade-

(piate, that i.s, that the defniens and defnitum
Ex])iic.inon. slionhl be of the same extension, i.s too ii-jnifest
_ ...
to reiiuirc much commentary. Is the detinltion
too w id e? then more is declared than ought to bc declare>'i ; is it
loo narrow? then less is declared than ought to bc ieclared ;
.and, in either case, the definition does not fully acconip!i.ih the end
which it proposes. To avoid this defect in definition, we must
attend to two conditions. In the first phace, that attribute shonid.
lie given wliieb the thing defined h.as in common with others of the
âinc class; and, in the second jdace, that attribute should be given
wliicli not only distingiii.shes it in general from all other things, but
|)roximately from things which arc included with it umler a common
cla,"s. Thi.s is expressed by Logicians in the rule J ) e fn itio con-
stet (jenerc p ro x im o et d if'e re n tia id tim a , Let the definition consist
of the nearest genus and of the lowc.st difierence. But .as the no
tion and its definition, if this rule be obeyed, are necessarily identical
or convertible notions, they imist necessarily have the same extent;
onscqiieiiily, everything to wliieli the definition ajjplies, and noth
ing to wliicb it does not apply, is the thing defined. Thus: if
the definition, A fa n is a ra tio n a l an im a l, bo adequate, we shall bo
.able to say h'cerg ra tio n a l a n im a l is h a rn a n : n o th in g w hich is
not a reUional a n im a l is h u m a n . But we cannot say this, for
I C f. K ru g , L ogik, ^ 123. E n . [ V i c t o r ii i ,. D rfin itin n r. Opera, p . (AS f t seq. B u flie r , Veri-

Lotfik, ( ZiZ ft if q . a'lgvtuT l, JlanUlxiick zii Vor- t t z de Consequence, 4 5 -5 1 . G o c lc iiiu s, Lxi-
e.sungen nbtr die L ogik, 371. Jio ctliiu B , De con Philosophicum , v . D e jin itio , p . 600.]
L ect. X X IV LOGIC. 34o
tliough this m ay he true o f this earth, \vc can co nceiv e in other

worlds rational animals w hich are not human. T lie definition is.
therefore, in this ease too w ide ; to make it adequate, it will be n e c
essary to add terrestrial or som e such term as, Jlan is a rational
animal o f this earth. A gain, were we to define ]Man, a ration
ally uctlny anitnal o f this earth, the definition would be too
uaiTOw; for it w ou ld be false to say, no animal o f this earth not
actiny rationally is human, for not o n ly children, but m any adult
persons would be e.xclnded by this definition, which is, therefoi-e, too
narrow.*
The Second Rule is, That the definition should not be made by
negations, or disjunctions. In regard to the for-
O u C O llll r t u l c aI j 1 I J l l i *
inur, ncgiitions, tluit w e should den ne a
th in g b y w h at i i is, and not by w h at it is not, tlie reason o f the
rule is manifcs;. 'I'fie definition should be an affirmative pro]'-osition,
for it out:ht to contain the positive, the actual, qualities o f the n o
tion defined, tliat is, liiC qualities which b elo n g to it, and w h ich
must not, therefore, be e.'celnded from or d enied o f it. I f there are
characters which, as referred to the subject, afford purely neg ative
j u d g m e n t s ; thi.s is a p r o o f that we have not a pro|Jcr co m p reh en
sion .:f the notion, and have only obtained a precursory definition
o f it, en closin g it w ith in only n e g a tiv e boundaries. F o r a defiiiiticii
Wliich contains only n egative attributions, affords merely an em pty
notion, a notion which is to be called a nothiiiy; for, as som e
tliiiik, it must at least possess one p ositive character, and its defini-
lion cannot, therefore, be m ade up e x c lu siv ely o f n ega tive attri
butes. If, how ever, a notion stands opposed to another which has
already been declared by p ositive characters, it m ay be defined by
n e g a tiv e characters, provided alw a ys that th e ge n u s is po sitiv ely
determ in ed. T h u s Cuvier and o ther naturalists define a certain or
der o f animals hy the negation o f a spine or back-bone, tb e inver-
tehrata a.s opjiosed to th e vertebrata; and m a n y such definitions
occur in Natural H istory.
For a similp.r reason, the definition must not consist of divisive or
disjunctive attributions. The end of a definition is a clear and dis
tinct knowledge. But to say that a thing is this or that or the
other, affords us either no knowledge at all, or at best only a vague
and obscure knowledge. If the disjiinetion be contradictory, its
enunciation is, in fact, tantamount to zero; for to say that a thing
either is or is not so and so, is to tell iis that of which we required
no assertion to assure us. But a definition hy disparate alternatives
1 C f. K r u g , L o g ik , 123. Anm . i E d .
44
346 LOGIC. L e c t. XXIV.
is, though it may vaguely circumsci-ibe a notion, only to bc consid

ered asa iirelnsory definition, nnd as the mark o f an incipient and
yet ini|ierfeet knowledge. W e mnst not, however, confound de
finitions by divisive attributes with propositions e.\{)ressive of a
division.
The Third Rule is, The definition should not be tautological;
that is, what is defined slionld not be defined by
itself. Idiis vice is called d efin inn in a circle.
Defining? in a c i r c l s . ^ ^ ^
This rule may be A'iolateil either i m m e d i a t e l y or
mediately. The definition, Jmuc is a la i r f a l co m n ia nd , is an
e.x.imple o f tlic immediate circle. A mediate circle requires, at
least, two correlative definitions, a [nincipnl nnd a subsidiary. For
exam ple, L a w is the ex pressed xcish o f a ruler, a n d a ru ler is one
who establishes laics. The circle, whether immediate or mediate, is
manile.5t or occult according ns the thing defined is repeated in tiie
same terms, or with other synonymous words. In the previous ex
ample it was manifest. . In the following it is concealed : G r a t i
tu de is a vir tu e o f aehnowledgnient, R i g h t i s the competence to do
or not to do. Such declarations may, however, be allowed to stand
as prelusory or nominal definitions. Concealed circular definitions
are of very frequent occurrence, when tlicy are at the .same time
mediate or remote ; for we are very apt to allow ourselves to be
deceived by the difference o f cxfiression, ;md fancy that wc have
declared a notion when we have only clianged the language. ^Ve
mght, therefore, to lie strictly on our giiaiu ag.ai:,''.; this besetting
vine. The ancients called the circular uefinition also In' tlic name
of iJ i a lk l o n , as in this case we declare tlic d c f n i t u n i nnd the
dcfinmns reciprocally by each other (6i h W r f w r ) } In probation
there is a siinilai- vice whicli bears the same names. W o may, I
think, call them by the homely English a[)i)ellation o f the Seesaw.
The Fourth Rule is, That the definition .should be precise;
tliat is, contain notliing unessential, nothing su-
F o u r l t i Itjle . ^ ^ .
])(i'fiuoiis. Unessential or contingent attributes
are not sufliciently characteristic, and as they arc now [jresent, now
abj(*nt, and may likewise be met with in other things which are not
(om])rebended under tlio notion lo be defined, they, consequently,
if admitted into a definition, render it sometimes too wide, some
times too narrow. Tlie well-known Platonic definition, '3 Ia n is
a t v o - h g g t d o n i u a d w ith o u t f e a t h e r s } eonld, as containing only
nnesseiitial cliaraeters, be easily refuted, as was done by a plucked
I ("om p arc .Suxlus E m p ir ic u s , PyrrK. I fy p ., 2 K r u g , L o g ik , i 123- A n m . 3. E d .

> 109, ii. Ed.
L kct. X X IV . LOGIC. 347
cock.* Ami Avlien a (.lefinition is not wholly made up of such attri

butes, and when, in consequence of their intermixture with essen
tial characters, the definition does not absolutely fail, still there is a
sin eommitted against logical purity or precision, in assuming into
the (leelaration (pialities such as do not determinately designate what
is defined. On the same iirinciplc, all derivative characters ougbl
to be exelmled from the definition; for although they may neces
sarily belong to the thing defined, still they overlay the declaration
with superfluous accessories, inasmueli as such characters do not
designate the oi'iginal essence of the thing, but are a mere conse
quence thereof. This fault is committed in the following defini
tion : The Circle is a c u rv e d line r e t u r n in g u p o n itself, the p a r t s
o f u'hich are a t a n eq u a l d is ta n ce f r o m the central p o in t . Here
jArecision is violated, though the definition be otherwise correct. For
that every line returning upon itself is curved, and that the ]>oint
from which all the jiarts of the line are equidistant is the central
point, these are mere eoiisecjueuces of the returning on itself, and
of the equidistance. Derivative characters are thus mixed up with
the original, and the definition, therelbi'e, is not jArecise.
The Fifth rule is, That the definition should be jierspieuous,
that is, couched in terms intelligible, not figura-
I'imi U u le. . V f . ,
tive, and comjAendious. l h a t dehnitions oiiglit
to be jAersjAieiioiis, is self-evident. F o r w h y do we declare or define
at all ? T h e perspicuity of the definition depends, in the first place,
on the intelligible character o f th e language, and
In order to per.spi- tJiis again dejAciids on the em p lo y m en t o f words
cuii> jii Deiimiion, tlicii received or ordinary signification. T h e
1. ITie language must _ .
meaning o f words, both separate and in con
b e jn te iii< 'ib ie .
junction, is already determined by conventional

usage ; when, therefore, we hear or read these, we naturally .asso
ciate with them their ordinary meaning. jMisconceptious o f every
kind must, therefore, arise from a deviation from the aecustome<l
iis.age ; ami though the'definition, in the sense of the defiiier, may
be correct, still false conceptions are almost inevitable for others.
I f such a deviation becomes necessary, in consequeiiee o f the com
mon meaning attached to certain words not eorresjiouding to cer
tain notions, there ought at least to be appended a comment
or nominal definition, by which we shall be warned that such
words are used in an accejitatioii wider or more restricted than they
obtain in ordinary usage. But, in the second place, words ought
not only to be used in their usual signification, that signification,
1 Diog. L aert , vi. 40. E d . 2 K rug. L o g ik , 123. A nm . 2. Ed.

348 L0 O I C . L kct. X X T V .
i f tho definition be pcrspiciions, m u st n o t he fignrntix-e bnt proper.

T rop es and figures nre logical liicroglyjihics, and th em selv es re
quire a declaration. T h e y do not indicate tlie
2. The iiic-iniing iiin.fttiling itsolf, blit oiilv Som ething similar. ' Siieli,
l>e not ligiiialive, but
, \
tor examjilc, are th e definitions we Iiave of
Logie as tlie P /ia ru s JideUcctus, the Light-
hoHse o f the Understanding, th e Cgnosura Ueritatis, tlie 65/-
nosure o f Truth, th e M cdicina ATentis, tlic P h g s ic o f the
Afind, etc. *
H owever, m any e x p r e s s i o n s , o r ig i n a l l y m e ta p h o r i c a l (su ch as
conception, intagiradion, comprehension, rejiresentation, etc. e tc .),
h a v e b y us.age b e e n l o n g s in c e r e d u c e d from f i g u r a tiv e t o ]iroper
te rm s, so t lia t w e m a y e m p l o y t h c s e iu d e f i n i t io n s w i t h o u t scruple,
n a y fr eq ue ntl}' m u s t, as t h e r e are n o o th e r s t o be fo u n d .
In tlie third place, the perspicuity o f a definition dojicnds iqio
its brcvilv. A long definition is not onlv Imr-
3 riie deliiiitiou , i i-i * ,
mioi bv brici' th c i is o in c to tlic m c iu o r y , bu t l ik e w is e to th e
u nderstanding, which o ught to compi-cheiid it at
a single jet. R rev ity o u g h t not, however, to be ]uirehased at the
expense of ])crs])icnity or coniiilcteness.
T h e rules hitlierto eonsidered p roxim ately relate to Definitions
ill the stricter sense. In reference to the other
Till- oiber kinds of kinds of D eclaration, there are certain modifica-
lA-c.aiuiioii. tions and cxcciitions adm itted. T h ese Dilncida-
iJiliicidations or K x- . ,
i.:icaiioii.s. t i o n s or r .x p lic a tio iis , as t l ie y m a k e no iir e te iic e
t o lo g ic a l ])erfection, and are o n l y s u b s id ia r y to
t h e d i s c o v e r y o f m o r e jicrfect d e liiiitio iis, are n o t t o bc v e r y r ig id ly
d e a l t witli. 4 4 i e v are usefu l, jir o v id c d t l ie y c o n t a i n e v e n a si n g l e
true c h a r a c t e r b y wliicli avc are c o n d u c t e d to t h e a iip re lion sion o f
other.'-. 4 h e y m a y , th e r efo r e, b e s o m e t i m e s t o o Avide, s o m e t i m e s t o o
iiarroAv. A c o n t i n g e n t a nd d e r i v a t i v e clia r acte r m a y be also iisefitl
for t h e d i s c o v e r y o f t h e e s s e n tia l and origiii.al.
< ir c u la r JZtliuitioDS. , -i i i
E v en Circular J)eim itions arc n o t here .abso
lu tely to lie c on d em n ed , if tliereby the language is rendered sinqder
and clearer. F ig u ra tiv e E xp ressions are like-
tignralivc Kxprcs- q, dcfiuitioUS
|i io p e r , iiiasm u cli a.s such e x p r e s s i o n s , b y t h e
a n a l o g i e s t h e y sugge.''t, c o n t r i l m t e a h v a y s so i n e t l ii i ig to t h e illu s tra
tion o f the n o tio n .
In regal'd to Descri]>tion.s, these m ust he adequate, and no circle
1 K r u g , Logft:, j 123. A n m . 4. E d . 2 S e e a b o v e , p. 2 5 . E d .
3 K ru g, ibid. Ed.
L ect. XXIV. LOGIC. .349
is permittoJ in tliem. But tliey need not be so precise as to ad

mit of no dei-ivative or contingent charactcis.
D e s c r ip tio n s
l-ior descriptions ouglit to enumerate the char
acters o f a thing as fully as jiossible ; and, consequently, they cannot
be so brief as definitions. They cannot, however, exceed a certain
measure in point o f length. '

- K r u g , L o g ik , 5 123 A nm . 5 Ed.
LECTURE XXV.
AI E T H O D O E O Ct Y .
SECTION II. L O G I C A L METHODOLOGY.
II. DOCTRINE OF DIVISION.
T NOW p r o c e e d t o tlie S e c o n d C h a p t e r o f L o g i c a l I \ [ e l l i o d o l o g y ,
t h e D o c t r i n e o f D i v i s i o n , t h e d o c t r in e w h ic h
affords ns t h e r u le s o f t h a t braiieli o f M e t h o d ,
b y w h ic h w e r e n d e r o u r k n o w l e d g e m o r e d i s t i n c t a n d e x h a n s l i v o .
I shall p r e fa ce t h e s u b j e c t o f L o g i c a l D i v i s i o n b y s o m e o b s e r v a t i o n s
on D i v i s i o n in g e n e r a l .
U n d e r D i v i s i o n {d iv is io , Siutpecri?) w e u n d e r s t a n d in g e n e r a l t h e
s u n d e r i n g o f t h e w h o l e in to its jiarts.' The
DiMHon in gtiierai w h i c h is d i v i d e d is ca lle d t h e d iv id e d
irhole {toturn d ir is n r n ) , and t h i s w h o l e m u s t he a e o n n e c t c d m a n y ,
a e o n i ie e t e d m \ il ( i p l ie i ty , for o t h e r w i s e no d iv is io n w o u ld he p o s
sible. T h e divided w h o l e m u s t c o m p r is e at l e a s t o n e eliaraeter,
a fford in g t h e c o n d i t i o n o f a c er ta in jiossilde s p l i t t i n g o f t h e obje c t,
or t h r o u g h w h ic h a c er ta in o p p o s i t i o n o f t h e o lij e e t lie c o m e s r e c o g
n iz ed ; and t h is c h a r a c t e r m u s t be an e sse n t ia l a ttriln ite o f t h e
oliject. i f t h e d i v i s i o n he n o t a i m le s s and w i t l i o n t u tility . T h is
j ioin t o f v i e w , from w h ic h a l o n e th e d i v is io n is possible, is ealleil
tin* jn 'in f'ip h n f the d ir is io n { p r in e ij/ in n i s ir e fio id n o n c jitn in d iv is i-
o nin) ; and t h e parts wldidi, by th e d ist r n e t io n o f tb e w h o le , e o m c
i n t o \ lew, arc c a lle d t h e d ir is ir e 7/iemhers {m n n h rd d lv id e n t iu ) .
W h e n ;i w h o l e is iliv id c d in t o its parts, th(S( parts m ay, e itlie r all
or somr-, be tlic-msidvcs still e o i m e e t e d m u l t i p l i c i t i e s ; nnd i f t h e s e
are again i liv id c d , th e r e r e s u lt s a .s/z/zz/Zc/.s/o?/ { s o h d ii''s io ) , \]\o. s e v
er,d jiartA o f w b ic b are ca lle d t b e s v h d in isit'e rnrmhr^'s, {m em hra
s n h flh 'ii/i ),tid ) O n e and tlie s a m e o b j e c t m a y , lik i'w ise, be differ-
c ii t l \ d i v i d e d from d itler eiit p o i n ts o f v i e w , wliercdiy r o n d iri.d o n s
I [On Liviifin ami itn various kimls. sc,, Atnrnonius, Df Qiiinquc VorAhus, f Ga, Aid. 1&46.J
L ect. X X V . LOGIC. 351
[ c o n d i v is i o v e s ) arise, w h ic h , tak en to g e th e r, are ail re c ip ro c a lly

co o i-(liii:itc(l. Tf a d i v i s i o n has oid y tw o i n e m b c r s , i t is c a l l e d a
d ic h o t o m y [ d i c h o to m ia ) ; i f t h r e e , a tr ic h o t o m y [tr ic h o to m ia ) ; i f
f o u r , a tetra ch o to m ij; i f m a n y , p o h jt o m y , e t c .
D i v i s i o n , a s a g e n u s , is d i v i d e d in to t w o species, a c c o r d i n g to
t h e d if f e r e n t k i n d o f w h o le w h ic h it s n n d c r s i n to
D iv is io n o f t w o sp e- p n r t s .* T h e s e J i a r t s a r e eith er co n tain ed in t h e
d iv id ed w h o le, o r t h e y a re c o n ta in e d under it.
L o g ic a l Divijîoii. . . , .
I n t h e f o r m e r c a s e t h e d i v i s i o n is c a l l e d a p a r t U
tion [partitio,aTTaf^yy](Ti%)f in t h e l a t t e r , i t is n a m e d a Joyical d i v i
sion"' P a r t i t i o n f i n d s a n a j i p l i c a t i o n o n l y w h e n t h e o b j e c t t o b e
d ix id ed is a w h o le co m jio n n d ed o f jia rts , c o n s e q u e n tly , xvhere
t h e n o t i o n o f t h e o b j e c t is a c o m j i l e x o n e ; L o g i c a l D i v i s i o n , o n t h e
othei- h a n d , fin d s its a jijtlic a tio n o n l y w h e r e t h e n o t i o n co n tain s a
j iln rn lity o f c h a r a c t e r s n n d e i- it, a n d w h e r e , c o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e n o t i o n
is a u n i v ( r s a l o n e . T h e siinjtle n o tio n is t l i u s t h e l i m i t o f P a r t i
t i o n ; a n d t h e i n d i v i d u a l o r s i n g u l a r is t h u s t h e l i m i t o f D i v i s i o n .
P a r t i t i o n is d i v i d e d i n t o a p h y s i c a l o r rerd, x v h e n
iM r t it i o n e it l.c r R e a l acU iallv h e so jiaratcd fro m e a c h
or I d e a l ^ '
o th er; a n d i n t o a m e ta p h y s i c a l o r ideed, w h e n
t h e p a r ts can o n ly b e s u n d e re d b y A b stra c tio n .^ I t m a y b e ap p lied
in o r d e r t o a t t a i n t o a c le a r k n o w l e d g e o f th e w hole, or to a clear
k n o w led g e o f th e p arts. In th e fo rm e r case, th e p a r ts are g iv e n
and t h e w h o l e is s o n g h t ; i n t h e l a t t e r , t h e x v h o l e i s g i v e n and th e
Jiarts a re so u g h t. I t th e w h o le b e g iv e n a n d th e jia rts s o u g h t o u t,
t h e o b j e c t is f i r s t o f all s c j i a r a t e d i n t o i t s j i r o x i r n a t e , a n d , t h e r e a f t e r ,
i n t o i t s r e m o t e r J i a r t s , u n t i l e i t h e r a n y f u r t h e r p a r t i t i o n is i m j i o s s i b l e ,
1 [On v a r io u s k in d s o f W h o le s , se c C ara- P.y D iv is io n , triangle is d is tin g u is h e d , 1,

n iu c l, R a tio n a lis et R ealis P/iilnsnp/iia, I., iv . 1 n io th e t w o s p e c ie s o f r e c t ilin e a r a n d c u r v i-
s e ct. iii. (lisp . iv . p. 277,] [a n d a b o v e , L e c tu n s lin e a r . 2 , B o th o f th e se a re a g a in .subdi-
011 M etaphysics. ]>. , Lectures on L o g ic , j). v id e d (A ) b y r e fe r e n c e to th e s id e s , (15) b y
1 4 2 . E i).] r e fe r e n c e to th e a n g le s. B y le f e r e n c c to th e
ATTapl^lxTpris i.s p r o p e r ly a r h e to r ic a l s id e s , tria n g les a re d iv id e d in to th e th r ee
ter m , a n d signilie.* tl.c d iv is io n o f a su b je ct s| e e ie s o f e q u ila te r a l, iso s c e le s , a n d sc a le n e ,
in to s u c c e s s iv e lie.ads, ,/7rst, seconel, e tc . ^ ce (T lie d ic lio t o in ic d iv is io n w o u ld , h o w e v e r , be
l le r m o g e iie s , riepl iSecet/. R hitures C lro 'c i.x .p . h ere m o re p r o p e r .) B y le f e ie i ic e to th e aii-
101, e d . A id Ki). th ey are d iv id e d in to th e th r ee sp e c ie s o f
3 [.'See K e c k e r m a im , S ysterna L ogicrr, L . i. r e c ta n g u la r , i e. tr ia n g le w liic h h a s o n e o f
c 3. Opera, t. i. p. G07. D r o b is c h , Neue lia r - its a n g le s r ig h t; in to a m b ly g o n , o r tr ia n g le
stellung (ler L ogik, 112. K r u g , L o g ik , 121. w h ic h has o n e o f its a n g le s o b tu s e ; a n d in to
Anm . 2 ] o x y g o n , i. e. tr ia n g le w h ic li lia s its th ree
4 B y r a i litioiqtr/nra^l? truly b e d is tin g u is h e d , a n g le s a c u te .
1, I n to a c e rta in p o r tio n o f sp a c e in c lu d e d B y D e lin it io n , tr/aaglc is d is tin g u is h e d in 'o
w ith in c e rta in b o n iid a r ic s ; 2^, I n t o s i d e s a n d fig u r e o f th r e e sid es, e(iu al to Iria n g n h ii'
tin g le s; 3'^, I n to t w o t r ia n g le s , or in to a In i- lig u r e ; tlia t is, in fo fig u r e , th e p r o x im a te
p eziu m an d a tr ia n g le . T h e first t w o jia rti- g e n u s , a n d trila tera l o r three-sided, th e difler-
t io n s a ic id e a l, th e y c a n n o t be a c tu a lly a c- e n t ia l q u a lit y .
c o m p lis h c d T lic last is r e a l, it m a y .
O02 LOGIC. L ect. X X V .
o r t h e j i a r t i t i o n lia.s a t t a i i i o d i t s o t u l . T o t h i s t h e r e is, l i o w c v e r , r e
quired a n a c c u r a t e k n o w l e d g e o f t h c o b j e c t , o f i t s jiai t s j i r o . x i i n a t e
and re m o te , a n d o f th e c o n n e c tio n o f tb e se p a r ts to g e th e r, as c o n
stitu tin g tb e w hole. W c m u st, lik ew ise , ta k e heed w b e tb e r th e
p a rtitio n bo n o t d e t e r m i n e d fro m s o m e jia r ti c u l a r jio in t o f v ie w , in
eonsc(]iienee o f w h ic b tb e n o tio n s o f m ore p ro x im a te and m ore
rem o te m ay be very vague and u n d eterm in ed . If th e p arts be
giv en , an d from th em th e w h o l e s o u g h t o u t , t h i s is a c c o m p l i s h e d
w hen we liav e d iscovered the o rder, th e arran g em en t, o f th e
]>arts; a n d th is again is d i s c o v e r e d w h e n th e jirin cip le o f d iv isio n
is d i s c o v e r e d ; a n d o f t h i s w e m u s t o b t a i n a k n o w l e d g e , e i t h e r f r o m
th e g eneral n a tu re o f th e th in g , or from th e p a rtic u la r e n d w e h av e
iu v iew . If, f o r e x a m p l e , a m u l t i t u d e o f b o o k s , o f e v e r y v arious
k in d , are arranged in to tb e w h o le o f a w e ll-o rd e re d l i b r a r y , in
th is case t b e g r e a t e r o r le s s e r s i m ila r ity o f s u b je c t w ill afford, e i th e r
e x c lu s i\ ely o r m a in ly , th e p rin c ip le o f d iv isio n . I t happens, how
ever, not u n fre q n e n tly , th a t th e jia rts are o rdered or arranged
a c c o rd in g to d ilfe re n t rules, a n d b y th e m co n n ected in to a w h o le ;
a m i , in t h i s c a s e , a s t h e d i f f e r e n t r u l e s o f t h e a r r a n g e m e n t c a n n o t
to g eth er and at once acco m p lish t h i s , i t is p r o j i e r t h a t th e less
im jio rta n t a r r a n g e m e n t sh o u ld yield t o t b e m o r e i m p o r t a n t ; as, fo r
e x a m p l e , in tb e o rd erin g o f a lib rary , w h en , b esid es th e c o n ten ts
( jf t b e b o o k s , w e t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t t l i e i r l a n g u a g e , s i z e , a n t i q u i t y ,
b in d in g , e tc . '
I now jiro c eed to L o g ic al D iv isio n , o n w h icli I g iv e you the
f j ll o w i n g ])aragra])h :
LXXXV, Tbe D istin ctn ess and C o m ])le te n e.ss of our

k n o w l e d g e is o b t a i n e d b y t h a t lo g i c a l p r o -
w h ich is term ed D ivisio n (d ivisio ,
Stutpecrts). D ivision supposes the k n o w l
e d g e o f th e w hole lo b e g iv e n th rough a f o r e g o n e ]> ro ces s o f
D e fin itio n o r D e c la ra tio n ; a n d proposes to d isc o v er tb e p arts
o f th is w h o l e w liieli are f o i ii n l and d eterm in ed not by th e
d ev elo jin io n t o f th e C om jircb en sio n , b u t by tb e d e v e lo jn n e n t
o f th e K xlcnsion. z\s L o g ic a l D e fin itio n , th e re fo re , jiro p o scs
to r e n d e r th e e l i a r . a e t e i 's c o n t a i n e d in an o b ject, t h a t is, t h e
co m p rclien sio n o f a re a lity o r n o tio n . C h a i r ; L o g ic al D iv isio n
pro p o ses to re n d e r th c ch aracters c o n tain ed u n d e r an object,
th a t is, t h e ex ten sio n of a n o tio n . D istin c t an d E x liau stiv e.
D iv isio n is, t h e r e f o r e , tbe ev o lu tio n of tbe ex ten sio n of a
1 FjiBcr, L o g ik , H 134, m , p. 20104. Ed.

L ect XXV. LOGIC. 353
notion ; an d it is e x j i r c s s e d in a d isju n ctiv e p ro p o sitio n , o f

w h ich tlie n o tio n d iv id ci] c o n stitu te s th e su ly ect, and tlie
n o tio n s co n tain ed under it, t h e pre.dicate. It is, t h e r e f o r e ,
regulated b y tlie la w w h i c h governs D isju n c tiv e Ju d g m e n ts,
(th e P rin c ip le of Plxcliided M id d le), alth o u g h it is u su a lly
e x p r e s s e d in t h e t b r i n o f a C o p u l a t i v e C a te g o rical J u d g m e n t.
T h e r u l e s b y w l i i c h t h i s p r o c e s s is r e g u l a t e d a r e s e v e n :
1 . E v e r y D i v i s i o n s l i o u l d b e g o v e r n e d b y s o m e p r i n c i p l e ,
( U i v i s i o 7te ca reat f u n d a m e n t o ) .
2 , E i ' e r y D i v i s i o n s h o u l d b e g o v e r n e d by o n ly a single
p rin c ip le .
3*. T h e p rin c ijile o f D iv isio n s h o u ld be an a c tu a l a n d e s s e n
tia l c h a r a c te r o f t h e d iv id e d n o tio n , a n d th e d iv isio n , th e re fo re ,
n e i t h e r c o m ]ile x n o r w i t h o u t a p u r p o s e .
4. N o d iv id in g m em ber of th e p red icate m ust by itself
e x h a u s t th e subject.
5. T h e d i v i d i n g m e m b e r s , t a k e n t o g e t h e r , m u s t e x h a u s t , b u t
o n ly e x h a u s t, th e siibjeet.
G. T h e d i v i s i v e m e m b e r s m u s t b e r e c i p r o c a l l y e x c l u s i v e .
7 . T h e d i v i s i o n s m u s t j i r o c e e d c o n t i n u o u s l y f r o m i m m e d i a t e
t o m e d i a t e d i f f e r e n c e s { D i o i s i o 7xe f i a t g>er saltu m ).
In th is p a ra g ra jih a r e c o n t a i n e d , first, t h e g e n e r a l P r i n c i p l e s o f
L o g ic a l D iv isio n , a n d , se c o n d ly , th e L a w s b y
E x p lic a tio n . .\y],ich i t is g o v e r n e d . I shall n o w illu s tra te
t h e s e in d e t a i l .
I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , i t is s t a t e d t h a t t h e d i s t i n c t n e s s a n d c o i n p l e t e -
nes's o f o u r k n o w l e d g e is o b t a i n e d b y t h a t lo g ical jirocess w h ic h is
t e r m e d D ivisio n { d iv isio , Siaipea-i?). D iv isio n su p p o ses th e k n o w l
e d g e o f t h e w h o le to b e g iv e n t h r o u g h a f o r e g o n e jiro c ess o f d e fin i
tio n , a n d ] ) i 'o p o s e s t o d isc o v er th e p a rts o f th is w h o le w h ic h are
found and d e ten iiiiicd n o t by th e d ev elo p m en t o f th e co m p reh en
sion, b u t b y th e d e v e lo jim e n t o f t h e e x te n s io n . A s logical d e fin i
tio n , tliere fo re, p ro p o se s to render th e ch aracters co n tain ed in a
n o t i o n , t h a t i.s, i t s c o i n ] ) r e h e n s i o i i , c l e a r ; logical d iv isio n proposes
to render th e ch aracters co n tain ed u n d e r an o b j e c t , t h a t is, t h e
e x te n sio n o f a n o tion, d istin ct. D i v i s i o n is, t h e r e f o r e , t h e e v o l u t i o n
o f th e ex ten sio n o f a n o tio n , a n d it is e x p r e s s e d in a d i s j u n c t i v e
p ro p o sitio n , o f w h ich th e n o tio n d iv id ed c o n stitu te s the su b je ct,
and the n o t i o n s c o n t a i n e d u n d e r it, t h e ] )rc d ie a te . I t is, t h e r e f o r e ,
reg u lated h y th e law w h ich governs d isju n ctiv e ju d g m e n ts (th e
} ) ri i i c i p l e o f e x c l u d e d m i d d l e ) , a l t h o u g h it b e u s u a l ly e x p r e s s e d in
th e form o f a cojiulative categ o rical ju d g m e n t.
1.3
354 LOGIC. L ect. X X V .
T h e sjic c in l v i r tu e , tlie p a r t i c u l a r elem en t, o f p erfect th in k in g ,

w h ich D iv isio n en ab les ns to acquire, is D i s -
Eiui of Division ISt i n c t i i o s s , b u t , a t t h e s a m e t i m e , i t is e v i d e n t
Disliiicliii's.s, whicli ill- , . i* i , . . i
voivos Coiiipk-.encss. ^lia t it c a n i i o t a c c o m p l i s h t h i s w i t h o u t r e n d e r
ing onr th in k in g m ore eo n ip letc. T h is, h o w
e v e r , is o n l y a secondary and c o llateral resu lt; for the p roblem
w liieli d iv i s i o n pro .x in ia le ly an d p rin c ijia lly p ro p o s e s to so lv e is ,
to afford ns a d istin c t consciousness o f th e ex ten sio n o f a given
n o tio n , tliro n g li a c o m p le te o r e x lia u s tiv e sc ries o f s u b o r d in a te or
c o o rd in a te n otions. T h is n t i l i t v oVf D iv isio n , in re n d e rin g O onr
k n o w led g e m ore c o n q i l c t c , is, I f i n d , s t a t e d b y A risto tle , th o u g h
It h a s b e e n o \ e r l o o k e d b y s u b s e q u e n t l o g i c i a n s . H e observes th a t
i t is o n l y b y a r e g u l . a r d i v i s i o n t h a t Ave c a n b e a s s u r e d th a t n o th in g
h a s b e e n o m i t t e d in t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f a t h i n g .
As it is b y m ean s o f division that avc d i s c o v e r Avhnt a r e t h e
characters contained under the notion of an
As m a n y k i n d s of , . .
Divi.don p.>?-iide as ohjcct, it follows t h a t tlicre iniist be as many
there are characters kiiuls o f d i v i s i o n j i o s s i b l c Hs t l i c r e a i G c l i a m c -
nffordiiig a I'riiicipie contained Under the notion o f an object,
ofDiMMou. which m a y afford the principle of a different
division. I f t h e c h a r a c t e r s w h i c h afford t h e p r i n e i p l e o f a divi.sion
are only external and contingent, there is a d i v i s i o n i n t h e Avi der
. s e n s e ; if, . agai n, t h e y a r e i n t e r n a l and c o n s t a n t , t h e r e is a d i v i s i o n
in t h e s t r i c t e r s o u s e ; if, f i n a l l y , t h e y a r e n o t o n l y i n t e r n a l b u t :ilso
essential and original, t h e r e is a division in the strictest sense.
F ro m t h e v e r y c o n c e p t i o n o f logical d i v i si o n , it
A iinivcisni notion j,. t h a t it ca n o n l y b c a j i j i l i e d Avber e
iho onl\ object of j o b j e c t t o Vto divided
is a u n i v e r s a l n o t i o n ,
l-ogical Divi.-n n. . . .
and t h a t it is w h o l l y i n a p p l i c a b l e t o a n i n d i v i d
u a l ; f o r a s t h e i n d i v i < l n a l c o n t a i n s i i o t l i i n g u n d e r it, c o n s e q u e n t l y i t
is n o t s u s c e p t i b l e o f a n u l t e r i o r < l i v i s i o n . d'he g en eral problem of
Avliieli d i v i s i o n u f f o r d s t h e s o l u t i o n is, T o f i n d
t.c-ii.Tni i.rohicm of s u b o r d i n a t e gener:i a n d species, t h e h ig h e r
D iv i-io ii. ^ ^ 1 1
or g en eric notion b ein g given. J he h ig h er
n o tio n is alw ay s so m e th in g a b s t n ic tc l, so m e th in g g en eralizetl
from th e lo w e r n o tio n s, w ith w h ic h it ag rees, in a sm m d i as it c o n
t a i n s all t h . a t is e o m i n o n t o these* i n f e r i o r c o n e e j i t s , a n d fi'o m w h i c h
it difi'ei-s. i n a s i i n i e l i as t h e y c o n ta in fi g r e a t e r n n n i b e r o f d e t c r i n i n -
iiig eh ar.aeters. T h e r e th u s su b sists an in te rn a l c o n n e c tio n b e tw e e n
t h e l i i t r l i e r a n d t h e I n w e r c o n c e p t s , a n d t h e r e is t h u s a f fo r d c < l a t r a n
sitio n from th e siq ierio r n o tio n to the su b o rd in ate, and, eonse-
qiieu lly , an evo lu tio n o f th e lo w er n o tio n s from the h igher. In
1 A n a l. P o il., L ii. c. 13.

L e c t. XXV. LOr. r c . 355
order to discover tlic inferior genera and species, wo have o id v to

discoA'ei tliosc characters wliicli alford the jiroxiniate determ ina
tions, by which the sphere or extension o f the higher notion is
cireuinscrihed. B u t to find w hat charncters are w anted for the
th oro u gh -g oin g determ ination o f a higher notion, we must jire-
vionsly know w h at characters the higher notion actually contains,
and this k now h'dge is o n ly attainable by an analysis, a su ndering
o f the biglier notion itself. In d oin g this, the several eliaracters
must be scjiarately drawn forth ami considered ; and in regard to
each, Ave nmst ascertain b o w far it must still be left undeterm ined,
and b o w fir it is capable o f opjiositc determ inations. B n t wlietlier
a character be still iimletermined, and o f Avliat ojijiosite deteniiina-
tions it is capable, on these jioiiits it is im possibh to d e c i d e r
2 v / o n \ but only <i p o ste rio r !, tlirougli a knoAvledgc o f this jjaitieiilar
character and its rel.ations to other notions. A n d the aceomplisli-
m en t o f this is renderei] easier by tw o circuinstance.s; the one,
that the goiierio notion is never a ltog eth er abstract, but alw ays
realized and held fis t by som e concrete form o f im ag in ation ; the
other, tliat, in general, we are more or less acquainted with a greater
or a smaller number o f sjiecial notions, in which the g eneric notion
is coiiqireheuded', and th ese are able to lead us either m ed iately or
im m ed iately to other subordinate concepts.
B u t the determ inations or co n stitu en t characters o f a notion
Avhich Ave sock out, must not only be com pletely, but also jnecisely,
opposed. C om pletely, iiiasiniich as all the species subordinate to
the notions o u g h t to be discovered ; and jirecisely, inasmuch as
Avhatever is not a subordinate sjiecies, o u g h t to be ab so lu tely
excluded from the notion o f the genus.
In regard to the com p leten e ss o f the opposition, it is not, h o w
ever, required that the notion should be determ ined tlirougli everv
possible contradictory ojiposition ; for those at least ou gh t to be
omitted, concerning w hose existe n c e or non -existen ce the notion
itself decides. In regard to the oiijiosition itse lf it is not required
that the division should be carried through by contradictory o]i])o-
sitioiis. T h e on ly opposition necessary is the reciprocal exclusion
o f the inferior notions into Avhicli the higher notion is di\ i(led."*
In a mere logical relation, indeed, as we k n ow n othin g o f the nature
o f a thin g more than that a certain character eitlier do(>s or docs
not b elon g to it, a strictly logical division can only consist o f tw o
contradictory mem bers, for exam ple, that angles are either r ig h t
or not righ t, that men are either ichite or not white. B u t looking
to the real nature o f the thing k now n, e ilb er a p r i o r i or a p o ste ri-
1 Esser, L o g ik , to'j. E d.
356 LOGIC. L k ct. X X \,
ori, the division may be n o t only dicbotomons but polytomoiis, as

for ox.Minjilo. angles <tre right, or acuti, or obtuse; tnen are white,
or blacn\ or copper-colored, or oUoe-colored, etc.
W e now come, in the second j)lace, to the
Itiiles o f Losrical Di- , t . . i / t i
..
vi.sion. rules (lietntoil tor Logic.al
_ ^ iJn ision. _
T hese Rules spring either, 1 , F ro m the P rin -
eijile of Division : or, 2, F ro m the Relations o f the D ividing 3Iem-
bers to the D ivided W h o l e ; or, 3, From the Relations o f the
several D iv id in g 3Iem heis to each o th e r ; or, 4, From th e relations
of the Divisions to the Subdivisions.
T h e lirst o f these he.ads the Principle o f Division com pre
hends the three first rules. O f these the first'is
ihn-e fpniiKing. I. sc lfc v id c u t, T h e re must he some principle,
Proin the l i ihfipur ol ... i i
Division. First Rule. somc rcusou, for cvcry divisiou ; for otherwise
th e re would be no division determ ined, no divi
sion carried into effect. '
In reg.ardto the soeoiid rule, T h a t every divisiim should have
only a single pi'ineijile, the in'ojiricty of this is
likewise siifllcieiitly a])])areut. In every divisiou
we should d e p a rt from .-idefiuite th ought, which has I'efereiiee either
to the notion as a unity, or to somc single eharactvr. On th e eon-
tr:ii-y, if we do not ilo this, h u t carry ou the process by difl'ereut
principles, the series o f notions in wh.ieli the division is realized is
nut orderly and homogeneous, h ut heterogeneous and per|)lexed.
T h e T hird rule, T h a t the principle o f division should be an
actual and essential charaetei o f the divided
Tliirc], . . .
notion, IS not less manliest, x\s th e groiiinl
of division i^^ th;il wliirli principally regelates tlic correctness of the
whole jii-ocess, th a t is, the comiiletepe.ss and ojiposition of the divi-
'iuu, it follows th a t this g rou nd mu'-t he of notoriety aud impor-
t.ance, aiirl neeomiiiodated to the e;id for the sake of which the
divi-ioii is in stitute d. 3'hose cluiracters o f an object are best
Jidapled for a division, whose own determ inations exert th e gieat-
<sl infliiciice on the deterniinations of other eharaeters, and, eon-
.scqiiently, on those of the notion itself; h ut such are manifestly not
tlu! e.xtornal ;iiid contingent, h ut the internal and esseiiti.al, charac
ters, and, o f these, those h.ave the jireeiiiiiieiiee through whose d e te r
mination the greater niiuiber o f othei's are (leteriiiiiied, or, w hat is
till .-ame thing, iroin which, as liiiidameiit.al and urigiual attributes,
the <rre,iier iiiimher ot tlie others are derived. 'I'he choice of char-
leti-r is. howc-ver, for tlu! most pail, regulated by s.aue particular
e n d ; so th:it, un d er certain circumst:inces, external and eoiitingent
characters may obtain a p rep o n d e ra n t importance. Such ends can
J .E C T . XXV. I.OOIG. 357
n o t, lio w ev o r, b e en u in ern tei]. T h e ehar.nctei' a f f o r d i n g t h e jirin o ip le

o f d iv is io n i n n s l l i k e w i s e b e e a jia b le of b e i n g ele:irly ;ind d e f i n i te ly
b r o u g h t o u t ; for u n less th is b c p ossible, w e ca n h a v e no d istin ct
e o n s c io n sn e s s o f th e c u in p le te n e s s a n d c o n tr a s t o f th e delerr.iin r.tio n
o f w hich i t is s u s c e p t i b l e . W e o u g h t, th e re fo re , a lw a y s to se lect
th o se ch aracters for p rin c ip le s o f d iv isio n , w h ich a re cajiable o f a
clear an d d istin c t re c o g n itio n . '
T h e s e c o n d p a r t o f tlie ru le , T h a t t h e d iv isio y b c n o t, th e r e f o r e ,
to o coin])le.\', a n d w i t h o u t a [ l u r p o s e , i s a c o r o l l a r y of t h e first.
Tn d i v i d i n g , w e m a y g o o n t o i n f i n i t y . F o r w liile, as w a s f o r m e r l y
show n, there is, in t h e s e r i e s o f h i g h e r a n d loAver n o t i o n s , n o o n e
w h i c l i c a n b o c o n c e i v e d a s a b s o l u t e l y t h e l o w e s t ; s o in s u b d i v i d i n g ,
there is no n ecessary lim it to the process. Tn like m a n n er, th e
co o rd in atio n s m ay be e x te n d e d a d in fn itu n i. F o r i t is i m p o s s i b l e
t o e x h a u s t all th e possible relatio n s o f notions, and each o f th ese
m a y b e e m p lo y e d as t h e ])rinciple o f a n e w d iv isio n , ddm s w e can
d iv id e m en b y relation to t h e i r ag e, to t h e i r sex, to t h e i r co lo r, to
th e ir sta tu re , to th e ir k n o w led g e, to t h e i r r ic h e s, t o t h e i r rai^k, t o
t h e i r m a n n e r o f life , t o t h e i r e d u c a t i o n , t o t h e i r c o s t u m e , etc., etc .
I t A vould, h o w e v e r , b e rid ic u lo u s , an d re n d e r th e d iv isio n s ivholly
useless, i f w e m u ltijilie d th em in t h i s f a s h i o n w i t h o u t e n d . W e,
th erefore, in te n tio n a lly re stric t t h e m , t h a t is, w e m a k e th em eom -
jta r a t iv e l y lim ite d , i n a s m u c h ns w e o n l y g i v e t h e m t h a t c o m p l e t e n e s s
w l i i c h is c o n d i i e i v o to a certain end. In th is m a n n e r, d iv isio n s
becom e r e la tiv e ly useful, o r a c q u ir e th e v irtu e o f a d a p ta tio n . In
t h e s e le c tio n o f a jirin cip lo o f d iv isio n , w e m u s t ta k e heed w h eth er
It b e fe rtile a n d p e r t i n e n t . A g r o u n d o f d i v i s i o n is f e r t i l e , w h e n i t
affo rd s a d iv isio n o u t o f w liieb a g a in o t h e r i m p o r t a n t c o n s e q u e n c e s
m ay b e d r a w n ; i t is p e r t i n e n t , Avlicn th ese consequences have a
p r o x i m a t e r e l a t i o n t o t h e cm d , o n a c c o u n t o f Avliieli w e Avere o r i g i
n a lly in d u c e d to d ev elo ]) tlie e x te n s io n o f a c o n c e p t. A p rin c ip le
o f d iv isio n m ay , th erefo re, be u s e f u l Avitli o n e in ten t, an d useless
w ith an o tb o r. Soldiers, f o r e x a m p l e , m a y b e c o n v e n i e n t l y d i v i d e d
i n t o c a v a lr y a n d i/ t/a u tr i/, A'S t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n h a s a n i n q i o r t a n t i n f l n -
e n e e on th e ir d e te r m in a tio n as soldiers. B u t i n c o n s i d e r i n g m a n in
g e n e r a l a n d liis r e l a t i o n s , i t Avoiild b e l u d i c r o u s t o d i v i d e m e n in to
f o o t a n d h orsem en ; Avhilc, o n t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e i r d i v i s i o n Avonhl b e
h e r e a])]iro]iriate a c c o r d i n g t o p r i n c i p le s w h i c h in th e fo rm e r case
Avould h a v e b e e n a b s u r d . Seneca says avcII, Q n i e ( } u i d in n i a j n s
c r c v i t f a e i l i u s n g n o s e i t n r , si d i s c o s s i l in p a r t e s ; q n a s i n n n m c r a b i l e s
esse e t p a r v a s n o n o ])o rtet. I d e m cm ini v i t i i h a b c t n i m i a , q u o d n u l l a
1 Esser, L o g ik , j 137. E d 2 E p is t., 90.

ooS LOGIC. L ect. XX V .
di\ i.';io. Simile coidiiso est, qiiicquid usque in |m lverem scctnin

e s l.' '
U n d e r tlie seeond head, that is, as springing from the relations of
the D ividing iMembcM's to the ])ivided W holes,
II. From the rela- j^^.l.i.led the foiuth and fifth hlWS.
tioiis ol dll' l)iviilin{ . , . . . , . , .
iiomherMo the Uivici- " A s tho notioii and the notions into winch it
eti Wholes. Fourth. di\ ided Stand to each other in the relation of
^ whole and p.arts, and as the whole is grea ter
than the part, the ftnirth rule is manilestly iieeessary, viz.. T h a t no
dividing m em ber of the predie.ate niiist by itself exh.aiist the sub
ject. W h e n this occurs, tlie division is vicious, or, more })ro]erly5
there is no division. Tlius th e division of ixnoi into ratloxial a n i
mals and uncnltinited nations, would be a violation o f this law.
On th e o th e r hand, ns the notions into whieh a notion is divided,
stand to each o th e r in the relation of eoiistitnt-
Filth . .
m g ])arts to :i eonstiliited whole, and as the
whole is only th e sum of all the jiarts, the necessity of th e filth rule
.is nftuiifest, d'liat the dixidiiig members of the ])re<licate, t.akcn
together, must ex haust t h (3 snbjeet. F o r if thisilo es not take place,
then the di\ isioii of th e ])rineipal notion has been only ]>:irtial and
mqiorfcct. W e transgress this law, in the first place, when we lea\'e
out one or m ore mem bers of di\ ision ; as I'or e x a m p le . The actions
o f )m:)L are e.thcr good, or had, for to these we should have added
or in diferent. A nd in the seeoml place, we tran.sgress it when we
eoilrdiii.ate a siiI)division with a division ; as for example, J^hilos-
ophg is e ither tlnioretie-al philoso]>h\j or m o n d phUoso])lni: here the
pr<3per opposition would ha\ e been thoircticeil j>hiIosophg iwa\ p r a c
tical ]>hilosophgf- On tlie oth e r hami, th e dividing members, taken
together, must not do more tli.an exh.anst the subject. T h e defini
tion of tlie wlioh* m ust apply to e\ ery one of its ji.arts, bu t this con
dition is not fulfilled if then* be a dividing m em ber too mneli, th a t
i.s, it there* be ;i notion b roug ht :is a dividing member, wliieh, how-
c\ei-, doc^, not stand in .siibordiiiiition to the ilivided whole. Foi*
example. Mat/nmatii'ed Jignres a m either solids or surf<.ices [or
Hots or poin ts\. H ere the last tw o meinners {liues a n d jeoixUs) are
n'diiiidaiit and erroneous, tor lines and point.s, though the elements
o f unitlieiiiatieal figures, ;ire not themselves figures.
U n d e r tin* third licad, as springing iroiii tlie relations o f the sev
eral D ividing Memb(*rs to Fach Other, tliere is a single law, the
s i x t h , whieh enjoins, T h a t the dividing mem bers be recipro
cally exelii.sivc.
1 Kru;,', [ 12'T A i,m 4 Ed. 2 E s s c r , L o g ik , 1,37. E d .

L kct. XXV. LOGIC. 359
A s a d i v i s i o n d o e s n o t j t r e s e n t t h e s a m e b u t t h e d i f f e r e n t de tc - r-
m in a tio n s o f a single n o tion (for o tlie rw is e o n e
I I I . f'r o in ( 111! r fiu - d e t e r iiiin 'itlo ii w o u ld be p r e se n te d
tio n s ot' llie se v e r a l . - x . i i - - r i . 1 .
. . , t w i c e ) , t h e d i v i d i n g m e m b e r s m u s t lie s o e o i i s t i -
D iv id m g M em b ers to '
iCach Olher. Sixth. tilted t h a t t h e y tire n o t i n u t n a l l y e o i n e i d e i i t , so
th a t t h e y * e i t l i e r in w hole or in p a r t eonttiiii
each o th er. T h i s h i w is v i o l a t e . 1 w h e n , i n t h e f i r s t p l n e e , a s u b d i
v i s i o n is j d a c e d a b o v e a d i \ i s i o n , a.s, P h i l o s o p h y is either theoret
ical p h il o s o p h y , or m o r a lp h ilo so j> h y , or p ra c tic a lp h ilo s o } > h y ; h e r e
m o ra l p h ilo so p h y falls i n t o p ra c tic a l p h ilo so p h y as a s u b o r d i n a t e
j i a r t ; o r w h e n , in t h e s e e o n d place, tb e s a m e t h i n g is d i v i d e d in
d i f f e r e n t ] ) o i n t s o f v i e w , as, U n m a n a c tio n s a re either yitcessary,
or f r e e , or nseful, or d e tr im e n ta l ^ ^
U n d e r th e fo u rth and last b e a d , as a r is in g from tb e r e la tio n s o f
tb e D iv isio n s to tb e S u lx liv isio n s, th e r e is e o n -
IV . F ro m tlie re la - t a i n e d oiiG l a w , t h e S e v e n t h , w h i c h j n e s e r i h e s ,
lio n s o f tlie D iv is io n s rn i . .1 t 1 4 - \ 1
.. ih a t th e d iv isio n s ijroeeetl c o n tin iio n sly from
to tlie S u b d iv is io n s . . . . . .
S ev en th . im m e d ia te to m ed iate d ifferen ces ( D i v i s i o ne
f i a t p e r saltnra vel h ia tin n ).
A s d iv isio n s o rig in a te in th e c h a r a c te r o f a n o tio n , cap ab le o f
an o p p o site d e te rm in a tio n , re c e iv in g tb is d e te rm in a tio n , a n d as tb e
s u b d i v i s i o n s o r i g i n a t e in t h e s e o p p o s i t e d e t e r m i n a t i o n s l i e i n g t h e m
s e l v e s a g a i n c a p a b l e o f o p j i o s i t e d e t e r m i n a t i o n s , in w b i e h g r a d u a l
d e s c e n t w e m a y p r o c e e d i i i d e f i i i i t e l y o n w a r d s , f r o m t b i s i t is e v i
d e n t, t h a t tlie d iv isio n s sb o n k l, as far as possible, b e co n tiin io iis, t h a t
is, t b e n o t i o n m u s t l i r s t b e d i v i d e d i n t o i t s p r o x i m a t e , a n d t h e n i n t o
i t s r e m o t e r j i a r t s , a n d t h i s w i t h o u t o v e r l e a j i i n g a n y o n e j i a r t ; o r in
o th e r w ords, each p a rt m u .s t b e im m ed iately su b o rd in ated to its
Avliole. * T h u s, w hen som e o f th e an cien ts d iv id ed into
r a tio n a l, a n d n atu ral, a n d m o r a l, t h e f i r s t a n d s e e o n d m e m l i e r s a r e
m e r e l y s u b d i v i s i o n s o f theoretical p h il o s o p h y , t o w h i c h m o r a l a s
p r a c t i c a l q/h ilo sop h y is o p p o s e d . S o m e tim e s , lio w e v t'r, su c h a
s p r i n g siieb a sa ltu s is, f o r t h e s a k e o f b r e v i t y , a l l e w e d ; b u t
th is o n ly u n d e r tb e e x jiress c o n d itio n , t h a t tb e o m itted m em bers
.are i n t e r j i o l a t e d i n t h o n g b t . T h u s , m t i n y m . a t l i e m a t i e i a n s s a y , angles
are either r ig h t, or acute, o r obtuse, a l t h o u g h , i f t h e d i v i s i o n w e r e
e o n t i n i i o i i s , w i t h o u t h i j i t n s , i t w o u l d r u n , angles are either r i g h t
or o b liq u e ; a u d the oblique, a g a in , either acute or obtuse.
1 Egser, L o g ik , 137- E d . 2 Esser, L o g ik , 137. E d .

LECTURE XXVI.
M E T H O D O T. O G Y .
S E C T I O N 11. L O G 1 C A L M E T H O D O L O G Y .
I l l DOCTIIIXE OF PROBATION.
W e now proceed to tlie T h ir d P a r t of Ihire 3 Ietlio d o lo g y , th a t

w h i c h g u i d e s iis l o t h e t h i r d c h a r a c t e r o r v i r t u e
irobation. P erfect T liin k iiig , th e C o n c aten atio n of
T h o u g h t; I m ean P ro b a tio n , or th e L ead in g o f P roof. I eom -
m c n c e w ith th e fo llo w in g jiarag rajih .
^ L X X X V I. W lien th ere are p ro p o sitio n s or ju d g m en ts

w h icb are n o t in tu itiv e ly m anifest, and the
P a r . LXXXVI. P r o - ip ntli o f w l i i c l i is i i o t a d m i t t e d , t l i c u th eir
b a tio a ,-its N a tu r e , i- , , ,
andEiements. V a l i d i t y cMii o iil} 1)0 e s t a b l i s h e d w licn w e
e v o l v e i t , a.s a n i n f e r e n c e , f r o m o n e o r m o r e
ju d g m e n ts o r propositions. T h i s i.s c a l l e d Probation, P ro rin g ,
or th e L e a d in g of' P r o o f {probatio, argnnientatio, o r deinon-
stratio, ill i t s w i d e r s e n s e ) . A P ro h a tio n is th u s a series of
t h o u g h t s , in w h i c h a p lu ra lity o f differen t ju d g m e n ts sta n d to
e a c h o t h e r , i n r e s p e c t o f t h e i r l a i l i d i t y , in t h e d e p e n d e n c e of
d e te rm in in g and d eterm in ed , or of a n te c ed e n ts and eonsc-
fp ieiits. I l l e v e i y I b o b a t i o n t h e r e a r e t h r e e t h i n g s to b c dis-
tingiii'<lie<l, 1 . T h e . J u d g m e n t t o b e j i r o v e d , {th e s is ) ; 2 , T h e
G round or P rin e i|d e of P roof, {argam entum ) ; a n d , 3, d d i c
Cogency of ib is princi])le to n ecessitate tb e c o n n ectio n of
a n te c e d e n ts and co n se/iu cn ts {vis demon stra ti onis o r nervns
j,robaudi). F rom tb e n a t u r e o f P r o b a t i o n , i t is e v i d e n t t h a t
P r o b . ' i t i o i i w i t h o u t i n f e r e n c e i.s i m p o s s i b l e ; a n d t h a t t h e T h e s i s
t o b(; p r o v e d and Ih 'in e ip le s o f I r o o f s ta n d to each o t h e r as
c o n clii-io n and p rem ises, w ith t h i s d i d e n i n e e , t h a t , in T^roba-
tio n , th ere i.s a j u d g m e n t (th e th e sis) ex p ressly supposed,
w h i c h , in t h e S y l l o g i s m , is n o t , a t l e a s t n e c e s s a r i l y , t h e c a s e . '
1 F a w t, Ijogik. S 138. Of. K n ig , L n gik, j 1 2 7 . E d . [ C f U ic h le r , Vbcr den G eg en sta n d und

d tn Urr\/ang d fr L n g ik , j 32 el i tq . \
L e c t. XXVI. LOGIC. 301
I n r e g a r d t o t h e t e r m s l i e r e e n q d o y e d , i t is t o b e n o t i c e d t l i a t t b e
term u r g x i m o d a t io n { a rg u in en ta llo ) is a ] t ] ) l i e d
E x p lic a tio n . n o t o n ly to a r e a s o n in g o f m a n y sy llo g ism s, b u t
T e rm .c in p io y c c i. , v a . s o i i i n g o f 0110. T lic t e r m arga-
A r}iim eiitalioii. . i i
A rg u m e n t. xxxcnt {arguniexUx(m) i n l i k e m a n n e r is e m p l o y e < l
n o t o n ly for th e g r o u n d o f a co iise e u tiv e r e a s o n
i n g , b l i t f o r t h e m i d d l e t e r m o f ;i s i n g l e s y l l o g i s m . B u t i t is, m o r e
o v e r, v u l g a r ly e n q d o y e d fo r t h e w h o le ]iroeess o f a rg u in eiita tio ii.*
The term dexnonstratioxi { d e m o n s t r a t io ) is u s e d i n a l o o s e r a n d
in a s t r i c t e r sigiiiiieatioii. I n th e fo rm e r sense,
U e m o iis lra lio ii. . . . . , .
i t IS e q u i v a l e n t t o jtro o a tio n , o r argimxexitatam.
iix generxd; in t h e h i t t e r , t o xiecessarg p -ohation, or a r g ia n e n ta tio n
f r o m , in tn itiv e p r in c ip le s .
T h e e.K p r ess io ii leadbxg o f p r o o f m i g h t , p e r h a p s , b e t r a n s l a t e d b y
t h e t e r m d edu ctio n , b u t t h e n t h i s t e r m m u s t
L e a d in g o f 1 1 oof o f ^ la titu d e as to in elm le in d u c tio n , to
; w o so rts.
w hich i t is c o m m o n l y o p p o se d ; fo r I ro b a tio n
m a y b e e i t h e r a j i r o c e s s o f D e d u c t i o n , t h a t is, t h e l e a d i n g o f p r o o f
out of one h ig h e r or m ore general pro p o sitio n , o r a ])roecss o f
I n d u c t i o n , t h a t is, t h e l e a d i n g o f p r o o f o u t o f a ] i l u r a l i t y o f l o w e r
o r less g e n e r a l j u d g m e n t s .
T o p r o v e , is t o e v i n c e t h e t r u t h o f a p r o j i o s i t i o n n o t a d m i t t e d to
be tru e, from o th er iiro p o sitio n s th e tru th of
Ir o b a lio n in g e n e ra l. i - i , i i i- i i t i
w l i i e l i IS a l r e a d y e s t a b l i s h e d . Jii e v e r y j i r o l i a -
t i o i i t h e r e a r e t h r e e t h i n g s t o b e d i s l i n g i i i s l i e d : 1 . T l i e P r o j i o s i -
t i o i i t o b e j i r o v e d , t h e T h e s i s ; 2. T h e G r o i i i i d s o r P r i n c i p l e o f
P ro o f, th e A rg u m en t; a n d , 3. The D egree of C o g e n cy w ith
w h ich t h e t h e s i s is i n f e r r e d h y t h e a r g m n e n t u m o r a r g m iu 'n ta ,
th e v i s or txervus jyrobaxxdi. A ll ])robation is t h u s s y l l o g i s t i c ; b u t
all s y l l o g i s m is n o t j i r o b a t i v e . T h e jie c n lia rity
H o w d iH m g u isiied p r o b a t i o n c o n s i s t s i n t h i s , t h a t i t e .v i i r e s s l y
fro m S yllogifini. * . . . .
sujip o ses a c e rta in given ju 'o p o s itio n , a c e r t a i n
th esis, to be tru e; to th e e s tiib lislim eiit of th is jiro p o sitio n th e
p r o o f is r e h i t i v e ; t h i s p r o p o s i t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f t h e
sy llo g ism , o r se ries o f sy llo g ism s, o f w h ic h th e p ro b .alio n is m a d e
i i ] i ; w h e r e a s , in t h e m e r e s y l l o g i s t i c p r o c e s s , t h i s s i q i p o s i t i o i i is n o t
necessarily involved. I t is a l s o e v i d e n t t h a t t h e
W h e re o n d ep e n d s l o g i c f i l v . 'i l i i e o f a p r o b . i t i o n d e p e n d s , 1. O n th e
th e lo g ical v alue o f a ^ " .i k i . rx
probarion triitli 01 i l s p rin c ip le s OI- a r g i i m e i i t : i , 2 . U i i
th eir c o n n ectio n w ith each o th er, a n d w ith th e
th esis or pro p o sitio n to be proved, a n d , 3. On th e lo g ical for-
1 See above, p. 196. E d .

46
362 LOGIC. L e c t. XXVI.
n in l i t y o f tlie in f e r e n c e o f t h e t h e s is f ro m its .n rg iin ie n tn . N o proj)-

o s i t i o i i c a n b e t o r a n o t h e r t h e p r i n c i p l e o f p r o o t j w h i c h is n u t i t s e l f
e ith e r im in ed ialely or m ed iately certain. A p ro p o sitio n is i m m e
d iately certain , or e v id e n t a t lirst h a n d , w h e n , h y t h e very n atu re
o f th o u g h t, w e c a n n o t b u t th in k it to b e t r u e , a n d w h e n it, t h e r e
fore, iic itlie r re c jn ire s n o r a d m i t s o f jiroof. A p r o p o s i t i o n is m e d i
a t e l y c e r t a i n , o r e v i d e n t a t s e c o n d h a n d , w h e n i t is n o t a t o n c e a n d
i n i t s e l f t h o u g h t a s n e c e s s a r i l y t r u e , b u t Avhen a vc a re ab le to d e d u c e
it, w ith a co n s e id u sn c s s o f c e r ta in ty , from a jn-oposition Avliicli is
e v i d e n t a t f i r s t li.a nd. T h e f o i ' i n e r o f t h e s e c e r t a i n t i e s is c a l l e d stlf-
t v id tn t. in tu itir c , o r l g b ia i , p r i m a r y , u ltim ate, e t c . , a n d th e latter,
duno)istr(itii'e, d eriv a tiv e , seco n d a r y, e t c .
A c c o rd in g to th is d istin c tio n , th e G io iin d or P rin c ip le o f P ro o f
is e i t h e r an ab so lu te or a relative. A b s o lu te ,
(.rouiKi o f I 'r o o f w h e n i t is a n i n t u i t i v e ; r e l a t i v e , w h e n i t is a
eillier Absolute or , . . . .t-o
d e m o n s tr a tiv e jiro p o silio n . J h a t e v e r y jiro p o -
sitio n m ust u ltim ately rest on som e in tu itiv e
tru th , on s o m e j u i l g m e n t a t f i r s t h a n d , is m a n i f e s t , i f t h e f a c t o f
p ro b atio n itself be a d m itted ; for o th erw ise th e regress Avould
ex tem l to in fin ity , a n d all jiro b a tio n , e o n s e q n e n tly , b e im jio ssib le.
W h e n , f o r e x a m j i l e , in the se rie s of g r o u n d s IT, G , P , E , D , C , B ,
t h e r e is n o n l l i i n a t e o r jn i m a r y A , a n d w h e n , c o n s e t j i i e n t l y , e v e r y A
is o n l y i c l a t i v ( d y , in r e s j i e e t o f t h e c o n s e q u e n t s e r i e s , b u t u o t .ab so
l u t e l y a u d in i t s e l f j f i r s t ; in t h i s c a s e , n o s u f f i c i e n t a n d s a t i s f a c t o r y
j i r o b a t i o n is j i o s s i b l e , f o r t h e r e a l w a y s r e m a i n s t h e q u e s t i o n c o n c e r n '
in g a still h i g h e r p rin e ijile . B u t jio sitiv ely to s h o w t h a t su c h p r i
m ary ju d g m e n ts are actu ally g i\en , is an e x jio sitio n w hich, as
j'lir e ly n ie t.a jd iy sic a l, lies b e y o n d t h e s jth e r e o f L o g i c .
d'o t h e g e n e r a l form o f a s y s t e m o f Jh-oof b e l o n g t h e folloAving
d i s t i n c t i o n s o f jirojiositions, to Avhieh I f o r m e r ly
lli^lillCl)on of Irop- n i i o i i i r ii
. . . . a l l u d e d , ^ a n d Avhudi 1 m a y a g a i n r e c a l l t o y o u r
0-iiioiiH in rwpi-cl of J O
tiip >r<n< raiform of a rem em brance. Ih -o p o sitio n s are e ith e r Theoret-
1-ypK III of I'roof. { ,- ( ,1 q,- JXfactical. P ra ctical, w h en th e y enounce
1 i-.-ireiicai and w hich it is jio s s ih le t o e f f e c t u a t e o r
rruciical. _
ji i -o d i i c e s o m e t h i n g ; T h e o r e t i c . a l , w h e n t h e y sim -
j d y e m i n c i . ' i t e a t r u t h , w i t h o u t r c s j i e c t t o t h e Avay in w h i c h t h i s m a y
b o r e .i l i/ .e d o r p r o d u c e d . ' A T h e o re tic a l jiro p o sitio n , if a jirim ary
o r i n t u i t i v e j u - i n c i j d e , is s t y l e d a n y \x io m . Ex-
' am jd es of th is are given in th e four Funda
m e n t a l T.aAvs o f L o gOi c ,' a n d in t h e m a t h e m a t i c a l c o i i i m u n n o t i o n s
1 Compare RPcr, Lygik, m En 2 .See above, p. 187. Ed.

3 [FrieH, S y ste m der L o g ik , 7.3.]
L k c t. XXVI. LOGIC. 3G3
The v:hole is yreciter than its pxirt, I f equals be a d d ed to equals,

the vdiolcs are equal, e t c . A P n i e t i c a l j i r o p o s i t i o n , i f a p r i i n a i y o r
i n t u i t i v e j i r i n c i j i l e , is s t y l e d a Postulate. 4 'lu is
G e o m e tr y jio stu la te s th e p o ssib ility o f d r a w in g
lin e s, o f jiro d u c in g th e m a d infinitum, o f d e s c r i b i n g c i r c l e s , e t c .
A T h e o r e t i c a l j n ' o j i o s i t i o n , i f m e d i a t e a n d d e m o n s t r a b l e , is c a l l e d
a Theorem. T l i i s is l a i d d o w n as a Thesis,
T lieori-in
as a j u d g m e n t to be jiro v e d , a n d is p r o v e d
from in tu itiv e jiriiicijdes, t h e o r e ti c a l and jira etic n l. A P ra ctical
pro p o sitio n , if m ediate and d em o n stra b le , i.s
called a Problem. In th e jiro b a tio n , t h e P r o b
lem i t s e l f is f i r s t e n o u n c e d ; i t i s t l i e i i s h o w n i n t h e s o l u t i o n how
th at w liicli is req u ired is t o he d o n e , is t o be effe cted ; and,
f i n a l l y , in t h e j i r o o f , i t is d e m o n s t r a t e d t h a t t h r o u g h t h i s j i r o c e d u r e
t h e s o l u t i o n o f t h C j i r o b l e m is o b t a i n e d . F o r ex am jile, in t h e g e o
m etric a l p ro b lem , to d e s c rib e an e q u i l a t e r a l t r i a n g l e o n a gix e n
s t r a i g h t lin e , t h e r e t h i s p r o b l e m is f irs t s t a t e d ; t h e s o l u t i o n t h e n
show s th a t, w ith th is g iv en line as a sem i-d iam eter, w e are to
describ e from e a c h o f its jio iiits o f t e r m i n a t i o n a c i r c l e ; th e tw o
c ir c le s will i n t e r s e c t ea c li o tlie r , a n d w e are th en , from th e jio in t
o f in te rs e c tio n , to d r a w s tr a ig h t lin es to each p o in t o f te r m in a tio n ;
th is bein g done, the p r o o f fin a lly d e m o n s tr a t e s t h a t th ese circles
m u st iu terseet each o tlier, t h a t th e d r a w n s tr a ig h t lines n e c e s sa rily
c o n s t i t u t e a t r i a n g l e , a n d t h a t t h i s t r i a n g l e is n e c e s s a r i l y e q u i l a t e r a l .
Corollaries o r Consectaries a r e j i r o p o s i t i o n s w h i c h , a s f l o w i n g
im m ed ia te ly as co llateral resu lts o f o th ers, re-
C o r o lla r ii8. Em - . . ' i r'
p e ire in a ta .
qûî r e n o s e ij i a r a t e ij i r o o t . P m pi eîrem u ta o r P m -
p ir i c a l Ju d ym ents a r e p r o j i o s i t i o n s , t h e v a l i d i t y
o f w hich reposes u jion o b s e r v a tio n a n d e x p e r ie n c e . Scholia o r
Comments a r e j i r o p o s i t i o n s x v h ieh s e r v e o n l y f o r
i l l u s t r a t i o n . P em rnata o r S um ptions a r e p r o i i o -
L e m m a ta . ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
sitioiis, b o r r o w e d e ith e r from a d itie re n t jiart o f
t h e s y s t e m w e t r e a t of, o r f r o m sciences o th e r th a n th at in w h i c l i
w e n o w e m p lo v tliein. F in ally , Ilupotheses a r e
H y p o th e s e s . . . * Ji Ji
p ro p o sitio n s o f tw o d in e r e n t significations, her,
ill t h e first p la c e , t h e nam e is s o m e t i m e s given to tlie arb itrary
assum jition o r ch o ice o f o n e o u t o f v a rio u s m e a n s o f a c c o m p lis h in g
au e n d ; w h e n , fo r e x a m jile , in t h e d iv i s i o n o f t h e p e r i p h e r y o f t h e
circle, w e selectth e d i v i s i o n i n t o 3G0 d e g r e e s , o r w h e n , i n A r i t h
m etic, w e select th e d eead ic schem e o f n u m eratio n . B u t , in th e
s e c o n d jilacc, t h e n a m e o f hypothesis is m o r e e m j i l i a t i c a l l y g i v e n t o
j i r o v i s o r y s u jijio s itio n s , xvhieh s e r v e to e x jila in t h e p h e n o m e n a in so
f a r a s o b s e r v e d , b u t w h i c h ai c o n l y a s s e r t e d t o b e t r u e , i f u l t i m a t e l y
3G4 LOGIC. L k c t. XX V I
co n firm ed liy n c o m ] ) lc te i n d u c t i o n . F o r ex am p le, th e su p p o sitio n

o f tlio C o ] c n iic a ii s o l a r s y s t e m in A s tr o n o m y . *
Xow th ese v arious k in d s o f p ro p o sitio n s arc m u tu ally co n cat-
en .ifed in to s y s te m b y th e L e a d i n g o f P r o o f b y I b 'o b a tio n .
S o m i i c l i f o r t h e c h a r a c t e r o f t h i s j i r o c e s s in g e n e r a l . The jiara-
g rajili a l r e a d y d i c t a t e d c o n ta in s a su m m a ry o f th e v ario u s p a r tic u
la r char.-icters b y w liic h P ro b a tio n s are d istin g u ish ed . B e fo re con
s i d e r i n g t h e s e in d e t a i l , I s h a l l o f f e r s o m e p r c j i a r n t o r y o b s e r v a t i o n s .
The d ifferences o f P ro b a tio n s are d cjie n d e n t jia rtly on tb eir
fla tte r, and
j i a r t l y o n t l i e F o i a n in w h i c h t h e y
The differences of i
, a r e exju-csscd.
rrobations depend '
partly on their Matter r e s j j e c t o f tlic fo riiic r g r o iiiid o f differ-
and partly on their e n c c , tbc fla tte r, P ro b a tio n s arc d istin -
g n ish ed in to P u re or a p rio ri, .and i n t o E in p ir-
1.In respect of their ical Or a jio ste rio ri, acco rd in g as th ey arc
Matter. I'robntions oil
prillcijllc'S W b icb WC m U S t r ecO g -
are Cure and Enipir- . . . .
jgj,] nize as tr u e , as c o n s titn tiiig tlic n e c e s s a ry c o n
d itio n s o f a l l e x p e r i e n c e , o r Avhicb Ave do
2. In respect of their . . , , .
re c o g n iz e as tr u e , as jia r tic n la r r e s u lts g iv e n
by certain ap jilie.atio n s ol exjuaaencc. In re
s p e c t o f t h e l a t t e r g r o u n d o f d iffe re n c e , tlie F o i i n , P r o b a t i o n s
fill in to v ario u s ebisses acco rd in g to th e d ifferen ce o f th e form
i t s e l f Avliicli is c i t h e r a n E x t e r n a l o r a n I n t e r n a l .
In relatio n to tlic I n t e i n a l F o r m , p ro lia tio n s a re d iv id ed in to
D ire c t or O ste n siv e a n d in to In d ire c t or A pa-
() In relation to gogictil, a c c o r d in g as t h e y ai-e drtiAvn from th e
Ihe I n te r n a l torm, i t s c l f o r froiii i t s o j i j i o s i t c , ill O t h e r Avords,
i;r o h a lio n s a r c D ir e c t
orOMonsiveand indi- a c c o r d i n g a s t h e j i r i n c i p l c s o f p r o b a t i o n a r e j io si-
n-ct(ir ApagoRicai. t i v e o r a r e n e g a t i v e . U n d e r t l i e s.aiiie r e l a t i o n
Synthetic or Iro- I n t e r n a l F o r m , t h e y t ire a l s o d i s t i i i g u i s l i e d b y
gres.-ive and Analytic . .1 i 1
referen ce t o t lie ir o r d e r of jiro c e d iir c , ti n s
or Uegresnve. '
o n i e r b e in g e ith e r E sse n titd o r A c c id e n ta l. T h e
essen tial o r d e r o f jiro c ed iire regards th e n atu re o f th e inference
i t s e l f , ;is e i t h e r f r o m t h e w h o l e t o t h e j i a r t , o r f r o m t h e j i a r t s t o t h e
w h o le. d 'h o form er c o n stitu te s D ed u ctiv e P ro b a tio n , th e la tter
In d u ctiv e. 'I'h e ticeidttntal o r d e r ' o f jiro c e d u re regards on ly onr
jio in t of d c p tirtn rc in co n sid erin g a jiro b a tio n . If, c o n i i n e n c i n g
w ith th e h i g h e s t jii'i iicijilc, Ave d e s c e n d ste ji h y s t e p t o t h e c o n c l u
s i o n , t h e J i r o c e s s is S y n t h e t i c o r P r o g r e s s i v e ; h e r e t h e c o n c l u s i o n is
e v o lv e d o u t o f t h e p riu c ijile . If, ag tiin , s ttir tiiig f r o m th e co n clu -
1 Fries, S ijtte m der L o g ik , \ 73. K rug, L o g ik , H 67, 6 8 .]

* Eer, L o g ik , 4 141. E d .
L k c t. X X V I. LOGI C. 3G5
sion, wc ascend step b y stcj) to the lughest principle, the process

is A nalytic or R e g re ssiv e ; here the jirinciplo is evolved out o f the
eonclnsion.
In respect to the Extei-iial F orm , P ro ba tions arc Simjilo or
Monosyllogistic, if th e y consist o f a single
(6) E x l e r n a l E o r m . , n f
P r o b a t i o n s n , e S im p le Com posite o r Polysyllogistic if they
and C o m p o s i t e . cousist o f a jiliiralitv of reasonings. U nder
R e g u la r a n d ir r e g it- the S M i u e r e l a t i o n o f e x t e r u t i l f o r m , t h e y a r e
p e r f e c t * ^ ' ^ ^ divided into R e g u la r and Irregular, into
' ^ ' ^
P erfe ct and linjieifeet.

A n o th e r division o f P i ohations is hy reference to their Cogency,
or th e D e c re e o f C e rtain ty with which tlieir
3. A c e o r d in g to . . . . .
th e ir d e g re e o f C o - mforeuce IS drawii. B u t their cogency is of
g e n c y . P r o b a t io n s a re various dcgrces, aiid tliis either objectively con-
A p o d e ic tic a n d P ro b a - sidcrod, th a t is, O S d eterm ine d by the conditions
of the Jiroof itself, or subjectively considered,
th a t is, hy reference to those on w hom the proof is calculated to
operate conviction. I n the former, or ohjective relation, probations
are p artly Ajiodeictic, or D em onstra tive in the stidcter sense of th a t
term, when the certainty they necessitate is absolute and com
plete, th a t is, when the opposite alternative involves a contradic
tion ; jitirtly P r o h a h l e , when th e y do no t jiroduce nn invincible
assurance, hu t when the evidence iu favor o f the conelusion jire-
jionderate.s over tluit Avhicli is ojijiosed to it. I n th e la tte r or sub-
_ je c tiv e relation, jirohations are either U niversally
Aâlid, whcii th e y ai-e calculated to operate con
P a r U c u i r r ) ? ^^^
viction on all reasonable minds, or Pai'ticularly

Valid, w hen th e y are fitted to convince only certain individutil
minds.
Par. Lxxxvii. ^ LX XX A ÎI. Pi'obatioiis are divided by

Probations, their Di- rcferciice to tlieir jMatter, to their Form ,
:md to tlieir D egree of Cogency.
In relation to their JMattei-, th e y are jmrtly Pure or a p rio r i,
Jiartly K m p ir ic a l or a posteriori.
A s to thcii- F o rm , this is either Intern al or Fxtei-nal. In
resjiect to their Internal F orm , they aic, 1 , By refercnee to the
M a nner of Inference, D irect or Ostensive {HiKTiKai, ostcusiviv),
and Indirect or A p a y o fp c a l {}>robationes upuyoyicce reductioues
a d absurdunt) ] 2, B y refertMiee to their Fssential or In te rn a l
Oi-dcr of Procedure, tlicy are either Deductive or In ductive ;
3, B y refercnee to their A ccidental or F x tc n ia l O rd e r o f P r o
cedure, they are p artly Synthetic or Progressive, partly A n a -
36G LOGIC. L e c t. X X V I.
h/tic o r Regressive. I n r c s ] i e c t t o t l i e i r E x t e r n a l F o r m , t h e y
a r e , 1 , Simple o r JhuosgU ogistic, a n d Composite o r P olg sg llo -
gistic : 2 , J R r /tc t a n d Im p e r f e c t; 3, P eg u h ir a n d Irregular.
In respect to tlieir D egree ot C ogency, they are, 1 , A s
o b jectiv ely co n sid ered , e ith e r Apodeictic o r D em o n stra tive in
t h e s t r i c t e r s i g n i f i c a t i o n o f t l i e t e r m (aTrdSetfets, demonstrationes
strirte dieter), o r Probable {jirobationes sensu latiori) ; 2, A s
s n h j e c t i v e l y c o n s i d e r e d , t h e y a r e e i t h e r UniversaUg V a lid ( s a f
(LhjSday, secunduin vcritatcm), o r P a r tic u la r ly V a lid { s a f di*-
SpoiTTov, a d liomincni)}
T o s p e a k n o w o f t h e s e d i s t i n c t i o n s in d e ta il. I n t h e first p lace,

P r o b a t i o n s , w c h a v e s a i d , in r e l a t i o n t o t l i e i r
E x p lic a iio ii. . . -
iT o b a .io n s . 1. In re- ii>-Mter, a r e d i v i d e d in to P ure or o and
fpcci of iiioir jiaiier, i n t o E iiq firica l o r a posteriori. P u re or a jm io ri
are P u r e a n d E in p ir i- p r o o f s a r e tllOSC t h a t r e s t Oil p r i i i c i p h ' s w liicli,
nlth o iig li r is in g in to c o n s c io u s n e s s o n ly on occa
sion o f s o m e e x t e r n a l o r i n t e r n a l o b s e r v a t i o n , o f s o m e a c t o f ox]e-
r ic n c e , a r e still n a t i v e , a r c still o r i g in a l, c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f tlie m in d
itselfi and a c o n trib u tio n w ith o u t w hich no act of ex p erien ce
becom es jiossible. P roofs again are called Empiirical o r a p o s
teriori, i f t h e y r e s t o n j i r i i i c i i d e s Avhicli a r e e x c l u s i v e l y f o r m e d f r o m
ex ]ierien c e o r o b se rv a tio n , a n d w h o s o v a l i d i t y is c o g n i z a b l e in n o
o th e r w ay th a n th a t o f e x p e rie n c e or o b serv atio n . W h e n th e p rin -
ci]lcs o f P r o b a t i o n a r e s u c h a s a r e n o t c o n t i n g e n t l y g i v e n by expe
rien ce, but s])o n tan eo n sly engendered by tlic m in d itself, th ese
])riiicii les a r e alw ay s ch aracterized b y tlie qualities o f n ecessity
and u n i v e r s a l i t y ; c o n s e q u e n t l y , a ] > ro o f sii]]orted b y t h e m is e l e
v ated a lto g e th i'r above th e p o ssib ility o f d o u b t. W h e n , on th e
<t h e r h a n d , t h e P riiieiiilcs o f P r o b a tio n a r e siie li ;is h a v e o n l y t h e
g u a ra n te e o f o b se rv atio n .and e x p e r i e n c e l o r t l i e i r t r u t h , ( s u p j i o s -
i n g e v e n tli.a t t h e o b s ( * r v a t i o i i Ik* c o r r e c t a n d tlie e x p e r ie n c e sta b le
;in<l c o n s t a n t ) , t l i e s e p r i n c i ] l e s , a n d , e o n s i ' q i i e n t l y , t h e j i r o b a t i o n
fo u n d e d on th e m , can [irc te n d n e ith e r to n e c e ssity n o r u n iv e r s a lity ;
se e in g th a t w h a t [iro d n ces th e o b se rv a tio n o r e x p e rie n c e lias o n l y a
r e i .a t i o n t o i n d i v i d u a l ( d i j e e l s , .and is o n l y c o n q i e t e n t t o i n f o r m us
o t wli.al n o w is, b u t n o t o f w li.at tilw .av s is, o f Avli.at n c c e s s a i i l y m u s t
be. ,\Itl)o iig l), h o w e v e r , tlie se e m p iric a l p rin c ip le s are in q ire sscd
w iili th e cliaracler n e ith e r o f n ecessity nor o f u n i\ersality , th ey
p lay a v e ry im p o rtan t ]art i n th e th eatre of liiiiiian tlio u g lit.
1 ( f. K n ig . Log,A, SS 128, 120, 1.30, 1.31. 1.32, L o g ik , 1.39.- E d . [C f. D e g e r a n d o .

0-5 S ig n tt. I. iv . nil. V, p 2.34 ) 2 l i s u r , L o g ik , ^ 140 - E d .
L ect. XX VI. LOGIC. 367
T h is d istin ctio n o f P roofs, b y reference to th e m a tte r o f our k n o w l

e d g e , is o n e , i n d e e d , w b i e h L o g i c d o e s n o t t a k e
T h is d is tin c tio n o f accoiiiit. L o g ic , in fact, c o iis id c r s e v e r y
Ir o b a tio n s n o t ta k e n . ^ ^ ^
_ , . i n f e r e n c e o t a c o n s e q u e n t i r o ii i a n a n t e c e d e n t a s
in to a c c o u n t b y L o g ic . i
an inference a p rio ri, s u p p o s in g e v e n tlia t th e
a n t e c e d e n t s t l i c m s e l v e s a r e o n l y o f nii e m p i r i c a l ch aracter. Thus
w e m a y say, tliat, from th e g e n e ra l relatio n s o f d istan c e found to
bold betw een t h e planet.s, K .a n t a n d O lb c rs jiro v e d a p r io r i tln it
b etw een IM ars and Ju p iter a p lan etary body m ust ex ist, b e fo re
C eres, P allas, J u n o , an d V esta, w ere a etu .ally d i s c o v e r e d .' H ere,
h o w e v e r , th.p a q irio ri j i r i n c i p l e is i n r e a l i t y o n l y a n e m p i r i c a l rule,
o nly a gen eralizatio n from ex jicricn ce. B u t w ith th e m anner
in w hich these e m p iric a l r u le s (B acon w o u ld call th em ax i-
077is) a r e th em se lv e s d iscovered or ev o lv ed w ith this. P u r e
L o g ic has no concern. T h i s w i l l f a l l t o b e c o n s i d e r e d i n ^M o d ified
L o g ic , w h e n w e treat o f the co n crete D o c trin e of In d u ctio n and
A n alo g y .
In th e second p l a c e , in resjiect o f th eir F o rm , and th at th e
I n t e r n a l , P r o b a t i o n s a r e , a s w e s a id , f irs t o f all,
2. I n r e sp e c t o f th e ir d iv id ed iu to D irc c t Of O stc n siv e , an d in to In d i-
F o r m , (a ) D ir e c t ^ . - i t r r\
a n d I n d ir e c i. ^^P "g o g H ail. A j i r o o f IS D i r e c t o r 0.S-
te n siv c , w h e n it e v in c e s th e tru th of a th e sis
tb ro n g b p o s i t i v e p r i n c i p l e s , t h a t is, i m m e d i a t e l y ; i t is I n d i r e c t o r
x V pagogical, w h e n it e v i n c e s t h e t r u t h o f a - th e s is t h r o u g h t h e fa lse
h o o d o f i t s o j i p o s i t e , t h a t is, m e d i a t e l y . T h e in d ire ct is s j i c c i a l l y
called t h e a pagogical ( a r g a m e n ta t io a p a g o g ic a s i v e de du ctio a d
im p o s s ib ile ), b e c a u s e i t s h o w s t h a t s o m e t h i n g c a n n o t b e a d m i t t e d ,
since, if a d m i t t e d , c o n s e q u e n c e s w o u ld n e c e s s a rily fo llo w im p o ss ib le
or absurd. The In d irect o r A p a g o g i c a l m o d e o f i i r o o f is e s t a b
lish ed on t b e p rin cijile, t h a t t h a t m u s t b e c o n -
Proof ceded to be tru e w hose c o n tra d ic to ry op jio site
co n tain s w ith in itself a co n trad ictio n . T in s
jirinciple m an ifestly r e s t .s on the Law o f C o n tra d ic tio n , an d on
th e Law of E x clu d ed M id d le; for w h a t involves a c o n tra d ic tio n
i t is i m p o s s i b l e f o r u s t o t h i n k , a n d i f a c h a r a c t e r m u s t b e d e n i e d
o f an oliject, a n d t h a t it m u s t b e so d e n i e d th e p ro b atio n h a s to
show , th e n the co n trad icto ry o jip o site of th at character is o f
n e c e s s ity to b e affirm ed o f t h a t o b je c t. T b e D i r e c t m o d e o f jiroba-
t i o n h a s u n d o u b t e d l y t h i s a d v a n t a g e o v e r t h e I n d i r e c t , t h a t it n o t
o n ly f u r n is h e s t h e s o u g h t - f o r t r u t h , b u t also t r u l y d c v e h ijis its n e c e s
sa ry c o n n e c tio n w ith its u ltim a te jirin c ijile s ; w h e re a s th e In d irect
d e m o n s tr a te s o n ly t h e re jiu g n a n c e o f so m e jiro p o sitio n w ith certain
1 S e e K a n t s Vorlesungen ilbei Physische GfO graphie, 1802; Werke, v i. p. 4 4 9 Ed.

368 LOGIC. L ect. XXVI.
trutlis, witliont, however, po.sitively evincing tlie tr u th of its opjio*

site, aiul tliereby o btainin g for it a full and satisfactory recognition.
I t is, tlioivfu'e, usually einployed only to constrain a Ironblesoine
ojijionent to silence, by a disjilay of the absurdities which arc
iinjilicd in, ami wliicli would How o u t of, liis assertions. N e v e r
theless, the indirect probation establishes the projiosition to be
Jiroved not less certainly than tlie d ire c t; nay, it still more p re
cise!} exelmles the snpjiosition of the ojiposite alternative, and,
eon>e(pieinly, allbnls an inteu ser consciousness o f necessity. W e
ought, h o w e \e r, to he on onr g uard against tlie jiaralogisms to
which it is jiecnliarly exposed, by ta k in g c a r e 1 , T h a t th e oppo
sites are eontradietory and not c o n t r a r y ; and 2 , T h a t an absurdity
really is, and not merely appears to be. T h e differences o f A pa-
gogical P rob ations corresjiond to tlie different
D iffe r e n c e s o f i n d i- J^Jnds of projjositions wliicli may be indirectly
d em o nstrate d ; and these are, in th e ir widest
generality, eitlier Categorical, or Ilyjiotlfetical,
or D isjunctive. Is th e thesis a categorical jiroposition ? Its con
trad ictory ojiposite is snjijiosed, and from lliis counter jirojiosition
conclusions are deduced, until we obtain one of so aljsurd a cliarac-
ter, tliat we. are able to argue back to tlie falseliood of tlie original
jirojiositioii itself. Ag.-iin, is the tlicsis an hyjjotliefical j u d g m e n t ?
T h e c o n tra dictory ojiposite o f the consequent is assumed, and the
same jirocess to tlie saine end is jierfbrmed as in th e case o f a ca te
gorical Jiroposition. Finally, is tlie thesis a disjunctive proposi
tion ? In tliat case, if its membra disjuncta are contradictorily
ojijioscd, we cannot, eith er directly or indirectly, jirove it false as a
w h o le; all th a t we can do being to show tliat one o f these disjunct
nieinliers can not lie affirmed of the subject, from which it necessa
rily follows th a t the o th e r must. '
U n d e r tlie In te rn a l F orm , P ro b a tio n s are, in th e second place, in
respect of their Essential or Internal O rd e r of
(b) D e c iu c in e a n d i n'ocedlire,either D oductivo 0 1 ' Iiidiicti V C , accoi'd-
In d u c tjv e . . .
ing as the thesis is jiroved by a jirocoss of reason
ing descending from generals to jiarticular.s and individual.s, or by a
jiiocess of reasoning asce n d in g from individuals and jiarticnl.-irs to
generals. On this subject it is not necessary to say anything, as the
rules wliich govern the formal inference in these jirocesscs have
lieeii already stated in tlie D octrin e of Syllogism s; and llie consid-
er.Mtioii of Induction, as modified by tlie general conditions of the
to wliicli it !>.; aj]ilied, can only be treated of when, in the
setjuel, we come to Moditieil or Concrete M ethodology.
1 E escr, L o g ik , i 142. E d .
L kct. X X V I. LOGIC. 309
U n d e r t h e I n t e r n a l F o r m , P r o b a t i o n s a re , h o w e v e r , in t b e t h i r d
p la c e , in r e s p e c t o f t h e i r E x t e r n a l o r A c c i d e n t a l
O rder o f jirocedure, S y n th e tic o r P ro g ressiv e,
and /V n aly tic or P eg ro ssiv e . A p ro b atio n is
c a l l e d syn th etic o r p ro y r e s s iv e , w h e n t h e c o n c l u s i o n is e v o l v e d out
o f t h e p r i n c i p l e s , a n a ly t ic or regressive, w heu tb e p r i n c i p l e s arc;
e v o lv e d o u t o f th e eon cln sio ii. In th e fo rm ci case, th e p ro b atio n
g o e s f r o m t h e s u b j e c t t o t h e j i r e d i e a t e ; in t h e l a t t e r c a s e , f r o m t h e
pred icate to the su h ject. W here th e p ro b atio n is c o m p l e x , if
s y n t h e t i c , t h e e o n e l u s i o n o f t h e j i r e c e d i n g s y l l o g i s m is t h e s u b s u m j ) -
tio n o f t h a t fo llo w in g ; i f a n a ly tic , t h e c o n c lu s io n o f th e p i-eceding
s y l l o g i s m is t h e s u m p t i o n o f t h a t f o l l o w i n g . In re s p e c t o f c e r ta in ty ,
b o t h j ) r o c e d n r e s a r e e q u a l , a n d e a c h h a s i t s p e c u l i a r a d v a n t a g e s ; in
co n se q u e n c e o f w h ich th e c o m b in a tio n o f th e se tw o m o d e s o f p ro o f
is h i g h l y e x p e d i e n t . But th e A n aly tic P ro ced ure is o f t e n c o m p e
te n t w h ere th e S y n t h e t i c is n o t ; w h e r e a s t b e S y n t h e t i c is n e v e r
p o s s i b l e w h e r e t h e A n a l y t i c is n o t , a n d t b i s i s n e v e r p o s s i b l e w h e r e
we have not a req u isite sto ck of p ro jio sitio n s a lr e a d y verified.
W h e n t b e P r o b a t i o n is p a r t l y a n a l y t i c , j i a r t l y s y n t h e t i c , i t is c a l l e d
M ix e c ir ^
^ L X X X V III. The F o rm al L e g itim a c y o f a P ro b a tio n is

(letci-m ined b y t h e f o llo w in g ru les.
F o rm al iS u Jac y ^ ^ o t l i i n g is t o b e b c g g c d , b o iT O w e d , o r
of a P ro b a t io n ,- I t s s t o l e u ; t h a t is, i i o t l i l n g i s t o b e j u e s u p p o s e d
as p ro v e d , w b ie h itself requires a d e m o n
stratio n . The violation o f tb is rule afibrds the vice called
th e P e t i t i o p r l n c i p i i , o r F a l l a c i a qucesiti m e d i i {rb iv dpxo
a lT u a S a i).-
2, N o j i r o j i o s i t i o n is t o b e e m p l o y e d a s a p r i n c i j i l e o f p r o o f ,
th e tru th o f w hich is o n l y t o be ev in ced as a c o n seq u en ce o f
t b e j > r o j i o s i t i o n w l i i c b i t is e m p l o y e d to jiro v e . T b e v io latio n
o f t h i s r u l e is t h e v i c e c a l l e d va-repov jrporcpov.
3, N o c i r c u l a r p r o b a t i o n is t o b e m a d e ; t h a t is, t h e p r o p o
sitio n w h ic h w e jiro p o s e to jiro v e m u s t n o t b e u se d as a jirinci-
p le fo r its o w n pro b atio n . T h e v i o l a t i o n o f t h i s i*ule is c a l l e d
th e Orhis vel circidu s in d e m o n s tra n d o , dia llelu s , 6 8c
dXX-gXwV TpOTTOS.
1 E sser, Log-fT:, 142. Ed q u o d in it io fu it p r o p o s itu m e t in d isq u isi-

2 [On e r ro r o f th is te r m , see P a c iu s , Com - tio n e m v o c a tu in . Ib id . ii. 24. E d .]
m e n ta r iu sin O r g ] [ / a A n al. Prior ii. 16. N o n
est p e titio a p x n s , id e st, p r in c ip ii, v el 3 .Sec S e.x tn s E m jiir ic u s, Pyrrh. H y p ., i. 169.
eV ap x j? . id est, in p r in c ip io ; sed t o D eV ii. 68. L a e r tiu s , L. ix . 88, 89. [C f. F a c c io -
PXP v p o K e i/x iv o v , id e s t, ejiis p r o b lc n ia tis . l a li, Acrooji., v . p. 69 ft sr?.]
o70 ' LOGIC. L ect. X X V L
4, N o l e . i p , n o h i a t u s , m u s t b e m a d e ; t l i a t is, t h e s } d l o g i s i n s
o f w h i c h t h e p r o b a t i o n i s m a d e u p m u s t s t a n d in i m m e d i a t e o r
coiitiiiiio iis co n n ectio n . F rom th e tra n sg re ssio n o f th is ru le
r e s u l t s t h e v i c e c a l l e d t h e S a ltu s v e l H i a t u s in d e m o n s tra n d o .
5 , T h e s c o p e o f t h e p r o b a t i o n is n o t t o b e c h a n g e d ; t h a t is,
n o th in g is t o b e proved o th e r th a n w h a t it w as jiroposed to
prove. T h e v i o l a t i o n o f t h i s r u l e g i v e s t h e lletex'ozetesis, I g n o -
r a t io v e l J d u ta tio elen'chi, a n d t h e T r a n s i tu s v i a l i u d g e n u s v e l
a g o i c r e a d genus, /xerajSao-is aAXo yevo<;}
In th is p arag rajih , I h a v e g iv e n , as d iffe re n t ru les, th o se c a n o n s

w h i c h a r e o p p o s e d t o v i c e s n o t a b s o l u t e h ^ i d e n -
These rules reduced . , i i . i i i t .r. ^
ti c a l , a n d w liieii h a v e o b t a i n e d d in e ro iit d e n o m
inations. B lit y o u m u s t o b s e r v e , t h a t t h e first
th ree rules are all m an ifestly o n ly v ario u s m o d ific a tio n s on ly
special cases, o f one general law . To th is law , lik ew ise , th e
f o u i l h r u l e m a y w i t h p e r f e c t p r o p r i e t y b e r e d u c e d , f o r t h e sa ltu s o r
h ia t u s in p r o h a n d o is, i n fiic t, n o l e s s t h e a s s u m p t i o n o f a j i r o j i o s i -
tioii as a p riiicijile o f p ro b a tio n w hich its e lf re ip iire s p roof, t h a n
e i t h e r th e qxetitio q v'incip ii, t h e ligsteron gtroteron, o r t h e circuhis in
probatado. T h e s e fiv e la w s, th e r e f o r e , a n d t h e c o r r e s p o n d e n t v ices,
m a y all h e r e d u c e d t o t w o ; o n o o f w h i c h r e g a r d s t h e m e a n s , t h e
jtriiicip lo s o f p r o o f ; th e o th er th e e n d , th e p ro])osition to he
proved. T h e f o r m e r o f th e s e la w s p re sc rib e s , 'P h a t n o jiro p o sitio ii
be em p lo y e d as a p rin cip le o f p ro b a tio n w h i c l i s t a n d s i t s e l f in w a n t
o f p i'o o f ; t h e la tte r, T h a t n o t h i n g else he jiroved t h a n th e p r o p o
sitio n for whose j ir o o f tlie p ro b atio n w as in stitu ted . You m ay,
th e re fo re , a d d to th e la st jia ra g ra p h th e fo llo w in g s u p jd e m e iit:
L X X X I X . T h e s e r u l e s o f t h e l o g i c i a n s m a y , h o w e v e r , all
he re d u ced to tw o.
Par. LXXXIX |Tliiit 110 | ) r o p o s i t i o u b e e m p l o y e d a s
R ules of P ro b a tio n i p i i i i
re d u c e d to two. ^ P riiicip lc o f F ro b a tio ii w liicli s t a n d s i t
s e l f in n e e d o f p r o o f
2 . T h a t n o tliin g else be proved th an tlic P ro p o sitio n for
w h o se p ro o f th e P ro b a tio n w as in stitu ted .
O f t h e s e t w o , t h e f o r m e r c o m j i r c h e n d s t h e first
E x p lic a t io n . , , r. n i
f o u r r u l e s o f t h e l o g i c i a n s , t h e l a t t e r t h e f ifth.
I s h a l l n o w , t h e r e f o r e , p r o c e e d t o i l l i i . s t r a t e t h e f i v e r u l e s iu d e t a i l .
I r sep U c in lio lfl, I>if Lngik n h r ilif iiUgi- 1S27 ) (C f. tv ru g , L o g ik , 1.3.3. E sser. L o g tk
rofin f hftikfoT m fnU hrf. ^ \!J). |. )fi7. .te iia . < 144 Ejj.1
L k c t . X X V I. LOGIC, 371
Tlie First Rule Xothing is to bc begged, borrowed, or stolen ;

, th.'it is, notliiiig is to be i)i-esii])|)osed as proved,
F ir s t R u le . .
Avliicli itself I'ecpiires ;i deiiioiistratioii, is, in
fact, an enunciation of th lirst gcuer.al rule 1 g.ave you, and to tliis,
tlierefore, as wc shall see, the second, third, and fourth are to bc
reduced as special ajijilications. But, in considering this law in its
nnivcrs.ality, it is not to be understood as if
L im if a fio n u n d er every pi'tibatioii were at once to bc rejected as
w in c h th is R u le is to * . . . .
be u n d e r s to o d . Avorthloss, in whicli iiuytliiug is ]>resupj)osed and
not Jirovcd. 5Vere this its sense, it would be
necessary inevery probation to ascend to the highest princijiles
of huinaii knowledge, .nd these tlicinselves, as iuitnediate and,
consequently, incajiable of jiroof, might be rejected as unproved
assumjitioiis. Were this tho meaning of the law, there could be no
jirobation whatever. Bnt it is not to be understood in this extreme
rigor. Tliat jirobation alone is a violation of this law, and, conse
quently, ;il()iie is vicious, iu whicli a projiosition is assumed as a
princijile of jiroof, Avliich may be doubted on the ground on which
the thesis itself is doubted, and where, therefore, we jirove the un
certain by the equally uncort.ain. The jirobation must, therefore,
depart from such jirincijiles as are either immediately given as ulti
mate, or mediately admit of a proof from other sources than the
proposition itself in question. When, for example, it was argued
that the Newtonian theory is false, whieli holds colors to be the
result of a diversity of parts in light, on the ground, admitted by
the ancients, that the celestial bodies, and, consoqueutly, tlieir ema
nations, consist of homogeneons elements; tliis reasoning Avas
iiiejit, for the priiicijile of proof Avas not admitted by modern jihi-
losojihers. Thus, Avlien Aristotle defends the institution of slnverv
as a natnral law, on the ground that the barbarians, as of inferior
intellects, are the lioiai bondsmen of the Greeks, and the Greeks, as
of siijierior intellect, tho born masters of tlie barbarians' (an
argnnient whieh h.as, likewise, been enijiloycd in niodcaai times in
the British Parliament, with the substitution of negroes for barba
rians, and Avliiles foi- Gi-ccks), tliis argnnient is invalid, as assmiiing
wliat is not admitted by tlic ojiponcaits of slavery. It would be a
petitio principii to prove to the Alolianiniedan the divinity of
Christ from texts in the New Testament, for he docs not admit the
authority of the Bible; but it would be a Aalid arfjainentum ad
homlnem to jirove to him from the Koran the jirojilietic mission of
Jesus, for the authority of the Koran lie acknowledges.
The Second Rule, That no jiroposition is to be employed as a
1 P o U t., i. 2. E d.
372 LOGI C. L k c t. XXVI.
priiioiple o f jiroof, tlie truth o f which is only to bc evin ced as a

consecpieiicc o f the iiroposition wbich it is ein-
:?econd Kule. ^ ^
])loyo(l lo prove, is on ly a special case o f tlie
preceding. For examjile, if Ave Averc to argue that man is a free
agent, on the ground that he is morally resjioiisible for his actions,
or tli.-it his actions can be iinjuited to biin, or on the ground that
vice and virtue are a bso lutely different, in these cases, the h ystcron
jtroterun is e o m m itt e d ; for on ly on tlie grouml that the bnmaii Avill
is free, can man bc vioAved as a morally resjionsible agent, and bis
.ictioiis be imjinted to him, or can the discrimination o f Aicc and
A'irtiie, as more than a m erely accidental relation, be maintained.
But Ave m ust jianse before Ave reject a reasoning on the ground o f
hy.-'tn-on prot-'-rnn : for the reasoning m ay still be valid, tbougli this
logical limit he co m m itted . X a y , it is frequently necessary for us
to reason hy sneh a regress. In the very examjile given , i f a v c be
unable to jirove directly that th e Avil! o f man is free, but are able to
jirove that he is a moral agent, resjionsible for bis actions, as sub
je c t e d to the volu ntary but nncom litioned L .av o f D u ty , and i f the
fact o f this laAV o f d u ty and its unqualified obligation in volve, as a
jiustulate. an einaneijiation from necessity, in that case, no com-
jieteiit olijection can be taken to this jirocoss o f reasoning. This,
in fact, is Ivants .argmnenl. From Avbat he calls the cateyoriccd
b nperatirc, that is, from the fact (if the unconditioned hnv o f d u ty
.as ohligalory on man, he jiostulates, as conditions, the liberty o f the
hum.m Avill, and tlic ex is te n ce o f a God, as the moral g o vern o r o f a
nior.al uiiiAerse.*
The Third BaAA', That no circular jirobation is to he made, that
is, the jirojiositioii AAl i i c l i a v c juopose to juove
Tliird laile.
must not be used as a jiniieijile tor its OAvn juo
},;,tion. this, inlike manner, is o n ly a particular case o f the first.
'I'o the Giiade there are required jirojicrly tAvo probatioii.s, Avhicli
ire so rcciproe.ally related that tlie :iiitecedeiit in the one is proved
iy iis oAvn co nseq u ent in the other. T lie jirojiositioii A is true be-
ii^c the jirojiositioii B is true; and the projiosition B is true
bccaiixc tlic jirojiositioii A is true. A circle so ji.alpable as tliis
AAdiihl imlccd lie c om m itted by no one. d'lie vice is usually (;on-
cc.aled liy the iiiterjiolatioii o f interm ediate jirojiositions, or by a
(diaii'_''e in ilie cxiii essioii. ' T im s Plato, in his l l u p d o f dcxwow-
'tr itc- the im m ortality o f the soul from its siiiijilicity ; and, iu the
lb jm h lir* !)' 'Iciiionstrates its simjilicity from its iminort.ality.
1 A III. d .r r .m It V irniinft. .A lollioflonlclire, 2 K n ig , L o g ik , ( 18.3.A n m . 3 . Rd.

II' ii; ; . ii A t ! - . - '! ! ! .2 K m i k / h r jir n k lis r h e n .3 I' 78 Eli
K .m unH , p. 274, <;rl. I. o c n k r a iiz . E d . 4 15. X. p O il. E d .
L ect. XXVI. LOOic. 373
In relation to the Tlysteion Proteron and the Circfe, I mn.^t

observe that these invsent some jieculiar diffi-
Ki'greBsive and Pro- culties for the systematio an-angenient of onr
gressive p.oois not to j^ ^,,vledge. T h r o u g h th e C ircle^ (th e l e s u lt o f
be confounded witb , , , . , , x x \
the tautological Cir- O n ly t h e jHo o f o f a n a s s e r t i o n ) ,
cle. through the circle by itself, nothing whatever is
gained for the logical develojnnent of our knowl
edge. But we must take care not to eonfonnd the connection of
Regressive
O
and ]^rogressi\e
O
Proofs with the tautolo"ie:il
O
Circle.
When, in the treatment of a science out of thc observed facts, we
wish to genertdizc nniversal laws, we lead, in the first jilace, an in
ductive jirobation, that (6Vt) certain laws there are. Having assured
ounselves of the existence of these laws by this regressive jiroeess.
we tlien jilace them in theory at the head of a jirogressive or syn
thetic jirobation, in which the facts again recur, reversed and illus
trated from the laws, which, in the antecedent jiroeess, they had
been emjiloyed to establish ; that is, it is now shown why (Slotl)
these facts exist.
The Fonrth Rule, Xo leaji, no gaji, must be made, that is, the
syllogisms of which the probation is made uji
P'ouitb Uule. . . . . .
must stand in immediate or ccnitiiuioiis connec
tion, may bc, likewise, reduced to thc first. For here the only
vice is that, by an ellijisis of an intermediate link in tlie syllogistic
eliain, we use a jirojiosition which is actnnlly witliout its jiroof, and
it is only because this jirojiosition is as yet iinjn'oved, that itsemjiloy-
iiieiit is illegitimate. The Saltus i.^;, therefore, only a special case
of the Petltio.
The Saltus i.s committed tvhen the middle term of one of the
syllogisms in a probation is not stated. If the
The Fakus in demon-
middle term be too manifest to require state
ment, then is the saltus not to be blamed, for it
is committed only in the expression and not in the thought. If the
middle term be not ea.sy of discovery, then the saltus is a fault; but
if there be no middle tenn to be found, then the saltus is a vice
which invalidates the whole remainder of the jirobatioii. The
proper saltus, the real violation of this law, is, therefore, when
wc make a transition from one projiosition to another, the two not
being connected together as rea.son and consequent.' The (vulgar)
Enthyineme and the Sorites do not, therefore, it is evident, involve
violations of this law.
The Fifth Rule, The scojie of thc probation is not to be
changed, that is, nothing is to be proved other than wliat was pro-
1 Cf. Krug, L o g ik , 133. Anm. 4. Ed.

374 LOGIC. L eut. X X V I .
posed to be jiroxed, corresponds to tlie second of the two rules

wliieli I gave, and of wliieh it is only a less
rniiiUiiio explicit statement. It evidently :ulmits of three
Aiimiis of three de- or degrees. Tn tlie first ease, the jirojiosi
tion to be Jiroved is ehtmged by the eliange of
its .subject or jircdicate into different iiotioiis. Again, the jirojio-
sitioii may substamir.lly remain the same, hi.I may be eliaiiged into
line either of a wider or of a mirrower extension, the second and
lliird eases.
The fii'st of tliese cases is the J r u ta tio E le n c ld , or J V a n situ s a d
a liu d yenus, jirojierly so called. When a jiro-
1 ir.MDtgice, iihi- l);ition does not demonstrate what it oimht to
td ilo E lfnchi. ^ ^
demonsti-ate, it may, if considered absolutely or
in it.self, be valid ; but if considered relatively to the projiosition
XVhieli it behooves us to jirovc, it is of no value. W e commute by
tliis jirocediire the xxliole seojie or jmrjiort of the probation; wo
desert the jirojier object of inquiry, the jioiiit in question. If a
I ei'son xvoiild jirove the existence of ghosts, and to this end jii'ove
by witness (be fact of unusual noises and ajijiear.-inecs during the
night, he xvonld jirovo something very dillerciit from what he j>ro-
jiosed to eslalilish ; for this would lie admitted xvitliout diflieiilty by
those who still denied the tqijiarition of ghosts; it, therefoi'e, be
hooved him to slioxv that the unusutd jiheiiomena xvere those of a
sjiii it good or bad. *
The txvo other cases, xvhen tlie jirojiosition actually proved is
either of a smaller or of a greater extension
Second iifgrec, 111 t|i;ni ilie jirojiosition wliicli ought to have been
w h i c l i loo l i l t l c 18 , .
Jiroved, arc not necessarily, like tlie jirece-
ding, altogether irrelevant. 3hey are, hoxvever,
comjiarcd together, of x ririous degrees of relevancy. In the former
case, xx'licre too little is jiroved, here the end jirojiosed is, to a
i crl.-jin extent at least, changed, ;md the jirobation results in somc-
(liiiig different from xvliat it xvas intended to aeeonijilisli. For
evaiiijile, if xve ju'ojiose to jirox e that Semjironius is a virtuous eliar-
ai-ter, :tnd only jirove the legality of liis actions, xve lu're prove
'oiiieliiing les-; than, something different from, xxhat we jirofessed to
do; for xve jirojiosed to jirove the internal morality, and not increlx
llie exicrnal lawfulness, of his conduct. Such a jiroof is not aliso-
lutely inv.-did; it is not even relatively null, for the external legality
is alwtiys a eoncomitaiit of internal morality. But the existt'iico of
the latter is not evinced by that of the former, for Semjironius
1 K rug, L o g ik , 5 133. Aiim. 2. E d.

L kct, X X V I. LOGIC. 3 7 .;
may conform his actions to tho law from expediency and not from
duty.*
In the other case, in which thei'c is proved too mueh, the proba
tion is lawful, and only not adequate and pre-
i h i r d Degroe, m ji-'jjj. exanqilo, if WC propose to prove that
w liic h to o m uch is , , , i i i i i i
the soul does not peiash witlt the body, and
actually jjrove tli.at its dissolution is absolutely
impossible, liere tlie proof is only superabundant. The logical
rule, Q ui n im iw n pirohat, n ih il pvobat, is, therefore, in its univer
sal, or unqualified expression, ineoiTeci. The proving too much is,
however, often tlie sign o f a saltus having been committed. For
example, when a religious enthusiast .argues from tlic strength of
his pei*suasion, that he is, therefore, actuated by the Holy Sjiirit,
and his views of religion consequently true, there is here too
much proved, for there is implied the antecedent, omitted by a
saltus, that whoever is strongly persuaded o f bis inspiration is
really inspired, a proposition too manifestly absurd to bear an
explicit enouncement. In this case, the apparent too much is in
reality a too much which, when closely examined, resolves itself
into a nothing.
W o have tlius terminated the consideration of Pui'e or Abstract
Logic, in both its Parts, and now enter on the Doctrine o f Modified
or Concrete Logic.
1 C f. K r u g , iogrfc, 133. A n r a . 5. E d .
3 [C f. S ig w a r t. H andbuch z u Vorlesungen uber d ie L o g ik , 407, p. 252.]
LECTURE X X V II.
M O D IF IE D L O G IC .
PAPT I.-M O D IF IE D S T O IC H E tO LO G Y .
S E C T I O N I. D O C T R I N E OF T R U T H A N D E R R O R .
T R U T H . IT S CHARACTER AND K IN D S. *
I I a viXG now te rm inated the D o ctrine o f P u re or A bsti'act Logic,

wo proceed to tliat of Modified or Conci'cte
M otiiiied L o g i c , L y g ic _ J , , en terin g on this s u b j e c t ,! have to
iis o b je c t. J
I'ceall to yoni m em ory w hat lias formerly been
stated ill regard to th e object which JModified Logic proposes for
consideration. P u r e Jôgic takes into acconnt only the necessary
eomlitions of tliouglit, as founded on the iiatnre o f the thinking
proce.ss itself Modified Logic, on the contrary, considers th e con
ditions to which th o u g h t is subject, arising from the empirical cir-
cnmstance.s, external and internal, u n d e r which exclusively it is the
will of our C reator th a t man should manifest his faculty o f th in k
ing. lûre Logic is th u s exclusively eonver.sant with the form ;
.Modified Logie is, likewise, occupied w ith th e m atter, of thonglit.
. \ n d as th e ir objects are difierenl, so, likewise, innst he their ends.
I'lio end o f P u r e Iôgie is formal tnitli, the h a rm ony of th o u g h t
with t h o u g h t; th e eml of Alodified I.ogic is the harm ony of th o u g h t
with existence. O f these ends, th a t which P u r e lôgic jiroposes is
le.s ambitions, bu t it is hilly and c e ila inly accomjdislied ; th e end
which Modified Logic proposes is higher, h ut it is far less perfectly
att:iiiie<l. T h e problem s which Alodified Logie has to solve m ay he
reduced to tliree: 1 , W h a t is T ru th and its con-
l o p robif.inH , re - trad icto ry oiiposite, E r r o r ? 2 , AVhat are the
lu ccfl lo th ree. J ii
Causes o f E rror, and the Im p e d im e n ts to T ru th ,
by wliicli man is hes(.t in the em jdoym ent o f his fiieulties, and
w h at are the M eans o f their P em o v a l ? A nd, 3, W h a t are the
Siihsidiaries by wliieli Tinman T h o u g h t m a y b e stre n g th e n e d and
LTuided in the exercise o f its functions?
L ect. X X V II. L O G IC . 37T
F ro m tills st.atemcmt it is evident tlint Concrete Logic might, like

P u r e Logic, have been divided into a Stoieheiol-
A n d d is tr ib u te d b e- ogy and a jMetliodology, the former eoinjiris-
u v c e u its s t o ic h c io i- h e a d s , the la tte r the third.
o g y a n d its J lc t lio d o l- . i i i n >
h o r it to Moclihed btoielieiology we reier the
consideration o f th e nature o f concrete tru th
and error, and of the conditions of a merely not erroneous eiiijiloy-
mciit o f th ought, this will he exhausted in tlie F irst and Second
C h a p te rs; whereas, if we refer to JMetliodology a consideration of
the means of em]iloyiiig th o u g h t nut merely w itho ut error, b u t with
a certain positi\ e perfection, this is w hat the T h ird Cliajiter jiro-
fesses to expound.
I comnienee the F ir s t C hapter, which proposes to answ e r the
question, W h a t is T r u t h ? with its correlatives, by the dicta
tion o f the following paragraph :
^ X C . T h e end which all our scientific eftbrts are exerted

to accomplish, is Truth and Certainty.
P a r . XC. T r u t h a n d 'p,q,th is tlic corresiioiideiice or agreem ent
C e rta in ty , w h a t. _ _ _ * _ . _ p _
of a cognition with its o b j e c t ; its Crite
rion is th e necessity d eterm in e d by the laws which govern our
faculties o f k now ledge ; and C e rtainty is the conseioiisness of
this necessity.' C ertainty, or th e coiiseions necessity of know l
edge, absolutely excludes the admission o f any opposite sup
position. W h e r e such appears .uliiiissible, d o ubt and unce r
ta in ty arise. I f we consider tr u th by relation to tlie degree
and kind o f Certainty, we have to distinguish Knoxoledye,
Belief, and Opinion. K now ledge and Belief difier not only in
degree, b u t in kind. K now led g e is a certain ty founded upop
in sig h t; B elief is a certainty founded upon feeling. T h e one
is ])crs])icnous and objective; the oth e r is obscure and subjec
tive, Each, however, supposes the o t h e r ; and an assurance is
said to be a know ledge or a belief, according as the one elem ent
or the other preponderates. Opinion is the admission o f some
th in g as true, where, however, neither insight nor feeling is so
intense as to necessitate a jierfect certainty. 'W hat prevents
the admission o f a proposition as certain is called Doubt. T h e
approxim ation o f the inqierfect certainty of opinion to the p er
fect certainty of know ledge or belief is called Probability.
I f we consider T r u t h with reference to K now ledge, and to
the w.ay in which this know ledge arises, we m ust distinguish
1 C f. T w e s le ii. D ie J.ngik.insbesonderedie A n id i/tik , 3 0 6 . E d .

4
378 LOGIC. L ec t. X X V IJ
Emjn'n'crtI or a pnsten'ori, from P u r e or a piriori Truth. Tlia

former lins I'eference to cognitions which have their source in
tlie |ireseiitations o f Perception, E.xternal and Internal, and
which ohtaiii tlicir form by the elaboration of the Understand
ing or Faculty o f Relations (Stdroca). The latter is contained
ill the nccessarv * and universal cognitions
O afforded bv
V the Ret;-
O
Illative I^'ncnlty Intolleet Projier or Common Sense (rovs).
This jiaragrapb, after stating that Truth and Certainty constitute

the end o f all our endeavors after knowledge.
E x p lic a t io n / i , , i ^
tor only in tbe attainment or truth and certainty
can wc jiossibly attain to knowledge or science ; I s.ay, after tbe
statement o f this manifest proposition, it pi'oeeeds to define what
is meant by the two terms Truth and Certainty; and, to conynence
with the former, Truth is defined, the con-esjiondence or agree
ment of a cognition or cognitive act o f thought with its object.
Tlie q u e stio n W hat is Truth? is an old and celebrated prob
lem. It was proposed bv the Roman Covernor
T n it li, w lia t. , T-v . T7 - 1 * 1
by Pontius Pilate to our Saviour; and it
i.s a question wliich still recurs, and is still keenly agitated in the
most recent schools o f Pliilosojiby. In one resjicct, all are nearly
agreed in regard to tbe definition of the term, for
*"6 tvdmit that by truth is understood a harmony,
an agreement, a eorresjiondcnce between onr
tlioimbt andthat wliicli wc think about. This definition o f truth
wc owe to the schoolmen. Veritas intelleetus, says Aquinas,
est ad:equatio intelleetus et rei, .seeiinduiii quod intelleetus dieit
esse, (]iiod est, vel non esse, quod non est. ' From the sclioolinGii,
this definition has been banded down to modern [diilosopbers, by
whom it i.s currently cmjiloyed, without, in general, a suspicion of
its origin. It is not, tlieivfore, in regard to the meaning of the
term truth, that tliei'c i.s .any difference of ojiiiiion among philoso-
])liers. The questions which have jirovoked dis-
Qufftions in (lebaie cussion, and wliicli remain, as heretofore, without
r e g a r d in g T r u tli.
a definitive .solution, are not whether truth be
tbe bannony o f thought and reality, but whether this liarmony, or
tri.tli,be attainable, and wbetber we possess any criterion by wliieli
we can be assured of its attainment. Coii.sidering, however, at
present only tbe meaning of tbe term, pbilosoiihers have divided
Tnilli (or the liarmony o f thought and its object) iuto different
I [C onirn O rn tiU s, h h . i. c .'IJ . .See B iu n d e , g e n e r a l, s e e U u iz .C o m m e n t.,le S rien tia , de Id eis

Otier W ahrluit tn E rken iien , ]>. 11. O n T r u t h in de V eritalr, e tc . D is p . I x x x v ., p. 871 e M ej ]
L k ct . X X V I I . LOGIC. 379
s p e c i e s , t o w l i i c h t h e y Ii.ave g i v e n d i v e r s e n n m c s ; b u t t h e y .are a t
one n e i t h e r i n l l i e < liv isio n n o r i n l l i e n o i n e n c h i t i i r e .
I t is p l a i n t h a t f u r m a n t h e r e e:in o n l y b e c o n c e i v e d t w o k i n d s o f
^hailh, because th ere are for lin in an llio n g h t
For man only (wo s])ecies o f object. For th at about
k in d s o f T tu til, F o r - i * i i i i i .
in a la n d K e u i. wIiicli WC lliiiik iiuist e itlie r b e a tlio u g lit, o r
s o m e th in g w h ic h a tlio u g lit c o n ta in s. On th is
is f o u n d e d t h e d i s t i n c t i o n o f F o r m a l K n o w led g e and Ileal K n o w l
e d g e , o f F orm al T ru th and Real T rn tli. Of th ese in th eir
o rder.
I. In Ie g a r d to th e form er, a th o u g h t a b stra c te d f r o m w h a t it
contains, th a t is, f r o m i t s m t i t t e r o r w h a t i t is
I. F o r m a l T r u lli. . n , ,
c o n v e r s a n t ;il)Oiil, is tlie n i c r e l orni of l l i o n g h t .
3 ' h e k n o w l e d gcr*e o f t h e f o r m o f t h o u g h t is a f o r m a l k n o w l e d g e ,' a n d
t h e l i a r n i o n y o f t h o u g h t w i t h t h e t o i m o f t h o u g h t is, c o n s e t p i e n t l y ,
F o rm al T ru th . N o w F o r m a l K n o w l e d g e is o f
F o r m a l T r u ih o f j f o ,. re g a rd s e ith e r th e co n d itio n s
tw o k in d s , L o g ic a l .. i v-m i t -, , . t-, ,
a n d MatiK.maticai. f th e F la b o ra tiv c I n c u lty , - the F acu lty ot
T h o u g lit P ro p er, or th e co n d itio n s of our
P re sen tatio n s or R e p resen tatio n s of ex tern al t h i n g s , t l i a t is, t l i e
in tu itio n s o f S jiace a n d T im e . The fo rm er o f these s c i e n c e s is
P u ie L o g ic , th e sc ien ce w h ie h c o n s i d e r s t h e l a w s t o w liieli t h e
U iid e i's ta n d in g is n s t r i e t e d in its elab o rativ e o jieratio n s, w itlio n t
i n q u i r i n g w h a t i s l l i e o b j e c t , w l n i t is t h e m a t t e r , t o w l i i e l i t h e s e
o p eratio n s are iijip lie d . The l:itte r of th ese sciences is M a t l i e -
m aties, o r the sc ien ce o f Q u a n t i t y , w liich considers th e relations
o f "Jhiiie a n d S p a c e , w i t h o u t i m p i i r i n g w h e t l i e r t h e r e b e a n y a c t u a l
r e a l i t y in s jia c e o r t i m e . F o i'in a l t r u t h w ill, th e r e f o r e , b e o f tw o
k in d s, L o g ic al a n d M a tlie m a tic a l. L o g i c a l t r u t h is t h e h a r m o n y
o r agreeiiieiit o f o u r th o u g h ts w ith tlicm selv es
L o g ic a l T ruth. , , , , ,
a s i l i o n g l i t s , 111 o t l i e r w o i x l s , t l i e c o r r e s j i o n d e n e e
o f th o u g h t w ith th e u niversal la w s o f th in k in g . T hese law s are
t h e o b j e c t o f P u r e o r G e n e r a l L o g ie , a n d in t h e s e i t p la c e s t h e c r i
terio n o f tru th . T h i s c r i t e r i o n is, l i o w e \ ' c r , o n l y t h e n e g a t i v e c o n
d i t i o n o n l y t h e c o n d itio sine q u a nou, o f t r u t h . L o g i c a l t r u t h is
supposed ill s u p p o s i n g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f l l i o n g l i t ; fo r all t h o u g h t
p resen ts a com binatiini, th e e le m e n ts of w hich are re])ugiiant or
c o n g r u e n t, b u t w hicli cannot bc repugnant and congrnent at tlie
sa m e tim e. L o g ic m i g h t b c tr u e , a ltlio iig h w c ])ussesscd n o tr n tli
b e y o n d its riin d a n ie n ta l l a w s ; altlio u g li wy knew n o tliin g o f an y
real e x is te n c e b e y o n d th e fo rm al liy p o tlie sis o f its p o ssib ility .
H u t w e r e t h e L a w s o f L o g i e p u r e l y s u b j e c t i v e , t h a t is, w e r e t h e y
tr u e o n ly for o u r t h o u g h t a lo n e , a n d w i t h o u t a n y o b je c tiv e v a lid ity ,
"SO LOGIC. L ect. X X W L
all luiinaii soicnoo.s (and Aralheniatics am ong the rest) would be

juirely snbjoctive likew ise; for we are cognizant of objects only
nndei- the forms and rules of which Logic is the scientific develop
ment. I f the t)-nc ch a racter of objective validity he universality,
the laws of Logie are really o f th a t character, for these laws eon-
stiain u.s, by their own authority, to regard them as th e univeisal
laws not only o f hum an th o ught, b u t o f universal reason.
T h e ease is the same with the o th e r formal science, the science of
Q u antity, or Mathem atics, W ith o u t innniring
J l.a tlie r e a tie a lT n itli . . . .
into the reality o f existences, and w ith o u t bor
row ing from or a tlrib n lin g to them anything, A rithm etic, the science
o f Disei-ete Q uantity, creates its numbers, and Geom etry, th e science
o f Continnons Q uan tity , creates its fig ure s; and both opei'ate upon
these th eir objects in absolute in de pend e nce of all external actuality.
T h e tw o m athem atical sciences are d e p e n d e n t for th eir several
objects only on the notion o f tim e and the notion of space, no
tions u n d e r which alone m a tte r can he conceived as possible, for all
m a tte r supposes space, and all m a tte r is moved in space and in time.
B u t to the notions o f sjtaec and tim e the existence or non-existence
of m a tte r is indifferent; indifferent, coTisequently, to G eo m etry and
A rithm etic, so long a t least as th e y remain in the lofty regions of
])ui-e sjiecnlation, and do not descend to th e iiraetical application of
their jirineiples. I f m a tte r had no existence, nay, if space and time
existeil only in o nr minds, niathem aties would still he tr u e ; h u t
their tru th would he of a pu rely formal and ideal character,
would furnish us with no k n o w led ge o f objective realities.*
So much for F orm a l T ru th , u n d e r its tw o species of Logical and
Alathematical.
T h e other genus o f tr u th (th e end which th e Real Sciences
p r o p o s e ) is the harm ony betw een a th o u g h t
11. U ea l T r u th . , , o ,
and Its m atter. J he Real Sciences are those
R ea l and Form al determ in a te reality for their ob-
S c ieiicft-. . 1 , .
ject, and which are conversant .ahont existences
oth e r than th e forms of th o u g h t. T h e F orm al Sciences have ;i
sufierior certtiinty to the real ; for th e y are simjtly ide.al comhina-
lion^;. ami tln'V co n s tru c t th e ir objects w ithout im piiring about their
objective reality, d'he real sciences are sciences o f fact, for the
jifiint from which th e y d ep a rt is always a fact,
U n d e r th e R ea l S c l-
alw ays a presentation. Some of these rest on
enccH are iiic lu d id th e , p ip
presentations of Self-consciousncss, or the
M e n ta l and M a te r ia l.
facts of mind ; others on the jtresentations of
Sensitive P erception, or the facts of nature. T h e former are the
J C f. E sser, L o g ik , } 172 E d . [F r ie s , L ogik, ) 124.1

L k c t. XXVI I . .LOGIC. 381
jMt'iital Science.s, tlie latter the JMaterial. The facts of niiiul are
given partly as contingent, partly as necessary; the hitter the
necc.s.sary facls are universal virtually and in themselves; the
former the eontiiigeiit facts only obtain a fictitious universality
by a process o f generalization. The facts of nature, however n eces
sary in themselves, are given to us only as eoiitingent and isolated
pluenomena; they have, tlierefore, only that conditional, thatomjiir-
ical, generality, which we bestow on them by classification.
Real truth is, therefore, the eorres])OiHlcncc o f our tbonglits with
the existences wliicb constitute their objects
H o w can w e k n o w Blit liei'c a (lilliculty arises ; H ow can we know
th a t th e r e is a c o r re - there is, that there can be, such a corre-
r"umught anrits spo"Icnee ? All that we know o f the objects is
o b je ct? tliroiigli the presentations of our faculties; but
whether tltese pre.sent tbe objects as they arc in
theinsclvcs, we can never ascertain, for to do this it would be requi
site to go out o f ourselves, out of our faculties, to obtain a
knowledge of the objects by otlicr faculties, and thus to compare
our old presentations with our new. But all this, even were the
supposition possible, would be incompetent to aflford us tbe certainty
required. For were it possible to leave our old, and to obtain a
new, set of fiieiilties, by which to test the old, still the veracity of
these new faculties would be equally obnoxious to doubt as the
veracity o f the old. For what guarantee could we obtain for the
credibility in tbe one case, wliicb we do not already possess in tbe
other? The new faculties could only assert their own truth; but
tbis is done by the old ; and it is im])Os.sible to imagine any jiresen-
tations of the non-ego by any finite intelligenee, to which a doubt
might not be raised, wlietlicr these jiresentations were not merely
subjective modifications o f tbe eoiiseious ego itself. All tliat could
be said in answer to such a doubt is, that if such were true, our
whole nature is a lie, a siqiposition which is not, without the
strongest evidence, to be admitted ; and the arguineiit is as compe
tent against the skejitic in our present condition, as it would be were
we endowed with any other conceivable form o f Acquisitive and
Cognitive Faculties. But I am here trenching on what ought to be
reserved for an explanation o f the Criterion o f Truth.
Snell, as it ajipears to me, is the only rational division of Truth
Recording to the diflferent eharactor of tbe ob-
subdki<ioii'* j e c t s to wbieh thought is relative, into Formal
and into Real Truth. Formal Truth, as we
have seen, is subdivided into Logical and into Mathematical. Real
1 ruth might likewise be subdivided, were tbis requisite, into various
LOGIC. L f . c t . XXATI .
species. For ex.ainjde, Metaplivsical Trntli iniglit denote tlie hannon}-

o f thought with the necossaiy facts o f mind;
M e ta p liv s ic a l. Psychological Truth, the harmony of thought
contingent facts o f mind; and Physical
Truth, the harmony of thought with the phae-
nomcna of external experience.
It now remains to .say a word in regard to the confusion which
has been introduced into this subject, by the
V a r io u s a p p iic - t io u s groundless distinctions and contradictions of
o f th e ter m 7>I/1/|.
]iliiloso]ihers. Some have absurdly given the
name of truth to the mere reality o f existence, altogether abstracted
from any coiicciition or jiulginent relative to it, in any intelligence
human or divine. In this sense jd ig sic c d tr u th has been used to
denote the actual existence of :i tliiinjj. O Some have o"iven the name
o f m eta p h ysica l tru th to the congrnenco o f the thing with its idea
in the mind of the Creator. Otliers again have bestowed the name
o f m eta p h y sic a l tru th on the mere logical possibility of being
thought; while they have denominated h y loyic(d truth the meta-
jiliysical or physical corresjiondence of thonght with its objects.
Finally, the term m o ra l or ethical tru th has been given to veracity,
or the oorrespondeiice o f tliouglit with its exjuession. In this last
ease, truth is not, as in the others, employed in relation to thought
and its object, but to thought and its cnoiincemciit. So much for
the notion, and the jirincipal distinctions of Truth.
But, returning to the ]iaiagr:iph, I take the next clause, which is,
The Criterion o f truth is the necessity de-
Tbe C r ite r io n of tcrmiiied bv tbe laws which govern our faculties
T r u th . .
of knowledge ; and the consciousness of this
necessitv is certainty. That the necessity of a cognition, that is,
the impossihiliiy of thinking it other than as it is jiresented, that
thi necessity, as founded on the laws o f thought, is the criterion of
trnth. is shown by the circumstance that where sncli necessity is
fiiind, :dl flonbt in regard to tlie correspondence of the cognitive
thoucrht and its fihjcct must \'anish ; for to doubt wlietlier what we
ncci's'irily think in a crtain inanner, actually exists as we conceive
it, i'i notliing h'-^s than an ondea\or to think the necessary as the
not necessary or the iiii]iossible, which is contradictory.
What has jii'-t i ciai .s.aid also illnslrates the trnth o f tlie next sen
tence of the paragraph, viz., C(rtaiiity or the conscious necessity
o f a cocrnitioii abvolntely cxeliides the admission of any oppo.site
Mqipovition. When such is found to lie admissihle, doiiht .and iin-
cert.aiiity arise. This sentence reqiiii-ing iifi explanation, F ]>roceed
to the next viz., If wc consider tiulh by relation to the degree
L ect. X X V IL LCCIC. 383
and kind of Certainty, we have to distinguish Knowledge, Belief,

and Opinion. Knowledge and Belief differ not only in degree but
in kind. Knowledge is a certainty founded on intuition. Belief is
a certainty founded upon feeling. Tlie one is perspicuous and ob
jective, tlie other is obscure and subjective. Each, however, sup
poses the other, and an assurance is said to Ijc a knowledge or a
belief, according as the one element or the other preponderates.
In reference to tliis passage, it is necessary to say sometliiiig in
regard to the difference of Knowledge and Be-
K n o w ie d g e a n d B e- co m iu ou la n gu a ge the word B e l i e f is
M et. th e ir d iffe r en ce . T . , ^
often used to d en o te an interior d egree or cer-
ta intv. W e mav, how ev er, be equally certain
That tlie c e r ta in tv * . * , ,
o f a ll k iio w ie d -w is ^ f wljtit Ave believe as o f what Ave know , and it
u ifin ia te iy r e s o lv a b le liHs, iiot witlioiit giouiid, been maintained by
in to a c e r t o iiify o f B e - many pliilosoplicrs, both in ancient and in mod-
h e f, m a in ta in e d by times, that tlic certaiiitv of all knowledge is,
L u th e r . . . . . ' . .
, in its u ltim ate analysis, resolved in to a certainty
o f b e lie f A ll things, says Luther, stand in a belief, in a faith,
Avhieh Ave can neitlier see nor com prehend. T h e man Avho would
make these visible, manifest, and compreliensilile, has ve.xation and
heart-grief for bis reward. M a y the Lord increase B e l i e f in y ou
and ill others. * B u t y ou m ay perhaps think that the say in g o f
L uther is to be t.aken theologically, and tliat, jihilosophictilly co n
sidered, all b e lie f o u g h t to be founded on k n o w led g e, n ot all knoAvl-
ed g e in belief. B u t the same doctrine is lield even by those phi
losophers who are the least disposed to mysticism or blind faith.
A m ong these xVristotle stands distinguislied. l i e
A r is to tle . i
deh n es science, strictly so called, or the k n o w l
e d g e o f indubitable truths, merely by the in ten sity o f our c o n v ic
tion or stibjective assurance; and on ti primary and incomprelien-
sible b e lie f he bangs the wliole chain o f our comprelicnsible or
mcditite k n o w led ge. T h e doctrine Avhich has been called The P h i-
losophg o f Common Sm se, is tbc doctrine wbieli foiinds all our
k n o w led g e on b elief; :ind, tliongli this li.as n ot been signalized, the
doctrine o f (Common S en se is perli.aps b etter stated by the S tagirite
than hy any su cce ed in g thinker. W h a t , lie says, ajijiears to .all
men, that we ttffirm to be, and be w h o rejects this b elief (ttioti?) avIII
assuredly ad\ance noth ing b elter Avortby o f credit. T his jiass.age
is trom bis Xicomache<m E thics? B nt, in Ids Bliysical Treatises, be
founds in b elief tlie k n o w le d g e avc have o f tlie reality o f motion,
1 W tisheil, T h . iii. A b tli . 2. Q u o te d b y .Sir effect a re c ite d b y tlie A u lb o r , W orks,

A\' H a m ilt o n , R O d's 778. ICn. ]i. 771 E l).
2 A a r io u s p a ssa g e s fr o m A r is tn tle to tliis 2 B. x . c. 2. E d .
384 LOGIC. L ect. XXVIl.
and by this, as a source of k now ledge p ara m o u n t to the U n d e r s ta n d

ing, be supersedes the contradictions which are involved in oiir con
ception of motion, and which had so acutely been evolved by the
Kleatic Zeno, in order to show th a t motion was impossible.' In
like manner, in his Logical T reatises, A risto tle shows th a t the
jn'imary oi ultiimite principles of know ledge m ust be incom prehen
sible ; for if eompreliensiblc, th e y m ust be com prehended in some
higher notion, and this again, if no t itself incomprehensible, m ust
be again eoinjirehended in a still higher, and s o o n in a progress a d
v ifn itim i, which is absurd.- B u t w hat is given as an ultim ate and
incomprehensihlo principle of know ledge, is given .as a fact, the
e.xistence of which we m ust admit, b u t th e reasons o f whose e.vist-
cnce we can n o t know , we canno t understand . B u t such an a d
mission, as it is not a know ledge, m ust be a belief; and thus it is
that, according to A ristotle, all our k now ledge is in its root blind,
a ]assi\c faith, in oth e r words, a feeling. T h e same doctrine was
snbseqnently held by many o f the ac nte st think-
T h e r ia f o n i s ls . r * . ii
^ ^ ers of ancient times, more especially a m o n g the
P h ito n ists; and of these P roclus is perhaps the
philosopher in whose works the doctrine is turn ed to the best
account.' In m odern tim es we m ay trace it in silent operation,
tboiigh n ot c.xplicitly iiroclaimed, or placed as the foundation o f a
system. I t is found spontaneously recognized even by those who
m ight be siipjiosed the least likely to acknow l
edge it w ith o u t compulsion. Ilu m e , for e x a m
ple. a ga inst whose jihilosophy th e doctrine of Com m on Sense was
systematically arrayed, him self jiointed o ut the weapons by which
his adversaries subseipiently assailed his skepticism ; fur he himself
was possessed o f too much philosophical acuteness n o t to perceive
th a t tlie root o f know ledg e is belief. T hus, in his L iq u in j, he says
It seems e v id en t th a t men are carried by a natural instinct or
prepossession to repose faith in their se n s e s : ami that, w ith o u t any
reasoning, dv e \ c n almost before the use of reason, we always sup
pose ;iii e.xlenial universe which depen ds not on our jircceptiim, hut
would exist though wc and every sensible creature were absent or
annihilateil. IKeii the animal creation are governed by a like
opinion, and )>re>erve this belief, th e belief o f external objects, in
.all tbeir tlioiiglits. designs, and actions This very table,
wliieh we sec while, and which we feel hard, is believed to exist
I II. v iii. c . 8. S e e - Re id s W o r k s , T i t ) . 15u. 3 //t Plritoms T kenlogiam , i. c. 25. Q u o te d

- M 'i'ip h y s ., iii. ( iv .) 4. C f. A n al Post , i. 2, in R eid's Works, p. 770. K d.
i - Ed
L e c t. XXVII. LOGIC. 385
indejiondeiit of onr jierception, .and to be sonietliing cxtern.-d to our

mind wliioli perceives it. *
But, oil the other hand, tlie manifestation of this belief necessa
rily involves k n ow led ge; for we cannot believe
The mamfe.sfation without soiiie coiisciousncss or knowledge of
K novO ed ^ e the belief, and, consequently, without some con
sciousness or knowledge of the object o f the
belief. N ow , the immediate consciousness o f an object is called an
intuition, an insir/ht. It is thus impossible to
Intuition, \ihat. separate belief and knowledge, feeling and
intuition. They each suppose the other.
The consideration, liowever, o f the relation o f Belief and
Knowledge does not jiropcrly belong to Logie,
T h e q u e s tio n as to except in SO far as it is necessary to explain
th e r e la tio n o f B e l ie f . ^ z- m i
, , ,
a n d K n o w le d g e prop
the nature ot Iruth and Lrror. It is a to-
e r ly m e ta p h y s ic a l. gether a metaphysical discussion; and one of
tlie most difficult problems o f which M e ta
physics attempts the solution.
The remainder o f the paragrajih contains the statement o f cer
tain distinctions and the definition o f certain terms, which it was
necessary to signalize, but which do not require any commentary
for their illustration. The only jmrt that might liave required an
explanation is the distinction of Truth into Pure, or a prio r i, and
into Empirical, or a posteriori. The explanation o f this division
has been already given more than onee in the course o f the Lec
tures, but tlie following may now be added.
Experience presents to us only individual objects, and as these
individual objects might or might not have
Bure and Empirical come within oiir siihcre of observation, our
T ru th . * .
whole knowledge of and from these objects
might or might not exist; it is merely accidental or contingent.
But as our knowledge of individual objects affords the jiossibility,
as supjilyiiig the whole contents, of our generalized or abstracted
notions, our generalized or abstracted notions are, consequently, not
more necessary to thought, than the particular observations out of
which they are constructed. For example, every horse I have seen
I miglit not have seen ; and I feel no more necessity to think tlie
reality o f a horse than the reality of a hippogriff; I can, therefore,
easily annihilate in thought the existence of the whole species. I
can su])])osc it not to be, not to have been. The case is the same
1 Inquiry cnnrerning the H u m a n U nderstand- 2 S e e a b o v e . Lectures on M etaph ysics, p. 403

in g. se c t. 12. Philosophical IVoris, iv . p . 177 et seq. C f. E sser, L ogik, 4, 171. E d .
- Ed. [F r ie s , L o g ik , 5 124.]
43
386 LOGIC. L e c t. XXVJI.
with every other notion which is mediately or immediately the

datum o f ohservatiou. W e can think away each and every part
of the knowledge we have derived from exp erience; our whole
oinpirical knowledge is, therefore, a merely accidental jiossession
o f the mind.
Blit there are notions in the mind of a very different character,
notions which avc cauiiot but think, if Ave think at all. These,
therefore, are notions necessary to the mind; and, as necessary,
they cannot be the product of experience. For examjile, I perceive
something to begin to be. I feel no necessity to think that this
thing must be at all, but thinking it existent, I cannot but think
that it has a cause. The notion, or rather the judgment, o f Cause
and Effect, is, therefore, necessary to the miud. I f so, it cannot be
derived from experience.
LECTURE XXVIII.
M O D I F I E D S T O I C H E I O L O C t Y .
sec tio n I. d o c t r i n e of tr u th and error.
SECTION II. ERROR, ITS CAUSES AND REMEDIES.
A. GENERAL CIRCUMSTANCES SOCIETY.
I NOW proceed to the considerntion of the opjiosite of Tiuth,

pMTor, and, on tJiis subject, give yon the following jiaragrajd] ;
IF XCI. Error is opposed to Truth; and Error arises, 1,

P"roin the eoinimitation of wliat is Snbjec-
p a r . XCI. E r r o r , - tive witli what is Objcetive in tlionulit :
its character and tt i i- n n
sou rces. I roiii the Contradiction ot a sujijiosed
knowledge with its Laws; or, 3, From a
want of Adequate Activity in our Cognitive Faculties.
Error is to be discriminated from Ignorance, and from lUa-
sxon ; these, however, along with zVrbitrary Assninjition, ailbrd
the most frequent occasions of error.'
This paragraph consists of two parts, and these I sluill siicecs-

sively consider. The first is : Error is opposed
E x p lic .a t i o n . i i t-
to truth ; .and Error .arises, 1, From the com
mutation of what is snhjective with what is ohjeetive in thought;
2, J"roni the contradiction of a siijtjjosed knowledge with its laws;
ur, 3, P'roin a want of adequate activity in onr cognitive faculties.
In the first place, we have seen that Truth is the .agreement of
a thought with its ohjeet. Xow, as Error is the
E rro r, what
o])]>osite of trutli, Error innst necessarily con-
sist i;i a want of this agreement. In the second jilaee, it has been
I I'u c s lc ii, D U L n gik Jnshesotiflere d ie A n a ly tik . 308. 309. E d . [C f. K liiz , C om m enlariu s a t

S. ir)Uiu, e tc . D is p . x c ii . p. 925.]
oSS LOGIC. L e c t . X X V U l.
shown tliat the criterion or sta n d ard of tiiitli is the necessity

founded on tlie laws of onr cognitive faculties; and from this it
follows th a t the essential character of error must be, either th a t it
is not founded on these laws, or th a t it is rejm gnant to them . B u t
these tw o alternatives may be viewed as only o n e ; for inasmiieh as,
in th e foianer case, the ju d g m e n t remains undecided, and can make
no jiretciice to certainty, it m ay be th row n out of account no less
than in tho latter, where, as ]iositivcly con tra d icto ry of th e laws of
knowledge, it is necessarily false. O f these sta te m en ts the first,
th a t is, the n on-agree m ent o f a notion with its
As-Material. . -
object, IS error viewed on its material side ; and
:is a notion is the common ])roduct, th e jo in t result afforded by
the reeiprocal action of object and subject, it is evid en t th a t Avhat-
fv e r the notion contains n o t correspon dent to the object, m ust be a
contribution by the th in k in g subject alone, and wc are th u s w ar
ranted in saying th a t ^Material E r r o r consists in th e com m uting of
wliat is subjective with w h at is objective in tlionght ; in other
words, in m istaking an ideal illusion for a real representation. T h e
second of these statcmeiit.s, th a t is, the incon-
As Formal. . , i i
g n ie n ec of the supposed cognition witli tlic
laws of know ledge, is error viewed on its formal side. N o w here
ihe (piestion at once jircsents itself f lo w can an act of eognilioii
conlradiet its own l.aws? T h e answer is th a t it e a n n o t; and erroi,
when moi'c closely senitiiiized, is found not so
A ri- from iiic nu ich t o c o i i s i s t ill t l i c (o n t r a d i c t o r y a c t i v i t y ( i f
\oiit i.i ai.tqi.jioac- cognitive faculties as in their w an t of act'.\ -
liviiv o f the ( 'ogiii- '
tive Faculties. A nd lliis may lie in consequence o f one or
ipv.
other of tw o eanst's. F o r it m ay arise from
some other mental power, the will, for c.xample, s u p e rse d in g ,
t:ikiiig the ]ilaec ofj the defective eogiiition, or, by its inte n se r fort e,
tu rn in g it aside and leading it to a false resu lt; or it may arise from
-OHIO w ant of relative perfection in the object, so th a t th e cognitive
faculty is not d elerm ined liy it to th e reciiiisite d egree o f action.
" W h a t is actually thou ght, eannot but be correctly tbouglit.
E r r o r first eom menees when th ink in g is rem itted, and can in fact
(jidv gain admission in virtue o f the truth which it c o n tain s ;
e v e r y error is .a perverted truth, lie n e e D e.seartes' is justified in
the estalili-hiiieiil of the ].iiiiciple, th a t wc Avould never ad m it
the fal'C f or the true, if we would only give assent to w h a t we
ele:irlv and distinctly a|)prehend. Nihil nos nmiutim falsnm pro
v e l d :(diiiis>uros, si t:iiiluiii iis assensiun jinebeainiis, (pue clarc ct
1 P rin cip ia Philo.%ophi<p., i. 43. CT- iv . D e Vero et F aiso.

L k c t . X X V I IT . LOGIC. 389
(listincte percipirmis. In this view thc saying of thc R om an

po et
N n m n e q u e d e c ip itu r ratio , nec decipit u iiq u a in , ^
is no longer a paradox ; for the condition o f error is n o t the

a ctiv ity o f intelligence, bnt its inactivity.
So much for the first jiart of the paragraph. T h e second is
E rr o r is to be discriminated fi-oin Ignorance and
E rror d is c r im in a te d fcom Illusion, wliich, liowcvor, along with A rb i
trary Assumption, afford the usual occasions of
E rr o r .
Ignorance is a mere negation, a mere n o t-k n o w led g e; whereas
in error there lies a positive iiretence to know l-
Ig n o ra n ce.
etlge. H e n c e a representation, lie it imperfect,
he it even w ith o u t any correspondent objective reality, is not in
it s e lf nn error. T h e im agination o f a hippogriff is not in itse lf
false ; the Orlando F nrioso is n ot a tissue o f errors. Error only
arises when w e attribute to th e creations o f our minds som e real
object, by an assertory j u d g m e n t ; w e do n ot err nnd d ece iv e either
ourselves or others, when Ave bold and enounce a subjective or
problem atic siipjiosition o n ly for Avhat it is. Ignorance, no*^
knoAvledge, how ever, leads to error, Avlien Ave either regard the
unknown as non-existent, or Avhen Ave falsely fill it np. T h e latter
is, hoAvevcr, as much the result o f W ill, o f arbitrary assumption, ns
o f ignorance ; and, frequently, it is the result o f both together. In
general, th e will lias no inconsiderable share in the a ctiv ity b y
Avliich k n o w led g e is realized. T h e will has not im m ed ia tely an
intlnence on onr ju d g m en t, but m ed ia te ly it has. A tte n tio n is an
act o f volition, and attention furnishes to the U n d e r sta n d in g the
elem en ts o f its decision. T h e will determ in es Avhether Ave shall
carry on onr investigation.s, or break them off, co n tent Avith thc first
apparent probability; and Avhether Ave shall apjily onr observations
to all, or, o n ly partially, to certain, m o m enta o f determination.
T h e occasions o f Error which lie in those qualities o f P resen tr-
_ tion, R ejircsentation, and T h o u g h t arising from
the conditions and influences o f the thin k in g
subject itself, are ealled Illusio7is. B n t the ex istence o f illusion
does not necessarily inqily the ex isten ce o f error. Illusion becom es
error o nly Avbcn Ave attribute to it objective truth ; Avhereas illusion
is no error Avhen Ave regard the fallacious njipearance as a mere sub
jec tiv e affection. In (lie j.anndice, wc see ev ery tb iu g tinged with
yelloAV, in consequence o f the suffusion o f the ey e Avith bile. In
1 T w e ste n , L o g ik , 308. E d . 2 M a n iliu s , i i. 131 Ed.

390 LOGIC. L ect. X X V U l
this case, tlie yellow vision is illusion ; and it would hecoino error,
were we to suiipose th a t the ohjects we perceive were really so col
ored. All the jiowers which cooperate to llie loniiatioii of oiii
judgnieiits, may hecome the sources of illusion,
Its so u r c es. * , , , r
and, consequently, the occasions of error. T h e
Senses,* the P rc s e n ta tiv e Faculties, E x te rn a l and In tern al, the
Representative, the R e tentive, the R e productive, and the E lah-
oralive. Facilities, are imm ediate, the F eelings aud the Desires
are m ediate, sources o f illusion. T o these m u st he added the
F a c u lty of Signs, iu all its actual manifestations in language.
Hciice we speak of seiisihle, psychological, moral, aud syuiholical,
Ulusioii. 1 1 1 all these relations th e causes of illusion are partly
general, p artly p a rtic u la r; nnd though th e y pro xim ately manifest
themselves in some one or other o f these lorms, th e y m ay ulti-
ni.-itcly he found contained in the circiimstaiiees hy Mliich the
uiuiilal ch a racter o f the iiidiviilual is coiiforiucd. T akin g, th e re
fore, a general view of all th e jiossihle Sources of E rro r, I th ink
they may he reduced to th e following classes, which, as they consti
tu te the heads nnd d eterm in e th e o rd e r of the ensuing diseussioii, I
shall comjirise in the following paragrajdi, with which conimenees
the coii.Nideratioii of the Second Clinjiler of Modified Logic. Be-
thie, however, jiroceeding to consider these several classes in tlieir
order, I may ohseiwe th a t Bacon is the first plii-
Bacoii s cia--.oiica- losojilicr AvIio atteiiijitcd a system atic eniimera-
IiDii o f i h e s o u rc e s o f . ^ 9 - 1 1 .
lion or th e various sources of error;'* and his
quaint classification o f these, u n d e r th e signifi-
c:iiit name o f idols, into the four g en e ra o f Idols of tlie T rihe {idola
triljHs), Idols of the Den {idola sptcas). Idols of the F o r u m {idola
f o r i ) , wllicll may mean either the market-jilace, the har, or th e
Jilace of jnihlic nssemhly, nnd Idols of the T h e a tr e {idola theatri),
he thus hriefly eliaracteii/.es.
X C I I . T h e Causes nnd Occasions of E r r o r are com pre

hended in one or other of the four follow-
P a r . X C II. E r r o r ,- c la S S C S . F o i t ll C V ai'O fo lliu l c it lie i', 1,
ils l o u r c e i . o v i r
the General Circiim.staiices which m o d

III
ify llie iiitellecTual character o f the individual ; or, 2, Iu tbe
1 I.a Kontaiiic-. Si-p .Mnziirc, Coiirs de Phi- ghroD t. Cest ce quc La Fontaine a tri-8 bien
leiijihie. ii 241 c ro iilo '- If* (ciciiccH i ia l u r - t'X ]iriiii6 d a n s Ics veiH s u i v a n t ;
o l l i s i.c i-ont a n t ic clio r c q u ' u n c ;;iicrre ou-
V. ,t c rle la ra i-o ii c o n lr c Ics ilc c c iilio n .s d c la
I |. . . . 1 - ...
-**n-ib 111.;...................c c -t a d i r e , q u c II ch o n l
. (1reuse,* e tc . E d .
p ou r o b jc l d c rtftH-nicr Ics crrciirK d c 1 1 08 .'eii.s, 2 (T w o stc n , .309, p p . 288. 289. Cf

c* d c f.i]b O iiiicr Ics ri'cililcs d c la s c ie n c e a u x S iji'v a r 1, jLog-it;, 184, 48.5.J
a p p a r e n c c s f a c lic c s q u e n o s t e n s n o u s b u g - li N o vu m O rganu m , I A p h . x \ x i x . E d .
L ect, X X V III, LOGIC. 391
Constitution, Habits, and liecijirocnl Relations'of bis po'veis

of Cognition, beeling, and Desire ; or, 3, In tbe Language
which he emjiloys, as an Instrument of Thought and a iMedium
of Communication ; or, 4, In the nature of the Objects them
selves, about which his knowledge is conversant.
XCIII. Under tbe General Circumstances wbicb modify

tbe character of tbe individual, are eompre-
Par. xciii. I. Gen. jo 'pp^ particular degree of Culti-
eral circumstances 5 \ ^ ^
which modify the vatiou to wliifli liis iiatioii lias attained ;
character of the indi. ,.,ieMiess, the iiai'tiality of its civili-
vidual. L
zation, and its over-retinement are all mani
fold occasions of error; and tbis cultivation is e.xpressed not
merely in tbe state of the arts and sciences, but in the degree
of its religious, political, and social advancement; 2 . The
Stricter Associations, in so far as these tend to limit the free
dom of thought, and to give it a one-sided direction ; such
are SeliooLs Seels, Orders, Exclusive Societies, Corporations,
Castes, etc.'
In the eommene>'inent of the Course, I had occasion to allude to

the tendency there is in man to assimilate in
E x p lic a t io n . M an oiiiiiions and habits o f th o u g h t to those with
b y n a tu r e .'o c ia l, a n d , , at i ^ ^ i
in flu e n c e d by th e "'I'O'" ""t'lre, iiot merely
by accidental necessity, a social being. For
o p j u u ii.> o f b is f e llo w s .
only in society does be find the conditions

wbicb his different faculties require for their due development and
application. But society, in all its forms and degrees, from a fam
ily to a State, is only possible under the condition of a certain har
mony of sentiment among its members; and as m:in is by nature
destined to a social existence, be is by nature determined to that
analogy of thought and feeling wbieh society suppose.s, and out of
which society springs. There is thus in every association, great
and small, a certain gravitation of opinions towards a common
centre. As in our natural body every part has a necessary synijiathy
with every other, and all together form, by their harmonious con
spiration, a healthy whole; so, in the social body, there is always a
strong jiredisposition in each of its members to act and think in
unison with the rest. This universal sympathy or fellow-feeling i.s
the principle of the different spirit dominant in different ages,
countries, ranks, sexes, and periods of life. It is the cause why
fashions, why jiolitical and religious enthusiasm, why moral example
1 B ac lim an u , L o g ik , 402, 403. E d . 2 See L ectures on M eta p h ysics, p. 59. E d .

392 LOGIC L e c t . XXVITI.
citlior for good or evil, .spread so rajiidly an 1 oxcrt so jiowerfnl an

intluenco. As men are natiiially jirone to im itate others, they, con
sequently, regard as impoiTant or insignifie.ant, as honorable or dis
graceful, as true or false, as good or bad, wliat those .around them
consider in the same light.'
O f tlie various testim onies I formerly qnot(d. of the stro n g as
sim ilating inflncnee o f man on man, and o f tlie
1 !i>cai q u o te d on the custom to m ake that appear true, mat-
p o w c i o f cn.'to m . . . . . .
urn], and necessnry, wliicli in reality is false, nn-
natural, and only accidentally suitable, I shall only addiiee th a t o f
Pascal. In tlie j u s t and the mijiist, says he, we find hardly a n y
th in g whieh does not change its d i a m e t e r in ch anging its climate.
T h re e degrees o f an elevation o f th e pole reverses the whole of
jnrisjiiaideuco. A meridian is decisive o f truth, and a few years, o f
jiossessiun. F u n d a m e n ta l laws change. R ig h t lias its epochs. A
pleasant jnsiice whieh a river or a momitain lim its! T ru th on this
side the Pyrenees, error on the oth e r I It is tlie rem ark of an in
genious jdiilos.ijiher, th a t if we take a survey o f the universe, all
nations will be found a d m irin g only the relled io n o f th eir own
qualities, and euntenining in others w h atev er is c o n tra ry to w hat
they are aeeustomed to m eet with am o ng themselves. H ere is the
Englishinaii accusing th e F re n ch o f f riv o l ity ; and here the F r e n c h
man reproaeliing the Englislinian with selfishness and brutality.
Here* is the A ra b jiersuaded o f the infalliliility of Jiis Calijih, and
derid in g the T a r t a r who believes in the im m ortality of the G rand
Lama. In every nation we find the same congratulation of their
own wisdom, and the same eoiitemjit of th a t o f th e ir neighbors.
W e r e there a sage sent down to earth from heaven, who regn-
late<l his c ond uc t by tlie dictates o f |)iire reason alone, this sage
would be universally reg a rde d as a fool. l i e would be, as Socrates
says, like a physician accused by the pastry-cooks, before a tribunal
of chihlren, o f prohibiting th e e a tin g o f ta rts and cheese-cakes; a
crime luidoubteclly o f th e h ig h e st m ag n itu d e in the eyes o f his
judges. Ill vain would this sage sujiport his opinions by the clear
est a r g u m e n ts , th e m ost irrefragable tle m o n stra tio n s; th e whole
world would be for him like th e nation o f liuncbbacks, am ong
whom, as the Imlian fabulists relate, tliere once upon a tim e ap
peared a god, young, beautiful, and o f coiisnminate sy m m etry. T his
god, they add, entere<l the ca pital; he was th e re forthw ith sur
rounded by a crowd o f n ativ es ; his figure appeared to th e m extra-
I (M e in e r s, U ntcrsuchungrn M rr die D enk- 2 p a r tie i. a r t. V). ( 8 ( v o l. ii. p 126, e d

k rd fu unde \Vm>nskrnfle des M ensehen, ii. 322.] F a u g e r e ). C o m p . L t d . on M eta p h ysics, p. 60
L e c t. XXVIII. LOGIC. 393
ordinary; langliter, liooting, and taunts manifested tlieir astonish

ment, and they were about to carry tlieir outrages still further, had
not one of the inliabitants (who had undoubtedly seen other men),
in order to siiateh him irom the danger, suddenly cried out INTy
friends! my friends! W h at are we going to do? Let us not insult
this miseralile monstrosity. I f heaven has bestowed on us the gene
ral gift of beauty, if it has adorned our backs with a mount of
fiesh, let ns with pious gratitude repair to tlie temple and render
oiir aeknowlodgmeiit to tlie immortal gods. This fable is the his
tory of luiman vanity. Every nation admires its own defects, and
contemns the opposite qualities in its neighbors. To succeed in a
country, one must be a bearer o f the national hump of the people
among whom lie sojourns.
There are few jiliilosophers who undertake to make their coiiiitry-
luen aware o f the ridiculous figure they cut in
I h e a r t o f d o u b tin g the cvc o f reason ; and still fewer the n a ti o n s
w e ll d iffic u lt to te a c h , * , , , , . . .
and (o icani profit by tlic advico. All are so
punctiliously attaclied to the interests o f their
vanity, that none obtain in any country the name of wise, except
tliose who are fools o f tlie common folly. There is no opinion too
absurd not to find nations ready to believe it, and individuals
prompt to be its executioners or its martyrs. Hence it is tliat tlie
philosojiher declared, that if he hold all trutlis sliut up within liis
hand, he would.take es])ecial care not to show them to his fellow-
meii. In fact, if the discovery of a single truth dragged Galileo lo
the prison, to what ]ninisliiiient would he not be doomed who sliould
discover all ? A m on g those who now ridicule the folly of the human
intellect, and are indignant at the persecution of Galileo, there are
few who would not, in the age o f that philosopher, have clamored
for his death. They would then liave been imbued with difierent
opinions; and ojiinions not more passively adopted than those
wliieh they at [iresent vaunt as liberal and en lig h ten ed ,^ T o learn
to doubt of our opinions, it is siifiieient to examine the powers of
the liuinaii intellect, to survey the circumstances by which it is af
fected, and to study the liistory o f liunian follies. Y e t in modern
Europe six centnries elapsed from the foundation of Universities
until the appearance o f that extraordinary man, I mean D e s
cartes, whom his age first ]icrseciiled, and then almost worship
ped as a demi-god, for initiating men in the art of d oubting, of
doubting well, a lesson at wliich, however, both tbeir skepticism
and credulity show that, after two centuries, they are still but awk
ward scholars. Socrates Avas Avont to say All that I know is
50
394 LOGIC. L e c t. XXVIll
tliat I kn o w iiolliiiig. In our age it Avonkl seem that men k n ow

e v erv tliiiig e xce p t wliat Socrates knew . Our errors w ould not be
so frequent were we less ig n ora n t; aud our igiiorauce more curable,
did we n et b elieve ourselves to be all-wise.
T im s it is that the iiitlueuco o f S o ciety , both iu its general form
o f a S ta le or N a tio n , and in its particular forms o f Schools, Sects,
etc., (lelermiiies a uiiiltitm le o f oi>inioiis in its mem bers, Avliicli, as
th ey are passively received, so th e y are often a ltog eth er erroneous.
^Viiioiig the more general and iiillueiitial o f th ese there are tw o,
, .. which, th oagh aiiiiarcutly contrary,j i are, i how-
I w o {{vi H' ni l l o r n i s .
ofihu iiiHueiice ofu.x- cvei, boili, ill reality, fouiidcd on the same iu-
ouipie. e.apaeity o f in d ep en d en t th ought, on the same
1 . rnjiidice in fa inlluciice o f exaiuiile, I mean the ex cessive
\ o r o f I l n; O l d . . . . , , , , . , .
admiration or the Uld, ami th e ex cessiv e a d m i
ration o f the N e w . T h e former o f these jircjiidiccs,' under Avhich
may be reduced the jirejudiee in favor o f A u th ority , was at one
lim e ]revalent to an e x te n t o f Avhich it is difficult for us to form a
conception. T h is prejudice is jirepared b y the very ed u cation not
o n ly which Ave do, but Avliich Ave all m ust re-
Ir tp a r c d bv E d u c a - * m i i i i ..i
lion
c o nê . I h e eliihl iiecessa n iv learns ev er y th in ^g
at first oil credit, he believes upon authority.
I>nt Avlieii the rule o f authority is once e.stahliahed, the habit o f pa s
sive acfpiieseence and b e lie f is form ed, and, once formed, it is uot
ag.aiii alw ays easily tlirowii offi. W lie u th e child Ijas grow n uji to
ail age in which he m igh t e m p lo y his oavii reason, he has acquired a
large stock o f id eas; hut w ho can calculate the iniiiihcr o f errors
which thi.s stock co n ta in s? ami hy w h at means is he able to di.s-
eriiiiimite the true from the false? His mind has been formed to
obcflieiice and iiiiim |iiiry ; he jiossesses no criterion by which to
j u d g e ; it is p.ainfiil to su sp ect w h at has been long venerated, and it
is fell even :is a kind o f personal inntilatioii to tear uji Avhat has be-
(jiiie iiT.fîcated in bis iiilclleetnal and moral being. P o n e r e d i f f i
c ile c s t ijiiip j d a c a c r e d i n . T h e adult d ocs not, therefore, often j u d g e
for h im self more than the child ; and the tyranny o f authority ami
foregone ojiiiiioii co n tin u es to ex ert a sw a y during the w h ole course
o f his life. Ill our infiiiiey and childhood the credit accorded to our
parents uiid iii.xlrnclors is im p licit; and if w h a t avo have learned
fr<mi them be confirmed b y wliat we bear from others, the opinions
I r i a l o . Apnl . i> 2 .3 . E l). ft lies PrrjMgfs rJpam lus d a n s la Sncietc, I a ris.

(O n I rvjiiilic*- in (.'iii-ral h-o tlic Ib llo w m K 1810181.3, 3 v o ls. 8 v o . .1. L. C a s tillo n , E ssa i
workM i Iliim arK am , AVvii sur Us Ierjugiis, sur Us Erreurs et Us su p erstitio n s Anciennes et
D > -w f<l , I'arif*. 1822. E rn m e n d e l ' E smii sur M iid irn ts. A m feterdam . 1"<).5; I a r is, 1767. S ir
Us P rrju grs. I'cr). 1777 PUsni ,iir Us rrej,i:;rs, TIioiiiaH lir o w ii, Vulgar Errors. U l a n v i l, Es-
N c u c b 'ile l, 179)j. J . 15 .Siil<|iic, O'S Err-urs .says.]
L e c t. XXVIII. LOGIC. 395
thus recominciKled liecoine at Ic'iigtli staiiqied in .dniost indelible

eharaeters upon the mind. T his is the e:uise why men so rarely
abandon the opinions which vulgarly jjass eiirreiit; and why what
comes as new is by so many, for its veiy novelty, rejected as false.
A n d hence it is, as ali-eady noticed, th a t tr u th is :is it were g eo
graphically and politically distributed ; w h at is tru th on one side
of a boun dary being error and absurdity on the other. W h a t has
now been said o f the influence of society at large, is true also of the
lesser societies whieh it contains, all o f which inqiose with a stron ger
or feebler, a w ider or more contracted, authority, certain received
opinions upon the faith of the members. Jle n ce it is th a t w h atev er
has once obtained a recognition in any society, large or small, is not
rejeeled when th e reasons on whieh it was originally adm itted
ha\ e been jiroved erroneous. I t continues, even for the reason that*
it is old and has been accepted, to be accepted s till; and the title
whieh w:;s originally defective, becomes valid by continuance and
jireseription.
Blit oi>]-)osed to this cause o f error, from the prejudice in favor of
the Old, there is th e other, directly the reverse,
2. r r e j u d ic r ill fa v o r * t i rr.,
o f th e N e w projiidiec in favor ot the N ew . This
prejudice nniv be, in ]inrt :it letist, the result of
synquithy :uul fellow-feeling. T his is the cause why new opinions,
how ever erroneous, if th e y once obtain a certain n u m b e r o f con
verts, often spread with a rapidity and to an extent, which, after
their futility has been u ltim ately shown, can only be explained on
the principle o f :i kind o f intelleetiial eonttigion. B u t the principal
cause of the prejudice in favor of novelty lies in th e Passions, and
the eonsider.ation of these does not belong to the class o f causes
with which wo arc at present occiqiied.
Connected with and comjiosed of both these prejudices, th a t in
f iv o r of the old and th a t in favor o f the n e w ,
P r o jiid ice o f L e a r n e d ,i . t / t i . . .
there is the jirejudice of L earned A u t h o r i t y ;
for this is nsnnlly associated with the jircjndices
o f Schools and Sects. A s often as men have ajipeared, who, by the
force of their genius, have opened up new views of science, and thus
contributed to the progress of human intellect, so often have thev,
likewise, afforded the occasion of checking its advancem ent, and of
tiiriiiiig it from the straig h t ]>:ith o f im provem ent. N o t th a t this
result is to be iinjmted as a reproach to them, b u t sinqily because it
is of the nature ot man to lie so affected. T h e views w hich influ
enced these men o f genius, and whieh, consequently, lie at the
foundation of their works, arc rarely conqirehended in their to ta lity
by those who have tho nam es o f these authors most frequently in
oPo LOGIC. L e c t . XXVIII.
th e ir nioiitlis. T h c ninnv do not concern tlicniselvcs to seize the

ideal which a jihilosuphcr contem plated, and of which his actual
works are only the imperfect r e p r e s e n ta tio n s ; th e y apjn opriate
to themselves only some o f his d etached apothegm s and proposi
tions, and o f these compound, as th e y best can, a sort of system
suited to tbeir understanding, and whicll they cmjiloy as a talisman
in their controversies with others. A s their reason is thus a cajitive
to niitliority, and, therefore, unable to exert its native freedom, they,
consc'juently, catch up the true and thc fiilse w ith o u t discrimina
tion, aud remain always at th c jioint o f progress where they liad
heen placed by th eir leaders. In their hands a system of li\in g
tru th s liceomcs a mere jietrilied o rg an ism ; and they require that the
whole science shall become as dead and as cold as their own idol.
.Snell was P lato 's doctrine in the hands o f the P lato n ists ; sueh was
A ristotles jtiiilosojihv in the hands of th c Sehoolnicn ; and the his-
toiy of m odern systems atlbrds equally thc same result. '
So nmeh for the first genus into which the Sources o f E r r o r are
divided.
1 i ia c b m a n n , L o g ik , 404, p . 550. E d .
LECTURE XXIX.
M O D I F I E D S T O I C H E I O L O G Y .
SE C T IO N II. E R R O R I T S CAUSES AND R E M E D IE S
A. GENERAL CIRCUMSTANCES SOCIETY.
B. AS IN POWERS OF COGNITION, FEELING, AND DESIRE.
1. AFFECTIONS PRECIPITANCY SLOTH HOPE AND FEAR

SELF-LOVr:.
In o u r last L ectu re, w e en tered on th e co n sid eratio n of th e

vai-ions s o u r c e s o f E r r o r . T hese, I sta te d , m ay
R e c a p itu la tio n , i i
lie e o n v e i i i e i i t l y r e d u c e d t o I'oui- h e a d s , a n d c o n
s i s t , 1. I n t l i e G e n e r t d C i r c u m s t a n c e s w l i i c h m o d i f y t h e i n t e l l e c t u a l
ch aracter o f th e in d iv id u al; 2. I n tlie C o n stitu tio n , Ila h its , and
K eeiprocal R e la tio n s of his jio w ers of C ognition, F eelin g , and
D esire; 3. I n t l i e L a n g u a g e w h i c h li e e m p l o y s a s a n Iiistrn m eiit
of Thought and a M e d iu m of C o m m u n ieatio n ; a n d , 4. I n tlie
n atu re of the O b jects th e m s e lv e s a b o u t w h ic h his k n o w le d g e is
c o n v ersa n t.
O f these, I then gave yon a general view o f the nature of those
occasions oI Error, which oi'iginate in the circumstances under the
iiifiuence of which the character and ojiinions of man are deter
mined for him as a member o f society. Under this head I stated,
that, as man is destined by his Creator to fulfil the end o f hia
e.xisteiice in society, he is wisely furnished with a disjiosition to
imitate those among whom his lot is east, and thus conform himself
to whatever section of human society he may by birth belong, or
of which he may afterwards become a member. The education we
receive, nay the very possibility o f receiving education at all, siiji-
])Oses to a certain extent the passive infusion o f foreign and tradi
tionary opinions. For as man is comjielled to think much earlier
than he is able to think for himself, all education necessarily
imposes on him many ojiinions which, whether in themselves true
COS LOGIC. L ect. X X IX .
o r f al se, a r c , i n r e f e r e n c e t o t h e r c c i i > i e n t , o n l y p r c j n d i c o s ; a n d i t is
e v en o n ly a small n u m b e r o f m a n k i n d wlio at a later jieiiod are
. abl e t o bi i n g t l i c s c o b t r u d e d o p i n i o n s t o t h e t e. st o f r e a s o n , a n d by
a free exercise o f tlieir o w n intelligence to reject tlient if found
false, o r t o a c k n o w l e d g e t l i c n i i f p r o v e d t r u e .
Bnt while the mass o f m a n k in d thus remain, du rin g tbeir whole
l i v e s , o n l y t h e c r e a t u r e s o f t b c a c c i d c n t . a l c i r c n m s t n n c e s wl i i c l i l i at ' C
coiicuriaul t o f o rm f o r t l i c ni t h e i r h a b i t s a n d b el ii d's; t li e f e w w h o
a r e at l a s t a i d e t o f o r m o j i i n i o n s f o r t l i c m s c l v c s , a r e still d e p e n d e n t ,
in a great nieasiire, on tlie uni-easoniiig j u d g m e n t of tbc many.
Public Opinion, l i o r c d i t a r y c u s t o m , d e s p o t i c a l l y im])ose on ns the'
cajiricious laws of prujiricty and maimers. The individual may
ji oss ibl y, in m at t c i - s o f s c i e n c e , e m a n c i p a t e l i i m s e l f f r o m t b e i r s e r v i
tude; ill t h e at l i i i r s o f l i f e b e m u s t q u i e t l y s u b m i t l i i i n s e l f t o tlu*
yoke. Tlie only freedom he can here ])rndeiitly m a n i f e s t , is t o
resign l i i i n s e l f w i t h a c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h a t li e is a s l a v e n o t t o r e a s o n
but to c o n v e n t i o n a l accident. A n d w h i l e lie co n f oi an s h i m s e l f t o
t h e u s a g e s o f his o w n so c i e t y , h e will b e t o l e r a n t t o t h o s e o f otliers.
In tliis r e s p e c t h i s maxim will be tliat o f the Scylliian jirince :
W i t h y o u s u c h m a y b e t h e c u s t o m , w i t h n s i t is d i f f e r e n t .
So mncb f o r t l i e g e n e r a l n a t u r e o f t li e i nf ln-
Aieaiis by wbicb Die o u c c t o wl i i c l i WC a r e c x p o s c d fio m t h e c i r c i i m -
influeiice of .ocietv, as i o - 4. i
, s t a n c e s o f S o c i e t y ; it n o w r e m a i n s t o s a v w li at
a source of error, .
may be counteracted ti'e t l i c n i c a n s b v wl i i c l i t l i i s i n f l u e n c e , a s a
so u rce o f error, m a y be e o n n t e r a c t e d .
It has been seen t h a t , in c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h e m a n n e r in wl i i c h
o n r o i > i n i on s a r e f o m i c d f o r n s b y t h e a c c i d e n t s
N ecfs.sa ry t o in s ti- s oc iet y, oiir iii ipose d a n d siipjiosed k n o w l e d g e
tu tc a c r itic a l e .x a in in - J i ii ,i i it
IS a c o n f u s e d m e d l e v ol t r u t h s a n d e r r o r s . Here
alioii ol Ibe conleiils
o f o u r k iio w k d ^ o -. i t is cAi d e n t l v neces'âry to institute a ci -iti cal
e x a m i n a t i o n o f t li e c o n t e n t s o f tliis k n o w l e d g e .
I l e s e i i r t e s p r o j i o s c s t h a t , in o r d e r t o d i s c r i m i n a t e , a m o n g o n r p v e j u -
diced o] )i ii i oii s. t l i c t r u t h s f r o m t h e e r r o r . s w e o u g h t t o c o m m e n c e
Iiy doubting al l . ' This has exposed him to r ni icli fihloquy and
c l a m o r , I nit m o s t unjustly. T h e doctrine of Descartes has nothing
skcjitical o r o f l c n s i v e ; for h e o n l y m a i n t a i n s
i f s c a n e s - b i p r t - I j c h o o v e s n s t o e x a m i n e all t h a t h a s
' been inenleated on ns fro m i n f a n c y , ai nl u n d e r
the mas t e^^ t o w h o s e antliority we have been s u b j e c t e d , wdt l i t h e
sr i i ne a t t e n t i o n and circninsjieetion wl i i cl i wo accord to dubious
fpicstions. In fact tliere is n o t h i n g in t h e jireccpt o f D escartes,
whir-h had not been jnvvioiisly enjoined by other pliilosopliers.
1 D iscours de la M rth o d e, P artie ii. E d.

Lect. XXIX. LOGIC, 399
O f these I formerly quoted to you sever.al, and am ong others the

rem arkable testim onies o f A ristotle, St. A ugustin, an d L ord Bacon.'
B u t although th ere be noth in g reprehensible in th e jirecept of
Descartes, as enounced by him, it is of less prac-
C o n d ifio n s w h ic h u tility in conseqiieiice of no account being
m o d if y its a p p lic a - , / i i i t i
jjpjj taken ot the circnmstances wliicli condition and
moilify its application. For, in the first jdace,
the jiu lg m en ts to be exam ined o u g h t no t to be taken at random,
bu t selected on a principle, and arranged in due order and d ep e n d
ence. B u t this requires no ordinary ability, and the distribution of
things into th e ir jiroper classes is one o f the last and most difficult
fruits of pliilosopliy. I n the second jilace, there are am ong our
prejudices, or prete n d ed cognitions, a g re a t many h asty conclusions,
the investigation of which requires m uch profound th o u g h t, skill,
and acquired knowledge. N ow , from both o f these considerations,
it is evident th a t to com mence philosophy by sftch a review, it is
necessary for a man to be a philosojiber before he can a t te m p t to
become one. T h e p recept o f D escartes is, therefore, eith er u n rea
son,able, or it is too unconditionally expressed. A n d tins la tte r
alternative is true.
Wh.at can be rationally required of th e s tu d e n t o f philosophy, is
A grad u al and pro-
not a 'iirelimiiiarv^
and absolute,' b u t a ogradual
g r e s s iv e a b r o g a t i o n o f progressive abrogation, of prejudices. I t
p r e ju d ic e s a ll t lia t c a n can oiily bc required o f him, tha t, wlicii, ill th e
b e r e q u i r e d o f tlie s tu - cOlirsC of llis Study o f pllilosopliy, lie lllCetS witll
d e n t o f p llilo s o p liy . . . i i i i i i
a projiosition winch has n o t been already suffi
ciently sifted , (w h e the r it has been elaborated as a jirinciple or
ad m itte d as a conclusion), he should pause, discuss it w ith o u t
prepossession, and hiy aside for future consideration all th a t has not
been subjected to ;i searching scrutiny. T h e precejit of Descartes,
when rightly explained, corresiionds to th a t of St. Paul: I f any
man am ong you seemetli to be wise in this world, let him become ;i
fool, th a t he may be w i s e ; th a t is, let him not rely more on the
ojiinioiis in which he has been b ro u g h t uj), and in favor of whicli he
and those around him are jirejudiced, than on so m.any visions of
iiiiagination ; and let him exam ine them with the same circumspec
tion as if he were assured th a t th e y contain some tr u th am ong
much falsehood and m a ny extravagances.
P ro c ee d in g now to th e second chiss of th e Sources o f F rror,
X S e e Lect. on M etaphysics, p. QS ft seq. E d . is , w ith g o m e s lig h t c h a n g e s , ta k e n fro m

2 1 C or. iii IS. C r o u sa z , L ogique, t. i ii ., p a r t ii., c h 6, p. 263
3 T h is c r itic is m o f t b e p r e c ep t o f D e s c a r te s et seq. K d .
400 LOGIC. L kct. X X I X .
whicli are foniul in t h e FMi nd itself, I shall comiiience with the

f o l l o w i n g ]inragra|ili :
XCIV. Tlic Sources of E rr o r w hich arise fro m t h e Con

stitution, Habits, and Heeiproeal Relations
PftTi X C I V I I . S o u rc e j.' A1 T* * X* 17^ 1 1
o r E r r o r a r i s i n g fro m ^bc ])OWCr.S o f C ogllltlO ll, P ecllllg , and
th e p o w e rs ol c o g n i- Dcsirc, m a y bc Subdivided into tw o kinds.
t io n . F e e l in g , a n d D e- rj-i] ^ tllC S C C O Ils is tS ill t llC U lld u C p i'C -
B l r e , o f tw o k in d s . I
ponderance of the Aflectivc E lem ents of
m ind (tbe Desires and PA'clings) o v e r t h e C o g n i t i v e ; t b e s e c
o n d , in t h e weakness or inordinate strength of some one or
o t h e r o f t h e C o g n i t i v e Pa c u l t i e s t h e m s e l v e s .
^Vf f eet i o n is t h a t s t . a t c o f m i n d i n w h i c h t h e F e e l i n g s a n d D e s i r e s
e x e r t an infinence n o t u n d e r t h e control o f rea-
Kxpiicatioii.. son ; in o t h e r w o rd s, a t e n d e n c y b y w h ic h th e
1. I rcpomieraiice of i n t e l l e c t is iiiiiiccled ill its e n d e a v o r t o th i n k an
Alli'cnon over Coûi ^
,io n object as that object really is, a n d conqiclled
to think it in c o n f o r m i t y w i t h som e view pre
sc ribed by t h e passion or jirivate in t e r e s t o f t h e su b je ct th in k in g .
The human mind, w hen nnruftled b y passion, m a y be com jiarcd
t o a c a l m sea. A c a l m s e a i.s a c l e a r m i r r o r , i n
in r tu e i.e e o f 1 asM oii \ y] , j c b t l i c siiii a n d c l o u d s , ill w h i c b t b e f o r m s
o n tin.* M nul.
of heaven and earth, arc reflected back pre
cisely as t h e y arc prcsentcil. B u t l e t a w i n d arise, a n d t h e s m o o t h ,
e l e ; i r sii i -faec of f l i c w a t e r i.s l i f t e d i n t o billows and agitated into
fo: ini . It no m o re reflects t h e sun an d clouds, t h e fo rm s o f h eav en
and e a r t h , o r it r e H e e t s t h e m o n l y as d i s t o r t e d a n d b r o k e n im a g e s .
In like ni:miier, t h e traiupiil mind receives and reHeets t h e world
wi t l i Di i t a s it t r u l y i s ; l ) n t l e t t h e w i n d o f j i as s i oi i b l o w , a n d every
( di je c t is I ' e p r c s e n t e d , n o t as i t e x i s t s , b u t in t h e c o l o r s a n d a s p e c t s
and partial p h a s e s in w l i ic b it p l e a s e s t h e s u b -
I. oolhlus qnoltd. .
jeet t o r e g a r d it. I b e s t a t e of j i ass ion a n d its
i n f l u e n c e o n t h e C o g n i t i v e b a c n l t i c s a r e t r u l y p i c t u r e d b y B o c t l i i i i s . '
X i i li il ii is .-iii-is P iir q iie s c r e n is

< o i u i i a i iiiilliiin r i i i l u ( lic lin s ,
1 111 I c iv p o .H iin i .M ox ix 'x i ln i o
i r.i l ii m r i i. Sordid;', ( ( r i i o ,
S i in u r e v o l v c i i s V is it n is o b ? n it .
T i ir h iilu s i ii i i l e r ..................................
M i- e c u t : e - n i i i i , T u q i io q u c si v is
V itr e ;i d n d ii in , L u n iin e e lu r o
1 De Consol. P h il., L . i., M ctr. 7. E d .

Lec t . X \ I X . Looic. 401
Cernere- vcrtini, Speinqnc fiijrato,

Trainitc recto N ee dolor adsit,
Carpere e a llc iii: N nbila mens g;t,
Gandia pelle, V inctaqiie frenis,
Pellc timorera, Htec ubi rcfîiaiit.
E v e r y e r r o r c o n s i s t s i n t h i s , t h a t Ave t a k e s o m e t h i n g f o r n o n
existent, hocanse we have not becom e aw are o f
E r r o r lim ite d to e x i s te n c e , a n d t h a t , in p lac e o f t h i s e x i s t e n t
P r o b a b le R e a s o n in g . .
s o m e t h i n g , w e n i l nj) t h e j i r o m i s e s o f a j i r o b a b l e
r e a s o n i n g w i t h s o m e t h i n g else.
I have here limited t h e jiossibility o f e r ro r to P r o b a b l e P c a s o n -
i n g , f or , in I n t u i t i o n and D e m o n s t r a t i o n , t h e r e is b u t little j i oss i -
bility o f i m p o r t a n t error. H obbes indeed asserts th a t had it been
contrary to the i n t e r e s t o f t h o s e in a u t h o r i t y , t h a t t h e t h r e e a n g l e s
o f a triangle should b e eipial t o t w o r i g h t a ng l es , t h i s t r u t h w o u l d
have b e e n l o n g a g o jiro s c r ib e d as h e r e s y , o r as hi g h treason.* This
m a y be an in g e n io u s illustration o f t h e blind tendency of tbe pas
s i o n s t o s i i b j n g a t e i n t e l l i g e n c e ; b u t Ave s h o u l d t a k e i t f o r m o r e t h a n
w a s i n t e n d e d h y i t s a u t h o r , w e r e xve t o t a k e i t a s m o r e t h a n a n i n g e
nious exaggeration. L im itin g , therefore, e r ro r to proliable inference
(and t h i s c o n s t i t u t e s , xvith t h e e x c e p t i o n o f a c o m p a r a t i v e l y s m a l l
departm ent, the xvhole d o m a i n of human reasoning), we have to
i n q u i re , IIoxv d o t h e Passions influence us to the assumption of
fal se i i r e m i s e s ? estim ate t lic amount of ju-obahility for or
against a given proposition, requires a tranquil, an unbiassed, a
eomjirehensive c o n s i d c r . a t i o i i , in o r d e r t o t a k e al l t h e r e l a t i v e e l e
m ents o f j u d g m e n t into d u e aeeount. B u t this requisite state of
mind is disturbed xvhen any interest, any wish, is alloxved to
interfere.
^ X C V . T h e disturbing Passions m a y b e reduced to four:

P ar. XCV. The Pas-
P recipitancy,
I J
Slotli,5 Hoiie
I
and F ear,5 Self-
sions, as so u rces of loX C.
E r r o r ,- reduced to |o vcstlcss aiixiety foi* a dccisioii be-
four.
g e t s i m p a t i e n c e , AXhich d e c i d e s b e fo r e th e
lir e lim in a ry in q u ir y is e o ii c ln d e d . T h i s is p r e c ip ita n c y .
2 . T h e s a m e r e s u l t is t h e e f f e c t o f S l o t h , x v h i c h d r e a m s o n
i n c o n f o r m i t y .to c u s t o m , w i t h o u t s u b j e c t i n g i t s b e l i e f s t o t h e
test of active observation.
3. T h e restlessness o f H o p e or F e a r im pedes observation,
d i s t r a c t s a t t e n t i o n , o r f o r c e s it o i d y o n w h a t i n t e r e s t s t h e p a s -
1 L e v ia th a n . Part I. c h . 11. E d .
51
402 L OGI C. L ect. XXIX
sion ; tlie sanguine looking on only wli.at liarmonizes with

his hopes, the difliden.t only on w h a t accords with his fears.
4. Self-love perverts onr estim ate of probability by causing
ns to rate the g ro u n d s o f ju d g m e n t, not according to their real
intlncnce on the tr u th of the decision, b u t according to their
bearing on onr ])crsonal intei'csts tbcrcin.
In regard to I m p atien c e or Precijiitation, all is the cause of

this which determ in es onr choice on one side
t.owpiicaiioii. r a th e r th:in another. A n imagination excites
1. P r e c ip it a u c y . , . ^
pleasure, and bc(*ause it cxcitcs jiloasure we
yield ourselves up to it. W e suppose, for ex;implc, th a t wc arc all
th a t wc o u g h t to be, and w h y ? Because this supjiosition gives us
pleasure. This, in some dispositions, is one o f the grcate.st obsta
cles to i m p r o v e m e n t ; for be who en tertains it, thinks th ere is no
necessity to labor to become w h at he is already. I believe, says
Seneca,* th a t m any bad it in th e ir jiower to
h.ave attain ed to wisdom, had they no t been
imjiedcd by th e belief th a t 'wisdom th e y had already attained.
Miiltos pn to ad sajiicntiam potnisse ])ervcnire, nisi ])iitassent sc
pervcnisse.
iicr\ c m s s c -' E rasm us gives the following as
E r a sm u s.
the principal advice to a y o u n g votary o f learn
ing ill ihe c on duc t o f his stu d ie s: T o read th e most learned books,
to ((inverse with th e most learned men ; but, above all, never to
conceit th a t lie liimself was learned. '*
F rom the same cause, men fl.attcr themselves with the hope of
dy ing .old, although few attain to longevity.
Illn stra iio itfs. i i i i i
J he lo.^s proli;il)lc tlic event, tlie more certain
arc they of its o cc u rre n ce; and w h y ? Because the imagination of
it is agreeable. D(crc|iti scncs )i iicorum annornm acccssionem
votis m e n d ic a n t; miiiorcs natn seipsos cssc
From Seneca.
tin gun t ; inciidacio silu iilan d im itu r; ct tarn li-
bcntcr falliiiit, qiiam si fata iina dccipiant. * Pi-(';ichcrs, says
3Ioiitaignc, .arc :iwarc th a t the emotion which
F r o m M o iiiiiig iie . , . , . . , ,
arises (luring their sermons animates themselves
to belief, and wo arc con.scious th a t when roused to anger we apply
1 I)f TrnnquiU ilntt A n im i, c . 1. F.D. d o c l o s d ilig c n fc r edi.c c r c t, d c n iq iic si se d o c -

2 ( "roiioiz, I^ g iq iir , t. iii , pa ri ii c li. 7, p turn riiiiu ]iia m p u la r e t. J I o llo lo G . .1. V o s-
2 97 \'a>. s iu s , O piisrula de S tu d io ru m liiiliiin e. See
( .lo a n r ie s A le x a n d e r I.rasi-icanuH ro g a v it, (J rc n iu s, Concilia rt M e tlw d u i, e lc .. p. 080, 1092.
K rasm u n i, riun r u iio iic d o e t iis (lo ssc t fieri, 17d .
r e sfio n d it e x te m p o r e , i d o c tis a'-sidue c o n - 4 .Seneca, De Dre.vilule Vila;, c li. 11. C rou-
v i v e i e l , i-i d o c lo s a n d ir e l n o n rninns s n b in isse sa/., L ogique, t. iii. p. ii. c li. 7, p. 297. ed . 1725
lio n o r iC c e , i d o c lo s s ir e n u e le g e r c t, si Ed .
L ect. X X IX . LOGIC. 403
o u r s e l v e s m o r e i n t e n t l y t o t h e d e f e n c e o f o u r t h e s i s , a n d e m b r a c e it
with greater vehem ence ami approbation, than wc did when our
m i n d wa.s c o o l a n d nnrnlHed. Y o u sim ply state your case to an
a d v o c a t e ; h e I'cplies w i t h h e s i t : i t i o n a n d d o u b t ; y o u a r e a w a r e t h a t
i t is i n d i f f e r e n t t o h i m w h e t h e r h e u n d e r t a k e s t h e d e f e n c e o f t h e o n e
side or o f the o t h e r ; b u t h a v e y o u o n c e f e c d h i m w e l l t o t a k e y o u r
case in band; he b e g i n s t o f eel a n i n t e r e s t in i t ; h i s wi l l i s a n i
m ated. Ili.s r e a s o n and b i s s c i e n c e b e c o m e a l s o a n i m a t e d i n j i r o-
])ortion. Your case presents itself to his understanding as a
manifest and indubitable truth ; he n o w sees i t in a w h o l l y d i f
fere n t light, a n d i - eal l y b e l i e v e s t h a t y o u h a v e l a w a n d j u s t i c e o n
your side. ' It is proper to observe th at M ontaigne was him
self a law yer, he had been a counsellor o f the Parliam ent of
Bordeaii.v.
It m ight seem th at Precipitate D ogm atism and an inclination to
Skepticism were opposite characters of mind.
Irccipitafo DoL'ma- d J i c y ai'o, l io w c v c r , c lo s e l y allied, i f n o t m e r e ly
tis m an d S k e p tic is m , , ' , i 5
p l.a se s o f th e s a m e disposition. I h lS IS indeed
d is p o s itio n . Confessed by the s k e p t ic M o n taig n e ." The
m ost uneasy condition f o r m e i s t o h e kc] t in
suspense on u r g e n t occasions, a n d to b e a g ita te d b e t w e e n fear an d
ho] ) c . Deliberation, even in things of lightest m oment, is v e r y
t r o u b l e s o m e t o m e ; a n d I f i nd m y m i n d m o r e p u t t o it, t o u n d e r g o
t h e viirious t u m b l i n g a n d t o s s i n g o f d o i d i t a n d con su lt: it io n, tlnm to
set lip i ts r e s t , a n d t o a e q u i e s e e in w l n i t c v e r s ha l l h a p p e n , a f t e r tlic
d i e is t h r o w n . F e w p a s si o n s b r e a k m y slee]>; b u t o f d e l i b e r a t i o n s ,
th e least distu rb s me.
Precipitation is n o i n c u r a b l e disease. T h e r e is f o r i t o n e sure
and simple r e m e d y , if properlj- applied. I t is
Kerned) forlieupi- s])cak w i t h Confiicius, m a n f i il l v
tatiou. . .
t o r e s t r a i n t h e w i l d l i o r s e o f ] ) r e c i p i t : ; n c y b y tin-'
c u r b o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n , t o w e i g h t h e r e a s o n s o f d ec is io n, oacli a n d
all , ill t h e b a l a n c e o f c o o l i n v e s t i g a t i o n , n o t t o : d l o w o u r s e l v e s l o
decide until a clear consciousness has declared these reasons to be
true, to b e sufficient; a n d , f i nal ly, t o t h r o w o u t o f a c c o u n t t h e
suffrages o f self-love, o f p r e p o s s e s s i o n , o f jiassion, a n d to admit
only those of reflection, of (x j i c r i c n c e , and of evidence. This
r e m e d y is c e r t a i n and ( *ffeet ual . In t l i e o r v i t is s a t i s f a c t o r y , b u t
its pr;ictic;d a p p l i c a t i o n r e q u i r e s a m o r a l r e s o l u t i o n , fo r t h e a c q u i s i
t i o n o f w h i c h n o ] ) r cce] ) t c a n b e g i v e n .
In the second place, Sloth is l i k e w i s e a c a u s e o f p r e c i p i t a t i o n ,
a n d i t d e s e r v e s t h e m o r e a t t e n t i o n a s i t is a c a u s e o f e r r o r e x t r e m e l y
1 E s s a is , L. ii. ch. 12. Q u o ted by C rousaz, I. c. E d . 2 E ssa is, L . ii. c. 17. Ed.
404 LOGIC. Lr.CT. X X I X
frequent, an d o n e o f w l i i e l i w o .ai-e o u r s e l v e s l e s s a w a r e , a n d w h i c h
is less n o t o r i o u s t o otiicrs. AVe f e e l i t f a t i g u i n g
2. S lo th . . . 1 p A
to eontiiiiie an i n v e s t i gOa t i o n , t l i e r e f o r e wo do
not jiursue it; b u t as it is m o r t i f y i n g t o t h i n k t h a t w e h a v e l a
bored i n v a i n , w e e. as i l y a d m i t t h e flattering illusion t h a t w e h a v e
succeeded. B y t h e i ii fl ii enee o f t h i s d i s p o s i t i o n it o f t e n Ii :i ) ) pens,
t h a t , a f t e r h a v i n g r e j e c t e d w h a t f irs t p r e s e n t e d i tself, a l t e r I i a v i n g
rejected a seeond time and a third tim e w h a t snhscqnently turned
up, because n o t sufficiently applicable o r certain, w e g e t tired o f t h e
in \estigation, and p erhaps p u t up with the fourth suggestion, which
is n o t b e t t e r , li .api y even worse, th an the jneeeding; and this
simply heeanse it h as come into the mind when more exhausted
and less s e n q u i l o u s than it w as at t h e eoiiimeneement. ' The
vo l i t i o n o f t h a t m a n , s a \ s S e n e c a , is o ft en
_ e u c c a q u o te d . fi 'u st ra tc d , w l i o u n d e r t a k e s n o t w h a t is eas y, h u t
who wishes what he undertakes to he easy. As often as you
attem pt an vthing, oonqiarc together yourself, t h e end whicli yon
p m j i o s e , : i n d t h e m e a n s 1 y w h i c h i t is t o h e a e e o m p l i s h c d . F o r the
r e ] ' e n t : i n e e o f a n u n f i n i s h e d w o r k will m a k e y o n r a s h . A n d h e r e it
is o f con.. 5e q n c n e e w h e t h e r a m a n he o f a fervid or o f a cold, o f an
a s i ' i - i n g o r o f a h n m h l e , d i s p o s i t i o n . -
'Io r e m e d y this f a i l i n g i t is n e c e s s a r y , i n conformity with this
a d v i c e o f S c n e e : i , t o e o n s n l t o u r f o r c e s , r . nd t h e
ii-iLiiR(i>. lime we can .-iflord, a n d the difticnlty o f th e
su b je cts on w h ich w e enter. W e o u g h t to labor only at intervals,,
to a \ o i d tlie t e d i u m a n d d i s q u i e t e o n s e i p i e n t o n u n r e i n i t t e d aj ijili-
c.ation; and to adjouiii the consideration of any ihoiiglit which
may jilease ns velieincntly at the m o m e n t , until the ]>reposses-
sion in its favor has subsided with the anim ation which g a v e it
birth.
4'lic tw(j Causes of prem ature j u d g m e n t the affeetions of
Im patience and Sloth being considered, I
i. M ope an d Kear , , . , . ia i
pass on to the third principle of i assion, b y
which the intellect is t i i rne<l asi di* f r o m the path of truth, 1
mean th e d i s t n r h i n g iiifluenee o f H o p e an d F e a r , d'hese passions,
tliongli r e c i p r o c a l l y c o n t r a r y , < le t e r m in e a s i m i l a r effect u p o n tlu'
d d i h e r . a t i o n s o f t h e T ' n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n d a r e e q u a l l y u n f a v o r a b l e for
th e in terest o f fintli. In f o rm i n g a j u s t conclusion upon a ipiestion
ol j u - o h a h l e r e a s o n i n g , t h a t is, w h e r e the grounds of decision are
not f ew, p a l p a b l e , a n d of d e t e r m i n a t e effect, a n d s u c h que.stions
I fr o u a z , L o g iq u f, t. ill. p a r t ii. c h 7, p . 2 De Ira, L . iii, c. 7 Q u o te d b y C ro u sa z,

002. L d . L o g iq u e, t. iii. p. 302. E d .
L k c t. XXIX. LOGIC. 405
may be s.aid to be tliose alone on wliich fliffcrence.s o f opinion may

arise, and are, consequently, those alone which I'cqiiire for their
.solution any high degree of ob.servation and ingciinit}', in .such
(luestions hope and fear cx e it a very stron g and a very milav(;i';;hle
influence. In these questions it is retjuisite, in th e flist jilace, U;
seek out the prem ises; and, in the secoml, to draw the conclusion.
O f these requisites th e first is th e more imjiortaiU, and it is also by
far the more difficult. .
N o w the jiassions o f H op e and F e a r operate severally to p revent
th e intellect from disco\-ering all the elements
H o w H o p e and F ear o f d e c i s i o n , w h i c h O u g h t t o lie c o n s i d e r e d in
o p e r a te u n fa v o r a b ly f o r m i n g :i c o r r e c t C o n c l us i o n , a n d ctiuse it t o
oil tb e U n d e r s ta n d - ^ i , .
ta k e into account tliose only which, harmonize
with th.at conclusion to which llie :ictu;itiiig
jiassion is inclined. A n d here the ji.assion operates in two w.avs.
In the first place, it tends so to determ in e the tissociations of
thou ght, th a t only tiiose niedi.a o f jiroof are suggested or calle 1
into consciousness, which snjiport the eonclnsion to wdiich the
passion tends. In th e second place, if the media of jiroof b\-
w hieh a cmuitei- conclusion is supported ai-e b rought befoi'c the
mind, still the mind is infiiieneed by the passion to look on their
reality with doubt, and, if sneh cannot be (jnestioned, to undervalue
their inferential im p o rta n c e ; wlicrcas it is moved to admit, w ithout
hesitation, those media of jiroof which favor the eonclnsion in the
interest o f onr liojie or fear, and to exaggerate the eogmicy with
whieh th e y establish this result. F itlie r jiassion looks exclusively
to a single end, and exclusively to the means by wliieh th a t single
end is accomjvlislicd. T h u s the sanguine tejnjieranient, or the
mind under th e habitual jiredominancc of liojic, sees only and
magnifies all th a t militates in favor of the wished-for consuin-
matioii, which alone it c o n t c m j d a te s ; whereas th e melancholic
teinjicraincnt, oi the mind u n d e r the habitual j^redominance of
fear, is wholly occupied with th e dreaded issue, views only w hat
tends to its fulfilment, while it exaggerates the jiossiblc into the
jirobuble, the jirobable into th e certain. T h u s it is th a t w hatever
conclusion we grea tly liojic or grea tly fear, to th a t conclusion we
are disposed to leaji; and it has become almost jiroverbi.al, th a t
men lightly believe both w h at they wish, and w hat th e y dread, to
be true.
B u t tbe influence of Hojie on onr ju d g m e n ts, inclining iis to find
wli;itcv(>r we wish to find, in so far a.s this ai'ises from the illusion
o f Self-love, is com prehended in this, th e fourth cause o f F rror,
to which I now proceed.
40G LOGIC. L kct. X X IX .
Self-love, u n d e r which I include the disposition.s of V anity, P rid e ,

and, in qeneial, all tliose wliich incline us to
4. Sell'-lovo. . . . . .
a ttrib u te an undue w eig ht to those opiuions in
which we feel a jiersoual iutercsl, is hy tar the most extensive and
inlluciitial iu the way of reason and tru th . In virtue of this priiici-
jile, w hate v er is ours w hate v er is adopted or jiatroiiized by us,
\ \ l ia t e \e r belongs to those to w hom we are attached is either
gratu itously clothed witli a ch a racter of truth, or its jireteiisioiis to
he accounted tru e are not scrutinized with the requisite rigor aud
impartiality. I am a native ot thi.s country, and, therefore, not only
i.> its history to m e a m a tte r o f jieeiiliar interest, h u t th e actions
and character of m y eoniitrymen are viewed in a very different
liqlit
O
from th a t in which th c v* are req'arde.d
O
bv a foreigner.
O
I am
horn and bred a niem her o f a religious sect, and hecause th e y con
stitu te iiiv creed, I liiid th e tenets of this sect aloiu* in conformity
to the W oril o f God. I am the jiartisaii of a jiliilosopliieal doc
trine, and am, tlierefore, disposed to reject w hatever docs n o t h a r
monize with my adoptei' system. .
I t is the part o f a philosopher, says A ristotle, inasmuch as lie is a
Jihilosopher, to subjug ate self-love, and to refute,
A o .- lo l le . In.- pre- tl U tl l, llOt O ll l y tllC OJlilliollS of
h is frien d s, h u t th e d o e tr iiie s w liieli h e h i m s e l f

m ay liai e jirofessed .* It is c e r t a i n , h o w e v e r , t h a t jiliilo so jiliers
for jd iilo so jilie r s :i r e m e n h a v e heen to o o lte n fo u n d to iv g iila te
t l i e i r c o n d u c t h y t l i e s a m e o j i j i o s i t e jir in ci jiU *. T h a t m an ju elen d ed
t o t h e n a m e o f jiliilo so jilier, w h o s c r u p le d n o t t o
iiiu s ir a iio n s o f llic d ecla re th at lie w o u l d r a tlier he in th e wrong
iiitlu c iic c <i|' S e lf- lo v e 1 1 1 - 1 , 1
o .io u r o p i..io n .R . rig h t W ith lllS O JlJlO -
neiits. G ishert V oetius urged Alerseniius to
refute a w ork of D escartes a year before the hook ajijieared, and
hefore he had him self th e means of ju d g in g w heth er the ojiiiiioiis it
contained were right or wrong. A certain jirofessor of jiliilosojiliy
in P adiia came to Galileo, and rcfjiiesled th a t he would e.xjdaiii to
him the ineaiiing of th e term j->a/yilla.n's ; which he wished, lie said,
to refute, Inn ing heard th a t it was ojijxised to A ristotles doctrine
touching th e relative situation o f the comets. \V h a t! answered
G'llilc*;, yon wish to co n tro v e rt a word the m eaning ot which yon
(hi not k n o w ! lie d i tells ns th a t a stu rdy Perijiatetic of his
acquaintance would never consent to look at the lieavens tlirongli
a tclescojic, lest he should he comjielled to adm it the existence of
ttic new stars discovered hy Galileo and others. T h e same P e d i
informs u.s th a t he knew a n o th e r Perijiutetie, a staunch advocate of
1 E ih . Atc., i. 4 (6). E d . 2 C ic e ro , Tusc. Qucest., i. 17.

L kct. XXIX. LOGIC. 407
tlie Aristotelian doctrine o f equivocal generation (a doctrine, by

tlie Avay, wliieli now again divides the physiologists o f E urope), aud
who, iu particular, m aintained th:it the green frogs which a])])oar
upon a shower eoine down with the rain, who would not he
induced liimself to select and e.xamiiie one o f these I'rogs. A nd
w h y ? Because lie was unwilling to be convicted o f his error, by
K edi sliowiiig him the green m a tte r in the stoinacli, aud its feciihe
in the intestines o f the animal. ' T h e spirit o f the I'e iip a tetic
philoso]liy was, however, wholly m isunderstood by these mistaken
followers of A r i s t o t l e ; for a true Aristotelian is one who listens
rather to the voice of n ature than to the jireeejit of any master,
and it is well e.xpressed in the m o tto o f the g re a t F re nch anatomist,
Riolamis est P e r ip a t ^ t ic u s ; credit ea, et ea ta ntnm , quae vidit.
F rom the same jiriiiciple proceeds the abuse, and sonietiines even
the persecution, whieh the discoverers of new tru th s encounter from
those who cherished opinions these trutlis subvert.
In like m anner, as we are dis]osed to maintain our own ojiinioii,
we are inclined to regard with favor tlie opiii-
S e lf-lo v e lea d s u s lo . 7 1 1 1 1
r e g a rd wiiJi fa v o r tlie o f t l i o s c t o w l i o i u WC a r e a t t a c h e d b y lo v e,
o p iu io iis o f th o s e l o g ratitude, aiid O th e r conciliatory affections. W e
w h o m w e are 111 a n y limit our attaeliiiieiit to t l i e p e r s o n s of
w a y a t ta c h e d . r . 1 , ,1 ,
our ine n d s, we love in a certain sort all th a t
belongs to t h e m ; and as men generally manifest sufficient ardor in
supjiort o f their ojiinions, we are led insensibly by a kind of sym
p athy to credit, to njijirove, and to defend these also, and tliat even
more jiassionately than our friends themselves. W e bear affection
to others for various reasons. T h e ag re em e n t of temjiers, of incli
nations, o f jiursuits; th e ir ajipcaranee, their manners, th e ir virtue,
the p artiality whieh th e y have shown to ns, tlie services we have
receivetl at their hands, and m any oth e r jiarticular causes, determ ine
and direct our love.
I t is observed by the g re a t Alalebrauche, th a t if any o f our
friends, any even o f those we are disjiosed
M a ie b r a n c iie ad- love, advance a i l ojjiiiion, we forthwith
d u c e d t o t h is effect. . .
lightly allow ourselves to be per.suaded o f its
truth. This ojiinion we accejit and sujijiort, w ithout tro ubling o ur
selves to inquire w h eth e r it be conformable to fact, frequently even
against our conscience, in conformity to the darkness and confusion
1 R ciraaru s, p. 389. [D ie Vernunftlehre, v o n p u b lish e d in 1756. T h e a b o v e fo u r a n e c d o te s

H S. R. ( l l e i tn an n S a m u e l R e im a r u s ), are all ta k e n fr o m th is w o r k . E d .]
d r itte A u fla g e , llim ih iir g , 1703, 332. F ir st 2 Recherche d - la V k itc , L. iv . c li. 13. E d .
408 LOGIC. L ect. XXIX.
of our intellect, to the cornijition o f onr he:irt, nnd to the ad v a n

tages which we hope to I'eap from onr facility and complaisance. '
T h e intlnence o f this principle is seen still more manifestly when
th e passion changes ; foi' tliongh tho things
Tins siiovvii cspe- tlieiiiselvcs remain unaltered, onr jn d g m e n ts
c ia l h will'll lliu pas- . i -it
?iuii" ciiuii 'is eonceniing tliem are totally reversed. H ow
often do we behold persons who cannot, or will
not, recognize a single good quality in an individual from the m o
m ent lie has chanced to incur their dislike, and who are even ready
to adojit ojiinions, merely because ojijiosed to otliers maintained by
th e object o f their aversion? T h e celebrated
Arnauiu iioUis tliat A niaiild goes so tin- even a.s to assert, th a t men
m a n i> i ia t u ia lly c liv i- . , . , , . . . ,
are naturally ein ions a n d je tilo n s; th a t it is with
jiain they en d n re th e contemjilation o f others in
the en joym ent o f advtnitages which th e y do not themselves jiossess;
and, :is the know ledge o f tr u th and th e jiower of enlighten ing m a n
kind. is of one o f these, th a t th e y have a secret inclination to de-
jirive them o f th a t glory. T h is accordingly often d eterm ines them
to controvert w ith o u t a g round the ojiinions and discoveries of
ollicrs. .Selt-love accordingly often argues t h u s : T his is an
ojiinion which I have originated, this is an opinion, therefore, which
is t r u e ; whereas th e natural m alignity of man not less frequently
suggests such a n o th e r : I t is a n o th e r than I who has advanced this
d o c trin e ; this doctrine is, therefoi'C, false.
W e may distinguish, how ever, from m alignant or envious c o n tra
diction a n o th e r jiassion, which, thou gh more
The love of Dii-pu- renei'ons in its natn re and not sim jilva m ode of
lulion. _ . .
Self-love, tends, neverthele.ss, equally to divert
ns from th e stra ig h t road of t r u t h , I mean P u g n acity , or the love
o f Disjiiitation. U n d e r the influence of this jiassioii, we jirojiose
as onr end victory, not truth. W e insensibly become accustomed
to find a reason for any ojiinion, and, in jilaciiig ourselves above all
reasons, to su rre n d er onr belief to none. Tim s it is why tw o dis-
jnitants so rarely ever agree, and w hy a (jiiestion is seldom or never
dccidcil in a discussion, w here the com bative disjiositions o f tlie rea-
.'oiiers have once been roused into activity. In controversy it is
:.lw;ivs easy to find wlierewitlial to rejily; .the end of the jiarties is
not to avoid error, but to iiiijiose .silence ; and tbey are biss ashamed
of coiitirmiiig wrong tlian of confessing th a t th e y are not right.
1 ( arOjiVouf.Wz Ijogiqur, fiart ii., c h . v iii., p. 3 V A n tic P rn str, p. iii. c h . 20. Cf. Caro.
28-8. E l). NiiiictUe IjOgn/ue, p a rt ii., c li. 0, p. 311, I arib
2 V A rt dr Penser (P ort R o y a l Logic), p. iii. 1820. E d .
c h . 20. - E d .
L fx t. X X IX . LOGIC. 409
T l i e s e a l T e c t i o n s m a y b e s a i d t o b e t h e i m m e d i a t e c a u s e s o f al l
error. O i l i e r ca u s e s tliere are, b u t n o t i m m e d i -
Ih ese alTections the L ogic d e te c ts th e s o u i'e c s of
imineclinie c a u ses o f , . , , , , .
Diir f a l s e JII I g n i e i i t s a n d s h o w s t n e i r reiiiedie.s
rieiiiniiiary coiidi- it iiiiist ctirefiilly iiieiilctite t h a t n o i i r e e a i i t i o i n i r y
lio n s reiiiiisite lor the [ii'ecep t for p iviticiilar c a se s eaii a \;iil, u n le ss th e
eiiicieiicj ol precepts i m i i o s t i i r i i i e i p l c o f t h e e \ il b e d i s c o v e r e d , a n d
against tlie sources of *
grror. ciirc u]iplied. 1 0 1 1 i i i u s t , t h e r e f o r e , ;is y o u
would remain free from the hallnciiialion of
filse opinion, b e co n v in c e d o f the absolute necessity of following
o u t t h e i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f e v e r y q u e s t i o n c a l m l y a n d w i t h o u t jiassion.
Y o u m u s t learn to pu rsue, an d to e s tim ate, t r u t h w i t h o u t distraction
o r bias. T o t h i s t h e r e is r e q i i i i - e d , a s a p r i m a r y e o i i d i t i o i i , t h e un
shackled freedom of thought, the equal glance whieh c a n t a k e in
t h e Avliole s j i h c r e o f o b s e r v a t i o n , t h e cool d e t e n iiin a tio n to pursue
t h e t r u t h w h i t h e r s o e v e r i t m a y l e a d ; a n d , w h a t is s t i l l m o r e i m p o r
t a n t , t h e d i s ] ) o s i t i o n t o f eel : m i n t e i ' e s t i n t r u t h and in t r n lh alone.
I f p e r c h a n c e so m e collateral interest m ay fiis t j i r o n i p t us to the
i n q u i r y , in oiir g e n e r a l i n t e r e s t f or t r u t h w e m u s t re pr e ss , w e m u s t
forget, this interest, until the inquiry be concluded. Of what
a c c o u n t are t h e most venerated ojiiiiioits i f t h e y b e l u i t r u e V At
best t h e y are o n ly v e n erab le delusions. H e w h o allows liimself to
be actuated in his sc ie nt iti c [ i r o e e d u r e b y a n y pa r tial i n t e i e s t , can
never obtain a e o m p i e h c n s i v e s u r v e y o f tlie w h o le he has to tak e
into account, and always, therefore, re m a in s incajiable o f d isc rim i
nating, with accuracy, error from truth. T h e independent thinker
m u s t , i n al l h i s i n q u i r i e s , s u b j e c t h i m s e l f t o t h e g e n i u s o f t r u t h ,
m u s t b e p r e p a r e d to follow h e r foo tsteps w i t h o u t falterin g o r h esita
tion. Ill t h e c o n s c i o u s n e s s t h a t t r u t h is t h e n o b l e s t of ends, and
t h a t h e j m r s u e s t h i s e n d w i t h h o n e s t y a n d d e v o t i o n , h e will d r e a d
n o c o n s e q u e n c e s , for h e relies u p o n t h e t r u t h . D oes he compass
t h e t r u t h , h e c o n g r a t u l a t e s h i m s e l f u p o n h i s s u c c e s s ; d o e s h e f al l
s h o r t o f its a t t a i n m e n t , h e k n o w s t h a t e v e n h i s p r e s e n t fa il ur e will
nltimately advance him to the reward b e m erits. E r r l ie m a y , a n d
that perhaps frequently, b u t h e Avill n e v e r d e c e i v e himself. W e
cannot, indeed, rise superior to our limitary natni'e, we cannot,
therefore, be r e p r o a c h e d for failure ; b u t w e are alw ay s responsible
for t h e calm ness an d inijiartiality o f o u r researches, a n d these alone
r e n d e r ns w o r t h y o f suc ces s. But tlioiigh it b e manifest, th a t to
attain t h e t r u t h Ave m u s t folloAV A v h i t h e r s o e v e r t h e t r u t h m a y l e a d ,
still m e n in g e n e r a l a r e f o u n d t o y i e l d n o t a n a b s o l u t e , b u t o n l y a
r estricted, o b ed ien ce to t h e jirccept. T h e y caiiitiilate, a n d do not
unconditionally surrender. I g iv e hp, b u t m y c h e rish e d d o g m a in
52
410 LOGIC. L kct. X X IX .
religion m ust not be ennvasscd, says o n e ; niy political jirinciples

are above inquiry, and must be c.veinpted, says a se c o n d ; iny
eountrv is the land of land.s, this cann ot he disaliowed, cries a th ird;
inv order, iny vocation, is u n don hte dly the noblest, e.vclaim a.
tovirtli and fifth ; only do not reipiire th a t we should confess our
having erred, is the condition which m any insist on stipulating.
A bove all. th a t resolve of mind is ditticult, which is read y to sur
rende r all fond convictions, and is prepared to recommence investi
gation the m o m e n t th a t a fundam ental error in the former system
o f belief has been detected. T h ese are the principal grounds why,
am ong men, opinion is so w idely separated from o p inion; and why
the eloarest dem onstration is so frequently for a season frustrated
o f victory.
P a r. xcvi. R u l e s ^ X C V I . A g ain st the E rro rs which arise

against Errors from froiii tlic Afiectious, tliore m ay ho glvcn
th e A ffe c tio n s . following I'ules : '
1 . W h e n the error has ai-isen from the influence o f an
active all'eelion, th e decisive ju d g m e n t is to he annnlled ; the
miml is then to be freed, as far as ])0 ssible, from jiassion, and
the proce.ss o f in quiry to he recommenced as soon as the requi
site tranquillity has been restored.
2 . W h e n the error has arisen from a relaxed enthusiasm tor
knowledge, we m ust i-eiinim;itc this interest by a vivid repre
sentation of the p arainon nt dignity of tru th , and o f th e lofty
destination o f oni- intellectual n:iture.
.3. In testing the accuracy of o nr ju d g m e n ts, we m ust he
particularly suspicions of those I'csnlts which accord with our
jniva te inclinations and p redom inan t tendencies.
T hese rules i-equire no com ment.

LECTURE X X X
M O D I F I E D S T O IC H E IO L O G Y .
S E C T I O N II. E I I R O R I T S C A U S E S A N D R E ME D I E S .
B. AS IN THi: COGNITIONS, FEELINGS, AND DESIRES.
II. WEAKNESS AND DISPROPORTIONED STRENGTH OF THE

FACULTIES OF KNOWLEDGE.
I NOW go on to th e Second H e a d o f the class of E rro rs founded

on th e N atu ra l C onstitution, the A cquired H ab-
W e a k n e s s a n d D is - Reciiirocal Helatioiis of O U l' Cogni-
p r o p o i t io n e d S t r e n g t h Affective P ow ers, th a t is, to the Causes
o f the* ! a c u itie s of ^ ^ ^ ^
K n o w le d g e . EiTor Ml i i c h O r i g i n a t e in t h e W e ak n e ss or
Dispi-opoitioned S tre n g th o f one or more of
onr F aculties o f K n ow ledge themselves.
Here, in the first place, I m ight consider the errors w hich have
arisen from the L im ited N a tu r e of the H u m an
N e g le c t o f th e L im - Intellec t ill g e n e r a l, or rath e r from the niis-
ite d N a tu r e o t th e have been m ade b y p h ilo so ith ers in
H um an I n t e lle c t a
so u r c e o f e r r o r . d e n y in g Or u o t t a k i n g t h i s l i m i t e d nature in to
account.' Tlie illustration o f this subject is one
which is relative to, and supposes an acquaintance with, some of
the abstrusest speculations in Philosophy, and whicli belong no t to
Logic, b u t to Metaphysics. I shall not, therefore, do more th a n
simply indicate at jtrcsent, w h a t it will be projier at a n o th er season
fully to c.xplain. I t is manifest, that, if the
1 . 1 hiiosoph> of the ]|,im;m miitd be lim ite d , if it only know s as
Absolute. . . .
it is coiiseions, and if it be only conscious, as it
is conscious of co ntrast and opjiosition, o f an ego and non-ego ,
if this su])i)osition, I say, be correct, it is evident th a t those jthiloso-
phers are in error, w ho virtually assume th a t the hu m a n mind is
1 [O n th is su b je ct se e Ci u s iu s.] [C h r istia n verld ssig k eit tier m enschlichen E rk en n tn U s, 443,

A u g u s t C ru siu s, llVg z v r G tw is s k e it unci Zu- 1st ed . 1747. E d -
412 LOGIC. L ect. XXX.
niiliinitecl, tli.at is, tliat th e hiiinan mind is capable o f a know ledge

superior to consciousness, a cognition in whicli know led ge and
existence the E go and iioii-Ego God and the creature are
iilciitic.-il ; th.-it is, of an act in which the mind is the Absolute, and
know s the -Vbsoliite. T h is |)hi]osuphy, the s ta te m e n t o f wiiich, as
here given, it would require :i lung coiiimeiitary to make you niidcr-
staiid, isone which has for m any years been th a t dom inant in Ger-
iiiaiiy ; it is called the Jlu'iosojdig o f the Absolute, or the J ld lo s o -
p b g o f Absolute I d tn titg . T his system, of which Schelling and
llc g cl arc the grc.-it representatives, errs by denying the limitation
o f hum an intelligence w ith o u t proof, and by boldly building its
edifice on this O gratuitous negation.'
O
B u t th e re are oth e r forms o f philosojihy whieh err not in actually
jiostulatiiig the infinity of mind, b u t in ta k ing
2. A onc-?ided view oiie-sidcd view o f its finitude. I t is a
of the liiiilude of ~ , a i ,
general lact, whicli seems, liowcver, to have
escaped the ohservatioii o f philosophers, th a t
w h a te v e r we can positively comjiass in thought, w h ate v er we can
conceive as possible, in a word, the omue eogitabile, lies betw een
tw o extrem es or jioles, contradictorily opjioscd, and one of which
m ust conscipieiitly be true, b u t o f neitlier o f which re p u g n a n t oppo
sites are we able to represent to onr mind the jiossibility,-' T o take
one exanqile out of m a n y : we cannot construe
Illustrated by refer- mind as iiossiblc the absolutc commence-
*rice to llie two con- / -
traiiiciorics,-the ab- 01 t i m e ; b u t we are equally unable to
soiuiecominenceinent, tliiiik tlic possibility o f tlic couiitcr alternative,
and Ibe luiiniie nou- infinite 01 ' absolutc iioii-comiiieiiceinent, in
commencement of , i i a -vv
Other words, the iiihnite regress of time. N ow
it is evident, lliat, if we looked merely at the
one of these con tradictory opposites and argued t h u s : w hatever is
inconceivable is imjiossible, the absolute commeiicemeiit of time is
iiiconcci\'ab!e, therefore the absolute coniiiieiiceinent o f tim e is
impossible; but, on the principles o f C ontradiction and E xcluded
5Iid<lle, one or o th e r o f the tw o opposite contradictories m ust be
t r u e ; tlierefore, as tbe absolute com m en cem ent of tim e is impossi
ble, the .ihsoliite or infinite iioii-conimencemeiit of time is neces
s a r y : I say, it is ev id ent th a t this reasoning would be incom pe
te n t and one-sided, because it niiglit be c o n v e r te d ; for, by the same
oiie-sided process, the opjiosite conclusion m ig h t be draw n in favor
o f the absolute coininencem ent o f time.
1 S e e Di.tfii.tsinns, p. 19. E d .
2 S e e D iscussions, p. COl et seq ., Lectures on M etaphysics, p. 027 (t seq. E d .
L i .c t . X X X . LOGIC. 41-3
Now, tlie unil.ateral and incom petent reasoning Avliich I have here
supjio.sed in the casc o f time, is one of whicli
T h e s a m e p r in c ip le Necessitarian is guilty in his a rg n m e n t to
e x e m p lifie d 111 th e c a s e ^ . . . . . .
of t b e Necessitarinii jirove tliG impossibility ol liumnii volitions being
Argument agaiii.Q tbe fi'cc. Ho coiTectly lavs down, as tlie foundation
!recdoin^ of Uie Hu- j.j^ reasoning, tw o Jiropositioiis which must
at once he idlowed : 1 , T h a t the notion of the
liberty o f volition in v o h c s the siijijiosition of an absolute com
m encem ent of volition, th a t is, of a volition which is a cause, h u t is
n ot itself, qita e:mse, an effect. 2 , T h a t th e absolute com m ence
m ent of a volition, or of a u g h t else, cannot he conceived, th a t is,
cannot he directly or jiositively th o u g h t as possible. So far he is
c o rre c t; h u t when lie goes on to ajiplv these priiicijilos hy arguing
(and he it observed this syllogism lies at the root of all the reason
ings for necessity), Whatever is inconceivable is impossible ; but the
supposition o f the absolute commencement o f volition is inconceiva
ble ; therefore, the suqiposition o f the absolute commencement o f
volition {the condition o f f r e e xcUl) is irnjjossible, we may here
d enm r to the sumption, tind ask him, Can he jiositivcly conceive
the opposite contradictory of th e absolute com mencem ent, tliat i.s,
an infinite series of relative non-commenceiiieiits? I f lie answers,
as he must, tliat he cannot, wc may again ask him, By w hat right
he assumed as a self-evident a.xiom for his sumption, tbe proposition,
t h a t whatever is inconceivable is impossible, or hy wliat right he
could siihsuiue liis m inor premise, when hy his own confession he
allows th a t the opjiosite eontradietory of his minor premise, th a t is,
the very proposition lie is ajiagogically proving, is, likewise, iiieon-
ceivahle, and, therefore, on the principle of liis sumption, likewise
imjiossihle.
T h e same inconsequence Avonhl equally apply to the Libertarian,
who should attem jit to jirove th a t free-will must
And in the case of Jjg a l l o w e d , o n t h e g r o u n d t h a t i t s c o n t r a d i c t o r y
Ibe Liberlaiian Argu- -i i i ii*
m en t
. . ...
in b e lia lt
..
of
ojiposite
^
IS imiiossihlc,

because
_
inconceivable.
F r e e -w ill. l i e c a i i ii o t j ir o v c liis tli o sis h y s u c h a j i r o c e s s ;
in fict, hy all sjieculative reasoning from the
conditions of th ought, th e two doctrines are in ccquilibrio ; both
are equally possible, both are equally ineonceiv;ihle. It is only
when the Lihcrtarian descends to argum ents draw n from the fact
of the IMoral l.aw and its conditions, th a t he is able to th row in
reasons wliich incline th e hahince in liis favor.
On these matters, I however, at present, only touch, in order to
show you under wliat head o f E r r o r these reasonings would natn
rally fall.
414 LOGIC L kct. X X X
L e a v in g , tlicrefo rc, o r a d jo u rn in g , th e c o n s id e ra tio n o f tlic im b e

c i l i t y o f t h e liu im iii i n t e l l e c t in g e n e r a l , I shall
Menkiie>s or di.-pro- vioAV, as M SOUrcO o f l o g ic a l CITOr,
portJoiiei ftr v n ^ tli o f ^
(he sevcnil f'ojrnilive W crik llO SS OV D i s ] ) r O ] ) O r t i o i R (l S l r c M l g t l l o f
Fnculiic.-!. a sou rce tlic scvcral C o g n itiv e F acu lties. N o w , as the
o f E rror. C oguitiA C Facilities in ni.an co n sist p a rtly of
Oo-niiive Facniiies cer tain LoAvcr PoAVcrs, Avjiicli bo jio sse ss es in
o f tw oclas.-^cs.a L o w e r - .i ,i -i i . t
, , e o n im o n Avith o i li e r s e n s ib le c.xisteiiees, n a m e l y ,
a n d a llif;lie r . _ , ' j i
the Presciitative, the Kcteiitive, the Pejiresonta-
tivo and t h e P e]iro d iietiv e F acu lties, a n d p.artly o f c e r t a i n Higher
P o w e r . s , i n v i r t u e o f Avliich li e e n t e r s i n t o t l i o r a n k of intelligent
existences, n am ely , th e E la b o ra t i v e ami P e g u l a t i \ c F a c u l t i e s , it
wi l l b e j i r o p e r t o c o n s i d e r t h e jiOAvers o f t h e s e t w o cl c. s scs s e v e r a l l y
ill s u c c e s s i o n , i n s o f a r a s t h e y m a y a f f o r d t h e c a u s e s o r o c c a s i o n s
o f error.
O f t h e loAver c l a s s , t h e f i r s t f a c u l t y in o r d e r is t h e P rcscn tn tiv e
or A c q u isitiv e F a c u lty . T h is , as y o u ren ieiiib er,
I The Lower Class, jg d i v i d e d iiito t w o , v i z . , i i i t o t l i c f a c i l i t y A vh ic h
1. The Fresentalivo ^ i ' x- . 1
jircscnts u s Avith t h e plieiiomeiia of l lic o u t e r
world, and into the faculty which p resents us
Avith t h e p h e n o m e n a o f t h e inner.' The f o r m e r is E x t e r n a l Per-
cejitiou, or E x t e r n a l S e n s e ; t h e l a t t e r is S o l f - c o n s e i o i i s n e s s , I n t e r
nal P e r c e p tio n , or I n t e r n a l Souse. I c o m m e n e e , t h e r e f o r e , Avith t h e
F a c u l t y o f E x t e r n a l P e r c e p t i o n , i n r e l . a t i o n t o Avhich I g i v e y o u t h e
f o l l oAvi ng p a r a g r a p h .
* X C 'V II. W hen aught is p resented th rou gh the outer

senses, th ere arc tw o co n d itio n s necessary
P a r .x c A u i . (a)Ex- n d c q u a t c iie rc e p tio ii : 1 , T h e rela-
t e ma l P c r c e p Mo n , _ 1 1 1
as a Bource of Error. tl v e O r g . a i i s m u s t h e p r e s e n t , .and i n a c o n
d itio n t o d i s c h a r g e t h e i r f u n c t i o n s ; .and 2 ,
The O b je cts tlien iso lv es m ust b e a r a certain relatio n to th e se
o r g a n s , v o tli.at t l i e bitt<>r s l i a l l b e .'s u it a b l y a f f e c t e d , : n i d t h e r e b y
the fo rm er su it.ah ly apprehended. It is p o ssilile, th erefo re,
th a t, p a r t ly th rfiiigh t h e a l t e r e i l c o n d i l i o i i o f t h e o rg tin s , ji.artly
through the altered situ a tio n of the o lje cts, d issim ilar pre
sen ta tio n s o f the sam e, and s im i la r p rcse n ta tio ii.s o f d iffe re n t,
o b j e c t s , m a y b e t h e r e s u lt .' "
In the first ]>laco, Avitliont t h e o r g a n s s p e c i a ll y s u b s e r v i e n t t o
1 ,S(.f) L fr liir n n n M ttn p /iy \irs,p .'ll-2 ft seq. ?'-D. K o u relle Jîgirpie, p a il ii. C ll. v i. p . 273. B ach
2 K ru f), Lngik, 1 3-). E l). [C f. C a r o , in a n n , L o g ik , 407. p 0.>3.J
L k c t. XXX. LOGIC. 415
E x te rn a l P e r c e p tio n , w ith o u t the eye, th e ear, etc., sensible per-

co])tions of a precise and d e te n n in a te character,
E x p iic a iio n . siicli, for cxanijde, as color or sound, ai-e not
C o n d itio n s o f th e . . . . . i .1 i 1 .
a d e q u a te a c tiv ity o f to man. In the seeon.l place, to per-
E x t e r n a l I e r c c p tio u . fomi their functions, tliosc organs m ust he in
a healthy or normal s t: ite ; for if this condition
he n ot fulfilled, th e presentations which they furnish are null, incom
plete, or false. P u t, in the third pltice, even if the organs of sense
are sound and perfect, th e objects to he presented and perceived
m ust stand to these organs in a certain relation, m u st hear to
them a certain p ro portion; for, otherwise, the objects can not he pre
sented at all, or canno t he perceived w ith o u t illusion. T h e sounds,
for example, which we arc to hear, m ust neither be too high nor too
low in q u a lity ; th e bodies which we are to see, m ust n either bo too
near nor too distant, m ust neither be too fec-
Io c s ib le illu s io n s o f 1 1 . . 1 -n . i t 1 .
,
th e S e n se s.
hi}' nor too intensely~ illiimmated. In relation
^
to th e second condition, there are given, in con
sequence of the altered state o f th e organs, on the one hand, differ
en t presentations of th e same o b j e c t ; thus to a jierson who has
w axed purblind, his friend apjioars as an u tte r stranger, the eye
now presenting its objects with le.ss clearness and distinctness. On
the other hand, there are given the same, or nndistingnishably simi
lar, ])rcsentntions of different o b jects; th u s to a person in the
jaundice, all things are presented yellow. In relation to the third
condition, from the altered position of objects, there are, in like
manner, determ ined, on th e one hand, diftcrent presentations of the
same objects, as when the stick which apjiears s tra ig h t in the air
appears crooked wlien partially im m ersed in w a te r ; and, on the
oth e r hand, identical presentations o f different objects, as when a
man and a horse ajipear in the distance to he so similar, th a t the
one cannot he discriminated from th e other. In all these cases,
these illusions are d e t e r m in e d , illusions which m ay easily become
the occasions of false ju d g m e n ts . *
In regard to the detection of sneh illusions and obviating the
error to which they lead, it behooves us to take
Trecaulions with a 1 ,, ' ,
view ,0 .be dctec.ion f<"3owiug precautions. Y e muse, m the
o f iiiiiM or.s o f tlie fil'st place, examiiio the state o f the organ. If
S e n se s, a n d o b v ia tin g .found defective, W C lUust cn dcavo r to rcstorc it
th e e r ro r s lo w in c h perfection ; b u t if this cannot he done, \.o
th e y lead . ' /
m ust ascertain th e e x te n t and natu re of the
evil, in order to be upon our g u ard in regard t(. qviality and degree
of the false presentation.
1 K ru g , L o g ik , 138. A nm . E.
416 LOGIC. L k c t. XXX
In tlio second place, we m u st exam ine tlie relative situation of

tho object, and if this be n o t accom m odated to th e organ, we must
citlier obviate the disproportion and remove tb e media wbich occa
sion the illusion, or repeat th e observation u n d e r different circnm-
stances, com pare these, and thus obtain the means o f m aking an
ideal ahstraction o f the d isturbing causes. '
In reg.-ird to th e o th e r I*reseiitativo F a c u lty , th e F a c u lty of
Self-coiisciousiicss. In te rn a l P erception , or In tern al Sense, as we
know less of the material conditions which modify its action, we
are unable to ascertain so jireciscly th e nature o f th e illusions of
which it may be tbe source. In reference to this subject you may
take the following paragraph.
X C V I I I . T h e faculty o f Self-consciousness, or In ternal

Sense, is subject to various changes, xvhich
P a r . XCVIII. o>) eith er modify onr ajijirehensions o f objects,
Self-co nB C io u snesB , . - , . .
0' mfliience tlic maiiuer in which we ju d g e
as a s o u r c e o f E r ro r .
concerning them . In so fir, therefore, as

false j u d g m e n ts are thus occasioned. Self-consciousness is a
source o f error,-
It is a m.atter o f o rd inary observation, th a t tlie vivacity with

whicb we are. conscious of tbe various phenom-
hxplicanoii. mind, differs not only a t different times,
Scll.Clilli-cioUSllCB.'i . / . I l l 1 1-/V 1
ill in (liirerciit states of health, and in different d e
grees o f mental freshness and exhaustion, Imt, at
the same time, differs in reg a rd to th e different kinds of these phe
nomena themselves. A ccording to th e gre a te r or less intensity of
this faculty, the same th o u g h ts o f w hich we arc conscious are, at
one lime, clear and distinct, at another, obscure and confused. A t
one tim e we are almost ivholly incapable o f reflection, and every
jict of sclf-:itteiition is forced and irksome, and differences tb e most
marked pass unnoticed ; while, at another, onr self-consciousness is
;ilerl, all its applications ])lcasing, and the most faint and fugitive
phenom ena arrested and observed. On one oceasion, self-eonscioiis-
ne.''S, as a refh-elivf* cognition, is s t r o n g ; on another, all refec tio n is
extintrnished in the intensity o f th e direct conseioiisness of feeling
or de-ire. In one st;:te of mind onr representations are feeble ; in
.inotlicr. they are so li\ ely th a t th e y are mistaken for external reali
ties. O nr sell-eon-iioiisness may thu s be tbe occasion of frequent
e r r o r ; fur, according to its v.arioiis modifications, we may form the
most opiiosite ju d g m e n ts concerning th e same tbing.s, pronounc-
1 K rug, L o g ik , 15-5. E d . 2 K rug, L o g ik , j 139. Ed.

L e c t. X X X . LOGIC. 417
ing tlicin, for c.v.ample, now to he ngrecnble, now to be disagreeable,

according as onr Internal Sense is variously affected.
The ne.xt is the Retentive or Conservative Faculty, IMemory
strictly so called ; in reference to which I give you the following
paragrajih.
IT X C I X . M emory, or the Conservative Faculty, is the

oee.asion of E rror, botli when too weak and
P a r . X C IX . 2. M e m - wllCll tOO StlOUg. WltCU tOO W eak, tllC
ory, as a so u r je of , ^ i i ^
comjilement oi cognitions winch it retains
is small and indistinct, and the U n d e r
standin g or E laborative F a c u lty is, consequently, unable a d e
quately to j u d g e concerning the similarity and differences
o f its rejn'csentations and concejits. W h e n too strong, the
U n d e r s ta n d in g is overw helm ed with the m nltitu d e o f acquired
cognitions sim ultaneously forced upon it, so th a t it is unable
calmly and d elib erately to com pare and discriminate these.'
T h a t both these c.xtrem es, that both the insufficient and the
snjierflnous vigor o f the C onservative F a c u lty
E x p lic a t io n . i J
are severally the sources of error, it will not
require many observations to make apjiarent.
In regard to a feeble memory, it is manifest that a multitude o f
false judgments must inevitably arise from an
F e e b le m e m o r \. . , ,
, incapacity in this faculty to preserve the obser
vations com m itted to its keeping. In eonseqiienee of this incapac
ity, if a cognition be not wholly lost, it is lost ;it least in jiart, and
the eircnnistaiiees o f time, jilaee, jiersons and things confounded
with each otlicr. F o r examjile, I m ay recollect th e te n o r of a
passage I have read, b u t from defect o f m emory may a ttrib u te to
one a uthor wliat really belongs to another. T h u s a botanist may
ju d g e tw o different plants to be identical in species, having for
gotten th e differential characters by which th e y were discrim inated;
or he may hold th e same plant to be tw o different sjieeies, having
examined it at different tim es and jilaces.
T hough n o thing could be more erroneous than a general and
unqualified decision, th a t a g r e a t m em ory is
S tr o n g m em orv. . ^ . . . . . ^ .
incompatible with a sound ju d g m e n t, yet it
is an observation confiniied by the experience of all ages and coun
tries, not only th a t a great memoi-y is no condition of high intellect
ual talent, bu t th a t g rea t memories are very frequently found in com-
1 [C f. B a c h tn a n n , Logik, 408-1 - K r u g . Logik, 141. A n m . Ed.

53
418 LOGIC L ect. X X X .
bijiation witli com paratively feeble poAvers o f tlionglit. T h e tiaith

seem s lo bo, that Avhere a vigorous m em ory is eunjoinod with a
vigorou.s intellect, not o n ly docs the force o f the subsidiary faculty
not detract from the sti'engtli o f th e principal, but, on the contrary,
tends to confer on it a still h ig h er ] i o w c r ; Avbei'eas Avhen the infe
rior fficnlty is dispro])oi-tionately strong, that so far from noui-isliing
and corroborating the snpei'ior, it te n d s to reduce this fiicnlty to a
low er levt1 than that at whieh it w ould have stood, if united with
a less o \ ei'powei ing subsidiary. T h e greater th e m agazine o f Aari-
ous knoAvledge w hieh the m em o ry contains, the b etter for the nn-
derstaiidiiig, j)i'ovided the u n dersta n din g can reduce this various
k n o w le d g e to order and subjection, A great m em ory is the ])rin-
eijial condition o f bi'inging before th e mind many different fcpi'C-
sen tations and n otions at once, oiin rapid succession. T h is sim ul
taneous or neaily sim u ltan eou s pi-cscnce disturbs, h ow ev er, the
tranquil com]>ai-ison o f a small mimbei- o f ideas, which, if it shall
ju d g e ai-ight, the in tellect m ust contem ])late with a fixed and steady
attention. ' N o w , w h c 0 an in telle ct jiossesses the jiowei o f c o n cen
tration in a high degree, it Avill n ot be harassed in its m editation s
bvV the officious in trusions o f th e subordinate faculties,> lioAvever vig- O
oi'ous those in th e m se lv e s m ay be, but Avill control tlieii' vigor b y e x
hausting in its own opei-ations the Avhole a|qfiieablo en ergy o f mind.
W h e r e a s where the inferior is more vigorous than the superior, it Avill,
in like mannei', engi'oss in its o w n function the disjiosablc am ou n t o f
activity, and o v er w h e lm the prineijAal faculty Avith materials, m an y
even in proportion as it is able to claboi-ale few. T h is a])])cars to J ti c
the reason AvJiy men o f stron g meinoi-ies are so often men o f projior-
tionally weak ju d g m e n ts, and Avhy so m any errors ai-ise from the
possession o f a faculty, th e perfection o f Avhich ou g h t to ex em p t
them from m any mistaken ju d g m e n ts.
As to the rem edy foi- these opposite extremes. T h e foi-mer
th e imbecility o f I\Icmory can only be allcAi-
I'cm crlics Tor llie sc . 1 1 .1
at('d b y i n v i g o r a t i n g t h e c a p a c i t y ot u c t c n t i o n
o p p o n t e I'Xtrc-mc's *
tbroiigli m nem onic exercises and m e th o d s ; the
l a t t e r , llic inordinate a igor o f jMcmory, by cultivating the
U ndcrstaiidiiig to tlic neglect of the Conservative F aculty. It
will, likcAvisc, be necessary to bo upon onr guard against the errors
orig-inriting in these coiintm sources. In the one case distrusting
the accuracy of facls, in the other, the accuracy of their elaboration.'*
T h e n e x t fiiculty is tlic licpro d u ctiv e . This, Avhcn its o])cration
I f'o m p a r o l^ r lu r fi on M e tu p h y s id . p 4 2 ) . q u o lc d b y S te w a r t, E lem ., P a rt iii. c h . i. s e c t

El) vi Colleeled IVor/;3 , v o l iv , p. 24ft
D id e r o t. J^ttre avr fiow nh >t jA/itet!, 3 Cl'. K)'U", L o g ik , lijfj. A Din. E d .
is voluntarily exerted, is called Recollection or Reminiscence : wlu n

it energizes s])ontaiieously or w ithout volition, it
F acuT r t
governed in either case, b u t especially in th e
latter, are called th e Lem s o f Mental Association. Tliis R e p ro
ductive Faculty, like th e R etentive, is th e cause of error, both if its
vigor be defective, or if it be too strong. I shall consider Recollec
tion and Suggestion severally and apart. In regard to the former I
give you the following paragrajih.
^ C. T h e R e produ c tive Faculty, in so far as it is volunta

rily exercised, as Reminiscence, becomes a
Par. c. (a) Berninis. soiircc o f FiTor, as it is eith er too slug-
c e n ce, a s a s o u r c e o f . i i
Error. ôo proiiipt, precisely as t h e ' R e
te n tiv e F aculty, combined with which it
constitutes ^ le m o ry in tbe looser signification.
I t is necessary to say very little in special reference to Rem inis

cence, for w h a t was said in regard to the Con-
E x p lic a t io n . scrvative F a c u l ty or M em ory P r o p e r in its
R e m in is c e n c e , its , , i- i i , r - r- ^
u n d u e a c t iv it y . highest vigor, was ajijdicable to, and in fiict
supposed a corresponding degree of, the R e
productive. F or, how ever g ro a t m ay be tlie mass of cognitions
retained in tlie mind, th a t is, out o f consciousness b u t poten tially
capable o f being called into consciousness, these can neve r o f th e m
selves ojiprcss the U inlerstaiiding by th e ir sim ultaneous crow d ing
or rapid succession, if the faculty by wliich they tire revoked into
conscionsiiess be i n e r t ; vvhereas if this revocative faculty be com
paratively alert and vigorous, a smaller magazine of retained cogni
tions may suffice to harass tbe intellect with a ceaseless supply of
materials too jirofnse for its capacity o f elaboration.
On the oth er liand, th e inactivity o f our Rccollcetioii is a source
o f error, precisely as the weakness of our 31 cm-
J ls iu a c li v it y . c . c iv . i
c ry p r o p e r ; lor it is of the same effect in rela
tion to o nr ju d g m e n ts, w hethe r the cognitions requisite for a deci
sion be not retained in the mind, or whether, being retained, they
are no t recalled into consciousness by Reminiscence.
I l l regard to Suggestion, or the Rejirodiictive F acu lty operating
spoiitaiieonsly, th a t is, not in snliservieiice to an act of Will, I
sliall give you the following paragraph.
\ Cl. As onr Cognitions, Feelings, and Desires are con

nected to g e th er by w h at are called X\\o. L a w s o f Association,
4-20 LOGIC. L k c t. X X X
and as each link in th e chain o f th o u g h t suggests or awakens

into consciousness some o th e r in conformity
Par ci. (b) sugges- tliosc Laws, tlioso Laws, as th e y bc-
t lo n , a s a s o u r c e o f . . . . *
ettot. stow a strong siuijective connection on
t h o u g h ts and objects of a Avliolly arbitrary
union, frequently occasion g re a t confusion and error in our
ju d g m e n ts.
Even in m ethodical th inking, wc do no t conn ect all our

tliou<rhts intontionallv and rationally, h u t m any
E x id ic a t io u . . *; . . . .
press forward into the tram , e ith er in conse
quence o f some e.xtornal impression, or in virtue of certain internal
relations, which, however, are no t o f a logical dependency. T hus,
th o u g h ts tend to suggest each other, wliich have reference to things
o f which we were previously cognizant as coexistent, or as im m edi
ately eonsequent, which have been apprehen ded as hearing a roscm-
hlancc to each other, or which have stood to g e th e r in reciprocal
and striking contrast. T h is connection, thou gh precarious and
non-logieal, is thus, how ever, govern ed hy certain laws, which have
heen called the L a w s o f Association?'* T hese laws, which I have
ju st eiimiierated, viz., the L aw o f Coexistence or S im ultaneity, the
Law of Coiitiiiiiity or I m m e d ia te Succession, tho L aw of Similarity,
and the Law of Contrast, are all only special modifications of one
general law , which I would call th e Laio o f Redin tegration th a t
is, the priiiciitlc according to which w hate v er has previously formed
a |art <>f one total ;.ct o f consciousness, lends, when itself recalled
into consciousness, to reproduce along with it th e o th e r jiarts of
tliat original whole. B u t though these tendencies be denom inated
lan-s, the inilnence which th e y exert, though often stro n g and some-
lim es irresistible, is only co ntin g en t ; for it frequently liajipcns th a t
tlioiiqdits whicli liai e jir' viously stood to each otlier in one or other
ol' the four relations do imt suggest each other. T h e Laivs of
.\'><iciation stand, therefore, on a very dilferent footing from the
1 iws of locrical connection. Hnt those Laws of Association, contin-
gi'iit ihoiiLdi they he, exert a gre.at and often a very jiernicioiis
iiitlui*iK*c iijion thriiight, iiiasmiieli as hy tlie iiivolniitary intrusion
of icjiie'eiit .lions inlo the mental chain which are wholly irrele
vant lo the iM.atter in hand, there arises a jierjilexed and re d u n d a n t
t i" iie ot lhoii_dil, into which false eh.araeters may easily find admis-
-ioii, and in w hich trii characters may easily he overlooked. B u t
1 K n ig , Log'A-, 141. A n m . E d . 2 Hco L t d . on M etaphysics, p . i Z i el seq. YX).

3 K r u g , L o g ik , 144 A n m . E d.
L kct. X X X . LOGIC. 421
tliis i.s not all, Por, by being once blended together in our eon-
sciousnc'ss, tilings really distinct in their nature tend again naturally
to reassociate, and, at every repetition o f tlii.s eonjuiietioii, this ten
dency is fortitied, and their mutual suggestion rendered more cer
tain and irresistible.
It is in virtue of this prineijile o f Association and Custom, that
things are clothed by ns with the iireearioiis attri-
Inflnence of Asso- biitcs o f deformity or heantv; and some ijliil(;s-
ciatioii ill malleis of , , _ ' . . ,
opliers have gone so tar as to maintain that onr
principles o f Taste are exclusively (le]jeiident
on the accidents o f Association. But if this he an exaggeration, it
is impossible to deny that gVssoeiation enjoys an extensive jurisdic
tion in the empire o f taste, and, in particular, that fashion is almost
wholly subject to its control.
On this snhject I may quote a few sentences from the first ohime
o f uMr. Stewarts Flements. In matters of
S le w a r t qu olecl. i n .
la ste , the effects which we consider are pro
duced on the mind itself, and are aeconqianicl either with pleasure
or with pain. Hence the tendency to castinl association is much
stronger th:;n it commonly is with respect to physical events; ami
when such assoeiatiuns are once formed, as they do not lead to any-
imjiortant inconvenience, similar to those which result ti'om phys
ical mistakes, they are not so likely to be corrected by mere experi
ence, unassisted by study. To this it is owing that the infiuenee
of association on onr judgments concerning beauty and deformity,
is still more remarkable than on our speculative conclusions; a cir-
cninstanee which has led some ]hilosophers to snpjiosc that associa
tion is siifiieient to account for the origin o f these notions, and that
there is n.o such thing as a standard of taste, founded on the princi
ples o f the human constitution. B ut this is undoubtedly pushing
the theory a great deal too far. The association of ideas can never
account for the origin of a new notion, or of a pleasure essentially
different from all the othei's which w e know. It may, indeed,
enable us to conceive liow a thing indifferent in itself may become
a source of pleasure, by being connected in the mind with some
thing else which is naturally agreeable; hut it pi-esnpposes, in
every ^ instance, the existence of those notions and those feelings O
wliieh it is its province to combine; insomuch that, I ajijirehend, it
will he found, wherever association ]>roduces a change in our ju d g
ments on matters of taste, it does so by coojierating with some n:ii-
ural jirinciple o f the mind, and iin])lies the existence o f certain
original sources of jdeasure and uneasiness.
A mode of dress, which at first appeared awkward, acquires, in
i-2'2 LO G IC .' L k c t. xxx.
a few week'* or nionllis, the a]])carance o f elegance. B y being

accnstomeil to see il worn by those whom we consider as model.s
of taste, it becomes associated witli the agreeable imjircssioiis
Avhieli W e receive from tlie ease and grace and relineiiieiit ul' tlieir
manners. W hen it jileases by itsclf, the effect is to be a.scribe<],
not tl) the objeet actually before us, but to the impressions with
which it lias been generally connected, iiUd whicli it naturally
recalls to the mind.
I'iiis observation points out tlie can.se o f tlie porpetnal vicissi
tudes in dress, and in everytliing whose chief recoinnicndation
arises from fashion. It is evident tliat, as far as tlie agreeable effect
of' all oni.-inicnt arises from association, the effect will contiime only
wliilo it is confined to the higher orders. W h en it is adopted by
tlic multitude, it not only ceases to bo associated with ideas of
taste aud rcHiiemciit, but it i.s as.sociated with ide.is of affectalioii,
absurd imitation, and s ulgarity. It is acconlingly laid aside by the
higher ordc'rs, wlio studiously avoid every circumstance in external
ajipearance which is debased by low and coinniun use; and they
are led to exercise llieir invention in the introduction of some new
jieciili.-iritics, which tirst become fasliioiuible, then common, and last
o f all, arc abandoned as vulgar. '
Onr mor.'il jndgnients, too, may be modified, and even ]crverted
to a certain degree, in coiiscMpience of the operation o f the same
firiiiclple. Ill the same manner in which a person wlio is regarded
as a nnxlcl of taste may introduce, hy his example, an absurd or
fantastical dress; .so a man of splcmlid virtues may attract some
esteem also to liis imperfeelioiis ; and, if placed in a coiispiciioiis
siluati<jii, may render his viccs and follies objects o f general imita
tion .mioiig the miiltitnde.
In the reign of Charles II., says Air. Smith, a degree o f licen-
tioiiMie.-'S was deemed tlie cliaracteristic of a liberal education. It
was coiiiiectcd, according to the notions of those timc.s, with gen
erosity, sincerity, magnanimity, loyalty; and jiroved that the jierson
who acted in this manner was a gentleman, and not a puritan, Sc-
seril\ o f maniier.s, and regularity o f conduct, on the other hand,
were ;dloir<lher iinfashioiiable, and were connected, in the imagina
tion of that age, willi c;int, ciiniiiiig, hyjiocrisy, and low manners.
I'o siiperfif'ial niimls the vices of the great seem at all times agrce-
ahle. Tln-y connect them not only with the splemlor of fortune,
bill v ilh many sii])crior virtues wllicll they ascribe to their superiors;
1 E lem en ts, v o l i , I'ai l i. clia]). v . ColUr.teel 2 Theory o f M oral S e n tim e n ts, Ia r t v. C. 2.

Works, ii. |> 322 et seq. K d.
L ect. X X X . LOGIC. 42o
xvitli t l i c s])ii'it o f f r e e d o m a n d i n d e p e n d e n c y ; w i t h frankness, g e n

e r o s i t y , h u m a n i t y , a n d pol it cno.ss. T h e v irtu e s o f t h e inferinr r an ks
o f j i e oj i l e , o n the c o n tra ry , their j i. ar si moni oi is hiigality, their
j i ai nfi d i n d u s t r y , a n d ligid adliereiiee to rides, seem to t h e m m e a n
a n d di s . Mg r e e a b l e , T h ey connect them both with the m eanness of
the station to w hich these ( pi . al i t i es e o m m o i d y b e l o n g , a n d witli
m any great vices which they su])pose usually accomiany them ;
su c h as an ab j ec t , c o w a r d l y , i l l - n a t u r e d , l y i n g , j iilfering disj io si tio n.
T n g e n e r a l , s a y s C o n d i l l a c , t h e i i n p i ' o s s i o n xve e x j i e r i c n c e i n t h e
different eircnmstances o f life, m a k e s ns asso-
C om iiliac quoted on eiatc i dca. s xvitli a force xvli i ch renders them
th e in flu e n c e o f A s s o - v 1 1 1
. . e v e r a f t e r for ns indisscilnble. xv e e a i m o t , t o r
cia lio n .
e x a i n j i l e , f r e q u e n t t h e s o c i e t y o f o u r f e ll oxv-men
w i t h o u t i n s e n s i b l y a s s o c i a t i n g t h e n o t i o n s o f c e r t a i n intellectii.il or
m o r a l q u a l i t i e s xvi t h c e r t a i n c o r p o r e a l c h. a r . a c t e r s . T h i s is t h e r e a s o n
xvhy p e r s o n s o f a d e c i d e d p h y s i o g n o m y j i l e as e o r disjile.ase n s m o r e
than o t h e r s ; f o r a p h y s i o g n o m y is o n l y a n a s s e m b h i g c o f char.ac-
t e r s , xvi t h xv hi e h xve h a x e associated notions xv h i c h .are n o t sug
g e s t e d xvit li out a n a c e o m j i a n i i n e n t o f s a t i s f a c t i o n or disgust. I t is
not, therefore, to b e m a r v e lle d at th a t wc j u d g e m en according to
their iihysiogiiomy, a n d that xve s o m e t i m e s f e e l toxvards them at
fi rst s i g h t a v e r s i o n o r i n c l i n a t i o n . In consequence o f these associa
t i o n s , xve a r e o f t e n v e h e m e n t l y j i r e p o s s e s s e d i n f a v o r o f cer t t i i i i i n d i
v i d u a l s , a n d n o l es s v i o l e n t l y d i s p o s e d a g a i n s t o t h e r s . I t is b e c a u s e
all t h a t s t r i k e s u s i n o u r f r i e n d s o r i n o u r e n e m i e s i s a s s o c i a t e d xvith
t h e a g r e e a b l e o r t h e d i s a g r e e a b l e f e e l i n g xv h i e h xve s e v e r a l l y e x p e r i
e n c e ; :m d b e c a u s e t h e fa u l t s o f t h e f o r m e r borroxv alxvays s o m e t h i n g
p l e a s i n g f r o m t h e i r a m i a b l e q u a l i t i e s ; x v h e r e a s t h e a m i . ab l e c| u: di ti es
o f t h e l a t t e r s e e m alxvays t o p a r t i c i p a t e o f tlieir vices. H e n c e i t is
t h a t t h e s e a s s o c i a t i o n s e x e r t a poxverful i n f lu e n c e o n o u r xvhole c o n
duct. T h e y foster o u r love or h a t r e d ; e n h a n c e o n r e s te e m o r con-
tem jit; excite our gratitude or indignation; and produce those
sym p a th ies, those antipathies, or those capricious inclinations,
for xvhich we are som etim es sorely puzzled to render a reason.
D e s c a r t e s t el l s u s t h.at t h r o u g h life h e h a d a lxvays f o u n d a s t r o n g
predilection f o r s q u i n t eye.s, -r- w h i c h he explains b y the circum
stance, t h a t t h e n u rse ry -m a id b y xvhom he h a d been k i n d ly t e n d e d ,
a n d t o xvhom as a c h il d h e xv.as, c o n s e q i i c n t l y , m u c h a t t a c h e d , h a d
t h i s d e f e c t . S G r a v c s a n d e , I t h i n k i t is, xvh o t e l l s u s h e k n e x v a
man, and a m a n o t h e r x v i s e o f s e n s e , xvh o h a d a s e v e r e f al l f r o m a
1 E U m m ts , v o l. i.- c . v , 3 . Collected IVorfcs, 2 Origine des C onnoissances H u m a in e s, se c t

v o l . ii. p. 335. i i. c li. i x . 80. E d .
424 LOGIC. L e c t. XXX

wngon ; and tlici'caflci- h e could never enter a wagon wdthont
Icar and trcinhling, th ou gh he daily used, Avit l i oi it a j i p r c h e n s i o n ,
an ot li ci - a n d tar m o r e d a n g e r o u s vehi cl e.* A girl o n c e a n d again
sees h e r m o t h e r or m aid f ain tin g a n d v o cifera tin g at th e a p p e a r a n c e
o f a m o u s e ; i f s h e h a s . a f t e r w a r d s t o e s c a j i e f r o m d a n g e r , s h e wi l l
i - at l i er p a s s t l i r o u g l i f l a m e s t h a n t a k e a j i a t e n t w a y , i f o h s t n i c t e d b y
;i n'dicuhis nixs. A i-emarkable e x a m p l e o f t h e f al se J u d g m e n t s
a r i s i n g f r o m t h i s ] >r i nei ] i l e o f a s s o c i a t i o n , is r e c o r d e d hy Herodotus
and . Instill, in reference to tlie w a r o f the Scythians with tlieir
slaves. The slaves, after they had repeatedly rejnilsed several
atta c k s witli arm s, w e r e in c o n t i n e n t l y p u t to flight w h e n t h e i r m a s
t e r s c a m e o u t a g a i n s t t h e m w i t h t h e i r whi ps.
I shall n o w oiler an observation in regard to the appropriate
r e m e d y for th is evil in f lu e n c e o f A s s o c ia tio n .
T h e only mean by which W(! c a n b e e o i n o a w a r e of, c o u n t e r a c t ,
and overcom e, this besetting weakne.ss of onr
Only rpmcdy for the n a t i i r c , is P l i i l o s o ] i l i v , t h e P l i i l o s o p l i y o f t h e
.iifluu.ic of A-.-oci.i- I l i ;i , i ; i ii ; an d this stu d ie d botli in th e
lio u I^ th e I liiIu .'oi)liy _
o f th e H u m a n M in d . c o n s c i o u s i i e s s o f t l ic i ii (l i\ 'i dnal , a n d in t h e h i s
to r y o f t h e speeies. The philosophy o f mind,
as stu d ie d in t h e c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l , e x h i b i t s t o ns t h e
source and n a t u r e o f tlie illusion. I t a c c u s t o m s us t o d i s c r i m i n a t e
t h e casual, from the n e c e s s a r y , c o m b i n a t i o n s o f t l io iig lit; it sliarp-
ens and c o r r o b o r a t e s o u r facul.tie.s, e n c o u r a g e s o u r r e a s o n t o r e v o l t
.against t h e b l i n d j i re for ii iat ion s o f o p i n i o n , a n d fin ally e n a b l e s us t o
b r e a k t l i r o u g l i t h e e n e l i a n t e d c i r c l e w i t h i n wl i i c l i C u s t o m a n d A s s o
ciation bad enclosed us. H u t iii t h e n c c o n i p l i s h i i i e n t o f t h i s end.
w e are g r e a t l y a i d e d b y t h e s t n d y ' o f m a n u n d e r tlie v a r i o u s eir cuin-
staiices which have concurred in modifying his intellectu.al and
moral character. In the g r e a t sjiectaele o f history, w e behold in
dilferent ages an d countries th e p re d o m in a n c e o f different system s
of association, and tliese ages and countries are, consequently,
distinguished by the prevalence o f different s y s t e m s o f opinions.
B u t all is n o t f l u c t u a t i n g ; a n d , a m i d t l i e c e a s e l e s s c l i a n g e s o f a c c i
dental e i r c m i i s t a n c e s a n d prec.arions heliets, w e bel iold s o m e jirinei-
ples e v e r active, an d so m e t r u th s a lw a y s co m rn an d iiig a reco g n itio n .
W e t h u s o b t a i n t h e m C a n s o f d i s c r i m i n a t i n g , in s o f a r a s o u r u n a s
sisted reason is c o n v e r s a n t a b o u t m e r e w o r l d l y c o n c e r n s , b e t w e e n
w h a t is o f u n i v e r s a l and n e c e s s a r y c e r t a i n t y , a n d w h a t is o n l y o f
I I n t r o '/ u r t i o n d P h ilo s o p liia m , L o g ic a , c.. 20. w liic li f o llo w are a ls o fro m .S U r a v e s a n d e .

T h e fx a iD i le , h o w e v e r , is p iv c n as a su p ito fe tl Ed .
cae, a n d not as a l a c i . JTic iw o in s ta n c e s 2 H e r o d , iv . 3. J u s t in ., ii. 5 . E b .
local and tem porary acccjitation ; and, in reference to the latter, in

Avitnessing the influence o f an arbitrary association in inijiosing the
m ost irrational opinions on our fellow-iiKm, onr ey es arc 0 ])cncd,
and Avc arc warned o f the danger from the same illusion to our
selves. A n d as the philosophy o f man affords us at once the in di
cation and the rem edy o f this illusion, so the philosophy of man
does this cxcln siv cly and alone. Our ii-rational associations, our
habits o f groundless ci'cdulity and o f arbitrary skepticism, find no
medicine in the stud y o f aught beyond the doiiiani ol mind itself.
A s G o ethe has avcII observed, ]\[athcmatics rcnio\'c no jArcjn-
d ic e; th ey cannot m itigate obstinacy, or tciiqicr jm rty-sjiirit; in a
Avord, as to any moral inflncnce ujion the mind, th ey arc absolutely
null. Ilciic e AVCm ay avcH explain the aversion o f S cera tcs for
these studies, if carried b e yo n d a very lim ited extent.
T h e n e x t faculty in order is the Reiu-esentativo, or Im agination
pi'opcr, Avhich consists in the greater or less
The K o p r cse iita tiv e pow er o f h o ld in g up ai! ideal object in the
F a c u ltv , o r l in a g iiia - ^ ^ rpi c r> .
. ligh t o f consciousness. I h e eiiergv of Leprc-
t io u I roper. .
sentation, tho u gh d ep e n d en t on R e ten tio n and
R eproduction, is n ot to lie identified Avith these operations. F o r
th ou gh these three functions (I mean R eten tion , Re]jrodnction, and
R ep re se n tation ) im m ed iately suppose, and are im m ed iately deiicnd-
cnt on, each other, th e y are still manifestly discrim inated as differ
ent (pialities o f mind, inasmuch as th e y stand to each other in no
determ in ate ])roportion. W e find, for exam ple, in som e individuals
the cajiaeity o f R eten tio n strong, but the Re])rodiictive and Rejire-
sen tativ e F acu lties sluggish and Avcak. In others, again, the C o n
servative ten acity is feeble, but the R ep ro d u ctiv e and R eju esen ta -
tiv e energies prompt and vivid ; Avhile in others the p ow er of
Reproduction may be vigorous, but Avhat is recalled is never pic
tured in a clear and d istin ct consciousness. It Avill be gen erally,
indeed, admitted, that a strong reten tive m em ory docs n ot infer a
prompt recollection ; and still more, that a strong m em ory and a
])roinpt recollection do not infer a vivid imagination. T h ese, there
fore, though variously confounded b y pliilosop'liers, avc arc war
ranted, I think, in vieAving as elem en ta ry qualities o f mind, Avhich
o u gh t to be th eoretically distin guished. Lim iting, therefore, the
term I m a g i u d t i o n to the mere F a c u lty o f Reju-esenting in a more
or less Aivaeious manner an ideal o b j e c t , this b''aeulty is the
source o f errors Avhich I shall comprise in the fo llo w ing jjaragraph.
1 W erke, x x i i . p . 258. Q u o te d b y S c h e id le r , Psychologie, p. 146.
54
426 LOGIC. L e c t. X X X .
^ CXI. Im agination, or the F a c u lty of R e p re se n tin g with

more or less vivacity a recalled object ot
Par.cu. 4.inineiua- cogiiitiou, is llio soiircc of Fri'ors, both
tioa, a s a source of . . . , ., ,
K rro r. whcii it I S too laiiguul aiid when it is
too vigorous. Ill the former case, the ob
je c t is represented obscurely and indistinctly ; in tbe latter,
the ideal representaiion affords th e illusive appearance o f a
sensible presentation.
A strong im agination, th a t is, th e pow'cr of holding up any ideal

object to the mind in clear and steady colors, is
Exj.iicutioii. f;,eulty necessary to the jioet and to the a r tis t;
N c o e js ity o f . . . 1 * 1 t - i h
i i a lio n
. s c ie. t il,.ilio
111
7. Imt not _
to tliein alone. I t is almost equally 1 J
j,ur.-uitis requisite for the successful cultivation of every
scioiiliiic jm rsu it; and, though differently aj)-
jilied, and different in the character o f its rcpre.seiitation, it may
xvell be doubte<l w hctlier A ristotle did not jiossess as iiowertul an
imagination as Ilonicr. ddie vigor .and jiorfectioii of this faculty is
sea^n, n ot so ninth in th e rejireseiitation of individual objects and
fragiiKMitary sciences, iis in the representation of systems. In the
b e lte r ages o f anticjnity the iierfection, the beauty, o f all works
of taste, w h e th e r in I*oelry, Floqneiice, Scnlj)-
D i v c r s e c lia r a c le r is - . u - . - n r - 1 1
. . . .
lic s o l A r t 111 a n c ie n t
. tnre,
1 aintiiig,
=
or iliisic, was iprmcipally i J
esti-
a n d m o d e r n l im e s . m a t e d froiii t h e S y m m e t r y or p r op or tion o f all
th e jiarts to each other, and to the whole which
th e y to g e th e r c o n s t i t u t e d ; and it was only in subservience to this
general harm ony th a t the bea u ty of the several parts was ajipreci-
ated. Ill th e criticism of m odern tiiiie.s, on the contrary, the reverse
is t r u e ; :ind we are disposed to look more lo th e obtrusive qualities
o f rletails, than to th e keeping and unison o f a whole. O n r works
of art are, in general, like kinds o f assorted patch -w o rk ; n ot sys
tems of p.-irts all subdued in conforinity to one ideal totality, but
((lordiiiaiioiis o f indtqiendcnt fragments, am ong which i x p u r p iir e u s
pdnuns''^ seldom comes amiss. T h e reason o f this difference in
taste seems to be, wliat a t first sight may seem th e reverse, th a t in
antiquity not the Reason b u t th e Im agination was the more vigor
o u s ; th a t the Im agination was able lo rejiresent sim ultaneously u
more eom prchensive sy s te m ; and thus the several parts being re
garded juid v.diieil only as conducive to th e gener.al result, these
parts never obtained th a t indiviibial inqiortance, which would have
fallen to them had they been only created and only considered for
thenisclves. N o w this p o w e r of representing lo th e m ind a com-
jilex .system in all its bearings, is not leas requisite to the philosopher
L k c t. X X X . LOGIC. 427
than to the ))oet, tliongli the re])rescntation ho different in k in d ;

and th e nature of tlie iliiIo.so]diic representations, as n o t concrete
and palpable like the poetical, su])poses a m ore arduous operation,
and, therefore, even a more vigoious faculty. B u t Im agination, in
the one case and in the other, rccpiii-es in pi-oportion to its own
jiower a ])owei-ful in te lle c t; for im agination is no t i)oetry nor
philoso])hy, h n t only the condition of the one and of th e other.
B u t to S])cak now of the E rrors which arise from the disiuopor-
tioii betw een the Im agination and th e Ju d g -
E r r o r s wiiicii a r ise m c n t ; tlioy originate e it h e r in t h e weakness,
fro m tlie (.isijr o p o r - . . . i / i /
t io u b e tw e e n im a .H u a - o* m o r d m a t c S tr e n g th , of t h e formr r.
tio u a i K i J u d - m e n t . l u reg a rd to the errois which arise from the
T iio sc a r is iii- fr o m im bccility o f the Rejn-esentative Faculty, it is
i i i c u t a k i . c s s o t i m a g i- difiiciilt to conccix e how this imbeoilitv
n a t io n .
m ay become a cause o f erroneous ju d g m e n t.
T h e E laborative F acu lty , in ord er to ju d g e , requires an o b je c t,
requires certain differences to he given. N ow , if the imagination
he weak and languid, th e objects represented by it wdll be given in
such confusion and obscurity, th a t their differences are eith er null
or e\anesceiit, and j u d g m e n t thus rendered either impossible, or
possible only with the probability o f error. In these circumstances,
to secure itself from failure, the intellect m u st not a t te m p t to rise
above the actual presentations of sense ; it m ust not a tte m p t any
ideal analysis oi- synthesis, it m ust abandon all free and self
active elaboration, and all hope o f a successful cultivation of
knowledge.
A gain, in regard to th e o])])osite errors, those arising from the
disproportioned vivacity o f imagination, these
F r o m its d i-.p r o p o i- J , , t j . i s casc th e rciiewed
tioiiatw v iv a c it y i v i i ^
or newly-inoUihcu representations m ake an e(iual
impression on the m ind as th e original presentations, and are, con
sequently, liable to be mistaken for the.se. Even d u ring th e perce])-
tion of real ohject.s, a too lively im agination mingles itself with the
observation, which it thus cori'upts and falsifies. T h u s arises w hat
is logically ealle<l th e v itiu m suhre])tionis} T his is frequently seen
in those jn e ten d e d observations m ade by theorists in sup p o rt of
their hypotheses, in which, if even the pos.sihility he left for im agi
nation to interfere, imagination is sure to fill up all th a t the senses
may leave vacant. In this ease the ohsoi'vers are at once dupes and
deceivers, in the words of Tacitus, F in g u n t sim ul cred u n tqu el
1 K r u g , L o g ik , 142 Anm . Ed.

2 H is t. lib . ii c . 8 . S e e Lectures on m eta p h y sic s, p. 54. E d .
428 LOGIC. L k c t. X X X .
In reg.anl to the reineilies for tliese defects of th e R epresentative

F acu lty ; in the former case, the only allevia-
K cnicU iis for th e se pioiioscd for a feeble Imagina-
ilelects of Die Iningi- , . . . , , ,
tion, IS to nnim ale it by the contem]dation and
stu d y of those works of art which arc the jiro-
diicts of a strong P han tasy, and wliieh tend to aw aken in tlie stn-
deiit a eorrespoiiding energy of th a t faculty. On the oth e r liand, a
too powerlid imagination is to be (pielled and regulated hy abstract
tliinking, and the study of jiliilosopliieal, perliajis o f matlieiiialical,
science.
T h e faculty which iie.xt lullows, is the E lnhorative Faculty, Com
parison, or tlie F acu lty of Relations. . This is the U n d e rsta n d in g ,
in its three fmietioiis o f Ctmcejitioii, J u d g m e n t, and Reasoning.
On this faculty take the following paragraph.
^ cm . T h e zVllections and th e L o w er C ognitive F aculties

afford the sources and occasions o f e r r o r;
P a r . cm. 5 . Eiabora. j^,,^ Jg jjj^. Ehihorativc Faciilt}, U nd er-
tiv e P acu U y, as a t t i i ,
source of E rro r. Standing, Comjiarisoii, or .Judgment, which
truly eiTs. T h is faculty does not, hoAvever,
err from strength or over-activity, but from inaction ; and this
inaction arises either I'rom natural Aveakne.s.s, from want o f
exercise, or trom the im p otence o f attention.
I formerly observed th a t error does not lie in the eoiulitions

o f our higher ficiiIties themselves, and th.at
i.xiiiicaiioii. these f'( iilties are not, hy their OAvn laws, deter-
h r r o r rlucs not lie in i i i
th e e o n d it io n .8 o f o u r " ' " '-'I t*' JlldginOlltS Or COnclllSlOllS :
I lig liiT I-'aeuliicR, but
ib ])07Mbli- in li.e ii]j- N a m n e q u c d e c i p i i i i r r a i io , n o c ( le c ip it u n q i i i i i n . 3
]>Iicalion o f th e la w s
.uat-rminaie w .'ir ^liis wcrc otlicrAvisc, all knoAvledge would hc

imjiossihle, the root of our nature Avoiild he a
lie. P ut in the ajijilieation o f tho laws of our higher faculties to
d e te rm in a te eases, m any errors are jiossihle ; and these errors may
actually he occasioned hy a variety o f cireumslances. Thus, it is a
l.aw o f our intelligence, th a t no event, no jilienomenon, can he
hoiight as ahsolntely hegiiiiiiiig to hc ; avc cannot hnt tliink
liat all its eoiistitiieiit elemciils had a virtmil existence jirior
X) their eoneiirrciiee, to iioccssitatc its iiiaiiifcstation to us; Ave
1 C f K n ig , L o g ik , 15G. A n m . E d .
2 K n ig , Ixigik, 14S. E d . [C f. E r ic s, L o g ik , 108 B a c h m a n n , L o g ik , 411.]
'* S e e a b o v e , p. 339 E d .
are thus unable to accord to it more than a relative c o m m e n cem eu l,

in other AVords, aa' c arc constrained to look ujioii it as the elleet o f
an tece d en t causes. N o w tliongli the laAv itse lf o f om- in telligen ce
that a cause there is for ev ery e v e n t be altogetlier ex em p t
from error, y et in tbe application o f this laAv to in dividual cases,
that is, in the attribution o f d eterm inate causes to determ inate
effects, AVC are easily liable to g o Avrong. F o r Ave do not know,
ex cep t from ex perience and induction, what jiarticul.aj* anteceden ts
are the causes o f particular conseq u ents ; and i f our k n o w le d g e o f
this relation bc im perfectly generalized, or if Ave ex ten d it by a
false analogy to cases not included Avithin onr observation, ei'ror is
the inevitable consequence. B u t iu all this there is no fault, no
failure, o f intelligence, there is o n ly a d e ficien c y , a deficiency in
the a ctivity o f in telligen ce, w h ile the W i l l deterinines ns to a d e
cision before the U n d e r sta n d in g has becom e fully conscious o f cer-
t.aintv. T h e defective action of the U n d e r
D e f e c tiv e a c lio n o f '
tlie U iu ie if t a iid iiig Standing m ay arise from three causes. In the
m a y a r ise fr o m ih r c e first place, the facility o f J u d g m e n t m ay by
nature be to o feeble. T h is is the ease in idiots
nei! fbTwalittrnl- "'sak pcrsoiis. In the second place, th o ug h
c e ssa r y e x p e iie n c e (c) uot by miturc in c om p ete n t to ju d g e, the iiUel-
iiic o m p e t e n c y of a t- jpct m ay be Avitliout tlie necessary experience,
may n ot jiossess the gronnds on Avhich a cor
rect j u d g m e n t must be founded. In the third jilacc, and this is
the m ost frequent cause o f error, the failure o f the understanding
is from the in com jietoncy o f that act o f Avill Avhich is called A t t e n
tion. A tte n tio n is tlie volu ntary direction o f the mind upon an
object, with the intention o f fully ajiprehending it. T h e co gn itive
en ergy is thus, as it Avere, concentrated upon a single point. W e ,
therefore, say that the mind collects itsclf, Avhen it b egin s to be
a tte n tiv e ; on the contrary, that it is distracted, Avhen its attention
is uot turned upon an object as it ou gh t to bc. T h is fixing this
concentration, o f the mind upon an object can only be carried to a
certain degree, and continued for a certain time. T h is d egree and
this continuance arc both dejtendent iiimn bodily circumstances; and
th ey are also frequently interrupted or suspended by the intrusion
o f certain collateral objects, whicli are forced upon the mind, either
from without, by a strong and sudden iiiqiression upon the senses, or
from witliin, through the influence o f A sso c ia tio n ; and thcse, when
once obtruded, gradually or at once divert tlie attention from the
original and jirincipal object. I f avc are not siiflicieiitly attentive,
or if the effort Avbicb accompanies the concentration o f the mind
upon a single object be irksome, there arises hurry and thoughtless-
430 LOGIC. L e c t. X X X *
ness in ju d g in g , inasmuch as we j u d g e cither before we have fully

sought out tb e groum ls on whicb our decision o u g h t to proceed, or
have co m pete ntly e.xamined tb eir validity and ctfect. I t is hence
manifest th a t a m u ltitud e o f errors is the inevitable consequence. '
In regard to tlie R egulative F acu lty , Common Sense, I n te l
lig e n ce , cor?, this is not in itself a source
6. R e g u la tiv e F a c - eiTor. EiTors may, however, arise either
u l l y , u o t p r o p e r ly a - i i i i . .
so u rce o f E rror * overlooking th e laws or necessary princi
ples which it does co n ta in ; or by a ttrib u tin g to
it, as necessary and original data, w h a t are only con tin g en t general
izations from cx'iicrieiicc, ainl, consequently, make no p art o f its
com pleinent o f native truths. B u t these error.s, it is evident, are
not to be a ttributed to the R e g u la tin g F acu lty itself, wliicb is only
a jilace or source o f principles, b ut to the im|ierfect operations of
the U n d e r s ta n d in g and Self-conscionsiie.ss, in n ot jirojierly observ
ing and sifting the p hen o m en a which it reveals.
Besides these sources o f E rror, which imm ediately originate in
the several jiowers and faculties of mind, there
R e m o te s o u r c e s o f e . r .i
,, , arc otiicrs oi a remoter origin arising irom the
E rror iii the (IiflTereiit . . . .
h a b its deiermiiiaiod different luibits wliicli are detci-mined by the
by sex, age, b o d ily differences of scx,'' o f age, of bodily constitu-
c o n s tit u tio n , cduca- tJon,' o f education, o f rank, of fortune, of jiro-
' fession. o f intellectilal pursuit. O f these, h o w
ever, it is impossible at present to a tte m p t an analysis; and I shall
only endeavor to afford you a few specimens, and to refer yon
for information in regard to th e others to the best sources.
Intellectual jmrsiiits or favorite studies, inasmuch as these d e te r
mine tbe mind to a one-sided cultivation, th a t
e x a m p le s ncglcct o f Some, and to the dispropor-
,\ one-.-id ed cuiiiva- tioiicfl d e v e lopm e nt of otlicr, o f its faculties, are
lio n o f th e in te lle c tu a l mnoiig the most reiiiavkahle c.insc-s of error.
T h is partial or one-sided cultivation is excmpli-
fhi" exemplified in , t r- i rm .< />
Ibnv different pba-es. f"'*! lltfcrcilt pluiSCS. PllC h rst of
i.xciiiHve ciiiiivaiioii. tlicsc is sliown ill the exclusive cultivation of
I Of iiie powers of powers of Ohscrvatloii, to th e neglect of
oiji-eriaiion. higher faculties of the U nderstan ding. O f
this tvfie are your men of physical science. In this (Icp;irtment of
knowlcflgc there i.s chiefly dem.'indcd a p atient habit of aitentioii to
details, in o rder to d etec t jiheiioniena, and, tlie.se discovered, their
I K r u g . t 1 4 s . A n rn . In s o m e p la c e s 3 [A r is t o t le . R h rl., L. ii. c . 12. C ro u sa z.

s li" l My e lia n g i-d . El. Lesgiqw , I. i. p a rt i. s e c t. i. c li. v. L5, p. 104.]
. r - i (. ,-te w a r t. JCUments, v o l. iii. jiart iii 4 [S e e O ro u sa z, t. i. p. i. s e c t. i. ch .
KfCt, v c h a p i. Works, v o l. iv . p. 2.38 et ser/.] V. p. 01 rt seri,]
L e c t. X X X . LOGIC.' 431
generalization is usually so easy th a t th ere is little exercise afforded

to the higher energies of J n d g n ie n t and Reasoning. I t was Bacons
boast, th a t Iiidnetion, as ap])lied to nature, would etpialize all ta l
ents, level the aristocracy of genius, aeeoiuplish inai vels by coopera
tion and method, and leave little to be done by the force of individ
ual intellects. T h is boast lias been fulfilled. Science has, by the
In d u ctiv e Process, been b roug ht dow n to minds, who previously
would have been ineonipetent for its cultivation, and jdiysieal know l
edge now usefully occupies many who would otherwise have been
w ith out any rational jmrsuit. B u t th e exclusive devotion to sneh
studies, if no t combined with higher and grav e r speculations, tends
to wean the stu d e n t from the more vigorous efforts o f mind,
whieh, though iinamusing and even irksome at th e com m encem ent,
tend, however, to invigorate his nobler powers, and to prepare him
for the final fruition of the highest happiness o f his intellectual
nature.
A partial cultivation o f the intellect, opposite to this, is given
in the exclusive cultivation of M etaphysics and
2 . O f M e ta p iiy sic s. M athem atics. On this snbjeet I m ay refer
3. O f J I a tlie m a tic s . ^ z- at o . .
...
.Stew art referred to.
,,
yon to som e observations ot Mr. b te w a it , in
2
tw o chapters en titled The M etaphysician and
The M athem atician, in the third voliimo o f his Elem ents o f the
P hilosoph y o f the U n m a n M !)uJ, chapters distinguished equally
ly their candor and their dc))th o f observation. On this subject
Mr. S te w a r ts authority is o f the higlicst, inasmuch as he Avas di.s-
tinguished in both the departm en ts o f knoAvledge, th e te n d e n c y o f
'.vhich he so Avell develops.
LECTURE XXXI.
M O D U ÎE D S T O IC H E IO I.O G Y .
S E C T I O N I 1. E R R O R I T S C A U S E S A N D R E M E D I E S .
C. L A N G U A G E D. O B J E C T S OF KNOW LEDGE.
I n niy last Lecture, I concliitlerl th e survey o f the E rro rs which

have th e ir origin in thc conditions and circuin-
III. i.aiigtiage, as ptaiiccs o f th e Several C ognitive Faculties, and
a sourie ol Lri or. .
no\*' proceed to th a t source o f false j u d g m e n t
whieli lies in the imjierfection o f the In s tr u m e n t of th o u g h t and
C."nmmnnie;itioii, I I mean Jâiigiiage.
o c?
YInch controversy lias arisen in regard to th e question, H as
man invented L angunge ? B u t th e differences
lias man invoiitr.i o,,j,qQ have in a g r e a t measni-e arisen from
LflHL'uiicc? A m liig ii- , . . . " , . 7. ,
ill of,hc-que.s.ion. a m big uity or com plexity o f tbe terms, in
which tlie jiroblem has been stated. B y lan-
(ludfp we may mean c ith er the jiower which man jiossesses o f asso
ciating his th o u g h t with signs, or the jiarticular system s o f signs
with which diffen>nt portions o f m a nk ind have actually so associ
ated their thoiight' 4.
T a k in g hmyuorjc in the former sense, it is a natu ra l faculty, an
origin.'il t(>ndency o f mind, and, in this view,
In wliat sonso Lan- nuirc invented language than he
crnagp is n a lu r a l lo , . , , , t 1 o
has invented tlionglit. In fact, tlie jiower ot
th o u g h t and tlie jiower o f language are equally
entitled to be oon'id ered as elem entary f|nalities o f intelligence;
for while they are so different th a t th e y cannot be identified, tliey
are still so reeiproeally nccessjiry tb a t the one cannot exist w ithout
the other. It is true, indeed, th a t jiresentations and rcjiresentations
o f given individual o l i j e e t s m igh t have taken jilace, altlioiigli there
were no siuoi' with wliieli they were inentally connected, and by
w liieh tln-v coiild be overtly exjires.sed ; but .all coiiijilex tiiid facti
tious consiniciious o ut o f these given individual objects, in other
L e c t. X X X I. LOGIC. 433
words, al l notions, concepts, general ideas, oi- t h o u g h t s proper,

w o u ld h a v e been im possible w i t h o u t an association to certain signs,
by wbich their scattered elements m ight be combined in unity,
and th e i r v a g u e a n d e v a n e s c e n t ex iste n ce ob tain a kind o f definite
and f i x e d a n d j j a l j i a b l e i - enl it y. Speech and cogitation are thus the
r e l a t i v e c o n d i t i o n s o f o a e b o t h e r s a c t i v i t y , a n d b o t h c o n c u r t o t b e
a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o f t h e sa m e j o i n t result. Tbe Faculty of T hin k
i n g t b e Pbicidty o f fo rm in g G e n e ra l N o t i o n s b e i n g giv en, this
necessarily tends to enei-gy, b u t the energy of thinking depends
upon the coiictivity o f t b e Pa c u l t y o f S j i e e e h , w h i c h itself tends
equally to energy. These faculties, tb es e tendencies, tbese
energies, t h u s coexist an d have always coexisted; and the result of
their combined action is t h o u g h t in language, and language in
tbongbt. So m u c h for t b e origin o f L a n g u a g e , c o n s id e re d in g e n
eral as a faculty.
But, though tbe Faculty of Speech be natural and necessary,
t h a t its m a n i f e s t a t i o n s are, t o a c e r t a i n e x t e n t .
W a s th e first Ian- f . o n t i n g e i i t a n d ar ti fi ci al , is e v i d e n t f r o m t b e
g u a g e , a c tu a lly sp o- ^ ^
k e n , th e in v e n tio n o f s i m p l e fact, t h a t t h e r e a r e m o r e t h a n a single
m a n , or a n in s p ir a tio n language actually spoken. It may, therefore,
o l tlie D e ity ? asked, W a s tbe first language, actually
sjioken, t h e i n v e n tio n o f m an , o r an inspiration
T h e la tte r h y p o th e - D eity? T h e l a tte r h v p o th e s is cuts, b u t
sj.s c o n s id e r e d ^
does n o t loose t h e k n o t. I t declares th a t ordi
n a r y causes a n d t h e law s o f n a t u r e are insufficient to explain t h e
p h e n o m e n o n , b u t it d oes n o t jirove this insufficiency ; it t h u s vio
lates tb e rule o f P a r c i m o n y , b y p o s t u l a t i n g a second an d hypothet
i cal c a u s e ' t o e x p l a i n an eftect, w h i c h it is n o t shown cannot be
tiecounted for without this violent assumption. Tbe first and
g r e a t e s t d i f i i c u l t y i n t b e q u e s t i o n is t h u s : I t i s n e c e s s a r y t o t h i n k
in o r d e r t o i n v e n t a l a n g u a g e , a n d t h e i n v e n t i o n
D iffic u lty of th e l a u g u a t r e is n e c e s s a r y i n o r d e r t o t h i n k ;
q u e s tio n . . .
for w e cannot think w ith ou t notions, and no
tions are only fixed b y w o rd s.' T h i s ca n o n l y b e so l v e d , as I h a v e
.-aid, b y t h e i iat ni-al a t t r a c t i o n between thought and sjteecb, b y
tlieir secret affinity, w b i c h is s u c h that they suggest and, pari
yjai - s/ q a c c o m p a n y e a c h o t h e r . And in reg a r d to t h e q u e s t i o n ,
W h y , i f sjicech b e a n a t u r a l faculty, it does n o t m an ifest itself like
o th e r natu ral p rinciples in a u n ifo rm m a n n e r , it m a y be an s w e re d
1 S e e R o u sse a u , D iscours sur V O rigin s de V p o u r a p p r e n d r e i p en ser, iis o u t eu b ien p lu s

Inig a l it i p a r m i les H om m es. P r e m ie r e P a r tie . b e so iii e n c o r e d e s a v o ir p e n se r p o u r I r o u v e r
S i les h o m m e s o u t eu b e so iu d e la p a r o le I'art d e la jia r o le . E d .
434 LOGIC. L e c t. XXXI.
tliat the F a c u lty of Speech i.s coiitrollecl and modified in its e.xer-
eisc hy oxtenial eireiimstnnccs, in consecjucnee of which, though its
exertion he natural and necessary, and, therefore, identical in all
men, the sjiecial forms o f its exertion are in a g r e a t degree conven
tional and contingent, and, therefore, diflerent am ong ditferent por-*
tions o f m:mkind.
Considered on one side, languages are the results of onr intelli
gence and its im m utable laws. In eonseipiencc
Languap:c has a gen- they exhibit ill tlioir juOgress and dcvel-
oral and a siiecial ,, , ,
ciaracier opmciit resemblances and connnoii characters
which :dlow ns to conqiare and to recall them
to certain prim itive and essential forms, to evolve a system of
Universal Gr;nnmar. Consi<lered on ano th er side, each language is
the oftspriiig o f ji.-n ticular wants, o f special cireiimstaiiccs, physical
and moral, and o f chance. H enc e it is th a t every language has
]);u-ticnlar forms as it has pccniiar words. L angua g e thus bears
the impress o f luimaii intelligence only in its general outlines.
T h e re is, therefore, to be found reason and ))hiloso]thy in all la n
guages, blit wc shoiihl be w rong in believing th a t reason and jilii-
loso])hv have, in any language, determ ined everything. N o tongue,
how ))crfect soever it may appear, is a com-
N o l a n g u a g e is a pleto and jicrfcct inslrum eiit of human th onght.
licrlfct i n s i r u r a e n t o f . ... ,
b r o m Its very conditions every language must
be imperfect. Tlie Ininian m em ory can only
compass a limited com plem ent o f word.s, but the d a ta of sense, and
still more tlie com binations o f th e understanding, are wholly un
limited in iiiimher. N o langnage can, therefore, he adecpiate to
the ends for wliich it exists; all are imperfect, b u t some are far less
in c om petent in slrnm c n ts than others.
From w hat has now been s.aid, yon will be prepared to find in
L anguage one o f the ]rincipal sources of F r r o r ; but before I go on
to coii''id(r the ]):irliciilar modes in which the Inqierfections of
Langnage are tin' causes o f false ju d g m e n ts, I shall comprise the
general doctrine in the following paragraph.
flA". As the human mind necessarily requires th e aid

of-signs to elaborate, to fix, and to commu-
par. CIV. LanKu.ige. its iiolioiis, and as ^Vrliculate Sounds
a .1 Hourec of E rro r.
are the species of signs which most cffect-
nally airord this aid, Sjicech is, therefore, an indispensable
in''tninient in llie higlier funetion.s o f tliouglit and knowledge.
Lilt as s])eecli i.s a neecssary, bu t not a ])crfeet, iiistrmnent, its
inqicrfection must reiict upon the mind. F o r the JIn ltitu d e
L ect. X X X I . LOGIC. 435
ot Lnngii.agof!, tlio Difilciilty o f tlicir Acquisition, tlicir iieccs-

s:iry InadcMpnicy, ami tlie eoiisc(}iioiit A m biguity of \Vords,
both singly and in coinh ination , these are all eojtions sources
of Illusion and E rror.'
W o have already snfiiciently considered th e reason why tliouglit

is deiiemleiit iqioii some system o f signs or syni-
E x p lic a t io n . internal nerfeetioii ami e.x'teriial
Signs necessary f o r . ,
he i.uernai opoia.ion ^^'P'Tssion.- 1 he analyses ami syntliese.s, the
ofTiionght. d t f o m ] ) o s i t i o n s a m i e o n q i o s i t i o n s , in a w o i d,
the elaborations, jierformed by the U m lerstam l-
ing njion the objects presented by E x te rn a l Pei-ec|ition ami !S(If-
Consciousnoss, and rejiresented by Iin.-igination, these o]>er:Uions
are faint nnd fugitive, ami would have no existence, e \ c n fiir the
eonseions mind, heyoml the m o m e n t o f present consciousness, wei-e
we not able to connect, to ratify, ami to fix them, by g iv ing to
their jiai'ts (wiiicli would otlierwise im m ediately fall asiimh'r) a
perm a n en t nniry, by as so d a tin g them with a sensible symbol, which
we may ai'ways recall at jileasure, and which, when Ieealleil, I'eealls
along with it the characters Mhicli concur in con stitu tin g a notion
or factitious object of intelligenee. .So far signs are iiecessar\' for
the internal operation o f tlionglit itself. B u t for tlic eommuiiiea-
tiori o f th o u g h t from one mimi to another, signs are equally imlis-
]iensahle. F o r i n itself th o u g h t is known, th o u g h t is knowahle,
only to the th in k in g mind itself; ami w ere we
A i . d f o r t l i e c o iT ii ii n - * 1 n
.
incjilii.ii o ( I Ijo u ^ Ik .
, not enalilcfl t o conm
^
'ct certain eomiilenu'iits
i
of
th o u g h t to eertain sensible symbols, :iml by
their means to suggest in oth e r m inds those coinjilemeiUs of
th onglit of which we were conscious in ourselves, we shoiihl mn'er
he .able to coininunie.ate to others w h a t engaged our interest, .and
man would remain for man, if an intelligence a t all, a mere isolated
intelligence.
In regard to the q u e s tio n , W h a t may these sensible symbols
he, by wliieii we tire to conqi.ass such incniortihle effects, it is
needless to sliow th a t mien and gesture, which, to a certain extent,
afford a kind o f natural expression, are tiltogether inadequate to the
double ])urpose o f th o u g h t and coinmiinication, which it is here
required to aeconqilisli. T his double juirpose can he effected only
' K iu g, L o g ik , 145. E d . [Cf. E r n o s li, L o g ik , 10 9. C a r o . L n g i q v f , P a r i. i . c h . i. a rt.

I n i t i fi Ih K tn n a -. S n l i i/ i o r i s : P a t s M h r n ; D i n h c - 9, p. 1 2 1 . C r o u fa z , I'o u ssa iiil ] [C r o u sa z , L o -
'"rt. c. 2 , 5 2 4 . W y ttc iilia c li, P rrrc e p tn P h il, g i q u r , I. iii. part i. sect. iii. c . 2 . ; 6 S f t S fq
i.og. P. iii. c iii p. 9 S . T itto l. Log.T-, j). 2 9 2 . Ton.s.saint, O e /a Peasce. C lis. v iii. .x. E d .]
K ir w iiii, iM g ic k , i. 2 1 4 . E r ic s, S y s t e m iler 2 S e e a b o v e , p 430. E d .
436 LOGIC. L ect. X X X I.
by symbols, Avliich e.xprcss, tlirougb intonations of tbc voice, wbnt

is jtnssing in th e mind. T hese vocal iiiton.itions
lutoiiaiions of Ihe either inarticulntc or articulate. T h e for-
voice tlie oiilv aue-
lUHie #cu#ibic symbols mcrc souiids Or c r ie s ; and, ns such, a n '
of ibousbt mill its expression o f the feelings of which the lower
coiiimmiicaMon aiiimals are also caitablc. T h e la tte r t onslitute
These iiiarliculiite i i i i i
ami uriicuiatc words, aiid tlicsc, as tlic ex]iression ol tlioiiglits
T lie la tte r c o iistiiiite Of iiotioiis, constitute L an g u a g e P r o p e r or
Language Troper Siiccch.' Spcecli, US WC liavc said, as the in-
iio" Language is a g t p u m e n t o f e l a b o r a t i n g , f i x i n g , n n d c o n i m u -
source of Lrror. . ? .
nicating our tliougbts, is a jnineipal mean of
knowledge, nnd even th e indispensable condition on wliich depends
tlic exercise of onr h igh e r cognitive faculties. But, at th e same time,
in consequence ot this very depe ndenc e o f th o u g h t upon language,
inasmuch as language is itself n ot perfect, the u n d ersta n d in g is not
only restrained in its operations, and its higlier developm ent, conse
quently, checked, b u t m a ny occasions are given of positive error.
For, to say no th in g o f 'h e im pe dim e nt ]ircsonted to th e free com-
niiiiiication o f th o u g h t by th e m u ltitu de o f tongues into which
luimaii language is divided, in consequence of whicli all speech
beyond their iiiother-tongiie is ineom]irehensible to those who do
nol make a study o f oth e r iaiigiiages, oven the necurate learning
of :i single langiinire is a tte n d e d with stieli diflieulties, that ]:e;Iinps
there never y e t iias been found an individual who was tliorougbly
acquainted with all tbc words and modes of verbal eomliinntion in
any single la n g u a g e , his m otlier-tongne even not excepted. Liit
the eirciinistance of pi'ineipal inqioiTaneo is,
fbo iiinbigiiity of copious aiul exjircssive soever it may
word- tbo priiiciiial , , . . i . i .
-ource of error origi- be, IK) laimiKiffe
o r ' is eoinnetent
i ndcqnatclv
j . to
1 aiiiig ill Language. dciiotc all jiossilile notioiis, and all possible rela
tions of notions, and fi'om this neccss.ary poverty
f language in all its different degi'ces, a certain inovitalile am bigu
ity arises, both in th e einjiloymont o f single w ords and o f words in
mutual coiiiiex-tion.
As t h i s is t h e piincipul source o f th e e rror o rigina ting in I.,nn-
gmiifc, it will be proper to be a little more
Two oirrnrnMiii r . . s c.vplicit. Aiid l i c r c i t is e x p e d i e n t t o t a k e i u t o
I II m rllii-bi-ad wl.irb ^ ^ l i , .11 .
account tw o eireiimstunees, wliicIi niiitiially at-
>uiiially afTict o:\cU
,ti.,r feel encli otlier. T ho first is, llint ns the vocab-
niary of every language is necessarily finite, it
I- neee-sarily disproportionml to the niiilti])licity, not lo .say infinity,
of tliouglit ; and the second, th a t th e coiii]>lement of w ords in any
1 C f K rug, L o g ik , 145. A nm . Ed.

L e c t. X X X I. LOGIC. 437
g i v e n l a n g u a g e lia s b e e n a l w a y s filled u p Avilh t e r m s s i g n i f i c a n t o f

o b j e c t s a n d r e l a t i o n s o f tlio e .x t e n i a l Avorld, b e f o r e t h e Avant Avas
ex p erien ced o f aa' oixI s to e x p ress tb e objects an d rela tio n s o f the
in te in al.
From the fii'st o f these circnmstance.s, considered excliisivelv
nnd b y itself^ it is manifest that one of Iavo
The vocabulary of a l t e r n a t i v e s m u s t t a k e p l a c e . E i t h e r t h e Avord.s
every language ueces- o i i i ,
sarily fiuiie. Conse- "*st cach d e s ig n a te on ly a single
queiices of this. u o t i o n , a s i n g l e f a s c i c u lu s o f t h o u g l i t , t h e
m u l t i t u d e o f n o t i o n s n o t d e s i g n a t e d b e i n g al-
loAved to p e r i s h , n e v e r o b t a i n i n g m o r e th an a m o m e n ta r y ex ist
e n c e i n t h e m i n d o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l ;/ o r t h e Avords o f a laiigua<>-e
O O
must e a c h b e e m p l o y e d t o d e n o t e a p l u r a l i t y o f e o n c e ii t s . In
t h e f o r m e r ease, a s m a l l a m o u n t o f t h o u g h t Avould b e ex p i-e ss ed ,
b u t t h a t p r e c i s e l y a n d Avithout a m b i g u i t y ; in t h e latter, a large
am ount o f th o u g h t w ould be expressed, b u t th at vaguely and
e qu iv o c ally . O f t h e s e a l t e r n a t i v e s ( e a c h o f Aviiieli h a s t h u s its
advantages and disadvantages), th e l a t t e r is t h e o n e Avhieh h a s
u n i v e r s a l l y b e e n p r e f e r r e d ; a n d , a c c o r d i n g l y , all l a n g u a g e s b y t h e
s a m e Avord e x p r e s s a m u l t i t u d e o f t h o u g h t s , m o r e o r less d i f f e r i n g
from each other. Now , Avhat is t h e c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h i s ? It is
]ilain t h a t i f a Avord h a s m o r e t h a n a single m e a n i n g a tta c h e d
to it, Avhen i t is e m p l o y e d i t c a n n o t o f i t s e l f d ii-e c tly a n d per
e m p to rily su g g e st an y d e f i n i t e t h o u g h t ; all th at it c an d o is
v aguely and h y p o th etica lly to su g g e st a v a rie ty o f different no
tio n s; a n d Ave a r e o b l i g e d from a co n sid era tio n of t h e c o n t e x t ,
o f t h e t e n o r , o f t h e g e n e r a l a n a l o g y , of t h e d i s c o u r s e , t o s u r
m is e, Avitli g i 'o a t e r o r les s a s s u r a n c e , Avitli g i e a t e r o r le s s p r e c i s i o n ,
Avhat p a r t i c u l a r b u n d l e o f c h a r a c t e r s i t Avas i n t e n d e d to convey.
W o r d s , in f a c t, a s l a n g u a g e s are co n stitu ted ,
AVords are m e r e ly i i
. .
h in ts t o th e m m d .
clo noth in g more
^
th a n suggest, are n o th in g
m ore th an h i n t s ; h i n t s , likcAvise, Avhich l e a v e
th e p rin cip al jia rt o f th e process o f in te r p r e ta tio n to be p e rfo rm e d
b y th e m in d o f t li e b e a r e r . In t h i s r e s p e c t , t h e e ffe c t o f Avords
resem bles th e e ffe c t o f an o u tlin e or shade of a connfenance
AA'ith Avhich aa' c a r e f a m i l ia r . I n b o t h cases, t h c m i n d is s t i m u l a t e d
t o fill uj) Avhat is o n l y h i n t e d o r p o i n t e d a t. T h u s it is t h a t t h e
function o f l a n g u a g e is n o t so m u c h t o i n f u s e k n oA vle d ge f r o m
o n e i n t e l l i g e n c e t o a n o t h e r , as t o b r i n g tAvo m i n d s i n t o t h e s a m e
t r a i n o f t i i i n k i n g , a n d t o c o n f in e t h e m t o t h e s a m e t r a c k . I n tin .'
p r o c e d u r e Avliat is c h ie f ly Avonderful, is t h e r a p i d i t y Avith w h i c h t h e
m i n d c o m p a r e s t h e Avord Avith i ts c o rre latio n .s , a n d in g e n e r a l , w i t h
o u t t h e s l i g h t e s t effort, d e c i d e s Avhich a m o n g i t s v a r i o u s m e a n i n g s
438 LOGIC. L i- x t . X X X I .
is tlic one whifli it is here intoiidod to convey. Jjiit how m arvel

lous soevei- he the ease and velocity of this jiroccss o f selection, it
cannot .alw.avs he iicrl'ormed with equal c-ertainty. W o r d s are often
em ployed with a ]>lurality o f m e .in in g s; several of \t liieh may
ipiadriile, ur he supjiosed to quadrate, with the geneial ten or
o f the di-coiirsc. I'h-rur i.s thus po-sible ; and it is also jiroba-
ble, if wo li:i\e :.n}- jirejiossos-ioii in la\oi- of one in te r p re ta
tion ratlici than o f :uiother. So copious a source of error is
the am biguity o f language, th a t a very large proportion of human
coiitroversv lias boon concerning O tbe sense in which certain term s
should be understood ; and m any disputes have even been fiei'cely
waged, in eonsucpienee o f the Jisjiiitaiits being unaw are th a t
th e y acrri'od in ojiinion, and only ditfered in the me.-ining th ey
:Ulaelied to tbe w ords in which th a t o))inioii was exjiressed.
On thi- suhjeet I m ay refer yon to the very ainnsing and very
in -trnclive treatise of W erenlelsins, entitled D e .L o g o m a c h iis
Knnlitoi'U n \.
- I n reg.ird to a i-eincdy for this dcseriplion of eri-or, this lies
exelnsively in a thorough study of thc language
la mf.lv lor fi-ior eiiiplovod ill th e conimnideation of knowledge,
:iriiii.r Iroiii Laii- . . , , ,f .
and 111 an aeqnaintance with the rules oi L riti-
cisni and Interpret.atiun. T h e stn-ly o f l.an-
gnages, when ration.illy jmrsned, is not so n n im jioita nt as many
tondl}' cone(-i\c*; for niiseoneejitioiis most freipieiitly ari.-e solely
from Ml igiior.anee of w o rd s ; and every la nguage may, in a eer-
l.ain sort. 1 k t lewed as a eo m m en tary iqion Logic, inasmuch as
e \ e r y hnign.agc', in like m anner, mirrors in itself the laws of
llionght.
-In iclerence to the rules of Criticism and Interpretation,
thc'se espcci..i!v -Iionld he f ai ni i i . ar t o those who make a study
of the w I'itings of ancient .antliors, as these writings have de
scended to ns o l t e n in a t c r y m u t i h i t e d state, and are conqiosed
in !-ing'n:igi*> w h i c h ai'O n o w d e a d . How m a n y th eo lo gical errors,
.or c xMi i ] le, In.ve only arisen because the divines were eitlier
i ' . n o r a i it of the ] lineiides of Critieisin and Ilernienontie, or
did not p r o j i c r l y a]>]>lv t h e m ! Doctrines originating in a eor-
i|.le<l l ect i . HI , or in a lignrative exjiression, hate thus arisen
: ii'l l i e e n k e e n l v def ei id.ed. Sncli erroi's are best eonihalcd by
I liilolo'j'e .1 wcajions; for l l ie.se j ni l l them ii] a l o n g with l l i ei i '
lo o t'.
- A thoi'ongli k now ledge of languages in general aeenstoins the
mind in.t to rein:.in s- tislied with the husk, h ut to jieiietrate iu,
even to the keiaiel. 'W'itli this know ledge we shall n o t so easily
L ect. X X X I. LOGI C. 439
im a g in e that w 'e n n flcrsta m l a system , w lio n Ave o n ly p ossess

th e la n g u a g e in Avliich it is expressed ; we sliall not co n ceive
t h a t Ave t r u l y r e a s o n , w h e n wo o n ly em p lo y certain em pty w ords
and fo rm IIh e; we sh.-ill not b etray o u rselves into unusual am i
o b sc u re e x p re ssio n s, u n d e r w b ic li our m ean in g m a y bo e a sily m is
t a k e n ; f i n a l l y , Ave s h a l l u o t d i s j u i t e Avith o t h e r s a b o u t A v o r d s , w l i e n
we a r e iu f a c t , a t o n e Avith t h e m in r e g a r d to th in g s. ISo m u c h
f o r t h e e r r o r s w d i i c h o r i og i n a t e i u L a n go u a go e .
As to the last source of Error Avhich I enum erated, the
Objects them selves of o u r ku oA vledge, i t is
IV Source of E rro r, h a r d l y necessa ry to say an y th in g . I t is e v i d e n t
tlie Objects of our , , , ,
K now ledge souic matters are obscure and abstruse,
Avl iile o t h e r s are cle ar an d p alp ab le; aud that,
consequently, th e probability of error is g r e a t e r iu so m e studies
t h a n i t is iu o t h e r s . B u t a s i t is i m p o s s i b l e t o del ivei - a n y s p e c i a l
r u l e s foi' t h e s e c a s e s , d iffe re n t from t h o s e Avhich a r c g i v e n for th e
A c q u isitio n of Ivu o A vlcd ge in gen eral, c o n ce rn in g A v h ie h we are
s o o n t o s p e a k , t h i s s o u r c e o f e r r o r m a y b e, t h e r e f o r e , j i a s s e d o v e r
in silence.
W e have now thus finished the consideration of the Aa r i o u s
S o u r c e s o f Pfi-roi-, a u d
^ CV. The fo llo A v in g ru le s m ay b e g iA m n , a s t h e resu lts

of the fo re g o in g d iscu ssio n , to u c h in g the
P a r. CV. R ulea t-.
tou ch in g th e Causes Causos aiid R em edies of our False J u d g -
and R em edies o f o u r i nCUtS
F a lse Ju d g m en ts.
1 . E n d e a v o r as fa r as jiossible t o o b t a i n
a clear and tborongli insight into the laws o f the U n d e r s t a n d
i ng, a u d o f t h e M e n t a l F a c u l t i e s in g e n e r a l . S tu d y Logic aud
Psychology.
2. A s s i d u o u s l y e x e r c i s e your mind iu the application of
t h e s e laAvs. Lcaiai to t h i n k m eth o d ically .
3. Concentrate your attention in the act of T hinking;
and princijially einjiloy the seasons Avheu the Intellect is
alert, the Passions slumbering, aud no external causes of
d i s t r a c t i o n a t Avoi k.
4. C a r e f u l l y e l i m i n a t e al l f o r e i g n i n t e r e s t s f r o m t h e o b j e c t s
o f y o u r inquiry, a u d alloAv y o u r s e l v e s t o be actuated by the
i n te r e s t o f T r u t h alone.
0 . C o n t r a s t y o u r v a r i o u s c o n v i c t i o n s , y o u r p a s t a n d p r e s e n t
j u d g m e n t s , Avith e a c h o t h e r ; a n d a d m i t n o c o n c l u s i o n as cer-
1 K ru g , L o g ik . i 157. A nm. Ed.

440 LOGIC. L ect. X X X I.
tain, until it has b e e n once and again thoroughly examined,

an d its co rre ctn ess ascertained.
G. Collate your own persuasions with those of otheis;
attentively listen to and weigh, without jirejiossession, tli*
ju d g m e n ts formed by others of tho opinions which you your
selves maintain.*
1 C f. K r u g , L o g ik , 5 160. B a c h m a m i, L o g ik , 416. E d .
LECTURE XXXTI.
M O D I F I E D M E T H O D O L O G Y .
S E C T I O N I. O F T H E A C Q U I S I T I O N OF K N O W L E D G E
I. EXPERIENCE. A. PERSONAL : OBSERVATION
INDUCTION AND ANALOGY.
I n our Inst Lecture, having conclucled the Second Department

o f Concrete Logie, tliat Avhieh treats of the
M ean s b y w h ic l. o u r Caiises o f Error, wc now entei- upon the Third
k n o w le d g e o b ta in s tlie ^ t /> i r t
c h a r a c te r o f r e r t e c - f Concrete or Modihed Logie, that
t io n , v i z , th e A c q iiis i- wliicli coiisidei's the Mcaiis by Avhieh our
t io n a n d tlie C o m m u - K nowledge obtains the character of Pcrfec-
n ic a rio n o f K n o w l- ,. rp, , i
tion. These me.ans mav, in general, be re
edge. ' .
gardcd as two, the Acquisition and the
Communication o f knowledge, and these two means Ave shall,
acco rd in g ly , c o n sid er e o n seen tiv cly a n d ap art.
In regard to the A cquisition o f KiioAvledge, Ave must consider
t h i s by r e f e r e n c e t o t h e d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f knoAvl-
T i;e a c q u is itio n of o f Avliicli t h e h u m a u i n t e l l e c t is c a p a b l e .
K n o w le d g e . . . . . . . . . .
And th is , vicAved in its greatest u n i v e r s a l i t y , is
o f tAvo species.
U n m a n 'k n o A v led g e, I s a y , v i e w e d i n i t s g r e a t e s t u n i v e r s a l i t y , is
o f two k i n d s . For e i t h e r i t is o n e o f Avhich t h e
H u m a n K n o w le d g e objects are given as contingent phaanomena, or
o f t w o k in d s . > . .
o n e in w ln e li t h e o b j e c t s a r e g i v e n as n e c e s s a r y
facts or laws. In the former case, the cognitions are called emph'-
ical, eyipex'ientkd, or o f cxpexdence; in the latter, pux'e, intuitive,
7'ational, or o f xxason, also o f common sense. These two kinds
of knoAvleclge a re , likeAvise, s e v e r a l l y d e n o m i n a t e d coynitions a
postei'iori and coynitions a jmiori. The distinction o f these tAvo
species of cognitions consists ]iroperly in this, that the former
are solely derived from the Presentations of Sense, External and
Internal; Avhereas t h e l a t t e r , t h o u g h first manifested on the occasion
56
442 LOGIC L e c t. X X X II.
of such Pi'esoitations, arc not, liowovor, nicic jirodiicts o f Sense;

on llie eontrai'v, they are laws, in-incijiles, forms, notions, or by
whatever n.ame they may he called, native .and original to the mind,
ih.at is, tbiiinied in, or constituting the very naluic Intelligence;
.-.nd, accordingly, out ot' the mind itself they must be deieloijed,
.and not sought for and aeijnired as foreign and accidental acquisi
tions. .Vs the Prc'sentative Faculties inform ns only of wliat e.xists
and wliat iKqipens, that is, only o f facts and events, such emjiir-
ieal knowledge constilntes no necessary and universal judgm ent;
.all, in this ease, is contingent and partienlar, for even our general-
i/.e<l knowledge has only a relative and ju'ecarions universality,
'i'he cognitions, on the other hand, which are given as Laws of
Alind, are, at once and in llieniselves, universal and necessary. W e
cannot but think tbem, if we tliiuk at .all. The
D.xaiiiR- of the Ac- doctriiu', tliorefore, o f the Acquisition o f Kiiowl-
i.ni.'ilioii ul Kiiowl- , r. ' .i .
, ., , .
i d g e c oiiM sts o l t w o
edge,
.
must consist
. . . .
ot two parts, the nrst treat-
p a n s. ing of the acquisition o f knowledge tbrougli the
(bit:, of F.xperieiuc, tbe second, o f the acquisi
tion o f knowledge ibroiigli tbe data ot Intelligence.'
In regard to the tirst of these sources, viz., Fxjiericnce, this is
either our own ex])erienee or the experience of
I. T h e D o c t r in e o f otlua's, and in either case it is for us a mean of
KxiiLiiu.cc. K\in kiiowledife. It is manifest that the knowledge
o n c e of iw o k in d s . ^
we aetjiiire through onr jiersonal experience, is
far superior in degree to th.at which we obtain throngli the experi
ence ot other men ; inasmiicli as our knowledge o f an object, in
the former ease, is far clearer and more distinct, far more complete
and lively, th.an in the Inller; while at the same time the latter
:il>o till'ords n.s a far inferior eonviction of tbe coireetness and cer-
t.ainly of the cognition lliini the tonner. On the other band, for-
eiiDi is fir snpcaaor to onr jiropei exjterienee in this, that it is
nmeh more eonqn-eliensive, and that, without this, man would be
dejuived of those brancbes of knowledge wliicb are to him o f the
most indispensable importance. Now, as the jirineipal distinction
o f exjicriiaiee is lliiis into onr own experience and into the exjteri-
eiice of others, we must consider it more closely in this twofold
rehitioii.^ First, llnai, o f our Iersonal Fx])erience.
F.xpiaaenee necessarily snpjioses, as its primary condition, certain
jtreseiil.ations by the ficulties o f Fxternal or of Internal Perception,
1 .See F.î-pr. L o g ik , ) TT5. K j>. In re g a rd acr|ttircd e ith e r , 1 , P>y e x p e r ie n c e ; o r , 2'^, O n

to th e a c q u i-iiio n o f k n o w le d g e , a ll k n o w l- o c c a s io n o f e x p e r ie n c e ,
e d g e m a y be c a lle d a cqvired , Inai^niuch a.s it Is 2 Esi-er, L o g ik , S ITd. E d .
.C T . X X X II. LOGIC. 44 3
.and is, t h e r e f o r e , o f t w o k i n d s , a c c o r d i n g a s i t i s c o n v e r s a n t a b o u t
t lie o b j e c t s o f t h e o n e o f t h e s e f aci il li es, o r t h e
1. P e r fo iia i Lxperi- o b j e c t s o f tlie Other. Blit the presentation o f a
f;'.ct o f t h e e . x t e r n a l o r o f t h e i n t e r n a l w o r l d is
n o t at once an ex p erien ce, d ' o t l i i s t h e r e i.s r e q u i r e d a e o i i t i n i i e d
series o f such jiresentations, a c o m p ariso n o f tliese to g e th e r , a m e n
t al s e p a r a t i o n o f t h e d i f f e r e n t , a m e n t ; i l c o m b i n a t i o n o f t h e s i m i l a r ,
and it, t l i e r e f o r e , o v m - a n d above the operation of the Preseiitative
Faei il ti e. s, r e i p i i r e s the eobjieration of the K e t e n t i v e , tlie R epro
ductive, the Rejireseiitative, and the Elaborative Faculties. In
regard to E x p e rie n c e , as the first means by wliieb we acquire
k n o w l e d g e tlirougli t h e le g itim ate use and ap plicatio n o f o u r C o g
nitive Faculties, I give you th e follow ing parag rap h :
^ CVI. T h e F i r s t j Me a n t o w a r d s t h e A c q u i s i t i o n o f K n o w l
edge is E x p e rie n c e {experientin, IpirupLa).
P a r . CVI. E rp e ri- F x p e r ic iic e m a y be, ru d e ly a n d generally,
erai.' described as t h e .a( >prcbensi on o f t h e ji bre-
nomcna of the outer world, presented by
the F aculty of E xternal Perception, and of the plianiomena of
tbc in n er world, jirescnted by the Faculty o f Self-conscioiis-
n c s s ; tliese ji li renoniena b e i n g r e t a i n e d in M e m o r y , r e a d y for
Rejiroduction and Rejiresentation, being also arranged into
order by the U n d e rsta n d in g .
T h i s par.agrajdi, y o n will r e m a r k , affords o n l y a p r e l i m i n a r y v i e w

of the general conditions of Exiierienee. In
E x p lic a t io n . , r* , i ,
t h e f i r s t jil.aee, i t is CA' i dent , t l i a t w i t h o u t the
P r e s e i i t a t i v e , or, as t h e y m ay with equal jiropriety be c a l l e d , t lie
Acquisitive, Faculties of Perception, E xternal and Internal, no
experience Avoiild b e p o s s i b l e . B u t th ese faculties, t h o u g h afford
in g t h e fiindaiiiental c o n d ition o f k n o w l e d g e , d o n o t o f th e m s e lv e s
make up experience. Tliere is, moreover, required of the jilias-
nonien.a o r a p p e a r a n c e s t h e a c e i i m n l a t i o n a n d r eten tio n , tlie r e p r o
duction and representation. Jlem ory, Reminiscence, and Im agina
tion m u st, therefore, also cobjierate. Finally, unless the plnenoinena
be com pared together, and be arranged i n t o classes, a c c o r d i n g t o
t b e i r s i m i l a r i t i e s a n d d i f f e r e n c e s , i t is e v i d e n t t h a t n o j u d g m e n t s ,
no coneliisions, can be formed concerning tliein ; b u t w ithout a
j u d g m e n t k n o w l e d g e is i m p o s s i b l e ; a n d a s e x ] ) d r i e n c e is a k n o w l
edge, co n s e q u e n tly experience is i n q i o s s i b l e . The U ndei'standing
or Elaborative F a c u lty m ust, therefore, likewise cooperate. Maui-
*144 LOGIC. L e c t . X X A JJL
lins lias well e x p r e s s e d the nature of experience in t h e f o l l o w i n g

li nes.
Per viirios usus artciii ex p crien tia fecit,
K xem plo m on strante v ia m . i
A n d A fra n iu s in th e o t h e r s :
U sus m e gcn u it, m ater pcperit Jlcm o ria;

Sop hiam vo ca n t m e Graii, vo s S a p icn tiam . 2
Onr own observation, be i t e x t e r n a l o r i n t e r n a l , is e i t h e r w i t h ,

or w i t h o u t , i n t e n t i o n ; an d it consists e i t h e r o f a
C o m m o n a n d S c ie n - . / > t> i a i ^ . -
_ ,, series 01 Presentations alone, or Abstraction
tin c L x p i-n o u c e . .
and Reflection su p e rv en e , so t h a t t h e p r e s e n t a
tions obtain that conqdction and system which they do not of
tliemselvos possess. In the former case, the experience may be
e:dled a n U n le a rn e d o r a C o m m o n ; i n t l i o l a t t e r , a l e a r n e d o r
S c io i ti ji c E x p erien ce. I n t e n t i o n a l a n d r e f l e c t i v e e x j i e r i e n c e i s c a l l e d
O bserra tion . O b s e r v a t i o n i s o f t w o k i n d s ; f o r
obsLTvatioii, w h a t. eiliior tlic ohjcets wl i i cI i it considers remain
o r Iw o Ob- , , . ,
- c r v a tio ii P r o p e r , a n d
. i i i i cl i . ' i ngcd

, o r , Ip r e v i o u s t o i t s a pI iIi l i c a t i o n ,; t h e vj
Exieiimeiit. fire m a d e t o u n d e r g o ccr t . aii i n r h i t r a r y c h a n g e s ,
o r :)!(' p l a c e d in c e r t a i n i a c t i t i o u s r e la ti on s. In
t h e l a tte r case, t h e o b se rv a tio n c o n t a i n s t h e sjiecific n a m e o f E x -
perirm-nt. Ob. s er x a t i o i i a n d e x p e r i m e n t d o n o t , t h e r e f o r e , c o n s t i t u t e
opjuxite or tw o d i f f e r e n t j i r o c e d i i r e . s , i l i e l a t t e r is, i n projiricty,
o n l y a ce r t : i i i i s u b o' . ' di i i r . t o i i i o d i f i c . a t i o n o f t l i e f o r m e r ; for, w h i l e
oliservaiioii may aceomplish its c u d w ithout experiment, experi
m e n t without observation is i m p o s s i b l e . Observation and exjieri-
ni Pi it a r c m a n i f e s t l y e x c l u s i v e l y c o m p e t e n t u p o n t h e o b j e c t s o f o u r
einpiricnl k n o w l c l g e ; a n d t h e y coojieratc, equ ally an d in l i k e m a n
ner, to the jirogress of that knowledge, partly by establishing,
p a r tly h y corre ctin g, jiartly b y : mi i li fy in g it. Under observation,
t h e r e f o r e , is n o t t o b e n i i d o r s t o o d a c o m m o n or niilcarned expcri-
(Mice, wbicli o b t i ' u d ( S i t s e l f upon every one endowed with the
o r d i n a r y l . a c i i l t i e s o f Scns<! a n d U n d e r s t a n d i n g , b u t an in ten tio n al
.iiid c o n t i n u e d ap jd ieatio n o f t h e faculties o f Jêrccption, eoiiibined
with a n a b s t r a c t i v e a n d r el l e e t i v i * a t t e n t i o n t o a n o b j e c t o r c l a s s o f
( i bjeet s, a m o r e a c e u r . a t c k n o w l e d g e o f wh i c l i , i t is p r o p o s e d , b y t h e
observation, to aecomplish. Rut in cirder that the observation
sh o u ld accomjilish this en d , m o r e especially w h e n t h e objects are
1 I 01.
2 F ragn tfn tu n i e A'tlla. V id e Corjtui P o eta ru m L a tin o r u m , v o l. ii. p. 1513, L o n d . 1713. E D
L e c t. X X X II. LO G IC . 445
numerous, and a systematic c o m j i l e m e n t o f c o g n i t i o n s is t l i e c u d

p r o p o s e d , i t is n e c e s s a r y t l i : i t w e s l i o u l d k n o w
Pra'cogii'.ta of Ob- c e r t a i n j i n e c o g i i i t a , 1. AVl i a t w e o i i g l i t t o
servatiou. j o o
o b s e r v e ; 2. H o w w e o u g l i t t o o b s e r v e ; a n d 3.
By w h a t m eans arc the d ata of observation to be reduced to sys
tem. TIu.i f i r s t o f t h e s e c o n c e r n s t h e O b j e c t ; t h e s e c o n d , t h e I'ro-
cednre; tlie third, the scientific Com pletion, of the observations.
I t is p r o p e r t o m a k e s o m e g c n e i - a l o b s e r v a t i o n s in r e g a r d t o t h e s e ,
in t h e i r o r d e r ; a n d first, o f t h e O b j e c t o f o b s e r v a t i o n , t b e xeliut
w e oiiglit to o b s e r v e .
T h e O b j e c t o f O b s e r v a t i o n can only bc som e given and deter
m inate pliainomenon, and this phajnomenoii ei -
Kirst, The Object t l i c r ail e x t e r n a l o r ai l i n t e r n a l . T l u - o u g l i o b s e r v a -
t'nii, w h e t h e r e x t e r n a l or in te r n a l, t h e r e a r e fo u r
This fourfold.
se vera l c o g n i t i o n s whicli w e jiropos e t o c o m p a s s ,
viz., t o a s c e r t a i n 1 . W l i a t t l i e P l u e n o m e n a t h e m s e l v e s a r e ; 2 ,
W l i a t a r e t h e C o n d i t i o n s o f t l i c i r R e a l i t y ; 3. W h a t a r e t h e C a u s e s
o f t h e i r - E x i s t c n c e ; 4. W l i a t i s t h e O r d e r o f t h e i r C o n s e c u t i o n .
In r e g a r d t o w h a t t l i e ] ) ha 3n o m e n a t h e m s e l v e s a r e { q u i d sbxt),
t h a t is, i n r e g a r d t o w h a t c o n s t i t u t e s t h e i r j i eci i -
p . \Miat the 1 ha?- jp jg e v i d e n t , m u s t b o t h e
n on n e n a . a r e .
liriinary m a t t e r o f co n sid eratio n , it b e i n g a lw a y s
s i i p ] ) o s e d t i i a t t l i e f a c t ( t h e a n sit) o f t h e ] > h a e n o n i e i i o n i t s e l f h a s
been established.* T o t h i s t h e r e i s r e q u i r e d , a b o v e al l , a c l e a r a n d
d istin ct P r e s e n t a t i o n or R e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f th e object. In order to
obtain t h i s , it b e h o o v e s n s t o a n a l y z e , t o d i s -
iii tiieir individual member, th e c o n stitu e n t parts o f the object,
necuiiarities and con- i
a n d t o t a k e i n t o p r o x i m a t e a c c o u n t tl iose cfiar-
ti-asls. _ *
a c t e r s w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e t h e o b j e c t , t h a t is, w h i c h
make itto bc wlnlt it is, a n d n o t l i i n g I n i t w h a t i t is. This being
jierformed, w c m u s t proceed to c o m p a r e it w ith o t h e r objects, an d
with those esjiecially which bear to it the strongest similarity,
t a k i n g a ccu rate n o te a lw a y s o f th o se p o in ts in w h ich t h e y re c ip ro
cally r e s e m b l e a n d in w h i c h t h e y r e c i p r o c a l ly d is a g r e e .
B i l l i i is n o t e n o u g l i t o c o n s i d e r t h e s e v e r a l ] i h a e n o m e i i a i n t h e i r
in d iv id u al peculiarities a n d contrasts, in w h a t
As under determi- t h e y a r e , a n d i n w h a t t h e y a r e n o t , i t is a l s o
nate genera and spe- . . , . , *, , , . ^
requisite to brin g th e m u n d e r d e te rm in a te g e n
e r a a n d sjiecics. To this end w e must, having
obtained (as p rev io usly ])rescribcd) a clear an d distin ct k n o w l e d g e
o f t h e s e v e r a l j i l i a e n o m e n a in t h e i r e s s e n t i a l s i m i l a r i t i e s a n d difter-
e n c e s , l o o k a w a y o r a b s t r a c t f r o m t b e l a t t e r , t h e di f fer eii cv- s, a n d
1 B etter the A ristotelic questions, A n S it^ etc. [See Lectures on M etaphysics., p. 4V. - E d .]
446 LOGIC. L kct. X X X II.
coinprcliciul llie former, th e simil.-irities, in a eompeiulions and

clinraeteristic notion, under an apjiropriate name.
^Vhon the distinctive jieciiliarities of the jih.enomena have hecn
thus definitively reeogni/.ed, the second qiies-
2^. AVhat th e C o n d i- . ,,7 , , .1 t a
. r . I
lio n s o f t lie ir l l e a l i l y . .
e m e r Pg e s, , \\ hat are. .the Conditions of
tlieir Reality. T h ese coiiditiuis are com monly
called R equisites, and u n d er requisite we must iiiiderstniid all th a t
m u st lia\ e jireccdod, hefore the jiha'iioiiiena could follow. In order
to discover the roijiiisites, we take a n n m h e r of analogous cases, or
eases similar in kind, and imjiiire w hat are the circumstances un d er
Avliieh the jiha'iiomenon always arises, if it docs arise, and Avliat are
the eireiiinstances u n d e r w hich it neve r arises; and then, after a
com jietent ohservation o f in dividual cases, we construct th e general
ju d g m e n t, th a t th e jiliieiiomenon never occurs unless this or th a t
oth e r jiliaMiomeiioii has jireceded, or a t least aecomjiaiiicd, it. Here,
however, it m u st ho noticed, th a t noth in g can he viewed as a requi
site which adm its o f any, even the smallest, e.vecjition.
T h e requisite conditions heing discovered, th e th ird question
arises, W h a t are the Causes of the Pluenom -
3'. A\ hat the ( au.ces A cco rd in g to the cu rre n t doctrine, the
o f llie r h iP iio n ie n a .
causes o f ])lio?noinc)KV inv n ot to be eonfoniided
with their , for altlimigli a jilia3iioiiieiion no more oecurs
w ith o u t its reijiiisite than w itlioiit its cause, still, the requisite h eing
g iv en , the jiliaMiomenoii does not jiccessarily follow, and, indeed,
very frequently does n ot ensue. On the contrary, i f the cause
occurs, th e jilia'iionieiioii must occur also. In other words, the
requisite or condition is that w ith o u t which the jiluenomeiioii never
is ; the eau.se, on the other li;ind, is that through Avliicli it alw ays is.
'riiiis an eniotioii o f jiity never arises w ith ou t a knoAvledge o f the
misfortune o f an oth er; hut so little docs this k n m vled g c necessitate
that em otion, that its ojijiosite, a Iccliiig o f rejoicing, coinjilaccncy,
at siicli siilfering may ensue ; whereas the k n o w le d g e o f anothers
nii'fortiine inn''t he f<>IIowe<l hv a .sentiment o f J'ity, if avc are j)re-
disjiO'cd in favor o f the jiersoii to wlioin the inisfortiiiie has oe-
enrred. In this vicAV, the k n o w led g e o f anotlu'rs misfortune is
only a r e q u i s i t e ; Avhereas our favoi-ahle jn-edisjiositioii constitutes
the cause. Jt must, howcA'er, he adniiue<l, tliat in different rela
tions one and the same eireum stance m ay he hoth reijnisite and
c a u s e ; ' and, in jioint o f fact, it would he moi'e correct to consider
the e;nisc a.s the w h ole sum o f antecedents, Avilhont wliieli the plia3-
nom cnon never does take jilaee, and Avith Avliicli it alw ays must.
1 I'jiBer, L o g ik , 148. E d.
L e c t. X X X II. LOGIC. 447
Wliiit arc commonly called requisites, are thus, in truth, only jiartial
causes; Avhat are called causes, only proximate requisites.
In the fourth place, having ascertained the essential qualities,
the Conditions and the Causes of ]ili;enomenn,
4 . A\ h at tlie O rd er ^ emerges, Wliat is the
o f llie ir C o n se c n lio n . ^ , . , . , , -7 , 1 0 i
Order 111 which they arc manifested t and tins
being ascertained, the observation has accoiiqdished its cnd. This
question apjilies either to a plia3iiomeiion eonsidered in itscli, or to a
jdiaiiioiiienon considered in relation to others. In relation to itself,
tlie (|uestioii concerns only the time of its origin, of its ooutimifiiice,
and of its termination ; in relation to others, it concerns the recip-
roeal cousocution in whieh the several jdnenomciia apjicar. '
Wc now go on to the Second Praicuguituni, the Alanner of
Observation, H ow we are to observe. What
Second,Ihe 5ian ^vc have liitliorto spokcii o f the Object can
ner of Oh-ervafion , , , . , 7 0 -
be known only in one way, tlic way ot Scien
tific Observation. It therefore remains to be asked, How must
llie observ.ation bc instituted, so as to afford us a sati.sfactory result
in regard to all the four sides on whicli it behooves an object to bo
observed ? Iir the first place, as preliminary to
f rop er s ta le o f observation, it is required that the observing
(h e o h s e r v in g m in d . . . . .. i i 1 .
mind be tranquil aud coraposetl, be exempt
from prejudice, partiality, aud projiossession, and be actuated by
no other iiiterc.st than tho discovery of truth. TraiiqiiilHty and
composure of mind are of peculiar importance in our observation of
the ])linenomena of the internal world; for these pha3noinena are not,
like those of the external, perccjitible by sense, enclosed in space,
continuous aud divisible; and they follow each other in such num
bers, and with such a rapidity, that they are at best observable with
difficulty, often losing even thcir existence by the interference of
the observing, the reflective energy, itself. Bnt that the obser
vation slionld bc always conducted iu the calm and collected state
of mind required to purify this condition, wc must bo careful to
obtain, more and more, a mastery ovcr tho Attention, so as to turn
it with full force iqion a single aspect of the phajnomena, and, conse
quently, to abstract it altogether from every other. Its projier func
tion is to contemplate the objects of observation tranquilly, eoutinu-
onsly, and without anxiety for the result; and this, likewise, without
too intense an activity or too vigorous an apjilication of its forces.
But the observation and concomitant energy of attention will be
without result, unless wc previously well consider what precise
objeet or objects wo are now to observe. Nor will onr cxjierience
1 Esser, L o g ik , 148. Ed.

446' LOGIC. L e c t . X X X I l.
obtain an answer to tbe tjnesiion jirojioscd for it to solve, unless

that question be of such a natu re as will anim ate
2 . c o i i d i i i o i i s o f th e observing faculties by some stimulus, ami
.|iie > n o u to he iie t tr - them a (lotenn iuatc direction. W h e r e this
in iu e ti by ih e o b se r v a - p
lion is no t the ease, a tten tion does no t effect any
thing, nay, it does not operate a t all. On this
account such psychological questions as the following : W h a t takes
jtlace in the jirocess o f Self-eonsciousncss, of Perccjition, of
Vision, o f H earing, of Im aginatio n, etc., can n o t he a n
swered, as thus absolutely stated, th a t is, w itho ut reference to
some d eterm ina te object. B u t if I jn-ojiosc the jirohlcra, W h a t
takes ]ilaee when I see this or th a t object, or b e tte r still, when I seo
this table, th e atten tio n is stim ulated and directed, and oven a
child can give res]ionsc.s, which, if properly illustrated and ex
plained, will afford a solution to the problem. If, therefore, the
question upon th e object of observation lie too vague and general,
so th a t the a ttention is no t suitably excited and ajiplicd, this
question must he (divided and snh.Iividcd into others more par-
tienl.-ir, and this process m ust be continued nnlil wc reach a ques
tion which affords th e requisite conditions. W e should, therefore,
determ ine as closely as possible the object itself, and the phases in
whicli we wish to observe it, sc]>arate from it all foreign or a d v e n ti
tious parts, resolve every qncstion into its constitu e n t elements,
(mnneiate each of these as sjieeiany as jiossihle, and never couch it
in vairne and general exjiressions. B u t here we m u st at th e same
linu* lake care that the object lie not so torn and m angled th a t the
attention feels no longer any attractio n to the several jiarts, or th a t
the several jiarts can no longer he \ie w e d in their natural connec
tion. So much it i.s jiossible to say in general, to n e h in g th e M a n
ner in which observation o u g h t to lie c.ai'ried on ; w h at m ay further
he a<hled nmler this head, dcjiends upon the particu lar n atu re of
the objects to he ohservcil. '
In this manner, then, m ust wo proceed, until all has been
accomplished which the jirolilem, to he answered by the observa
tion, jioinied out. W h e n tlie observation is eoneluded, an aeeiirate
record or notation ol' wliat has Vieen observed is of use, in o rder to
enable us to siqqily w h at is found w anting in our subse quent obser
vation. J f we have accum ulated a consideraljle ajijiaratns of re
sults, ill relation to the oliject we observe, it is projier to lake a
survey of t h e s e ; from w hat is found defective, new questions m ust
he evolved, and an answ er to these so u g h t out th ro u g h new obser-
I l-> 9 e r. Iôgik, i 149 E d

L ect. XXXII. LOGIC. 449
vntions. W licn tlie inquiry li:is r.llniiicd it.s is.suc, a ta b u lar view of
all the observations made upon the .subject is convenient, to afford
a consjiectu.s of the Avliole, and as an aid to the memory. B u t bow
(and this is the 'Lhird P recogn itio n) individual
T h i r d , - T l i e m ea n s observations uro to be built up iuto a system atic
b y w in c b tb c d a ta o f whole, is lo be souglit for iiartly from the nature
O b.servation arc to b e . .
re d u c e d to S y s te m . o f s e i e u c e 111 g e n e r a l , ] ) a r t l y f r o m the n ature of
' th e jiu rtic u la r e m jiirie a l sc ie n c e fo r th e c o n s tit u
t io n o f w h ic l i t h e o b s e r v a t i o n is a p p l i e d . N o r is w l ia t is t lin s s o n g li t
d iffic u lt to fin d. I t is :i t o n c e e v i d e n t , t l i a l :i s y n t h e t i c a r r a n g e m e n t
is l e a s t a p p l i c a b l e in t h e e m j i i r i c a l s c ie n c e s . F o r, an terio r to ob ser
v atio n , th e o b je c t is a b s o l u t e l y unknown ; a n d it is o n l y t h r o u g h
o b s e rv a tio n t h a t it b e c o m e s a m a t t e r o f s c ie n c e . W c can, th e re fo re,
o n ly g o to w o r k in a p ro b lem atic or in te rro g a tive m an ner, an d it
is im p o ssib le to c o m m e n c e by a s s e r t o r y p r o j i o s i t i o n s , o f w h i c h Ave
aftcrA vard s le ad th e d e m o n s t r a t io n . W e m u st, th erefo re, d eterm in e
t h e o b j e c t on all s i d e s , in s o fiir ns o b s e r v a t i o n is c o m p e t e n t t o t h i s ;
Ave m n s t a n a ly z e e v e r y q u estio n in to its su b o rd in a te q u estio n s, an d
e a c h o f t h e s e m u s t fin d its an sA ver in o b s e r v a t i o n . The system atic
o r d e r is t h u s g i v e n n a t u r a l l y a n d o f i t s e l f ; a n d in t h i s [ i r o c e d u r e i t
is i n q i o s s i b l e t h a t it s h o u l d n o t b e g i v e n . B u t fo r a c o m iir e b e n s iv e
an d all-sid e d s y s t e m o f em jiiric al k n o A v le d g e , i t is n o t s u f f i c i e n t t o
p ossess th e w h o le d a ta o f o b se rv a tio n , to have co lle cte d these to
g e t h e r , a n d to h a v e a r r a n g e d t h e m a c c o r d i n g to s o m e e x t e r n a l jirin -
e i p l e ; it is, lik cA v is e , r e q u i s i t e that w e h ave a tb o ro u g h -g o in g p rin
c ip le o f e x p la n a tio n , e v e n th o u g h th is e x p la n a t io n be im p o ssib le in
the Ava y o f o b se rva tio n , and a pOAVer o f j u d g i n g o f the d ata, ac
c o r d i n g t o u n i v e r s a l laAvs, a l t h o u g h t h e s e u n i v e r s a l I uaa^s m a y n o t b e
d iscove re d b y e x p e r ie n c e alon e. T h e s e tAvo e n d s a r e a c c o m p l i s h e d
b y d ifferen t m ean s. T h e f o r m e r Ave c o m j i a s s b y t h e a i d o f H y p o t h
esis, tlie la t t e r , b y t h e aid o f I n d u c tio n and A n a lo g y . ' O f these
in d etail. In regard to H y p o th e sis, I g ive yon the fo lloA vin g
paragraph.
^ C V I I. W h e n a jihaBnomenon is presented, which can be

explained by no princijile afforded through
Par. cATii. Hypoth- Expcricnce, Ave feel discontented and im-
e s is , w hat.
easy; a n d th e r e a rises an effort to d iscover
som e cause A v h ic b m ay, at least jiroA 'iso rily , a c c o u n t for th e
o u tsta n d in g p h aen o m en o n ; a n d tb is cau se is f i n a l l y r e c o g n i z e d
as v alid and tru e , if, tb ro iig h it, tiie g iv en jrh a m o m e n o n is
1 Esser, L o g ik . 150. Ed.

57
450 LOGIC. L kct. XXXl
found to obtain a full aud perfect explanation. T h e jiidgniei.

iu Avliieh a phauioiucnou is referred to such a problem atic
cause, is called H ypoth esis}
IIv])otbescs have thus no oth e r end than to satisfy th e desire of

th e mind to reduce the objects of its know ledge
Kxpiicaiion. nnitv and system ; and th ey do this in recall-
I ly p o tb e .-is , its e n d . _ ^ j i j ^ ^
ing tliein, a d in te rim , to some principle, throngh
Avhich the mind is entiblod to coinprelicnd tbeni. From tins \ iew
o f tlieir nature, it is iminifest how far they tire jiennissible, and bow
far th e y are even useful iind ex jiedicnt; th ro w in g .iltogether out of
account the jiossibility, th a t wlnit is a t fir.st assumed as hyjiothetieal,
nniy, siihseqnently, he proved true.
W h e n onr exjierienee h:is revealed to ns a certain corresjiondcnce
am ong a nninhci* o f objects, we arc determ ined, by :;n original prin
ciple o f onr nature, to siqijiose the existence of a more extensive
corresjiondenee th an o n r observation Inis alrctidy proved, or may
ev er be able to cstabiisb. T h is te n d e n c y to gener.alizc our know l
ed ge by th e ju d g m e n t, t h a t where mncb lias been found accord
ant, all will bo found accordant, is not ju'operly a conclusion
deduced from premises, b ut an original jirineiple o f our nature,
which Ave m ay c.'ill tliat o f L o yic(d , or perh:i|)s better, th a t o f P h i l o -
sophh'fd, P r ts ii m j iti n n . J'liis P resum ption is o f tw o k in ds; it i.
either Tnduction or An.alogy, wliieli, though usually coufoimdcd.
are, liowever, to b(! carefully distinguislied. I shall commence the
consideration o f these by the following paragraph.
^ CVm. I f we lia\c uniform ly observed th a t a un m b c r of

olqeets of tlie same el.ass (genus or species)
Par cviii. Indue- posscss ill eomiiioii a certain attribute, AVe
tion and A n a lo g y . * _
are disjjo.sed lo couclnde that this attribute
is joss('ssed by all the objects of th a t class. J'liis conclusion is
{irojicrly eiilled an T n f -rence o f In d u clio n . Ag;iin, if we liave
observed tli.at tw o or more thin gs agree in several internal and
c.'-seiiti;il cii.ar.'icters, avc* are disposed to conclude th a t they
agree, likewise, in all o th e r essential cliaracters, th a t is, that
they ai'e eonstitiienls o f the same class (genu s or species).
J'his eonehision is properly called an I n fe ren ce o f A n a i o y y .
J'he prineiple by whieli, in either c.ase, we arc disposed lo
extend onr inferences beyond the limits of experience, is a n.at-
ural or iilliinate jirinciplc o f intelligence ; and m ay be called
1 U ig ik . h j i I'/i. iu clu re s on iX 'tlaphysics, p 117 el seq. ~ E d

L ect. X X X I I. LOGIC. 451
the J i r i n e i p l e o f L o g ic a l , o r , m o r e j i r o p e i l y, o f P h il o s o p h ic a l
P r e s u m p d io n ?
The reasoning hy Induction and the reasoning hy Analogy

h a v e this in c o m m o n , tliat t h e y b o th conclude
E x p lic a t io n . froi i i s o i n e t l i i i i g o b s e r v e d t o s o m e t h i n g n o t o b -
I iid n c fio ii a n d A n a l- i
, . served ; iro m so in etliiiig w itliiii to so m eth in "
o g y , llie ir a g r e e- .
m en i a n d d iffe r en ce . beyond t h e spli cr c o f a c t u a l exjiei'ieiice. They
differ, l i o w e v e r , in t b i s , t l ia t, in Induction, that
wl i i c l i is o b s e r v e d and from w hich the i n f e r e n c e is d r a w n to that
w h i c h i s n o t o b s e r v e d , is a u n i t y in j i l u r a l i t y ; w h e r e a s , in A n a l o g y ,
i t is a j i l n r a l i t y i n u n i t y . I n o t h e r w o r d s , in I n d i i c t i m i , w e l o o k t o
t h e o n e in t h e m a n y ; in A n a l o g y avc lo o k to t h e m a n y in t h e o n e ;
a n d Avliile i n b o t h w e c o n c l u d e t o t l i e u n i t y i n t o t a l i t y , Ave d o t b i s ,
in Indu ction, from the recognized u n i t y in p l u r a l i t y , in A n a l o g y ,
from the recognized j i li ir a li t y in unity. T h u s , as i n d u c t i o n rests
i i j)on the J ir inei pl e, that Avhat belongs (or does not belong) to
m a n y things of the sam e kind, belongs (or docs n ot belong) t o all
tilings o f the sa m e k i n d ; so a n a l o g y r es ts njion the jirincijile,
t h a t t h in g s whicii have m a n y o b s e r v e d a t t r i b u t e s in c o m m o n , h a v e
o t h e r n o t o b s e r v e d a t t r i b u t e s i n c o n i i i i o n l i keAvi se. I t is b a i ' d l y
necessary to r e m a r k t h a t we are now sjieaking o f In d u c tio n and
A n a l o g y , n o t as jirineijiles o f P u r e Logic, and as n ec e s sita te d b y
the fundam ental l a w s o f t l i o n g b t , b n t o f tliese as n i c a n s o f a c q u i r
ing know ledge, and as l e g i t i m a t e d b y tlie co n d itio n s o f objective
reality. I n P u r e L tl g ic , A n a l o g y l ias n o p l a c e , a n d o n l y t h a t i n d u c
tion is a d m i t t e d , i n w h i e b all the several jiarts arc su p p o s e d to
legitim ate the inference to the whole. Applied I n d u c t i o n , on the
co ntrary , rests on the constancy, the nniformity of nature, and
on th e in stinctive exjiectation w e h av e of this stability. This con
s t i t u t e s w h a t h a s b e e n c a l l e d t h e p r i n c i p l e o f L o g ic a l P resu u ijition ,
t h o u g h j i e r b a j i s i t m i g l i t , w i t h g r e a t e r j . i r oj i r i e t y, bc' c a l l e d t h e j i r i n-
c i j i l e o f J^hilos(>2 >hic<d L r e s n m p ti o n . W e shall n o w c o n s i d e r t h e s e
s e v e r a l l y ; a n d , first, o f I i u b i c t i o n .
A n I n d u c t i o n is t h e e n u m e r a t i o n o f t h e p a r t s , in o r d e r t o fegi ti-
m a t e a j u d g m e n t in r e g a r d t o t h e Avhole. X o w .
I n d u c t io n . w h a t. ^ o
t h e Jiarts m ay c ith er be in d iv id u a ls o r jia rtic u -
lar.s, s t r i c t l y s o called. I s a y s t r i c t l y so called, for y o u a r e a w a r e
1 Of. Es.'Cr, L ogik, 1 40,152. K r u g , L ogik, 3 [C f. Abu A li (A v ic e n n c ) Viri D o cti. D r Log-

1 0 6 .1 0 7 ,16S.E l). [ W o lf , Phil. Ita tio n n lis, ^ i~ 9. ica. Poem a, 1. 190. ( lu S c h m fild e rs. D oruinenta
U en> ch, Si/stem n L ogiru m . ( 5 7 2 ,5 7 3 N u n iie - Philosophic- A rabuin, p. 1 Uonii.T . ls.36. Zuba-
siu s, De C oiishliitionf A rtis Dinlectica;, ]). 126.] r c lla . O p,ro Logicn. D e N nlura Logicee, L . i. C
2 E sser, L ogik, 152. E d . 18, p. 45.]
452 LOGIC. L k ct. X X X Il.
tli.at t h e t e r m p a rtic u la i' is v e r y c o m m o n l y e m j i l o y c i l , n o t o n ly to

denote the s p e e i ( s, ns c o n t a i n e d under :i g e n u s , b u t , l i k e w i s e , t o
tlenote tbe i n d i v i d u a l , as c o n t a i n e d u n d e r :i s p e c i e s . U s i n g , li ow-
ev cr, t h e t w o t e r m s in t b e i r j i r o p c r si gnific at io ns , I say, i f t b e jiarts
are individual o r s i n g u l a r t h i n g s , t b e i n d u c t i o n i s t h e n c a l l e d Tndi-
vid ita l: w b e r c n s if t h e p a r t s be sp ecies or subal-
of tw o k in d ', In - geiicra, tbe induction then obtains the
d iv id u a l a u d Special ^
name of Special. An example of the I nc l i -
vidiial I n d u c t i o n is g i v e n , w e r e w e t o a r g u e t l n i s , M e r c u ry ,
Venus, (he E a r t h , J fa r s , etc., a re bodies in theinsd ces opaqu e, a n d
irhich borroxo th eir lig h t f r o m (he sun. P u t fSIercarg, ]''enus, etc.,
a n p la n ets. Therefore, a ll q fa n e ts a re opjaxjue, a n d borrow their
lig h t f r o m thr sun. A n e x a m p l e o f t h e s p e c i a l is g i v e n , w o r e w'c t o
.-irgue a s f o l l o w s , Q u a d ru p e d s, birds, fish es, the a m p h i b ia , etc., cdl
h ave a n ercou s sys te m . E a t q u a d r u p e d s , birds, etc., are a n im a ls .
T lu rcfov e all a n i m a l s ( t b o u g b i t i s n o t y e t d e t e c t e d i n s o m e ) have
n m r r o u s sy s te m . N o w , h e r e i t i s m a n i f e s t t h a t S i i cci : i l r e s t s u p o n .
I n d i t i di ial imlnction, and t h a t , in t b e last r e s u l t , al l induction is
imlividiinl. For wc can assert notbiiig concerning species, u nles s
wh . a t w e a s s e r t o f t h e m h a s b e e n p r e v i o u s l y o b s e r v e d in t b e i r c o n
s t i t u e n t s i ngnl : i i - s . '
F o r a legitiniate I in ln e tion t h e r e are requisite at least t w o c o n d i
tions.- In the first jilace, it is n e e e s s r . r y . T h a t
riie two condiiioii- ]initial (and this w ord I use as iiielnding
of k-^ritimate In d u e - , . 7 \ t
tion - l in-t t e i m s 'im livu la al : i n d p a r t i c u l a r ) , 1
s.i v. i t is necessary t h a t tliG j i a r t i a l jiulgments
o u t o f w b i c h t h e t o t a l o r gei i cr . nl j u d g m e n t is i n f e r r e d , h e all o f t h e
same quality. For i f om.* e v e n o f t h e partial j n d g n i e n t s had .an
op]i o.>i t e fjii .i li t y, t h e w h o l e i i i d n e t i o n w o u l d be subverted. Hence
it is t h a t w o r e f u t e nni ver .sal j n d u n i e n t s f o i m d e d on ::n i i i i j i e r f e c t
i n d n e t i o n , b y b r i n g i n g w h a t is c a l l e d an instance { in s t a n t i a ) , t h a t
i>, l i v a i l d n e i n g a t h i n g belon g in g to t h e s.anie c l a s s o r n o t i o n , in
rofermiee to which the ojijiosite holds true. For exanijile, the
giMi or al a " o r t i o n , d o g s bark,,\8 r e f u t e d h y t h e i n s t i n i c e o f t h e
d o g > c.f L a l i r a d o r o r C a l i f o r n i a (I forget which), these do not
hirk. In l i k e m a n n e r , t h e g e n e r a l a s s e r t i o n , X o q n a d m j m l is ori-
l> irons, i ' r o l n t o d h \ t h e i n s t a n c e o f t h e Oruifhor/n/nchus P a r a -
lo.rn.'t. B u t th.at t h e u n i v e r s a l j n d g m e n l n i n . ' t h a \ c t h e s a m e
pi-lily i l i c p.-irti.al, is s e l f - e v i d e n t ; l o r t h i s j n d g m e n l is s i m p l y
t i n- t'sorlion of soinelliing to he true of .all which is t r u e of
m :in\.
'riie second eoiidilion required is, T h . a t a eonqietent number
1 K r u g , L o g ik , i IC7. A n n i. E d . 2 E ssc r , L o g ik , } 1.52. E d .

L ect. X X X IL LOGIC. 4 5 8
o f t h e j i i i rt i nl o b j e c t s f r o m w h i c l i t h e i n d u c t i o n d e p a r t s s h o u l d h a v e
^ ^ been o b serv ed , for o t h e r w i s e th e com|ireheiisioii
o f o t h e r objects u n d e r t h e tot:d j u d g m e n t w o u ld
b e rash.* W h a t is t h e n i i m b e r o f s u c h o b j e c t s , wl i i el i a m o u n t s t o a
c o m p e t e n t i n d n e t i o n , i t is n o t j i o s s i b l e t o s a y in g e n e r a l . In some
cases, t h e o b s e r v a t i o n o f a v e r y f e w j i a r t i c n l a r o r i n d i v i d u a l (,x a i i i -
p l e s is s u f f i c i e n t t o warrant an assertion in r e g a r d to the whole
c l a s s ; ill o t h e r s , t h e total j u d g m e n t is h a r d l y c o m j i e t e u t , u n t i l o u r
observation has gone through e a c h o f its c o n s t i l u e n l p a r t s . This
d i s t i n c t i o n is f o u n d e d o n t h e d i f f e r e n c e o f e s s e n t i a l a n d unessential
character.s. I f the character be essential to th e several objects, a
comparatively limited observatic.i is necessary to legitim ate onr
general conclusion. F o r e x a m j i l e , it w o u l d r e q u i r e a far less i n d u c
t i o n t o p r o v e t h a t al l a n i m a l s b r e a t h e , t h a n t o j i r o v e t h a t t h e mam
m a l i a , a n d t h e m a m m a l i a a l o n e , h a v e l a t e r a l l o b e s t o tliC e e r e b e l l u i i i .
F o r t h e o n e is s e e n to b e a fu n ctio n n e c e s sa iy to an im a l life; t h e
o t h e r , as fa r as o u r pi-esent k n o w l e d g e r e a c h e s , ajijiears o n l y as an
arbitrary concomitant. The difference o f essential and accidental
is, h o w e v e r , o n e i t s e l f f o u n d e d on in d u c tio n , a n d varies a c c o r d in g
t o t h o g r e r. t c r o r less p e r f e c t i o n t o whi cli t h i s h a s b e e n c a r r i e d . In
the progress o f science, t h e lateral lobes o f the cerebellum may
a p p e a r t o f u t u r e p h y s i o l o g i s t s as n e c e s s a r y a e o u d i t i o u o f t h e f u n c
t i on o f s u c k l i n g t h e i r y o u n g , as t h e o r g a n s o f b r e a t h i n g a j i p e a r t o
n s o f c i r c u l a t i o n a n d o f life.
T o s u m u p t h e D o c t r i n e o f I n d u c t i o n , T h i s is m o v e c e r t a i n ,
1 , I n p r o p o r t i o n t o t h e n u m b e r a n d d i v e r s i t y
suminar) of the o f t h e o b j e c t s o b s e r v e d ; 2, I n jirojiortiou to
d o c tr iu e o i I n d u c t io n . ^ ^ ^
the aecnracy with which the observation and
c o m p a r i s o n h a v e b e e n c o n d u c t e d ; 3, I n j i r o j i o r t i o u a s t h e a g r e e
m e n t o f t h e o b j e c t s is c l e a r a n d p r e c i s e ; a n d , 4, I n jirojiortiou
as it h a s b e e n t h o r o u g h l y e x p l o r e d , w h e t h e r t h e r e e x i s t e x c e p t i o n s
or not. .
A lm ost all induction is, hoxvevei', necessarily imperfect; and
L o g i c can incu lcate n o t h i n g m o r e i m p o r t a n t on the investigators
of nature than that sobriety of mind, w hich regards all i t s j i a s t
observations only as h y p o t h e t i c a l l y true, only as relatively com
p l e t e , a n d w h i c h , c o n s e q u e n t l y , h o l d s t h e m i n d ojien t o e v e r y n e w
o b s e r v a t i o n , w h i c h m a y c o r r e c t a n d l i m i t its f o r n i e i - j u d g m e n t s .
S o m u c h for I n d u c t i o n ; n o w for A n a l o g y . A n a l o g y , in g e n e r a l ,
means proportion, or a sim ilarity o f relations.
A n a lo g v . w h a t. ^ ,
liiiis, to judge analogically, or a e c o i d i n g to
a n a l o g y , is t o judge things by the similaiity of their relations.
1 Esser, L o g ik . i 152. E d- 2 E sser, L o g ik , $ 152. E d.

LOGIC. L kct . X X X I I .
Tluis when we ju d g e t h a t a s t w o i s l o f o u r , s o is e i g h t t o s i . v t e e n ,
we judge t h a t t h e y a r e a n a l o g i c a l l y i d e n t i c a l ; t h a t is, t h o u g h the
s u m s in o t i i e r r e s p e c t s a r e d i f f e r e n t , t h e y a g r e e in this, t h a t as t w o
is t h e h a l f o f l o u r , s o e i g l i t is t h e h a l f o f s i . v t e e n .
Ill c o m m o n l a n g u a g e , h o w e v e r , t h i s j u o p r i e t y o f t h e t e r m is n o t
preserved, f o r hy a n a i o y y is n o t a l w a y s m e a n t m e r e l y hy p r o p o r -
tio)!, b u t f r e i j u e n t l y hy c<nj>arisoit hy r d a t i o n , o r s i m | d y b y sh n i-
bn'ity. I n s o f a r a s A n a l o g y c o n s t i t u t e s a p a r t i c u l a r k i n d o f r e a
s o n i n g f r o m t h e indivi<lual o r ] )a rt ic ul ar to t h e u n i v e r s a l , it signifies
an inference from tlie p a r t i a l s i m i l a r i t y o f t w o o r m o r e t h i n g s to
their complete or
total similarity. F o r e . x a m p l e , T h is disease
corrcsjioiids in xnuny syiiiyAonis w ith those v:e h a ve observed in
ty p h u s f e v e r s ; it will, therefore, c o rr e sp o n d in all, th a t is, it is a
tyqdius f t v t r ?
Like I n d u c t i o n , ^Vnalogy has two essential requisites. In the
f i r s t ]l ace, i t i s n e c e s s a r y t h a t o f t w o o r m o i ' c
Mas i o t>M.iu ia i ;i c e r t a i n n u m b e r o f a t t r i b u t e s should
c a n d iliu iis:,
have been observed, in order to ground the
inference that t h e y also ag re e in t h o s e otlier attrib u tes, which it
h a s n o t y e t li een a s e e i l a i n e d t h a t t h e y ] ) os s es s . I t is e v i d e n t t h a t
in proportion to the number of points observed, in wliich the
tilings c o m p a r e d t o g e t h e r c o . i i e i d e , i n t h e s a m e p r o p o r t i o n can it
be with safety assum ed, th a t th e re exists a c o m m o n p rinciple iu
t h e s e t h i n g s , o n wl i i c h d e p e n d s t h e s i m i l a r i t y in t h e points kn ow n
as in tlie | ; o i n t s u n k n o w n .
In the second p l a c e , i t is r e q u i r e d that the predicates alieady
oljserved should neillier he al l n e g a t i v e n o r all
contingent; hut that some at least should be
positive and necessary. 3Iere m^gative characters d e n o te only w hat
l l i e t h i n g is n o t : a n d c o n t i n g e n t c h a r a c t e r s n e e d n o t b e j i r e s e n t in
t h e t h i n g a t al l . In regard to negative a t t r i b u t e s , tlie inference,
th a t tw othings, t o w h i c h a iiiiiiiber o f q u a l i t i e s d o n o t b e l o n g , a n d
w h i c h are,ciiiisefpieiilly, s i m i l a r t o each o t l i e r o n l y in a n e g a t i v e
| oi ii t of view, th a t these things are, therefore, alisolntely and
p o s i l i \ c l y - i i i i i l a r , is h i g h l y i m p r o b a b l e . B u t t h a t t h e j u d g m e n t in
reference to ihe comparcal tilings (say A : u i d X ) i i i n s t lie o f t h e
s a m e (| iialii v ( / . e. e i i h c r b o t h a f l i r m a t i v e o r b o t h n e g a t i v e ) , is sel f-
ex i d e n l . F o r i f it b e s a i d A is B , X is not B , A is not C, X is C ;
l i u - i r l i a r n i o n v o r . s i m i l a r i t y is s u b v e r t e d , a n d w e s l i o u h l r a t h e r be
w a r r a n t e d in a r g u i n g t h e i r d i s c o r d a n d d i s s i m i l a r i t y in o t h e r p o i n t s .
1 < f. K n i " . ] 108 A i i n i . TA). [ f o ii- A v ic e n n a (in Sclim H lderg, D ocurnrnta Phil.
(.'iliac, L'A rt d f lia iso n n r r, L . iv . c li. 3, J). 1.59. Aruhum . p. 35.) X V liately, R hetoric, p. 74.]
L kct. X X X I I . LOGIC. 455
A n d lioi'C it is to be noticed th a t Analogy differs fi-oin Induction iu

this, th a t it is n ot lim ited to one quality, b u t th a t it adm its of a
mixtui'e of both.
In regard to co n tin g en t attributes, it is eijiially manifest th a t the
analogy cannot jiroeeed exclusively upon them. For, it tw o things
coincide in certain accidental attrib u tes (tor examjile, tw o men in
respect of stature, age, and dre.ss), the siqiposition th a t there is a
common prineijile, and a general sim ilarity founded thereon, is very
unlikely.
T o conclude: A n alo g y is cei'tain in jiroportion, 1 , T o the n u m
ber of con g ru e n t observations; 2 , T o tho nuin-
Sumiiiao of tlie co ng ruent characters observed ; 3, To
d o c tr in e o f A n a lo g y . . ^ ,
tlie inqiortanee o f these characters and their
essentiality to the o bjects; and, 4, T o the certainty th a t the char
acters really belong to the objects, and th a t a jiartial corresp ond
ence exists.* L ike Induction, A n alog y can only pi etend a t best to
a high degree o f pi'obability ; it may hav e a high degree, o f cer
tainty, bu t It never I'eaches to necessity.
C om paring these tw o iirocesses to g e th e r : T h e Analogical is
distinguished from the In d u ctiv e in this th a t
i n d u c ii o n a n d A n a l- Induction regards a single jirodicate in m.any
siibjects as the a ttrib u te Z in A, in 13, in C, in
D, in F, in F , e t c . ; and as these m a n y belong
to one class, say Q ; it is inferred th a t Z will, likewise, be m et with
in the other thin gs belonging to this class, th a t is, in all Qs. On
the other hand. A nalogy regards m any .attributes in one subject
(say xn, v, o, p , in A) ; and as these m any are in jiart found in
an o th er subject (.s.ay m, and n, in L ), it is concluded that, in th a t
second thing, there will also be found the other attributes (say o
and p ) . Throngli Inductio n wc, therefore, endeavor to prove th a t
one ehar.aeter belongs (or does not belong) to all th e things of a
certain class, because it belongs (or does not belong) to many
things o f th a t class. T h ro u g h A nalogy, on the other hand, we
seek to pi-ove th a t all th e eharaeters of a th in g belong (or do not
belong) to anotlier or sevc'ral others, because many of these eliarae-
ters belong to this o th e r or these others. In the one it is pro
c laim ed, One in m an y, therefore one in all. In the o th e r it is
jirocl.aimed, M a n y in one, therefore all in onei'^
B y these pi'ocesses of Induction and Analogy, as observed, we
are. unable to attain absolute cert.aiiity ; a g re a t pirobability is all
1 E sser, L o g ik , 152 P f K ru g , L o g ik , 168. Anm . Ed.

2 K r u g , L o g ik , 168. Aum . Ed.
456 LOGIC. L ect. X X X n.
that w ecan reach, an d this for t h e s i m p l e r e a s o n , t h a t i t is i m p o s s i -

hle, n n d e r any condition, to infer the unob-
iinluctioiiandAiini- f; ei- ved from th e o b s e r v e d , th e w lm le from
ogv (lo not nltord ab- . ,, , . . ,
.oiute certainty. V^'oyovUon ot t h e p a r t s , 1.1 t l . e W a y of
an y ration.il necessity. Even from the requi
sites o f I n d n e t i o n and A n a l o g y , i t is m a n i f e s t t l i a t t h e y h e a r t h e
stam p of nncertaiiity; inasmneh a s t h e y ti re u n a b l e t o d e t e r m i n e
how m any objects or h ow many eharaoters m ust he o h s e r v c t l , in
o r d e r t o d r a w t h e c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e c a s e is t h e s t n n e w i t h all t h e
o t h e r objects, or w ith all t h e o t h e r c h . ar a ct e r s. I t is p o s s i b l e o n l y
in o n e w a y t o ra ise I n d u c t i o n an d A n a l o g y fro m m e r e prcihability
to complete c e r t a i n t y , vi z. , t o dem onstrate that the jirinciples
w h i c h lie a t t h e r o o t o f t h e s e j i ro e e s s e s , a n d w h i c h w e h a v e a l r e a d y
st a te d , are eitlier n e c e s sa ry law s o f t h o u g h t , o r n eces sa ry law s o f
nature. T o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t l i e vV a r e n e c e s s a r v l a w s o f t h o u O
g h t is
im possible ; for L o g ic n o t o n ly d o es n o t allow inference from many
t o all, h i lt expressly rejects it. A gain, to dem o n strate that they
are necessary hiws o f n a t u r e is e q u a l l y i m j i o s s i h l e . T his has in
deed been atteinjited, from t h e u n i f o r m i t y o f n a t u r e , h u t in vain,
, F e r i t is i n e o m p e t e i i t t o e v i n c e the necessity of the inference of
Induction and A nalogy from the fact denom inated t/ie Icm o f
m itu re : s e e i n g t h a t t h i s l a w i t s e l f c a n o n l y h e d i s c o v e r e d b y t h e
way of Induction and Analogy. In this atte m p te d demonstration
t h e r e is t h u s t h e m o s t g l a r i n g p e t i t i o p r i n c i p i i . T h e r e s u l t wliieh
has been previously given remains, therefore, in ta c t: Induction
an d A n a l o g y g u a r a n t e e no jierfeet c ertain ty , h u t o nly a h ig h d e g r e e
of probability, while all probability rests at best iqioii Induction
a n d A n a l o g y , a n d n o t h i n g else. '
1 E sse r , Log/it, f 1 5 2 . E d [O n liis lo r y a n d seq. IIofT baiier, ztn/ang-iifm nrfe der L o g ik , i

d o c t r in e o f tlie L o g ic o f Iro b a b ilir ie s, se e 422 et seq. J io lz a n o , L o g ik , v o l. i i. 101, v o l.
L e ib n itz . S o u c tn u x E ssais. I,, iv . c li. x v . p. iii. S 317. lia c lim a n n . L o g ik , 229 et srq.
42.7, c d . Iia |i(;. W o lf, Phil- H ot. 504 >t seq. F r ie s , L o g ik , 90 el seq. I r e v o st, E ssn is de
\ \a\ni-T. Phil. A ph nrism en, 701 (o ld e d i t ) P h iln s o j) U ie ,i\.\j.i p a r t iii. p. 56. K a n t, Logi'4:,
.5.91 ( n e w e d it .) . '/AoWetr, Ix x ik o n . v.W ahrsr.hcin- E in le lt u n g x . .la c o b , G run driss d ' t A llg e m e i-
lich. W a lc h , L exikon , Jhid. E a in b c r l, N o tes nen L o g ik , j .3.58, p. 1.31 et seq ., 1800, I la l le .
O rganon , ii p. 318 et seq. l;cu.c li, S y ste m a L o g - M e tz , In stitiitio n e s L o g ic a , 230 el seq ., p . 171,
tcu m , i G53 et seq. I J o llin a iin , L o g ica , 215 179G.]
LECTURE XXXTTT.
M O D I F I E D M E T H O D O L O a Y .
SE C T IO N 1. O F T H E A C Q U ISIT IO N OF K N O W L E D G E
i. EXPERIENCE. B. FOREIGN : ORAL TESTIM ONY

IT S CREDIBILITY.
H a v in g , in onr last Lecture, te rm inate d th e D o c tiin e o f E m p iri

cal K now ledge, considered as obtained Im m edi-
F oreign E xperience. , i i i r
ately, th a t is, through the exercise of our own
pow ers o f O b se rv a tio n , we are now to en te r on the doetriiie of
Empirical K n o w led g e considered as obtained IMediately, th a t is,
tlirougli the E xperience of O th e r jMen. T h e following jiaragrapli
will afford you a general notion of the n atu re and kinds of tbis
know ledge.
*ll' C IX . A m a tte r o f Observation or Emjiirical K now ledge

can only be obtained Mediately, th a t is, by
P a r . CIX . T e s tim o n y . ,
one individual from another, tlirough an
en oune em ent deelariii" it to be true. This eno uneem en t is
called, in the most extensive sense o f the word, a }V.itnessing
or T 'estim ony { te s t im o n h o n ) ; and the person by whom it is
m ade is, in tlie same sense, called a W itness, or Testifier
{ te stis ). T h e object of the testim ony is called the E a c t { f o e -
turn ) ; and its validity constitutes w h a t is styled J li s t o r i c a l
C red ib ility {credibilitas h is to ric a ). T o estim ate this credi
bility, it is requisite to c o n s id e r 1, T h e Subjective T r u s t
worthiness of the "Witnesses { fid e s testiu m ), and 2, T h e O b
jective P ro b a b ility of the F a c t itself. T h e former is founded
jiartly on th e Sincerity, and jiartly on the Comjietenee, of the
W itness. T h e la tte r depends on th e Absolute and R elative
PossiViility of the F a c t itself. T estim o n y is either I m m e d ia te
or Mediate. Im m ediate, where tlie fact repo rted is the object
58
458 LOGIC. L e c t. X X X III.
of a P ersonal E.xperienoe; Mediate, wliere the fact rep o ited is

the object o f a Foreign E xperience,'
I t is manifest th a t P'oi'cign E xperience, or th e experience of

oth e r men, is asti'icted to the same laws, and its
K .\|d ic a tio n . . 1 1 , . . .
certainty nieasnred by th e same criteria, as the
experience we carry th ro u g h ourselves. B u t thc exjierience o f the
individual is limited, when conijiared with the exjiericnee of the
Sjieeies; and if men did not possess the means of eoniniunicating
to each otlicr th e results of tlicir scA'cral o b se rva tions, were they
unable to cobjicrate in accuiiuilating a stock o f know ledge, and in
carry ing on tlie jirogress of discovery, tb e y would nevei* have
risen above th e very lowest stcjis in the acquisition o f science.
B u t to this mutual cominuiiieatioii th e y arc c oinjie tent; and each
individual is th us able to ajijirojiriate lo bis own benefit the exjieri
ence of bis feilow-nien, and to confer on them in rc'tnrn th e ad v a n
tages which liis own observations may sujijily. B n t it is evident
th a t this recijirocal coniiiuinication of their r esp e eliie exjieriences
am ong men, can only be effected inasmuch as one is able to inform
an o th er of w hat he has him self observed, and th a t th e vehicle of
this information can only be some eno u n c em cn t in conventional
signs of one ch a racter or anotliei. Tlie enouneeinent of w hat has
been obser\ ed is, as stated in thc jiaragrajih, called a xcitnessing, a
hcori/nj xritnes.% a testimong, etc., these term s being employed in
tlicir w ider acccjitation ; ami lie by whom this declaration is made,
and on wliosc veriicity it rests, is e.allcd a xcitness, voucher, or testi
fie r (testis)}'- Tlie te rm testiuiong, I may notice, is sometimes, by
an abusive nietonym, emjiloyed for xcituess/ and tlie word evidence
is often am bigmnisly used for testiinong, and foi* the beai'er o f testi
mony, the irituess.
Sncli an cnomicciiicnt, sn(*h a testim ony, is; however, neces
sary for others, only when thc exjierieiice wliieh
riic j.rojier object of com m unicates is beyond the compass o f their
IchlJiriony. . ^ *
own observation, lie n e e it follows, th a t m a t
ters of reasoning are not jirojier objects of testim ony, since m atters
o f re;isiiiiiiig, as such, neith er can rest, nor o u g h t to rest, on the
o b sc n .itions o f o th e r s ; for a jiroof of tlicir certainty is equally
coiiijicteiit to all, and may by all lie obtained in th e m anner in
which it was origin.'illy obtained by those who may bear witness to
their truth. A nd lieii<*e it further follows, th a t m a tte rs of exjieri-
eiice alone ;irc jirojier objects o f te stim o n y ; and of m a tte rs of
exjicrienee themselves, such only as tire beyond th e sphere of our
1 K r u g , L o g ik , ] 1 7 2 . K d . [C f. .S cb eib ler, Topica, c. 31.] 2 E s s e r , L o g ik , 1 5 3 . E d .

L ect. XX X III. L O G IC . 4 5 9
person.al e x pe r ie ii cc . T c s t i n i o n y , in tl ie s t r i c t e s t s e n s e o f t h e t e r m ,
t h e r e f o r e , is t h e e o m m u n i c ; i t i o n o f .an e x p e r i e n c e , or , w l i a t . a m o u n t s
to t h e s.aine t h i n g , t h e I'eport o f an o b s e r v e d jilueiioinenon, m a d e
to th o se wh o se o w n exjierience or o b se rv atio n lias n o t r e a c h e d so
fill*.
The o b j e c t o f t e s t i m o n y , as s t a t e d in t h e p a r a g r a j i h , is called
t h e f a c t ; t h e v a l i d i t y o f a t e s t i m o n y is calle<l
Tht; F a c t. h is to r i c a l credibHity. The. testim ony i.s either
n i s lo r ic u l c r e d ib il- ^ i'. ^ , ,
im m ediate or mediate. I n i n i e d i a t e , wi i e i i t h e
ity. . . .
witness has him self observed the fact to which
he testifies; m ed iate, w h e n the witness has not him self had experi
e n c e o f th is fact, b u t h a s r e c e i v e d it on t h e testim o n y of others.
The former, the im m ediate witness, is eoi i i -
Far whuusT iiionly stylcd an eye-witness (testis oculatus) ;
and the l a t t e r , t h e m e d i a t e w i t n e s s , a n ear-
'witness (testis a i i r i ta s ) . The superiority of im m ediate to m e d ia te
t e s t i m o n y is e x p r e s s e d b y P l a n t n . s , P l u r i s e s t o c u l a t u s t e s t i s u n u s ,
quam auriti deceni. These d e n o m i n a t i o n s , eye a n d ear loitness,
ar e h o w e v e r , as s y n o n y m s o f in n n ed ia te a n d m ed ia te w itness, n o t
always either apjiiicable or correct. The jierson on w h o se te s ti
m o n y a f a c t is m e d i a t e l y r e i i o r t e d , i s c a l l e d t h e
The Guaraiilce. J i >
yu a ra n tee, o r h e o n w h o s e a u t h o r i t y i t r e s t s ;
and the gnarantec h im s e lf m a y be a g ain e ith e r an i m m e d i a t e or a
m e d i a t e witness. t h e l a t t e r c a s e h e i s c a l l e d a s e c o n d -h a n d or
In
in term e d ia te xcitness; a n d h i s t e s t i m o n y is c o m m o n l y s t y l e d h e a r s a y
evidence. F u r t h e r , T e s t i m o n y , w h e t h e r i m m e d i a t e o r m e d i a t e , is
e i t h e r p a r t i a l o r compdete; e i t h e r consistent o r
lestnnonies Par- co n tr a d ic to ry . Tliese distinctions require no
tia l, C o m p le te , Con- ,, . . . .
sisteni. Contradictory. coinmciit. F i n a l l y , t e s t i m o n y IS e i t h e r direct o r
i n d i r e c t ; d i r e c t , w h e n t h e Avi t nes s h a s n o m o
t i v e b u t t h a t o f m a k i n g k n o w n t h e f a c t ; i n d i r e c t , Avlien h e is a c t u
a ted to this by o th e r ends. "
The only question in reference to T estim ony is that AAl i i c l i
r e g a r d s its C r ed ib ility ; and the question oon-

D iv is io n o f th e .nb-
^ e e r u i n g t h e c r e d i b i l i t y o f t h e Avitiiess i i i a v b e
ject: I Credibility of .
Te!^tiinony in general. c o i i i j i i e l i e n d e d u i u l e r tllMt t o i i c l i i i i g t h e C i c d i -
II credihiiily oi Tes- bility o f T e s t i m o n y . The o r d e r I s h a l l folloAV
ti.nony in it. part.cu- s u b s e q u e n t o b s e r v a t i o n s is t h i s , I s h a l l ,
lar forms of Immedi- . , , . , , ^ /.
a te a n d M e d ia te . pl.Mce, c o i i s i d c r t h e C r e d i b i l i t y o f
T e s t i i i i o i i y in g e n e r a l ; a n d , in t h e s e c o n d , c o n
sider t h e C r ed ib ility o f T e s t i m o n y in its p articu lar form s o f I m m e
diate and Mediate.
1 Truculentus, I I . v i. 8 . C f. K r u g , L o g ik , 172. Anm . Ed. 2 E sse r , L o g ik , 1 5 3 . E d .

400 LOGIC. L e c t. X X X III.
First, tlicn, in regard to tlie C redibility of T estim o n y in g e n e r a l ;

W h e n wc* in q u ir e wlietlier a cortaiu testim ony is, or is not,
desei'ving o f credit, there are tw o tilings to be considered : 1 , T h e
Oltject of th e T estim ony, th a t is, th e fact or facts io r th e tr u th of
which th e Testiiiiony vouches; and, 2 , T h e Subject o f th e Testi-
iiiouy, th a t i.'i, the jierson or pei'soiis by wliom llie testim ony is
borne. T h e (jnestion, tlierefore, concernin g tlie C redibility of T e s
timony, tliii.s naturally subdivides itself into two. O f tliese ques
tions, the first asks, W lia t are llie conditions o f tl;e crediliility
of a tcstinioiiv l>y reference to w h a t is testified, th a t is, in rel.ition
to the O bject of the te stim o n y ? T h e second asks, W h a t arc tlic*
conditions of tlie credibility of a tcsliiiiony by refcreiiee to him
who testifies, th a t is, in relation to th e Siibjeet of th e t e s t i m o n y ? '
O f these in th e ir order.
Oil th e first question. In regard to th e m a tte r testified, th a t
is, in reg a rd to the object o f the testim ony ; it
1. C r e d ib ility of 7 . "'g n t .* x i x
, I S, h rst of a l l , a requisite condition, th a t Avhat is
T e s tim o n y lu c 'c ie r a l. ) i
V, The Object of the ^ reported to be tru e sliould be po-;sible, both
T e s tim o n y . absolutely, Or as an objeet o f the F laborative
^ Us xAbsoinie 1 ossi- F;ienlty, and relatively, or as an oliject o f the
' P re se n ta tiv e F aculties, P erce p tio n , F x tc r n a l
or Internal. A th in g i.s jiossible absolutely, or in itself, when it
can be construed to th ou ght, th a t is, when it is n ot inconsistent
with the logical laws of t h in k i n g ; a th in g is relatively jiossible as
an object o f Perccjitioii, F x tc r n a l or Intern al, Avlicn it can affect
Sense or Self-conscioiisncs.s, and, througli such affection, determ ine
its ajijirelicnsioii by one or o th e r of these faculties. A testim ony
is, therefore, to be iincoiiditioiially rejected, if the fact wliicli it
rcjiorts be citlicr in itsclf imjiossible, or imjiossible as an object o f
tbe P re sen ta tiv e Faculties. B u t tlie imjiossibility o f a tiling, as an
object of these f.iciillics, m ust bc decided eith er
I'livKicai and M.ta- njioii jiliysical, or ujjoii nietajihysical, jirinciples.
)b)niai imii.j."fibii- th in g is jihysieally imjiossible as an object of
scii.sc, when th e existence itself, or its jzercep-
tion by us, is, liy tlie laws of tbe material world, imjfossible. I t is
metnjihysically imjiossible, when the object itself, or its jierception,
is Jiossible neillier th rou gh a natnral, nor through a snjiernatural,
agency. But, to establish th e luelajihysical impossibility o f a
thing, it is n o t suflicieut th a t its existence cannot be exjilained by
the ordinary laws o f nature, or even th a t its. existence .should
ajipc.'ir rejiugnarit with these la w s ; it is re/piisite th a t an universal
and imm utable law of n atu re should have been d em o n strate d to
I Cf. Eeser, L o g ik , 164. E d.

L kct. X X X I I I . LOGIC. 401
exist, and tliat this law would he snhverted if the fact in (inestion
w ere adm itte d to ho jilivsically jiossihle. Iu like manner, to co nsti
tu te the metajihysical imjiossihility o f a thing, it is hy no means
enough to show th a t it is n ot exjilieahle on natural laws, or even
th a t any natural law stand s ojijiosed to i t ; it is further requisite to
Jirove th a t the intervention even of siijicrnatnral agency is incom-
jietent to its jirodnction, th a t its existence would involve th e viola
tion o f some necessary jirincijile o f reason.
T o estahlish the credihility o f a testim ony, in so far as this is
regu lated hy th e nature of its ohject, there is,
Rfiiative Possibility besides th e Jiroof of the ahsolnte jiossihility of
o f ail o b je ct. , . , . . , , n n 1
this ohject, rotjiiired also a jirooi oi its relative
Jiossihility; th a t is, there m u st n ot only he no contradiction he
tw ee n its necessary attrihntes, the a ttrihntes hy which it m ust he
tho u g h t, h u t no contradiction hetw een th e attrihntes actually
assigned to it hy th e testim ony. A testim ony, therefore, which,
qua testimony, i.s sclf-contradictory, can lay no claim to credihility;
for wliat is self-contradictory is logically suicidal. A n d here the
only question is , D oes th e te stim ony, te stim ony, contradict
itself? for if tlie rcjiugnancy arise from an ojiinion of th e witness,
ajiart from which th e te stim o ny as such would still stand undis-
jiroved, in thn t case th e te stim ony is not at once to he rejiiidiated
as false. F o r examjile, it would he w rong to reject a testim on y to
the existence o f a thing, hecause the w itness had to his evidence
of its ohscrved reality annexed some conjecture in regard to its
origin or cause. F o r the la tte r m ig h t well he shown to he ahsnrd,
and yet the former would remain unshaken. I t is, therefore,
always to he o b se rv e d , t h a t it is only the self-contradiction o f
a testim ony, qua testim ony, th a t is, the self-contradiction o f the
fact itself: which is jieremjitorily and irrevoeahly suhversive of its
credihility.
W e now proceed to th e second question ; th a t is, to consider in
general the Credihility o f a T estim o n y h y ref-
2, T lie S u b je c t o f ereiicc to its Suhject, th a t is, in relation to the
th e T e s lim o iiv , 01 - per- ^
Bonai tru B txvorihiiiess P ersonal I riistw orthm ess of the \ \ itness. The
o f th e W itn e s s . T liis tnistw ortliiiiess of a witiiess consists o f tw o ele-
c o n s is ts of tw o e le - xueiits 0 1 ' conditions. In the first p l a c e , h c m ust
m e n ts . (a) H o n e s t y ^ willing, in the sccoiid jilacc, he m u st he ahle,
o r \ LMiicity. I
to rejiort the truth. T h e first of these elements
is the H onesty, the Sincerity, the V erac ity ; the second is the
Coinjictency of the W itn es s. B oth are equally necessary, and if
one or other he deficient, the testim ony heeomes altogeth er null.
These constituents, likewise, do n o t infer each o th e r; for it fre-
^^62 LOGIC. L e c t. X N X I I I
q n cn tly liajApciis that wlici'C llio h o n esty is greatest tlie com pe

te n c y is least, and where tho eon q ieton ey is g reatest the h o n esty is
least. B ut when the A'oraeity o f a w itness is established, there is
established also a presnmjition o f his e o in p o t c n c y ; for an honest
man w ill not bear ev id e n c e to a jioint in regard lo which his recol
lection is not jireeise, oi to the obsei'vation o f which he had not
accorded the requisite attention. In truth, when a fact d ep en d s on
the tes tim o n y o f a single witness, the com jietency o f that witness
is solely gin.rantced by his h onesty. In regard to the h o n esty o f a
Avitness. this, though olten a d m ittin g o f the highest jirobability,
n ev er admits o f ulisoliite certainty ; for, though, in m an y cases, a v c
m ay k n ow en ou gh o f the general ehyraeter o f the Avitness to rely

Avith j.eifeet confidence on his A craeity, in no ease can we look into
the heart, and obseiwo the infinence Avhieh m otives have actually
had upon his volitions. W e are, howevei", eonqiolled, in m an y o f
th e most im portant e o n een is o f our existence, to dojicnd on the
testim o n y, and, consc(juenlly, to confide in the sineerily, o f others.
B u t from the moral constitution o f hninan nature, arc Avar-
a v c
ranted in p resum in g on the h o n esty o f a w itn e ss; and this jirc-

.snmption is enhaneed in proportion as the fo llow in g eirenmstanees
concur in its confii-mation. In the first jilaee, a w itness is to be pre
sumed veracious in lliis ease, in jiroportion as his lo ve o f truth is
already established fi-om others. In the seeond jAlaec, a w itn ess is
to be juesu m ed vei-aeions, in jiroportion as he
The prcoimption of few er M i l d weaker m o tiv e s to falsify his tes-
ihf iiojiL-.-i> of .1 A\ It- îmonv. In the third place, a Avitness is to be
jie^' CBhin;c(rtl b y cer- . .
ta/ii ciicuin-ianct-. prcsum cd A oi'aeious, ill proportion to the like
lihood o f contradiction Avhich his testim o n y
Avonhl encounter, i f he deviated Ifoin the truth. S o much for the
Sinceiity, H o n e s ty , or V e r a c ity o f a Aviliiess.
In r tg a rd lo the Coiiipetoncy or A bility of a witness, this, in
genei'al, dejieiids on the supposition, th a t he has
(b) ( oiiipcp ncy of a | pow er coiTcctlv to observe the fact
ViinviKi. . , .
to wlneli be testilies, and correctly to rejiort it.
d'hc jiresiimjition in fiivor o f llie com jielen ce o f a w itness rises in
proportion as tho folloAviiig eondilioiis are fiil-
Cim.moancc" hyfilled: 1 1 1 the first place, he m ust be ))ro-
uhich the prcHuinp- j.efeieiiee to the ease in
fioiio f c o JiiiH -tciicy )8 * 1 I
h:md, in proporliori as his general ability to
observe and to cornmunieate bis observation
na' bi-eiie .tablislic(l in other eases. In the second place, the
coriipctciicy o f a w itness must be presumed, in jiroportion as in
ifie |>;irtienlar ease a lowci- and com m on er am ou n t o f ability is
L kct. X X X I I L LOGIC. 463
req u isite r ig h tly to o b s e r v e , n nd r i g h t l y to r e p o r t tlie o b s e r v a tio n .

In tbc t l i i r d j i l a c e , t h e c o n q i e t e n c y o f a w i t n e s s is t o b e i n - e s i i i n e d ,
in j i r o p o r t i o n a s i t is n o t t o b e p r e s u m e d t h a t b i s o b s e r v a t i o n w a s
m ade or co m m u n icate d a t a t im e w h e n h e w a s u n a b le c o r r e c t l y to
m a k e o r c o r r e c t l y t o c o m m u n i c a t e it. 80 in u cli fo r t h e C o m p e t e n c y
o f a w itn ess.
X o w , w lic n both the good w ill and the a b ility, th a t is, w h e n
both the V e r a c it y an d C o m p e te n c e o f a w itn ess
T esD m on7*^not'iuvaii^^ h a v e b e en S u fficie n tly e s ta b lis h e d , th e c r e d ib ility
dated because ttie fact o f l i i s t e s t i m o n y is i i o t t o b e i n v a l i d a t e d b e c a u s e
testified i.s one out o f tJlC f l i c t w l l i c l l i t gOCS tO pi'OVC i s OnC OUt o f
th e o r d in a r y cou rse o rd in a ry co iirse of e x p e rie n c e . * Thus it
of e x p e n e ii c e . *'
w o u ld b e f a l s e t o a s s e r t , w i t h I T i i m e , t h a t mir.T-
c l e s , t h a t is, s n . s j i c n s i o n s o f t h e o r d i n a r y l a i v s o f n a t u r e , a r e in cap a
ble o f p roof, b e c a u s e co n trad icte d b y A vliat w e have been ab le to
observe. O n the co n trary, w h e re the tru stw o rth in e ss o f a w itn ess
o r w i t n e s s e s is n n i n q i c a e h a b l e , t h e v e r y ciren m stan ce th a t the ob
j e c t is o n e in i t s e l f u n u s u a l a n d m a r v e l l o u s , a d d s g r e a t e r w e i g h t to
th e t e s t im o n y ; fo r th is v e r y c iren m stan c e w o u ld itse lf in d u c e m en
o f v e ra c ity and in te llig e n c e to a c c o rd a m o re a tte n tiv e s c ru tin y to
th e fa ct, a n d secure from them a m ore accurate report o f th e ir
o b se rva tio n .
T h e resu lt o f w h a t has n o w been stated in r e g a r d t o t h e c r e d i
b i l i t y o f T e s t i m o n y in g e n e r a l , is : T h a t a te s-
Summary regarding t i m o i i y is e n t i t l e d to C r e d i t Avb en t h e req u isite
n l^ u y r g a ie im " '" (co n d itio n s, b o t h on the j.a rt o f th e o l.je ct and

on the part o f the s u b je c t, lia i e b e e n fu lfd le d .
On the part o f the o b je ct these are fu lfilled when the o b je c t is
a b s o lu t e l y jio ss ib lc , a s an o b je c t o f th e h i g h e r f a c u l t y o f e x p e r ie n c e ,
the U n d e r s ta n d in g , the E la b o ra tiv e F acu lty, and re la tiv e ly
p o s sib le , as an o b je c t o f tlie lo w e r o r s u b s id ia r y fa c u ltie s o f c x jic r i
cncc, Sense, and S e lf-co n scio n sn e ss. In tb is ease, th e te s tim o n y ,
qua te s t im o n y , d o e s n o t c o n t r a d ic t itse lf. O n th e p a r t o f th e siib -
je e t th e req u isite co n d itio n s are fu lfilled w h e n th e trustA V orthin ess,
t h a t is, t l i e v e r a c i t y a n d c o m p e t e n c y o f t l i e A v i t n o s s , is b e y o n d rea
son ab le doubt. In regard to the veracity of tlie A v i t n c s s , t l i i s
c a n n o t b e r e a s o n a b l y d o u b t e d , Avb en t h e r e i s n o p o s i t i v e g r o u n d on
w h ich to d isc re d it the s i n c e r i t y o f t h e A vitnoss, a n d w h e n the o n ly
g r o u n d o f d o u b t lies in the m ere general p o ssib ility o f d e c c jitio n .
A n d in r e f e r e n c e t o t l i e c o n q i e t e n c y o f a A v i t n e s s , t h i s i s e x j i o s e d
to no re aso n ab le o b je c tio n , Avlien tlie ab ility of the A vitness to
observe and to e o in n u m ic a te t h e f a c t in te stim o n y ca n n o t be d is
1 Esser, L o g ik , 154. Ed.

464 LOGIC. L ect X X X III.
allowed. H a v in g , therefore, co n c lu d e d the consideration of testi

m o n y in g e n e ra l, w e pro ceed t o t r e a t o f i t i n s j i e c i a l , t h a t is, i n s o
f i r :is i t i s v i e w e d e i t h e r as I m m e d i a t e or as M e d i a t e . * O f these
in t h e i r o r d e r .
T l i e sjieeial c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f T e s t i m o n y , w h e n t h a t t e s t i m o n y is
I m m e d i a t e . A n i m m e d i a t e t e s t i m o n y , o r tcs-
II. Te.'îimoiiy in . ^ i i i i i
siieciai. as imnR-diate tim o iiy a t f i r s t h a n d , IS o n e in w h ich the fact
and .Mi-aiiite. r e j i o i ' t c d is a n o b j e c t o f t h e j i r o j i c r o r j i c r s o n a l
u . iinmcdiaie Ttoii- experience o f th e reporter. N o w i t is m a n i f e s t ,
t h a t an i m m e d i a t e w i t n e s s is i n g e n e r a l b e t t e r
entitled to c re d it t h a n a w itn ess a t s e c o n d h a n d ; a n d his t e s t i m o n y
rises in ji ro b a b il ity , in ji r o p o r t i o n as t h e requisites, already speci
fied, b o t h on t h e p a r t o f its o b j e c t a n d on t h e p a r t o f its s u b j e c t ,
are f i i l t i l l od. Au iniincdiate testim ony is, therefore, en title d to
c r e d i t , 1 , I n jirojiortiou to the g reater ability w ith which tho
observation h a s b e e n m a d e ; 2 , I n j i r o p o r t i o n
f oiidiMon, of 113 i m j i c d i m e n t in t h e w a y o f t h e obs e r-
Crcdibilily. .
vation b e i n g j i e i - f c c t l y a c c o m j i l i s h e d ; 3, I n
j ir oj Hi rt ion as w hat was observed could be fully and accurately
i - ( * me n i b e r e d ; and, 4, In projiortion as the facts observed and
r e m e m b e re d h av e b een c o m m u n ic a te d b y intelligible a n d u n a m b ig
u o u s sif f us.
Now, w hether al l these conditions of a higher c r e d i b i l it y be
f u l f i l l e d ill t h e c a s e o f a n y i m m e d i a t e t e s t i m o n y ,
Wlivtlier all llic.sc , . ^ i t 3 i .
. tin s cannot be d ire c tly and at onee ascer-
ci iidrioiis arc fullillcd
ill Ihe case of any irn- t a i n o d ; i t cai i o i i l y b e i n f e r r e d , w i t h g reater or
mcdiaic lesiimoiiy, l e s s C e r t a i n t y , fio i i i t h e q u a l i t i e s o f t h e w i t n e s s ;
cannoi be direeii) a.s- c o n se q u e n tly , the v a lid ity of a t e stim o n y
ccriaincd. ^ i j g
can o n l y b e a c c u r a t e l y e s t i m a t e d f ro m a critical
k n o w l e d g e o f t h e j i e r s o n a l c h a r a c t e r o f t h e w i t n e s s , a s g i v e n in h i s
i n t e l l e c t u a l a n d m o r a l q u . al i t i c s , a n d i n t h e c i r c u m s t a n c e s o f h i s life,
which h a v e concni-red to m o d ify an d d e t e r m i n e these. T h e verac-
i t } o f .a w i t i i o . * e i t h e r is, o r is n o t , e x e m j i t f r o m d o u b t ; and, in th e
lnt t(- r c as e , it m a y n o t o n l y lie oj ion t o d o u b t , b u t e v m i b e e x j i o s e d
to ' (iisjiieioii. If the sincerity of the witness he indubitable, a
d i r e c t t c s t i m f i u y is a l w a y s jircfci'able to an indirect; for a d ir ec t
t(*stimony hciii'j mailc w ith t h e sole i n t e n t o f cstahlisliiiig t h e c er
t a i n t y o f i l i c f a c t i n q u e s t i o n , I h e c o m j i c t c n c y (i f t h e w i t n e s s is l e s s
exjiosed to objcelion. Ifj o n t h e e o n t r a i ' v , t h e s i n c e r i t y o f t h e w i t
ness he iidt Ik'voikI a d o u b t , a n d , s t i l l m o r e , i f i t b e a c t i i . i l l y siis-
e e t e d , ill tln.t ease an indirect testim ony is o f b i g h e r cogency
t h a n a d i r e c t ; for t h e indirect testim ony being given with another
1 EeEcr, L o g ik , { 1.54. Ed.

L e c t . X .N X I I I. LOGIC. 405
v i e w tli.an m e r e l y t o e s t n b l i s l i t h e f a c t in q u e s t i o n , t h e in te n tio n of
t h e w i t n e s s to fa ls ify th e t r u th o f t h e fa c t h a s n o t so s t r o n g a p ie-
8u m ] ) t i o n in its f a v o r . If both tho s in c e r ity and the com peten cy
o f the w itn ess ai-e a l t o g e t h e r i n d u b i t a b l e , i t i s t l i e u o f no im j)or-
t a n e e A vh etlie r t h e t r u t h o f t h e f a c t b c v o u c h e d f o r b v a s i n O
g le w it-
ness, or by a lilu ra lity o f w itn esses. On th e o tlie r h a n d , i f th e
sin c erity and com ])O tcncy of the A vitness li e at all d o iib tfn l, th e
c r e d i b i l i t y o f a t e s t i m o n y Avill b e g re a te r, the g re a te r the num ber
of tho A vitnesses by Avhom the fact j s corrob-
AViien t e s tim o n y a t- oratcd. B lit here it is to be c o n sid ere< l, t h a t
ta iu s th e | Avlicn t li ei'C a r e a p l u r a l i t y o f t e s t i m o n i e s t o t h e
frree o f p r o b a b ility . ^
s a m e fa ct, th e se t e s tim o n ie s are e ith e r c o n s is te n t
nr in co n sisten t. If t h e te s tim o n ie s b e co n s is te n t, a n d th e s in c e r it y
a n d c o m p e t e n c y o f a l l t h e A v i t n e s s e s c o m p l e t e , in t h a t c a s e t h e tes
t im o n y atta in s th e h ig h e s t d e g r e e o f p r o b a b ility o f w h ic h a n y te s ti
m o n y is ca])nble. A g a i n , i f t h e A vitnesses b e in c o n s is t e n t , o n th is
h y p o th esis tAvo c a s e s a r e p o s s i b l e *, f o r e i t h e r th e ir d isc r e p a n c y is
n eg ative, or it is p o sitiv e . A n eg ativ e dis-
N e g a t iv e an d T o s i- o r e p a iic v ariscs, w h e r e one Avitncss p a s s e s over
f iv e D is c r e p a n c y . i . j
i n s i l e n c e Avb.at a n o t h e r A v i t n e s s p o s i t i v e l y a v e r s .
A p o sitiv e d iscrep an cy a r i s e s , Avhere o n e Avitness e x p l i c i t l y affirm s
som eth in g , A vliich so m e th in g r.n o th e r Avitn ess exp licitly d en ies.
W hen the d ifferen ce of testim o n ie s is m e re ly n egative, avo m a y
suppose vario u s causes o f the sile n c e ; an d , th e re fo re, th e p o sitiv e
a v e r m e n t o f o n e A vitn ess t o a f a c t is n o t d i s p r o v e d b y tlie m e r e eir-
c n n istn n ce that the s a m e fa c t is o m it t e d b y a n o t h e r . B u t i f it b e
m ade out, th a t the A v i t n e s s Avho o m i t s m en tio n o f the fact could
not h ave been ig n o r a n t o f th a t fa c t b a d it tak e n p la c e , an d , at th e
am e tim e , th at he co u ld n o t h a v e p a s s e d it o v e r A vitbont v i o l a t i n g
e v e r y p ro b a b ility o f hum an a c t i o n , in th is ea se , tlie sile n ce of
the one w itn ess m an ifestly d ero gates fro m the c re d ib ility o f the
o th e r w itn ess, an d in certain c irc u m stan c es m a y a n n ih ila te it a lt o
geth er. W h e r e , aga in , th e d ifferen ce is p o sitiv e , th e d iscrep an cy
is o f g r e a t e r in i])o rta n c e , b e c a u s e ( t h o u g h t h e r e a r e c e r t a i n l y ex ce))-
tio n s to th e ru le) an o v e r t c o n t r a d ic tio n is, i n g e n e r a l a n d in i t s e l f ,
o f s t r o n g e r e o g e i ic y th a n a m e r e n o n -c o n fir m a tio n b y s im p le sile n c e .
XoAv the p o sitiv e d iscrep an cy of testim o n ies eith er ad m its of
co n ciliatio n , or it does not. In the fo rm e r case, th e c re d ib ility
of the several testim o n ie s stan ds intact ; and the d iscrep an cy
a m o i i " t h e A vitnesses is t o b e a c c o u n t e d for b y such circu m stan ces
as e x p l a i n , A vitb out i n v a l i d a t i n g , t h e t e s t i m o n y c o n s i d e i e d in itse lf
In th e la ttei' case, o n e t e s t im o n y m a n if e s t ly d e t r a c t s fr o m th e c r e d
i b i l i t y o f a n o t h e r ; f o r o f i n c o m p a t i b l e t e s t i m o n i e s , A vh ile b o t h c a n -
09
406 LOGIC. L e c t. X X X IIl.
not be true, tlie one iinist bc false, wlien reciprocally contradictory,

or they may both be false, when reciprocally contrary. In tliis
ease, the whole question resolves itself into one of the g re a te r or
less tnistw orthiiiess o f th e opjiosiiig witnesses. Is tlie triistworthi-
iK'ss of the eonntor-witiiosses equally g r e a t ? In th a t case, neither
o f the eunriictive testim onies is to be .admitted. Again, is the
trustw orthiness o f th e witnesses not upon a p a r ? In th a t case, the
testim ony o f the witness wIio.se trustw orthiness is the greater, ob-
taims th e preference, and this more especially if the credibility
o f the o th e r witnesses is suspected. '
So much for the C redibility o f Testim ony, considered in Special,
in so far as th a t testim ony is I m m e d ia te or a t F irs t H a n d ; and I
now, ill the second place, pass on to consider, likewise in special,
the Credibility o f T estim o ny, in so far as th a t testim ony is M edi
ate, or at Second H an d .
A M ediate T e stim o n y is one where the fact is an object n ot of
P ersonal, Init o f Fo reign Fxjierience. Toncli-
2 M e d ia te Tc.sti- credibility of a mediate te stim ony, this
sujiposes tliat tlie rejiort o f tlie im m ediate, and
th a t tbe r e p o rt o f the mediate, witness are both tru stw o rth y .
^V hether the rejiort o f th e im m ediate witness be t r u s t w o r t h y ,
this we are e ith e r of ourselves able to determ ine, viz., from onr
jtersonal acqnaiiitance with his x'eracity and comiieteiice ; or wo are
unable o f onr.'êlves lo do this, in which case tlie credibility o f the
im m ediate m ust bc taken iijion the auth o rity of th e mediate w it
ness. H ere, however, it is necessary for us to be aware, th a t tbe
m ediate witness i.s jiossessed o f tlie ability requisite to estim ate the
eredihility o f the im m ediate witness, and o f tlie honesty to cornmii-
iiic.-ite th e tr u th w ith o u t r e tre n e h m e n t or falsification. H ut if th e
trustw orthiness hoth o f tlie m ediate and of the im m ediate w itness
bo siillieieiitly establislied, it is o f no consequence, in regard to the
eredihility o f a testimony, w holh er it be at first hand or at second.
N ay, the testim ony of a ine<liate may even tend to eoiifinn tlie tes
tim ony of an im m ediate witiie.ss, when liis own eomjietence fairly
to apjireciato the rej-ort o f the im m ediate witness is indubitable.
If. however, the credibility o f th e imiiiediate witness be niiimjieaeh-
;ible, but not so the credibility o f - th e mediate, in tliat case the
m ediate tesliinony, in resjieet of its authority, is inferior to the
irnmediale, ami this in th e same jirojiortion as the credibility of
the .second Iiaml witness is inferior to th a t o f the witness a t first
hand. F u rth e r, mediati; witiies.scs are either P ro x im a te or R e m o te ;
and, in hoth eases, eith er Indejiendeiit or Dejieiident. T h e trust-
1 E.s#er, L o g ik , ) Ito. El).

L e c t . X X X Iir. LOGIC. 467
w o rtliiiie .ss o f p ro x im ate \v itn csse.s is , i n g e n e r . a l , g r e a t e r tlian th e

tru st w o rth in e ss o f ix m o te : am i th e c re d ib ility
M e d ia te W itn e s s e s . .
are e ith e r P r o x im a t e O' i n d e p e n d e n t w ' l t i i e s s e s g r e a t e r t l i mi t l i e c r e d -
o r itc m o te , a n d e ith e r ib ility of (le jio iid en t. d d ic rem ote w itn ess is
in d e p e u d e u t or D e- u i i w o r t l i y o f bclielF w l ie ii t h e i n t e r m e d i a t e l i n k s
arc w a n tin g betw een h im and th e origim il w it
ness ; and the dependent w itn ess deserves no cred it, w h e n tlia t
on w h ic h li i s e v i d e n c e depends is r e c o g n i z e d as fa lse o r iinestab -
lislicd . M ed iate te s tim o n ie s are, lik e w is e , e ith e r d ire c t o r i n d ir e c t ;
an d, lik ew ise, w h e n m ore than one, e ith e r re c ip ro c a lly c o n g ru e n t or
c o n flic tiv c . In both eases the c re d ib ility of the w itn esses is to
be d e te rm in e d in the sam e m anner as if the testim o n ies w ere
im m ed iate.
The t e s t im o n y o f a p lu r a l i t y o f m e d ia t e w itn e s s e s , w 'h crc t h e r e
is n o recogn ized i m m e d i a t e w itn cs.s, is c a l le d a
R u m o r , w h a t. ... . i
T r u i it i o n I'tm io r, it tlic w itiio sses be c o n tc in jio ra n e o n s;
and a tr a d it io n , i f t h c w i t n e s s e s b e c h r o n o l o g
ic a lly su ccessiv e. T h e s e a re b o th le ss e n title d t o c r e d it , in p r o p o r
t io n a s in e i t h e r c a s e a fic tio n o r fiils ific a tio n o f t h e f a c t is c o m p a r a
t iv e ly e a sy , and, c o n setp ie n tly, c o m jia ra tiv e ly p ro b a b le . '
1 E e se r , L o g ik , 156. E d .
LECTURE XXXIV.
M O D I F I E D M E T H O D O E O G Y .
SEC TIO N I. O F THE A C Q U ISIT IO N OF K N O W L E D G E .
I. E X P E R I E N C E . B. FO R E IG N : R EC O R D E D T E ST IM O N Y
AND W R IT IN G S IN GENERAL.
II . SPE C U L A T IO N .
I n our last L ecture, we w ere engaged in the consideration o f

T estim ony, and th e Princi)iles hy which its
C r itic ism o f U e - Credibility is g o v e r n e d , on the sn])]) 0 . si t ion
c o r f . T e s tim o iij-, , , i i i r.
an d o f W r itin g s in a lw ays tliat WC ])Ossess tlic v e r i t a b l e rejiort o f
^rcnnrui the witness who.se testim ony it professes to lie,
and on the supposition th a t we are at no loss to
u ndersta nd its m eanin g and piirpoit. B u t (piestions may arise in
regard to these points, and, therefore, there is a further critical pro-
ce.'S requisite, in o rder to establish the A u th e n t ic i ty , th e I n t e g
rity, and the Signification, o f the d ocum ents in which the te s ti
mony is conveyed. T his leads to the irnjiortant subject, the
Criticism of Recorded 'festim ony, anfl o f W r itin g s in general. I
>hall comprise the heads o f th e following observations on this suh-
je e t in th e ensuing paragraph.
^ ex. T h e exam ination and ju d g m e n t of W r itin g s profess

ing to eontaiii the testim onv of eertain
P a r . e x . C r itic is m
and I n te r p r e ta tio n .
witnesses, and o f W r itin g s in General p ro
fessing to he the work o f certain authors, is
o f tw o pnifs. F o r the inquiry regards either, 1, T h e Aiitlien-
licity of the dociiinent, th a t is, w heth e r it he, in whole or in
p.'ii't, the product o f its osteiisilile a u t h o r ; for ancient w ritings
in p.'irticnlar are freq uently supposititious or in te rjio la ted ; or,
2'^, I t regards th e Cleaning of tlie words of whicli it i.s coin-
tosf(l, for these, esjiecially when in languages now dead, are
L f p t . XXX I V. LOGI C. 460
fi'((]iuntly obscure. T h e former of tliese prolileins is resolved

by the A r t o f Criticism (C r itic a ) , in the stricter sense o f the
te rm ; the la tte r by the A r t o f Intex'j rctation {h\i'eyctic<t or
Jlermencuticd). Criticism is of tw o kinds. If it be oeeiipied
Avith the criteria of the aiithentieity o f a Avriting in its totality,
or in its princijial parts, it is called the HiyJier, and sometimes
the Internal, Criticisxn. If, again, it consider only the integ
rity of Jiarticular words and phrases, it is called th e lon-cr,
and sometimes the External, Criticism. T h e former of these
m ay jierhajis be best styled th e ('riticism o f A u th e n tic ity ; ^
the latter, the Criticism o f In teyrity.
T h e problem Avhieh In te rp re ta tio n has to solve is, To
discover and exjionnd the m eaning o f a Avriter, from the
w ords in Avhich his th o u g h ts arc exjiressed. I t dejiarts from
the jirinciple, th a t how ever manifold be the jiossible meanings
o f the exjiressions, tho sense o f the Avriter is one. Intcrjireta-
tion, by reference to its sources or subsidia, has been di\ i d e d
into the Grammatical, th e Historical, and the Philosophical,
E xeyes is.^
Testim onies, especially Avhen the ostensible Avitnesscs themselves

^ can no longer be in terro gated, m ay be snbieetcd
E x p l ic a ti o n
to an exainiiKition un d er various form s; and
this examination is in fact indisjiensable, seeing n o t only th a t a
ftdse testim ony m ay be sub stituted for a true, and a te stim o ny true
upon the whole m.ay yet be falsified in its jiarts, a jiraetice wbieli
prevailed to a g re a t e x te n t in :meicnt tim e s ; while at the same
tim e tho nieaniiig o f the testimony, by reason cither o f the foreign
charaeter o f the language in Avhich it is exjiressed, or of the foreign
eharacter o f th o u g h t in whieh it is conceived, may be obsenre and
n n d eten n in e d . T h e exam ination of a testim ony is tAvofold, inas-
much as it is either an examination of its An-
I h e e x a m in a t io n o f
a te st im o n y tw of old , thc n tic ity and In teg rity , or an examination of
of its Auiheiiticity its Meaning. T h is t A v o f o l d process of exainina-
and Integrity, and o f jg n jijilica b lc to te s tim o n ie s o f e v c rv k in d ,
its M ea n i n g . . t , , , , '
b u t I t b e c o m e s i n d i s p e n s a b l e Avhen th e testi
m o n y h a s b e e n r e c o r d e d in Avriting, a n d w l i e n th is , f r o m i t s a n t i
q u i t y , h a s c o m e d o w n t o us o n l y in t r a n s c r i p t s , i n d e f i i i i t e l y r e m o v e d
fr o m t h e o r i g i n a l , a n d Avhen t h e Avitnessos a r e m e n d ilF ering g r e a t l y
f r o m o u r s e l v e s in l a n g u a g e , m a n n e r s , c u s t o m s , a n d a s s o c i a t i o n s of
1 Cf. K r u g , L o g ik , 177 e( seq. E v . [ S n e ll, L o g ik , p. ii. } 6 p. 195. K ie s e w e tt e r ,L o g ii, p.

ii. 185 ct if^ .]
i70 LOGIC. L ec t. X X X IV .
tho ught. Tlic solution of the prohlciii, B y wli.at Laws nve the
^ niitliciiticity or sjuiriousness, the inte g rity or
eorruplioii, of a w riting to be (loteriiiinecl,
constitutes the A r t o f Critieisin, in its stricter signification { C r it -
ic a ) ; and the solution o f the jiroblein, B y w h at law is th e sense
or m eaning of w riting to bo detenn iiied, coii-
Iiiterpretation. . " , . x
stitiitc.s the A rt ut Jiilcrjiri'tation or Exjiosition
{ ir e n n c n e u i ic a , E x t ( /c t ic a ) . In theory, Criticism o u ght to jirecedc
Intcr]retatioii. for tbe question, W h o has siiokeii, naturally arises
before thc q nc'lion, Ilotv w h at has been s]>okeii is to be u n d er
stood. But in jiractice, criticism and interpretation cannot bc sepa
rated ; lor in applic.ation they proceed band in ban d.
First, then, o f Criticism ; and the question th a t jircsents itself in
th e threshold is, W h a t are its Definition and
I. CriliciMU. ^ tt t *
Divisions ? U n d e r Ci'iticisni is to bo under-
stood the conipleiiiciit o f logical rules, liy which the a u th e n tic ity or
spiiriousiiess, the in tegrity or interpolation, o f a w riting is to be
ju d g e d . T h e jiroblcins which it proposes to
answ er are 1, Does a w riting really jiroceed
from the au th o r to w hom it is ascribed ; and, 2, Is a writing, as we
]>o.ssoss it, in all its ]>arts th e same as it came from the h an d s o f its
anthnr. T h e system of fnndanieiital rules, wliieli are siqijiosed in
ju d g in g of the autlieiitieity and in tegrity of every writing, consti
tutes w hat is calletl the D o c t r i n e o f U n ivers a l
1 nil LTsal Crilicii-m. r " i i
< riticisn i ; and the system ot jiarticular rules,
hy which the authen ticity and in te g rity of writing.s o f a certain
kiml are jndge<l, c<mstitntes the doctrine of wliat is c.alled S p e c ia l
C'riticisrn. I t is manifest, from the nature of
.spiciai fTitici'tii. Logic, th a t th e doctrine o f U niversal Criticism
UiiivcT'al f'riiic i'm . , -.i i at tt i
IS . al o ne witliin its spliere. Now Universal
aloiK- WTlIiii) the . . . . .
cpiiert-of i.ogic. Crilicisiti is coiivers.aiit either with the antlieii-
ticity or spurionsiiess nf a w ritin g considered as
.a whole, or with the iiilegiaty or interpolation of certain parts. In
, th e former case it is c.alled J lig h e r, in the latter,
IiMD iv is io n s . , , , , . .
JfOV'er, ( r i t i c i s n i ; Init these denom inations are
inappropri.ale. T h e one criticism has also been styled the Internal,
tin- olln-r thc J'Jj'ti r n a l ; l>nt these a|tpellatioiis are, likewise, exccji-
ti<in.ahle; ami, jierhajis, it would he jireferahle to call the former
I ho ( 'rilifisin o f the A a tl a .n ti e it >j, X\\o. latter, the ( f i t i c i s m o f the
Inh g r itg , of a work. I shall consider these in jiarticnlar; and, first,
ot the Crilicisin of A u thenticity.
m V jiroof of the a u th enticity of a wntiiig, m ore especially o f an
1 Esswr, L o g ik , j 167. Ed.

L ect. X X X IV . LOGIC. 471
ancient AVi'iting, can be rested only upon tw o grounds, an I n t e r

nal and an E xternal, and on tbese either
1. C r itic is m o f A u -
.. apart , or in i
coinbiinition. J>y u d e r n a l; f/roianls,
7
tlieiilicity. . . .
W e i n e : i n t h o s e i i i d i c M t i o n s o f : i n t l i e n t i c i t y w b i c b
th e w r it in g it s e lf afford s. By e xtern al g ro u n d s , w e denote th e tes-
tiin o n y bo rn e b y o th e r w o rk s; o f a c o rre sjio iid iiig a n t iq u it y , to the
a u t h e n t i c i t y o f t h e w r i t i n g in q u e s t i o n .
Ill regard to the Inteiaial G ro u n d s ; it is evident, Avithout
en terin g niion details, th a t these cannot of
( a ) I n l e n i a l (jr o u n d s.
T h ese o f th e m s e lv e s tlien isc lv es,th a t IS , apart from the external
n o t su ffic ie n t to est.ib - g ro iiiid s, affo rd ev id en ce cap,able o f estab lisli-
iish the !uitiieniicity j,^g. b e y o n d a (lo iib t t h e a iitlie iitic itV o f an an -
o f a wiitiug. . , ^
c i e n t w r i t i n g ; l o r W'e c a n e a s i l y c o n c e i v e t h a t
:in a b l e a n d l e a r n e d fo r g e r m a y a c c o m n io d .ate his fa b r i c a t i o n s both
to till the genera! c irc n m sta iic c s of t i m e , j i l a c e , j i e o p l e , .and l.aii-
g n n gc, u n d e r w h ich it is s iip jx y se d to h a v e been w ritten , an d even
to all the p a rticu la r c ircu m sta n ce s o f the style, h a b it o f tlio iig lit,
lie i'so n al re l.ation s, e tc ., o f t h e a u t h o r b y w h o m it p r o fe s s e s to have
b e e n w r it t e n , s o t h a t e v e r y t h i n g m a y n iilit.ate fo r, a n d n o t h i n g m i l i
t a t e :;g:;iiist, its aiitlie n tic itA '.
B u t if our criticism from th e internal grounds alone be, on the
one hand, im p o te n t to esttiblisli, it is, on the
B u t o iiin ip o tc n t to om nip o ten t to disprove. F o r it is siifh-
d is p r o v e t h is . ^ ^ . . . .
c i e n t t o s h o A v t h a t a w r i t i n g is i n e s s e n t i a l j i a r t s ,
t h a t is, p a r t s Avliich c a n n o t b e s e p . a r a t e d f r o m t h e w h o l e , in oj>j)Osi-
tion t o t h e k n o w n m a n n e r s , in s t i t u t io n s , u s a g e s , etc., o f t h a t jie o p le
w 'i t h w h i c h it w o u l d , a n d m u s t , h.ave b e e n in h a r m o n y , w e r e it th e
j i r o d n c t o f tlie w r i t e r w h o s e nam e it b o a r s ; t h a t , o n the con trary,
it b e a rs iijion i t s f a c e i n d i c a t i o n s o f .a n o t h e r c o u n t r y o r o f a hater
age; a n d , f i n a l l y , th.at i t is a t varian ce w i t h th e p erso n til c ir c u m
stan ces, the turn o f m in d , and the pitch o f in tellect, o f its pre
tended author. And h ere i t is t o bc n oticed , th a t th ese g ro u n d s
are o n ly r e la tiv e ly in te rn al ; fo r we becom e a w .are o f t h e m origi-
n a lly o n ly tliro n g li the t e s t i m o n y o f o t h e r s , tli.a t is, t l i r o n g l i exter
nal g ro u n d s.
In regard to th e E x ternal G ro u n d s ; they, as I said, consist
in th e testim onv, direct or indirect, given to
( b ) E x te r n a l G rou n d s. . . . , . . . ^ .
the a u th e n tic ity of th e w 'ritin g in qu estion by
oth er Avorks of .a c o m j i e t e u t a n tiq u ity . T h is te stim o n y m ay be
co n tain ed eith er in oth er and ad m itted A vritings o f th e snjipo sod
au th or h im se lf; o r iu t h o s e o f e o i i t e m p o r a r y A v r i t e r s ; o r in those
o f Avriters . a j i p r o x i m a t i n g iu a n t i q u i t y . T h i s t e s t im o n y m a y also be
1 E sser, L o g ik , 153 iGO. E d .

472 LOGIC. L kc t . X X X I V .
given oitlier directly, by attribution o f the disputed Avriting by

title to the a u t h o r ; or indirectly, by quoting as bis certain pas
sages wliifli are to be found in it. On tliis sidijeet it is needless to
go into det.ail. and it is hardly necessary to observe, tliat tlie ]roof
o f the auth en ticity is most coni)lete when it jiroeeeds upon the
internal and e.\teinal g round s to gether. 1, tlierefore, pass on to
tlie Criticism o f Integrity.*
W h e n the authenticity o f an ancient Avork has been established
on e.xternal ground s, and been confirmed on
2. C r itic ism of In - . 1 -i
in te rn a l, tlie in te g rity oi th is A vriting is not
tbercA vith p r o v e d ; fo r it is v e r y jio ssib le, a n d
in an cien t A vritings in d e e d very jir o b a b le , th a t jia r tic n la r jin ssa g e s
are e itlie r in te rp o la te d or c o rru jite d . T h e a u t h e n t i c i t y o f jia rtic u -
l a r ji . -i s s a g c s i s t o h e j u d g e d o f j i r e c i s e l y b y t h e sam e la w s A vh ieh
regu late o u r c r it ic is m o f t lie a n t li e n t i c i t y of tlie w lio le w o r k . The
jir o o f m ostjK 'rtin e n t to the :u ith e n tie ity o f jia rticn la r p assa g e s is
ilra w n 1 , h r o i i i t l i e i r a e k n o w lo d g m e iit b y t h e a u t l i o r h i m s e l f in
o tlie r, a n d these n n su sjio cted , w o r k s ; 2, F r o m tlie a tt r ib u t io n of
them to the auth or by oth er w riters of co iiijie te n t in fo rm a tio n ;
a m i , .3, F r o m the evid en ce of tlie m ost a n cien t M SS. O n tlie
oth er liand , a jia ss a g e is to be o b e liz e d ns s ji u r i o u s , 1 , W h e n
lo im d to be ro jn ig iia n t to th e g e n e r a l re la tio n s o f tim e an d jilaec,
and to tlie jie rso n al r e l a t i o n s o f tlie a u t h o r ; 2 , \ V l i e n w a n t i n g in
tlie m ore an cien t co d ices, an d e.xtaiit o n ly in the m ore m odern.
A jia ssag e is s i i s j i i e i o n s , w h e n any m o tive fo r its iiite ijio la tio n is
m a n ife st, even sh ou ld avc be u n a b le to estab lish it as s jn irio iis.
d ' h e d i f f e r e n c e s Avliieli d i f f e r e n t e o j i i e s o f a A v r i t i n g e x h i b i t in t h e
Jia rtic n la r jia ss a g e s, a r e c a lle d v a r i o u s r e a d i n g s ( v a r i w lectioucs o r
Icctiones va ria n tc s) . N o a v , as o f vaiao iis r e a d in g s o n ly o n e can be
t h e t r u e , Avliile t h e y m a y a l l v e r y e a s i l y b e f a l s e , t h e j i r o l i l e i n Avliicb
tlie c r i t i c i s m o f I n t e g r i t y j i r o j i o s e s t o s o l v e i s , H o w is t h e g e n u
ine read in g to be m ade ou t; and liero in co n sists w lia t is tecb-
n ie a lly calle d th e Jieeeusion, m o r e p r o j i e r l y t l i e E m e n d a t i o n , o f t h e
text.
T h e F m e n d a tio n o f an ancient antlior may be of tw o k in d s ;
tlie o n e o f w h ich m a y be calle d H i s t o r ic a l , t h e
K m cnrtatfon o f Ih e o th er tlic ( 'onjcctural. The fo rm e r of tliese
I c x l, o f l o k iiiits , , 1 . 1 1 - c
,,, , , , fo u n d s n jioii liisto rical data fo r its p r o o f ; the
VIZ., llkiorfcal and * '
coiij.ciurai. latter, again, jiroceeds on groniids wbieli lie
beyond tlie sjiliere o f historical fact, and tbis
for the very reason th a t historical fact is found in c o m p e te n t to the
re.^toration o f the te x t to its original integrity, T h e historical
1 See Eaacr, L o g ik , ) IGl, IG2. Ed.

L e c t . X X X IV . LOGIC. 478
eincn(lntion iiecessai'ily precedes tlic conjectural, because tlie object

itself of cniciidation is w holly of an historical character, and be
cause it is not ])criuitted to a t te m p t any o th e r than an em endation
on historical grounds, until, from these very grounds th e m se h es, it
be shown th a t th e restitution o f the te x t to its original in tegrity
cannot be historically accomplished. H istorical
H is to r ic a l E n ie iid a - E m e n d atio n is again of tw o kinds, according as
t io n of tw o k i u ii s , ju d g m e n t ])roceeds on external or on inter-
L x t e r n a i a n d J iit ir gfonuds. I t fouuds upoii external grounds,
when the reasons for th e truth or falsehood of
a reading arc derived from t e s t i m o n y ; it founds njion internal
grounds, when th e reasons for the tru th or falsehood o f a rending
are derived from th e w riting itself. H istorical em endation lias thus
a twofold fniiction to jierform (and in its apjilication to practice,
these m u st always bc ]>erformcd in conjunction), viz., it has care
fully to seek out and accurately to weigh both tb c external and
internal reasons in snjiport of the reading in dispute. O f external
g ro u n d s th e ])riiuipal consists in the confirmation aftorded by IMSS.,
by printed editions which have im m ediately em ana ted from M SS.,
by ancient translations, and by passages quoted in ancient authors.
T h e internal grounds are all derived cither from the form, or from
th e contents, of the work itself. In reference to the form, a
rea d in g is probable, in proportion as it corrcsiiouds to the general
cdiaracter o f the language prev a len t at the epoch when the work
was w ritten, and to tho iieenliar character o f the language by which
th e a uth or himself was distinguished. I n referenee to the contents,
a reading is probable, w hen it barmonizcs with th e context, th a t
is, when it concurs w ith the o th e r w ords o f the iiarticular passage in
Avliich it stands, in affording a m eaning reasonable in itself, and con
formable with the a u th o rs opinions, reasonings, and general charac
te r o f th ought. *
I t frequently happens, how ever, that, n o tw ith s ta n d in g the uni
formity o f MSS., and o th e r external snbsidia, a
C o n je c tu r a l E m e n - ,-eading cam iot bo rccogiiizcd as gcmiine. In
tbis case, it m ust be scientifically shown from
the rules o f criticism itself th a t this lection is corrupt. I f tbc
dem onstration th u s a tte m p te d be satisfactory, an<l if all external
snbsidia have been tried in vain, the critic is jAcrmitted to con
sider in w hat m ann er th e corruitted passage can be restored to
its intfegrity. A n d here th e conjectural or divinatory em en d a
tion comes into p l a y ; a process in which the pow er and effi-
1 E sser, L o g ik . 1 6 3 . E d .
GO
474 LOGIC. L e c t. XXXIV,
cicncy of criticism and tlie genius of the critic are principally

m anifested.' *
So m uch for C r i t i c i s m , in its a p jilic a tio n s b o t h to the A u t h e n
t i c i t y :iii(l t o t h e I n t e g r i t y o f W r i t i n g s . W e have n ow to consider
t h e g e n e r a l r u l e s b y w h i c h I n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h a t is, t h e s c i e n t i f i c p r o
c e s s o f e . x p o i m d i n g t h e ^ Me a n i n g o f a n a u t h o r , is r e g u l a t e d .
T > y t h e A r t o f In terp rcU ition , c a l l e d likew ise tceh n ically H er
m e neu tic o r E x c y e tic , is m e a n t t h e c o m p l e m e n t
11. I iiU i|in .ia liu ii. I 1 1 , 1
of l o g i c a l l a w s , b y w h i c h t h e s e n s e o f a n a n c i e n t
w r i t i n g is t o b e e v o l v e d . Ilcrm encutic is e i t h e r G e n e r a l o r Sjve-
cial. General, when it contains those laws
(je n c r a l a n d SiK 'C ia l. i . i , . .
which ajiply to t h e in t e r p re t a t i o n o f a n y w rit
ing w hatever; Special, when it co m p rises those laws by which
writings of a particular kind are to bo e x p o u n d e d . The former
o f t h e s e a l o n e is o f l o g i c a l c o n c e r i i m e n l . The problem proposed
for tb e A r t o f I n t e r p r e t a t i o n to solve, is, ITow are w c to pro ceed
in o r d e r t o d i s c o v e r f r o m t h e w o r d s o f a w r i t i n g t h a t s o l e m e a n i n g
which the a u th o r in ten d ed th em to convey ? In the interpretation
o f a w o r k , i t is n o t , t h e i x ' f o r e , e n o u g h t o s h o w i n w h a t s i g n i f i c a t i o n
it s w o r d s m a y b e m i d c r s l o o d ; f o r i t is r e q u i r e d t h a t w e s h o w in
what signification they must. To th e execution o f this task tw o
c o n d i t i o n s a r e a b s o l u t e l y n e c e s s a r y ; 1 , T l i a t t h e i n t e r j j r e t e r s h o u l d
be thorouglily acquainted with t h e l a n g u a g e itself in gen eral, an d
with the language of the w r i t e r in j i a r t i c u l a r ; a n d , 2, T h a t the
i i i t e rj i r e t e r s h o u l d b e f a m i l i a r w i t h t h e .subjects o f w h i c h t h e w r i t i n g
treats. R u t tliese t w o requisites, t h o u g h indispensable, are n o t of
t h e m s e l v e s suflieient. I t is a ls o o f i m p o r t a n c e t h a t t h e e x p o s i t o r
should h av e a com jieten t a c q u a in ta n c e with t h o a u t h o r s jiersonal
circiiiiistances a n d eharactcr of thought, and with the history and
sj ii ri t o f t h e a g e a n d c o u n t r y in w h i c h he lived. In regard to the
interjiretation i t s e l f , i t is t o b e a g a i n o b se rved , t h a t as a w r ite r
c o u ld e m j i h i y e x jir c s s io n s o n l y in a s i n g l e se nse , so t h e r e s u l t o f t h e
exjiositioii o u g h t t o h e n o t m e r e l y t o s h o w w h a t meaning m ay pos
sibly attach to the doubtful term s, b u t w h a t m e a n in g necessarily
must. \\'Iicii, therefore, it ajipears that a jiassage is o f d o u b t f u l
iinjiort, t h e b e s t ji re ji a r a t i v c for a final d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f its m e a n
i n g is, i n t h e lir.sl j i l a c e , t o a s c e r t a i n i n h o w m : i i i y d i f f e r e n t s i g n i f i c a
t i o n s it m a y b e c o n s t r u e d , a n d t h e n , b y a jirocess o f e x c l u s i o n , to
arnvc at the one v e r i t a b l e i net i i i i i i g. AVl i c n, h o w e v e r , t h e o b s c u
r i t y c a n n o t b e r e m o v e d , in t h a t c a s e i t is t h e d u t y o f t h e e x j i o s i t o r ,
1 Vm c t , Lfjgik, i ICO. E d . [P a rrlu isia n a , I. 3598C5, 2(1 c d . 1701. G c n u c n s is , Ars Logico-

C n iica , L . tv c . v l. t l )" /.]
L f.c t . X X X I V . LOGIC. 4iO
before abnndoiiing lii.s t a s k , to evince that an interpretation of

t l i e p a s s a g e i.s, w i t h o u t e h a n g e , a b s o l u t e l y o r r el ati ve*!} i n i p o s s i h l e .
As to the sources from whence the Interjirotation is t o he
draw n , these are th ree i n al l , vi z. , 1, T h e
U terariim , t h e words tliemselve.s, as
they a p p e a r i u i M S S . ; 2, T h e context, that is,
t h e p a s s a g e in i m m e d i a t e eoiiiieetion w ith t h e d o u h tfn l t e r m ; 3,
P a r a l l e l o r a n a l o g o u s j i a s s a g e s i n t h e s a m e , o r in o t h e r w r i t i n g s . '
How t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n d r a w n f r o m t h e s e s o u r c e s is t o h e a j i p l i e d , I
shall n o t a tt e m p t tod etail; h u t pass on to a m ore g e n e r a lly usefih
an d in t e r e s t i n g suhject.
So inuelifor Experience or Observation, t h e first mean of
scientific discovery, that, viz., h y which we
Si-ecuiation llie Sec- n p p v e h e i i d w l i a t is p r e s e n t e d a s c o n t i n g e n t
ond Means of Knowl- , i t
j d i r e n o m e n a , a n d b y w l i o s e p r o c e s s oi l i i d n e -
tion and A n alo g y we carry up individual into
g e n e r a l facts. W e have now to consider th e o th e r m ean o f sci-
entitic d i s c o v e r y , t h a t , vi z. , b y w h i c h , f r o m the jilioenomena pre
sented as contingent, we separate what is r e a l l y n e c e s s a r y , and
thus attain to the knowledge, not of m erely generalized facts,
hut of universal laws. This mean may, for d i s t i n c t i o n s sake,
he called Sqyeculation, a n d i t s g e n e r a l n a t u r e I c o m p r e h e n d i n t h e
f o 11o w i n g p a r a g r a p h .
^ CXI. W hen the mind does not rest contented with

observing and classifying the objects of
P a r . CX I. S p e c u la - c x p e r i e n c c , but, by a reflective analy-
tion, as a m eans of . , ,
Knowledge. SIS, s i i u d c r s t l i c c o n e r c t e w h o l e s presenteu
to its cognition, throw s out of account
all that, as contingent, it can think away from, and con
centrates its attention e x clu siv ely on those elem ents which,
as n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n s o f its o w n acts, it c a n n o t h u t t h i n k ;
hy this process it obtains the knowledge of a certain
o r d e r o f facts, fac ts o f Self-eonseionsness, w h ich , as essen
tial to all Ex])erienee, are not the result of any ; eonsti-
tnting in truth the Laws hy which the possibility of our
cognitive functions is determined. T his process, b y which
w e t h u s a t t a i n t o a d i s c r i m i n a t i v e k n o w l e d g e o f t h e jFeces-
sary, N a tive , a n d , a s t h e y a r e a l s o c a l l e d , t h e N oetic, P u re ,
a p rio r i, o r T ranscendental, E le m e n ts o f TJiouyht, m a y h e
s t y l e d Speculative A n a ly s is , A n c d y tic Speculation, o r Specu-
1 E sse r , L o g ik , 1 6 . E d . [C f. S n e l l, L o g ik , p . ii. 6, p. 200.]

470 LOGIC. L ect XXXIV.
hit ion s i i n j i l y , a n d is c a r e f u l l y t o b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m I n d u c
t i o n , w i t l i w l i i e h i t is n o t u n i i s n a l l y c o n f o u n d e d .
The o m jiirical k n o w led g e of w hieli we have liith c rto been

sneaking, does n o t, h o w e v e r v a rie d and e .x t e n -
siv e It m a y be, siim ee to sa tisfy th e th in k in g
m i n d a s siivli ; f o r o n r e n i j i i i i c a l k n o w l e d g e i t s e l f p o i n t s a t c e r t a i n
h i g h e r e u g i i i l i o n s f r o m w h i e h i t m a y o b t a i n c o n i j i l e t i o n , a n d Avliicli
are o f a v e ry d ilfe re n t c h a r a c te r from t h a t b y w h ich th e m e re e m
p iric al c o g n itio n s th e m s e lv e s a re d is tin g u is h e d , d h e c o g n i t i o n s a r e
sty led , a m o n g o th er nam es, by t h o s e o f xioetic, p u re , o r x-ational,
and they are such as e a n n o t, ilio iig h m anifested in ex p erien ce,
be d eriv ed from e x p erien ce; for, as th e co n d itio n s u n d e r w hieli
ex jierien ee is p o ssib le, t h e y innst be view ed as necessary con
stitu en ts of the n atu re of th e th in k in g jirin cip le itself. P hilos-
opliers h a v e in d e e d b een fo u n d to d e n y th e reality o f such eog-
n ititm s nativ e to the m in d ; and to co n fin e th e w h o le sp here
of hum an k n o w led g e lo th e lim its of experionee. But in th is
ease iiliilo so p h ers have o v erlo o k ed th e im p o rtan t eiren in staiicc,
th at th e acts, t h a t is, t h e a p p re h e n sio n and j u d g m e n t , o f exjie-
rien ee, are th em se lv e s im p o ssib le, ex eejit under th e sn p jio silio ii
of eert.Jii p o ten tial co g n itio n s p rev io u sly e x is te n t in the tliiiik -
ng siihjeet, a n d w hich becom e actu al on oeeasio n o f an o b ject
bein g p resen ted to th e ex te rn a l or in tern al sense. As an exam
p le of a noetic e o g iiitio n , th e fo llo w in g p ro p o sitio n s m ay suf
f i c e : .V.II o b ject and all its attrib u tes are c o n v e r tib le ; A ll
th at is has its siiflieieiit cause. The jirin eip al d istin ctio n s of
E m pirieul and B a tio iial K n o w le d g e s , o r ra th e r
Irincipai distinc- K m p i r i c a l a n d N o e t i c C o g n i t i o n s , a r e t h e fo l-
tioii? of Kiiiiiiiical , i,- i ,
, . l o w i n g : 1, I t i n i u r i e a l c o g n i t i o n s o r i g i n a t e
and NiK-tic Cogiii-
tions. e x c l u s i v e l y in e .x p e r ie n e e , w h e r e a s n o e t i c c o g
nitio n s are v irtu a lly at least before or above
a l l e x p e r i e n c e , al l e x p e r i e n c e b e i n g o n l y p o . s s i b l e t h r o u g h th em .
2, K m p i r i c a l c o g n i t i o n s c o m e i i i e e e n i e a l a n d s n e e e s s i v e l y i n t o o x i s t -
eiiee, a n d m ay again g r a d u a l l y f a d e a n d d i s a p j i e a r ; Avhereas n o e t i c
c o g n itio n s , like P a lla s , a r m e d a n d im m o rta l from th e h e a d o f J u p i
ter, s p r in g a t o n c e in to e x is te n c e , c o m p le te a n d in d e s tn ie tib le . 3 ,
K m jiirienl e o g n i t i o i i s find o n l y a n a p p l i c a t i o n l o t h o s e o b j e c t s f r o m
w hieh they w ere o rig in a lly ab stracted , and, a cco rd in g as th in g s
obtain a d ifferent form , th e y also m ay becom e d iffe re n tly fasli-
ioneil ; n o e tic c o g n itio n s , on t h e co n trary , b ear th e ch aracter nn-
prc^^scd on th em of necessity, u n iv ersality , sam eness. W h eth er
a cog n itio n be en i|)iiie a l or n o etic, can o n ly be d eterm in ed by
Lect. X X X IV . LOGIC. 477
co n sid e rin g w h e tlie r it can or cannot he presented in a sen sib le

p e r c e p t io n ; w lie tlie r it d o or do not stand fo rw ard cle ar, d is
tinct, a n d in d e stru c tib le , b e a r in g tlie s t a m p o f n ecessity and abso
lu te u n iv e rs a lit y . T h e n o etic c o g n itio n s can be detected o n ly b y a
critica l a n a l y s i s o f t h e m e n t a l jih m n o m e n a p r o p o s e d fo r tlie p n r jio s e
of th e ir d i s c o v e r y ; * an d th is an alysis m a y , as I have said , be
sty le d S p e c u la tio n , fo r w a n t o f a m o re a jip ro p ria te ap p ella tio n .
1 Esser, Logik, 171. Ed.

LECTURE XXXV.
M O D I F I E D M E T H O D O L O G Y .
SEC TIO N I. O F T H E A C Q U ISIT IO N OF K N O W L E D G E
III COMMUNICATION OF KNOWLEDGE. A. INSTRUCTION

ORAL AND W R ITTEN . B. CONFERENCE
DIALOGUE AND D ISPU TA TIO N .
T NOW go on to the last ]\Iean o f A cqu iring and P e rfe c tin g our
k n o w le d g e ; and com m ence with the Ibllowing paragraph ;
^ C X I I . A n im p o r ta n t mean for the A cquisition and P e r

fecting of K now ledge is th e Com mnnica-
P a r . C X II. The Tlioiiglit. Considered in general,
C o m m u n ic a t io n of o
T h o u g h t .- a s a m ean s tlic Coniimiiiication o f th oug lit is either
o f A c q u ir in g a n d P e r - Ono-sidod, 01* .Arntiial. T h c fo^mcr is called
f e e l i n g K n o w le d g e .
In s tr u c t io n { in s titu tio ), the latter. C o n fe r
ence {eoUocutio) \ hilt these, though in theory distinct, are in
practice easily comliined. Instn ic tio n is ;igain cither Oxxd or
W ritte n : and Conference, as it is interlocutory and familiar, or
controversial ami solemn, may he divided into iJialoejne [col-
lofjuiiini, d.hdfjgns), and ] I;rjm totion { d is p n td tio , concertatio).
T he ( 'oniinimieatioii of thonght in all its foi-ms is a means of
intellectual im provem en t, not oidy to him who receive.s, b u t to
him who bestows, inform ation ; in liotli relations, therefore, it
oug ht to be considered, and not, as is usually done, in the
former only.*
In illustrating this paragraph, T shall eommenee with the last

sentence, and, hefore tre a tin g in detail o f Tn-
E x p lic a t io n . i / " r- . i
-tnietKui and ( finlereiiee, as means ot c.xtenfl-
iiig the limits of onr know ledg e by new acfpiisitions derived from
1 Cf. K ru g , IfO gik, ] Kd

L e c t. X XXV. LOGI C. 479
th e com n n in icn tio n o f o tlic r s , I sltnll e n d e a v o r t o sliow , tlia t th e

. C o m n n iu ieatio n of
t h o u g h t i s i t s e l f a n iin p o i--
'I'lie ('ommunicnlioii ^ i r- . i i
.
ol llionglit an impor-
ta n t mean tow ards the perleeting

0 1 know ledge
^
laut mean towards the in t h e in iu d o f t h e c o m in u iiic a to r h im self. In
pcriecting of Kiiowi- th is v icw , th e c o m m u n i c a t i o n o f k n o w l e d g e is
edge in the mind of a ttrib u te o f m crcv , tw ic e b le s s e d ,
the communicator. . .
blessed to b u n tliat g iv es and to h im th a t
t a k e s ; i n t e a c b i i i g o t h e r s Ave i n f a c t t e a e l i o u r . s e l v e s .
T h i s v ie w o f t h e reflex eftect o f t h e co m in m iicr.tio ii of th o u g h t
on t h e m in d , w h e t h e r u n d e r tlie fo rm o f In stru ctio n or o f C onfer
e n c e , is o n e o f h i g h i m p o r t . a n c e , b u t i t is o n e w l i i c l i h a s , i n m o d e r n
tim es, n n f o rtu n a te ly been a lm o st w h o lly o verlooked. To illiistra to
it in all i ts b e a r i n g s w o u l d req u ire a v o lu m e; at present I can
o n ly c o n t r i b u t e a few b i n ts t o w a r d s its e x p o s itio n .
3 I a i i is, b y a n o r i g i n a l t e n d e n c y o f li i s n a t u r e , d e t e r m i n e d t o c o m -
m n iiic a te to o th e rs w h a t o c c u p ie s his th o u g h ts ,
Man naturally de- Com m unication h e ob tain s a clearer
fermined to communi- p ,
nation. n n d e r s ta n d iiig o f th e su b je c t o f bis co g ita tio n s
th an h e co u ld o th e rw is e h a v e co m p a sse d . T h is
Piat'r escape th e acu ten ess o f P la to . In
th e P ro ta g o ra s, I t lias been w e ll, says
P lato ( a n d h e h a s s u n d r y jiassag es to th e p o in t), I t h a s b e e n
w ell, I th in k , o b s e rv e d b y H o m e r
Through mutual intercourse and mutual aid,

Great deeds arc done and great discoveries made;
The wise new wisdom on the wise i)estow,
Whilst the lone thinkers thouglits come slight and slow. i
For in c o m p a n y w e , all o f ns, a r c m ore a l e r t , in d e e d and w ord

A n d i f a m a n excogitate a u g h t by h im se lf, fo r th w ith
an d th o u g lit.
he goes about to f i n d som e one to w hom he m a y revecd it, a n d f r o m
whom he m a y obtain encourayem ent, aye a n d u n til h is discovery be
c o m p le te d ^ ' T h e s a m e d o c t r i n e is m a i n t a i n e d
A risto tle. A i i s t o t l c , a n d illu strated by th e sam e q u o ta
t i o n ; ( t o w h i c h , i n d e e d , is t o b e r e f e r r e d t h e
Tlieniistius. - n , n tt-
.adage, U n u s h o m o , n n l l u s h o m o . ) W e
gjijg rejo ice, sa y s T h e i n i s t i u s , in h u n t i n g tru th in
com pany, as in h u n tin g g a m e . '' L n c iliu s,
S c i r e e s t n e s c i r e , n i s i i d m e s c i r e a l i n s s c i e r i t ; ^ p a r a p h r a s e d in
Hnmer, P .o ok x . 265.
1 A l t e r e d fr o m P o p e s X Ornt . ,xxi. Erplnrntor aiit Philosnphiis, Orn-
Prniiig., p 348. C o m p a r e Lectureson M u-
2 tiones, ]> 25 4, e d . I l a r d u i i i , P a r i s , 16 S4 E n .
aphysics, p. 2 6 1. 6 Fragm., 2 5 , in t h e B i p o n t e d i t i o n of Per-
3 Eth jVic., viii. 1. sius andJuvenal, p. 176. E d .
4S0 L OGI C. L k c t. XXXV.
t l i c c o n i p n c t e r , t h o n g l i f o r i n f e r i o r , Ao r s c o f P e r s i i i s , S c i r e t i i n n i
n i h i l e s t , n i s i t o s c i r e h o c s c i a t . a l t e r . ' C i c e r o s
Persius. C a lo te s tifie s to tlic s a m e t r u t h : N o n facile
Cicero. cst in v eiiiio , qni quod sciat ipse, non trad at
Seueca. n ltc ri. A nd S e n e c a : S ic cu m l i a c e x cc] -
t i o n c d e t i i r s a p i e i i t i a , ii t i l l a m i n c l u s a m t o n e a m
n e c c m m c i e m , ro jic in in . N iilliu s h o n i, s in e socio, j u c u n d a p o ssessio
cst.
Contlira tabcscit, vulgata scicntia crcscit. 4
In h o c g a iid e o aliip iid d isc e re , u t d o c e a m : n e c m e u lla re s d e le c -

ta h il, licet e x im ia sit e t s a l u ta r i s , qiiaiii m ilii uni, sc itu riis sim . ^
Ita non solum ad discendum propensi sum us, v erum ctiam ad
l o c e n d m n . "
T h e m o d e s i n w h i c h t h e C o m m n n i c a t i o n o f t h o u g h t is c o n d u c i v e
to th e p e r f e c t i n g o f t h o u g h t itself, a r e t t v o ; fo r
Modes in w liich . ' ,
C om m u n icatioi, is m ay he d eterm in ed to m o re ex alted
c o n d u c iv e to the P er- e n e r g y h y th e sy n q ia th y o f society, a n d h y th e
feciinp of 'iiio u gh t stim u lu s o f o p p o sitio n ; o r it m a y he iieccssi-
ta te d to m ore d istin ct, accu rate, a n d o rd erly
t h i n k i n g , a s t h i s is t h e co n d itio n o f d istin ct, accu rate, and o rd erly
co n im u iiieatio n . Of tliesc the fo rm er req u ires th e presence of
o th e rs d u rin g t h e ; i c t o f t h o u g h t , a n d is, t h e r e f o r e , o n l y m a n i f e s t e d
in o r a l i n s t r u c t i o n o r in c o n f e r e n c e ; w h e r e a s t h e l a t t e r is o j i e r a t i v e
h o th in o u r o r a l a n d in o u r w r i t t e n c o m n i u n i c a t i o n s . O f t h e s e in
tlieir o rd e r.
In th e first p la c e , th e n , t h e in flu e n ce o f m a n o n m a n in r e c i p r o
cally d e te r m in in g a h i g h e r e n e r g y o f t h e faciil-
1 reciprocally |ilu c n o iiie n o n sn flicien tly m a n ife st. P>v
ilelermining a lilphcr ' _ _ ' .
energy ol the facul- n atu re a Social lie in g , m a n h a s p o w e r s w h i c h
li e - a r e r e l a t i v e to , a n d , co iise tiiieiitly , fin d tlie ir d e-
la ) T h r o u g h . S y m p a - v e l o p m e i i t in, t h e c o m p n n y o f h i s f e l l o w s ; a n d
t h i s is m o r e j i a r t i c u l f i r l y s h o w n in t h e e n e r g i e s
o f th e co g n itiv e f ao iiltie.s. A s iron .sliarpenctli iron, sa y s S o lo
m o n , so a m an sliarpeiieth the m id erstan d in g of h is frien d . '
T h i s , a s I h a v e s a i d , is e f f e c t e d h o t h h y f e l l o w - f e e l i n g anl h y o p j i o
sitio n . W e s e e t h e e f f e c t s o f f e l l o w - f e e l i n g in t h e n e c e s s i t y o f ;m
1 I 2". E d . ('om m unti. p. 1 7 . L o n d . 1 6 8 3 ; b u t th e a u t h o r

2 f'a io aj iii d f ' i c e r o , Oe Ftn., iii c 20, is no t n a m e d . E d .
CO. 5 Seneca, Epist., v i . E d .
n ênecn. Ep.. vi C P iccro, De Fin., iii 20. Ed.
4 (îioImI a ik o in Diseutsions, p. 77 8 This t Proverbs, x x v i i . 1 7 . 1 ho a u t h o r i z e d vc r -
l i n e ap|K-an> t o h a v e b e e n t a k e n f r o m a s m a l l s i o n is, rotmietietnce o f hi.s friend. C o m p a r #
t olurne en titled Ceirminum Prorerbialium Loci Ijirture.s on M rtophysia, p. 231 E d .
L ect. X X X V . - LOGIC. 481
a u d ien ce to call forth the exertion s of the orator. E lo q u en ce

req u ires n u m b e rs ; a u d o r a t o ry has o n ly flou rish ed w h e r e the con
d itio n of la rg e au d ien ces has been siijijjlie d .
(b ) T h r o u g h O pposi- o p p o sitio n is perhaps still m ore p ow erfu l
than m ere sy m jia th y in ca llin g out the re

so u rc e s o f th e in te llect.
Iu th e mental as well as in th e m aterial w'orld, action and reac
tion are ever equal : and P lu ta rc h well ob-
riutarcb. .
serves, that as m otion w ou ld cease w ere con
ten tion to he taken out of th e p liy sic al u n iv e rs e , so ju-ogress in
im p ro v e m e n t-w o u ld c e a s e A ve re c o n t e n t i o n t a k e n o u t o f t l i e m o r a l ;
7rdA.ep.o? a ~ n v T u n ' T r a T r jp ?
It is i i i a i i i t a i i i e d , s a y s the su b tle S c a l i g e r , b y V i v e s , t h a t Ave

jiro fit m ore by sile n t m ed ita tio n than by d is-
S c a ii^ e r , J . c. T l i i s is iio t t r u e . For as fire is e lic ite d
b y the collision o f s t o n e s , so truth is e lic ite d by the co llisio n of

m in d s. I m yself (lie adds) freq u en tly m e d ita te by m yself lo n g
a u d i n t e n t l y ; b u t i n A-.ain ; u n l e s s 1 f i n d an an tago n ist, th ere is n o
h o p e o f a su ccessfu l issue. B y a m a s t e r Ave a r e m ore excited than
b y a b o o k ; b u t a n a n t a g o n i s t , A v h e t h e r b y h i s p e r t i n a c i t y o r b i s Avis-
d o m , is t o m e a d o u b l e m a s t e r . '
But, in the second jilace, the necessity o f com uuinicating a piece
of know ledge to others, imposes upon us the
2 . B y im p o s in g tlie U w r u c
n e c e ss ity of o b ia iid n g n e c e s sity of o b t a in in g a fu lle r c o n sc io u sn e ss of
a f u lle r c o n s c io u s n e s s th at ku oA vlcdge fo r o u rsc lv e s. T h i s r e s u l t is t o
o f k n o w le d g e fo r our- certain e x t e n t se c u re d b y th e v e r y jiro ce ss o f
c lo tliin g o n r c o g i t a t i o n s in Avords. F o r speech
is a n a n a l y t i c p r o c e s s ; a n d t o e x p r e s s o u r tb o u g liis iu la n g u a g e , it
is r e q u is it e to ev o lve th e m fro m th e im p lic it in t o th e e x p lic it, fro m
the co n fu sed into t h e d i s t i n c t , in o r d e r t o bostOAv o n e a c h part of
the o rg a n ic to tality o f a th o u g h t its p re c ise a u d ap jiro p riate sym
bol. But to do th is is in fact o n ly to acco m p lish the first step
toAvards t h e p e r f e c t i n g o f o u r c o g n i t io n s o r th o u g h t s .
But the com m u n icatio n of t h o u g h t , in its h ig h er ap p lica tio n s,
i m p o s e s o n u s f o r m o r e t h a n t h i s ; a n d i n s o d o i n g i t r e a c t s Avith a
still m o r e b e n e ficia l in flu e n ce on o u r h a b its o f tliin k in g . Suppose
that w e are uot m e r e ly to ex jire ss o u r t h o u g h t s iis t h e y s p o n t a n e
o u s ly arise ; su p p o s e t h a t Ave a r e not m e rely e x te m jio ra n e o n sly to
speak, but d e l i b e r a t e l y t o w r i t e , a n d t h a t Avhat w e a r e t o c o i n m u n i -
I V ita A gesilai. Opera, 1599, v o l. i. p. 5 9 8 . E d . 3 E x ercit.. f. 420. [ F o r a c r itic is m o f S c a l-

2 iJei-a clitiis. C f. Iliita r c li, D e l s . e t O s ir .,p . ig e r 's r em a rk as r e g a rd s V iv e s , s e e D iscus-
370. B r a n d is , Gesch d tr Philos., i. p . 158. E d . sin ns, p. 773. E d .]
61
482 LOGIC. L fx t. X X X V
c a t e is n o t a simjile and eas y, b u t a c o m p l e x a n d diflicult, m a t t e r .

In th is case, n o m a n will e v e r f u l l y u n d e r s t a n d
I n flu e n c e o f C o m p o - ]jjg s u b j e c t w lio bas iio t S tu d ied it w it b t h e v i e w
s it io u niui I n s tr u c tio n i .1 c
lu p c r le c t lu g our
01 c o_m m u n i c a t _io n , w
_
liile tlie p o w e r oi c o m m u -
'
K n o w le d g e . uicatiiig a s u b j e c t is t h e o n l y c o n q i e t e n t c r i t e
rion o f bis f u l l y u n d e r s t a n d i n g it. W hen a
G o d w in q u o t e d . m an, says G odw in, writes a book of m e th o d
i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n , lie d o e s n o t w r i t e b e c a u s e h e
undci-stands t h e subject, b u t he u n d e r s t a n d s t h e s u b je c t becau se bo
has written. l i e w a s an nninsti-iieted tyro, e x p o s e d to a thousand
fooli.'^h a m i m iserab le mistakes, w h e n h e b e g a n bis work, c o m p a r e d
Avitb t h e d e g r e e o f p r o l i e i e i i e y t o w h i e h he has attained when he
h a s f i n i s h e d it. H e w h o is n o w a n e m i n e n t p h i l o s o p h e r , o r a s u b
lime j ioel, w a s formerly neitlier th e one nor the other. ] \ l a n y ti
man has been overtaken by a jn em atu re death, and left n o t h i n g
behind him but compositions worthy of ridicule and contempt,
w h o , i f h e h a d l i v e d , w o u l d j i e r l i a j S h a v e r i s e n t o t h e l i i g l i e s t l i t e
rary eminence. I f we could examine the school exercises o f men
w h o have afterw ards d one h o n o r to m ankind, we should o f te n find
them inferior to th o se o f tlieir o r d i n a r y com jietitors. I f w e could
live i n t o the j)ortfolios o f t h e i r e a r l y y o u t h , w e s h o u l d m eet with
a b u n d a n t m a t t e r for l a u g h t e r at t h e ir senseless incongruities, an d
for co n lem jjtu o n s as to n is h m en t. '
3 h e one exclusive sign, savs Aristotle,
A r i - l o t le , . , , , r.
that a man is t h o r o u g h l y cognizant of any
t h i n g , i s t h a t l i e i s a b l e t o t e a c h i t ; a n d Ovi d,
Quodquc parum novit nemo doccrc potest.
In this reiietivc offeet o f tlie communication of knowledge in

leterniiuing the perfection o f the k n o w le d g e eo inm unieated, origi
nated t h e . s c h o l . i s l i c m a x i m iJo ce nf. d isco s, a m a x i m w h i c h h a s
unfortmiatcly been t o o m u c l i o v e r l o o k e d in t h o s c h e i n o s o f m o d e r n
education. Ju f o r m e r a g e s , teach th a t y o u m a y lea rn a l w a y s c o n
s t i t u t e d o n e a t I c.ast of t h e g r e a t m e a n s o f irit el -
* I c c t na l c u l t i v a t i o n . T o t c a c b , s a y s P l a t o , is
.'-(iifca
the w a y for a imin to learn most and best, '
H o m i n e s d u m d o c e n t d L se u n t , s a y s Seneca. I n teacliing, says
1 E n g u in r, fiart i. E-isay iv . p p . 2.3, 21, e d . 3 TVistm, ii. 348. E d .

17a". I-i). 4 IBcudo l l a lo , E p in o m ia , p. 989.
2M tin p k y s , i. I Q u o tw l in D iscussions, p. Ed.
~Vj l.D i E p is t., 7. E d .
L ect. XX X V . LOGIC. 483
C lem ent of Alexandria,* th e in struc to r often learns more tlian his

pupils. Disce sed a d o c t i s ; indoctos ipse
C le m e n t o f A ie x a n - doceto, is the preccjit of Dionysius Cato;
.
D io n y s iu s C ato.
and the tw o following
. . .
were maxim s of au-
th o rity in the discipline o f the middle ages.
T h e first
Multa ro'rarc, rogata tenerc, rctcnta docere,
Ilaee tria, discipaluni faciiiiit superare magistrum. ^
T h e second
Discere si quaeris doceas; sic ipse doceris;
Nam studio tali tibi proficis atque sodali.
This trutli is also aa' cH

enforced by th e g re a t Vives. D o c trin a est
traditio coiaim quae qnis novit ci qui non novit.
V iv e s . . *
Disciplina est illins traditiom s a c e e jitio ; nisi
quod mens accipientis inqiletnr, dantis A'ero non exhauritiir, imo
com municatione a n g e tn r ernditio, sicut ignis, inotn atque agitatione.
E x c ita tn r cniin ingeniiim, et discnrrit ]ier ca quae ad jircesens ncgo-
tium p e r t i n e n t : ita invenit atqne excnd it mnlta, et qnae in m entem
non v eniehant ccssanti, doeenti, a n t dissercnti occiirnint, calore
acnente vigorem ingenii. Idcirco, niliil est ad magnnm eruditio-
nem perinde condiicens, n t doeero. T h e celebrated logician. Dr.
R o b e rt Sanderson, used to sa v: I learn much
S an d erson . i i
irom m y master, more irom my equals, and most
of all from my disci]>lcs.
B n t I have occupied perhaps too much tim e on the influence of
the com m unication o f know ledge on those bv
I n flu e n c e o f th e , . . i i ,
c o m m u n ic a tio n *''**o*** *^ *
of ; and shall uow pass on to tlie
K n o w le d g e o n th o s e consideration of its influence on those to Avhom
to w h o m It IS a d - addressed. A n d in tre a tin g of comniuiiica-
cl
tion in this respect, I shall, in tlie first place,
consider it as One-sided, and, in the second, as Reciprocal or
Bilateral.
T h e U nila teral Com m nnication o f knowledge, or Instrnction, is
of tw o kinds, for it is cither Oral or W r it te n ; b u t as both these
1 S tr o m a ta , lib . i. p. 275, e d itio n S y lb ., te r d a m , 1092. T h e lin e s a rc q u o te d as fro m

A iSdtrK oiv n s y a v ^ d v e i irA eior, Kal \ e y c c u an a n o n y m o u s a u t h o r . E d .]
crvu aK poarat ir o W d K ts ro 7 s iiraK O vo vtn u av- * G iv e n w it lio u t a u t h o r s n a m e in th e Car-
. tn in u m P roverbialum Loci Com m unes, L o d (L
0 jY p jj 1583. p. 17. S e e a b o v e , p . 480, n o te I . E d .
3 [C r c n iu s, p 581 ] [G a b rielis N audcei S y n - ^ A n im a , p. 89.
ta g m a de Sturlio Liberali. I n c lu d e d in th e <3 [Ar n s o n a n d J u d g m e n t, or Special R em arks
C onsilia et M itlio d i Aurers stu dioru m optime. o f the L ife o /th e R enow ned D r. S a n d e rso n ,-p .V l
in stitu e n d o ru m , c o llc c lc d b y T h . C r c n iu s, R o t- L o n d o n : 1G63.]
484 LOGIC. L ect. X X X V
species o f instniction jnopose tlic same end, th e y are hoth, to a cer

tain extent, suhject to the same laws.
1. I n s t r u c t io n , W rittcii Instruction have each their
O ral an d W r ilte n .
jicciiliar advantages.
In the first jdacc, instruction hy th e living voice has this ad v a n
tag e over th a t of hooks, th a t, as more natural,
O ral i i i s l r u c l i o i i , . L . . ,
.its .a ilv. iin
. la g e .s. It IS moi-e imiircssivc.

H ea rin gc* rouses the at-
(a) M ore n a iiir a i, tciitiou and kccjis it alive far more effectually
th e re fo r e m o re im - than readitig. T o tliis W C have the testim ony
of th e m ost c o m pete n t ohserv ers. H earing,
T h eo])lirasfu 8. * ^
says T heo phrastus,' is of all th e senses the
mi>t pathetic, th a t is, it is the sense most in tim ately associated
with sentim ent and passion. M n lto magis, says th e y ou nger
P liny, m ulto magis v i v a vox affieit. N am ,
Y ou n ger r iin v , X , i
licet acriora siuit qnai legas, altiiis tam cn in
am m o sed ent qnie jironnntiatio, vnltiis, hahitns, gestus etiam dicen-
tis adligit. *
Plus jirodest, says V alerius jMaxinms, d ocentem au d ire, qnam
in lihris stiid ere; (jnia vehem cntio r fit iinpressio
V a le r iu s M a x im u s . ,. . . , .
in m en tions aiulietituim, ex visu doctoris et
audilii, qnam ex studio et lihro.
A nd St. J e ro m e H aliet neseio quid latcntis enei-gim v i v a v o x ;
et in aiirc-s diseipnli de doctoris ore traii.ffiisa,
S t. J e r o m e . n ^ .
lortiiis sonat. '
x\ second icason w hy our A tte n tio n (and jMemory is always in
the ratio o f A tte n tio n ) to things spoken is
(b ) Le.). p e r m a n e n t, g r e a te r th a n to things read, i.s th a t w hat is
tlie re lo r e m ore a l- . ,
le u d e ii to wnttoii W C regald as a jierinanent jiossessioii
to which we can always recur at jile a s u re ;
whereas wc are conscious th a t the winged w o r d s are lost to ns
forever, if we do no t e.itcli them as they fiy. As P lin y hath i t ;
" Legendi sem per est oecasio ; andiendi non sem per. ''
third eaiise of the snjicrior ellieaey of oral iii.stniction is th a t
man is a soci.al animal. H e is tlins natu rally dis|)Osed to find pleas
ure in society, and in the perfbrnianee of the actions jierformed hy
those willi whom he consorts. P u t reading is a solitary, h earin g is
^ OvK h.v^ atjO ws o olfxat (Te Trpo(FaKovrrat 1^'*^ P lo rts o f T litim a s I lib e r iiic u S j aiu l in
TT-'Ot t ' v UK0Vf7Tln'i s. a G S U f w s , I-a iig iiis, n n d e r tb e a r fie le
, - . Dnrtrinn. Il is n n l, h o w e v e r , to b e fo u n d in
d>t a.rT'Its n a .im iK u n a T rtv d i/a i itrnwi Tra/ruiv. . . . . .
' llia l a iillio r h e .
I U la ii'li. /)r A in litio iii, tub in it. ElJ.
-' F p i't . I I . .'3 IA) * hi/list , c iii. Opera, A u tv 1579, t o m . iii p
V Tlioiiiu.s lIiI .iT n ic n s . p. .3 .3 0 .] [T h e a b o v e ~
pa.-sage i ijiio le d a.s fro m V a le r iu s , lib . v iii., 5 E p h t. ii. 3. E d
L ect. X X X V . LOGIC. 485
a social act. In reading, we are not detertnined to atten d by any

lellow-feeliiig with others a t te n d i n g ; wliereas
(c) H eanii g a social hearing, our attention is not oiil v engaged bv
act
onr synipalby with tlie speaker, but by our syni-
patliy witli the o th e r atten tiv e auditors around us.
Such are the causes wliicli concur in reinleriiig Oral Iiislrnctioii
more etlectual than W r it te n . FM. Varillas,
M e n a g e q u o te d . FMoiiage (and Varillas was one o f the most
learned o f m odern liistoriaiis, an d jMenage one of the most
learned o f modern scholars), JM. Varillas himself told me one
day, th a t o f every ten things he knew, he bad learned n in e of them
in conversation. I myself m ight say nearly th e same tiling. '
On the o th e r Land, Reading, thou gh only a substitute for Oral
Instruction, h:is likewise advantages peculiar to
K e a d n ig , Its a d - itself. Ill tlio first jilaee, it is more easily ac-
v a iita g e s. -i i t i t
(a ) M ore e a s ily ac- Ill the sccoiid, it IS iiiore coiiipreheii-
C G S s t b le .
c e ss ib ie sive ill its S p h e r e o f o j i e r a t i o n . In t h e t h i r d , it

(b) M ore c o m p re - jg transitory with t h e voice, b u t m ay again
h c n s iv e . q o r a in ho taken up and considered, so th a t
(c) 3 Iorc p e r m a u e n t. ^
the object of th e instruction may thus more
fully be e.xaniined and b rough t to proof. I t is thus manifest, th a t
or:d and w ritten iiistrnction severally supply and sevei'ally support
each o th e r ; and that, w here this is com petent, th e y oug h t always
to be employed in conjiiiietioii. Oral instruction is, however, iu
th e earlier stages o f education, of principal import.ance ; and writ
ten ought, therefore, at first only to be b ro u g h t in as a subsidiary.
A neglect of the oral instruction, and an exclusive em ploy m e nt o f
the written, the way in which those who are self-taught (the
autoilidacti) obtain tbeir education, for the m ost p art betrays its
one-sided influence by a contracted cultivation o f th e intellect,
with a deficiency in the pow er o f com m unicating know ledge to
others.
Oral iiislruction necessaril}' supposes a speaker and a h e a r e r ; and
written iiistrnction a w riter and a reader. In these, th e capacity
of the speaker and of the w riter m ust c/pially fulfil certain coiiiinoii
recpiisites. In the first place, they .should be fully masters of the
subject with which their instruction is con v e rsan t; and in the sec
ond, they should be able and willing to comihmiicate to others the
know ledge whicli th e y themselves possess. B u t in reference to
these several species of instruction, there are various special rules
th a t oug ht to be atten d e d lo by those who would reap the a d v a n
tages they severally afford. I shall eomineiiee with W r it te n In-
1 M e n a g ia n a , to m . iv . p . I l l , e d . 1 7 1 6 . E d .
486 LOGIC. L k c t. X X X V .
striiciion, and comprise tlie rules by whicli it o u g h t to be regulated,

ill the following paragrajih.
V C X I I I . In regard to 3Vritteii Instruction, and its profit

able eiiqiloyiiient as a means of intellectual
J s tr u c tl o n ,' a i r T t s i'iil>roveiiient, there are certain rules xvliich
em p lo y m en t as a O l l g l l t tO b c o b s c r v c d , U lld wllicll tO g C tllC r
means of intellectual eoiistitute tlic P ro p c r 31etliod of Reading.
improvement. 1 t:;
T hese may be reduced to three classes, as
th ey regard, 1, T h e Q u antity, '2, T h e Quality, of w h at is to
be read, or, o. T h e 3Iode o f rea d in g w hat is to be read.
I. -Vs concerns the Q u a n tity o f w h at is to be read, there
is a single rule, R ead miicli, b u t not many works (luultum
iioii iinilta).
II. .(Vs concerns the Q u ality of wliat is to be read, there
m ay be given five rules. 1, Select th e works o f principal
iiiiportaiice, estim ated by relation to tbe several sciences theni-
selve.s, or to your |)arlieular aim in reading, or to your individ
ual disposition and wants. 2, R e ad n o t the more detailed
works upon a seieiiee, until you have obtained a rndim eiitary
know ledge of it in general. 3, 3Iake yourselves familiar with
a science in its actual or jirescnt state, before you jirocced to
stu dy it ill its clironological develojunent. 4, T o a\'oid erron e
ous and e.xcliisive views, read and compare to g e th e r the more
im p o rta n t works of every sect and party. 3, T o a \oid a one
sided d evelojnnent tif mind, eoinbine w ith the study of works
whicli cn k iv ate the U n d e rsta n d in g , the stu d y of works which
cultivate tlie Taste.
I II . zVs coneenis the 3Iode or P lan ner of rea d in g itself,
thei-e are fi)ur principal rules. 1, R e ad th a t you may accu
rately remember, but still more, th a t you may fully understand.
2, Strive t(j compass tlic general ten or of ti work, before you
atteiiipl to j u d g e of it in detail. 3, ..Vccommodtite the inte n
sity of the readin g to th e iinjiortaiice of the work. Some
books are, therefore, to be only dijijied into ; others are
to be m i l over i-apidly; and others to be studied long and
sednloii>ly. 4*^, Reg ulate on llie same )iriiici]de the extracts
which you imike from the works you read.'
I. In reference to th e head of Q uantity, th e single rule is
I f f . K rug. 1-ngik, 5 ISO. Kd. [ K i .- c l ia b c r , iler llo d e g e lik , 53 p. 1 9 6 ; 1832. JV lag ir u s v.

L o g ik , p. I s S . I'd lolS. iS ch e i U lc r , r ir u n d r is s lA C lio .]
Read nmcli, b u t n o t m a n y works. Tliougli tliis g o l d e n rule has

r i s e n in i m p o r l a i i c e , s i n c e t h e w o r l d , b y t h e a i t
E x p lic a t io n . iirinting, has b een o v e r w h e i m e d b v t iie m u l -
I.# Q u a u liiy to be . * , mt n i i
t i t n d o o f boo K>, I t N\ :is s t i l l t i i Hy r o c o g n i z c d by
R u le . the great thinkers of antiquity. It is even
S o lo m o n . hinted by Solomon, when he coiiiiilains that
Q u in t ilia n . o f m a k i n g m a n y b o o k s t h e r e is UO e n d . ' Ry
Y ou n ger r iin y . Quintilitiu, b y t h e y o u n g e r P lin y , an d b y S eneca,
t h e ma.xim, l u u l t n m I c g e n d u m esse, n o n im i l ta ,
L u th e r q u o te d . o f St udy. AH,
says Luther, in his T a b l e Tal k, w h o would
s t u d y w i t h a d v a n t a g e in a n y a r t w h a t s o e v e r , o u g h t t o b et . a k e t h e m .
se lv es t o t h e r e a d i n g o f s o m e s u r e a n d certtiin b o o k s o f t e n t i m e s o v e r ;
for to read m a n y b o o k s p rod u cetli coufusioii, r a t h e r t h a n learning,
like as th o se w h o dw ell e v e r y w h e r e , are n o t anywhere :it h o m e .
H e allm les h ere to t h e s a y in g o f S en eca, N u s q n a n i est qui u b iq u e
est. ^ A n d l i k e as in s o c i e t y , w e u s e n o t d a i l y t h e c o m m u n i t y o f
al l onr acquaintances, but of some lew selected friends, e v en so
likewise o u g h t w c to aceiistoin ourselves to t h e b e s t books, a n d to
m a k e t h e s a m e f a m i l i a r u n t o us, t l i a t is, t o l i a v e t l i e m , a s w e u s e t o
say, a t o u r fingers en d s . n h e g r e a t logician,
S a u d c i> o u , o 1 1 r a x r x
J i i s l i oj ) S a n d e r s o n , t o w l i o m 1 f o r m e r l y r e f e r r e d ,
as his f r i e n d a n d bi o g r a j il i e r I s a a c W a l t o n i n f o r m s ns, s a i d t h a t h e
declined reading many books; but what he did r e a d w e r e well
chosen, and read so o f t e n t h a t h e b e c a m e v e r y f a m i l i a r w i t h them.
T h e y w e r e p r i n c i j i a l l y t h r e e , A r i s t o t l e s A q u i n a s s /Se-
c u n d a Secundw , a n d C i c e r o , p a r t i c u l a r l y h i s Offices. ^ The great
Lord Riirleigh, w e are to ld by his b io g raph er.
Lord Rui c a r r i e d C i c e r o D e Officiis, w i t h A r i s t o t l e s Ixhet-
oric, a l w a y s i n his bosom; these being comjilete j ii eees, t h a t
w o u ld m a k e b oth a sch olar a n d an lionest m a n .
Our a g e , s a y s H e r d e r , is t h e r e a d i n g a g e ;
a n d h e adds, it w o u l d have been b e t t e r , in m y opinion, for th e
world a n d f o r s c i e n c e , if, i n s t e a d o f t h e miiltitiule o f b o o k s w hich
n o w o v e r l a y ns, w e p o s s e s s e d on ly a few w o r k s g o o d an d sterling,
and which as few, xvouhl, t h e r e f o r e , b e more diligently and jiro-
foundly studied. I m ig h t quote to you m an y other testimonies
1 E rd e s. x i i. 1 2 . E d . 4 E p is t., ii. E d .
2 Q iiiiit ilia u , X . 1, 59, P l ii iy , E p ., v ii. 9. 5 S e e XV a lt o u s L ives o f D onne, W otton,
S e n e c a , De Traiujnill. A n im i, c. 9. E p is t., 2, Iln o k .r , H trbert, a n d .Sanderson, v o l. ii., p. 287,
45. E d . e d . Z o u ch , Y o r k , 1817. E d .
8 N o. D C C C X L IV . 0 / L earned M en. 6 B rieje iiber d a s S tu d , d tr Theol B . x l i x . ,
Ed . Her/l-e, x i v . 267, e d . 1829. E d .
4SS LOGIC. L e c t. XXXAL
to the same effect; h u t te.stimonies are useless in supjiort o f so

manifest a truth.
F o r wliat piirjiose, with w hat intent, do we r e a d ? W e read
u o t for the sake of reading, hut we reail to* the
Liut ol Leading. tliiiik. R e a d in g is \-aluahle
only as it m ay supply to us tlie materials which the mind itself
elahorates. .Vs it is not the largest quantity o f any kind o f food,
taken iiito the stomach, that condiice.s to health, hiit such a quan
tity o f such a kind ns can he hest digested ; so it is not the greatest
coinpleineiit o f any kind o f information that imjiroves the mind,
hut such a qiiantit}' o f sueli a kind as determ ines the in tellect to
m ost vigorous energy. T h e only proiitahle read in g is that in
which we are comjielfed to think, and think inten sely ; Avhereas
that reading which serves o n ly to dissijjate and d ivert our thought,
is either jiositively hurtful, or useful on ly as ; n occasional relaxa
tion from .severe exertion. B u t the am ount o f vigorous think in g
is usually in the inverse ratio o f multifarious Icading. Multifarious
reading is ngrceahle ; hut, as a hahit, it is, in its Avay, as destructive
to the mental ns drnin-drinkiiig is to the hodily health.
II. In reterence to th e quality o f w hal is to he read, the F irs t of the
five rules is Select the works of priiicijial ini-
II. Quality of whal p o r t a i i c c , ill a c c o i i i m o d a t i o i i e i t h e r t o t h e sca o ra l
is to b e r e a d . .
... , sciences th em selves, to your iiarticular aim in
b iraU u le . . . . . . .
reading, or to your individual disjiosition and
Avaiits. T h is rule is too m anifestly true to rccjiiire any illustration o f
its truth. X o one will d en y tliat for the accomiilislim eiit o f an end
yon o u g h t to e m id o y the m eans hest ealculated for its accomidish-
inent. T h is i.s .all tha t the rule inculcates, I5ut w hile there is no
difliciilty ahuiit the ex p e d ie n c y o f o h ey iiig the rule, there is often
cun.siderahle difficulty in o h e y in g it. d'o know wh.at hooks oug h t
to he read in order to learn a science, is in fact frequently ohtained
after the .(cieiiee li.as heen already learned. On this point no ge n -
-ral a d \i e e can he g ive n , AVo have, on all o f the sciences. Avorks
Avliicli jirofess to supply the a dv ice wliicli the stu d e n t here requires.
B u t in general, I must say, th e y are o f small assistance in jiointing
out what hook:> Ave should select, h o w ev er useful th ey m ay he in
Bliizwing us w hat h>oks exist upon a science. In this respect, the
British stu d e n t .also lahors under peculiar d isadvantages. T h e lihra-
ries in thi.s cou n try are, one and all o f them, Avreteliedly im p erfect;
and there are few d epartm ents o f science in whicli th ey are not des-
liln t e even o f the Avoiks o f iiiamary necessity, AVorks Avhich, from
their high jirice, Imt more frequently from the difficulty o f procup
in g them , are heyond the reach o f ordinary readers.
L ect. XXXV. LOGIC. 489
U n d e r t h e he. ad o f Q u a l i t y t h e S e c o n d R u l e is R e a d n o t t lie
i noi -e d e t a i l e d works upon a science, until you
Second itiiie. ] ); i ve o b t a i n e d a I ' l i d i i n e n t a r y k n o w l e d g e o f i t i n
general. T h e e . x p c d i e i i c y o f t h i s I' ul e is s i i t h c i e i i t l y a p p a r e n t . It
IS a l t o g e t l i e r i m p o s s i b l e t o r e a d w i t l i a d v a n t a g e an e.xtensive w o r k
on a n y branch o f k n o w led g e, if w e are n o t p r e v i o u s l y a w a r e o f its
general bearing, and of the relations in which its several jiarts
stand to each other. In t h i s case, tlie m i n d is o v e r p o w e r e d and
ojipressed h y t h e m a s s o f d e t a i l s j i r e s e n t e d t o it , d e t a i f s , t h e s i g
nificance a n d su b o r d i n a t i o n o f w h ic h i t is a s y e t u n a b l e t o r e c o g
nize. A consjiectiis, a s u r v e y o f t h e s c i e n c e as a w h o l e , o u g h t ,
therefore, to precede the study o f i t in its p a r t s ; we should be
a w a r e o f i t s d i s t r i b u t i o n , b e f o r e w e a t t e n d t o w h a t is d i s t r i l n i t e d ,
we sliould jiossess t h e emjity f r a m e - M o r k , b e f o r e we collect the
m a t e r i a l s w i t h w h i c h i t i s t o b e f i l l e d. H e n c e t h e utility o f an ency-
clo]i;edieal k n o w l e d g e o f t li e s c i e n c e s in g e n e r a l , p r e l i m i n a r y t o a
study of the se\cr;d sciences in particular; that is, .a s u m m a r y
k n o w l e d g e o f t h e i r o bj ec t s , t h e i r e x t e n t , t h e i r c o n n e c t i o n witli eacli
other. B y this m eans t h e s t u d e n t is e n a b l e d to ste er bis w a y on
t h e w id e ocean o f science. B y this m eans he always know s w here
abouts l i e is, a n d becomes a w a r e o f t h e p o i n t t o w a r d s w hich his
a u t h o r is l e a d i n g h i m .
In e n t e r i n g iijioii t h e s t u d y o f s u c h a u t h o r s as P l a t o , A r i s t o t l e ,
Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Locke, Kaiit, etc., i t is, therefore,
proper that we first obtain a j i r e j i . - i r a t or y a c q u a i n t a n c e w i t h the
seoj ie, b o t h o f t h e i r j i h i l o s o p h y iu general, and of the particular
work on w h ich w e are ab o u t to enter. In t b e case o f w riters o f
such a b i l i t y t h i s is n o t d i f fi cu l t t o d o , as t h e r e a r e a b u n d a n c e of
subsidiary works, affording the p relim inary k n o w le d g e o f which w e
a r c ill ( p i e s t . B u t in t h e ca s e o f t r e a t i s e s w h e r e s i m i l a r a s s i s t a n c e
is l i o t a t h a n d , w e m a y o f t e n , in s o m e d e g r e e , p r e p a r e o u r s e l v e s f o r
a r e g u l a r jjerusal, b y e x a m i n i n g t h e t a b l e o f c o n t e n t s , a n d t a k i n g a
c u r s o r y i n s p e c t i o n o f its severed d e p a r t m e n t s . I n this respect, and
a l s o ill o t h e r s , t h e f o l l o w i n g a d v i c e o f G i b b o n t o y o u n g s t u d e n t s is
highly deserving of attention. A f t e r a rajiid
G ib b o n q u o te d . g j^ n ce (I t r a n s la te from t h e original PTencli)
after a rajiid g lan ce on t h e su b je c t a n d d istrib u tio n o f a n e w book,
I suspend t h e r e a d i n g o f it, w h i c h I only resum e after h av in g m y
s e l f e x a m i n e d t h e s u b j e c t i n all i t s r e l a t i o n s , a f t e r h a v i n g c a l l e d
u p i n m y s o l i t a r y w a l k s al l t l i a t I l i a v e r e a d , t h o u g h t , o r l e a r n e d i n
r e g a r d t o t h e s u b j e c t o f t h e w h o l e b o o k , o r o f s o m e e l i a p t e r i n j i ar -
licular. I t h u s place m y s e l f in a c o n d itio n to estim ate w h a t the
author m a y add to m y general stock of know ledge ; and I a m thus
G2
490 LOGIC. L e c t. X X X V
sonictinies favorably disposed by tbe accordance, sonictiines armed

by the ojijiosition, of oiii' views.
T h e T h ird R ule iiiidei- th e bead o f Q uality is JMake y o u r
selves familiar with a science in its present
riiird R u le . , , , ^ . . .
state, betore yon proceed to stu d y it in its
chronological d evelopm ent. T h e ])ropriety o f this p rocedure is
likewise manifest. U nless w e be acquainted with a science in its
m ore advanced state, it is impossible to distingiiisli between w hat
is more or less im portant, and, conse(juently, iiii]o.ssible to d e te r
mine wliat is or is not w o rth y o f attention in tbe doctrines o f its
earlier cultiv.ators. W c shall thu s also be overw helm ed by the
intinitude o f details successively jiresented to u s; all will be confu
sion and darkness, where all o u g h t to be ord er and light. I t is
thus iiiqiroper to stu d y pbiloso]ihy historically, or in its past prog-
res.s, before we have studied it statistically, or in its actual results.
T h e F o u rth R u le u n d e r th e same bead is I o avoid erroneous
and e.xelusive views, reail aud compare to g e th er
I'o u rlh Rule. , . , , '
the more im p o rta n t works ol every ]>arty. In
proportion as diflerent opinions may be entei tained in regard to the
objects o f a science, tb e more necessary is it th a t we should weigh
with care ami inijiartiality tb e reasons on which these different
ojiinions rest. Such a science, in particular, is philosophy, and such
.sciences, in general, are those which proceed out o f iibilosojiby. In
the philosoijliical sciences, we ought, tbeicfore, to be especially on
our g uard against th a t partiality which considers only th e arg u
m e n ts in favor o f ])articular ojiinioiis. I t is tiaie th a t in th e wilt-
ings of one ]):irLy we find adduced the reasons of tbe opposite
j i a r t y ; b u t fretpieiitly so distorted, so m utilated, so enervated, th a t
tb e ir refutation occasions little effoit. AVe mu.st, therefore, stu d y
the argum ents on both sifles, if we would avoid those one-sided
and contracted views which ai'c tbe I'csiilt of ])arty-spirit. T h e
]>rccept of tbe Apostle, 4est all things, bold fast by th a t which is
gooil, is a ])recept wbicli is ajiplieablc equally in pliilosojihy as in
theology, but a )iieeept th a t lias not been more frequently neglected
in tb e one stud y lliaii in tbe otbei'.
T h e Fifth R u le un d er the bead o f Q uality is do avoid a one
sided develo]unerit of mind, combine with the
stu d y o f works wdiich cultivate the U n d e r s ta n d
ing, tbe study o f w orks which cultivate tbe T a s te . T h e propriety
I TTic . u b '- t n ii c f of fhr; above pasnage is F r e u c h o r i g i n a l is q u o t e d b y S c h e i d l e r , Horfe-

g i v e n in Riigli>.Ii, in ( i i b b o i i ' s Memoirs o f m y ] 5 5 , p. 204. E u .
Life and H'ntlngs, |)ji. 5 4, .55; e d . 18.37. Tlie
o f this rule requires no e l u c i d a t i o n ; I, th e r e f o r e , p a s s on to the

t h i r d b e a d viz., t h e j M a u u e r o f r e a d i n g i t s e l f ;
III. M anner of Y iv s t Rule i s R ead that
Ileacliug. , , ,
YOU m ay a ccu rate ly rem em ber, but still m ore
First R ule , i,
th a t y o u m a y liilly u n d e rsta n d .
T h is also re q u ire s n o comineiit. R e a d i n g sh ould u o t be a l earn
in g b y rote, b u t au act o f rellective tliinking. M e m o r y is o n l y a
s u b s i d i a r y f a c u l t y , i.s v a l u a b l e m e r e l y a s s u p j i l y i n g t h e materials
on which the understanding is t o ojierate. We read, therefore,
l i ri nci i ) . al l y, u o t t o r e m e m b e r f a c t s , b u t t o u n d e r s t a n d r e l a t i o n s . To
c o m m it, llieiefore, to m e m o r y w h a t w e r e a d , b e f o r e w e e l a b o r a t e it
i n t o a u i n t e l l e c t u a l p o s s e s s i o n , is n o t o n l y u s e l e s s b u t d e t r i m e i i t a l ;
f o r t b o h a b i t o f l a y i n g uj ) i u m e m o r y w h a t h a s n o t b e e n digested
by the u u d e r s t a u d i n g , is a t o n c e t h e c a u s e a u d t h e e l f e c t o f m e n t a l
Av e a k u e s s .
The Second R u le u n d e r th is h e a d is S t r i v e to co m p ass the
g e n e r a l t e n o r o f a A vo r k , b e f o r e y o u a tt e m p t to
S e c o n d K nie. ju d g e of it ill d e t a i l . N o th in g can be m ore
absurd than th e a tte m jit to ju d g e a jia rt b e fo re c o in p r e lie u d in g th e

A vlio le; but u n fo rtu n ately n o tliiiig is m ore com m on, e sp e c ia lly
a m o n g p ro fe s s io n a l c r i t ic . s , r e v i e w e r s . T h is jiro c e e d iiig is, h o w
ever, as freq iieiitly the effect of Avilful m isrep resen ta tio n , as of
u iiiiiteiitio u n l erro r. <
The T h ird R u le u n d e r th is h ead is A c c o m m o d a t e t h e i n t e n
sity of the re.a d in g to the im p o rtan ce of the
A vo rk. Som e books are, th e re fo re , to be o n ly
d ip jied in t o ; o th ers are to be run over ra p id ly ; and oth ers to bo
stu d ied lo n g aiid se d u lo u sly . A ll books are uot to be r e a d Avitli
the siiiiie atten tio n ; au d , a c c o rd in g ly , au an cien t d istin ctio n Avas
tak en o f r e a d in g in to lectio cu rs o ria a n d lectio s ta ta r ia . T he fo r
m e r o f t h e s e . Ave h a v e a d o p t e d i n t o E n g l i s h , c u r -
Lectio cursor,a . r e a d in g h c iiig a fa m ilia r aud co rrec t tran s-
Lectio sta ta ria . ; o o
la iio n of lectio cu rsoria . But lectio s t a ta r i a
c a n n o t be so Avell r e n d e r e d b y the e x jiressio u o f sta tio n a ry read
ing. R e a d u o t , s a y s B a c o n , in b i s F i f t i e t h E s s a y r e a d n o t to
c o n tr a d ic t a n d co n fu te, n o r to b e lie v e a u d ta k e
B a c o n q u o te d . g r a n t e d , iio r to find ta lk an d d iscou rse, b u t
t o A ve igh a n d c o n s i d e r . S o m e b o o k s are to be tasted , oth ers are to
b e sAvtill oAved , :i n d so m e fe w to be chcAved aud d i g e s t e d ; t h a t i.*<,
s o m e b o o k s a r e to b e r e a d o n l y iu p a r t s ; o t h e r s to b e r e a d , b u t not
c u r i o u s l y ; :iiid s o m e f e w t o b e r e a d A v l i o l l y a n d Avitli d i l i g e n c e and
atteiiiioii. S o m e b o o k s also m ay be read b y deputy, and extracts
m a d e o f t h e m b y o t h e r s ; b u t t h a t A vo iil d b e o n l y i u t h e l e s s i m p o r -
402 LOGIC. L e c t. X X X V .
tant a r g n n i o n t s , a n d tlic m e a n e r s o r t o f b o o k s ; else d i s tille d b o o k s

are, like common distilled w a t e r s , ilesliy t h i n g s . One kind of
books, s .m v s t h e g r e ; i t l i i s t o r i a n , J o h a i i i i v o n ]\ Ii i l l ei , ' I r e a d w i t h
g r e a t r a p i d i t y , f o r i n t l i e s e t h e r e is i n u e l i d r o s s
.lo h n n n v o n .MUlivr , . . i t i ,
to tlirow aside, ami little gold to be lom id;
s o m e , h o w e v e r , t h e r e a r e all g o l d and diamonds, and h e wl io , for
e . \ a m | i l e , in T a c i t u s c a n r e a d m o i e t h a n t w e n t y p a g e s i n f o u r h o u r s ,
c e r t a i n l y iloes n o t n n d e r s t a i i d h i m .
R a p i d i t y i n r e a d i n g de] )ei i d. s, l i o w e v c r , g i - e a t l y o n o n r a c q u a i n t
ance with t h e .subject o f discnssion. A t fii'st, u p o n a science w e
can only lead with profit few books, a n d laboriously. B y degrees,
h o w e v e r , o u r k n o w l e d g e o f t h e m attei's t r e a t e d e.vpands, t h e re a so n
ings appc.ir more manifest, we advance more o.asily, until at
length w e are able, w itlio n t o v e r l o o k i n g anything o f inqiortance,
to read witli a v elo city wliieh ajijiears a l m o s t i n c r e d i b l e for t h o s e
w ho are only e o m m e n e in g the study.
The Fourth IRile u n d e r this b e a d is R e g u l a t e on the same
jn iiieiple tlio e x t r a c t s w h i c h y o n m a k e f r o m t h e
Fourth Iliile. , , ,
w orks you read.
So much for the I'liih iteral Coramnnication o f t h o u g h t , as a
m ean of knowledge. We n o w p r o c e e d to th e ]\Intnal C o m m n n i e a -
tion o f t h o u g h t , C onference.
T h i s is e i t h e r m e r e C o n v e r s a t i o n , m e r e D i a -
oiiference,ol t " o logiic. Or F o r m a l Di sj u i t c, a n d a t p r e s e n t w c
consider both of these exclusively only as a
m e a n s o f k n o w l e d g e , o n ly as a m e a n s for t h e coinmuiiie.ition o f
truth.
T h e e m p l o y m e n t o f D i a l o g u e a s s u c h a m e a n , r e q u i r e s g r e a t ski l l
a n d d e x t e r i t y ; for preseiiee o f m in d , confidence,
' tact, and pliability are n eces sa ry for this, a n d
tliese are only o b ta in e d b y exercise, i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f n a tu r a l talent,
'riiis was t h e m etliod whicli S o c r a te s a lm o st exeliisixely e m p lo y e d
in t h e c o r m n u n i e n t i o i i o f k n o w l e d g e ; a n d h e ca l l e d it his art o f
i i il d lt c tn a l iiiid.irifcry, b e e a n s e i n i t s a]]>l i eat i on t r u t h i s n o t g i v e n
o v f r b y t h e m a s t e r t o t h e d i s c i p l e , b u t t h e m a s t e r , b y s k i l l i i l ( j ues -
tioning, o nly h elps th e disciple to d e liv e r liim self o f t h e trntli explic
i t l y , w h i c h l i is n i i m l h a d l i o f o r e l i e l d i m p l i c i t l y . Odi i s m e t h o d i s n o t ,
h o w e v e r , a p p l i c a b l e t o al l k i n d s o f k n o w l e d g e , b u t o n l y t o those
wliieh the huniau i n t e l l e c t is a b l e t o e v o l v e out o f i t sel f , t h a t is,
only to the eognitions o f P u r e Reason. D i s j u i t a i i o n is o f t w o priii-
<-i]al k i n d s , i n a s m u c h a s i t is o r a l o r w r i t t e n ; a n d iii b o t h e a s e s , t h e
c o n tr o v e rs y m a y be c o n d u c t e d e i t h e r by t h e rules o f strict logical
1 VtVrke, iv. 177 Cf. xvii. 253. Quoted by Sclieidler, I lo d e g e tik , } 55, p. 204. E d
L ect. X X X V . LOGIC. 49o
tlispntntion, or left to t h e f r e e d o m o f d e b a t e . W i t h o u t e n t e r i n g on
d e t a i l s , i t m a y b e s n l l i c i e n t t o s t a t e , i n r<g a r d t o
2. D isp u tatio n , Logical Disimlation, that it is here essential
O ral a n d AV ritlen. .1 .
. , . , t l i a t t h e p o i n t i n ( i i i e s t i o n , u w sta tu s contro-
A c a d e m ic a l d isp u - *
taiion. versicc, t h e t hesi . s, s h o u l d , i n t h e f i r s t [ i l a ee, b e
accurately d e t e r m i n e d , in order to prevent all
logomachy, or m ere verbal wrangling. Tbis b e in g done, th a t dis
p u t a n t w h o d e n i e s t l i e t h e s i s , : i nd w h o i s c a l l e d l l i e opponent, m a y
c i t h e r call u p o n the disputant w ho affirms t h e thesis, a n d who is
called t h e d efen da n t, t o . al l ege an. a r g n n i c n t in its s n jipor t, o r he
may at once himself ]irodnce his c o u n t e r - a r g u m e n t . T'o avoid,
h o w e v e r , .all m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , t h e o p p o n e n t s h o u l d also adv.aucc
an antithesis, th a t is, a ] ) r o p o s i t i o n c o n f l i c t i v e w i t h the thesis, and
when t liis lias b e e n denied by the defendant the process of argu
m entation commences. T h i s p r o c e e d s in r e g u l a r s y l l o g i s m s , a n d is
governed b y de f i n i te rules, w h i c h a r e al l s o c a l c u l a t e d t h a t t h e d i s
c u s s i o n is n o t a l l o w e d t o w a n d e r fr o m t h e p o i n t a t issue, a n d e a c h
d i s p u t a n t is c o m p e l l e d , i n r e f e r e n c e t o e v e r y s y l l o g i s m o f h i s a d v e r -
s.ary, e i t l i e r t o a d m i t , o r t o d e n y , o r t o d i s t i n g u i s h . * T h e s e rules
y o u wi ll fi nd in most of the o l d e r s y s t e m s o f L o g i c ; in ])articid.ar
I m a y r e f e r y o n t o t h e m a s d e t a i l e d i n I T e c r e b o r d s P r a x i s L o g i c a ,
t o b e f o u n d a t t h e e n d o f hi s e d i t i o n o f tlie S gnopsis o f B n r g e r s d i -
cii i s. T h e p r a c t i c e o f d i s p u t a t i o n w .as l o n g a n d j u s t l y r e g a r d e d as
t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t o f academ ica] e x ercise s; t h o u g h liable to abuse,
tlie g o o d w b ic b it c e r t a i n l y e n s u r e s g r e a t l y s u r p a s se s t h e evil w h i c h
it m a y accid en tally occasion.
1 C f. K r u g , L o g ik , 186. A n m . 2. S c h e id le r , H o d eg e tik , ] 45, p . 138. E b

APPENDIX.
1.
THE CHARACTER A ND COJIPREIIENSION OF LO G IC . A
FRAOSIENT.
(See piigc 3.)
I n the com m enoem en t o f a course o f acad em ical instruction, th ere are

u sually two prim ary (piestions which obtrude tliem selves ; and with the answ er
to these questions 1 propose to occu p y the jiresent L ectu re.
T h e first o f these questions i s , W h at is the ch aracter and eom prehension
o f the subject to be tau gh t? T h e secon d, W h at is the m ode o f teach in g
it? In regard to the former o f these, the question, W h at is to be ta u g h t,
in the p resen t instance is assuredly not supertluons. T h e subject o f onr course
is indeed professedly L o g ic; but as under that rubric it has b een too often the
practice, in our Scottish L biiversitics, to com prehend alm ost everyth in g e.xoept
the scien ce which that nam e p rop erly d en otes, it is evid en t that the m ere in ti
mation o f a course o f L ectu res on Logic d oes not o f itse lf d efin itely mark out
what the professor is to teach, and w hat the stu d en t m ay rely on learning.
I shall, therefore, p roceed to give you a gen eral notion o f what L ogic is, and
o f the relation in which it stands to the otlier sc ien ces; for L ogie L ogie
p roperly so called is the all-im portant scien ce in which it is at once m y duty
and m y desire fully and faithfully to instruct you.
T h e very gen eral 1 m ay call it the v ery vagu e con cep tion which I can
at p resent attem pt to shadow out o f the scope and natu re o f L ogic, is o f course
not intended to anticipate wha't is hereafter to be articu lately stated in regard
to the peculiar character o f this scien ce.
A ll scien ce, all k n ow led ge, is divided into two great branches ; for it is
either, 1 , C onversant about O bjects K now n, or, 2 , C onversant about the
P lan n er o f know ing them , in 'oth er words, about the law s or conditions un d er
which such objects are co g n izab le. T h e former o f these is D irect S cien ce, or
S cien ce sim p ly; the latter. R eflex S cien ce, the S cien ce o f S cien ce, or thc
Method o f Scien ce.
N ow o f these categories or great b ran ch es o f k n ow led ge. Sim ple S cien ce, or
S cien ce d irectly con versan t about O bjects, is again divided in to two b ran ch es;
496 APPENDI X.
for it is cither eonvei-snnt about tlic i)Ii;ciionicna o f tlic internal world, as re

vealed to us in conseionsness, or about tlic ]ilia?noniena o f tlie e.xternal world,
as made known to us ly sense. 'Ilie former o f tliese eonstitules tlie .Science
o f Mind, tlie latter tlie Science o f M atter; and eacli is again divided and sub
divided into tliose numerous branches, which together make np nearly the
whole eyele of human knowledge.
The otlier category the .Science o f Seienee, or thc Methodology o f Sei
e n e e tails likewise into two branches, according as the conditions wliieh it
considers are the laws wliich determine the possibility of the mind, or subject
o f seienee, knowing, or the laws wliich determine the possibility of the exist-
(iiee, or objei t o f science, being known ; Science, I repeat, considered as
ix'lleeted upon its own conditions, is twofold, for it either considers the laivs
under wltich the human mind can know, or the laws under wliieh wliat is pro
posed hy th(* liunian iiiind to know, can be known. O f tliese two sciences of
seienee, the former that which treats of those conditions o f knowledge which
lie in thc* nature o f thouglit itself is Logie, pioperly so ealled; tlie latter,
that which treats o f tlio.se conditions o f knowledge which lie in the nature, not
o f tlionglit it.'clf, but o f tliat wliieh we tliiiik about, tliis has as yet obtained
no recognized appellation, no name by which it is nniveisally and familiarly
known. Various deiiomiiiatioiis have indeed been given to it in its several
parts, or in it.> special relations; thus it has bei ii called IJ cu rrtic, in so far as it
c*x|)oimd' tlie rules o f Iin eiitioii or Discovery, A rc h ilec lo n ir, in so far as it treats
o f the method o f building up our ob.servations into system; but hitherto it lias
obtained, as a wliole, no adcfjuate and distinetive title. The conse([uence, or
])crhap> tlie eau-'C, o f this want o f a peculiar name to mark out the second
science of seienee, as distinguished from tlie first, is that the two have fre-
(jiieiitly been mixed up together, and tliat the name o f Lfxjic has been stretched
.so as to eomprehciul the confused assemlilagc o f tlicir doctrines. O f these two
seienees o f tlie conditions o f knowledge, the one owes its systematic develop
ment principtilly to Aristotle, the other to Bacon ; thougli neither of these
philo'OpIiers lias precisely marked or rigidly observed the limits which separate
them from e.adi other; and from the cirenmstance, that tin* latter gave to his
gn-at Treatise tin* name, o f Orqnnum, the name wliieh has in later times
been ajiplied to designate thc* complenient o f the Logical Treatises o f the for
m er. from tliis cireunistance, I say, it has often been snjijiosed tliat tlie aim
o f Ba' on was to build np a Logie of Iiis own ujion the ruins o f the Aristotelic*.
Xothing, however, can be more erroneous, eitlier as to Bacons views, or as to
tin* relation in which ihe two sciences nmtmilly stand. These are not only not
iiicoiisi.steiit, they arc in fact, as correlative, each necessary to, eacli dejiendcnt
on, tin* otln*r; and although they constitute two several doctrines, which must
be treated in the first iii'tanee each by and for itself, tliey an*, however, in the
la't re?ort only two jihases, two members, o f one great doctrine o f method,
which eoii'idcr'. in the counter relations of thought to the object, and o f thc
object to thniig'it, the universal t'onditions by which the jiossibility o f human
knowledge i.? regiilateil and defined.
But allowiicj Ihe tenn Jxxjic to be extended so as to denote the genus of
wliich thc'C opposite dcjctrines of Method are tho species, it will, however, be
necessar}' to add a difference by which these special Logies may be distin-
APPENDIX. 497
guished from each other, and from the gen eric scien ce o f wliicli they are tlic
constituents. T h e doctrine, tlierefore, whicii exjiounds the law s by whicli our
scientific procedure should be govern ed , in so far as tlicse lie in tlie forms o f
thought, or in tlic conditions o f the mind itself, wliich is the subject in which
k now ledge inheres, this .science m ay be called F o rm a l, or S u b je c tiv e , or A b
stra c t, or P u r e L o g ic.
T h e scien ce, again, w hich exp ou n d s thc laws by which
our scientific procedure should be govern ed , in so far as these lie in the
con ten ts, m aterials, or oljjeets, about which k n ow led ge is con versan t, this
scien ce m ay be called M a .e ria i, o r P b je e .ic e , or C o n crete, or A p p lie d L o g ic.
Now it is Logic, taken in its m ost u n ex clu siv e acceptation, .which will con
stitute the object o f our consideration in the follow ing course. O f the two
branches into which it falls, Form al L ogic, or Logie P roper, dem ands the
principal share o f our atten tion , and tliis for various reasons. In the fii-st
Jilace, considered in referen ce to the (juantity o f their contents, Form al Logie
is a far m ore eom jirehensive and com plex scien ce than M aterial. F or, to sjieak
first o f the la tte r : i f we abstract from the sp ecialities o f p articular objects
and scien ces, and consider on ly the rules w hich ought to govern our procedure
in referen ce to the objeet-m atter o f the scien ces in gen eral, and this is all
tliat a universal logic can projiosc, these rules are few in num ber, and their
applications siinjile and ev id en t. A ^Material or O b jective L ogie, ex c e p t in
special subordination to the circum stances o f particular scien ces, is, therefore,
o f very narrow limits, and all that it can tell us is soon told. O f the former,
on the other hand, the reverse is true. F or though
O the highest
IT' law s o f thought
O
be few in num ber, and tbougb Logie proper b e on ly an articulate exposition o f
the universal n ecessity o f these, still the steps through whicb this e.xjiosition
must be accom plished are both m any and m ultiform.
In the second jilace, the doctrines o f IMateiial L ogie are not o n ly far few er
and sim pler than those o f Form al L ogic, they are also less in d ep en d e n t; for
the principles o f tlie latter on ce established, those o f the other are eith er im
p licitly eonfirnieil. or the founda'ion laid on which they can be easily re.sted.
In the third jilace, tlie study o f Form al L ogie is a more im proving ex e r c ise ;
for, as ex clu siv ely con versan t with the law s o f thought, it n ecessitates a turn
ing back o f the in tellect upon itself, which is a less easy, and, therefore, a m ore
invigorating, en ergy, than the m ere contem plation of th e objects d irectly jire-
sented to our observation.
In the fourth p lace, the doctrines o f Form al Logic are possessed o f an in
trinsic and iK'cessary ev id en ce ; th ey shine out by their native light, and do not
require an y proof or corroboration b eyond that which consciousness itself snp-
jilie.s. T h ey do not, therefore, re/juire, as a p relim inary condition, an y aji-
paratus o f acijnired k n ow led ge. Form al I.ogle is, therefore, b etter fitted than
IMaterial for the purposes o f academ ical instruction ; for the latter, jiriinarily
conversant with the conditions o f the extern al world, is in itself a less in vig
orating exercise, as determ ining the mind to a feeb ler and more ordinary
exertion , and. at tbe sam e tim e, can n ot adcqnateh' bc understood w ithout the
jirovious jiossession o f such a com iileinent o f inform ation as it would be unrea
sonable to count upon in the case o f those who are on ly eom m enein g their
philosophical studies.
63
498 APPENDIX.
II.
G E N U S OF L O G IC .
(Sec p.age 7.)
I. S c i e n c e .
A . A ffirm ative. Stoici (v. A lex a n d er Aplirod. I n To/i/crt, P r o c e m .D i o g

en e s L aertius, V ita Z e n o n is, L. vii., -1 2 ) . P lato et P laton iei et A ead em iei
OHines (v.C am erarius, Selectee D is p n t. P /tilo s. P ars, i., qu. 3, p. 3 0 ).
fa; SPECULATIVE SCTE.VCE.
T oletn s, In U n. A r ls t. L o g ., D e D ia l, in C n m m tn i, Qu. ii., iv. S u arez. D b p .

M eta p h ., D isp. i. iv. 2 G ; D isp. xliv. xiil. 5-1. C oniinnniter Tliom islm , ut
Capreolus, Sotiis, iMasius, F lan d ra, S on cin as, J a v elin s O innes fere Scotista;
cum Scoto, ut I'a ler a , A n toiiiu s A ndreas, e te . (v. Ildeplionsiis de Pennfiel,
L o g ic a D is p u ta tio n e s , D isp. i. qu. 4. Ciir.hus, p. 79.) F o r A quinas, D urandus,
N iphus, C anariensis, see A n tonin s Ilu vio, C om . in A r is t. D ia le c t., Prooem. qu.
.j. For r.aeelion u s, J a v elin s, A verroes, see C oniiuliricenses, In A r i d . D ia l.
Procem. Q. iv. art. 5. L alem andet, C ur.sus P h il., L o g ic a , D isp. iii. part iii.
D erodon, L o g ic a P e .d il., D e G en eve, p. 4.;. Cam erarius, D i.sp. P h il., Pars i.,
<pi. 3. 4. (T h a t L o g ica dnrenx a (rue soien ee.) F o r P seiid o-A ugu stim is, A v
icen n a, A lpharabiiis, .see C oiiiinbricenses, Coin, in Ari.sl. D ia l. Procem. Qii. iv.
art. 3. F or B oethius, M ercado, V era Crnce, M oiitanesius, see, M asius, Com., in
P o rjih . et in C n ic e rsa m A risto fe lis Ijo g ica in , Sect. i., Prooem. (|u. v. et seq.
P onciiis, De. N a t. Log., Disji. ii., con cl. 2 . F or Piapineus, P etron iu s, F aber,
see Cam erarius, S el. D i.yi. P h il., P ars i., qu. 4 , p. 44.
(b) PP,ACTICAL SCIENCE.
C nniinbricenses, In C n ic rr s a m A visto te lis D Ia lectiea m . Procem. Q u. iv., art.

.7. Foii-êca. In M /id p h . L. ii. c-. 3, cjii. 1 , 7. F or \ eu etiis, A lb ertu s iMagnus,
.la n d iiiiii', sc< Kiivio. I. r. .^: !mler, P h ilo x ip h ia nova M eth odo E r p lir a ta , Pars
Prior, L. v. c \ . i., p. 300. tl(;o. 3 ). D A bra dc R acoiiis, S n m m n T otiu s Philo.m -
jihifr. L og. P r ir l., c. i. Lciidooiai, C n rsu x L o g icn s, L. i., c. 2 , f|u. 7. Riel, In
Sf-iiicni., L. ii. Pro]. t).-caiu, Suntm n I'o tiu s L o g letr, ]). x x x ix . (ju. 0. P'or
.\iirco liis, lic r n . M irandtdaiiiis, sec* Cnnhnhrlrcn.s-es, i. r. F or iMatliisius, Mureia,
\'a-^c|Me/,, Pc-kiiH, cc* Cam erarius, Sel. D lsji. P h il. P ars i.. cpi. 4, p. 44. Ilde-
plion-ciis dc PcnaticI, Lug. I)is]>. D. i. (jii. 4, sect. 2 . O vied o, C n r.m s P h ilo-
sop h icu s. L o g ., Contr. Proam i. ii. .7. Arriaga, C u rsu s P h ilo so p h ic u s, D isp. iii. 4.
ir) sri'.CVL.iriVE AND PRArTWAL.
H urtado dc M endoza, L og. U d p . I), ii. 2 .

R. N eg a tiv e. F or almos: ail (lie G reek eom n if'iitators,see Z abarclla, Opera
APPENDIX. 499
L ogica, D e N a t. L o g ., L . i. c. .5, and Smiglcicins, L o g ic a , D. ii. qu. 5. S ee also

Ildephonsus do P en a fiel, D is p . L o g . U . i. qu. 1, 1, p. G7.
II. A rt .
S ch eib ler, O p era L o g ica , Para. i. c. 1 , p. 40. J . C. Scaligev, E x ercU ation es,
E.xere. i. 3. G. J . Vos.siiis, D e N a h ir a A n ia m , L. iv., c. 2 , 4. IJalfiireiis, In
O rg. Q . V. G, Prooein., ]>. 31. P nrgersdiciiis, In stilu tio n es Logiccr. Lib. i. c .
1. P aoius, Com m , in O rg. p. 1 . Sanderson, L o g . A r tis C o m p eiid lu m , L. i. c. 1 ,
p. 1 , Cf. p. 1 0 2 . A ldrieb, A r tis Log. C o m p e n d iu m . L. i. c 1 , p. 1 . H ildeiiiiis,
Q nastion es el C o m m eu ta ria in G/y/(;oh, p. .570 (1 5 8 5 ). G oclen in s,/V oW ew a/a
L ogica et J ltilosop/iica. Para. i. (|u. 3. Ramus, D ia le c tic n . L. i. c. 1 . A ugus
tinus, D e O rd ln e, ii. c. 15. C icero. D e C la ris O ra to rih u s, c. 41. D c O ratore. L.
ii., c. 38. L ovanii'uses, C om. in A r is t. D ia l. Praef p. 3. Rodoljilius A gricola, D e
D ia lc c ticic fiivcn iio n e, L. ii. j). 2.75. INIonloriu.s (B a p t.), Com m , in .Anal. P r .
Prajf. 'E u n u csh is, D c C on siitiil. D ia l.,]) . Ao. D ow n an i (R an iist), Cow//?!./n H am .
D ia l., L . i. c. 1 . p. 3. . P aracus, .Ira Tôgica, j). 1 , 1G70. F or H oratius Corna-
cliinus, A nt. B cn ia rd u s i\liran du lan u s, F lam iuinius N obilius, see Cam erarius,
Ael. D isj). 17til. P ars. i. q. 3, p. 30.
III. S cie n c e and A rt.
L alem an d ct, Log., D isp. iii. P art iii. (d. 4 {L o g ic a iitcns, an a r t ; L ogica do-
ceits, a speculative scien ce.) T artaretiis, In T \ IH sp a n n m , f. 2 (P ra ctica l S ci
en ce and A rt.) P. Ilisp anu s, C o p n la la O m n. T r a d a t. P e t. I lis p . P a r e . L ogictd.
T . i. f. 1 0 , 1400. P iiilo so jd iia V etus et X o r a in R e g ia H u r g im d ia o/im P e r tr a c -
ta la , L o g ic a , T . I., pp. 58, 50. 4tli cd. London, 1G85. ToR'a, C om p. PhU .
L o g ., Tr. i. 1. iv. e. 4, p. 208 (P ractical S cien ce and A rt). P iirchot, Instii.
P h il., T . I. Pro(em. p. 36. E u gen iu s, AoyncT), pp. 140, 141. D uplci.x, L ogigue.
p. 37. F a " c i o l a t i , L o g icec,\). 5. S ch m \cv, P h ilo so p h ia Q u a d r ip a rtita
(v. Ilenm an n u s, A c ta I d n osoph. iii. j). G7). Aquina.s (in C aram uel, P h il. R e a lis
et R a tio n td is , Disp. ii. p. 3 ).
IV . N e it h e r S cienc e nor A rt , uut I n st r u m e n t , O rgan , or H artt , or

I nst rujiental I)i sc i p m n e .
P liiloponus, In A n . P r io r ., in itio. F or Ainm onius ( P r f c f in P r w d .) , A le x

ander (III T o p ica , i. c. 4 ; M cduph. ii. t. 15). Sim plicius, {L*rcef. in P r c c d .).
Zabarella ( D c X a ' w a L o g icic, I., i. c. 1 0 .), Zim ara (I n T a b u la v. A h s u r d iim ),
A verroes, see Sm iglecius, L o g ica . Disp. ii. qu. G, p. 80. A egidius, In A n . P o s t.
L. i. (ju. 1 . For M agiiosius, N ig er (P e tr u s), Villalpandou.s, see Ruvio, In A rist.
D ia l., procem. qu. 2 . F . Crelliiis, Isagoge L o g ica , L. i. c. 1 , p. 5. P . A'allius.
L o g ica , T . 1. proocm. e. i. et alibi. B artliolinus, J a n ito rc s Logic!, TI. pp. 25 and
7(7. Bertiiis, L o g ica P e r ip a fc lic a . pp. G. 1 0 . T liem istiiis, A n . P o st. i. e. 24.
A(piitias, O p u scu la . 70. (ju. D c D irlsio n e S c ic u tiw S p ecu la tirce. sed alibi sci-
eu tiam vocat. (S e e Conim brieeiiscs, In A r is t. T)i(d.. T . 1. qu. iv. art. 5, p. 42.)
Baldiiinns, In Qucrslto an L o g ica sit S cien tia . 'Ac.aymxs, P a r a p h r a s is in O rg u 'w r
Pra?f. p. 0 .
nOO APPENDIX.
V T hat, LOOSELY tak in g the term s, L ogic ts e i t h e r A rt or S cience

OR nOTH.
.Zabarolla. O/in'o Lnr/irn, D e X n t. Log., L. i. c. vlii. D A bra dc R aconis,

Su/iuini To'. P h il. P rcel. Log., L. iii., c. 1 , j). 8 , cd. Colon. (P ractical S cien ce).
Ballbrciis, In O rgu nnn . Q. v. 1 , 6 , pp. 2 0 , 32. (A r t). D c r o d n n , L o g ic a R esfil.
D e P ro iv m . Log., j>. 49, (S p ec u la tiv e S c ie n c e ). C relliiis, h a g o g e , pp. 1 , 4 .
Bertius, L o g ica P e r ip a te tic a . pj). 1 1 , 13. A ld rieli. A r t. ].o g . C om p., L. ii. c. 8 ,
T . i. (A r t). San d erson , L og. A r t. C o m p . A p p e n d . P r ., c. 2 , page 192., (A r t).
C otiiinbriceiiscs, In A r i d . D ia l., T . L , p. 33 (P ractical .Science). J dii/osoph ia
B u rg u n d iu , T . 1. p]>. 56, 59. E nstacliins, Ni/mmrt P h ih s n p h ia , D in le c tic a Qua'st.
PnxriiL, i. p. 4. Nninu'sins, D e C onstii. D iaL,H '. 4 3 ,6 8 . S cb eib ler, O p era L o g
ica. jip. 48, 49. S ea yn u s, l* a r . in O rg ., pp. 1 1 , 1 2 . Canierarius, S el. D is p . P h il.,
Pars i. qu. 3, pp. 31, 38 (S p e e u la liv c S c ie n c e ). B. P ereira, D e C om m un . I^riii-
c ip . O mn. P e r . X a tu r a l, L. i. D e P h il. e. 18, p. 60, 1618.
VI. That at once S c ie n c e (part of P h ilo so p h y ) and Instrum ent of

PlIILOSOl'HY.
B oetliiiis, Prref. in Porphgr. (a V ictorino T ransl.) Opera, p. 48. Eustaeliius,

Summa Philosnphice, p. 8 (S cii'iitia organica et iiracli. a ). F or Siinplieiiis, A l
ex an d er, Pliiloponus, etc., see Caincrarius, Sel. Disp. P h il., p. 30. P acius, Com. in
Arisl. Org., p. 4 .
V II. T h a t Q u e s tio n , w h e tiie k L ogic p a r t ok Piiilosopiiy o r n o t, an

I dle Q u ts i io n .
P aciiis, Com . in A H .d. O iy , p. 4. A v icen n a (in C o n im b rie en ses,/n A ris l.

D i n t . Qn. iv. art. 4. T . I. p. 38).
V III. T hat Q u estio n of w iiE T nE R A rt, S cience, e t c ., Id l e only
V e riial.
Buflier, Conrs des .Sciences, Secnndc Lngirpie, 421, p. 8 8 7 .

Eiigonins, 'H A oym v, p. 140, lias tlie Io b ow in g:
From what lias been said, therefore, it clearly appears o f what character
are the diversities o f L ogic, and what its nature. F or one logic is N n lu rn l,
another A crp itre d . And o f the N n tn rn l, there is one sort according to J n icn llg,
another aeeord in g to D isjio silio n . And o f the A cipiired, there is again a
kiinl according to A r t. and a kind according to S cien ce. A n d the. N ative
Logic, according to F acu lty, is the rational faculty it.self with which every hu
man individual is em low cil, through which all are qualified for the know led ge
ami di'crim in aiioii o f truth, and w hich, in pro|)oi'tioii as a man em ploys the
Ic". the Ic'S is he rem oved from irrationality. But the N a tiv e Jmgic, aeeording
n iJi'pO'itioii. i- the s:mie faeiilt}- by wbieli 'om e, when tliey reason, are wont
to ex ert iheir cogitations with care and attention, eonfu.si-dly, in d eed , and un-
eritieally. 'lili, how (;\er, in pursuit o f ihe truth. T h e Aeijiiired, aeeording to
Art, is the correct ami corrected k n ow led ge o f the R ules, through which the
intellectual ei.erg ies are, without fault or failure, accom plished. B u t the A c-
APPENDIX. 501
qiiired, according to S cien ce, is the ex a ct and p erfect k n ow led ge botli o f the
energies tlienisclvcs, and also o f the causes through which, and through which
excdusively, they are cap ab le o f b ein g d irected towards the truth.
Native, according to i
( Disposition.
Logic.
gic. -<
Required, according to |
A n d thus Disposition adds to F a c u lty coiisuetuiii! and a prom ptness to en

ergize. A rt, again, adds to Disposition a refin em ent and accuracy o f E n ergy
F in a lly , S eien ee adds to A rt the eonseiousness o f cause, and the power o f ren
derin g a reason in the case o f all the R ules. A n d tlie natural logician m ay be
able, in his random reason, to ap p reh en d that, so to speak, on e thin g has d eter
m ined another, although the nature o f this d eterm ination m ay be b eyon d bis
k en . B ut he w hose disposition is exercised by reflection and im itation, being
able easily to con n ect thought with thought, is cogn izan t o f the several steps o f
the reason ing process, how hcit this otherw ise m ay be confused and disjointed.
B u t he who is disciplined in the art, know s e x a ctly that, in an act o f in feren ce,
there are required three term s, and that these also should be thus or thus con
nected. F in a lly , the scientific logician understands the reason, why three
term s en ter into ev ery sy llo g ism , why there are neither more nor fe w e r ,
and w hy they belioove to be com bined iu this, and in no other fashion.
W h erefore to us the inquiry appears ridiculous, which is frequently, even
to nausea, elam oroiisly agitated co n cern in g L ogie W h eth er it should be re
garded as an A r t or as a iScience.
III.
D IV IS IO N S , V A R IE T IE S , A N D CONTENTS O F L O G IC .
(See p. 49.)
/ V. Timpler, Logicce Sgsteina, L. i. c . i.

Docens, V qnst, 2 , 3. Isendoorn, E ffa ta , Cen-
, ^copls Kpayfxa/Twv, | tiiiia, i. EiT. 5o. Credins, Iscigogc,
J J Pars Piior, L i. c. i. p . 1 2 . Nolclius,
ooiCAjN Utens, \ L o q ia i Eecognita, V voivm . \>. 13.
fV Ka\ 7"M*'a<r' 9 y r h ilo p o m is ./. Rn. P ,- .,f 4. Alstediui,
irpayg-iruiv. I E n n jclo p a d ia , pp. 29 aiul 406. v
\ Aristotle, M etaph., L vii. text, 23.
Doctrinalis
nalis i1 [Objec- \ v. Timpler, Sgst. Log., Appendix, p.
IL L o g i c a , Systematica
aatica f tivaj. 7 877.
0 / /. Noldius, Log. Recog., Procem.,
Habitualis [Snbjcctiva] p. 1.3.
)02 A PPEN D IX .
'Ailopteil in different significations hy

C Piirs Communis,
C< Gcne- Tiiii]i]er, Si/st. L o r , f[. 19, ]i. 5.5.
J rali.s. Tlieopli. Gale, Loijica, pp. 6 , 246.
III. L ogica,
ct scq. (1681). Cielliiis, Isagot/e, P. i.
Pars Iropria, Spccialis.
L. i. c. 1, p. 3. Alsteciiiis, Encyclop.,
pp. 29 and 406.
jY. B . Avcrrocs (Pacius, Com. p. 2 )

( Para. lias I.ogica apjiropriata sen particularis,
I \ . L o g i c a , j A ji p li c a t a . and l.ogica coniniunis = Universal, A b
stract Lojrie.
( Alistracta.
V. L o g ic a ,
( Coiicrcta.
Pans Communis.
V I. L o g i c a , J p. .. p . i Apodictica. v v- Timpler, S p l . Log , p. 42. Isendooni,

j l^'Jikctiea. A yt, C e n t i. Eff. 56.
t Sopliistica.
Timpler, Sgs. Log., p. 44. Crclliii.s,

hogoge, pp. 1 0 , 11 , and Isendooni,
E ffa ta , Cm t. i. Eff. 51. Adopted
'EvpeTlK'f) vel rOTTiKTI. liy Agricola, D e Inv. D ia l., L. i.
Invcntio. p. 35. Mclanclitlion, E rot. D ial.,\>.
1 0 . Kainns, Schol. Dialect. L. i. t.
V II L o g i c a , < ,
\ KpiTiKri. i., and L. ii. c. i. p. 351 et scq.
' .Jiidicium. Spencer, p. 11 . D o w n a n i,//;
^D ispositio. R a m i D ial., L. i. c. 2 , p 14 Pcri-
onins, De D ialertira, L. i. ]i 6
(1.544). Vossins, D e N a t. A rtinm
sive Logica, L iv. c. ix. ji. 217.
( Pars de Projiositio.
VIII. Logica, V. Timpler, S yst. Log., p. 49.
I Purs do .ludicio.
^ Doctrina Dividend!. j v. Tiinjiler, Syst. Log., p. 51. Iscn-

IX . L o g i c a , ) Doctrina Definicndi. > doom, E ffa ta , Cent. i. Eff. 57.
( Doctriiia Argiiiiicntandi. ) lioctliius, ( Angiir>tin, Fonseca, etc.)
APPENDIX. 503
Simplicis Appreliciisi-
onis.
L . Timiiler, Lor/., 52 Iseiidoorn,
Judicii.
ICJdta, Cent. i. EiF. 58.
Iviitiociiiatioiiii.
X. L o g ic a , >Iscridoorn, L'ursus foglcu s, p. 31, and
K ffn la , Cent. i. 59 Noldius, Log
Noctica {niclins Nocm a-|
Itec., ]i. 9. A(iuinas.
Syiithctica. tic-a)
Diaiioetica.
1. Ideas (notions). IJ A r t de Penser, Part i. Clenens,

2. Judgment lAxjica, adopts tliis division, but
XL L o g ic a , 3 Reasoning. makes Method tliird, Ileasoning
4. iNIctliod. fourtli.
1 . Doetrine of Elements.
XII. L o g ica , Kant, L o g ik ; Krug, Logik.
2 . Doctrine of hlcthod.
1 st. Called Analytic by Metz, Instit. Log Twesten, D ie Logik,

insbesondere d ie A m ihjtik, jn Hi Esser, L ogik Part i.
2d. Called Systematic or Architectonic by Bachmann, Logik,
Part ii.
Called Synthetic l>y Esser (who includes under it also Applied
L ogic), Logik, Part ii.
Thematica de m ateria\
i
operation! Logicoe / Mark Duncan, Institutiones Loqicw,
1 . I
subjecta. \ Prolog, e. iii. ^ 2 , p. 22.Burgersdi-

Organica de1 . D instru- \
e ordinihus cius,
rerumInstit. Log., L. i c. i. p. 5.
gcneralibusX
mentis sciendi. )
et attributis eommiinissimis.
2 . De Voeibus et Orationc.
Communis, 3. D e Idcis simpHcibus et appre-
Generalis. Tlicopliilus
hcnsionc simplici dirigenda.
Gale [Ijogica,
4. Do Judieio et Propositione.
1581) follows
5. De Discursn
(besides Kcc-
6 . D e Dispositioiie seu Methodo.
kermann and
Genesis stricta. y Burgcrsdyk)
y principally
Genesis didactica.
XIV L o g ic a ,( Speeialis. / Claubcrg and
< Ilerineneutica. I J A rt de P e n
Analysis.
) Analyticaand Critiea. ser of Port
Royal.
In ordine ad inentcm Logica
strifte dicta.
Genetica.
In ordine ad alios Interpretativa
vel Ilermenentiea genetica,
Ilerineneutica analytica.
\ Analytica. |
Analytica stricta vel in specie.
504 A P I' E N D I X .
Theorctira pars.
Pnu'tica p ars (this iii-|

XV. L o g ic a / W olf, Philos. R ationalis, Pars i. and ii
cliuliiig thc MetIiod-|
ology and Applied
Logic of Kant.,
( On Adrastcan order, etc. of tlic iiooks of tlic Organon, vide

X V I. } Kainiis, Schohe D ial., L. ii., c. S., p. 354. Piccartus, In
Organum, Prolegomena, p. 1 et seq.
1. r ie p l aris TTpiirrts evvolas, or'

TTpoXrjipeoos.
2. npl <rK(ipu>s. Eugcnins Diaconus, AoyiKg, p.
X V I.* L o g i c . e , '
3. rifpl Kpiofoos. 144
panes,
4 . n p i S io r o io s .
ripl p.fb6Sov.
iG cnovesi. A division different in some

1. Emendatricc. respects is given in his Latin Logic,
2 . Invcntricc. Iroleg. 51, ]). 2 2 . Tlic fourtli
X V II. L o g i c a , 3. Giudicatrice. part of tlie division in thc Latin
4 . Ragionatrice. Logic is omitted in the Italian, or
5. Ordinatricc. ratl.er reduced to tlie second; and
tlio fifth divided into two.
Por/ilrjrii Isiiq. ) ^
X V U I. L o g i c a , <
i , ' I Iscndoorn, E ffa ta , Cent. 1
( Anahit. P r .................... \ Rca.son of terms, Pacius, Com

Nova. Ânalyt. P o s t ................f mentin Org., In P orph. h a g
) T o p ..................................( p. 3 .
\E le n c h ....................... J
ftS,roxfio\oyiK-fi.
Iscndoorn, Cent, i
E jfu ta ,
X IX . L o g i c a , ) f Apodictica. Eff. 5C. (F'rom John IIos
I S .vW o yia riK T j. I Topica. piiiian, De Controversiis
\ ( Sopliistica. D ialecticis.)
X 'S .T o ix fio K o y iK h.
( Prior. I Vossius, D e N atu ra
XX L o g ic a , ) Analytica. ! Posterior. V A rtium sive de Lo-
^ I v W o y K T T lK - f l.
D ia lccica . f
(^ Sopliistica. J P-
APPENDIX. 505
( prodroiniis de Interpretatione.
Ana ytica. J ,iivei-se de Syllogisnio.
( speeiatem
do Dcinoiistratione. ( Vossius, De Na-
X X I. L o g i a c , \ turu A r liu m ,p .
( jirodroiius de Categoriis. ( 2^ 0
T-. , . -< de Svll. verisiinili.
Dialectica. ) .
de Syll. sophistieo sive jiirastico.
Aristotle, in Laertius v. Vossius,

) Dialectica.
X X II. L o g i c a , ^ De Xul. Art. sive De Logica, L.
iv. c. ix. 1 1 , 1).
Stoieonira, see Vossius, De Nat.

X X III. L o g ic a Rebus qu32 signilicaiitur.
Art. sive De Logica, L. iv. c. ix
de Voeibus quae significant.
^ 7, p. 218.
I Loquendo.
X X IV . LoG iC iE \ E loquendo. Varro, vide Vossius, De Nat. A n .
partes de j Proloquendo. L, iv. c. ix. 8 , p. 219.
y Ir o l o q u i o r u m s u m m a .
( ripj)s evpecriv. ) Aristotle (?) in Laertius, L. v. ^ 28,

X X V . L o g i c a , < ripJis Kpiaiv. > p. 284. A lexander Aplu'od. in
( ripJis xp vd iV ) uota Aldobrandini.
I NoTjTi/ffj, Apprehensiva.
\ Kpiffipos vel KpiTiKT], I Caramuel Lobkowitz, Rationalis ec
Logica, < Judicativa. > Realis Pldlosophia, Log ica sett
J AioXfKTiKT), Argumcnta- V Phii. Rat. D isp. ii, p. 3.
\ tiva.
( Divisio.
paries? ] Iêfinitio. L - . Crellius, Tsagoge, Pars, prior, c. i. p. 1 0 .
(_ Argumentatio.
( Apodictica. ) ^ t
Logicae j . . ( a". Lrellius, Isagoge, Pars, prior, c. i. p. 10.
partes,
nm-tes K r Isendoom, Effata, Cent. i. Eff. 5 4 .
I Sopbistiea.
Logicae
partes, I Topica'*^^ } Crellius, Isagoge, Pars, prior, c. i. p. 1 0 .
Stoicheiology (pure) sliould contain the doctrine of Syllogism, Avithout dis

tinction of Deduction or Induction. Ddluction, Induction, Definition, Division,
Gt
506 A PPENDIX
from the law s o f thought, slioiikl com e u iuler pure IMctliodology. A ll are pro
cesses (v. C iesalpim is, Q u a s i. P e r ip . su b iiiit.)
Perliajis, V , F orm al Logie (from the law s o f thought p rop er) should be
distin-xiiislied from, '2 \ A bstract L ogic (m aterial, but o f abstract gen eral m at
ter) ; and then, 3^. A P sych ological L ogie might be added as a third part,
considering how R easoning, etc., is all'eeted by the constitution o f our minds.
A i)|tlied L ogic is p rop erly the scvertil scien ces.
Or mav not Induction and D ed u ction com e under abstract M aterial L ogic ?
lY.
LAW S OF THOUGHT.
(Sec p. GO.)
T h e law s o f Id en tity and Contradiction, each infers the other, b ut only

tlirongh the prinei])le o f E x eln d ed M id d le; anil the prin cip le o f E x c lu d ed
M iddle on ly exists through the supposition o f the two others. Tim s, the prin
cip les o f Id en tity tind Contradiction can n ot m ove, can n ot be ajtiilied, ex c e p t
through sMj)j)Osing the princijile o f E x clu d ed ^ lid d le ; and this last cannot be
co n ceiv ed ex isten t, ex c e p t through the snpjtosition o f the two former. T hey
are thus eo o n lin a tc b ut in sep arab le. B eg in with a n y on e, the other two
follow as corollaries.
I. PiuM/vnv L a w s of T h o u g h t , in g e n e r a l .
S)*e the follow ing authors on : D rcicr, Disput. ud Pldlosoplnam Primam,

D i'p. V. A ri.'iotlc, Anah/I. Post. i. c. 1 L 2, 3, 4, .7. C, 7. Schram m , Philoso-
plila A rid f/rlicfi, p. 3G. Lipjiins, Mc.ldjihusicn Magna, L. i. c. i., j). 71 et seq.
Stahl, Itrgidfr ] di'dasfgiliirfn, 'Pit. i., rcg. i. p. 2 et srq., rcg. ii. p. 8 et seq., T it.
.xix reg. viii., p. .720 et seq. Chtiiivin, Lexicon Philosopliicum, v. Metaphysica.
liisterfcld ev o lv es all out o f ens, ens est. .Sec Philo.so])hia P rim a ,c . ii. p. 24
et se.q. B obrik, System dcr Loyik, 70, p. 247 et seq.
AT r E N D IX. 507
Law s o f T liou glit ai-e o f two k in d s : F . T lio laivs o f the T h in k a b le ,

Id en tity, C ontradiction, etc. 2 . T h e law s o f T h in k in g in a strict sense viz.
laws o f C oneeption, J u d gm en t, and R eason in g. S ee S clieid ler, r s y c h o lo y ie ,\> .
15, ed. 1833.
T h a t th ey b elon g to Logie : Ram us, Schol. D ia l., L. ix., p. 549.
Is Affirm ation or N eg a tio n prior in order o f thought ? and thus on order and
m utual relation o f the L aw s am ong them selves, as eobrdinate or d ei-ived; (see
separate L aw s). F raeastorius, Opera, D e Jntellectiunc, L . i. f. 125 b., m akes
negation an aet prior to allirmation ; therefore, p rineijile o f C ontradietion prior
to jin n eip le o f Identity. E sser, AoîT, 28, p. 57. Sigwai't, llandhuch zu
Vuiiesunyen iiher die Logik, 38 ct seip P ieeoloin in eiis, De Mentc Humana, L.
iii., e. 4. ]i. 1301, on (]uestloii Is allirniativc or n egative p rio r? Seh u lz, I rixf.
der Kant. Krit. der I'eiuen Vernunft, I. ji. 78, 2 d ed. W eiss, Lehrhuch der lo g ik ,
81 et seq. pp. 61, 62, 1805. C astillon, Memoires de IAcadeinie de B erlin
(1 8 0 3 ) p. 8 (C ontradiellon and Id en tity eob rd in ate). A . A ndreas, In A rid .
I\Ictaph. iv. Qii. 5. p. 2 1 . (A flii'iiiatlve jirior to n eg a tiv e.) L eib n itz, CKnvres
Philosopliiques, iXouv. K.srais, L. iv. ch. 2 , 1 , p. 327, ed. Raspe. (Id en tity jnior
to C ontradietion.) W olf, Ontologia, 55, 288 (C ontradietion first. Id en tity
seco n d ). D orodon, Metaphgsica, e. iii., p. 75 et seq. 1669. (C ontradietion first,
E x clu d ed iMiildlo .second. Id en tity third). F on seca, In Metaph., I. 849. B in n d c,
Psijchologie, 3'ol. L, part ii., 151, p. 159. (T h a t p rinciple o f Conti-adietion
and iirineiple o f R eason and ConseipKMit not id en tical, as W o lf and R eim arus
hold.) N ie. T aiirelliis, Philosophke Triumphus, etc., ji. 124. A n ih cim , 1617.
Cum sim plex aliipia .sit alfirm atio, negatlo non item , hane illam sequi con elu -
dim us, etc. C hauvin, Lexicon Philosophicum, v. Metajdiysica.
B y whom introduced into L o g ie: E berstein { U h e r d ie Bestchuffenheit d e r

L oijik u n d M e ta jd iy s lk d e r re in e n P e r ijta te tik c r , p. 2 1 , H a lle, 1800) says that
D arjes, in 1737, was the first to introduce P rin cip le o f C ontradietion Into
L ogie. T hat Bulfier, and not Reim arus, first introduced prin cip le o f Id en tity
into L ogie, see B obrik, L o g ik , 70, p. 249.
II. P r im a r y L a w s o f T h o u g h t , ix p a r ti c u la r .
1. P rin cip le o f Id en tity. O m no ens est en s. H eld good by A n toniu s

A ndreas, In M eta p h . iv., qii. 5. (ajiud F onsccam , In M e ta p h . I. p. 8 4 9 ; m elius
apiid S u arez, S elect. D is p . M e ta p h . D isp. iii. sect. iii. n. 4 .) D erod on , M e ta -
p h y s ir a , e. iii., p. 77. J . S ergean t, M eth o d to S cien ce, ]ip. 133 136 and after.
(Sj)llts it absurdly.) B oeth iu s N u lla propositio est verioi ilia in ipia idem
pradicatiir de seipso. (V crso r, In P . I lis p a n i S u n m iu la s L o g ica le s, Tr. vii.,
]i. 441 ( 1st ed. 1 4 8 7 ); et Buridaiuis, In S o p h ism .) P ropositiones illas oportct
osse notissim as per se in qnibns idem de sc ipso priedieatiir, nt H om o est
fiomo, v el qnariim pra?dieata in definitionibns su b jeetan im in eln d iin tu r, nt
H om o est anim al. A quinas. C o n tra G en tiles, L. i.e . 10. O pera T . X Y I I l .
p. 7, V en et. 1 786. P rior to jHiiieip le o f C o n tra d ie tio n L eib n itz, N o u v e u u x
s s a is ,i> . 377. Buffier, P r in c ip e s d n R a isso n n em e n t, II. art. 2 1 , p. 204. R ejected
508 APPENDIX.
as idontioal and n u gatory by F on seca, loc. cit. S narcz, h e . cit. W olf, O ntolo-
g id ,55, 2 88, calls it Princijiiuin C ertitudinis, and d erives it from P rincipium
Contradictionis.
2. P rinciple o f C o n trad iction a f ia i g a r r is avrtip d a rea is.

A ristotle, M ctiijd i., L. iii. 3 ; x. 5. (F o n se ca , In M eta p h . T. I., p. 850, L. iv.
(iii.) c. iii.) A n a l. Pont. 1>. i. c. 11 c. 2 , 13. (O n A iisto tle and P lato, see
^ la n scls P r o h g o m e n a . pp. 236, 23 7 .) Stahl, Ileg n h c Philonophicce, Tit. i. reg. i
S n arcz, S e h c l Di.np. P h il., D isp. iii. 3. T im p ler, .M etaph. L. i., c. 8 qu. 14.
D crodon. M eta jih g n ica . p. 75 etc. Lip])ins, M r ajilig.nica, Ij. i. c. i., p. 73. B cr-
iiardi, The.i. A rin to t., r i \ P r in e ip iin n , C ontra>lic'io. L cii)iiitz, G lu v r e s Philono-
phiqu cn , X o u v . Enn., L. iv. c. 2 . Ramtis, A xioina C ontradictionis, Scholce
D ia l. L. ix. c .i., L. iv. c. 2 . 1 , p 548. Gnl. X ylan d cr, lu.ntitutloiien A phorinlicce
L aijicm A rin lo t., p. 24 (1 5 7 7 ), P rincip iu m priiicipiorm n hoc. est, lex Coiitra-
di. lionis. P hilojionus. aîwpa avTKpdafws, v. In P o s t. A n . f. 30 b. et seq.
Ainm oiiins, dfiu'pa r r js din-apdaems, In iJ e I n te rp r e t, f. !>4, A id. 1503; but princi
pium Excliisi M odii, S clicililcr, T o p ic a ,e . 19. On D efinition o f C ontradictories,
V. Sch eib ler, Ihid. On T w o P iiiiciiilcs o f C ontradiction, N eg a tiv e and
P ositive, I. Z abarella, O p e ra L o g iva , In A n . P o s t. i. t. 83, j). 807.
Conditions ol. A ristotle, Metaph., L. iv., c. 6 . B ern ard i, Thesaurus Arts/.,
V. Contrail., p. 300.
P roof attem pted b y C laubcrg, O ntosnjth ia, 26 (D eg era n d o , llis to ir e de
P h ilo so p h ic , T . I I . p. 5 7 ) , throngh E x c lu d ed IMiddle.
3. P rincip le o f E x clu d ed M iddle at^loipa ^laiptriKdv.

A|i'coga SiatperiKdv, d ivisivnm , dicitiir a Grmcis p r in c ip iu m e o n tra d ic tin n is
ajfirtn a livu m ; O portet de oinni re aflirm are au t nogare, G oclenius, L e x ic o n
P h ilo so p h iru in . Eat. ]>. 136. Z abarella, In A n . P o s t., L . i., tex t 83, O p era
I jjg ic a . p. 807. C oniinbricenses, In O rg., II. 125. L u cian , O p e ra , II. p. 44
fed . Ilcin stcrh iiis). A ristotle, M e ta p h ., L. iv. (iii.) c. 7 ; A n . I h s t ., L. i. 2 ; ii.
13 (M a n scls P r o le g o m e n a , p . 23 6 ). J o a n n es P hiloponus (v. B ernardi, Thes. v.
p. 3 0 0 ) . P iccartns, /.vayoê, pji. 2 9 0 , . 2 9 1 . AiwoW ws, In M e ta p h ., h .
iv. (ju. 9. S u arez, iJ isp . M e ta p h ., D isp. iii., sect. 3, 5 . Stalil, lie g u U e P h ilo s.,
T it. i. rcg. 2. W olf, O n 'oln gia, 2 7 , 2 9 , 5 6 , 7 1 , 4 9 8 . F oiiscca, In M e ta p h .,
L . iv. c. iii. (ju . 1. el seq ., T . I . p. 8 5 0 . (T h is p rin cip le not first.) T im p ler,
.M etaphgsira. L . ii. c. 8 , i p i . 15 . D erod on , M ela jih ., p. 76. (S ecu n d u m jirinci-
piinri.) Li])pius, M e la p h g sir a , L. i. c. i., pp. 72 , 75. C haiivin, L ex ico n P h ilo -
.-nphlrum , v. .M etaphgsica. S ch cib lcr, T o p ic a , c. 1 9 . H u rtado de M en d oza, DtsT).
.M elaph., D isp. iii., 3 (C aram u el, P a t . el R e a l. J d iil., 4 5 2 , p. 6 8 ) .
^Vhcthcr identical with Priiici])lc o f C ontradiction.

Afiirinativc, J a v elin s, /. c. IMcndoza, D isp . M etig ih ., D . iti. 3. L eib n itz,
fE n r r r s Phiiosn]thi<pies, N o n e . E s s ., L . iv. c. 2 , p. 327.
N e g a tiv e , E oiiscca, Disp. Met. D isp. iv. c. 3, 9. S u arez, D'lsp. Metaph.,
Disp. iii. 3. St.ilil, R eg. P h il. T it. i. rcg. 2.
W h eth er a valid and legitim ate Law .

F i'ch cr, L ogil.-,^ Cl e.t seq. (N e g a tiv e ). M ade first o f all principles b y
A lex a n d er de A les, M e ta p h ., x iv . tex t 9 : C onceptus om nes sim plices, ut
APPENDIX. 509
resolvim tnr ad ens, ita om nes con ccp tu s coiiipositi resolvuntur ad hoc princi-
piuni D e quolibet ajffirm atio v e l negutio." J. Pious iMirandulanus (after A ris
to tle), C o n cltu io n es, O p e ra , p. 90. Pliiloponus, In A n . P o s t. i. f. 9 b, (B ran d is,
S c h o lia , p . 199). T 5 o ' a n a v ( p a v a i ^ a n o c p d e a i , t) e l s r h a S v y a T o v a - n d S e t ^ i s K a y ^ d v e t .
A ristotle, A> 1 , Jôst. i. C. 11. 3. 'A u r l c p a i r i s 5e a v r l^ e ffis ys ovk e a ri fx e ra ^ v K a^'
a iir r iu . A n . P o s t. i . e . 2 , 13. M eT oô a v tK p d a e o o s o I> k ir S e x e r a i ou^ eu . M etujrh.

L. iii. C. 7. 'E T T t l a u r n p a f f e a s o v S e v d v d y .e c r o v , ( p a v e p h v o n ev ro ts iu a v r io is ea ra i rh
fiera^v. P h g s ic a , L . v. e. 3, 5. S ee al.-'O P o s t. A n . L. i. c. i. 4, p 414 , c. 2

13, p. 4 1 7 ; c. 1 1 , 3, p. 440 (v id e S cb eib ler, T o p ic a , e. 19 ; and M an seli
l^rolegom enn, p. 236, on A ristotle).
4. P rin cip le o f R eason and C onsequent.

T h at can be deduced from P rin cip le o f C ontradiction.
W olf, O ntologin, 70. B annigarten, M e ta p h g s ik ,^ 18.
Jakob, G ru m lr iss d e r a llg em ein en L o g ik u n d K ritisc h e A n g fa n g sg r ih id e d e r
u llgen iein en A letu p h g sik , p. 38, 3d ed., 1794. (S e e K iesew etter, I. c .)
T h at not to bo deduced from P rincip le o f C ontradiction.

K iesew etter, A llg en iein e l^ o g ik ; W eitere A u s e i n a n d e r s e t z n n g ,V . \ .a d 20,
2 1 , p. 57 et seep H um e, On H u m a n N a tu r e , B ook i. part iii. 8 . Sch u lze,
L o g ik , 18, 5th ed., 1831.
V.
NEAV A N A L Y T I C OF L O G IC A L F O P A IS - GENERAL RESULTS
F R A G IM E N T S .
I. E x t r a c t fro m P ro s p e c tu s ok E ssay t o w a r d s a N e w A n a ly t i c of
L o g ic a l F o r m s .
( F 'i r s t p u b l i s h e d in 18 46 ( Sec pp 102, 172. E d .)
N o w , u'hat has been the source o f o il these evils, I p ro ceed to rela te, a n d sh a ll clen rh j corv-
I'ince those who hare an intellect a n d a w ill to atten d , th a t a tr iv ia l slip in the elem en ta ry
p r e c e p ts o f a L o g ica l T h eo ry becomes the cause o f m ig h tiest e r r o r s in that T h eo ry its e lf. - -
G a le n . {D e T em p era m e n tis, 1. i. c . 5 .)
T i n s N ew iVnalvtie is in tend ed to com p lete and sim plify the o ld ; to

place the k eyston e in the A ristotelic arch. O f A bstract L ogic, ib e theory, in
Iiarticnlar o f Syllogism (b a tin g som e inqirovem ents, and som e errors oi d etail),
rem ains whore it was left b y the gen iu s oi'tb c S tagirite ; if it have not receded.
I An c .x t r a c f , c o r r o s p o ii d i n g in p a r t w i t h i s r e j m b l i s h e d in t l i e D is c u s s io n s on P h ilo so p h y_
t lia t n o w g i v e n f i o i i i t h e r r o s p c c t u s o f E s.ay p . 050. T o t l i i s e x t r a c t t h e A u t l i o r l ia s p r e -
to w a r d s a N e w A n a ly t ic o f L o g ic a l F o r m s , f i x e d t h e f o l l o w i n g n o t i c e r e g a r d i n g t h e d a t
610 APPENDIX.
still loss has it ad van ced . It con tains tho truth ; but the trutli, p artially, and
not alw ays co rreelly . d evelop ed , in com jde.xity, ev en in confusion. A n d
why ? B eeau se A ristotle, b y an oversiglit. m arvellous certain ly in liim, was
prem aturely arrested in liis an alysis; began liis synthesis lieforc he had fully
sifted the elem en ts to be roeom posod ; and, thus, the system whieli, alm ost
sp on tan eou sly, would have evolved itself into unity and order, he laboriously,
and y et im porfcetly, con striu tcd by slieor in tellectu al force, under a load o f
lim itations ami corrcetious and rules, which, deform ing the sym m etry, lias seri
ously iuijieded the usefulness, o f tlie scien ce. T his im perfection , as I said, it is
tlie ])iirpose o f the N ew A iialytie to sujiply.
111 tlie first p lace, in the E ssay there will be sliow n, tliat the Syllogism
jiroi ecds, not as lias liitlicrto, virtu ally at least, been taught, in on e, but in the
tiL'o Cl irrelative and eou n ter w holes (iNIetapliysIcal) o f C om preh en sion , and
(L o g iea l) o f E x te n sio n : the major prem ise in the on e whole lieiiig the m inor
prem ise in the other, etc. T im s is relieved a radical d efect and vital in con sis
ten cy In the p resent logical system .
In the second jilaco, the .self-evident trntli, T hat w c can on ly rationally
deal with what we already understand, d eterm in es the sim jile logical postulate,
To sta le expH citbj w hat is thought im p lic itlg . F rom the con sistent application
o f this p ostu late, on which L ogic ever Insists, but which L ogician s have never
fairly ob eyed , it follow s: that, logically, w c ought to take into account the
(ju antitg. alw ays understood in thought, but nsnally, and for m anifest reasons,
elided in its c.xjires.sion, n ot o n ly o f the. su b je ct, but also o f the p r e d ic a te , o f
a jud gm en t. T h is liciiig done, and the n ecessity o f doing it will be p roved
against A ristotle and his repeaters, w e obtain, in te r a lia , tho en su in g results:
I'-'. That (he p r e ln d e s ig n a te term s o f a projiosition, w hetlier siibjeet or predi
cate, arc n ever, on that accou n t, thought as in d e fin ite (or in d eterm in ate) in
quantity. T h e on ly in d efin ite, is jx irtie .id a r, as opposed to d e fin ite, (piantity ;
and this last, as it is eith er o f an ex ten siv e m a x im u m undivided, or o f an e x te n
sive m in im u m im livisible, con stitutes (piantity u n ire r sid (g e n e r a l), and ip ian tity
s in g u la r (in d iv id u a l). In fact, d r fin ite and iudrfm ite. are the on ly (piantltics o f
which we ought to hear in IogIe; for it is on ly as indefiiilte that particular, it
is only as definite that individual and gen eral, (pianlities have an y (an d the
sam e) logical avail.
2". The revocation o f the tnv} T e rm s o f a jiro p o sitio n In their irn e r e la tio n ;
a p ropo-iiien lieing alw ays an egna.tion o f its siiliject and its jircilleale.
.3 . T h e coM.sefpieiit reiliiellon o f the C on version o f J ro p o sitio n s from three
s p e c i e s to o n e , that o f S iiii|ile Coiii'ersloii.
' 1 . T h e reilucticjii o f all the G e n e ra l Imws o f C a te g o ric a l S g llogism s to a
Singh: C ation.
Ilf hip ( l o r i r i n e o f t h e Q i i n i it i fl c n t i o n o f t h e a t l i o r o n g h q u a n t i f i c a t i o n o f tli e p r e d i c a t e . In

I rc l i c u l f ' l o u c i n g th e ] r ii ic i] le cl an a f i . n i i a l i v c ] ir o | io s ii i o n s
cx| ic i il ejiirintifiif/frn/iciiti, ] 1 !'<l, liv IS.3.3, l ii ' fo r e 1 8 1 0 , I l i a d , l i o w e v e r , b e c o m e c o n -
1 c o r 1C e o n . i n r e d o f I he n c e c -it v to i- x l c i .d vii.ccd lhal it w a s n e c e s s a r y to e x t e n d th e
and rorrcci the h 'ical d oeliin c upon ll ii s p r i n c i p l e e( | ii a ll y to n e g a t i v e s ; f o r I f in d , b y
jioinf In l li e a r l i e l e on I . o g i c (in t)ic K'Hn- a e a d e i r i i c a l d o c i i i n e n t s , l li a t in t h a t y e a r , a t
tiirci,/.', lirst ] ,ii t, li- h e d in Ih.Ti, th e t h e o r y l a t e s t , I lia d j i i i l d i c l y t a n g l i i Die m i e x c l u s i v e
o f Induction tlierc m a in ta in e d jiroceeda on d octrine.' Discussions, tXif.). Kd.
APPENDIX. 511
5. The evolution from that one canon of all the Species and varieties o f
Syllogism.
6. The abrogation o f all the Special La ics o f Sgllogism.
7. A (lenionstration o f the exclusive possihiiitg o f 'Lkree syllogisticFigures .
and (on n ew grounds) the scientific and final abolition o f the Fourth.
8 . A m anifestation that Figure i.s an unessentiai variation in syllogistic
form ; and thc con seiju cn t absurd it ij o f Iteduciug the .syllogisms o f thc other
figures to the first.
9. A n cn oiin eom ent o f one Organic P rinciple for each Figure.
, 10. A determ ination o f the true number o f the legitim ate M oods; with
1 1 . T h eir a iiip lif cation in num ber (thirtg-six) ;
1 2 . T lieir num erical equality under all the figure.s; and,
13. T lieir relative equivalence, or virtual id en tity, tlirougliout ev ery sche
m atic difference.
14. That, in thc second and third figures, the extremes holding both the
same relation to the middle term, there is not, as in the first, an opposition and
subordination between a term major and a term minor, mutually containing and
contained, in tbe coanter wholes o f Extension and Comprehension.
1.5. Consequently, in the second and third figures, there is no determinate
major and minor premise, and there are tioo indifferent conclusions ; whereas,
in the f r s i the premises are determinate, and there is a single proximate con
clusion.
16. T h at the third, as the figure in which Comprehension is predom inant, is
more appropriate to Induction.
1 7. T h at the second, as tlie figure in which Extension is predom inant, is
more appropriate to Deduction.
18. T h a t th e/r,s7 , as the figure in whicli Comprehension and Extension are
in equilibrium, is com m on to Induction and Deduction, indifferently.
In the third p lace, a schem e o f Sym bolical N otation will be g iv e n , w holly
d ifferen t in princijile and perfection from those which h ave been p reviou sly
p ro jio sed ; and show ing out, in all tlieir old and new ajiplications, the proposi-
tioiial and syllogistic forms, with even a m echanical sim plicity.
This Essay falls naturally into two jiarts. T h ere w ill be c o n ta in e d , in
t h e a system atic exp osilion o f the n ew doctrine itself; in thc seco/n/, an
historical notice o f an y occasional anticipations o f its several parts which break
out in the writings o f previous jihilosojiliers.
Tim s, on the new theory, m any valid /orm.s /if jud gm en t and reasoning, in
ordinary use, but which the ancient logic con tinu ed to ignore, are n ow op en ly
recognized as leg itim a te; and m any relations, A u c h heretofore lay hid, now
com e forward into thc light. On the on e hand, th ciefore, Logie certainly
becom es more com p lex. B u t, on the other, this increased com jilexity p roves
on ly to be a higher d evelop m en t. T lie dcvelojied Syllogism is, in effect,
recalled, from m nltitnde and confusion, to order and system . Its laws, cn*-
while m any, are now few . we m ight say cu e alone, but lliorongligoing. 'I'l:/'
ex cep tio n s, form erly so jicrplexing, liavc fallen a w a y ; and the oncc form idable
array o f lim itary rules has vanished. T hc scien ce now shines out in the true
character o f b eau ty. as One at once and Various. L ogic thtis accom plishes
512 APPEXDIX.
its final destination : for as * T liriee-groatest Ilcrin es, sp eak in g in the m ind o f
P lato, has ex p ressed it, 'T h e e n d o f P h ilo s o p h y is the in tu itio n o f U n ity .
II. L ogic, Its P o s tu la te s .
(Xovcmher 184S Sec p. 81.)
I. T o state ex p licitly Avhat is thought im plicitly. In other words, to d eter

m ine what is m eant before p roceed in g to deal with the m eaning. T hus in the
proposition M en a re anim ul.s, wc should bo allow ed to d eierin ln e w h eth er the
term m tn m eans a ll o r som e m e n , w hether the term a n itm d s m eans a ll or som e
a n im a ls ; in short, to quantify both the subject and predicate o f the proposition.
T liis iiostnlate ajiplies both to P ropositions and to Syllogism s.'
II. T hroughout the sam e P roposition, or Im m ediate (n ot m ed iate) R eason

ing, to use tlie sam e words, and com binations o f words, to exp ress the same
tliouglit (th at is, in the sam e E xten sion and C om prehension), and thus id en
tity to lie presum ed.
T hus a particular in on e (p r cja c cn t) proposition o f an im m ediate reasoning,
though indefinite, should denote tlic .same p a r t in the other. T his postulate
ajiiilics to in fc fe n c e im m ediate, e. y . Convcr.sion.
Prcdedtrnatc in .'ame logical u n ity (|)ro])Osition or syllogism ), in sam e sense,
botli C ollective or both D istrib u tive. T h a t on e term o f a jiroposition or syllo
gism should not be used d istrilm tively and an oth er collectively.
III. A nd, e c o n tra , throughout the sam e logical u n ity (im m ed iate reason in g),
to denote :ind jircsum e denoted the sam e sense (notion or ju d gm en t) by the
sam e len n or tcrms.^
T liis ilocs not apply to the ditferetit propositions o f a jMcdiate In feren ce.
IV . (o r V .) T o lea v e, if n ecessary, tlie thought u ndeterm ined, as su b jectively

m iccrtaiii, but to deal with it on ly as far as certain or d eterm in ab le. Thus a
1 See (qiioicd b y W a llis , U girn. p. 2 9 1 ) , A r - I h e c o n v e r t e d p r o p o s i t i o n ( u n l e s s tlie I . w e r e

islolle. An. Prior . c o g e n t , Hie converletula w o u l d b e f a ls e) .
I., i., c . .3-3 ( I iiciiis, c, .32, H All
2. In, man is {an) animal, i.s c o n v e r t e d i n t o Some an-
.3. 4. p. 2 6 1) , a n d Itimiii'^ ( fi o i ri 1 J o w i i a i n ,
P. Ilami iJiahrt., I. ii ., c 9 . 1 . . 4 1 0 ) : W h a t i s imal is (all) man B u t i f the.ônie a a i w i a / l i e r e
iiiidi r - l o o d to be s u p p l i e d I [Itamns Dial., L. w o r e n o t l l i o ii g li l in a n d l i m i t e d to Hie se n se
II , c . ! .'-I ipiii [ d e a r g i i i i i e i i l a i i o n i s c o i is e - o f ll ie c o i i v e i t c i i d . it w o u l d be false. .So in
r| ii e nt ia p r o p t e r c r y p s i i i | f l u b i t a t i o (ii e r il , e x - Hie l i y p o t b e l i c a l p rop osition, the (Inmsp
//
p le n d ii f|ii:e d e - ii n t ; a i n p i i t a n d a e ii ie m p e r - are Mohamme/lans, they are {.some) in/nhls; Hie
-u iil; el p a r s i|i K e li be l in lieiiiii le d ig e n d a w o r d infnlel, u n l e s s tl i o u g l i t in a n i e a n i i i g
-ifii e - t [f'f. l b)iief|iiet, l-y, ni'i Pliiloso- l i m i t e d l o a n d t r u e o f il/o/iowiniriMn.?. is in ep t .
I'l'er f'onlemj'latife/. ) 2', p b. .stiilgardiie. B i l l il it b e so lim ited, w e c an (c o n tra ry lo
ITTS ' e r n n d i i m e i ci i in l o g i e n m cnr n o m n i Hie d o c t r i n e s o l' th e lo g ic ia n s) argue back
le i i i i i i i o j i i n / e n d n i i i e - t s l z n n i n q n a n l i l a l i . from Hie p o s i t i o n o f Hie c o n s e q u e n t l o Hie
- Ki> 1 p o - i l i o n o f Hie a i i l e c e d e n i , a n d f r o m Hie s u b -
2 riial w o r iN m ii- I l.e ii -ed in ll i e sn m I n li o n o f Hie a n t e c e d e n t to Hie si i l i l a t i o n of
-e _,\r' l o ' I e . ,\na' Prior . b i , cc . .3.3 Hie e o n s e ii ii e ii l, Hi oi igl l f a ls e . I f not granted,
3t .T'l. .3 9 . 3 7 . e tc L o g i c i a m e r e c l i i l d i s h p l a y w i l l i t b c v a g i i e -
I f il.e c p o - i i i l a t e s ( I I a n d I I I . ) w e re not ness and am b igu itie s o f la n g u a g e . [Cf. Titius,
c o g e n t , w e c o u l d n o t c o n v e r t , at le a r t n o t u se Ars f'ogiiamJi, c. x i i . , 26 E d . ]
APPENDIX. 518
whole may be truly predieable, though we know only the truth of it as a part.
Therefore, we ought to he able to say som e a t le a st when wo do not know, and
cannot, therefore, say detcrminately, cither that som e o n ly or that a ll is true.
(January 1850.)
HI. (or IV.) To be allowed, in an immediate reasoning, to denote, that a n
other Jiart, other, or som e, is used in the conclusion, from whatwas in the antece
dent. Inference of S u h -co n trn riety.
That the som e, if not otherwise qualified, means som e o n ly, tbis liy pre
sumption.
That the Term (Subject, or Predicate) of a Proposition shall be converted

with its qnantity unchanged, i. e. in the same extt nsion. This violated, and
violation cause of error and confusion. No /icr a c ch le n s, for the real tei'iiis
eomjiarcd are the q u a n tifie d terms, and we convert only the terms compared in
the prejacent or eonvertenda.
That the same terms, apart from the quantity, i. e , in the same comprehen
sion, should be converted. As before stated, such terms are new and different.
No Contraposition, for contraposition is only true in some cases, and even in
these it is true accidentally, not hy I'onversion, but through contradiction ; i. e.,
same Comprehension.
That^we may see the truth from tlic necessary validity of the logical process,
and not infer the validity of tlie logical process from its accidental truth. Con
version p e r a cch len s, and Contraposition, being thus accidentally true in some
cases only, are logically inept as not true in all.
To translate out of the complexity, redundance, deficiency, of common lan

guage into logical simplicity, precision, and integrity.'
(D ei'cm b er 1849.)
As Logic considers the form and not the matter, but as the form is only man
ifested in apjilication to some matter. Logic postulates to employ any matter in
its examples.
(J a n u a ry 1850.)
That we may be allowed to translate into logical language the rhetorical ex
pressions of ordinary speech. Thus the Exceptive and Limitative projiosi-
tions in which the jiredicate and suhject are predesignated, are to be rendered
into logical simplicity.
(M ay 1850.)
As Logic is a formal science, and professes to demonstrate hy abstract for-
mulie, we should know, therefore, nothing of the notions and their relations
except e x f a c ie of the propositions. This implies the necessity of overtly quan
tifying the predicate.
1 See p. 512, note 1. E d .
65
514 APPENDIX.
III. Q l . V N T I F l C A T I O N OF P r EPICATK, IM M EDIATE INFERENCE, CON

V E R S I O N , ---- O p 1O S I T 1 0 N . 4
(S e e pp. 172, 185.)
W o now proceed to tvhat has been nsnally treated u n d er thc relation o f

Propositions, and p reviou sly to the m atter o f Infei en ce altogeth er, bnt which I
think it M'onld be mon* correct to consider as a sp ecies o f Inference, or R ea
soning, or A rgu m en tation , than as m erely a preparatory doetriiic. F o r in so
far as these relations o f P ropositions w arrant ns, on e being given , to educe
from it anotlior, this is m anifestly an inferen ce or reasoning. AVhy it has
not alw ays been considered in this light is evid en t. T lie Inferenee is im m edi
ate ; that is, the eonehislon or .second proposition is necessitated, d irectly and
without a m edium , by the fii-st. T lierc arc on ly two propositions and two
notions in this species o f argum entation ; and thc logicians have in gen eral
limited rea sn u in g or in fere n c e to a m ediate ednetion o f on e proposition out o f
the correlation o f two others, and have thus alw ays supposed the n ecessity o f
llirec term s or collated notions.
Rut th ey h ave not on ly b een , with few e.xeeptions, unsystem atic in their pro
cedure, they have all o f them ( if I am not m y self m istaken) b een fundam en
tally erroneous in their relative doctrine.
T h ere are various Im m ediate In feren ces o f on e proposition from another.
O f these som e have b een wholly overlook ed by the logicians ; whilst what they
Uach in regard to those which they do consider, appears to mo at varian ce with
the truth.
1 .'hall m ake no previous enum eration o f all thc possible spoades o f Im m edi
ate In fe r e n e e ; bnt shall take them up in tliis ord er: Is lia ll consider, 1 ", T hose
M'hieli have been considered by thc logicians ; and, 2 , T liosc whieli have not.
A nd ill treating o f the first groiiji, 1 shall jirefaeo, what I tliink the true doctrine
by a view o f that wliich you will fiml iu logical books.
The first o f these is f'o u rr rs io n . W lieii, in a categorical proposition (for to
thi.s we now lim it onr eon sid eralloii), tlie, Suljjeet and P red icate are traiisjioscd,
tliat is, tin* nolion wliicli was previou sly the .subject becom es the iiredieatc, and
the notion wliieli was jir e iio ii'ly llie prcdieal** becom es the snbjeet, the jiropo-
'iiio ii i'- said to be converted.''* T h e propo'ilion g iv en , and its product, are
logetlier called (he j n d i r i a c o iic ersa , o r jira jin silio iies c o n n r sc e , whicli I shall not
atteiniil lo rem lrr into Fiiglisli. 'Ilie relation itself in wliich tin; two jud gm en ts
.stand, i' called r/D irrrsltjn , r rc ijiro c n lio n , transjiOHition, and som etim es o bversion ,
(ro T irers'o , r r r ij/r o ra tio , tniuspo.siU o, o b c e r s in f
1 ApjKMMli.v I I I . , I'roin \>. b i i to j>. .527, wa.s K a r a r o h s b p o v s a v a ir a X w T t ^ f p d y o v s ,

iw iia lly (J'-liviTC 'l by Hu- a ii l li o r a. a L e c tu r e , p - tr a t o v C T v v a \7 ] fc v fiv . A l e .x a n d c r . Tn A n .
i-u i)i) liiiie iila ry 1 o I lie ilo c i rilie o f f o tiv e rs io ii ]'i i. c. 1, i ) 5 b. S e c llie t-aitie iu (iifl'e re iit
a a g iv e n i>. Is5 . I'.d . w o r d - , by l'liilo i)O iiu s ( A in in o iiiu s ) , An.
D i-tlu ilio u s o f c o n v e n - io n in g e n e r a ) . Pr i c 2, f. I I b ., a n d c o p ie d f ro m liina b y
AvTUTTpurp-r) f'lTTiy irrorrTpo'pri r t s , fliilo p i> - .'M a to 'n iin u s. Tn A n . P r., f .3 b. T'f. H o e lliiu s,
n u j ( o r A m m o n iiis ) . In A n . Pr. i. c 2, f. 11 b. O /itm , In tr m lu r tio w l S i/lln g isin o s, \>. b l i- NVe-
' o ,\l! c ;e u lii,U '. In An Ir i. c 2. f. 3 1) g e 'i n , iu G rig o rii A nriinni/yni P/iit S i/n ta g .
A I o i iy m u , IJ ' Si/lldgiM no, f. 42 b W p o rd - ( c ir c a 1200), L . v ., c . 12, ji. 021. N ic e p h o r u s
a t u . . ayTttjTpocpr] (<t t i K o ivu ivia Oi/o irpoT a- J lle iiirn id u s , /a 'l. L o g ., c . 31, p . 221.]
A p p ]: X 0 1 X . 515
T he original or given projio'îtion is called the C o n verse, or C o n v erte d , som e

times the P rc eja ce n o , J u d g m e n t (ju d ic h u n , or -jn'opositio, c o n versu m , rn n versn .
proeju ce.u s) ; the. otlier, that into which the first is con verted , is called the ( d n -
vertin g , and som etim es the S n h ju ren t, Juilgine.nl ( p ro p o silio , or jn d . c on verten s,
s n b j(ir e n s ). It w ould be better to call the fbn n er the C o n v erte n d ( p r . c o n ver-
te n d a ) , tlie latter the Converse, ( p r . c o n v e r s a ). This language 1 shall u se.
Such is tlie doctrine touching Conversion taught even to the ire.sent day.
T his in m y view is beset with errors; but all these errors origin ate in two, as
these two are eitlier the cause or the occasion o f ev ery otlier.
T h e F irst cardinal error is, T liat the (iiianlities arc not con verted with the
quantified terms. F o r llie. real term s com pared in tlic C onvertend, and which,
o f course, ought to rciipjiear witlioiit ch an ge, ex cep t o f place, in the C onverse,
are not the naked, but the quantified term s. T b is is evid en t from the follow
in g eoiisidcrations :
1 , T lie Term s o f a Proposition arc on ly term s as th ey arc term s o f relation :
and the relation here is tlie relation o f com jiarison.
2 , As tlie P ro p o rtio n a l T erm s are term s o f com parison, so they are. on ly
com pared as Q nantilics, quantities relative to each other. An Afiirm ative
Propo-sition is sim ply the declaration o f an cipiation, a N eg a tiv e P iojiosition is
sim ply the declaration o f a non-e(]nation, o f its term s. T o ch an ge, therefore,
the quantity o f eitlier, or o f both S u b ject and P red icate, is to ehange their cor
r e la tio n , the point o f com parison ; and to exch an ge their quantities, if dif
ferent, would be to invert tlie term inal in te rd ep en d e n c e; that is, to m ake the
less the greater, and the greatei the less.
3, T h e Q uantity o f the P roposition in C onversion rem ains alw ays the sam e ;
that is, the absolute q u an tity o f tbe C onverse must be ex a ctly equal to that o f
the C onvertend. It was o n ly from overlook in g the q u an tity o f the p red icate
1 S o e p. 18 5 . E d . o r e x p o i i e n s , q u i t e difiLTent a s u.-ed b y L o g i -
[N am es fo r the tw o p ro p o sitio n s in C o n v e r- cian s, v. Scliegkiu s, In J n si. Org. 102 (aud
sion. a b o v e , p. 18 6 . )
I. N a m e f o r ttio t w o c o r r e l a t i v e proposi- g) C o n v c r t e n d a , C o r v im is , loc. cit. R ichter,
tion s C o n v e r sa , T w e s te n , Lngik, 87, C o n - loc. cit.
traposita, Id. ibid. h) C o n t r a p o n c n s , T w e s t e n , Ibid.
II. O rig in al, or G iv e n P ro p o sitio n . i) 1 r i o r , P . o e th iu s , D e Sijllog. Categ. L . I. Op.
a ) '] Kponyovp.evy), T p o K e i j j . e v r ) . avTKrrpetpo- rm . p. 588.
pevr] TTpfiratris C f. t - t i i g e l i u s In Me- k ) P r i n c i p i n m , D a r j e < , F/a a J IV r/ la lf m . 234.
lanckth. Ernt. Dial., L . ii . p . 5 8 1 III Product o f Conversion.
'AvTtcTTpecpovcrai trpoTdaeis, P l i i l o p o n n s , a) V d.vTtaTpe<povaa. .ôe . S t r i g c l i u s , / o r . cit.
( q u o t e d b y W e g e l i n , I. c ) b) C o n v e r t e n s . S n b j a c e n s , .'' co l u s .Qnaestiones,
b) ( ' o n v e r s a ( = C o n v e r t e n d a ) v u l g o . Scotus, In An. Prior., i. 9 . 2 4 , f 27 0, ft passim. K i n g ,
Qnceaiones in An Prior , i q. 12. C orvin u s, Logik, 65. p. 205 , a i ; d l o g i c i a n s in g e n e r a l .
Instit. Phil., 5 10 . R i c l i t e r , De Coni-nsione, C) C o n v e r s a , I t o e t h i n s , Opera, Introd. a d Si/tl.,
1740. Mala? M a g d c b . B a u m g a r l e i i . /.ogiVa, pp ri siq.. b%i rl seq.: l l l e l a n c h t h o n , E r-
278. Ul r ic h ,/ /i .'f it . L og. ft jtfet., 1 8 2 , p. 188. o tn n a tn .l, ii p 5 8 1 , a n d S t r i g e l i u s . o / tor.
c) C o i i v c r t i b i l i s ( r a r o ) . i t l i c r a e l i u s , Lex. Phil.,v. Conrersio. K o!d-
(i) C o n v e r t e n s , J l i c r a c l i u s , Lex. Phil. v. Con- in s, Logica Recognita, p. 263. s a y s t li a t l li e
i-er.si<i. fw esten, Logik, 87. A n teccdens, first s h o u l d m o r e [ i r o b a b l y h e c a l l e d C o n -
,8 c o t n s , I. c. Strigclins, I. c. vertibilis. o r C o n v c rte n d a , and the second
c) I n e j a c e n s . .8 c h e i b l c r , Optra Logica De Prop- Conversa.
o.sitionibns. Pars iii. c. x . p. 479. d) C o n v e r s u m . T w e s t e n , loc. cit.
f) E x p o 'ita , Aldrich , Comp., L. i. c. 2 e) C o n t r a p o s i t u m , L/ . i 6 ;V.
W h ately, Logic, p. 69 P ro po sitio cxp osita f ) C onclusio, D arjes, Via ad Veritalem, 234
516 APPENDIX.
(th e so.-ontl error to wliicli we shall im m ediately ad vert) that two propositions,
ex a ctly eipial in (piantity, in fact the sam e pro]iosition, ]ierlia])S, tiansp osed ,
were called the one im/rtovW, the other particular, by ex clu siv e refercu ee to the
quantity o f the subject.
t \ Y et was it o f no con seq u en ce, in a logical p oin t o f view , which o f the
notions collated were S iilje e t or P red ica te; and their com parison, with the
i-onscqiicnt detdaration ol' their m utual ineonclusion or exclu sion , that is, o f af
firmation or negation, o f no more real differen ce than the assertions, London
is fo u r hundred miles distant from E d in b u rg h , Edinburgh is fo u r huudredmiles
distant from London. In fact, though logician s have been in use to p lace the
subjeet first, the predicate last, in their exam p les o f p rop od lions, this is by no
m eans the ease in ord in ary lan gu age, -wdiero, indeed, it is frecpiently ev en dilfi-
enlt to ascertain which is the determ in in g and which the determ ined notion.
( )iit o f logical books, the p red icate is found alm ost as freq u en tly before as after
the Mihjc-t, and this in all languages. Y ou recollect the first words o f the
First Olgmpiad o f P indar, ''Apurroe fev vScop,^ B est'is w a t e r ; and the V u lgate
(1 forget how it is rendered in our E n glish tran slalion ) has, IMagua est ver-
itas, et praevalebit. ' A llu d in g to the B ib le, let us turn up an y C oncordance
under an y a d jeciiv e title, and we shall obtain abundant p roof o f the fact. A s
the adjc'-tive great, niagnus.hns last oeetirrcd, let us n d er to C n id en under that
sim ple title. H ere, in g la n cin g it over, 1 find C reat is the wrath o f the
l>ord G reat is the Lord and g reatly to be praised C reat is our God
flr e a t are thy w o r k s G reat is the H oly O ne o f Israel G reat shall be the
pe.iee o f tliv cliildren G reat is thy faithfulness G reat is D ian a o f the
Ephesians G reat is iny b o ld n e s s (irea l i.s my g lo r y in g G reat is the
m ystery o f g o d lin ess, etc.
T he lin e o f J u v en al,
Nohilit.is sola est atque uiiica virtus,
Ls a good in stan ce o f ihe p red icate b ein g placed first.

T h e S econ d cardinal error o f (he logicians is, the not con sid erin g that the
Predi(;ate has alw ays a q n an tily in thought, as nmch as the S u b ject; although
this (juantity be frc(|u ciitly not ex p licitly en ou n ced , as u n n ecessary in the com
mon em p loyin en t o f la n g u a g e; fo i-th e deterinining notion or ju'cdieate being
alwiiys tliongbt as at least adequate to, or coextensiv e with, the subject or de-.
f<Tinincd notion, it is seldom n ecessary to exp ress this, and lan gu age ten ds ever
to elid e w hat m ay safely be om itted. But this n ecessity recurs the m om ent
that, by con version, the predicate liecom es the subject o f the proposition ; and
I o.iiit its fermal statem ent i.s to (legr.iile Logic from the scien ce o f the ncces-
-itics o f thought, to an idle subsidiary o f the anihignities o f speech. A n un-
bia.'Scd consideration o f the subjeet w ill, I am confident, eon vin ee you that
this view is crtrreet
1. T h at the jiredicate is as ex ten siv e as thi; subject is easily sliown. T ake
the proposition, A ll anhn<d is man, or, A ll animals are men. T ins vve arc
M il I . s d r a s i v . 4 1 : M a f,'n a e s t v c r i t a a e t iv . 4 1 ), G r e a t i s t r u t l i , a u d m i g h t y a b o v e a l l
{ i - i f v a .i i I n th e E u g is li v e r e i o i i ( I . i-N d ra s th in g s . E u .
A PrEN DIX . 517
conscious is absurd, tliougli w e m ake the notion m an or men as widi- as jio ssib le;
for it does not m end tlie m atter to s a y , A ll a n im a l is a ll m a n , or, A ll a n im a ls
are a ll m en. W e feel it to be ecjually absurd as if we said, A ll m an is a ll
an im a l, or. A ll men a re uH a n im a ls. H ere wc are aw are that the subject and
])i-cdicate cannot be m ade co exten sive. Jf we would get rid o f tlic absurdity,
we bring tlie two notions into coexten sion , by restricting tlie wider. I f we say,
M a n is a n im a l {H o m o est a n im a l) , v/e tliiiik, though w e do not overtlv
en ou n ce it, A ll m an is a n im a l. A n d wliat do wc m ean here by a n im a l 1 We
do not think, A ll, but Som e, a n im a l. A nd tlien w e can m ake this iiKliil'er-
ently either subject or predicate. W e can think, ivv ei\n k i y . Som e a n im a l
is m a n , that is. Som e o r A ll M a n ; and, e c o n c erto , M a n (s a m e or uUJ is
a n im a l, \ \ z . , som e a n im a l.
It tlius appears that theic is a n ecessity in all eases for thinking the p redicate,
at least, as ex ten siv e as the subject. W h eth er it be absolutely, that is, out o f
relation, more ex ten siv e, is g en era lly o f no con seq u en ce; and Iience the
eoinm on reticen ce o f com m on lan gu age, w hich n ever expresses m ore than
can be u n d erstood , which alw ays, in fact, for tlie sake of brev ity, sti-ains at
ellipsis.
2 , But, in fact, ordinary lan gu age quantifies the P red icate so often as this
determ ination becom es o f the sm allest im port. TIiIs it does direi.-tly, by adding
all, som e, or their eq u ivalen t p red esignation s, to the predicate ; or it accom
plishes tlie sam e end in d irectly, in an e.xcoptlve or lim itative Ibrin.
a) D ii'cetly. as I eter. .John, J a m e s, etc., a re a ll the A p o s tle s M e r c u ry .
V enus, etc., a re a ll the p la n e ts .
b) B ut this is more fretjnontly accom plished ind irectly, by the ecpiipollent
forms o f JJm ita tio n or I n c lu sio n , and Exception.'^
F or exam p le, by the lim itative designations, a/nne or o n ly, w e s a y , (Jod
alon e is c/ood, which is c/p iivalen t to sa y in g , G o d is a ll g o o d , that is, G o d is
a ll that is g o o d ; V irtu e is the o n ly n o b ility, that is, T7r/ue is a ll notde, that is, aU
that is noble." T he sym bols o f the C adiolic and P rotestant divisions o f Chris-
1 B y t h e l o g i c i a n s t h i s i.s c a l l e d s i m p l y E z - snbject alone Man alone philosophizes

As,
elusion, a n d t h e p a r l i e l e s , / a n / a i a , e t c . , ;i artic- The dog alone barks, or,
( f li o i ig li n o t a l l do ).
uke, exdiish-a:. T h i s , 1 t l i i n k , is i n a c c u r a t e ; dogs alone bark ( t h o u g h s o m e d o n o t ) . Man
f o r it is i n c l u s i o n , l i m i t e d by an exclu sion , only is rational, o r . No animal but man is ra-
t l i a t is m e a n t . [ S e e S c h e i b l e r , Opera Logica, tional. Nothing but rational is risible. O f m a
x'. iii. c. v i i. t i t 3, ]). 45 7 et ssi;,] terial things tiure is nothing living (but) not
2 ( F e b r u a r y 1850.) On tlie I n d i r e c t P r e d e s - organized, and nothing organized not living.
ig n a t io n o f the P r e d ic a t e b y w lia t are ca lle d God alone, is to be worshipptd. God is the
t li e a n d Exciplive particles. single, sole object o f loorship. Some men only
N a m e s c f tli e p a r t i c l e s . are elect.
L a t i n , unns. uniciis, unice; solus, .'iolum, II A n n e .x e J to tbe P red ic ate, th e y lim it
solummodo. taniurn. tantummodo; duntaxjit; tli e s u b j e c t to tli e p r e d i c a t e , b nl d o n o t d e f i n e
prexcise; adequate. Nihil prater, prceterquam, its q u a n t i t y , o r e x c l u d e f i o n i it o t h e r su b -
ni nisi non. j e c t s . A s , Peter only plays. The ..acramenls
E n g l i s l i , one, only, alone, exclusively, pre- are only two. John drinks onh, water,
cisely. just, sole, solely, nothing but, not except. III. S o m e t i m e s th e p a r t i c l e s sole, solely,
not beyond. single, alone, only, e tc . , a r e a n n e x e d t o t b e
I. These ( a riicle s a n n e x e d to thc S u b je c t I're d ic a t e as a p rc d e s ig n a lio n la n t a in o u u t to
p r e d e s i g n a t e tlie P r e d i c a t e u n i v e r s a l l y , o r t o aU. As, God is the single. one. alone. _
its w h o l e e x t e n t , d e n y i n g it s j j a r t i c u l a r i t y o r only, exclusive, adequate, object , f worship.
i u d e f i n i t u d e , a n d d e f i n i t e l y l i m i t i n g i t t o tli e On tbe relation o f E x c lu s iv e propositions
518 A PPEN D IX .
tianitv m.iy atVoril us a logical illustration of flic po'.nt. Tin* Catliolics say,^
F a il/i, Iliific, 0 )1 ( 1 C lio rilg alo u e ju s tif ij ; that is, the th ree la a r c n lg virtu es together
a re all ju s tif g liig , that is, al l th at ju s tif ie s : oiuue J u siijica n s. ju s lu m fu c ie n s . The
Proicstants say. F a ith alo u e J u s lijic s : that is, F a i'h , Avhich they hold lo com
prise the other two virtues, is a ll jiis tif g in g , that is, a ll that ju s lijie s ; oiim e J u sti-
jiean.-t. In cither case, if we translate the watchwords Into logical simplicity,
the jiivdicalc appears prcdcsignatcd.
tg'aniiiials iiiau aloue is rational; that is, Afan is a 'lra 'io n a l ammal. What is
rational is alone or only risible; tliat is, A d rational is all risible, etc.
I now p.ass on to the Exceptive Form. To t.ikc tin- motto overhead, On
earth there is nothing great but man. Wliat docs this mean ? It means,
Man is ad earthtg great. Homo est omne magnum terrestre. And the
second claiHo In man there is nothing great but mind in like manner
gives as its logical eiiuipollent M in d is all humanlg great, that Is, all (hat
IS grmt in man. (.Mens est omne magnum hiimanum.y
to il i o sc ill w l i i c l i t h e p r e d i c a t e is prede.'-ig- o s i t i o n i s , ve t e t i a m seqiiatiir c o p n la m . Ib l

n n u i l . se e 'I ' i l i i i ' . . U sCogitandi. c . v i j 06, e n i i n i i i d i c a t u r e ss e p i o p o s i t i o e x c l u s i v a su b-
07 ll(Oii;i;:M, P/iilosop'.in Hntionnlis, 475. j e c l i , ut, s n lie i h n m n d is c n r r it H i e a u t e m in-
K r e i l , llinili.nrh dir l.ngik. 02. Duiodoii, d i c a i u r , ess e p i o j i o s i t i o e x c l u s i v a pr acd ic ati ,
I: Jim /Us'i'iiln, Dr Eiiiiiiriiiiinni, C. V. p 509 lit. .S u c r i o n e n t a K o fi T r s h o n n it i s iin t t iin lio n
I f>q. J v e c k e n i i a i i i i , .'Systrma Logirai, li b . iii., duo. P i c T . r l i c n m i 'n l a t a n t u i n d f c e n i
c II. Oprra, t. i. p. 7C3. .S che ib lcT th e n proceeds lo g i v e the fo llo w

T h e i l o c i r i n o h e l d b y i li e l o g i c i a n s a s t o th e i n g g e n e r a l ail'd s p e c i a l r u l e s o f E x c l u s i o n :
fxclusuin pra liciituin, irrl.isiiiii subjection, a n d I. (len eraliler tenem lum e st , quod a U le i
exclusion sixnion. is e r i i i n e o i i s . .'see .S cl ie ib le r, . in i x p n i i iu / c x ix r lii.s ir a : a p r c n d ic a t o , it a lU n
Ojurci Lng-cn. I , iii. c V ii. lit 3. )) 4-')7 et srq. e x r l i i s i v c p (I .s u b j f c t o .
J a c . Ti ll ni;L-his, Erulnn. Lug., c , \ \ . \ . p. 07 ft 'II. E x c l u s iv a p r o p o s ilio n o n e x c lu d it c o n c o m -
S-q. [(.1. F o n s e c a . Instil. D m .,. J-. I I I . c. 23 . ilc in t ia
I ' o r a d e l a i l e d e.x po .-i ti on o f t h i s d o c o in e b y 111. O n in is fx c lu s iv a r f s o l v i l u r i n d u n s s im -
i c h e i b l e r . .see b e l o w , n o t e I. F.t) ] p lic is , u llir o in n j/ ir m u la m , n llc r a m n eg n ta m .
I V ) i, e . S c h e i b l e r . Opfra Lngi a. I*, ii i. c vi i. A lque hoc c.'t qnod vu lgo d icitur, quod
p p . 4.'j8, 4'X). n I. ere h is e .M .i n p ie s , w i t h tli e e.\- ' o n i i . i s e x c l u s i v a sit h y p o i h e t i c a . Ilyp o thetica
poi-itiiin o f th e L o g i c i a n s , m a y b e w e l l c o n - e n i m i i r o j i o s i i i o est ()u;c i n c l u d i t d u a s a l i a s in
I r a - l e d w i t h m in e . v irtiite, ve l d is],ositionc sua. V elu li h:ec,
( sc h e i b h T . a ft e r r e fe r r in g to the Pnrra Lngi- F o lu .i h o m o tsl r o t 'o n n l i s , . I ' q u i v a l c t h is du.a-
calnt oX Iliu t c l i o o l m e i i , a.s c o i i t a i n i n g a )ir o- bii s. H o m o r s l r n iio n n lis , cl r p io d non est h o m o ,
p o s n l sn |> pl e m e nt o f tliO d o c t r i n e s o l A iis- non fs t r iit io n iilr . E l in s p e c i e , B fs lia n o n rsl
l o le, |iioeee dp to e x p o u n d the Piopnsitiones r n lio n iili.i. P l o n l i t n o n r.st r n i i o n n l i s .................................
Expontbi'is o f those treatises. lO.xclu siva A lqu c hae d in e p r o p o s i t i o n e s v o c a n t u r expo-
ei u i . c i a l i o e - t , c p i x h a b e t p a r t i c i i l a i n e x c l i i - n r n le s , si cii t piopositio exc lu s iv a dicitur ex-
si a m , u t , Sfdui h o m o est l a t i o i i a l i s . . . . p o n ib ilis .

I o r r o e x c l n i - i v a ' e n i i n c i a t i o n e s s m it d u p l i c i s .S p e c ia le s a u t e m r e g ii la ; e x i i l i c a n d i e x c l u -
gr neri<. A l i a - siiiif e x c h i s i v i e ] i r ; e ( i i c a t i : ali.t; si vi i " s u n t octo: s i c ii l el octo sunt genera
e x c l i i - i v a - s a h j e e l i ; In.c e.-l, in a l i i s p a r l i c u l a lociitioiiuin e x c lii s i v a r u m .
e x c h i - i i a e x c h i d i t a .nhjecto. in a l i i s e x c l n d i t I . Proposilio ixcliisivn iinin rsnlis iij/innn
a p r a o i c a t o , Vi l n ' i ha c p r o p o - i t io exclii.siva livn, clijns signnm non nfgotnr, ut, Tnnlunl
e-t, l>.ns t inluin r>t unhinrlnli.x K.slipie e x - oniiiis homo cnrril. e x p o n i l i i r si c. ftoinis homo
c l i - i i 11 a -iibji e l o . hirtj se ii si i. D e u s t a t i t u m , et curril, el nihd nlind iib hoinine cirrnt. V o c a r i
i. on hom o tel Inpis , e tc . . . . Om nes s o le t h a c e x i i o s i l i o IA T ER, q u i a p r i o r ij i i s
p r o i .o - i t i o i . e x e ii - iv a ; am higiia: sunt, si li a r s est u n i v e r s a l i s allirm ativa quod no'.at
h a b '- a i I ] a - t i c n l a m e x c l i i s i v a m . j/osl st ihj ec - zV. lit , aller.'c p a r s e s t u n i v e r s a l i s i i e g a t i v a
t u m p r o p o - i t i o i i i s , a n t e v i n c n i n i n , ut e r a t in q u o d ii ii li ca l in p o s t e r i o r i s y l l a b a li t e r u E.
[ r o p o - i t o e x i rn pl o . ( a r e i it a nt er n p r o p o s i f i - II. P r o p o s ilio p n r t ic u la r is , v e l in d e jin iln n f-
one.i e x c h i - i v x i l i a a r n h i g ii i ii i t e , si vel e .x cl u - f i r m if t i v a , in iiu n s ig n n m non n eg n tn r, n l Tun-
M v a j i u r t i c u l a , p o n a t u r a n t e s u b j e c t u m p ro j i- tu rn h o m o c tir r it, c x p u n itu r s ic , Ilo - m o c u r r it , e l

A T P E N D IX, 519
W e ought, indeed, as a corollary o f the postulate already stated, to require

to be allow ed to translate into ('(piivalent logical term s tlic rhetorical en ou iice-
ineiit o f coimnoii sjieech. W e should not do as Ihe logicians have been wont,
introduce and deal with these in their gram iiiaiical integrity ; for (his would
be to sw ell out and deform our scien ce with m ere gram m atical accidents ; and
to sneh fortuitous a ccrescen ces the form idable volum e, esp ecially o f the older
Logics, is m ainly ow ing. In fact, a large proportion o f the scholastic system is
m erely gram m atical.
3o, T h e whole doctrine o f the non-<iuantificntion o f the predicate is only
another exam p le o f the jiassive seqnaeity o f the logicians. T h ey follow ob ed i
ently in the footstcp.s o f tlieir great m aster. W e ow e this doctrine and its p reva
len ce to the precept and anthoritv o f A ristotle. H e prohibits on ee and again the
anne.xation o f the universal predcsicnation to the predicate. F or why, he says,
such predesigiiation would render the propo.sitioii ab su rd ; givin g as his on ly exam
ple and p roof o f all this, the jud gm en t AH n a n is a ll a n im a l. T his, how ever,
is o n ly valid as a refutation o f (he ridiculous d octrine, held liy no on e, that any
predicate m ay be universally quantified ; for, to om jiloy his own exam iile, what
absurdity i.s there in sayin g that some, a n im a l is a ll m a n ! Y e t this nonsense
(b e it spoken with all rev eren ce o f the S taglrite) has im posed the p recep t on
the system s o f Ivogic down to the presen t day. N everth eless, it could be shown
by a cloud o f instances from the A ristotelic writings them selves, that this rule is
invalid ; m iy, A ristotles own doctrine o f Induction, which is far more correct
than that usually taught, proceed s iqioii the silen t abolition o f the erroneous
canon. I'lic doctrine o f the logicians is, therefore, founded on a blunder;
which is o n ly doubled by tbe usual averm en t (hat the predicate, in what are
teclmica'.lv called r e c ip r o c a l j> roposition s, is taken u n iversally vi mafcrice and
not v i fv rm c e .
B ut, 4 , T h e non-quantification o f the predicate in thouglit is g iven iqi by
the logicians tlicm solves, but on ly in certain eases wliere they were forced to
admit, and to the am ount which th ey could not possibly d en y. T h e p redicate,
nihil aliud ab homine curril. V o c a t u r liicc e x - alii/uid aliud ab homine non currit, v o c a tu r
jio s itio N i s e . F e c it.
I I I . Propositio pxrlu.sivu, inqua signuni non V I ] . Exclusiva. in qua signutn nrgatur, rx-
ntgatur, uiiivrrsalis uegutiva, ut, Tanturn uulliis istnis particulnris ajffirmativn, n t , Non tantuni
homo ciirrit, c x ])O iiilu r s ic , A"iillus homo rurrit. aliquis homo currit. c .\] iO s itu r s ic , Aliquis homo
ft quodlibfl aliud ab hominr currit, v o c a tu r T e - rurrit, aliquid aliud ab homine rurrit, v o c a tu r
NAX. F i l o S.
IV . Exrlusivacujus signum nonnegaturpar- V I I I Nrgativa particularis exclusivcp. prop-
ticulnris vel indejinita nrgatira, u t , Tantum homo ositionfs. ntjus signuirf negotur, n t. Non tanturn
non currit, e x p o i i i t u r s ic , Homo non narit, aliquis homo non currit, e x ]) O n itu r s ic , Aliquis
et qnodlibet aliud ub homine currit, v o c a t u r homo non rurrit, ft aliquid aliud ab homine non
STO ltA X . rurrit, v o c r t u r N o b is .
V Exrlusii-a, in quasignum ncgatur,affir- * D iire re iitia a u te n i p r o p o s i t io n i s e x c lu s iv a ;
mativa ft uuiver.'.alis, n t . Non tanturn omnis e t e x c c jitiv a : e s t w i d e n s . N e n ip e e x c lu .s iv a
homo riirrU , e x p o n i t u r s ic , Omnis homo currit, p r a d i c a t u m v e n d ic a t u n i s n b je c to , a n t a s n b -
et aliquod aliud ab homine currit, v o c a t u r j e c t o e x c ln d if a li a p r a id ic a tn , u t. Solus Dms
t A N os bonus est. F x c e p t i v a a u te i n s i a t n i t u n i v e r s a le
N l. In qua signum negatur, existcns univer- s u b je c tu m , i n d ic a tq u e a li q u i d c o n ti n c r i s u b
sails affirmaliva, u t . Non tanturn nullus homo i.sto n i ii v c r s a li , d e q u o n o n d i c a t u r p r a 'd i c a -
cum t, s ic c .\ p o n it u r , NuUus homo currit, ft tu r n , u t , Omne animal est irrationale, prater
h o m i n t m . '' E d . ]
520 APPENDIX.
they confess, is quantified by p artienlarity in affirm ative, b y u n iversality in nega

tive, projiositions. B u t w hy the ijuantification, formal quantification, should
bo thus restricted in tliouglit, they furnish us with no valid reason.
T o these tw o errors 1 m iglil perliajis add, as a third, the confusion and per-
ple.xity arising from the atiem jit o f A ristotle anil the logicians to deal with in
definite (or, as 1 w oiihl eall them , in d c s iy iu ile ) terms, instead o f treatin g them
m erely as verbal ellijises, to be filled up in the e.xpression before b ein g logically
considered ; and 1 m ight also add, as a fourtli, the additional com iilexity and
p ir p le x ity introdneeil into the scien ce by view in g jiropositions, lik ew ise, as
a flecled bv the four or six m odalities. B u t to these I shall not advert
T h ese are the; two prin eip al errors which have in volved onr system s o f Logie
in confusion, and jirevented their evolu tion in sim plirity, harm ony, and com
p le t e n e s s : whieh h ave eondem ned them to bits and fragm ents o f the scien ce,
and for tliese bits and fragm ents have m ade a load o f rules and excep tion s
indispensable, to avoid falling into freq u en t and m anifest alxsurdiiy. It was in
referen ce to these two errors ehiefly that I form erly gave yon as a self-evid en t
P ostulate o f L ogic E x p licitly to state w hat has been im plicitly th o u g h t;
in otlier word.-, that before d ealin g logically witli a jiropositioii, we are entitled
to understand it; that is, to ascertain and to en ou iiee its m eaning. T h is qnali-
fieation o f tlie predicate o f a ju d gm en t is, indeed, on ly the b egin n in g o f the
application o f tlie P o stu late; but we shall find that at ev ery step it en ab les ns
to east aw ay, as useless, a miillitiicle o f canons, which at on ce disgust tlie student,
and, if not tlic causes, are at least tlie signs, o f im perfection in the scien ce.
I venture, tlien. to assert that tliere is on ly on e sp ecies o f C onversion, and that
on e tlioroiigli-gning and self-siiflieient. I mean P ure, or Sim ple C onversion.
T h e otlier sjiecies till are adm itted to be n eitlier thorougli-going nor self-
sulficicnt they arc in fact on ly other logical ]irucesscs, a ccid en tally com bined
with a traiisjiositioii o f the sn lje c t titid predicate. T lie c o n re rsio p e r a ccid en s
o f Boethiii.s, as an am pliative operation, has no logical e x is te n c e ; it is m aterial
ancl precarious, and lias righteously been allow ed to drop out o f scien ce. It
is now m erely a historical curiosity. A s a R estrictive operation, in which re
lation alone it still stands in our system s, it is eith er m erely fortuitous, or
m erely possible tliroiiuh :i logical process quite distinct from C on version; 1
mean tliat o f R estriction or S iib a ltcn ia tio ii, wliicli will be soon exjilaincd.
J'fjtnr-rsio p e r ro iilra jjo silio n etii Is a ch an ge o f term s, a siibstitiition o f new
demciiLs, atid o n ly holds through con trad iction ,' being ju st as good without as
1 t.sff A r i- to ilf, Topkn, L . ii. c . 8 . Scotus, constaniiam i l l a m n o n po .su cri s i n n n t e c e d c n t i ,

I'.aiines, >Ici i(! o/ .a, siloiitly follow in;; cacii i n s t a b i t u r illi c o i i f c i i u c n t i a ; in e v e n t u , i n quo
ot lu r, li a v o licId i l i a t c o i i t n i j i o s i l i o i i is o n l y n il iil s i t n o n a lb ii i ii , ct o t n n i s h o n i o s i t a l b u s . '
in ( li al r, in liiiila liu n , io iu iriii;; fonshiniia, I',auwes. Instil. Min. Dial. L . v i . c. 2, p. 530.
tic. AVbolly w roiig. .Sve A rriag a. C arsns ICd ]
Philnsnphicus, I), M p. 4 1 1 . 1 8 . Obpervaii- B u l l 'f o r F in ite rr c ja c o n fs given,
d u m w-t p r a ' d i c t a s C(iiisi,'ijueniia.s ( p e r c o i i t i a - AVitli tli e f i i i g l e e . x c e p t i o i i o f K n K ( A n A ) ,
p o - i i i o i e m ) n i a l a s e-pe i t ii iHtabiliP , lii.-i i;c- t i n o t l i i r s e v e n p io i i o . s i l i o n s m a y b e c o n v i r t e d
ri--irit alia p rrposilio In a n t i c e d i i i l i <|Uic b y r o u n l e r | ) 0 - il i o ii i i n d i r t i n f o l l o w i n g r u l e ,
im ]iartil i x i s t i n l i a m su b je c li coiin(|U in tiB. L i t 1 be term s be In linitated a n d traiiFpoM d,
Tunc eiiim flrm a eril e. g.
coiibequenlia, tl i e i n e d e s i g n u t i o n s r e m a i n i n g its b e f o r e
O i n n n homo e s t aWus f t n o n album f s t , ergo AVitli t h e t w o a d d i t i o n a l e x c e j i t i t m s o f tbc
omne n<m album esl non homo. A l i o q u i u bi tw o co u v e rtib lc propositions, A f I, and I f
A P P i: N D I X 521
with conversion. T h e C on tin gen t Conversion o f tlie low er (Jreeks* is not a

con version , is not a logii-al jnocess at all, and has b een worthily ignored by
the Latin world. B u i let us now proceed to .see that Sim ple C onversion, as I
have asserteil, is thorough-going and all-sullieieiit. Iw t us try il in all the
eight varieties o f calegurieal proposiiious. B ut 1 shall leave this e.xplieation to
you rselves, and in the exam in ation will call ibr a statem ent ot the sim ple eon-
vei'sion, as applied to all the eigh t iirofiusitlonal forms.
It thus appears that this on e m etliod o f conversion has ev ery advantage
o v er those o f the logicians. 1 , It is N a tu ra l; 2 \ It is Im peralivi',; 3^, It is
S im p le; 4, It i.s D irect ; 5^, It is P r e c ise ; G, It is thorough-goi n g : W h ereas
their processes are 1 , U n n a tu ra l; 2 , P recariou s; 3 ', C o m p lex ; 4 ^, Cir
cu itou s; 5 , C on fused ; C, In a d ecp ia te: b reak in g down in each and all o f
their S|>ecios. T h e G reek L ogicians, subseciuent to A ristotle, have w ell and
triih' said, dyTicrrpoipri eariy laoarpoip-fj n s , oiniiis I'onversio est lecpiixcrsio; - that
is, all conversion is a conversion o f eipial into etpial ; and had they attended
to this principUg they would have d evelop ed em ivcrsion in its true unity and
sim plicity. T h ey would have considered, 1 , T iiat the absolute (juantity ot
A, tl ic in liiiitated p roposition s hold good T h a t C ontraposition is n o t p r o p e r l y C o n

w i t l i o u t th e t r a n s p o s i t i o n o f t h e t e r m s . v e r s i o n ( t h is b e i n g a s p e c i e s o f c o n s e q u e n c e )
R u le for Infiuite P re ja c e n ts g iv e n . a n .e qu ii io lle nc e o f pr opo .'.itioi is, n o t a c o n
W i t h ll i e s i n g l e e x c e p t i o n o f n I f n i (nE version o f tb e ir terms.
= n = i i E b e i n g i m p o s s i b l e ) , tli e otlier six N oldins, Logica Recognita, c. x i i . p. 299
propositions m ay be co n v o ite d by C ounter- C rak an tlioipe, Logica, L . ii i. c. 10, p. ISO
p o s i t io n u n d e r tli e f o l l o w i n g r u l e , ' L e t th e B a i i n c s , Instit. Min. Died.. L . v C. 2, p. 530.
teriii-i be u iiiiiflnitaled and t r a n s p o s e d , th e E u s t a e l i i u s , Siuninn Phdosophia', Logica, I . 1 1
preilesigiiations reniaiiiii.g as b efo re. t r a c t , i. q . 3 , ji. 104 H e r b a r t , Lehrbuch der
C o n t r a p o s i t i o n is n o t e x p l i c i t l y e v o l v e d b y Logik. p. 78. Scotus. Qmr.stiones, In An. Prior.,
A ristotle in Prior Analytics, b u t is e v o l v e d L . i. q. 15 . f 258 b C l i a u v i i i , v. Convtrsio.
from b is Topic.v, L . ii. ce I. S. alibi. De Iiiter- I s e n d o o n i , Cnrsiis Logicus, p. 308
pretatione, c. 1 4 . .See ( ' o n i i n b r i c e n s e s , In Ari.n. T h a t C o n t r a p o s i t i o n is u s e le s s a n d p e r p l e x
Dial., An. Prior., L . i. q i. p. 2 7 1 . H a n n e s , in g. S e e C h a i i v i n , v. Conversw. A rriag a,
Instit. Minori.s Dialertica;, L . v . C . 2, p. 532 . Ciirsiis, Philosnp/iieiis, (i. 18 . T i t i u s . Ar.s Cogi-
B i i r g e r s d i c i u s , Instit. Log. L . i. c. 32. tandi, c. v i i i 1 9 et sei/. D A b i a d e R a c o n i s ,
First explicitly enounced by Avcrroes, ac Tot. Phil. Tract., Logica, ii. i)u. 4, p. 3 1 5 .
c o r d i n g to M o l i i i a u u s (E'.ementa Lngira. L. i. B a n n e s , Instu Min. Dud., ji. 529 ]
c. 4, p. 5 1 ) . 1 c a n n o t liiid a n y n o t i c e o f it in
A verrocs H e i g n o r e s il, nuii ie and ti l i n g . t [Blem m id as.J [E p ito m e L o g ic a , c. 3 1 , p.
I t i s in A n o i i j m u s , De Syllogisma. f. 42 b., in 222. The f o l l o w i n g e x t r a c t w i l l e x i i l a i u th e
N iceplionis B l e m n i i i l a s , Epit. Log , c. x x . x i . n ature o f this co n versio n . 'H S ev tr p o r a -
p. 2 2 2 ; but l o n g b e f o r e liiin B o e t l i i u s h a s a ll a e a i y iv o p .e v r \ d v te r T p o e p y , i) r y v pev r a ^ iv
the kind s o f C o nversio n, Simplex, Per Arci- T u iv opcov < p u \< x T T e t, r b v a v r h v T r jp o v e ra k u t -
dens. et Per Oppositionein (Introdaetio ad Syllo- rpyop o vp evo v K a\ rbv a in b v ii w o K e l p e v o v '
gisnios, 1 1 . 576), w h a t he c a l l s Per Cuntrnposi- p 6 v e ] v Se T r iv i t o i o t t j t c i p e r a ^ d W e t , Troioi'tra

tionem {De. Syllogi.uno Cntegorico, L . i. 5SU). T ijv d T T O tp a n u b v ir p b T e e riv K a r a e p a n K y v , ica)
I s h e th e i n v e n t o r o f tho n a m e ? I t s e e m s so. K araepan K ^ v d ir o e p a n K y v . Kal K eyerai
Long before B oetliiu s, A p u l e i u s ( in s e c o n d atiTT) e v S e x o p e v y d v n e T T p o tp ^ , w s 4 trl p o v y s

c e n t u r y ) h a s it a s o n e o f tlie f i v e sp e c i e s o f rrjs e v S e x o p e v e s iiAtjv e r v v ie n a p e v i) ' o io v ,
C o n v e r s i o n , but g i v e s it n o n a m e o n l y d e T ts d v ^ p w ir o s \ o b e r a t , n s dv^ p a rrro s o v K o v -
s c r i p t i v e : see De Ilabitud. Doct. Plat., L . iii. p. TjTaC a jT T j S OVK S.V eft) K upia's d v n a r p o e p y ] .
3 3. A lexander, In An. Pr.. i. e. 2. 1. 10 a. li a s Tills so -called contingmt connr.son is in f a c t
it a s o f p r o p o s i t i o n s , no t o f t e r m s , w l i i c l i is n o t l i i n g m o r e t h a n tlie a s - e r t i o n . l e p e a t e d b y
conversion absolu tely. V i d e I h i l o i i o m i s . In m a n v L a t i n - l o g i c i a n s , t ha t in c o n t i n g e n t m a t
An. P r.,l f. 1 2 a. B y t h e m c a l l e d a F T i t r r p o f ^ ; ter su b c o n t r a r y proiiositio n s are both trus
avv otynêtTfi. So J I a g e n t i n u s , In An. Prior , E d .]
i. 2, f.3b. - See p. 515. E d .

bb
5*22 A I M E N D I X .
the proposition. l>e it eon verten d or ronvorsc. rem ains alw ays identical ; 2 ',
That the .several q n a n tilies o f thc eollated notions remain alw ays id en tical, the
whole elianoe b ein g the transposition o f lh c (piantified notion, which was in the
siibjeei place, into tlie place o f preilieate. and cice. versa.
Aristotle and the logicians w ere, tlierefore, w ron g; 1 , In not considering
the jirojiosition sim ply as the eom jilem ent, that is, as the equation or non-eipia-
tion, o f two conqiarcd notions, but, on the contrary, eon sid eiin g it as d e
term ined in its q u an tity by on e o f these notions m ore than by the other. 2%
T h ey were w rong in accord in g too great an inqiortanec to the notions con-
îdered as propositional term s, that is, as subject and predicate, in d ep en d en tly
o f the iiiii;ort o f these notions in them selves. 3, T h ey were w io n g in ac-
co n lin g too p n 'p o n d eran t a w eight to ono o f these term s over the oth er; but
d illeren tly in (iiiVerent jiarts o f the system . F or they were w rong, in the doc
trine o f diidgm ent, in allow in g th e tp ia n tity o f the jiropositioii to be determ ined
ex eln siv ely by the ip iaiitity o f the subject fen n ; whereas tliey w ere wrong, as
we shall see, in the doctrine o f R easoning, in considering a syllogism as e x
clu siv ely rela tiv e to the (piantity o f the predicate (e x te n s io n ). So nuieh for
the theory ol C onversion. R eforc con eln d in g, 1 have, h ow ever, to oliserve, as
a eurreelion o f the {iievalen t am biguity and vaeillaiion, that the two proposi
tions o f the Jirocess together m ight be ealleil the rn n verten l or co n cerln u j ( p r n -
p n sitio n cs c o u r e r tc n le s ) : and whilst o f these thg original proposition is nam ed
the e o n v e rte n d ( p r o p o sitio c o n r c r tc n d n ) , its jiroduet would obtain the title o f
conrer.se, c o n v e rte d (p r o p o .d tio c o n re r.s(i).
d'he o'lier sjieeles o f Im m ediate In feren ce will not detain us long. O f these,
there arc two noticed by thc logicians.
T h e first o f thc'C, E rp iijio llen ce (( e q u ip o lle n tia ), or, as I would term it. D ou ble
X ei/n iio n , is d eserv in g o f bare m ention. It is o f m ere gram m atical relevan cy.
T h e negation o f a negation is tm ta m o n n t to an alTirmation. D is n o t n o t-A , is
m anifestly on ly a roundabout way o f sayin g E is A . and, cice rer.sd, w e m ay
exp ress a jiosition. if we jicrv ersd y choose, by sulilatiiig a snblation. I h e
im m ediate in ferciice ol K qnijiollenee is thus m erely the graiiim aiical translation
o f an alTirmaiioii into a double n egation, or o f a double negation into an
airim iation. y o n - n u lh is ami non -nem o, for exam jile, arc m erely other gram
m atical exjiressions for (d lfp d s or qu iilu m . So N o n n d iil, N o n n u n q u u m , jS on n u s-
qunm , etc.
'riie Latin tongu e is alm ost pecu liar am ong lan gu ages for such double n ega
tives to cxjircss an aflirm ative. O f course the few which have found their place
in Logic, instead o f being desjiiseil or relegated to Gram mar, have been fondly
com m ented on by tlie in gen u ity o f the seliolastie logicians. Jn E n glish, som e
authors are fond o f this in d irect and idle way o f sp eak in g; th ey jirefer sayin g
I entertain a not unfavorable ojiliiion o f siieh a on e, to sayin g d irectly, 1
entertain o f him a favoralile ojiiiiion. X eg leetin g this, I jiass on to
'flic third sjieeies o f Inim ediate In feren ce, im tieed by the logicians. Phis
tliev call Sn biihi riK ition, but it m ay be more nnan ib ign oii'ly styled R estric tio n .
If I have 1 0 0 at niy cred it in tlie bank, it is evid en t that J m ay draw for 5 or
10. In like inanner, it I qan say u n exeh isively that a ll m en a re a n im a ls, l e a n
J See I). 185. E d .

APPENDI X. 523
say restrictivcly, tliat n eg ro es o r an g o th er f r a c t i o n o f m a n k in d a rc aniiiuils. T his

restriction is B ilateral, when w e restrict botli subject and p red icate, as:
A ll T ria n g le is a ll tr ila te r a l. A ll ra tiw ia l is a ll risible.

..Som e tr ia n g le is some trila te ra l. .'.S om e ratio n a l is some risib le.
It is U n ilateral, by restricting the oninitude or u n iversality eith er o f the Su b ject

or o f the P red icate.
O f the Subject
A ll man is some a n im a l;
.'.Some man is some an im al.
O f the P red icate, as

Some an im al is a ll risible ;
.'.S o m e a n im a l is some risible.
It has not been noticed by the logicians, that there is o n ly an in feren ce by

tliis process, if the som e in the inferred proposition m eans som e ut least, that is,
som e not e.xclusive o f a l l ; for if w e think by the som e, som e onlg, that is, som e,
not a ll, so far from there b ein g a n y conijietent in feren ce, tliere is in fact a real
opposition. T h e logicians, tlicreforc, to vin d icate tlieir doctrine o f the O pposi
tion o f Snbalternatioii, ought to have declared that the som e was here in the
sense o f som e o n lg ; and to vin d icate their doctrine o f tho In feren ce o f Siibal-
ternation, tlicy ought, in lik e m ann er, to have declared , that the som e was here
taken in the cou n ter sense o f so m e a t least. It could easily be shown that
the eri'ors o f the logicians in regard to O pposition are n ot to be attributed to
A ristotle.
B efore lea v in g this p rocess, it m ay be proper to observe that w e m ight Avell
call its tw o jirojiositions togeth er tlie re strin g e n t or re stric tiv e (p r o p o sitio n e s
re strin g e n te s vel r e s tr ic tiv c e ) ; the given proposition m ight be called the re.strin-
g e tid (p r o p o sitio r e s tr in g e n J a ), and the jiroduct the restric t or r e s tr ic te d ( p r o p o
sitio restricta ) .
S o much for the sp ecies o f Im m ediate In feren ce recognized b y the logicians.
T h ere is, how ever, a kind o f im m ediate in feren ce overlook ed by logical
writers. I have formei'ly n oticed that th ey en u m erate (am ong the sp ecies o f
O pjiosition) S a h co n tra rie tg (s u b c o n tr a rie ta s , virevavTidTTqs), to w it , som e is,
som e is n o t ; but that this is not In fact an ojiposition at all (as in truth neither
13 Snbalternation in a certain se n s e ). S iib eon trariety, In like m anner, is with
tlieni not an ojijiosition b etw een two jiarti d som es, but b etw een d iiferen t and
d ilT ercnt; in fact, no opjiosition at all. B u t if th ey arc thus all w rong by
conimi.ssIon, ilicy arc doubly w rong b y om ission, for they overlook the iinnicdiate
in feren ce wiiich tlie relation o f jiroposltions iu Siib eon trariety atfords. 'Ibis,
lio w eier, is siillicien tly nianil'est. I f I can say, A ll m en a re .some a n im a ls, or
Som e a n im a ls a re a ll m en, I am tliercb y entitled to say, A ll m en are not som e
a n im a ls, or Som e a n im a ls a re not som e m en. O f course here the som e in the
inferred jiropositions m eans som e other, as in the original jirojiosition, som e
on lg : b ut the in feren ce is p erfectly legitim ate, b ein g m erely a necessary
ex p lication o f the thought; for, inasnm cli as I think and say that a ll m en a re
o24 APPENDIX.
some ntiimals, T can think and say tliat they are some tinitnals only, which
imjtlies that they are a certain some, and not any other animals. This infer
ence is thus not only to .some others indefinitely, but to all others definitely. It
is fnrthcr eitlier allirniativo from a negative antecedent, or negative from an
ailirmative. Finallv, it is not bilatt'ral, as not of subject and incdicate at once;
but it i> unilateral, either of tlie subject or of the jircdlcate. d'liis inference
of Jsubcoittr.arlety 1 would call Jnlcijmlion, because tbe mind here tcnd.s to
determine all the parts of a whole, whereof a part only has been given. The
two propositions together might be called the integral or integrant (prapositiones
inl<grilles rel integrantes). The given jiroposition woulil be styleil tbe integrand
(projmsitio integranda); and the jirodnct, tlie integrate (propositio integrata)}
I may refer yon, for various observations on tbe Quantification of tlic Tredi-
catc, to the collection jiublished under the titie. Discussions on Philosophy and
Literature.
The grand general or dominant result of the doctrine on wdiich I have

already jiartiallv touched, but wliicli I will now exjilain consecutively and more
in detail, is as follows: Touching Propositions, Subject aud Predicate;
touehiug Syllogisms, in Categorieals, Major and ]\Iiuor Terms, Major and
Minor Premises, Figures First, Second, Third, Fourth, aud even wliat I call
.Vo Figu re, are all made convertible with each other, and all conversion re-
dttcorl to a simple etjiiation ; whilst in Ilvpotbeticals, both the .sjiecies (viz..
Conjunctive and Disjunctive reasonings) are shown to be. forms not of mediate
argumentation at all, but merely complex varieties of the immediate Inference
of Restriction or Subaltcrnation, and are relieved of a load of perversions,
limitations, exeejitions, and rules. The diirerences of Qnantity and Quality,
etc., thus alone remain ; and by these exclusively arc Terms, Projiositions, and
Syllogi.'ins formally distinguished. Qnantity and Quality combined constitute
the only real discrimination of Syllogistic jMood. Syllogistic Figure vanishes,
with its pcrjilexing apparatus of sjiccial rules; and even the General Laws of
Syllogism proper arc reduced to a single compendious canon.
Tliis doctrine is founded on the postulate of Logic: To state in language
what is cflicicnt in tliouglit; in otlier words, Before proeeoding to deal logically
with anv jirrijiosltion orsvllogism, wc mu.st be allowed to determine and exjiress
wliat it means.
First, then, in regard to Projiositions : In a proposition, the two terms, the
Subject and Predicate, have oa<-h their quantify in tliouglit. This quantity is
not alwavs exjircs.^cd in language, for language tends always to abbreviation;
but it is always understood. For cxamjile, in the jirojiosition. Men are animals,
wliat do we mean '! IVc do not mean that some men, to tbe exclusion of others.
1 I f w e p.iy some nnimnl is nil m an, a ri d ti Mrm. I m m e d ia t e in fe r e n ce o f C o n t r a d ic -

tomt nninutl is not any man. in t ii a l c a s e , w e tion o in ilted. A l s o ot l. e l i i li o ii , w l i i c l i w o u l d
m u 't li o l d tome a.s m e a n i n g some only. We com e under E(|ii i|> oll ene e. [h or I'ab ular
m a y l i a v e a m e d i a l c n y i l o j ( i n n o n it , a s : iicliem es of rro p o silio n al Form s, and of
tiieir M utual K elaiions, see up. 529, 630.
.Sortw itn tn tfiU t tr ^ ttH m ^ n ;
S o m t a m m o U ore, n o t a n y m n n ; >I>.]
T li t r c j o r e , o m e a n u u a la a r e n o t io m e a n im a i* .
APPENDIX. 525
are anim als, but w e use the abbreviated expres.sion for tlie tliougbt jjten.
L ogic, tIicn*fore, in virtue o f its postulate, warrants, nay reipiires, ns to state
tills ex iillcitly . L et \is, therefore, overtly (piaiitify the subject, and say. A ll
men are anbnaU. So far we have dealt with the propo.'ition, we have (pian-
tified in language the snbjcet, as it was qnantilied in tliouLdit.
B ut the prcdieate still n'lnains. W e have said A ll men are animals. But
what do w e mean hv animals ? D o we mean aZZ animals, or some anim als?
N ot the former ; for dogs, horses, oxen , etc., are anim als, as well as m en ; and
dogs, horses, o x en , etc., are not m en. ^ leii, thcrc'foie. are anim als, but exclii-
siv c lv o f dogs, horses, o x en , etc. A ll men, therefore, are not equ ivalen t tc all
anim als; that is, we cannot say, as w e cannot think, that men are all ani
mals. But we can say, for in thought we do aflirin, that all men are some animals.
B ut if we can say, as we do tliiiik, that all men are some animals, we can, on
the other hand, likew ise say, as we do think, that some animals are all men.
Jf this be ti'iie, it is a m atter o f in d ilferen ce, in a logical jioint o f view
(w h a tev er it inav be in a rlietorieal), whicli o f the two term s be m ade the
subject or p red icate o f tlie proposition; and w hichsoever term is m ade the
subject in the first in stan ce, m ay, in the second, be con verted into thc predi
cate ; and w hichsoever term is m ade the predicate in the first in stan ce, m ay, in
the second, be converted into the snbject.
F rom this it follow s
1 , T h at a juoposltion is sim ply an eijnatlon, an identification, a bringing
into congrnenco, o f two notions in rcsjiect to their F xten sion . 1 say, in re-
.spect to their F x ten sio n , for it is this (piantity alon e which admits o f am pliation
or restriction, the C om prehension o f a notion rem aining alw ays the sam e,
being alw ays taken at its full am ount.
2 , T h e total (|uantity o f the proposition to be con verted , and tlie total
quantity o f the jiroposition tbe product o f the conversion, is alw ays one and
the sam e. In this n n ex eln sive jioint o f view , all conversion is m erely simple con-
ver.sion : and the distinction o f a con version , as it is called, Inj accident, arises
on ly from the jiartial view o f the logicians, w ho have looked m erely to the
(juantity o f the subject. T h ey , accordingly, denom inated a jn-oposition univer
sal or particular, as its snbject m erely was (jiiantified by the jiredcsignation
some or a ll: and w here a projiosltion like, zl// men are animals (in thought,
.'tome animalit). was con verted into the projiosition, Some animnls are men (in
thought, all m en), they erroneously supposed that it lost (juantity, was restricted,
and b ecam e a particular propo'ition.
It can hardly be said that the logician s contenqilated the reconversion o f
sncli a jirojiosition as the jireccd in g; for they did not (or rarely) give tlie nam e
o f cnnrersio j>rr accblens to the case in which the proposition, on their theory,
was turned from a jiarticnlar Into a universal, as w hen we recon vert the jrrop-
osition, .Some uninuds are men, into the jiroposition. A ll men are animals.^ T h ey
1 S e e a b o v e , p. 186. K d . [ A m istake b y For A r i s t o t l e u se s t h e term s universal, and

l o g i c i a n s in g e n e r a l , t h a t p a r t i a l c o n v e r s i o n , partial conversion, s i m p l y to e x p r e s s w b e t b e r
eV ;Up(, is t h e m e r e s y n o i n m o f / ) > r nccn/fiij, t b e convertens is a universal or p articular
a n d t h a t ll i e f o r m e r is .o u s e d b y A r i s t o t l e . ) ir o p o s it io ii . S e e 4 o f l li e c h a p t e r o n C o n -
See V allius, Logica, t. ii. 1 f q . i. c. 2, p. 32. v e r s i o n (.4n. Prior., i. 2), n h e r e p a r t i c u l a r a f
520 A PPEN D IX .
likewi.'O n eg lected sueli afllm iative propositions as liad in tlionglit both subjeci
and jiredieale ipiantilicd to tlieir w hole e x te n t; as, A ll ti-ianc/ular J ly u r e is tr ila te
r a l, that is, it' exprebseil as understood, A ll tr ia a y u 'a r is a ll tr ila te ra l f ig u r e ,;
A ll ra tio n a l is risib le, that is, if ex p lieitly cn on n ccil, A ll r a tio n a l is all risible
a n im a ls. A ristotle, and subscipieiit logicians, had indeed frequently to do with
projiositions in which the predicate was taken in its full exten sion . In these
the logicians but, bc it observed, not A r is to tle attcm jited to rem edy the.
inijicrfcction o f the A ristotelic d octrin e, which did not allow the (juantifieation
o f the jii-edieate to be taken logically or tbrmally into accou n t in aflirm ative
propositions, by asserting that in the olin oxioiis eases thc jiredicate was dis
tributed, that is, fully quantified, in virtue o f the m ntlcr, and not in virtue o f
the form ( r i m a 'c rh v . non ra tio n e f o r m a ) . B n t this is ab ogcth cr erroneous.
For in thought we g en era lly do, nay, often m ust, fully quantity the jiredicate.
In our logical co n version , in fact, o f a jirojiosition lik e AU m en a re a n im a ls ,
som e a n im a ts, wc must form ally retain in thought, for w e can n ot formally
abolish, the u n iversal quantification o f the jircdicatc. W c, accordingly, must
form ally allow the proposition thus obtained. S o m e a n im a ls a re a ll m en.
'Plie error o f thc lo*gicIans is further shown by onr most naked logical nota
tion; for it is (jnltc as easy and (jnite as natural to q nanlify A , B , or C, as pre
d icate, as to quantify A , B, or C, as subject. T hus, A ll B is som e A ; Som e A
is a ll B.
A, :B
I m ay here also anim advert on thc co u n ter defect, the cou n ter error, o f the
logicians, in their doctrine o f N eg a tiv e Proposlilons. In n egative jiropositions
tliev'sav the predicate is alw ays distributed, alw ays taken in Its full e x ten
sion. N ow this is altogether unteii.'ilili!. F or we alw ays can , and frequently
do, think tin- jircdi<-atc o f n egative jiropositions as on ly partially ex clu d ed from
the sjilicre o f ilic snbjcet. For exam p le, wc can think, as onr naked diagram s
can sh o w , A U nn n a n - in d s a m e a n im a ls , \.\m i Is, not irrational anim als. In
Jioint o f fact, so often as wc think a snbjcet as jiartially included within the
=|)hcrc (if a jircd l-a lc, r o ip s a we tliink II as jitirllally, that is, jiarticularly,
(\i-lndc(l tlicrclnim . Lngi'-ians arc, therefore, .-iltogctlicr at fault in their
doctriiic, that the jircdicalc is alw ays distributed, i. e., alw ays im ivcrsal, in
n egative jirojiositions.
f r m a t i v r s ar e paid lo be n ec es s ar il y c o n - a n d projiooitions r e m a i n i n g alway.s th e .same,

v e r t 'l l i v gepei. .So I ti dig er, J)' S n n u Ihn t l hulsi, ji. 3(l3 .
Com ft d, jur riri-i,!,, I (j. I b r m s (liiriT- Tbe second i? tlnit o f l o g i c i a n s in g e n e r a l ,
e n t l v ill til ed I,;, dltli ' i iit l o g i c i a n s . T h e lirrt i v l . e r e t b e ( ji in nt it y o f th e i i r o p o s i t i o i i is d i-
l' \ I'.oetl 1.1 \ tioin tin- i s n i e w a s o r i g i n n i l i i i ' t i e d . Hie q i i i i l i t y o f tlie projin.'-itions a n d
r.Ci " i v i ' i . i that i w l ir li tin- q t i n n l i i y o f t e n n s r e m a i n i n g Hie s a m e , .la/ea cfr/tcrt' .]
ll i'( JK >.ilioii N eoiilii g e iilly e li a i g e d I llelaiiclitlion {ErolenmUi. t.. ii. De Cnn-
e it i e r Irom g r e a t ' T to le.. o r Irom le s to vm inne, p. filO), f o l l o w e d by b is jiiipil and
g re i- t c r, f r / i a i s . t b e ( j i i a l i l y of th e t e r m s eonim enlator . S t r i g c l iu s (In Erna-malti, pp
A P P ]: X D I X . 527
But, 3 , I f the preceding theory be true, if it be true that subject and

predicate are, as ([iiantilicd, always simply convertihle, the projiosilion being
in fact only an (noniicenicnt o f their etjuation, it Ibllows (ami this also is an
adequate test) that we may at will identify the two terms by making them both
the snhject or both tlie jirodlcate o f tlie same proposition. And this we can
do. For we can not onlv sav as A is B, so conversely B is A, or as A ll m en
a re som e a n im a ls, so, conversely. Som e a n im a ls a r e a il men ; but eipially say
A a m i B are co n vertib le, or, C o n rertib 'e a r e B a m i ; ..III m en a m i .'<oie a n i
m a ls a re e o n rcrtib le (that is, som e co n v ertib le ihing.s), or, C o n vertible (that is,
som e e o n rertib le tiling.';') a re .some a n im a ls a n d a ll m en . By c o n rertib ie , 1 mean
the same, the identical, the congruent, etc.'
576, 5 8 1 ) , and by K ockeim an n {Sy.a. Log. homo est anim at; n o n n t iq ii e t o f n m g e n u s a n i

Minus, L. ii. c. 3 , Op. p. 22 2), a n d o tl i e rs , m a l , se d al i( | n a p a r s l i u j n s g e n e r i s . . . . e r g o ,
t l i i i i k s tliat t l i e i e is a g r e a l e r I b i c e o f tlie Aliqua jiars animalis ist in ntrini homine. I t e m ,
jiaiticle tiinie Ini/lln.s. nut mii/), tl i a ii o f th e Qitiilam humo esl animal, . ci lic e t est ipirpilam
jiarticle all {niiinis). F o r , in a u n i v e r s a l n e g pars nnimali.s, e r g o , QiKTilam pars animalis tst
a t i v e , tli e loi 'c e o f t h e n e g a t i o n is so s p r e a d qnitlam liomu. e t c . ' ( j o t t l i e b ( i e r l i a r d I'itius,
o v e r tl i e w h o l e ] ) i o p o s i l i o n , tli at in it s c o n Ars Cogilanili, o. v i i. 3 et seq., ]i. 12 3 . Eipsiae,
v e r s i o n tli e s a m e s i g n is retaiiic<l ( a s Nn 1 7 2 3 (lirst e d . 17 0 1 ) . N ih il a u te m aliu d agit
slar is ron.sinneil; tin r-fare, nn Jiame wliir/i is fo iiv e i'sio , qiiam u l . s im p li o i te r p r x d i c a t u m
rnnsumei/ i.s a star): w l i e i e a s sn ol i c o n v e r s i o n et si i b je o t i i m t r a i i s p o n a t , li ii ic n e c q u a l i t a t e m
d o c s n o t t a k e ji la c e in a niiiversal allirm a- nec qiiaiititatem iis l a r g i t u r , a u t e a s niiit at ,
ti V e . 'r i i i s . S t r i g e l i u s c o m ] i a r e s t o tli e d i f sod pi o u t r e p e r i t , i t a c o n v e r t i t . E x q u o ne ce s -
f u s i o n ol' a f e r m e n t o r a c u t e p o i s o n : adding s a r i o s c q i i i t u r c o n v e r s i o i i e n i e ss e u i i i f o r m e i n
t i i a t tlie a l l i r n i i i t i v e p a r t i c l e is l i m i t e d to th e ac o m iies p ro p o siiio nes e o d e m jilaue m ode
s u b j e c t , w li il s t ti ie n e g a t i v e e x t e n d s to b ot li couverti. NuUus homo tst
I e r e .x e m p l a , ( 1 ),
s u b j e c t a n d p r e d i c a t e , in o t l i e r w o r d s , to Ilie lapis, e r g o , yiiUiis lapis esl homo. ( 2 ), Qiiii/am
w liole proposition. homo non i.sl mei/irns {nrnnis), e r g o , Meilicus
T h i s d o c t r i n e is a l t o g e t l i e r e r r o n e o u s . I t is non e.si homo qiiietam. s e u yiillas mei/icus e.sl
an e rro n eo u s theory devised to e x j i l a i i i a n humo quii/am .......................... (3), Hie Petrus non
erroneous p ractice. In the lirst i i la c e , we e.st rloclus (omnis), e r g o , Oinnis itncliis non est
I ia v e li e r e a c o m m u t a t i o n o f n e g a tio n witli hie Petrus..........................(4), Omnis homo esl ani
q u a i i t i l i c a l i o n ; a r. d , at tli e s a m e l i m e , e o i i - mat (qnni/ilam). e r g o , Qiioih/nm animal est
v e ivio ii. direct c o n v e r s i o n at le: :st , w i l l i.ot hau l). (5), Qiiie/nm homo currit Iparticiilnrihr),
he s a i d to c li iii ig c tli e ( p i a l i t y e i l l i e r ot a n e g e r g o . Quutani currens est homo. (6), Hie Pnulus
a t i v e o r a l l i r m a l i v e ] ir o p o s ;t io ii . In tlie s e c fsl ilurius {quit/am), e r g o , Quiilarn eloetus e.st hie
o n d j il a c e , it c a n n o t be p . c t e i u l e d t h a t n e g a Iniiltis. I n o m n i b u s i d s e x e n q d i s s u b j e c t u iu
t i o n J i a s a n e .x c ln s i v e o r e v e n g r e a t e r a l l i i i i l y cum sua q u antitale in locum p r x d i c a t i , et
to u n i v e r s a l ll ia i i t o p a r t i c u l a r q i i a i i t i l i c a t i o n . l io c . e o d c in n i o d o , i n i l l i n s s e d e m t r a ii s ii o n i-
\Ve c a n c i p i a l l y w e ll s a y not .snine, nut all, not t u r , ut iiu lla penitn.s r a t i o s o l i d a a p p a r e a t .
any; a n d t h e r e a s o n w l i y o n e o l' tiie se f o r m s q u a r e c o n v e r s i o n e n i in d i v e r s a s s p e c i e s d iv e )
is p r e f e r r e d lie s c e r t a i n l y n o t in a n y a t t r a c l e r e debi'amit.s. V u l g o t a m e n a l i t e r .'ioiitiuiil
t i o n o r a t i i n i t y l o th e n e g a t i v e p a r t i c l e ] siin-
( li i a ii d o tr i]) li ce in c o i i v e r s i o i i c m , n e i n p e
1 [IV iMi th e d o e t i i n e o f C o n v c i > i o n t n u g li t /ilirnn, per acciiJi ns, ac per ronlraposiliancm, a d -
in tlic t e x t , c o m p a r e ti le f o l l o w i n g r i i t l i o r i - s t r u i i n l ..........................E n i m v e r o c o i i v e r s i o a/cj
ties: Dmhctica, L . ii. c.
I. a u r e i i t i l i s V alla, arrii.'ens et per cnntraposilionem g r a tis asseriliir,
24. f. 37. Ti tiiis, Ars Cugitaiuli ( v . K i d i g e r , De ii a in c o i i v e r s i o p r o ) i o s i t i o n i s a f l i r m a i i t i s m:i -
Sen.sii Viriit Fal.si, L ii c. i. p 232). It c u s c li , v e r s a l i s p e r i i i d o s i m p l e x est a c ea q u a u n i v e r
Fysltma Logiciini, 380, p. 4 1 3 ft snj., e d . 1 7 4 1 . s a l i s n e g a n s c o n v e i l i i u r , ii cet p os t earn suli-
l l o l l m a n n , Lngira, 89, p. 17 2. I l o u c q n e t . j e c t n i n sit p a r t i c i i l a r c ; c o i i v e r s u n i i s e n i m liic
F r i e s , Lugik-, 3 3. ji. 146. E I t e i n l i o l d . Lngik, nnlla culpa est . q u . x q i i a n l i t a t c m . q i u e no n
f 1 1 7 , p. 2S6. A n c le i' .t s r e l e n e d l o b y A m m o - a d e s t , lai g i r i n e c |iotest n e c d e b e t ..........................
ii iu s, la D. Tiit rji , c vi i. J 4, f. . . . . r a i i l i i s li r r o r v u lg a r is d oc t r im e , nisi failor. ilidc e.-l,
V a 'lin s, Lagira, t ii.. In An Prior., I., i. ip ii. (juod e.xisiimaveriiit ad r o n v e r s i o n c m siiiipli-
e i i - ] [ V a l l a I. c s a y s ; N o n : i m ii li u s a c cem ei\u\ri, ul jtradicalum a.ssuinat signum it
la t i :i s a c c i i i i t i i r p r a ' d i i a i t n m q i m m snl j i c U im . qiuintitiit in snhjecli.............................. C o n v e r s i o n e n i
Ideoque cum il l o c o u v e r t i p o t e s t , ut ornnis per conlrapositionem q u o d a t l i n e t , f a c i l e o s t e n d i
528 A r p i: N D I X .
T lie general errors in regard to C onversion, the errors from w hich all the
rest proceed , are
1 . T h e omi.ssion to rpiantlfy the p red icate throughout.
2 . T h e e o i i e e i t that the (jnantitics did not b elon g to the term s.
3 , T h e eo iieeit that the tiuantlties w ere not to be transposed with their
relative terms.
4 , T h e one-sided v iew that the proposition was not eq u ally com posed o f the
two terms, but was m ore d cjien d en t on the subject than on the predicate.
5 . T h e eon seiiu en t error that the q u an tity o f the subject term determ ines
the quantity o f the propo.rition absolutely.
G. T h e eo n seiin eiil error that there was an y in crease or dim inution o f the
total quantity o f the projiosition.
7, That thoroiigh-going conversion could n ot take p lace by on e, and that
the sim ple, form.

S. T h at all called in at least the form o f A ccid en tal C on version; all adm it
ting at the sam e time that certain moods rem ain inconvertible.
9, That the m ajority o f logicians resorted to C ontraposition (w h ich is not
a convcraion at a ll) ; som e o f them , how ever, as llu rgersd yk , adm itting that
certain moods still rem ained ob stin ately inconvertible.
1 0 . T h at they thus iiitiod u ccd a form whieli was at best indirect, vague,
and useless, in fact not a conversion at all.
1 1 . That ev en adm itting that all the m oods were con vertib le b y on e or
other o f the three forms, the sam e mood was con vertib le by m ore than one.
1 -2 . T h at all this mass o f error and confusion was from their overlook in g
the iic<-e-sitv o f one sim ple and d irect m ode o f con version ; m issing the one
.'traight road.
W e have shown that a judgm ent (or proposition) is on ly a com parison re

sulting in a con grn eiiec, an eqiiaiion, or iion-ecjnalion o f two notions in the
(jnantitv o f E .xtension; and that these com jiared notions m ay stand to each
imlfi-t ( 1 ) o x e m p l a li e i c j a c l a r i s o l i t a , p o s s e rnmprehenslvo s u m t a m , e ss e circu lu rn ,

eoiiverli siinp lieiter; (2 ) c o i i v c r s i o i i e m jte r sen omnem c i r c u l u r n ess e iiunndnm liiftam
c o i i l r a ] ) 0 -ili< ii ein , r e v e r a n o n e s- e c o n v e r s i o - ciirvain. V a l l i u s , 1 . r. X e g a t i v a - v e r o eon-
nem ; i i it e ri n i (-3 ) p i i i a t i v a i i i iYlatn coiiver- verluntur et in p arlie iilare s ct in u iiiver-
s i o n e m mill in iii)iv<Tali a l l i i n i a n l e , el 1 a r t i c - sales iie ga tiva s; Sor.rahs non
u t si c l i c a m u s ,
I l i a n iK-g aiile s o l i se d in o i n i i i b u s p ot ills pst Inpis, c o i i v e r t e n g il l i i i s o r i t , Aliquis lapis
p r o p o - i t i o l i i b i i - loci ili i I ia b c r c . . . s. g ., nun rst SnrraUs, e t Nullus lapis est Sorrates, et
fjiin'/ /am animal non quadniprs, e r g o . Nul- idem di jc iid u m eril de o m iii a lia sim ili p ro p -
/u qiin'Iriip's iKi aniina' quniltain." S e e l li c ositioiie. I'.l).]
r r i l i c i s m ol ll ie d o f l r i i i e ( i t T i l i M s b y I t i i i i g e r , [ Tliat U n iversal A fiirm ative Propositions
(liio'<-d Isdow . ji. 'i.'i.'i. I' Io iie (| ii e l, Millinliis may be converted sim ply, if tlieir )ir edi -
Cnlriilaiuli III be gi d. r, J). 4U (I7i-3). Iid id lec- cates a r e r e c i p r o c a l i n g , se e C orviiius, Inslit.
t i o o/snli/dti'i ii b j e ci i el p r a d i c a t i e^t ojTirma I / i i l . U n i., ( .014 leiia*. 1 7 42 . IJauin garten.
1 ,0 . . . Omnis rirrnlus , si linra rurra Logira. ] 280, . -COlUs, In An. Pr., L .
170.0.
tjii.'c p r o p o i t i o l o g i c e expre^-a Ii;ec esi : i. (]ii. 14. U lrich ,Instit. Log. et Met., ] i. 2,
fann's nrnihis , si i/ii'rdam liiiea eiirvn Quo 1 7 7 (178.0) K r e i l , Logik. ( J 40, 02 ( 1 7 8 J ) . Is -
[ a c i o id, (|iiod i n i > ' l i g i l i i r in pra.- die ato i d e n - e r i d o o r i i . Logica Penpatciico, h. iii. c 8 , jip.
t i f i r a l i i r c u m er, f|iii,d ii l e l l l g i l i i r in s u l i j e c l o . 4.30, 4 3 1 . W a l l i s , Logira, I,, ii. e 7. / a b a r -
M v e I o ri in sive non noriin p r a t e r circu lu rn e l l a . In An. Prior. TahuUr, p. 148. L a m b e r t ,
d a r i (|iior|Ue a l i a s cnrvariirn sp e c i e s, v e r u m Dc Vniversaliori C a l c u l i Idea, ) 2 i ct seq.]
tam 'm est quandani lii ie a ii i ciira m sen sil
A P P !:N D I X . 529
other as the one suliject and the other p redicate, as both the subject, or as
both tlic predicate o f the jud gm en t. I f this bc true, tlie transposition o f the
term s o f a proposition sinks in a very easy and a v ery sim ple p rocess; wliilst
the Avholc doctrinc o f logical Convcr.sioii is superseded as ojicrosc and im per
fect, as useless and erroneous. T h e system s, new and old, m ust stand or fall
with their doctrines o f the Conversion o f propositions.
Tim s, according to the doctrine o f the logicians, conversion applies onh' to
the naked terms tliem selves : the subject and predicate o f the prcjaccnt
interch an ge places, but the quantity by which each was therein aflfectcd is
exclu d ed from the m o v em en t; rem ain ing to affect its correlative in the subja
cen t proposition. This is altogeth er erroneous. In conversion a v c transjiose
the com pared notions, the correlated term s. If we do not, e ve rsio n , not
coiiA'crsion, is the result.
If (as the Logicians suppose) in the c o n v e r le m the subject and predicate

took each o th ers (|uantitv, the proposition Avould be not the sa m e, relm lo n of
the sam e notions. It m akes no dlirerence th at the converse only takes place
when the subject chances to have an equal am ount or a les.s than the predicate.
T h e re m ust be a t any ra te a reasoning (concealed Indeed) to Avarrant i t : in
the form er case that the predicate is en titled to take all the quan tity o f the
subject, being itself o f eipiivalent a m o u n t; in the second (a reasoning o f sub-
alternation), th at it is entitled to take the quantity o f the subject, being less
tlian its OAvn. All this is false.. S ubject and p redicate have a rig h t to their
OAvii, and only to their OAvn, which they c arry Avith them , when they become
each other.
IV.A p p lic a tio n o f D o c t r i n e ok Qi a n t i f i e d P r e d i c a t e to P ro p o sitio n s.
(fi) AE i r I ' l i o r n s i T i o s . i r . f o r m s -x o t a t io x
Instead o f four species o f Proposition determ ined by the Q u an tity and

Q uality taken togctlier, the Q uantity o f the S ubject being alone considered,
there are double that num ber, the Q uantity o f the P red icate b ein g also taken
into account.
AlRrmative.
( 1) [ A f A ] C r A ll T rian gle is all T rilateral [fig. 1 ].
(ii) [ A f I] C ;i A AH T rian gle is som e F igu re ( A ) [fig. 2 3 .
(3 ) [I f A ] A - . C Som e F igu re is all T rian gle [fig. 2 ].
( iv ) [I f I] C B Som e T rian gle is some E quilateral (I )
[fig- 4 ].
67
530 APPENDIX.
N egative.
(v ) [E n E] C ; j----- : D A 113' T rian gle is not an y Square ( E ) [fig. 3 ].
(A)(A)
(6) [E iiO ] C : , B Any I'rianirlo is not som e E quilateral
( A ) ( 1) [fig . 4
(v ii) [O n E] B , 1------: C S om e Eijuilateral is not an y T rian gle ( 0 )

(1)(A) [fig. 4].
(8) [O n 0 ] C , I------, B Som e T rian gle is not som e E quilateral
(I) (I) [fig. 4].'
( 6) y r . t . v T /T y o f V R O V o s m o y s - d e f i s i t u d e a x d l v d e f ix it u d e .
N otliing can e.x-eed the ambiirnitv,

1 . vacillation, and uncertaintv o f lom
O cians
con cern in g thc Q uantity o f Propositions.
I. A s regards what arc called indcfimle (iS d p ia T o i) more properly indesignale
or preindes 'ujnale projxts 'Uinns. T h e ab sen ce o f overt quantification applies on ly
to the subject ; lor the p red icate was supposed alw ays In affirm atives to be
particular, in n egatives to be universal. Ileferring, therefore, on ly to the
in dcsignatioii ol' the su b ject: indefinites w ere by som e logieiaus (as the
G reek com m entators on .Aristotle (V), A puleius ajmd W a itz, In O rg. i. p. 338,
bnt see W cg elin , In Anepomjmi P hil. Sgn., p. .588) m ade tantam ount to par
ticu lars; b)- others (as \ alla, Dddedicu, L. ii. c. 24, f. 3 7 ), m ade tantam ount
1 [ I n tliis t a b l e tli e liom aii m i m e r a l s <lis- t i m e a f t e r h is d i s c o v e r y o f t h e d o c t r i n e of a

li i i^ u i. 'l i Micli i i r o ii o .' il iu ii a l l o r n . s :.s a i c r e c < iu a n ti li c d j i r e d i c a t e , .''ir \V H a m ilto n seem s
ognized iu ll ie A r i . ' l o l e l i c o r c o i n i n o n doc l o h a v e u se d t h e v o w e l s E a n d O in th e f o r -
t r i n e , w l i e n - a s ll ie A r a b i c c i p h e r s m a r k ll i o s e rn uh c o f N e g a t i v e I r o ) ) o s i t i o n s ; a n d t h e fu ll
( h a l f o f th e w h o l e ' w l i i c h 1 Ili i ii k o u g h t l i k e p e r i o d {.) ::s t h e .yrnlK>l o f some ( jn d e l i i i i t e
w i s e to lie r e c o g n i z e d , lii Ihe literal sy m b o ls, < iu a n t il y ) . Fn th e c o l l e g e se s s i o n o f 18 4 5 - 4 6 ,
1 s i m p l i l y a n d d i. - i i i l r i c a l e i he s c h o l a s t i c i i o l a - h e h a d a d o p t e d t h e c o m m a {,) a s th e s y m b o l
tion ; ta k in g A a n d 1 lor n iiivc rsal a n d p a r of indelinite <|ini nli ty . As the period ap
t i c u l a r . b n t , c x l e i i d i i i g t h e m l o e it h e r < ) U ii li t y , p e a r s in th e o r i g i n a l c o p y o f t h i s T a b l e a s th e
m a r k i n g a i r t r m a l i o i i b y I. n e g a t i o n b y ii, th e symbol of some, ils date cannot be later
t w o lirst c<m .sonaiii- o l th e \ e i b s and than 1845. T h e c o m m a (,) h a s b e e n siilj.<li-
n 'sn . verbs fro m w l ich I have no doubt luled b y th e D i i t o r s , t o a d a p t I h e T a b l e to
th a t I e l r n s ll is | >a n iH d r e w , i e s p e c l i v e l y . th e th e A u t h o r ' s la te s t Ibrm o f notation. The
i w o lir-l v o w e l s , l o d e n o t e lii- t o u r c o n i p l i e a - t r a n sla t io n o f ils s y m b o l s in to c o n c re te in op-
li o n s o f i|Uanlily a n d q n a lily J Discussions, o-ilions, alToi'ds d e ci'iv e evidence ol Ih e
p 0-ij m e a n in g w h ic h Ihe A u t h o r a lla e h e d lo them
[In th e n otalion en ip la.ed above, th e on (he n e w d o ctrin e . 'I'liat th i s, m o r e o v e r ,
com m a , denote- sum : t h e c o l o n : off Ih e w a s the u n iform im port o f .Sir W . H am il
li n e c denotes tlv tn in n alive copnia, t o n s p r o p o s i t i o n a l n o t a t i o n , f r o m t h e e a r li -
a n d n e g a t i o n i- e x p n - ' - e d hy d r a w i n g a l in e G 'f d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e t h e o r y o f a f j u a u t i l i e d
th ro u gh th e a l h r r n n l i v e e o p n i a J ; Ih e p r e d i c a t e , is ii h ic cd b e y o n d il on h t h y n u m e r -
t h i c k e n d o f th e l in e d e n o t e s Hie s u b j e c t , th e fins p a ' S a g e s in j i a p e r s ( n o t jirin ter t), a n d h y
I h n i e n d the j i r e d i e a l e , o f l . x i e r i s i o n . In In- in arginal notes on hooks, w ritten at vario u s
l e n - i o n th e i h i i i e n d d e n o t e s th e s n h j e c i , th e p e r i o d s hel w e e n I8:j!-4fi, a n d th e d a t e o f h is
t h i c k e n d Ihr- p r e d i c a t e I Ini-; - f ': , i l l n e s s , . I n l y 1 8 ( 4 . w h e n h e w a s c o m p e l l e d to
A i- re ad . A ! < r< ' uc C : (-----: I) is einjiloy an am an iien -i-. T h e le t t e r s in r o u n d
r e a d , .Ve I M . i n y l i D i e T a b l e g i v e n in t h e brackets (A ) and ,1) are th e v o w e l s f i n a l l y
t e x t is f r o m a cop- o l a n e a r l y s c h e m e o f th e a d o j i l e d hy t h e A u t h o r , in p l a c e o f E a n d 0
a n f h o r ' s neW I r o j i o - i l i o n a l k o r ir is . K o r s o m e .See J). 531 E d .]
A m -, x n r x . 531
to niiiversals. T licy niiglit to have lieon t'oiisidcrcd as m erely ellip tical, and to
bc d efinitely referable eitber to pai'tienlars or universals.'
II. A rem arkable u n certain ty p revails in regard to the m ean ing o f particu
larity and its signs, som e, etc. IIi*re som e m ay mean som e o n l y , som e not
all. H ere som e, tliougb alw ays in a certain degree indefinite, is d efinite so far
as it ex eln d es om nitnde, is used in opposition to a ll. T his 1 would eall its
S em i-ilejin ite m eaning. On tlie other hand, som e may mean som e a t le a st ,
som e, p e rh a p s all. In this signification som e is thoroiiglily indefinite, as it does
not ex clu d e om nilude or totality. T h is m ean ing I would eall the I w le fn ite .
N ow o f those- two m eanings there is no doubt that .Vristotle used jiartieularity
only in the second, or thoroughly In d cfm ile, m eaning. For, 1 . He does nor
recogn ize the incom possibility o f tlie sii|)crordInate and subordinate. 2 , H e
m akes a ll and ov -k us , or particular n egative, to be contradictories ; that is. one
necessarily true, the other n ecessarily false. B u t this is not the ease in the
Sem i-definite m eaning. T h e sam e holds good in the U niversal N egative and
P articular AHirmative.
T h e particularity the som e is held to be a d efinite som e when the other

term is D efin ite, as in ii. and 3. in G and vii. On the other hand, when both
term s are In d efin ite and Particular, as in iv. and 8 , the som e o f eacli is left
w holly indefinite.
T h e quantification o f d e fin h u d e or r iu n -p a riie u la rity (:) m ay designate am-

bignonsly or indifTerently one or oilier o f three eoncejits. 1 , It may designate
ex p licit om nitnde or totality: wliich, ivlien exp n -ssed articulately, m ay be
denoted by (::). T h u s A ll tr ia n y le s a r e a ll trila te ra ls. 2, It m ay designate
a class considered as undivided, though not positively tliouglit as taken in its
Avhole e x te n t; and this m ay be articu lately denoted by ( : .) . T im s The tri-
a n q le is the tr ila te r a l ; T h e d a y is the la tra n t. (H e r e note tin* iim- o f the def
inite article in E nglish, G reek, F ren ch , German," etc.) 3, It may designate not
1 [ T li a t I n d e f i n i t e i i r o p o s i i i o n s a r e to b e re- Itaraus, Srtiot. Diat., L . v i i . c. 2, p. 4.57.

t e r r c d to un iv er. : d s. see r u r e l i o t . Instit. Phit. Downnm. In Rnini Diuert., L . ii. c. 4. p . 350.
Logica, 1 . ii. c. 2, pp. 124 , 1 2 5 . T2li. Ivotteii- F . i c e i o l a t i , Itiut. Log. p. ii c i i i. . p. 67. De-
b c e c ii is , Logica Contracta, c. vi. J) 92 (1.560). l a i i v i e r e . Xoin-dte Lngigne Ctit'sigiif, L. ii. s.
B a u m e i s t e r . Li.a. PUd. Rat.. 2 1 3 . .1. C . . c a l - ii. c. 3 . s. 580. p. 34
i g e r , Exercitalion-s. B.x. 2 1 2 , 5 2. D robiscb, Tliat In d e lin itiide bas so m e tim e s a lo gical
Logik, ^ .39. N e o m a g i i s , .\d Trapfzun'iion. f. im p o r t , w lien w e do not k n o w w b e t h e r a//.
10. T o b e r e f e r r e d to p a r t i c u l a r : s e e L o v u n - or some, o f ll ie o n e b c to b e a tl i n i K ' d o r de-
Com in Arisl. Dial. p. If d
ie n s e s. M olin a'u s, nied o f tbe o tlie r: M. I t e i n l i o l d . Logik. S.S
Efementa Logica. L . 1 . c. 2. A l e x . A l i l i r o d . , Anm. 2, pji. 1 9 3 , 194. I l o n e i p i e t ,Me'lindn.s
In An. Prior., c. ii. p. 19. D e i i z i n g e r . Logica, Cidridandi. pp. 4 S. 53 ed. 17 7 3 . Lam bert.
71. l ii t li e r u n i v e r s a l o r ( l a r t i c i i l a r . K e e k e r - AVurs 0 >-?fli)ioii. 1.. 2-35. p 143. ]
m aim . Opera, p. 220. A ristotle doubts; se e 2 [O n e fie ct ot t b e d e f i n i t e a r t i c l e a n d il
. 111. Prior . )., I . c 27 . 7. a ni l De InOrp c. 7. absence in d if i e r c i i t l a n g u a g e s , in r e d u c i n g
Tlu it 1 . de .-iiiiliule i- n o s e i i a r a t e s| ic eie s o f tb e d e f i n i t e t o t b e i n d e f i n i t e , see D c l a r i v i e r e ,
Opera Logica. p iii. c.
( p l a n t i t y . i-ee . S c b e i b le r . Logigiie, 4 JRO. 5 81 .
6. p 4 1 3 . ( ir ie e ii s . V n o n v m i i - , i l .''i/ttogi.smo, On t b e 0 re e k a r t i c l e , se e A r n m o n i i i s . i n i l e
L i. c. 4. f. 42. L e i b n i t z , Opera, t. iv . p. iii InUrp c. v i i . f. 67 b.
p. 12 3. F r i e s , Sydem der Logik, 30, p. 1 3 7 . O n use o f t h e A r a b i c ii r t i c l e in q u a n t i n c a -
582 zvrPENDix.
what is ineroly iiinlividcil, tlmiigh divisible, a class, but what Is in d iv isib le,
an in d iv id u a l: and this m ay be m arked by tlic small letter or by (: ) 'I'bus
Socra'i s is the husfiand o f X 'lu th ip p c . T h is horse is D u eep h a iu s.
In like m aim er |)artieularity or inderuiitude ( ,) , when we wish to mark it as
thorou'_dily indi'linile, m ay be d esign ated by ( ,), w bercas when w e would
mark it as delinile.lv indcfm ite, as ex clu d in g a ll or not a n y , m ay be m arked
U ()
T h e indefinites (dSpia-Ta') o f A ristotle correspond .sometimes to the particular,
.sometimes to one or other, o f the two kinds o f nnlversals.*
T h e designatloii o f in d c jh iiiu d e or p a r tic u la r ity , som e (. or m ay m ean one

or otlier o f two very dille reiit thin js.
1 , It m ay m ean som e a n d sm ite o tily , liein g n either a ll nor non e, and in this
sense it will lie both alHrmative and n egative ( , f ) .
2 . It m IV m ean, n egatively, not (dl, p e r h a p s non e, som e a t m o s t; affirm atively.
not none, p e r h a p s a ll, som e a t le a st (, Q.
A ristotle and the logician s con tem p late on ly the second m eaning. T h e
rea.'on o f this perhajis is, tliat this distinction on ly em erges in the conslder.ilioii
o f Ojijiosition and Im m ediate In feren ce, which were less elaborated in the
1'ormir theories o f Logi.' ; and docs not olitnid" Itself in the consideration o f
M'Mliate In fen iii'(>. whicli is there p rin cip ally d eveloped. On the doctrine o f
tlie logicians, then* is no ojiposition o f subaltcrnation ; and b y A ristotle no
opposition o f siib altcrn alion Is m entioned. By other logicians it was erronc-
oti'ly introduced. TIu* opposition o f Snbcontrarics is. likew ise, iinjiroper,
being precariou.s and not bclwc.en the sam e things. A ristotle, though he
m im ner.itcs this 0 |)posil;on, was ijuitc aw are o f its im propriety, and d eclares it
to be m erely verbal, not real.'
iionj.-ee A ienoes, Dc InUr,i , ji. 39, cflition 1 [Logicians who have inarkcd tlie Quanti-
L>72: tics by D 'firtiu , Im liJ iviip, etc.
Al in ttie A r a b ic lo ng u e , a n d 7/a in tb e A ris tot le , A n . Pr., c. iv. 21. a n d lliere Al-
[li-Iirew, a n d in like m a n n e r llie ar li cl es in ox ai id er , I aciiis. T h e o |i b r a s lu s ( t' a cc io la li,
oilier la ng u ag es , Fonieliini-.< Inn e th e |i(i\vcr R ud Log., p. i. c. 4. p. 39). Aniiiioniiis, In
o f un iv e rsa l |irede sig naI ioi .s, si me linies o f D- Intrr., (. 72 b ( B r a n d i s , .'srhnlin, p. 113.)
pa r t ic u l ar . It the I'oniier, Iben they hiivc Simcs a n d A'(in-]ieri]nitetic l.ogic ian s in g'>ii-
th e force c f c o n t r a r i e s ; i f t b e l a 't e r . th e n tb e er al , see .se.xt. Ibnpiriciis. )h/e. L o g .,^'JS rt seq ,
force o f su h - co nl r ar ie s . I ' o r il is t r u e lo say, ji. 476, cd. Kahric ii ; D io g I,.acrt. Lih. vii. seq.
nl. I ba t i, ipse homo is xohite, a n d nl. t h a t is, 71, ohi illeiiagiii.s. D o w n a n i, In R /im i Dialec-
tpse homo i.s noi w hite; t h a t is, wlien t b e a r l i - lirain, L ii. c, 4, ji. 303, nolices t h a t a jiartic-
cle at o r / l a , Ibal is, d en o t es th e desig na - n i a r pro p os iti on was ca lled by tlie .Stoics
lion ( f iiarti cii lar it y. T h e y m a y , ho w ev er , indifiniie (aiipicrTor) ; hy .ome l.a tin s, a n d
he at on ce false, w h e n th e art icle o7 or La h as bometinies hy U am us biinself, in fin ite; he-
llie force o f th e u ni ve r sa l pr ed e s i g ii a t io n . cause it dee s n o t de s ig n a te some ce rta in
( M'f. a l o ji. 62 of th e sa me hoo k .) s|iecies. hu t leaves it u n c e rl a i n a n d indeli-
lii l.ng)ili llie de ll n il e arl iol e al w a y s de- n il e. I l i i i t a d o de 3 Ie nd o za , Disp. Log. et
riri's, re n d e r s d e l i n i l e , ),lit so m et im e s in- J / / t , t. i. d iv. 2, p. 114 Lo v an ien sc s, 7.i
dividiinlizes, a n d somi-liine- gene raliz es . I f Ari.it. Diol . \C,I. I l o l l m a n n , Lr/irica, |i 173.
M e w oi il l Ii-r m an j;ene rallv, Me must n o t B oel hin s, C)pern, ) . .31.6. Iteusch, Rijst. Log.,
ir e l i x th' I i t i r ' e . a- in ( .r e - k , L e r m a li , p 421. l > . e r , 6 .68 Wci.ss, 149.
I H I . ch. tc ; -o n-eolth. goi-irniiient. etc B u t I'/l. .So K ie.sewet ler. I.ogde. Kl2. 103.]
Ill definition o f hone, etc., Ihe reverse. a the 2 (In hotli forms o f ( 1|po.sil ion, see .Selieih-
dog {U chun, 6 Kiiwie, A in E n g l i s h is le r , [O/irra Loglen, ^ \\\.,ile Propositionibus, C,
often e q u i v a le n t l o any.] xi. p 487, an d aho ve , p. 18 4 . E d . ]
APPENDIX. . 533
By tlie iiifroiliietion of the first meaning of som e, we obtain a veritable

opposition in Siihalternation; and an inference in Siibeontrariety, which I
would call In teg ra tio n .
(c) o p ro s i T i o x OF r n o p o s i r i o y s .
P ropositions m ay be considered under two view s ; according as their par-

tieularlty, or indefuiitiide, is supposed to be thoroughly indefinite, uncxelusivo
even o f the d efinite: som e, m eaning som e a t lea st, som e, p e rh a p s a ll, som e, p e r
h a p s not a n y ; or definite indcfuiitnde, and so ex clu siv e o f tlie d efin ite; som e,
m ean ing som e at m o s t, som e o n ly, som e not a ll, efe. T h e latter thus exclude'!
om nitude or totality, positive or n egative; the form er does not. T h e form er ir
the view prom ulgated as alone contem plated by A r isto tle ; and has beer,
inherited from him by the L ogicians, without thought o f Increase or o f ch an ge.
T lie latter is the view which I would in trod u ce: and though it m ay not super-
sode, ought, I think, to have been placed alongside o f tlie other.
Causes o f the introdiictiou o f the A ristotelie .system alone :
1 , T o allow a harm ony o f L ogie with common language ; for language
eliding all that is not o f im m ediate interest, and the determ ination o f the
siihject-notion being g en era lly that alone in tend ed , the ])redieate is on ly con
sidered in so far as it is thought to cover tlie s u b je c t; that is, to bc at least
co ex ten siv e with it. B u t if we should con vert the term s, the inadecjuacy would
be brought to light.
2 , A great num ber o f notions are used p rin cip ally, if not ex clu siv ely , as
attributes, and n ot as subjects. IMen are, cou seiiu en tly, very com m only igno
rant o f the proportion o f the exten sion b etw een the subjects and jircdicates.
which they are in the habit o f com bining into propositions.
3, In regal'd to n eg a tiv es, m en natu rally preferred to attribute positively a
part o f one notion to an oth er than to d en y a part. H en ce the u n freqn en ey o f
n egatives with a partienlar predicate.
On the doctiine of Scmi-definite Particnlarity, I would thus evolve the
Opposition or Ineompossibility of propositions, neglecting or throwing aside
(with Aristotle) those of S u b a lte rn a tio n and S u b -c o n tra rie ty , but introducing
that of In c o n siste n c y .
Ineom possibility is eith er o f projiositions o f tbe sam e, or o f different, quality.
Ineom possible propositions differing in quality are either Contradictories without
a m ean, no third, that is, if one be true the other m ust be false, and if one
be false the other must be true ; or Contraries with a m ean, a third, that
is, both m ay be false, but both cannot be true. Ineom possible propo.-îtions o f
the sam e (p ia lity a re Incoii.sistenfs, and, lik e Contraries, they have a mean ; that
is, both m ay be false, but both cannot be true.
Contradictories are again either simple or complex. The simple are cither,
1, Of Universals, as undivided wholes; or, 2, Of Individuals, as indivisible
parts.
1 G e n e ra l term s, used as in d i v id u a l term s. S o th at there are three k in d s o f co ntradic-

w h e u o p p o s e d to e a c h o t h e r , m a y h e c o n t r a - lories,
d ictories, as Man is mortal, Man is not mortal.
534 . A PPEN D IX .
Tho oomplox are o f nnivorsals iliviilod, as -1 .5.

Contrarios. again, wliioli are only o f divided iiiiivcr.âls, are, 1 , Bilateral, as
1 .> : or, 2 ', Unilateral, as 1 C . 1 7 , 2 a, :5 :r. or, 3, Cross, as 2 7 ,3 6 .
Ineonsistents are either, 1 , Allirniatives ; or, 2, Xogative.s. Allirinativcs. as
1 2 , 1 3, 2 3. Negatives, as o G,5 7. The propositions C 7 are some
times Ineonsistents, sometimes Consistents.
All tho other jiropositional forms, whether of the .same or o f dilferent qnali-
ties, are Compossihle. or Unopjiosed.
The dillereiiees in eompossihility of the two sehomes o f Indefinite and Defi
nite ptirtienlarily lies, 1 , In the whole Ineonsistents; 2 , In two Contraries lor
Contradietories. 1 , Aeeording to the former, all allirmtitive and all negative
propositions are consistent, whereas in tlic latter th esi are inconsistent, 1 2 ,
1 3. 2 .3; among tlie allirmatives, and among the negatives, 5 C, 5 7.
(A s said before, 6 7 is in both schemes sometimes compossihle, and sometimes
inconi|ios>ible.) 2 , Two incompossiblc.s, to wit, 2 7, ,3 G, which, on the
Aristotelic doctrines, arc Contradietories, are in mine Contraries.
The propositional form 4 is consistent with all tlie allirmatives; 8 is not only
consi.'teiit with all tlie negatives, but is eompossible with every other form in
nniversals. It is useful only to divide a class, and is opjiosed only by the
negation o f divisibility.
By adopting exclusively the Imlelinito jiartieiilarity, logicians throw away some

imiiortant immediate inferences; those, to wit, 1 , From tlie allirmalioii of one
some to the negation o f tuiother, and vice I'ersn : and, 2, From the alHrmation
of one iivonsisi(nt to the negation o f another. 1 , Thus, on onr .system, bnt
not on tlieiis, allirming all man lo he some animal, we havc a right to infer that
no man is some (other) anim al: allirming that some animal is all man, we have
a right to infer that some (other) (inimal is not aujj man ; allirming some men are
some hUirks ( N' fjenes), We are entitled to say that (same) some men are not some
( o'her) b'acks ( lliinloos 3 , and abo that (other) some men are not the (same) some
blacks. And so backwards from negation to aflirmation. This inference I
w(jiild call that o f [Integralion],
2 ', Allinning all men are same anlmaLs, wc. are entitled to infer the denial of
the propo'ilions, all nun are all animals, some men are all animals. And so in
the negative mcoiisistenls.
A f f iio ia t iv k s .
1 .) Toto-total = Ai'a= All is all .
ii.) 'I'oto-jiartial = A fi = All is some . (A )
3.) Parti-total = Ifa = Some is all .
iv.J Parti-jiartial = I fi = Some is some . (I)
N kcjativk .s .
v.J Toto-total = An a = Any is not any . (E )

G.) Toto-partial = A xi = A ny is not some .
vii.) Parti-total = I.va = Some i.s not any (O )
8 .) Parti-jiartial = Ixr = Some is not some .
A P r K X I) I X . 535
T A B L E OF TiiK M u t u a l K l l a t i o .v s ou tiil E ig h t P r o u o sit io n a i . F o rm s on
E it iil r S ystrm o f P a r t i c u l a r it y . (F o r G rn era ls o n l y .)
COWio CO:
I
I eI. I 0r0c1 cri c.->I 0I0 no <I 0I0-cI tr.I <I :: i ITToo -cTc~T'i
^ oo oo
T f f' T Td T |
.r Z
- o
a-.r=r>r=r> s = = = = = p ' O', r - . :

^ T* - " p P
3*5 c
o
o Or-
I I;
_po=:_p -1 ^ co: gH
00 < 05 II II T^
i i . 00 Ci cc a . 00 co< o> -*-
I i f I.
< L<
r* r* EH-srr-
cc = = cc c c
" 3 5
icp:!?3 73r'
-? ? a:r^ M 0rr. 3Tl.
a S ^
? . 3 '
o& a^:
A b b r e v i a t i o n s : b i . = ^ M a / ^ r a Z ; c r . = c r o s s ; C o n t r a r . = Cbn^ranVs ; cli. = ^f/Vcc/ ;

Tncoiis. = lu c o tis is ie n ts : I n t . o r T n t c ^ r . = In te g r a tio n ; l i e p u ^ n . = R e p u g n a n ts , Con
tra d ic to rie s: Ucs. o r R c siv , ~ R e s tr ic tio n , S a h a lie r n a tio n ; iin. = u n ila ta 'a L UTaiiks:
in I. = C o m p o ss ih lfs : in I I . ~ X o inference. (U n ila te r a l, bilateral, cross, d irect, r e f e r
lo t h e E x t r e m e s . )
The precedin <5 Table may not be quite accurate in details.
536 APPENDIX.
V. S y l l o g i s .m s .
ODSERV A TIO X S OX THE .M UTOAL U E LA TIO X S OF SV LLO G ISTIC TE R 3IS IN QOAX
TITV VXD Q U A L IT Y .
General C anon. 117nR w o rst reln tio n o f s u b je c t a n il p r e d ic a te su b sists beiioeen

' ilie r o j' I w ) term s a n d a com m on th ird term , leidi w hich one, a t lea st, is p o s itiv e ly
n l a b d ; th a t r ela tio n su h sisls betw een the tw o term s them selves.
There are only three possible relations o f Terms (notions, representations,

presentations).
1. Tlie relation o f T o to -lo ta l C o'inclusion (coulentity, absolute convertibility
or reei])roealion) (A fA ).
2, The relation o f T o to -lo ta l C o ex clu sio n (non-iilentity, absolute inconverti-
liility or non-reei])roeation) (A n A ).
3, The relation oi' In co m jilcte C d in c ln sio n , wliieh involves the counter-rela
tion o f I n c o m p b te C o ix c la siu n (])artial identity and non-identity, relative con
vertibility and non-convertibility, reciprocation, and noii-rcciprocalion). This
is o f various orders and degrees.
a) Where the whole of one term and the part of another are co'inclnsive or
eoideiitieal ( A f l ) . Tliis I call the relation o f to to -jx irlia l eo'inclusion, as, vl//
men a re som e a n im a ls. Tliis necessarily involves the counter-relation o f loto-
j ia r lia l co ex clu sio n (A n I), as. A n y m a n is not som e a n im a l. But the converse
of this anirmative and negative alfords tlie relations o f
b) P a rti-to > n l C o in clu sio n (IlA) and C o ex clu sio ii (liiA ), as. S om e a n im a l is
a ll m a n , .Some a n im a l is not a n y m an.
e) There is still a third double relation under this head, wlientwoterms
partially include and partially exclude each other (I f I In i), as, ,So?hc w om en are
som e rt(i'//or.s, and So m e w om en a re no' som e a u th o rs. This relation I call that
of P n r ti-p n r tia l C o in c lu sio n and P a r ti- p a r tia l C oexclu sion .
O f these three general relations, the first is [teehiiieally styled] the best; the
secoml is the worst; and the third is intermediate. *
Fonuer logicians knew only of two worse relations, a particular, worse
than a universal, afTirmative, and a negative worse than an aflirniative. As to
;\ better and worse in negatives, they knew notliing; for as two negative
jiremises were inadmissible, they bad no oceasion to determine wliieh o f two
negatives was the worse or better. But in fiuantilying the jiredieate, in con
necting positive and negative moods, and in generalizing a one .supreme canon
o f syllogi.Mn, we are eompelled to look further, to consider the inverse proced
ures o f anirmatioii and negation, and to show (e. y ., in v. a. and vi. b.,ix. a.
and X. b.) how the latter, by reversing the former, and tnniiiig thebestcjuan-
tlty o f alfirmation into the worst o f negation, annuls all restrletion, and thus
apparently varies the quantity o f the eoiieliision. Tt thus becomes neee.ssary to
show the whole order o f best and worst quantification throughout the two
APPENDI X. bo (
qualities, and how alTinnation commences with the wliole in Inclusion and
Negation, with the parts in Exclusion.*
Toto-toml,
Toto-partial,
Identity or Comclusion.
Parti-total,
Parti-])iirtial.
Parti-partial,
Parti-total,
Non-identity or coiixclusion
Toto-partial,
Toto-total.
As the ncgition always reduces the best to the worst relation, in the inter
mediate relations determining only a cotimiutation from equal to etiual. whilst
in both the svttiltols of tjuantity, in their inverse signification, remain externally
the sam e; it is evident that the quantification of the eonelusion will rarely be
apparently different in the negative from what it is in the eorrespomlitig
positive mooil. There are, indeed, only four ditrerenees to be found in the
negative from the positive conclusions, and these all proceed on the same
p rin cip le viz., in v. a. and vi. b., in ix. a. and x. b. Here the particular
quantifi ation of the positive conclusions disappears in the negative moods.
But tliis is iu obedience to the general canon o f syllogism, That the worst
relation subsisting between either extreme and the middle, should subsist
between the extrem es them selves. For what was the best relation in the
former, becomes the worst in the latter: ami as affirmation comes in from the
greatest whole, while negation goes out from Ihe least pai t. so, in point o f fact,
the some o f the one max become the uol nng o f the other. I herc is here,
therefore, manifestlv no e.xception. On the contrary, this affords a striking
exam ple o f the universal applicability of the canon under every change of
circumstances. The Ccinon would, in fact, have been invalidated, had the
apparent anomaly not emerged.
I. Terms each totally cotnclusive of a) A term totally coexclusive, and

a third, are totally cotnclusive o f each a term totally contclusive, of a third,
other. are totally coexclusive of each other.
b) A term totally coinclusive. and
a term totally coexclusive, of a third,
are totally coexclusive of each other.
II. Terms each parti-totally coinclu- a) A term parti-totally eoexelusive.
sive o f a third, are partially cotnclusive and a term parti-totallv eoinelusive,
of each other. of a third, are partially coexclusive of
each other.
b) A term parti-totally cotnclusive,
and a term parti-totally coexclusive,
of a third, are partiall\ coexclusive of
each other.
1 Se e M a g e n t i n u s (iu B r a n d is , Schoha, p. 113, a n d t h e re t h e P l a to n ic s ).

08
638 A r P KN D IX .
111. A term totally, and a term par- a) A term totally coexclusivc, and
ti-totally, eoinelnsive o f a tliird, are a term parti-totally eoinelnsive, o f a
toto-iiartially eoinelnslve o f each other. third, are toto-partially eoexeluslve of
each otlier.
b) A term totally eoinelusive, and
a term jiarti-totally eoe.xelusive, of a
third, are toto-jiartially eoexclusive of
each other.
IV. A term parti-totally, and a term a) A term parti-totally eoexclusive,
totally, eoinelnsive o f a third, are jiarti- and a tcim totally eoinelusive, of a
totallv eoinelnsive o f each other. third, are parii-totally eoexeluslve of
each other.
b) A term parti-totally eoinelusive,
and a term totally eoexeluslve, of a
third, are jiarti-totally eoexeluslve of
each other.
V. A term totally, and a term toto- a) A term totally eoexclusive, and
partially, eoinelnsive o f a third, are a term toto-partially eoinelnsive, of a
parti-totally eoinelnsive of each other. third, arc totally eoexclusive o f each
other.
b) A term totally eoinelusive, and
a term toto-])artIally eoexclusive, of a
tliird, are jiarti-totally eoexclusive of
eacli other.
^T. A term toto-partially, and a a) A term toto-partially coexclu
term totally, coinedusive o f a third, are sive, and cl term totally eoinelusive, of
toto-partially eoinelusive o f each other. a third, are toto-jiartially coexclusive
o f each other.
b) A term toto-partially eoinelusive,
and a term totally eoexeluslve, o f a
third, are totally voe.xelusive o f each
otlier.
VII. A term parti-totally, and a a) A term jiarti-totally eoexclusive,
term partially, eoinelusive o f a third, and a term jiartially eoinelnsive, o f a
are partially eoinelusive of each other. third, arc ])artially eoexclusive o f each
other.
b) A term parti-totally eoinelusive,
and a term jiartially eoexeluslve, of a
tliird, are partially coexclusive o f eacli
other.
V lll. A term partially, and a term a) A term partially coexclusive, and
parti-totally, eoimdiisive of a thinl, arc a term p.arti-totally eoinelusive, o f a
partially eoinelusive of each other. third, are partially eoexeluslve of each
other.
b) A term partially eoinelusive, and
a teiTii jiarti-totc'illy eoexclusive, o f a
third, are partially coexclusive o f each
other.
APPENDIX. 539
IX . A teim totally, and a term jiar- a) A tenn totally coe.xclusive, and

tially, roinclusive of a third, are par a term jiartially coinclusive, of a thiid,
tially foiuelusive of each other. are totally coe.wlusive of each otlicr.
b) A term t o t a l l y c o i n c l u s i v e , and a
term j i a r t i a l l y co e.xc lu siv c , o f a tliird,
arc J ia r tia lly c o e x c l u s i v e o f e a c h other.
X. A term partially, and a term a) A term jiartially coexclusive, and
totally, coinclusive o f a third, are par a term totally coinclusive of a third,
tially coniclusivo o f each other. arc partially coexclusive o f each other.
b) A term partially coinclusive, and
a term totally coexclusivc, o f a third,
are toto-partially coexclusive of each
other.
X I. A term parti-totally, and a term a) A term parti-totally coexclusivc,
toto-jiartially, coinclusive o f a third, and a term toto-partially coinclusive, of
are jiarti-totally coinclusive o f each a third, are jiarti-totally coexclusivc of
other. each other.
b) A term parti-totally coinclusive,
and a term toto-jiartially coexclusive,
o f a third, are parti-totally coexelusive
o f each other.
X II. A term toto-partially, and a a) A term toto-partially coexclusivc,
term parti-totally, coinclusive o f a third, and a term loto-jiartially coinclusive, of
are toto-partially coinclusive o f each a tliird, arc toto-partially coexclusivc
other. of cach other.
b) A term toto-jiartially coinclusive,
and a term parti-totally coexelusive, of
a third, are toto-jiartially eoe.xclusive
of each other.
V I . 7 O b j e c t i o n s t o t h e D o c t r i n e o f a Q u a n t i f i e d P r e d i c a t e C o n
sid e r e d .
(a) G E y K R A L .
MATERIAL AND FORMAL. THEIR DISTINCTION.
But it is requisite, seeing that there are such mi.sconceptions prevalent on

the Jioint, to determine precisely ivhat is thc form al which lies within thc
jurisdiction of Logic, and which Logic guarantees, and what the material which
lies witliout the domain o f Logie, and for which Logic is not resjionsiblc. This
is fortunately easy.
Logic kncDvs takes cognizance o f certain general relations; and from
these it infers certain others. These, and these alone, it knows and guarantees ;
and these arc formal. O f all beyond these forms or general relations it takes
no cognizance, affords no a.snranoe: and only hypothetically says. If thc
several notions applied to these forms stand to each other in the relation o f
540 A P P E N D I X .
tlicsc forms, then so and so is the result. B n t w liethcr these notions are rightly
applied, tliat is, do or do not b ear a certain reciprocal d ep en d en ce, o f tbis
Logie, :is Logie, know s notliing. L et A B C rejiresent three notions, A eon-
laining B. and B eontaiiiiiig C ; in that ease Logie assures ns that C is a part
o f B, and B a jiart o f A ; that A con tains C ; tliat C is a part o f B and A.
N ow all is forniab the letters b ein g sujijioscd to be. m ere abstract sym bols. B ut
if we apply to them fill them iiji by tlie three determ in ate n o tio n s ,
A n im a l . M a n . X c g r o . we introduce a certain m a tte r, o f which Logic is
not it.<elf c o g n iza n t; Im gic, tlierefore, m erely sa y s , I f these notions hold
to each other the relations represented by A B C, then tlic sam e results will
follow : but w hether they do m utually hold these relations, that, as m a te ria l,
is extra-logical. Logie is, therefore, bound to exh ib it a schem e o f the forms,
that is. o f the relations in their im iuediatc and m ediate results, which are d eter
m ined by the m ere n ecessities o f thinking, by the law s o f tlionght as tliu u gh t;
but it is bound to nought beyond this. T hat, as m aterial, is b eyond its ju ris
diction lio w e v e r m anifest, this has, liow ever, been frerpieiitly m isunderstood,
and the m a te ria l has been e n riv n ily passed o if in Logic as the f o r m a l.
B n t further. Logic is botmd to exh ib it this schem e full and nne.xelusive. To
lojt or lim it this in eonforniity to any eircnnistance extrin sic to the bare con d i
tions, the iiiere form, o f tlionght. is a m aterial, and, eon setju en tly, an illegiti
mate cnrtailm i'nt. T o take, for in stan ce, the aberrations o f eom iiion language
as a m odel, would be at on ce absunl in itself, and absm d as in eoiisisten t even
with its own jirtietice. A n d y e t this double absurdity the Logie now realized
actually I om niits. F or while in p rineijile it avow s its allegian ce to thought
alone, ttnd in ji.irt it has o vertly rcjiudiated the elisions o f h in g n a g c ; in jiart it
has aecom m odatcil itse lf to the usages o f speech, and this also to the e.xtent
from which even Grammtir htis nitiintaiiied its freedom . G nim m ar, the seien ee
[irojier, the n oniology, o f laiigntige, htis not established cllijisis as a third law
beside C on eoid and G overn m en t; nor h:is it even allow ed Concord or G overn
m ent to be snpersedw l by ellijisis. A nd w hy? B eca u se the law, though not
ex tern a lly exprc.ssed in lan gu age, was still in tern ally op erative in thought.
Logie, on the contrary, the scien ce jiroper, the nom ology, o f thought, has
establisheil an im jierative (dlipsis o f its abstract forms in eonlbrm ity to the
jtrecarioiis cllip>cs o f outw ard sp ee ch ; and this, although it professes to look
ex clu siv e ly to the; iu tc n ia l jtrocess, and to exjd icatc, to fill ujt what is im plied,
but not stated, in tlie short cuts o f ordinary lan gu age. L ogie has n eglected ,
withln-ld, in fact o p en ly suppressed, o n e-h a lf o f its forms (tlie quantifiea-
tion o f the predicate u n iversally in aflirm atives, jitirticularly in n eg a tiv es),
because these forms, though alw ays op erative in thought, w ere usually passed
over as siijierflnons in the m atter o f exjiression.
'I'hus has l.o g ic, the science! o f the form, b een m ade liithertn tlie slave o f
the m atter, o f tlionght, both in what it has received and in what it lias rejected.
And well has it bci-n jinnishcd in its servitude. ]\Iore than lia lf its value has
at on ce been lost, confusion on thi! one hand, im |ierfection on the other, its lot;
disgust, t-ontcinjit. eom partitive neglet.'t, the eon seipien ee. T o reform L ogie, wc
must, therefore, reston! it to freedom ; einancijiati! the form from the m atter;
wc must, 1 , A dm it nothing m aterial under the nam e o f form al, and, 2,
APPENDIX. 541
R eject nothing formal under the nam e o f m aterial. W lieii this is done, Logic,
stripped o f its accid en tal deform itv, w alks forth in n ative beau ty, sim ple and
co m p lele; easy at on ce and useful.
It now rem ains to show that the (|u;uitities o f the P red icate den ou n ced bv
logicians
2? are true logical
O forms.
* * * * * * *
T h e logicians have taken a distinction, on which th ey have defended the
A ristotelic prohibition o f ;iii overt quantification o f the jired ieatc; the distinc
tion, to wit, o f the fo r m a l, in 0 |)|)Ositioii to the m u icria l, ~ o f w hat proceeds ct
fo rm c e, in contrast to w hat jtroceeds v l m a leru e. It w ill be rc(|nisitc. to d eter
m ine ex p licitly the m ean ing and apjilication o f these exju-essions ; for every
logical process is fo r m a l, and i f the logicians be correct in what they include
u n d er the category o f m a te ria l, the whole system ivhich I would propose
in sn p p lcm en t and correction o f theirs m ust be at on ee surrendered as
untenable.
Ill the first p la ce, tbe distinction is not establislied, in term s at least, bv
A ristotle. On the contrary, althongli tho jn-ojiositional and syllogistic relations
which he recogn izes in his logical jirecept be all formal, he, as indeed all
others, not unfretiuently em ploys som e whicdi are on ly valid, say tlie logicians,
r i matericE, and not ra tio n e fo rm c e , that is, in spite o f Logie.
B u t here it is adm itted that a distinction there truly is; it is, con sequ en tly,
on ly n ecessary, in the second p lace, to ascertain its import. W h at then is
m eant by these several p rin cijiles?
T h e answ er is easy, perem jAorv, and tmanibignous. All that is f o r m a l is
true as consciously necessitated by the laws o f tlio n g h t; all that is m a te r ia l is
true, not as necessitated by tho laws o f thought, but as legitim ated by the
conditions and probabilities discoverable in tbe objects about which we ohanoe
to think. T h e one. Is a jir io r i, the other a p o s te r io r i; tlie on e is n ecessary,
the other co n tin g e n t; the one is known or thought, the otlier unknow n or
nnthought.
F o r exam p le : if I think tliat the notion tr ia n g le contains tlic notion trila te ra l,
and again tliat the notion tr ila te r a l coiitaiiis the notion tr ia n g le ; in other word--,
if I think that each o f these is in clu sively and ex clu siv ely apjilicable to the
o th e r; I formally say, and, if I speak as I think, must say A ll tria n g le is all
tr ila te ra l. On the other hand, if I on ly think that all triangles are trilateral,
but do not think all trilaterals to be triangular, and yet say, A ll tria n g le is a ll
tr ila te r a l, tbe proposition, though m aterially true, is form ally false.
A gain, if I think, that this, that, and the other iron-attracting stones arc.som e
m agnets, and yet thereon o vertly in fe r , A ll m a g n ets a ttra c t ir o n ; the infer
en ce is formally false, even though m aterially not nntrne. W h ereas, if 1 iliiiik
that this, that, and the other iron-attracting stones arc a ll m agnets, and thence
eoncliido, A ll m a g n ets a ttra c t ir o n ; m y conclusion is form ally true, even
should it m aterially jirove false.
T o g iv e the former exam jile in an abstract notation : If I note C : ---- : F,
I m ay form ally con vert the projiosition and state F : ~ : C. But if I note
C : I r , I cannot form ally con vert it, for the F m ay mean cither : F or
542 APPENDIX.
. r ; a .iilif I iln, the product m ay or may not be true, accord in g as it isaccb

den tally applied (o tins or that particular m atter. A s to the latter exam p le :
C . : (m in' in", etc.) : ^ ---------: F
T his syllogism is form ally legitim ate. B u t, to take the follow ing a n te c e d e n t:
this, if form ally draw n, warrants o n ly , ( 1 ), a particular con clu sion ; and if, ( 2 ),
a universal be draw n, such is logically null :
C , : (m m 'm " , etc.) : -------, F

-
T his being the distinction o f formal and m aterial, that wliat is form ally
true, is true by a su b jective or logical la w ; that wliat is m aterially true, is
true on an ob jective or extra-logical condition ; the logicians, with A ristotle at
their head, are exp osed to a doulile accusation o f the gravest character. F or
th ey arc ch a rg ed : 1 , T h at they have exclu d ed , as m aterial, m uch that is
yiurely formal. 2 . T h at they have included, as formal, m ucli that is purely
m aterial. O f these in their order.
1 , I shall treat o f this u nder the heads o f A flirm ative and o f N egative
proiiositions.
O f the four A ffirm ative relation s o f con cep ts, as subject and p red icate; to
wit 1 . T h e Tn'.n-tutal ; 2 . T h e T o lo -/trlial : 3. T h e P a rti-T o ta l: 4. T h e
P a r t i-P a rt ia l : one h alf ( 1 , 3) arc arbitrarily ex clu d ed from logic. The.se arc,
how ever, relations ec|nally n ecessary, and eq u ally obtrusive in tlionght, with
the oth ers; and, as formal realities, eq u ally dem and a logical statem ent and
coii'id eration . N a y , in this partial p roceed in g, logicians are not even self-con-
î'l(nt. T liey allow , tor exam p le, the lota-jiarlial d ep en d en cy o f notions, and
In-y allow o f their conversion. Y et, though the terms, mIicii con verted , retain,
and m ust retain, their original relation, that is, their recijirocal q u an tities; we
find the logicians, after A ristotle, d eclarin g that the predicate in allirm ative
propO'itions is to bc rcganhal as p articu lar; liowbcit, in this instance, w here the
to'i-jHirlial is conv(>rtcd into tin* parti-tolal relation, their rule i.s m anifestly
iil'c. W hen I e n o iin c c , AU man is animal, I m ean. and the logicians do
not gainsay m e , AU man is same animal. I then con vert this, and am allow ed
to s a y , Sfjiin animal is man. But I am not allow ed to say, in words, though
I say. indeed niiisl say, in tlioiiglit, Sotne animal is all man. And w h y ?
Sinijily lici-aiisc there is an ohi traditionary rule in L ogic which jirohibits us
ill all ca-cs. at least o f aflirm ative jiroposilioiis, to quantify the jircdicatc nniver-
sally ; and to establish a rca'ôn for this exclu sion , the jirineiplc o f m ateriality
ha- liei-ii i-alled in. But if all is formal w h id i is nceessitated by tlioiiglit, and
if all lin t is rormal oii.dit lo find au exjiressioii iu L ogie, iu that ease the iini-
ver-al (|iianli(icnlioii o f the notion, whi-n it stands as pred icate, m ay bi, ought,
indeed, oil dem and, to In*, inioiiiiei-d, no less cxjillcitly than when It stootl as
1 fo r an <'X ()Iaiiatioii of tlie iiotalion I ic r c e m j i l o y c d , in reference to Syllogism , see

A p p e n d i x ,M . l.i).
A r pEX DIX. 543
subject. T h e quantification is no m ore m aterial on the one altern ative than

on the o ther; it is formal in both.
In like m anner, the to to -to ta l relation is d en ou n ced . B u t a sim ilar exp osi
tion shows that notions, thonglit as reciprocating or cocip ial, are en titled , as
p redicate, to h.ave a universal (piantific.ation, no less than as subject, and this
form ally, not m aterially.*
In regard to the four N eg a tiv e relations o f term s, 1 . T h e Toto-lolnl, 2 .
T h e T o to -p a rtk d , 3. T \\o P a r ti-to tiil, 4. T h e P u r ti-p a r lk il; in like m anner,
on e half, but these w holly d iileren t elas.ses (3 , 4 ), are cap ricioii'ly abolished. J
say ca p ricio u sly ; for the relations not recogn ized in Logie are eq u ally real in
thought, as those which are ex clu siv ely adm itted. W h y, for exam p le, m ay I
say, as I th in k , Som e a n im a l is not a n y m an : and y e t not say, eon vertib ly, as
I think , A n y m a n is not som e a n im a l? F or this no reason, beyon d the oajirice
o f logicians, and the elisions o f com m on lan gu age, can be assigned. N citlier
can it be show n, as I m ay legitim ately th in k , Som e a n iim d is n ot som e a n im al
(to take an extrem e in sta n ce), that I m ay not form ally express the sam e in the
tech n ical language o f reasoning.
In these cases, to say nothing o f others, the logicians h ave, therefore, been
gu ilty o f ex tru d ing from their scien ce much that is pu rely fo r m a l; and this on
the untenable plea that what is formal is m aterial.
(6) S P E C IA L .
T w o objections have been taken to thc universal quantification o f the p red

icate. It is said to b e 1 , F alse ; 2 , I f not false, useless.
I. T h e first observation may be subdivided into two heads, inasm uch as it
m ay be attenqited to establish it, a ), on m aterial; b ), on formal, grounds. Of
these in their ord er:
a ). T liis ground seem s to be tbe on ly one taken by A ristotle, who, on three
(jjerh.aps on four) diirerent occasions d en ou n ces the universal (inantification o f
the |)ied iea te (and he but im plicilly limits it to aflirm ative propositions) as
'A d ic a y s nn hm e."- T h e on ly p io o f o f this u n exclu sive denunciation is, how
ever, one special ex a m p le wliicli he gives o f the falsity em erging in the propo^
sitioii, A ll m an is a ll a n in n d . T his must be at on ce confessed false; but it is
on ly so niaterlally and eo n tin gen tly, argues, therefore, nothing for the formal
and necessary Illegitim acy o f sir. h a (piantificalion. A s extra-logical, this
p roof is logically in c o n q ic tc n t: for it Is on ly because we hapjien, throngli an
ex tern a l k n ow led ge, to be aware o f the relations o f the con cep ts, man and
an im a l, that tbe exam p le is of an y import. But, b ecause the unli ersal quanti
fication o f the predicate is, in this instance, m aterially false, is sneh ([nantifica-
tioii, therefore, alw ays form ally illegal V That tlils is not thc ease, let ns take
other m aterial e.xainjdes. Is it, then, m aterially false and fbrnially ineom pe-
tent to think and sa y , A ll h u m a n is a il r a tio n a l, A ll r a tio n a l is a ll risib le ,
1 It is l i a r d l y ro q ii i si fo to n o t i c e ttie b l i i n - ii o iii ic e d b y Ili e a c n t e r lo^ficiiiiis, w l i c i i tl i e y

dcriii" d octrine o f so m e a n i l i o i s , Ilia t the l i a v e e l i a n c e d t o n o t i c e tlie a b s u r d i t y . .'see
p r e d i c a t e is m a t e r i a l l y < in a n li li e d . e v e n w h e n Foi.seca, Iiittit. Dial. I. vi . c 20.
prcdesipriiiited as i i n i v e i s a l . It is s u ll ic ie n t l o .See p. 546. K d .
observe that this opinion is e x p l i c i t l y re-
51:4 Ar pEXDIX.
A ll risible is a ll ca p a b le o f a ih in ra lio n , A ll tr ila te r a l is a ll tr ia n g u la r , ^4/1

etc. ? Or, em-
tr ia n g u la r is a ll fig u re u'ith its a n g le s e q u a l to tw o rig h t a n gles,
[)Io\iiig Aristotles mnterial ex:iii|)le, is it untrue, as lie asserts, to say, Som e
a n im a l is a ll m an ; and tliis either coLlectivclg, A jx o 't o f the c la ss a n im a l is
'he irhole o f thc c la ss m a n , or ilistrib u tiv e b j, Som e s e v e ra l a n im a l is e ve ry
SI r c r a l man ?
r>nt the absurdity of such a reasoning is further shown by the fact, that if it
were cogent at all, it would equally conclude against the validity of the uni
versal (iii.intilieation of thc snhjeet. For this proposition is equally untrue
(employing alwavs Aristotles own material example), A ll a n im a l is m an .
After this, it mav thc less surprise us to find that Aristotle silently abandons
his logical canon, and adheres to truth and nature. In fact, he frciinently docs
in prai tice virtualh' quantify the predicate, his common reasonings often pro
ceeding on the reciprocation or coextension of snbjeet and predicate. Nay,
ill his logical svstcm, he expressly recognizes this eocxtcnsion ; unless, indeed,
we ovfi-tly siqiply thc quantification of thc jiredicatc, his doctrines of Induc
tion and of Dcmonstrailon proper have no logical notation; and, unless we
I'overtlv siqipoê it, the}' are actually arrested. His definitions of the Univer-
<al. as severally given in his J ir io r and P o s te r io r A n a ly tic s , arc, in this respect,
conllictivo. In the former, his universal (known in the schools as the U n iv e rsa le
P r io r is tic u m ) explicitly forbids, whereas the latter (the U n iv e rsa le l^ osterior-
isllcn m ol' the schoolmen) implicitly ])ostuIates, the quantification of the
predicate.
b). Thc defect in thc polemic of their master was felt by his followers.
The} , ai'cordiiigly, in addition to, hut with no correction of, Aristotles doc
trine. argue the question on broader ground ; and think that they dis])rove the
formal validity of such (pianllficatlon liy thc following reasoning. Overlooking
tin* case, where the subject is particularly, the predicate niiiversally, (pianti-
ficd. as in the instance I have just given, they allege the case of what are
called r< c ip r o r a lin g p rn jio sitio n s, where both subject and jircdlcatc arc taken
In tlicir utmost extension, vi m a te r u r, as snbscipicnt logicians* say, but not
Ari.'totlc. Il l this case, then, as in the exam|)Ie, zl// m a n is a ll risib le, th e y
a'xTt that the overt quantification of thc predicate is inept, because, thc a ll as
ai)]ilied to the subject being distribiitively taken, every individual man, as
Socratc<. Tlato, etc., would be all (that is, the whole class) risible. This ob
jection isonly respectable by authority, ihroiigh the great, the all but unc.x-
clii'Ivc, iiiimlxT of its allcgcrs: in itself It is futile.
T crm s and their (piaiitifications an* 'iscd cither in a d islrlbntlve, or in a col
lectiv e, scii'c. It will not be asscrti*d that an y (piaiitificatlon \s, p e r se, neces-
-arily coMcctive or necessarily distribntivi*; and It rem ains to ascertain, by rule
and nd.iilon, In which signification it is, or m ay bc, em p loyed . N ow a gen eral
rule or jiO'tiilate o f logic is, 'I'liat in the .same logical unity (projiosition or
.yllogi'iii), the sam e term or (|iiantIficatIon should not b e changed in inqiort.-
If. thereibn*, w c insist, as insist wc ought, that the (piaiitificatioii here, all,
should be ii'cd in the sanm p ro p o sitio n in the. .same m ia in n y , that Is, as a]i])lled
I ' In An I'rior,
r r cxi ii n i ii i ;, I ' a c i i i s , L . i. c. 5 , J). 134 . A lexan der, In An. Prior, L . i. c.
9, a n d a b o v e , p. IjZl, note 1, luh.fin.] S e e p. 5 1 2 . E d .
APPENDIX. 545
to the one term , co llcetiv o ly or distribntively, it slionld be so applied likew ise

to the other, the objection fails. T h u s taken r o llr d i r c li/: xlll (th at is, Me
w hole c la ss) m an is a ll (th at is, the w h ole c la s s ) risib le,< i\\e pro|)ositioii is valid.
A gain , taken (lis lr ib u liv e ly : A U (th at is, ev e ry se v e ra l) m an is a ll (th at is,
e v e r y s e v e ra l) risible, the projio.sition is, in lik e m anner, legitim ate. It is on ly
by violatin g the po.stiilate. T h a t in the sam e lo g ic a l u n ity the sam e sign or
w o rd sh o u ld be u sed in the sa m e sen se, that the objection ajiplies; w liereas, il'tlie
jiostiilate be ol)c_\ed, the objection is seen to be absurd.
It is hardly necessary lo say a iiy lliiiig In coiiiiitatioii o f the gen eral doctrine,
that in R ccip ro ca iin g propositions the p red icate is taken In its full e.xtcnt, v i
m a te rk e. In the first jilacc, this doctrine was not prom ulgated by A ristotle;
Avho, fre(jucntly allow ing, freijuently using, such projiositions, im plicitly
abandons the rule which he ex p licitly lays down in regard to the non-pre-
designalion o f tlie p red icate by a universal. In the second jilace, apart from
authority, such doctrine is in It.self unfounded. F or as form is m erely the n e
cessity o f thought, it is as easy to think two notions as toto-totally coinciding
(sa y , tria n g le and tr ila te r a l) , as two notions toto-partlally and parti-totally co
inciding (say, tria n g le and f ig u r e ) . A ccordin gly, ave can equally abstractly
rcjircsent their relations both by geom etric quantities (lin es or figures),
and by p u rely logical sym bols. T ak in g l i n e s : the former | ; the
latter | . T ak in g the sym bols, the form er C : m :F ; the latter
A, : B . B lit if the reciprocation w ere d eterm ined by the m ere m atter,
by the o b ject con tin g en tly thought about, all abstract representation would be
im jiossiblc. So mueh for the first objection, that tlie universal quantification
o f the p red icate would, at least in ailirniative propositions, be false.
11. A s to the second objection, that such quantification would be useless and
superiluous, di.-orderly, n ay con fusive, this only m anifests the lim ited and on e
sided A'iew o f the objectors, evi-n though A ristotle bc at their head.
Is it u'seless in any ea.'ie, theoretical or practical, that error be refuted, truth
established V A nd in this case
1 , Is it disorderly and confusive that the doctrine o f E x p n n ib les, as they
are called , sliould be brought back from anom aly and pain to ease and ord er;
that projiositions Exelu.sive and E x c ep tiv e, now passed over for their difficulty,
and heretofore con lessed ly studied as ojijirobria and excru ciation s, should
be shown to be, not m erely reducible b y a twofold and threefold tortuosity,
through eight gen era and eight rules, but suiijile, though m isunderstood, m ani
festations o f the im ivers.d (jiiantifieation o f the predicate ?*
2 ^, Is it useic.-is to dem onstrate that every kind o f proposition m ay be con
verted, and not som e on ly, as m aintained by A ristotle and the logician s? A nd
is It disorderly and con fu-ive, in all cases, lo aholish the trijile (or quadrujile)
confusion in the trijile (o r (jiiadruple) processes o f C onversion, and to show,
that o f these processes there is on ly one legitim ate, and that, the one sim ple o f
the whole ?
3, Is it disordei'Iv and confusive to abolisli the com plex confusion o f IMood
and F ig u re, with all their array o f rules and excep tion s, gen eral and sp ecial;
and thus to recall the scien ce o f reason ing to its real unity ?
gg 1 See p. 517. E d .
546 A r r e n d rx .
4, Is it useless and superfluous to restore to the seien ee the m any forms

o f reasoning which had erron eou sly, in elleetu a lly , and even in con sisten tly,
iieen proserihed ?
5. Is it useless or superfluous to p rove that all ju d gm en t, and, eon scqu cn tly,
all reasoning, is sim ply au eijuatiou o f its term s, and that the d ilferen ce o f sub
je c t and predicate is m erely arbitrary ?
G, lu fine, aiiil in sum , is it useless or superfluous to vin d icate L ogic against
the one-sirled view s and errors o f logieians, to recon cile the scien ce with truth
and nature, and to rebslablish it at on ce in its am plilu d c and sinqtlicity ?
V II. H is to r ic a l N o tices o f D o ctrin e o f Q u a n tifie d P re d ic a te .
(a) A R ISTO TLE .
It will bc sniTicient to m ake one ex tract from A ristotle in illustration o f his

doctrine upon this jioInt, and 1 select the follow in g ptissage from his C ategories,
c. v., 7.
F urther, the prim ary substances [irptiTai oixrlai, individual e x is te n c e s ] ,
Iteeause they are snhjeets to all the otliers, and as all the others are ])redieated
of, or e x i't in, th e m , arc, Io r this reason, called su b sta n ces by luecm in en ee.
A n d as the prim ary substances .stand to all the others, so stands the S iiecies to
the G enus. F o r g e n e ra a re p r e d ic a te d o f sp ec ie s, but not, c o n re rse lg , sp ec ie s o f
g e n e r a ; so that o f these two, the sp ecies is more a substtiuee than the gen u s.
Ainuioiiius, who has nothing in his C om m entary on the C a te g o rie s relative to
the above passage o f A ristotle, slates, how ever, the com m on doctrine, with its
reasons, in the follow ing extra ct from his C om m entary on P orp h yrys/a/m /M C -
rion (f. 29, cd. A id. 1-54G).
Bnt con finin g ou rselves to a logical consideration, it b eh ooves us to inquire,
o f these, which are suhject to, which p redicated of, the o th ers; and to be.
aw are that G enera are jtredicated o f Diircrence.s and S p ecies, but not eon-
v(>rs(>ly. The.se, as w e litive saiil, stand in a certain m utual ordi>r, the genus,
the d illcrcn cc, ami the sp ee ies; the gen u s first, the sp ecies last, the diirereuce
in the inidille. A nd the superior must be predicated o f the in fe r io r ; for to
predicate the inferior o f the superior is not allow able. If, for cxan q tle, we
.say, .\U m a n is a n im a l, the proposition is true ; but if we con vert it, and sa y ,
AH a n im a l is w/u/i, tb(! en ou n eeu ieiit isfa l.se . A gain , if wc sa y , A ll horse is
trra tin u a l, wc are righ t; hiit if co y v erscly we say , A ll ir ra tio n a l is horse, we
arc wrong. F or it is not tdlowitd ns to m ake a subject ol the accidental.
Ile n c c il. i.s in com peten t to say that A n im a l is m a n , as previously stated .
[^Caleg. ch. ii., 1 .

W hen one tliinir is p redicated o f another as o f its subjeet, all that is said
tru ly] of the predii'aUi will be said [tr u ly ] also o f the .subject. T hus tnan i.s
1 Tl i p c o n v i T W o f a t n i p ii r o p o s i l i o r i is a l - some animal, a m i , AU knrse is some irrational.

wn).s I n i i ' ; but l l j " lal.-i; p r o p o - i t i o i i s w l i i c h CouvcrHUvtat, Some annnal is all man. txv.i),
are Iii ti- K iv i ii, as c o i i v c r s i i i i i s o f Ilif true, Snmr irratinnal is all hnrsr : t h e t r u t h r e i n a ii i s ,
a r c i i o l c o i iM - r s io i is at a l l . The 1 ru e j i r o p o s i - h u t th e o ii c - s i d e i l d o e i r i i i e o l t h e l o g i c i a n s is
l i o i -. i f e x p l i c i t l y H a t e d , a r e . AU man is exjilod rsl.
APPENDIX. 547
predicatod o f tlii.s and tliat m an,' and a u itn iil o f m an ; a n im a l will tliorcforo be
predicated o f this and that individual, for this and that individiial is both man
and anim al.
iJ e In le rp re l., c. vii., 2 -4 ; see also e, x.
T o en ou n ce som ething o f a niiivcrsal n iiiversally, 1 m ean as. A ll or r r c n j
m an is -while, X o m an is a'hite .....................T o cn ou n cc som ething o f im ivcrsals not
nniversally, I mean as, M a n is w hile, M ia i is not w h ite : for whilst the term m an
is universal, it is not used in tlie.-c ciiou n cem cn ls as universal. Y a r a ll or ev e ry
(ttm ) docs not indicate the universal [its e lf], but that [it is apjiIIcd to a sub
je c t] u n iversally. Tim s, in referen ce to a universal p icd ica tc , to jiredlcate
the iiniver.sal, is not true. F or no aflirmation is true in wliicli the universal is
predicated [ o f a universal p red icate], as. A ll o r e v e r y m an is a ll or e v e r y a n i
m al." (S e c A m m oniiis, Boethius, P sclliis, IMageiitinns, etc.)
I b 'in r A n a liilic s , Bk.I. c. 27, 9. TIic con seq u en t [a e. the p red icate] is
not to be taken as if it w holly follow ed [from the an teced en t, oi- subject, e x
clu siv ely ]. I m ean, for exam p le, as if a ll [oi- irerij'] a n im a l [w ere eoiisetin en l]
on m a n , or a ll [or errry'] .science on m u sic. T lie i onse(|iieiu e s im p ly [Is to be
assum ed], as in onr jirojiositions lias been done ; to do ollierw lse (as to say tliat
all [o r everif] m a n i-. a ll [or e c c r y ] a n im a l, or tliatyns.'/ee is a ll [or evenj(\ y n o d ),
is useless and iin p o ssililc; but to tlie a n teced en t [or su b ject] tlie \_ov e v e rij]
is jirefixed .
Jôs/eriar A n a ly tic s, B . I. c. xii., 10. T h e predicate is not called a // [or
every']-, [th at is, the mark o f universality is not an n ex ed ex cep t to the subject
o f a proposition].
In refutation o f A ristotles reason ing against tlie universal predesignatioii
o f the predicate it will equally disprove the universal predesigiiation o f the
subject. F or it is absurd and impos.-ible to say, A ll a n im a l is m an ; A ll ( e v e r y )
im m o rta l h the s o u l; A il p lc u s n r e is health ; A ll .science is m u sic : A ll m otion is
pleasure.'^ But in point o f fact sneli exam p les disjirove nothing ; for all universal
predesitrnations an* applicable n eith er to subject nor iired ieate, nor to both sub
j e c t and Iired iea te n re th o u ylits, n o t thinij.s; and so are all jir e d c s iy u a titn ts :
therefore, etc. It is oid v m arvellous that such exam p les and sneh reasoning
could satisfy the acntest o f in te llec ts; that his authority should have im posed
on subsequent logician s is less wonder!id.]
1 [ F o r tl ic t Is li e r c , ii.s cl .- e w li e rc , d e i i o t e s o f tlic definition ele va te d into a tw o -fold

the iiirln-idiiiim signahnii, n o t the individunm a x i o m , th e es.se in totn, etc . a n d d id de onini,
I'liginn.] e t c . , t o w a r d tlie c o n c l u s i o n o f t h e li i s t c h a j )-
2 K xainiiles from W egelin, In Greg. Ane- o f t h e Prior Annlijlics.
t e r o f tiie first b o o k
ponymi Comp. P/iil. Synt. L . i v . C. 1 , p. 4 7 3 ; Ti 5t tr th a t ertpou ir ip w Kal rh
oA
Jv. v i . c. 1 , p. G73. Kara iravrhs K aTpyoptiaâi ârepov S a -
3 A n d here 1 m ay correct a n e r r o r , a.s 1 c o n - xepor ra\ir6v eariv. T h i s , w i t h it.s a m b i -
ce iv o it to he, w h i c h h a s d e s c e n d e d f r o m t h e giiity, m a y bo th u s l it e r a lly , lio w e v e r awk-
oldcst to the m ost recent in terp reters o f the w a r d l y , t r a n s l a t e d : B u t [ to s a y ] t h a t o n e
Organon, and been adopted im p licitly by t h i n g i.s ?n a )e/ior o/ifr, a n d [t o s a y ] t h a t ui.e
l o g i c i a n s in g e n e r a l . It is f o u n d in A l c . x a n - t h i n g ;sy ir tt/ ira/ft/o/aZmiot/icr, a r e i d e n t i c a l .
dcr and A m m on ius. as in T ren delen burg, Now, the question arises, W h a t does
S a i n t - l l i l a i r e , an d W a it z ; n o r in de e d , as fa r A ris to tle here m ean b y n u-hote other?''' for
a.s 1 k n o w , h a s it e v e r b e e n c a l l e d in q u e s t i o n it m a y s i g n i f y c i t h e r tli e c l a s s o r l i i g l i e r n o -
d u rin g tbe in te rva l. It re g a rd s the m e a n in g t i o n u n d e r w h i c h an i n f e r i o r c o n c e p t c o m e s ,
548 A r r i: x d ix .
Qtianlifiea'.Ion of rrodicate Aristotle.

1. Admits that syllogism mental not oral (An. Post. I. 10). This to be borne
in mind.
2. That individual is never predicated (Cat. c. 2), refuted by reciprocation of
singular (.In. P r. ii. 23, 4).
3. That allirmattvo universal not [to] be added fo predicate, incompatible with
what he says o f reeiproeation (in An. P r. ii., ee. 22 and 23 alibi). That hi.s
custom to draw miivcrsal conclusions in Tliird I'igure and afiirmative in
SocoiuU with allowance o f simple ion version in certain universal alfirma-
tivos.
4. That particular not in negative predicate, absurd in oh nas, non omnis.
Aristotles doetr'no o f Pirdc-ignation.

1, How can Aristotlc, on his uoelrine, make universal terms taken indif-
or llie inferior conce pt it.elf, o f wliicli, a.-; o f m ore than f iv e others, in w h ic h it is no less
a subject, tile liiglior is predicated. The for cl ea r ly ajiplied to d en o te the to ta lity of a loiver
mer is the sense given by all the co m m en t a n o tio n , o f w h ic h a h i g h e r is ]iredicated
tors; the laiter, the sense whi ch, I am coiilJ- passa ges in wliicli th e w o r d whole (oAos) is
deiit, w.as int ended by Aristotle. Used Con vertib ly with all {w a s). See for ex-
There are on ly tw o gro u n ds o f interpreta ani jde. An. Pr. J1 ii. 5, 10 iii. 5, 7
tion. Tlie rule mu.'t be exp ou nde d iu consis {bis ), 11, } l.j iv. 6 {bis.), 8, 10, 12
t e n c y P , With itself; 2 , Must be with the {bis ) x.xii 7, 8 -\.\iii. 4.
analogy o f Ar istotelic usage. lin t in th e s e c o n d jilaee (a n d lliis is d i r e c t ly
1 . On the former grou nd, the conimon s u b v e r s i v e o f t h e c o u i it e r - o ) ) i n i o n , e v e n in
doe'! ;i e .seems n n l ei ai bl e; for what Aristotle t lij prii.ci,);;! o f th e f e w jiassage.s w l i e i e the
deciarc.s to be ideiilical, by that doc trine be ter m ir'iolr i.s n .eii for class), tlie l o w e r n o t io n
0 0
come - dilferent, nay, ]i]) sed. An interior m ..y he in or u n d e r th e hi g h e r , on ly par'.in i-
cone pi may he in a high er whole or flats, lu r h j; a n d th is m a n i f e s t l y s h o w s t h a t A r i s
either Iiartially or t o t a l l y ; and the dellnition t o tl e c o u l d no t I'oss ibly m e a n , by m er e l y s a y
on llie prevalent interpretation virtually runs i n g tliat o n e t h i n g is iin ot he r , as in a cla ss ,
l o say that o n e thing is all or part in the tliat it s o tin ex rliislvrly, OV u n iversa lly. C o m
whol e ol another, und to say that this other pa re An Pr. 1 iv. 2, 3, 10. On t h is infe r-
is predicated ol it nne.xclnsively, are con ver t p r e la l i o ii , D a rii a n d Ferio w o u l d t h e n be
ible Had Ari-lotle, therefore, u'-ed the e.x- a n i i n l l e d ; a s pe c ia l re sult w h i c h oug ht t o
prei-'ion in Hie signilication aiiribiited to him, liavc startled t h e l o g i c i a n s i n t o a d o u b t o f
he rnn-t. lo a i o i d the contra dic tion, have t b e a c c u r a c y o f t h e re ce iv e d d o c t r i n e in g e n
-aid Tb OS n a u ( T fp o v Iu u\a> d u a i f T c p y , eral. {iiQo, iiisin r o m n iu m , I ac iu s, in hi s r e l a
K. T. A. (* I.ui to say that one t h in g i.s all in ti v e N o t e s and C o m m e n t a r y . )
a whol e other, etc.) 'I'hal d o c t r i n e m us t, t h e r e f o r e , be a b a n
2A tin the sico nd ground, it may, liowever, d o n e d , a n d t h e rule, r e duc ed fo a de fin it io n,
be aiiswi-red. Iliat the ambiguity o f tlie w ord, retid in tlie f o l l o w i n g s i g n i l i c a t i o n : IJnt
I - it stands, i- .uperseded, its significiilioii
t o s a y th at o n e t h i n g is in the whole o f another,
lieiiig deterrnii.ed by other passiige.s I Join as in a subject, a n d tn predicate one thing nnivir-
I."-- : and on this groiiiid am well eoiitent to sally oJ another, are m er e l y v a r io u s e.xjiressioiis
let the (juesiioii he decided. o f t he s a m e m e a n i n g . T h is , in fact , is just
Ill the lirst place, the mean ing I attribute Hie p r e l i m i n a r y e . \ ] d a n a l i o n o f t h e t w o o r d i
to the e.\pre'-ioii, 'whnlr o llu r " that is, n a r y in o d e s o f s t a t i n g a p r o p o s i t i o n , su bs e-
whole subject or iiih-iior notion is, in short, f|iieii tly used b y A r i s to t le . H er e , in bo t h
in strict con formity w ith Ari.-totle's ordinary c o n v e r t i h l e s , he dosceiKls f ro m e x t e n s i o n to
laiii'unge There a r e , 1 admit, sundry pa.s- c o in p r e h e n s i o ii , f r o m t h e p r e d i ca t e t o the
-a/e 111 his logical writings where the term s u b j e ct ; an d t he i n g e n io u s e x p o s i t i o n by the
irnilr I ' c b a r l y n-ed a - s \ n o n ) moiis with rUt.'.s, c o m m e n t a t o r s , o ld a n d n e w , o l the i n v e rs e
ir lug i-r n oiinii: as, to limit ourselves to the i i i lc i it io n o f t h e pl il lo s o p i i e r in t h e two
Prior A n n ly lir s. in I. ook I, iv. ' 2; and II. i. cla us es , m us t he re ga rd ed as e r r o n e o u s.
) 5. \U i\, I v rry i i n g r t i x l . in wl ich Ihe term
tjihol' appears in tliis relation, is overruled by
I 8ee p. 681. E d
A p p i: X I) IX . 549
fcrcntlv, or without prodesigiiatioii, he tantamount to particulars ? ( A n . P r io r ,

1. c. 4, 13; Ortj. P iic ii, j). 135, a lib i).
2, ylii. P r io r , 1 c. 27, 7. l ie says, as elsewhere, A proposition being in
definite [preinilesignate], it is not clear wlie.ther it be universal; wlicn, however,
it is definite [predesignate], that is manifest. Contrast this statement with liis
doetrine o f the all.
3, There arc syllogisms in Aristotle which arc only valid through the quan
tity o f the predicate.
4, Aristotle recpiires, tliongh hc does not admit, the universal prcdesigna-
tion o f the prcdictite in his syllogism of Induction. (V ide An. P r io r , L . ii. c-
23, 4 ; O rgan on lU ic ii, p. 399. Compare also his doetrine, p. 390.)
a>) jI L E X A N D E R A P IIR O D IS IE N S IS .
A lexander Aphrodisionsis, in his eomnientary on the first book o f the P-rior

A n a lg tic s , in reference to the second passage o f Aristotle, states as follow s:
And in the book o f E n n u n c em e n t Aristotle explains why hc there says :
that to predicate the universal o f a universal predicate is not true ; for there
will bc no proposition, if in it we predictUe the universal o f the universal. :is.
A l l m a n is a ll a n im a l. Ho repeats the same also here ; showing how it Is
useless to attempt thus to express the consecution [o f higher from lower
notions] ; and adds, that it is not only useless, but impossible. For it is im pos
sible that a ll m en should be a ll a n im a l, as [?/,sy7c,s.s to sa g (ax p g ffror e*Ve7v must
have drojit out)], tin t a ll m a n is a ll risib le. We must not, therefore, apply the
a ll to the subseciuent [or predicate], bi;t lo that from which it follows [or s u I k
jcct]. For m,a)i is to bc taken universally, as that from which a n im a l follows,
supposing this to be the conse(|uent of a ll m a n . Thus shall we obtain a stock
of universal jiropositions. The jiroccss is the same in making m a n the consc'
qiieiu on its jiropcr a l l ; but m a n is not consequent on a ll b iped, but on a ll
ra tio n a l.
The words, as wc express ourselves, mean as wc exjircss ourselves in
common usage. For wc say, that a ll m a n is simply a n im a l, and not a ll a n im a l,
and that nil p le a su re is n a tu ra l, not a ll n a tu r a l; jirefixing the a ll, not to the
consequent, but to tho subject from which the predicate follows. ( E d d . A id .,
f. 100 a ; J u n t.,I . 122 a ; compare A id ., f. 80 a; J u n t.,f . 105 a.)
(c) A .U M 0X1U S l I E R il E E .
Ammonins Ilermim, In d e I n tc rp . c. vii. 2. (A ldine editions, o f 1503, sig.

C. vii. 59, of 1540, fl. 70, 74.)
In these words Aristotle inquires, W hether, as the annexation of the
aflirmative prcdesignation (irpoo-Siopitrgds) to tho subject constitutes one distinct
class o f Jiropositions, the same annexation to the predicate may not, likewise,
constitute another; and he answers, that the sujtjiositlon is absolutely ground
less. Thus the onouncement a ll (or e ve rg ) m an is o il (or c v e r g ) an im a l
(iras drSpcvTTos -jdv ( i v eo'Ti), asserts that each m a n is a ll a n im a l, as horse, ox, etc
1 See p. 581. E d .
550 APPENDIX.
But tliis proposition is im possible ; as is sliowii by A ristotle in his here om itting

tbe word true. For no allirm ation ran be true in which the universal is
predicated o f a universal jired icate; that is, in which tlie niiiver.sal jiredesigiiate
is added to a iiiiivi'rsal iiredicato ; as when wc s.iv that man ( o f whom all, or,
as he sa }s, im iv c rsd ly , an'anal is jucd icatcd ) is not sim ply animal, but all
animal. l i e . ihcn'tlirc, teaches that such an allirm ation, as utterly untrue, is
utteil_v iiu'om jietcnt..................
' N eith er does Aristoth' allow the jiredeslgnation .some lo be an n exed to the
predicate, that projiositions m ay, thereb y, b ecom e true alw ays or occasionally.
F or logicians (as they do not jii'ojiose to them selves e ie r v sujierllnous variety
ot' en im eia tio ii) are juohibited li'om considering jirojiositions (n ot on ly tliosc
alw ays true or alw ays false), but those which exjiress no dill'erence iu referen ce
to necessary or inijXKsible m atli'r, and ail'ord ns absolnti'ly no discrim ination o f
truth I'rom falsehood. Thus, jiarticular jiropositions, which m ay be altern atively
true and fa k e, ought not to have a jiredesigiialed jiredicate. F or in a jiroposi
tion which has all tlicir jiowcr, without an y jiredesignation o f its predicate,
wliy should wc p refer to the sim jiler exjire.ssioii that which drags abuut with
it a siijierlhious additam cnt ? W h y. for exam jile, instead o f A ll man i.s .some
animal [I n'ad. t i Ctior], or. A ll man is not all animal.' should w(> not say, A ll
m an is animal, and in jilace o f A ll man is no ston e, not sa y , A ll man is not
stone: or, wliat is a sim jilcr and m ore natural en ou n cem en t still, lYo man
is sta'.a i
And wh n wc find som e o f the ancients teach in g that the jiartlcular aflirma-
tive predesignation is to be con n ected witli tbe jiredicate, as when A ristotle
liin iself sty les tlie soul a certain (same) en telech y (eVTeAexeiar Tiea), and Plato,
rhetoric, a certain (some) cxjicricn ce {ipn eipiav n v d ) ; it is to b e .o b se r ic d that
the same is there added for tin* sake o f show ing, that the jiri'dicatc is not con-
\ erliblc with the subject, but is its gcn n s, and reijnircs the adding on o f certain
d illerciiccs in order lo render it the su lijccl.s definition.
Blit, add th ey , is not tlie reasoning o f A ristotle rcfiiti'd by fact itself, .seeing
tliat we say. . 1// man i.s capahle o f all science; thus truly con n ectin g the uni
versal Jiredesignation with the universal p red ica te? T h e answ er is this:
tliat, in triith .il is not the jircdicatc to which wc here a n n ex the all. F or what
is Jiredicate I. is what is said o f the subject. B ut wliat is here said o f man is
not that he is s rie n r e , blit that lie is capahle a f .science. If, therefore, the all
were eonjoiiied with the capahle, and the jirojiosilion then to rem ain true, as
when wc s iy all man is all cujmhle o f .science : in that case the ri'asoning of
A ristotle would be n'futed. But this |)ro|)Osilioii i.s necessarily false. It, iu
faet, asserts nothing less than that o f m en, each individual is all the k in d :
that .koer;ite> is not .Socrates only, biil, also Plato, A lclbiadcs, and, in sliort,
e \e r y other in.ui. I'or. if all man i.s all rujxihle a f science, Socrates being
one o l't!ie all. is, tlierefore, him.sidf o// capahle < f science; so that .Socrates
will lie P laio, .\leib ia d es, etc., hiiiec they al.so are cajm blc o f scien ce. F or if
I 1: w ill l>i- o b m T V ft l t li a t A r n m o n i u s clocH o r A r i . s l o l o l i c ( t o c t r i n o ; a n d tlii.s i m p o . s s i b il it y

n o t all i- i n p l a n I'l pi li iileiil lo r Ib is projiosi- lls e lC o u g l i t I u li a v o 0 |ici:(iil Ids eyei, u p o n tlic
lion . I u l a d it is i m p o s t i b l c on I b c Ciîiiino:i ii ir u t ri c i e ii u y o f tlic v i e w h e m u i u l a i u c d .
A p p !: N u I X . 651
Sooratos be not, at once, Plato, Aleibiades, etc., ncitlici- will lie be nil capable
o f science.
Now, that we ought not to prefix the universal afiinnalive predesignatioii
to the predicate (wlicther the predicate be more general than the subject, as
.1// 7iian is all animal, or whether thev be coadeipiate, as .1// mah is all risible),
this is manircst from what has been said. Even when the ti'iins are i oiidecpiate
or reciprocating, the proposition nins into the alisnrd. For, di'claring that
all man is all risible, il virtually declares that each individual m;iu is identical
with all men ; that Socrates, in that he is a man, is all risible, consecpiently, alt
man.................
" Bnt why is it that the predicate is intolerant of tlic prcdesignation uH,
though this be akin to the coimtcr-predesigiiation no or none? Is it because
the adirmativo predicate, if predicated universally, tends always to contain
under it the subject, and this not only when itself coiidcquate with the subject,
bnt when transceudiiig the subject iu extension ; while, moreover, through a
jiartieipation iu its projier natui-e, it is suited to bind up and rednee to unity
the imiltitnde o f individuals o f which the subject is the complement ? For, as
Aristotle jircvionsly observed the all docs not indicate the universal, but
that [the iiuivci-sal predicate inheres in, or is attributed to, the subject] uni-
cersalhj. If, therefore, the alhrmative predicate thus tend to collect into one
what are by nature distracted, iu virtue of having been itself previously recog
nized as sinqilc; in tliis case, the all [siijicradded to this universal predicate,
in tact] enounces not a unity, but a multitude o f several things, things wliich
it is manifestly unable to complicate into recijirocity. But, on tin* other hand,
since what is negatively predicated of, is absolutely separated from, tlie subject;
we are, consequenilv, enabled to dein' ot the subject all under the predicate,
as in saying, AU man is no stone, ^ê nnv' indeed condense this projiosition,
and say more simply, A ll man is not stone; or, more simply still, No man is stone;
thus dispensing with the allirmativc predesignation in a negative proposition.
oo R O E T in U S .
Boethius, In Lihrum de Interpretatione, editio secunda, et in textum lauda-

tum. Opera, p. 318.
W hat he says is to this purjiort: E very simple proposition consists of two
terms. To the.se tliere is frecpiently added a determination either of univer
sality or of particularity ; and to which of the two parts these determinations
are to be added, he expounds. It ajipears to Aristotle that the determination
oiiirht not to he conjoined to the predicate term ; .for in this propo.>ition, Man is
animal (Homo est a n im a l),h is inijiiired whether the determination ought
to be eoiipled with the subject, so that it shall be ( Oninis homo animal
est) .U l (or every) man is anim al: or with the predicate, so that it shall be
(Homo omne ntiimtd est) Man is all (or every) anim al: or with both the one
and the otlu'r, so that it shall be, A ll (or every) man is all (oi- every) animal
(Omnis homo omne animal est). But neither o f these latter alternatives is
competent. For the determination is never joined to the predicate, but e x
clusively to the su b ject; seeing that all predication is either greater than the
552 AP I * E N D I X .
subject, or equ.'l. Thus in this proposition A ll (or e v e r y ) tnan is a in m a l

(o in n is homo a n im o l e s l j , (tn inutl [tlie predicate] is greater than man [the sub
je ct]; and. again, in the jiropositioii M a n is risib le (h om o risib llis e st), risible
[the predicate] iseiiuated to man [the subject] ; but that the jiredieate slionld be
less and narrower tluiii tlie snbjeetis impossible. Therefore, in those predicates
which are greater than the snliject, as, for example, where the predication is
a n im a l, the proposition is manifestly false, if the deteriniiiatioii o f nnivcrsalitv
be added to the predicate term. For if we say, M a n is a n im a l (h om o est
a n im a l), we <ontraet a n im a l, which is greater than m a n , by this deteriniiiation
to [an identity o f extension with] m a n , the subject, altboiigli the predicate.
a n im a l, nn y be apjilied not only lo man, but to many other objeets. ^Moreover,
in those [subjects and predicates] wliieli are eipial, the same occurs; for if I
say. A ll (or e v e r y ) m a n is a ll (or e v e r y ) risib le (o m n is hom o om ne risibile e s t ) ,
in the first ])Iaee, in referenec to the nature o f man itself, it is siipeifluous to
adject the determination ; and, again, if it be added to all se iefa l men, the
proposition beeonies false, for when I say. A l l (or e v e r y ) m an is a ll (or e v e r y )
risible, hy this I seem to signify that the several men are [each of tliein] all or
every risible, which is absurd. The deteriniiiation is, therefore, to be ]>Iaced
not to the predicate but to the subject. But tlic words of Aristotle arc thus
reduced to the foHnwiiig im port: Tn those p r e d ie a te s w hich a re u n iv e rsa l, lo
a d d lo them a iiy h l u n ire r sa l, .so that the u n ire rse d p ircd ica tc m a y he p r e d ic a te d w n -
rer.sally, i.s not tru e. For this is what he says In the ease o f a universal
Jiredieate (tliat is, in a jiroposition whicli lias a universal jircdieati*), to
predicate the universal il.-eif nidvii.-al!y, is not true. For in a universal
Jiredieate, that is, which Is universal and is itself predicated, in this case uni
versally to Jiredieate the jiredieate wliich is universal, that is, to adject to it a
determination of universality, i.s not true ; for it eaiinot be that any allirmation
should lie true in whieli a universal deteriiiination is jirodieated of a predicate
universally distributed; and he illustrates the concejition o f tlie matter by the
examjilc, vl// o r t r c r y m an is a ll (or e v e r y ) a n im a l (o m n is hom o om ne a n im a l
e sl), o f the ineompeteiiey of whieli wc have already spoken.
Boethius, In IJbrum de Jnlerprelalione, editio prima. Opera, p. 23G. (T ext

.'O wretcliedly jiriiited lliat the sense must be constituted by tlie reader.)
\_x\rislotle, e. vii. -1], In what i.s jiredicated as a universal, to predicate
the universal universally is not true.
In this sentence he instrnets us what is the place to wliieh the determina
tion o f universality should be riglitly added. For he teaches that the univer
sality, which we call the universal determination, is to be coiiinjcted with tlie
subject term, never with tlic jiredieate. For wore we to say - - A ll (or e v e r y )
m an is a n im a l ( om n is hom o n n lm a l e s l) , we should say rightly, annexing tlie alt
(or e v e r y ) to the subject, that is, to the term m a n . But if wc thus sjieak A ll
o r e v e r y m a n is a ll o r e v e r y a n im a l ( o m n is hom o om ne a n im a l est ) , we should
s.jicak fal.Tcly, lie , tliercforc, docs not say this [in the w ords] in what is
predicated a.s a universal, as a n im a l o f m a n ; for aiiliiial i.s universal, being
predieati'd of a ll o r e v e r y m an. [But he says] 'I'o jiredieate this universal
itself, a n im a l, to wit, universally, so that we enounce A ll (or e v e r y ) a n im a l is
APPENDIX. 553
m a n (o m n e a n im a l esse h o m in e m ), is n o t t r u e ; f o r h o a l l o w s ( h i s t o b e r i g l i d y
(lone n e i t h e r i n t h e s e n o r in a n y o t h e r a d i n n a t i o n . lie adds, th e re fo re :
F o r n o a t l i r m a t l o n w i l l be. t r u e i n w l i i c h a u n i v e r s a l p r e d i c a t e s h a l l li e u n i i ' c r -
s a l l y p r e d i c a t e d , a s A ll o r e rc r y m an is a ll or c re r y a n im a l (o m n is hom o est om ne
a n im a l) .
W hy this hapjiens, I will explain in a few Avords. T he predicate is alw ays
g reater than the su lje c t, or ecjnal to it. G nuiter, as Avhen 1 say, lUan is a n im at
(h o m o (ininial est J ; here a n im a l is jiredicaled, m a n is subjected, for animal is
jiredicated o f more objects tlian m an. A gain , it is ccjnal Avhen wc thus speak
M a n is risib 'e (h o m o risib ilis e s t) : here m a n is the subject, ?-/s/7'/e the ]ircd-
icate. But m an and risible arc ccp ial; for it is proper to man to be a risible
anim al. B u t that tlic jircdicatc sboiild be found less than the snbjeet, is im pos
sible. Is the predicate th e * g rea ter? T h en , to adject the universal to the
p red icate, \s fa ls e , as in the c.xanijile he him self has giycn A ll (o i e r c r y ) m an
is a ll (o r e r e r y ) a n im a l (o m n is homo om ne n n im a l e s t) .
Is it ccjual ? T h en , the
adjeetion is supeiiluous, as if one shonid sa} , A ll e v e r y w a n is a ll or c r e r y risible
(o m n is hom o om ne risib ile e s t) . AVherefore, to predicate a universal predicate
u n iversally is in com peten t.
(e) AVERI20ES.
A v erro es, P e r ih e rm e n ia s, L . I., c. v.

P ro p o sitio n s a rc n o t div id ed fio m tlie c o n j u n c t i o n o f t h e p red esig n atio n
( c l a i i s u r a i ) Avilh t h e p r e d i c a t e ; b e c a u s e t h e j i r e d e s i g n a l l o n , Avhcn a d d e d t o t h e
p r e d i c a te , t oiistitu lcs a false o r a s iije rtlu o u s p r o p o s iti o n : F a ls e , as or
e v e r y m an is a ll ( o r c r e r y ) a n im a l (o m n is homo est om ne a n im a l) ; s u p e r f l u o u s ,
a s A ll ( o r e v e r y ) m a n is som e o r a c erta in a n im a l (o m n is hom o est q u o d d a m a n i
m a l) . V i d e C o n i i n b r i c e n s e s , In A ris t. D ia l. ii. 1 5 8 .
(/) A L B E R T U S M A G XU S.
A lbertus M agnus, P e r ih c r m in ia s , L. 1., T r a c ta tu s , \ . c. 1 (O p . ed. Lugd.

1 G 5 1 , t. I., p. 2 G1 ).
[ By ' o m n i s non est universale, sed signum universalitatis. Q iiare ly
o m n is et luijusmodi signa distribntiva non snnt n n ivcrsalia, sccnndiim A vicen -
nam .] H oc enim signnm distribntivum , ipiod est onntis, non est universale,
proprie loijn en d o; sed e.st signum jicr ijuod stat pro jiarfieularibus uiiiversallter
u n iversale, eui tale signnm est adjnnctnm . Causa autem , ipiare non .sit un iver
sale, e s t : (juia, (juamvis seenndum gram m atieum sit nom en appellativnm , hoc
1 T l i e C o i m b i a J e s u i t s (.s c b a s t i a i i u s Coii lu .s, liis i n i g l i t y L o g i c (nd locum). AA i t h B o e l h i u s

1G06) e r r o n e o u s l y m a k e r . o e t l i i u s and A ver- he jo in s L evigersoiiides ; be menus tlic
r o e s o p i / o s e A i i s t o t l e , t l i i i i k i i i g tl i at t l i e s i g n Rabbi Levi lien G ersoii, o f C a ta lo n ia , w h o
o f u n i v e r s a l i t y m a y b e i i n u e x e d l o th e j i r e d i - d ie d at I e r p i g n a n iu 1370, w h o w r o le on
c a t e o f a ii ni \ei .'- al piO [ o s it io ii w h e n it is Il i e o l o g y , I l.ilosopliy, A lalliem atics, and
c o e x t e n s i v e w i l l i th e s u b j e c t I h J/ o c iu h ii., p . Logic. See Jticb er v. Levi, from B artolo cci
15 8 ). T h i s , iu i i i i s i a k e , has been copied by a u d AA'olf.
t h e i r b r o l h e r J e s u i t , 1 . A a l l i u s , o f R o m e , in
70
554 APPENDIX.
est, tnnltis scciindiini natura' snaj nptitndinom c o n v e n ie n s; tam en est, secnn-

dnni ronnain, inlinitm n. nullain eniin natnrain nnani dieit. PrOpter qnod om iiis
natura' oonnnnnis est distrilnitivnni. U n iversale aiitein est, (jnod est in nuiltis
ct de inultis. sine n a tu n e, sniijiositis. Id eo o m iiis, et u u llu s, et hiijnsniodi signa
nniversalia i-sse non p o ssn n t; sed snnt sign a designantia ntrnin un iversale sit
acceptnin n n iversaliter vel iarticulariter, secundum sua supposita. E t liaee
sunt \ erba A \ieen n ie.
[ (^nare signnm nn iversale non sit ponendnm a parte iiriedieati.] In sub-
je e to universali signnm distributivnm ordinandnm : (jnia per d ivisionem subjeeti,
pr.edieatnm jiartibus attribnitur subjeeti, nt divisim partieipent id jier jirmiliea-
tionein, ct non in prtedicato jionendinn : quia qninn jirajdicatnm fbrinaliter sit
a cccptnm , non jn-oprie dividitnr, nisi alterins, hoc est, subjeeti divisione : sed
im equaliter redditnr snbjecto et partibns ejns. U n d e id qnod est nniversale,
jira'dicari potest, ut Oinnis homo est an im al; sed unlver.sale n n iversaliter ac-
ce])(nm non j)o(est p n e d ic a r i: nn lla enlni vera alhrm atio esse potest, in qua de
nnivcrsali alicjno p n ed ieato prcdii'ctur sive jirasdieatio fiat; quoniam universal-
iter >ic jiatct. <piod talsum est, Omnis homo est omne animal, et si ponatur, quod
Nullum animal sit nisi homo. Cum enini Z/om/o subjiciatur gratia jiartinm snarum,
ct jira'ilicata tbrmaliter aeci])iantur, oportet quod Qailibet homo esset omne ani
mal, quod falsum est.
(a) L E I T L E X G E llS O N .
L evi Ben G erson (or L evi G crson id es), a Jew ish jihilosopher, who died in
1.370, at I erp ign an , w rote eoim nentarics on A verroes C om m entary upon the
logical hooks o f A ristotle. T h e follow ing is what he says on A verroes doctrine
touchin g (he (juantification o f tlie pi'edicate, as it is found (f. .39) o f the V en ice
edition, in folio, o f lo-52, o f the works o f A ristotle and A v e r r o e s : Al-
thongh it be not n ecessary that when the q u an titative n ote is attached to the
Jiredicatc, this should be false or snjierfluons, seein g that it m ay be neither, as
when we say, '7 is all rational; and the sam e holds good in all other
recijirocating jirojiosiiions ; n everth eless, as in certain m atters it m ay so haj)-
jion, A ristotle has dcclai-ed tlnit the q u an titative note is not to be join ed to the
Jiredicatc in any langu.ige. But it in.iy lie licre o lje c te d , that if this be the
c:i'c, the (jnantitative note should not be am u'xed even to the snbject, since
ilicrc too it m a y b e ciilicr false or sujierllnons. Sujierfluons, as when we
say, Srnue animal h rational. F or tlu; very sam e follows liere, as If we slmj)ly
say. Anim al is raiionat ; tlie some, therefore, is snjierflnous. Fa-lse, as when
we say, AU animal is ralioaal. T lie reason, therefore, assigned by A ristotle
wliy the <innntilative note slionld not be an n exed to the pred icate, is futile, se e
ing tliat for the same, reason it should not be eoim eeted with the subject. To
this we may an sw er: 'Iliat the cause why the (jnantitative note is not usually
conjoined witli tlie jire<licate, i.s, that there would thus be two (jinesita at
on ee. to wit, w lieih er th<! jiredicatc w ere affirmed o f the snhjeet, and, more
over, w hether it were d enied o f everyth in g beside. F or wlien we say, A ll man

2 N o t in t h e 8 v o e d i l i o n o f th e s e w o r k a . V e n i c e , 15C0.
A r i M . N D i x . 555
is a ll ra tio n a l, w e ju d g e tliat a ll 7uan is r a tio n a l, and jud ge, likcAvise, that r a

tio n a l is ile n ie tl-q f a ll but m an. B ut tiicse are in reality two ditl'ereiit qua^sita;
and therelbre it has becom e usual to state tliem,_ not In one. but in two several
jiropositions. A n d this is se lf-e v id e n t; seein g that a qiiajsitnm, in itself, asks
o n l y D oes, or does n ot, this inhere in th a tV and not D oes this inhere in
that, and, at the sam e tim e, inhere in n oth in g else V
(AJ TH E M A S T E R S OF L O U V A IX .
F a c u lta tis A r th im in A c a /lr m ia L o v a n ie n si C o m m en ta ria in A ris to te lis L ib ro s

de. D ia le c tic a (1 5 3 5 ), Tr. iii. e. 1 , ji. 1 G2 , ed. 154 7.
S jiea k in g o f the te.xt in the De. In te rp re ta tio n e , the ^Masters, in te r a lia , allege :
B u t if it be even eleg a n tly said by a poet N em o est om nis hom o,
N on onines oiim ihus a r te s [jiroverli, U iiiis homo nnllus h o m o ], w hy m ay
we not eontradiet this aptly, liow beit falsely, A llquis est om nis homo V 'Why
(th ey sa y ) do yon d eterm in e the p red icate by the note o f u n iversality, seein g
that the quantity o f the proposition is not to be sought from the p red icate, but
from the subject V W e answ er, because we wish to cxjiress a certain m eaning
in words, whieh b y no others can be done. B u t if the mark o f universality
could o n ly be cm jiloyed in ch an gin g the iiu an titv o f jiropositions, it would
not be lawful to anne.x it to the part o f the jiredicate. W e have, therefore,
thought these fcAv cautions requisite to evin ce that Avhat is condem ned by these
critics for its folly, Is n ot in con tin en tly sojihistieal or foolish bahbliiig. B u t as
to the universal rule wliich A i'istotle en ou n ces, N o aflirniatlon w ill be tru e,
etc., it is suflieient if it hold good in the m ajority o f e a se s; Avlietlier the
Jiredicate ex ceed the subject, as, A ll m a n is a ll a n im a l , be its equal, as, AU
m ail is a ll risib le, or its inferior, as, [Nowie] a n im a l is a ll m a n .
In a few cases,
how ever, the excejition is valid ; a s , T in s snn is e v e r y .sun. O ne p h te n ix is a ll
and som e others. N or are these futile subtleties, sin ce reason h erself
appi'oves.
(i) T IT IU S A N D R ID IG E R .
T h e o n ly n otice o f these speculations o f T itiu s' Avhieh I haA-e m et with in

an y subsecjuent jiliilosopher (and I speak from an inspection o f several hundred
1 [ T i t i u s , yir.v C n g itn n d i, c. v i . . liiia t h e fo l- totam quiclem suara co m p rc h e n sio n e m , n o n

l o w i n ' , ' r e l a t i v e to tl i e q u a n t i t i c a t i o i i o f th e \ e r o e x te n s io n em. 3 9 : E c o n l r a r i o In p r o p o -
pieiiicale: 36: - L i c e t autein I r o i ' o s i- s i t i o n i b u s i i c f t a t i v is , l i c e t p a r t i c u l a r i h u s , p ie -
ti o i i u n i 'lUiiii til aa e x i j u b j e c i o a ' s t i m e t u r , ill- ruinqiie p r: e < li ca t ii m est univer.yate, a c tar n
ta n i c n T r a ' i i i c a l i i n i n o n j i e n i t u s n e p l i i ; e n d u u i s c c u n c lu in com prehensioneni quain exten-
v i d e b a l u r , c e u v u l g o in lioc i r a c t a l i o i i e lier i si o ii e u i sunm t o t a in , a s u b j c c i o reuiovelur
s o le t , iniin e t b ii j u s q u a n t i t a t e n i obscrvasse 41, I n t e r i m n o n p i i t a r e m a U i n n a t i o n e m v e l
u t i le e st , el c r e d i d e r i m et d i s ( ] u i s i t i o n i s In i ju s n e g a t i o n e n i i p s a n i d i v e r s a i n i l i u m p ra> di cat i
n c g l e c l u v a r i o s e r r o r e s ta r n in d o c f r i i i a C o n - qm iutilatem n e c e s s a r i o p o s t u l a r e , se d c r e d i -
v e r s i o i i i s , q u a n i S y l l o g i s l i c a e sse e . x o r l o s . q u o s d c r i m j io l i u s , id o m n e a d i v e r s o r e r n m e t id e a -
su i s lo c i s v i d e b i m i i s . j 37: B reviter itaque rum b abitu oriri, a fb rm a tio n i vero et nega-
o b s e r v a i i d u m , in p r o p o s i l i o i i i b u s a l l i r m a t i v i s , t i o n i p r a - d i c a t i q u a n t i t a t e n i e ss e v e l u t i n d i f -
li cet nniversalib u s, praidicalum pleriim que ferenten i. 42: N a m p l e r u m q u c jjr. -c d ic a la
ess e parcicutare. t r i b u i q u e s u b j e c t o s e c u n d u m subjectis su n t la t i o r a ; q u o d si ig it u r ili a c u m
N)G Apr EXDIX.
logical system s, jiviiicipallv by G erm an s), is liis friend R id igers; wlio, in his
elaborate work. A S en su TVn et F a lsi, first jinhlislied som e eight years snbse-
q n en tly (in 1709, hnt I have only the, second edition o f 1722), attem pts a
tiirmal refutation o f the heresy o f a (jnantified jiredicate. It vvas only, h ow
ever. after the most m anifest dem onstrations o f the falsehood o f this novel
jn-ejndice had b een on ce ami again jirivatelv eom m nnicated to liis very learned
friend " (T iiin s V). that R idiger heeam e :it length tired, as he cxjiresses it, c f
w ashing a brick, ami laid tlie jiolem ie hefore the jmhlie. It was not certain ly
the cogem y o f tliis refntation wliieli ought to Iiave llirown the con iiler opinion
into oblivion ; hnt this refntation, such ;is it is, tliongh ivith n otliing new , is
d eservin g attention, :is jiri'smitiiig the m ost elaborate discussion o f the (jncstlon
to he m et with, after Am m onius, and in m odern times. But the w liole argn
ment snjijioses certain fonm la ions ; tind it w i.l he sallieieiit to show that tliesc
are false, to disjiose o f the w liole edifice erected upon them . I ought to m en
tion, that it M'as R idiger's eriticism w hich first directed m y attention to the
original o f T iiiiis.
Ori'jo anteiii hnjns orroris n egleetu s notissimtc aetjnivocationis signornm
om n is et q u id a m e^se videtur, ijna lime signa, vel c o llcctlce siimi jio.ssnnt, vel d is
tribu tive. Priori iiiodo, (juantlUis in jirmdieato eoncejitti sensiim (jiiidem infcrt
non penitiis ahsnrdm n, ca'teruni projiositionem eonstituit id e tilic a m el f r u s -
Ira n ia m .'' R idiger then goes on to a m ore d etailed statem ent o f what he sup
poses to he the grounds on which the erroneons ojiinion jiroeeeds.*
First Case. Jerlii gratia, Q u m ld a m a n im a l est om nis h om o; hoe est. S p e c ie s
a itim a lis, hom o n cm pe o m n e a t, q u o d homo e s t : (jnod aliiini soiisum ,
q u a ila m
liidiere niilim n jiotest. (jtiam, yt/od om n is homo sit h o m o : sic aiitem collective
snm itur et >ignnm siihjecli et sigiuim jirm dieali. T liis olijeetion is absurd, ibr
it i.-. su icid a l; ajijilyliig eq u ally to the jirojiositioii whli li the ohjeetor holds for
good, and to that wliii-h he assails as bad. A ll m an is (some') a n in a d . H ere,
is not a n im id or som e a n im a l ju st a certtiin sp ecies o f anim al, and is not this
sjiecies, jiiaii. to wit, a ll th at is m a n , and nothing else ? T h ere is, eonsctjnently,
the sam e tautology In the one case as in tho oth er; and if we are blam ed for
only virtually sayin g, by the former. A ll m a n is m a n , does the ohjeetor say a
whit more than this by the latter? R idiger goes o n : (Jnodsi vel alternm
signum , vel ntrnnujue, d is trib u tiv e snm atnr, sem jier ahsurdns crit jiropositlonis
seiisu s.
)ii com ponas, non polerit non pr.'cdicatum particulare habere; nihi] cn im obstat, quo
parliculare iiide ciriert'ere, dum unice ad minus aliquando totum alteri juiigere, i el
m ly e c lu m rei-Iringi ii<-(|uil, scil ad uliuquu<|uc partem ab eodein reinovere qneas. 45: ll w c
ex ten d i aptuiii niai.el. 4.3: Ast si pra.dica- itaque projio.sitio: O m nis homo esl risihilis,
luin a subjecto reinoveas, universale illud babet )ira'diciituni iiiiivcrsale. si risibilitateni
rit. cum <|nie<|uid in ejus vel coiiipreheiisione )iro hoiiiiiiis jjroprio habeas; siciit hie, A'uZ-
vel exiensioiie esl all hoc sejiingalur, nec ilii- liis Turca t.\l homo (.Beil. Chnsliaiuis), vel Qi/i-
miiiuil iiiiiversalilaleni. quod idem ab alii.s dam m utirus mm tsl homo quiilam , \m viVK M nm
siilijpcti-qii(S|iie reinovealiir, iiain si pradica- particulare continent, dum jiars so lum coin-
ttim aliis etiain conv enia l, turn qnldem iinl iireheiisioni.-el exteiisioiiis le movetiir." For
subjecto noil potest dici iiiiiveisaliter tribii- Hie aiiplication, by Titiiis. o f the jiiiiiciple o f
tnm, v en nn si de tniilli net'clur. jiolest nihil- a (|iiaiitifii'(l jiredicate to the ilnetrino o f C o n -
nn ii ii i-d e certo aliqiio subjecto imiversiiliter version, see above, pp. 628. 629; and to the
qiioqne negari. <41: Qnodsi babiltis attributl theory o f .Syllogism, see bel ow , p. 003, and
fsirmittat, p o le ii l aliquan do projiositio affir- A p p e n d ix , X. Fm.J
matlva prad icatu m universale, ct negativa I Second M i t i o u , jip. 232, 302,
APPENDIX. 557
Second Case. Verb! gratia, sinnatur utrvmqne sigmnn flistrihutire, sansus

erit, Qiindi/fun iiiflii'idunm nnimalis (v. g. Petrus'), est onine iudiriduinti lio/ninis
(v. g. Davits. Oedipus);' Tliis is a still liiglier tliglit of absurdity; for, to re
fute the projiosition, it is first falsely translated into nonsense. Its true moan
ing, ioM quantified terms being taken distrihutirelij, : A ll several men are
some several animals, or, Every several man is some several animal.
In these two eases, therefore, all is eorreet, and the objeetion from the
identity or absurdity of a (juantified jiredieate, null.
Third Case. Suinatur signum suhjeeti dislributive. signum prn3dieati col
lective, scnsiis c r it: Quoddam vtdividuum unbnalis est nnivtrsa species Itominis."
Fourth Case. Simiatur, deiiiijue, sigiuim suhjeeti collective, signum pnedi-
eati distributive, semus erit: Qaecdam species animal is, ut universale et pnedi-
rnbile, est umne individuu>n hnminis."
Ill regard to these last two eases, it is sufTiciont to refer to what has been
already said in answer to Ainnionius (p. -349) ; or simjdy to reeall the jiostulate,
that in the same logical unity (projiosition or syllogism) the tenns should be
supposed in the same sense. If this jiostulate be obeyed, tliese two eases are
inejit, and, eonseijucntlv, the objections snjiertlnous.
Ridiger then proceeds to treat ns with four long demonstrations a priori.
and to one elaborate demonstration et p o s t e r i o r i but as tliese arc all
founded on the blunders now e.xposed, it would bc idle to refute them in
detail.
Ridiger, it may well siirjirise us, howbeit the professed eliamjiion of the old
and eorreet doctrine, is virtually, perliajis iim onsciously, a confessor of the
trutli o f the new and false jirejudice ; for I find him projiounding four
several syllogistic forms, three of whieh are only valid through the universal
(imuitifieation of the jii-cdieate in affirmatives, and two (including the other
one) proceed on a convi t. though partial, view, oppo.sed to that o f the logi
cians, touching the conelusion o f the Second Figure (L. II. c. iv). I shall
insert the quantities, operative but not oxjiressed.
In the First Figure At, aut ego nihil AM o. nwt lonye naturalior osi hie
p rocessus: Quoddam jhiidnm est (^quodtlam'j leve; quoddam cnrjuis est [ow/;e]
/luidum ; ergo quoddam vorjius est quoddam leve; qiiam si dieas, etc. ( 3 4 ) .
Here the middle term is, and must be, aflirmatively distributed as predicate.
c , = , : \i : ,r.
In the Second Figure. Vcrbi g r atia: Quoddam ens est [omne) anim al;
omuis homo est (^quoililani] anim al: ergo, omnis homo est \_quod<lam'] ens. Ilaec
eonelusio vcrissima, etc. ( 3 9 .) In like manner the middle is here universally
quantified in an affirmative. C ,*-------: M, F.
The following, Ridiger (p. 330) gives, as Two new moods, whicdi cannot
be dispensed with. Quoddam animal est [owm'.s] homo: nullum brutuni est
[ti//u.s] homo . ergo, quoddam animal non est [?///io] bnitiim. Item : Quod
dam unimid non est [i/Z/i/.s] homo . omnis civis est [qiildam'] homo ; ergo, quoddam
animal non est [u//s] civis. In the fir.-.t of these, the middle, as predicate,
is affirmatively distributed; and in both syllogisms, one conelusion, denied by
558 APPENDIX.
the logieians. is asserted by Ridiger, although the other, whieh involves a pred
ieato, particnlar and negative, is recognized bv neither.
C, : M: -----( :F C . J-----: M , ------- : F
O) G O D F R E Y P L O U C Q U E T.
Godfrey Ploucijnct, a jdiilosopher of some acconnt, Professor o f Logic and

Metaphysics in the University o f Tiibingen, by various writings, from the year
1759, endeavored to advance tlie seienee o f reasoning; and his failure was
jierliaps owing more to tlie inadequacy and limitation of his doctrinc, tlian to
its positive error. To say nothing about liis attempt to reduce Logic to a
species of coinpntation, in whieli his one-sided views came into eonfiietion with
the one-sided views o f Lambert, bo nndonbtedly eommcneed ansjticionsly, on
the princijde o f a (|uanti(ied predicate. Tliis, like a few jireccding logieians,
he certainly saw afforded a mean of simplifying tlie conversion of proposi
tio n s; bnt he did not see tliat it conld accomjilisli mncli more, if properly
applied, in tlie theory of syllogism. On the contrary, in syllogistic, he profes
sedly returns, on mature, consideration, to the ordiiiary jioiiit o f view, and
tliinks himself successful in recalling the eoniinoii doctrine o f inference to
a single canon. That canon is this : The terms in the coriclnsioii are to be
taken absoltitely in the same e.xtension whieh they hold in tlie tinteeedent.
In concliisionc sint termini plane iidcm, (jui in jincmissis, iiitiiitn ipiantitatis.
(Melhoi/iis tain demonstraiiiU dirrcte omnes sgllof/ismoruni species, qimm rilia
/hrmce di-teticndi, ope uiiius regnice ; Methodiis cidcuiandi in Logicis; passim.
Both in 171)3.) 1'his rule, as ajijilied to his logical calculus, he thus enounces:
"A rrange the terms in syllogistic order; strike out the middle; and the e x
tremes tlicn afford the conclusion. Deleatiir in praemissis medins; id quod
re.-tal indicat concliisioneiii. (Methodus calodandi, passim : Elementa Philoso-
fdiice Gontrmpluiirre. Lagira, 122, 1 778.) This rule is simjilo enough, but,
uiifortiiiiati-lv, it is both iuadcqiiato and false. Iiiadcijuatc (and this was always
siiniciciitly ajiparent) : for it does not enable us to ascertain (and these the
jirincijial fjiicstions) how many torm^ rif what identity of wliat (juantity
and o f wliat (jiiality, can be legitimately placed in tho antecedent. But it is
not true (though this was never signalized) ; for its jieculiar jirincijile is falsi
fied bv ciglit o f the thirty-six moods, to wit. in adirmalives, by ix., x., xi., xii.,
and in negative-. Iiy ix. b, x. a, xi. b, xii. a. In all tlie.se, tin* (juantity of an
c x t-eiuc ill the coiieliisiou is less than its (juantity in the antecedent. ^Ve can
liardB'. therefore, wonder that Plouc(jucts logical sjicculalioiis have been
iicelcct'-d or coiitciniicd ; :ilthougli thcir author be an indcjieiidcnt and learned
thinker, and hi< works nil w<-ll worthy of jieriisal. But, though dismissed by
Hegel and oilier German logicians, not for its falsity, with sujireine contempt,
Ploii'-ijiiets eanoii lias, however, found its admirers in England, wliere 1 have
lately seen it jiromiilgatcd as original.
I \ i I'Mr.Tct Irorn lii- F in id n m fn la Ihilnsn- prc di cat o, will be found in Mr. Baynes
J .'ir r .S;.r)////0(v7>. IT-'gl. coiila iii iii )'
IloiieijuefH Fs^ ay, p . 12S.
dtiCirine loucliiii}; itie q u a n i i l i c a l i o n o f tli^ a .'See T a b le o f M o o d s , A p p e n d i x X I . E n
APPENDIX. 659
(k) L'Liacn.
Inditutiones Logicce et Metaphgsiccv, ^ 1 7 1 , 1 7 8 5 . Non tantum snbjecto

sed et ]>nedknto, ad subjeetum relatio, siia constat ([uantitas, siinm<iue igitur
sigmim qnantitatis prtefigere licet. Sed liicc praedieati quantitas ex veterum
prieeeptis sfejie justo minor iuvenitur. In loco de eonveisione distinetius de eo
exponetur. In that jdaee, however, nothing of the kind appears. *
YI-
CANONS OF SYLLOGIS.AI; GENERAL HISTORICAL NOTICES
AND CRI'riCISM.
A . H IS T O R IC A L N O T IC E S .
I. Q u o t a t i o n s f r o m V a r i o u s L o g i c i a n s .
( C o l l e c t e d a n d T r a n s l a t e d A u t u m n 1844. S ee p . 213. E d .)
(a ) D A V ID D E B O D O X .
David Derodon (who died at Geneva in 1G64, and had been previously
Professor of Philosoiiliy at Die, Orange and Nismes) ivas a logician of no
little fame among the French Huguenots; the study of his works ivas (if I
recollect aright) even formally reeommcnded to the brethren of their com
munion by one of the Gallican Synods. Either the Devil or Doctor Dero
don, was long a proverbial expre.-'sion in France for the authorship of an
acute argument; and the Sepulchre o f the M uss has been translated into the
vernaeular-of every Calvinist country. Derodon has left tivo systems of Logie :
1 [ T h a t th e E x t e n s i o n o f P r e d i c a t e i s a l w a j ' s P r io r L. i q u . 4, f. 24 0 ; q n . 1 3 , ff. 254k, 255 ;

reduced to E xten sion of S u b ject, i. c , is q u . 14. f 2.5Gb; qi i. 2 3 , f. 2 7 3 ' .
eq u ivalen t to it, s e e Purcliot, In s tit. P h il., For iu s fa n c c . s o f A r is to tle v irtu a lly using
L o g ic n . i pp. 1 2 3 , 1 2 5. T r a c y , E le m e n s <!' Id c - d i s t r i b u t e d p r e d i c a t e , se e A h . P o s t., i. 6, 1 .
o ln g i i- .t iii. D is c . P i e l . . pi>. 9 9 , 1 0 0 . t. r o u s a z . C f . Z a l j a r c l l a , a il toe. O pnn L o g ic n . p. 735.
L n g i q i i f , t. iii. )). 190. D e r o d o n , L o g ic a l i e s t i- Tlie sam e. In An. P o s t.. ]. 2. O p tr a , ji. 827.
tu ta . P ii. c. V. a r t . 4, |). 224. lioe tl iiu .s, and Df Q iia r in F ig iir n S j/llo g . O p ., i>. 12 3 .
O p e r a ,] ) 848 (see a b o v e , p . 5 5 1) . Sergeant, T h o a d d i i ig m a r k ot i i n i v e r s i i l i t y to ( ir e d ic a te
7lif(/iod to S 'c kH ff, b. ii ., less. i. p 1 2 7 Bencke, i.s, A r i s t o t l e s a y s , u se le s s a n d im |) 0 s s ih le "
L e h rb u c h der L o g ik , tj 15G, j). 100 . . S la t t le r , (A n P r io r ., i. c 27 . 9 ) ; y e t see ii. c. 22 , ( 7,
L o g ic n , ^ 196. 8 ; c. 23 , 4. 5. On t h i s q u e s t io i i, see Bol-
Tliat tli e P r e d i c a t e h as qu a n tity , an d po- z a n o , L o g ik , i 1 3 1 , ] ) . 27, l a n d n b o v e , jip. 543,
leulial designation o f it as w e l l a s l li c S u b - 54S. 549.)
ji ct . see l l o t r b a u e r , A rra lrjtic d e r U rth r ile u n d T l i a t Hie p r c d e s i g u a t i o n o f tli e p r e d i c a t e l>y
S c h l n s s e ,i S l e t .s e c j . L a m h c r t ,D e i i t s c h e r G e lih r te r a ll e o l l c e l i v e l y . in f a c t, r e d u c e s th e u n i v e r s a l
PriV/'KTr.^.sfl, B r i e l v i . vf)I. i. p 395. P lain er, t o a s i n g u l a r i ) i o p o s i t i o i i . .see P u t c l i o t , /)i.st)t.
Vhilnsaphi.^che A p h n r is r r rfn , \. y i\P \. Oorvilius, P/iib, i. p. 12 4. O f L o g ic n C o n tr a c ta T r n je c tin a .
In s tit. P h il. H o t ., 413.C o u im h ric e n se s , In P . ii. c. 5. ( 17 0 7 .1 ] *
A r i.s t. D i a l ., t ii. p p . 1 5 8 , 283. S c o t u s , In A n .
560 APPENDIX.
a lareor (L o g ic a P c s titjila , 1659) and a sm aller (L o g ic a C o n tra cta , 1 664), both

jniblished in 4to. 1 shall qnote on ly from thc former.
Tt is im possible to d en y D erod on s su b tlety, b n t his blunders unfortunately
oiiiw eigh his origin ality. L eavin g C onversion as he found it, after rep eatin g,
wiih ajqirobation, the old rules, that the predicate is n ot to be o vertly (jnan-
tified u n iversally (p. 5 7 3 ), bnt to be. taken, in aflirm ative propositions partien-
la r l} . as in negative propositions m iiversally (]). 623) , w e are snr|)riscd to find
him eontrovorting, in detail, the special rules o f syllogism . T h is polem ic, as
might bo ex p ected , is signally n n sn ccessfn l; for it is frequi-ntlv at varian ce with
all p rinciple, and nniform lv in contradiction o f liis ow n. It is, indeed, only
in terestin g as a m anifestation, that the old logical doctrine was ob scu rely felt
by so original a thin k er lo be erroneous ; for the corrections attem pted by
D erodon arc*, them selves, esp ecially on the ground which he adopts, o n ly so
m any errors. H e n n h a|)p ily starts with a b lu n d er ; for he gives, as rec tu s, an
e.xam ple o f syllogism , in which thc m iddle term is, ex cn o f necessity, u ndis
tributed : and he goes on (pp. 627, 628, 636, 637, 638, 639, 6 49) either to
stum ble In tin* sam e fashion, or to adduce reasonings, which can oid y be vindi
cated as inferential by su p p lyin g a universal quantity to the predicate in affir
m ative projinsiiions, or by red u cin g it to jiartieularity In n eg a tiv es; both in the
teeth o f D ero d o n s own laws. I have, h ow ever, recorded, in m y T ab le o f S y l
logism s, some o f bis exam p les, both the two forms which he has nam ed, and
four others which he on ly e n o u n c e s ; according, by lib eral con stru ction , what
was ri*i]uislte to giv e them sense, and which, w ithout doubt, thc author would
him self have recogn ized .
(b) ItA P IX .
Ilapin, R e jle x io n s s u r la L a g iq u e , 4, 1684.

* Heibn*. Aristotle, there had appeared nothing on logic system atic and estab
lished. 1 Ils gen iu s, so full o f reason and in telligen ce, p en etrated to the recesses
o f the mind o f m an, and laid ojien all ils secret w orkings in the accurate
analysis which he n n d e o f its ojierations. T h e depths o f hmnan thought had
not a- } tt been fathom ed. Arlstoth* was thc first who d iscovered thc new w ay
of attain in g lo scien ce, by the evldenci* o f dem onstration, and o f proceed in g
gi-omctric;dlv to ilem onstration. by the infallibility o f the syllogism , thc most
aceonqili-Iied work and m igliliest effort o f the human m ind, etc.
H ipin errs In m aking A ristotle lay the rule o f proportion along with the
hiriumile (Jmni as a principle o f Syllogism .
(n) L F .in X IT Z .
L eibnitz, 1 >n In r o n fo n n l'r d e la /'b i a c r e la Iln isn n , 2 2 , O p. t. )., p. 81.

IIi-iK-c il)(. faeiliiy o f som e writers is too great, in con ced in g that the doctrine
I rifrfidoii ff c m ' w l i o l l y i n i k n o w n lo f ix ; rnimljc-r in tlio s a m o b i n d l i i f ; mi is l l i r v e b e e n

x T m n t i lo} *iciai H, a n d , I iioi-d l i a r d l y a d d , l o in ii io r t o d a t o n c e , p r o b a b l y in c o n s e i j i . c n c e o f
Mio-<- III oib iT coiMilrii"*. In . S c o t l a n d , lii.s the sy iiod ic al rcconiineu datiou .
no ik' a r e not o l ll ie in r o i- I ; a c o n s i d c r n b l e
APPENDIX. 5Gl
of the Holy Trinity is repugnant with tliat great principle which enoum es
W h a t a re the sam e w ith the sa m e th ird , a re the satne ivith each o th e r ; that is, if A
lie the same witli I>, anti Cbe the same with 15, it is n-fcssary tliat A and C
should also be the same with one another. For this iirinciple flows immediately
from the pnnfi])le of Contradiction, and is the ground and basis o f all Logie;
if that fail, there is no longer any way o f reasoning with certainty.
(d ) RE V SC B .
Reusch, S y stem a L o g icu m , 1 734.

506. That dictum o f tlie Aristotelians d e O m n i et N ulJo (503) evinces,
indeed, a legitimate consequence, but it only regulates one species o f syllogisms,
at h;ast immediately. By this reason, therefore, logicians have been induced to
prove the conseipicnce o f tlie oflier species by means of Jlic first, to which they
are reduced. But, that we may be able to supersede this labor, I have en
deavored to give a broader basis to the Dictum de Omni et Nullo, or by what
ever name that rule is called, to which, in the construction o f syllogisms, the
order o f thouglit is eoiiforiued.
507. For the whole business o f ordinary reasoning is accomjilisbed by
the substitution of ideas in place o f the subject or predicate o f the fundamental
proposition. This some call the e q u a tio n o f thoughts. Now, the fundamental
proposition may be either affirmative or negative, and in each the ideas of the
terms may be considered either agreeing or diverse, and according to tliis various
relation there obtains a various sub.-titution, which we shall clearly illustrate
before engaging with our doctrine o f the Dictum de Omni et Nullo. [H aving
done this at groat length, he proceeds.]
510. From what has been now fully declared, the following Dictum de
Omni et Nullo may be fonned, which the definition itself o f reasoning and
syllogism ( 502) supports, and to which all syllogisms in every figure and
mood may bo accommodated.
I f tw o id e a s (two terms) h a re, through a ju d g m e n t (proposition), r e c e iv e d a
rela tio n to each other, eith er a jf r m a lir e o r n eg a tive, in that ca se it is allow able, in
p la c e o f cith er o f these (that is, the subject or predicate o f that judgment or
proposition), to su b stitu te a n o th er id e a (term ), a c c o rd in g to the ru le s g iv e n o f
E q u ip o lle n c e o r R eciprocm tion ( 508, s. 9), o f S u b o rd in a tio n , o f C o b rd im itio n .
(S ee W aldin, below, p. 565.)
(e) CRUSIUS.
Crusius, W eg z u r G eicissh eit. Ed. i. 1747; Ed. ii. 1762.

256. The supreme law o f all syllogism is, W h a t ice ca n n o t oth en vise think
than a s tru e , is tru e , a n d w h a t ice absolu tely c a n n o t th in k a t a ll, o r ca n n o t th in k
but a s f a ls e , is f a l s e . ^
1 K a n t ( Uber die E v id e n z in m etnphysischen g a r d t o t h e s u p r e m e ru le o f all c ert ai nt y

W iîtnchoften, 1763, V n vi Schrift. ii. 43) ha s w h i c h tliis c e le b r a t ed m a n t h o u g h t o f p l a c in g
he re on t h e f o l l o w i n g ob s e r va tio n : In reas t he p r i n c ip l e o f all k n o w l e d g e , a n d , couse-
71
5G2 APPENDIX.
2 59. O f necessarv jndgnicnts, o f ju d gm en ts which w e can n ot but think,

w hicli are not id en tical, and wliicdi constitute, in the last result, the positive or
the kernel in onr k n o w led ge ; to which w e apply tlic prin cip le o f C ontradiction,
and thereby enrich the understanding witli a k n ow led ge o f real ju d gm en ts,
sneh jud gm en ts are jirineipally the follow in g: E v e r y p o w e r o r fo r c e is in h erent
in <1 s t i h j i c l : A ll that a r ise s (b e g in s to b e ), a rise s in v irtu e o f a stijjicien r
ca u se : A ll w hose n o n -ex isten ce c a n n o t he Ihouyht. has its c a u se, a n d has al som e
tim e a risen (begun to b e) ; E v e r y su b sta n ce ex ists so m ew h ere : A ll that exists,
ex ists a t sam e tim e : T w o m a te r ia l th in ys ca n n o t e x ist a t the sam e lim e, a n d in p r e -
cisi ly the sa m e p la c e . T h ere are also m any other propositions, which treat of
ihc d eterm inate qualification o f things as p resen t; for e.xam p le T h e sam e
jx iln l a f a b o d y ca n n o t he a t o n ce r e d a n d y rc e n ; A m a n c a n n o t he in tw o p la c e s
a t once, and so forth.
2G1. A ll the jn d gm en ts p reviou sly alleged ( 259) m ay be com pre
hen d ed under these two gen eral propositions, W h a t c a n n o t in thought he .sepa
r a te d f r o m each other, c a n n o t he s e p a r a te d fro m each other in r e a lity : and, ll7iot
c a n n o t in thought he c o n n e c te d into a n otion , ca n n o t in r e a lity he c o -m e c te d : to
wit, although no contradiction shows itse lf betw een the notions, but w e arc
o n ly conscious o f a physical n ecessity to think the thing so and so, clearly and
a fter a com parison o f all the circum stances with each other. F or we now
.speak o f propositions which are not identical with the P rin cip le o f C ontradic
tion, but o f such as prim arily afford the m atters on whicdi it m ay be applied.
I lc n c e we see that tbe suprem e princijile o f our k n ow led ge given above
( 25G) lias two d eterm in ation s; inasm uch as the im possibility to tliink a
.something arises cith er b ecau se a contradiction would ensue, or because we
are positively so com p elled by the jiliysical constitution o f our thinking
faculties.
2G2. T h e highest p rin cip le o f all syllogism thus resolves itse lf into the
three capital jiropositions :
1 . X o th in g ra n a t once he a n d not he in the. sa m e p o in t o f view .
2. T h in y s x-hich c a n n o t he thought w ithou t each other, w ith ou t each olh er c a n n o t
ex ist.
.3. W lx it c a n n o t he thought ns with a n d hesi<le each other, ca n n o t e x ist w ith a n d
b e s id e rtw h olh er. on the s u p p o sitio n even that betw een the n otion s there is no con-
Ira d irlio n .
' T h e second o f those capital propositions I call flic P r in c ip le o f Tnse.para-
hh-s ( p ix iir lp lx x i ins/gnirahiliiini) : and the third the P r in c ip le o f In ron join ah les
( p r in e ip ix x i iu r o n jn n g ih d ix in J . T h ey m ay be also term ed the three P r in c ip le s
o j I leit.a n !'
Ch. V III. O f the d iffe re n t s p e c ie s o f syllo g ism s, he says ( 2 7 2 ), A m ong
r|npnl)y. also o f t h e m f l a p t i y s i c a l , Whni I n o ott inr p r i i i r i p t e o f f r n t l i is c o m p e t e n t , a n d

"innot c jI iii rii-ti' Hunk than m Iriif, ii irv', e tc ; I l i a t k n o w l e d g e is i n d e i n o n . s t r a b l e It is in-
il is in ai I ( I t li a l I b i s ) ir o ) i o s i ii n n c a n n e v e r d e e d I r n e t l i a l ll i e r e a r e m a n y i n d e m o n s t r a b l e
l.e a princip le o f tn illi for a n y k n o w le d g e k n o w l e d g e s , b u t tli e f e e l i n g o f c o n v i c t i o n in
w liaie\er I - o r i f il l,e a ' / re e d i l i a l n o o i l i e r regard lo l li e m is a coiile-sion, but not a
p r i n c i p l e o l i r i i l l i is )ios i b l e i l i a n i n a s m u c h grnnnd o f jiroof, th a t th ey a re t r u e S ee
K sw eare i i . c a p a b l e < f t i n l d i n g a t i l i n g not a.\m \W u\, liUf.Uectual Powers, A s j a y iv . c h . 4.
f o r t n i e , in Itiin ca.se il i.s a c k n o w l e d g e d that
A V r KX D I X . 568
the liiglicr principles o f syllogism s it is needful on ly to en u m erate the P r m c ip lr

o f C o n tra d lc lio n , and the P r in r iji/e o f S iijfic ie id R ea so n , w liieli is snbsm ned
from the principle o f Inseparables ( W c shall state the laws o f syllo
gism in this o r d e r , C onsider those which flow, 1 , F rom the P r in c ip le o f
C o n tra d ic tio n ; 2 , From tlie P r in c ip le o f S iif ic ie n t P ieason ; and, 3, From
both together.
(/; FUANCJS jiurciiEsoy.
[F ran cisci H u tch eson .] L ogicre C o m p e n d iu m . G lasgure, in (cdilnis a c a d em -

icis, excnde.bant R o b ert us et A n d r e a s F o u lis, A c u d e m k e 'J'gjiographi. 1 764.
Fart 111., Ch. ii., p. 58.
T h e w hole force o f syllogism m ay lie exp licated from tlie follow in g axiom s,
Flr.st A.xiom . T h in g s trldch a g ree in the sam e th ird , a g ree am ong them selves.
Second Axiom . T h in g s w h e r e o f Ihe one a g ree s, the o th er does not a g ree , in
one a n d Ihe sam e th ird , these things d o not a g ree a m o n g them selves.
Third A x io m . T h in g s which a g ree in no th ird , do n ot a g ree a m o n g them
selves.
Fourth A xiom . T h in g s ivhich d isa g re e in no th ird , d o not d is a g re e am on g
th em selves.
H en ce are deduced the gen eral rules o f syllogism s.
O f these the throe first regard the Q u n lilg [n ot alon e] o f J roposiiion s.
R ule 1 . I f one o f the p r e m ise s be n e g a tiv e , the co n c lu sio n w ill be n egative
(b y A x . 2 ).
Rule 2 . I f both p r e m ise s be a ffirm a tire , the c o n clu sio n w ill be a f ir m a tir e
(b y .Vx. 1).
R ule 3 . I f both p r e m ise s be n eg a tive, n o th in g f o l l o w s : b ecause, o f things
mntnaHv a g reein g and m utually d isagreeing, both m ay be d ifferen t from a third
tiling (b y A x . 3, 4 ).
T w o R u les regard the Q u a n tity o f T erm s.
R ule 4. Let the m id d le be once nt lea st d istrib u te d , o r taken n n ire r.sa U y :
for the com mon term frequently contains two or more sp ecies m utu ally opjio.sed,
o f which it may lie pi edieated according to various parts o f its exten sion ; these
[sp ecific] terms do not, therefore, truly agree in one third, unless on e at leas*
o f them agrees with the whole m iddle (liy A x. 3, 4 ).
R ule 5. X o term ought to be taken m ore u n ire r sa lly in the c o n rh isio n than
in the jir e m is e s : because no eoiisetiiienee is valid from the particular to tlie
universal. [r>eeanso we should, in that case, tran scen d the agreem ent or disa
greem en t o f tlie two term s in a third, on wliieh, ex h yp o tln ^ i, w e foun d .]
[In like m ann er there are two nile.s] eo n eern in g the Q u a n tity o f P r o p o s i
tions.
R ule 6 . I f one o f the p r e m ise s be p a r tic u la r , the co n clu sio n ivill also be p a r
tic u la r.
For, Case 1. If the eomdtisioii be afiirm ativc, therefore both jiremises will
he aflirm atiie (by R ule 1 ). lin t, in a particular jiroposition, tliere I.s no term
distributed; tbe niiildle is, therefore, to be distributed In one or other o f the
Jiremises (liy R u le 4 ). It w ill, therefore, be the subject o f a unit ersal affirma
tive jirojiosition ; but tbe other extrem e is also tak en particularly, w hen it
564 Ar r EXDIX.
the predicate o f an aflirniative proposition, the conclusion will, therefore, l)e

oartienlar (by Rule 5).
Case II. l>et tbe eonelnsion be negative; its predicate is, therefore,
Jistribiiteal: Ikmk e, in tlu* lucinises, tlie major and the middle terms are to be
distribnteil (liy Rules 5 and 4).
' Rut when (inc of the jircmises is negative, the other is aflirmative (by Rule
3). If one premise be particular, these two terms only can be distrilmtod;
since one premise alllrms, whilst the other is particular. The minor extreme,
the suhjeet of the eunclnsion, is not, therefore, distributed in the premises; it
cannot, therefore (liy Rule 5), be distributed in the eonclusion.
* Rule 7. From two particular premises iwlhiug follows: at least according
to the aecnstnnied mode of speaking, where the jiredieate of a negative jiropo-
sition is nnder<too 1 to be distrilinted. For. 1, If tlie eonelnsion alllrm, both
premises will alHmi. and, conseijnently, no term is distributed in the jireinises;
eontiar_\ (o Kii.e 4. 2, Let the conclusion be negative, its jiredieate is there
fore distrilinted: but in jiarticnlar premises there is only distributed the predi
cate o f a m-gativc jirojiosition ; there is, therefore, necessarily a vice (either
against Rule 4 or Rule 5 ). '
r<7; SAVO XARO LA.
Savonarola. d'ompemHum Logices, L. Iv. p. 115. cd. Venetiis, 1542. In

w hatever syllogism any jiroposition can be con clu d ed , there m ay also be con
cluded ev ery otlim' jirojiosition wliieh follow s out from It. On this he rem arks:
W hen any sylloaism Infers a eonelnsion flow ing from its im m ediate conelu-
<io:i, it is not to lie called nnr syllogism , lint two. For th:it oilier <om-liision does
not follow siiiiplv in virtue ol' the jireiiiises. but in virtue n f ihcm lliere first
to Hows the jiiTijier eon eln sion , and from tliis eonelnsion there follow s, by another
sylloLd-m, tli( coiiclnsioii cmisetimMit ou it. H en ce there are tacitly two syllo-
'ii-in s; otherw ise tlie moods n f syllogism s would lie alm ost in fin ite.
GO R A V X n A R T F .X .
Baumgarten. Arroasis l.ogiru Ed. Tiilliicr. Ed. 1. 1 765.

297. Every reasoning ilejicmls on this jirojiositloii : A and B connected
A n
1 ttules I an d 7 are tllllS c o n t r a c t e d i n t o Some Frenchmen are [some] Icanied ;
o n e : The conchision foU otvs the w ea ker p a r t ; *' II
lh a l i.-. ll.c ..galive o r th e imr tic nl a r . A l l no, [n]tenrncd; Therefore,
tome EnyltHhrnvK ttre ur>f n<nuc Eretu'UmcnE
ar c inclucJccl in ilic l o l l u w i i i g
Vcrf*cH:
\) n'rMitiat m H iu m , n^'C qiiartut* leriiiiiiUH ntiiili
IT niquc iKC pr ini-"n lu c paTticularis. A. KZ.*'
* rU-iur iiarH'ni c o iifln s .o fli-ti-rion n i;
Ell n o n d i B l n b i j u t iii^ i c Q r n p r u m kko , n e g f l v e .
In an u n u s u a l m o d e o f pp<*akin;;, a c e rt ai n ^Wliat are witli ln r larb vTncl. [W ritten

iieL'iiiivc c o nc lu hi on m a y l>* o t io d c n w i t h a yvuimiin in (lie lUUfsL n o t a t i o n v j ih
nrirj-diilr i b u ti vc j>redicaic. An iu t h is e x - nnljHliluIed tor (.). a n d (:) for SeeAi)p en
aj upl e; d i x XI -K u.]
APPENDI X. 5C5
w ith a th ird C, o re co n n ected with each o th e r : in aflirniation im m ediately, in

negatinn m ediately. T his proposition is, tlierelbre, the tdnndation and p rinci
ple o f ail rea so n in g ; wliicli, liow evcr, is subordinate to tlie ])rinci|)le of Con
tradiction.
324. E v ery ordinary syllogism con clu d in g according to the D ic tn m , either
d e O m ni, or de X iillo . T his D ictu m i.s thus the foundation o f all ordinary syllo
gism s. (It had been p icv io n sly an n ou nced , 319, 321.)
W liati'vcr is truly adirnicd o f a notion u n iversally, is also truly afllrmed
o f all that is contained under it. AVhatevcr is truly denied o f a notion un iver
sally, is also truly d enied o f all that is contained under it.
( i) R E IM A R U S .
R einiarns, V ern u n ftle h re . 17GG.

17G. T h e fundam ental rules o f syllogism are, con sequ en tly, no other than
the rules ofA greetnen/ [Id e n tity ] and o f C o n tro d ic tio n . F or wliat the geom eter
in regard to m agnitudes takes as the rule o f eijuality or ine(inality, tliat the
reasoner here adopts as the universal rule o f all m ediate in sig h t: I f tw o things
l e id e n tic a l with a th ird , th ey a re also in so f a r id e n tic a l w ith each otla r. J h tt f
the one be, a n d the other he not, id e n tic a l w ith the th ird , then th ey a re not m uluaU y
id e n tic a l, but ra th e r m u tu a lly re p u g n a n t.
177. H ere he notices that the D ic tu m d e O m n i et N iillo is n ot prop erly a
rule for all figures, but for the first alone.
(J) TTALDLV.
W ald in , N o v u m L o g la e S g stcm a . 17GG.
3 3 5 . S in ce the syllogism recpiires essen tially nothing but a distinct cogni
tion o f the siifiicient reason o f som e proposition, the mo.st universal ride o f all
.syllogisms is, T h e su jfic ic n t rea so n o f a g iv e n p ro p o sitio n is to be d istin c tly
co g n ized .
364, T h e most gen eral rule o f all reason ings ( 3 35) rem ains also the
rule o f all reasonings as w ell in synthesis as in analysis. B ut in the synthesis o f
the ordinary syllogism the m iddle term in the m ajor proposition is referred to
the m ajor term , in the m inor jiroposition to the m inor term. ( 3G0.) "Where-
I'ore, from this relation w e must ju d ge w hetlier the m iddle term be or be not
the sufficient reason o f the conclusion. W h erefore, the syn th esis o f the ordi
nary syllogism is to be cogn ized from the relation o f its ideas. T his you m ay
thus ex p ress :
1 .) A f te r the tru e p r o p o sitio n , the rela tio n o f w hose e x trem es y o u d is tin c tly
appreh en d;
2.) A d d to its su b je c t o r p r e d ic a te a n o th er id e a d iffe re n t f r o m both, w hether
a g ree in g or llis a g r e e iu g ;
3 .) In q u ire into Ihe rela tio n o f the a d d e d id e a , to the e n d th at y o u m a y Icnoir
w hether the m id d le term in the g iv e n rela tio n in fe r the conclusion ; a n d th is is
kn o w n hg the a p p lic a tio n o f the ru les o f R e c ip r o c a tio n , Su bordin a.'ion , C o o rd in a
tion , a n d O p p o sitio n . I f an y one wish to call this the D ic tu m de O m n i et N u llo
I have no objections.
.3 6 6 A P P E N D I X.
'D b s e r r a tio n . T h is th ey call tlie D ic liim d e O m n i el X i d h o f the celeb rated

Renseh. It stands true indeed, but is b eset witli difliculties, inasinurli as it is
rather a eoin p lexn s o f all rules than one on ly, which as y et is to be referred
to the class o f p ia d e s id ir in . L ogicians have, indeed, taken jiains to dis
co v er one siijireine rule o f all ordinary reason ings; hnt no one has as yet
been .<o hajipy as to find it ou t. T h en follow s a critleisin o f the attem pts
bv the Port R oval and Svrhius.
(k ) S T A T T L E R .
Stattler, PhilosopJtin, P. I. Logica, 17G9.

237. In this coinjiarison of two ideas with a third, six different cases may
in all occur: for, eitlier.
1.) ''Une o f the two ideas contains that same third, which again contains the
othf r : or,
2.) * I huh of the two are contained in the third; or,
3.) * Pach of the two contains the third; or,
4.) "One of the two contains the third, the other being repugnant toith it;
or,
5.) One of the two is contained in the third, with which the other is repugnant ;
or,
6.) Hoth o f the two are rejmgnant to the third.
Tlie formi-r three c a s e s genc'rate an airirniative conclusion, the latter three
a negatix'.' In a note Stattlei' eliminates a seventh case, in which neither may
contain, and neither he repugnant to tlie third.
2 4 4 . General Law o f all Reasonings. In all reasonings, us often as a co'n-
seipient i.s, bg legilima'e form, inferred from on antecedent, so tfe ii i.s there
included in the antecedent what the consegnent enounces ; either the congruitg and
rccijirocnl containment, or the repugnance o f A and C : and i f such be not
tnrtniled in onr or other o f the antecedents, whatecer is inferred in the consequent
is cold of leg i'in tate form .
(I) S A U T E R .
Sauter, Institntiones Lngicw, 1 798.

5 123. Foundntions ( f Syllogism. In every syllogism there are two notions
'omparcd wiih a tliird, lo the end that it may appear whether they are to be
oiijoined or sejoiiicd. d'licre arc, thcrcl'ore, here, three possible cases. For
there agrre witli tlie assumed tliird. either both notions, or one, or neither. In
n-a-oiiing, our mind, therefore, rejioses on the.se axioms, as on fimdainental
[iriiieiplc^.
1.) \ Vh, rr tu'o notions agree irith the same third, they agree with one another.
2 ) Win rt om is roniainnl by the third, with which the other is 7-ejjugnant,
dn y are nm'niifly rrpugmuit.
3.) * Whrn neither notion agrees v:ith the third, there is between them neither
ngreernenl nor repugnance.
A PPENDIX. 567
(mj sc te j :.
Sutcr, Logica.
61. Qute eidem tertio convcniunt vel disconveniunt, etiain eonveniunt
vel diseouveniunt inter se.
(n ) S E G U Y .
Segny, Philosophia ad Usum Scholarum Accommodata, T. I. Logica. Paris,

1771.
P. 175, ed. 1785. Concerning the rule of recent philosophers.
H aving recited the general rule o f the Port Royal Logic, he thus comments
on i t :
1, Tliis is nothing else than the principle o f reasoning; therefore, it is
improperly adduced as a new discovery, or a rule strictly so called.
2, It may be useful, to the rude and inexjierienced, to recognize wlietber
a syllogism be legitimate or illicit.
But the principal fault o f this rule is, that it contains no certain method
whereby we may know when, and when not, one of the premises contains a
conclusion ; for the discovery of which we must frequently reeur to the general
rules. '
P. 1 78. Seguy exposes Father Buffiers error in saying, that, according to
Aristotle and the common rules of Logic, the middle term ought absolutely to
be the predicate in the first or major jiroposition ; seeing that the middle term
is not the jiredicate in the first and third Figures. This must be a mistake ; for
I cannot find such a doctrine in Bulfier, who, in this respect, in many places
teaches the correct.
(o ) IIO F F B A O E R .
Hoffbauer, Anfangsgrunde der Logik, 1794, 1810.

317. Fundamental Principle.^.
I. 1.) An attribute which belongs to all and every of the objects contained
under a notion, may also be allinned o f these objects so contained. (Dictum
de Omni.)
2.) An attribute which belongs to none of the objects contained under a
notion, must also be denied o f these objects so contained. (Dictum de Nullo.)
II. W hen, of the objects X and Z, the one contains an attribute which the
other does not contain, and they are thus dillerent from each other, then X is
not Z, and Z is not X .
III. 1.) W hen objects which are contained under a notion a are also con
tained under another notion h, then (his last notion contains under it some at
least o f the objects which are contained under the first.
2.) If certain objects which are not contained under a notion a are eon-
1 F o llo w ed by L a r r o q u e , E l c m m s d e P h i l o - M e t a jis ic a , ]. 47, i. 348. E c o n t r a , P h i l o s o j d i i a

p. 231; G alluppi, L e z i o n i d i L o g i c a e d i
s o p h ie , L u g d u n e n s is , i. 159. T rox ler, L o g i k , ii. 41.
568 APPENDIX.
tained under b. tlien b eontains under it some at least o f the objects which are
not contained under a.
" IV . ].) If objects whieh are contained under a notion n belong to those
whifh are eont.iined under anotlier notion b, tlien this seeoiid notion b contains
under it sonie at lea.-t of the objects which arc contained under a.
'2) If all objci ts which ai-e contained under a notion ii belong to those
whieli ai-e not contained under a certain other notion b, then this notion b con-
Ulins under it no oliject which is contained under tJie notion a.
3.) If all the objei ts eontained under a certain notion a are difierent from
eertain othei- objects contained under b, then b contains under it at least some
objects wliieh are not eontaineil under a.
(,,) AM.vr.
Jvant. Logik. 180O-G. II. Syllogisms.

oG. Syllogism in General. A syllogism is the cognition thnt a certain
projiosition is necessary, through the subsumjjtion o f its condition under a given
scneral rule.
57. General princij/le o f all Syllogisms. Tlie general principle whereon
tlie validity o f all inference, through the reason, rests, may be determinately
enounced in the following formula :
What stands under the condition o f a rule, that stanils also under the rule
itself.
" Observation. The syllogism premises a General Ride, and a Subsumption
under its Condition. Hereby wc understand tlic conclusion a. priori, not as
manifesteil in things individual, but as universally inaintaiiicd, and as necessary
under a eertain condition. And this, that all stands under tlie universal, and is
determinable in univer.sal laws, Is the i rincijile itself of Rationality or o i JSeces-
sity (jirincijiinm rutiomditutis sen necessitatis).
5S . Esseiitiid constituents o f the Syllogism. To every syllogism there
belong tlie tlirec following parts:
1.) A general rule, styled the M ajor projiosition (propositio major, Ober.satz).
2.) The proj)0 .sItion which subsumes a cognition under tlie condition o f the
general rule, called the jirojiosition (projiositio minor, Untersutz) ; and,
finally,
3.) The jirojiosition whieh affirms or denies the jiredieate in the rule o f the
sulisiiined cognliiun, the Concluding jirojiosition, or Conclusion ( Conclusio,
.'srhlu.'isatzJ.
The two first propositions, taken in connection Avith each other, arc called
the Antecedents, or Rremi.ses ( Vordersiitze).
Obserration. A rule is the a.ssertion of a general condition. Tlie relation
of the condition to the assertion, how, to wit, this stands under that, is the E x -
jionent of the rule. The eogriitlon, that the condition (somewhere or other)
takes jilaee. I.s the Subsuinjilion.
The ne.xns of wliat is snbsmned under the condition, with the assertion of
the rule, i.s the fhinelusion.''
Having shown the distribution of syllogisms into Categorical, Ilyjiothetical,
and Di<junclice, he jirocecds to sjieak o f the first class.
APPENDIX. 569
G3. Principle of Categirrical Syllog isms. The principle wlieroon the

possibility and validity of Categorical Syllogisms is this, Wdiat [lertains to tho
attribute of a thing, that pertains to the thing itself; and what is ivpiignant to
the attribute o f a thing, that is repugnant to the thing itself ('.Ve.n no a t.-t
notu rei ipsius; Jlejiugimns notte, repugnat rci ipsi).
Ohscrrution. From this principle, thc so-called Die tnni de Omni et Nullo
is easily deduced, and cannot, therefore, be regarded as the highest principle
eitlier o f the Syllogism in general, or o f the Categorical Syllogism in particular.
Generic und Specific Notions arc in fact the general notes or attributes of all
tho things which stand under these notions. Consei|ucntIy the rule is here
valivl Whul pertains or is rejmgnanl to the genus or species, that also pertuins
or is repugnant to all the objects which are contained under that genus or species.
And this very rule it is which is called tho Dictum de Omni et Niillo."
Ol) C H R I S T I A N WEISS.
Christian ATeiss, Logit, 1801.

216. Principle fo r all Syllogisms. The principle of every perfect Syllo
gism consists in the relation of one o f the notions contained in the conclusion to a
third notion (terminus inedius), to which the other notion o f the conclusion belongs.
Now the relation which the first o f these holds to the middle notion, the same must
hold to the second, just because the second coincides with the middle notion to the
same extent ns the first.
llemarl:. Glelation to means only any determinately thought relatio..
expro.s.sed in a judgment.......................
The older logicians adopt, some of them, thc princijile Notn notie est nota
rei ipsius, guo<l repugnat nutcc, repugnat ipsi r e i; tliis, however, is only jiroji-
erly applicable to the first figure. The expression of others is preferable,
QuacuuKine conreniunt (rei dissentiunt) in uno tertin, cndcm conreniunt (vel
dissentiun!) inter se. Others, in fine, among wliom is IVôlf, give the Dietnm de
Omni et Nullo (cf. 233) as the princijde of syllogisms in general ; comjiare
Philosophical Aphorisms [o f Platner], P. i. 546. All inference takes jilace
according to a universal rule o f reason, here only exjiressed in reference to
Syllogism, to which, however, some have chosen to give a more mathematical
expression: I f two notions be equal to a (hird,theg are also equal to each
other.
\_Nota bene. W eisss mistake ( 2 3 1 ) in supposing that Aristotle desig
nated the svllogistie moods wiih words, like his learned followers.]
231. Categorical Syllogisms, Figure J . The first figure concludes by
means of a subordination of the minor term in the conclusion under the subject
of another judgment.
233. Tliis takes place under thc general princijde :
1.) What pertains to all objects contained under a notion, that pertains also to
.some and to each indirhluni of their nundier among them.
2.) What bcbrngs to none o f the objicts contained under a notion, that also
does not jierlain to some nr to nng indiridiial o f their number among them.
These are the celebrated Dicta do Omni and de N u llo, Quidquid prcc'
72
570 APPENDIX.
dicatur de omni, idem etiam de oliqvo, and, Quidquid prcedicalur de nullo, id nê>
de aliquo qira dicaltir. ^
(r ) F R IE S .
Fries, Si/.stmn der Logik.

52. Hitherto we have maintained two views o f the Syllogism in connec
tion. Tlie end in view of reasoning is this, that eases should be subordinated
to general rules, and through them beeome determined. For e.vample, the
general law of the mutual attraction o f all heavenly bodies has its wholc signi
ficance, for my knowledge, in this, that there arc given individual heavenly
hodies, as Sun and Earth, to which I apply it. To enounce thcsc relations, it
is, in the first place, necessary that I have a general rule, as Major Projiosition
(O bersatz) ; in the second, a Minor Projiosition (U iitcrsatz), which subordi
nates cases to the rule ; and, finally, a Concluding Projiosition, which determines
thc cases through thc rule. On thc other hand, wc sec that every Conclusion
is an analytico-hypothctic judgm ent, and this always tlows from the Dictum de
Omni ct Nnllo, inasmuch as thc relation of subordination of particular under
universal notions, is thc only relation o f Reason and Consecpiciit given in the
form of thought itself. Now, If the conclusion, as syllogism, combines a jilu
rality o f judgments in its jiremises. In this case thc princijilc o f thc inference
must lie in a connection of thc thoughts, a connection which is determined
by thc matter of thcsc judgments. In the simplest case, when taking into ac
count only a single syllogism, I thus would recognize in the premises the rela
tion o f snhordiiiation between two notions by reference to the same third
noiion, and therethrough jicrccive iu the conclusion thc relation of these two
notions to each other. I know, for examjile, tliat <dl men are mortal, and that
Caius is a man. Coiiswjucntly, through the relation of the notion o f mortality,
and o f my imagination o f Caius, to thc notion man, thc relation of Caius to
mortality is likewi.sc determ ined-. Cuius is mortal. Thc first o f these views
is a mere jiostiilatc ; hut In eonforiiilty to thc second wc arc enabled imme
diately to c io lv c thc general form o f syllogisms, and from this evolution does
it then Ik ' c o ih c manifest that all jiossible syllogisms satisfy the jio.stulatc. W e,
therefore, in tie* first instance, attach ourselves to the second view. Through
this there i? determined as follows:
1.) 11 H thc determination o f one notion is carried over to another, super-
ordiiiatc or subordinate to Itself. To every syllogism there belong three
notions, called its term'! (termini). (W c say notions (F e g rijf), because they
are, Iu general, such, and when Indivldiial representations [or images] ajipear
a.? terms, In that ease there is no iiitcr-commiitatioii jKw.sIhlc.) A major term,
or svjierior notion ( Olierhegrijf), P, is given as thc logical determination o f a
middle term or notion ( .Mlllelhegriff), 1\I, and, through this, it is positively or
negatively stated as thc determination of a minor term or notion ( Unlerheg-
riff), .S. ' ^
2.) If, then, we regard the propositions in which these relations arc
enonneed, there is, firstly, in thc conclusion ( Scfilns.satz), thu minor term, or
inferior notion, siiliordinated to tlie major term, or sujicrlor notion (S is P ).
Funlicr, in one o f tlie jircmi.ses, thc middle must lie connected with thc major
term or notion (Al is P ). This is called the major proposition ( Obersatz). In
APPENDIX. 571
the other, again, the minor is connected with the major term or notion (S is
M) ; this is called the ininnr proposition ( Untersatz).
Tlie form of every syllogism is therefore
M ajor Proposition, M is P.
M inor P roposition, S is M.
C onclusion, 8 is P.
In the example given above, man is the middle term ; mortality the major
term; and Caius the minor term. The syllogism is
iMajor P roposition, All men are mortal;

M inor P roposition, Onus is n man ;
' C onclusion, Cuius is mortal.
The fundamental relation in all syllogisms is that of the middle term to

the major and minor terms : in other words, that of the carrying ovcr of a
logical determination from one notion to another, through certain given sub
ordinations. For, Iiowbeit the Dictum de Omni et Nullo, as a common princi
ple o f all svllogisms in the formula, 117//// holds good o f the universal, holds
also good o f the j/artirulars subordinate thereto, and still more in that other,
The attribu'e of the attribute is also the attribute o f the thing itself is proxi-
matelv only applicable to the categorical sid/ordiiiation of a representation [or
notion] under a notion : still, however, the law o f mental connection is alto
gether the same in syllogisms determined by the snbordinatioii o f eonsequcnec
under areason [Ilvpothetic Syllogisms], or o f thecomplement o f parts under
a logical whole [Disjunctive Syllogisms],The displayed form is thetorm of
every possible syllogism. In fact, it also coincides with the first requirement
that, in the syllogism, a case should always be determined by a rule, inasmuch
as every syllogism juoi/oses a universal premise, in order rigorously to infer
its conclusion. This will be more definitely shown when we treat of syllo
gisms in detail. Only the declaration, that the rule is always the major proposi
tion, is sor.ucimcs at variance with the declaration, that the major proposition
contains the relation o f the middle term to the major term. "We must, however,
in the first place, always follow the determination of the latter. For every
svllogism pioperly contains the three processes: 1). The subordination of a
particnlar under a universal: this is the function o f the minor proposition, and
the relation between the minor and major terms; 2). Postulate of a logical
determination for one of these two; this is the function of the major proposi
tion, and the relation o f the middle to the major term; 3). The carrying ovcr
this determination to that other; this is the function o f the conclusion and the
relation of the minor to the major terms.
53. The subordination o f a particular to a universal must, tlierefore. in
every syllogism, be umhrstood wholly in general. Here either a particular
may be determiued through the superordlnated universal, and such au in
ference from universal to particular we shall call a syllogism in the first figure;
or there is a universal known through ils subordinated jiarticular, aud this
infereuee from the particular to the universal is enlled a syllogism in the second
[////>(/] figure. If, for examjile, the subordination is given me, A ll gold is
57 2 APPENDIX.
m eta l; I can eith er transfer an attribute o f m etal, for instance fu s ib ility , to the
gold, or ononiiee an attribute o f gold, ductility, fo r instance, o f som e m etal. In
the first ease, 1 draw a eoneliision in the first figure, from the universal to the
p a r tic u la r :
All metiil is fusible ;
All yold is metal;
All yuld is fusible.
In the other ease, I con clu d e in the second [th ird ] figure from the par
ticular to the g e n e r a l:
A ll gokl is ductile ;
A ll yold is metal;
Some metal is ductile.
Then, after distribution of the Syllogism into Categorical, Hypothetical, and

Divisive (D isjunctive), he proceeds with the first class.
(s) K IE S ID V E T T E R .
Kiesewetter, A lh je m c in e L o y ik , 1801, 1824. 1. T h eil.

228. All pure Categorical !4yllogisms, whose conclusion is an affirma
tive jmlgiiient, rest on the following principle: W h a t p e r ta in s to the attrib u te
o f nn object, p e r ta in s to the o b ject its e lf All syllogisms, whose conclusion is a
negative judgm ent, are based upon the p rin cip le: ] ] hal is r c ju iy iia u t to the
a ttrib u te s o f an object, is r e jin y iia iit to the o b ject its e lf Two iirineiples whieh
can be easily deduced, the first from the principle of Identity, the second
from the principle of Coiitratlietion.
229. If we take into coiisideraiion that the major proposition of every
categorical syllogism must be a universal rule, from this there flow the fol
lowing rules:
1. W hatever is universally affirmed o f a notion, that is also affirmed of
everything contained under it. The D ic tu m d e O m ni.
2. Wliat is uiiiver-jally denied o f a notion i.s denied also of everything con
tained under it. Tik! D ic tu m d e X uU o.
These rules are al.so thus exjiressed :
What pertains to the geinis or species, pertains also to whatever is eon-
taineil under them. W hat i.s rejiugnant to the genus or species, is repugnant
also to whatever i.s contained under them.
.See also the W eitere A u s e in a n d e rs e tzu n y on the paragraphs.
(0 LARROQ UE.
Larroejne, H itm e n s d e P h ilo so p h ic , Paris, 1830. L o y iq u e, eh. i., p. 202.

The attribute o f an affirmative jirojiosition is taken sometimes particularly,
'ometimes universally. It is taken jiartieiilarly when it has a greater extension
than the subject; universallv, when it has not a greater extension, which oc
curs in every proposition where the two terms are identical. The reason of
' AP T E N D I X. 573
this tlifTcrence is palpable. I f the attribute be a term more general than tho
snhject, we aflirm that the subject is a species or individual contained in the
extension of the attribute: .lA'o/ is m o r la l : P<tul k le a r n e d ; that \s,iiia n is
one, and not the only, species eoiitalned in the extension o f the term n io r la l ;
P a u l is an individual, and not every individual, contained iu the extension of
the term le a rn ed . If, on the contrary, the attribute be not more general than
the suhject, the attribute is the >amc thing with the suhject, and, consequently,
we aflirm that the snhject is all that is contained in the extension of the at
tribute: A c irc le k a p la n e s u r fa c e , w hich h as a ll the p o in ts in \_a lin e called']
its c irc u m fe re n c e a t an eejual d ista n c e f r o m a p o in t c a lle d its cen tre, that is,
1 circle is a ll or e r e r y plane surface, cte.
The attrilnite of a negative proposition is always taken nniver.sally. W hen
we deny an attiilmte o f a snhject, we deny <f this snhject everything that has
the nature o f that attribute, that is to say, all the species, as all the individuals,
contained in its extension : T h e .soul is not e x 'e n d c d ; to wit the .soul is tiot a n y
o f the species, not a n y of the individuals contained in the extension o f the term
e x te n d e d .
Ch. ii., p. 2.30. W e have supposed, in the demonstration of these rules

[the genei'al rules o f the Categorical Syllogism], that the attiihute of an afliriii-
ative premise is always taken particularly. It would, therefore, seem that the
calculations on which this demonstration rests are erroneons, whensoever the
attribute is not a term more general than the subject, for we have seen that,
in these cases, the attribute can he taken imiversallj'. But it is to he observed,
that when the two terms o f a projiosition are identical, if the one or the other
inav be taken universally, they cannot hoth he so taken at once; and that, if it
he the attrihnte wliich is taken universally, it ought to be substituted for the
subject, which then aflhrds a particular attrihnte. A tria n g le is a f ig u r e trhich
has threff s id e s a n d three a n g le s. W e cannot say. A ll tria n g le is a ll fig u r e ,
w hich, e t c .; hut we can say, A ll tria n g le is som e f ig u r e , ichich, c te .; or, A ll fig u r e
w hich has three sid e s a n d three a n g le s is so m e tria n g le . Now, in adopting either
of these last expressions of the proposition, the attribute Is particnlar.
Ch. ii., ji. 231. W c have seen that tho Syllogism inferred from Its prem-
i.ses a jirojiosition to he proved; now this eonclnsion cannot he inferred from,
unless it he contained in, the premises. From this iiicoiilestahle ohservation
the author of the Port Royal Logic has endeavored to draw the following pre
tended rule, by aid of wliich wc. may d c tc t tho vice o f any fallacious reasoning
whatsoever: T h u s sh o u ld one o f the jn n m is e s co n ta in the c o n clu sion , a n d the
other show that it is .so c o n ta in ed . A great many treatises on Logic call this
the sin g le r id e o f the m o d ern s. This jiompoiis denomination seems to point at
some marvellous discovery, of which the ancients had no concejition, at
some consummalive result o f the efforts of the human intellect. It is true,
indeed, that a syllogism is invalid if the eoneliision be not contained in the
premises; hnt a fine discovery forsooth! This all the world already k n ew ,
,A.ristotle among the rest; but he justly noted that it i.s not always easy to see
whether the eonclnsion be contained in the premises, and it is to asMire our
selves o f this that he laid down liis rules. The pretended rule of the Port
,h 4 a p p e n d i x .
Royal is, therefore, not one at a ll; it enounces only an observation, true but
barren.
00 G A L tv r r i.
Gallnppi, L e z io n i d i L o g ica e d i M e ta jis ic a . 1832. Lcz. xlvii., p. 353, cd.

iSll.
In a reasoning there must be an idea, ooinnion to the two prem ises; and a
judgm ent which allinns the identity, either partial or perfect, o f the other two
ideas.
In the same Lecture (p. 348) he shows that he is ignorant o f the law
(piotcd from the P h ilo s o p h ia L u g d u n e n s is , being by the authors of the L A r t de
P e n s e r.
(v ) R U F F IE R .
Bufllcr, P r e m ie r e L o g iq u e , about 1725. The following is from the Recapitu

lation, 100 :
The Syllogism is defined, a tissue of three jiropositions, so constituted that
if the two former be true, it is impossible but that the third should be true
also. ( G3.)
Tho first Proposition is called the M a jo r: the second the j\fm o r; the
thinl tho C o n clu sio n , which last is the essential end in view o f the sylloeism.
( C5.) . . . . . . *.
Its art consists in causing a consciousness, that in the conclusion the idea of
the su h jeet comprises the idea o f the p r e d ic a te ; and this is done hy means o f a
third idea, called the M id d le T e rm (hecanse it is intermediate between the sub
ject and predicate), in such sort that it is comprised in the subject, and com-
pri-ics the prcdicatt;. ( G7.)
If the first thing comprise a second, in which a third is comprised, the first
comprises the third. If a j l u i d comprise chocolate, in which cocoa is comprised,
the j l u l d itself comjirlses cocoa. ( G8.)
To reach distant conclusions, there is required a jilnrality o f .syllogisms.
( "'.) . \ ^
Gnr rule o f itself snfileos for all syllogisms, even for the negative ; for every
negatlvi' syllogi-ni Is e(|iiivalent to nn allirmative. ( 77.)
IIvpothetical sylloglsins consist In the cnonnccm cnf. bv the major premise,
that a proposition is trne in case there be found a certain condition: and the
minor premise shows tliat this eomlltion is actually fonml. ( 7!i.)
I)isjiinetivf> s.vllogi'ins, to admit o f an easy verification, ought to be reduced
to hypotlictieals. ( H].)
Aliliom.di the siM<Tl<. rule, which is proposed for all syllogisms, be subject to
certain chamjes of expression, it is nevertheless always the nio.st easy; in fact,
all logle.d l:iws ri<>ei--arilv suppose this eomlltion. ( 87.)
'I'he eniployineiit of Grammar is essential for the practice of T>ogic. ( 90.)
By means of sn -li pne tir'e. which enab!''s ns to estimate accurately the value
of the termin every jnojirisitioii. we sh;dl likewise obtain the rule for the dis-
coverv o f all sf)j)hi'ms, which c o n sist only o f the mere e(|uivocation o f words,
and o f the ambiguity o f jiropositions. ( 92 el >>cq.)
APPENDIX. 575
(w ) VIL'TO RJS.
Vietorln, Neue natiirl'ichere Darstelluug iltr Logik, Vienna, 1835.

II. Simple Categorical Syllogisms. 94. The fundamental rule o f all such
syllogism s:
In what relation a concept stands to one o f two reciprocally subordinate con
cepts, in the same relation does it stand to the other.
9 4 . First F igure: fundamental rule: A.s'n notion determines the higher
notion, so does it determine the lower of the same : or, In ichat relation a
notion stands to one notion, in the same relation it stands to the lower of the same.
9 6 . Second F igure; fundamental r u le : When two notions are oppo-
sitcbj determined bg a third notion, they are also themselves opposed; or. ''If
two notions .stand to a third in opposed relations, they also themselves stand in a
relation o f ojgmsition.
98. Third Figure ; fundamental rule : A.s a notion determines the one of
two [.a ;V] snbonlinate notions, so does it determine the other; or, In what
relation a notion stands to the one o f two [to iV] subordinate notions, in the same
relation stands it also to the other.
1 0 0 . Fourth Figure; fundamental rule: A.s a notion is determined by
the one o f two subordinate notions [Oco notions in the relation to each other of
subordination'], so does it determine the other: or, In what relation one o f two
subordinated notions [_notions rccijwocally subordinate or superordinate] stands as
to a third, in the same relation stands it also to the other.
II. F i:n u a m e x t . \ l L aws of S y l l o g ism . R e f e r e n c e s .
(See Galluppi, Lezioni di Logica e di Metafsica, Fez. xlvii., vol. i. p. 345

et seq. ; Troxler, Logik, i. p. 33 : Bolzano, Wissenyehuftslehre, Logik, vol. ii.
2C3. p. 543.)
I. Logicians who confound the Nota notre and the Dictum de Omni, being
ignorant of tlieir several significances ; making them
a) Coordinate laAvs without distinction.
Jiiger, Ilai.db. d. Logik. 08 (1839) ; Brochazka, Gesetzb.,/. d. Denken, 217
(1842) : Calker, iJenk/ehre. 143 (1822). Ti-oxler, Logik, ii. p. 40.
b) Derivative : tbe Dietnm de Omni, to wit, from the Nota notm. This
snpreme or categorical.
AVcnzel, FJcin. Philos. Log., 253, 250. Canonik, 04. Kant, Die falsche
Spitzf.,%?>. L o g i k , K r w " , Logik, %~0. Bachmann, 123. Jakob.
Logik. 202, 4tli ed. ISOO ; 1st ed. 1 788.
II. Logicians who cnonnco the law o f Identity (Proportion), in the same
third, by the mathematical expression Equality.
Beimarns, Vcnvnifllehre,%\~iQ>. iMayer, Vernunftscblusse,\. p . '250. Arriaga,
In. Sum.. D. 111. 3, p. 23.
III. Logicians wlio make the Dictum de Omni the fundamental rule of syl
logisms in general.
Aristot., An. Prior., L. i. c. 1, 4. AVolf, Phil. Pat.. 353. Scheibler, Up.
P. iv. De Syll. c. ii. 12. Jac. Thomasins, Erot. Log., c. 395. Buttner, Cur-
576 A P P E N D IX.
su.s Philos., Log., 146. Conimbriccnses, In Jri.s7, Dial., An. Prior., L. I. c. 2,

J). 204.
IV. Logicians who confound or make coordinate tlie law of Proportion or
Analogv . and the Dictum de Omni.
WMtoul.ai li, l^rcic Philos. Log., P. iii. e. 6. 4. Whafelj-, Logic, Intr., ch.
II. p. iii., 2. Lccchmaii, Logic, P. III. ch. 2. Kcckermann, Syslema Logica:
.l//u(/.'-. L. iii. c. 2. kyst. Log. M ajus., L. iii. c. 5.
V. Logicians who make the Law o f Identitv the one supreme.
Suter, Logicn. 61, calls this the princijile of Identity and Contradiction.
Aldricli. Comp., L. i. c. 3, 3, p. 2. Hutcheson, Log. Comp., P. iii. e. 2.
Arriaga, Cnr. Phil., In. Sum., D. iii. 16-22, pp. 23, 24. Larroque, Logiquc,
p. 224. Iffayer, \'ernunflschusse, i. p. 293. Troxler, Logik, ii. pp. 33, 40.
Ucinnrns, VLU-nunflhhrr, 17G. M endoza. LJisp. Log. el Mel., I. p. 470.
Derodon, I.oy. Ih-st., De Log., pp. 639, 644. Darjes, 17., etc., 271, p. 97.
Smigleciiis. Logicn. D. xiii. p. 517. qu. etc. Fran. Boiue Spei, Com. Prim , in
Log. .Iri.st.. D. \ii. d. 2, p. 25. Cursus Complut., De Ary., L. iii. c. 4, p. 57.
Alstediiis, En c. Logica, ii. c. 10, p. 435. Havichorst, Inst. Log., 324.
Poncins, Cursus Philos. In An. Prior., D. xx. qu. 5, p. 282.
VI. Logicians who restrict the Dictum de Omni to the First Figure (im
mediately).
Aldrich. Comp. 1. 1, c. 3, 7. Noldius, Log. Ilec., c. xii. p. 290. Grosser,
P lian is liitelli-rtus, iii. p. 1, mcmb. iii. p. 13 7.
VII. Logicians who make 4110. Dicta de Omni et Nullo the supreme canons
for Universal Syllogisms : tho law o f Proportion for Singular Syllogisms.
Burgersdicius, lust. Log.. L. ii. c. 8, p. 171. Îclanothon, Erol. D ial., De
Sy't. Expos., L. iii. ]). 172, ed. 1586. Fouseea, Instil. D ial., L. vi. ec. 21, 24,
pp. 363. 373.
\T II. What name given In what logicians to the Law of Proportion, etc.
Latr of Proportion, or of Analogy, Keckcrmann, Syst. Log. L. iii. c. 5, Op.,
p. 746. Alstcdius, EiicycL, p. 435. rh avaXoylas. Dictum de Omni et Nullo
M ojus. Noldius, Log., p. 28S. O f Identity. Zedlers Lex. P r. convenientiee.
Dirjcs, I7n ad Verit, 270, p. 96. Law o f Pro]/ortional Identity and Non-
Idi-ntity, .Self.
IX . Logii-ians erron eou sly supposing A ristotle to em ploy, besides the Die'cum
de O m ni, the riih* o f Proportion as a fundam ental law o f syllogism .
11 q)in, Ur'lif ji'in s sur In Loyiifue, 4.
X. 'rerins under whieh tlie law o f IVoportion has been enounced.
A g re e w ith, f'o in rid e w ith. T h e sa m e w ith. C ohere (Svrbius). C oexist
(b a d ), d 'o id e n tlra l irdh. E q u a l to (N o . Ii.). In co m b in a tio n w ith, D arjes, V'ia
a d T er., {>. !t7 (in clu d es n eg a tiv e). C onvertible.
in L v i ' v r i AT I ONS OK THE IIlGIIEU L a WS OF S y ELOGI SM.
L a w of Proportion.
Ari'totle, E h nrh, V. vi. 8. Things the same with one and the same, avo
the , - a m e with one another. Comjiare To]>ira, L. vii. e. 1, 6. Thus ScotUx,
In A rt. P r io r ., L. i. qu. 9, f. 218.
APPENDIX. 577
Som e say, Uni tertio in d ivisib U i ) ' som e otliers, U n i tertio in d ivisib ili,
indivisibiliter suinpto. O thers, in fine, say, U ni tertio, adeijuate suinpto
S ee IreniLMis, h d e y . P h ilo s. L o g ., 3, 5. Som e exp ress it, T h in gs that are
equal to the sam e third are equal to each other. S ee Irenams, ib. So Reim-
arus, M ayer.
Som e exp ress it, Q um eunque con ven iu n t (v e l d issen tiu n t) in uno tertio.
eadem eon vcn iu n t (v el dissentiunt) in ter se.
Qua? (liio eoiiveniiint emn iino quodam tertio, eatenus eonveniuiit inter se;
(juando antein (liionmi imiim convenit emn tertio, et alteruni huie rejiugnat,
repugnant (luoijue eatenus sibi invieem . W yiipersse, In st. L o g ic a , 272, Lug.
Rat. 3d ed. 1800.
Noldius (L o g ic a , p. 288) calls these the Dicta de Omni et de Nullo. The
former is. Qna?enn(|ne affirmantur in aliquo tertio (siiigiilari identiee, iiniver-
sali et identiee et complete distributive), anirmantiir inter se. The latter,
Quorum unum [totaliter] aflirmatiir in aliquo tertio, alteruni negatur, ea inter
sc iiegantur.
Noldius. W hatever is affirmed essentially o f a subjeet, is affirmed of all
that is inferior or reciprocal to that subject. W hatever is denied of a subjeet,
is denied o f all inferior or reciprocal. (S e e Noldius against the universal
application of these Dicta, L o g . R e c ., p. 290.)
R eusch ( S g s t. L o g icu m , ed. i. 1 734, 503) m akes the D icta de Omni et
N u llo the rule o f ordinary syllogism s, and thus en u n ciates them : Si quid
prm dicatur de om ni, illud etiam prtedicatur de a liq u o : et. Si quid predicatur
de nullo, illud etiam non prm dicatur de aliquo. S en su s prioris est, Quidquid
de g e n e r e , vel sp ecie om ni prmdicari potest, illud etiam prmclicatur de quovis
sub illo g en ere, vel sub ilia sp ecie, co n teiito ; Ite m , Cu!cun(|ue eonipetit
definitio, illi quoque com petit definitum . (A n d so vice ver.sd o f the other.)
Syrbius gives these two rules:
1) I f certain ideas cohere with a one-third, they also cohere in the sam e
m anner with each o ther.
2) Ideas which do not cohere with the same one-third, these do not cohere
with each other. (G iven in the original by Waldin, S y stem a , p. 162. See
also A c ta E r u d ito n im , 1718, p. 333.) Syrbius thinks that the law o f Propor
tion, unless limited, is false.
Darjes, I7n a d V eritatem (1 755), 270, p. 96, 2d ed. 1764. Two [things or
notions] in combination with the same third, may be combined together in the
same respect (ea ratione) wherein they stood in combination with that third.
( See further; sliows that other rules are derived from this.)
Dictum de O m ni, etc.
A ristotle, A n a l. P r ., L. i. c. i. 11.
T o be predh-ated, de O m ni, u n iversally, is when we can find nothing under
the subject o f wliieli the other [that is, the p red icate] m av not be said ; and to
be predicated de N u llo, in like m anner.
Jae. T liom asins, K ro te m a ta L o g ic a , 16 70.
40. What do you call the foundation o f syllogism ? The Dictum de
Omni et Nullo.
41, W h a t is the D ictu m de O m n i? W h en nothing can be subsum ed
73
578 APPENDIX.
umliT the subject o f the major proposition of Avhieh its predicate may not bc
affirmed.
42. MTiat is tbe Dictum de N id lo ? When notliing can be subsumed
under the subject of the major proposition o f Avhich its predicate is not
denied.
Thoniasins notices that the first rule applies only to the aflirmative moods of
tho first figure. Barbara and Darii; the second only to the negative moods of
the same figure, Celareut and Ferio.
I V . O b j e c t i o n s to t h e D i c t u .m d e O m n i e t N u l l o .
I. As a principle o f syllogism in general.

II. .\s a priiicijile o f the First Figure, as enounced by Aristotle.
1. Only applies to syllogisms in extension.
2, Does not apply to individual syllogisms; as, Peter is ru n n in g ; but some
man is Peter: therefore, some man is running.
(Arriaga. In . iSumm., p. 24.)
.3, Does not apply to coe.xtensive reasonings; as, A ll trilateral is (a ll) tri
a n gu la r; but all triangular has three angles equal to two right angles; ergo, etc.
Arriaga, ib.
Dictum de Omni et Nnllo does not apply,

1, To (lie other Figures tlian t!ie First.
2, Not to all the moods o f First Figure, for in many o f these the higher
class is subjected to tlie lower.
.3, The fonn of the First Figure does not depend upon the principle of the
Dictum de Omni et Xnllo. This im iicrfcct; not upon the tliorough-goiiig prin
ciple, that ill this figure one notion is compared to a second, and this second
with a third.
V. G e n e r a l L aavs o f S y l l o g i s m i n V e r s e .
(1 ) Partilms cx puris scipiitur nil (2 ) sive negatis.

( (.3) .Si (jna prieit partis, seipiitiir concliisio partis,
j (4 ) .Si (|iia negata pneit, eonclusio sitque ncgata.
j (J>) I>c.\ generalis crit, medium concludere nescit.
(G) IMi\tcii-(]uc : (7 ) triplex; (8 ) ac idem terminus esto.
'(1 ) Dislribiias medium ; (2) iiec fjuartus terminus adsit.
(;\) rtr.aquc ncc pr;nmisa negans; (1 ) nee particularis.
(:>) S cctcin r partem coriclusio dcteriorem ;
(G) Ft non ^li^tribnat nisi cum prirmissa, (7 ) negetve.
1 Ictruo Flispanns. .S u m m u la . (Tr. iv. c. 3, 2C a m p a i i e l l a , D ia le c t ., p. .384.

f. ib b. El' ] S JIutchesoM , Log. Com p. [!. iii. c. 3, p. 5 3 .
E d .]
APnxDix. 579
(1) Terminus csto triplex : meilins, majorque, minorque :

(2 ) Latins linnc (piam praemissae, com-Insio non vult,
(3) Neiinacjiiam nu'dinm cajiiat coiiclusio oportet.
(4) Ant ficnifl aut iiernin medinm generaliter esto.
i(5 ) Nil sc(|iiitnr geininis ex partienlarihus uiKjnam.
(C) lltra(jne si jii jemissa nogct, nihil indo secjiietnr.
(7) Amh.o! allirmnntcs neijuennt generare negantem.
(8 ) Est jiarti'siinilis ( OiK'lusio deteriorl.
Pejorein secjultnr senqier conclusio partem. j
'(1 ) Terminus est geininns, mediumqne aeeedit utricjnc.
(2 ) Praemi.ssis dieat ne finis jilura, eaveto.
(3) Ant scmel. ant itcrnni nu'dinm genus omne capessat;
(4) OlHcii(|ue tenax rationeni claudere nolit.
(1 ) Terniinus est trijilex. (2) jMedinm conelusio vitet.
(3) Hoc cx praemis.sis altera distribnat.
(4) Si ])raemissa siinnl fiiit ntratjnc jiarticnlaris,
(5) Ant iitriiKjue negans, nulla scijuela venit.
I(.6) Particuhire prmit V scijuitur conclusio partis.
(7) Ponitnr ante negans V Clausula talis erit.
.(8 ) Qnod non prsecessit. conelusio nulla recpiirit."
Turn re, turn sensu, triplex modo terminus esto.
( Argnmentari non est ex particulari.
\ Neipie nogativis recte concludere si vis.
Nnnqnam complecii medium eoneludo debet.
Qnantmn prtemissaj, rcferat conclusio solum.
( E.x falsis falsnm vernmqne alhpiando sequetur;
I E x veris possnnt nil nisi veraseqni.
V I. S p e c ia l L aw s o f S y llo g isw ix V e r s e .
1. Fig. Sit minor affirmans, nee major partioularis.

2. Fig. Una negans esto, major vero generalis.
3. Fig. Sit minor affirmans, conclusio particnlaris.
4. Fig. a) IMajor ubi affirniat. gcneralem snme minorem.
b) Si minor affirmat, conclusio sit speeialis.
c) Quando negans modus est, major generalis habetur.'*
B. C R I T I C I S M .
I. C r i t i c i s w o f t h e S p e c i a l L a w s o f S y l l o g i s m .
The Special Laws of Svllogism, that is, the rules which govern the several
Figures of Categorical Reasonings, all emerge on the suspension o f the logical
1 P u r c h o t , wit li v a r i a t i o n s o f Se g i iy , Ph. 3 C r a k a n tl io r p e , Lngira. L. iii. c. 15, p. 210.

Liigr/., (Jalliippi [Piiroliot. Inst. P h il., v o l . * P b a g l is , Logica> E le n u n ta , 225. S a nc r u-
i.. T.ngien, I, iii. c 3. ]i. 171. Kd ] ciu s. D ialectiea a d M en tn n D oct. Subtilis, L . i.
2 I s ei i d o o r n , Logica, L. iii. c 8, p. 427, 8, c. 3, p. 103. L o u d . 1073.
(1652). Cl ia uv iu a u d W a l c h , L ex . v . Syllog.
580 APPENDIX.
postulate, To he able to state in language what is operative in thought.

Thev all emerge on the refusal or neglect to give to the jiredieatc that quantity
in overt exin-ession which it possesses in thc internal ojierations of mind. The
loKieiaiis ass(*rt. 1, That in allirmative jiropositions the iiredicate 'must be
alwavs jiresumed iiartieiilar or indelinite, though in this or that jiroposition it
be known and thought as universal or definite; and, 2, That in negative
propo.'itions this same predicate must be always presumed absolutely (i. e.,
universally or definitely) excluded from thc sphere of the subject, even though
in this or that projiosition it bc known and thonglit as jiartially (t. e., partlc-
ularlv or indefinitely) Included therein. The moment, however, that the said
postulate of Logie is obeyed, and we arc allowed to (piantify the jirodieate in
laii'Tiiage. as the jiredicate is (jnantified in thought, tlu* special rules o f syllo
gism di.sajijioar, the figures arc all cipialized and reduced to unessential modi
fications; and while their moods arc multiplied, the doctrine o f syllogism itself
is carried iqi to the simplicity o f one short canon. Having already shown that
the general laws o f syllogism are all comprised and e.xjiressed in tliis single
canon. it now oidy remains to point out how, on the exclusive doctrine o f the
logicians, the special rules became neecssary, and liow, on the unexclusive doc
trine which is now propounded, they became at once superfluous ami even
erroneous. It is perhaps needless to observe, that the following rules have
ret'erenec only to the whole o f Extension.
The double nih> o f the First Figure, that is, the figure in which the middle
term is subject in the sumption, and predic'atc in the subsiimjition, is, Sit
miiinr (ijjiniiim s . hoc major particularis. Here, in the first place, it is prescribed
that thc minor premise must be aflirmative. The reason is manifest ; because,
if the miror prec.iisc were negative, the major jiremise behooved to be allirma
tive. But in thi.' figure, the predicate of the conclusion is thc predicate of the
major jiremi.-e; but if aflirmativi*, the predicate o f that premise, oii the doctrine
o f the logi< ians, is jircsumed jiartleular, and as the conclusion following tlie
minor prcmi.'c Is necessarily negative,a negative proposition thus,contrary to
logical law, has aparticular predicate. But if we allow a negative projiosition
to have in language, a.s it may have in thought, a jiartlcular or indefinite jircdi-
catc, the rule Is superseded.
The second rule, or second part o f the rule, o f this First Figure, is, tliat the
major jiremlsc shouM be iini\crsal. The reason o f this is etjnally apjiarent.
Fur wc h.ave . s e e n that, by the previous rule, thc minor premise could not be
in-L'atiM-, in wliidi ease certainly, had it been allowable, the middle term would,
IS predir-'ite. h a \e been distributed. But whilst it behooved that the middle
lerm -lioiild be once at least disfribiitixl (or taken universally), and, as being
tin* 'iibj. i I oi' tlie major preini.se, it could oiili' be distributed In a universal
propo'itioii, the rule, on the hypothesis o f the logieiaus, was eomjiulsory. But
I' we h.ave .seen that th(* former rule is, on onr liroader ground, inejit. and that
I ' m'ddle term m a y b e )iniv(>i-sally rpiantifieil, as the predicate either of an
itlirm iti ! or n'-eatiie siibsMmptlon, it is e(]ually manifest that this rule is, in
dk( M ' . I mil int. and i '.cii false.
Ill the .Second Figure, that is, the figure in whieli tlie middle term is prodicaê
1 .See pji. .>36 a m i 583. E d .

APPENDIX. 581
botli in sum ption and subsum ption, the special rule i s , U rm n cg a n s c s lo ;

major v ero gmerafis. . ,
In regai-d lo the first rule, or first h a lf o f the rule, That one or other o f
the prem ises should he iieg .iliv e , the reason is iiuiiiifest. For. on the doc
trine o f the logicians, the predicate o f an afiirm ative proposition is always
presum ed to he jiarticnlar ; eon seijiien tlv, in this figure the m iddle term can,
on their doetriiie, on ly bc distiihuted (as distributed at least on ee it m ust h e)
in a negative jm lgm eiit. B u t, on onr doetriiie, on wliieh the jiredicate is quan
tified in language as in thought, this rule is abolished.'
T h e second rule, or second m oiety o f the r u le , T h at the suinjition should
be alw ays universal, the reason o f this is eijnally (dear. Ifor the logicians, not
considering tliat hoth extrem es w ere in eqiiilihrio in the sam e wholc o f e x te n
sion, and, coiisecjiiently, that n either could claim [in either ijuantity] the jilace
o f major or m inor term , and thereby constitute a true major or a true m inor
p rem ise; the logicians, I say, arbitrarily drew one instead e f two direct con
clusions, and g ave the nam e o f m ajor term to that extrem e which formed the
predicate in that on e conclusion, and the nam e o f major prem ise to that an te
ced en t jirojiosition which they chose to en oiiiiee first. On tlieir doctrine,
therelbre, the conclusion and on e o f the prem ises being alw ays n egative, it
behooved the sumjition to be alw ays gen eral, otherw ise, contrary to their do( -
trine, a negative jiroposition m ight have a particular jiredicate. On our
doctrine, how ever, this difiienlty d ocs not e.xist, and the rule is, eonsecjneiitlv,
superseded.
In the. Third F ig u re , that is, the figure in w hich the m iddle term is snhject
o f both the extrem es, the special rule i.s, S it m in o r a jf ir m a n s ; c on clu sio p a r
tic u la ris.
H ere the first h a lf o f the rule, T h at the m inor must not be n e g a tiv e ,
is iiiaiiifestly determ ined hv the coim non doctrine. F or (m ajor and m inor
term s, m ajor and m inor projiositions, b ein g in this figure ecjifally arbitrary as in
the seco n d ) here the .sumption behooving lo be afiirm ative, its jiredicate, con
stituting the major term or jiredicate o f the con clu sion , behooved tu he jiartie-
ular also. But the conclusion follow in g the m inor prem ise would necessarily
he n egative ; and it w ould h ave w hat a n egative proposition is not allow ed
on the com mon doctrine an nndistrihiitcd jiredicate.
T he second h a lf o f the rule, T h at the con elu sion must b e p a rticu la r ,
is dcteiTiiined by the doctrine o f the logicians, tliat the jiarticnlar an teced en t,
which they choose to call the m inor term , should be afiirm ative. F or, in this
' case, tlie m iddle term h ein g the subject o f both prem ises, the jiredieate o f the
subsunijition is the m inor extrem e : and that, on tlieir doctrine, not h ein g dis
tributed in an affirm ative jirojiosition, it coiisecjuently forms the undistributed
1 [ F o r e x a m p l e s fr om A r i s to t le o f afflrma- o s i t i o n s in Seconrl F i g u r e , an d d o e s n o t g i v e
tivo c o n c l u s i o n s in llie .Sceoiid Fi g u r e , see De th e reason w h y t h e i n le r e n c e is g o o d or bad
Calo, L ii. c. 4, 4, t e x t 23, ibi A v e r r o e s . in s uc h s y ll o g is m . Ct. . \ n i m o n i i i s a n d Ih i h -
Phys. L. ii. c. 2, 12, t e x t 23, ibi A v e r r o e s ; c. p o n u s m t. Inc. A n . Prior, L, ii. c. 22, 7 , 8 .
4, 8. t e x t 33, ibi A v e n o o s . I b .c . 7, 1, l e x t A n. Post , L. i. c. 6, 1, et ibi. T h em ist iu s,
42, ibi A v e r r o e s . A n Po.a, L. i. c. 12, 12, Iac iu s, Za b a re l la . Cf. a ls o Z ab a r e l la , D e
l e x t 92, l ii A v e r r o e s et P a c i u s . A r g u e s h i m - Q u a rta F ig . S y l l . ,c . x . ]
e lf , li k e Cacneus, f r o m t w o a ffi rm a tiv e p r o p-
:'E 2 Ar i M' . XDI X.
subject of the eonehision. The eoneliision, therefore, having a particular sub-

jeet. is, on tlio common doctrine, a jiarticnlar proposition. B ut as, on our
doctrine, the predicate o f an afiirmative jiroposition may have a universal
quantification, tlic reason fails.
II. L .vivs OF S ec o n d I io u r e A d d i t i o n a l .*
B y d e s ig n a tin g th e q u a n tity o f th e jir e d ic a te , w e can h a v e th e m id d le term

(w h ic h in tliis fig u re is a lw a y s a jir e d ic a te ) d istr ib u te d in an a n ir u ia tiv e p r o jio
s itio n . Thus ;
A U P i s n il A ;
AU S is some M;
T h erefo re, n il S is some P.
A ll the thinr/s tlinl a r e o rg a n ize d a r e all the th in gs that a re endowed iwith li f e ;

B u t a ll p la n ts a r e some things endowed with li f e ;
T h erefo re, a ll p la n ts a r e some th in gs o rg a n ize d .
T h is first r u le (s e e a b o v e , p. 2 9 1 ) m u st, tlie r e fo r e , b e th u s a m p lifie d : T h e

m id ille ti-rm m itst b e o f d e fin ite q u a n tity , in o n e p r e m ise a t l e a s t ; th a t is, it
m u st e ith e r . 1, B e a >Ingiil;ir, in d iv id u a l, c o n e e p t, a n d , th e r e fo r e , id e n t i
cal in both Jn en li.'e^ ; or. 2 . \ n n i \ ( rsal n o tio n jir e su m jitiv e ly d istr ib u te d b y
riegatlnn In a s in g le jirem i.-e; or, 3 , A u n iv e r s a l n o tio n e.x'jiressly d istr ib u te d
b y d e sig n a tio n in o n e o r both jirem i.'cs.
B u t the s e c o n d r u le , w h ich has c o m e d o w n from A r isto tle , a n d is ad op ted
in to e v e r v .sy.'teni o f L o g ic , w ith o n ly o n e e .x e e jitio ii, an a n c ie n t sch o lia st, is
a lto g e th e r e r r o n e o u s . F o r , 1 , T h e r e is p r o p e r ly n o su m p tio n a n d siib siin ip -
tioii in this fig u r e : fo r th e p r e m is e s c o n ta in q u a n titie s w h ich d o n o t sta n d to
e a c h otiiei' in a n y r e c ip r o c a l r ela tio n o f g r e a t e r o r less. E a c h jir c n iise iiia i,
th e r e fo r e , sta in l first. T h e r u le o n g lit to be, O n e jircm lse m u st be d e fin ite :
but sn eh a ru le w o u ld b e id le ; fo r w lia l is lie r e g iv e n as a sjie eia l c a n o n o f th is
fi'_mre, w .is a lr e a ilv g iv e n as o n e o f th e la w s o f sy llo g ism In g e n e r a l. 2 , T h e
e rr o r in th e jir iiie ip le Is sn jip o rted by an e r r o r in th e illu stra tio n . In b oth th e
'y llo g i'iiis given, th e c o n e ln s io n d r a w n is n o t that w hich th e jirem ises w arran t.
T a k e till- first o r a fiirm a tiv e e x a m jile . 7 'lie e o iie ln s io n h e r e o u g h t to h a v e
b e .-11 , X o S is some B, or, Some is no S ; for t lie ie are a lw a y s tw o e ijn iv a le iit
e o iir lii-io iis in this fig u re . In th e e o iie r e te e x a m jile , th e le g itim a te eo in 'lu sio n s,
as iie e e ita le d b y th e p r e m ise s, a r e, X o horse is some animal, a n d , Nome
anim al is no horse. T h is is sh o w n b y m y m o d e o f e x p lic a tin g th e (jiia n tity o f
th e jtre iliM te . e o m liln e d w ith m v sy m b o lic a l n o ta tio n . In lik e m a n n e r, in
th e -ei oiid o r n e g a t i\ e s_\ llo g ism , th e c o iie liisio ii o u g h t to h a v e b e e n e ith e r
o f the tw o fo llo w in g ; In th e a b str a c t fo rm u la , A ll'S are not some 1 , or,
.Mme P are not all S ; in th e c o n c r e te e x a m jile , A ll tojxizes are not some min-
I Wtij.t liilIowH 10 page 58.3 wa.s ati early Tin; iiilerp olalioii appcurti in stiid eiils notes
w rilleii iiil>T]io:aIioii I.y ttie aiillior in Ixc- o f the I.ectnre.s o f se.-.-ion 1841-42, and was
I nr, I ( p. N il). hi-iiig an applieatloii o f tlw priii- j.rol.al.ly given still earlier. ICu.
iple o f a <|uantilie<l pred icale lo syllo g ism . 2
.See p. 292. Kl>.
APPENDIX. 583
erah, i. e., No topazes are some minerals, or, Some minerals are not all tojnczer.
i. e., Some ininm'als are ho topazes.
The moods Ce.sare and Caniestres may be viewed as really one, for they
are only the same syllogism, with jiremises jilaced first or second, as is always
allowable in this [F igu re], and one o f the two conclusions, which are always
legitimately eonsefjnential, assigned to each.
A syllogism in the mood Festino admits o f either jireniise being jilaced fii-st-,
it ought, therefore, to have had another mood for its pendant, with the aflirma-
tive premise first, the negative premise second, if we are to distinguish moods
in this figure by the aeeidental arrangement o f the premises. But this was
prohibited by the second Law o f this Figure, that the Sumption must always
be universal. L et us try this rule in the formula of Festino now stated, revers
ing the premises.
Som e S are M (i. e., some M);

No P is M;
AIo P is some S. 1
SSom e S a re no P. )
Some actions a r e p r a is e w o r th y ;
N o vice is p r a is e w o r th y ;
( No v iie is some action. |

( Some action is no vice. )
From what I liave now said, it will be seen that the Dictum de Omni et de
Nullo cannot afford the princijile o f the Second Figure.
The same errors o f the logicians, on which I have already commented, in
supposing that the sumption or major jiremise in this figure must always be
universal, an error founded on another error, that there is (jiroperly sjieak-
ing) either sumption or subsumption in this figure at all. this error, 1 say,
has prevented them recognizing a mood corresponding to Baroco, the first
jiremise being a jiartieiikr negative, the second a universal alfirmative, i. e..
Baroeo with its jiremises reversed. That this is competent is seen from the
example o f Baroco now given. Reversing it we have:
[Some d a r e not B; Some an im als a r e not ( a n y ) o vip a ro u s;

A ll a ai'B B. A ll bird s a re (s o m e ) oviparous.
No a is some d ; N o b ird is some a n im a l;

Some d a r e no a. I Scnne a n im a l is no b ird .
III. A u t h o r s S u p r e m e C a n o n s of C a t eg o r ic a l S y l lo g is m s .
[The supreme Canon or Canons o f the Categorical Syllogism, finally adopted

by Sir W. Hamilton, are as follows :]
I. For the Unfigured Syllogism, or that in which the terms compared do
not stand to each other in the recijirocal relation o f subject and predicate,
being, in the same proposition, either both subjects or (possibly) both predicates.
584 APPENDIX.
the canon is: In so f a r as tiro notions (notions proper, or individuals)

exthrr both mjrti, or one agreeing, the other does no!, with a cotiunon third notion ;
in so Ja r. lhi.<e notions do nr do not agree iritli each other.
11. For tlie Figured Syllogism, in which the terms compared are severally
>ubject and prcdirate. conscijuently, in ret'crcnce lo each other, coiitainiiig and
contained in the counter wholes o f Intension and E.xtcnsion, the canon is:
ir /m t worse rt lotion o f sidgeel and jiredicate .\ubsists between either o f two
h nils and a conniuoi third tirm, with which one, al least, is p o sitively re la te d ; that
Illation subsists betwiin the two terms themselves.
" Each Figure has its own Canon.
" F ir s t F i g u r e : W hat worse relation o f determ ining (p re d ic a te ) a n d o f
d itc rm in e d ( s i i b p c l ) is held by either o f two notions to a third, with which one at
least is jio sitirelg re la te d ; that relation do they inim ediatelg (d ir e c tly ) hold to
I acli other, a n d iiid in etlg (in e d ia te lg ) its converse.
' Second F ig u r e : ]]l(iit worse relation o f determ ined (sid ije c t) is held by
cither of' two n o'ions lo a third, with which one at least is jiositivelg r e la te d ; that
n lation do they hold indi fe r e n llg to each other.
' I'hird F ig u r e : W h a t worse relation o f determ ining (p r e d ic a te ) is held by
eithn- o f two notions to a third, icith which one at least is p o sitively r e la te d ; that
n lation do they hold in d ijferen tlg to each other.'^
IV . U L T U A -'rO T A L Q U A N T IF IC \T IO V OF M iD D L E T e R.M.
(a) L A M llE R T S D O C TRIXE.
Lambert, X e u e s O rganon.
Dianniologie,% \D'i. " If it be indctermined how far A docs, or does not,
coincide with 1>. but, oil the Otlier band, we know that A and B, severally,
make iiji more than h a l f " the individuals under C, in that case it is manifest
that a [linear] notation is jiossiblc, and that of the two following k in d s:
C c.
15----------------------------- b,
A ..
For since B and A arc each greater than the h a lf o f C, A is consequently

greater than C less by B ; and in this case, it is o f necessity that some A are
B. and some B arc A. W e may accordingly so delineate:
C----------------------------------- c,
A ------------------------- a,
.B b,
ceing that it is indifferent whether we commence with A or with B. I may

add, that the ca.-e which we have here con.sidered does not frequently occur,
Inasniiicli as tlie coiiijiarativc extension o f our several notions is a relation
1 pp. c,vt. CA. f-.i). I liave elsfwliere had occasion to show. See
'i It 1ji e io u g h if fiilier A or IJ exceed ihc below, p 588.
half i the oilier need be only half This, 3 Jn itie original, for A there is, by a typo-
whicb Lambert here and bercalter overlooks, graphical erratum, C. See Ph. 208.
APPENDIX. 685
Avhich r em a in s Avholl)' u n k n o w n .' I, e o n s e q n e n lly , a d d u c e th is o n ly as an e x a m

p le , th at a legitiin atjj e m p lo y m e n t m a y c e r ta in ly b e m a d e o f th e se r e la tio n s .
Phanonienologie, v. 0 / Ihe probable
188. In so far as siicli propositions are parlii ular, they m ay, like all oilier
parlicnlar propositions, be syllogistically em ployed ; but no farther, unless we
look to tlicir d egree o f particularity, or other ]iroxiniate d eterm ination, som e
exam p les o f ivliicli avo luiA-e adduced in the Dianoiologie ( 2 3 5 et seq.). Thus
the d egree o f particularity m ay render a syllogism valid, Avhieh, w ithout this,
Avould be incom petent. F or exam p le :
Three-fourths of A are B;
Tico-thlrJs of A are C;
Thenfore, some C are B.
T h e in fe r e n c e h ere fo llo w s, b e c a u s e th re e -fo u rth s a d d ed to tAvo-thirds are

g r e a t e r than u n ity ; a n d , c o n s c (]u e n tly , th e r e m u st b e , a t le a st, five-tA velfths o f
A w liich a r e a t o n c e 13 a n d C.
204. In the Third F igu re avc have the m iddle term, subject in both
prem ises, and the conclusion, particular. If, iioav, the .subjects o f the tAvo
prcniise.s bc furnished Avith fractions [;. e., the m iddle term on botli sid es], both
prem ises rem ain, ind eed , particular, and the conclusion, con seq u en tly, indeter
m ined. B ut, inasm uch as. in both prem ises, the degree o f particularity is
determ ined, there are eases Avliere the eonclu>ion m ay be draAvn not on ly Avitli
probability, but Aviili certain ty. Such a case Ave have already adduced ( 188.)
F or, if both prem ises be anirm ativc. and the sum o f the fractions Avith Avliieh
their siibjeets are furni>lied greater than u n ity. In that ease a lon clu sion m ay
be draw n. In this sort w e infer AvIth certain ty :
Three-fourths of A are B;
Two-thii-ds of A are C;
Therefore, some C are B.
205. If, hoAvever, the sum o f the two fractions be less than unity, as
One-fourth of A are B;
One-third of A are C,
1 In reference to tliis statem en t, see above, tive am ou nt. F or L ogic and P h ilo so p h y
D inn. 179, and holow . Ph. 157, w licre it is tend alw ays to an u n e x clu siv e g en era lity :
rejieatcd and coiifirinod. Lam bert m iglit and a general con clu sio n is invalidated
have added that, as w e rarely can em jiloy eq u ally by a sin gle advor.se instance as by a
tliis i-elaliou o f Hie com iairative ex ten sio n o f tliou.sand. It is only in tlie concrete or real
our n otion s it is .till m ore rarely o f any ini- w liole, the w hole (ju an liiativc or integrate,
port that wo should. F o r in the tw o abstract, and, w beib er con tin u ou s or discrete, tbc
or notion.il. w holes. tbe tw o w holes correl- w h ole in w liicb raalliem aiics are ex c lu siv ely
ative ar.d counter to eacli other, witb w liicli con versan t, but J.ogic and P h ilosop h y little
L o g ic i.s alw ays conversant (tlio U niversal and inierested, tliat tb is r e la tio u is o f any avail
Form al), if tlie exten sion be not com p lete, or sign ifican ce,
it is o f no consequence to note its com para-
74
5SG a t p f -n d i x .
in that case there is no certainty in any ainrniative conclusion [indeed in any

conclusion at all]. But if we state the premises thus deteyninately,
Tliree-fmrths o f A ore not B;

Two-ihirds o f A are not C ;
in that case, a negative conclusion inaj' be drawn. For, from the propositions,
Thrcbfourths o f A are not B;

One-third o f A are C;
there follow s Some C are not B. And this, again, because the sum o f the
two fractions (thrcc-fourths added to one-third) is greater than unity. And
so on. See the remainder o f this section and those following, till 211.
(A) A U T H O R 'S n O C T R IX E .
Aristotle, followed by the logicians, did not introduce into his doctrine of
sv'llogisiu anv (juaiitification between the absolutely universal and the merely
particular predcsignatious, for valid reasons. 1, Such (juantifications were
ot no value or applica'.ioii iu the one whole (the tinivmsal jioleiilial, logical),
or, as 1 would amiilily it, iu the two correlative and counter wholes (the logical
and the formal, actual, m etaphysical), with which Logic is conversant, l o r
all that is out o f cla>sificatioii, all that has no reference to genus and species,
is out of Logie, indeed out o f Philosophy; for Philo.sophy tends always to the
universal and nc'-cssarv'. Tlius tlie highest canons ot deductive reasoning, Ih(>
Dicta de Omni ct de Nullo. were founded on, and for, the procedure from the
universal whole fo the subject parts; whilst, conversely, tiie princiiile o f in
ductive reasoning was cstablislied on, and for, the (real or presumed) collection
of all the subject jiarts as constituting the universal wliole. 2, The integrate
or mathematical wimle, on tlie contrary (whether continuous or discrete), the
j.hilosoj.hers coiitemiied. For whilst, as Ari.stotle observes, in mathematics
genus and sjiccies are o f no account, it is, almost e.xclusivelj'', in the mathemat
ical whole that (juaiitities are compared together, through a middle term, in
neither juemise, ccjtial to the whole. Pmt this reasoning, in which the middle
term is never universal, and the conclusion always jiarticular, is, as vague,
partial, and coiitiugeiit, of little or no value in jihilosojihy. It was accord-
iiiglv ignored in Logic ; and the predcsignatious nioi'c, most, etc., as I have
aid, referred to universal, or (as was most common) to particular, or to neither,
qiiantitv.' 'J'his di.scre.paiicy among logicians long ago attracted my attention ;
and I saw, at once, that the po.ssibility of inference, considered absolutely, de-
(leiidcd exclusively on the (jiiaritificatioiis o f the middle term, in both premises,
lieing, together, more than its jiossible totality its distribution, in an yon e.
At the same time 1 was imjiresscd 1, ^\ith the almost utter inutility of
I ( f f . CorvliiiiR, TnKtlt. Phil. c. V. } 370. p. S y s t. J ^ g . S 300. W a lli s, I n s tit. L og. L . ii C

123. Ictix-, 1742 Ilfu.'Cli, tVailis.J [ U c u s c li , 4, p. 100. 5th e d . E d . ]
APPENDIX. 587
such reasoning, in a philosophical relation ; and, 2, Alarmed with the load of

valid moods which its rccoguilion in Logic would introduce. The mere quan
tification of the jircdicatc, under tlie two jiurc quantities o f (Jefinitp and indrji-
nite, and the two qualities o f aJfiniKtlicc and negative, gives (abstractly) in each
figure tJiirtg-six valid moods; wliicli (if my present calculation bc correct)
would bc imihiplicd, by the iiitrodiiction o f tlic two hybrid or ambiguous (juan-
tificatious o f a tnajority and a h a lf, to thc fearful amount o f f o i i r h u n d re d a u d
eighty valid moods for each ligure. Tliough not, at thc time, fully aware of tlie
strength o f tlicse objections, they, however, prevented me from breaking down
the old limitation ; but as my sujircmc canon of Syllogism proceeds on tlie
mere formal jiossibility o f reasoning.it of course comprehends all tlie legitimate
forms of (juantifieation. It is : W hat worst relation o f suhjecl a n d predicate
subsists hetireen either o f two term s a n d a com m on third term , with tchich one, al
least, is positively re la te d ; that relation subsists between the two term s themselves :
in otlier words, Jn as f a r as two notions both agree, or, one agreeing, the other
disagrees, with a common third n o tio n ; in so f a r those notions agree ur disagree
ivith each other. Tliis canon apjilies, and pro.ximately, to all categorical syllo
gism s, in e.xtension and comjirehension, atfirmativc and negative, and
of any figure. It determines all thc varieties o f such syllogism s: is developed
into all tlicir general, and sujiersedcs all their sjiccial, laws. In short, without
violating this canon, no categorical reasoning can, formally, be wrong. Now,
this canon supposes that tlic two extremes are comjiarod together through tlie
.same com mon m id d le ; and this cannot but be if the middle, whether subject or
|)iodicatc, in both its (jiiaiitifications together, exceed its totality, though not
taken in that totality in either premise.
But, as I have stated, I was moved to the reconsideration o f this whole mat
ter ; and it may have been Air. De Alorgans syllogism in our corresjiondence
(ji. 19) which gave the suggestion. Thc result was tlie ojiinion, tliat these two
(|uantifications slionld be taken into account by Logic, as authentic forms, but
then relegated, as of little use in practice, and cumbering the science with a
superfluous mass of mooils.'
A union's D O U T R IX E - continued.
No sylIogi:-m can lie formally wrong in which (1 ), Both premises are not
noffative; and (2 ), Thc quantifications of the middle term, wlicther as sub
ject or Jiredicate, taken together, exceed the quantity o f that term taken in its
whole extent. In the former case, tlie extremes are nolcomjiared together; in
the latter, they are not necessarily eomjiared through the same third. These
two simjile rules (and they both flow from the one supreme law) lieing obeyed,
no syllogism can be bad, let its extremes stand In auy relation to each other
as major and minor, or in any relation to the middle term. In other words, its
premises may hold any nmtnal subordination, and may be of any Figure.
Ou my doctrine, Figure being only an unessential circumstance, and every
projiosition being only an eijuation ot' its terms, we may discount Figure, etc.,
1 E x t r a c t f r o m A Letter to A . de M o rg a n , E ^ q .,fro m S ir IT. H a m ilto n , p. 41. E d .

588 APPENDIX.
altogether: and instead of the symbol ( ) marking snbjeot and predi

cate, we might use the algebraical sign o f equality ( = ) .
The m lc o f the logicians, that the middle term should be once at least dis-
ti-iluited [or indistribntable] (/. c.. taken universally or singularly = definitely),
is untrue. For it is snilieient if, in both the premises together, its qnantifieation
be more than its quantity as a whole (U ltratotal). Therefore, a major part (a
mart, or must) in one jireinise, and a h a lf in the other, are sulHeient to make it
elTective. It is enough, for a valid syllogism, that the two e.xtreine notions
slionld (or sliould not), o f neeessity, partially coincide in the third or middle
notion ; and this is noecssarily shown to be the case if the one extreme coin
cide with the middle to the extent o f a half (Dimidiate Q nantifieation); and
the other to the extent o f aught more than a half (Ultradimidiate (iuantifiea-
tioii). The first and highest quantiiieatioii of the middh* term ( : ) is siidieient,
not only in combination with itself, but with any o f all the three inferior. The
second ( . , ) sniliccs in combination with the highest, with itself, and with the
third, but not with the lowest. The third ( . ) siiflices in combination with
either of the Iiiglier, Imt not with itself, far less with the lowest. The fonrth and
lowest ( , ) sullices only in eombination with the highest. [1. D efinite; 2. In-
definito-defimte ; 3. Sem i-definite; 4. Indefinite.]
(I.s-/ M arch. 1847. Very earcfullv authenticated.)

'Ihereare 4 (|iiantities ( , | . | ., | :), afl'ording ( 4 x 4 ) IG possible double quan
tifications of the middle term of a syllogism.
Of these 10 arc legitimate equivalents (: M : | : IM., | . ,IM . | : M . | . ]\I : |

4 6
: M , I , IM ; | . , M . , | . , M . | . M . , ) ; and G illegitimate, as not, together, neeos-

sarilv exceeding the (jnantity o f that term, taken once in its full extent ( . , IM ,
| , m . , | . m . | . m , | , m / ] . m ,).
Ka<li o f these IG quantified middle terms affords G4 possible moods; to wit,
IG afrirniative, 48 negative ; legitimate and illegitimate.
.Vltogetlicr, these IG middle terms thus give 25G afrirniative and 7G8 negative
moods : which, added together, make up 1024 moods, legitimate and illegitimate,
for each figure. For all three figures = 3072.
The 10 legitimate (luantifications o f the middle term aflTord, of legitimate
mooils, 160 afiirmative and .(20 negative ( = 4 8 0 ) , i e., each IG aHinnativc and
32 negative moods ( = 4 8 ) ; be.Jdes o f illegitimate moods, from doulile nega-
t o i l , IGO, 1. c., e;u h IG. 'I'lie 6 illegitimate quaiitifieations afford, o f affirmative
moo(Is, !)G ; o f sinqile negative moods, 192; of double negative moods, 96 ( =
384). Adding all the illegitimates = 544.
The 1024 moods, in each figure, thu.s aflord, o f legitimate, 480 moods (1440
for all .3 F igs.); Iieing o f ailirmative 160 (480 for 3 Figs.), of negative 320
(9G0 for 3 Figs.), o f illi*gitlmate 544 moods; there being excluded in each,
from iriade<]iiate dislribiilion alone (), 288 moods (viz., 96 afiirmative, 192
negative) ; from double negation alone (J), 160 moods; from inadequate dis
tribution and double negation together (J), 9G moods.
APPENDI X. 589
(c) M N E M O N IC V'ERSES.
A it affirms o f this, these, nil

W hilst E denies o f any:
I, it affirms, w liilst 0 denies,
O f some (or few or m an y).
Thus A affirms, as E denies,

A nd definitely eitlicn-:
T im s 1 affirm s, as 0 denies,
And definitely neither.
A half, left sem i-dcfinite.

Is w orthy o f its score;
U , th en , affirm s, as Y denies,
T his, neither less nor m ore.
Indefinito-dcfiiiites,
T o U1 and YO we com e;
A nd that affirm s, and this denies.
O f more, most (I'alf plus som e).
U I and Y O m ay be called Jndefinito-definite, eith er (1 ). B ecau se they ap

proxim ate to the w hole or defm ite, [form in g] m ore than its m oiety, or (2''),
B ecause they include a half, whieh, in a certain sense, m ay be regarded as
definite, and som ething, indefinite, over and above.
YU.
IN D U C T IO N AND EX A M PLE.
(See p. 225.)
I. Q u o t a t i o n s from A u th o rs.
(a) ARISTOTLE.
A ristotle, P r io r A nalytic.^, B . ii. c. 2 3 . A fter stating that we b elieve all

things either through [d e d u ctiv e] S yllogism or from Induction, he goes on to
cx])oiin(l the nature o f this latter proce.ss.
N ow . liu luetion , and the S yllogism from Induction, is the inferring one
extrem e [th e m ajor] o f the m iddle through the o th er: if, for in stan ce, B is the
m iddle o f A C, and, through C, w e show that A inheres in B . T h u s do we
institute Inductions. In illustration : L et A be Inny-lire/K B , vdntiny-hile,
ami C, imlividual long-Ured nnbmds, ns man, horse, mule, etc. A , then, inheres
in the w hole o f C (for all anim al without bile is [a t least som e] long-lived) ; but
590 Ar PE NDIX.
B, wonting bile, also [partinllv. at least] inheri's in all C.* If now C reeiproeate
with B. and do not go lieyond that middle [if C and B. subject and predicate,
are each all the other], it i.- of necessity that A [some, at least] should inhere
in [all] B. For it has been previously shown,- that if any two [notions] inhere
in tho same [remote notion], and if the middle reciprocate with either [or
1 I liave, h ow ever, doubts w hctlier the e x apart from tbe liver and attached to th e in
am ple w liich n ow stands in the (,)rf,'anoii be testines, he n otices the p igeon , crow , etc.
tliat w liicli A ristotle h in iself ]iroi>osed. It 2 A risto tle relers to the chaiiter im m edi
appear', at least, to have been coii'id erab ly ately jn eced in g, w liich treats o f the R ecip ro
niodilied, probably to bring it nearer to wliat cation o f Terms, and in th at to the fifth rule
w as subsequently supposed to be the trntli. w hich he gives, aud o l'th e I'ollowing jiurport:
Tin's I infer as lik ely from the C om m entary s\gu in , wlien A a n d . 15 inhere in all C [i. e.,
o f A m inunius on th e Prior Anulytics, o cc a all C is A and is 15], and w hen C reciprocates
sio n a lly interpolated by, and thus erroneously [i. e., is o f the sam e ex ten sio n and com p reh en
quoted under the nam e o f a |iiisterior ci itic, sion ] w ith 15, it is n ecessaiy tliat A sliould
J oan n es, snrnanied I h ilop on u s, etc. ll is inhere in all 15 [i. r.,tlia t till 15 slio u ld be A ].
w ords are, in reference to A ristotle, as fo l 8 For &Kpov. 1 read fJ-fffOf, bnl jiei haps the
lo w s ; " H e wislies, tlirougli :in exam p le, to true lection is irphs r o v r o Sarep oi' avT w v
illu strate the In d u ctive jirocc's; it is o f this avTKTTpfcpy) TWD aKpwg. The n ecessity o f an
in ten t. Iwt A he to n g -liv n l; It. icnnting bite; em endation becom es m anifest Irom the slig h t
C, as rroic, m ill thr likr. N o w , he says, t/iaC est co n sid eia tio n o f tlie co n tex t. In fact, the
tnr rrotv a n d i/it S l a g , b ein g anim als w ith ou t com m on reading y ie ld s o n ly nonsense, and
b ile and lo n g -liv ed , therefore. :inim al w a n t this on sundry g io iin d s. 1, Tliere are three
in g bile is lo n g lived . T hus, tliio u g h the last th in gs to w hicli Sarep oi/ i.s here a|j|)licable,
[or m inor] do w e co n n ect the m id d le term and yet it can on ly ajijily to tw o. But i f lim
with the [major] extrem e. F o r argue thus: 1 ited , as lim ited it m ust be, to the tw o iiihe-
the in d ivid u al animal.s w an tin g bile are rents, tw o ahsiirditics em erge. 2, F o r the
[all] lo n g -liv ed : con seq u en tly, [all] anim als m id d le, or coinn ion , n otion , in w liich both
w a nting bile are lo n g -liv e d . F . 107, a. ed. tlie o llie is inhere, that, in fact, here exclti-
A id . C om iiare also the greatly later Leo sively w anted, is alon e ex c lu d e il. 3, One.
M agentiiins. on tlie Prior Analytics, f. 41, a. too, of the inhercnts is m ade to reciprocate
111 . A id . On the age o f .M agentinus, b i'to ii- with cith er; tli:it is, w ith itself, or other. 4 ,
ans (as .'a x iu s and Fabricins) vary, from the O f thc tw o inlierents, the m in or extrem e is
seven th century to the fiairieen th . l i e was that w liich, on A risto tles doctrine of In d u c
certain ly suljsef|iient to M ichael Pscllus. ju tion , is alone considered as rcci|iro ca tin g w ith
n ior. w hom he q uotes, and. therefore, not tho iniddle or com m o n term . I5nt, in A ris
before the end o f the elevcn tli centu ry; w hilst totle's language, t o UKpoVi The E x t r e m e , " is
h i' ignorance ol the d o ctrin e o f C onversion , (like h i r p 6 x a a i 'i . The P r o jio s itio n in the eo in
introdiieed hy I. o eth iii', nniy show that he m on langinige o f thc lo g icia n s) a sy n o n y m c
could hardly have been so recent as the Ibur- for the major, in op position to. and in o.xelu
teenlh sion of, the m inor, le iiii. In the tw o sliort
A ri-lotle, r>c Pari A n im a l {l^. iv. c. 2), s:ivs, correlative chapters, the iiresent and tlnit
In 'mm' anim als the gall [bladder] is aliso- w h icli im m edi:itely follow.s, on Indiictinn
hitely w anting, as in the hon-c, m u le, a's, and on K xam |dc, the ex p ressio n , besides the
stag, and roe. . . . It is. Iheretore, evi- instance in q uestion, nccnrs :it least seven
di-iit that till- gall serves no useful pnr|io'e, tim es; and in all as th e major term . , 'I'ho 5
hut i a mere e x c :e tio n . W herelore those o f em endation is required by tlie dem on stration
the aiicieiils say wi ll, w ho d eclare Unit the it.self, to w hich A risto tle refers. It is lound
cane o f lon gevity is the absence o f the g a ll, in the cinipler irnm edititely p receding (} , j, 0
a id this lio m lln-ir oh-ervatioii ol the soli- and is as fo llo w s: A g a in , when A and 15
(Inngnhi and deer, lor anim als o f these classes inhere in :ill (', a n d w h e n C r e c ip r o c a te s w it h
w a it l i e gull, a id are lo n g -liv e d / / i s l . I!, it n ecessarily follow.? that A should [jiar
An . L ii r II. 'c h n . 1*1, ,sral. 1.6 vul. X otices ti:illy, at least] inhere in all 15. F or w hilst A
that som e anim als have, others w ant, the [som e. :it least] inheres in all C, anil [all]
gall b la d d er V .'^ e h n . iii. p 10f ;) ,a ttlie hy ie:ison o f their reeiiirocity, inheres in [all]
liv er Ol llie h i t l e r , a m o n g v i v i p a r o u s q n a d - 15; w ill al.so [some, at least] inhere in all 15.
r ipeds. he iioiiees 'la g , roe, h o i-e, m ule, ass, I he mood here given i.s viii. o f our Tablo.
etc O f bird.s w ho liave the gall-b lad d er (.See A jij.endix X I .)
APPENDIX. 591
with both], then will the other o f the predicates [the syllogism heing in the
third figure] inhere in thc co-reciprocating extreme. But it behooves us to
conceive C as a complement of the whole individuals; for Induction has its
inferenee through [as it is of] all.'
This kind o f syllogism is of the primary and immediate proposition. For
the reasoning of things mediate is, through their medium, of things immediate,
through Induction. And in a certain sort, Induefioii is opposed to the [D educ
tive] Syllogism. For the latter, through the middle term, jiroves the [major]
extreme o f the third [or minor] ; whereas thc former, through the tliird [or
minor term, proves] the [major] extreme o f the middle. Thus [absolutely],
in nature, the syllogism, through a medium, is the prior and more notorious;
but [relatively] to us, that through Induction is the clearer.
An. P r., L. ii. c. 24. O f Example. 1. Example emerges, when it is
shown that the [major] extreme inheres in the middle, by something similar to
the third [or minor term ]....................... 4. Thus it is manifest that the
Example does not hold the relation either o f a whole to part [Deduction], nor
of a part to whole [Induction], but of part to part ; when both are contained
under the same, and one is more manifest than the other. 5. And [E xam ple]
diil'ers from Indin tion, in that this, from all the individuals, shows that the
[major] extreme inheres in the middle, and does not [like Deduction] hang the
syllogism on the major extreme ; whereas that both hangs the syllogism [on the
major extrem e], and does not show from all the Individuals [that the major
e.xtreme Is inherent in the minor.]
An. Post., L. i. e. 1, 3. The same holds true in the case o f reasonings,
whether through [D ediietivc] Syllogi.sms or through Induction ; for both ac
complish thc Instruction they afford from information foreknown, the former
receiving it as it were from the tradition of thc intelligent, the latter manifest
ing the universal through the light o f the individual. (Pacii, p. 413. See the
rest o f the chapter.)
An. I*o.s., L. i. c. 18, 1. But it is manifest that, if any sense be want
ing, some relative science should be wanting likewise, this it lieing now imjios-
sible for us to apprehend. For we learn everything either by induelion or by
demonstration. Now, demonstration is from iimvcr.sals, and induction from
particulars ; but it is impossiljlc to speculate the universal unless through in
duction, seeing that even the jiroducts of abstraction will become known to us
by induction.
A. Aristotle's Errors regarding Induction.

Not making Syllogism and its theory superior and common to both Deduc
tive and Inductive reasonings.
A corollary o f thc preceding is the reduction of thc genus Syllogism to its
species Deductive Syllogism, and the consequent contortion of Induction to
Deduction.
I This requisite o f L ogical I n d u c tio n , im m ediately fo llo w in g , in w liich lie treats tlie
that it should be th on gh t a.' the result o f an reason in g from E xam ple. See passage quoted
agreem ent o f all the in d ivid u als or parts, on page 590 (j 5).
is further show n by A ristotle in the cliaptcr
59 2 APPENDIX.
B. Omissions.
Omission of negatives.
O f both terms reciprocating.
C. Ambiguities.
Confusion o f Individuals and Particular. See Seheibler [Opera Logica, P.
iii. De Prop., c. vi., tit. 3, 5. E d.].
Confusion or non-distinction o f Alajor or Elinor e.xtremes.
The subsequent observations are intentled only to show out Aristotles au

thentic opinion, which I hold to be substantially the true ((pctrine o f Induction ;
to expose the multiform en ors o f his exjiositors, and their tenth and ten times
tenth rejveiiters, wonhl be at once a tedious, siqicrfliions, and invidious labor.
I shall, first of all, give articulately the correlative syllogisms o f Induction and
Deduction which Aristotle hail in his eye ; and shall employ the example which
now stands in the Organon, for, though physiologically false, it is, nevertheless
(as a supposition), valid, in illustration of the logical process.
A r i s t o t l e s c o r r e l a t iv e sy ll o g ism s.
{n ) O f I n d u c t i o n . (/>) O f D e d u c t i o n .
.All P (miin, horse, mule, etc.) issom eA {hug- A ll A {wanting-bile) is some A (long
lived ) ; A ll C (man, horse, mule, etc.) is all B (want-
.All C (man, horse, mule, itc.) is all B (wanting-bile)]
ing-bile) ; A ll C (man, horse, mule, etc.) is some A (long-
A ll B (wanting-bile) is some A (long-lived). lived).
A , ----- -^m : C (p, q, r, etc.) : :B A, ^ :B : ' : C (p, q, r, etc.)
The.so syllogisms, though of difTerent figures, fall in the same mood ; in our
Ublc they are oi' the eiglitli mood o f the Ihird and first Figures. Both un
allowed. (S ee Bailin', quoted below, p. .593.)
The liiduetivc syllogism iu the first figure given by Schegkins, Pacius, the
.Jesuit' of Coiuibr:i, and a host o f subseiiueiit rc])eater.s, is altogether iiicoinpe-
tciit.so far a' meant for Aristotle's correlative to his Inductive s^llogisui in the
tliird. Neither directly nor indirectly docs tlic philosopher refer to any Induc
tive re.'t'Oniiig iu any other figure, than the ihird. And he is right; for the
tliini is the figure iu whirli all the inferences of Induction naturally run. To
rediu-e sucli rcisouings to tic- first figure, far more to the second, is felt as a
eontortioii, as will be found from the, two following instances, the one o f which
i' .\ri'totles example of Indiietioii, reduced by Pacius to tlic fir.st figure, and
the other the sami- exam ple reduced bv me to the seeond. 1 have taken eare
also to st.itc articulately what arc distinctly thought, the qii;intificatioiis of
the predicate in this reasoning, ignored by l*aeius and logicians in general, and
A P P E N I) I X . 593
I
admitted only on compulsion, among others, by Derodon (below, p. 594), and

the Coimbra commentator.
A r i s t o t l e s i n d u c t i v ' e s y l l o g i s m in f ig u r e s .
(c) F ig . I. (rf) F io . II.
AU C {man, horse, mule, rtc.) IS .some A (long- Some A (long-lived) is all C (man, horse,
lived)] . mule, etc.)]
All B (u-anting-hile) is all C (man^horse. A ll B (wc.nting-bile) is all C (man, horse,
mule, etc.)] mule, etc.)]
A ll B (u'anting-bile) is some A (lonej-lived). All B (wanting-hile) is some A (long-lived).
(b ) P A C H Y M E R E S .
Pachymeres, Epitome o f Aristotles Logic (T itle viii. ch. 3, e. 1*280). In

duction, too, is celebrated as another instrument o f philosophy. It is more
persuasive than Deductive reasoning, for it proposes to infer the universal
from singulars, and, if possible, from all. But as this is frequently impossible,
individuals being often in number infinite, there has been found a method
through which we may accomplish an Induction, from the observation even of
a few. For, after enumerating as many as we can, we are entitled to call on
our adversary to state on bis part, and to prove, any opposing instances.
Should he do this, then [for, data instantia, cadit inductio] he prevails; but
should he not, then do we succeed in our Induction. But Induclion is brought
to bear in the third figure ; for in this figure is it originally east. Should, then,
the minor premise be converted, .so that the middle be now predicated o f ali
the minor exireines, as that extrem e was predicated o f all the middle : in that
case, the comdnsion will be, not o f some, but o f all. [In induction] the first
figure, therefore, arises from conversion, from conversion of the minor prem
is e , and this, too, ( onverted into a//, and not into .soHa. But [an inductive
syllogism] is drawn in tin* third figure, as follows: Let it be supjiosed that
we wish to prove, every animal mores (he lower jaw . With that intent, we
place as terms: tlie major, wmres the under ja w : the minor, [o//] anim al;
and, lastly, the middle, edl contained under animed, so that these contents recip
rocate with edl animal. And it Is thus perfected [?] in the first figure, as
follow s: To move the lower ja w h predicated of (dl individual anim als; these
edl are. predicated of edl animcd; therefore, moving the lower ja w is predicated
of all animal. In such sort induction is accomplished.
(c ) R A i f U S .
Ramus, Scholce Dialeciicce, L. viii. c. 11. Quid vero sit inductio jierobscure
[Aristoteli] declaratur : nee ab interpretibns intelligitur, quo inodo syllogismus
])cr medium concludat majus extremum de minore : inductio majus de medio
1 [In An. Prior, L. ii. p. 403. Cf. P erionius, DiaUctica, L. iii. p. 366 (1544). Tosca, Cotnp.
Phil Logica, t. I. 1. iii. c. 1, p. 115 ]
75
594 APPENDIX.
per minus, Ramus has confirmed his doctrine by his example. For, in his
expositions, he himself is not correct.
(d ) D E R O D O y.
Dcrodon. Logica Resliliila, 1G59, p. G02. Philosophia Contracta, IG G i, Logica,

p. 91. Induction is the argumentation in whicli, from all thc particulars,
their universal is inferred; a s Fire, air, icater, earth, are hudies; therefore,
crery elemeat i.s hody. It is recalled, however, to syllogism, by assuming all the
particulars [including singnlar.s] for the middle term, in this m ann er: Fire,
air, icah r, and earth arc hodie.s; hut fire, air, water, and earth are crery clement;
therefore, en ry eh ment i.s hody. Again : The head, chest, feet, etc., are dis-
t a s x l: hid the head, chest, feet, etc., are (he wholc anim al; therefore, thc ichole
animal U disni'o d. Tims induction is aecomplislicd when, by thc enumeration
o f all thc individuals, wo conclude o f thc species what holds o f all its indi
viduals ; as Pticr, Paul. James, etc., are rational; therefore, all man is
rational; or when, by the enumeration o f all the species, we conclude o f the
genns what holds o f all its species; as Man, ass, horse, etc., are sensitive;
therefore, edl animal w .'<en.silirc; or when, by the enumeration o f all the parts,
we conclude the same o f thc whole ; as Head, chest, feet, etc., arc diseased;
therefort, the whole animal is diseased.
(e) TH E CO LLEG E OF A L C A L A .
A onrions error in regard to the contrast o fth e Inductive and thc Deductive
syllogism stamls in the celebrated Cursus Complulcusis, in the Disputations
an ArLUitle'.s Dialectic, by thc Carmelite College of Aleala, 1G24 (L. iii. c. 2).
W e there find surrendered Arisiolles distinctions as accidental. Induction
and Deduction arc recognized, each as both ascending and descending, as both
from, and to, the wholc; the essential difierence between the processes being
taken, in the exi>teuce o f a middle term for Deduction, in its non-existence
for Induction. Thc following is given as an example of the descending syllo-
irism of Induction : AU men arc anim als; therefore, this, and this, and this,
etc.. mail is an animal. An ascending Inductive syllogism is obtained fioni the
preceding, if r(*vei-?ed. Xow all this is a mi.-takc. The .syllogism here stated
i' l)c luclive ; (he middle, minor, and major terms, the minor jjremisc and thc
conclusion h'-ing confoiindcd together. Expressed as it ought to be, thc syllo
gism is as follows : AU men are (some) anim als; this, and this, and this, etc.,
are ( r e o i t i t u ' e j idl rn'oi : therefore, this, and this, and this, etc., are (some)
eir,lined Here the middle term and three propositions reappear; whilst the
Deductive syllogi'in in the first figure yields, o f course, on its reversal, an
Inductive syllogism in the third.
The vulgar errors, those fill latterly, at least, prevalent in this country,
that Induction is a syllogism in the Mood Barbara o f the first figure (with thc
minor or tlie major jiremise usually suppressed) ; and still more tliat from a
s o m e in the antecedent we eari logieallv indiiee tin e d l in the eonelnsion.
these, on their own account, are errors now hardly deserving o f notice, and
APPENDIX. 595
haAG been already sufliciently exposed by me, upon another oeca.sioii (E d h t-

burgh Review, L VII. p. 224 el se q .). ' \_Discussions, p. 158 et seq. E d.]
If) F A C C IO L A T I.
Facclolati, Riidim enia Logica, P. iii. e. 3, defines Jnduction as a reasoning

without a middle, and concluding the universal by an enumeration o f the sin
gulars of wliieh it is made iij). Ilis examples sfow that he lo o k it for an
Enthymeme. "Prudence, Temperance, Eurtilude, ete., arc good habits \_thesi:
constitute all virtue^ i therefore [off] virtue is a habit.
(g ) LA M BER T.
Lambert, Neues Organon, i. 287. W hen, in consequence o f finding a

certain attribute in all things or cases which pertain to a class or species
[genus (V)], Ave are led to aflirm this attribute o f the notion of tlie class or
genus ; Ave arc said to find the attribute of a class or genus tlirough induction.
There is no doubt that this succeeds so soon as the iiiduetion is comjilcte. or
so soon as Ave have ascertained that the class or species A contains under it no
other eases than C, D, E, F , M, and that the attribute B occurs in each
o f the cases C, U, E, F , M. This processnoAv presents a formal syllo
gism in Cuspida. For Ave thus reason
C, as well as D , E, F , M are all B ;

B u t A is either C, o r D , or E , or F or M ;
Consequently, all A are B.
T h e e x a m p le p r e v io u s ly g iv e n o f th e sy llo g is tic m ood Caspida m a y h ere

s e r v e for illu stra tio n . F o r , to find Avhether e v e r y sy llo g ism o f th e Second
F ig u r e b c n e g a tiv e , Ave g o th ro u g h its s e v e r a l m ood s. T h e s e are Cesnre,
Camestres, Feslino, Baroco. N oav bo th th e first c o n c lu d e in E , both th e last in
0. But a n d O a re n e g a tiv e , c o n s e q u e n tly a ll th e fo u r, an d Iierew ith th e
S e c o n d F ig u r e , in g e n e r a l, c o n c lu d e n e g a tiv e ly . A s. in m o st c a se s, it is v e ry
d ifficu lt to r e n d e r th e m in o r p r o jio sitio n , w h ich h a s th e d is ju n c tiv e jn e d ic a te
for its m id d le term , c o m p le te , th e r e a r e, tlie r e fo r e , c o m p e te n t Aery few p e r fe c t
in d u c tio n s. T h e im p e r fe c t a re [ lo g ic a lly ] \A-orthless, sin c e it is not in e v e r y
c a se a llo w a b le to a r g u e from some to all. A n d e v e n th e p e r fe c t avi- ( scIicav.
w h e n s o e v e r th e e o u e liisio n ca n b e d i'd iic ed im m e d ia te ly from th e n o tio n o f the
g e n u s, fo r th is in fe r e n c e is a sh o r te r a nd m o re b e a u tifu l.
Strictures on Lamberts doctrine o f Triduetion.

1, In m a k in g th e m in o r p r o p o sitio n disjnnctiA'C.
2, In making it particular.
3, In making it a minor of the First Figure instead o f the. Third.
Better a categorical syllogism of the Tliird Figure, like Aristotle, Avhom he
does not seem to have been aAvare of. Kid'uted by his o a v u doctrinc in 230.
I I t is " i v e n in 2So. as f o llo w s ; . Abie e i - f r i/ s t / llo g is m o f th e S e c o n d F i g u r e i s e i t h e r i.t

( ' e . v ir e, o r ( 'o in e s t r e s . o r F e . d i n o , o r B a r o c o ;
'T h e r n V n g i- n m , o s v e i l in C ce o rc o s in C a m c ftr e s . t o n e c g H e n t ly e v e i'U s y l lo g i s m n i t h e i S e c o n d F i g v r e ts
F e s t in o , a m i J k t i o c o , a r e a l l n e g a t i v e ; S e g a t iv e l
o9G APPENDIX.
, Tlie reeont Gennan Logicians,* following Lnmliort (N . Org. i. 287), make

the indnetivo syllogism a byword. Lambert's exam ple: C, as xrell as I),
E. F ]\I, all are H; hut A is cither C, or I), or E, or F , or M ;
therefore, all A is ]>. Or, to adapt it to Aristotle's example : Man, us well
Its horse, mule, ete., all are long-lived anim als; but animal void o f gall is either
man. or horse, or mule, e t e .; therefore, all animal void o f gall is long-lircd.
This. I find, was an old opinion, and is well invalidated by the commentators
of Lonvaiii.
The only imlncement to the disjnnclive form is, that the predicate is e x
hausted without the predesigiiation of universality, and the First Figure,
attained. But as these erolehets have been here refuted, therefore, the more
natural, etc.
Some logicians, as Oxford Crakanthorpe (Logica, 1. iii. c. 20, published
1022, but written long before), bold that induction can only be recalled to a
Hi jiollielical svllugism. A s, I f Sojdiorles be risible, likewise Plido and all
n'Jur men, then all xiuin is risible; but Socrates is risible, likewise Plato and all
oth< r men : therefore all man is risible. Against the Categorical syllogism in
one or otlicr figure he argues: This is not a universal categorical, beeause
both the Jiremises are singular ; nor a singular eategorieal, beeause the eonelu-
'ion is.unlvcrsal. It is snllicient to say, that, though the subjects o f the prem-
i.-c- be singular (Crakanthorpe docs not coiitemjilatc their being partienlar),
a- snjijioscd lo be all the constituents o f a .-jiecies or relatively universal whole,
they are cijuivalcnt to that species; their universality (though contrary to
.\ri-!iotles caiioii) is, indeed, overtly declared, in one o f the jiremises, by the
universal jiredesiciiatioii of tlie jireihcntc. Onr antlior further adds, ilial In
dnetion cannot be a ealeguiical syllogism,*beeause it contains ybm terms; this
1 .\- llcrliari, Jxhrbur.h d tr L o g ik , G9, m i n o r , a n d tli c p r o d i c n t e t h e m a j o r , e x t r e m e

r w c s l t - n , D r o b i s c h , 11. I t i l l e r . in t h e s y l l o g i s m ; wliil.st t h e s i n g i i l a i s , wliicli
2 1 am a w a re o f the op in io n o f m an y , l ia v e n o p l a c e i n t h e c o n c l u s i o n , c o i i s l i l n i e
t h a t t h e s i n g u l a r s in i h e I n d u c t i v e s y l l o g i s m t h e m i d d l e t e r m . T h u s t h e 1 n d u o t i o n S or-
s h o ii h l be e n u m e r a t e d b y a di.'-jiinclive c o n - ro Os n in s , Ilnto r u n s { a n d so o f ot/ier w e n ] \
j u n e l i o i i , in so in iic b tl i a l t b e ))ren iises o f therefore, all m a n ru n s, is l li u s r e d u c e d :
su cli a . s y l l o g i s m a r e c o m m o n l y w o n t t o b e A ll th a t is Socrates, or P la to (a n il so o f others).
t h u s c a s i ; W 'halsuivir is .John, or Pi ter, or P a u l, r u n s ; but all m a n is Socrates, or Plato ( a n d so
'ic ., IS capnbU o f in str u c tio n . l ! u t lli ey e r r , o f o th ers); therefore, a ll m a n ru n s. A n d these
iiol o l - e r v in g ll i u t t h e p r e v i o u s p r o p o s i t i o n s in g u la rs onghi to be t:ikcn d isju n c tiv e ly , and
i- i ii a n ili '- lly e r | u i v a l e n t t o I h e f o l l o w i n g , d i .s ju n c t iv e l y , n o t c o m p u t i i t i v e l y , v e r i l i c d o f
L o in , a n d Peter, a n d P aul, fU ., are capable, o f t h e i r u n i v e r s a l . (I n I tis p . S u m m u l. T f . v .)
i n o r i i r i i n n " t L o v a i i i e n s f s , G'oni. In A n . Pr , T)k; g a m e d o c t r i n e is lie ld in tl i c lie p a ra -
b ii Ir .3. e. 2 p. Zs !, ed . I.G47: 1st e d . , l.G-G.G.) tooo.s o f A n i o l d u . s d c T n n g c r i a n d t h e M a s t e r s
Th i s h e i c - a i d o f t h e m a j o r is I r n e ol' L a i n - R e g e n t in t h e l l n r s e ( o r C o l l e g e ) o f S t . Liiw-
b rl's m in o r. T he L o u v a in m aste rs refer r e n c e , in ( o l o g n e , 1490 ( Tr. iii. c. ii., Sec .
p r o t a l d v [lo t ' e i - o r . e lc .) T h i s d o c t r i n e , I ri )
ll i a i l l .e In d iie liv e s y llo g is m bhoiild he d r a w n II is also m aintained in the C o p u la ti o f
, a di -jiii ('l iv e |((riii. w a s c o r n i n o n l y li e l d , L i iii il .e rln s d e J l o i i l e , a n d t h e o t h e r J t e g e n t s
( I s e i a l L li\ t h e c h o ' a s i i e e o ii i in e iil nl ( jr s o n in t h e l l n r s a M o ii li s o f f h i l o g n e , 1490. They
I c i n i - III I a i m - . I lois V c r o r ( l o l a k e t h e give Iheir reasons, w h ic h a re, h o w e v e r, not
l(0 ()k ai a i d ) , tv lio-e K x p o s itm n first a p - w o rth stalin g a n d refuting,
peai'cd ill 11S|' - a - I n Ilie f o ii rl h iil a ee , l!ul T a r t a r e t i i s , n e i t h e r in h i s r o i n m e n t a '
li.i iiciioi i i h u s r e d u c e d l(j s y l l o g i s m , s e e i n g r i e s o n I l i s p a n u s n o r o n A r i s l o t l e , m e n t i o n s
t h o i . ill t h e c o n c l u s i o n o f Ih e J i i i l i i c t i o n , t h e r e t h i s d o c t r i n e ,
a r e t w o t e r r a s o f w h i c h t h e s u b j e c t f o r m s tlie
APPENDIX. 597
quatornity being made by tlie all men (in his exam ple) of the promises
being Iunsidered as difle rent from the all man of the coiiehision. This is
the veriest trilling. Tlie difference is wholly factitious : all man, all men, etc.,
are virtually the same ; and we may indifferently use either or both, in prem
ises and conclusion.
II. M a t e r ia l I n d u c t io n .
Material or Philosophical Induction is not so simple as commonly stated,

but consists of two syllogisms, and two deductive syllogisms, and one an Epi-
cheirema. T im s:
I What is found true o f some constituents of a natural class, is to he pre
sumed true of Ihe whole class (for nature is always uniform) ; a a' a are some
constituents of the class A ; therefore, what is true of a u' a" is to he presumed
true o f A.
II is true o f a a' a, is to he presumed true of A ; but z is trueo f a
a' a ' ; therefore, z is true o f A.
It will be observed, that all that is here inferred is only a presumption,
founded, 1, On the supposed uniformity o f nature; 2, That A is a natural
class; ?>^, On tlie truth o f the observation that a a' a" are really constit'uents
of that class A ; and, 4, That c; is an essential quality, and not an accidental.
If any be false, the reasoning is nought, and, in regard to tlic second, a a' a"
(some) cannot rejiresent A (a ll) if in any instance it is found untrue. Data
instantia cadil mductio. In that case the .syllogism has an undistributed
middle.
598 APPENDIX.
YI I I .
H Y P O T H E T IC A L A N D D IS J U N C T IV E R E A SO N IN G D IM E -
D IA T E IN F E R E N C E .
I . A u t h o r s D o c t r i n e E r a g .m e n t s .
(S e e p, 231.)
A ll ^ led iatc in feren ce is o n e ; that in correctly called C a te g o r ic a l; for tne

C o n ju n c tiv e and D is ju n c tiv e forms o f H y p o th e tic a l reason ing arc red u cib le to
im m ediate in feren ces.
R ecognized,
as Propositional.
Im m ediate; (V ariou s.)
o f w llicll som e
D isjunctive,
kinds arc
Not recognized,
O' as S y llo g istic, >Hypothetical.
C onju nctive,,
a) U nfigured.
A ) A nalytic.
M ediate;
-ET Syllogism P roper,. b) Figured,
V (C ategorical.) (Intensive
B) .Synthetic. or E.xtcn-
sivc) in
1. Rea.soiiing is the show ing out ex p licitly that a jiroposition, not granted
or sii])jio,H'd, is im plicitly contained in som ething difTerent, w hich is granted or
'U JlJK l'C ll.
g 2. W hat i.s gran ted or siipjiosed is cith er a single proposition, or more than
a single jirojio-itioii. 'J'he R eason in g in the former ease is Im m ediate, in the
latter M ediate.
3. The jiropo.sition implicitly contained may bc stated first or last. The
R'-a-oniiig in the former east; is Analytic, in the lattt'r .Synthetic.
Ohs! rrm io n s. 1. A jirojiositioii, iiot a truth ; for the jii'oposition m ay
iitt. absolutely eonsidered, be true, but, relatively lo what is siijijiosed its
ev oh ilion , is anil must be nticessary. All R easoning is thus h yp oth etical;
hypfithetieaily true, though absolutely what contains, and, eonsetjucntly,
what is eontaiii(;d, m ay be false.
1 Rojir in let J f r o m D i s r u fs i o n f, p. f>56. E d , c al , an d t ha t C a t e g o r ic a l S y l l o g i s m is r e al ly ,

a n d ill a lii glier sigriiticatiori, liy jio lli e tic al ,
2 T h a t all l o g i c a l r c a e o i i ln g is h y p o t h e t i se c M a i m o i i , Yersuch einer ncuen L o g ik , vi. 1.,
AIT K X D I X 599
O b sc rv n tio n .s. 2. Exam ples: Immediate I f A is B. th en B is A ; )Medi-

ate 7/A is B, a n d B is C, I/ten A is C.
O b s e r v a liv n s . 3. Exam ples: Analytic B is A , f o r A is B ; A is C , f o r
A is B, a n d B is C. Synthetic A 5 B ; th e r e f o r e , B is A ; A is B, and
B is C; th e r e f o r e , A is C.
ON THE NATURE AND D IV ISIO N S OF IN FE R E N C E OR SYLLOGISM IN GENERAL.
(November, 1848.)
I. Inference, w h a t .............................
II. Inference is of three kinds; what I would call the 1, Commutative;
2, Jjuplira ir e ; and, 3, Comjiurative.
1, In the lirst, one proposition is given; and required what are its formal
eommntations ?
2, Ip the second, two or more connected propositions are given, nnder cer
tain conditions (therefore, all its species are conditionals) ; and recjuired what
are the formal results into which they may he explicated. O f this genu.s there
are two sjiecies, the one the Disjunetive Conditional, the other the Conjunc
tive Conditional. In tlie Disjunetive (the Disjunctive also o f the Logicians),
two or more jirojiosition.s, with identical subjects or jiredieates, are given, under
the disjunctive condition of a counter ipiality, i. e., that one only shall be alHr-
iiKitivc ; and it is rccjuired what is the result in case o f one or other heing
aflirmed, or one or more denied. (Excluded IMiddle.) In the Conjunctive
(the Ilyjiothetieals o f tlie logicians), two or more propositions, convertible or
contradictory, with undeteim ined quality, are given, under the conjunctive
condition of a correlative quality, i. e., that the affirmation or negation of one
being determined, determines the eorrespoiiding affirmation or negation of the
others; and it is rcijnired what is the result in the vanou.-: jio.ssihle cases.
(Identity and Contradiction, not Sufficient Reason, which in Logie is null as a
separate law.)
3, In the third, three terms are given, two or one of which are jiositively
related to the third, and reijuired what are the relations o f these two terms to
each other V*
III. All inference is hypothetical.
IV. It has been a matter of dispute among logicians whether the class which
pp . 8 2 ,8 8 . E. R e iiih o ld , L ogik, 109, p. 253 1 A b e tte r s ta te m e n t o f tlic tlir ee d ifferen t

ei seq. S m ig le c iu .s, Logica, Di.p x i ii . q 5, p r o c e ss e s o f R e a s o n in g ,
p. 495 (1st e d . 1616) I . G iv e n a p r o p o s itio n ; c o m m u t a t iv e ;
On tlie n a tu r e o f tlie N e c e s s ity in S y llo g is t ic w lia t are th e in le r e n c e s w liic h its c o m m u la -
I n fe r e n c e ; d is tin c tio n o f I'o r m a l a n d A la te- tio n s a ffo r d ?
rial N e c e s s ity , or o f nece./as co/iseyHeiiD> a n d I I G iv e n tw o or m o re jir o p o s itio n s ; re-
necessitns cnnseqiienlis. soc S c o tu s , Qitirsliones, la te d a n d c o n d i t i o n a l ly ; w h a t are th e in -
Sitper Eleiic/tos, qn iv ., 227. ed 1639, a n d Ihat fer e n c e s w h ic h tlie r e la tiv e ijro j)o sitio n .s,
a ll in fe r e n c e h v p o lh e lic a l. In A n . Prior, L . ii. c x p lic a ie d n n d e r th e se c o n d ilio n s , afford?
q u . i . p . 3 3 1 . A p iile iiis , D e HitZi. Z)od Plat ,p . I I I . G iv e n th r e e n o t io n s ; t w o r e la te d , a n d
34. A r i s lo t le , An. Prior, i. 32, 5. S n iig le c iu s , a t lea s! o n e p o s itiv e ly , to n th ird ; w h a t are
Logica, loc. cit. B a l f o ie u s , In Arist. Org., A n. th e in fe r e n c e s afforded in th e r e la lio n s to
Prior, \. t. 8, p. 451. 1616. [S e e a lso Discus- ea c h oll-.er, w h ic h thi.s c o m p a r is o n o f th e tw o
sions, p. 146, n o te . E d .] n o t io n s to th e th ir d d e te r m in e s ?
600 appendix.
I call Erplirntirr (viz.. tlic Hypothetical and Disjunctive Syllogisms) be of

Mediate or Immediate iiiferenee. 'I'he iiiiiiiviise majority hold them to be me
d ia te : a -^mall minority, of which 1 recollect only the names o f Kant [Fiselier.
Weiss, Boiiterwvk, H crbart], hold them to be immediate.
The dispute is solved by a distinction. Categorical Inference is mediate, the
medium of eonelusion being a term; the Hypothetical and Disjunctive syllo-
adsms are mediate, the medium o f conclusion being a jiroposition, that wliieli
I call the K.rj)linitini}. So far they both agree in being mediate, but they differ
in lorn- jioints. The first, that the medium of the Comjiarative .syllogism is a
term; o f the Explicative, a jiroposition. The second, that the medium o f the
Comjnr.uive is one; of the Exjilicative, more than one. The third, that in the
Comjiarative the medimn is always the same; in the Exjilicative, it varies
according to the various eoneln.sion. The fonrth. that in the Comparative the
medium never enters the conclusion ; whereas, in the Explicative, the same
jirojiosition is reciprocally medium or eonelusion.
V. Logicians, in general, h ive held the Exjilicative class to be composite
syllogisms, as compared with the Categoric ; whilst a few h.ive held them to be
more simjile. This disjmte arises from each jiarty taking a jiartial or one-sided
view of tbe classes. In one jioint of view, the Exjilicative are the more com
plex, the Comparative the more simple. In another jioint o f view, the reverse
holds good.
Our Hypothetical and Disjunctive Syllogisms m aybe reduced to the class of

Explicative or Conditional. The IIvjiotlieiicals should be called, as they were
bv I>oetliIus and others, Conjundire, in contrast to the coordinate species of
Disjnurtlvr. IIvjiothetical, as a name of the sjiecies, ought to be abandoned.
The Conjunctive are eonditional, iiiasnmch as negation or alTirmatioii is not
ali-olutclv asseited, but left allern ilivi*, and the (jiiality of one jirojiosition is
made deimiident on another. They arc, however, not properly staled. The
first projiusiiion. that containing the condition, which I would call the
E rp lin in il, should be thus enounced: J.v B, so A; or, .I.s B is, so is A ; or,
.I.s C is B,.so is B A. Then follows the jirojiosition containing the explication,
which I would call the Explicative; and, finally, the projiosition embodying the
result, which 1 would call the Explicate.
Thcv are called Conjunctives from their conjoining two convertible proposi
tions in a mntnal dejicndenee, o f which either may be made antecedent or
coiibetjiient o f the oilier.
Di.'jiinctivc syllogisms are eonditional, inasmuch as a notion i.s not absolutely
asserted a.s snlijei-tor jiredicate of another or others, but alternatively conjoined
with some jiart, but only with some jiart, o f a given jilurality of notions, the
affirmation of it with one part involving the negation o f others. The first
[irojiobition, containing the eomlition, I would call the Jbxplicuiid, and so forth
a.s in the Conjunctives. They are properly called Disjunctives.
|l K ant, Ixigik, 7.5. I.ou terw ck , Uhrhuch 137. W'eisg, L ogik, 210, 251. Herbart,
(I/T phOotophisr.hfn V otkfnnlntfS', KXt, p. 158, Uhrhurh ziir Einteilung in die Philosophie, 64,
2<1 ed. 1S20. y iectier, L ogik, c. v. SS 99,100, p. p. 87, 1831.)
ArrENDfX. 601
D IS T in iU m O N ' OF ISKASONINGS.
(N ov. 1848). Inference may he thus distrilnited, and more fully and aecn-
rately than I have seen. It is either (!) Imnicdiate, that is, without a middl<*
term or medium of eom parisoii; or (II.) Mediate, with such a medium.'
Both the Immediate and the Meiliate are subdivided, inasmuch as the reason
ing is determined (A ) to one, or (B ) to one or other, coneliision. (It is mani
fest that this latter division may eonstitiite the principal, and that imincdidte
and mediate may constitute subaltern classes.)
All inference, I mav observe in the outset, is hi'pothedc, and what have been
called lljjpolhelicul Syllogisms are not more hypothetic than others.
I. A Immediate Peremptory Inference, determined one conclusion, con

tains under it tlie following s p e c i e s : " .......................
]. B Immediate Alternative Inference contains under it these five spe
cies, ,
1, Given one proposition, the alternative of affirmation and negation. As
A either is or is not ; but A / s ; therefore, A is not not. Or, A is or is not B;
but A is B ; therefore, A is not not-li.
This sjiecies is anonymous, having been ignored by the logicians; but it
recpiires to be taken into account to explain the various steps of the process.
2, Given one proposition, the alternative between different predicates. This
is the common Disjunctive Syllogism.
3, The previous ])ro|iosItions conjoined, given one proposition, etc. As, A
either is or is not either B or C or D ; but A is B ; therefore, it is not not-B, it is
not C, it is not D.
Alias, A is either B or non-'B, or C or non-C, or D or n o n -D ; but A is B ;
therefore it is not non-B, and it is non-C, and it is non-D.
4, Given two propositions, second dejicndent on the first, and in the first the
alternative of affirmation and negation. This is the Hypothetical Syllogism of
1 [Cf. Foiisec.T, I n s t i t . D i a l ., L. vi. c. 1., 1st r e h i n i L o g ik , 130, p. 891. S clieib ler, O p.

ed. 15G4. E u slacliiu s, S i n n m n P h i l n s a p k i a L o g ., D e P r o p o s it. C n n s e n illn n e , p . i m el seq .]
Q u a iJ r ip r ir tita , D i a l e c t k a , P . iii. tract, i., p. 2 [K inds o f Im m ediate Inferen ce. I Sub-
112. [ Q noniam argu n ien fatio est qiKcdam altcrn aliou . II C on version . I II . Opposi-
conseqnentia (latins eu im patet con seq uenfia tion (a) ol C ontradiction (b) o f C ontra-
qnam argum eutatio), prius de conscqneiitia, riety (c) o f S iibcontrariety. IV^. E q n ip ol-
qnam de argu m en tation c dicendum est. lence. V. M odality. V I C ontraposition.
C onseqiientia igitnr, sive con seciilio. esi ora- V II . C orrelation. V III. Iden tity ,
tio in qua e x aliqu o aliijuid co llig itu r ; ut, F o n s e c a (lV ),(I ),(I I ) . Fiistacbiiis (I), (IV ),
O ir a iis h o m o est a n i m a l , i g i l u r a liq u is h o m o e s t (II), (V II I .) W olf, (IV ), (V II), (III), a, b, C,
anim al. E d ] [W lietb er Im m ediate Infer- (II). S tattler, (I), (IV ), (II), (III) K an t, (I),
ence le a lly im m ed iate,see, on tbe affirmative, (III), a, b, c , ( l l ) , (V I). F. K einliold, (I), (II),
E. K einliold, L o g ik . lOG; on tlie u egalive, (V I), (V II). Kbsling, (1). (IV ), (II), (III), a,
W olf, P h il. R a t ., 4G1. K rng, L o g i k , } 94. p. b, c, (V). K rug, (IV ), (1), (III), a, b. c, (II),
28". Scliiilze, L o g i k , 85-90 80, 5tli ed ). (V ). G. E. Sclinlze, (I V ), (I), (III). (II). S*.
Cf. M aim on, Vfr.;f/i p/n^r nenfji Logi'I:, Sect. V. M aitdon, (I). (I ll), (11), (V I). B acbinani..
} 2, p. 74 ft sf?. F . Fisclier, Logil:, p. 104 et (IV ), (I). ( I ll) , a, b. c, (II). (V l), (V).
s e q . B aclim ann, L o g i k , ; 105, p. 154 ft seq . P lain er, (I), ( II), (111), (1V). F. Fisclier, (V ),
Reim arus, V t r n n n f tl e h r r , 159 ft seq. (17G5) (I), (H I), (H ), (V I) Reim arus, (IV ), (I),
B o lza n o , W 'is s e n s e h a ftsR h re , L o g i k , v o l. ii. } (111). a, b, ( 11). Tw eslen. (I), (V ), (III), (IV ),
255 ft seq. T w estcn, L e ig ik , in sh eso n U e re the (II), (V I). See pp. 534, 535 ]
A n a lyttk, 77, p. 66 . K osling, Die Lehren tier
76
602 APPENDIX.
the logicians. It is, however, no more hypothetical than any other form of
reasoning ; the so-calletl hypothetical conjunction of the two radical propositions
being only an elliptical form o f stating the alternation in the one, and the de
pendence on that alternation in the other. For exnmiile : I f A is B, B is C ;
this merely states that A e ith e r is o r is not B, and that B is o r is not C, a c c o r d
in g a s A is o r is n ot B. In short .I.s A is o r is not B, so B is o r is not C.
(E rrors, 1, 'I'his is not a mediate inference.
2, This is not more composite than the categorical.
3, The second proposition is not more dependent upon the first than the
first upon the second.)
.5, Given two propositions, one alternative of affirmation and negation, and
another o f various predicates; the Ilyjiothetico-ilisjunctlve or Dilemmatic
Syllogism o f the logicians.
II. A Alediate Peremptory Inference. This is the common Categorical
Syllogism. Three iiropositioiis, three actual terms, one primary conclusion, or
two convertible ecpially and conjnnctly valid. '
II. B Alcdiate Alternative Syllogism. Three propositions, three possible
terms, and eonelnsions varying aeeording . . . .
2, The Disjunctive Categorical.

4, The Hypothetical Categorical. '
5, IIy])Othetico-Di?junctive Categorical.
lIY rO T IIE T lC A I. sy l l o g is m . CANON.
(O ct. 1848.) Canon Two or more propositions thought as indetermined

in quality, but as in (juality mutually dependent, the iletermination o f quality in
the one inters a determination o fth e corres|ionding (juality in the other.
This canon embodies and sinqilifics the whole mystery of Hyiiothetical Sjd-
logisms, wliich have been strangely Implicateil, mutilated, and confused by the
ligieiaiis.
1, \Vliat are call(!d Hypothetieal Projiositions and Syllogisms are no more
hyjiothetieal than others. They are only hypothetical as elliptical. When we
say, / / -\ is, then B is, we mean to say thc jirojio-sition, A is o r is not, and the
jirojio.sitimi, B is o r is not, are mutnally dependent, that as the one so the
other. I f here only means taking for the nonce one o f the qualities to the
exclusion of the other; I, therefore, e.xpress in my notation the connection of
the antecedent and consc(juent o f a hyjiothetieal jirojiosition, thus :
(A X X ^ ) = (B ----------- --- H - )
2. The interdependent projiositions are erroneou.sly called A n te c e d e n t and

Either i.s antecedent, cither is consequent, as we choose to make
( 'n n s e q n e n t.
th<;rn. Neither is absolutely .so. dhis error arose from not exjire.ssing overtly
the quantity o f the suhjitet of the .second proposition. For examjile: I f m a n is,
then a n im a l i.s. Iin this projiosition, as thus stated, the negation of the first does
APPENDIX. 603
not infer the negation of the seeond. For m an not existing, a n im a l niiglit be
realized as a eonseqnent o f dog, horse, etc. But let us consider what we mean :
we do not mean a ll a n im a l, but som e onljq and that som e determined bv J'c
attribute ot' r a tio n a lilg or such other. Now, this same som e a n im a l dejxmds on
m a n , and m an on i t ; expressing, therefore, what we mean in the jiroiiosition
thus : I f a ll m a n is ,th e n som e a n im a l is, we then see the mutual dependenee
and convertibility of the two propositions.' For to say that no a n im a l is, is
not to explicate but to change the terms.
3, The interdependent propositions may be dependent through their counter
qualities, and not merely through the same. For example ; A.s o u r hem isph ere
is o r is not illu m in a te d , so the o th er is not o r is ; hut the o th er is not illu m in a te d :
th e refo re ou rs is. Another: 7/ A is, then B is n o t; but B is ; th erefo re A is not.
D IS.TU X C TIV E AND H Y PO TH ETIC A L SY LLO G ISM S PROPER.
Aristotle ignores these forms, and he was right.- His followers, Theophras
tus and Fudennis, with the Stoics, introduced them into Logie as coordinate
with the regular syllogism ; and their views have been followed, with the addi
tion of new errors, u]> to the present hour. In fact, all tliat has been said of
them has been wrong.
1, These are not composite by contrast to the regular syllogism, but more
simple.
2, I f inferences at all, these are immediate, and not mediate.
3, Bnt tliey are not argumentations, but preparations (explications) for
argumentation.^ They do not deal with the qiuesitum, do not settle it; they
1 C f . T i t i u s , J r s C o g ita n U i, c . x i i . 2 6 . In L ccipiatur, ac in s y l l o g i s m o fo rm a liter pro-

sp ccie falsu m quoque nrbitror, q u o d S y llo - posito queat m in or p rob aii, turn con clii.sio
gi.smi C o n d i t i o n a l e s d u a s l i a b e a u t f i g u r a ? , < i U e erit v eri.'sin ia , idque v irtu te praeinissaruni.
liis m u n i a n t u r re g u li.* , ( 1 ) p o s i t o a n ie c e U e n te , 30. O m n is ig itu r er r o r e x i n d e liab et origi-
j i o n i t u r c o u s e q iie n s . n o n \ e r o r e m o lo a n lc c e U e u te , nem , quod q iiaiititatein p r.a/d icati vel non
r e m o v i li i r c n n s e q iie n s . (2) r e m o to c o n s e q iitn le , in te llig a iit, vel n o n o b . ' e r v e n t ; si i g i t u r l i u n c
r e m o v t u r n n le c u ln ts , n o n autem p o s i t o cn n se- lap siim ev ites, o b je c ia exeiiipla o m n ia , q u a lia
q u o U f . p n n i i ii r i i i i H r n h n s , . . . 28. V id e- etiain W eisiu s U. I. c o m i i i e i n o r a t , faciie di-
ainus speeialius; contra prim am r e g u la m sic l u e s . ' E d
p eccatur: C f . T i t i u s , A r s C o g iln n d i, c . x i i . 7 . S yl-
S> C h in e n s e s s u n t M a h o m e t a n i , s u n t in fid e le s , logism u s D i.'ju n ctiviis est en tiiy in em a sine
A t n o n s u n t M a h n m e t a n i, inajore, bis. oration e disjuncta et positiva,
E r g o n o n s u n t i n f id d e s , prop ositu m . . . . 17. C o iid ilio n a lis seu
nam con elu sio liic est a b s u r d a l V erum si lly p o fh eticu s nihil 'aliu d est quam en tliy-
]ir:edicatiim c o n c lu s io n is s u m a t u r p a r tic u la r - m e m a vel s in e m a jo r e , v el in iu o r e , bis, p r im a
ite r , n u l l a est . i b s u r d i t a s , si a u t e m g e i i e r a l i t e r , scil. v ic e , c o n d itio n a lite r . s e c u n d a , jiu ie, p ro-
lu m cvadu nt q n aiu o r term ini. 9. Eodcni positu m . 20. S equ itu r n u llu m pecu liare
e x e m p i o se c u n d a regiila e tia m illu str a tu r , se d co n c ln d e n d i fu n d a m en tiim vel fo r m a m circa
assu m eim is aliud e x t V c i s i o , d . I. S yllo g isiiio s C o n d itio n a les occurrere, nam
S i m ile s est d o c tu s , n o v i l lib r o s ( n e m p e s i c u t a r g u m e n ta tio n e s im p erfeclas, ad eoqiie m a le -
eruditi solen t'. riam sy llo g ism o ru in regu lariu in illi conti-
S e il n n i-it lib ro s ( s c i l . u t a l i i h o m i n e s , e t i a m n cu t. E d.
in d octi. nosse solen t) 3 T h is I s a y , for, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g w lia t M .
E r g o m ile s est d o c tu s . St. H ila ir e so a b ly sta tes in r e fu ta tio n o f m y
H ive c o n e lu s io itid em p r o falsa lia b c tu r ! p a r a d o x , I m u s t a d h e r e t o it a s u n d i s p r o v c d .
Bed jam in d ica v im n s iu a d d ita p a rentliesi See his T ra n sla tio n o f the O rganon, v o l.
veram causam , nem pe quatnor terniinos, iv . p . 55.
quodsi autem m ed iu s term in u s eo d em seusu
G04 APrENDix.
only jiut the i]iiostion in the state required for the syllogistic process; this,
indeed, they are freipiently used to supersede, as jilaeing the matter in a light
whieh makes denial or donbt impossible ; and their own jiroeess is so evident,
that they might, e.\ee|U for the sake o f a logical, an artienlate, development of
all the stejis o f thought, be safely omitted, as is the ease with the (pimsitum
itseli. For example :
1. Hypothetical (so called) Syllogism. Let the qiimsittnn or problem be, to
take tlu siiiqilest in stan ce. D u es (in hun l ex ist f This question is tlms hyjio-
tlietieall v jireiiared I f m an is, a n im a l is. l i n t [as is conceded] m an is ; there
f o r e , a n im a l Is. But here tlie (piescion, though prejiared, is not solved ; for the
opponent ma\' tlcnv the c'onseqnent, admitting the anteeetlent. It, therefoi'C,
is ineumbcnt to show that the existence o f a n im a l follows that o f m a n , whieh is
done by a categorical syllogism.
x ln im a l, : M a n : * --------, E x iste n t.
2. Disjunctive (so called) Syllogism. Problem Ts Jo h n m o r ta l? Dis

jnnetive syllogism John is cith er m o rta l o r im m o rta l; but he is not im m o rta l:
ergo [ami this, eonsequently, is admitted as a necessary alternative] he is m o rta l,
Bnt the [alternative antecedent] m ayb e denied, and the alternative consetjnent
falls to the ground. It is, therelbre, neeessary to show cither that he is nol im
m ortal, o r the necessary alternative that//e is m o rta l, whieh is done by
cat egorieal sy 11ogism.
Juhn CT , M an : j : Im m o rta l,
John c I , M an : , M o rta l,
n Y l'O T IlE T IC A L I.N FEU E N CE .
Inasmuch as a notion is thonght, it is thought either as existing or as non-ex-

i'iting; ami it cannot be, thonght as exi.sting unless it bc thought to exist in this
or that mode o f being, which, conscipumtly, affords it a ground, condition, or
reason of exisience. 4'liis is merely the law o f Reason and C onsetjucnt; ami
the hypothetical inference is only the limitation o f a supjiosed notion to a cer
tain mode of being, by which, if posited, its existence is affirmed ; if snblatcd,
its exi>Ienee is deiiieii. Por example : I f A is, it is B ; but A is, etc.
.\gaiii, we may think the existence of B (conscipicnily of A B ) <as depen
dent upon C, ami C as dejiendcnt upon I), ami so forth. W e, accordingly,
may reason : J f A is B, am/ B w C, ami C is D, etc.
D I S. II . . N C T I V E S V I.I.O O IS M rU O PER,
(October 1848.) Inasmueh as a notion is thought, it is thonght as deter-

mlne<l by one or other, ami only by one or other, of any two eoiitratlietory at-
trilmtes; ami ina.sinuch as two notions are thought as contradictory, the one or
A PPEN D IX . 605
the other, and only the one or the other, is thought as a determining attribute
o f any other notion. This is merely the law o f E.xtliided Middle. The di.-
junetive inference is tli5 limitation o f a subject notion to the one or to the otlna'
o f two predicates thought as contradictories ; the aflirmation o f the one infer-
rins the neaation'of the other, and vice versa. As, A is either B or not B, etc.
Tliongh, for the sake o f brevity, we say A is either B or C or D , each o f these
must bo conceived as the contradictory o f every other; as, B = [ C l 1), and
so on with the others.
IIY PO TIIET IC A LS (C O N JU N C T IV E AND D ISJU N C TIV E SY L L O G ISSi).
(April 30, 1849.) These syllogisms appear to bc only modifications or cor

ruptions of certain immediate inferences; for they have only two terms, and
obtain a third jiroposition only by jilaeing the general rule of inference (stat
ing, o f course, the possible alternatives), disguised, it is true, as the major
premise. It is manifest that we might prefi.x the general rule to every mediate
inference ; in which case a syllogism would have four propositions ; or, at least,
both Jiremises merged in one complex proposition, thus :
I f A and C be either subject or predicate [of the same term ? ], they are both subject or pred
icate of each other ;
But B is the subject of A and predicate of B |C?];
.'.A is the. predicate o/C.'
Thus, also, a common hypothetical should have only tiro propositions. Let ns
take the immediate inference, prefixing its rule, and wc have, in all essentials,
the cognate hypothetical syllogism.
1. Conjunctive Hypothetical.
A ll B is {some or all) A; All men are {some) animals;

Some or all B exists; {All or some) men exist;
Therefore, some A exists. Therefore, some animals exist.
H ere it is evident that the first proposition merely contains the general rule
upon which all immediate inference of inclusion proceeds; to wit, that, the sub
jective part being, the snbjoctiAC whole is, etc.
Now, what is this but the Hypothetical Conjunctive ?
I f B is, A is ; I f man is, animal is;

But B is ; But man i s ;
Therefore, A is. Therefore, animal is.
1 Tliere seem s to be an error here in the C is B, then C is A ; but B is A , a n d C is B-,

author's M.S It is obvious that a m ediate there/ore, C is A . This is ap parently w hal the
inference m ay be expressed in the form o f a author m eans to express in a so m ew h a t differ-
b ypolb etical syllogism . Tbu.s : 1 / l i i s A , a n d e n t l'o r r a E d
COG APPENDIX.
2. Hypothetical Disjunctive.
B /s cither A or not A ; M an is either animal or non-animal;

B nt B /s A ; B nt man is anim al;
Therefore, B is not not-A. Therefore, is not non-animal
Stating tliis hyjiothetically, we may, of course, resolve the formal contradic

tory into the material contrary. But this is wholly extralogical.
I1Y PO T 1IK T 5C A U A N D D ISJU N C TIV E .SYLLOGISM S.
( 1 8 4 8 or 1849.) The whole antecedent must be granted ; and there can

not bc two pro])Ositions inferred. In Categorical Syllogisms, the antecedent is
composcil of the major and minor premises, and thci-e is only one simple con
clusion (though this may, in the second and third figures, vary). .So in Hypo
thetical and Disjunctive Syllogisms the whole antecedent is the two clauses of
the fir?t jiroposition; and the whole inference is the first and second clauses o f
the second proposition, erroneously divided into minor proposition and conclu
sion.
(January IS.jO.) The IMedium or Explicative may be indefinitely various,
according to the complexity of the Explicand ; and so may the Explicate. The
explicative and the explicate change places in different explications. There
is, in fact, no ]U'opcr medium-exjilicative oi conclusion-explicate.
(January 18.50.) In Disjunctives there is always at least double the num
ber o f syllogisms (positive and negative) o f the disjunct members; and in all
.syllogisms where the disjunct members are above two, as there is thus afforded
the po^sihility o f di.sjnnctive explicates, there is another half to be added. Thus,
if there be two disjunct members, as A x B C, there are four syllogisms, bnt
all o f an absolute conclusion, explicate. Bnt if tlieie be three disjunct
members, as A x B C D, in that ease there are six ab.solute exjilieatcs, three
po.'îtive and three negative, and, moreover, three disjunctivo-jiositive conclu
sion s, explicate.s. after a negative explicative, and so on.
irV P O T IIE T IC A L S Y L I . O G I S M . CA N O N S.
(February 18.50.) I. Vor JJreaillli. The extensive whole or class being

uni viTsally pO'itcd or .sublatc.d. every subjacent jitirt i.s posited or sublated ; or,
for ] ) ( p t h , All the comprehensive, wholes being posited or sublated, the c o u p
prchcndcd parts arc univcrsally jiositcd or sublated.
II. For Unaillh, Any subjacent jiart being jiosited or sublated, the exten
sive whole or cla.ss is partially posited or sublated ; or, for Dejilh , Any eonp
prcheii'iic whole being jiosited or sublated, the coiujirehended jiarts (or party
are, jjro leinto. posited or sublated, Conversion and Hestrictioii.
III. If one eoiitradietory be posited or snldated, the other is sublated or posi
ted. f'oiitradietioii.
IV. If -oiiie or a J i a r t only of a notion be posited or sublated, all the rest
(all other sonnQ i> sublated or jiosited, Integration.
V. If till* same under one correlation be jiosited or sublated, so under the
other, Efjuijiollence.
APPENDIX. 607
V I. Law of Mediate Inferenee.' Syllogi?ni.

Mem. The som e in tlie exiilieand is (as in the Conversion o f propositions)
to be taken in the explicative as the sa m e som e. There is thus an inferenee
equally from consequent to antecedent, as from antecedent to consequent.
H Y P O T H E T IC A L S , OR A L T E R N A T IV E S .
CON JU N CTIV E (lIV rO T IlE T IC A L S E M PIT A T I C A l . L Y ) A N D D ISJU N C TIV E (A L T E R N A

T IV ES E M P H A T IC A L L Y .)
(August 1852.)
Quantification, A n y .
.-Mfirmative, A n y ( A n y th h u j, A u y h t) contains under it every positive
(juantifieation, A ll o r E r e r y , S o m e a t lea st, Som e o n ly , T h is, T h ese.
(B est.)
Negative, N o t a n y . N o n e , N o ( N o th in g , N a u g h t) , is equivalent to the most
e.xelusive o f the negations. A// u u t: A// o r e r e rg ) i o t : N o t m?e, and goes be
yond the following, which are only jiartial negations, N o t a l l ; N o t s o m e ;
S om e not. (W orst.)
Afiirmative, A n g , a highest genus and b e s t; not so Negative N o t a n y ,
a lowest species, and ivorst. Therefore can restrict, subalternate in the
former, not in the latter.
Any (all or every, some). Some not, or not some, or not all some only (def.).
Pure affirmative. Alixed aflirmative and negative.

3
All o r every not, not one, noi any.
P ure n egative.
I f any (every) JI be an (some) A, and any (every) A an (some) S, (hen is any (every) M
an S ; a>id, v. v., i f nn (not any) A be any S, and any JI some A , then is no JI any S.
.. ( O n o n e a l t e r n a t i v e ) , some JI beiny some A, ami all A some S, some M is some S.
( O n t h e o t l i c r ) , no A beiny any S, and every JI some A , no JI is any S.
I f (OTi a n y p o s s i b i l i t y ) JI is, some .\ is; or, v. v., i f no A is, no JI is.

( o n o n e a l t e r n a t i v e ) ( i n t h i s a c t u a l i t y ) , some JI beiny, some A is; (on the other), no
A heiny, no JI is.-
P ossible J I : , B - . A or A : ^ : JI. S u p p o sitio n o f u n iv e rsa l P o ssibility. In
any t'as*f.
Actual J [ , , A or A : i ^ ------: A . A ssertion o f p a rticu lar A ctuality. In this
ease.
From P o ssib le , we can descend to A c t u a l ; from A n y , to S o m e ; but N o i a n y

being lowest or worst, wc can go [no] lower.
1 See p. 536. E d . 2 See p. 603. E d.

608 A P P E N D IX .
The Posriblc indiiTeront to Atrirnialion or Negation, it contains both implieith.

Rut when wc descend to tlie .I c/ ho/ (and Potential?), the tw'o qualities emerge.
This e.xplaiiis much in both kinds o f Hypotheticals or A lternatives, the
Conjnnetives and Disjnnetives.
Higlier claves, Possible, Actual Semper, quandocunque, tunc, nunc
Ubicunqut, td)iqiu\ ibi, hoc A n y, all, some In all, every, any case, in this
rase Conceivable, real.
RULES OF H Y PO TH ETIC A L SYLLOGISM S.
1. Universal Rule of Restriction. W hat is thought of all is thought of

some. wliat is thought o f the whole higher notion (genus) is thought o f all
aiul each o f the lower notions (special or individual).
2. General Rule of both Hypotheticals. \Vhat is thought (im plicitly) of
all, tlie Possible (genus), is thought (e.xplieitly) o f all and each, the Actual
(sjiecics).
S Special, Rule o f Conjunctives. What is thought as conse(|uent on every
Posjible, is thonglit as consequent on every Actual, antecedent.
4. Special Rule of Disjunctives. W hat is thought as only Possible (alter
natively), is thought as only Actual (alternatively).
5. Most .'sjiccial Rule of Conjunctives..........................................................................
6. Most Special Rule of Disjunctives..........................................................................
h y p o t h e t ic a l s e x a .m p l e s u x q u a x t if ie d .
(Higher to Lower.)
A f f ir m a t iv e . N e g a t iv e .
/ / the genus is, the species is. I f the genus is not, the species is not.
I f the stronger can, the weaker can. I f the stronger cannot, the weaker cannot.
(Lower to Higher.)
I f the sprcieh is, the genus is. I f the species is not, the genus is not.
I f Oie Weaker can, the stronger can. I f the weaker cannot, the stronger cannot.
(Equal to Equal.)
I f triangle, so trilateral. I f A be father o f B, P> is son n f A ;
S uch jKwt I h m u r , sui h poet V irg il. .'. A being f a t h e r o f B, B is son o f A ;
W h ere {will II) the c a rc a ss is, th e re (th e n ) .'. \> not being son n f A , A is not f a t h e r o f H.
are the. Hies. I f the angles be proportional to the sides o f
I f iywraUs be the son o f .Saphronisrus, Saph- a A:
rtmiseus is the fa th er a f Rfn rates. An equiangular will be an equilateral A.
I f equals be (uhled to equals, the wholes are I f wheresaerer the carcass is, there, will the
equal. eagles be gatbereel together (Matl-
xxiv.28);
.'. I f here the carcass is, here, etc.
APPENDIX. 609
A .) C O N JU N C T IV E IIY PO T H E T IC A L S .
^ . ( A , being D , is A;
1.) JLA6eD, it is a ; /
( A, not
i being A , is not D ;
In other words A is either
or D or not IA D.
Identity and Contradiction.
- , A , is not non-A;
2.) Jf T
B> be AA, i l i s notAnon-A;
A j
. .
t B, being non-A, isli not A ;
III other words B is either A or non-A.
Excluded iMiddlc.
B, not being A , is non-A]

3.) I f B be not A , it is non-A] .'. |
bein non-A, is not A ;
< B, being
In other words B is either not A or not non-A.
Excluded jMiddle.
. , T-A. T-A Ts . not being D, IS not A\

Ik.) I f B b e n o t D , i t i s not A-,
( E, being A, is D ;
I n other words E is either not D A , or A D .
Contradiction and Identity.
B .) D ISJU N C TIV E H TP O T H E T IC A L S .
. ( B being A , is not non-A :

I f B be either A or non-A\ . 1 i , . . .
( B being non-A, is not A .
Excluded Middle.
I f means suppose that, in case that, on the supposition hypothesis,

under the condition, tinder the thought that, it being supposed possible ;
.-. etc., means then, therefore. in that case, etc., etc., in actuality either.
Only, properly, in both Conjunctives and Disjunctives, two contradictory
alternatives. For contrary alternatives only material, not formal, and, in point
of fact, cither A or B or C means A ur non-A . B or imn-B, C or non-C.
The minor premise, on the common doctrine, a mere materiality. Formally,
logically, it is a mere differencing of the conclusion, which is by formal
alternative afforded.
1.) In Ilypotheticals (Conjunctive and Disjunctive), two or three hypotheses.
The first is in the original supposition of possibility. ( I f B be A, it is not non-
A I f B he. either A or non-A .) The second (and third) is in the alternative
suppositions of actuality (.-. either i f B be A, it is not non-A, or i f B be non-A.
it is not A. .-. I f B be A, if is not non-A. or i f B be non-A. it is not A). (Pos
sibly, by possible snpjiosition) I f man is, animal i s ; .-. (actually) M an being,
animal is : (or) animal not being, man is not.
1.) Possibility a genus indiffvwent to negative and affirmative. These two
.species of Possibility, to wit, two Actuals, an actual yes, and an actual no
Thc total formal conclusion is, therefore, of two contradictories. This explains
77
610 APPENDIX.
why, in Conjunctive and Disjunctive Ilypotheticals, there are two alternative

conso(jiients, and only one antecedent
2.) In Ilypotheticals (Conjunctive and Disjunctive) a division o f genus in
the first supposition into two contradictories, species. The inference, there
fore, one o f subalternation or restriction.
3.) In Ilvjiotlieticals (Conjunctive and Disjunctive), two alternative contra
dictory conclusions the form giving no preference between the two, the mat
ter oniy determining (other immediate inferences have only one determinate
conclusion, and all mediate syllogism has virtually only one). Formally, there
fore, Ave cannot categorically, deterniinately, assert, and assert exclusively,
either alternative, and make a minor separate from the conclusion. This only
materially jiossible ; for we know not, by the laws o f thought, whether a cer
tain alternative is, knowing only that one o f two alternatives must be. For
mally, therefon', only an immediate inference, and that alternative double.
4.) Ilvpotlictical (Conjunctive and Di.qunetive) reasoning more marking
out, predetermining bow a thing is to be jiroved, than jiroving it.
5.) Thus, three classes o f inference: 1, Simjilc Immediate Inference. 2,
Comjilcx Immediate Inference (Ilypotheticals Conjunctive and Disjunctive).
3, Syllogisms Projier, INIediate Inference.
C.) If we (juantify the terms, even the formal inference breaks down.
7.) The only difTerence between the first projiosition and the two latter, is
the restriction or subaltcrnation. These last should, therefore, be reduced to
one. and made a conclusion or restriclion. The genera and species are o f the
most common and notorious kinds, as Possible and A ctu a l, W/iei-ever, Here,
etc., Whenever, Now , A ll or E very, Some, T his, oto. The commonness
and notoriel v o f this subordination is tlic cause why it has not been signalized ;
and if signalized, and overtly exjiressed, Ilyjiotheticals might be turned into
Categoricals. It is better, however, to leave them as immediate inferences.
For it would be found awkward and round-about to ojipose, for example, the
Possible to the Actual, as determining a diirerence. o f terms. (S ee Moliiiams,
Elein. Log., L. i. tr. iii. ji. 95, and Pacins, In Org., D e Sgll. Hyp., ji. 533.) The
example o f the Cadaver there given shows the approximation to the ordinary
Ilypotheticals. They may stand, in fact, either for Categoricals or Ilyjiotheti-
cals.
X.) Disjunctives (Possibly) A is either B or non-V, \ .-. (Actually) A is
>ithf-r, etc.
9 ) The doctrine in regard to the Universal (inantity, and the Aflirmative
(,uality (see K nig, Logik. 57, 83, 80, jip. 171, 204, 275), o f the supjxisition,
jiro|)o-<ition, o f Conjunctive (V) and Disjunctive Ilypotheticals, is solved by my
theory o f Pussibilitg. In it is virtually said (whatever quantity and quality be
the clauses), on arty possible supposition. (On the Quality, v. Krug, D g ik ,
57, p . 172. Paeius, In Org., ji. 533. Moliincns, Eleni. Log., I. c.)
10.) Possibly, prob'emntically includes as species the actual afTirmative and
the actual negative. It will thus be snpc'rflnoiis to enounce a negative in op-
fioîtion to an affirmative alternative ; for thus tlic jiossible would be brought
down to the actual, and the whole .syllogism be more tautological repetition.
11.) The quantified terms, if introduced, must either bc made determinate,
to suit the Ilyjiotheticals, or must ruin their inference. For example I f all
APPENDIX. Gil
or some mnn he some nnimnl, we must be able to say, But some animal is not,
therefore man (any or same) is not. But lierc sotne animal, except definitized
into tbe same some animal, would not warrant the rerpiired infcrenee. And so
in regard to other quantifications, wbieh tbe logicians have found it neces.sarv
to annul.
12.) The minor proposition may be either categorical or hypothetical. (Sec
Krug, Loyik, 83, p. 2G4. Ileerobord, Instit. Loyicar. Synopsis, L. ii. e. 12, pp.
2G6, 2G7.) In my way o f stating it: I f man is, animal is, .-. I f man is (or
man being), animal is.
13.) O f notions iu the relation o f sub-and-siiperordination (as, in opposite
ways Depth and Breadth, Containing and Contained), absolutely and relatively,
the lower being anirined, the higher arc (partially) affirmed; and the higher
being (totally) denied, the lower arc (totally) denied. A , E, I, O, U , Y may
represent the descending series.
The first proposition is conditional, complex, and alternative : we should

expect that the second should be so likewise. But this is only satisfied on inv
plan ; whereas, in the common, there is a second and a third, each categorical,
simple, and determinate.
The snbaltcrnation is frequently double, or even triple, to wit, 1, From the

Possible to the Actual. 2 (for examjile), From Everywhere to here, or this
place, or the place by name. 3, From all to some, etc. in fact, this infer
ence may be of various kinds.
The/UToA7jfIS of Aristotle may moan the determination, the subalterna
tion ; the icara Troi6ji]-ra may refer to the specification o f a particular quality or
proportion under the generic; and tbe Trpdo-ATjâs of Theophrastus (for tlie
reading in Aristotle should be corrected) may correspond to the koto iroiSrtiTa.
There is no necessary connection, formally considered, between the antcci-

dent and eonsoqnent notions o f the Hypothetical major. Tlierc is, conse
quently, no possibility of an abstract notation : their dependence is merely
supposed, if not material. Hcneo tbe logical rule, Propositio conditionalis
nihil ponit in esse. (S ee Krug, Logik, 57, p. 1G6.) But on the formal siq>-
position, on the case thought, what arc tbe rules ? ..............
W e should distinguish in Hypotheticals between a propositional antecedent

and consequent, and a syllogistic A and C ; and each o f the latter is one
proposition, containing an A and C.
The antecedent in an inferenee should be that wdiich enables us formally to
draw the conclusion. Show in Categorieals and in Immediate Inferences. On
this principle, the conclusion in a Hyjiothetical will contain what is commonly
calk'd the minor proposition with the conclusion proper ; but it will not bo o;ie
and determinate, but alternative.
If there were no alternation, the inference would follow immediately from
the fundamental jiroposition; and there being an alternative only makes the
conclusion alternatively double, but does not make a mediate inference.
612 APPENDIX.
T o make one alternative determinate is extralogical; for it is true only as

materially proved. 1, Tlie splitting, therefore, o f the eonelnsive proposition
into two a minor and a eonelusion proper is wholly material and extralogi
cal ; so also, 2, Is the imdtiplying o f one reasoning into two, and the dividing
between them o f the alternative conclusion.
Errors o f logicians, touching Hypothetical and Disjunctive Reasonings:

1, That [they] did [n ot] sec they were mere immediate inferences.
2, ^lost moderns that both Hypothetical.
.3, That both alternative reasonings in one syllogism.
4. ^listook a pait of the alternative conclusion for a minor premise.
5, Made this a distinct part (minor premise), by introducing material consid
erations into a theory o f form.
6. Did not see what was the nature o f the immediate inference in both,
how tliey resembled and how they differed.
II. H is to r ic a l N o tice s.
(C O N JU N CT IV E AND D IS JU N C T IV E .)
(n) A R I S T O T L E .
(August 1852.)
Aristotle {AnuL P r. L . I. e. .32, 5, p. 202, Pacii) describes the process of the

Ilv]>othetie Syllogism (that called by A lexander Si okoiv), but denies it to be a
syllugi-m. Tlierefore bis syllogisms from Hypothesis are something different.
This li;is not been noticeil by Maiisel, W a it z ,.................
Thus literally : " Again, if vian existing, it be neecs.sary that animal c.xist,
and if animal, that snhsfance : man existing, it is iieeessary that snhsfanre exist.
As vel. there is, however, no .syllogistic process; for the iiropositioiis do not
stand in the relation we have stated. Hut, in such like cases, we aie deceived,
b\ reason ot the necessity o f .something resulting from what has been laid
dnwn ; whilst, al ihi> same time, the syllogism is o f things necessary. Bnt the
Neec.s,ai-y is more extensive than the Syllogism ; for though all syllogism be
indeed neees.,;iry. all ne-essary Is not syllogism. Why not? 1, No middle.
2 . No quality, atlirinatlon or negation : problem, also not assertory, hvpo-
ihetieal not sylloolslie. 3, No ([iiantity. Compare, also. An. P r. L. i. e. 24.
Aristotle (Anal. Pn<l., L. i. e. 2, 15, p. -US; c. 10, 8. 0, p. 438) makes
77/. or Position the geiins opjiosed to and containing nndi'r it, as
'peelc'. 1, 7/.///'/ /r v/.v or Siipfjosition ; and, 2, iJnJinitlon. Hypothesis is that
ihcsi- which assumes one, or other alternative o f a eontrndietion. Definition is
that thc'is which neithi'r aflirnis nor denies. Ilyjiothetleal, in ,\ristotles.sense,
Is ih'i' that which adirms or denies one alternative or other, whiidi Is not
indifferent to yes or n o , whieh is not possibly eitlier, and, consequently.
AP P E N DIX. Gl'3
in elu d es both. H yp oth eticals, as in volvin g a positive and n egative alternative,

are thus, in A ri'totle's sense, righ tly nam ed, if d i v i d e d ; but, in A ristotles
sense, as com plete, they arc neither propositions nor syllogism s, as not allirm ing
on e altern ative to the exclu sion o f the other.'
(b) A i lM O y W S IIE E M I.E .
I. Am m onius H cn n iaj, on Aristotle O f Enouncement, Introduction, f. 3, ed.

A id. 154G, f. 1. ed. A id. 1503. A fter distinguishing the five sp ecies o f S p eech ,
according to the P e r ip a te tic s, the ]ocatire, the Lnperntire. thc Interrogutire,
the Optative, and the Enunciutive or Assertive, having further stated the
corresiionding division by the Stoics, and h avin g finally shown that A ristotle,
in this book, lim ited the discussion to the last kind, that alon e being recipient
o f truth and falsehood, he thus p roceed s: A gain , o f Assertire speech (avo-
<pavTiKov \6yov), there are two sp ec ies; the on e called Categoric [or Predicalicf),
the other Ilgpothelic [o r SupposUire']. T h e C ategoric d en otes that something
does or does not belong to something: as w hen we say, Socrates is (calling, Soc
rates is not w a llin g ; for w e p red icate icalking o f Socrates, som etim es alHrm-
a tively, som etim es n eg a tiv ely. T h e H yp oth etic denotes that something Ixdng.
something [e ls e ] is or is not, or something not being, something [e ls e ] is not or is :
A s when w c say. I f man he, animal also is , I f he he man.Jie is not stone.
I f it be not dag, it is night, I f it he not dug, the sun has not risen.
T h e Categoric is thc o n ly sjieeies o f A ssertive speech treated o f by A ris
totle as that alone p erfect in itself, and o f u tility in dem onstration ; w hereas
H yp oth etic syllogism s, usurping [u su a lly ] w ithout dem onstration the [m in or]
proposition, called the Transumplion, or Assnmjdion. and som etim es even a
[m ajor p rem ise] C onjunctive or D isju n ctive, recpiiring jiroof, draw their jier-
snasion from hyjiothcscs, should an y one [I read eT n s for friQ con ced e their
prim ary supjiositions. If, then, to the establishm ent o f such suppositions we
should em ploy a secon d h yp oth etic syllogism , in that case, w e should recjuire
a further establishm ent for confirm ation o f the supjiositions in volved in it ; for
this third a fourth would again be n ecessary; and so on to infinity, should we
attem pt b y h yp oth eses to confirm hyjjotheses. B u t to render the dem onstra
tion co m p lete and final, it is m anifest that there is need ed a categoric syllogism
to p rove the point in question, without an y foregone supposition. H e n c e it is
that Categoric [reason in gs] are styled Syllogisms absolntely ; w hereas H yp o
thetic [rea so n in g s] o f ev ery kind are alw ays denom inated Syllogisms from
hypothesis, and n ev er Syllogism s sim ply. Add to this, that H yp oth etic en ou n ce-
1 [ W lie th e r th e S y llo g U m s e x h yp o lh esi of Opera L o g ic a Tract. S y ll. F . iv . c . x . t it . 2, p.

A r is to t le are c o r r e s p o n d e n t to th e o i'd in a r y 548. B u rsg e r sd ic iu ? . I n s iii. L o g . L. ii. cc. 12,
H y p o th e t ic a l S y llo g is m . 14, p p . 263. 270, 275 B itte r , t its h der Phil.
F o r tlie a ffir m a tiv e , see P a c in s . Com . In iii. p. 96. ( E n g . T r ., p SO.) naim i.?, tScholce
O rg A n . P rior, L i. CC. 23, 29. 44, pp. 153, 177, D ia l. L . v ii. cc. 1 2 ,1 3 pp 492, 503 M olinam .?,
194. S t H ila ir e . T ra n sla tio n o f O rg a n o n , v o l. E le m e n ta L o g ica , p. 95 et seq. W a ltz , Org. i.
ii. pp. 107. 139, 178. p p . 427, 4.33 t f. A l e x a n d e r , In A n . Prior, tf.
F o r tlie n e g a tiv e , s e e P ic c a r tu s , In Org. A n . 88, 109. P liilo p o m is , I n A n . Prior, ff. 60", 60 ',
Prior. L. i. cc. 40, 41. 42, p. 500. N e ld e liu s , ST**, 88. A n o n y m u s , De S y llo g ism o , f. 44*>.
D e UsH Org. A risl. P . iii. c . 2, pp. 38. 45 (1607). M a g e n tin u s , I n A n . P rio r, f. ITt*. A m m o n iu s ,
K e c k e r m a n n , O pera, p p . 766, 767. S c h e ib le r , I n de 7nterp.,3'>. B le m m id a s , E p i t. L o g . c. 36.]
G 14 APPENDIX.
m ents are m ade up o f C ategoric. F o r th ey e.xpross the consetjuence or oppo

sition (luioXovbiav X] bidirraaivy o f o n e Categoric pro|)Osition and another, u n itin g
them with eacli otlier by either the C on jun ctive or D isju n ctive particle (avfj.-
x tU k tik ^ 7*) SiaêvKTiKw (TvrStano!'), in O r d e r to show that they constitute togeth er a
'iii'jlc cn o iin cem en t. F or these reasons, therefore, A ristotle has on ly consiil-
cred, in d etail, the Categoric sp ecies o f A ssertive sp eech .
(c) Axoymocs scnouox}
In H y p o th etic Syllogism s, the first [ I ] arc those o f tw o terms [ a ], Conjunc

tive, or [b ] D isju n ctive (opoi oi ffw rgintvoi /) biaKtKvptvoi') ; then follow [ I I ] the
two [cla--c< o f ] syllogism s with three, and these con jun ctive terms.
[I. a.] * T h ere are four syllogism s through the R eturn (r) ivduobos) on the
prior (6 tr p d T t p o s , 6 i r p u r o s ) [or a n teced en t clause o f the hypothetical proposi
tio n ], and four through it on the posterior (6 S f v r e p o s , 6 to-xoTos). F or the
terms are taken eith er both afhrm ativcly or both n egatively. A n d the return
ujion the jirior is p on cn t (xaro upon the posterior tollen t (xaTo dvalpcffiv).
F or exam p le [th e return upon the prior] :
(1.) I f A is, B is ; (Return) hul A is ; (Conclusion, <rvp.irfpcuTpM) therefore, B is.

(Q.) I f A is, B is n o t ; but A w ; therefore, B is not.
(.3.) I f A is not, B is ; but A is not; therefore, B is.
(4.) I f A is not, B is n o t; but A is n o t; therefore, B is not.
T h e return upon the posterior:
(1.) I f X is, B i s ; but B is n o t ; therefore, A is not.

(2.) I f A is, 15 is n o t ; but B i s ; therefore, A is not.
(3.) I f A is not, B is ; but B is not; therefore, A is.
(4.) I f A is not, B is n o t; but B is ; therefore, A too is.
[b .] F ollo w in g those o f i-onjnnctive, arc syllogism s o f disjunctive term s.

In tlie-c, tilt* return is upon cith er [cla u se] indiil'crcntly. F o r exam p le : I f it
niu<i he lhal eith er A i.s o r B i.s [in tho on e c a s e ]; B i.s n ot, th e refo re , A is ; or
[in the other], A is not, th e refo re B h .
[ I I .] D f three coiiju n etivc term t, there are [in the figures taken togeth er]
eiehr s v llo g i'iiis , through a return on the jirior, and eight [sixteen ] through a
return on the |)()-terior [elau.se]. F or the three term s are correlated ( c r u r r l^ f i/ -
To<), citliei- all affirm atively, or .'-ome; and here either the third alon e, or the
thinl and seeom l, or the second alon e, n egatively. A gain , eith er all are neg-
atiM.lv eorrclatt;d, or som e ; and here the third alone, or the third and second,
>r the second alone, affiirmatively. In this m anner the correlation [in each
1 In W a ilz , Org. 1. p p 9, 10. p r e m i.se (th e m in o r p la c e d first, a c c o r d in g to

J 11 w o u ld s e e m th a t th e a u th o r h e r e , a n d tiie c o m m o n p r a c tic e o f th e G re e k s, or th e
iu llie last s e n ie r ic e , d is c o iin t a l lo g e t lie r th e m a jo r p r io r, in A r is to t e lic th e o r y ) lie s h o u ld
first fig u r e , p u z z le d , a p iia r e iitly , to w liic li a c c o r d th e d e s ig n a tio n o f first.
APPENDIX. " 615
figure] is eightfold; taking for exemplification only a single mood [in the
several figures] :
I f A is, B i s ;
I f B is ,C is ;
I f A is, therefore, C is.
This is of the first figure. For the middle collative term (6 (Tvvayw v Spos p.i<jos)
is twice taken, being the eonsequent (6 K-frycov) in the former eonjunctive
[premise] ( t J -KplTepov avvTpfxpdvov), the antecedent (6 g y o v n e v o s ) in the latter.
Wherefore, these syllogisms are indemonstrable,' not requiring reduction
(rt & vd\v(Tis) for demonstration. The other moods o f the first figure are, as has
been said, similarly elrcumstanced.
The second figure is that in which the collative term [or middle] {6 awdywv)
holds the same relation to each of the collated [ore.xtrem e] terms, inasmuch as
it stands the antecedent o f both the conjunctive [premises], except that in the
one it is affirmative, in the other negative. Wherefore, when reduced to the
first figure, they demonstrate, as is seen, through the instance of a single mood
composed o f affirmative collated terms. As
I f A is , B i s ;
I f A is not, C i s ;
7
I f B i's w t, therefore, C is.
This is reduced to the first figure in the following m a n n er: W hether it

has the collated terms, both affirmative, or both negative, or both dissimilar to
the reciprocally plaeed collative term, there is taken in the reduction the
opposite [and converse] o f the jirior conjunctive [prem ise] ; and the latter is
applied, in order that the opposite o f the consequent in the former conjunctive
[premise] may find a place in the foresaid mood. As
I f B is not, A is n o t;
I f A is not, C i s ;
I f B is not, therefore, C is.
This it behooved to show.

The third figure is that in which the collative term holds the samerelation
to each of thecollated terms, being the eonsequent in either conjunctive [pre
mise] affirmatively and negatively, as in the example o f a single mood again
consisting o f affirmative collated terms. Thus :
I f A is, B is ;
I f C is, B is n o t;
I f A is, therefore, C is not.
The reduction o f this to the first figure is thus eflfeeted. The opposite [a
1 V id e A p u le iu s. [D e D o g m . P la t iii. p. 37. E lm . Cf. D iscu ssio n s, p. 836. E d .]

616 ArrENDix.
converse E ] o f tlie second conjunctive [premise] is taken along witli the

first conjunctive [premise], and the antecedent o f the former is applied to the
opposite o f the latters consequent; as in tbe foresaid mood. Thus:
I f A is , B i s ;
I f B is, C is not ;
I f A is, therefore, C is not.
All this requires to be shown concretely. As in the first figure [first

mood] :
I f d a y is , lig h t i s ;
I f lig h t is, visible objects a r e seen ;
I f d a y is, therefore, visib le objects a re seen. .
Second figure, first mood :
I f d a y is , lig h t i s ;
I f d a y is not, the s u n is u n d er the e a r th ;
I f lig h t is not, the s u n is [therefore] u n d er ihe ea rth .
R eduction:
I f lig h t is not, d a y is n o t ;
I f d a y is not, the sun is u n d er the e a r th ;
I f lig h t, therefore, is not, the su n is u n d er the earth.
Third figure, first mood ;
I f d a y is, lig h t i s ;
I f th in g s visib le a re unseen, lig h t is n o t ;
I f d a y , th e rifo re , is, th in g s visible a r e not unseen.
There are eight moods o f the second figure, and eight o f the th ird ; two
composed o f affirmatives, two of negatives, four o f dissimilars, with a similar
or dissimilar collalive.
End of Aristotles Analytics.
Relative to the translation from the Greek interpolator on Hypothetical

Svllo'/isms, in W aitz (O nj. i. p. 9, 10); and in particular to the beginning
r-f [II]. ^
Better thus : In all the Figures: the cjuality o f the syllogism is cither
p u r e . and lierc two. viz., one aflirmative and one negative; or il/ix e d ,
and here six, viz., llirec in which affirmation, and tlircc in which negation, has
the preponderance.
APPENDIX. 617
The following are thus arranged :
F ir s t Figure. Se con d Fig ur e. T h i r d F igu re .
All I f A is, B is ; I f B is, A i s ; I f A is, B is ;

A I f B is, G i s ; I f B is, G i s ; I f C is, B is ;
c 1 .'. I f A is, C is. .'. I f A is, C is. .'. I f A is, G is.

g I
^ \
c
o i 1.2, I f A is, B i s ; I f B is, A is ; I f A is, B i s ;

Q 4 1^ I f R is, C is not ; I f B is, C is n o t ; I f G IS not, B i s ;
. ' . I f A is, C is not. .'. I f A is, C is not. .'. I f A is, C is not.
ScS /y
P. \
0
c 1 1. 3, I f A is, B is not ; I f B is not, A i s ; I f A is, B is n o t ;
I f B is not, C is ; I f B is not, C i s ; I f C is, B is not ;
s 1^
c3
.'. I f A is, C is. .'. I f A is, C is. .'. I f A is, G is.
t
< 1
2, 3, I f A is not, B is ; I f B is, A is not ; I f A is not, B is ;
''v D I f B is, C is ; I f B is, C i s ; I f C is, B is ;
.'. I f A is not, C is. .'. I f A is not, C is. .'. I f A is not, C is.
1' All I f A is not, B is not. I f B is not, A is n o t ; I f A is not, B is n o t ;

E I f B is not, C is not ; I f B is not, C is n o t ; I f G is not, B is not ;
.'. I f A is not, C is not. .-. I f B is not, C is not. I f A is not, G is not.
g"
a
^ 2 1, 2, I f A is not, B is not ; I f B is not, A is not ; I f A is not, B is n o t ;
T3 0
g F I f R is not, C i s ; I f B is not, G i s ; I f C is, B is n o t ;
gt C .'. I f A is not, C is. .'. I f A is not, C is. .'. I f A is not, C is.
0. /
| l "
C- Cs \ 1> 3, I f A is not, B i s ; I f B is, A is not ; I f A is not, B is ;
c G I f B is, C is n o t ; I f B is, C is nut ; I f G is not, B is ;
P Cw
0 w .'. I f A is not, C is not. .'. I f A is not, C is not. .'. I f A is not, G is not.
n
2, 3, I f A is, B is n o t ; I f V> is not, A is ; I f A is, B is not ;

H I f B i s not, C is n o t ; I f B is not, C is n o t ; I f G is not, B is n o t ;
.'. I f A is, C is not. .'. I f A is, C is not. . .'. I f A is, C is not.
These eight syllogisms are all affirmative, the negation not being attached
to the principal copula.' If, therefore, the negation be attached to one or
other premi.se, there will be sixteen negative syllogisms, in all twenty-four.
The negatives are, however, awkward and useless. (S ee Lovanienses, p. 301.)
But each o f these twenty-four syllogisms can receive twelve ditferent forms
of predesignation, corresponding to the twelve moods o f the simple categorical;
according to whieh they are arranged and numbered. It is hardly necessary
1 See Lo v a ni en s es . In A risl. D ia l., Tract, de H y p o tlu tic is S yllogisrn is, p. 299.

' 78
6 1 8 APPENDIX.
to notice that the order of the premises is in eomprehension, after the Greek
fashion of the scholiast.
i. ii. iii. iv. v. vi. vii. viii. ix. X. xi. xii.

rA , , , : , , ,
MB , : : , . : 1: , , : : , , : : ,
cc - > f f
1 1
This is exemplified in the Sjdlogism E of the preceding table, th u s:
1. I f all A is not, all B is not; if all B is noi, all C is not; .-. if all A is not, all
B IS uot.
2. I f some A is not, all B is not; if all B is not, some C is not; .'. if some A is not,
some C is tiot.
3. I f some A I's not, all B is not; if all B is not, all C is not; .'. if some A is not,
all C is not.
4. I f all A is not, all B is not ; if all B is not, some C is not; .'. if all A is not, some
C is not;
0. I f all A is not, some B is not; if all B is not, all C is not; .'. if all A is not, all C
is not.
6. I f some A is not, all B is not; if some B is not, all C is not; .-. if some A is not,
all C is not.
1. I f all A is not, some B is not; if all B is not, some C is not; if all A is not, some
C is not.
8. I f some A is uot, all B is not; if some B is not, all C I's not; .'. if some A is not,
all C is not.
9. I f some A is not, some B is not; if all B is not, all C is not; .-. if some A is not,
all C is not.
10. I f all A is not, all B is not; if some B is not, some C is not; . \ if all A is uot,
some C is uot.
11. I f some A is not, some B is not; if all B is not, someC is not; if some A is not,
.some C is not.
12. I f some A IS not, all B is not; if some B is not, some C is not; if some A is not,
some C is not.
APPENDIX. 619
IX .
S O R I T E S .
(See p. 274.)
(Without order.)
A ll logicians have overlooked the Sorites o f Second and Third Figures.

In Sorites of the Second or Third Figures, every term forms a syllogism
with every other, through the one middle term. In Sorites o f the First Figure,
every Second term at most forms a syllogism with every other, through its
relative middle term.
No subordination in Sorites of Second or Third Figure, ergo no one domi
nant eonelusion.
A lias In First Figure, there being a subordination o f notions, there may
be a Sorites Avith different middles (all, huAvever, in a common dependency).
In Second and Third Figures, there being no subordination o f terms, the only
Soi'ites competent is that by rejietition o f the same middle. In First Figure
there is a neAv middle term for every new progress of the Sorites; in Second
and Third, only one middle term for any number of extremes.
In First Figure, a Syllogism only betAveen every second term of the Sorites,
the intermediate term constituting the middle term. In the others, every two
propositions of the common middle term form a syllogism.
Alias There being no subordination in Second and Third Figures between
the extremes, there, consequently, are *
1, No r e l a t i o n s betAA 'cen e x t r e m e s , except t h r o u g h t h e m i d d l e t e r m .
2. There is oidy one possible middle term ; any number o f others.
3, Every tAvo of the terms, with the middle term, may form a syllogism.
4, No order.
Before concluding this subject, I would correct and amplify the doctrine in
regard to the Sorites.*
1, 1 Avould state that, by the quantification of the Predicate (o f Avhieh we
are hereafter to treat, in reference to reasoning in general), tliere are two
kinds of Sorites ; the one descending from Avhole to part, or ascending from
part to Avhole ; the other proceeding from Avhole to whole : o f which last it is
noAv alone requisite to speak. It is manifest, that if Ave can find two notions
Avholly equal to a third notion, these notions will be wholly equal to each other.
Thus, if all trilateral figure be identical with all triangular figure, and all tri
angular figure Avith all figure the sum of Avhose internal angles is equal to two
right angles, then all figure, the sum of Avhose internal angles is equal to two
right angles, and all trilateral figure, Avill also be identical, reciprocating, or
absolutely convertible. W e have thus a simple syllogism of absolute equation.
On the same principle, if A and B, B and C, C and D, are absolutely equiva
lent, so also will be A and D. W e may thus, in like manner, it is evident,
1 luterpolalioii in Lectures. See p. 274. E d.

G20 APPENDIX.
have a Sorites o f absolute equivalents. Tt is not, indeed, very easy always to

finil four or more terms or notions thus simply convertible. In geometry, we
may earrv out the eonerete syllogism just stated, by adding the three following
propositions : .1// fn u re. the sum o f whose Internal angles is equal to tiro right
angles, is all fg n re which can be bisected through only one angle : A ll fg u re
which can be bisected through only one angle, is all fg u re which, bisected through
an angle and a side, glees two triangles; and A ll Jiyure which, thus bisected,
gives two triangles, is all figure which, bisected through two sides, gives a triangle
and a i/uadraugte; and so forth. In theology, perhaps, however, these series are
more freipiently to be found than in the other seieiiees. The following twelve
eijnivalent concepts'eonstitute at once a good example o f such a Sorites, and
at the same time e.xhibit a compendious view of the whole Calvinistic doctrine.
These are, 1. Elected; 2. lloleem ed; 3. Called ; 4. Graced with true repent
ance: '). 1I7M true fa ith ; G. 117M true personal assurance; 7. Pardoned; 8.
Justifed: 9. .Sanctified; 10. Endowed with per.severance; 11. Saved: 12. Glorifed.
This series could indeed bc am plified; but I have purposely restricted it to
twelve. Now, as A ll the elect are all the redeemed, all the redeemed all the called,
all the called all the [truly) penitent, all the [tru///] jienitent all the [tra/y] beliei'-
iny, all the [truly) believiny all the [truly) assured, all the [truly) (wsui'ed all the
pardoned, all the pardoned all the ju.difed, all the justifed all the sunctfed, all
the sanctified all the per.sevcrunt, edl the ju-rseverant all the saved, all the saved
all the glorified, all the glorifed all the blest with life eternal; it follows, o f neces
sity, that all the ble.-^t ivitli life eternal are all the elect. To turn this affirmative
iiqo anegalive Sorites, wc have only to say, cither at the beginning, None
o f the rejirobate are any o f the elect, and, consequently, infer, at the end, that
noiu: o f the ble.<sed with eternal life are any o f the reprobate ; or, at the e n d ,
None o f the blest with eternal life are any o f the punished, and, consetjuently,
infer that none o f the j/unished are any o f the elect. Perhaps the best
formula for this kind o f Sorites is to be found in the letters a, b, c. This will
afford us a .Sorites o f six lei ms, viz., a, b, c a, b b, a, c b, c, a c, a, b c,
b. a. whicli are all virtually identical in their contents. If there l)C required
a formula for a longer Sorites, we may take the letters a, b, e, d, whieh will
affbnl us twenty-four terms. Perhaps the best formula for a descending or
ascending Sorites is, for e.xamplc, a, b, c, <1, e, f a, b, c, d, c, a, b, c, d, a,
b, c, a, b, a.
I. C O .M P U m iE .N 8 IV K SO R IT E S P R O O R E SS IV E AND R EG R ESSIV E.
E
Ilucephalufl:
APPENDIX. 621
: E
X.
SYLLOGISM.
I. I t s E n o c n c e jie n t A n a l y t ic and S y n t h e t ic O r d e r of P r e m ise s .
(See p 281.)
(a ) E N O U N C E ilE S T O F S Y L L O G IS M .
(N ov. 1848.) There are two orders o f enouncing tlie Syllogism, both
natural, and the neglect of these, added to the not taking into account the
Problem, or (Question, has been the ground why the doctrine of syllogism has
been attacked as involving a petitio jn-indpil, or as a mere tautology. Thus,
BufHer cites the definition ihe art o f confessing in the conclusion what has been
already avowed in the premises} This objection has never been put down.
The foundation of all syllogism is the Problem. But this may be answered
either Analytically or Synthetically.
1. Analytically (which has been wholly overlooked) thus, Problem or
qusesitnm, Zs P C ? Answer, F is C; fo r F is M, and M is C. This is tbe
reasoning of Depth. IMore explicitly : Docs F contain in it C ? F contains
iu it C; fo r r contains in it M, and M contains in it C. But it is wholly indif
ferent whether we cast it in the reasoning o f Breadth. For example : Does
C contain under it F ? C contains under it F; fo r C contains under it M, and
contains under it F.
Here all is natural ; and there is no hitch, no transition, in the order o f pro
gressive statement. The whole reasoning forms an organic unity ; all the parts
of it being present to tbe mind at onee, there is no before and no alter. But it
is the condition o f a verbal enonncement, that one part should precede and
follow another. Here, accordingly, tbe proposition in which the reasoning is
absolved or realized, and which, from the ordinary mode o f enonncement, has
1 Seconde L ogique, A r t iii. 126. E d . (th a t g o o d m en so th in k ), la s t ly th e m a jo r {that

2 r ia to , in a le tte r t o D io n y s iu s {E p is t. 2), the p resen tim en ts o f d iv in e m en are o f highest
re v er se s th e e o m in o n o r d e r o f S y llo g i.-m , a u th o rity). P la to n is Opera, B e k k er . i x . p. 74
p la c in g th e c o n c lu s io n first {that he thinks C f. M e la n c h th o u , D ia lectica , L. i ii ., De F ig -
three is som e sense in the de a d ), th e n th e m in o r uratione, p. 93, e d 1542.
622 APPENDIX.
boon styloil tlio ConchiAmu is stated first; and tho grounds or reasons on which
it rests, wliioli, from the same circumstance, have been ctilled the Premise or
Antecedent, are stated last. This order is Analytic. W c proceed from the
cficet to the cause, from the jirincipiattim to the princijtia. And it is evident
that this may be ilone indifTercntly either in Doptli or Breadth ; the only dif
ference being that in the counter quantities the grounds or premises naturally
change their order.
II. Si/ntlntically, the only order contemplated by tbe logicians as natural,
but on erroneous grounds. On tbe contrary, if one order is to be accounted
natural at the e.xpcnsc o f the other, it is not that wbich has thus been exclu
sively considered. F o r
1, It is full o f hitches. There is one great hitch in tho separation o f the
conclusion from the question ; though this latter is merely the former jiroposi-
tion in an assertive, instead o f an interrogative, form. There is also at least
one subordinate hitch in the evolution o f the reasoning.
The exclusive consideration o f this form has been the cause or the occa
sion o f much misconception, idle disputation, and groundless objection.
(O n the two ^lethods; tumultuary observations, to be better arranged, and

corrected.)
1, In the first or analytic order, what is principal in reality and in interest
is placed first, that is, the Answer or Assertion, called on the other order the
Conclusion.
2, In this order all is n atu ral; there is no hitch, no saltus, no abrupt transi
tion ; all slides smoothly from first to last.
a) The question slides into its answer, interrogation demands and receives
assertion.
b) Assertion requires a reason, and prepares ns to expect it; and this is
given im mcdiatelj'in what, from the other order, has been called tbe Antecedent
or P r e m is e s .
c) Then the first term, cither in Breadth or Depth, is taken first in the
ground or reason, and compared with ^1; then M is coin|)arcd with the other.
As in Breadth : Pews C contain under it F ? C contains F ; fo r C contains
under it ,M, and M contains under it F. In Depth Does F contain in it C ?
F rnutains in it C ; fo r F contains in it i\I, and IM contains in it C. This is the
first Figure. .Second Figure, using common language: Js F C ? F is C
(and C is F j ; fo r F and C a re hejth the same. M. Here the two e.xtrenies taken
together arc compared with M. In the third Figure M is compared with both
extremes Is F C V F is C (and M is F ) ; fa r the s<ime IM is both F and C.
3, In this order there is nothing pleonastic, nothing anticipated.
4, Nothing begged.
5, In this ni(>thod the process is simple. Thought is one ; but to be enounced
it must be analyzed into a many. This order gives that necessary analysis,
and nothing more.
G, In this onlcr, when assertive, answcu* is limited by question ; good reason
why. in .Secon<l and Third Figures, one answer should be given.
7, This order is the one generally used by the mathematicians. (Sec Twes
ten, Lfxjik, insbejsondere die AnaUjtik, 117, p. 10.5, and below, p. 626. Plato
also).
APTENUIX. 623
8, If the Quajsitum be stated as it ought to be, this order follows of course;

and the neglect o fth e quJBsituni has followed from the prevalence of the other.
I f the qnajsitnm be stated in using the common form, we must almost of course
interpolate a yes or a no before proceeding to the premises in the common
m ethod; and in that case, the conclusion is only a superfluous recapitulation.
In the Synthetic, or common order, all is contrary. (T he numbers cor

respond.)
1, In this order, what is first in reality and interest, and in and for the sake
of which the whole reasoning e.xists, comes last; till the conclusion is given we
know not (at least we ought not to know) how the question is answered.
2, III this order all is unnatural and contorted by hitches and abrupt transi
tions. There is no connection between the (juestion and what jirepares the
answer, the premise. (Show in detail.)
3, In this order all is pleonastic and anticipative. The premises stated, we
already know the conclusion. This, indeed, in books of Logic, is virtuallj'
admitted, tho conclu.sion being commonly e.xpressed by a therefore, etc. An
cient doctrine of Enthyineme (U lpian, etc.), unknown to our modern logieians;
amon" their other blunders on the Enthymeme. On the common doctrine,
Logic Syllogistic is too truly defined the art o f confessing in the conclusion
what liad been already avowed in the premises.
4, On this order the objection of petitioprincipii stands hitherto unrefuted, if
not unrefutable, against Logic.' .
5, In this order the process is complex. The simple thought is first mentally
analyzed, if it proceed, as it ought, from the qufesitum; but this analysis is not
expressed. Then the elements are recomposed, and this recomposition affords
the synthetic announcement o f the syllogism. the syllogism being thus thc
superfluous regress of a foregone analysis. Aristotles analytic is thus truly
a synthetic; it overtly reconstructs the elements which had been attained by a
covert analysis.
6, In this method, the problem hanging loose from the syllogism, and, in
fact, being usually neglected, it does not determine in the Second and Thin!
Figures one of the two alternative conclusions which, ex facie s)/Uogismi, arc
competent in them. The premises only being, there is no reason why one of
the conclusions sliould be drawn to the preference of the other. Mem. Coun
ter-practice old and new. The logicians ought not, however, to have ignored
this double conclusion.
7, See corresponding number.
8, See corresponding numbet.
1 [S te w a r t(H fm e n M , v o l. ii. c li. 3, 2 , W orks, m e a n in g o f t lie term is th e d o c tr in e s h o w in g

v o l. iii. p 202, et alibi) m a k e s t h is o b j e c t io n , h o w to a n a ly z e or r e d u c e r e a so n in g s t o s y l-
R e fu te d b y G a llu p p i, L ez. d i L o g ic a e d i M eta - l o g is m s ; sy llo g ism .s lo fig u r e ; fig u r e t o m o o d ;
/isicn ,~ L ez. i. p. 242, ff sf? .] s e c o n d a n d th ir d fig u r e s to first; s y llo g is m s
2 [ A r is t o t le s A n a ly tic s are in s y n t h e t ic or- t o p r o p o s itio n s a n d te r m s ; p r o iio s itio n s fo
d e r ; tlie y p r o c e ed fr o m th e s im p le t o th e te r m s ; fo r o f a ll th ese a n a ly s is is sa id . S ee
c o m p o u n d ; tlie e le m e n ts t h e y c o m m e n o e P acei O rganon , An. Prior, i c c . 2, 32, 42, 44,
w it h are g a in e d b y a fo r e g o n e a n a ly s is , w h ic h 46, pp. 128, 2G1, 273, 275, 278, 280.]
is n o t e x p r e ss e d . T lie y are as s y n t h e tic as a
g r a m m a r c o m m e n c in g w it h th e le tte r s. T h e 3 C o m p a r e Discussions, p . 652. Ei>.
6*24 A m : xD ix.
(b) O R D E R O F P R E M IS E S .
Aristotle places tlic middle term in the first Figure between the extremes,
and the major extrem e first; in the second Figure before the extremes, and
tho major extreme next to i t ; in the third Figure, after the extremes, aud
the minor extreme next to it.
In his mode o f enouncement this relative order is naturally k e p t; for he
expresses the iiredicate first and the subject last, th u s: A is in a ll B, or A is
p r e d ic a te d o f a ll B, instead o f saying A ll B is A.
But when logicians came to ciiounee propositions and syllogisms in conform
ity to eommon language, the subject being usually first, they had one or other
o f two dilHeiiltics to encounter, and submit they must to either ; tor they must
either dis])laee the middle term from its intermediate position in the first Figurc,
to say notliing of reversing its order in the second and third; or, if they kept
it iu an intermediate jiosition in the first Figure (in the second and third the
.\ristotelic order could not be kept), it behooved them to enounce the minor
premise first.
And this alternative actually determined two opposite procedures, a dif
ference whieh, though generally distinguishing the logieians of different ages
and countries into two great classes, has been wholly overlooked. A ll, it must
be borne in mind, regard the syllogism in Figure exclusively, and as figured
only in K.xicnsion.
Tlie former difficulty and its avoidance determined the older order of
cnonnccincnt, that is, constrained logicians to state the minor premise first in
tlie first Figure ; and, to avoid the discrepancy, they of course did the same for
uniformity in the second and third. Siicli is the order.
The latter difficulty and its avoidance determined the more modern order of
enouncement, that is, constrained logicians to surrender the position o f the
middle torm as middle, in following the order o f the major premise first in all
the Figures. *
Iliiloiionus on the First Book o f tlie P r io r A n a ly tic s , c. iv. 4 (Pacian

Division), f. xx. cd. Trincavelli. This definition appears to bc o f the extremes
ami o f the middle term; but is not. It behooves, in addition, to interpolate in
thought an ' o i d y and thus will it be rightly enounced, as if he had said;
l',Ht the (x tren ies a re both th a t irhich is o n ly in a n o th er, a n d th at in vdiich an oth er
o n ly is. For it' A is [predicated] o f all B, and B is [predicated] of all C, it is
iiecc-.-ary that \ should be jiredieated o f all C. This is the first syllogistic
mood. 'J'wo universal affirmatives, inferring a universal conclusion. For if
B is in all C, eoiisrcpiently C is a ptirt o f B : but again B is a part o f A ; con-
secjiifiitlv. A is in all C, inasmuch as C is a jiart o f B. But what is here said
will appear more clearly from a concrete examjile S u b sta n ce o f a ll a n im a l;
a n n u a l o f a ll m a n ; (there follows) su h sla n ee o f a ll m a n . And backwards
(a vi-n o A ivf AH m a n a n iin fd ; a ll a n im a t s u b s ta n c e ; <dl m a n th e refo re su bstan ce.
In regard to this figure, it is plain how we ought to take the terms o f the first
moo<l. 'Jhe first [major] is most g en eric; the second [m iddle] is a subal
tern genus; ami the third [minor] is a species more sjiecial than the iiiidillc.
Bin a foneln-.ion is here always necessary. Thus, following the synthetic
order, that is, if we start from the major term, su b sta n ce begins, beginning also
A P pp. N n r x . 62 5
the conclusion. Suhsiance o f (til anhnal (suhsUincc stands first) ; nniiixtl o f all
man ; (finally the conclusion commences with substance) substance o f all man.
But if [on the analytic order] we depart from the minor term, as from man, in
this case the eoiielnsion will, in like manner, begin llierewith: A ll man anim al;
all animal .substance : all man substance.
This is the only pliilosojiliic view of tlie matter. His syllogisms really ana
lytic ( = ill Dejitli).
Analytic and Synthetic ambiguous. Better, order of Breadth and Depth.^
1 (Instances and authorities for tlie enounce- G enev. 1650, gives altern ative, but in Fsalni
m cnt o f S yllogism , w ith the Jlin or Prem ise x x .x i. V . 10, gives a syllogism w ith m in o r first,
stated first: ila r tia n u s C'apella, De Seplem Anibus Ltberali-
A ncien ts. 6 m s , a llow s both forms for first F ig u re; g en er
ally m akes tlie m inor first (see b elo w , p. 640).

G r-tks: G regory o f Ny.ssa, O ptra, t. ii. p.
B oethius (o rig o niali), v. Opera, p. 594 el seq.
612. in his 12 (not 10) Syllogi.-m.- against Jlan-
icheans, varie.s. These very co n u p i. J o a n
Or ie n t a l s .
nes D a m a s c m n s {Dialectica, c. 04, Opera, cd.
Lequien, Jaris, 1712, t. i. pp. CO. CO) gives tw o M o h a m m e d a n s: A vcrroes (en o u n cin g as
S y llo g ism s, one w itli m in or first. A lciu ou s, WC) i n all the F igures, lias m in or first. (See
De Dart. Plat L . i. cc. 0 and C. A ristotle b elow , p. 640 )
often places m inor first. See Zabarella, Op;ra J e w s : Kabbi Sim eon [truly JMaimonides]
Logica. De Qiiarta Figiira, )). 124 V alh iis, (in H ebrew ), Logica, per S. ilu n stcru in , cc. , 6
Logica, t. ii , p]). 72, 7C. Ari.siotlc and A le x 7, Basil. 1527.
ander not regular in statin g inajoi' proposi Modern an ticipations o f tbe d octrine that
tions. See in F irst F igu re, A n . Pr. i. c. 4. tbe M inor F icm ise should precede the M ajor,
Ari.stotlc used the ichole on ly o f ttie predi V alla. Dialectica, f 60 b, etc. Opera, pp. 733,
cate. See Z abarella, Tabula-. In A n. Prior, p. 736. Joan nes N eoin agu s, In T ra p ezu n tiu m , 1.
149. (Hut see above, p. 548 ) Boetliins.ri/irru, 38 b. (on)j' adduces cxam jiles). Caram uel,
pp. 5C2. 583 A ristolle, An Pr. i. c i.s u b jiii- . Hat. et Realis Philosophia. Logica, D isp.i.x. x v i.
ubi A lex a n d er, f. 9 a. P liilop on u s, f. 17 a. t 11 A quinas, Opusc. 47. (Cam erarius, D isp. Phil.
b. A lexan d er A pli In A n. Pr. i If. 9 a, 15 b. F. i. qu. 13, p. 117.) A lsted iu s, K/icycZopcpi/m.
Pliilo))onus, in Jn Pr. i. tf. 11 b ,2 0 a , exp lains p. 437. Gas.sendi, Opera, ii. p 413; i. p. 107.
the practice o f Greek Feripatetics in lliis C am erarius, Disp. Phil. V. i. qu. 13, p. 117.
m atter. See also If. 17 a. IS a; and 11, 21 a L eibn itz, Opera ii. Fars. i. p. 3.56, Dissert, de.
tliese in i F ig. in ii. F ig 23 b. TTie same Arte Combiiiatoria (1606), ed. D utens, w lio le-
In Phy.nca, i. c I. f 2 Thcmistius, In A n . fers to Kainus, Gas.-endi, A lciu o u s, etc. Cf.
Post. ii. c 4. A i .0111mus, De Sytlogism o, f. 8
N nnveaur Es.sais, L. iv. , p. 454, ed. Raspe;
43 a. G regorius A neponym us,C om pfnii. P/nl- and Lockes Essay, ibid. Biilfier, Logique,
osophice S yn tn g w n , L. v cc. 1, C, pp. 58, 70. 68 . C.Tsai'ins, Dialectica. Tract, v. De .Syll.
G eorgius D iacon u s F aclii iiierius, Epit. Log. Cat. p 198 (first ed. 1632). J . C. E. N ova De-
tit. iv. cc. 14. Se.xtus ICmpiricus, Pyrrh. Hij- tecta V trdas, etc., see R euscli, Systerna Logicum ,
potypos., L . ii. cc. 13,14. ])p 103,110. C lem ens 547, p. 626. C liauvin, Lexicon Philo.sophicum,
A le x . Stroni L. viii Optra, p. 784 (cd. S yl- V. Figura Hobbes. Compuiacio, c. iv ., prefi.xes
bnrgii) B leniniiihis. Epitom e Logica, c. 31, p. the m in or (see H allam , L i t . o f E urope,voX.'m .
219. Gregorius Tr;ipezuntius, Dialectica, De c. 3, p. 309, ed. 1839). Lam bert, Afues Organon,
Syll. p. 30. Frim a (F igura) est in qua i. 136, 225. F.achniann, L ogik, 133, pp. 202,
m edius term inus snbjieitnr in raajore, et in 226 llo llm a u n , Logica, 454. E sser, L o g ik,
niinore pr.X'dicatnr : tjuami-is contraJieriit soleal 107, p. 210. Krug, L ogik, 114, p. 408. Ben-
ctpossit."' A Greek, lie wrote in Italy for the eke. System dtr L ogik, c. v. p. 210 et seq. Stap-
L atins; but refers here to tlie practice of bis ulensis, in S ergeants IXIethod to .Srience.,\>. 127.
cou i.trym cn . F acciolati (tliough he errs him self), R in /im tu tu
Ixitin s; Cicero, De Fin. iii. 8 ; iv. 18. 86
L ogica, ]). , F. iii. c. 3, i.i.tc 4, where B o e
Tusc. Di.sp. iii 7: v. 15, Opera Phil. pp. 885, thius, Se.xtus Em piricus, A lciu o u s, etc. Ch
903, 981,1029, ed .V erb u rgii. -Maci obins,Opjrn, Maync, E ssay on Natural Notions, p. 122 et seq.
p. 181, Z ennii. Seneca, E pist. 85, p. 308. Apu- L am y, Acta Erud., 170S, p 67.
Icius, De Habit. Doct Plat. L. iii. p 33, ed. W ho have erred in tliis subject, m aking
E lm enhorst. Isidorus in Gotho/r. Auctores, p. our order o f enunciation Lie natural aud
878. Cassiodorus, Dialectica, Opera, p. 556, usual. V ives, Censura Veri. Opera, t. i. p.
-9
026 APPENDIX.
IT. F ig ure. U nfigured and F igured S yllogism.
(1853) (a ) C O N T R A S T A N n C O M P A R IS O N O F T H E V A R IO U S K IN D S O F F O R M A L S Y L L O G IS M
-D IF F E R E N C E OF F IG U R E A C C ID E N T A L .
A.) [litigurcil Si/llogisiii Ono form o f syllogism : for here there is abolished,
1. The diHereiiee o f Breadth and Depth, for the terms are both Snbjeet or
both Prediealo, and may be either indill'ereiitly ; 2, All order of the terms, for
these may be enonneed from first or second indilfcrcntly ; 3, All difrerence of
major or minor term o f proposition, all duplicity o f syllogism ; 4, All difference
of direct and indirect conclusion.
R.) Fkiiirrd .'(glhf/ism Two forms of syllogism by difTerent orders o f terms :
First Figure . Here the two forms of syllogism arc possible, each with its
major and minor terms, each with its direct or inimedialc, its indirect or
mediate, conclusion. Those two various forms of syliogisni are essentially one
and the same, differing only accidentally in the order of enounconient, inasmuch
as they severally depart from one or from the other o f tho counter, bnt correl
ative, quantities o f Depth and Breadth, as from the containing whole. But, in
fact, we may enounce each order of syllogism [in ] either (piantity, the one is
the more natural.............................
Second and Third Figures. In each of these figures there arc po.ssible the
two varieties o f syllogism; but not, as in the first figure, are Ihese different
forms variable by a counter (piantity, and with a determinate major and minor
term: for in each tho extrem es and the middle term (tliere ojiposed) are
neces.sarily in the same (piantity, being either always Subject or always Predi
cate in the jugatinn. They differ only as the one extreme, or the other (what
is indifferent), is arbitrarily made the Subject or Predicate in the eoncliisioii.
Indirect or i\Icdiatc concliisioiis in these figures are impossililc ; forthe indirect
or mediate conclusion o f the one syllogism is in fact the direct conclusion o f the
other.
Thus difference o f Figure accidental.
If rule true, it will follow that it is o f no consequence whether

1, The middle one or any other o f the tlirce terms be, in any proposition,
subject or jiredicate. if only eiiher. Hence difference of F ig iu 'C o f no aceonnt
in varying Ihe .'vllogism. 1hns (retaining the subordination o f terms), convert
major propo'iiion in I'lxlcnsioii of first Figure, and yon have second F ig u re ;
<7 V, . 1 . I,. V o ill'. I)' Nnl. A rt. Liberal , Lag- lirUinnal Nnlionn, p. 123 el ' 7 . M iir io ttc , Lo-
ea. c v iii ( ;> .1 A K abriciu.s, AU. .7e;ri. gir/iie, I lirt ii , ili'C . iii. )). 101. Ia r is, 1078.
E m p 1 0 3 . I iif c io liili, liiiilh iu n la Lngieep, p. ('lilaiU'iiiis, Phil. Di f. p. 18 (in W o lf. Phil.
*0. W a ilz . /rt f)rg. C n m m .. pp. 3SII. 3 '0 . H al. .O.Ol). t 'iis t illo n , M em . Ue B erlin. 1802.
riial l.c a ' o - i i t i / i t ( o in ii if l ic i i' iv c ( )im iility l l a l la i n , /.?7. o/'Ero/>i, v o l. iii. p 300. T lio n i-
m o 't iiiiliin il W o lf. Phil Hat. ' .300. p. 327. s o i i ( t V .) , Oniliiiex n f the Lainx a/' T h n iigh t,]).
ICcii-r'i. .Si/H-ma Lnirieum . I 017. .' c l i u l / 0 , 30. 111 r e fe r e n c e 1o (lie a lio v i', I be m at livm ii-
I jig ik . ' 77 o l o ' i l ( l ' I 7 ) , 7 2 o f la st (1831) t ic i a ii 'u s u a l l y l)ef;in w illi w liiit is c o n m io n iy
e .lit io n . Iiobis ilu it U irtum Ue n inni. e tc ., c a lle ii tlie .M inor I r e in i'e (as A _ H, 1. = C .
e v o lv e d out o f nata iie/'y. tor m er e s n b o r d in a - th en fa re A = 0 ) ; a n d f r e i|n e n lly th e y .state
lio n v lo .'i'iii'. 11a i e e b i n - , in A 'ta E n ul. th e C o n e.ln 'io n (irst (a s A - U far A = and
17-8 p 17 0 l.a m v d ? ) in Aeia Ernd. 1 7 0 8 . ( 1 . JI = 1.), or, e tc .. se e W o lf, Phil. Rat 001,
07 f ).d lie 'i|. B iia ii r,n H -nsan. \r 240. V a lla , a n d T w e -t e n , l.ngiic, ^ 117, )i. 105; a n d L am -
D ia lertic a , I,, iii c 40. 11 o iriia n e r, A n a ly tik h c r t, N rues Org. i. 220.]
der Urlhe.ile \tnd E rh ln ae, V jl. ]i. 108 J la y n e 's
ATI'ENDIX. C2T
convert minor proposition, and yon Iiave tliird Figure; convert bolli premises,
and you have fourtli Figure.
2, Wlietlier one of the extremes, one or oilier of the premises, stand first
or second, bc, in fact, .major or minor term of a proposition; all that is reijnircd
is, that the terms and their (piaiititics should remain the same, and that they
should always bear to each other a relation of subject, and predicate, 'riuis, if
[in] any of the Figures the major and minor terms and propositions inter
change relation of siibordiiiatioii; when, in tlie fiist Figure, you convert and
transjiose; and when [in] the other three Figures (fourth V), you simply trans
pose the premises.
IndifTerent (in first Figure) which premise precedes or follows. For of two
one not before the other in nature. Bnt not indifferent in either vvhole, which
term should be subject and predicate of coinclusion.'
(b ) D O L T .L E C O X C L U S IO X IX SKC O X D A X D r ilI R D F IG U R E S .
My doctrine is as follows:
In the L'njif/itred Syllvgism there is no contrast of terms, the notions compared
not being to each other subject and predicate; consequently the conclusion is
here necessarily one and only one.
In the Figu red Syllogism we must discriminate the Figures.
Tn the First Figure, where the middle term is snbjeet of the one extreme and
predicate of the otlier, there is of course a determinate major extreme and
premise, and a determinate minor extreme ami jiremise; eon.'cqnently, also,
one proximate or direct, and one remote or indirect, coneliision. the latter
by a conversion of the former.
In the Second and Third figures all this is reversed. In these there is no
major and minor extreme and premise, both extremes being eitlier subjects or
predicates of thc middle; eonseijneiitly, in the inferenee, as eitlier extreme
may be indifferently subject or predicate of tlie other, there are two indifierent
coneliisions, that is, conclusions neither of which is more direct or indirect than
the other.
This doctrine i.s oppo-ed to that of Aristotle and the logicians, who recognizi*
in the Second and 'riiird Figures a major and minor extreme and premise,
with one determinate coneliision.
The whole (piestion with regard to the duplicity or simplicity of the concln-
sion in the latter iigiires dejiends iqion (he distinction in them of a major and a
minor term ; and it must be perenqitorily decided in oppo.dtion to the universal
doctrine, unless it can be .shown that, in the.se figures, this distiiietion actually
subsists. This was fi'lt by the logkians; accordingly they ajiplied themselves
will) zeal to establish (his distinelioii. But it would ajijiear. from (he very
imiltijilicity of their opinions, that none jiruved satiffaetury: and this general
presnr.qitioii is shown to be correct by the examination of these ojiiiiions in
detail, an exainiiiatioii wliich evinces that of tlicse opinions there is no one
which ought to satisfy an imjiiiriiig mind.
In all, there are five or si.x different grounds on which it has been attempted
1 Com pare D iscu ssio n s, p. 653. E d .

62 8 APPENDIX.
to e.^tablish the discriiiiiiiation o f a in.ajor and m inor term in the S econ d and
Third Figures. A ll are m utnally subversive ; each is in com peten t. E ach
tbllowiiig the first is in fact a virtual aek iiow led gm eiit that the reason on which
.Vristotlc pnx-cedeil in this establishm ent is at on ce aiiibiguons and insiifli-
cient. I shall en u m erate these ojiinions as n early as possible in ch ron ological
o n ler.
1. TIm t the m a jo r is the e rtr e m e w hich lies in the S e c o m l F ig u re n e a r e r to, in
the T h in l F ig u n Jartlur f r o m , the m id d le .
This is Aristotles definition (An.
P r ., L. i. cc. 5. 6). best it is ambiguous, and has, accordingly, been taken
in dillcrent senses by following logicians; and in treating o f them it will be
seen that in none, except an arbitrary sense, can the one extreme, in these
tiiDires, be considereil to lie nearer to the middle term than the other. I
exeliiile the supposition that Aristotle spoke in reference to some scheme of
mechanieal notation.
2. T i.a t th< m a ja r term in the a n te c e d e n t is th at which is p r e d ic a te in the con-
I'hisifin. This doctrine dates from a remote antiijiiity. It is rejected by
A lexander; but, adopted by Ammonius and Philopomis ( f 17 b, 18 a, ed.
Trine.), lias been generally recognized by subsequent logicians. Its recognition
i' now almost universal. Yet, critically considered, it exjilains nothing. Educ
ing the law out o f (he fact, and not deducing tlie fact from tlie law, it docs not
even attempt to show why one lieing, either extreme may not be, jucdic.ate of the
conclusion. It is merely an em pirical. merely an arbitrary, assertion. The
.Vphrndisian, after refuting the doctrine, when the terms are indefinite (proin-
ilc-ignate). justly says: ' Nor is the case (litlerent wlieii the terms are definite
[prcdcsigii.ite]. For the coiicliision sliows as predicate tlu; term given as
major in the jiremises; so that t'.ie conclusio:i is not itself demonstrative o f the
major ; on tlie contrary, the being taken in the premise.; as majo:*, is the cause
wh} icrni is also taken as jiredicate in the conchisioii. (.4;i. P r . f. 24 a,
i-d.*.\ld.)
.3. That the jtroximitg o f an cx'rcme to the miildle term, in Logic, is to he decided
h'f the n-liitire prorim i ij In na'nre to the middle notion of the notions roiiijiareil.
Thi-. which is the interjiretation of Aristotle by Ilermlntis, is one of the oldest
njio i re ord, being detailed and refuted at great length by the Ajihrodisian
( f. '2.'j b. 24 a). 'I'o determine tlic natural jiroxiniity required is often difficnlt
in aflirmative. and always impossible in negative, syllogism ; and, besides the
oliji' tioiis of .Vh-xander, it is wliollv material and extralogieal. It is needless
lo dw.dl nn ihis ojiiiiioii, which, obscure in itself, seems altogether unknown to
onr mo lern logicians.
f. 'Thu' the major term In the Syllogism is the predicate of the problem or
fpinlioii. 'fhi- i- the do trine inaintaine 1 by Alexander (f. 24 b) ; but it is
donbtfnl whcth'T at first or se"onfl hand. It has been adoptc^d hv Averroes,
Zabardla, and sundry of the aciitcr logicians in modern times. It is incoinpe-
tcnt. liowcver, to cstabli-h the di<cnmination. Material, it presupposes an
intentir)!) of the rea-nner: does not apjiear ex facie syllagism i; and, at best,
oiilv -ho V- w'li h of two jio-ib lc fjiimdta whieh o f two jiossible coiielusions
ha- Ixên aeiiially c n r r i e 1 oii. For it assumes, that o f tlie two extremes
either might have been major in the antecedent, and predicate in the concln-
sion. If Alexander had ajijilied the same subtlety In canvassing his own
A P P E N 1) I X . 0*29
opinion which lie did in criticizing those o f others, he would not liaAe given the
authority of liis name to so untenable doctrine.
5. That ihe majoi- extreme is that couluiued in Ihc mnjnr premise, and the
major prpmisc that in the order o f enouneement f is t . This doctrine seems
indicated by Scotus (zln. P r ., L. i. qu. .xxiv. f>, G) : and is held expliciily
by certain of liis followers. This also is wholly incompetent. For the order of
the premises, as the subtle doctor himself observes (76., qu.xxiii. G), is altogiHlier
indifferent to the validity o f the conse(]uence; and if this cxferual accident be
tadniitted, wc should have Greek majors and minors turned, presto, into I.,atiii
minors and majors.
6. That the major extreme is that contained in the major jiremise, and the
major premise that itself most general All opposite pra< tice originates in abuse.
This opinion, AvIiich coincides with that of Ilerininus (No. 3). in making thi
logical relation of terms dependent on the natural relation of notions, I find
advanced in lG 14,in the Disputaliones o f an ingenious and mdi'pendcnt plii-
losopher, the Spanish Jesuit Petrus Hurtado de IMendoza (D isp. Log. et M d .. I..
Uisji. X. 50-5.5). It is, however, too singular, and manife.-tlv loo imtenalde.
to require refutation. As material, it is illogical; as formal, if allowed, it
would at best serve only for the disi-rimination of certain moods : but it cannot
be allowed, for it Avoiild only subvert the old ivithout being adeipiate to tlie
establishment o f aught new. It shows, however, how unsatisfactory Averc the
previous theories, Avlien such a doctrine could be proposed, by so acute a
reasoiicr, in substitution. This opinion has remained unnoticed by jmstorior
logicians.
The dominant result from this Iiistorical enumeration is, that, in the Second
and Tliii^l Figures, there is no major or minor term, therefore no major or
minor jiremise, therefore tAvo inditferent eonelusions.
T h is im p o rta n t tr u th , h o w e v e r n a tu ra l a n d CA-en m a n ife st it m a y s e e m Avhen
fu lly d e v e lo p e d , lias b u t feAv a n d o b sc u r e v a tic in a tio n s o f its r e c o g n itio n d u r in g
th e p rogress o f th e s c ie n c e . T h r e e o n ly I a v o I m e t w ith .
T h e first I find in th e A p h r o d isia n (f. 24 b ) ; fo r h is expres.ions m igh t se e m
to in d ic a te th a t th e o p in io n o f th er e b e in g n o m a jo r a n d m in o r term in tb e
s e c o n d fig u re (n o r , b y a n a lo g y , in th e th ir d ), Avas a d o c tr in e a c tu a lly h eld b y
som e e a r ly G r e e k lo g ic ia n s . It aa'ou IcI b e c u r io u s to k n o w i f th e se Avere th e
a n c ie n ts , a ssa ile d b y A m m o n iu s, fo r m a in ta in in g an o v e r t q u a n tifica tio n o f
th e p r e d ic a te . T h e Avords o f A le x a n d e r a r e : N o r , h o w e v e r , c a n it be
said th at in th e p r e s e n t fig u re th er e is n o m ajor. F o r th is at le a st is d e te r m i
n a te , th at its m ajor m u st b e u n iv e r s a l; a n d , i f th e r e b e in it a n y sy llo g istic
c o m b in a tio n , th a t p r e m ise is th e m a jo r AAh ic h c o n ta in s th e m ajor term (f.
24 a .). D e m u r r in g to th is r e fu ta tio n , it is, hoAvevcr. e v id e n c e siilfic ie n t o f th e
o p in io n lo w h ich it is o p p o se d . T h is, as it is th e o ld e s t, is, in d e e d , th e o n ly
a u th o r ity for a n y d e lib e r a te d o c tr in e on th e p o in t.
The second indication dates from tlie middle o f the fifteenth century, and is
contained in the Dialectica o f the celebrated Laurentins Valla (L. iii. c. H
[5 1 ]). Valla abolishc's the third figure, and his opinion on the question is
limited to his observations on the second. In treating of G.'nrc and Camestres.
Avliich, after a host of previous logicians, he considers to be a single nioorl,
there is nothing remarkable in his statem en t: Neque distinetas sunt pro-
GoO A P P E X D IX .
positio ot assnniptio, iit allora major sit, altora minor, sed qnodammodo pares;
idfO<pK sient nontra viiidicat .sibi prinumi ant sci'iindimi locum, ita iitraiiuo
ju? liabel in utraipie conclusione. Vernm istis placuit, ut id (|uod secuiido
lo -o jioiierctiir, vendicarct silii conclusiunem : quod v(nim essct nisi semper
gcmina csM-t conclusio. Sed earmn dicamus alteram ad id (juod pi'imo loco,
alieram ad id quod secuudo loco jiositum est refci-ri. We. tlierefbre. await
tlie develojimeiit o f lijs doctrine by reltitioii to the otlier moods, Eeslino.
and r>nnn-n. wliieh tlm? aii?pieioii.-.ly liegiiis: * I lem eontingit in rcliiiuis
diioliiis: (jiii tniiieii sunt inagis distiiieti. AVe are, however, condemned to
di.'-appointmeiit. For, hy a common error, e.xcusalile enough in tliis im-
petiioiis writer, he lias coiifoiiiided singulars (defmitc.s) with jiarticulars
( iiidefniites) : and tlius tlie e\am |)los whi- h he adduces o f these moods are,
in fact, only cxaiiqiles of Cesare and Cameslres. Tlie same error liad also
been ]irevioii?ly committed (L. iii. c. 4). Tlie whole, therefore, of V allas
do-trine, wllicll is exclusively founded on tliese e.xaiiiples, must go for nothing;
for we eaiinot presume, on siu-h a ground, that lie admits more than the four
(-onuiioii moods, identifying, indeed, the two first, by admitting in llu-in of
a double eonelnsion. We cannot, certainly, inter that he ever thought of
reeogiiiziiig a |)articiilar, an indefinite, jiredicate in a negative |)ro|iosition.
Tlie tliird and last iiidieatioii which I can adiluec is that from the Method to
Si'i) lire of .John Sergeant, wlio lias, in lliis, as iu his other books (too sue-
ee"fn llv), ( (i;v-ealed his name under tlie initials -J. S. l ie was a Catholic
jiric't, and, from IGO.'), an active religious controversialist; wliilst, as a jiliilos-
oplier. in his Idt-a Jditlu nphhr. ('artesiaiKC, a criti(-ism o f Desearics, iu liis Solid
Phllo<op!i'i, a eritii-ism o f Lo-ke, in his Metajihysics, and in the jiresent work,
lie maiilfe.its reiiiarkahle eloqueiiee, ingenuity, tiiid iiidejK-ndi-iii-e, iiîigled, no
doubt, widi many untenable, not to say ridiculous, jiarado.xes. Iiis works,
however, contain genius more tliaii enough to have saved llieiii, in any other
eouiitrv, fi'om llie total oblivion into wliieli tliey liavc fallen in tliis, where,
iiiiI(-(-d, they jirohahly never were a|)|)reeiated. Iiis Method to Science (a
treatise ou Logii-) was juihlished in 1GOG, with a Irefaee, dedicatory to tlie
learii(-d stmleiits o f both onr Universities, extending to sixty-two jiages. But,
alasl neither this nor any otlier o f his jiliilosojihical books is to he found in tlie
Bodleian.
Ill the (bird hook of liis Me hod, which treats of I)is<-ourse, after speaking
o f the first, or. as he i-alls it, only riglit figure o f a .'vllogism, wc liave the
Ibllowiiig olj->ervations on the second and tliir d : 14. JVliereforc the other
two figure? [he does not n-eognize tlie foiinli] are unnatural and monstrous.
For, sill -e naiiire has shown us, tliat what conjoins two notions ought to be
pi I -<-(1 in the middle hetwecn them ; it is against nature and reason to jilace it
either ahorr them ho'h, as is done in that they eall tlie second figure, or under
ihein ho'h. ;is i? done in tliat figure tlu-y call tlit; third.
5 l.'i. Ib-iiee no determinate conclusion can follow, in cither of the last
1 .-rgf-aiil i? nil in lp lllg i-n t a n la g o iu B t o f m a n U n ihrslnnilin". In c e r ta in v ie w s tic an-

h o lli Ihi-sc iiliili>-< |ilie r s, nnd I h a v e elsi-w lio r c lic ip a le s K a n t; a n d I o p e lia s e v id e n tly ta k e n
had o c c a -iu i in q o tc liim as tin- liis t a n d frnni liis hro llii-r t 'a lh o lic tlie liin t o l s o m e o f
o n e o f Ih e ahh->l c r ilic s o f Ih e K s x iy on IIu- Iiis niobl c e le b r a te d th o u g lit s .
APPENDIX. 631
figures, from tlie disposal o f the jiarts iu the syllogisms. For since, n.s ajijiear.s
( 13), the extreme which is predicated of the middle term in the nidjnr, has
thence a title to he the predicate in the conclusion, because it is above the
.middle term, whieh is the jire/llcdte, or uhove the olher extreme in the minor, it
follows, that if the middle term be twice ohore or twice below the other tv o
terms in the jiremises, that reason ceases; and so it is left iiidid'ereiit whi<-li of
the other terms is to be subject or predicate in the coiielusion ; and the inde
terminate conclusion Ibllows, not from the artificial form of the syllogism, but
m erely from the material identity o f all the three terms; or from this, that
their notions are fouud in tlie same E n s. W herefore, from these jiremises [in
the second figure].
S o m e la u d a b le th in g is fnW] v irtu e ,
[ A ll \ courtesy is a v irtu e ;
or, from these [in the third],
[A //J v irtu e is [some] laudable.

Som e v irtu e is [all] c o u r te sy ;
the conclusion m ight eith er be,
T herefore, [Z/] courtesy is [some] laudable.

O r , S o m e la u d a b le th in g is [all] courtesy.
So that, to argue on that fashion, or to make use o f these awkward figures, is

not to know certainly the end or eonelusion we aim at, but to shoot our bolt
at no determinate mark, since no determinate eonelusion can in that case fol
low. (P . 232.)
E xtrem es, it is said, m eet. S ergean t would abolish the second aud third
figures, as petitory and uiiiiatiiral, as m erely m aterial corruptions o f the one
formal first. I, on the con trary, regard all the figures as equally n ecessary,
natiir.il, and formal. B u t we agree in th is: both hold that, in the second and
third figures, there is a twofold and iu d iiferen t con clu sion ; how beit, the oni'
m akes this a m onstiosity o f the syllogistic m atter, the other, a beauty o f tlie
syllogistic form. T lierefore, though I view S ergean t as w rong in his prem ises,
and shooting his bolt at no determ inate m ark, I must n eed s allow that he
has, by ch an ce, hit the b u lls ey e. I have inserted, within square brackets, the
quantifications reijuired to restore and show out the form ality o f his exam jiles.
On m y schem e o f notation, they stand as fo llo w s:
C, --------- : l\r , ------ : r C , ------- : M , ----- :P

632 APPENDIX.
III. IIisiouic.vL Notices K eg .vrdi.vg F igure of S yllogism.
(a ) A ltlS T O T L K .
A risto tle; F ig u res and T erm s o f Syllogism , P rio r Analgtics, B . I. eh. iv.
First Figure, eh. iv. 2. W hen three terms [or notions] hold this mutual
relation, that (ho last is in the whole middle, whilst the miildle is or is not
in the whole fii>t. o f these extremes there results o f necessity a jierfect
syllogism.'
3. " By iiiiiliUc term [B (B )] I mean that which itself is in another and
another in it ; and which in jiosition also stands intermediate. I call extreme
lioih that which is itself in another [the minor], ami that in which another is
[the major]. For if A be predicated o f all B. and B o f all C, A will neces-
.sarily be predicated o f all C.
10. I call that the ?;uyor extrem e [A ( A ) ] in whieh the middle is; the
minor [F (C )] (hat which lies under (he middle.
Second Figure, eh. v. 1. W hen the .same [predicate notion] inheres in

all of the one and in none o f the otln*r, or in all or in none o f both [the sub
ject notions]. this 1 denominate the Second Figure.
2. " 'I'lic niidille [M (M )] in this figure I call that which is jiredicated of
liotli [notions] : the extremes, the [notions] of which the middle is said. The
iiKijor cxticm c [X (N ) ] is that towards the m iddle; the [H (O )], that
I'roiii the middle more remote.
3. ** The middle is placed out [from between] the extremes, the first in
position
|So, M M
N N
H 0
Third F igu re, ch. vi. 1. W h en in the sam e [su b ject notion] one
[p red ica te n o tio n ] in lieres in all, another in n on e o f it, or when both inh ere in
all or in none o f it, such f ig u r e I call the T h ird .
2. In this [fig u re] I nam e the m/V/c/Zi?, that o f which both [th e other term s]
arc p i r e d i c i i c d ; d i e <xlr<nies, the p red icates them selves. 'Jlie m a jo r extrem e
II ( F ) ] i' that farther from, the m in o r [ P ( Q ) ] that n earer to, the m iddle.
I I h. iv . ( 2 T liis d f fln ilio n o f th e F ir s l th e a ll or w lio le o f th e h ig h e r n o tio n A ; a n d

I ig u r e t f o i i m l e d o n lliv rule.H D e (Jiiini a n d d e w ith r e fe r e n c e t o c o m in e lie iis io n , lo r th e
N u llo ) o n ly to Ihe univ eri'n l m o o d s , h ig h e r n o lio n A a.s c o n tiiin e d in Ihe a ll or
h u i. o f thi-fe, o n ly lo t)io e l e g iiiiiia ie a n d w h o le o f th e lo w e r n o tio n 15. In Ihe fo rm e r
u s e fu l, Itarh ara an d f e la r e n l. I t, tlie re - w n s e , w liic h w ilh A r is to t le is th e m o r e u su a l,
lo r e , Hceiii- iiia d e iiiia ie , h u t n o t s u p e r flu o u s. a n d , in fa c t, th e o n ly o n e co n tein i h ited b y
A r is io ile n*-e- Ihe p lir a -e * l o he in nil o r in Ihe l o g ic i a n s , Ih cre is al.so to he o b se r v ed a
Ihe whole." L o lh w ith r e fe r e n c e to ej-ien yn n , d is tin c tio n h e lw e e n tlie in lic sio n a n d tlie pre-
for th e lo w e r n o t io n 15, as c o n ta iu e d u n d e r d ic a tio n o f t h e a ttr ib u te .
APPENDIX. G33
3. The middle [ 2 ( D )] is placed out [from betAveeii] tlie e.xtremes, tlie

last in position, _
[As, n P
P M
2 K
Aristotle, P rio r Ancdytics, B. i. c. 23, 7.

General Tlioory of F igu re. If, then, it be necessary [in rea.soning] to
take some [term] eommon [or interiiiediute] to both [extrem e terms] ; this is
po.ssible in three ways. For a v c predicate either [tlie extrem e] A o f [the
middle] C, and [the middle] C o f [the extrem e] B ; or [the middle] C o f both
[extrem es] ; or both [extrem es] o f [the middle] C. The.se are the [three]
Fignre.s o f Avliich av c have spoken ; and it is inaiiifest, that through one or other
of the Figures every syllogism must be realized.
(b) am i (c) - A L E X A N D E R A N D H E R M IN U S.
A le x a n d e r , In An. P r., f. 23 b.
Second Figure, c. v. Aristotle. Tlie middle e.xtremo is that which lies
tOAvards the middle.
2. B u t it is a q u e s tio n , w h e th e r in th e S e c o n d F ig u r e th e r e b e b y n a tu r e
a n y m ajo r a n d m in o r e x tr e m e , a n d i f tlie r e b e , b y Avhat c r ite r io n it m a y be
know n. F or if avc c a n in d iffe r e n tly c o n n e c t Aviili th e m id d le lernt A vliichsoever
extreme avc c h o o se , th is aa-c m a y a h v a y s ca ll th e major. A n d as n e g a tiv e e o n -
e ln sio n s o n ly a re draAvn in th is fig u re , u n iv e r s a l n e g a tiv e s b e in g also m u tu a lly
c o n v e r tib le , it folloAv.s, th a t in u n iv e r sa l n e g a tiv e s th e o n e term h as n o b e tter
title to b e s ty le d m a jo r th a n tb e o th er , s e e in g th a t th e m a jo r term is Avliat is
jir e d ic a te d , Avhilst both a r e h e r e in d iffe r e n tly p r e d ie a b le o f e a c li o th er . In
u n iv er sa l a ffirm a tiv e s, in d e e d , th e jir e d ie a te is m a jo r, b e c a u se it h as a Avider
e x t e n t ; a n d fo r th is rea so n , su eli jir o jio sitio n s a r e n o t [s im p ly ] c o n v e r tib le ; so
th a t h e r e th e r e is b y n a tu r e a m a jo r term w h ic h is n o t to be fou n d in u n iv e r s a l
n e g a tiv e s .
Hcrminns is of opinion that, in the Second Figure,
[1.] If b o th th e e x tr e m e s , o f Avhieli th e m id d le is jir e d ie a te d , b e lio m o g e -
n e o u s [o r o f th e sa m e g e n u s ], th e m a jo r term is th at m o st p r o x im a te to tlie
g e n u s co m m o n to th e tAvo. F o r e x a m jile : If th e e x tr e m e s b e bird a n d man ;
bird ly in g n e a r e r to tlie eo m m o n g e n u s [animal] than man, as in its first
d iv isio n , bird is th u s th e m a jo r e .\tr e m e ; a n d , in g e n e r a l, o f h o m o g e n e o u s
term s, th a t h o ld in g su c h a r ela tio n to th e co m m o n g e n u s is th e m ajor.
[2.] Blit if the terms be efjiially distant from the eommon genus, as horse
and man, we ouglit to regard the middle jiredicated o f them, and consider of
1 A r is to t le liere v a r ie s t lie n o ta tio n b y let- n o ta tio n m ig h t a p p ea r t o in d ic a te ) t lia t t lie

ter s o f t lie llir ee s y llo g is t ic l e n n s , m a k in g C m id d le ter m w a s a n o tio n in llie F ir s t F ig u r e ,
( F ) s ta n d fo r tlie m id d le le r in , A a n d 15 i'or n e c e ss a r ily in te r m e d ia te lie lw e e n t lie i w o e x -
tlie t w o e x tr e m e s . T h is lie d id , jierliiip s, to tre n ie s, in tlie S e c o n d s u p e r io r , iu t lie T h ir d
p r e v e n t it b e in g s u p p o se d ( w h a t h is p r e v io u s in fe r io r , to th em .
80
G34 A I I E N D I X .
whicli [term ] it is predicated through [that term] itsolf, and o f which through
some otlicr predicate ; and comjiare that tlirough which it is predicated of
another with tliat tlirongli which it is predicated of [the term] itself. And if
that through which [the iniddle] is predicated o f another (viz. the one e.xtreme)
be nearer [than the otlier extrem e] to the eommon genus, that [e.xtreme] of
wliieli [lor t o v t o h / o b , 1 read t o u t o h o o ] the middle is [m ediately] predicated,
from its cloM-r propiinjuity to tbe eominon genus, rightly obtains the title of
major. For exam ple: I f the extremes bc horse and man, rational being predi
cated o f tliem, negatively o f horse, alfirmatively of man ; seeing that rational
is not o f itself denied o f horse, but because horse is irrational, whereas rational
IS of itself allirmed of man, horse is nearer than man to their eommon genns
anim al: horse will, therefore, bc the major extrem e, thougli man bo no further
removed than horse from its proper genus. And this, because that tlirongli
which the predicate [ / . e. the middle] is predicated o f this last, as being
irrational, is g rea ter; for rational is not deiimd o f horse qua horse, whilst it is
atlirmcd of man ijiia man.
[.).] * r.iit if the extrem es be not homogeneous, but under different genera,
that is to be, eoiisldered the major term, wliieh of tlie two liolds the nearer of
its own genns. For iiistnnee : If aught be predicated o f color and man, color
is the major extreme : for color stands closer to quality than man to substance:
as man is an individual [or most special] species, but not color.
[4.] Finally, if each be ecpially remote from its proper genns, we must
consider ihe middle, and impure o f which term it is predicated through [that
term]J itself,I and o f which tlirouqh ~
sometliing O
else;^ and if that,^ tliroimh
C
which
the middle is jiri'dieated of another [/. e., one extrem e], be nearer to its proper
geiin.', and if tlirongli that the middle bc actually predicated of this term, this
term is to be deemed tlie major. For exam ple: I f the terms be tchite and
the one being an individual sjiecies in quality, the other in substance;
and if rational be allirmatively jiredicated o f man, negatively o f ichite; the
allirniation is made in regard to man as man, whereas the negation is made o f
white, not as ichite, but as inanimate. But since inanimate, tlirongli wliieh
rational is denied of white, is more eommon, more universal, and more proxi
mate to substanre inanimate than man to \_subslance] animate, on that account,
white is tlie luajor term in jirefereiiec to man. [S o far Ilerm iniis.]
But to rea.-oii thus, and to endeavor to dmnonstrate a major term by nature,
in the Second Figure, is a speculation whieli may bc curious, but is not true.
[I reail irphi ry .]
[1 .] For, ill the finst place, if we consider the given terms, not in thcni-
iielves, blit in relation to others, in which the predicated term docs not in h er e ;
the major term will be always found in the negative jirojiosition. For, in this
<-ase, the major is alwajs eijiial to the middle term ; since, whether it be thus or
thus taken from the eoinmeiiccmeiit, or be so made by him who denies it, .he
iiegatiie major will still stand in this relation to the iniddle term. For tlic mid
dle doe- not inhere, where it is not snjijiosed to irilierc. Wherefore, its repug
nant oj)j)Osite inherc.s in the subject, but the rejiiignant ojiposite of the middle
IS erjnal to tlie middle. And this, either tlirongli the middle itself, or through
another notion of wider e x te n t; as when ratiomd i.s denied o f something through
inanimate. For there is here au equalization through irrational, through which
APPENDIX. 635
rational is negatively predicated o f horse. For either tho iniddle is equal to

this'of which it is denied, or [I read ^ for 6] it is less; as when through inani
mate, rational is denied of anght. For inanimate is eipial to animate, under
which is rational, a notion greater than that other o f which it is allirnied. For
since the afliriiiative prcdieate is greater than its snbject, of which thc middle is
denied or not allirined ; and since the rc.ason why the middle is denied is equal
to or greater than thc middle itself, which middle, again, in an allirniative
proposition, is greater than its subject; on these accounts a negative )>ropo-
sition is always greater than an allirniative. Nevertheless, Aristotle himself
savs that a negation is to be placed in the minor [proposition] ; for the .second
syllogism in this figure [Camestres] has as its minor premise a universal
negative.
[2.] Further, why in the case of negatives alone should e.xplanatioii or
iiKiniry be competent, in regard to the reason o f the negative predication,
seeing that in the case o f affirmatives the reason is equally an o ljec t o f inquiry ?
F'or rational is predicated o f man, of itself, indeed, but not primarily, that is.
not iiiasinnch as he is man, but inasinnch as he is ra tio nal : so that if rational
[be denied] of horse through irrational, still these arc both branches of the
same division. By this method, assuredly, no major can be ever found.
"Wlicrcforc, we ought not, in this way, to attempt a discrimination o f the major
o f afTirniiitive syllogisms in the Second Figure. For in this figure affirmation
and negation are equally compatible with the major term; so that whatsoever
term has by the foromciitioned melliod been found major, the same, taken
either as major or minor, will effectnate a syllogistic jugation ; which being
(.onipctent, there is no longer any major [or minor] in this figure. For the
problem is to find not a major term absolutely, but one o f this figure. [So
much touching Herminns.]
[;j.] Nor, on the other hand, as is thought by some, is that unconditionally
to be called the major term whicb stands jiredicate in the eonelnsion. For
neither is this manifest; if left indefinite [prcindesignate], the same term will
hold a different relation, though a eonver.sion o f the universal negative; so
that what is now the major, may be anon the minor. AVe may, in fact, be
said to constitute tbe same term both major and minor. Naturally there is in
negative propositions no major notion, nor, from the eonelnsion, ought we to
miakc out the major at all. Nor is the case different when the term is defined
[predc.'ignate]. For the conclusion shows, as jiredicate, the term given as
major in thc premi.ses ; so that the conclusion is not itself demonstrative of the
major; on the contrary, the being taken in the jwemises as major is the cause
why a term is also taken as prcdieate in the conclusion.
Nor, however, can it be said that in this figure there is no major. For this
at least is determinate, that its major must be universal; and, if there be
[ill it] any .syllogistic combination, that premise is the major which contains tho
major term.
[4.] But, in thc Second Figure, which o f the terms is to be deemed the
major ? T ly t is to be deemed the major, and to be placed fii-st, which in tlic
problem [question or quaisitiim] we intend to demonstrate, and which wc
regard as predicate. For every one who reasons, first o f all determines with
himself what it is he wouhl jirove; and to this end he applies his stock of
C36 APPEXDIX.
suitable propositions: for no one stinnblos by chance on % conclusion. The

notion. tluMclbiv, jiroposcd as predicate in the problem to be jiroved, is to be
constituted the major term; for although the propo.sition be converted, and the
notion thereby become the snbjeet, still, in what wc proposed to provc. it
[actnallv] was. and, therefore [virtually], remains, the iiredieato. H ence, even
if there be drawn another eonelnsion, we convert it; so that, to us who jirove
aud syllogize aud order terms, that always stands as the major. For major and
minor aiv not. in negative syllogisms, regulated by their own nature, but by
the intention [o f the ivasoner] to coneliidc. Thus it is manil'est, that what is
the ])redieate in the problem, is also the predieale in the eoiieluslon.
Alexander on P rio r Aunig'irs, L. i. e. vi. f. 30 a. ed. Aid.
(Third Figure.) . . . This is the Third Figure, and holds the last place
because nothing univers:d Is inferied iu it, aii.l because sophistical syllogisms
childly afTcct this figure with their indefinite and jiarticnlar conidiisions. lint
the sojihistical are the last o f all syllogisms. . . . Add to this, that while
both the Second and Third Figiiies take their origin from the First o f the
two, the Third is engendered ol' the inferior premise. For the minor, ({ua
minor, is the inferior jireniiso, and holds reasonably a secondary jilaec [the
conver.-lnn o f the minor proposition o f the first figure giving the second figure].
F. b. (D.irajiti). The first fyzygy in this figure is of two universal
aflirniative- [D.irajni]. lint it may be asked M liy, whilst in the second
figure there are two syllogistic eonjugatioiis, having one o f the premise-i a
universal afiirmativo. the other a uiiiver.sal negative (from having, now their
major, now their minor, as a universal negative jiroposition eon verted ,, wliy,
in the third figure, there is not, in like manner, two syllogistic eonibiiiatlons of
two universal afiirinatives, since o f tlii'se either the major or the minor jirojio-
sltiriii is convertihle'.' Is it that in the second figure, from the jiropositions
being o f divei>e form [ipiality], the commutation o f a universal negative into
soiin lliiiig el.-e hy ((inversion is necessary, this being now the major, now tlie
minor, and it not being in our power to convert which we will'/ In the third
figure, on tin* other hand, there being two universal affirmatives, the po.sition
[relation] o f the propositions (for they are similar in character and po-ition) Is
not the cause of one being now converted, now another; the cause lying in us,
not the jiigation. W herefore, the one or other being similarly convertible,
ina-much as the position [relation] o f the two propositions is the .same; the
one which affords the more imjiortant jirobation is selected, and hereby is
dctcmiiiiefl tlie svllogistic jngatioii. Moreover, the diirerences o f syllogism
[iiKKxls] in each figure are effected by the differences among their jugations,
not by tho'C among their probations. Thus that the eomliiiiatioii o f jirojiosi-
lioiH Is svllogistic [or valid], is jiroied by conversion and reiluriio ad imjiossihi/e,
a l'O by cxpo-itioii. liiit from this circiinistanee there does not emerge a jilii-
ralitv o f svllogi'iiis [mcxxls]. For the different jirobations [are not valid from
'in-li plurality, bet] from the unity o f the jiigation from which they arc inferred,
-o that one jiigation o f two universal affirmatives may constitute, in the third
fiL'urc, a single syllogism [m ood], howbeit the probations are different; inas
much as now the one, now the other, o f the jiropositions can be converted.
APTEXDIX. 637
((/; - viuLornyus.
Philoponus (or rather Ammonius) on Aristotle, A n . P r ., i. 4, i. f. 17 a, cd.

Trineavelli, 1536.
Tlie Predicate is ahvays better than the .subject, because the predicate is,
for the most part, more e.xtensive (Jw\ wk4ov) than the subject, and beeattse the
subject is analogous to the matter, the jiredieate to the form ; ibr tlie matter is
the subjeet of the Ibrms. But when the middle term is jiredicatcd of the two
extremes, or is the subjeet of both, in this case, it is not jiroperly intermediate.
But, howbeit, though in jiosition external to the middle, it is still preferable to
be the jiredicate than to be the subject. On this ground, that is called the
first figure, the middle term O f whieli preserves its legitimate order, being
subject o f the one extreme, and predicate o f the other. The second figure is
that ill which the middle is jiredicatcd o f both extremes, and in which it occu-
jiies the better position o f those remaining. Finaliv, the third figurc is that in
wllicll the middle torm is subjected to the two extrem es; here obtaining only
the Im rest jiositioii. Wherefore, in the first figurc the middle term is delineated
on a level with the extrem es; whereas in the second it is placed above, and in
the third below , them. *
Philoponus (or rather Ammonius) on Aristotle, A n . P r ., f. 17 a, ed. Trinca-

vcih, 1536. .
Syllogistic Figures in gen eral. " W c must premise what is the I\Iajoi
Projiosition of the Syllogism, and what the Minor. Bnt to iindersland this,
we mu.st jireviously he aware what are the IMajor and Minor Terms. And it
is possiiile to define tliese, both, in eommon, as apjilieable to all the three
figures, and, in sjiecial, with reference to the first alone. In the latter relation,
that is, regarding sjieeiallv the first figure, ihe M a jo r T erm is that w hieh con sti
tu tes the P r e ilie a te , the ^^lnor th at w hich co n stitu tes the S u b jec t, o f the M id d le , so
far as limited to the first figure. Bnt since in neither of the other figures do
tlie extremes reeiproeally stand in any definite (?) relation to the middle term,
it is maiii est that this determination is inapjilieable to them. Me must, there
fore, employ a rule eommon to all the three figures; to ivit, that the m a jo r
term is that jir e d ic a tc d , the m in o r th a t s iih je c tcd , in the c o n clu sion . Thus, the
M a jo r P r o jio s itio n is the o n e c im tu in iiv j the M a jo r T erm : the M in o r P ro jio sitio n
the one containiiH / the M in o r T e rm . Exam iiles : O f the First Figure, M a n
[/.s'] a n im a l; a n im a l, s u b s ta n c e : th e n f o r e , m a n , s u b sta n c e ........................ O f the
Second, A n im a l [is jiredieated] o f id l m an ; a n im a l n f no ston e : m a n , there-
I A m n io iiiiis , or P liilo p o itu s , lie r e m a iii W h e t h e r tlie so d ia g r a m s a s c e n d liig lie r tlia ii

fe stly refers to th e d ia g r a m s r e jir e se iitin g Ihe A m in o iiiiis doe.s n o t a jiiie a r ; fo r tlie y a re
th r ee fig u r e s, au d a c c o m m o d a te d to A r is- lu o lia lily n o t tlie c o iis t n ie t io iis r eferred to by
lo tle 's th r ee se ts o f le t t e r s , n o t in g th e th r e e A r is to t le ; a n d n o n e a re g iv e n b y tliu A p b r o -
ler n is in e a c h o f t h e s e ; th u s : d isia n in liis o r ig in a l t e x t , tlio n g li lib e r a lly
a /3 p. w p s n p iilie d by id s J .a lin tr a n sla to r , f li e d ia
W A
g r a m s o f A m m o n iu s w e r e lo n g g e n e r a lly cm -
[ ilo y e d . l!y X e o m a g n s , 103.3 {In Trnprziouii
Dinltcl , f. 3-0). tliey are m o st e r r o n e o u s ly re
fer r e d to I'a b er S ta iin lc n sis . [ 8 e e fu r th e r .
D iscu ssio n s, p. U70. E d . |
COS A p p KX n I X .
fore, o f no stone.................... O f the Third, Some stone is xoliite: all stone is

inanimate: consequently, some white is inanimate.'
Fii-st Figure. F. 19 h, 59; Aristotle, I. c. 3. But I CctII tlwt the

middle term whieli itself is in another, and another in it; and wliioli in position
lies intermediate.
This definition of the middle term is not common to the throe figures, but
limited to the middle o f tlie first figure only. For, ete................. But, if there
be a eertain diUe renee in species between tlie middle terms o f the three
figiii-es. they have likewise something in lonnnon; to wit, tliat the middle term
is found twice in the premises, thronghont the three figures; wliieli also in
pO'ition is middle. For Aristotle wishes in tlie Diagrapli (iv al-rg rrj Karaypaipfj)
to preserve the order of intermediacy, so that, jilacing the three terms in a
straight line, we assign the middle place to tlie niiildle term. [ ?]
Aristotle, /. c. 4. lint [1 call] the extremes both that wliieli is in another,
and tliat in which another is. For if A be iiredieated of all B, and B of all
C. it is necessary that A should also be predicated of all C. W e have previ
ously said what we mean by the e.xpression [predicated] o f all.
It may seem, perhaps, that this is a [perfect] definition o f tbe extremes and
of tlie middle term. But it is not; for it behooves us to snl>niiderstand, in
addition, ilie word only: ami thus the definition will rightly run, But [I call]
the extremes, both that wliieh is in another [m inor], and that in which another
is [major]. For if A be jiredicated of all 13, and 13 of all C, it is necessary
that A he predicated o f all C.
This the first syllogistic mood is o f two afiirmative universals, collecting an
ailirmative c om-lnsion. For if 15 inheres in all C, C is, coiiseipiently, a jiart of
15. Blit 13 is a part o f A : A tlierefore, also, inheres in all C, C being a part
of 15. The reasoning will be plainer in material examples as substance \\s
predicated]!?/ all anim al; animal o f all m an; and tliere is inferred .s'ti/iQunce
ejf all m an: and conversely, o// nnai [is] anim al: all animal subskaice; there
fore, nil man substance.
But it is manifest how, in this figure, tlie term of the first mood [Barbara]
ought to lie taken. Tlie first is the most general, and the scioml tbe subaltern,
genus; whilst tin- third is a s|i(cies mon? special tlian the middle. The con-
clii'ion ought :ilways lo b(> drawn. dhus, if, proceeding .synthetically, wc
com m cm c In the major lenn [and proposition], substance begins; wherefore it
also lead-? tin- way in tlic conclusion. ['Ilicrc is jiredicated] snlistance o f all
animal (here snlxtnnrr coniniciice-) : nninnil o f all man : whilst the ( onclnsion
again commences with snbslance, siihstanre < f all man. But if wi; start from
till- minor term [aud jiropo.ition], as from man, with this also the conclusion
will cuniiM me ; atl man [is] anim al, all animal substance; all man siihstanre.
Ari'toMc t ike- the icrms A, 15, ('; ami, from tin*, relation of the letters, he
maiiif'-'i- lo ii> the order o f the first figure. The major term he calls A,
fie aii-e ,\ '.taiid- fir.-.t iu oriler; tlie minor term C ; aud the middle term B; as
13, III ilA order, follows A. and jireeedes C.
* It i- jilain th u the terms may jio->ilily lie enadefjiiate [and tlierefore reeip-
iw a t in g ] ; a- rere/ilitf o f scienii risih'e man; for all man is risible; all
risible Is reerq,iire o f seieiicetherefore, all man is receptive o f science.
A P l KND I X . 639
F. 23 b, Aristotle,ch. 5, 2, Second Figure. The major extreme is that

which lies nearer to the middle ; the minor, that whieh lies farther from the
middle.
In place of more akin and more jiroximate to the middle ; not in jiosition,
bnt in dignity. For since, o f the terms, the middle is twice jircdieated, while,
in the eonelusion, the major is once predicated, but the minor not ev(>n once
predicated ; [coiisi'fiuentlv] that whicli is once predicated will be the more
proximate to that which is twice predicated, that is, to the middle, than that
which is not even once predicated. Whcrcfon*, wc shall hear him [Aristotle],
in the Third Figure, calling the minor the term more proximati' to the middle
on aceonnt of their affinity, for they are both subjects, while he calls the major
term the more remote. Perhaps, also, he wi.shes that in the diagrajih (t^
Kara-ypaepfi) the major term should be placed closer to the middle, and the minor
farther olf. But the major extreme in this figure, the two premises being nni-
vei-sal, exists not by nature but by position, for the first of the extremes which
yon meet with as a subject in the second figure, this is the minor extreme,
the other is the major. So in the exam p le A ll ninn an anim al: no plant
anim al: thorcj'nre, no man jilant. In like manner, if we take the commence
ment from' ])lan(, this becomes the minor term, and man the major ; as, no ]>lant
anim al: all man anim al: no plant, therefore; man. Consequently the major
and minor terms exist in these examples only by jiosition, not by nature.
If, indeed, one or other o f the propositions be particular, the major and the
minor terms arc then determined ; for we hold that in this figure the universal
is the major.
Aristotle. 3 . The middle is placed external to [not between] the
extremes, and first in jiosition.
The middle term passes out of what is properly the middle position ; it is
also placed out o f or external to the extremes ; bnt either above these or below.
Bnt if it be placed above, so as to be predicated o f both, it is eailed first in
position : if below, so as to be subjected, it is called seeond. W herefore, here,
as juedieate of both premises, he styles the middle term the fir.st; for if it be
placed above, it is first in position, and iu being apart from the extremes, it is
placed witliont them.
Aristotle, ch. G, 2. Third Figure, f 27 b. The major extreme is that
more remote from, the minor is that more proximate to, the middle.
The major term in this figure is twice predicated o f the middle, and in the
eonelusion : but the minor once only, and that of the middle, for it is subjected
to tli(' major in the conclusion ; the middh* alone is subjected, never predicated.
When he, therefore, says that the major term is more remote from the middle,
he means the term always predicate is in affinity more remote from that whieh
is never preilicate, but always subject. And that which is never subject is
the major and more proximate term ; that again, which is now subject, now
predicate, is the minor.
(e) .M .in r r A .v c s c a p e l l a . i
Martianus Capella, De Sej/tem Ariihus Liheralibus, L. iv. De Dialectiea, iu
1 F lo u r is h e d A . C. 457. P a s s o w ; 474, T e n n e m a n n .
640 APPENDIX.
rapito. Q iutl sit P re rlicn lii'u s S y llo g is m u s , p. 127, ed. G rotii; p. 83, ed. Basil
1532.
Ilujiis generis trcs forma; [figurm] snnt.
Brima est, in qua dcelarativa [jirmdieatum] particula superioris snmpti,
setpientis ellieitur snbjcetiva [siibjeetiiin] : ant snbjeetiva superioris, deelarativa
seqnentis. Deelarativa siqierioris fit snbjeetiva secjnentis, ut O m n is volu jitas
lionum e s t : om n e boniim u tile e s t: om n is ig itu r ro liip ln s u lilis est. Subjectiva
superioris fit deelarativa setpientis, si lioe modo veils eonvertorc: Onuie bonum
u tile est ; o m n is ro liijitn s bon u m e s t; o m n is ig itiir v o lu p ta s u tilis est.
In First Form or Figure, notices tlie four direct and five indirect m oods,
rejlexinn ; and. in tlie second and third, the usual nnmber o f moods.*
In Second Figure Mie retlexione si utaris, alins modus non efficitur,
(IMoniam de utrisqne subjeetivis fit illatio. l ie seems to hold that two direct
eonelusions are enmpctcnt in Second and Third Figures.
In Second Figure he enounces generally (four times) as thus: O m ne j u s
/am lion esltiiu : n u llu m tu r p e hon estu m ; n u llu m ig itu r ju s lu m tu r p e : but some
times (onee) thm-, X u llu m ig itu r tu r p e j u s t i m .
In Third Form or Figure generally (six times) tlius, as O m ne ju s tu m
Inincstnm : om n e ju s tu m b o n u m ; iju m hbim ig itu r h o n estu m b o n u m ; but some
times (once) as Q u o d d a in igU u r bonu m h o n estu m .
(f) ISIDORES.
Isidoru.s, O rig in u m . L. i e. 28. D e S g llo g ism is D ia le c tic is. O p e ra , p. 20

(1017) ; in G olhof'red. A u c to re s , p. 878.
Fornmhe Categorieornm, id e.st, Bnedicativorum Syllogismonnn sunt tres.
Iriime formula* modi snnt novcni.
* Primus moiliis est fjni eondncit, id est, qiii colligit c.x nnivcrsalibus dcdica-
tivis dedicatixiiin universale direetim ; ut, Omne justum honestum: omne hones-
him honnm : <rgo omne justnm bonum. All in first figure, with minor first; in
second and third fignn*s. varic.s; uses per rejicxioncm el rejlexim indifferently;
and through all moods of all figures follows Apuleins. lia s formulas Cate-
L'orlcornm Syllogisinornm qni plene nosse desiderat, libruni legat qui inseribitur
Perihermfiiias Apuleii, et (jiim subtilius sunt tractata cognoscet.
(g) A V E R R O E S.
Averroes. In A n a l. P r io r , ]j. i. c. v., on First Figure. If, therefore, the

middle term bc so ordered between the two extremc.s, tliat it bc predicated o f .
the minor ami snbje<-ted (o the ni.ajor (as. if we say a ll C is B, and a ll B is A ) :
il i- plain that thi" onlcj- i/f syllogism is n.atnrnl to ns; and it is called by
Ari'totle the Fii>t f'igiire. And thus are slated all the exanqiles in detail.
vi.. Figure Sci Olid. And the jirojiosition whose subject is the subjeet
I f i l l I'ir-I F ig u r e , g iv e s h o lli p p IjPJi, 550, G c iic v . 1050. iim l a b o v e , p. 020

Il ri se| G c. " ill .S i ' Cn l i f l am i l l iin l, (II 520). C f A p n U n u s, Dc Si/Uogi.iimc Culegnr-
tl o iig li iie g iv e s a l s o a " v e l s ic , tlie y a r e iro, Op., p . Z-'i. l-3m en. ( a . c . 100). I s id o r u s ,
e x n n ip li -, b o lli in c o n v e r s e , o f C a p e lla 's g e n - o f .S ev ille ( O olho/r. A u c l., p. 878), ( a . c . 600;
eral m o d e o t f D u n c i a i i o n . S e e D io U c i.,O p frii, d i e d 0.30)
APPENDIX. 641
of the (luaisitum is the minor proposition, but that ivhose subject is the pred
icate o f the (ina'sitnm is the major. Let ns then place first in order of enun
ciation the minor extrem e; let the middle term then follow, and the major
come last, to the end that thus the major m aybe distinguished from the minor:
for ill this figure the terms are not distinguished, unless by relation to the
(juaisitiiin. So all the examjiles.
C. vii., 'fhird Figure. That proposition in which lies the subject of the
quaisitum is called the minor jiroposition, since the subject itself is called the
m i n o r t e r m ; that piojiosition which contains the predicate o f the (jnaesitum Is
named tlie m a j o r . In the example, let the minor term bc C, the middle B, and
Ihe major A, and their order be that we first enounce the middle, then the
minor, and last of all the major. And so the examples.
(h) M E L A y C I lT IlO S .
jMclanchthon, Erotemata Dialeciicce, L. iii. p. 175.

Demonstration why there arc necessarily three [and only three] Figures.
E very argumentation which admits the syllogistic form (for of such form In
duction and Examjile are not recijiient [?]) proceeds either [ l U ' From genus
to species universally with a universal conelusion ; or [2 ], From species to
genus with a particular conclusion ; or [3 ], A distraction o f two species takes
place; or [4], There is a concatenation of a plurality of causes and effeets.
Nor are there more modes o f argumentation, if we judge with skill.
The jirocess from genus to species engenders (lie First Figure. And the
consequence is valid from the genus with a universal sign both affirmatively and
negatively to the species, tliis is naturally manifest. The jirocess from
sjieeies to genus with a partienlar conclusion engenders the Third Figure.
And it is evident that, the species posited, the genus Is posited.
The distraction o f species engenders the Second Figure. And the reason
of the consc(jnence is clear, because disparate species are necessarily sundered.
Tliese may be judged of by eoinmon sense, without any lengthened teaching
Both are manifest, that the figures are rightly distributed, and that the eon-
seijiicnces are indubitably valid.
(i) ARKAULD.
Arnauld, IJ A rt de Pensc-r (P o rt Royal L o g ic), P. iii. ch. 11, p. 2 35.

General jirincijile of syllogism s: That one o f the premi.ses should contain
the conclusion, and the other shorn that it does so contain it. [S o Purehot,
Instil. P h il., Vol. 1. P. iii. ch. 1.]
Ch. v., JI. 215. Foundation of First Figure.
Prineijile o f affirmative m oods: That whal agrees with a notion taken uni
versally, agrees also with all o f which this notion is cifirmed ; in other words, with
all that is the subject o f this notion, or is composed within its sphere. [Or, more
shortl}- (says Purehot, c. vi.), Whatever is predicated o f the superior, is pred-
ircVed o f the inferior.']^
" Principle of the negative m oods: What is denied o f a notion taken uni
versally, is denied o f all ichereof this notion is affirmed. [Purehot Whal is
repugnant to the superior, is repugnant also to the inferior. Ch. vi. p. 217.]
Si
642 ArrENDix.
Foundation of the Second Figure.* Principle of the syllogisms in Cesare

and F estin o : Thai u-luit is denied o f a unirersal notion, is denied also of
whatever this notion is iifinned, that is to say, o f fill its snbjec's.
Principle o f the syllogisms o f Camestres. Baroco: A ll that is contained
under the ixtension of a anieersal notion, agrees with none o f the subjects whereof
that notion has heen denied, seeing'that the attribute o f a negative proposition is
tal'cn in its whole extension.
Ch. vii.. p. 220. Foundation o f the Third Figure.
Principle o f the allirmative m ood s: When two terms may he afirmed of
the .same thing, they may also be afirmed o f each other, taken particularly. [S o
Purehot nearly.]
Principle o f the negative m ood s: When o f two terms the one may be
denied, and the other afirmed, o f the same thing, they may be particularly denial
o f each other. [S o Pnrchot nearly.]
No foundation or principle given for the Fourth Figure. -
(j) G R O S S E R .
Samuelis Grosscri, Phnrus Intellectus, 1G97, P. iii. S. i. Alem. .3, c. 2 (prob

ably from Weiss, sec Pref.). The foundation o f the first figure Is the Dic
tum lie Omni c l N ullo: for wliatcver is universally affirmed or denied o f a
universal subject, that is also affirmed or denied o f all and each contained
under that subject.
The tbiindation o f the second figure is C ontrariety; for the predicates of
contrary things are contrary.
Tlic foundation o f the third figure is the agreement o f the e.xtrenies in any
th ird : for wliat agrees with any third agrees with each othe;-, and may be
joined or separated in the same pixijiositlon, Inasmuch as they are in agree
ment or coiillictloii ill ndation to any third thing.
BliiTtnites the tlirce figures by three triangles, p. 132. In the first, we ascend
to the apex on one side, and tlesccnd on the otlier; in the second, we ascend at
both sides: in the third, we descend on both sides.
<k) L A M B E R T .
Lambert, Xenes Orgnnon, Vol. I. 22.3. (S ec Mclanchthon, p. 641.)

lielatlon of Fi'_oirc. W e fiirtlier remark, that the first discoverer of Svl-
logi.-ms and their Figures was, in liis arraiigeinenl o f their propositions, deter-
inineil by 'oine arbitrary <Ircnmslaiiee : lils views and .selections at least were
not rounded on anght natural and necessary ( 19G). Ib? places, to wit, that
[irmiiisr- aficr the other which <'f)iitalns among Its terms Ihe subject o f the con-
eliisioii, Iirobably in order tfj intrtxliice into till tlie figures a common law. To
that law, however, we do not nistrlet ourselves either in speech or In writing.
The inathcmntieian, who. perha]is, ilraws the greatest nnmhcr of formal syllo
gism- with the fewest paralogisms, commenees to take the first figure, for cxain-
1 P n r c h o t f>ays I h i s Fi;rur<- rcfilR u p o n a s i n - but sn m rlh in g agrees w ith the one, which is re-
p l f p r i n c ip l e T w o th in g s arc not the sa m e , jn ig n a n t to the otlur.
A p r ENDIX. 043
plc, not witli tlio inajor, lint witli tlic minor proposition, boransc not only in
this figure is such jireuiisc always the more obtrusive, hut also because its sub
ject is the. proper matter of diseoiirsc. Fre(|ueiitly the premise is only ijiiotcd,
or it is absolutely omitted whensoever it i.s of itself obvious to the reader, or is
easily discoverable from the minor and coiiehisiori. The eonelnsion inferred is
then, iu like ni.uiner, constituted into the iiiirior proposition o f a new syllogism,
wherewith a lu'w major is coiiiieeted. This natural arrangement of the syllo
gisms of the first figure rests, eoiiseiiuently, altogether on the jirlnciple, That
we can assoi of (he suhjeet of an (ij)inii(i'ice jwoj/osition whatecer we ninij know
o f Its prcdicae : or what moy be said of Ihe attribute of a thing is vidid i f the
thing itselj'. Ami this is what the syllogisms of the first Figun* have jicculiar
to themselves. Tt is also so c.\]>ressed : What is (rue of the gci.us, is true ako
o f each of its sjiecies.
22G. On tiie other hand, in the second and third Figures there is no
talk o f species .and genera. The second Figure denies the subjects o f each
other, Ix'caiise they are diverse in their attrihutes ; and every ditlVrcnee of
atlribiite is here eflectunl. We, eonsecpiently, use this figure principally in the
ca.se where two things ought not to be intereommuted or confoiindeil. This
becoiiK's iiecc'ssarily imjiossible, so soon as we discover in the thing A something
which does not e.xist in the thing I>. W e may, conseqnently, say that syll-i-
gisms of the second figure lead us to distinguish things, and jireiciit ns f'roiu
coiifonndiiig notions. And it will be also found that in these eases we always
use them.
227. The third Figure affords Examples and Exceptions; and, in this
Figure, wc adduce all excmpla in ronlrariiiiii. The two formula arc as follows:
1. There an R udiieh arc C ; fo r i\I is I> and C.
2. There are B tchieh are not C ; Ja r IM is B nnd not C.
In this manner wc draw syllogisms o f the Third Figure, for the most part,
in the form of cojnilativc projiositions ( 135); beeau-c we are not wont twice
to repeat the subject, or to make thereof two projjositions. Soinitinies one
projiosition is wholly omitted, when, to wit, it is self-manifest.
III the Fourth Figure, as in the First, spccii's and genera ajipcar-only with
this difrcrence, that in the moods, Uaraliji, Dihatis, Fesapo, Fresison, the infer
ence is from the species to the gcnns; whereas, in Cnlentes, there is denied of
the sjiecies what ivas denied of the genus. For where the genus is not, neither
are there any o f its species. This last mood we, therefore, use when we, coii-
eliide negatively a ininori ad mnjiis, seeing that the genus jireeedes, and is more
frequently jiresented than any of its sjieeies.
220. 'flie syllogisms of the four Figures are thus distinguished iu relation
to their einjiloyment, in the following resjiects :
1. The First Figure ascribes to the thing what we know o f its attrlhiite.
Tt coiieludes from the geniis to the sjieeic.s.
2. The Second Figure leads to the discrimination of things, and relieves
perjilexity in our notions.
3. The 'fliird Figure affords cxainjiles and excejitions in jirojiositions which
appear general.
4. The Fourth Figure finds species in a genus in Baralip and Dihatis; it
644 AP P E XDI X.
shows that tlie speeies docs not exhaust the genus in Fesnpo, Fresison ; and it
ileiiies the speeies o f what was denied o f the genus in CuknUs.
230. * This determination o f the ditrerenee o f the Four Figures is, abso
lutely s]leaking, only manife.sted when we employ tliem alter natural tashion,
and without any thought of a selection. For, as the syllogisms of every figure
admit o f being transmuted into those o f the first, and partly also into those of
any other, if we rightly convert, or interchange, or turn into propositions of
etjual value, their premises ; conseciuently, in this point o f view, no ditrerenee
subsists between them ; but whether we in every ease should perform such eoiii-
nuitations, in order to bring a syllogism under a different figure, or to assure
ourselves o f its eorreetness, this is a wholly different (juestion. The latter
is manifestly futile. For, in the commutation, we must always undertake a
eoiivei'sioii of the preniises, and a converted proposition is assuredly not always
o f equal evidence with that wliieh we had to convert, while, at the same time,
we are not so ucll aeeiistomed to it; for example, the juoposition. Some stones
attract iron, every one will admit, because The muynet is a stone, and attracts
iron. This syllogism i.s in the Third Figure. In the first, by conversion of
one o f its ]iremises, it would run thus:
^lajor. All m agnets a ttr a c t iron ;

Elinor, Som e stones a re m agnets ;
Conclusion, Som e stones eittrarl iron.
Here wc are unaccustomed to the minor proposition, while it apjiears as if we

must p a s s all stones under review, in order to pick out magnets from among
ilicin. On th'- other Imiid, that the- maejnet is a stone, is a proposition whieh
fur more naturally siiggesis it.self, and demands no consideration. In like man
ner. .1 cirrh is no! ei i qnare : for the circle is round, the sejuare not. This proof
[ill the third figure] is as follows, when east in the first:
U 'h at is luit rou n d is no circle ;

A sepnire is ne>t r o u n d ;
Cemseepieaitly, etc.
Here the major proportion Is converted by means o f terminus injinitus, and its
trutli is niuiiifc-tcd to us only through the conseioiisiicss that edl e-ircles are
round. For. iiidi-pcii leiitlv o f this proposition, should we not hesitate, there
bi ill'.' iriiiuuicrablr things which arc not round wliether the circle were one
of tliO'c wliich bcloti'_'cd to this category? We think not; because we are
aware.
8 231. * If is ilius apparent tliat we use everv svilogistie figure there, where
the , iropo'itioiis. a- eacli figure rcrpilrcs them, arc more familiar and more cur
rent. The difference o f f i g u r e s rests, therefore, not only on their form, but
extendi it'clf. by relation to tlieir eiiiploymciit, also to things themselves, so
that wc ii-e e,i h fi'.'iire where its use is more natural ; Ihe-. first fo r findiny out
ir jiroriny the' ,\ilrihalts ej~ et ihiiiy : the seretnd fitr findhiej ou or prneiney the
D/ffe re-ne e nfthiny ; the third for firieliny enit and proeiny Uample;s anel E x -
ceptieyns ; the fejnrth fur fuieliiiy out einel i-xclueliny the Spe:cies o f a Genus.
APPENDIX 045
232. Fiirtlior, whether the three last figures arc less evident than the
first, is a (Hiestion which has been denied [aflirmed (?)] on this account, that
the first figure only rests inmiediately on the Dictum de Omni et XnUo [ 220]_
whilst the others have hitherto, by a eirenit, been educed tlieretroin. W e have
already reniHrked [ 2 1 1 ] that this circuit, through our mode of notation, is
wholly snjierseded. We need, therefore, only translate its principle into the
vernacular, and we shall find that the Dictum de Omni et XnUo is on that
account applicable to the first figure, because its truth is based on the nature
of the proposition. From this jirineiple, therefon*, the first figure and its
moods admit o f an immediate deduction ; it is thus only a ijncstion whether the
other figures are incapable [cajiable (? )] o f such immediate deduction, or
whether it is necessary previously to derive them throiigli the first figure. Our
mode of notation shows that the latter is an [u n n eeessu y] eirenit, because
every variety o f syllogism admits for itself a various notation, and because, in
that ease, the premises are taken for wliat they actually au*. Consequently,
every figure, like the first, has its own probation, a jirobation drawn exclu
sively from the natures o f the jirojiositioiis. The whole matter is reduced to
this ; Whether a notion, wholhj or in part, is, or, ivholbj or in part, is not, under
a second : and whether, again, this second, witollg or in j>art, is, or, whalh/ or in
part, is not, under a third. All else proceeds only on the interchange of equiv
alent modes o f expression, the figured, namely, and those, which are not
figured. .And this interchange we may style translating, since the figured
modes o f e.xfiression may be regarded as a special language, serving the pur
pose o f a notation. W e have above ( 220), after all the syllogistic moods
were discovered and denoted, adduced the Dictum de Omni et X idio, but only
historically, since onr manner o f determining the syllogistic moods is immedi
ately founded on the nature o f the pro|)Ositions, from which this Dictum is only
a cons' (]iience. Alnreover, this consequence is special, resting, as it does, on
the notions ot Species and Genera. Wherefore, its validity only extends so far
as propositions can be recalled to these notions; as, for example, in the First
Figure. In the Second, the notion o f Difference emerges; and in the Third,
the notion of Exam ple. I f we, therefore, would have special dicta for the
several Figures, in that ease it would follow, and, at the same time, become
manifest that the middle term of a syllogism, considered for itself, expresses, in
the First Figure, a principle \_of Ascription or Procreation'] : in the. Second,
D ifferen ce; in the Third, an E x a m p le ; and in the Fourth, the principle of
Reciprocity.
1. For the First Figure. Dictum de Omni et Xullo. What is true of all A,
is true of everv' A.
2. For thc Second Figure. Dictum de Diverso. Things which are different,
are not attributes of each other.
3. For the Third Figure. Dictum de Exemplo. WTien we find things A
which are B. in that case some A are B.
4. For the Fourth Figure. Dictum de Reciproco. I. If no M is B, then no
B is this or that AI. II. If C is [or is not] this or that B, in that case some B
are [or are not] C.
G46 APPENDIX.
0) PLATNER.
Platner, Philosophlsche Apfioi-kiiien, 3d ed., 1793. Part I., 544, conformed

to his Lchrbuch der Lugik und Mctaphgsik, 1 795, 227. Tlie reason why the
predicate belongs to the subject is in all jiossible syllogisms this, because the
subject stands in a relation o f subordination with [is either higher or lower
than] a third notion to which the predicate belongs. Consccpicnfly, all infer
ence jiroceeds on the following rule: If the subject of the [eonclnding] judg
ment stand in a relation of subordination with a third notion, to which a certain
predicate jicrtains ; in that ease, this predicate also jicrtains to the same judg
ment. allirm.itivcly or negatively.
In his note on this Ajihorism, Platner ( Lehrbitch) adm its iMy funda
mental rule is only at fault in the seeond Aristotelic figure, which, however, is
no gciuiinc figure ; because here, in the jiremises, the subject and predicate
liave changed places, etc. In the 2d edition o f his Ajihorisins (1784) he had
adojjtcd the princijile of Identity with the same third, as he has it: " In whal
txli nsioii or jiroporlioii (Mousse) two notions are like or unlike to a third, in the
same extension or jwoporlion are they like or unlike each other. ( C28.)
Philijsojdiisrhe Ajdiorisnien, Part I., third edition, 1 793, 5G8, comjiared with
second. 1 784, G72-G7G. Nevertheless, each o f these grammatical figures of
syllogism has its jicculiar adaptation in language for the dialectical ajijilicatioii
o f jiroofs: and the assertion is without foundation that the first is the most
natural. Its use is only more approjiriate, when we intend to show (hat a
pndicate pertains [or tlues not pertain) to a subject in virtue o f its class. J\lore
iiaturallv than the first do we show, in the second, the dijj'erence o f things
njiparcnilg sim ilar: and in the third, the siinilarilg o f appeirentlg dijf'erent things.
Tlie fourth figure [it is said in the second edition], on account o f the position
o f its terms, is always uniiatur:tl in language.
Philosi/phische Ajihorismcn, Part I., last edition, 1 793, 5G1. Tlie principle
o f the first figure is the Dictum de Omni el Nullo.
g ,5 6 t . 'rouching the other figure [the tliird, for in this edition Platner
abolishes, in a logical relation, the sei oiid], its spcci.al jirincijile is the following
rule : What belongs to the sultoriPinale, (hat, since the subordinate is a purl of the
unircr.sii/, belongs edso in part (particnlarlg) to the unirersid.
In till- sccoinl 1ditioii, 1 784, tho second figure is recognized, and, with the
third, obtains it.s sjiecial law.
G59. " 'I'lic jirincijilc of the seeond figure is: I f two notions, irhoUg or
in part, are ojiposite to a third, so are theg also, irholbj or in part, opposite lo each
o th e r .
5 GGl. 'Ihe principle o f the third figure i s : What can he particularly
ajfirund or denied < f a suba/lerrt species, that also, in so fa r as such subaltern
fperies is pari o f a (p-nns. may be particularly ajjirmeil or denied of the genus.
}>hdo. ophisrhe Aphorisnnn. Part I., 54G. Note. In general, logicians
treat the su ljfct as if it were neccsstirily subordinated to the predicJite. It
may, howcvi-r. on the eoiitrary, be tlie higher notion, and the jncdieate thus be
snbordiria'ed to it. 'Phis is the case in all jiarlicnlar projiositions where the
predicate is not an attribute o f the genus, hut an aecident o f the subject. For
instance, Some creatures arc animals ; here the subject is the high er: Some
APPENDIX. 647
men are imperfect ; here tlie higher is the predicate. Wo must not, therefore,
in our syllogistic, thus eiiounee the fundamental rule of reasonings , f the
subject be suboniinated to a third notion, but with or in the relation o f subordina
tion with a third notion.
(m ) - F R IE S .
Fries, Sjplem der Logik, 5 6 . Tlie sjiceies o f categorical syllogisms are

determined by the variety of relations in Avhieh three notions may stand to each
other, so that a syllogism may be the result.
These relations may be thought as three.
Casc I. Three notations arc reeiprocallv subordinated in gradation, so
that tlie second is subordinated to the first, but superordiiiatod to the third.
Case 11. Two notions are subordinated to a third.
Case III. Two notions are siqierordinatc'd to a third.
W hen, in these eases, is a syllogism possible ?
57. In all the three eases the syllogisms are equally valid, for they are
founded on the general laAvs of the eonneetion o f notions.
They all follow, to wit, from tlie relation o f a whole sphere to its parts,
Avhich lies in tlie Dictum de Omni et Nullo. The principles lor the three men
tioned cases are th u s:
For the first, The part (C ) o f the p a ri (B ) lies in the whole ( A ) , and what
(A ) lies out o f the whole (B ), lies also out o f its parts (C).
For the secoiKi, Whal (A or some A ) lies out o f ihe whole (B ), lies also
out o f its purls (C).
For the third. f a part (B ) lies in two wholes (A and C), in that case
these hare a part in common ; and i f a part (B ) lie in a winde (C ), but out o f
another whole (A ), in that case the first (C ) has a part out o f the other (A ).
The first case alone eoiucides immediately with the iierfeet declaration
o f a syllogism . that a case is therein determined by a rule. For tlie third
casc, therefore, our two declarations o f a major premise that it is the rule.
and that it contains the major term do not coiiu-idi*, seeing that here the
minor term may bc forthcoming in the rule. On this account the arrangement
of' the first case is said to be the only regular, and tlie others are reduced to it.
That this reduction is easily jiossible, ive may in general convince ourselves, by
reflecting that ci ery syllogism recjnircs a general rule as jiromise, and that the
other cases arc only distinguished from the first by a converted arrangement
of the projiositions. But as all propositions may be either purely converted or
purely coimterjioscd, coiisetjuently the two last eases can at most so far deviate
from the first that they are connected ivith the first ease only through reversed
(gegentheilige) notions.
5 7 b. The doctrinc of the several species of categorical syllogisms, as
regulated by the forms o f their judgments, is at bottom an omptv subtlety ;
for the result o f all this circuity is only that, in every categorical syllogism,
a case is determined by a rule, and tbis is already given in the law, that
in every reasoning one jiremise must be universal. The scholastic logic
treats of this doctrine only in so far as the sjieeies o f sv'llogism are determined
by the forms of judgment, and thereby only involves itself in long grammati-
1 [See Jo rd a n o B runo (iu D enzinger, L o g ik , t. ii. p. 259). S tattler, L o g ic a , 237, p. 163.]

648 A P P E N DI X .
oal discussions. A ristotlc has been falsely rojiroachod for overlook in g the
fourth ti iire, he o n ly having adm itted tlii'oe. F or .Vristotle p roceeds, pre
cisely as 1 have here done, on ly on the relation o f notions in a syllogism , o f
wliieh there are jiossibly on ly onr three eases. I lis error lies in this, that
he did not lav a gen eral rule at the root o f ev e r y figure, but, with a proli.xity
wliolly useless, in d eterm in in g the moods o f the several figures, details each,
even o f the illegitim ate, and ilen.onstrates its illegitim acy. T h is jirolixity has
been too often im itated by other logicians, in the attem pts at an evolution
o f the moods. K a n t goes too far in d eiioiin eiiig this w hole doctrine as a
m ere grainm atieal su b tlety. T h e distinction o f the three eases is, how ever,
a logical d istin ction ; and his assertion that the force o f in feren ce in the other
two is wliolly derived from that o f the first ease, is lik ew ise not correct. I
m anifestly, liowi-ver, eo n eh id c as easily in the third ease, A jiart whleli lies
in tw o wholes is a part eom inon to b oth, as in the first, T lie part o f the
part lies in the w h ole. 'Jlie third ease p resents, in d eed , tlic readiest arrange
m ent for reasonings from tbe particular to the gen eral, i. e., for syllogism s in
tlie second figure accord in g to onr terminolog}'.
T h e scholastic doctrine o f the tour syllogistic figures and n in eteen moods
o f categorical syllogism s re<iuiros no len gth en ed illustration. I f the ligures are
determ in ed by the arran gem en t o f notions in the prem ises, then the follow ing
fom bination is ex h au stive. -For tbe eonelnsioii in all eases S ---------- P [being
supposed tho sa m e], tlie [ le m is o ;] notions stan d :
1) A e e o n l i n g t o o u r fi r s t c a s c , M -----P
S ------ M
2) W i t l i c o n v e r t e d m a j o r p rcin i.sc, P ------ M
s xM
3) W ith co n v e rte d m i n o r p rem is e, M P
AI S
1) D o t h p r c m i s c s c o n v e r t e d , P ------ M
xM S
Should wo therefore sim ply con vert both iirem iscs in a syllogism o f the
first figure, we are able to e-xjiress it in all the figures. L e t the notions given
Jirfjiraof, lead, melcd, there then follow s the conelusion Some metal is not
fireproof from the prem ises :
In tl ic F i r s t F i g u r e N o le a d is fir e p r o o f;
Som e m etal is l e a d ;
I n t h e S e c o n d F i g u r e N o th in g fir e p r o c f is le a d ;
S om e m etal is lead ;
I n t h e T h i r d F i g u r e N o le a d is fi r e jir o o f;
A l l lead is m e ta l;
I n t h e F o u r i l i F i g u r e N o th in g fi r e p r o o f is le a d ;
A l l lead is m etal.
It is here ap p aren t that the first three figures are our three ca ses; b ut the
APPENDIX. 649
fourth we did not employ, as it contains no peculiar relations or notion.s, but

only under our first case superordinates, and then siibordlnalcs a iniddle term.
This manner of enunciating a syllogism is thus only jiossibh* where we are
competent, through coiivcisions, lo transniute the arrangement of the first
figure into th a to f llu; fourth. Xow this hapjicns : 1] If wc coin'crt thc eoiu-lu-
sion S----------1* iuto P ---------- S, since then the major and the minor terms, as
also the major and minor premises, change nam es; or, 2] If both ]u-emiscs
allow o f an immediate conversion, so that the one remains un iversal; for then
the converted ])ro]io?itions contain the same thoughts as those given, and,
consequently, establish the same conclusion.
[Objections to Fries doi trine of figure 1, Only apjilies to affirmatives;
2, Only the arrangement of the results o f a succc.ssful comparison, and takes
no heed of the eonqiarison that may have been frnitless (the illegitimate
moods) ; 3, Takes account of only one subordination, for, in the second and
third cases, in each there is a reciprocal subordination in Extension and Com
prehension.]
(n a m lo ) KRUG AN D R E X E K E -T H E I R D O C TR IN E S OF S Y L L O G I S il CRITICIZED.
The authority o f the two following jihilosophers, who conchule this series, is
rather negative than positive; inasmuch as they both concur in proving that
the last attempts at a reformation o f the Syllogistic Theory proceed on a
wholly different ground from that on which, I think, this alone can be accom
plished. Tliosc two philosophers are Krug and Bcneke ; for, beside them, I
am aware o f no others hy whom this has been altcnqited.
K nig was a di.scijile o f the Kantian school, K ants immediate successor in
his Chair o f I>ogic and IMctajihysics at Kamigsbcrg, and, siihsc(]iiently, Pro
fessor of Philosophy in thc University o f Leipsic. l ie is distingiii'hed not
only as a voluminous writer, but as a perspicuous and aciitc thinker ; and bis
peculiar modification o f thc Kantian system, through a virtual return to the
principle o f Common Sense, is known among the German theories by the
name o f Synthelism. His Logic (the first part o f his Sgslcm. o f Theoretical
Philosophy') was juihlishod in 1806, and is one o f the best among the many
excellent treatises on that science which we owe to thc learning and ability of
the Germans. (I have before me the fourth edition, that o f 1833.) Krug
propounded a new theory of syllogistic; but the novelty of liis scheme is
wholly external, and adds only fresh complication to tlic old confusion. It has,
accordingly, Ibund no favor among subsequent logicians.
Passing over the perverse ingenuity o f the principles on which the whole
doctrine is founded, it is enough to state that Kriig distributes the syllogistic
moods into eight classes. O f these, the first (which, with some other logicians,
he considers not as a figure at all, but as the pure, regular, and ordinary form
o f reasoning) corresjionds to the First Figure of the Aristotelieo-Scholastic
distribution. Thc other seven classes, as so many impure, irregular, and e x
traordinary forms, constitute (on the analogy o f Rhetoric and Grammar) so
many figures. O f these, thc new is only the old First Figure, the minor
premise, in extension, being stated before the major. Kriig, like our other
modern logicians, is not aware that this was the order in which the syllogism
82
650 A T T E N D I X.
was romilarly cast, in common language, by the Gi eeks, by the Arabians, by

the Jews, ami by the Latins jirior to Boethius.' The old and new first figures
are only a single figure, the syllogism being drawn in the counter orders of
breadth and of ilejuh. A mood in these orders, though externally varying, is
intrinsieally, is sehematieally, the same. Krngs distinction o f his new first
figure is, therefore, null. Thus, Barama is Bai-bara ; Caleme is Celarent;
Dirauii is D a r ii: Kireino is Ferio. Nor is his discrimination o f the other six
belter foiiinled. His new (tbe old) Second and bis F ifd i Figures are .also one.
The latter is jtrceisely tbe same with tbe former ; Fbneso is Festino, and Fomaco
is Jhinico. In one case (um ler Caincstrcs), Krug adopts, .as .alone right, the
conclusion rejected by the logicians. In this, he and they are, in fact, both
wrong, though in opposite ways. Each mood, in the second (as in the third)
figure, has two indill'erent conclusions; and the special one-siiled practice o f
the former is only useful .as gainsaying the gencr.al one-sided precept o f the
latter. The same objcetion ajiplies to Krngs new (the old) T hird , in connec
tion with his Sixdi Figure. They are one; Daroco is Bocardo, Fupimo is
FildjV on, and J-i. t ino is J-'erison. In two cases (under Disam is and Bocardo)
Kriig has recognized the reimdiateil conclusion. Krug ( 109) h.as, however,
committed an error in i-egard to Bocardo. He gives, as its example, the
following syllogism, in which, for brevity, 1 li.avc filled up tbe quantifications:
" Some nnim nls a r e not [(cny] v iv ip a ro u s;

A ll anim als a re [siwie] o rg a n ize d th in g s;
T h erefo re, some o r g a n ize d things a r e not [an y] vivip a ro u s.
In a note, he adds, The conclusion should here be : Therefore, some

things which are not ririparotts arc (some) organized.' And tliis is seen also by
reduction. Wc, have, however, followe<l the tirbitrary jirci-cpt of the logicians,
that the extreme in the sceond proposition should stand subject in the conclu
sion ; although it be liero Indifiercnt which extreme becomes the subject. The
coie lusioii is only chaiigeil into another (juality. Only changed into another
ijiiality ! Only an afiirmative conclusion from a neg.ative premise! The
legitimate inference is:
T h er< fore, no vivip a ro u s is some o rg a n ic ; or,

" T h e r e fo r e , an y vivipo.rous is not some o r g a n ic .
Bachmann (Logik, 155), another eminent logiei.an, has erred with Krug.
A |),articular jiredicate in a negative projiosition seems indeed one o f the last
difTiciilties for reformed logic. Krugs new (the old) Fourth Figure bears a
c o r r c s | i o i i d i n g relation to his Sereuth. lie is right, certainly, in .abolisliing all
the moods o f tin- fourth figure exi-cjit L'esa]io and I're siso ; and, from his point
o f view, he is hardly to be blamed for not aboli.shing these likewise, along with
the eorn-lative moods Fopesinn and Frbtesmo, and, with them, his seventh
figure. Filially, rejecting the sidiolastie doetrine o f Bednetion, he adojits, not
without sundry jierverse additions, Kants jilan o f aeeonqilishing the same end;
so that Krugs coiiversive and contrajiositive and transjiositive interpolations,
1 .Sec p. 025 E d .
A r i ENDIX. ;651
b y wliich he brings back to p roiiriely his seven fold figured aberrations, are
m erely the substitution o f one false su b tle ty for another, l i e , and B ach
m ann after liliii, ren ou n ce, h ow ever, the crotchet o f the A ristotelians, in
m aking the e.xtrenie o f the jirior jiremise the predicate, alw ays, of the eoiicln-
sion. in the first and second figures; and, though both do this jiartially and
from an erroneous jioint o f view , their en u n ciation , such as it is, is still
som ething.
P rofessor B e n e k e , o f B erlin , is the last to whom I can refer, and in him wi*
h ave, on the jiniiit in question, the final result o f m odern speculation. This
acute and very original n ieta|ih ysieian stands the uneom jirom ising chamjiion
o f the pliilosojihv o f ex jierien ee, against the cou n ter doctrine o f transcenden-
talisiii. in all its forms, now jirevalent in G erm an y; and, am ong ihe other de-
jiartm ents o f m ental seien ee, he has cu ltivated the theory o f rea.'ôning with
great ab ility and success. In 1832 ajijieared \\\s Lehrbuch der Lngit, in
Sgllngismnruin AnaUjticorum O rig in e s el Ordo Nntnrnlis, e tc . \ anil In
1842. liis Si/sirm der Logik, etc., in two volum es. In L ogie. B e n e k e has devoted
an especial share; o f attention to the theory and distribution o f S yllogism ; lint
it is precisely on this jioiiit, tliongli alw ays adm iring the in gen u ity o f his reason
ings, that 1 am com p elled o vertly to dissent from his eonelusions.
T lie S vilogistic o f B e n e k e is at on ce ojiposcd, and eorrosjiondent, to that
o f K n ig ; there is an ex tern a l difforenco, but, w ithout im itation, an internal
sim ilarity. Instead o f erroneously m ultip lying the syllogistic figiire.s, like the
L eipsle jihilosopher, the jihilosojiher o f B erlin ostensibly supersedes them
altogether. Y et, when eonsidered in essen ce and result, both theories agree
in b ein g, and from the sam e side, severally, the one an am plification, the other
an exjiress doiitiling, o f the n in eteen scholastic m oods. In this, botli logicians
w ere unaw are that the sam e had been lon g ago virtu ally accom jilislied in the
progress o f the se ie n c e ; n either considered that the am plification he proposed
was snjierfieial, not to say m istaken ; and that, instead o f sim plieity, it only
tended to introduce an additional jierjilexity into the study. B e n e k e has the
m erit o f more o p en ly relievin g the opposition o f Breadth and Dejith, in tho
construction o f the syllogism ; and K rug, ihough on erroneous grounds, that
o f partially renouncing the old error o f the logieians in regard to the one
svllo'ustie conelnsion, in the second and third figures. B ut, in his doctrine o f
m oods, B en ek e has, I think, gone w rong in two opjiosite w ays : like K n ig , in
his arbitrary m ultiplieation o f these form s; lik e logieians in gen eral, in their
arbitrary lim itation.
In regard to the form er the cou n ter qnaiititios o f breadth and depth do not
discrim inate two m oods, but m erely two w ays o f stating the same mood. A e-
eo n lin g ly , w e do not m ultijily the moods o f the first figure, to whieh alone the
jiriiu ip le ajiplies, by castin g them in tho one d ep en d en ey and in the oth er; we
on lv show that, in that figure, every single mood m ay be onouneed in a two
fold order, more germ an, the one to the (piantity o f exten sion , the other to the
(jnantity o f in tension . A n adequate notation ought, equally and at once, to
indicate both. But in referen ce to the second and third figures, the casc is
wor>e. F o r in tliem wo have no sneh d ejien deiiey at all betw een the e.\-
trenies ; and to double llieir m oods, on this prineijile. we must take, divide, and
6 5 2 APPENDIX.
arbitrarily appropriate, one of the two indifTerent conclusion?. Bnt, as every

single mood o f these figures lias a double conclusion, ihis division cannot be
made to difierenee their plurality. If Professor Beiu'kc would look (in s ta r
o in n in n i) into .\piileius or Isidorus, or, better than either, into Blemmidas. he
will fmd Jill his new moods (not. of course, those in the fourth figure) stated hy
these, as hy other aiieieiit logicians; who, however, dreamed not that the mere
accidental ditferenee of. what they ealled, an a n a ly tic and s yn th e tic enounee-
m eni, determined any mnlti])lieation of the mooils themselves.
In the latter respect. Dr. Beneke has only followed his predecessors; I, there
fore, make no comment on thc imperfection. But, in aecomplishmg what he
specially propo.ses, whilst wc do not find any advancement o f the science, we
ful l the old eonfiision and iiitrieaey replaced by another, perhaps worse. To
say nothing o f his non-abolition of tlie fourth figure, and o f his positive
failures in doubling its moods, the whole process is carried on by a series of
arhitrary teidiiiieal ojierations, to supersede whieh must bc the aim o f any one
who would reconcile Logic with natnre. His new (but which in reality are
old) amjilifications are brought to bear (I translate his titles) througli Com
mutations o f the Premises, by Subaiternation, by Conversion, by Con
traposition ; and o f the Major, o f the IMiiior, in fact, o f both premises
(e. y., Ffsajm, etc.). And so difiicult are these jirocesses, if not so uncertain
the authoi's language, that, after considerable study, I am still in doubt o f his
mi'aning on more jioints than one. I <im unable, tor e.xample, to reconcile the
following statements; Dr. Beneke rcjieatcdly denies, in coidbrmity witli thc
eomnioii doctrine, thc universal ipiantificatiqn o f thc predicate in .afiinfiative
jiropo'itioiis; and yet founds four moods upon this very (jiiaiitification, in the
conversion o f a universal affirmative. This is one insolubility. But there
ari.'Cs another from these moods themselves ( 28-31). For, if we employ this
quantification, we have moods certainly, but not o f the same figure with their
nominal correlatives; whereas, if we do not, simply rejecting the permission,
all slides sm ootlilv, we have tlie right moods in the right figure. This, again,
I am unable to solve. Dr. B enckes duplication o f tlie moods is also in sundry
cases only nominal ; as i.? seen, for e.xample, in Ferio 2, Fcsajio 2, and Fre-
siso 2, which arc. forms, all, and in all respects, identical. I must jirotest also
against his vio'ciice to logieil language. 'I'hiis. he emjiloys everywhere nun
omne, non omnia, alle siiid nieht. etc., wliich is only a particular (being
a men; denial o f om nitude), for the absolute or universal negative, nullum,
* nulla. keiii ist, ;/o, nanc, not a n y , etc., in ojiposition both to principle and
to thc jiraclice o f Aristotle and succeeding logicians.
(p ) T IT IV S .
Gottlieb flerhard Titiiis, Ars C n y itn n d i, s ir e S c ie n lia C o yila lin n u m C o yita n -

tiu m . ( 'ofitlaiionihu.f N e r e s s a r is J n stru c ta el a I ^ tre y rin is L ib era tn . Leijisi,
1 723 (first edition, 1701).
Tiiiii? has been partially referred to, by Sir W . Hamilton, as having main
tained the doctrine o f a (inantified Predi;ate. Sec above, p. .5.55. His theory
o f the Figure and Mood o f Syllogism is well deserving of riotiee, proceed
ing, as it does, ou the application o f that doctrine. This theory is jirincipally
APPENDIX. 653
contained in the following extracts from his A r s C o g ita n d i, which show how
closely he ha approximated, on several fundamental points, to the doctrines
o f the X e w A n a ly tic }
Titius gives two canons o f syllogism:
I. Allirmative. Qumcunque conveniunt in uno tertio, 111a etiam, jnxta
mensuram illius convenicntiae, inter se conveniunt.
II. Negative. QuaseuiKiue jmgnant in certo aliquo tertio, ilia, juxta men
suram illius disconvenientim, etiam inter se pugnant C. i.x. 30, 27.
The following relates to his doctrine o f Figure and Mood, and to the special
rules o f Syllogism, as commonly accepted :
C. x. i. Sic igitur omnium Sylloglsmornm formalis ratio in genuina medii
termini et praedieati ae subjoeti Conclusionis collatione consistit; cam si dieere
velis fo r rn a m e sse n tia le m ant J ig u r a m g e n e ra le m , vel conununem , non valde
reluctabor.
ii. Praetor earn vero Peripatetiei F ig u r a s ex p e c u lia r i m e d ii te rm in i situ
adstruunt, ea ratione ut P r im a m figuram dicant, in qua medius terminus in
Majore est subjectum, in ilin o r e Praedicatum, S e c u n d a m , ubi idem bis praedi-
cati, et T e rtia m , ubi subjectl locum bis subit. Galenus adjeeit Q a a rta m primae
contrariam, in qua medius terminus in majore est pr:edieatnm, in ininore sub-
jeetum, quam pluribus etiam exposuit Autor. A r t. ('og. p. 3, c. 8.
iii. Caeteriim ilia; figurm tantnm sunt a c c id e n ta le s . ab iisijue vis eonelu-
dendi non dependet. Qnodsi tamen quis diversum medii termini sitnm atten-
dendum esse, putot, turn n(v Qnarta figura ncgligenda esse videtur, licet earn
Peripatetiei nonnulli haut curandam existiment, v id e Ulman. S y n o p s. Log. 1. 3.
c. 2, p . 1 6 4 .
iv. Interim P r im a caeteris magis naturalis ex eo videri potest, quod Sub
jectum et Praeilicatum Conclusionis in Prjemis.'/is suam retineat qnalitatem, cum
in se c n n d a et tertin altermn qnalitatem suam exuere, in q u a rta vero utrumque
earn deponere debeat.
V . Postea in unaquaquc fignra.pro ratione qnantitatis et qnalitatls p rop o
sitionum, peculiares M o d i adstruuntnr, ita quidem ut Primae figurae Q u atu or.
to tidem Secnndae, Tertiae s e x attribuantur, ex quibus etiam debite variatis
Quarta qu in q u e aeeipiat, prout ilia passim cum vocabulis memorialibus recen-
seri solent, nt ilia qnidem hue transcribere opus non sit, v id e Autor, A r t. C ogit.,
p. 3, c. 5, 6, 7. 8.
vi. Non opus esse istis fignris et modis ad dijudicandam Syllogismornm
bonitateni, ex monito 3, jam intelligi potest. Quomodo tamen sine iis bonitas
laudata intelligi (pieat, id forte non adeo liqnidnm est..................................
vii. Non din hie quaerenda sunt reraedia : Observetnr forma esSentialis
sen figura communis, ac dc veritate Syllogismi recte judieabitur. Applicatio
autcm Imjus moniti non est dilHeilis, nam prinio rcspiciendum ad eonclusionem,
deinde ad medium tcrminum, quo facto etiam jndicari potest, an ejus et ter-
iniuorum eonclnsionis collatio in prreniissis recte sit instituta nec ne. .
ix. D e caetero uti anxie jam non inquiram, an omnis bene concludendi
1 F o r T iliu s " d o c tr iiie o f a Q u a n tifie d IT e d - P r o p o s itio n s a n d to th e H y p o tlie t ic a l S y llo -

ic a te , its a p p lic a tio n to th e C o n v e r s io n o f g ism , see a b o v e , p p . 5 5 5 ,5 2 7 , 603. E d .
654 A r r EXDI X.
ratio un m cro m o d o ru m d e n a r io circumscribatur. quo] quidein juxta aKpl$(iav

matlieinaticam denioiistras-e videri vidt Aiitor. Ar/. C og. p. 3, c. 4. ita id bant
admisorini, (piod illi m o d i, quos vulgo laudant, Prima;, Secmula; ant Tertia;
figiirm |ira;ei>e sint assignandi. licet hoe itidem acumine mathematico se demon-
strassc |)iitet dietus Aiitnr. d . I. c. 5 .<tegg.
X. * Cum enim qumvis propositio possit converti, modo quantitas praedicati
probe observetnr, hinc neeessario setpiitiir, cjnod fjuivis Syllogismus, adhibita
propositionum eonversione, in quavis figura possit proponi. ex (juo non potest
non a?(jiialis modorum numeriis in iimKiuaijue figura oriri, lieet illi non ejusdem
semper .dnt (jiiantitatls.
xi. * Opera; jiretinm non est prolixe per omnia Syllogismorum singulis
figuris adseriptormn exempla ire, sufiieiat iino asscrtionem illustrasse. v. gr. in
prima figura. modo Barbara hie occurrit Syllogismus apud d. Autor. c. 5.
0. sapiens subjicilur volunlati Dei,

0. honeslus esi sapiens,
E. 0- honeslus subjicilur volunlati Dei.
xii. Hunc in secunda figura ita proponere licet:
Quidam, qui subjicilur volunlati Dei, est omnis sapiens,

Omnis honeslus est sapiens,
E. omnis honeslus subjicilur volunlati Dei,
ratio eoncludendi manet eadem. .sapiens enim et is g u i s u b jic ilu r v o lu n la ti D e i,

imiiintur in Majore. dein sa p ie n s et h o n eslu s in Minore, ergo in eonelusioue idea
sa p ie n lis et E j'is q u i ro ln n tn ti D e i s u b jic ilu r , quoque conveniunt.
xiii. In tertia figura ita se hab eb it:
0. sapiens subjicilur volunlati Dei,

Q. sapiens est omnis honeslus,
E. 0. honeslus subjicilur volunlati Dei,
nee in hae eondudendi ratione aliqiiid desiderari potest, nam medins terminus
imiver'aliter unitiir cum conclusionis prmdicato. delude, rjuantum sufficit, con-
jnn'.ntur ciiin eju'dein idijeeto. sen o n m i h o n e.sio ,ero n sulijcctnm ct pricdicatum
- e qiii(|ue tllUtUO a d m i l t e i l t .
x i\. C;eterorum eadem est ratio, (piod faeilc ostendi posset, nisi trieas illas
v f | >-ribere v e l leêre t:e<lif)'iim foret. Ex his autem si(|iutur. fpiod om nes
refpihi p i r i th .. q u n tiiorlis c u /q n rib u s a ttem pern lce vu lg o c ir c u m fe r im lu r , f a ls a ,
int. <|iiod 'pei' itiiii n-fi'iidere liee-it.
X V . * In iiiiiver'Uin tripliei modo impingitiir. vel enim conelusio credilnr
nb nrdo. tpnr inhs non e s t . vel i ilium est in materia, ac ahern prfrmissurum J'alsa,
vel ftd.uiil quaiuor f/rmini, ;t<\i-i)([no alisiirditas conclusionis, .d alicpia subcst,
I n i i c p n m a b e a e a i i ' a d e p e n let, r j u a m r e f e n i i i t n-giihe.
5 x \ i . * bed videam us distinetius ( 1 ) m a jo r in p r im a f ig u r a se m p e r sit u n ive r-
.salis. . . . . .
APPENDIX. 055
xvii. Infleclam hue cxemplum minus controversum, quod Autor, Art. Cog,
p. 3, c. 7, in modo Disamis, tertim fignrae, proponit:
Q uiflam im p ii in h o n o r e h a b en tu r in m undo,
Q uidam v iliip era n d i su n t om nes im p ii,
E. quidam r itu p e ra n d i in Iw nnre h a b en tu r in m undo.
xviii. llic liahes primam figuram enm majore particulari, optime iterum
conelndentein, nain licet medius tenninns particulariter .snmatnr in majore,
ejus tamen ilie est eapacitatis, nt in eodein convenientia jirmdicati et snlijecti
ostendi qiieat, et nisi hoc esset, nec in tertia fignra rite eonelnderetnr.
xix. Nec valde ohsunt, qua; vnlgo illustranda; regulm adducuntur. Ex
sentonlia Weis, in Log. p. 1, lib. 2, e. 2, 4 , male ita concluditur:
Q . a n im a l volat,
0. leo cst a n im a l,
E . Q. leo volnt.
V em m si animal snmitur in minore sient in majore, turn ilia falsa est, si vero
alio sensu, tnm existnnt (jn \tuor termini; his ergo cansis, non particularitati
iMajoris, vltiosa conclusio tribuenda.
X X . Nam alias ita bene coneluditnr:
Q. a n im a l v olat,
0 . a v is est a n im a l ( il lu d q n o d d a m ) ,
E . 0 . a v is volat,
nam licet medins terminus particularis sit, tantm tamen est latltudinis, nt cum
ntroqne Conelusionis tcrinino possit imiri.
xxi. Porro (2 ) Minor semper sit ajftnnnns. Sed quid desiderari potest
in hoc Syllogisino:
0. homo est a n im a l ra tio n a le,
L e o non est homo,
E . non est a n im a l ra tio n a le ?
et nonno ilia ratio concludendi manifcste bona est, qua; subjoctam et prmdi-
eatum.qna; in eerto tcrtio non eonveniimt, inter sc quoqnc pngnare contendit ?
xxii. ' Sed ais, mnteinns paululnin Syiloglsniuin et absurditas conelusionis
erit m anifcsta:
0. homo est a n im a l,
L e o non est homo,
E . leo non cst a n im a l!
Yernm si tenninns animalis in Conclusione perinde snmitur, sient suppositns

fuit in majore. nenipe particulariter, turn conclusio est verissima ; si antem aliter
Acclpiatur, tnm evadunt (inatnor termini, qnilins adco, non negationi Minoris,
656 APPENDIX.
absiinlitas conclusioiiis est inipiitaiida, (jiiaj obscrvatio in omnibus exeinplis quae

hie objici possuiit et solent, locum liabet.
xxviii. Setl rovortamur ad rogulas vulgares ! Nimirum (3 ) In secunda

figura major sii universalis. A'erum cur non ita liceat conelu dere:
Q u id n m d iv e s esl S a x o ,
Q id d iu n G e rm u n u s esl o m n is S a x o ,
E . q n id u m G e rm a m is esl d iv es ?
(jnod argumcntum AVeis. 1. 2, c. 4, 2, intuitu tertia? figurae proponit.

xxix. Argumenta, quae fallere videntur, v. gr. quod AVeisius 1. 2 , c. 3, 8,
l)rotert:
Q u id a m hom o esl s a p ie n s ,
JNuUiis slu lliis esl sa p ie n s,
E . uuU us s tu llu s esi homo,
et similia. rosjiouRione, 2 2 , data eliduntur; nimirum conclusio vel non <

alwurda. si recto iiitclligatnr, vel adsunt qnatuor termini, quibus adeo, non
partifidaritati majoris, vitiuin est impntandum.
X X X . Aiiiplins (4) E x puris ajfirmntivis in secundafigura nihil conrhiditur.
sod niirum foret. si ilia eoneludendl ratio ta lleret, (jiiae fundamentum omnium
.Syl!ogi>moruin allirmativorum tain evidenter prae se fe r t! Hoc argumcntum
utiqiie forinaliter bonum est:
O m n is sa p ie n s s n a sorte esl contentus,

P n u lu s s n a sorte esl contentus,
E . F a iiliis esl sa p ie n s.
x.xxi. Scd tallunt multa argnmcnta, v. gr. AVcisio d. c. 3, 3, adductum:
O m n is lejjus v iv il,
T u v iv is ,
E . In es lepus,
vcruin non fallunt ob aflirniationem pncinissarum, sed quia vel minor falsa est,
''il. jineilicatiiiii accipiatnr eodcin scnsii, quo in Majore siinitiiin est, vel
fjiiia a<l<iiiit (piatuor Icriiiiiii, si [irjedicatiim Minoris jiarticulariter et alio sensu
accipiatnr.
xxxii. Non po-'Uiit etiam vtilgo diflltcri, quin cx jniris aflirmativis ali-
qiiaiido quid sc(|iriiiir, \criiiii id non vi fnrmu sed innferia fieri caiisantiir, vide
riinan A0 7 . 1. 3 . 1 . .J. 4. lla- vcro c-t ])i-titio priiir-ipii, iiani qua- conveniunt
in lino ti-rtio. ilia etiam inter sc, coiivcnire debent, idque non fortuito, sed
viitntc iinioni- laudatfp, sen beneficio forime.
5 xxxiv. In U-rlia figiira (.3) Minor semper sit affirmaus. Ego tamen sic
reetc coii' liidi pos^c arbilror'
APPENDIX. 657
Qitoddam laitdandmn ist omnis virtns,

NuUiim Idiidnndiim est qiKednm m'ujnificentia,
E . qnccdam magnificentia non est rirtus.
XXXV. N ec valde urgent exeinpla opposita W eisius d. 1. 2, e. 4, 2, hoe

aflert:
Omnis homo nmbulat,
Niiltiis homo est porciis,
E . qiiidam porcus non ambulai,
nam reeurrlt responsio 22 data, (piae vel eonidnsionem falsam non esse, vel
causani falsitatis a qnatnor terminis dependere ostendit, qua; etiam locum ha-
beret, licet comdnsionem universalem, Nidlus porcus ambulat, assmnas.
xxxvi. Tandem (G) In tertia Jifjura condnsio semper sit particularis.
Veniin S}dIogisninm cum eonclusione universali, jam exhibni 13, in Exemplis
autem qua; vulgo aflTeruntur, v. gr.
Omnis senator est honoratus,

Omnis senator est homo (quidam scil.),
E , omnis homo est honoratus,
vide W eis. d. 1. 2, e. 4, 3, oeeurrunt quatiior termini (nam homo, in minore

partieulariter. In eonelu.sione universaliter snmitur), (jui adeo veram absurd
eonclusioiiis eausam, ac simnl regnhe vulgaris falsitatem ostendunt.
xxxvii. Ilia antem omnia, quic contra vulgarcs regulas hactcnus dlsputa-
vimns, non co pertinent, quasi rationem comdudendi rejiciendi.s regulis bine
inde confcctam omincndcinus, ita ut in denionstrationibns cadem nti,aiit valde
delectari debeainus. tjuiii omni jiotius eo spectant, nt Peripatetieos, qni for-
mam Syllogismorum essentialem vel omnino non vel niniis trigide exponunt, in
explicandis etiam eorum figiiris accidentalibns, fall! probarem.
xxxix. .\.t(nio ex hactenus dietis etiam intelligi potest, qn nostra de

lie.duetione sit sententia. Nimirum ex nostris hypothesibus ilia nihil aliud est,
(inam Sgllogismorum per omnes quutuor Jigurus accidentales, salva semper ron-
rlnsione, facta rarialio.
ij xl. Pertinct icifur ilia tantnni ad Preemissa, Syllogismus enim semper ut
iiistrunientnm veritafis inciuirend considerari. adeoque qnstio probanda,
qu semper iinmobilis sit. nec, pront visnm est, varietur, prsiipponi debet.
xli. Rediictionis unica Lex est, ut simpliciter, jiixta figiir indolem, pro]>-
ositioiies convertamiis. quod sine nlla difficiiltate procedit. diunmodo qnanti-
tatem snbjccti ct prdicati dcbite confidcremns, ceu ex iis qu de Conversione
diximus satis liquet.
xlii. " Fin is est, ut per ejnsmodi variationem. terminonim unioneni vel
separationcm co accuratins intelligamus, hinc omnis uti/itas rodnctioni non est
abjndicanda. si enim recte institnatnr, ingeniuin qnaiititati propositionnni
obscrvand inagis magisqne assuescit, ac inde etiam in penitiorem form essen-
tialis intelligentiam provehitur.
83
G5 S ArrKXDix.
xliii. Ill viilgorl lidhietione, qnm in libellis Ipgicis passim exponitiir, vide
Aiit. .-Ir/. i'o g . p. 3, c. 9. qiia'dom cxonqila repreliendi non debonl, (piando
V. g . C'tstin ad Ctlaren/ roilni'itur, nam ibi simplici conversione alicnjus jirojio-
sitionis doliingnntur, jnxta legem, qnam 41. rednotioni dedinnis.

xliv. Sod si ab illis exemplis abeas, parinii vel niliil est, qnod in eadeni
landari delieat, diiin fere <x falsis bypotliesibns oninis vediietio oritnr, nam
rnnversio j)er conlntpositionim priesupponitnr, qnam tamen valde duliiam esse,
supra ostendinuis, jmetorea pvridiares modi in singulis fignris adslrunntiii', ae
omnis rediietio ad primam Jiynrum iaeienda esse existimatur, cnm tamen idem
Syllogismns per omnes fignras variari qiieat.
xlv. Ipsa vero reduetio niillis legilnis adstricta est, convertitnr Con-
clnsio, transponnntnr Pnemissie, propositiones negativao nnitantnr in atTirma-
livas, atipie ita (jnidvis tontatur, modo lignra intenta ob'.ineatuv. (,Jno ijiso
puerilis error, quo Logica, pro arte eoneinnandi tres lineas, eascpie in varias
formas nnitandi liabctnr satis eliuet. Inojita seientia est, qu;e in verbis dispo-
nendis, eireiimagendis ant torcpiendis uniee, oeeiqiatnr.
^ xlvi. Jiixta luee igitnr, vulgari modo rediu-ere, maximam jiartem niliil
aliud est, qnam errorem errore tegere, irigenia diseentimn tonpiere, ac magno
conatu magnas nngas agere, inseitiamque professa opera ostendere. E d .]
IV. S vu L o o isT T C IM o o d s .
(p. 285 ).
1 . DIR EC T A X l) IN D IR E C T SIOODS.
<n) T I I E I R P l t l X C I P L E . - F I R S T A N T ) F O U R T H F I G U R E .
(Sec p. .302.)
Direct and Indirect Moods principle of. That the two terms should
hold the .same relation to each other in the conclusion tliat they generally liold
to the middle term in the jiremises. This deterniineil by tlie Question. This
constitutes direct, immediate, natural, orderly iiifi'rencc. \Vhon reversed, by
ConviTsiou, there emerges Indirect, mediate, unnatural, irregular inference.
In the two la.'t Figures (.Second and Third), the two terms hold the same
rclitien to the middle term in the premises; ergo, no indirect infiTtmcc, but
always two dire< t ( oneliisions jiossilde.
I l l the fiT't Figure, as the two terms are subordinated to each other In the
j i r e i n i s e s , one direct l oiieliisiou from jiremises, whether read in Fxttmsion or
( oiiiprelieiision, and, eonseqnently, an indinu't one also, the First Figure

tieiiig fiP't figure iu Fxteiisivc (jiiaiitlty : tlie Fourth Figure being first figure in
(/'omjirelieiisive ipiantity. Illreet and indirect moods in each.
1. Plunder aliont definition of major and minor terms by logicians (for
wliieh Ari'lotle not resjionsible), caiiAC of fancy of a Fourth Figure, eonsti-
tutei] liy indirect moods in eomprelionsion.
I '- If; s|a |,I ( , V I'7- ;l A n n n u ili'r s h n iis in f 'a i j i a r i P o s n 'r i P r o f. P u b . .Tenm . 1C5G, L,-
r o m p m 'h u m D iip T n n im I) . O m r a iJ i I J o r n 'i i , ii i. c. v i i i . ] .
n u n r p r i m u m e x A u r .l o r u A u l o g r a j d io e d ita : c u r a
A r i !: N D I X . 059
2. That prcdieate could have no prcfinitlon, and, tlierefore. tliough tlu'v

allowed its eonversc, the direct inferenee was not sidfered. This in I'apesnio,
FriSesino (these alone, by some logieians, admitted in the First Figure), and
Fesapo and Fresison in Fourth, or Comprehensive First.'
3. That major proposition, that whieh is placed first.
Fonrth Figure. Thc First Figure, and that alone, is capable o f being
enonneed in two orders, those o f Breadth and o f Depth. It is exaeth' the
same syllogism in eitlier order; and, wliilc the order o f Depth was usually
employed by the Greeks, Orientals, aud older Latins, that of Fjreadth has been
the eonunon, if not the o.xelnsive, mode of enonneeinent among tlie western
logieians, .since tlie time of Boethius. In either lorm tliere are tints four direct
moods, aud five indirect in all nine moods; and if the Figure he held to
comprise, the moods o f either form, it will have eighteen moods, as in fact is
allowed by some logieians, and, among others, by iMendoza (/hV/i. L<kj. it Mit.
T. I. p]). 51.5, 51f)). Alartianus Cajiella (/ Siji'n ii .\r.ihus Lilwrnlihus. L. iv..
Do. Didlictica, in eaji. Q iiiil sil Pricilica.'lrus Syllni/i. miis see p. G39) slates and
allows either form, bnt, like his eontenijioraries, Greek and Latin, he emjiloys
ill his examjiles the order of Dejith.
Now, mark the caprice of tlie logicians of the West suliseipieiitto Boethius.
Overlooking (iitirely the four direct moods in tlie order of Dejith, which they
did not employ, as the eonelnsion would, in these eases, liave been ojijiosed to
their owji order; lliey seized njioii the five indirect moods of the order of
Depth, as this afforded a eonelnsion eorresponding to their own, and consti
tuted it, thus limited, into a Fourth Figure.
Did not make two forms of First Figure.
An indirect eonelnsion is in subjeet aud jiredicate the reverse of a direct:
opjiosod, therefore, to the order o f jiredieation marked out by the premises
which the direct conclusion exclusively follows. An indirect eonelusiou (wliat
the logieians liave not observed) is an inference from the direct eonelusiou.
and, tlierefore, one mediate from the jiremises.
(6) M OO DS O F F O U R T H F IG U R E R E D R E S S E D .
(Earlv jiaper previous to 1S44. Later signs of quantity substituted. E n.)
I. Bamalip, only Barbara with transjiosed premises a^d converted con

clusion.
(2) AU irons arc (soiiir) mctats;
(1) AU iiiitals an {sonic) minerals;
AU irons arc (some) minerals.
1 [Tlint foiirtli F igu re dilTers from first on ly Dialect., Lib. ii. c. vi. art. x i. p391. and art.
by trim.'po.'itioii o f rrcnii?e.. held b y Dc- iv. p. 8S5 (1G35). Kidigov, De Senstt Vrri el
lo d o ii, Loffica Re.ctitiita, i>. OOG. ('anuM'iirius. F a k i, ii. 6, 36. Crusiu!-, U6g Znr Geicisc/ieil.
Dispiiiatione.'i Iliiliisopliicn-. tli.'p. i. qu. 13, p. ( 3.3;j, p. 606. Tlrtrier, Pkilosophische Aphoris-
111), t araim icl, Aal. fl R ial P h il. Di.sp. x ii. w fii. i. ^ 554, p. 267 ]
p. 45. Xvcuxus. h ite g . P hil.. E lfm e iiln L o g ir ts , 2 But see ( oiilarcm is. D e Q iiarta F igura
!Sect. iii 3, p. 29. C aiupanella, P hil. R a t. S y llo g ., Oj>era, p. 235. E d .
660 ATPEXDIX.
(B y conversion.)
S o m e m in era ls are (a ll) irons.
A: C
{Minerals) , ' -.(Metals), :(Irons).

(Rodres.scd)
II. Calemes, only Celarent with transposed premises and converted con
clusion.
(2) A l l s n a ils a re {some) m oU usca;
(1) N o m oUuscum is a n y in s e c t;
N o s n a il is a n y insect.
(B y conversion.)
N o insm d is a n y s n a il.
, B: :0
(Insect):
III. Dimatis, only Darii Avith transposed premises and conA'crted oonclu-
eion.
(2) So m e sta rs are {some or a ll) p la n e ts ;

( 1) A l l plainLs a re some th in g s m o vin g ro u n d su n ;
So m e sta rs a re som e th in g s m o vin g ro u n d su n ;
(I>y conversion.)
S om e th in g s r m v in g ro u n d sun a r e some sta rs.
( Movinej round S u n ), -.(Plnnets) ,, n , (Stars)

(Redressed)
ATPEXDIX. 6 6 1
IV . Fesapo [Felapos].*
(2) N o a r te r y is a n y v e in ;
(1) A l l veins arc (som e) bloodvessels;
N o a r te r y is (som e) bloodvessel
(B}' eonvei'sion.)
S o m e bloodvessel is no a rtery.
A:-4
(Bloodvessels) , * ; ( Vein) : - '.(Artery

(Redressed)
V. Fresison [Frelilos].
(2) N o m uscle is a n y n e r v e ;
(1) S o m e nerves a re (som e) ex p a n sio n on h a n d ;
N o m uscle is (som e) ex p a n sio n on ha n d .
(B y conversion.)
S om e ex p a n sio n on h a n d is no m uscle.
(Expansion on hand), , (Nerve) : ; (Muscle)

(Redressed)
+
(March 1846.) My universal law o f Figured Syllogism excludes the
Fourth Figure. What worse relation o f suhject and predicate suhsi.sts hetween
either o f two terms and a common third term with which one, al least, is positively
related: that relation subsists between the hvn terms themselves. What relation,
etc.; that relation, etc. Now, in Fourth F'lgure this is violated ; for the jiredi-
eate and subject notions, relative to the middle term in the premises, are in the
conclusion turned severally into their opposites by relation to each otlier. This
cannot, however, in fact be ; and, in reality, there is a silently siipiiressed con
clusion, from which there is only given the converse, but the conversion it.self
ignored.
1 Zab nrella, Opera Logira h e Qunttn Fig . r e du c e s t o F a p e s m o an i n d ir e c t m o o d o f

Syll. pp. l i s , 119, 125. B u r g e r s d y k , I ns til . F i r s t ; t liu s v i o l a t i n g t h e rule o f t h a t F i g -
Lo g ., L . ii. c. 7, p. 167, r e ver se s p r e m i s e s a n d ure.
b02 APPF.N'DIX.
Fonrtli Figiirc. Ixoasons against.

1. Conid never directly, naturally, Il'acli (a) Conclusion from premise,
or (1) l*reim>es tVom qiuesitum.
2^, All otlier figures conversion o f premises of First, but, by conversion of
com liision (as it is), no new figure.
.p^. All otlier figures have one eonclnsion Fourth a converted one, often
ditlerent.
(March 18.)0.) Fourth Figure. The logicians who attempt to show the
pervcr>ion in this figure, by sjteaking o f liiglier and lower notions, are extra-
ln_dcal. Logie knows nothing o f higher and lower out of its own terms; and
any notion imiy be -iubjcct or jiredicate o f any other by the restriction of its
exteii'ion. Logic must show the jverv ersion in this Figure ex fncie sylloglsmi,
or it inu't ^taml good. On true reason, why no Fourth Figure, see Aristotle,
A iiiil. P r.. L. i. c. 23, S, ami Iacius, in Commcntari/.
(M arch IK.30.) Ftsopn and Fresko (al.-ô Fajie.Diw, Frisesmo) proceed on

the immediate inference, unnoticed by logicians, that tlie (juantities, apart from
tbe terms, may, in jirojvositions I/iA and A n /, be converted.
Averroes fui P rio r Andhjlirs. B. i. Ch. S.

If we ask wlieiher A be in C, and say that A is in C, because A is in B.
and B in C : in this ease, tliere is a natural syllogism by general confession;
and tlli^ in the First Figure.
In like manner. If we say that A is not in C. because B is in C, and B Is
not in A ; it is jilain that we collect that conelusion by natural process; and
thi- It the .Second Figure, wliidi is freijuently found employed by men in their
ordinary discourse.
In like in uiner, also, if we say that A is in C, because A and C are in B ;
that syllogi>m is also natural to us, and is tlie Tliird Figure. But if we say A
i' in C. becaii'O C is in B. and B in A ; the reasoning is one which no one
wonhl naiiirally imike, for the reason that the (jua'.'itiiin (that is, C to be in
\ ) does not hence follow the process being that in which we say A is in C,
since A is in B, and B in C; and this is something which thought would not
perform, unless in ojijiosition to nature. From this it is manifest that the
Fourth Figure, o f which Galen makes mention, is not a syllogism on wliicli
tbom.dit would naturally light (etc.). Thereafter follows a digression against
this fiLoirc. .See al.so tlie same book, Cli. 23d, and the Epitome, by Averroes,
of the same, Cli. i.
(C) FOVHTH FIGUItF.- M'TllOIHTIES FOR AND AGAINST.
.\dm ittcd by
IldcfonMi' 'li I'cnaficl, C'nrsns Philosophirus, D kp. Snmmiil. D. iii. p. 39.
Ci. CairicrariiK, JJiyiut. Philos., B. i. q. xili. j). 116. Port Poyol Logie, j>. iii.
. X. and r. 4. Bidlger, De Sensu ]'eri et Falsi, I,, ii. c. G, 3G. Ilauschius in
Aefa Fro//. J}. i7<> el .seg. Llj)s. 1 728. Noldius, I.oglcn Jlecognita, e. \n p.
277. Crr.kantliorjic, F-. iii. c. xv. p. 1 94 (omitfed, but defended). Lam-
b<Tt, Xew < (Jrgonon, I. 237 el seq. Iloffbaucr, Aunlylik der Urlheile und
APPENDIX. 663
Schlusse, 138. Twcsteii, Loylk, Insbesohdrre die Anahjtlk, % \ \ b. Leibnitz.

Opera, ii. 357 ; v. 405 ; vi. ilO , 217, ed. Dntcns. Oddiis de Oddis (v. Con-
tareniis, Xoii D a ri Quart. Fi<j. SylL, Opera Omnia, j). 233, ed. A'enet, 1589).
I
Rejected by
Averrocs, In An. Prio r, L. i. c. 8. Zabarella, Opera Loejiva, De Quarta
F iy . SylL. p. 102 et seep riircbot, Instit. 1 hil. T. I. J.oej. P. iii. c. iii. j). DJ!.
jMolinauis, Elcmenta Loyica, L. i. c. viii. Faeeiolati, lludimenta Lnyira. I, iii.
e. iii. p. 85. Scaynns, Paraphrasis in Oryan., p. 574. Tiinpler, J.oylea: Sys-
tema, L.-iv. e. i <pi. 13, j). 543. Platncr, Philusophische .Aphorismen, I. ]). 207.
Burgcrsdicins, Instit. Lay. L. ii. c. vii. p. 105. Dc-rodon, Rcstitnla, p.
600. Wolf, P h il Rat., 343 et seej. (Ignored.) Hollinann, Loyica, 453, p.
509. Goclenins. Prahhnnitu Loyica, P. iv. p. 119. Keekerniann, O pera,!!. 1.
Syst. Luy. Lib. iii. c. 4, p. 745. Arriaga, Cursus Philusophivus, In Sunimidas,
D. iii. 5, p. 24. Aristotle, An. Prior, i. e. 23, 8 ; c. 30, 1 (omitted). Jo.
Picus IMiranduIamis, Conclusiones, Ojeera, p. 88. Melanchtlion. in 1st edition
of Dialectic, I>. iii., D e Fiyuratione (1520). afterwards (154 7) restored (H eu-
manni, Acta, iii. 753). Cardiiialis Caspar Contareiuis, Epistolu ad Oddiun de
Oddis, De Quart. F iy . SylL, Opera, p. 233 (1st ed., 1571) Trendelenburg,
Elementa Loyica, 28, etc. Flerbart, Lehrbuch der Loyik, Einleit. 3, 71.
Ilegel, Encyclopddie, 187. Fries, System der Loyik, 57 b. Griepenkerl,
I.ehrbnch der Loyik, 29 et seq. Drobisch, Loyik, 77, ]). 70. allis, Institu-
tio Loyicce, Is. iii. c. ix. p. 179.
II. IN D IR E C T JIOO DS OF SECOND AND TH IRD FIG U R E S .^
F ro m (II. F ig .)
i. /C esare Jlejiexim ; (1, 2, 5, 8, 9 .)- Cesares.
ii. C am estres Befle.rim; (2, .5, 8, 9.) C amcstre, Cam estres, Faresm o
(on ly subaltern o f C a m estres); rejected (2), adm itted
(3, G.)
Festino Preniises reversed; (2, 3, 4, 5, G, 1, 8, 9.) Firesm o,
Frige ros.
iv. Baroco P rem ises reversed; (2, 5, 7, 8, 9 .) B oeardo, M oracos,
Foraiiieiio.
(III. F ig.)
i. Darapti Reficxim; (1, 2, 3, 4, 10, 11.)
ii. Felapton P rem ises transposed ; (4, 5, G, 7, 8, 9, 11.) Fapem o,
F ap elinos.
iii. /D isa m is Reflexim; (4, 7, 10, 11.)
iv . ''D atisi Refipxim; (4, 7, 10, 11.)
v. Boeardo P rem ises transposed; ( 4 , 7 ,9 , 1 1 .) B aroco, M acopos,
D aiiorcoc.
vi. Ferison Prem ises transposed; (4, 5, 6 ,7 , 8, 9, 11.) Frisem o,
Fiscros.
I The indirect Moods of the First Fipture 2 The numbers within bractcets refer to the
are universally admitted. authorities giveu ou following page. E d .
664 A r p i: X D I X .
( I I . F ig .)
1. M a r t. CajK-Ila C c sarc, rrfiexim.
n u ll s S c o tu s C e s a ie a n d C a m e s tr e s , c o n c lu s io n s s im p l i c o n v e r t e d ;
F e s tiiio a n d B a ro c o . R e je c ts (a iu l r ig l itl y ) w h a t
lia s .<iiice liceii c a lle d I 'a r c s m o , a s a m e r e s u b a lt e r n
o f C .m ie s tie s (.4 . P r . L. i. q n . 23. S e e a ls o C o n im -
b r ic e iis e s . I n x lr is t. D ia l. I I. p . 3G2).
3. I x iv a u ic iis c s , (153.5) F a r e s m n , F ir e s m o .
4. P a c iiis , (1.5S1) F ir e s m o (o n A n . P r . L . i. c. 7, a n d r e l a ti v e p la c e o f h is
Com. Auai.).
5. C o iiiiiib r ic e n s e s R e c o rd t h a t in d i r e c t m o o d s fro m C e s a r c a n d C a m c s -
tr c s ; a u d a ls o F r is e s o , B o c a r d o w e r e a d m i t t e d b y
s o m e r c c c iit io r c s ( I I . ]i. 3 6 2).
B u r g c r s d ic iu s , (1G2G) F a r e s n io , F ir e s m o .
C a r a in n e l, (1 0 1 2 ) J l o r a c o s , F r ig c s o s . .
S. S c lie ib le r, (1G.53) C e.sarcs, C a m e s tr e s , F ir e s m o , B o c a r d o .
9. N o ld iu s , (IGGG) C e s a r e s , C a m e s tr c , F ir e s m o , F o r a in e iio (h e h a s fo r
th e d ir e c t m o o d F a c r o n o , in p la c e o f B a r o c o ).
( I I I . F ig .)
1. A p u le iu s D a r a p ti , reflexim.
2. C a s s io ilo r u s D o.
3. ' Is o d o ru s D o.
4. D u n s S e o tu s D a r a p t i , D is a m is , a n d D ati.si, t h e i r c o n c lu s io n s s im p ly
c o n v e rte d ; F c la iito n , B o c a rd o , F e r is o ii { S u p . An.
P r. L . i. q u . 2 1 ).
.5. L o v a n ic n s c s F a p e m o , F r is c n io ( ib .) .
G. P a c iii- F a p e n i o , F r is c n io ( ill.).
7. C o n iin b r ic e n s e s R e c o rd tl ia t s o m e " r e c e n tio r c s a d m i t i n d i r e c t m o o d s

f r o m D a r a p t i , D is a m is , D a ti s i ; a ls o F a p c s m o , F ri-
se sm o , a n d B aro c o .
8. B u r g c r s d ic iu s F a p e m o , F r is e m o .
'*. C a ra m iic l F a p e l m o s , M a c o p o s , F is c ro s .
10. S c h c i b le r A d m it s tlie iii fro iii D is a m is , D a tis i, D a r a p ti , b u t n o t

fro m th o s e w liie h c o iie lu d e p a r t i c u l a r n e g a tio n s .
11. N o ld iu s D a n o r e o c ( h e h a s fo r B o c a r d o D o e a m r o c ) , F r is e m o ,
F apem o, and w h a t a re c o n v e rt e d fro m D a r a p ti ,
D is a m is , a n d D .atisi w ith o u t n a m e s .
D a r a p ti v ir tita lly tw o m o o d s ; th i s m a in ta in e d b y T h c o -
p h ra -in -.
Indirect inood.s arc impossible in tlic Second and Third Figures, for what are
called indirect contdusions are only the direct oomdtisioiis. M e m . , that in the
Second Ceare and Camestres are virtually o n e ; wliile in the Third Figure
Darajiti is virtually two, as Disamis and Datisi are one.
APPENDIX. 665
For tlie particular (iiiautificatioii of the Predicate, useful illustrations, as in

the First from Fapesmo, Frisesiuo, or (in the jisendo Fourth) from Fesapo
and Fresiso; so in the Second Figure of what liave been called the indirect
moods of Figure II.
F igure II.
1. Boeardo. A , J :B , :C
2. Firesmo. A , ,B ; h- :C
1. Baroco.
2. Fapemo. A, : B : ^ : C
3. Frisemo. A, ,,B : /-L :C
(1853.) Blunders of Logicians. W hat have been called the Indirect Moods
of the Second and Third Figures, arise only from the erroneously supposed
transposition o f the premises ; and the Fourth Figure is made uji of the really
indirect moods o f the First Figure, with the premises transposed.
III. NEW MOODS N O T E S UPON TABLE OF S Y LLO G ISM S .*
Fig. I. v i. Corvimis (Institiitiones Philosophke Rationalis, 1742, 540)

says: There sometimes appears to be an inference from pure partiLiilars.
For example. Some learned are [some] amhitious men ; some men are [all the]
learned; therefore, some men are amlntioiis. B ut the minor proposition,
although formally particular, involves, however, a universal, to ivlt, its con
v erse, AU the learned are [some] men, which Is e(|uipollont. W^hv not,
then, scientifically enounce (as I bave done), without conversion, what the
thought o f tlie convertend already really and vulgarly involved ?
In all Figures. I have not been iindoubtfiil whether the syllogisms of tlie
class in wliieh the two premises, being the same, are mutually interchangeable,
slionld be regarded as a single or as a double mood. .Abstractly considered
from all matter, the mood is single; for the two premises, however arranged,
1 See A p p e n d i .x X I . E d .
84
666 APPENDIX.
affbixl oiilv a ropotition o f the .same form. Bnt so soon as tlie form is applied to
anv matter, be it even o f a symbolieal abstraetion, tbe distiiietion o f a double
mooil emerges, in the jio.ssihle interchange o f thc now two distinguished
premises. To the logicians this (jiiestion was only presented in the case of
Darajiti (111. ii.) ; and on this they wi-re divided. Aristotle (.In. P r. i. c. G,
G) cnntt'mplates only one mood; bnt his successor, Theojihrastns, admittcil
two (.Vpidcius, Ih Hub. Poi'tr. Platonis, L. iii. Up. p. 38, Elm). Aristotles
ojiinion was overtly preferred by .Vle.xander (ad locum, f. 30, ed. .Aid. quoted
above, p. C3G), and by .Apuleius (I. r.) ; whilst that o f Theophrastus was
adopted by Porphyry, in his lost commentary on the P rio r Anuli/Ucs, and,
thou_di not without hesitation, by Boethius (l)c Syll. Catcg. L. ii.. Op. p]i. 594,
598, GUI. Got). 'I'he other Greek and Roman logicians silently follow the
master: from whom, in more modern times. A alia (to say notliing of others)
onlv differs, to redneo, on the eounter-extrenu', Cesarc and Camestres (II. i.x.
a, and x. h), and. he might have added, Disamis and Datisi (III. iv. v.), to a
single mood (/A Dud.. L. ii. e. 51). (F or the observations of the Apbrodisian,
see above, p. 033 d scg.)
To me it apjicars, on refleetion, right to allow in Darapti only a single
mood ; because a second, sinqily arising through a first, and through a transpo
sition, has, therefore, merely a secoiulary, correlative, and dependent existence.
In this respei-t all is different with Cesare and Camestres, Disamis, and Datisi.
d'he principle here applies in my doctrine to thc whole class o f syllogisms with
balanced middle and extremes.
Fig. II. xii. b. David Derodon (Lag. Rest. De Arg.. e. ii. 51), in canvass
ing the special rule of tlie Second F ig u re , that tlie major jiremise should bc
universal, he now ajiprobates, he now reprobates syllogisms ot this mood;
bnt wrong on both altcrnativi*s, for his admissions and rejections are cfjually
erroneous. llie syllogismus non v a le t I/iV/hoJ animal est laligiiod] ration
al : srd [ uII ik ] asinus non est [nilus] rationalis ; ergo lidlns] osinus non est
[arupuxl] anim al: (P . C35.) The syllogism is valid: only it involves a prin
ciple whicli Derodon, with the logicians, would not allow, that in negatives
the predicate could be jiarticnlar. (.See Log. Rest. De Argument, c. ii. 28, ji.
023.) Y et almost immediately thereafter, in assailing the rule, he says : At
mnlti dantur s\ llogismi eonstantes majori partieulari, qui tamcn siint r ec ti;
ut, Allipiod animal non csl lajiis ; sed [e/im/sj adanias est (^riltguis]
la jiis ; ergo, \_ullits] adaiitas non est [^rdiguoil] animal. ( l l i i s sy llogism is,
indeed, 11. iii. a ; but lie goes on :) Item : Alupiod animal est laliguod]
rationale; sed [af/as] lajiis non est \_nllns] rationalis ; ergo [(///as] lapis non est
(ali'puiif] animal." Now, tliese two syllogisms are both bail, as inferring what
Deroiloii thinks they do infer, a negative conclusion, with, o f course, a
di-,tribiited jiredicate (ji. 023) ; are both good, as inferring what 1 sujipose
them to infer, a negative conclusion with an undistributed jiredicate.
Fig. III. viii. b. Deroilon (Ibid. 54), in considering the Special Rule
o f the 'Fliinl Figure, that the minor premise should be affirmative, alleges
the following s\llogism as virio ns: ''Otnnis homo est \_aiupiod] anim al; sed
Julius] homo non est [a//u.i] asinus; ergo, asinus non est [_ulujuod]
APPENDIX. 667
anim al (p. C.38). It is a virtuou.s syllogism, with a jiarticular iiredioate

(and not a miivcrsal, as one logician imagines) in a negative eonelusion.
Again (omitting his reasoning, whieh is inept), he jiroceeds : llie vero
syllogismus noil est vitiosus, sed reetus: homu est [r/i/iWritii] rationalis,
sed [u//((.s]/(o/ao non est [a/Za.s] asinus [or iJcus'j ; ergo, [//us] asmus [or Deusj
non est [_qnidam'] rationalis. This syllogisin is indeed correct; but not as
Derodon would liave it, with a distributed jiredicate in the eonelnsioii. That
his conclusion is only true o fth e asinus, per accidens, is shown by the substitu
tion o f the term J)(us ; this showing his illation to be formally absurd.
Fig. III. ii. Derodon (Ibid.) saj s : Denique, conclusioiiem in tertia
figura debere esse jiarticularem, non universalcm, statuunt eommuiiiter Philos-
ojihi; unde hie syliogisinus non valet; 'Omnis homo est [r/mV/ro/i] rationalis;
sed omnis homo est [^quodilam'] anim al; ergo, omne \_quoddam~\ animal est [^/juod-
d(tnf\ j'ationule. Veriim, licet eonelusio sit unieersalis, syllogismus erit bonus,
modo, etc. (p. 038). The syllogism is, and must remain, vicious, if the subject
and predicate of the conclusion be taken universally, whilst both are undis
tributed in the antecedent. But if taken, as they ought to be, in the conelnsion
parlieularly, the syllogisin is good. Derodou, in his remarks, jiartly overlooks,
partly mistakes, the vice.
Derodon, criticizing the Special Rule o f the First Figure, that the major
Jiremise should be universal, says, inter alia : At multi dantur syllogisini
jirinne figura; eonstantes majori particulari, qui tamen sunt recti; ut, 'Aliquod
animal est [idiquod'] I'atiunale ; sed homo est laliquod] anim al; ergo, [!!] homo
est [((/(V/m'.v] rationalis': item, etc., etc. (p. 027). This syllogism is vicious ;
the middle term, animal, being particular iu both its quantifications, affords no
inference.'
XI.
L O G IC A L n o t a t io n .
(See p. 215.)
I. L a m b e r t s L i .v e a r N o t a t i o n .^
This very defective, indeed, almost as bad as possible. It has accordingly

remained unemjiloyed by subsequent logicians; and although I think linear
diagrams do afford tlie best geometrical illustration of logical forms, I havc
found it necessary to adopt a method ojiposite to Lamberts, in all that is
peculiar to him. I have been unable to adojit, unable to improve, anything.
1. Indefinite or jiarticular notions can only be rcjiresented by the relation
1 Se e p. 559. E d . t h e s c h e m e s o f L a m b e r t a n d En ter , see S

F o r L a m b e r t s sc li e m e o f n o t a t i o n , see his M a i m o n . Yersuch einer neuen Log ik , S e c t. iv^
Neiies Organon, I. 21; a n d for a c r it ic i s m o f 7, p. 64 et seg. B e r l i n , 1794. E d .
GG8 a p p e n d ix .
of two linos, and in two ways : 1. One being greater than the other; 2, One
being partially out of relation to thc other. Instead of this, Lambert professes
to paint partimilarity by a dotted line, i. e., a line different by an accidental
(juality, not by an essential relation. But not even to this can he adhere, for
the same nolion, the same line, in different relations, is at onee universal and
Jiarticular. Accordingly, in Lamberts notation, the relation o f particular
notions is represented soinotimcs by a continuous, sometimes by a dotted line,
or not represented at all. (.'See below. 1*, 1. 2, 3, 4, 5.)
2. The ineonsisteney is seen al all climax in thc case o f the predicate in
anirmatives. where that term is particular. In Lamberts notation it, however,
shows in general as distributed or universal ; but in this he has no constancy.
(See 1*, 1, 2. 3, 4 ) Bnt the ease is even more absurd in negative propositions,
whore thc jiredicate Is really taken in its whole extent, and yet is, bj the dot
ted line, detcrminately marked as particular (S ee 4.)
3, The relation o f negativity, or exclusion, is professedly represented by
Lambert in one line beyond, or at thc side of, another. This requires
room, and is clumsy, but is not positively erroneous ; it does express e.xclu-
sion. But his aflirmative projiositions are denoted by two unconnected lines,
one lielow the other. This is jiositively wrong; for here the notions arc equally
out o f the other, as in the lateral collocation. But even in this he is inconsist
ent; for he as often expresses the relation o f negativity by lines in thc relation
o f higher and lower. (S ee below, 1, 4.)
4. He attempts to indicate the essential relation o f thc lines by the fortuitous
annexation of letters, the mystery o f which I have never fathomed.
5. H e has no order in thc relation of his lines.
The middle term is not always thc middle line, and there is no order between
thc extremes.
This eould not indeed be from his method o f notation ; and except it be ex
plained by the affixed letters, no one eonld discover in his lines the three com
pared notions In a .syllogism, or gncss at thc conclusion inferred. (S ec 1 5.)
G, From jiovcrty the same diagram is cmiiloyed to denote the most dlilerent
moods in aflirmaiive and negative. (Compare 2 and 3 with 4.)
7, Xo order in the terms in the same figure.
8, Ineomjilcte. Lambert can rejiresent ultra-total, etc., included in aflirma
tive, but not ultra-total excluded in negative. Has thc merit of noticing this
relation.
9, Lambert bnt it is needless to proceed. W hat has been already said,
-hows that Lamberts scheme of linear notation is. In its jiarts, a failure, being
onlv a eorriijition o f the good, and a hlmidering and incongruous jumble o f
the natural and eonveiitional. 'riie only marvel is, how so able a mathcmati-
eiaii should have jirojioiinded two such worthless mathematical methods. But
Lamberts geometrical is worse even than algebraic nottition.
To vindicate what I have said, it will be enough to (jnote his notation o f thc
moods o f the Third Figure (I. p. 133), which I shall number for the previous
references.
APPENDIX. 669
III. F tguke.
I.* Darapti. . . . . C---------- c . . . .

M ------m
. . .. B-----------b . . . .
1. Felapton. M ------- m C ------- c

B---------- b ................
2. Disamis. B---------------b
U ----------- m
. . . C ..................
3. Datisi. C----------- c
M ----------- m
. . B ......................
4. Boeardo. B-------------------b
M ----------- m
C
5. Ferison. M------ m C ------- c

. . B ............................
II. N o t a t i o .n by M a a ss.
Professor Maass, o f H alle, discontented, not vinreasonably, with the geomet

rical notations o f Lambert and Euler, lias liimself proposed another, conijiared
with whieh those o f his predecessors show as absolutely perfect. It will be
sufficient to despatch this scheme with a very few remarks. To use it is wholly
impossible ; and even the ingenious author himself has stated it towards the
conclusion of his Logic ( 4 9 5 512), in the course o f whieh it is not (if I recol
lect aright) honored with a single reference. It is, however, curious, as the only
attempt made to illustrate Logic, not by the relations of geometrical quantities,
but by the relations o f geonieti ieal relations angles.
1, Il is fundamentally wrong in principle. For example, Maass proposes
to represent eoinelusive notions notions, therefore, to be thought as the same
by the angles o f a triangle, whieh cannot possibly be imaged as united ; for
surely the identity o f the concept>. triangle, trilateral, and figure with angles
equal to (wo riqht angles, is not illumined by awarding each to a separate corner
of the figure. On the contrary, coexclusive notions he represents by angles in
similar triangles, and these can easily be conceived as superposed. The same
may be said o f coordinates. But, waiving the objection that the different angles
of a figure, as necessarily thought out o f each other, are incapable o f typifying,
by their coincidence, notions to be thought as eoinelusive, it is further evident
that the angles o f an equilateral triangle cannot naturally denote reciprocal or
1 Gn indriss der Lngi k. 1793 I quote from d o o f J I a o s s s c h e m e o f n o t a t i o n ; for his

t h e fo ur th e d i t i o n , 1823. I r e g re t t h e ne c e s- Logi c is o n e o f t h e bes t c o m p e n d s p u b lis h ed
sit y i m p o s e d o n m e o f s p e a k i n g in th e w a y I e v e n in G e r m a n y .
670 AprENDix.
wholly idontical notions, in contrast to others partially identical; for every angle
o f everv triainjle infers, necessitates, contains, if you will, the whole of
every otlier, eipially as do the several angles o f an e<|uilateral triangle.
2, But Maass is not consistent. l ie pives, for instance, a triangle (1 ig. 12)
to illn-irate the subordination o f one notion to another; and yet he reiirescnts
the lower or contained notion by an obtuser, the higher or containing notion
by an acnter, angle.
3. 'I'lie scheme is nninanifest, in fact, nothing can bc less obtrusive. It
illustrates the obscure Ity the obscure, or, rather, it oliscures the clear. Keqiiir-
iiu: itself a painful study to compreliend Its import (if comprehended it be),
iu>tc;ul of informing the understanding tlirough tlie eye, it at best only addresses
the eve through the uiiderstandliig. D Itlieult; we only regret that it had
not bi'cn iiiqiossiblo.
4, It is clumsv, opcrose, eoinple.x, and supcrfliions. For, to re])rcsent a
notion denoted by a single angle, it is conqiellcd to give the redundance o f a
wliole triangle ; and three repugnant notions demand an aijiaratns of three
several futures, and six vacant angles. In fact, the only manifestation to which
tliis sclieme o f angles can jiretcnd, is borrowed from tlie scheme o f figures
which it projioses to supersede.
5, It is wholly dependent upon the accidents of foreign aid. To let It work
at all. it calls in to its a'sl>tance an indefinite jilnrality of figures, a Greek and
Latin alplinbet, combinations o f letters straight and deflected, and an assort-
ment o f lines, thick and tliin, plain and dotted. I have counted one diagram
of the eighteen, and find that it is brought to bear through three varieties of
line, four triangles, and eleven letters.
It is needless to enumerate its other faults, its deficiencies, excesses, ambigu
ities, e tc .; transeal in pace.
III. T he A u t i i o u .s N o t a t i o n .
N O . I. LI.N EAK
The notation previously spoken o f represents every various syllogism in all

the accidents of Its c.xternal form. But as the nmnbcr o f Moods in Syllogi.sms
Analytic ami Synlhclic, Intensive and E.xtensivc, Unfignrcd and Figured (and
o f thi- in all tlic fignn-s), are the sam e; and as a reasoning, essentially identi
cal. inav l.e carried tlirfiiigli the same numerical mood, in every genus and
qiccic ol syll<><_risin. it sccins, a.s wc should wish it, that ilicrc must be po.ssible,
al'O, a notation jirccl-clv nianifcsliiig the modal process, in all its essential dif-
fcr. ncc-. blit, at tic 'ainc lime. In its internal idonlily, abstract from every acx-i-
(li-nlal varict\' fif external fitrni. The anticipation and wish arc realized, and
n- ilizcd with the iitnio'-l clearness and sinqilicity, in a notation which fulfils, and
ilo H- tnllll', the-c conditions. This notation 1 have long cinjiloycd ; and the two
I'ollowiii'.'aif 'pi-i-iiiK'ns. IIcrciri, four I'onimon lines arc all the rc(|iilsilc.s : three
(horizoiitid) lo deiioO- the t(rms ; one (two ? perjieiidieiilar), or the want of it,
at the eommen -emeiit of eoninarison, to e.xjiress the (pirihli/ o f aflirmation or
of negation : whil.-l ip/nntili/ i.s marked by the relative length of a terminal
1 .See T a b u l a r fjclicjiK ; a l t l i e e n d o f t l i e p r c H e i it v o l u m e . E d .
APPENDIX. G71
line -witliin, and its indefinite exenrrenee before, the limit of comparison. This
notation can represi'iit equally total and ultra-total distribution, in simple Syllo
gism and in Sorites ; it shows at a glance tho rompetence or incompetence of any
eonelnsion ; and every one can easily evolve it.
O f these, the former, with its converse, includes Darii, Dabitis, Datisi, Disa
mis, Diniaris, e tc .; whilst the latter, with its converse, includes Celarent, Cesare,
Celanes, Camestres. Canudes, etc. But of these, those whieli are represented
by the same diagram are, though in ditferent figures, formally the same mood.
For ill this scheuie, moods of the thirty-six each has its peculiar diagram;
whereas, in all the other gconietrieal schemes hitherto jiroposed (whether by
lines, angles, triangles, sijuares, parallelograms, or eiirles), the same (complex)
diagram is necessarily employed to represent an indefinite plurality of moods.
These schemes thusêiid rather to complicate than to exjilieate, rather to
darken than to clear up. The principle o f this notation may be realized in
various forms.'
The problem, in general, is to manifest, by the differences and relations of

geometrical quantities (lines or figures), the differences and relations o f logieal
forms. Tlie comparative excellence o f any seheine in solution o f this jiroblein
will he in jirojiortioii as it is. 1, Easy : 2, Siinjile; 3, Compendious; 4, A ll
sufficient; 5, Consistent; G, M anifest; 7, P recise; 8, Complete.
In the scheme proposed by me,
1, I denote terms or notions by straight lines ; and, as a syllogism is consti
tuted b}- three related notions, it will, of course, be represented by three re
lated lines.
2, I indicate the correlation of notions by the order and parallel coexten
sion of lines. (Tho perpendicular order and horizontal extension, here
adopted, is arbitrary.)
3, Lines, like notions, are only immediately related to those with which
they stand in jiroximity. H ence the interine(liate line in onr diagram, repre
senting the middle term of a syllogism, is in direct relation with the lines
rei'rescnting the extremes, whereas the latter are only in mutual correlation
throuLdi it.
4, The relative quantity o f notions is expressed by the comparative length
of the related lines. In so far as a lino commences (here on the left) before
another, it is out of relation with it, is indefinite and unknown. Where a
line terminates under relation (liere towards the right), it ceases alisolutely to
be. A line beginning and ending in relation indicates a whole notion. A
hue liceiuiiiii'T
C , O before or endingO after its correlative indicates a iiart
* of a
iiocion.
1 itepri iiteil f r o m Disnissions, p. 6o7. F o r a f u r th e r e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e r e la t io n s d e n o t e d

b y th e d i a g r a m s , se e p. 1 34 . E d .
072 APPENDIX.
5, Tlio kiiuls o f correlation, Aflirmation and Negation, are shown by the

connection or non-connection o f the lines (here from the left). The connec
tion (here a iicrpeiulicular line) indicates tlie identity or coinclusion o f the
connected terms : the absence o f this denotes the opposite. The lines in posi
tive or allirmative relation are supposed capable o f being slid into each other.
This geometric scheme seems to recommend itself by all the virtues of such
a rejiresentation, and thus stands favorably contrasted with any other. For it
is easy. simiile, comjiendious, all-suflicicnt, consistent, manifest,
precise, complete.
1. Kasy. Linear diagrams are more easily and rapidly drawn than those
o f figure ; and the lines in this sclicme require, in fact, no symbols at all to
mark tlie terminal differences, far less the double letterings found necessarj- by
Lambert.
2, Sim ple. Linos denote the quantity and correlation of notions far more
simply than do any geometric figures. In those there is nothing redundant;
all is significant.
.3. Compendious. In this respect lines, as is evident, are far preferable to
figures ; but Lamberts linear scheme reijuires more thanRouble the space suf
ficient for tliat here projtosed.
1, .All-snffieient. A ny scheme by figures, and Lamberts scheme by lines,
is, in itself, unintelligible, and depends on the anne.xation o f accidental sym
bols to enable it to mark out the differenees and relations o f terms. Lambert,
likewise, eiideavor.s to supply this e.xigency by another means, by the fortui-
tou.-5 quality (his dottings) o f certain lines. In our scheme lines, simple lines,
ami lines alone, are siifiieient.
5, Consistent. l.am berts linear sclieme is a mere jnnible o f inconsisten
cies. Compared with liis, those by figures are, in this respect, far jireferable.
lin t tlie present linear selienie is at once thorough-going, unambiguous, and
ronsi'tent.
G, .Manifest. In this essential condition, all other geometrical illustrations
are lamentably defcetive. In those by figure, each threefold diagram, typifying
an indefinite jiliirality o f moods, reijnircs a painful consideration to e.xtract out
o f il any pertinent elncidatioii; this is, in fact, only brought to bear by the
foreign aid o f contingent sj mbols. Nor can tliese schemes properly represent
to the eye the relation o f the toto-total identity of a plurality o f term s; the
intenlion requires tube intimated by the e.xteinal aecldcnt of signs. Lamberts
lim-s sink, in general, even below the figures, in this respect. But as lines
are here applied, the. sole pertinent inference leajts at once to sense and under
standing.
7. Ireci.-e. .Ambiguity, vagiieni';s, vacillation, redundancy, and, withal,
inade<inacy, prevail in the other sidicmes. In those by figure, one diagram is
illn-trative o f as many as a dozen moods, positive ami negative,; and a single
mood may fall to b<- rejnescnted by four diagrams, and perhaps in six several
wavs. Lamberts lines are even Avorsc. In onr .si heme, on the contrary, every
moo<l 1 ;ts a di:i'_'ram applicable to itself, and to it-elf e.xidusively, Avliilst every
jKi'-ible variety o f its import has a corresponding jiossible A'ariety of linear
d ifrcre iicc.
Complete. In this last and all-imporlant condition, every scheme
APPENDIX. 07 3
hitherto proposed is found to fail. A thorough-going, adequate, and pliant

geometric method ought equally and at once to represent the logical moods in
thc Unflgured and Figured Syllogism, in the Syllogism Synthetic and Analytic,
in Extension and Intension, this, too, in all their mutual convertibilitie.s, and
in all their individual varieties. This our scheme performs, but exclusively. So
much ill general. Again, in particular: O f thc figures, circles and triangles
are necessarily inept to represent the ultra-total inclusion or coexclnsion of
terms, in a word, all the relations o f jiroportion. except totality and indefinite
partiality ; whilst quadrilateral figures are, if not wholly incompetent to this,
operose and clumsy. Lamberts linear method is incompetent to It in nega
tiv e s; and such inability ought to have opened his eyes upon the defects of thc
whole plan, for this was a scheme which he expressly proposed to accomplish.
The jnesent scheme, on the other hand, simply and easily affirms this, in
afiirmation and negation, and with anv minuteness of detail.
a u t h o r s SCH E3IE OF N O T A T IO N U N F IG U R E D AND F IG U R E D SYLLOGIS3I
NO. II.
(1853.) The following Diagram (see p. G74) affords a condensed view

o f my O t h e r srhcine o f Syllogistic Notation, fragments o f which, in detail, will
be found in M r . Thomsons Outline of the Laws o f Thought, and in Mr. Bajuies
Essay on the New Analytic o f Logical Forms. The paragraphs appended will
supply the necessary exqilanatlons.
1.) A Proposition (Sido-TTj/no, intervallum. -irp6Taais, literally protensio, thc

stretching out of a line from point to jioiiit) is a mutual relation o f two
terms (8po<) or extremes (fucpa). This is therefore well represented, The
two terras, by two letters, and their relation, hy a line extended between
them.
2.) A Syllogism is a complexus of Three Terms in Three Propositions. It

is, therefore, adecjuately typified by a Triangle, by a Figure of three lines
or sides.
3.) As upwards and downwards is a ]irocednre arbitrary in the diagram, the

diagram indicates that we can, indiflerently, either proceed from the Premises
(rationcs) to the Conclusion (rationatum J ,o r from the Conclusion to the Prem
ises; the process being only, in different points o f view, cither Synthetic or
Analytic. (A n exclusive and one-sided view, be it rmncinbcred, lias given an
inadequate name to what are called Premises and Conclusion.)
4.) Rationally and historically, there is no ground for constituting that

Premise into Major which is enounced first, or that Iremisc into Aliiior whicli
is enounced last. (S ee after, p. 697, etc.) The moods o f what is called the
Fourtli Figure, and the Indirect moods o f the First Figure, are thus identified.
In the diagram, accordingly, it is shown, that as right or left in thc order of
position is only accidental, so is first or 1 ist in the order of e.xpressiou.
So
674 APPENDIX.
V-
%7,
C/2
U n f i g u r e d S.
% ^ %
Order
2/
B re a d th D e p th
>
E i t h e r or Ee ith er .
0.) Tlio diagram truly represents, by its various eoneentric triangles, the
Tiifignred .8;yllo'jrIsin, as involving the Figured, aiul, oi' the latter, Ihe First
Figure as involving tin- two others. (In fact, Ihe whole difl'erenees o f Figure
:tiid F i g u r e s are ae< idental : Mooils alone are essential, and in any I'igure and
in none, these are always the same and the same in lumiher.)
1;.) Depth and Ireadtli, Snhjeet and Iredieate, arc denoted by the thick
and thin ends o f the same jirojiositional line.
7.) Depth and Breadth are rpianlilles always eoihxistcnt, always correlative,
e;u li b e i n g always in tin* inverse ratio o f the otlier. Ihis is well shown in the
e o i i r i e e t i o n and contrast o f a line gradually diminishing or inereasing in thick
n e s s from end to end.
APPENDIX. 675
8.) Bnt tlinngh always eoe.xistent, and ron.'cquently always, to some amount,
potentially iid'erring each other, still we cannot, without the intervention of an
actual inference, at once jump from the one (luantity to the other, i-hange.
p e r sa h u m , Bnsdicate into Subject, and Subject into Prcdicalc. Wc must
proceed (jrw h itim . W e cannot arbitrarily commute the (juantities, in passing
from the Qii.avsitnm to the Premises, or in onr transition from the Premises tu
the Conclusion. When this is aiiiiarcntly done (as in the Indirect moods of
the First Figure and in all llie nioodc o f the Fourth), the procedure is not only
nnnatiiral, hut virtually conqile.x and m ediate; the m ed'm nj he'nnj c v n c e a le d by
the co n rea lm eiit o f the m e n ta l in fere n c e which r e a lly p r e c e d e s . Indicated by the
line and broken line for the First Figure.
9.) In Syllogism, Figure and the varieties o f Figure are determined by the
counter relations o f Subject and Predicate subsisting between the syllogistic
terms, between the IMiddle and Extremes. All adequately rejircscnted.
10.) Figure and the differences of Figures all depending iqion the difference
of the mntiial contrast o f Subject and Predicate bi'twcen the syllogistic terms :
conseqiiciitly, if this relation be abolished, if these terms be made all Sub
jects (or it may be all Predicates), the distinction of Figure will be abolislicd
also. (W e do not abolish, be it noted, the Syllogism, but we i-ecall it to one
simple form.) And this is represented in the diagram. For as the opposition
of Subject and Predicate, of Depth and Breadth, is shown in tlie opposition
of the thick and tliin ends of tlie same tapering lin e ; so where (as in the out
most triangle) the propositional lines are of uniform breadth, it is hereby
shown that all such ojiposition is sublated.
11.) It is manifest that, as we consider the Predicate or the Siihjeet, the

Breadth or tlie Dcjith, as principal, will the one premise of the Syllogism or
the other be Major or IMinor; the IMajor Premise in the one (inantity being
Minor Premise in the other. Shown out in tlie diagram.
) 2.) But as the. First Figure is tliat alone iiy which there is such a diflference
of relation between the Syllogistic Terms. between the IMiddle and Extreme,
so in it alone is such a distinction between the Syllogistic Propn.sitioiis realized.
By the diagram this is made apparent to the eye.
1.3.) In the Unfigured Syllogism, and in tlie Second and Third Figure?,
there is no difrerence between the IMajor and IMinor Terms, and, consccinently,
no distinction (more than one arbitrary and accidental) of IMajor ami Minor
Proiiositions. All eons])icuonsly typified.
1 f.) All Figured Syllogisms have a Double Conclusion, but in the different
figures in a different way. This is well represented.
15.) The Double Conclusions, both equally direct, in the Second and Third
Figures, arc shown in the crossing of two counter and corresponding lines.
676 Ar r E X D I X .
The logicians are at fault in allowing lin lin ct Conclusions in these two figures,
nor is Aristotle tin exeeiition. (S ee P r. .la., 1. vii. 4.)
IG.j Tlie Direct and Indirect Conclusions in the First Figure are distinctly
tyjiificd hy a coinnioii and liy a hroken lin e ; the broken line is placed iin-
lucdiatcly under the other, and nia\' thus indicate that it represents only a
retlcx of, a cnnscqnence tlirongli the other ( x o t acd/fA am i/, rcjlexitn, p e r
refii .riniu in ). The diagram, therefore, caii show that the Indirect moods of
the First Figure, as well as all the moods of tlie Fourth, ought to be reduced
to merely auY/iok inferences; that is, to conclusions from conclusions o f the
conjugations or promises o f the First Figure.
[T lie following Table affords a view in detail o f the Authors Scheme of

Syllogistic Notation, and o f the valid Syllogistic IMoods (in F igure), on his
do'.'triiie o f a quantified Predicate. In eacli Figure (three only being allowed)
there are 12 .Mfirmative and 24 N egative moods; in all 36 moods. The
Table exhibits in detail the 12 Aflirmative IMoods of each Figure, and the 24
Negative flood s o f the First Figure, witli the appropriate notation.
Till* letters C, F, each the third letter in its rcspi'clive alphabet, denote the
extrem es; tlie letter M denotes the middle term of the syllogism. Definite
<linii;'..y (all, iing) is indicated hy the sign (:) : indefinite (piautily (some) by
the sign ( . nr .). The horizontal tapering line (!= ) indicates an anirin-
ative relation li<-tween the snbjeet and jiredleate of the jnoposit.on. Negation
is marked by a perpendicular line crossing the horizont.al ( mu ! ). Tbo
ncga'ive syllogi'iii'. In all the Figures, arc exactly double ilie nnmlicr of the
aflirma'iNc: for every affirmative affords a double negative, as each of its
fircmiscs ni.iy be marked by ;i negative. In Extension, the broad end o f tin;
lirii.* dctiotcs tlic subject, the pointed end the predicate. In Conqirchcnsion
tliis is reversed; the jiointcd end indicating llic subject, tlic broad end the
|nedicatc. By the jircscnl scheme o f notation, wc are thus able to read a
syll<i'i-iii Ivitli in Extension aud in Coniprclicnsion. The line beneath tlie
three terms denotes the relation o f the extremes of the conclusion. Prcdesig-
natioii o f the coni liisioii "is marked only when its terms obtain a different
<|n;nitity from wli.it tlicy hold in the premises. Accordingly, when not marked,
the qiiaiitilic.atioM o f the jiretnises is held nqicated in the conelusion. In the
SiToiid and 'I'hird Figures, a line is iiiM>rte(l aliovc ;is well as below the
tenii- o f tie- svllogi-tii, to cx|ircss tic* double coiiclusion iu thrxc figures. The
<iin))ol I'lowii that when the jiremises arc cnnvertcd, the. syllogism
remains in the same mood: shows thal tlie Iwo mood.' between which
it 'tand' arc cfiincrliblc into each other by com(Tsinn of their jircniiscs. The
middle term is said to b e l i u l i i u n i l , when it i.s taken definitely in both jiremises.
d'he e x t r e m - s a>-e I r d a m e d . wI k - m both arc taken definitely; unbalanced, when
the one is definite, and the, other is not.
1 U e p r iiilo d fro m D iscu ssio n s, pp. CoTCGI. E d .

A P P E N D I X . 677
T ho T able hero g iven oxliib ils the authors final arrangem ent o f the S yllo-
'istic Mooils. T h e M oods are either A ), Balanced, or B ), Unbalanced. In the
former class both T erm s and P ropositions are B alaneod, and it contains two
moods, i , ; ii. In the latter class there are tw o subdivisions. F or either, a ),
the Term s are U n b alan ced , iii. i v . ; or, b ), both the T erm s and Propositions
are U n b alan ced , v. vi. ; vii. v ii i.; ix. x. ; xi. xii.
It should be observed that the arrangement o f the order o f jMoods given in
the present Table dilTers from that o f the earlier scheme printed above, p. 537
et seq. The following is the correspondence in the order o f m oods;
Present and E arlier

F inal T able. T able.
I. corresponds to 1.
II. II.
ni. XI.
IV. xn.
V. . VII.
VI. VIII.
VII. III.
VIII. IV.
IX. V.
X. VI.
XI. IX.
XII. X.
The order of the earlier Table is that given by Mr. Baynes, in the scheme of
notation printed at p. 7G of his Essug on the Xew Analytic. The order o f the
present Table ccrrespoiids with that given by Dr. Thomson in his Laws o f
Thought, p. 244, 3d edition, 1853. E d .]
6 'S A 1> 1> Ji N L) 1 X .
S G U iL Y iiL O l' n o t a t i o n ^
C A B 1 . 16 O F SYLLO-
\. AFFIUA JA-. iIOU_:
Fio. I F ig . it.
i. C: : M; -:r ( > ; M: :T
ii. C; - :M: - -Lf C,^' : M : ---- , r
iii. C, : M, -:r U,.------ : M , ->:r
i iv. C:------ , M : , r ------ , M ; .,F
V. C; : M, , r c.*- .,r
I I
vi. C , M ,r , M:
vii. C:----- : M : , i Q;------ : M : -------- , F
viii. C, :M : :f (j,------ ^ M :
I---- - : M , ------
9
:---- - , M : -----
J
- : M, ----- - .r
9 '
xii. C, , M : -:p CS------ M : ------ :V
N- - A . i. a n d ii. a re iJ .iu J ic e a li liu : o t h o i . a o o d a are U n b a la n ced . O f these,

A P r E N D IX . 679
FIG U R ED SY LLO G ISM .

O I S T I G M O O D S .
A. A F F IR M A T IV E M O O D S. B. N E G A T IV E M O O D S.
F ig . III. Fig. I.
f a C . rt--- M1 -.r
C:- :M -:r
)b O : M 1. -F : r
a 0 , -f M ,r
c ,- ;M - r 11.
bC, ]\1 4 , r
.. j ^ ^ -1 M 1, :r
c ,- :M T 111.
Ib0 M, 4 _ :r
X J a C:--4 ,]\I: ,r
I V.
C :- -,r ibC : ,M : x r
a G, :M, r
c/ ;M , - .r V.
bO,,- : M, -4 , r
X X . ,r
i
VI. J
c ,- M -> r ( bC,
M1 r
-f-
C: - :M : 5 r Vll.
(bC:- MI
X I
a C 1 " M1 ---- : r
vm
o> :M : :T bC,- Mf -f=r
y" pi G - f- ]\i, .-r
c --- : M, - .T ix.
( bC:- M , 4: r
X (a 0 M r
X.
C: - , M : - -.T Ib0 M r
>
a C:- M r
C: - : M , - >r xi.
> bC:- M r
x: a C ,4 ]\r r
9 xii.
G, - , M : - : r b C , - r
iii. a n d i r . a re u n b a la n c e d in te rm s o n ly , n o t in p ro p o s itio n s ; tbw re s t iu b o th .

I 1ST D E X .
A bstract o f General L ogic, see L ogic. A l pt e d iu s, on the p rin ciple o f C ontradic

A bstr a c tio n oi- (ien era liza tio n , w lia t , 88, tio n ,63; partially am iciinited L am bert in the
104-5; its s y n o n y m s , ih. use o fjia r a llel lines as log ica l n otation , 180.
A c a d e m i c a l D i s ] m l a t i o n , 49 3. A l v a r e z , 326.
A c c id en ts, or L x tiin s ic D en om in ation s, A m . v o n i u s I I e r m i . e , referred to on genus
w liat, 153. o f L ogic, 7, 39; on the iiriiieip le o f C ontra
A c q u isit io n o f K n ow letlge, D o ctrin e of, .sfe d iction , 63, 135, 160, 172. 196, 240, 278; re
L ogic. ferred to on the S b y o s Aepi(a>v, or reaper,
A f f e c t i o n s or P assion s, as a source o f error, 331, .333, 336; referred to on D ivision and
see Error, causes of. its various kinds, 350; le fe n e d to on Greek
A f r a n i u s , quoted o u the n ature o f ex p er i article, 531; quoted on quantification o f
ence. 4-14. p redicate, 546, 549-51; quotqd on H yp oth et
A g r i c o l a . U odolphus, 198. ical (C onju n ctive) and D isju n ctiv e S y llo
A i . b e r t u s :M a i : n u s , relerred to on genus o f gism s, 613-16; (and P liilo p o n u s), tlieir
L ogic, 7; quoted on provin ce o f L ogic, grou n d o f the discrim in ation o f m ajor
20 ; quoted ou quautification o f predicate, and m in or term s in the second and third
553-4. F igures, 628.
A L D i i i c n , D ean, his Com pendium , 21; liis A n a l o g y , w hat, 450-51, 453-4; founded on
abusive em iiloym eiit o f the Xcrms hypotheli- the p rin ciple o f Philosophical Presum ption,
cnl and conditional, 167; hi.s abuse o f tho 451; its agreem ent w ith and d isiin clion
plirase proposiD'o exposita, 185, 249. from In d u ction , ib .; has tw o essential co n
A l e x a n d e r o f Ajihrodi.sias, the oldest com d ition s, 454-5; sum m ary o f the d octrin e of,
m en tator on A ristotle, 4; referred to as to 455; In d u ction and A n a lo g y com iiared
his use o f the term XoyiKr], ib.; has tlie togeth er, ib.; these do not afford absolute
d istinction o f A bstract or General and A p certain ty, 455-6; authors referred to on,
plied or Special L o g ic , 38; his illu straiion 456.
o f the d istin ction , 38-9, see L ogic; 198, 199; A n a l y s i s , see IMethod.
on principle o f nam e o f m ajor and m inor A n a l y t i c , nam e em jiloyed by A risto tle to
term s, 207, 215, 240; referred to on q uantity den ote a iiarticular jiart o f L o g ic, .6
o f hypothetical syllogism s, 247,278, 296. 336. A n a x i . m e n e r , o f Lainpsacii.s, the treatise
514; quoted on quantitication of p ied ieate, Rhetoric to Alexander attributed to, 278.
549; his ground o f the d iscrin iin atioii o f A n c i l l o n , F red eric, referred to , 32.
m ajor and m inor term s in the secon d and A n d r e a s , A nton in s, the first to ex p lica te
tliird Figures, 628-9; certain early Greek the law o f Identity as a coordinate p rin ci
logician s m entioned by, w ho recognized no ple, 65.
nwjor or m in or term in th e second and A n s c i i a u u n o , exjiresses w hat is com m on to
third Figures, 629-30; (and H erm inus), 1 erceptioii and Im agin a tio n , as o;i|)osed to
quoted on figure o f syllo g ism , 633-6. Conceitioii, viz., the in d ivid u ality and im
A l e x a n d e r d e A i . e s , or A lep sis, lield the m ediacy o f their objects, 90-1, 129; can be
law o f C ontradiction to be the in im ary translated into E n glish o n ly by In tu itio n ,
principle o f k n o w led g e, 66
; but, in fact, blit am b igu ou sly, 90-1
identified it wdth that o f E xclu d ed M id A n t h o l o h i a G r . e c a , 280.
dle, ib. 'AtrcLpiApritris, its character and m ean in g, 351.
86
682 INDEX.
A r o D E ic T ic .o m ifio y e it by A risto tle to d en o te o f Hie ini'ctse consecution fr o m contradictions,

a ] i a r t i e u l i i r p a r t o f E o ; ; i e , G. ib.; liis em ploym ent o f tlie term e/Tiêcris,
A r o p ii.\N T ic , ire Jud;;nun ls, D octrin e of. exposition, 185; liis exp ression for Sim ple
Arr<5</)o'(ns. its U s e b;> A ri.'totle, lo'J. C onversion, 18G; liis Anali/iics are Syiitlietic,
.V rPL iEP Logic, lI)ee.\)ires.sion, l\o\v em ployed 195; sec oho G23; liis d etinition otTlie term.s
by K ant. 43; can on ly w itli )iropiiety be o f a S yllogisin , 210; bis defin ition o f Hie
8
Used lo denote i>ecial or C oncrete L ogic, m iddle, as m iddle by jiosition, not a p plica
and i.s im properly em p loyed as a d esig n a ble to tbe m ode in w liicli siibseiiuciit lo g i
tion o f .Mod ilied L ogic, 43, 44. cians en ou n ce Hie sy llo g ism , ; but ap pli
A P I 'L E I I S '29G. cable lo tlie reason in g in con ip reiieiision ,
A q c iN .\s , .''I. T hom as, 42: referred to on 211 ; did n ot, how ever, nece.-saiily con tem
classification ot llie C ategories, 141; bis plate tlie reason in g iu com p reh en sion , i b . :
detinition o f trntli q u oted . 37S. enounced Hie ca n o n s b otli o f E xten sive
Ap..mii.\.v 8
cliooIm en , view ed L ogic as a and C om prclieusive reason in g, 211, 243;
science, 7. his law , tliat tlie w h o le is necessarily
A p x h t r s y v w o ' f w s , distinguislted by Ari.s- con ceived as iirior to the part, criticized
to tle from tlie a p x v r i\s yfvicT fu is. G6-7. by Hie A ullior, 254-5; on ly once vagu ely
Anoc.MENT, properly denotes tlie m id d le n o allud ed to the process o f w lia t w as altcr-
tion in a reasoning, 19G; liO(v defined by tlie w ards called .Sorites, 267; his rule translated
L atin lllietoriciaiis, ib .; often em p loyed as jirerdieotiim prerdicoli, etc., con tain s th e p rin
coJN teiisive \vith argu m en tation , ib. ciple o f .Sorites, 2GS; did n o t d iscrim inate
Alll.sTOTKLic q uestions, An sit, etc., referred Hie vulgar E ntliyn iein e as a d istin ct species
to , 445. o f reason in g, 277; ids Eiitliym em e a sy llo
A p. i s t o t e h a n s , ancient Greek, denied J.ogic gism from sign s and lik elilio o d s, ib .; Rhet
to be eitlier science or art, 7; tiieir view s on oric to .l/croio/fr attributed to , 278; Hie term
the object-m atter of l.o g ic , 19, 20. ffXhpo-y Figure, due to, 285; distiiiguislied
A r is t o t e l ia n s , m odern, m any o f tliem tlie first lln e e figures, 2S5, 292, 296, 324, 333,
m aininiiied L ogic lo be an art, 7. 339; liis d istil,ciio ii o f tlie tw o m odes o f
A r i s t o t l e , q uoted, 4 ; liis em p loym ent o f scientific procedure as from , and to, p rin ci
6
tlie le n n DinUctic, ; did n ot define L ogic, ples, 340, 342; Ids argum ent for slavery a
7 ; b is relation to view s o f the nature and jietitio principii, 371; leterred fo and q uoted
d om ain o f L ogic, 19; by far the greater on know ledge and b elief, 383; Ids precept
num ber o f bis logical w ritings lost, 19; i.on e regarding tlie subjugation o f self-love,
o f Ills treatise.' affords a view of L ogic Ifom 406. 430, 479; quoted on a b ility to teach as
a central jioint, ib ; g ave no general dcfiiii- a mark o f k n ow led ge, 482; first sy.stemati-
lio ii o f J.ogic, iL.,- said Hull m edicine begins cally develojicd L ogic proper, 49G; referred
M'bere tlic jd iilosop liy o f n a tu ie leaves to on postulates o f L o g ic, 512-13; quoted
off, 20; cinp liaiically enounced Hie law o f against q uan liticalion o f predicate, 546-49;
C oiilrad ietion, C2; ex p licitly en ou nced Hie tbe true n ieaidng o f Ids eise in toio, and d id
principle o f I'.xcluded M iddle, G5; recog de om ni, 547-8; Ids d octrine o f predesig-
nized Hie law o f Keason and C onsequent, n ation , 548-9; sy llo g ism s in liis w ritings
CG; d i-liiigiiislied it from llie principle o f w b icli are valid on ly tlirough q uaiitili-
Iro d iiciieii, CG-7; said Hull Hie d octrin e o f cation ol' tlie predicate, 549, 581; Ids d oc
.''vllogism s deal.' n ot w illi llie external e x trine o f Ind u ction and E x a m p le, 589-93;
p ression , but w itli the internal reasoning ignored the D isjun ctive aud Ilyp oH ietical
o f the rniiid itself, 82; sfc oho 277; used sy llo g ism s o f (he lo g icia n s, 603; quoted
voTifiara in a sense equ ivalent lo cnncii'h, and referred to on Ilyp oH ietical s y llo
85; lii.sfirst aiili-iin ed ieaineiitu l ru leq u oted , gism , 612-13; lii.s sy llo g isiiis ex hypolhesi,
103; Illis rule translated by llie A'ola o/<e w liedier correspondent lo Hie ordinary
f.it nolo rti ipsius. ib.; liis C ategories, w liaf, h yiiotlietlcal s y llo g is m , autliors referred
130, s " fa le g o r ie s ; noticed Hie difl'erei.cc to 011,613; liis doctrine o f tlie di.'criraina-
o f Io le iiiia l and A ctual W lioles, 140; re tioii o f major and m in o r term s in tlie second
ferred to o n in clusion of t'op u la in pra;di- and third Kignrc, G27-8; quoted on Figure
cale. IGl; called subject and predicate, and Terms o fs y llo g isiiis . 6.32-3.
the terms or ixtrcm rs o f a p rop osition , ib. ; A r n 'a u lI ), along w itli N ico le, aullior o f the
called a proposition an InU rvnl. SidiTTTjwa, Iorl Ifoyal Logic {L 'A rt de Fen.ser), 50; re
lb., allow ed o n ly four kinds o f m od ality, ferred lo a.' liold in g lliat men are naturally
181; described ,''iib-conlrary opposition as en viou s, 408; quoted on figure o f S y llo g ism ,
m erely in lan gu age, ISt; s'c oho 532; his 041-2.
con version i v p i p f i , 18G; noticed Conver- A uN 'oE ous DE T ung k r i , lils d octrine o f In
."lon ficr Contraposiiioncm, under tbe nam e du ction , 596.
I N D E X . 683
A k u i a n , ic fo i recl t o on tlie a r g u m e n t c a ll e d 05; c a l l e d t h e p r i n c ip l e o f I d e n t i t y , princi-

\ 6 y o s Kvpievaiu, 331. p i it m positioiiis sii-e identitatis,C>0', at temjit ed
A i iS K X iu s , 334 to d e m o n s t r a t e tlie l a w o f Sutficient lie.v-
A r.T , a n c ie n t a n d m o d e r n , d iv e rs e c iia r a c tc rs son by that o f C o n t i a d i e t i o n , 68,101; ip ioted
o f , 120. on C a n o n s o f S y l l o g i s m , 564-5.
A f i .s oc iA T io x, l a w s of, w l i a t , 419-20. B a y x e s , T h o m a s Sjieticer, Ids Es.saij on the
A r . s o c i a t i o n or S u g g e s t i o n , as a s o u r c e o f An r Analy tic o f Logical Forms r e f e n ed to,
Error, see Error, c au se s o f 31; Ids t ra n sl at io n o f t he I ort B o y a l L o g i c
As s u. M lT i o x , m im e for J l i i i o r Ir e m is e, 201; n o t ic e d , 50, 114; Ids E s s a y r e t e r ie d to,
but not a .suitable tei in, ib. 558.
A T Tl iX Tl o x , t h e act ol , li o w c o n s t i t u t e d , 88; IS kg k i f f , tlie term in G er m an j il d lo s o p i i y
r r c s c i s i o n , A b s t r a c ti o n , an d A t t e n t i o n c o r for t h e s v n i b o li c a l n o t i o n s o f th e u n d e r
r e la t iv e t en ii s , 88. s t a n d i n g , 129.
A u o u .s t i x , St., Ids a n s w e r t o t h e q u e s t io n B e l i e f , see Trutli an d E rr or , d o c t r i n e of.
w l i a t ti m e is, 113. B e x G e u .s o x , or G e r s o n i d e s , J.evi, q u o t e d o n
A u o u .s t i x , Is e u d o , referr ed t o ou i n a p p l i c a q u a n ti fi c a ti o n o f jire di eat e, 554-5.
bi lit y o f th e c a t e g o r i e s to D e i t y , 140. B e x e k e , 08; ids d o c t r i n e o f s y l l o g i s m , 651-2.
A u g u s t i .n u s N i f i t u s SUESSANUS, 0 3 . B e u t i u s , 196, 268.
A u l c .s O e l l i u .s . 331-3. B e z .i , 280
A u t i i e n t i c i t v , c r it ic i s m of, .lee T e s t i m o n y . B i e l , Ga br ie l, liis use o f conceptus, 30.
A v E ui iO E S, q u o t e d on use o f t h e A r a b i c B i u x d e , 378.
a r tic le in qu a ii t i ti c a ti o n , 531-2 ; q u o t e d on B l e .m m i d a s , N i c e p h o n i s , 85; re fer re d t o ou
qu a n ti fi c a ti o n o f jire diea te , 553; (juot ed on or ig i n o f d i s t i n c t i o n o f p r o p o s i t i o n s secioirft
figure o f s y l l o g i s m , C40-1; q u o t e d o n f o u r th an d le n ii ailjiiccntis,](>\', q u o t e d o n imjiort
F i g u r e , 002. . o f tlie te r m c u K K o y i a p . 6 s , ] f i , 274; h i s E p i t -
A v i c e x x a , 451, 454. ome for m a n y c e n t u r i e s tli e t e x t - b o o k o f
AXKi.li A, u s e d b y S t o i c s a n d K a m i s t s as a L o g i c in tlie s c h o o ls o f th e G re e k C h u r c h ,
s\ i io u y m for pro po sit ion , 188. 308 ; m e n t i o n e d a.s tlie i n v e n t o r o f t h e
A f i o i p a T)/s avTicpdffeais, n a m e apj ilied by G r e e k m n e m o n i c ve r se s for m o o d a n d
A m m o n i u s an d Il ii lo p o u u s t o p r i n c ip l e o f figure o f s y l l o g i s m , ib.; b u t , a c c o r d i n g to
C o n t r a d i c t i o n , 03 ; see C o n t r a d i c t i o n , prin- la t e r v i e w , t he se v e r se s o n l y a t r a n s l a t i o n
cijilc o f o f t h e L a t i n , ib., 514; q u o t e d o u C o n t i n g e n t
A x i o i i s , w h a t , 188. C o n v e r s i o n , 521.
B o e t h i u s , refe rr ed t o on t he a p p l i c a t i o n o f
B a c h .m a x n , referred t o o n t h e a n a l o g y be tiie t er m logic, 4, 101, 110; hi s d i v i s i o n o f
t w e e n L o g i e an d 3 I a t b e m a t ic s , 32, 68, 88,149, C o n v e r s i o n , 186; t h e first t o g i v e t he n a m e
162, 179, 1S3, 198, 215, 218, 219, 237 ,24 3, 288; Conversio p e r accidens, i b . ; n a t u r e o f th is
q u o t e d , w i t h b r i e f o r ig i n a l i n t e r p o l a t i o n s , Jirocess as e m p l o y e d b y , 1 86 ,1 9 8; qu o t e d f o r
o n tlie figur es a n d m o o d s o f S y l l o g i s m , use o f s u m p tu m a n d a s s um p tio , 201; referred
2 8 8 - 3 0 2 ; his r e d u c t i o n o f B a r o c o , 314; t o o n use o f t e r m s p o ne ns a n d tollens, in
qu o t e d on c h ar a c te r o f a n c i e n t C r e e k S o p h c o n n e c t i o n wi fli iiyjio tl iet ica l s y l l o g i s m ,
ism s, 323-4, 391; q u o t e d o n t he pre ju dic e 240, 296, 344; q u o t e d on tlie in fl u e n c e o f
o f le a r n e d a u t h o r i t y , 395-6, 414-17, 428, 440, jiassion on tlie in itu l, 400, 514; q u o t e d o n
456. qu a ii t i ti c a ti o n o f j ire di ea te , 551-3.
B a c o x , L o r d , w h o l l y m i s c o n c e i v e d th e c h a r B o l z a x o , 240, 244, 456.
acter o f L o g i c ill c ert ai n r esp ect s, 20, 21; at B o v l e , l i o n . K o b e rt , re fer r e d t o for d i s
f a u lt in ids ci'iticism o f A r i s t o t l e ' s d o c t r i n e ti n c t i o n o f re a so n in abstracio, a n d r e a so n
o f I n d u c t i o n , 230; c a l l e d e m p ir i c a l g e n in con ere to, 43.
e r a li z a ti o n s axio ms , 307 ; Ids c la s s if ic at io n B h a x d i s , Ch. A . , referred to on t he title
o f th e s o u r c e s o f e r ro r , 390; q u o t e d on Organon fo r t h e l o g i c a l t re a tis es o f A r i s
r e a d in g , 491; tlie a i m o f his Organon, 496. t ot le , 24 ,1 3 5.
iSALFOUu, or B a l f o r e u s , r e fe r r e d to on a B h a x i s s , Ch. J . ,1 8 4, 3' 20 .
s p u r i o u s p a s s ag e in A r i s t o t l e s liketoric,^-, B f. e a u t u a n d D e p t h , n a m e s for t h e e x t e n -
qu o t e d ou i ll u s tr a t io n by tlie A p li r od is ia ii .ioii a n d c o m p r e h e n s i o n o f c o n c e p t s , 100,
o f A bs tr ac t an d Ajijilied or Sj iecial L o g i c , , t alibi.
38; on A b s t r a c t a n d A p p l i e d or S p e c ia l B u c h a x a x , G eo r g e , 280.
L o g i c , 44. B u f f i e h , 112, 344; q u o t e d o n c a n o n s o f s y l
B o A o s , its m e a n i n g in r e l a t i o n t o c o n c e p t s , l o g is m , 574.
100 . B u h g e u s u y k , or B u r g c r s d i c i u s , re fer re d to
B a u m g a k t e x , a . G ., t h e L e i b n i t i a n , the o n g e n u s o f L o g i c , 7 ; hi s Institutiones
lirst to use the term pr in ci p iu m exclusi med ii, Loîcte n o t i c e d a n d r e c o m m e n d e d , 51, 493;
GS4 INDEX.
r e f e r r e d to o n W lio le n n d T a rt. 143; q u o te d ClRCTTi.CS III demonstrnndo, see P r o b a t i o n .

on ro te iitiiil iiiu l A c t u a l 4 V h o I c , 1 4 0 ,2 9 6 . C l a s s e s , n a m e s for tlic ditfercnt ste ps in t he
l? ri :il >. \M 'S , Ills sopliisni o f tlie -4.o referred serie s of, in ph y s i c a l s c ie n c e , 142.
to tlie IuIkI o f Soi/iisiitn } k te r o z e tf f fo s , .133. C l e .v r x e s s a n d O b s c u r i t y , D i s t i n c t n e s s and
r>i i:i.Ki(iii. I,or d, llis pr ac tic e in retuliiif;. 4S". li u l i s l i u c t n e s s o f C o n c e p t s , see C o n c e p t s ,
lU'TLiat. .''ainiiel, q u o t e d as to th e pr i n c ip al tj m ili fy of.
n t ili t y o f K li c lo r ic . 35. Ci.K.MENT o f A l e x a n d r i a , q u o t e d on t e a c h i n g
as a m e a n o f s e l f - i m p r o v e m e n t in k n o w l
(.w j K T . e x . t ' a r d i i i a l . q u o t e d f o r l i i s u .s e o f t h e e d g e . 482-3.
te rm - tat'ii.oiv a n d tx laifii-e i n r e l a t i o n to Ci-ERC, .'Cf Le Clerc.
n o tio i.s . lu l. C o ti tT A T io ( Thought), its use b y D e s c a r t e s , 9;
( .VLKEU. 1 0 1 . see I'lionglif.
C a .m k u a u i u s , G u l. . referr ed t o o n pciiiis o f C o u M T t v u Fa c u l ti e s , W e a k n e s s an d Dl.spro-
Lopric. 7; referred t o f or s c h o l a s t i c t he or ie s jio r fio iie d S t r e n g t h of, as a so u r c e o f erro r,
on the obj ect- iniittcr o f Lo),'ic, 20. .sfc Ivrror. Cau.-cs of.
C a .m p i i e l l , Iriiicijml, q u o t e d on i n d i s t i n c t CiiKE, Z a c h a r y , his us e o f t h e t er m concept,
nes s o f leriii'-, r 4. 30.
C a p e lla , M a rtiiin u s , q u o te d on f ig u re of Cor.LEOE o f A l c a l a , t h e , see Ciirsus Complu-
s y l l o g i s m , WO. lensis.
C a r a m c e e . .srr L o b k o w i t z . C oM M U X tCA TioN Of K ii ov v lc dg c , D octriiic
( a RLETON.Th o m a s C o m p t o n , referred to o n t f, see L o g i c .
tlie m e t a p h y s i c a l c h a r a c t e r o f t h e C at e g o r ie s Cd.viPAUi.soN, F a c u l t y o f , its p r o d u c t s t h r e e
o f A r i s t o t l e , 141. f o l d , C o n ce p t s , .1 ii d g m e ii t s, a n d K ea s on -
C a r o , q u o t e d , 4 0 7 -R , 4 1 4 , 4 3 5 . i iig -, 83; ils olli ces , 87-8.
C a r t e .s i a n .s . m a j o r i t y o f , m a i n t a i n e d L o g i c Co. viPREiiKxsioN a n d E. x te n sio n o f C o n c e p t s ,
l o be an a r t , 7. see C o n cei its , Q u a n t it y of , n n d l l e a s o n i n g s .
C A Ss to in iR f S , 279, 640. C o n c e p t , s h ou ld be used t o d e n o t e the obj ect
C a t e c s o r ic a l I r o p o s i t i o n . b e t t e r s t y l e d A<<- c o f. c e iv e d , 3 0 ; its d e r i v a t i o n , i b . ; m a n y
soliiic o r r trftr .i, 1 0 5 ; see J u d g n i e i i f . s , < lo c - w o r d s ill E n g l i s h fo rm e d o n flie s a m e a n a l -
Irin c o f * o g y , a s precept, digest, etc ., i b . ; w a s in c o m
CA TE tio Ri rA L, t he t er m , ns us ed by A r i s t o t l e , m o n use in th e s e n s e pr oj io se d a m o n g th e
er |uivnlent to affinrmlive, 165; i ls aj ip lic a t io n o l d e r Ei iglisli i ih ilu so p hi c ul w ri ter s, ib. ;
by T h e o p h r a s t u s and L u d e m u s , in opjiosi- a n d a m o n g th e old F r e n c h p h i lo s o p l i e r s ,
tioii to conililioniil, 165 ; th is diirer enc c o f 31; n o w e m p l o y e d in F r e n c li in t r a n s l a t i n g
sigiiificiitioii not lii tli er lo o lis e r ve d , 166. t h e G o r m a n Regriff, ib. ; see also Co n cep lu s;
C a t e o o r i k r or r r e d ic a m e i i l. s o f A r i s to t le , w h a t , 54 ; its s y n o n y m s , 55 ; see C o n c e p t s ,
w l i a l, 139; o r i g i n a l ni eiiniii g o f t h e term D o c t r i n e of.
CuUeary. i b . ; ils e m p lo y i ii e ii f by A r i s to t le , C o x c E P T t o , it s m e n n ii ig , 85-6.
139-10; by r i o t i n u s , 140; by K a n t , ib.; th e C o n c e p t i o n , e m p l o y m e n t o f t he te r m by
C a t e g o r ie s ol A r i s t o t l e m e t a p h y s i c a l , 141 ; .Stewart t o d e n o t e t h e s im p l e rcpr ese nf n-
c rit ic iz ed as a c la s s iti c a lio n o f b e i n g , ib. ; fioii ol' a n ob je ct p r e s e n te d in I e r ce iif io n,
obj ect s n o t i n c l u d e d u n d e r , 110; d i v e r s i ty 29; v a c i l l a t i o n in its use by Itei d, i b . ; s en se
o f iqiinl oii a m o n g l o g i c i a n s r e g a r d i n g th eir 111 vviiicli e m p l o y e d by th e autli or , 3 0 ; its
lini nhe r, 112 : v a r io u s a u t h o r s referred to d e r i v a t i o n , .30; m e a n s bo t h t h e a c t o f con-
r e g a r d in g , ib. c e i v i n g i i i i d th e obje ct c o n c e i v e d , ib.; s h o u l d
('KRTAi.srV. .11' Triifli a n d E rr or , D o c t r i n e bc us ed to d e n o t e e x c l u s i v e l y t b e a c t o f c o n
of. c e i v i n g , an d concept apjilied to t h e o bj e ct
f l l A L V I N , 1R7. c o n c e i v e d , i b . ; Keld (| iio fed o n, 78-80; liis
C t f E U o . referred t o o n the us e o f L n g i c a ,4 \ inlstnke.s r e g a r d in g , 80 -1; u s u a l l y c a ll e d b y
pro lja bl y b o r r o w e d ills us e o f that term t he l o g ic i a n s Simpl e Apprehension, 85.
fro m llie .'-loics, i b . ; qiioti'd o n Ihe p r o v i n c e ('oNCEPTSi, D o c t r i n e o f , 83-8.S; o f C o n c c i i t s or
o f L o g i c . 26 : oiiomic<-d tlie ) )i in c l p l e o f N o t i o n s , o r de r o f di.-ciission, A . In gcli-
r .x c l n d e il M id dle , 1)5 ; r e c o g n iz e d tlie jirin- ernl, vvhul th ey are, an d h o w jir odn ce d, 34
r i]d e o f Ileas on an d C o n s e q u e n t , 67; liis et .eeej., 93 et seep ; d o c t r i n e o f C on ce p t s
d i fi ii i ti o n ol nr gut nr ntu m q u o t e d , 19 6 ; aji- o r n i ll e d b y I V h a l e ly in his Element.^, 84 ;
jilied lire term .'Sontrt {(> ail a r gi im ei it li k e n. M e a n i n g o l ' t h e t er m s Concept or Notion,
th e m o d e r n .Xorilcs, h ut w l i ic h c o u l d al so 8.5-6; th e ir s y n o n y i n s , 85; Concept d e n o t e s
be a f'hrysip/i'rin, 263; c a lle d Ihe s o p h i s m t h e r e su lt o f t h e act o f Cemccption, t h a t is,
.Xorites Arrrv'tlit, ib. ; Ids e m p l o y m e n t o f o f c o in ii r c h e n d ii ig or g r a s jii n g uj) i n to
t h e ter m En thijmrme, 27H; his s t a t e m e n t o f u n i t y tlie v a r i o u s q u a l i f i e s by w h i c h an o b
th e Ig nn rn Rat io, 3.'/ ! , .3-32-3, 406, 430. j e c t is c h a r a c te r iz e d , 85 -6; Not ion d e n o t e s
INDEX. 685
e it h e r t h e act o f a p p r e h e n d i n g t h e n o t e s or lliis i llu s tr a t e d, ib .; jirocc'sses b y wliicli

narks o f an o bj e ct , or t he r e su lt o f tlmt amjililied a n d r e so l v e d , I le l e r m i m i t i o u or
act, 8G ; eniplov niei.t o f Hie t e r m s eniimo C o n c r e t i o n , Ab.' tra cl ioi i or Ce i ie r al iz i il io n ,
vel mrn te amcipere, mid a n i m i conrejitiis, i b . ; Deliiiilion, and Oivi.îon, 102-4; ojijiosed
o f concijiere, conceptus am i concijitio, w i t li o n t iu an i n v e r s e r a tio , 100-6; l l e l i n i l i o n mid
adjunct,/A.,- t l i e t e r n i iVoOo/i, b o w e m i i l o y e d l li v i s i o i i tlic jiroce.sses by w h i c h tlie Con i-
by tlie initlior, ib.; b. N a t u r e o f tlie t h in g pr elie iision an d E x t e n s i o n o f c o n e e ji ls are
e xj ir e ss e d, 87 <i s e q. ; a co iicc |)t eii uiv iileiit r e sji ect iv el y re.'-olved, 106-7; di ag r m ii lejire-
to t h e m e d ia t e a n d l e h i i i v e k n o w l e d g e w c se ii ti n g . w it li r e la t iv e i l l n s lr a l io i i, 108-10.
h a v e o f an object, ns c o m p r i s i n g (| iia lit ies C o N C K i TS. (ûalit) Of, 111 ft s e q. ; th is d e t er
o r cliiiractcrs c o m m o n t o it wi tli o t ii e r o b m in e d by tlieir r e la tio n to llieir subj ect ,
jects , 87; n a t u r e am i j ir o du c t io n o f con ce jits 111; c o n s is t s ill tlieir lo gi ca l jier fectimi or
i llu str a te d liy r e f e i e n c e t o tlie liistor y o f i m p e r f e c t i o n , 111-12; tin's o f t w o d e g r e e s ,
o n r k n o w l e d g e , 87 ft se q.; th e l e s n l t s o f C l e a r n e ss an d D i s ti n c t n e ss , mid Cb.'-euiity
c o m p a r i s o n a nd a bs t ra c t io n or a t t e n t i o n , a s and I n d i s t i n c t n e s s , 112; the se de g r e e s dis-
o j ie n i t i n g on (dijeets o r i g i n a l l y p r e s en te d in ting m'slied , ib.; o r i g i n a l aj iji li cat io n o f the
conl'useil an d im pe r fe c t jie ice jit io iis , an d e x j i r e s s i o n s , clearness, obscurity, e tc ., ib.;
r e d u c i n g m u l t i t u d e to u n i t y , 87-8; tlie r e i ll u s t r a t e d by r e fe r e nc e to v is io n a n d r e p
d u c t i o n o f m u l t i t u d e t o un i t y i n v o l v e d in r e s e n t a t io n , 112-13, 115-16; c le a r n e s s a n d
c o n c e p t i o n e x ji l a iu e d an d ill us tr at e d, 89 ct o b s c u r it y as in c onc eji ts, 113 ft s e q .; th e
s e q. ; f l i o u g h t o n e a nd tlie s a m e , w l i il c it.s a b s o l u te l y c le a r a n d tlie a b s o l u t e l y obscure,
c o n t e n t s are i d e n t i c a l, ib.; ob jects are to us 114; d i s ti n c tn e s s a nd in distin ctne.ss of, i b . ;
t h e s a m e wlieii w e are u n a b l e to di s li n g n i sl i liisl o r ic al no t ic e s o f tliis d i s t i n c t i o n , ib. et
tli eir c o g n i t i o n s , w h e t h e r as w l i o le s , or in Seq.; d u e to Lei bi.itz, 115; n o t i c e o f E o c k e
tli eir part ial c h a r a c te r s , 89; c o n c e p t s or in e o ii n e c ti o i i with it, 114-15; di irerence
n o t i o n s are c o n s t i t u t e d b y th e p o in t s o f b e t w e e n a clem- a n d d i s t i n c t k n o w l e d g e
s i m i l a r i t y di.scovcred in obje cts , and i d e n ti il l u s tr at e d , 115 et .seq.; t h e j u d i c i a l d e t er
fied in tlie u n i t y o f c on s c io u s n e s s , 'JJ; c o n - m i n a t i o n o f life an d d e a t h su pp o s e s t h e
cejits m a y t h e m s e l v e s b e c o m e th e obj ect s o f dill'erence b e t w e e n a c le a r m id di s ti n c t
c o m p a r i s o n a n d a b s t r a c t io n , 90; c o n c e p t s k n o w l e d g e , 116; fu rtlier ill u.' tra ti on f r o m
or n o t i o n s snjier flu ous ly s ty l e d gmeriil. ib ; tlie Imnimi c o u i i t c n a i i c e , ib.; sjiecial c o n d i
g e n e r a l e h a r a e te r s o f co nc e jit s, 91 ft .c7 . 96 t io n s o f th e d i s ti n c tn e s s o f a c o n c e ji t, an d
ft s eip ; a A c o n c e p t afl'or. s o n l ) mi ii.adc- o f its d e gr e es , 116-17; H;e d i s ti n c ti o n b e
'luat c k n o w l e d g e o f Hie t il in g tl i o n g h t u nd er t w e e n c le a r an d d i s t i n c t k n o w l e d g e illa.s-
it, 91 ft se q.; b. AlTorcls n o a b s o l u te object t ra ie d by e x a m p l e s , 118; h o w t he d i s t i n c t
o f k n o w l e d g e , b u t c an be realized o n l y by ness o f a co ncejit is all'ected by l lie t w o
b e i n g apjiliod as a te r m o f re la t io n to o n e q u a n t i t i e s o f a conc eji t, IIS ft seq.; d i s t i n c t
or m o r e o f th e objects wiiicli a g r e e in tlie ness is i nt e r na l an d e x t e r n a l , 119; r e la t io u s
po i n t o r p o i n t s o f r e s e m b l a n c e w l i ic b it o f D e l i n i t i o n and D i v i s i o n to in te r n a l a n d
e x p r e ss e s , i b . ; tliis d o c t r i n e ex ji l a ii is tlie e x t e r n a l dislii.ctne.ss, i b . ; siinjile n o t i o n s
w ii o le m y s t e r y o f g e n e r a l i z a t i o n a n d g e n a d m it o f an e x t e n s i v e , i n d i v i d u a l n o t i o n s
eral te r m s, i b . ; tlie g e n e r a li t y ol' a c on ce jit o f an i n t e n s i v e , d i s t i n c t n e s s , i b . ; tlie liigli-
is po t e n ti a l , not ac tu .1, 92- 6; c o n c e p t s are est jioiiil ot Hie d i s t i n c t n e s s o f a c o u c e p t ,
no t , on th at a c c o u n t , m e r e word.s, 97; c. 120; i m pe r le c tio ii to w l i ic h concejit.' arc
. T h e i r d e p e n d e n c e o n Im i g n a g c . 97 et .seq. ; li ab le , in resjiect o f t h e tli ou gl it o f wliicli
l a n g u a g e nec ess ar y t o t he jicrl'ection o f t h e y are t he exjir ess io ii, 121; tin's i m p e r
conc eji ts, 99; 1!. O f c o n c e p ts o r n o t i o n s in fe c t io n ill u s tr a t e d , 1-2 et seq.; n o tic e d by
specia l, 99 it seq.; q u a n t i t y o f c on c e ji ts , 100 r.ritisli jiliilo.'ophers, 123; S t e w a r t q uo te d
ft s e q . ; w h a t is m e a n t b y s a y i n g tliat a (111 th e su bject, l 2 3- 5; L o c k c aiitici jia ted
c o n c e p t is a q u a n t i t y , 102; tliis (ju m iti ty o f H u m e iu l e m a i k i n g t he L i u p l o y m e n t ol
t w o ojijiosite k i nd s , I n t e n s i v e or C o m - te r m s w i t h o u t d i s ti n c t m e a n i n g , 125; L o c k e
jir e he ns iv e and E x t e n s i v e , 102-10, see C o n (juoted on Hiis p o i n t , 125-6; th e di s ti n c ti o n
cepts, ( ju m i ti ty o f ; q u a l it y o f Coiice jd s, o f I n t u i t i v e a nd S y m b o l i c a l k n o w l e d g e
111-31, A-e C o n c e p t s , ( ju a l i ty of; I lec ip ro - first tak en by L e i b n i tz , 126; tliis di.stinctioii
cai Itela tio ns of, 132 ft seq., see C o n c e p t s , siijierseded tlie c o n t r o v e r s y o f N o m i ii a li s n i
lle eij iro ca l K el a t io n s of. a n d C o n c e p t u a l is m iu G e r m a n y , T26-9; d i s
7 o x c i i i TS, ( ju a n ti ty of, or C o m j ir e h e n s io n cu ss ed by h i m in De Cognitione. Verilate, it
an d Ex te n. 'io n o f C o n c e p t s , w h a t . 100-3; Ideis, 127; tlie jiassage q u o t e d , 128-9; tlie
h o w resji ect ive ly d e s i g n a t e d , 100; t he se d i s t i n c t i o n ajipreciated by tho di scijiles of
q u a n ti ti e s ojijiosed t o e a c h o th er, 103; l aw L e ili ni tz , 1'29: W o l l ' q u o t e d o n . 129-31.
r e g u la t i n g t h e m u t u a l r e la t io n s of, 104; Cox cE i' TS U e c ip r o ca l K el a t io n s of , 132-58-
686 INDEX.
rvlatinn pr o pe r of. xvhnt. 132; c a n bc c o m - c o n t r o v e r s y o r i" i n a f c d in Ihe a m b i p n i t y o f

piin'd toircilier w i i li refcrcMice o n l y e it he r , w o r d s , 91, 97; h o w t o b e r e c o n c i l e d , 92; this
1 . To tlieir E x t e n s i o n , or, 2 , T o t he ir q u e s t i o n not Hfrilatcd in G e r m a n y , 97.
( oi niire lieiisioii. i 6 . ; e o n s id e r e i l. A . . \ s de- C o x c ' E i TCS, ils use by Biel. D c c a in . 30; Con-
tieiiileiit o n e x t e n s i o n , 132-49; a d e p e n d e n t re/itiis, an d coacepius a ni in i, ils m e a n i n g , 8 6 -
on e.xte ns ioi i. c o n c e p ts s t a n d l o e ac h o t h e r C o N C i i EitE, its m e a n i n g , 80.
in ttio live tn iil na l re la tio n s o f E. xc lu' io n, C o x c i - U s i o N , o f a s y l l o g i s m , w h a t , 198; its
ClK-xtension. M i b o r d i n a l i o n . C o n id i in il io n , s y n o n y m s , i b . ; is t h e p r o b l e m s lat ed as a
a n d I nt er s e c ti on . 132: e x a m p l e s o f th e live d e c is i o n , ib.
m u tu a l r e la t io n s o f c o n c e p t s , 132-3; d i a C o x c i tE T E o r Spe ci al L o g i c , see L o g i c .
g r a m s i l h i ' t r a l i v c of, 134; o f t he se re la CoN Dii.LA C q u o t e d o n in flu e nc e o f A s s o c i a
tio ns . s u b o r d i n a t io n an d c o o r d in a t i o n of t i o n . 423. 454
prin ciiial im] )o r ta nc e , 133; s u b o r d i n a t i o n C o x n iT iD N A L . r n d g m e n i o r Ir o p o s i l i o n , sff
c o n s id e r e d . 13 3-lS; te r m s e x p r e s s i v e o f tbe . l u d g m e n t s . D o c t r in e of.
ditferent inotles o f tlic re la t io n o f .subor C o x D i T i o x A i . a nd Hijpotheiicnl, v a r ia t i o n s in
d i n a t i o n , 133 et s e q . ; .Snjierior. In f er i o r , r eg ard l o t h e a p p l i c a t i o n o f th e terms,
B r o a d e r , N a r r o w e r N o t i o n s , 135; U n i v e r 1613-7; Boelliiiis. used rnnr/itinnitli.s {condition
sal, Ia r li c u l a r , ib.: G en er a l N o t i o n , G en n s , al) an d tii/pollulinis {lu.p o t/i fti r al )a s c o n v e r t
.Special N o t i o n . .S|)ecies. 135-C, see G e n u s ib le, 167: c ondi tional 1 0 be ap))Iied l o the
a n d .S])ecies; C o o r d i n a t io n , w h a l , 14S; tlie g e n n s as i n c l u d i n g hypothetical a n d disjunc
t w o "c nc ra l l a w s by w l iic h s u b o r d i n a t io n tive, ib.
a n d coo rdin iilinn u n d e r e x t e n s i o n are re"ii- CONFEUEXOK. .see K n o w l e d g e , D o c t r i n e o f
l a te d . viz.. o f 1 1 o m o i e n c i l y a n d 1 leieioj re - the A cq i i is it i o n an d Ie r f e c t in g of.
n c i ty . ib , th eir i m p o r t , ib ; l a w o f l l e t e r o - CoN KCC lfs . lii l e in ed y for p r e c ip i t a ti o n . 403.
trciieity. true o n l y in t h e o r y , ib. : a d d i t io n a l C o x i. M B Ui CE Xs ts, 184; tlii ir er ro r r e g a r d in g
l a w o f Lot(ieal .Mlinity jiroin ulf ia led b y llie o]iiii>sition o f Bo e t li i n s a n d A v e r r o e s to
K a n t, but to be rejec ted . 149; B A s d e A r i s to t le on quantitication of pre di ca te ,
p e nd e nt o n c o in p r el ie n si on , but not in the 553
r e la t io n s o f i n v o l u t i o n nnd c o o r d in a ti o n , Coxs PECiES. wlia t. 14S; in s o far ns th ey are
15 0 - 3 ; n o t io n s , in r e la t io n l o e ac h ot he r, c o n s id e r e d di ffe ien t. but n o t c o n t r a d i c t o r y ,
are I dc iil ic nl a n d iJ ill e ie n I, 150; i d e n t i c a l, c a ll e d D is c re t e or Di sju nc t N o t i o n s , ib.
d i v id e d i n l o a b s o l u t e l y a n d re la t iv e l y i d e n C'OXTixoE.xT C o n v e r s i o n , o f tlie L o w e r
tica l, i b . ; a b s o l u t e l y id e n ti c a l n o t i o n s i m G re e ks , w h a l , 521; B l e m m i d a s c ite d o n . ih.
po ss ib le , ih. ; r e la t iv e l y i d e n t i c a l, c a ll e d a ls o C u X T R A D ic T l o . x .o r NOil C o i i t r a d i c ii o ii , p r i n
. Similar and U ec ip ro cat iii }' or C o n v e r t ib le . c ip le of. a l ii n d a m e n l a l l a w o f t ln m g l it , 57;
ib : n o t io n s arc C o n " r n c n t o r A<,'reein<r, w h a t . 58; ])io[iei ly Ihc l a w o f N o n - C n n l r a -
an d t on tl i c li v e . 151; C o n y r n e n t an d I d e n d i c t i o n , 59 ; h o w e ii o n iic e d , ib ; t h e priiici-
tical n o t io n s , anil D i v e r s e and C o n ll ic t iv e , ]ilc o f all l o g ic a l n e g a t i o n a n d d i s ti n c ti o n ,
distiiu'i iis lie d, ib , .see C o n c e p t s , O p p o - it io n ib .; <lillers from th e l a w ol I d e n t i t y o n l y
of; I nt rin si c an d E x t r i n s i c . 153; I n v o l u t i o n hy a n e g a t i v e e.xpre.-sion. 59; its h i s to r y ,
an d CiKirdinalioii in c o m p r e h e n s i o n . 153, 62 It seq. ; c an be t rac ed bac k to I l a to , 62;
155; t h e se r e la tio n s o f n o t i o n s ne;tleoled by e m i i h a l i c a l l y e n o u i .c e d b y A r i s t o t l c . 62-3:
l o e i c ia n -. anil h e n c e a l s o n e g l e c t e d re asoii- w i t h Ihe Je r ip a te lie s a n d .'^clmolmen th e
iii); in c o m | ir e li e n - io n , 1 5 3 -t ; t h e r e la hi gh e st p r i n c ip l e o f k n o w l e d g e , ih ; o b
t io n III I ,e CO laiiiin;; an d th e c o n t a i n e d in t ain ed its n a m e f i o n i t h e G re e k A r i s t n l e li -
r o m | re he iiio n jiropei-Iy c:illed i n r o li u w n , ans, ib. ; said by A i n m o n i n s a n d r iii lo ] jo -
155: i h i - ill .str ate d. 150: tlie i n v ol vi iif ; no nils to be the c r it e r i o n wl iic li d i v id e s trntli
ti 111 th e m o re ei n i p l e x . th e i n v o l v e d tlie f r o m f als eli ood t h r o n g li o n t t he u n i v e r se o f
m o re sjmiile. l.",T: eoiJrdination in cornpre- e.x istence, ib ; said by .' i i a i e z t o hol d th e
hens ii II. 157 n o t i o n s colirdiniited in e o m - s a m e su]>riiiiacy a m o n g ti e ])riiiciples (,|
pr< I -1111 ralli-d D i- pa r a te , in e x t e n s i o n ki io w li d g c w h i c h Ihe De ity doe s a m o n g the
Di-jiiiiet or D i - cr e i e. 1 5 s. pr in e ip le s o f e .xi sie nc e. ib. ; c o n t ro v e r s ie s
C o m I I'la. ii| p o - i i i o i i of, a r i - e .1 n n d e r Con i- t o u c h i n g its t ru th and a x i o m a t i c c h a r a c
iriln i-io ii. 151 ; c o ii - li ii led by c o n l li c - ter. 63-1: i l s l r n l h d e n i e d iiv m o d e r n a b s o
t io n . or llie , m i io -- ib ili l'. o f b e i n c c o n - lu tists, 64; h o w v i e w e d by .Sche lli ng and
n i c t e d i liioii.'Ic. iV., t n o f o ' d . 1 . Iriiine- J l e g e l , ib. ; a l o n g ivilli Unit o f Id e n t it y ,
il "iie 1 r < out 1 a o i r ory ; 2 , Mi-d iaie or C o n - re gu lat es llie c a t e g o r i c a l s y l l o g i s m , 207,251;
tra rv . i> . Il.i e di s |i n " ii i- ii e i| a i d i l l u s a ut ho r s referred l o o n , .508; c o n d i t i o n s of,
tr a te d. 152; till ir li ii' ic a l -i o n i t ic a n c e . 152-3; ib ; Jiroof of. a t te m p t e d by c l a n b e r g , ib.;
1 1] I I . li o n . Ilf Ir o po -il io iis . .sn 1 ii n d i i m e n l a l L a w s n f Tl io u gl i t.
Co.xf Ki-TirAi.is.M an d N o m i i i a l i in, t h e w h o l e CoNTU.s, .'icba.stianus, 553.
INDEX. 687
Co n v e r sio n , p^r w h a t , 186; C o n v e r - | CoNVERPTON i v pi epfi, its m e a n i n g in A r i s

sioii i v no t tlie m e r e s y n o n y m of, t o t l e , 525-6.
525; di fle r en tly dc tin e d by d iff eie nt lo};i- ('obi tii iN AT U iN o f c ou c e ji ts , .see C o r c e p t s ,
c ia n s, 526; by I. oetliiiis, i b . ; by l o g ic i a n s in I tel ati oi is of.
g e ne r al , i h . ; as amji liat ivo, no t l o g ic a l , 520; C'oiCLA, th e lo g ic a l , w li a t, 1 0 1 - 2 ; in clt nl ed
as restr ictive , tb rtu it ou s, or n o t a c o n v e r in t he p r e d i ca t e by A r i - f o t l e , I ' i . s t y l e d
sion , ib. tiic A p p red ica te,T cp o cT K a rr)yo p o vp n vo v, p ; l ;
C o n v e r s io n , of J u d g m e n ts or Propositions. tha t n e g a t io n do c s n o t b e l o n g to, lield b y
185-8; w li at , 185; sff 514-15; te r m s e m s o m e l o g i c i a n s , 177; t h e ojipo si te d o c t r i n e
p l oy e d to d e n o t e the or ig i n a l a n d c o n v e r t e d m a i n t a i n e d by th e a ut li o r , i b . ; tru e iaijiort
Jiroposition, 185; th e o r ig i n a l jirojiosition o l, 177-S; o r ig i n of th e c o n t r o v e r s y t e g a r d -
o u g h t to lie c a ll e d tlie Converleml o r Cmi- i n g th e p l a c e o f n e g a t i o n , 178; its m i u n i u g
vertible, t h e ] iio duc t o f th e c o n v e r s i o n the in C o m p r e h e n s i v e a n d E x t e n s i v e proj iosi-
Coni-ertcl o r Converse, 184-5; see nlso 511-15, tions , 193.
521-2; sjiecies o f c o n v e r s i o n d i s ti n g n i s l i e d CORAX a n d Tisias, ca se of, referr ed to, 334.
by l o g ic i a n s , 186; (1). Si m j i le or Pu r e . i6..- ' C'ciitdLi.ARiES, w l i a t, 188.
(2), C o n v e r s i o jier A c c i d e n s , i b . ; th is n a m e , CoRViNU.p, q uo te d on in fe r e n c e f r o m p u r e
lirst g i v e n by B o e t h i u s , i b . : (3), C o n v e r s i n i j.artieiilars, G65.
per C o n t r a p o s i t i o n e m , t b . : d i v is i o n s of, by C o u s i n , V i c t o r , his c o i i t r a i l i c l i o n s on the
B o e t h i u s , ib ; m n e m o n i c ve rse s for c o n c o g n i t i o n of tlie A b s o l u t e , 64.
v e r si on , 18i>-7; de f in i t io n s of, in g e ne r a l, C r a k a n t i i o r i E, 1G2; referred to on n a m e s
514-15; a case o f i m m e d i a t e i n ter en ce , , o f jiro po si tio ns in c o n v e r s i o n , 185, 229, 261,'
n a m e s for tlie jiropo si tio n g i v e n in, an d it.s liis d o c t r i n e o f I n d u c t i o n , 596.
p r o d u c t , 515; best n a m e s for tliese t o g e t h e r , C r e l l i u s , 38. 2.30, 243, 342.
Convertent or Converting, a n d tor e ac h lijjart, C r e n i u s . 402, 483.
Convertend an d Converse, i6., 522; error s o f C r i t i c i s m . A r t of, see T e s t i m o n y .
th e c o m m o n l o g ic a l d o c t r i n e of, t w o first. C r o u s a z , 399; q u o t e d in i ll u s tr a t io n o f pre
That t h e qu an tit ie s arc no t c o n v e r t e d w i t h c ip it a n c y , 402-3; q u o t e d on s lo th as a so u r c e
tlie q u a n tif ie d t e r m s , 515-16, 529 ; ili is w r o n g o f error, 404, 430, 435.
s li o w n , 1, B e c a u s e t h e t er m s o f a projiosi- C r u s i u s , C hr is tia n A u g u s t , 411 ; q u o t e d on
t io n are o n l y t erm s o f r e la tio n , 615; 2'^, c a n o n s o f s y l l o g i s m , 561-3.
O nl y c o m p a r e d as q u a n ti ti e s , i b . ; 3'^, Q u a n CUKSUS Compfi/ifttsis, referred to on in d u c t io n
tity o f p r o p o s i t i o n in c o n v e r s i o n r e m ai n s o f A r i s t o t l e , 594.
a l w a y s th e sa m e, 515-16, 525; 4^, O f n o c o n CusTO.M. p o w e r of , a s a s o ur c e o f e rro r, set
s e q u e n c e lo g ic a l ly w h e t h e r subject or p r e d E r r o r , Cau ses of.
icat e p l a c e d first, 516; s e c o n d error Th e
not c o n s id e r i n g tliat tlie jiredieate has a l D ' A b r a d e liACONis. referred to for sc liolas-
w a y s a (juaiitity ill t h ou gl it as w e l l as th e t ic t h e o i i e s o f tlie o b je et -n ia tt e r o f L og ic ,
su bject. 516-20; .(f' atsn 52-5-7, 529; o n l y one 20.
sp ecies of, and that t l i o r o u g h - g n i n g and D a m a s c e n u s . J o a n n e s , 5 ; referred to on
sclf-siillicient, 520; conversin per ncnd en s. as m e t h o d in L o g i c , 341.
am jili at ive . no t lo g ic a l , a n d as re strictive, D a m IIKIN, his L n g i q v e , 50.
m er e l y f o rt ui to u s, ib : see also 525-0. .see D a v i d , th e A r m e n i a n , reterred to ou tlie c a t
C o n v e r s i o n per accidens; Conversio per con- eg or ies . 142.
trapn.sitlonem o n l y h o l d s tl i r o u g h c o n t r a d i c I)At:.iEs. o r D a r i c s. 25; referred to o n priti-
t io n , a n d is i n d e p e n d e n t o f c o n v e r s i o n , 520, cijile o f .Sullicieiit Reas on, 68.
see C o n v e r s i o n /ler contra pos ition em; the D e M o r g a n , A , L e t te r o f .Sir IV. H a m i l t o n
C o n ti n g e n t C o n v e r s i o n o f tlie l o w e r C r e e k s , t o. .587.
n o t a c o n v e r s i o n , 521, see C'ont ing ent ('o n- D k f i m t k and In de fin it e P r o j io s i li o n s . as nn-
v e r si o n ; ad va nt : ig e s o f flie a u t h or 's o w n de r sto nd b\ tlie au tli or , 1 7 1 - 2 , 1 7 5 , s/e J u d g
m eth od ov er t h o s e o f the l o g ic i a n s , 521-2; m en ts. P r o p o s i ti o n s .
tlie ciiara cte r of. as g i v e n b y G re e k l o g ic i a n s D e f i n i t i o n , or D e c l a r a t i o n , tlie a n a l y s i s of
subsc<|iient to A r i s to t le c o r re c t . 521; errors t he co m p re l ie i is i o ii o f a c o nc e ji t, 104-6; d o c
o f A i i s t o t l e an d th e l o g i c i a n s re g a rd in g , tr i n e of. 341-2; w h a t , tb.: (lie tei ms/-/fr/urOon
522, 52S-9 ; a ut hor iti es referred to o n , 527-S. ar.d definition e.xprcss t h e s a m e jirocess in
CONVEP.SION per c n n trn p o sitlo n e in , o n l y l io l d s different aspe cts , ib. : d e f in i t io n in its str ic t
t h r o u g h c o n t r a d i c t i o n , a n d is n o t jir oj rc rly er .sense. 342; tliis e xj il ie at ed . ib a s e q .; v a
a c o n v e r s i o n . 5 2 0 - 2 1 .5 2 8 ; lield by s o m e to r io u s n a m e s o f Declaration. Explication,
b e m e d i a t e . ,520; t h i s e r r o n e o u s , ib : r u l e s E xp o s iti o n, Description, Definition Proper,
f o r , 520-1; h i s t o r i c a l n o t i c e s o f , a n d au ib. ; N o m i n a l , R e a l , a n d G e n e t i c , w li a i.
th o r s r e f e r r e d to o u , ib. 342-3; rules of. 341; these e x p l a i n e d , ib. et
688 IX D ]: X .
s e q. ; llrst rule, 814-5; s e c o n d ru le, 315-0; D i d k u o t , qu o t e d o n m e m o r y , 418.

t hi rd rul e, 346; e i r e u l a r d e l h ii ti o n , 346-9; D i l e m m a , see H y p o t h e t i c o - d i s j u n c t i v e s y l l o
t'ourth rule, 31 6- 7; tiflh rule, 347-6; Delii ii- gism .
t io n . in its l o o s e r se ns e, 34S; D i l u c i d a t i o n s D i l k .m .m a t i c j u d g m e n t o r j ir o po s iti on , see
or 17.\|ilieiilions, it) ; ] tosc ri|it ion s, 348-9. .1 lu lg m e iit s.
P k g k u a n T'O, r.aroii, 68, 123. 366 D u i g e x e s J . A E U T i u R , referr ed to on g e n u s o f
liKi.AUivikiti-;, his Logique, 50; referred to L o g i c , 7; a t tr ib ut ed t h e i n v c n t i o u o f .Soph
on d e l in i le a r ti c le in r e la t io n to q u a n ti li c a - is m Sorites to K u b u l id e s , 208 , 324, 331-3;
t io n . 581. referred t o on th c I l a t o n i c d e f in i t io n o f
I>KNZiN(;Kr,, I g n a t i u s , referred to o n C a t e g o m a n , 217. 369.
ries, 142, 1*4, 1*7; (juoted on in o de s o f D i a o i i a m s o f A m m o n i u s . 637; e r r o n e o u sl y
/tilhiriii s'nsiis co mpositi et dii'isi, 326-7 , 333. referred to I'liber St ap u l c ii si s , ib.
D k i i o d o n , D a v i d , referred to on W l i o l e an d D i a l o g u e , 492, ."fe K n o w l e d g e , D o c t r i n e o f
1a r l. 1 4 3 ,2 15 ; q u o t e d on q u a n t i t y o f dis- the A c q u i s i t i o n a nd I e r fe c t in g of.
j u i e t i v e a n d h y p o l h e t i c a l p r o j i o s i t i o n s , 2.37, D i o n y s i u s o f Ilal icarna.ssus, Ids e m p l o y m e n t
244, 247; held s y l l o g i s m a n d e n t h y m e i n e to o f Ihe t er m enthijmeine, 278
he llic s a m e sjiccies o f r e ii s on in g , 276, 289, D io n y siu s C a t o , on t e a c h i n g as a m e a n s o f
2111.311; Ills m e t h o d o l r e d u c i n g Cainestre.s se lf - i m p r o v e m e n t in k n o w l e d g e , 483.
tu l ia r h n r a ,3 1 4 ; n o t i c e of , 559; Ids j io le m ic D i s c u s s i o n s on Philosophy, A u t h o r s, referred
agiiinst Ihe sjiecial ru les o f s y l l o g i s m . 500; t o for .scholastic th e or ie s ou o bj e ct m a tt e r
((iioted on I n d u c t i o n , 594; his c r it ic i s m o f o f L o g i c , . 0 ; on t he c h a r a c t e r o f Dr .
tlie sjx'cial ru les o l t he figur es r e v ie w e d , W l i a t e l y ' s Elements, 2 \ ,2 2 - , referred to for
666-7. a l a te r d e v e lo j i m e n t o f t h e a u t h o r 's d o c
D e s c a k t e s , q u o t e d r e g a r d i n g t he e x t e n s i o n t r i n e o n t h e L o g i c d L a w s , 70, 75, 19 6, 207;
ot ih e t er m Thought {rogitutio), 9; q u o t e d on refer re d t o on hi sto r y o f L a t i n a n d G re e k
th e m e a n s o f a v o i d i n g e r r o r , 388; hi.s n i ii e m o i d c ver ses for M o o d a u d F i g u r e o f
d o u h t , 3 9 3 ; his pr e c ep t to d o u b t a l l, 398-9; .'Syllogism, 308.
conditions w idch m odify its a p p l i c a t i o n , D i s .i u n c t i v e Ite a s o i ii ii g o r S y l l o g i s m , first
;Wi cla.?s o f C o n d it i o n a l S y l l o g i s m s , a n d s e c o n d
D e t e i i m i x a t i o x . o r C o n c r e t i o n , w h a t , 104-5; cla ss aflbr dc d b y I n t e r n a l F o r m o f S y l l o
its s\ i i o i n m s, ib. g i s m , 231; a r e a s o n in g w h o s e form is detor-
D i a l e c t i c , a n c i e n t n a m e ( w i t h c ert ai n l i m i i id n e d by t he l a w o f F.xcliided M i d d le , and
ta ti o ns ) for L o g i c . 5; its us e by I la lo , ib ; w h o s e s u m p t i o n i.s a c c o r d i n g l y a di .qiinc tive
it- o r ig i n , ib. ; its ii-e bv Ili-gel, 6; by A r i s p r o p o s i t i o n , eitl ier o f C o n tr a d i c ti o n or o f
t o t l e , I lie l o g i c ol jiro bah le m a t t e r , 0; C o n tr a r ie t y , ib.; e it lie r a l fi r m at iv e , c o n s t i
m is t a k e s r e g a r d in g t he use o f t h e tei ni hy t u t i n g Ih e Moilus Ponens. o r Modus ponendo
A r i - t c l l c , ib. ; e m p l o y e d in a v a c i l l a t i n g tollens, o r n e g a t i v e , c o i i s t i l u t i n g t h e Modus
iimni.e." hy t h c .Stoics, 6. Tollens, o r M odus tollendo p o n m s , i b . ; inne-
AiaKfKTiKT] TTpaygaToiv, e qua l t o Ab- i n o id c ve rses f o r tliese m o d e s of, i b.; its
striicl or (i c n e r a l L o g i c , 3H,sre J.ogic. d c f ii d li o n e x | d i c a t e d , i6 e t s t q ; a s y l l o g i . - m
A t a X c c T iK q i v xpT )(Tei ic a l y v g v a t r i q ir p a y - w ith di .sjunctive m aj o r jiremi se is n o t neces-
p a T c c v , ei| ual l o .Sjiecial or A p ji lie d L o g i c , s a i i l y a d i s j u n c t i v e r e a s o n i n g , 231-2; g e n
28 sfr L o g i c . eral vi ew of, 232 e t ; f o r m u l a for a s y l l o
D i c t a dr O m ni rt dr js'ullo, t h e c a i i o n s o f g i s m , a. W i t h t w o di.sjunct m em b e r s , ib.;
d e d u c t i v e c a te g o r i c a l s y l l o g i s m s in e x t e n - b. W i t h m o r e t h a n t w o di sju n ct m em be r s ,
ioi.. 211; h o w e x jir e sse d, ib. ; l o g i e i a n s 23 3-4; Ihe jirincijile of. 2-34; t h e s ev era l
w h o coi foiind tlic D i c t u m ile O m n i w i t h par ts of, 225; t h e ru les of. 2.35-0; t he se
th e N o t a N o I . t . e tc ., 575; w h o m a k e th c e x j i l i c a l e d , 2-36 el s e q .; lirst rule of, 236;
D i c l n i n i h e lii nd ai in iital rul e o f s y l l o g i s m s e c o n d rule o f , 237; th ird rul e of, 237-8;
ill ge n e r a l, .075-ij, J"- .Sy I lo g i - in ; w h o coii - I he d i s ju n c t i v e s y l l o g i s m o f eo iii jir ehe ns io n
fomi d or m a k e c o i i n d n n l e th e l a w o f I ro- a n d e x t e n s i o n , i b.; t li o u g h sji e c ia lly r e gu
jior tion or A n a l o g y w i t h , 576; w h o restrict lated h y th e l a w o f K xc li id e d .Middle, still
llie D.ctiiiii to Ih e lirst figu re (iin iii ed iat ely ), Ihe o th e r lo g ic al l a w s oj ier ali vc in, 2.52;
di w h o m a k e i h e D i c ta Ihe s u j ir e m c c a n m a y b e d r a w n in all tlic four figures, 319;
on" for iiiiivcrsul s yl lo g! ins, ib : w l i o th is ill list rated, 319-20; its e li a rn ele r a c c o r d
er r o n e o u sl y >.np| o e A r i - l o t i c to employ^ i n g to an t li o r s latest v ie w . 604-5, 612-13,
ls-side tn D . c ln m . Ihe rule of r r o j cirtioii 6 1 1, ."er l l y j othi'tic:;! Le r s o i i i n g or ,S\Ho-
a< a f n n d a n i e n la l l a w o f s y l l o g i s m , d,. ; h o w gisni.
e n o n n e e d by N o l d i i i - , 577; hy Le ns el i, di. , D i s p u t a t i o n , see K n c w l i d g e , D o c t r i n e o,
hy A r i - i o t l e , d, ; by ,Jac. fhomasiiis, i b. ; t h e A e q i i is i ioii an d I e r f e c l i n g o f
object i on s to. .578. D i v i s i o n , t h c a n a l y s is o f t h e E x t e n s i o n o f a
INDEX. 089
c o n c e p t , 105-7; d o c t r i n e of, 850-9; d i \ i s i o n g i T .m m a t ic e x a m p l e s of, w i t h s u p p r e s s e d

in ge n e r a ], wl ia t, 8.50-1; o f t w o specie.*;, c o n c l u s i o n , 2.80-1
r ar fi ti o i i and L og ic a! 1)iv i s io n , 351; ))arti- KiiciiElitE.MA or B e a s o n - U c n d e r i n g .Syllo
l io n eitlier l!ca l or I d e al , 351-2; e x a m p l e s g i s m . the lir.st var iet y o f c o m i i l e x s y l l o g i s m ,
o f tlie.se t w o k i n d s of, 351; lo g ic a l d i v is i o n , w h a t , 259; a u t li o is r e l e n e d to on vari:i-,
w li a t, 352-3; its rules, 353; its c h a i a e t c r t io n s in th e a i ip lie a lio n o f tlio n a m e , 220;
a n d rul es e.xp lic at cd, ib. t t s e q . ; t h e e nd of, in A r i s to t le t h e te r m is used tor a d ia lec tic
is D i s ti n c t n e s s , w h i c h i n v o l v e s C o m p l e t e s y l l o g i s m , li. , as a po l y s y l lo g i sm con iiiar a-
ness o f t h ii .k in g . 3.54: as m a n y k in ds o f l i v e l y simi ile . 274; m a y he d r a w n in an y
po ss ib le ,a.s t i. e ie are elii.ractcrs all'ording figure, 320.
a pr i n c ip l e o f d i v i s i o n , tb .; a un i v e r sa l E p i c t e t u s , 332; la lla c ie s m e n t i o n e d b y . ib.
n o t io n the o n l y obj ect of, ib .; g e n e r a l jirob- K p. a s .m u s , h i s a d v i c e t o a y o u n g m a n o n t h e
lem of, 354-5; ru les of, 350 et s e q. ; these c o n d u c t ol hi.s s tu d i e s , 402.
class ified, 350; th os e spi-i ngi ng , i.), li'om E n i z z o , .Sebastiano, 25.
t he iirinei]ile o f d i v i s i o n , first, s e c o n d , E r x k s t i , 435
nn d tliird rules, 35'5-7; iii). from t h e rela- Eitiioi*., see I'rutli a n d Error, D o e t r i n e of.
t i o i . s o f tlie d i v i d i n g in o in b ei s t o t l i e d i v i d e d E n r . o n , Cau ses, O c c as io ns , a n d Bei nc ilies of,
n l . o l e s , f o u r th an d tifiIt rules, 358; iii ), 390; Ihicon's chissifieiilioii ol t he s n m e e s of,
f r o m t he r e la t io n s o f th e .'everal d i v i d i n g 390; it.s cau.ses a n d oc c a si o n s c o m i i ie l ic n d e d
m e m b e r s l o e a c h ot he r, .-ixtli rule, i6. ; in o n e or o t h e r ol' four classes, p , In the
iv.), I'roin the r e la t io n s o f t he d i v i s i o n s to g e n e r a l c ir c u m s ta n c e s w l iic h m o d i f y the
Ihe s u b d i v i s i o n . .'eventh rul e, 359. in te lle c tu al ch.ir ac ter o f the 1 n d i v i d i i a l ; 2'^,
D o u b t or d o u b t i n g , t h e nrt o f d o u b t i n g w e l l 111 the C o n s t i tu t i o n , H a b i t s , a n d K e l a t i o u s o f
di llcult t o t e a e l i a n d l o le ar n, 393, .I'f E r r o r , liis p o w e r s o f C o g n i t i o n , F e e l i n g , a n d D e
Ca us cs of, D e s c n r li s . sir e; 3^, In L a n g u a g e as an I n s t i u m e u t o f
D o w x A i r . 3S'i; referred to o n A r i s t o t l e an d T l io u g h t a n d M e d iu m o f C o m m u n i c a t i o n ;
r i a t o ' s v i e w s o f m e t h o d , 30' . or, 4, I n tlie na tu re o f t h e objects about
D u o b i s c i i , 88; referred to o n o p p o s i t i o n o f w h i c h liis k n o w l e d g e is c o n v e r s a n t , 390-1;
c o n c e p ts , 151; on c o o r d in a ti o n ot n o t i o n s these c o n s id e r e d in d e t a il, .391 et .seq.; I.
ill c o m p r e h e n s i o n , 155, lo**, 179, 219, 320, G en er al c i i c u m s t a n c e s w l iic h m o d i f y the
351. i n te l le c t u a l c h a r ac te r o f th e i n d i v i d u a l , ib.
D u x c a n , W i l l i a m , o f Abe.'-cleen, hi s Logic, et se q.; these o f t w o k i n d s , P , T h e p a r
50. ti c u l a r d e g r e es o f c u l t i v a t i o n to w h i c h hi.i
D u x c a x , J l a r k , 24.5, 244, 201, 311; re d u c e d n at io n ha.s a t ta i n e d ; 2, I he .-trictor a ss oci
C a m e s tr e s l o C e l a r e n t, an d B a r o c o to F e r io at io ns , as sclio ols , sects, e tc ,39 1; these il l u s
by c o u n f e r p o si f io n , 314 tr at e d, 391-400; m a n by na tu re soc ial , and
i nl lu en ce d hy flic o |i in io n o f his fellow.s,
E x c YCLOPAJWIA Br ita nn ica , 81 et alibi. 3 9 1 -2 , Iascal q u o t e d o n th e p o w e r o f Cu s
E x x o e m a t i c , see C o n c e p t s , Docti-ine of. t o m , 392; an i n g e n i o u s iihi losoiilier q u o t e d
"Euvoia, iv v o g j x a , v6r}yia, a m b i g u o u s , 85 on Ih e s a m e su bj ect , 392-3: th e art o f
E x t h y m e i i e , a s y l l o g i s m dc-h c ti v e in e x t e r d o u b t i n g well difl icu lt l o le ar n an d to
nal fo r m , 275; t he c o i n n i o n d o c t r i n e o f tcacli, .39.3-t; t w o g e n e r a l fo rm s o f tli"
l o g ic i a n s r e g a r d i n g , ib.; th is d o c t r i n e f u i n fl u e n c e o f e x a n q i l e , 394, (1) Irejudice
tile, au d er r o n e o u s l y at tr ib u t ed to A r i s t o t le , in f a v o r o f the O ld, 394-5; (2) Brcjudice
276 et s e q. ; l'^. N o t a spec ial f o r m o f rea in f a v o r o f tlie N e w , 395; Irejud iee o f
s o n i n g , 276; 2 , D i s t i n c t i o n of, as a s pec ial L e ar ne d A u t h o r i t y , 395-0; m e a n s by w h ic h
f o r m o f r e a s o n in g , n o t m a d e b y A r i s t o t le , t h e in flu e ne e o f So c i et y as a s ou rc e o f Error
277 et seq.; t he e n l h y m e r a e o f A r i s to t le , m a y ho e o u n f e r a c l e d , 398 It srq .; nec ess ar y
w h a t , ib .; v a r io u s a j ip l ie a t i o n s o f t h e te r m , l o i ns tit u te a cr itical e x a m i n a t i o ; i o f the
by D i o n y s i u s o f H a li c a r n a s s u s , a u t h o r o f c o n t e n t s o f our k n o w l e d g e , i b . ; t h e jire-
Rhetoric lo Alexander, S o p a t e r A p a m e c ii s is . cejif o f De.scartes o n thi.s p o i n t , ib. el seq.;
A ti lu s G el liu s, C ic e ro , Q u in t i li a n , 278; c o n d i t i o n s w h ic li m o d i f y its a pp l ic a t io n ,
d e n o t e d , w i t h s o m e o f t h e a n c i e n ts , a s y l l o 399; a gr ad ua l a n d i ir o g ie s s iv e ab r og a tio n
g i s m witli s o m e suiijiresscd pa r t , as tho o f |i rej udi cc s all that ca n he re qui red o f
A p lir o d is i a ii . A m m o n i u s , Ih i lo p o m i s , In- tlie s tu de nt o f iih il o s o p l i v , ib. II. Th e
c h y m e r e s , ( J u i n t i l i a n , U l i i i n n , S c h o l i a s t ou C o n s t i t u t i o n , H abi ts , and B e c i p r o ca l Beh;-
H e r m o g e n c s , l i . . 3, A d m i t t i n g tlie v a l id i t y tioi is o f t h e B o w e r s o f C o g n i t i o n , Keel in g,
o f th e d i s c r i m i n a t io n o f the E n f h y m c n i c , an d Desire, 400; o f t w o k i n d s , i Tlie
it c a n n o t be rest ric te d to a s y l l o g i s m o f o n e u n d u e p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f tlie A f f e ct i v e E l e
s upp re ss ed p r e m i s e , 279; e x a m p l e s of, o f m e n t s ol 'M i n d , 400 t t S'q.; infl ue nc e o f pas
t he first, s e c o n d , a n d th ird o r d e r , i b . ; epi- sion on t h e m i n d , ib ; B o e t hi us q u o t e d o n
87
090 INDEX.
fliis in fl n e n c c , ift.; th e p o s s i b i l i t y o f e r ro r ib .; its u n d u e a c l i v i t y , ib ; its i n a c ti v it y ,

iiiiiiUil lo l i o b i i l i l e l.Vii.'Diiing, 4 l l l ; tlie i b . ; b. S n g g o s t io n or A s s o c i a t i o n , as a
I li-.-ioii.s iiSMiiiTve- ot en i> r l e il iic e d l o four, s o u r c e o f error. 419 et . w q . ; iii lln e nc c o f A s
401-2; 1 1i t c i p i i a i i c y . 4o2 t t seq. ; Jjciioc.a so c ia t io n in m a tte r s ol' I'aste, 421; S t e w a r t
ijliotevi o n, ib. ; KniMiius (|llotccl o n , i6. ; il- <liioted on this in tiu c nc e , 421-3; C o n d i l l a c
lu.-Irations of, f r o m Xeiieea, ^ lo i i ta i gi i e , qu o te d o n the s a m e , 4'23; 'S Ciravcsande.
402-3: jirecipitato ( lo g m a t i s iu a n d skojiti- H e r o d o t u s , an d .Inst in, referred l o o n the
cisin pliascs o f t he s a m e d i s it os ili o ii, 403; s a m e , 42 3 - 4 ; o n l y r e m e d y for 1he iii llu en ce
r e m e d y for p r e c ip i t a t i o n , ib.; 2. 8 l o l h , ib. ; o f A s s o c ia t i o n is Hie Il ii lo s o p l iy o f tlie
S e n e c a cjuoled o n, 404; its r e m e d y , i4. ; 3. H u m a n .Mind, 424-5; (4) I m a g i n a t i o n , ns a
ll o j ic a n d 1 ear, i b . ; l i o w tliese pa s s io n s s o u r c e o f error, 42 6 et seq ; i|.s ne c e ss it y in
o p e r a te i i n l a v o n i b l y on t he Llid er sta n d- s c ie iil ili c jinrsnits. 420; def ect in the art o f
i u g. 415: 4. ^ e ll - l o v e , i n c l u d i n g V a n i t y , m o d e r n tim e s as eo nq ia r cd w i l li lli al o f
I l ii'e, etc ., 40(3 it .or/.,- A r i s t o t l e s jn-ecept a n c i e n t, a r is i n g I'roni iin]ierfect c u l tu r o o f
icgarding lliis p as s io n , ib ; illii str at ioi is i m a g i n a t i o n , 42 (3-7; e r ro r s ari.-ing from tlie
o f Ilie i ii llu e nc e o f S e l f - I - o v e on o ur o p i n di s p r o p o r ti o n h o t w e c n i i n a g i n a l i o i i and
i o ns , 41X3-7 ; S e l f - L o v e l e a d s us l o regard j ii d g in e i i l, 4'27't v"/ ; Hiose a r is i n g from the
witll fa vo r flie o p i n i o n s .l tli os e t o w h o m w c a k i e ss o f im a g i r .a t io n , 427; fro m its dis-
w e ar e in a n y w a y at ta c l ic d , JOG: M;ile- l>roi.(iitioi;ate v i v a c i t y , ib.; r e m e d i e s for
br a nc lie .adduced to tin's effect. 40G-7; this lli esc d ef ect s, i 5 . ; 1! H ig l ic r fa cu lt ie s , 428
s l i o w i i csji eci al ly w l i o n Ihe jias. ion c li an g e s , St .s'f/. , (5J Kla ho ra tiv e l-'acnlty as a s ou rc e
40.3; A r n a u l d h o l d s t ha t m a n is n a i ui : ill y o f I'.rror, ib. et seq ; e r ro r d o c ; n o t lie in
i iivi oiis , i b . ; Hie l o v e o f D i s p n t a li n i i. ib. ; tlie c o nd iti o n. s o f o n r liig lie r lacu lH os, but
t h e atrections n o w m e n t i o n e d t h e i m m e d i is jiossilile in llie ai p l ic a t io n o f tlie l a w s o f
a te c a us e s o f a l l e r r o r , 40'j; i n c l i m i n a r y c o n t h o s e f a c n ll ie s to de t e r m ii m tc ca ses , 423-9,
d i t i o n s r is |u is it c f o r t he e l h c i e n c y o f prc- del'ective ac ti on o l Ihe u n d e r s t a n d i n g m a y
cejits a g a i n s t t h e s o u r c es o f e rro r, 409-10; ar i-e I'liiin oi.e o f t h r ee c a u s e s ; a. Na t u r a l
ru les a g a i n s t e r r o r s I'roni llie Afl'eclions, 410. l ee bl e lie ts , h. Wat.I ol' i.ece.-.-ary exjjeri-
JVeakness a n d D is pn ))) O rt io ne d .S trength e n c e , c I i: c om ] i et e n c y o f a t t e n t io n , 429;
o f tlie I 'a c u lt ie s o f K n o w l e d g e , 411-31; (6) I te gi ila tiv o I 'a c nl ty n o t projicrly a
n e g le c t o f the l im it e d n a t u r e o l 't li e U n m a n s o ur c e o f error, 43D; r e m o t e s o u r c e s o f e r
I n t e l l e c t a s o u r c e o f er ror , 411 et seq.; (1) ror in th e diireient lia hi ls de t cr n i i ii e d by
riiilo sf )]i hy o f th e .Vbs olu te, 411-12; (2) A se.x, age . b o d i ly c o i. s li li i t i o n , e d u c a t io n ,
o ne -si de d v i e w ol' t he fiiii lii dc o f th e m in d . etc .. lb ; f e l e c te d e x a m p l e s o f tlicse, a
412 et.eeq.; tliis ill u s tr a t e d by rc le r e iic e l o o i . e r i d e d en ll i v at ion o f t h e i iit e llo c lu a l
I lie t w o c o n t r a d ic t o r i e s , t he n h s o l ii c c o m - power.-, lb. ; tliis e.xeniiililied in Hirco(lill'er-
m e n c e i n e i. t a n d th e inli iii je n o i . - c o m e i. t jiliases, in e x c l u s i v e c u l t i v a t i o n , 1.
m e n c e m e n t o f t im e , 412; llie s a m e jirinci- O f tlie jiowers o f o b s e r v a t i o n , 2. O f rneta-
))le ( x e n i i i ilied i n tlie c a - e o f t h e n e c e s s i ta jihvsics, 3. O f m a tl io n ia t ic s , 431; S t e w a r t
rian a r g u m e n t a g a i n s t tlie f i e e d o m o f llic rel'cricd to on llie t w o l att er e r r o r s , / * . ;
h a m a n w i l l. 413; a n d in tlie c as e o f the 111. l.angiiag'e as a i oi irc e o f e rro r, 4.32-9;
lilKwtarian a r g u m e n t in lie l ia l f ol fr e e - w i ll , its g e n e r a l c l i a r a c l e r c o n s i d e r e d w ilh a v i e w
)b.; w e a k n e - s an d d i s p r o p o r ti o ii e d stret iglli l o s h o w h o w it b e c o m e s ili e o c c a s i o n ol
o f ilie s ev era l < o g i i i l i v e 1 a c u it ie s, as a er ro r, 4.32 -4 ; in w h a t s en se l a n g u a g e is
s o e r r e o f erro r, 411 i t n q . . tlie.-e Cacultie.s na tu ra l l o m a n , 4.32-3; di ll ic u l l y as to th e
< f l u o c a es a J. ow er a n d a i II iglier,
ii ig iii oib
f l:a n g u a g e , 4.33; l a n g u a g e ha s a
A Ilie L o w e r < la i4. n mq ; (1) Th e g e n e r a l an d a .sjiecial c li a r a c le r , 431; n o lan-
I'n < Illa tive I a r ii l lv . o f I w o ki n d - , ib ; a. giiago! is a iierl'eci in str ni ne nt o l 't ln u ig l .t .
I . \ | e r i : i l r e t e i jition. a- a s ou r c e o f error, lb.; l a n g u a g e s , I'roin Ih eir n i nl li lii de , dilli-
> el u q , tl I d i t i o i - o f it- adeijiiil e a e ti v - eii lty o f th e ir a c q u i s it io n , i n a d e q u a c y , arn-
II> , 415: 1 r e e a n ii o i - w ilh a v i e w t o t.i tecl- liignity o f w o r d s , are s o u r c e s o f erro r, i b . :
in g i !i i o n- o f i < .-i - e . , ai d t holiv
is iill
a iii
i n-tgr a le d , 435 et se q.; s ig n s n e c e s
II I r n r- lo wliieli i l i . lead , 41.5-16; b sary for tlie i n te r n a l o|ierati(m o f Hiongl I.
.Ri i.( 0 1 -cion ne -. a- ii <onrce o f error. 4-35; an d lor its c o in m i in i c a li o i i, ib. ; i n lo i .a
116'' / . thi.s jiovver V:iri's in i n l e i - i l y ae- li o n s o f t he v oi ce Ihe on l y a de( |ii al e son
e o t i l i n g I O I ime . H;ite o l iiea ll ll. ai.d olijeel, sihio s y m b o l s ol t lioiiglit a nd its coni ini i-
lb. (2| .Vi'i o r v . a s a s o u r c e o f e rro r. 417 n ic a ti on , ib ; t he se i n a r ti c u la t e a n d a r ti c
't ' I/. , a le< ll, .1 1 7 : a to o -Ir o n" . 117 I'R: ul at e, 436, the l att er e o n s l i l u t c La n g nt ig e
rern ed ifs lo r thei-e fi; po He i x iinie.-, II'-; Pr ope r, i b . ; h o w this is a s o u r c e o f error.
(3) 1 he l;e],ri d i i c l i v e 1 acn t y , o f t w o l . i n d s , ib. : lli e a i n h ig u if y o f w o r d s llio pr in c i| al
419, a. Iteiim ii' Cen ce , as a s ou r c e o f error s o u r c e o f er ro r o r i g i n a t i n g in, ib. ; t w o c i -
I X D F, X . 891
c u m s t a n e c s u n d e r (his h e a d w l i ic h m u t u a l l y .369-70, 380, .385. 442: ei i o t cd o n e x p e r ie n c e

ntl'ect encli otlier,-Ifi l-T; t h e vo c iib iil a r y ol a u d o b s e r va ti o n . 4 1 i - 9 ; q u o t e d on i n d u c
e v e r y liiiigiiage nec s s a i i l y (iiiite, a n d the t io n a n d a n a l o g y , 4.51. 4.52, 453; q u o t e d on
c o n s e q u e n c e s ol tliis, 137; w o n t s are m er e l y s nin o f d o c t r i n e o f i n d u c t io n , 153: qnc.ted
liints to the m i n d , 437-,S; r e m e dy f o r e rro r on i n d u c l i o n a nd a n a l o g y us not airoidii g
a ris in g from la n g ii a g o , 438-9; I V . fl i e Ob- a b s o l u t e c e r t a i n ty , 45.5-6; cjiioted on te.'ti-
j c c l s o f ou r k n o w l e d g e a s o ur c e o f error, m o ii y , 4.58-9. 460; q u o t e d on eiei'.il ;'it- o f
439; rules t o ii c li in g tlie ca us e s a n d len ie- t e s t i m o n y in g e n e r a l, 460-4: on Il^tnl 0 l:.
die s o f onr false j u d g m e n t s , 439-40. in sj ec ia l, 4i>4-7; qu o t e d on c ii l ic i. ni an d
E s s e n c e , E.-seiitials, or I n t e r n a l U e iio in in a- i nl er jir eta ti o: , 469-75; (jiioird on sjieciila-
tions , wl ia b 1.53. tion as a m e a n s ot k n o w l e d g e , 47')-7.
llssE u , qu( ted on t h e d i s t i n c t i o n o f tb e m a t ICUUE.MLP, relerred to on ii>e o f t h e term cnte-
ter a n d Ibim o f tli o u g li t , I I ; on tb e latt er gori'frt/, ll45; Jiis n o i n e n c h it u r e o f t h e ];arts
as t h e objecl o f I. o g i c t o th e e x c l n s i o n o f o f t h e hy j io t h e t ic a l s\ l l o g i -m , 241.
t he rorni.;-, 11-12; on th e l a w s o f t h o u g h t E u g e n i o s , o r Ei ige iii us , 85, lUl, 142; referred
' as t h o u g h t as s tr ic tly t he objeet o f L o g i c , t o on the d i s ti n c ti o n o f Iof eiitia l an d
12-13: (jiioted o n th e d i s ti n c ti o n o f lo gi ca l A c t u a l in r e la t io n to nc.fions, 14.5-6; q u o t e d
a n d m et a p h y s i c a l 1 r n t l i . 7 ; - 7 ; referred to o n inijiort o f t he Icrni ( T v W j y i a p b s , 197,
on r e la t io n o f c o n e e p ts to llieir o r ig i n as 19.8, 30.
diree f o r in di re ct , 100-1; quoted on th e L u l e i : , e in jil oye d c ir c u l a r d i a g r a m s as l o g i
c lea r ne s s and o b -c iir ify o f c o nc e jit s , 113-14; cal n o t a t i o n , ISO; bnt not th e lirst, ib.
q u o t e d on th e sjiecial c o n d i t i o n s o f t h e dis- Eu sTAC iiiUP, r e f e r r e d t o o n J l e t l i o d in Lo gi c ,
t in c f n e s s o f a c o nc e ji t, 117-18, 119; q uo te d 341.
oil th e liigliest poi nt o f th e d i s t i n c t n e s s o f a E u s t h a t i u .s , 336.
c oncej)!, 120; (ju o le d on t h e imjios si bil ity E x a m t e e , A ri .- tc t le q u o t e d o n , .591.
o f n o t i o n s a b s o l u le l y id e n ti c a l, 151; q u o t e d E x c l u i i e i ) 31 iddle, o r Third, jirincijile of, a
ou t h e a g r e e m e n t and differ en ce o f con- f un da m e nt ti l l a w o f t h o u g h t , 57; w Init. 59 :
c e pl s a n d j u d g m e n t s , 102-3, 174; q u o t e d on its h i g ic a l s ig n if ic an c e . 59-60; t he p;ii.ci jil e
ce rt a in u l tr a -lo gi c a l di .'t in et io ns o f projio- o f d i s j u n c t i v e j u d g m e n t s , 6 0 ; its hi.'tory,
s i l i o n s , 187-8; q u o t e d o n th e act o f r e a s o n 62 fZ s eg .; c a n be trac ed ba c k t o I ia to , 62.
i n g , 189-90; q u o t e d on th e g e n e r a l c o n d i 65; e x jil ic itl y e n o u n c e d by A r i s t o t l e . 65;
tio ns o f . syl log is m, 197; q u o t e d on th e torm e n o u n c e d by Cic ero , i 6 . ; receiv ed tlic ap-
o f s y l l o g i s m us a g r o u n d o f its di vis io n j ie lla tio n by w l i ic h il is n o w k n o w n at a
i n t o species, 20-3-4; on th e l a w s r e g u la t i n g c o m j i a r a t i v e l y m o d e r n da te , jiro ba bl y f r o m
t h e va r io u s k i n d s o f s y l l o g i s m s , 20 t, 215; I ? a um g a rt c n, 65; l e g i i la t e s in c o n j u n c t i o n
q u o t e d on i i o s i t i i e a n d c o n t r a r y opj o s it i on w i t h that o f l i e a s o n an d C on se qu en t l l y p o -
in a d is ju n ct iv e r e a s o n in g , 233; on the thcf ico -d is jui .ct ivc 8y llo g i.- ni s, 204-5; d e t e r
pr inc ijile o f t h e d i s j u n c t i v e s y ll o g i s m , 234-5; m i n e s t h e f o rm o f t h e Ii i s ji in ct i v e .Syllo
on t he se veral part s o f th e d i s j u n c t i v e s y l g i s m . 231, 252; a ut ho r s r e f e i f e d to on. 508;
l o g i s m , 2.34-5; (jiioied o n t h e jiec uliar jiriii- w lietlier id e nt ic a l w ith l a w o l C o n tr a di c -
cijile o f th e liy jjo lh el iea l s y l l o g i s m , 241-2; lio i i, ib .; w h e t h e r a v al id a n d l e g i t im a t e
q uo te d on the tirst rule o f h y jio th e tic a l s y l l a w , 5 0 ' -9 ; sie E u n d a n i e i i t a l L a w s ol
l o g is m s, 215-6; on tlie g r o u n d on w h i c h the Iho'ight.
h yp o t h e t ic a l SAllogism has liecn re g a rd ed E x c l u s i v e a n d E.xcejitive Iarti cle s, w h at ,
as h a t i n g o n l y t w o t erm s an d t w o jirojio.-i- a n d their eflect as i u d i i i et l y p r c d e s i g n a t i n g
tion--, 246-7; q u o t e d ou re la t io n o f s y l l o the p r e di ca t e , 517: ai itl io ril ics referred to
g i s m s t o e ac h o t h e r 25.8; q u o t e d on Ejii- on, 518; s-e. Irojio sit io ne s E x ji on ib il cs .
c he ire ni a and Sor ite s, 258-!), 323; q u o t e d on I'ixPEUiENCE,.# K n o w l e d g e . D o c t r i n e o f t h e
d iv is io n in g e n e r a l. .35 ) 2; on lo g ic a l d i v i A c ij u is it io n and 1e r f e c i n g of.
sio n, 354-5 ; q u o t e d o:i tlie 1 ule s o f d i v is i o n , E x p e u i e n t i a l or E.xjieriniental I rojio.-i-
,35i-9; q uo te d o n rules o f d i t i s i o n s p r i n g lioiis, w h a t . 18S.
i n g troin r ela tio n s ol d i v i d i n g m e m b e r s to
t he dividtfd w l i o 'c ' , .358; on t b e rc lulioii of F a c c i o l a t i , 1.3.5, 1.39; q u o t e d on t he m e a n
t h e se veral di vidii i;' m e m b e r s f o e ac h other, i n g a n d di s ti n c ti o n ot aiirso ric in tt, v ag um .
359; on th e rul e o f di t isi on, D i t - i s i o n e a n d transreiirlens, 140; reterred to o n Ca te
fta t per sat turn, qnotecl on t h e diU'er- g o r ie s , 142; rele rr ed fo on W h o l e a n d rt i t f,
en e c s o f jiroliatioiis, 364-6; on pure aud 14.3. 160, I9S. 219, 260. 261. 2C.8, 3.30, 331, 369;
e m p ir i c a l p r o b a t io n s , 366: q u o t e d on d i .- (juoted on I n d u c t io n , 505.
t i n c t i o n s o f j iro bat ion s f ro m tli eir in ter nal F a l l .a c i e s , wl m t, 321: o f t w o k i n d s , Ea-
fo r m , .367-8; on pr o b a t io n s, tinder the i n r a lo g i ' in s a n d .8ojiliLms, i b . : this d i s t i n c
t er na l f o r m , as s v ii lb c t i c und a n a l y t i c . t io n not o f ' t r i c t l y l o g ic a l imj.ort, 323; bu t
692 INDEX
no t w i t h o u t l o g ic a l v a l u e , ib. ; d i v i d e d in to 29 4-6; its l e g i t i m a t e m o o d s , w i t h di a g r a m s ,

F o r m a l , J l a l i rial, a n d t h o s e at o n c e F o r m a l 295-S; F o u r t h I 'i g u r e , its s y m b o l . 299;
a n d M a te r i a l, t b . ; J l a i e r i a l , lie be> o n d the its ru les , 299-300; its l e g i t i m a t e m o o d s ,
ju r i s d i c t i o n o f l .o g . c . 0 . A n c i e n t G re e k wi tli d i a g r a m s , 300-2; w b a te V er llgiire is
^ o p hi '^ n' . tli eir c h a r a c t e r , o _ 3 - l ; c o n s i d v a lid a n d l e g u l a r in E.x ten sio n is a ls o v a lid
ered iu detail in in- tar as th ey lie w i i h i n a a nd r e g u la r iu C o m p r e li e ii s io u , 302; c r i t i
s i n g e s \ IKyisiii, 3'2o <t jcy ; 1. F o i m a l F a l ci s m o f t h e f o r e g o i n g d o e l r i n e o f Fi g ur e ,
la cie s. C a t e g o r i c a l , 32o-7,- lirst s u b o r d i n a t e ib >t .seq : t h e F o u r t h F i g u r e , rcjiudintcd
c.a.s.'. t h o - e c o n - i ' t i n g in qu a lr ni io iu Ur- by Ihe g r e a t m a j o r i t y o f t h e rig id A r i s t o t e l
mmoriDii. 32j ; u n d e r th is g e n u s are c o n i - ians. 302; l o g ic i a n s n o t m jiosse.-sion o f the
pri.-ed th ree specie.-, r t, Fallncia sensus g r o ii i u ls on w h ic l i th is f i g u i e m a y b e set
eoiv/ s ili (I dii-isi, 172.5-C; modes o f this asid e, 303; g r o u n d s on w h i c h tlie F o u r t h
f a l l a c y , 320; 2 , F u l i . i i n a diclo se cundum F i g u r e o u g h t to be d i s a l l o w e d , ib. et seq :
qui I n l di ctu m s im p h n t e r , ib. ; 3 7 Fnllacia a c r o ss i n l e r e a c e jiossible fr o m E x i e u s i o i i
jigureT diciionis, 327; I I . M a te r i a l, 327-34; t o C o m j i r e h e n s i o n , n;.d vice versa, 333; this
o f tw o kinds, 1 ) < ) f a n Unreal U niversal Ihe n a t u r e o f t h e i n f e r e n c e in tlie F o u r t h '
ity. 3 2 7 - ' : 2.) U l ' U i . i e a l J l i d d l e or K ca s o n , F i g u r e , 304; tli is j n o v e d and i ll us tr at e d,
; .le-e k in ds o l , c o 'u c i d e , 32S-9; tliis 30 4-5; tin's h y b r i d i ii le r e n e c i s , rt. U n
f al l ac y a- i..iugerou.- in its n e g a t i v e as in its n a t u r a l; 2' , U s e l e s s ; S*. L o g i c a l l y i n v a l i d ,
p o s i ti v e l o r i n , 3 2 9 ; s p ec ies o f thi.s f a l l a c y , 3')5; g e n e r a l c ha r a c te r o f t I.e .'second. T h ir d,
1 ' . .'Sop/ii.'.mn cum hoc, vel jiosl hoc, i rgu proptec i m d F o u r t h F i g u r e s , 307; tli e last tliree
hue. 329-31; 2 . J g n a r a Rat io, 33<f-l; tlie ligure s o n l y th e m u l i l a t i d e x ji r e s s i o n s o f a
h i 'l o r y o f this t a l l a c y , 3 3 1 ; its vi ce, 331-2; coinjile.x m e n ta l proce.-s, an d v i r t u a l ly i d e n
3 . .Suphisiii'i pol ijzitesios, 332; its v a r io u s tical w i t h Hie lirst. 30S-9 el s e q . ; th is s h o w n
d e s i g n a l i o i . ' . i6 . 4 . .Sophisi la hctiro ze tis io s. in dei.ail, 310-11. b u t .0 6 .Jlood o f . S y l l o g i s m ;
lb .; il- var in ii- n a m e ' . 333; iis ch a i a e ie r . ib.; F i g m e in re lat ion to Hy j i n l li e li c a l, Ifi.e-
t h e I.itigio.siis. tb.; i ll u s tr a t e d in Ih e c a s e o f j u n c l i v e . a n d l l y j io t l ie t ic o - D i s j i ii .c l iv e .Syl
F r o l a g o r a - a n d E n a t h l u s , 35 3-1; a n d in t'..e l o g i s m ' . 3bS-20: o f 1 1 0 a c c o u n t in v a r y i n g
par alle l ca.-e o f Cora.x a n d Tisias, 334; .see t he Sy i l o g s m , 020-7; d o i ih l e c o n c l u s i o n , in
I : . . . in, lliictri: e o f .Second nn.i Third F i g u r e s, 027-31; g r o u n d s
It.vu , E r i o r . Cau.-es ol. on w h i c h il has liccn atten iji ted l o e sta bl ish
1- LL'EULiN. n ferred to on pr inc ijile o f Snlli- Hie d i s c r i m i n a t i o n o f a m a j o r a n d m in o r
cieiit l le a s o .. . 0.3. t e i n i in llie .Second a . ,d I'liird l igures.
I' i c h t k , pl ac ed t h e l a w o f I d e n t i t y as Ihe C27 et s e q .; ..\ri sl Otle. 028; A m m o n iu .s an d
p n n i a r v jiri nc ipl e o f a l l k n o w l e d g e , GO Ihi loj iom is. l b ; l l ' T m i n n s , iti. , A l e .x a n d e r
F l o u i ; ! - . o f sy llogi.'in, c u i .' li t i i t e d by the A|lllro(i,îe;:sis, 628- 9; S c o l u s , 029; J le ii -
p iice wl lic ll llie iiiiildle te r m bo l d s in prem (!o:'a, ib ; a n l ic i ji a lo r y r e c o g n i t i o n s o f t h e
i.-i-. 2 s l - g , 2S'i; llie F o u r Figure.' aii.-e tru th llnit th e re is n o m a jo r or m i n o r lerin
f r o m t he r e la tiv e j iosi lioi.s ol' t h e m id d le in lli e s e c o n d a n d Ihird ligur es , 629-31
n-i .-'<2: I' i n u h i - o f llie F i g u r e ' i l l ( 'oin- b - r ' l t i i i n e a r ly ( i r e e k l o g ic i a n s , 029; liy
I n-'.i i.' ioi i a n d l'. .\l ens io u. i 6 . ; i n n e m o . . i c V a l l a , 029-3J: by .l o l .n .Sergeant, C.39-31;
l e . ' - . - lor tlie -e ill ( o m p r el ie i sion r.nd hi s to r i ca l n o t i c e s ' r e g a r d i n g t i g n i e o f 's y l lo -
E.\ -i.Moii, lb. : th e n a m e aX'lht-O-, figur e, gi'in,C.3'2; .\ r i> ' o ti c , 632-3; A . c x a n d e r anil
gi eii |,y Ar i.-uitle, 2S.7: Ibe first, on tlio l l e r m i n n s , (;.33-0; F h i lo j i o m i s (or . \ m i n o -
jin i a h - n t d o c i r n ie . not jirop er ly a figure, 1 ins), t'37- 9, .Mai l ia i.u s I'ajiella, 0-39-40; Isi-
I'- Il i< e tig' l e - d i 't ii i g ii is h e d by A r i s i o i l e , d o r u s . 61) ; >e . ; n e '. 619-1 ; . M el anc ht hoi i,
>'y. n irtli i . i i i ib i i le d lo ( j a l e ii , but on ()41; A r n a i i n . . 611-2: i .r o s s e r . 642; L a m be r t,
'.e iid i r a u l l i i i i l y . 2'.j. 4'23; first n o t ic e o f 613; F l a tn e r . 616-7; Fri es. 647-9; K r u g a nd
1-< III 1 , . by A V <-rroe<. 2'.a; coiiijile.x I'.eneke, 619-52; I'ilius. 65'2-8; di r ec t a n d
no n I le a l i o n o f I i gu r e by tlic ( j u a u t i t y an d in di r e c t m o o d s in lir.'l a n d I'uiirlli ligiire,
Qu al ity o f tlie j ir oj io -il io ii' , or t he .Mood, 658: bnt not in s e co n d an d t h ir d , lA./ l o iir th
o f a r e a s o n in g , 28!, .o. .Mood o f .S y ll o g is m ; ligiire, its cln ira cle r, 659; a ut lio r s by
d ' s i n i o - o f llie 1 igiires a c c o r d i n g l o Ihe wli oni held that f o u r th figure dill'crs fro m
l o g i c i a n ' , a n d in l,.\ti nsioii a l o n e , 2-3}-,% 2 ; lirst o n l y by transjiiisilioii o f jireniises, ib.;
y in b o l by h tt'-r' o f t h e I'ir.-t I-igure, 288; m o o d ' o f fo ur th l ig ur e redre.'sed, 659-61;
r ul e- ol I ir-l l i g i i r e . 2 - - 0; le g i t im a te c rit iei -in o f f o ur th ligur e, 662; a ut h o r it i es
mncni- o f I i r ' l F i g u r e w it li c i r c u l a r dia- for an d a g a i n s t th is ligure. 662-3.
/ r a i n ' i ll u ' t r a t i v e of. 2 s 9 ; l , .'i-cond F i g F l i . s r F i g u r e , . ' " F i g u r e .
ur e . It' i n b o l' , 2ttl ; it ' rules, 291-2: it' F i s c i i k h , 186; referred l o on c o ii r di na lio n o f
I t g i l ir n a l e m o o d - , w i t h d i a g r a m s , 2J2-3; n o t io n s in C o m p r e h e n s i o n , 155-8.
Th ird f i g u r e , its s y m b o l , 291: its rules. F i s c i i A i i E U , 486.
I N D T' X . 008
F o n t a i n e , La, q u o t e d , 890. 251-2; th e ir r e la t io n s , 506; a u t h o r s o n , in

l oMSECA, r . . 1S4, 207, 210, 289, 292,32.5; re g e n e r a l, i6. , o f t w o k i n d ' , t h e l a w s o f the
ferred to as ag a in st t h e d o c t r i n e o f a inute- T h in k a b le , a n d the I a n s o f T h i n k i n g , 507;
i.a l q u a u ii li c a ti o n o f lli e in-edieale in recip- that the y b e l o n g to L o g i c , i b . ; on or de r and
ioc a : ; :; g pi oiio sit io ns , 543, ni iitu al relat ion of, ib .; Ir- wli oni intro
F o r . m a l I n d u c t i o n , see I n d u c t i o n . d u c e d i n t o I.o g ic , <7i, , in Jiarticnlar, auth or s
F o r m a l Tr u t h , see T r u t h a n d Krror, D o c 011,507; s e e I d e n t it y , C o u t i a d i c t i o i i , E x
tr in e of. c lu d e d J l id d l e .
F o r m a l an d M a te r ia l, th e ir d i s t i n c t i o n , 539
42. G a l e , T h c o p h il ii s , 326
F o u r t h F i g u r e , see Fi g u r e . tiALEN, th e fo ur th tigure o f s y l l o g i s m a t t r i b
F k i e .'s , 43; on p r i n c ip l e o f D o u b l e N e g a t io n , ut ed to, but on slei.dei- a u l l i o i i t y , 285. 302;
G8. 149, 203, 215, 243, 249, 201, 301, 380, 3S5, n e w l o g ic a l tieati.-u of, 285.
428. 435, 456; q u o t e d on C a n o n s o f B y l lo - G a l i l e o , his re buk e o f t h e I r ofe ss or o f
gisn i. 570-2; (juoted on F i g u r e o f S y l l o g i s m , P a d u a . 406.
647-9. G a l l u p p i , quoted on c a n o n o f syllogism ,
F u n d am en tal L a w s o f T l io u g li t, or d e r o f 574.
t h e ir c oi . s ii le r a l io n , 57; the se lour in n u m G a s s e n d i , 330 , 332, 338, referred to. on
b e r , 1. I d e n t it y , 2 C o n t i a d i c t i j i i o r N o n J l e t h o d in L o g i c . 341
c o n t r a d i c t i o n , 3. E x c l u d e d M id d le , 4. Itea- G e l l i u s , s e e A u h i s G el liu s.
son a n d C o n se (| ue nt , o r Sul Rci eiit Ite as o n, G e n e r a l or A b s t r a c t L o g i c , Logic,
57 et seq. {but see 61); th e ir hi sto r y , C2-8. G e n e r a l i z a t i o n , w l i a t. 90; its w l u d e m \ -
s e these l . a w s ; g e n e r a l o b s e r v a t i o n s in tery e .x j ila in e d. 91. .wf Co n cej its . D o c t i ine of.
re lat ion to, 69 et seq.; t he se fall i n t o t w o G en eric and Bpecilic Ditfereiice, see G e u u s
classes, t h e first clas s c o n s i s t i n g o f tlie three an d Sjiecies.
pr in c ip le s o f I d e n t i t y , C o n t r a d i c t i o n , a n d G e n e r i f i c a t i o n a n d Sjie ci fic ati on, lim ite d
K x cl u d e d J l i d d l e , t he s e c o n d o f t h e pr inc i- e.Xjii'essions f o r t l i c pr oc e -s e s o f A b s t r a e li o n
jile o f Re as on a nd C o n s e q u e n t a l o n e , ii. . nnd D e t e r m i n a t io n , c o n s id e r e d in a jiartic-
tllis c la s s ili c a tio n f o u n d e d . 1, On i h e d it f e r - u l ar re la t io n . 135-8; dejieud o n t h e t w o
en c e o f c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n th e l a w s t h e m l a w s o f H o m o g e n e i t y an d l l e t e r o g e n e i t ; . .
se lve s. 70; 2-, On t h e difle rei .ee o f t he e n d s 148; s e e G e n u s an d Sjiecies.
w h i c h th e t w o cla ss es se v er a l ly ac co niiilisli, G e n e t i c De f in it io n , .o=< D e f in it io n .
i b . ; t w o c o u n t e r o j ii u io n s r e g a r d in g th e G e n o v e s i , o r G c n u e n s is , referred to o n o n e
limit s o f o bj ect iv e jio ss ib ili ty , 71; th e r e s c i e n c e b e i n g th e iu s tr u m e ii t o f a n o t h e r . 25;
s pe c ti v e sjiheres o f t h e t w o cla ss es o f th e his La ti n L o g ic n o t ic e d . 51, 474
la w s o f th on gl it d e l in e d a n d ill u s tr a t e d , 71 G en 'UENSIS, .see G en o v es i .
et .seq.; to de ny Ihe tn iiv e is a l ajip lic at io n C E N U s a n d Species, or G en er al a n d .Special
o f tlie tirst i h i e e l a w s is to s n b v e i t the n o t io n , w h a t ami h o w d e s ig n a t e d , 1:35-6;
reality o f i li o a g h t , 71; but this is n o t in t he d i s t i n c t i o n of, m e r e l y r e .a t iv e , 136-7;
v o l v e d in t h e d e n i a l o f t he u n iv e r sa l ajijili th e ab s t r a c t io n w h i c h carri es up sjiecies
c a t i o n o f the l a w o f R ea so n a n d C on se qu en t, i nt o g e n e r a , ca lle d G en er i fi c a ti o n or G e n e r
72 f t .seq.; this l a w s h o w n in g e n e r a l n o t to a l iz a t io n , 136-7; th e d e t e r m i n a t i o n w h i c h
be the m ea s ur e o f ob je ct iv e p o s s ib il it y , 72-5; d i v id e s a g e u u s i n to its s p e c ie s ,c a l le d Sjieci
by re ference t o E x t e n s i o n , 1 , A s a w li o le , fica tio n, 137-8; g r a d a t i o n s o f ge ne r a a nd
72-3; d i s ti n c ti o n o f p os it iv e an d n e g a t i v e sp ec ies , a nd th eir d e s i g n a t i o n s , 138: S u p re m e
t h o u g h t , 73; tliis l a w n o t t h e c r it e ri o n o f or M o s t G en er al g e n u s , w h a t . i f t . ; S u b a l
obj ect iv e po ss ib ili ty s h o w n by r efe re nc e t o tern o r I n t e r m e d ia t e g e n u s , w l i a t. i b . ;
E x t e n s i o n ; 2':*, A s a jiarf .71; l!y r efe re nce L o w e s t or M os t Sjiecial spe cie s, w li at . i 6 . .'
to t he l a w o f Re as on an d Conseijiient itself, S u b a lt e r n or InleriiK'diiite sjiecies, w h a t ,
74-5; th is l a w r e d u c ib le to a h i g h e r jirinci- ib .; these di s ti n c ti o n s t; ke n from Porj ihy-
ple, 75; s u m m a r y s t a t e m e n t o f Ilie sjdieres ry's Litroiliictioii t o t h e CnUgories. 139: a
o f these la ws , 75; t h e g e n e r a l in flu e nc e g e n u s as c o n t a i n i n g u n d e r it sjiecies, or a
Avhich th e f o r e g o i n g l a w s e.xert o n th e sjiecies as c o n t a i n i n g n n d e r it i n d iv id ua ls ,
o p e r a ti o n s o f t h i n k i n g , 76-7; t h e lii gh est is c a ll e d a Lo g i c a l. U n iv e r s a l, .Subject.
cr ite ri o n o f n o n - r e a li ty , b u t n o c r it e ri on o f Su b je c tiv e , o r Put en lia l w li o le . 142; an
re ali ty, 76; e r r o n e o u s l y lield to be t h e jiosi- i n d iv i d u a l as c o n t a i n i n g in it species, or a
tiv e sta n da r d o f tru th, i b ; t h e a bs o lu ti s ts sjiecies as c o n t a i n i n g in it g e n e r a , is c a lle d
Jiroceed on the ir s u b v e r s io n , 77; th e w h o l e a M e ta p h y s i c a l, F o r m a l , or A c t u a l w h o le .
o f these la w s o p e r a ti v e in e a c h fo rm o f 142-3; th e se d i s ti n c ti o n s ill ustrate.l. 143 et
s y l l o g i s m , a l t h o u g h ce rta in o f t h e m m o re s e q . . S e e AVholc; ( ie n e r ic a nd .8|iccitic Dif
p r o m i n e n t l y r e g u la t e e ac h v a r io u s torm. fe re nc e, 146-7; as c o n t r a d i s t i n g u i s h e d fro m

694 INDEX.
In d ivid u al D iflV ieiice, 147 ; C d i i s ] t'cio s, or x.vii., 187; author of the L atin mne
w liai, 1 1 8 ; t h o o l a s s i l i o a l i u i i o f t h i n g s liy i n o n i c v e r s e s f o r .M ood a n d I'ignrc o f S y l
g o iio n i m id sp irivs go v en icd by tw o Inw s lo g ism , 308; n o liec of, ib .; his N u m r nn l er ,
v i/., o f I h iiiogeiK 'ity iiiul of IIctoroge- fo r im iiiy c e n tu r ie s the text-Iiook o f L ogic
u c i t y , 11*-; 11 t h i r d la w n llogoil by K ant i l l t h e s c h o o l s o f t h e L a t i n < l i u r c h , ih.
\ i / . , o f l.o g io a l A tlin ity o r c o iitiiin ity , but 1l o n u E S , m a i n t a i n e d a l l t h o u g h t t o b e a t b o t -
rojvciod, 149; lieiiu s m id I'ilfv ici.co , tlio t o t n a c a l c u l a t i o n , 10 7; ( j u o t e d o n t h e i i i l l u -
id i'in vn ts o f D cliiiilion I'ropor. 342-3. en ce o f au thority 011 o i d i i i o i i , 4 0 1 .
.E n itcK of T k lii soi. d, o r G s o r g ia s T ra pe- I b v C K E i t . 8.-,.
zt I tills, ilv.sciitiod th e piooo.ss o f Sor ite s, IlO E K i t A L i . n , 43 . 50 , 17 4 , 2 1 5 , 3 3 8 ; q u o t e d o n
l u t g a v e it n o a pp r op r ia te n a ni c , 209. c a n o n s o f s y l l o g i s n i . 4.56.
( . i K K l . A C I I , OS l l o i . i . M A X X , 2 8 9 , 2 9 1 . 2 9 4 . 4.56.
( . l u n i i . N . liis p i a t M t c e i n r c a i ' i i i g , 4 8 9 - 9 0 . I loM iK iE X E iT V , law o l . w l u i t . 1 4 8 , .(re G e r . n s .
( j 1. e i i ; . D r., m is to o k R e i d s \ i e \ \ o f C oncep Ili)fi;m id K e i i r , s et K i r o r , C a u s e s o f .
t i o n . 81. l lo s f iM A N , J o in t, e n oiieously a tliib u lc d the
C .oi L K M r.p. R o d o l p l i i i s , d i s c o v e r e d m td .sig in v e n tio n o f the b oui'lli F ig u ie lo Scotus,
nalized the R egri'ssive C oin p relieiisivc 303
.sorites. 2 7 3 ; but before Iiin i tliis given by H um an J lin d . lim ifeil n a t u r e o f , a.s a s o u r c e
I l i c i u s , 3 4 4 . o l e r r o r , see I ' l r r o r , C a u s c . s o f .
( lO iiw iN , q iioied on co m p o sitio n as a m ea n s H u .m e , D a v i d , 8 4 ; i p i o t c d on in d istin cfn ess
ol i n l e l l e c l i i a l i n ip r o v e i i i e n t . 482. ol term s, 123-4; (pioted on belief as the
(ju K 'i iiK , bis e s t i m a t e o t m n t lie m a t ic s , 425. r o o t o f k n o w l e d g e . 384.
(jIiea t B k i t a i . n , t h e c o u n t r y in w l i i c l i L o g i c H u tcheson, F raiicii, q u o ted on canons of
lias been m ost geiicriilly a n d com p letely s) llo g iM ii, 563-4.
n i i ' i i i i d e r s l o i d . 20 . llv fo i.E .M M A , nam e for m in or iircm ise or
G RK itic Soidii.-nis, an cien t, tlieir cliaraclcr, s i i h s i i m p l i o i i o f a s y l l o g i s m , 199.
32.3-4 I I v f O T i i K S i s , w h a t , 188, 4 4 9 -5 0 ; its p l a c e a n d
(j K o s s K i! . o r ( j i o s s e r u s , 2 5 ; (|U O ted o n ligure e n d i n s c i e n c e , 4.50.
o f s y l l o g i s m , i 42. II V E o T i i E T i C A L .Indgiiioiit, cr I lo i'.o s ilio ii,
l i U X P I . l M i , 25. see J u d g m e n t s , D o c t r i n e o f .
i i U . N N E i : , 10. l I v i O T i i K T i C A L R e a s o n i n g o r S y l l o g i s m , t h e
f e c o m l c la. s. s o f t ' o i i d i t i o n a l S y l l o g i s i i i . s , a n d
H a i i v e v . ( l i d e o n , li is u s e o f C o n cep t. 30. third class all'orded by Internal b'orm of
II E i . i i E l t o l i D , ti ls Praxis Logica reterred lo, Syllogism , 2 3 9 ; ' it.s g e i i t ' r a l eliaractcr a
4'.ty l e a s o i i i n g w h o s e f o r m is d e l e r n i i i i e d by the
II E t i E i . . b i s e m p l i n m e i i t o l t l i e t e r m D ia le c tic , L a w o f R e a so n an d C o n s e q u e n t, m id w h o s e
>j. r e j i i i d i a t e d t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f < ou trad ic- s n n i i i l i o n is t h u s n e c e s s a r i l y a n l i\ i j o l l i c l i c a l
tio, m . d E . N c l u d e d . M i d d l e ill l e l a t i o i i t o t h e in o p o sitio ii, 239-40; ol' t w o form s, A llin ii-
all. o l u t e . 0 4; rejected th e p rin cip le o f l d e i i - ativc or C o i . s t r n e l i v e m o i h i s p o n i n s , ixnt]
iry IIS a p p i c i i h l e o n ly to the l i i i i l e , GO; a N egalive or D e s t r u c t i v e viodtis tolle ns ,
<l) m g d i - l i . e i m . e e o f , 2 S I 239; m itliors rel'erred to on use ol' t e r m s
l l E l . A C l . l T U S . i p i o l e i l . 4 8 1 . j i o n e n s a n d to llens, 2 4 0 ; i i n i e i n o i i i c v e r s e s f o r
H e t i l \ i :t . r e f e r r e d t o f o r a c o i n ] i ; i c a t c d Ihe- these form s, ib.; a u lliors on, in gen eral,
or\ o f . 8 i ) | - i t e s i n l i i t r e r e i i t l i g u r e s , .320 rel'erred lo , ib .; its g e n e r a l e h a r a c l e r e x ]tli-
I lK tD E lt. ((iioied on ten d en cy o f the a g e to cated, 2 4 0 et s u / . ; c o n t a i n s three inojio si-
o v e r r e a d i n g , 4' '7 . tions, ib. ; Ihe modus puinns and m oi/us
ll E ii .M A .N N . < i o i ; l i i i - d , 2 8 0 . to lle ns illn slia led . 241; n oin en c'atn re of
llE K.M i. N UP . li is g i o n n i l o C l l i e d i s c r i m i n a t i o n 'I'heoiilirastus, K iidem iis, etc., regarding,
ol m ajor and iiiii.or term s ju the second ib. ; its Icciiliar j n i n e i j d e Hie Law ot
a n d tliird ligiiH s. 0 2 8 ; q u o t e d o n lig u re o f R eason and ( on.seqiienl, 241 it .seq ; l l i i s
y l .eg'.sm .-, 33- 1 priiiciiile, how variously etio iin ceil. 242 ;
I I k i :.m o / ; e .m ;s .3-33. 3 5 1 . w h y w e ca iin ol c o n c l u d e I'rom t h e t r u l h . o f
II E E o n o i f s . e a . - e c i t e d f r o m , i l l i i s t r i i t i n g t h e th e conseqm 'iit to the truth ol Ihe anleee-
j.o '.ve r o f .\ - - r i e i a t i o n , 421 ileiit, a n d from th i! la ls e h o o d o f th e a iite-
I I I I'E .I OOEM I T V . Law ol, w liat, 148-9, .see eedeiil to the Inlsehoorl o f Ihe c o iise q n i-n t,
I .elllis a n d .s|sc ies. i b . ; c o n v e r s i o n ol' l o c a t e g o r i c a l s y l i o g i s i i i s
tllisE n .M cfs. 1 iiiiia-. 484 Is, 18, U nnecessary, 213; 2, Not a lw ays
lIll.A l.iE , | >I3 po^ .M ble , 2 4 3 - 4 ; m ith ors on the con versioii
l l l . M i s . D r . . bi'< e i i e i . n i l i i i i i o l t h e E l e m e n t s o f o f , r e f e r r e d t o . 2 l 3 ; t h o s e o f o n e b n in I 'a sil y
Leg-f o f D r \ V b a l i - l \ . 21. coiiverlib h ; in to a n o t h e r , 2 1 1; sjicciul luL ij
IllSP A N U S, I e l r u . s , R o j i e .John x .\., or x x i., o l, 2 4 5 ; t h e se e x i i l i c a t c d lirst rule, 245 et
IN D E X . 695
seq ; rc g iil al e s tlie g e n e r a l f o r m of, 245; t h o u g h t , 57; w h a t , i b . ; viirioiisly e n o u n c e d .

g r o u n d on w h i c h it has hccii l og iir ded as l b . ; its l o gi c al imj iii rla ne e th e jiriiicijJe
h a v i n g o n l y t w o te r m s and t w o jiroposi- o f all l o g ic al a t lii lu a t io n and de lin iti oi i,
tio ns , 216; Ihis v i e w erro ne ou s,/<i. , se c 58; its hi.'lory. 62 s/ s i q . ; d e v e lo p e d hist in
o n d rule, 247; that th e sn iiiptioii is a l w a y s the i n d e r o f t im e , 62. 65; liist e x ji l ic a l e d as
de lin it e , to he u n d e r s t o o d in a ((Ualilied a e n a i d ii ia l e jirincijile. by Aiitiiiim> A n
.seme, i b . ; tliat th c s u ni iit io n is a l w a y s af- drea s, al th e e n d o f t h e 13lh c e n tu r y , 65.
l i n n a t i v e , ih.; Ihe sub.-uinptioii o l , 2 t8 ; m a in t a i n e d by A n d i e a s a ga in st A i i s l o l ' e
th ir d rule, ib. ,s ee 602-6; t h o u g h p r o iii iii c nt ly l o be Ihc o n e a b s ol u te ly lirst jii ineijile, 65.
re g ul at e d by Ihe l aw o f Itea so n an d C o n s e CO: c o i i t r o v e i s y l e g a r d i i i g Ihe l e l a l i v e jni-
q u e n t . still th c o t h e r lo g ic a l l a w s op e r a ti v e or it y o f Ihe l a w s o f I d e n t it y ai.d ( oiilra-
ill, 252; difficnlty in e o i n i e e t i o n w i t h , in d i e li o ii . CO; c al le d by W o \t ' /iruiri/nuiii o r -
re g a rd to the d o e t r i n e that till r e a s o n in g is titiii/iiiis, i b . ; by Ia i im ga r le ii p rim iji iu m
c it h e r f ro m w h o l e to jiart or fro m 11 e jiarls jw s iti o n is sire iilentitntis, ib. . jihiCfd hy
l o th e wl io le. s tal ed and o b v i a t e d , ib. i t F i c h t e nnd S'clielliiig i s Ihe pr i m a r y p r i n
seq. ; an t e c e d e n t a nd co iiseq iieiil of, ecpial cip le o f all k n o w l e d g e , ib ; re jected by
l o c o n d i t i o n ai.d (ond il iot ied , 252- 3; h e n c e H e g e l , l i . ; a l o n g \ ii tl i Ihat o f C o n t r a d i c
t he re a so n or c o n d i t i o n m us t c o n t a i n Ihe ti o n , r e g u la t e s t h e e a l e g o i i e a l s y ll o g i s m ,
c o n s e q u e n t . 253; w l i o le a n d jiarls re?iee*- 207, 251; t ii im a l ly the s a m e w it h that ol
iv el y m a y be v i e w e d in t h o u g h t e it h e r as H e a s o n and C o n s e q u e n t . 251; a u t h o r s re-
t h e c o n d i l i o i i i i i g o r as Ihe c o ii d i li o ii e d . 254 ; I'erred to o n , 607-8: see I'm d a m e n l a l l . a w s
apj ilicntion ol this d o c t r i n e l o Ihe Mi'iiiion o f T h o ug ht , Il o jio r lio n, l a w of.
o f th e p r e vi ou s di ll ie i il t y , 255; not l ia bl e I.MAOiXATioN, w h a t . 425 -6; its n e c e s s i ty in
to t h e a fle cli on o f ligur e, 31S; a n l l i o r ' s l a l e r sc iii;ti:ie jini'suits, 426; as a s o u r c e o f er ror ,
d o c t r i n e o f l i y j io t l ie t ie a l (or ( o i ij n n e t iv e ib.. see l-. n o r , Cau scs of.
an d D i s ju n e ti v e ) K e a s o n i n g s , 508-618; these Ixi.MEDjATE I n f e r e n c e , w h a t , 514; c a tg s of,
r e d u c ib le t o i m m e d i a t e inl'erenees, 50S-9, r e c o g n iz e d by l o g ic i a n s . 514 i t s i q . ; 1 ( oi:-
599-600. 601-2, 003-4, 605; referred to the v e i s i o n , i b ., s e e ( 'i i i ' e i s i o n , fdo ; 2. liijuiju.i-
clas s o f E x p H c a li v e s o r C o n d i t i o n a l s , 599 Icr.ce. or, bet ter . D o u b le N e g a t i o n , m er e l y
600; n o t c n m p o s it e by c o nt ra s t to (he r e g u g r a m n i a l i c a l , 522; 3- . S n ha lte r na tio n, bet ter
la r s y l l o g i s m , but m o re simjile. 603; on l y H is t ri c ti o u , /A . , tl ;s r.i'aleral nnd U n i l a t
p r e p ar at i o n s for a r g u m e n t a t i o n , 603-1. 609 er al. 523; not n o t ic e d by l o g ic i a n s that in
10; c a n o n s o f H y ji o th e t i e a l s y l l o g i s m , 602. s n h a l t e n . r .E o n t he soiiu meains some at least,
606 ; t h e o ry of, r e g a r d e d as al le r n n l iv e s , i b . ; t he t w o projio si tio ns in s n h i il le r n a t io n
607-12; er ro r s o f l o g i c i a n s r e g a r d in g , 612; sli ou id Le c a ll e d Restriiigeiit o r R e s t n c tl r r .
hi s to r i ca l n o t ic e s of, 612-18; A r i s to t le . t h e g i v e n pr o p o s i ti o n t h e Reslrlngeml. \ vj \
612-13 i A m m o n i u s Hernii ;e, 013-14; A n o n y the jii'oduct th e Restrict or Restrntei/. iji'-i:
m ous S c l io l io i i, a n d m atter r e la tiv e to, l o g i c i a n s h a v e o v e r l o o k e d t h e imi i.eiiinle
611-13. i n f e i e i . c e o f S u h e o i i t r a r i e l y , 52.3-4, 534;
11 YPOTiiETit'AL r r o p o s i t i o n , a p p l ic a t io n o f tills c a l l e d b y th e a u t h o r I itlrgrat ioii, ' 2 i ,
t h e d o c t i i n e o f a qu a n ti fi e d j irc di cat c fo, 534; th e t w o jir o p o s i ti o n s in i n te g r a t io n
a n d its result, 512, see H y p o t h e t i c a l S y l l o c a ll e d t he Integral or In tig rn nt , t he gi v e n
g ism . jir ojiosition th e Inlegrnnd. an d th e jirodnct
lly ro T iiE T ico -D isjU N C T iV E or D ilem m atic t he Inlegealf, ib.; taliiilar s c h e m e o f ,5.35;
J u d g m e n t , see J u d g m e n t s . D o c t r i n e of. Kust.nchius (jiioted o n, 601; a u t h o r s l e f e r i e d
l l Y f o T i i E T i c o - D i s j u x c T i V E S y l l o g i s m . Ul- l o on, i 6 . ; k i n d s of, ib : aiillinrs by w h o m
I cm in at ic or D i l e m m a , th ir d c la ss o f C o n a ilo pt c d, ib ; I m m e di .a le I e i c m j i l o r y . and
d i t i o n a l S y l l o g i s m an d f o ur th c la s s iiirorded I m m e d i a t e A l t e r n a t i v e I ii le r e ne e , 6 01 - 2;
by In t er n a l I'o rm o f S y l l o g i s m , 205. 2 4 9 ; t h e l at te r c o n t a i n s liv e sjieeies, e m b r a c i n g
r e g u la t e d by Ihe l a w s o f E x c l u d e d M i d d l e a m o n g t he se Ihe Di."junctive, H y ji o th e t i e a l ,
a n d o f H ea so n an d C o n s e q u e n t in c o n j u n c - and lly p o lh e tic o Disjunctive syllo gism s o f
l io ii, 205; w h a t , 2 48 - 9; helil hy W a l l i s l o Ihe l o g ic i a n s , i 6 . ; l o g ic i a i. s w h o refer H y
be a n e g a t i v e i iu l u c t i o n , 249; its e h a r a c t e r p o t h e ti c a l a n d D i s j u n c t i v e S y l l o g i s m s to,
ex ji l ie a t ed , ib. ; d e s i g n a t i o n s o f ccraiiiiiis, 6;10.
corniitiis, se., sijllogismiis, etc., 219-50; i nl e s l.vrEDiMEXTS to t h i n k i n g . D o c t r i n e of, see
for s i f t i n g a jirojiosed d i l e m m a , 2.50. Lo gi c .
IxDEKiXABLE. Ilic, w h a t , 105, 167.
I d e a , the term , reason w h y n o t regularly IxDE S'i xiT E, th e, h o w d i s t i n g u i s h e d fro m Ihe
e m j i l o y e d , a n d s e n s e i n w h i c h it is oeea- I n t iii it e . 74.
s i o n l y u s e d hy t h e a u t h o r , 90. I n d e f i n i t e P r o p o s i t i o n s , 171, ser J u d g m e n t s ,
Id e n t it y , p rin c ip le of, a f u n d a m e n t a l la w o f Propositions.
696 IN D E X
iNDETEUMiNZD. th e. ivliat, 5.5, 56. en ce h yp oth etic, 598-9; authors by w hom

l.\i> tv i')u .\L or .'iiiu'uliir DilTercnce, wlint. tliis m ain tain ed . 598-9; tlic d istin ctio n o f
14 5-7, sre (.leiin.- and .Sj>ecic>. as t'on im n tativc, E xp lica tiv e, and Conipar-
1-M>tvii>L-.\ L I'loini.-ilioli.-, 171. s>e J lu..;;- ativc, 599-61M3; M ediate I'erem ptory, and
I ijnl.'. l i t ; -ilinns. !Mc<liate A ltern ative In feren ce. 652.
I N n iv iD i L'.M fg tta lu m and Indn'uluutn va~ I n f i n i t e , its mime and n otion , 73-4; e.\-
g ' u n . '.IT. pri-ssi-d by negative term s. 74 ; Pow distin-
I M)| v isiiiL E . the, w lial, 105-7. 1
giiislied fi oni tlie ndelinite, ib.
I M 'l'cT loN , o f tw o kiiii!-, l.o .'ical or For- I n s t k l ' C ' T I O n , its en d , 1; m ethods o f w rit
II il. and Ih ilosoid iical, Koal, or .Material, ten and oral iiislrn ction dilTerent, ib., see
6
LJ . 5'J-0<i, 507; tl.e view s o f logiciiuis re Ivuow ledge, 1). ctrii.e o f th e A cq uisition
garding tlie nature o f L ogical Ind:ict"ion and ri-rli-cting of.
erriilieoii', 'J'25; the eh araclers o f L ogical iNTEiiiUTV, (.'liMeisin ol'. See I'estim ony.
and o f Real In d u ction . _J 6 -7 ; can on o f iNTEr.lM'.ETATioN, 01 ICxegesis, A rt of. see
Ind u ctive .''vllogi-iii, 227; lliis eq u ally for I'estim ony.
mal With tliat o f Iled u ctivc S y llo g ism , ib.; I n t u i t i o n , the term , its m ea n in g , 90; am b ig
u m aterial in d u ction , how e.\|)rcssed us a uously translates the riennan Ansrhanung,
form al, ib .; ohj'-ction ob viated . 228; lor- ib .; w hat, 385, see Truth and P5rror, D octrine
mula- for Ind u ctive ,<y Ilogi.-ins in Comprc- of.
hcasion and E .\ieiisio u , 228-9; M 'hatcly I n t u i t i v e and .Sym bolical K n o w led g e, si e
and otliers erroneously m ake the in d u ctive C oncep ts, (Quality of.
svllogisin deduct iI e, 229; tliis d o n e belore I n t u i t i v e . Ibc tcn n , sense in w liieh used by
U 'liatelj by Schram m and \V o lf, i>.; d o c L eibnitz and the co n tin en ta l philosopliers,
trine o f the old er logician s regarding, 121.
correct a- far as it goes. 229-.80; d octrine o f iNvoi.UTiON o f C oncepts, see C oncepts, R ela
Im perfect Ind u ction . 235; Bacon at fault tion s of.
in lii- critici-m o f A ii-to tle 's d octrine ot, iPENDooRN, Gisbert ab. 37-8, 230.
li ; aiitliors referred to on, in gen eral, ib.; Isiiiouu-S, q uoted on F igure o f S yllogism ,
Real o r Jlatcrial. founded on the p rinciple 640.
o f Philnsn/iii'nil Prfsnnifilinn, 470; its agree
m ent w ith and d istin ction from A n a lo g y , .I .\ kiiii ,456.
47'5-l; o f tw o k in d s, In d ivid u al and . I e r o . m e , .St., quoted on Hie superior cfTect o f
.siiecial. 472; but in tlie last result all Jn- tlie livin g voice, 484.
d nction is in d ii idual, 4.72; tw o co n d itio n s JuiiO-MENT.s, D octrine of, 159-88; a .Judg
o f legitim ate, 4-72-3; sum m ary ol' tbe d o c m ent. w hat. 159-50; how d istinguished I'rom
trine of. 473; Ind u ction and A n a lo g y com 1
a io p o silio n . ib.; w hat i.s inqilied in ju d g
pared togetb er, 455; thcj-o do not afTord m ent, 160; con d ition u nd er w liicli n otion s
absolute c -rfa in ty , 455-6; aiitliors referred arc judged con gru en t, 16i5-l; a ju d g m en t
to on. 4-76; authors qunled and referred to must con tain three notions v iz , o f S ub
on , 5'-9-97: A risto tle, .789-93; e.xainpic of, ject. I'redicate, C opula, 161; tliese co n
given in llie Organon o f A ristotle, probably stitu en ts illustrated, 162 ; prop osition s o f
not that ]iroposed by the author liiinsell'. the Tliird A djacen t, and o f the .Second
55<1: A ri-totle's d octrine ol' the correct, 6
A djacen t, i .; concepts and ju dgin en ts, how-
.7'i2-3; Iacli) iiiei-es, 593; liaiiins, 59.3-4; I5c- far tliey co in cid e and dilfcr, 162-3; ju dg-
rod on , 591: the co lleg e o f A lcala Iheir ineiit.s. how d ivid ed , 163; 1. Jroin the rela
orror n oticed. .791; certain vu lgar errors tion ol subject and predicate a.s reciprocally
on . refi'i red lo. .791-5; F acciolati, .79.7; Lam w liole and part, judgm ent.s arc d ivided into
bert, d>.. stiic tn . s on Lam bert K doctrine, ( oin |iieliei. i', and l-lxtensivc, i5.; tliisd is-
.795, his d octrine adopted by certain subse tinction I'onndcd on tin-com prelieiisioii and
quent (lerm aii logicians. .796; bis d octrine e.xtension ol'con cep ts, 163-4; It. From the
old , and w ell iin alidated by the com m en diireieiiei; in the relation o f deteriniiiatioii
tators o f I.onvaiii, ib ; a sim ilar doctrine betw een subject and predicate, d ivided into
lo that o f Lambert lield by V erm r. Ar- C ategorical, and ( oiid itio iia l. iiiclu ilin g
I o diis d e 'I'liiigeri. and Lamberlu.s de 1
11 piitlieiical, iL .ju n c iiie . and D iletiim atic,
-Moi |e . lb. : ('rakaiitlioria; held that Induc- 6
165; ca leg o iiea l ju dgm ent ex p la in e d , i <l
tioii ran only he recalled to a h ypoth etical se'/.; till' term caifgoriral used by A ristotle
fy llo g ism , 59-5-7; M aterial, its character, in tbe sense <i{aj/innai.ice, ib .; in its second
.797. sigiiiticatiu u, as opposed lo co n d itio n a l,
I n f k r e n o e , m eaning o f tlic term, 196; d is probably first ap]ilied by T heophrastus, ib. ;
tribution of, .79>-6-itl: its tw o grand classes, in tliis em p loym en t the to rm s nbsolnle and
M ediate and Im m ed iate, 598-; all in fer j)tr/ect better exp ressio n s, 165; nature of
INDEX. 697
a categorical ju d gm en t, IGC; con d ition al A ffirm ative, U niversal N egative, Particular

ju dgiiients, 106-71; these com prise three A llii iniitive. Pin ticiilar N egative, ib .; these,
species, 166; 1 11
. ) iiollietieiil, ib. tt seq ; how .sym bolized, ib. ; circular diagram s
varialioiis in regard to the aiiplieation o f illii.stnitive of. I'O; d iv i-io n o f j/rojiosilions
the terms cnmlitintial and hyimtlitticnl, 166-7; in to Ilire anil Jlod a l, 180-81; this di.sliiie-
a hyiiothetical jiu lgineiit, w hat, 167; api.et- tion fu tile, I s l; (I h i'io ii o f Jlod al jiidjio-
18
lalions o f its constituent elem en ts, J ; not sitioiis by logician s a.' N ecessary, Im jiossi-
10
com posite, .; not eon vertib le into a cate ble, C onfingeiit, and Iossibie, extra lo g iea l,
gorical, I'A. Dl.'junctive, 169 (t API/. . not in 1
181-2; W liate.y (juoted on his d istin ctio n ,
reality conii>osite, and not con vertib le into and cr il.ei/ed , 182-3; the term s Assertory,
a categorical, 169-76; 3 D ileniinatic, or ProbUnuitie, A/iO'leictir, or Vtm oiistratiee in
lly p o tlietico-D isju n ctive, 170 tt seq.; in d i relation lo iiroposilion.s, ex p la in ed , 183;
visible, and not reducible to a iilurality o f e. Ity R elation to each oilier, jiiilgineiits
categorical JiidgmeiMs, 170; these viirious divided into Identical, Dilferent, R elatively
kinds o f jiu lgm ents may be considered in Id en lical, Disjiarate, D isjiiuct, Subalter-
reference lo (ju an tity, (ju ality, and R ela iiiuit, S ubalternafe, 183-4; out o f R elation
tion , 171; a. In lelatioii to (Juantity, i . tt 6 arises tho Opposition ol ju dgm ents. 181;
.seq.; the com inoii di:ctrine o f tlie division ojijiosilion eitlier o f con trad iction or o f
o f ju d gm en ts accord in g lo their (juantity, coiiti ai'iety, ib.; C ongruent .Jndgm eiits,
171; the d oetiiiie o f the author on this i b .; S ub -con tiary iijijjosition, w hat, ib. ;
jjoint, 171-2; all ju d gm en ts are, according not a real opjiosition, ib., see O jiposition ;
to the author, either D etinite or Indetinite, conversion of, 185-6, ste C onversion ; cer
171; D etinite in clud es U niversal and In d i tain d istin ction s of, n ot .-irictly lo gical,
vidual ju dgin en ts, 171-2; Indetiisite in clud es exjilaiiied viz.. Theoretical and P racti
Particu lar ju dgm ents, 172; jiropositions are cal, Ind em on strab le and D em on strable,
6
either Prede.-igiiate or P r c in d e s ig n a te ,/ . ; A x io m s and P ostu lates, Theorem s and
com m on d octrine errs by tak in g into :ie- P roblein s, C orollaries, L xp erim en tal P rop
cou n t on ly tlie q uan tity o f the subject, osition s, H ypotheses, L em m ata, S ch olia,
tb.; tlie.se d o eliin es e.sjilicated, 173 et siq.; 187-8; set Propositioius.
Univei.-al ju dgm ents, w liat, ib ; .'singular Ju stin , case cited from , illu stratin g the
or Individual ju dgm ents, w hat, ib ; Par jiow er o f A s so cia tio n , 424.
ticular ju dgm ents, w hat. I*.; w ords w hich
serve to mark out (juantity in universal, KaKov gSpaKos KaKhu w6i/, tlie proverb, its
individual, aud jiarliculiir jiropositions, ib ; origin, 3.34
distin ction o f universal and in d ivid u al K a n t , 42; his A pjilied Logic identical with
from particular ju dgm ents, 173-4 ; cate llie A u th o rs JModitied L ogic, 43; his em -
gorical ju dgm ents alone, aeeord in g to the jiloyineiit o f the jihrase censured, 44, 58, -59,
logicians, adm it o f all the foiins o f quau- 88 112
, ; his em jiloyraent o f th e term cate
lity . 174; this d octrine erroneous, ib ; b. gory, 140, 170; his threefold division o f
In relation to (Juality, ju d gm en ts are di jirojKisitions as A ffirm ative. N'l-gative, and
vided into A tlirm ative and N eg a tiv e, 176; L im itative, grou n d less, 179-83 ; rejected
geuerality o f tbe d eliniiion o f predication Sub -con trariety as a sjieeies o f ojijiosition,
and o f atlirm alion and n eg a lio u , as given 184,242; his d octrine o f K igiiie borrow ed by
by the author, 176; affirmative and negative th e A u tlior, 307; his sjieciilation founded
jirojiositioiis, 176-7; tliat negation does not on the general relations ol d istance betw een
belong to tlie copula held by som e lo g i the p lan ets, 367; his argum eut from the law
cians, 177; the ojijiosite d octrine m aintained o f duty for Imiiian liberty, aud tbe ex ist
by the author, 177-8; origin o f th e c o n tro en ce o f a flo r a l C overnor, valid, 372,456;
versy regarding the place o f n eg a tio n , 178; quoted on Crusiiis's sujireine can on o f S y l
the possibility o f en u n ciatin g negative jiroj;- logism , 561; quoted on C aucus o f S y llo
osifions in an allirnuitive, aud a llin n a liv e gism , ,563-9.
propositions in u n egative, form , the oee:;- KKCKun.MANN, 210, 230. 243, 250. 342.331,527.
sion o f m uch jierverse relinem ent am on g K i e s e w e t t e r , 174.'243 , 469; q uoted on ca n
logician s, 178-9; n egative term s, how desig- ons o f s y llo g ism , 572
n.ated liy A risto lle, 178; by H oetliiiis, ib.; K i u w a n , Dr. R icliaril, 435.
by the Sch oolm en , ib.; prapositiones infinitcp. K n o w l e d g e . D octrine o f the A cquisition
o f the S choolm en, ib ; K an t's d ivision o f aud P erfecting of, 441, 493; the m eans ol
ju dgm ents in to A ffirm ative, N egative, and jierfeclin g k now ledge are, in gen eral, tw o,
L im itative im foiin ded, 179; ju dgm ents the A cijuisition aud the C om niiinicalion
divided aeeord in g to their q uan tity and o f k now ledge. 441; the first m ean, the
quality takeu togeth er, in to U niversal A cquisition o f k n o w led g e, considered,
bb
698 IND EX .
441 t t s e q . i th is must be view ed in relation dressed, 483 et s.eq.; A . U nilnternl Comnm

to the ditlerenl kinds o f k n ow led ge, w hieli nication or Instruetion Oral and AA'ritten.
are tw o , as o f con tin gen t and o f necessary 483-92; Oral, its ad vantages, 484-5; a.
m atter. 4 11-2; coiisi.-Is o f tw oim rts ncijui- M ore natnral, therefore m ore im iiressive,
silio n tln im gli K.\|.ei ienee, and tlirougli In 484; T lieoiiliiiistns, (he younger Iliiiy , V a le
tellig en ce, 4t2; in what sense all k now ledge rius M axiiu ns (?), .St. Jerom e, cited to this
may bo failed ncquirtil, ib .: i. Ilie d octrine ell'ect, rb.; b Less p en iia iien t, tlierefore
o f K.\|Krience, 442 >t s>q.; e.xperience ol m ore attended to. I'i.; c H earing a social
tw o kiiiils, 442: 1. 1ersonal, 442-3; th is in act, 461-5; testim on y o f .Aleiiiige and V aril-
g en eral, w lial, 443; c s|ilic iite d , ib. <t stq ; las to the ad vantages o f co n v ersa tio n , 485;
com m on anil seientilie, 444; O bservation, reading, a substitute lor oral in stru ction ,
w liat, ib. : o f tw o kinds O bservation its advantages, a. More easily accessible, b.
jiroper and E xjiei in io n l, ib. ; inivcognita Alore conii>reliensi\e, c. More |)erm anent,
01,445 ft ; F irst. The object o f observa 485; its (lisadviiiitiiges as an e.\e!iisiv em ea n s
tion , 445-7; this fourfold, 445; P , W hat I o f a eq iiiiiiig k now ledge, 485-6; AVrittcii
the iiliieiiom ena are in (heir in d ivid u al jie- liis li n ction. and its eniplov nient as a m eans
cu liarities nnd contrasts, and as under o f p erlccting k n ow led ge, rules I'or, 460; 1.
determ inate genera and sjiecies, ib. ; 2 , (Quantity to be rend rule, Bead niucli, but
AVhat the eo n d iiio iis ot' tlieir reality, 446; not m any w orks, 487; (cstiinonies to tin's
3 ', AViiat their causes, 416-7; 4, AVhat the rule by S olom on , (Jiiintilian, the yotinger
order o f their con secu tion ; S econ d , The Ilin y , Selieea, Liilliei', .Siiiidersoii, L old
m anner o f ob servation , 447-6; T . l ro|.er lUiiOeigb, lle id e r . ib .; end o f reading, 468;
sla te ol (he observing m ind, 447; 2^>, C on 2 . (.iia lity ot wliat is to be read lirst rule,
d itio n s ol the i|Uestion to be delerinined by Bead by s e l e c t i o n , second rule, Begin
observation. 447-S; T hird, The m eans by w ith the general, 489; G ibbon quoted to
w hich I h e data o f observation are to bc re efl'ect o f secon d rule, ib . third rule. Study
duced lo s /h le n i viz., Ilyiiotlnjsis, In d u c a science as it is, b efore iiio ceed iiig lo its
tio n , and A n alogy, 449-56, sre llio.se w ords; cb roiiological d evelopineiit, 490; fourth
2. Foreign ex|)erieiici. 457 tl fe q .; this re rule, Bead difTereiit w oi lis on tlie sam e sub
alized tlirough te-Iin ion y, ib .; testim ony, ject, ib ; til'tb rale, .S'ndy w orks wl.icli
w lia l, ib ; oral ancl recorded, 457-75, .sff '1 es- cu ltivate the u iid eisla m iiiig , and also those
11
tim on y ; . ^|Jeculation the .second nieiins w liich cu ltivate the taste, 490 ; 3. J la n u cr
o f acqniring and iierfectin g know ledge, ol' le a d in g , 491 el .sr;/. , lirst rule, Bead
475 6 - ; i)rinci|iiil (lislin ctio n s o f em piriciil that you may reiiicm bcr, but csiiecially that
and noetic cogn ition s. 470; 111. C onnniiiii- you m ay understiiiid, 4 9 1 ; second rule,
cation the last mean o f iicc|uiring and .Seek to coni|)ass the general tenor o f a
jKTlecling k n ow led ge, 47s 93; this an ini- w ork , b e fo ie ju d g in g ol' it in d etail, i b .;
liortant tiieiin ot | o fe c tin g k n o w led g e in tb.ii'd rale, A econ in iod ate the in ten sify o f
the m ind ol Ihe eotnniiiniciilor, 479; man tbe reading to tbe im portance o f (lie w ork,
n atnrully delc-nnined lo coin n in n ication , ib. ; Lectio rursoriu, and Lectio slntnria, ib.
and his k n ow led ge o f the object o f his Bacon i]UOted on tbis d istin ctio n , ib.,
thought is thereby rendered clearer, ib.; Jolian u A'on 31'uller quoted on th e sam e.
th is fact noliceci by Ilato, ib .; by A ristotle, 492; Coiirtli rule, B egnliile, on tlie sam e
1 liem isiiiis, l.iiciliu s, IVi-sius, C iceio, .Sen jirinciple, tbe extracts from th e w orks yon
eca, 479-yj; the m odes in w hich com m ui.i- read, ib .; 1!. .Alntnul co m m u n ica tio n , or
cution is con d u cive to the iicrfeclin g o f coiil'erence, 492-."; o l'tw o k in d s D ialogu e
knowledge; a ie tw o. 4si|; 1 I.y reci|iroeally and Form al iJispiitc, 492; (1), D ialogu e,
d eterm in in g a h ie'" r em rgy o f the facili ib.; (2), D isputation oral and w ritten,
ties, a Thioii .Il sj in|iath v, b. 'i'hrongli op 492-3; A cad em ical. 493.
p osition . 4 ' ) - s l ; riu ta rcli, and .J. C. Scal- KcifuKN, 2.52.
igi-r, quoted on the benefits o f ojipo.-ilion K p itr is and K p lv c iv , rarely used by the
and d i-p n (e ,4 sl ;2 I.y im p osin g the neces- G reeks, and never by A risto tle, as (ecbnical
Bily o f olilain iiig ii fu ller conscioiisne.s.s o f tcrmK o f L ogic or o f Isy clio lo g y , 159
k now ledge for ourselves, 4sl ; ii.llu eiiee o f K n u o , W. T., reli-ned to on tbe fon n of
coinpirsition and iiistruction in la-i feelin g tliouglit as tlie exidu sive object o f l.o g ic,
onr k n ow led ge, 481-2; lio d w iii (]iiotfd lo 12; on tlic law s o f tlioiiglit us tlio u g h i, 13;
this ell'eci, 482 ; and A ri lo lle, Iliito, .Seii- referred lo for (lelin itions o f L ogic, 25; re-
ern. ( leineni o f A lexn n d ria, U ionysius, (erred to and (juoled as lo Logic being
( j lo . .''Clio,a-lic A laxim -, V'ives, .Sandc-r- m erely a foiiiial inst runiei.I o f the sciences,
3
don, P J- ; iiifluence o f the coin m m iicalion 26-7; quoted us to the sense in w hich l.o g io
ot k n ow led ge on those to w liom it Is ad- , can be St vied the M edicine o f t/ie M ind,2& ,
INDEX. 699
32-3; quoted on the u tility o f L ogic as tion-s, 428-30. 430; quoted on rem edy for
serving to guard again.st error, 3t, 30, 38; error arising from lan gu age, 43S-9, 440,
n o t aware o f tiie o iig in a l d istiiietion o f 451, 152, 454, 455; quoted on Ind iiclioii and
Logira iJocins aiitl L ogini utni'i, 42, 43,50, A n a lo g y , 455, 458, 450, 400, 478, 480, 493; bis
57, 59, GO; (|Uoled on the d istin etioii o f d octrin e o f S y llo g ism , 6-10-51
Reason and C onsequent, and Cause and
2
L irect,C l- ; referred to as to ('oncej)tion L a m u e u t , 43; em ployed parallel lines as lo g i
and R easoning, in v o lv in g Jiu lgu ien t, 84, cal n otation , iso. 2.30.450; liis d octrine o f
88 , 101, 104,112, 118,119. 120, 132, 135 130, tile ultra-total q m ii.tiliealion o f tbe m iddle
147; quoted on Individual and .Singular term . 584-0; <pioled on Ind n ctin n . 505;
D iiference, 147, 140. 151; quotrd on the O p stiicrn i es on liis d octrine ot, ib .; (juoted on
position o f C oncepts. 152-3, 100; quoted on Iigure o f ,S\ llogisni, 042-5.
the Coim la, ICC; (juoied on H ypothetical L a m h e i . t l ' s u e J I o n t k , liis d octrine o f In
Jiiclgnieuts, lGS-9; (|Uoled oil D isjunctive duction. 590.
J u tlgm ei.ts, 109-70; (pioted on q uau lity o f L a x ge . 25.
H ypothetical and D isjun ctive Ju dgin eu ts, La N O IL 'S .484.
174, 170, 181, 188, 203,214, 215; quoted on Language, its relation to tliouglit, and the
tlie first rule o f D eductive E xten sive Cate in tlm n ce w liich it e.\erts on our m enial
gorical S yllogism . 210; quoted on QiinUniio o);cialioi.s. 98 ft s e i/.; niincce.ssary in cer
tsini/aori/ii). 210-17. 218, 219; i|UOted on third tain m ental o)ici tilions, li. indispensable
rule o f D eductive E xten sive C alegoiical in certain other m ental operations, and its
sy llo gism s, 219-20, 227; quoted on tiie first relation to tlie.se, 98-9; has man invented
rule o f the D isjun ctive S y llo g ism , 230 ; it ' am biguity o f tlie q uestion, 432; in
0
c|U ted on lly ))o lh etic a i S yllogism in gen w liat sense natural to m an, 432-3; was tiie
eral. 211, 242; quoted on the application o f first language actu ally spoken the in v en
tlie ]jrineiple o f Reason and C onsequent to tion o f m an, or Hie inspiration o f the
the H ypothetical S y llo g ism , 242; ijuoted on D eity ? 433; tlie latter liypotliesi.s c o n sid
Reduction o f lly p o tlietieu ls, 243 4 ; on C on ered , ih.; difficulty o f tiie q uestion, ib. ;
version of H vp oth eticals from one form to 11
Roiisse: cited on , ib .; lan gn age has a g en
iiuotlier, 244-5; quoted on the third rule o f eral and a special ciiaractcr, 434; n o la n
lly p o llie lie a l S y llo g ism s, 248; quoted on guage is a perfect inslruincnt o f tliouglit,
the d esign ation s o f the llyiiolh etico-d is- 434; sign s necessary tor tiie internal opera
ju n ctive S y llo g ism , 249-50; on tlie rules for tion o f Ihoiiglif, 435 ; and for its com m u
siftin g a ]iroposed d ilem m a, 250; ijuoted on n ica tio n , ib.; in ton ation s o f l h c v o ice, tiie
classes and design ation s o f related sy llo on ly adequate sym b ols o f tliouglit and o f
gism s, 258,284, 311, 320, 321; iiuotcd on a its eom inuiiication, ib. ; these inarticulate
categorical syllo g ism w itli four capital no and articulate, 430; the latter constitute
tions, 320, 327; quoted on liillacie.s o f an Language Proper, i b .; the vocabulary o f
U nreal U niversality, 327-8; qiioteil on flic any language necessarily liiiite, 437; w ords
Igiiava Ratio, 330; ipioted on vice ol Igiiava are m erely liints to tlie m ind, 437-8; L an
Ratio, 331; quoted on .Sojikisnia pohjzeteseos, gu age as a source o f Error, 430, ste Error,
332; (pioted on eiiaraeter o f tlie Sopltisma Caii.'es of.
iitlerozeteseos, .333, 3-38, 341; (|HOled on the L a r u o q u e , quoted on c a n o n s o f .syllogism ,
con stitu en ts o f L ogical M eth od ology, 341, 572-4. .
343; (pioted on N om in al, R eal, aiul (Jeiiclic L 'A u t d e P e n s e r [Port-Royal Logic), 25;
d elinitions, 343, 314, 345: quoted on tau to its study recom m ended, 50, 408; autliors ol
logical delinition , 346-7; (juoted on the rule very nearly took the d istin ction betw een
o f delinition w hich requires it to be pre n otion s as Clear and Obscure, D istinct and
cise, 347; (pioled on the necessity tor a defi- lu d islin c t, 114.
nitiou being pers])icuons. 347-8; on delini- L a t i n S clioolm en , view ed Logic a s a science,
tioii ill the looser sense, 34S-9, .351; quoted 7
; their views as to tlic object-m ailer o f
against com p lexity o f divi.don, 357-8. 304, L ogic. 19-20.
800,370; (pioted on the circle in probation, L a u r e m b e r g i u s , p ., 25.
372 373; quoted on the Ob/tatie Hrnr/ii, 374, Law s o f T h ou ght, see F u n d a m en ta l Law s o f
375; (pioted on con d ition s o f tlie adeqiiate flioiight.
a ctivity o f ILxIernal Iereeptioii, 414-15; on L e C l e r c , 71
precautions against errois o f the tsenses, L e c t i o C u r s o r i a and Ltctio Stataria, 491,
415-10. 417.418; quoted on the Law s o f A s see Know ledge, D octrin e o f tiie A cip iisilioii
sociation, 420, 427, 428; quoted on error as and Perfecting o f
ly in g not in tlie con d ition s tliem selves of L e i b n i t z , o n the principles o f Identity and
the liiglier faculties, but in tiieir iipplica- C on trad iction , 64; did not alw ays disLin
TOO INDEX.
iriiish the principle? o f Identity and C on- com m on design ation o f th e science, as ap.
6
tn id ictiin i. (i; calli'd n ttcntion to law o f ]iears trom t'iccro, 4; b. Its derivation
Siillicioiit Iti'iuoii, 07: foin.dcd his pliiloso- and iiieai.iiig, from \ 6 y o s , s ig iiif iiiig both
l>liy on the priiici|ilc> o f Sntliciciit Reason tlioiiglit and its exjiression, 4; this ainliigii-
and C oiitn id ietioii (iiicliiilin.u' l d e i i t i t \ ), i . . 6 ity tin ored the rise o f t wo couiiter-o])iiiioiis
did not siillieieiitly di.'Criinimite the law o f regarding tlic ohjecl-niatter of, 5, 23; tliis
(.a ii'ah ty fn in the law ol .'iitlicieni Iteasoii, tw ofold m ean in g, how con tradistinguished
l i . ; e u \e various nam es to the ]iriiiciple o f in expression by A ristotle, 5; by others, ib .;
Sullieieiit Itea.-oii, it> ; controversy between aiipellatioii.s o f the science alterw ards calleil
and Clarke, on pro\ iiice o f .Snllieient Rea I.ogic, ib : vacillation in the a; plicatii.n ol
son, tb : his d i'tin c tio n o f In tu itiv e and tlie term by the S toics, Epicureans.and other
m bolieal K n ow leiloe, n oticed , S 7 ; to ancient sch ools o f iih iloso p h y , C; (2) The Oe-
liim is owiiiir the d i'tin c tio n o f C onccjits iiiis o f L o g ic , w liellier science or art. 7 ct
in to Clear anil D i'tin c t. 1 1 2 - 1 1 ; the first to .tiq.,.sre uhn 498-501; a scio. ce according to
take tlie distin ction o f I n t iiiiiie and yni- 8 P lato and the PU itouists, hut D ialectic w ith
hohcal knowled^'e, 120
: uniicquaintunce o f them ciiuivnk'iit lo tlie Logic and Aletapliys-
tlic iiliilosojiliers o f th is cou n try w ith tlic ics o f the Pcri)iatetics, 7 ; deiiied to be either
d octrines of, 1 2 7 ; m anner in w hich lie gave science or art hy the Greek A ristotelian s
llis w ritin gs lo tlie w orld , ib .: his paper and many philosoiihcrs since the revival
De Cognitione, Vtrltate, ct f i t is, quoted from o f letters, ib .; a science a ccord in g to tlie
on In tu itiv e and .Sym bolical Ivnow ledge, ' S to ics,/5 .,- and accord in g to the Arabian
121. 4 ; quoted on canon o f .Syllogism , , ri (1 Latin sclioolin eii, ib .; n iain tain ed to
o'jO-l, referred to on sim p licity o f sorites, be an art in more m odern tim es by iiiaiiy
274 A ristoieliiin s. tlie R am ists, and a m ajority
Ls;inENFr:ri?T. niaintained all th ou gh t to be o f Ilie C artesians, ib.; both science and art,
nt bottom a calcu h itioii. 197. a cc o rd in g to otliers, ib.; in G erm any, since
L em m .v. nam e for the m ajor P rem ise or Leibnitz, regarded as a science, ib .; the
Sunqition id'a S y llo g ism , 200. question futile, 7; errors o f AVliafely on
I.EM.MATA. w hat, IsS. 78
tliis jioint, , ; w hat is inqilicd in d eliniiig
L.KX C o n t r a d i r l i i r i a r u m , p r i n c i p i u m C o n tr n i l i ce n - 8
Logic as a science, , 9; held by som e lo
tiiim . its ex ten sio n in the scliools, Co. be a science, 498; and either S pecu lative
Lo d k o w it z , .loiin ncsC arainu el, 184; referred science, ib ; or P ractical, ib .; or both
to on various kinds o f w lioles, 351. 16
.Speculative and P ractical, .; an art, 449;
I.ik /k k , J o h n , totally m isaiipreliended the science and art, 16 .; n eith er science nor
nature ol L ogic, 21
; on tlie p rin ciple o f art, hut instrum ent, organ , habit, or iiislru-
C ontradiction, C-1; his real m erits in rela m cntal diseijiliiic, ib. ; th a t, loosely tak in g
tion to the d i'tin c tio n s o f Ideas, the doc the term s, is eillier art, or science, or both.
trine o f D elii.ition, etc., 115: anticijiated 500; that at once science (jiart o f jihilcsc-
iliiin e in rem arking the einp h iym en t o f jihy) and instrum ent o f philosop hy, ib. ;
term s w ith out d i-tin ct m ean in g, 125; (juolcd th at q uestion, w hether part o f ]iliiloso]ihy
on this poin t, I2-5-C. or not, an id le q uestion, i i . ; that q uestion,
I .o o tc . tlie first -even lectures o f the A u th ors w lietlier art, science, etc., o iil\ M-rlial.
.Melafdiysical Course delivered as ii general 500-1; E iigeiiiiis (pioted to this elfect, ib. ;
introduction lo tlic course of, ; m ode in 1 (3) Its (Ihjcct-m atter, 9 d sup ; a. Tliought,
w liich i:s con sid eration oiiglit to lie con w liat. tb tl sfq .; in its w ider rue:;niiig,
ducted. ib. ; sysli'in of, consists o f tw o |iaii.s, tlio u g h t denotes every C ognitive act, and
v iz .: Iiitrish iclio n to the .Science, and even every m ental inodilication o f w hich
Body o f D octrine con stitu tin g the science w e are coi scions, ib. ; in tl.e more lim ited
itsi'lf 3
; i|iietjons to he answ ered in the m eaning, I'hoiiglit (Thought jiroper)denotes
Introdu ction to Logic, rt s -q .; 8D efini 1 on ly tlie acts o f ihe iiiid eista iid in g , I'aculty
tion of, .3-21. o-s ipio 49C 7; tlie Science o f o f C om parison, E laborative, or Discursive
the Laws 1,1
T hoiiglit as 'riioiight, 3 <t s r q . ; 9 10
Eiicu lty, - ; in tin- m ore lim ited iiieaii-
thjs dermition e\p latn i-d in d etail. i . ( ) 6 1 in g. Thought is the olijecl-nnitter o f L ogic.
1 he word Ijig ir .a I ts h istory, 3 >t . . , tlie 07 9 ; objects tliat lie beyond the siilieie o f
term (Ao'/oft)) u>, m arking U fiurticiilar L ogic, ib.; h. Thought as th ouglit, w hat,
1
science ot so old as the science itself, ib ; 10 ft seq.: M atter and Eorm o f T liought,
not used in ilds smise hy A ristotle. 3, 4; di.-tiiiguished. 11 ; I.ogic iiroperli eonver-
a ccord in g 10
P.oethins. lirst n|i]died to the saiit on ly w ith the Form o f T h oiiglil, 11 >t
science hy Hie aiicii'iit I'eiip atelics. 4; used seq.; this show n hy a con sid eration o f tlie
in the w ide sense by A lexan d er o f A phro- nature and con d ition s o f the th in g itself,
disiaa, ib.; but previously to A lex a n d er a 11-12; c. L aw s o f T houglit as T h ou ght, 12
INDEX. 701
et s e q . ; t he se tlie prop er obj ect o f I. o g i c , t he se to bc p r o p o s e d as Hie e n d o f inslruc-

12-13, ('e also 14-17; b o w (listingiiislieil from t i o n ill, lb ; By r ehi ti bn l o otijects. is
Emi)irical or lii .-lorical I 's y c l io l o g y , 17; as A b s t r a c t or G e n e r a l , a nd C o n c r e t e or .'spe
tlic s c ie n c e o f th e L a w s o f I'liouglit as cial , 38, see also 497; t h e se I :;,ds of. ho w
T h o u g li t. is file s c i e n c e o f tlie nec ess ar y d e s ig n a t e d by tlie G ree k A r i s to t e li a n s , and
I 'o r m s o f T l io u g li t, 17, 1S2-3; ne c e ss ar y b y t he A r a b i a n an d L a t i n s c l.o ol n ie n . 38;
f or m o f tlio ugl it iiiii>lies Ibnr e o m l i t i o n s Hiis di vis io n o f r e m o u n t s to A l e x a n d e r the
I. Det eriniiieil by Hie na t u r e o f t h e Hiiiik- A p l i r o d i s i a n , i b.; bis il l n s tr a t io n ot t he di>-
i n g subject itself; 2. O r i g i n a l ; 3. L ' n i v e r s a l ; t i n c l i o n , i b. ; ot he r i ll n s l r a t i o n s ol Hiis
4 A L a w , 17-18; lieiice t he obj ect -in at te r o f d i v is i o n of, 39; G en er a l L o g i c is iil on e o ne ,
L o g i c e x p l i c i t l y e n o u n c e d , in s a y i n g that Sjieeial L o g i c is m a n i f o l d , a n d |iart o f tlie
L o g i c is Hie sc ie n c e o f Hie L a w s o f Tl io u g li t s c ie nc e in wliieli il is ap pl ie d, 39-10; th e
as T l io n g h t , or o f tlic F o r m a l J.aw s o f d i s l i n c t i o u o f Logica docens a n d Logica
ThcJuglit, or o f Hie L a w s o f Hie F o r m o f utens m i s t a k e n liy s o m e m o d e r n uutliors,
T l io u gl it , 18, see nlso 28 -9; liei. ce a n a l o g y 42; 3, B y re fer e nc e to Hie c ir c u m s ta n c e s
b e t w e e n and .Matliemiitics as botli fo rm a l u n d e r w h ic li it c an c o m e i n t o e x e r c i s e by
sc ie nc e s, 31 -2: g e n e r a l hi sto r ic a l retrosiiect us, i.s d i v id e d i n to r u r e a n d J l o d il ie d , 42
o f v i e w s in r eg ard to th e obje ct a n d d o m a i n et seq.; P u r e L o g i c , w l i a l, 43; Mod ifi ed
of, IS et s e q . ; m er it o f t he auH ior s v i e w of, L o g i c , w h a t , ib.; n o m e n c l a t u r e o f J lo di f ie d
i b.; A r i s t o t le ' s re la tio n t o v i e w s o f the L o g i c , 43- 4; this id e nt ic al w i t h th e A p p l i e d
n at ur e an d d o m a i n of. 19; v i e w s o f G ree k L o g i c o f K a n t a n d otheis-, 43; not pr ojierly
A r i s t o t e li a n s a n d L a t i n s c li o o ln i e n r e g a r d an e s se u l i a l pai t o f, 44-5: ( o ns jie c lu s o f
i n g . in g e n e r a l c o r re c t , 19-20; v i e w s o f Ihe tlic p re sen t cour se of , 45; F o r m a l a n d i l a -
ob j e ct - m a t t er of, iu tlie J. ci b n i ti o - W ol f- f e i i a l L o g i c c o n t r a s t e d , 497; d i v i s i o n , va
i:m an d K a n t i a n s c lio o ls , 20; its na tu r e rietics, a n d c o n t e n f s o f , in de ta il, 50I-G.
m o s t c o m j i le t e l y a n d g e n e r a l l y m i s u n d e r IV. H is t o r y of, iios tii one d, 4 8 . V . Bi bl i-
s to od in Great B r ita in , i b . ; in ce rta in le- o g r a p l iy o f , ib ; t h is s ho r tl y n o t i c e d , 49-51;
spec fs w l i o ll y m i s c o n c e i v e d liy B a c o n , 20-21; first g r e a t d iv is io n of, P u r e L o g i c ,
t o t a l l y m is a p p r e l ie n d e d by L o c k e , 21; g e n c o n s id e r e d , 52-375; Jart I , .S to ic lie io lo g y,
eral c ha r a c te r o f W l ia t e ly ' s E b m i i i t s p / . i b ; 52-334; .Section 1., N o e t i c , o r o f t h e F u n d a
bis v i e w o f t h e o b j e ct - m a t t er an d doi in. in m e n t a l L a w s o f T h o u g li t . 52-82; in wli af
of. stated and c r it ic i z ed . 21-23, .see W l ia t e lv ; aspect T li o u g li t is v i ew e d b y, 5 2- 3; tlie true
II. Ut ili ty of, 24 et seq ; U t i li ti e s falsely r e l a t i o n s o f L o g i c o v e r l o o k e d on t w o sides,
at tri bu ted to, ib. et srq ; suii|)oscd to b e a n 70 ft .seq. I. F r r o n e o u s ly lield t o afiord
i n s tr u m e n t o f scie nt ifi c d i.' co ver y, 24; l;ei ce lli e p o s i ti v e s ta n d a r d o f t rn tli , 7 0 2. Re
c al le d an I n s t m m m t , or Instruniental Vhilos- p u d ia t e d as afl'ording n o c r it e ri o n o f triiHi
o/)/iI/, et c , 24-5; snjijiosed to be t h e i n fa lli bl e in r e la t io n to tlie a b s o l u te by s o m e p h i l o s o
c or r e c t o r o f o u r i n te l le c t u a l vices , 20; its phers , 77; its P o s t u la t e s , Sl ..( se al.so 512-13;
d e s ig n a ii o ii s on this s u p i io s i li o n , ib., 348; o f Hiese o n l y on e s i g n a l i z e d , T o be a l
in wliat resjiect an i n s t r u m e n t o f th e .sci l o w e d to s ta le e x p l i c i t l y in l a n g u a g e all
e n c e s, 25-C. 32; n o t p r o p e r ly an art o f tliat is im itl iei lly c o n t a i n e d in t h o u g h t , 81,
d i s c o v e r y . 2(J. 32; in w h a t s en se to be sl_\ led .see also 510; lliis c a n n o t be r e fu s e d, SI; is
Hie ineriiciiie o f the m i n d , 2 0 . 3 2 ; th e law.s of, i m p l ie d in w l i a t A r i s t o t le s la t e s o f th e d o c
t h e n e g a t iv e c o n d i t i o n o f truHi, ib.; its t ri ne o f S y l l o g i s m , 82; S e c t i o n II. O f Hie
u til ity t ha t o f a f o rm al i n s t r u m e n t , or m e a n P r o d u c t s o f T h o u g h t , 83-334; i. F n n o e -
by wli ich k n o w l e d g e , al r e a d y a c q u i r ed , m a t i c , O f Co ncejtts o r N o t i o n s , S3-I5S,
m a y bc m e t h o d i z e d i n t o Htc fo rm a c c o m .see C o n c e p t s , D o c t r i n e of; ii. A i i o id i a n t ic .
m o d a t e d to the c o i . d i t i o n s o f t he u n d e r or Hie D o c t r i n e o f J u d g m e n t s , 159-88. see
s t a n d in g , 33; useful as g i v i n g us, to a c e r J u d g m e n t s . D o c t r i n e o f ; on th e s u pp os it io n
ta in e.xtent. d o m i n i o n o v e r o u r t li o u g li t s, Hiat L o g i c ta ke s c o g ni zi ii; c e o f tlie m o d a li t y
3-3-4; as s u p p l y i n g , in |iar(. Hie c r it e ri on o f o f objects. Hie s c ie nc e c a n h a v e n o e x i s t
Truth fr o m K ri o r . 34; as i n v i g o r a t i n g Hie e nc e , ]82: iii. D o c t r i n e o f R e a s o n i n g s . 189
u n d e r s t a n d i n g , ib. ; as af ibrdiiig a scien tif ic 334, see R e a s o n i n g s , D o c t i i n e of ; Part II,
n o m e n c la t u r e ol t h e l a w s by w l i ie h t h i n k M e l l i o d o l o g y , S e c t i o n i. J l e t h o d in g e n e r a l.
i n g is g o v e r n e d , a n d o f t h e v i o l a t i o n o f S e c t i o n ii. L o g i c a l M e t h o d o l o g y . 335-375;
the se l a w s . 35-0 III. Its D iv i si o n s , 37 et L o g i c a l M e t h o d o l o g y , w h a t , 335-0 , 340-41;
.seq . see nl.so 491-7; d i v i s i o n o f i n t o N a t u r a l c on s is t s o f Hiree p a r t s , P , ' I he D o c t r i n e
a nd .Vrtiticial in ep t. 31; its K in d s , or .'spe o f D e f in it io n , 2^, O f D i v i s i o n , 3 , O f P r o
cies. and Farts, ib. et s e q. ; 1^, B y re la tio n b a t io n , 341; liistorical n o t ic e s o f Lo g i c a l
l o tlie m in d , is (Jbjectivc a n d .Subjective, 5I eth od ol og y, t6 ., - 1 ' . D o c t r i n e o f D ef in it io n .
Sy ste m at ic a a u d Hu bitualis, 37; bo t li o f 341-9, see D e f in it io n , D o c t r in e of ; 2 , Of
'02 INDEX.
D o c t r in e o f D i v i s i o n . 3.VM>0, see D i v i s i o n . 067-9; J l a a ss ' s s c h e m e of, cr iti c iz ed , 669-70;

D octrine of; D o c t r i n e o f Iro bi iti on , tlie A i i th o i '' s s c h e m e o f , N o . I. Line ar ,
300-75. Il o l i a t i o n , D o c t i i n e o f ; s e c o n d 070-3; A u th o r ' s s c h e m e o f . N o . II. U n -
great d i v is i o n of, M odi lie d L o g i c , 376 l ign re d a n d F i g u r e d s y l l o g i s m . 673; N o .
493; its ( ib j o e t, tlie c o n d i t i o n s to w h ic h H I . Fi g i u e d s y l l o g i s m . t a b le o f .s y l l o
t h o u g h t is siihjoct, a r is i n g Irom t h e e m p i r i g is ti c J l o o il s , in e ac h ligure 12 al lir nia tiv c
cal circi mi.staiices, e x t e r n a l and in te r n a l , a n d 21 n e g a t iv e , in all 36, 678-9.
' u n d e r w h ic li m a n 's f a cu lt v o f t h i n k i n g is L o g ic a l ( and D i a k c t i c a l j K oa so n in g, its
inanite.'ted, 370; its i iro bl eni s three , r t, i n e a n i n g in A r i s t o t l e , 4.
W hn t is Tni'tli, a n d its c o n t r a d i c t o r y o pp o L o g ic a l t n i i i s . c h i e f l y b o r r o w e d f r o m Matlie-
site. Error? 2~. W h a t are th c c aus es o f ni aties, 196, 209 10.
Er r o r a n d t h e i m |) c d i m e i i( s to Triitli, an d A o y i K b s X o y i K i h h o w e m ji lo ye d b y A r i s t o t l e ,
wha t arc Ihc m e a n s o f tlicir I t e iu o v al ? 3^, 3. 4; by A l e x a n d e r o f A p h r o d i s i a s , 4; b y
W h a t arc th e M ib sid ia ric s by wl iic li H u m a n (lie su bs e qu e nt A r i s t o t e li a n s , ib.
f l i o u g h t m a y he s t r e n g t h e n e d an d g u i d e d A o y o s , its t w o f o ld i n e a n i n g , t h o u g h t and
in t h e e x e r c i s e o f its f u n c t i o n s ? ib : tho its e x p r e s s i o n , e q u i v a l e n t to th e rfi/?V> and
first t w o q u e s t io n s b e l o n g to t h e S t o i c h e i o l - oralio o f t h e I.a lin s, 4, 5; tliei-e m e a n in g s
o g y o f J l o d il ie d L o g i c , t h c th ird fo its l i o w c o n t r a d i s t i n g u i s l i e d by A r i s t o l i e , 5;
M o l h o d o l o g y , 377; Iart I. J l o d il ic d S t o i- b y otliers, ib ; X S y o s irpucf)opii<hs, and
f l v i o l i i g y , 376-410; .'section i. D o c t r in e o f \ 6 y o s e v S i a d e T o s , p r o b a b l y o r ig i n a t e d w i t h
r n i t l i a n d Error. 37 0-90: .s e c t i o n ii. Error, t h e .Stoics, ib.
its Cau ses an d H ei ne di e s. 397-140, Tr ut h L o v a x i k n s e s , or M as ter s o f L o u v a i n , 289,
and Error, D o c t r i n e of ; M odified J l e t l i o d - 2 0 1 . 2 9 4 ; (pioted on q u a n ti fi c a ti o n o f jircd-
o l o g y , S e c t i o n i. O f th e J l e a n s by w h ic l l ieal e, 555; q uo te d o n ei ror r e g a r d in g li;-
o n r K 'n nw lcd ge olitain.s tie- c h a r a c t e r o f (liictuiii, 59 ). 617.
I e r le c ti o i i, t h e A c q u i s i t i o n a n d C o m m u L r c i A x , 331, 333
n i c a t i o n o f K n o w l e d g e . 441-93. sre K n o w l l . u c i i . i r s , 479.
e d g e . D o c t r i n e o f tlie A c q u i s i t i o n a n d Icr- Jî'Tin;t:. q u o t e d on K n o w l e d g e a n d B e l ie f ,
fe c t ii i g o f 383; q uo te d on l e a d i n g . 487.
l.oGK A Dorens, e qua l t o A b s t r a c t or G en er al
L o g i c , sre Lo g ic . M a a s . s , Ir ofe ss or , o f H a ll c , hi s e d i t i o n o f
J.rioicA Hn bit iia lis , see L o g i c . tlie Pr r ir i jt a o f W y t l e i i b a c l i n o t ic e d nnd
Ixir.iCA Sy .st cm al ic a , see L o g i c . cen.snred. 50: in his ed i ti o n o f tli e Prercepta
I . o g i c a Co n s, e qua l to C o n c r e t e o r Sjiecial o f W \ Itenhncli rc\ ersed tlie a nt lio r's m e a n
Logie. I.ogic. i n g on a n a l y s is and sj nt liosis, 338.
I.niiK a l D i v i s i o n , see D i v i s i o n . M AGLNTINCS. . 4 ' \ 514; c . r i a t i o n o f h is to r i
I.df.H A L I n d n c t i o i i , Induction. a ns as to t h e age in w l i ie h lie l iv e d , 590.
L<m;h a i , J.,!iws, see Fundainenful Laws o f JI A (It I! u s , 486.
fliought J I a i .m on .8., r e li' iie d to on ."cliemcs o f l o g i
L o f i i f A l , J l e t h o d o l o g y , sec Logi c. cal iiijtatioM, 667.
Lo g i c a l I c r fe c t io ii nnd I m j ic r f e c ti o n o f J l A . n m iir o p o s it i o n , .see rrenn'sc.
< oi (([jts, o-c f o n c c j i t s , (Jua lit y of. JlAKO 11 1 -: K i:i.i;iv-(i KDU, Iai ilus, 42.
J. o o k a l f i u l l i , ."<e Trill ll a n d E rr or , D o c - JlAi.i .ni tA xc iii -; , qiHiled on t he in fl u e n c e o f
trii e of. .Self. Lo ve , 107-8.
I.o' .ii \ L A l l in i ly or t'ontiim ily, J. aw of, J i A M i . i f s , q u o i c il , 3'-'9, 128; q u o t e d on th e
: "i gi ll 1 y K a n t , bnt rrjected hy 1lie A u t h o r , l i a l n i e I l f e.Njierieiico, 413-1.
1 1.1 .MAninTTli, reliM'rcil to l o r correct d o c t r i n e ol
l . i i ' . l f A t. N o t a t i o n , t h a t h y c i r c u l a r d i a g r a m s th e A r i s to t e li c ciitliy i ne me . 278.
! il.i'sir: li n g j / n p o s i t n i ?, rtl);'tlie first JlA ST int s Ilf Liui vai n, Hie. sn- Lo va iii en se s.
i - i n j . o ' n i l lit of t h e i- i n i p r i i | i e r l y a?crihed JIAB'l'KUS Begi iit ill t h e ( o l l e g e o f S I . Lan-
I I I r. lA . t o he lonnil in W e i s e , lA. , reiice in C o l o g n e , th e ir d o c t r i n e o f Tiidiic-
ll.a I . p a r a l l e l I h u s o f il iiri-reiit I n gtli? liiiii, 596.
(I. I' III t -J p artially a n tiei|ia lei| hy A i J I a t e i ' . i A I. I n d u c t i o n , ."rr I n d i i e t i o n .
'e in?. A . e i r n i h i r d iagran i- illu stra tive Ji A Ti iK M A T ic A i/ l' r u ll i, "cr Triitli aiid Error,
o f reasoning'. Id ; eiren lar ainl l i n e a r , fo i' D o e t r in e ol.
.' l l i i g i - i , h I'.x iei-io n aid ( dM ijirehni- J l A f n i T i U B , refers to St. A n g i i s l i n a a u t h o r
"i . 211-15: ohjeeiinn to n otation liy c i r ity for q no t a t iii n its lo l>ogic lie in g tlie
c -.2 1 1 I i; g r a i i i ? . e i r e n l a r a i ll l i i i n i r . i l - .Irs (irtimn ami Se irntm srifntiiiTinn, 2.5.
li i t r a ' i v it tl e s> or if es. 261 , t h e A l l l h o r ' ? . JI A/.ii.i-;. f|Moted on t h e olli ce o f t h e nat ural
f o r I r | i i - i t i o i . s . .52!i- e i r n i l a r l o r t h e s a m e . seiei ee?. .390. '
lA. . L a i n h e r t ' s l i n e a r t c l i e i n c o f , c r i t i e i z e d . J I e i .n e u s , 392.
INDEX. 703
M EL A N c nr nO N , 261; liis d o c t r i n e that th ere c i p i t a n c y . 402- 3; q u o t e d on pr e c ip i t a te

is a g r e a te r Coree in th e n e g a t i v e |i iiiticle d o g m a t i s m a n d sk ejii icisn i a.s jihates o f the
none, not nny, lliati in t h e af lir nta li vc n/l, s a m e di.spositioii. 4(i3.
527; th is d o c l f i i i e s h o w n l o be erron eotis , M o o d o f S y l l o g i s m , d o c t r i n e of, a c c o r d i n g
i/j., 621; q uo te d on F i g u r e o f 8 y l lo g i s t n . 641. to l o g ic i a n s , 286 t l seq.; n a m e for th e a r
M e x a g e , 330,3.32,33.3; <iiioicd o u liio b eiielil o f r a n g e m e n t o f Ihe t h r ee jir o p o s i ti o n s o f a
t oiiversaliijii as a m e a n o f K n o w l e d g e , 485. s y l l o g i s m , w it h d e s i g n a t i o n o r q i t a n l i l y an d
JlKXDOZA, H u r t a d o de , q u o t e d o n iir o x i in a t c (piality o f ea ch , 2^6; t h e G ree k l o gi c ia ns ,
an d r e m o t e m a t t e r o f S y l lo g i > m , 202. 207; l o o k i n g m e r e l y to th e t w o jiicnii.ses in c o m -
his g r o u n d o f Hie d i > c i ii n i n a ti o i i o f ma jor h in a t iu n , c a ll e d the se S y z y g n s , i b . ; in all
an d m i n o r te r m s in tlie S e c o n d a u d T h ir d s i x t y - f o u r m o o d s , 287-8; hul o n l y e le v e n
F i g u r e s , 62!). v a l id , 288; o f the s ix in cacli figure, in all
M fT a\T ]i pis , o f A r i s to t le , its p r o b a b l e m e a n t w e i i l y - f o n r , o n l y n i n e t e e n use fu l, ib. ;
i n g, 611. th e se , a c c o r d i n g to d o c t r i n e of a u t h o r , m a y
M e t a p i i y - s i c ' S , th e A i t t h o r s Co u rs e o f L e c be still f u r th e r si m p l il ic d , ib .; Ihe d o c t r i n e
tures o n , Ihc lirst s e v e n w e r e d e l iv e r e d by ol . c x i i l ie a t e d , 2S7 t t .seq. ; t he jiossihle coin-
th e a u t h o r as a ( lei ier al I n t r o d u c t i o n l o t h e li i n a ti o u s o f pre mi se s tested as l o tlieir
c ou r s e o f L o g i c projier, 1; referred l o , 88 v a l id i t y b y t h e g e n e r al l a w s o f Ihe C a t e
t t alibi. g o r ic a l . Sy llo gi s m . 287 -8; t he se la w s g i v e
M e t a p h y s i c a l Tr ut h, ./ee T r ut h a n d Error, e ig h t jiossiblc m o o d s o f a l e g i t im a te s y l l o
D o c t r i n e of. g i s m , 288; these e ig h t m o o d s l ie in g Itirtlier
M e t h o d , in g e n e r a l, w h a t . .335-6 ; a ut ho r s re t cs l e d by t h e s j i e c i a l rules o f Ihe First F i g
ferred l o on, 336; in r efe re nc e t o s c ie nc e , ure , l ea v e o n l y four l e g i t i m a t e m o o d s in
w h a t , 336-7; c o n s id e r e d in its in te g r i ty is th at figure viz., B a r b a r a , C e la r en t, Da ri i,
tw ofold An alytic and Synthetic, what, F e r i o , 288-9 ; e x a m p l e s w i t h d i a g r a m s o f
3.36-7; t h e A n a l y t i c , w h a t , 337; t h e .Syn t h e l e g i t im a te m o o ds o f t h e Kir.st F i g u r e ,
t he tic . w h a t. i b . ; conf itsio ii in r e ga rd to 290-91; in t he S e c o n d F i g u r e the re ai e four
t h e n))plica1ion o f tlie t e r m s yliia/y.i/.'i and l e g i t i m a t e m o o d s vi z., Cesarc, Cam es tre s,
Synthesis, 337-8; au th or s referred to o n this Fes tii io, B a r o c o , 291-3; e x a m p l e s o f these
c o n f u s i o n . 338 ; t he se c o u n t e r pr o c e ss e s as w it h di a g r a m s , 29 2-3; in the Third F i g u r e
apjilied to the c o u n t e r w h o l e s ot c o m p r e t he re arc s i x l eg it im at e m o o d s \ i z . . Da-
h e ns io n an d e x t e n s i o n c o rre si ioi id w it h e a c h ra pli. F e la ji to n , Di.-aniis, D at is i, B o c a r d o ,
o t h e r . 3.38; the S y n t l i e t i c m e t h o d ha s been Feris oi i, 29 4-5; exanijile.s o f these w i t h d i a
c a ll e d Ihc Ir o gr es s i v e, a n d t h e A n a l y t i c g r a m s , 295-8; s o m e a n c i en t l o g i c i a n s m ad e
t h e R e g r e s s iv e . 339 ; t h e se d e s i g n a t i o n s t w o m o o d s o f Da ra pt i. 295-6; in t h e F o u r t h
w h o l l y ar bi tra ry a n d o f var ious apj ili ca ti on , F i g u r e t h e re are five l e g i t im a t e m o o d s
339-40; in g e n e r a l, S y n t h e s i s has bee n d e s vi z., B r a ni a nt ip . C a m c n c s , D i m a r i s , Fe.-apo,
i g n a te d Ihe r r o g r e s s i v e , a nd A n a l y s i s Ihc Fr es iso ii, 299-300; e x a m p l e s o f tliese w i t h
K eg re ss ii e, ju-ocess, 310. d i a g r a m s . 300-1; wliat is true o f m o o d in
M k t h o d o l o o v , see L o g i c , M e t h o d . E x t e n s i o n ho ld s al so o f it in ('(unpr che n-
M e t z , 456. s io n , 302; L a t i n a n d G ree k n i n c iii on ic
I M k - h . e l i u s , 8,5. ve rse s for m o o d s hi sto r ic a l n o t ic e of,
M i x o p , I r o p o s i t i o i i . .irf I l e m i s c 30 7- 8; Ihc L a t i n d u e to 1e t n i s Hi.-panus,
MiP .A X D U LA xr s . .lo. I icus, 142. 308 ; t h e G reek loss i n g e n io u s t han Ihc
J l l I . AXD UL AX fS, .1, E. I'ictis, 230. L at in , a u d , a c c o r d i n g to a u t h o r s latest
M x e m o x i c V eiscs, th o se em b racin g th e dif v i e w , Jirohably cojiicd f r o m th e latt er, ib. ;
fe r e n t k i n d s I f J ir o p o s it io n s in r e f e r e n c e to r e d u c t i o n ot th e inno ds o f th e .Second,
qu an tity anil ([U ality co m b in ed , " A s - e r i t T h ir d , a n d F o u r t h F i g u i e s to t h o s e o f Ihc
A , " e t c . , 179, 2 ' 7 ; au thor's lu igli.-h m etri Fi rst. 069-18; direct a nd in di re ct m o o d s ,
cal v er sio n o f t l i c s e , 2 ,8 7; jirerioiis Engli.-li t h e ir jiiincijile, 658-9; direct a nd in direct
m etrical v e r s i o n s o f I lie sam e, ib.. s i t also m o o d s in First a n d F o i i i l h I'igtires. 658;
589; fo r ( 'o n v e v s io ii, 186-7; for l> isju n ctive in di re ct m o o d s o f l o g ic i a n s o f .8( co iid and
S yllogism s. 231; tor llyp o tlictiea l .Syllo Tliird F i g u r e s . 663-4; t he se im po s s ih lc , 664 ;
gism s, 240; f o r E i g i t r e o f S y i l o g i s i n , 28 2. n e w m o o d s , 605-7; A u t h o r ' s tab le ol m ood s,
JlODIFII-D Lo gi c . .Of l .o g i c 678-9.
M o i.ix .e u r. (pioted on tiicai.ing o f th e L ix JIOHE, mo st, e t c , t h e j ir e d e s ig n at i o n s . v a ii-
Co n l r a . l i r l n r 'n r n i i. 6.5. 2. 30. 2 4 3 .3.36 .3.38 (iiisly rc lcrrcd to un i v e r sa l , pa r tic in ar , or
SloXBODiX). Lord, i ,n o t e d i n tlie d i - l in c t i o n to ne i th e r q u a n t i t y . 586; a n t h o i s le l e r r e d
of jiotential and actu al in re hilio ii to n o to o n, l b . ; C o r v i n i is . ib.
t io n - . 115-6; his error on this jioint, 146. JlULLER, J o h a n n v o n , his jiraclicc in read
M o x t a i g x e , q u o t e d on i ll u s tr a t io n o f Ire- i u g , 492.
'0 4 INDEX
M c r e t c s , referred to o n a sp u riou s passage O rg a n o n , nam e bestow ed on tlie c o lle c tio n

o f .\r is to lle 's R lutone, G. w e jiossess o f the logical treatises o f A ris
JICRMELLti's, in n ein oiiic verses o f, com p ris totle, 24; but not by A risto tle him self, i6. ;
in g Ihe Ten C ategories, lot); his m nem onic as thus applied, contributed to th e errone
versos, quoted o f objects not in clud ed under ous supiiosition th at L ogic is an instrum ent
th e fen <'iitegoriei, 110. o f discovery, ib.
M u t . v t i o ELENt'Ul. fee Probation. O v i d , q uoted, 482.
NErEssiTA Consoqiienti.T ct N occssitas Con- j Pachym eres, or P acliym eriu s, Georgius,

.eqiicntis, authors referred t o o n distin ction 278; q uoted on In d u ctio n , 593.
o f 5'J.i. P a c i u s , Ju liu s, 37, 196, 243, 268; g ave the
N e g a t i o n , con troversy regard in g the place R egressive C om prehensive S orites before
of. IT'S; n egative term s, how d esign ated by (ioclen iu s, 273; referred to, on Figure, 285;
A ristotle. B oeih iu s, the S ch o o lm en , ib.; quoted on error o f jdirase petitio principii,
partteuin in/iniinns, w hat, ib .; propositiones 369
tn /in iu r, w hat, ib. P a i -.a l o g i s .m . sie Fallacies.
N ew Analytic o f Logical Form s, proposed P a r t , see W hole.
Kssay by the a u th or on . 509; e.xtracl from P a r tic u la r P ropositions, 1 7 1 , see J u d g
Pro-i>cctus of, 509-12. ments, P io]iosition s.
N o e t i c , srr l.ogie. P a r t i t i o n , see D ivision .
N o l d i c s , 1S5; referred to, on ll is t o iy o f P a s c a l , quoted on the d ig n ity o f man as
Fourth I'ig u ie, 3' 3; his rediCtioii o f l>a- con sistin g in th ough t, 34; quoted ou the
roco, 3H -I" ; called the m ood Boeardo jiowcr o f custom , 392.
D oeam roc. P a s s i o n , a s a . s o u r c e o f E rror, see Error,
N o m e n c l a t u r e , scientific, im p ortan ce of, Causes of.
33. P a u l , .St., quoted, 399.
N o m i n a l D eliiiition , see D efin ition. nepiox't?, not used by A ristotle, but th e verb
N o n - C o n t r a d i c t i o n , principle of, see C on Trepiex^'V, in relation to n otion s, 100.
tradiction. P e r i p a t e t i c s , tlieir n om en clatu re o f the
N o n ens logirum , w h a t , 5 5 - parts o f the H ypothetical S y llo g ism , 241
N o t i o n . .sre Concept. P e r s i u s , quoted on C lirysiiqius, as in v en to r
.\UNNE.SIUS, 3-36, 451. o f the S oiiliism Sorites, 268; q uoted, 272,

479.
( m . l K C T I V E Logic, see L o g i C . P e t e r s e n , referred to on history o f C atego
OiiSEi.VATluN. see K n ow led ge, D octrin e o f ries in a n tiq u ity, 142.
Ihe .Vcqiii.'ilion am i P erlecliiig o f P e t i t i o Principii, w hat, 369; error o f the
O f( A.M. W illiam , his use o f Conrrpius, 30 plirase, ib., see Probation.
)LnKi;s, hi- sitecn'atioii foiim'.ed on the I E T i t u s A C O R N i n u s , s a t i r i z e d b y B u c h a n a n ,
g eiieia l relation s o f d istance b etw een the i . e z a . a n d R a b e l a i s , 280.
id a iicl-, .3i;T. PlIILO, 5.
u ri.M oN . see I n iili ainl Error, D octrine of. PiiiLOPONUS, or G ram m aticus, J o a n n es, 39;
I liMOsrriON, or 1iiei m p o ssib ilily , o f .Iiidg- on the iirinciple o f C o ntradiction , 63, 196,
lueuts or P ioi)ositii,n s, w hat, D J; either ol 207, 240, 241. 278, t;96, 330: relerred to on
C ontriidictioii or ol ('ontriiriety, ib .; Siib- an alysis o l't.eo in elry , .339; (o r A m m uiiiiis),
coiilrary op]Mj-ilion, w hat, i b . ; not a real hi.s d efinition o f con version, 514; quoted,
o j/p o'itioii, . Ihis d eicriljcd h y A r is lo lle on order o f Prem ises. 624-5; quoted on
a* an opposition in lan gu age, not in leal- T igiire o f .Syllogism . 6.37-9.
itv, lb : d i-tiiicl.o ii betw een 1 m leliiiitiide P h ilo s o p h ic a l or L o g ica l P resum ]ilion,
and ^ ein i.d elin iliid e nr D efinite indeliiii- p riiiciiile of, 4.50; Ihe foundation ol' Induc
lude. .'.il; m e aiillioi - d octrine of, ev<d\ed tion and A n a lo g y , ib
out ol II i- d i-li .clio i, ib .. .'subalteriialioii P ilil.o s o P llv ol C om m on Sense, the, w hat,
and ,'iil>eoi ira riei\ ;r- IVirnis of, rejected. .'W3; w ell stated hy A r islo lle , ib
lb . I .coii-i-' -I cv I lrodiir(-il, ib.; ( oiilrii- P i i o c v i . i D i s, (iie e k t ' l i i g r a i n hy, 280.
dictorv und ( onlrary op position am on g I I C ( A R T U S , 196.
jiropo-itioiis o f lilfe iiiili| iiililv .what. .5-3-3-1; I ' L A T I N A , leterred to o n death o f Petrus llis -
Iiico ii-islioicy iiiiion ] ropijsiiionH ol the )iniiii, .3fi8.

s.irn (piiiliti'. 53 nbdiv i-ioiis ol ( oiitia- I T . a t n k r . Erii'-I, referred to, on L ogic being
dietioii ( o ii'ra 'iet . a id Iiic o iisi-te n c y , a fo iiiia l iiisl riiini iit o f the sciences. 26.249.
V f , 4 . ililf r - n c - i < om ;io -ih ility o f llie 4.56; quoted on I'igtire ol'.S y llo g ism . 646-7.
tw o *e lemc- ol h id In lie and D elinile Iar- I L A T O , his ii-e ol llic le im I> ia U r iic ,fj. 0 ; (and
tic u ljr ity , 5-34 ; lab u lar schem e of, 53-5. Hie P laton ists) coubidered D ia lectic (i.e.,
INDEX. 705
L o g i c a nd M e t a p h y s i c s ) as a sc ie n c e , 7; lish ed , 1, That t he pre di ca te is a s e x t e n s i v e
f re qu en tly e m p l o y e d th e l a w s o f E x c l u d e d as t h e su bject, 516-17; 2'^, T h a t o r d i n ar y
M id d le aud ol' C o i i tr a d i c ti o u , 02 -5; his l a n g u a g e qu a n tif ie s th e pr e d i c a t e s o ofte n
( al le g ed ) Second Alcibiadts sjuirious, 65; rec a.s thi.s d e t c n i i i m i t i o u is o l i m p o r t a n c e , 517,
o g ni z ed the l a w o f l i e a s o n an d C o n s e q u e n t th is d o n e e it h e r d i r e c t ly , or by Liniif ati on
or Su l li c ic u t K ea s o n , 00; e m j i lo y e d , in ref or E x c e p t i o n , 517-19; 3 , 'J'lie d o c t r i n e o f
er e n c e to this in iii ciple, tlie a m b i g u o u s term t he n o n - q u a n t i t i c a t i o n of, o n l y an e x a m p l e
oiVi'a, 00, 34(); g u i l t y o f th e vice o f circulus o f th e jiassive seti uac ity o f th e logician'-.
in dt moHstrando, in hi s p r o o f o f th e iiniiior- 519; 4 , T h e n o i i- q n a n t i fi c a ti o n of, g i v e n
t a li ty o f th e s o u l , 372; q u o t e d t o tlie effect uj) by l o g ic i a n s tl i e m s e lv c s , in ce rt a in cases.
tliat m a n is n a t u r a l l y d e t e r m i n e d to co in - 519-20; l o g i c i a n s (bnt no t A r i s to t le ) as
m ii n ic a t i o ii , 479. ' serted t h a t in a f fir m at iv e i n o p o s i t i o n s in
Plato, Pseudo, quoted o n te a c h i n g a s a m e a n w h ic h subject a n d p r e d i c a t e are cjuantilied
o f s e l l - i m p r o v e m e n t , 4S2 t o tlieir full e x t e n t , t he jire di cat e is di.striD
P l a t o x i s t s , th e . ifl'crred to on k n ow led ge uted in v ir t ue o f its m a t i e r , 52 6; lo g ic i a n s
a n d b e l i e f , 3-S4 w r o n g in tlieir d o c t r i n e t h a t in n e g a t iv e
r iA ar oy , its m e u u ii ig i u r e la t io n f o c o n c e p ts , p ro jio si tio ns t h e p r e d i ca t e is a h v a y s dis
100. t r i b u t e d , i 6 . ; o b j e c t i o n s to t he d o c t r i n e o l
P l a u t u s , quoted on the su p eriority o f im t h e q u a n t i f i c a t i o n of, c o n s id e r e d , 539 et
m e d i a t e t o m e d i a t e t e s t i m o n y , 45 9. s e g ; 1. G e n e r a l , o bj e ct io ns f o u n d e d on
Il i x y , t h e you n ger, quoted on the greater t he d i s ti n c ti o n o f I'or m al a n d i l a t e r i a l
te n d e n c y o f h e a r in g to rouse the atten tion , c o n s i d e r e d , 539-43; II. S p e c i a l, 1, T h at
484; h is m a xim reg a rd in g q u a n tity fo be it is false, 543-5 ; 2, U.seless, 545-6; h i s to r i
r e a d , 48 7. c a l n o t i c e s r e g a r d in g q u a n ti fi c a ti o n of,
P l o t i n u s , his e m p l o y m e n t o f t h e t e r m cate 646-559; A r i s to t le , 546- 9; A l e x a n d e r A p h-
gory , 140; referred t o on C a t e g o r ie s , 142; r od isi en sis , 549; A m m o n i u s l le r m ia ; , 546,
referred to o u a n a l y s i s o f G e o m e t r y , 330. 549-51; B o e t h i u s , 551- 3; A ve r r oe s , 553; A l -
P l o u c q u e t , G o d f r e y , 4 3 ; referred t o o n P o s bertu s M a g n u s . 553- 4; L e v i Ben G e r s o n ,
tu la t e o f L o g i c , 612; q u o l c d o n C ou v er s i o ii , 554-5; bl asters o f L o u v a i n , 555; Ti tiu s
528; relerred to on q u a n t i f i c a t i o n o f 'p r e d i - a n d R i d i g e r , ib. ; G o d f r e y P l o u c q u e t , 558;
c at e , 558; his g e n e r a l c a n o n o f S y l l o g i s m , Ul r ic li, 559; au tli or s referred to o u t h e
658. d o c t r i n e t h a t t h e e x t e n s i o n o f j n c d ic a t e is
P l u t a r c h , 5, 3 3 1 ; c i t e d on the benefits of a l w a y s re du c e d to e x t e n s i o n o f subject,
o p p o s i t i o n , 481. 5-59; a u t h o r s referred fo o u t h e d o c t r i i i e th a t
P oN C iu s, referred to for sc h o la stic th eories Jiredicate has q u a n t i t y as w e ll a.s subject,
o f t h e o b j e c t - m a t t e r o f L o g i c , 20. i b. ; references t o A r i s t o t l e for use o f di.s-
I'OPE, A l e x a n d e r , lias bo r r o w e d fro m Ser t ributed pr ed ica te , ib.
g e a n t , 630. P r e j u d i c e , a u t h o r s referred t o o n , 394, see
Po r ph y r y , 101, 104; q u o t e d on t b e relat ion P r e l e c t i o n , A u t h o r .s M e th o d of, 2; s a m e
b e t w e e n th e B r e a d t h a n d D e p t h o f no t io n s, as t h a t p r e v a le n t in G e r m a n y a n d H o l l a n d ,
104, 139; m a d e t w o m o o d s o f D a r a p t i , 296. ib.
P o r s o n , I. i c h a r d , bis im i ta t i o n o f an e p i P r e m ise , P r e m i s e s , o f S y l l o g i s m , w h a t . 19S,
g r a m o f P l i o c y d i d e s a s a i q d i e d to H e r m a n n , 139, 207; 5Iajor a n d M i n o r P r e m is e or
2S0. P r o p o s i t i o n , i b . ; o b j e c t i o n s to th e se t er m s
P ort Royal I.ogic, .ce L'Art de Penser. a s d e n o m i n a t i o n s o f th e pr oj io si tio ns ol' a
Postulates o f L o g i c , see L o g i c . s y l l o g i s m , 200; tli eir d e s ig n a t i o n s , i b . ; best
I o s t u l a t e s , w h a t , ISS. na m e s for are S um pt io n a u d Subsumption,
Pp.AvDICATUM p r m / i r a t i est eti am prrrdiratum 199-201; or de r o f 624; Plii lop onu .s q u o t e d
subjecti, t h e c a n o n o f D e d u c t i v e C a t e g o r ic a l o n , 624-5; in s ta n c e s a u d a u t h o r it i e s for th e
Syl logism.s iu C o m p r e h e n s i o n , 214; h o w e n o u n c e m e n t o f s y l l o g i s m w i t h th e m i n o r
o t h e r w is e ex|)re.ssed, ib p r e m i s e sta te d first, 625-6
P p . e c i p i t a n c y , see EVi or, Ca u se s of. P itE SC isiO N , w h a t , 88.
PREDESIG XATE aiid P r c ii i d e si g ii a t e P r o p o s i I ltE S E N T A T iV EF a c u l t y , as a so u r c e o f Error,
t i o n s , w h a t , 172, see J u d g m e n L s , P r o p o s i see Error, Cau ses of.
tion s. P r e v o s t , 456.
P r e d i c a t e , o f a j u d g m e n t , w h a t , 161; in A r i s Pn iM AR Y L a w s o f T h o u g l i t , see l-'uiidamental
to tle th e p re d ic a te in c lu d e s th e c o p u la , ib ; L a w s o l 'T h o u g li t .
called t h e u r m o r extreme o f a p r o p o s i t i o n , P rim u m C ognitum , controversy re g a rd in g .
ib . : Q u a n t if ic a t io n of. d a t e o f its d is c o v e r y 156.
b y a u th o r , 510; its resu lts sp ecified , 510-11, P r i n C I P I L t.m Contradicentium, se e L ex Contra-
S24-7; c o n s id e r e d iu detail, 516-20; estab dictor iaru m
89
706 INDEX.
P r o b a t i o n . D octrine of. 360-75; its c h a r a c P roof, see P r o b a t i o n .

ter a u d elcnu-in.s. 300; t he se e x p l i c a t e d , 361 P r o po r tio n, A n a l o g y or I d e n t i t y , l a w of,
t! s e q .; t er m s e m p l o y e d tor P r o b a l i o n . as a f u n d a m e n t a l rule o f s y l l o g i s m s , 575;
Argr)i.)U itlion, A rgiiD ifiil, D evionstrnlion, m a d e b y s o m e l o g ic i a n s tlie o n e su p r e m e
l e a d i n g 0 / Proof, 361 ; in g e n e r a l , w h a t , i6. , c a n o n o f s y l l o g i s m , i b . ; l o g i c i a n s by w h o m
lio w d i s t i n g u i s h e d f ro m .S y ll o g is m , ib.; thi.s l a w is c o n f o u n d e d , o r m a d e cobrdiiiiite
w h e r e o n d e p e n d s tlie l o g i c a l v a l u e of. w it ll t h e D i c t u m d e O m n i , i b . : n a m e s
361-2; g r o u n d o f P r o o f e it h e r ab.olute or g i v e n b y l o g i c i a n s t o, i b . ; e r r o n e o u s l y
r e la tiv e . 3i?2; d i s t i n c t i o n s o f p r o p o s i ti o n s s u pp o s e d t o bc c m j i l o y e d b y A r i s t o t l e as a
in respect o f tlie g e n e r a l f o r m o f a s y s te m f u n d a m e n t a l rule o f s y l l o g i s m , 576; terms
of, &71-5; d i v is i o n s o f P r o b a t io n s , 36 5 ; th e u n d e r , w l i ic h e n o u n c e d , 575-8 ; Sy r bi us
d ill e r ei ic e s o f p r o b a t i o n s d e p e n d pa r tly t h o u g l it th at this l a w , u nl e s s l i m i t e d , is
o n tb e ir m a tt e r a n d p a r t ly o n t b e ir f o r m , false, 577, see S y l l o g i s m .
l b . : (1) In rcsi>ect o f th e ir M a tt e r , tliey are P R O P O S t T t O Conditionnlis nihil pnnit in esse,
P u r e a n d F m p i r i c a l, 364-6; th is d i s ti n c ti o n t h e rule, i t s o r i g i n , 169.
o f P r o b a t io n s no t t a k e n i n t o a c c o u n t by P u op o siT io .x , Tlie, n a m e f o r m a j o r p r e m i s e ,
l . o g i c , 307: (2) In respect o f tii eir F o r m tliis '260; b u t a m b i g u o u s , 200-1.
is In t er n a l an d K x l e n i a l , 3C5-C; Probation.s P r o p o s i t i o n , w li a t, 159; its s y n o n y m s , 159
are, in respect o f I n t e r n a l F o r m , a. Di r e ct 60; c al le d by A r i s t o t l c a n interval, S i d a r p f i a ,
a n d I n d i r e c t , 36 6-7; ) ii in c i |i le o f indir ec t 161; l io w di v id ed by th e l o g ic i a n s , in respect
pro of , 367-8; ditrcrences o t In d i r e c t or ot (;u aiitity, 171; p r o |i o s i l i o n s d i s ti n g u i sh e d
A p a g o g i c a l P r o b a t io n s , 3t<S; b. D e d u c t i v e by t h e a u t h o r i n t o P r e d e s ig n a t e ( D e f i
a n d I n d u c t i v e , 3'>5-8; c. S y n t h e t i c an d nite), an d P r e i n d e s i g n a l e ( I n d e fi n i te ) , a c
A n a l y t i c , 365, 369; in respect o f F x t e n i a l c o r d i n g as th e ir q u a n t i t y is or is not m a rk ed
fo rm , lli cy are, P , S i m p l e a n d C o m p o s i te , out by a ve r b a l s ig n , 172, sre J ud gm e iit ss
29, Per fect a n d Im ii er fe ct . 3' , l le g u l a r an d d i s i i i i c l i o n s of, in resjiect o f tlie g e n e r a l
Ir re g u l a r , S'15-6; (3) In re.sjiect o f th eir f o r m o f a s y s t e m o f p r oo t , 362-3, see also 187
D e g r e e o f C o g e n c y , t h e y are , P , A p o d e ic t ic et .seq.; t e r m s o f, o n l y t er m s as t e r m s o f a
o r D e m o n s t r a t i v e a n d P r o b a b l e , 366 ; 2 , r e la t io n , 515; t h e se o u l y c o m p a r e d as q u a n
U n iv e r s a ll y a n d P a r t i c u l a r l y V a l i d , ib. ; tlie tities, ib. ; o f n o c o n s e (| u ei i ce l o g i c a l l y
form al l e g i t i m a c y of , d e t e r m i n e d a c c o r d w l i e t h e r s ubj ect or jir edicate o f be pl ac ed
i n g to t h e logician b y five rules, 369-70; first, 516, 527; in c o m m o n l a n g u a g e pr e di
thee rul es re du c e d to t w o , 370; tlic five ca te o l t e n pl a ced first, 516; simjily a n equ.-.-
rules e x p l i c a t e d , 370 h s e q . ; first rule, N ot i i- t io n o f t w o n o t i o n s in resjiect o f tiieir
ii i g is t o be be ggeH, borrower!, o r s to l e n . e x t e n s i o n , 525, 526-7, 52 8-9; n e w projiosi-
369-71; its v i o la t io n afibrds tlie Pititin I'rin- t io n a l f o rm s r e s u lt in g f ro m th e d o c t r i n e o f
c t p i i , 3 y j; li m it a t io n u n d e r wl iicli tliis rule a qu a n ti fi e d p r e di ca te . 529 et seq , see also
is to be u n d e r s t o o d , 371; s e c o n d rule. That 537; tliese, w i t h tlic o l d , in all e ig h t , 529
n o p r o p o s i t i o n is l o b e e n q d o y e d as a prin- 3 0 . 534- 6; th e ir lit e ra l s y m b o l s , 529-30;
cijile o f proo f, th e t r u t h ol w h i c h is o u l y th e ir n o t a t i o n , ib. ; q u a n t i t y of, 530 et seq.;
to be e v in c e d a a coiie<(iienee o f tlio p r o p I n d e f in i t e p r o p o s i t i o n s ( o f tli e l o g ic i a n s ) .
o s it i o n w h i c h it is e m i i lu y e d to pr o v e , 3 i 9 - he ttiT Jndesigniite o r Preindesignale, i b . ; va
72; it. v i o la t io n nflbrds tlie i ice ot va -re pov rious oj iiiiions a.s to tii eir c la s s ifi c a tio n, i b . .
TTpdripov, 379; tliird ru le. I'liat i i o c i i c u l a r a u lli or s r e f e n e d to o n tliis su bject, 530-31;
p r o b a t io n i to be m a d e , 369-72; its v i o la t io n j ir e va le iit u n c e r t a i n t y in r eg ard to P a r t ic u
affords t h e v ic e o f Ci m i l n s in dr nwnylrnndu, l a ri t y a n d its s ig n s, 531; t w o m e a n i n g s o f
36:t; regri-ssivc an d pr o g r e ss i v e p r o o l s n o t some, e itl ier .Semi-definite, a n d e q u i v a l e n t
l o be c o n f o u n d e d w il li Ihe t a u t o l o g i c a l c ir t o some only, or I n d e f in i t e , a n d evjuivalcnt
cl e , 373; fou rth Yule. Tliat n o leap, n o hia- to some at least, i b . ; lio w t h e se m a y be s y m
tii mii-t he iniide, 376 73; it v i o l a t i o n a f b o l iz e d , 532; A r i s to t le a n d l o g i c i a n s r e c o g
f ord - (lie 1 lee ot SaUus in di mtinetrrindn, ni zed o n l y t h e la tt e r o f t h e s e m e a n i n g s .
376. 373: (ittli rule. T h e scojk; o f t h e jiroba- 5 3 1 - 2 ; re a so n s o f th is, .532-3; D e t i n i t i i d e o r
ii( n i" not to b<' c l i a n g e d , 37f>-4; Ilii rule No n -j ia r t ic i il a r it y o f th r ee k i n d s , 531-2;
admit ot tl ree d e g r e e s , .374; (1) Mnlolin h o w t he se f orm s m a y b e s y m b o l i z e d , i b . ;
jy-neiii, 371. 12] P r o v i n g t o o li t tl e , i b . ; (3) efTent o f Hie definite a r ti c le a n d ils a b s e n c e
P r o v i n g t o o m u c h . 375. ill (litlerent l a n g u a g e s in r e d u c in g Hie deti-
1Kfitii.LM. the. w , t. 19=1 n i lc t o llie in d e fi n it e , .531; t o wli al Hie I n
P i o t t L K M . vvl al. 1 de fin it es ot A r i s t o t le corres jio iid , .532; l o g i
I'I <11 1,1 . l eP rjed lo o n K n o w l e d g e a n d 15c- c ia n s w l i o liavi; m a rk ed th e (ju antities by
lie l. 3--i dc tin it e an d i n de fin ite , 5-32 ; t he tliroc jios-
P R i Xt IIE.SSIV E Metborl, o s .Methorl sib lc r e la t io n s o f tlic t e r m s of , 1. T o to -to ta l
INDEX. 707
co vnc liision , 2. T o t o - fo t n l c o c x c l n s i o i i , 3. R e a l T r u t h , ser T n i t l i a n d E rr or , DocI r i n e o f

lii c ui n] ilc te c o i i i c l u s io i i , i n v o l v i n g I n c o m R eason an d C o n s e q u e n t, L a w of, see .Suffi
pl e te c o ii x c lu s i o n . 530; t h e w h o l e or de r ol cient Ri-a.-on.
best a nd wors t (lu a n ti li c a ti o n o f t h e term> R e a . s o . m n o , see R e a s o n i n g s , D o c t r i n e of,
of, t l i r o n g li o n i the t w o (| ua lit ies o f At lir m a- .81 llogi sn i.
tioii a n d N e g a t i o n , 537-3'J, see J u d g m e n t s , R easom n os, D o c t r i n e ol, 189-334; th e act o t
D o c t r i n e of. R e a s o n i n g , w h a t , 189-90; lids i llu str at ed by
I K O l ' O S I T I o X K S tertii adj acentis, o r tertii ad- un e.xanijile, 190; t he e.xainjde g i v e n is a
je c ti, w h a t , 1 0 2 ; lio w lies igm ite d by the r e a s o n i n g in th e w h o l e o f L. xt en sio n. an d
G re e k s a l te r A r i s to t le , 101-2 ; sr cu nd i a dj a- m a y be r e jn e s e nt e d by th ree cir c le s, 191,
cenlis, w h a t , 1 0 2 . t h e r e a s o n i n g o f hi.xteiision m a y be e x ln b -
I r . o i o s i T i u N E . s Exponibiles, Ihe d o c t r i n e of, ited in C o m p r e h e n s i o n , PJl-3; t h e c o jm l a
as g i v e n by l o g ic i a n s , 518-10, see K.xclnsive in e x t e n s i o n an d c o in jii e he i.s io ii o f a
a nd E x c e j it iv e Pa r tic le s. c o u n t e r m e a n i n g , 193 ; def in it io n o f th e
ripd(rAi)i|/is, o f Theoiihrastiis, its p r o b a b l e Jirocess o f R e a s o n i n g w i t h th e jirincipal
m e a n i n g . Oil. d e n o m i n a t i o n s o f j n o c e s s a n d jir od uc t,
n p d r a i r .r , its t.se b y A r i s to t le , 159 193-1; the se e x j i l i c a l e d a n d il l u s tr at e d . 194
I R O T A O O U A . s nnd E n atliliis, the case of, et seq.; 1. Th e A c t o f R e a s o n i n g , a r ea
q u o t e d , 33-1. s o n i n g is o ne o r g a n i c w h o l e , i b . ; e rro rs o f
P roverbs, T h e B o o k of. c it e d , 480. lo g ic i a n s on th is jio in t, 195; i d ili ty o f the
P SE L L U S, M icl.iio l, t h e iiyiiD/isi.s o f the Orga Jirocess o f r e a s o n i n g , i o . ; 2. Te r m s by
non a t t r i b u t e d t c m a l l j i r o b a b i l i t y a t r a n s w h i c h t h e Jirocess ol re.asoning is d e n o m
lation fr o m lli s p a . ' u s , 308. i n a t e d , Jira.soning, Uatin rin at ion , l)is-
P s Y C ii o i .o o Y , Hmpi vic al o r H is t o r i c a l, b o w cour.se, Ar g iim e nt ii lio n, Ar gum ent , Iii/irenre,
d i s ti n g u i s h e d f r o m -G^gic, 17, 22. To conclude. Conclusion Tu syllogize, Cotlec-
P U R C i i o T , referred to on C a t e g o r ie s , 142; tiii, Colligere, 195-7; g e i i e i a l c o n d i t i o n s ol
m n e m o n i c ve r se for D i - j u n c t i v e S y l l o g i s m , R e a s o n i n g or S y l l o g i s m , 197, set .Sy llogis m:
from, 231; his lo rmiilii for the F i g u i e o f r e a s o n i n g may jiroc eed in th e q n a n t i t y o f
S y l l o g i s m (in E x t e iis io n v 282; referred to E x t e n s i o n , an d iu t h a t ol Co m jii eli eii .-i o n ,
on tlie i n e d e s i g n a t i o n o l th e pr e di ca t e by 207 et seep ; r e a so n in g s in t he se njijiosite
all c o l l e c t i v e l y , 559. q u a n ti ti e s e x p l i c i t l y con ijia red a n d eon-
P ore a n d A/iphed, a s u s u a l l y e m p l o y e d in ti asted , 209 et .seq. ; l o g i c i a n s ha\ e ov er,
opjiosition in G erm an p liilo so p liy , not l o o k e d l e a s o n i n g in C o m p r e h e n s i o n , a nd
projjcrly relative nnd correlative to each h a v e t h u s g i v e n n a r r o w a n d e r r o n e o u s defi
o th e r , 44; pure a n d m ix e d , ap pl ied a u d un n i t i o n s o f the ma jor , m id d l e , nnd nd n or
applied, j i r o j i e r l y c o r r e l a t i v e , i G ter m s. 209-10, see also 153 et seq ; di lli cu lt y
P ure nnd M odal I r o p o s i t j o n c , 180-81, see in regard t o the d o c t r i n e iliat all l e a s o n i n g
Judgm ents. is c it h e r fro m th e w h o l e t o the pa r t, or
Pure Lo gi c , see Lo gi c . trom t h e paris to th e w h o l e , stat ed and ob
vi a te d, 252. see I nf er e nc e , S y l lo g i s m .
(Q UALITIES, or M o d e s , w h a t , 55; t h e ir s y n o P r o jio s iti o ns . c o in in u n do c
R e c i i k o c a t i n o
nym s, 55 trin e o f l o g i c i a n s that jiredicate in the se
Qu in t il ia n , 200; h i s e m j i l o y m e n t o f t h e q u an ti lie d vi materier, 520, 512. 544; this i n
term Entity men,e, 278, 332; h i s m a x i m r e c o r re c t , 544 : a u t li o is rcl'encd l o w h o hold
ga rd in g q u a n tity t o be r e a d , 487. th at th e y m a y be s im p l y c o i i v e i t e d , 528:
P a c i u s , A l e x a n d e r A j i h r o d is i e n s is r e l e i r e d
R a b e l a is , 280. t o o n , i b . ; F o n s e c a cit ed a g a i n s t their
R a m i s t s , m a i n t a i n l o g i c t o b e a n a r t , 7. qu a n ti fi c a ti o n vi maUrier. 543.
R a .m u s , referred t o o n g e n u s o f L o g i c , 7 ,1 4 2; R k d i , his a n e c d o t e s o f t w o Periprdetics, 407.
Ids ill us tra tio n ol tlie d i s t i n c t i o n be tw e e n R e d u c t i o x o f .S yljogisms, t h e w h o l e ot the
A b st r a c t or G e n e i n l , a n d C on c r e t e or rules g i v e n liv l o g ic i a n s for. i in jih ilo so pl i-
Spe ci al Lo gi c , 39; referr ed to o n M e th o d in ica l, 308; the se s ii jie ise de d. 309-18: r ednctw
L o g i c , 311; rele rr ed t o on jiostulate o f ad im/ios.sibde aj iplied lo B a i o c o a n d liocar -
l .o g i c , 512; q u o t e d on I n d u o t i o n o f A r i s do. but a w k w a r d an d pei jik x i n g . 312, 314
to tle , 593-1. R e g r e s s i v e M etli od , see M etliod.
U. vr iN , re lerred to on c a n o n o f s y l l o g i s m , R k i h q u o t e d on C on ce j it i o n . 7 .s-.''0 : Ids m i s
500 t a k e ' i c g a i d i i i g . 8 (1. sj ; not. h o w iw e r . o j c i i
I KAiiiNt;. see K n o w l e d g e , D o c t r i n e o f th e t o Dr. G le i g 's ecii su re on this ji o i n l, 81
A c q u is i t i o n a n d P e r f e c t i n g of. R ki.m arU S . II. ."s., a n e c d o t e s c it e d t ro m , o f
R e a l D e l in il io n , see D e f in it io n . the in flu e nc e o f jiassion on o p i n i o n , 407:
R e a l Induction , s f f Induction . q u o t e d o n c a n o n s o f S y l l o g i s m , 505.
70S INDEX.
K e i m io l p . 370 (rad iclion and E xclu d ed M iddle in relation

K e m im s c k x c e . n? a source o f Error, set l> - lo tbe A b.'oliitc, 64; lesjiect in w hich his
ror. ( aii'i ' uf. treatm ent o f the iirii.eijile ol C oiilrad iclion
UEPr.EStixTATIdX ( r e p r f s e m a t i n ) . th e lerin, dill'eied from that ol lle g e l. ib. : jilaced the
soii'C in (vliic i it l.a' been tiseil oti tlic law o f Identity ns th e jniinary iiriiiciple a f
* '< titinent 'iiiee tlio tim e o f L eibnitz, tK); all k n ow led ge. 06
want in Kngli-li ol a ten ii to exjiress wliat SciiMOi.DEits. . , 4.51. 451
is Iliiis (ini)ir<>]>erl_\ ) ileiioleil by r c p r t s f n - Sc h o l ia . w ! i: . ; , 1,'S.
inn H, >h.: seli-e in w liieli li-eil by tllC S ciiuL iA .sr on lle i inogenes. his d octrine o f
ant lior. <6 the K iilhym eine, 279. .334.
U e iw : x . \ x c e , o f X d tio iis,eq u iv a len t lo Con- S ciiirrru .s, A iid ieiis, 331.
iia ilie tiir i l>|i|i(i'itiini. 152. Sf.'iiitAMM. m ade the liid iic liv c S yllogism
K ei -1
II. nr Ib U'cl ill', 101, 213, 259, 311; liis d ed iictii e, 2'29
r-' 1 letioii o f Itaroeo. 314, 315. 317, 313. 151, S c i i i i.E K . lel'erred to for scholastic tlieorie'
I '* ;. - q u o ted on c i i i i o i i s o f . ' ^ y I l o g i ' i n . .511 o f the object nnilter o f L ogic. 20.
K i i E T O K l c to .t l f x n n d r r , a u t h o r o f . h i s e m p l o ) - S c h u l z e , (j E , 5t5, 57, 59, CO, 88,104, 162,174,
111 III o f ih e term r i i l h y i n t i f , '2 i S . 179, 1S.3. 196, 215. 219
U iriiT E i:. ileiiiricli. referred to. as to L o g ic . 'C i i 'v i ; i { ; i i . K u . e E i : , '2(X); referred to on true
'lol b eing inojKwly an art o l D iscovery, ; 20 le-.iding o f E iiiclelu s, 3-32.
quoted on the doniinion w hicli L ogic gives .^ciExcE. d eliiiilioii of, 335-6; its jierfeclion
'I- over our ll.o iig lils. 33-4. 45. D 3. 312. .300 ol tw o k in d s Fornial and 3Iaterial, 337;
K ll'l ;ei:. I'O,; i.oiieed I he error o f those w ho di.'tiiigiii.'hed as Ileal and F oriinil, 380;
m ake "oriles on ly o f conqirelieiisive w hole. nnder Hie Heal .Science' are included the
270; erroiieou'ly attributed introd u ction o f .Mental and .Maleriiil, 380-81; divided into
Koiirili Figure to tiiileii and . ( '. .30.3: 800 11 tw o great h iaiich cs, accord in g as il is coii-
quoted and criticized on (|iian titication o f v e i'a iit, P . A bout objects k n o w n , or, 2-^,
555
] III icate. . - . -S; 'y llo g is tic form ' jiro- A bout (lie niaiiiier o f know iiig tlien i. 49.5-G;
|s i iiided by. .>.57-3 these lirat.clits called respectively D irect
ItOM.AONO-l. 5 1 .s;cie..ce or .Science S im p ly , and llellex .>ci-
b o ' i im ;, 5 0 ence. ti.e Science o f S cience, Ihe .Method o f
I.in " E M . , c ited on th e d illicu lty as lo llie Scieiic,'. 495: the latter falls in to tw o great
r gii ol L a n g u a g e . 4 3 -3 b ran dies as it is con versan t. P , About Hie
I.L I/.. I).I i i e i i ' . r e l e r r e d lo , o n h i'to ry o f d i'- law s under w liich Hie liiim aii m ind can
|i c l i o . i o f S . 11.1U 1 C o m p o s i t i et D i v i s i , 2 2 ij, k n ow . or. 2^, The law s under w liich wliat
57
. -. 3S7. i' propo'cd by the liiiniaii mind to know ,
can he k n ow n , 496; llie I'oiiiier is Logic
'.\L T l ' 01 il.m o n ilr n n ilo , w h a t . .3 7 0 - 3 : o n ly a l.roperly so c:illed. Hie latter o nam ed, ib .;1
'1 eia c 'e o f llie P ' t i t i o l ' r i n r i / , 11, 373, Ijilt ill its parts, Callid II n n lir , Arrliiter-
l ro!>;iT,on 1
toiiir, ib. ; these .'cienees. e'p eeliv cly devel-
>AMiElt'()X l'ii-lio|i, q uoted on objects not ojied by A r i'lo tle . and by Bueoii, ib. , not
iiielud -d iii.ibT the tell ca leg o rie '. 110; re iiicoiisisleiit, but co r rela lii e and dependent,
ferred lo o I iin-' o f |jro]io.'itioiis in con- ib
ver-ioii. 1'5. 227. q uoted on im iiortaiice o f S c o t u s , .Jolin Ifiins, re len ed lo as to gem is
ti-aohing a' a in'-uii o f self-im in overaen t, o f Logic. 7; referr'-d lo lor sch o lii'lic Hieo-
1-3; lii jiraotice in reading, 4S7. ries on Hie oliject-iiiatter o f L ogic. 20; (or
'A i'TKit. 12; quoted on can on s o f .Syllogism , .St. A iigu stiiil quoted as to Logic b eing Hie
5>;'. Ars artium and .''ci.iiiia irientm riim . 2o, A2,
' A \ ()x A f.oLA. quoted on can on o f .Syllogism , 227,291; alleged as d eli'iidiiig Hie Fourth
1 Figure, 303; I I ii'e r r o iie o ii', iL ; held Feri-
M io E it, .1 ( '.q u o t e d on Hie beiielits o f Roti, P.ocardo, and Felapton as in e le " , l?e-
1
cti' ion, I 'l. ca ii'c eo iic lu d in g iin lireclly.S IS ; h i'g ro u n d
'c III-tin.n:. 181, 210. 210; q uoleil on wliat o f the di'C riininatioii o f major and minor
-n iu ti-, a D i'ju iiclive I b a -o n in g , 2-32, term s in Hie Second and 1 liird Figure',
'.1 r I ro 1 lo on A li'lo tle and P la to s 029
1
w o l .M oil. .310; referred to on Si.I o x n F i g u r e , .see F i g u r e ,
31 t O. I l.ogie. -311 15'; quoted on .312 (pioted on eaiion s o f S \llo g i-m , .567
. 'E O L 'V .
1' >1
o 'II L \|.o iiib ile , .51' 19; refi rred ,''l.i,K-l,oVE, lei Liror. ('aii'e.' ol.
to 01
o, |iii I'loii ol 'iib a lte r n a lio n and o f .S|.;xi;cA. ex a m p le o f .Sorites from , 272,327;
' ils iM ir irii Ij . .5.'J2 (pioled on D ivi'ioii, 357; tpioted on evil
'f liE in i.i '. 12.5
I - >. X , If/i, 103 1 1 influence o f jirecipitaiicy, 102; <|iioled on
'CiiELl.iXG. repudiated tbe iiriiicii.h-Hof Coii- the hojie o f d yin g o ld , as an illustration o f
INDEX. 709
p r e cip ita te j u d g m e n t , 402; q u o te d o n sloth the .Sorites o f ex ten sio n o verlook ed , and
as a source o f error, 404. 480; ([u oted on th at of com jireh en sion , the jirogressive,
teach in g as a m e a n o f s e l t - i m p r o r e m e n t in a lo n e confeinjilateiJ by l o g i c i a n s , 27(J; d i f -
k n o w l e d g e . 4. 82; his m a x im regard in g the t e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e t w o f o r m - o f , ib. : j i i d b -
(j u a n t i r y t o h e r e a d . 487. ahlc reason w liy logician s overlook ed , in
.R E no KA .N T, . l o h i i , i io t ic i- o f , 0 3 0 ; his d o c t r in e th e c a s e o f S o r ite s , tlio r e a s o n i n g in e.x teii-
i f f l i e .Re c oii d a n d T h i r d I ' i T i i r e s , (230 -3 1. s i o i i , 2 7 1 - 2 ; e x a m j i l e s o f, in co in j relien.-io;i
. 'si -.XTUS 18m I ' l i M C O s . ,5, l'J8, 3 0 0 and exten sion , 27 '2 -3 ; the tioclcn iiin . or
'.S t . i i A V E S A M J E , c i t e d o n i n f l u e n c e o f A.sso- H egressive C om jireliensive .Sorites. 273;
c i a t i o i i , 42 4. n a m e s g i v e n to, 2 7 3 -4 ; before V a lla , called
S i c w ' A HT, i - e f e r r e d to o n what truly c o n sti v a gu ely co i n p l e x s y l l o g i s m , 2 7 4 ; a s a jio li-
t u t e s a U i s j u n e t i v c l l e a s o n i n g , 232, 3 3 i , 314, .syllogism , co m jiu ru tiv cly sim jile, ib.; m ay
375. 390. b ed raw tii in any figure, 320; ob servation s
.Ri m p l h i u s . 5 ; r e f e r r e d to o n g e n u s o f L o g i c , on, 619; correction and anijilitiea tio n of
7, 65. the com m on d o c t r in e o f, 019-21; (liiigrains
.R i.o ni , s-e Error, t aiise.s of. illu s tr a tiv e of, 620-21.
.S.M lG E E nu.s, r e l e n e d to on genus o f L ogic, SO H iTES, the sojiliism , its d erivation and
7; referred to for s c h o la - t ie th eories o f the m e a n in g , 208; its n a t u r e , ib.; sa id to have
o b j e e l - n i a t l e r o f L o g i e , 2 0 , 42. b e e n i i i i e n t e d b y t h e . S t o i c C l i r y s i p p u s , ib. ;
. 'SMI TH, A d a m , q u o t e d on in fln en ce o f A s s o by E u b i i l i d e s , ib ; c a l l e d (p a K a K p h s , c a l v n s ,
c ia tio n . 422-3. ib ; c a l l e d n c t r v a l i s h y C i c e r o , ib. ; i t s c h a r
. 8x e l l . 4 6 9 . 4 7 5 . acter, 332; its variou s design ation s, ib .
8 o c i i ; t y , intluencc of. as a source o f Error, w ell defined by U lp ian . ib.; exem jililied,
see E r r o r , C a u s e s o f . a32-3.
S o c u A T E S . his s a y i n g r e g a r d in g th e e x t e n t o f S p a c e , or E x te n sio n , as a b so lu tely b o u n d ed ,
his k n o w le d g e , 393-4 u n t h in k a b le , 73; as u n lim ited , in co n ceiv a
.R o i .o m o n , 487. b l e , b e c a t i s e c o n t r a d i c t o r y , ib. ; a s a n a b s o
. S O I 'A T E H A I 'A M E E N R I R , 2 1 1 . lute ininim uin, or as iu fiiiilely divid ed ,
S O f H l S M , Ste F a l l a c i e s . i n c o n c e i v a b l e , 74 .
S oitiT E S, or cin iin .S yllogism . 257-74; the S p e c i a l L o g i c , see L o g i c .
second v a riety o f C o in p le .x .S y llo g is m , 260; . S P K C t A L o r C o n c r e t e L o g i c , see L o g i c .
w h a t , lb ; i t s f o r m n h e i n C o i i q i r e l i e n s i o n a n d . S i ' E C l E . s , see G e n u s .
E . M e n s i o n , ;/). . I r o g r e s s i v e a n d R egressive, S peculation as a m e a n s o f k n o w l e d g e , see
26'4-l; authors on, in g en era l, referred to, K n ow led ge. D octrin e of the A cq u isilion
261; d i a g r a m s ,e i r c u l a r a n d lin ea r, illu s tr a a n d I e i l e c i i n g o f .
tive ( i f, ib . : concrete c.x a m p le s o f 261-3; S t a iTLEH , 12; (juutcd ou canons o f syllo-
the form al in feien ce (( j n a l l y n e c e s s a i y i n , g i ' i i i . 5 6 1.
a s i n s i n q i l e s y l l o g i s m , 2 6 3 ; I'esolvab le in to St e p i i a n u s . U ., 85; his im it a t io n o f an epi
sim p le .syllogisnis, ib .: th is i l l n ^ tr a te d .2 6 3 -4 ; g r a m (It i l i o c y l i d e s , '280.
e (|iia lly natural as sim p le s y l l o g i < n i , 2(54; S te w a r t. D u g a h l, (juoted o n th e lia b ility o f
m a y be eith er C atego rical o r Ily iio th e tic a l, n o t i o n s t o v a g u e n e s s a n d a m b i g u i t y , 12.3 -5;
lb.; l a w s o f th e - e f o r m s o f, 2 o 4 -5 ; torm u lu refe r.s t o H u m e and C a t i i j i b e l l , ib. ; hi . s u n
o f H ypothetical S o rites, 265; resolution of fav o ra b le strictu res o u th e a lle g e d m odern
H y))O tlietical Sorites, p rogressive and re o r ig in o f certain te c h n ica l lo g ic a l h ingiiage,
g r e s s i v e , i n t o s i i i q i l e s y l l o g i s m < , 2(55-6; a D i s g rou n d less, 146. 197, 4 1 8 ; ( j n o l e d ou iu flu -
ju n c tiv e Sorites Jiossihle a f t e r a so r t. 2 1 6-7; e ii c e o f a s s o c i a t i o n . 4 2 1 - 3 . 430. 431.
but eu m jilex and m iscrviceab le, 267; h is .' T o i c i i E i o L O G Y , o r D o c t i i i i e o l E l e m e n t s .
torical n o tice o f the logieal d o c t r i n e o f , ib. L ogic.
f t .set/ . ; n e i t h e r n a m e n o r d o c t r i n e f o u n d i n ST d lc.s, view ed L ogic as a science, 7; th eir
A r is t o t le , ib .; b u t t h e ]irinci|>'e o f g i v e n in n o m e n c l a t u r e o f th e jcirts o f Ih e lly j io lh e t -
A r i s t o t l e ' s t i r s t a n t i j i r e d i c a m e n t a l r u l e . '268; i c a l . R v l l o g i - m . '2 4 1: t h e e x c o g i t a t i o n o f t h e
the teinn .sorites n e v e r a j i j i I i e d hy any an sojiliism fg.i'ira flntio attrib u ted to, 330;
cient w riter to d e s ig n a t e a cei ta in torm o f b u t t h i ' d o i i b t l i i l , 331. '
reasoning, ih.; w ith them denoted a par S t r a b o . 280
t i c u l a r k i n d o f s o j i l i i s m , ib ; l i r s t u s e d i n i t s S T R H i E L I U S , 526.
jirc.sent a ccejitation hy L an ren tin s V alla. .'SU.M'. EZ. o n the p rin cip le o f C ontradiction,
'-6 9 ; t h e J i r o c e s s o f . d c s c r i l i e d in t h e Dinlec- 63. 6 5 ; referred to on classification ot the
lie o f G e o r g e o f T r e b i s o n d . t h e c o n t e i n j i o c a t e g o r i e s , 141.
rary o f V a lla, ih .; the d o c tr in e o f lo g ic ia n s SUB.tECT, of a .Iiid g n ieiit or I r o j i o s i t i o n ,
reg a r d in g , illu strates th eir on e-sid ed v iew w hat, 161; c a lle d t>rni o r f x lr t m e , ib., see
o f the nature o f reason in g i n g e n e r a l . <6. ; J u d g i i i e i i t s , I r o p o s i t i o n .
10 INDEX.
.^ rn jE C Ti vK L o g i c , s e e L o g i c . o r d i n a r y use , i b . ; llic use o f Su?nption an d

Scits iD iA RiE .B or A i d s o f t i i i n k i n g , D o c t r i n e Sub.siitnptinn s a n c t i o n e d by p r e c ed en t, 201;
ol. L ogic D i v i s i o n s of. ib. et .\eq. ; lirst d i v is i o n o f
.''CBoiiinN A rioN o f ('o nc c i)l s , ."rr C o n c e p t s , S y l l o g i s m s , c om j i re l ie n i l ii ig all Ihe o th ers ,
L'fliitioi.s of. i n l o lvxten.?ive a n d C o m j n e li e n s iv e , 201-2;
.'C KFioE.NT l ie n s o n , or Henson a n d Con sc- m a i l e r an d fo in i of, 2U2-3; | ) i o x i i m i l e and
i,ue iit, pr nicijile of, a fii n d a i n e n ta ] l a w o f r e m o l e m a i l e r of, 202 ; t h e form affords t h e
tli ong lit . 57 ( 4 u / i ' r Cl); winil a n d lio w e.x- n e x t g r a n d d i s ti n c ti o n ol, 203; Ihe f or m of,
p c ed.i'A; reln li ons b e t w e e n H ea so n a n d t w o f o l d liiLcnia l a n l E x l e r n a l , i b . ; I.
I oi i' is i u e n l, f sj - l; l o gi c al sig i ii l ie i u ic c of. ? \ c c o r d i n g to I n t e r n a l o r Esseiilini F o r m .
Cl ; di-.c rii nin nle d Iroin t b e ]iriiici|)le o f S y l l o g i s m s a rc div iiled i n l o l o u r classes, as
( iiiise a n d LlJVcl, i b . ; logical a m i txeiaplty.si- r e g u la t e d by th e l a w s r t , Ol I d e n t it y and
cal t a.son an ! rons'quent, ib. ; tliese b o t h in- C o n l r a i l i c l i o n , 2?, Ol E x c l u d e d J l .d d l c , 3^,
c iiidc il u n d e r t he l eri ns cnmlitinn an d cnndi- O f Heason a n d Co n sei ju eii l, a n d , 4' , O f
twiieil, lb .; tills l a w .'holild be e x e li n l e d Ivxc nn ed M id d le a n d o f H ea so n a n d Coii-
from L o g i c , ib. ; r e c o g n i z e d by Ii a l o . GO; seipieiit. viz.. C at e g o r ic a l , D i - jn i i c l i v e , l l v -
b> .VristOi'le. ib ; by bot ii i n .d e r th e aiiibig- p o l l . e l i c a l , a n d llv ]j ot lie lico-di.-junctivc, or
uoii? term a i r i a , al Tiou (cans, ), ih . Imt th e D f e i i i m a l i c , 205-C (itit fc5 98- C OO ,an d I n f e r
I iri nciple o f K n o w l e d g e di.-criiiiii.aled by e n c e ) ; the se four cla ss es c o m p r i s e d in t w o
A r i ' l o t l e f ro m t he p r i n c ip l e o f I ' l o d u e l i o i i , g e n e r a . S i m p l e an d C o n d i t i o n a l . 20C, see
OC-7; e o n i p r eh ei u l e d by C ic ero , and by t h e C a t e g o r ic a l . I l y p o f h e l ic a l , D i s j u n c t i v e a n d
f c h o o l i n e i i , ni nl er t h e fo rn ui la iiihil sine l ly |) o l h e l i c o . ( l i s j u i . C l i v e S y l l o g i s m ; C a t e
f<iu,vi, 07; but un d er that di.-ci iiiiiii ale d, i i ; g o r ic al .Sy l i o g i s m , Ihc on e c la ss u n d e r Ihe
in iii odern time? a t t e n t io n c a ll e d to il by g e n u s Si m ji le S y l l o g i s m , 200; its g e ne r a l
L e i b n i tz , li. , but liot a d e q i ta l e ly di sciiiii- ual iire , 200-7; m ay j n o c e e d in llic q u a n t i t y
iiiiiled by h i m . i b . : c o n t r o l er?y b e t w e e n o f l i x l e n s i o n , and in th at o f Comjir eli cn-
L e i b n i tz and D r S a m u e l t l ar k c on tlii.s s i o n . 207-8; c x a m j i le s o f th e E x t e n s i v e , an d
l a w , a m o n g o t h e r j o h i l s . i 4 . a s s u m e d hy o f th e I n l e n s i v e o r C o m j ir e li e n s iv e Ca te
Liibiiirz. as th e f o u n d a t io n of Natural g o r i e a l S y l l o g i s m , 208; liiese rcasoniiig.s or
I h i i o s o p h y , l i ; the l o r m o f t h e llv j .o t lie t- s y l l o g i s m s e x ji l ic i tl y c o m j i a i e d anil c o n
ieal S y l l o g i s m d e l e r n i i n e d b y . 239; h o w tras te d, 209 ct se q. ; l o g i c i a n s l o o k i n g o n l y
e n o u n c e d by W o l f . 07; d i s c u s s i o n r e g a .d - l o tl.e r e a s o n i n g in E x l e i . s i o n inive g i v e n
in g t h e lA.'ihiiilian p i i n e i p l e of, CO; l a w of, n a r r o w a n d e r r o n e o u s d e l in i ti o n s o f t h e
regiiliile?. in coi j ii li c li o n w i t h th at o f e x - J I a jo r , M id d le , a n d .Minor t e i m ? , 200-10;
ci 111 lei I III ill d ie , II > p o t h e t. c o -d is j n n e l ive sy I- A r i ' l o t l e s d e l in it io ii o f t h e s e will ajipiy to
io g i- ii i' , 204-5; onlv iin ol ln r e x p i e . - s i o n o f Loth q n a lit ili e s. 210 11, set also 154-5, see
A r i s t o t l e s l a w , that t h e h o l e i - i n Cessarily J'ei m s o f .Sy lio g i s m : m os t c o n v e n i e n t m o d e
c o n c e i v e d as p r i o r t o th e part . L 53 -4 ; a u o f s l a t i n g a s y l i o g i - i n in an a bs tr a c t fo rm
tho rs l e f e r i e d to 0 1 1 , 5 1 9 : llinl ca n be d e by t h e l ett ers S, 1, JL 211-12 {but see 674,
d u c e d from law o f C o n t a i i. cl io ii, l i ; t ha t 676. 678); d i v id e d i n l o sjiecial c la ss e s a c c o r d
c a n n o t Le so d e d u c e d , l i . , o e r u n d a m e n t a l i n g to t h c ajijilicatioii o f ll i c l a w s o f I d e n
L a w s ol T h o u g h t . t i t y an d C o n t r a d i c l i o n , u n d e r t h e r e la t io n
'cii'As. aoi. o f w h o l e an d jiart, 212 et seq ; this r e la
jL'.MI'lTOX and . S u bs um pt io n, best n a m e s for t io n m a y he r e g a r d e d in t w o p o i n t s o f
the pri iiii?e? o l a s y l l o g i - i i i , 199; th e ir e m v i e w , an d tlius affords f w o c la . s s e s o f Hea-
ploy m e n t v i n d i c a t e d , 199-2(HJ; not coiiBli- s o i l i n g s , vi z.. D e d u c t i v e and I n d u c t iv e ,
l u le d by the ii i e ie o r d e r o f e n n i .c i a t i o n , 212-13; I. D e d i i c t i v e ( a l e g o r i c a l .Sy llogism ,
21?; wh at truly eo n?l iIiile? Ilie-e, 219. c h a r a c t e r o f I he jiroeess i n , 213 et s e q .; its
.''CTKi:, i | l i o ' e i l n i l e a i i o l i o l S y l l o g i s m , 5 0 7 . c a n o n s , in I nt el .s io n an d in E .x te n sio n,
. ' t l.i.iiGIs.M. o r ig i n a l m e a n i n g o f tlic te r m , 213-14; c o n n e e ti o i i o f tlie jiroj iosi tion s a nd
1!*>, borrii wi il i . o i n M al h e m a l ics, i i ; E u t er m s of. il l u s ir a t e d by se n s ib l e s y m b o l s ,
g e ni o? , I L e m n ii d a ' . nnd Z ah a r e i la (juoted 214-15; jir o.ximaie iii le s o l , 1 E. xi on siv e
o n mj orl ol, 1,(7! 198. e t s e q . ; g e n e r a l co n- 'I'hiee H ines, 215; lirst rule of, i llu s tr at e d,
I l'ioii? i f . Iti7; III'' |iar ls o f w h i c h coiii- 216-17; s e c o n d rule of , i lh i s lr a l e d , 217-19;
pii-ei|. an d l l i i i r d e n o m i n a l i o i i s . 197-8; in isc on ce jit ioi i in r e ga rd t o d e l in it io ii o f
tl.i -e e x p b e a t e d . 19s, , t sei/. ; 1'reini?es, m a .Sunijitioii ill s e c o n d rul e o b v i a te d , 218-19;
j o r an d m iiior, I'.ft; .'i in ip tio n, Si ib s u m |i - third rule, 210-20; 2. I n l e n s i v e , th r ee n i k s ,
t ioii. ( oi icl ii- .o ii, hi s| niiine.s tor th e t h r ee 222 t t seq ; lirst rule i ll u s t r a t e d , 223; s e c o n d
pr o|M) -ilioii of, l i . ; I,eiiiina, 11y i io l e m i n a, ru le ilh is tr at e d, 22.3-4; g r o u n d s o l t h e ru les
l i . A ?Ninptioii. 2ii0; obj 'C lio n? t o th e r e g a r d i n g .Snmjition an d .Snh su m jit io n in
di-norn ina tio ii s o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s of, in E x t e n s i v e a n d C o m p r e li e n s iv e S y l l o g i s m s ,
INDEX. 711
224; tliird l u l c il l u s tr a l e d , 224-5; II. Ii;- :ill Hie varietie.s of, d i v id e d i n to cla.sses, a c
d u c l i v e Ca te gor ica l S y l l o g i s m , w h a t, 225; c o r d i n g to llieir V a l i d i t y , viz., in to Correct
v i e w s o f l o g ic i a n s r e g a r d in g th e n a t u r e ol or Tr ue , an d I n c o r r e c t or Fa ls e, 321; tlie
this rc asoi. iiig eri oi.eou.-, L25 rt s-y., S" Iii- m e a n i n g o f the se t e r m s as ajijJied l o s y ll o -
d n c l i o i i ; c;'iini:sol the IJedi e ti ve .c nd In due - g i - m s dete: iii:;.cd, 322; i n c o r : e c t , di v id e d
t i . i .S\llogi.-iiis eijua lly to iii ia l. 227; t i u s e i n t o Iai a l o g i ' i u s ainl .'soidii-iiis, 321-3 ; this
K'lisoniiigs iil u > ti a le d ,2 2 7- S ; o hj e cl io ii o b v i d i s t i n c li o ii no t o t ' d i i c c t l y lo g ica l i i i i . o . ; ,
a t e d . 228; l o rm ul ie l o r I n d u c t i v e .S) l lo g i s m s 323; but no t a lto ge tli c r wi ilioiit lo gi ca l
iu Coui|)rehei..'ion an d E.xt en siou , 228-9; va l u e , ib.; in co rre ct, v i c i o u s , e it h e r in le-
W lu ite ly ai.d otliei-s e n o u c o u . - l v m a k e th e s p e c t ol' th e ir Ibrm, or o f th eir m a tte r , or
i n d u c t ii e syllogi.-m d e d u c t iv e , 229; d e c : i ii.v in re."pec t o f hot 11 form an d m a tt e r , 3 -2 -3;
o f tlie o ld er l o g ic i a n s diirerenl. an d c or rec t syllogisiins inc orr ec t iu rcs|ieet o f t heir m a t
as far as it g o e s , 229-39; t h o u g h th e Cate- t er lie b e y o n d t he j u r is d i c ti o n o f L o g i c ,
g o i i c a l Sy llogi .'iu i- sjiccially l e g u l a t e d by 823; s y l l o g i s m s Ibrnially i n e o - r e c t , to Le
Hie la w s o f I d e n t i t y and C o n t r a d i c t i o n , j u d g e d by an a pj ili c a t io n o i ' t i . e rules o f
still tlie otlier lo g ic a l Iaw.s iil>o oiier ati ve in, s y l l o g i s m , ib., .see I'al lacics; l io w di sti n-
231; f ii v i- i o i. s I f ; e c i) ; d ii ,g II To E \ i c r - g ni s lie d Horn I 'r o b a l io n , 3 i l ; o:i tlie m u
I.iil r o i m , 237-.3J9 ; A. C o ii i|i le x, E|)i- tual r e la t io n s o f tlie l e i m s of, in ijiian ll ty
c l i i ir c m a , an d Sor ite s, 257- 74; re lat ion o f an d i;u:iiity, tliroiigli th e aj jil ica tio n ot t he
sy llogi.' ius to ea ch oth er, 23S; c la ss e s ai.d d o c t r i n e o f a (|ii:inliticd p i c d i e a l e . 536-9;
d c ' ig i ia t io n s o f i-elated s y ll o g i. ms, ib ; g e n e r al c a n o n of, 536; llie t li ie e fo.-sible
J I o n n ' \ ll o g i -n i . w h a t , ib.; I o l \ > y l' o g i> m , r e la t io n s ol te r m s, 1. f o t o - t o t a l C o i n e l n -
..al. lb.; llli^ Aiialy t ic and S y n t l i e t i c , l i ; sio ii; 2. fo to - t o ta l Co. i.xclusion ; 3. I n c o n i -
r ro .-y llo g.s iii , ib. ; E])isy l l u g b m , ib , .s-e jilete Co 'i iiclusion, i n v o l v i n g I n c o m p l e l e
K|iic i.c iie ma . S o i i l e s ; p i o b a b l e reason w l i y C o j x c l u s i o i i , l b.; tlie first is t h e bes t, th e
log ici ai. s, in t h e e as e o f sin qjle s y l l o g i s m s , s e c o n d tlie wo r st , th e Ihii'd i n te r m e d ia t e ,
o ' .e r lo o k i d t h e r e a s o n i n g o f Co in pr el iei .- i b . ; th e w h o l e Older o f Lest an d w o ; s t
sioii, 270-71; d i v i s i o n s oI\ a c c o r d i n g to ijiiai tilieiilioii tin oiiglioiit tlie t w o q i i a l i t i e s ,
l - x l e i i . a l 1 o; I U. B. D c l e C t iv e , Eiitl iy- 537; ajijilication ol t h i s d o c t i i n e in sjiecial
iiieiiie. 2T'i-Sl ,r l a . t h v m c m e ; C. R e g u l a r cas es o f tlie g e n e r a l c a n o n ol , in tlie 12 af-
II. (1 l . i e g a ar, CSI-.320. .'te I 'i g u i e , rdoi.d, f l i m a t i v e a n d 24 n e g a t i v e m o o d s . 537- 9:
Rcdiic ion ot .'syllogisms; i r r e gu la r bv ic - C a n o n s o l, g e ne r a l lii storical n o t ic e s re
la liu n, r t. To the t i a n s j o ed O l d e r ot its g a r d i n g , 559-79; q u o t a t i o n s fro m va r io u s
r i o p i i s i i i o n s ; 2 , O f i t s f e i n i s ; 3 ' , Ol bo t h l o g i c i a n s o n, 559-75; D e r o d o n r ele rr ed to
its 1i'opositioiis and Te r m s. 281-2; d o c t r i n e i n, 559-60; Rajiiii, 560; J.eibnitz, 560-61;
o f l o g ic i a n s r e g a r d i n g t he l e g i i l a i i t y and R e ns c li, 561: Crus iu s. 561-3; l l u t c b e s o n ,
il leg ii la i ity ol , in resjiect o f the o r de r ol 563 4 ; .8 a\ o i .a r o l a , 564 ; A l e x , (.i Ba m u-
its pi'opositions, 281; t h is on e- sid ed and g a r t c n , 5 6 4 - 5 ; l i c i n i a i n s , 565; IVal di n,
e n o i eoiis. '2S2; in rcsjiect o f its I c r m s , a 56.5-6; St artler. 566; .''iiuter. i/i. . .'nter. 567;
s.. l.u gi'iii is icg in ai ' or ir r e gu la r , r .c c o i d in g S e g n y , 567 : Ilotl'bauer. 567-S>; K a n t , 568-9;
to the ;i!ace w h i c h Ike J l ii .d l e T e r m ho ld s C liristia n Weiss, 569; Fries. 570-2; K i' s e -
in th e jireiiii-c'. i b . ; r e g u la r a n d irr e gu la r w e t t e r , 572; La r r o qu e . 572-4; (la l lu p p i, 574;
o r d e r of. in Comj n elicn.sion an d I'lxteiision, B u lk e r , i6 ; J 'i c t o ii n , 575; r e ler en ee s to a u
282 ; th e le h it iv e jiO'ition ol' th e J l id d l e t ho r s on f u n d a m e n t a l l a w s of. 575-6; eiiun -
I'cnn in a syllogi>iii c o ii s ii t u t e s its Fi g ur e . c i a t i u n s of, 576-8; D i c t u m de o m n i et n u l lo ,
i b . ; tlie F o u r F ig ur e s of, io .; m n e m o n i c c r it ic i z ed , 57.8; g e n e r a l Ir ws of, in verse,
verses fo r F i g u r e s , / 6 . , F i g u r e o f .Syllo- 57 8 -9 ; c r it ic is m by t h e a u t h o r o f ih eFj'c-
gi -iii; reg ula ri ty a n d ir r e g u l a r it y of, exjjli- cial l a w s ol . 579-83; t he a u t h o r .s sujireme
Cated, 2's.3 ft s-q ; i rr e g u l a r it y in e x t e r n a l c a n o n s of, 583-4; d o c t r i n e of. a t ta c k e d , as
l o - m of, a r i d i i g from tr a n sp o si t io n o f tlie i n v o l v i n g a petitio pr 'n rip il, 621; h o w this
I'l oj ios iti oii s, 283 -5; c a n be j.ersi iciioiisly oh j c ct io n i s t o be m et , 021. 6 3 : this o b j e c
e.x)iie'sed by a i n o f tlie live i n e g u l a r c o n - tion m a d e by S t e w a r t an d re lu te d by tial-
s eci iti on s o f its j ni ip o sil io iis , 2 83-4; true lu ji p i .6 2 3 ; its e u o u n c e i n e n t An al v tic and
d o c i i ilie o f c o n s e c u ti o n o f s y ll o g i s m , wh icl i S y iiH ie t ic , 621-2; Hiese m e i l i o i N o l e n o u n c e -
is e it h e r i sy iii he tic , th e jircniises b e i n g mciit c o m j i a re d , 622, 623; U n fi g u r e d and
pla ced lirst, t he e o n e l u s i o n last, or A n a - F i g u r e d , 626; difl'ereuce o f F i g u r e of, o f n o
l u i c , t h e c o n c l n s i o n pr e c e d in g , Hie jirem- pcei lint, G2<>-7.
ises I dl lo w iii g, 28J-5; s e c o n d g r o u n d o f Sv M nu t .iC A i. a n d I n t u i t i v e K u o w l c d g e ,
r e g u la r i ty and i rr e gu la r it y of, tlie n a t u Coi ice jil s, Q u al it y of.
ral an d tiansj nise d o r de r o f Hic S y l l o g i s t i c S y n t h e s i s , 338, .see
M eth od .
T e i m s , 285 t l seq , see F i g u r e o f S y l l o g i s m ;
12 INDEX.
T a c i t u p . q u o t e d , 427. nnd p o s i ti v e d i s c r e p a n c y , 46 5-6; 2 , Me di

TAR T AR C Tf s. 1e l n i s , c o m m e n t a t o r on l li s - ale, 4')6 <z .'?</. , m e d ia t e w i t n e s s e s are e ith er
piu.U', D 7 . 590. pr o . x im a tc or r e m o t e , a n d e it h e r i n d e p e n
rhN.NK.MAN.X, 142. de nt or d e p e i a le n t . 46t>-7; lliii iio r. Iciid.-
I LR.Ms O l il I'l u|ui.'ilioii. stc Pr o p o s i ti o u . tio ii. ib . 1.e c u .( l e d 'I' es.inioiiy, 408 i t s,i/ ,
I'er.ms o f N i l l o g i s n i . M a jo r , M i n o r , a n d C ii lic isi ii a u d l i . t e i p i e l a t i o i i , ( (h a t . 468-9;
M id d le , w hill. 20? ; b o r r o w e d I r o m M atl ic- t he se e x) i l ie a l e d , 4 9 i t .sn/.; tbe e x a n i in a -
niiilic.', 210; tlieir s v n o n j in.', ib.: in K.xlen- tion o f a t e s t im o n y f w o l o l d o f ils An-
s i o n t h e |irediciite o f tlie c o n c l u s i o n tlio llieii tic ity tind 1nf e g i ity. anti ol ils .\l eni .ing ,
grenle.'t w h o le , n n d , t h e re f or e , th e m a j o r lb.; th e Id r m e r llie |i io b lc n i o f Critici.-ni
ler ni , tho subject t h e smii llc sf pa r t, tiiul, (Critirn), tlie la tt e r o f l i i t e r p i c f a i i o n or
t lie re lo r e, th e m i n o r ter m . 207; in Coiniire- e x p o s i t i o n ( I L r m n i n i t i e n , Exegilicii), 470'
heii.'ion, th e subj ect ol th e c o n e l n s i o n is I. C ri tic ism c o n s id er e d in de t a il . 470-74; ils
tile greatest w l i o le , a nd , tli erefore, th e m a pro b' e ni s, 470; U n i v e r s a l a nd .''|iecial C r it i
j o r t er m , t he pr eil iea te llio s m a l l e s t |iarf, c is m . ill ; U n iv e r s a l Cri ticis m a l o n e wi tli in
a n d . tlierefore, Ihe m i n o r t er m , ib.; n a r r o w th e siiliere o f L o g i c , ib ; lliis d i i i d e d in to
an d e r ro n eo u s ile tii iit io ns by l o g i c i a n s of, H ig l i e r a nd b o w e r C r i ti c is m , or t h e Criti-
2'J9-10; Ar istotle'S d e l in i t i o n of, 210; his c i'i ii o f A u t h e n t i c i t y a n d t h e Cr itici'iii o f
d e l in i t i o n o f t h e m i d d l e term as m id d le I i i l e g r i l y . i b . ; (1) Ci it icisni o f A u ll ie i il ie i ty ,
by po si tio n not a p p l ic a b l e t o tlie m o d e in 470-71; a. I n t er n a l O i o m i d ' . the se o f t h e m
w h i c l l si)b.se<|iieiif l o g i c i a n s e n o u n c e Hie s e lv e s n o t s ul lici enf f o es ta b l i sh th e antlieii-
s y ll o g i- n i , i b . ; but a p p l ic a b l e t o Ihe rea t i e i l y o f a w i i f i n g . 471: but o m n ip o t e n t l o
s o n i n g in P o i n p i e h c i i s i o n , 211; |io ssi bl e fo d i s p r o v e an a l le g e d ai it h e ii t ic if v , ib.'; b
s la t e II ren.-oiiing in ICxleiision in w hich the E x t e r n a l Uroiind.s, ib. ; (2) Cr iti c ism o f In
ma jor t e i n i si.all s ta n d lirst, t h e m id d le t e g r i t y , 472-4; e m e n d a t i o n o f llic text o f
s e c o n d , ami tlie inii ior last. ib. ; w h a t is t w o k i n d s viz., H ist or ic al an d C o n j e c t u
p i o p c r l y l o be r e g ar d ed as a t er m o f sy ll o - ral, 472; liistoric.al. o f t w o k in ds , E. xt en ial
gi -n i . 216. a nd I i i t e n ia l . 473; C on je c t ur a l, i6.; II. Iii-
Th.srtMiiNV. w h a t. 457; e .x p li ca l e d , 458 >tseg ; le r p r e t at io ii, 474-5: G en er al a n d Sp e c ia l,
its |ii(iiier o b j ie t . 45'>-9; tl.e o bj ecl of. c a ll e d 474; s o u r c e s o f i ii le r p r e ta t io ii, 475
tl.e F u r t . i'l '.t ; t h e v a l i d i t y of. c a ll e d / / A - T r . x t I'eiOK, i l s u s e i n a s i s t c m a t i c c o u r s e o f
i n n n U C r . t h b i l i t i j , i b ; e il l ie r im i n c il iu te or L e ct ur es. 2
m e c . a t e , ib . ; all i iii m e ili al e w i t n e s s s ty l e d Tiix.Ml.'s'nus, referred t o on g e n u s o f L o gi e ,
an iij> w i t i u \ s . tb ; a m e d ia t e an m r - w i t u i s s , 7, 179.
lb : t he g n n r i i n t i e , w li a t. ib . : l e s t i m o n y m a y TiiKOPiit'.ASTrs, referred to on us e o f the
be Pa r tia l. ( om p'.eic, f o n s i s t e n t . Coi itr a- t e r m eategorical, 105, 172; his n o n i e ii c a l i i i e
d i c t o i i , l b . : d i i l - i o i i o f Ilie . -ub je ct : I . o f t h e part s o f tin; H y p o ll ie t ic a l . Sy llo gi s m ,
I l e d ib i ity o f ' r c s l i m o n y in get e r a l, ib et 241: q u o t e d on lie ar in g, 481; mii de t w o
ffi/ : P . riie obj ect o f th e l e s t i i n o n y its m o o d s o f Uara|)ti. 666; th is op in io n ad opt ed
a b s o l u t e iio ss ibi lit y, 4*30; pliysicul aiid inel- by P o r j ih y r y . ib ; an d by B o e t h i u s , i b . ; but
i p ' i i - i c a l I ris-il)ilitv, 4<i9-61; its l e ' a t i v e o p p o s e d b) Hie aiitlior, i6.
p os - ib ili t y, 4'il ; 2 . I'Im- subject o l , or per- T i i k i r k m p , w l i a t , 188
- o n a l i r u s lw o ill iii ie s .s o f t h e w i t n e ss , ib.; TliIliiJ I ig iire, .'PS Kigiire.
this c o n s i s t ' o l t w o e le i n e n l s . ti. H o n e s t y or T i i o . m A S l f . (, . l a c o b i i s . h o l d s t h a t sim ple ap
v e r a r i l y , 461 2 ; tlie |i r es u n ip t io n o f tile p r e h e n s i o n isiiiiiiossible w i t h o u t j i id g iiie n i,
lio iie -t\ o f a w i t n e s s e nh i in c e d by cert ai n 84
cir c iim -ta iic e s, 462, b C o i iip e le iic y o f ti Ti to Uf iii T , llie P r o d i ie t s of, see Con cep ts ,
w i t i i e . . . lb : c irei ims tiiiice s b>' w l i ic h th e .1 i i d g m e n t s , l lc a s o n ii i g .
pr es iii np lio n o f e nm jie tim cy is e iil ia iic ed , T h o u g i i t , w h a t , 9 ft seg ; in its w i d e r m e a n
lb . t h e er ed ib i l it i o f T e - i i m i i n y not i n v a l i in g , e q u i v a le n t fo e v e ry c o g n i t i v e act, or
d at e d Is-eaii-e t he fact le ' t il ie d is o n e out e v e n l o e v e r y c o n s c i o u s m e n i a l modificti-
o f t h e o r d i n a r v ciiiir-e o f e x p e r ie n c e , 4R3; t i o i i , 9 ; in its n a r r o w e r m e a n i n g as llioiigl.t
uiiimury r e g a i d i n g t h e c r e d ih i l il y o f lesli- jji'oper, (leiiot rs tlie acts o f t h e U i id e rs t a nd -
in my in ge ne r al 4^3-4; II resiiiinniy in iii g Jiroper, 9-1 0; in th e h i tl e r s en se, the
-|s -ci al. 11 i m m e d i a t e a n d meilitile, 461 it o h j e c t - m a l t e r o f b o g i c , 9; M a t t e r a i i d F o r m
<7 ; P . I m m e d i a te , ib ; c o i . d i l i o n s o f ita of. (listiiigiiislieil, 11; j ilieiio me iia o f for
r i e d i h i l i l v , lb : w li et lie r all tlie-e c o n d i - m a l, o f t w o ki nds , co ii l ii ig e i it a n d iiece.s-
tioi.s are liillllb d in i h e r a - e o f a n y iiniiie- sa r v. 17; iie c e s-a r v lo rm of. im p l ie s four
d i a l e testiriK iiv, eaiiliot be d i r e c t l y a s c er c o n d i t i o n s , (1) D e t e r m i n e d by Hie na tu re
ta in e d. 46I-.5; w l i e n les l in i n i iy attiiiiia llic ol t he t h i n k i n g subject i x d f . (2) O ri g i n a l,
bl g li e sl de g r e e o f p r o b a b i li t y , 465; n e g a t iv e (3) U n iv e r s a l, (4) A L a w , 17, 18; its s ubj ect
INDEX. 713
Ibrm. an d m at t e r di s c r i m i n a t e d , 5.3; as tlic H ip fo rm o f TIm nglit, ib ; i'o r m a l Trutli o f

(ilijcct re sp ec tiv e ly o f r.s y c lio lo g y nnd o f l w( i k in ds , Lojrical nnd M a lli em nt ie a l,
L og ic , ih.; a m e d i a t e an d comjile.x c o g n i 379-80; 11. Heal Trnlli, Hie l ia r m o n i lie-
tion, 54- 5; tlie va r io u s t e r m s liy wliicli tlie t w e e n a lli onglit an d its m a tte r , 3^0; l.'eal
m od e s o f tiuniglit, o r c o g i t a b l e e x is t e n c e , nnd !'( rnial Sci ei. ee s. 389-81; H o w ca n we
are d e s ig n a te d , 55-6; w li at is i n v o l v e d in k n o w lliat Hiei e is a e o n e s j i o n d e i i e e I n -
t h i n k i n g nn obj ect , 65; tlie at tr i b n l io n i m t w e e n on r Hioiiglil an d its obj ect ? .381; snli-
plied in, re g ul at e d b y l a w s , 56, .ire I'lin da- divis iii ns o f I.eal Ti iitli, .Metajilii sieal.
tncntal J-aws o f T h o n g l i t ; d i s t i n c t i o n o f P s y c li o l o g ie a l, I'lii siea l. .3S1-2; v a r io u s a j -
Io s it i v c a nd N e g a t i v e , 73; its jir oducts are jilicalion.s o f tlie l e i m tri'/*. 3=2; I li e e r i ' e -
o f th ree kinils, C o n c e p t s . .I in lg m e iit s , an d rion (if, tlie n e e e -s i ty de t e r n i i n e d liv He-
Keasoniiig--, S3 ft al ib i; tlicse are all jirod- l a w s wllicll g o v e r n o u r lacnltie.s o f kiiovvl
uct s ol com)>iirisoii and all m o d if i c a t i o n s ol' e d g e , 377-82; C e r t a in t y , tlie conseiousi.e.-.s
. Iiu lg m on t, S 3 - t, .op C o n c e p t s , . l u d g m e n t s , ol' tills ne c e ssi ty , .382; triitli c o i.s id e r e d in
K e a s o n i n g s ; its I'oimal o r l o g ic a l jierl'ec- re lat ion to Hie de g r e e an d ki nd o f eel t ai nt y
tinn c o n s is t s o f tliree v irt ue s, Clea rn ess , is (listingiiislied as K n o w l e d g e , Belief, and
D is ti nc t ne ss , and H a r m o n y , 3.35, .340. D ji in io n, 377-83; K n o w l e d g e a nd B e l i e f ,
T i m p l e r . 37, 13S; let'erred to o n w h ole ami th e ir dill'erence, .3.83; tlial Hie c e r t a i n ly o f
part. 1 4 3 . 14 i. 3 3 1 . 3.39. ail k n o w l e d g e is n l l i m a l c l y r e s o l v a b l e i n to
T itil's , ( . o l t l i e b C er lia rd , referred to on aji- u ce rla in lv o f b e l i e f n i ai nt ai i.c d iiy Lntlier,
lilieatioii o f qi iaiititieatioii o f jiredi cate to ib. ; by A i istotle. 3R.3-4 ; b y t he P l a t o n is is ,
tlie I ly p o tl ie t ic a l P r o jio s iti o n, 512; liis d o c 384; by Da v id Hiiine, /*. ; tlie in a n il e s ta t io n
trine o f C o n v e r s i o n jiroc eeds on tlie doc o f lieliel' inv o lv es k n o w led ge, 385; Intui
t rin e o f a quan tif ie d pr e d i c a t e , 527; qu o t e d til II vv bat. I*. . tlie q ne s t io n as l o t b e i c ' a -
on qu a n ti fi c a ti o n o f jiredica1<>. 5.56; his ti(.ii ol Ijeliet ai.d k no w ' ed ge jirojierly m et-
d o c t r i n e o f I lyji uHie lical .S y llo g ism as jiro- ajili; sica '. ib ; P u r e a n d K nipirical Trutli,
c e e d i n g o n th e ap p l ic a t io n o f t he jirincijde di s ti l. g ii is h e d . 385-G; Fr ror, ils c ha r a c te r
o f a qu an tif ie d pr e d i c a t e , G03; his d o c t r i n e and sour ces , 387; Hiis c x j d i c a t e d , ib. et .seq. ;
o f D i s ju n c ti v e S y l l o g i s m , ib .; Iield both as Ilie ojijiosite o f Irntli, c o n s is t s in a w a r t
Ibrins m er e l y t o bc th e m a t t e r o f r c g n' ar o f a g i e e n i e n t b e t w e e n a llioii^lil an d ils
s y l l o g i s m , i b . ; his d o c t r i n e o f th e F i g u r e objiet.GST; d is lin g iii sli e d as JI at er ia l, .38';
a nd M o o d o f S y l l o g i s m , 6.52-8. a.s I 'o i m a l. i b . ; vvlieii c lo s e l y s c ru ti n iz e d is
I 'lT T E L . 4.35. fo un d l o a i i s c fro m llie w a n t o f ad ei ju al e
T o p i c , e m j i lo i e U by A r i s t o t l e t o d e n o t e a a c ti v i ty c.f ll;e c o g n i t i v e f ac u lt ie s , i b . ; di s
jnirticular jiart o f L o g i c , 6. ci iiiiini,ted f n III I g n o r a n c e . 389; f ro m I l l u
T o u . s . r a i n t , 435. s io n . ib...S'i I'.ri or. Cau ses of.
T ra x scex d ex t and Trans ce vdf nta l. Hieir T . S f l i n t M I . V U P E X . 25.
or ig i n al a pp l ic a t io n , au d use by Kaii t, 140. T w k s t e x . 237, 377, 387; q u o t e d on th e na tu re
f R E X D E L E X B U R G , F . A . , referr ed l o on th e o f F r r o r . 387-9; (ju o le d on I g u o r a ii c e , I l l u
t it le Organon for tlie lo g ic a l treatises o f sion, etc , 38J-90.
A r i s to t le , 24; referr ed to for t h e d o c t r i n e s
o f th e Ilatoiiists an d S t o ic s on t h e C a t c g o U l p i a x , his d o c t r i n e o f th e E n t h y m e m e , 279;
rics, 142, 186, 260, 338 h is de l in i ti o n o f Ilie 8 o r il e s . 332.
T r o x l e r . 3 0 , 2 4 9 , 3. 38. Ul .Ric ii. 184 2='9; q u o t e d on qn a n li fi c n ii n n o f
T r u t h , its d i v is i o n i n t o L og i c al a n d ,5Ieta- jiredienie, 559.
jdiy.sical, cr iti ci zed , 70; w h a t , ih. ; lo g ic a l U l t r a t o t a l (J u a nt ili c al io n o f J l i d d l e f ei m.
di s cr i m i n a t e d fr o m a b s o l u te , 322, wp Iriith L a m b e r t' s d o c t r i n e of. 384-6; t h is d o c t ri n e
and Frror. D o c t r in e o f c ii t ic i ze d . 584-5; aut lior 's d o c t r i n e ol ,
T r u thaud l-hior. D o c t r in e of. 376;90; Trutli 5'8i-8.
and ( er ta iii iy . w li a t, 377; I'ruHi is defined U m v e r s a l Pro jio si tio i s, 171, see .J ud gm e nt s .
Hie e o n e - j i o i de iic e or a g r e e m e n t o f a c o g "Ta-re pov Trpiirepov, see P r o b a t io n .
ni tio n witll its oliject. .377. 378; tliis dcliiii-
tioii du e l o tlie s c h o o li n e n , 378 ; A q u in a s ' \ ' a l l a , La ure nt iii s, 14 2. 26 1 ; lirsl t o us e tin'
q uo te d to Ihis ell'ect. ih ; jiliilosojihers t er m Sorites in ils jiresciit ajijilicatioii. 269;
a gr eed as to th e d e l in i t i o n o f t ru th ib ; (juoled on C o n v er s i o n . 527; his d o c t r i n e ol
(jiiesiioiis in d e ba t e r e g a r d i n g , w h e t l ie r tlic S e c o n d an d Tliird F i g u r e s, 629-.30.
trir li lie a lta ii. a bl e, and w h e t h e r wo jiossess '\' a l e r i u s .41 a x i m u .s (?). (jiioted. 4=4.
anv c ii t er i o ii liv w hi ch wo ca n lie as.-ured V a l l i u r Ia u l i i s ,q u o t e d o n C o i i v e r s i o u , 528,
(It its a lta i n n i o i. t, /* . lor m a n o n l y t w o 553
ki nd s of, F o r m a l an d I.eal , 379; I. F o r V a u i l l a s . 485.
mal Trijtli Hie h a n i i o i i v o f Tl io n g h t w i t h V e r s u r . his d o c t r i n e o f I n d u c t i o n , 596.
yo
T14 INDEX.
V iC T oniN , K>8, 344; quoted on can on s o f and w h ole per nrciilrns, ib. ; w h o le p /r sr
S y llo g ism , 576. divided in to, P . L ogical or ro tc iitia l, 2^,
5 ' i c t o u i m s l i is d o c t r in c o f E iitliy n u 'in c,2 7 9 . .Meta]ihytical or A ctu a l, 3 , Iliysical, d"*.
V lT IU M S a l e , / I I I , t i n s , w l i a t , 42 7. .Miitheiiintical, 5^, ( o llectiv c, 14.3-1; tlie
V ivi;s, l.iid o v iciis, l;iS; liis tipinion regard terms siihj.it and suhjrriirr as applied to thc
in g sik'iit T iH - d ila t io n a.s a nieuiis of in tel- L ogical W h ole and Iarfs 144; thc term
Ifctii.il iin p ro v cin cn t coin lialed by Sca l- p nifitllnl as aiqilied fo d en ote tlic Logical
igcr, 4 ' 1 ; q u oted on im p o r ta n c e ol le a cliin g W hole, 145; Lord M onboddo quoted on
a- a m e a n o f s id f - i n i p r o \ e i n e n t . 483. /lotentinl, 145-6: .S te w a ifs sii ictiircs on the
VOKT. o r V o e tin -, ( ii'b e r l. b is cn lid iicf cited passage from M onboddo rebntted. 146;
as an in -ttin ce o f the in llu cn ce o f passion M onboddo w ron g in a sciib in g the aullior-
o n o i> in io n . 400. slii]) and apiilicatioii o f tbe term put-iitinl
V o s s i L ' s , (.leia rd .loliii, referred toon g ciiiis lo Imgeiiin.', 110; bofli term and ap plica
ol' L o g i c , 7 : rclerrcd to for s c lio la s lic tlico- tion fn be found, wit!i few e.vcz] tio n s, in
r i e s o f t h e o b j e c t - m a t t c r o f L o g i c , 2 0 , 37. all tlie old er system s o f L ogic, ih .; Hurg-
crsd vk fpioted as an e.xam ple, i6. ; t li e d if
AV. m t z . q u o t e d r e g a r d i n g Aoy t/cJj oT r o p io , 4, ference o f tile r o te n tia l and zVclual W h ole
8.7. 1 0 0 . 1 8 0 . 1 9 0 , 2 4 0 n oticed by A ristotle, ih. : all reasoning
\ V a i . ( It , 2 0 1 . under the relation of. 191.212; tliis relation
W a l d in , quoted on canons o f S yllogism , m ay be regarded in tw o iioin ts o f v iew , and
oC5-0. tliiis iiffords (w o classes o f K e a so iiin g s,
V a llis . Dr. J o lin , b is In s titu tin L n g ir r p . 2 1 \ D ed uctive and In d u ctiv e. 212-13; dilficiilty
relericd to on nam es of p rop osition s in in con n ection w itli Ilyi.n tliefical .Syllo
I in version . I'O ; r e le r r e d to on eliaraclcr gism s in regard to llio di c'l ine tln.f <d! rca-
o f II 1 o tb e 'ic o - D i- j iin c t iv e S y l l o g i - m , 249; so n iiig is either ft oni Hie wlioIc to part or
lii- E iigli'li v er sio n o f tb e l.atin m nem on fio in llie parts lo the w hole, eo; sidcred
ic ' (o r t b e fo u r k ii.d s o f l u o p o s i t i o i i s , 287. and ob viated , 252 rr .s-q.: A rlcccd cr.t and
W a l z . .3-03. 11
( ( .sequent in lly |.o lh e t:c a !s equal fo toii-
W .vT T s. D r. Isaac. 25; b is L og/c. 50. ditioii and (nndifioned, 253; licnce the
W K O K L i x , 5 1 4 . .547. reason or con d ition must contain Ihe ccii-
W eise. flirislia n , em p loved (before E uler) sequent, ib .; the law o f lleason t.nd Con-
c i r c u l a r d i a g r a m s a s l o g i c a l i i o l a t i o i i , 1.8.). seqncnt on ly another ex j re'>ion o f Aris-
W i is .s, ( ' l i r i - l i a n , 1'9 ; < n o t e d on canons of toHo's law . That th e w hole is n ecessarily
S y l l o g i s m . 5d9. conceived as prior to the part. 253-4; A ris
W 'kiie.n F E L S ll s , lii- D r L n g o tn n c h i ls E r i n l it o - totle's law criticized , 254; W h o le and Iarts
riii I l e l e r i e d t o , 4.33 respectively may be view ed in tliouglit
IVii.vTELY. Dr.. 1-i' d efiiiilioii o f I.o g icq n o tcd either as tlic co n d itio n in g or as tlie c o n d i
and criticized , 7-9: general cliarticter o f tion ed . 2.54; ajiiilicafioii o f this d o ctrin e fo
liis E ltm rn ts n f Ij'g ir. 21 ; bis view o f tbe the sohitio:i o f tl:e d ilh eu lty previously
object-m attcr and dom ain o f J.ogic, staled stated. 2.55.
and criticized , 21 3 : projio-e' to I.ogic W n . S d N , Ids E nglish m etrical version o f H ie
..."'i'll 1.1 a id I'oi.t :.dictii y ob jic'-n ialter, Latin m nem onics for llie (bur kinds o f
22 ( V"/.; tbe iq;er:iiion n f Itea'-ouing not Irop osition s, 287.
tlie oltjecl-inalter o f I.ogic, as iilfirmed liy. WriI.K, (Miristiaii, ini-appied dm (erm s l.ngiru
i!i. . erroneou.-ly and em Irad iclorily nii.l i s i.'iiriiis and I.ngirn utrvs, 42 : his division o f
L anguage tlie n bjeel-n iallcr o f L ogic, 2 2 - 3 ; L ogic in to 'l licorelical and rracH cal, i6 . ;
the true nature o f Logic more correctly nn- used the phrase rrrlusin m n tii in h r cnnirai/ic-
ilcr-tood by the ic lio la slic logicians tliaii by, Innn, 05; caTed the jiriiicip lc o f Identity
2 3 ; Id' A7.li m is u f Lngir, .5 0 ; om its llic d o c principiiim crrtitiiilinis, GO; did n o t siilli-
trine o f f Ol ecj.ls I'roiii Ids E lrm m ts n f cien tly discrim inate tlic p rinciples of Ident
Js)g ir,'-i : idiii r. c i v c iiip lo -s the terms ity and f on trad iclioii, ib. ; hi.s form ula for
t ae.il II III d < iii( lii'ii'im i a ' c o n v c iiib lc , the law o f .'uHiciciit R eason, r.7; blam ed tie-
TlH-L fo low A li'ricli 111
I d 'id iii'iv c (iii- .'climilini'ii fur not di tin gn isliin g rmsnn
< in< n t o f tliC pliril'C prr/u.stim r.rjiosiln, [rut u) and rnusr (rnusri), ih ; atli llllited to
1- i; 1 i ' tibii-ive eiiiplov m c l i t o f I lie leriiis d ein m istiate tlie law ol .stnfliciei.t R iason
t i l l ' n ill 1 rnil'litiniiiil. li)7 ; n llo lid o n by Ibat ol' fonti-.nlicTion, dS : qin .td l on
I c Ilio I. V I f I r o ] ) 0 ' Il O I l' . 1 8 j ; I d s floC- In tu itiv e and .d'riiliolical K n o w led g e 12'.)-
I n i i c I n i l 'Zei . I ' l : Id.s rcdiiclion o f l ie- .31,173,227; made tlie in d n cliv e sy llo g ism
rn - o f t . 1 I 1 -..OI i c a l . ' y llo g i-iii lo six , 215, di-diictive, 220, 240, 24.3.201; bis reduction
151. o f liaro. o, 311. 313,451, 450.
W hole and I a r t , w liat, 14-3, w lio le p e r .r, W o i - E l A NH, s o m e , d i s t i n g u i s l i e d j u d g m e n t s a s
IX D E X . 7 1 5 701
L im itn tivr, 179; follow ed by K an t, 178; tlie quoted on im port o f the term <rvW oytap.i% ,
distinction grou n dless, 179 197, 230.296; lield Cesare and Caiiiestrcs to
IVoRDS, srf Language be tlie same sy llo g ism , 310, st-- also 296, C.3tj,
W y t t e x b a c i i . D aniel, 5 ; liis Logic recom 338. 461.
m ended, 60, .332; referred t o on A n a l y s i s Z k d i . e r , 460.
a n d . S y n tl i e s i s . 436 Z en o , the .Stoic, said by Laertius to liave
purchased tlie k n ow led g e o f seven specie-
Z a b a r e l l a , Jacob u s, referred to on genus o f the nrgnm ont \ 6 y o v b tp i( a iv for twi,
o f L ogie. 7; referred to for sch olastic th eo liuinlred iniiiu;, 331.
ries o f the object-inatter o f L ogic, 2 0 ;
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LECTURES

SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON, BART.

A D V O C A T E , A. M. ( O X O N .) , E T C . ; CORRESPONDINO MEMBER OF TH E IN STITU TE OF FRANCE ; HOHOEABT

THE REV. HENRY L. MANSEL, B. D OXFORD,

JOHN VEITCH, M. A., EDINBURGH.

SII! WILLIAM HAMILTON. BART.

REV. HENRY L. MANSEL, B.D..LL D.,

JOHN VEITCH, M. A..

M JE M Z fl. G O C L D A JfD L n fC O L K , O P B O ST O N , U N IT E D STA TES, A U E E X 0 L U 8 IV E L T A U T H O R

HUBSBX HAM IIiTOK.

T he Lectures comprised in the present V olum e fonn

The Lectures on Logic, like those on M etaphysics,

liiiiisclf of the labors of previous writers, many of

In the com pilation of the Appendix', some responsi

absence o f any such criterion, they have thought it

The N otes, in this as in the previous volum e, are

In conclusion, the Editors desire to express their ac

and allusions scattered tliroiigli this and the preceding

LOGIC I. ITS D E F I N I T I O N , ......................................................................................................1

L O G IC I. ITS D E F I N I T I O N HI STOR ICAL NOTICES OF O P IN IO N S

LOGIC II. ITS U T IL IT Y III. ITS D IV I S I O N S S U B JE C T I V E A N D

LOGIC III. ITS D IV I S I O N S P U R E A N D M OD IF IE D , . . . 41

THE E r N D A M I N TAI. LAWS OF T H O U G H T T H E IR C L ASSI FICA

.SECTION II. OF T i n : PR ODU OTS OF T H O U G H T . I. E N N O E M A T IC

LECTU IiE VIII.

I .N N d F .M A T K ' A. OF CON CEP TS IN GE N E R A I. ; IL IN SPECIAL.

FNNOF.MATIC. 15. OF C ON C EP TS IN SP EC IA L. II. T H E IR S U B -

E NNO EM ATIC. IMPERFECTION OF C O N C E P T S , ..................................................121

E N N O EM A T IC . HI. RECII'IiOCAL R E LA T IO NS OF CONCEPTS. 15.

II. A POP II A N TIC , OR T H E D OC TRINE OF .JUDGMENTS . J U D G -

HI. D OC TRINE OF R E A S O N IN G S . R E A S O N IN G IN GENER AL.

DOCTRINE OF R E AS O N IN G S . SYLLOGISMS TIIEIR D IV IS IO NS

DOCTRINE OF R E A S O N IN G S . SYl.LOG IS MS T H E IR D IV ISI ON S

DOCTItlXK OF IJKASOXIXGS. SYLLOG ISMS T II E IL D IV ISIO N S

DOCTKIXi: OF UFA.SOXIXGS. - SYLLOG IS MS TIIEIU DIVISIONS

DOCTRINE OF R E A S O N IN G S . SYL LOGISMS T H E IR D IV I S I O N S

DOC TRINE OF REASONINCJS. SYLLOG IS MS THEIR D IV I S I O N S

D OCTRINE r>F R E A S O N IN G S . SYLLOG ISMS T H E I li D IV I SI O N S

PART II. METI IODOL OC Y. SEC TIO N I. MET HO D IN G E N E R A L .

LOGICAL M ET HO DOL OG Y. II. DOCTRINE OF D IV ISIO N , . . 350

LOGICAL M ET HOD OLOGY . HI. DOCTRIN E OF PR O B A T IO N , . . 360

PA R T I. M OD IF IE D STOICIIEIOLOGY. SE CTION I. DOCTRINE. OF

SECTIO N I. DOCTRINE OF T R U T H A N D ERROR. SECTION II. ER

ERROR - ITS C A U SE S AND REMEDIES. A. GENERAL CIRCUM-

E R liO R -rrS ('.M 'sr.s and re . m e d i e s . b. as in the co g n i-

TIO.NS, EEEI.IN'GS. A X D DI'.SIRES. H. W E A K N E S S A X D D I S -

E R R O R ITS C A U SE S AND REME DIES. C. L A N G U A G E . D. OB

OF T H E A C Q U IS IT IO N AND PE RFE CTING OF K N O W L E D G E . I.

OF T H E A C QU IS IT ION AND PI.RFIJT IN G rF KN O W L E D G E . I.

OI T HE Ar QI I.^'ITION A N D ILRFECTING OF K N O W L E D G E . III.

II. G E N U S OF LOGIC......................................................................................................... 19&

III. D IV ISIO N S, V A R IE T IE S, A N D C ON T EN T S OF LOGIC, . . .701

I. EXTItACT I ' UO. M P R O S P E C T U S OF ESSAY TOWARDS A NEW

ANALYTIC OF LOGICAL FORMS, ................................................................509

II. LOGIC, ITS P O S T U L A T E S , ......................................................................................... 512

III. QUANTIFIC ATIO N OF PREDICATE, l.MMEDIATE INFER

E N C E , CONVERSION, OPPOSITION, . . . . 514

VI. OBJECTIONS TO T H E DOCTRINE OF A QUANTIFIED PRED-

V II. HISTORIC AL NOTICES OF DOCTRINE OF QUANTIFIED

PREDIC ATE, . . . 546

V I . CANONS OF SYL LOG ISM; GE N E R A L HISTORICAL NOTICES

I . C RIT ICIS M OF T H E SPE CIA L LAWS OF SYLLOGISM, . . 579

VII. ~ IND UCTIO N A N D EXA.MILE.