CALLANTA v. CARNATION PHILS., 145 SCRA 268, G.R. No.

70615 October 28,

1986

FACTS: Upon clearance approved by the MOLE Regional Office, respondent

dismissed the petitioner in June 1979. On July 1982, petitioner filed an illegal
dismissal case with claim for reinstatement with the Labor Arbiter, who granted it.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the judgment based on the contention that the action
by the petitioner has already prescribed, since Art. 291 & 292 of the Labor Code is
expressed that offenses penalized under the Code and all money claims arising from
employer-employee relationships shall be filed within 3 years from when such cause
of action arises, otherwise it will be barred.

ISSUE: Is ruling of the NLRC correct?

HELD: No. It is a principle well recognized in this jurisdiction, that one's

employment, profession, trade or calling is a property right, and the wrongful
interference therewith is an actionable wrong. The right is considered to be property
within the protection of the Constitutional guarantee of due process of law.

Verily, the dismissal without just cause of an employee from his employment
constitutes a violation of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and
regulations. Such violation, however, does not amount to an "offense" as understood
under Article 291 of the Labor Code. In its broad sense, an offense is an illegal act
which does not amount to a crime as defined in the penal law, but which by statute
carries with it a penalty similar to those imposed by law for the punishment of a
crime. The confusion arises over the use of the term "illegal dismissal" which creates
the impression that termination of an employment without just cause constitutes an
offense. It must be noted, however that unlike in cases of commission of any of the
prohibited activities during strikes or lockouts under Article 265, unfair labor
practices under Article 248, 249 and 250 and illegal recruitment activities under
Article 38, among others, which the Code itself declares to be unlawful, termination
of an employment without just or valid cause is not categorized as an unlawful
practice.
 Cirtek Employees v. Cirtek Electronics

G.R. No. 190515 : November 15, 2010

CIRTEK EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION-FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS,

Petitioner, v. CIRTEK ELECTRONICS, INC., Respondent.

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS:

Prior to the 3rd year of the CBA of respondent and petitioner, the parties
renegotiated its economic provisions but failed to reach a settlement, particularly on
the issue of wage increases. Petitioner thereupon declared a bargaining deadlock
and filed a Notice of Strike. Respondent, upon the other hand, filed a Notice of
Lockout.

In the meantime, as amicable settlement of the CBA was deadlocked, petitioner

went on strike. The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction over the controversy
and issued a Return to Work Order which was complied with.

Before the Secretary of Labor could rule on the controversy, respondent created a
Labor Management Council through which it concluded with the remaining officers
of petitioner a Memorandum of Agreement providing for daily wage increases.

The Secretary of Labor resolved the CBA deadlock by awarding a wage increase.
Respondent moved for a reconsideration of the Decision stating that the union
members were waiving their rights and benefits under the Secretarys Decision.
Reconsideration of the Decision was denied. Hence, respondent filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals.

The appellate court ruled in favor of respondent and accordingly set aside the
Decision of the Secretary of Labor. It held that the Secretary of Labor gravely
abused his discretion in not respecting the MOA.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the Secretary of Labor is authorized to give an award higher than
that agreed upon in the MOA?
HELD

LABOR LAW

It is well-settled that the Secretary of Labor, in the exercise of his power to assume
jurisdiction under Art. 263 (g) of the Labor Code, may resolve all issues involved in
the controversy including the award of wage increases and benefits. While an
arbitral award cannot per sebe categorized as an agreement voluntarily entered into
by the parties because it requires the intervention and imposing power of the State
thru the Secretary of Labor when he assumes jurisdiction, the arbitral award can be
considered an approximation of a collective bargaining agreement which would
otherwise have been entered into by the parties, hence, it has the force and effect of
a valid contract obligation.

That the arbitral award was higher than that which was purportedly agreed upon in
the MOA is of no moment. For the Secretary, in resolving the CBA deadlock, is not
limited to considering the MOA as basis in computing the wage increases. He could,
as he did, consider the financial documents submitted by respondent as well as the
parties bargaining history and respondents financial outlook and improvements as
stated in its website.

It bears noting that since the filing and submission of the MOA did not have the
effect of divesting the Secretary of his jurisdiction, or of automatically disposing the
controversy, then neither should the provisions of the MOA restrict the Secretarys
leeway in deciding the matters before him.

While a contract constitutes the law between the parties, this is so in the present
case with respect to the CBA, not to the MOA in which even the unions signatories
had expressed reservations thereto. But even assuming arguendo that the MOA is
treated as a new CBA, since it is imbued with public interest, it must be construed
liberally and yield to the common good.

While the terms and conditions of a CBA constitute the law between the parties, it
is not, however, an ordinary contract to which is applied the principles of law
governing ordinary contracts. A CBA, as a labor contract within the contemplation
of Article 1700 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which governs the relations
between labor and capital, is not merely contractual in nature butimpressed with
public interest, thus, it must yield to the common good. As such, it must be
construed liberally rather than narrowly and technically, and the courts must place
apractical and realistic construction upon it, giving due consideration to the context
in which it is negotiated and purpose which it is intended to serve.

GRANTED